DESIGN FOR SAFETY

HAZARDS ANALYSIS (HAZAN)

HAZAN STUDY
STARTS WITH THE SAME INFORMATION AND TEAM AS THE HAZOPS STUDY EXAMINES THE RESULT OF FAILURE OF EQUIPMENT OR CONTROLS
INDIVIDUAL - SINGLE JEOPARDY MULTIPLE - DOUBLE JEOPARDY

CAN BE ORGANIZED WITH FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA) ALSO CALLED QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA)

HOW MUCH SHOULD BE SPENT FOR SAFETY?

tx.technion.ac.il/~dlewin/054402/LECTURE_13.pdf -

WHAT KIND OF RISKS ARE PRESENT?

tx.technion.ac.il/~dlewin/054402/LECTURE_13.pdf

GENERIC FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR HAZAN WITH DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRIMARY EVENT CONTROL RESPONSE SECONDARY EVENT CONTROL RESPONSE CONTROL SUCCEEDS EVENT OCCURS CONTROL FAILS CONTROL SUCCEEDS EVENT DOES NOT OCCUR EVENT OCCUR S EVENT OCCURS CONTROL FAILS CONTROL FAILS CONTROL SUCCEEDS EVENT DOES NOT OCCUR CONTROL FAILS CONTROL FAILS CONTROL SUCCEEDS CONTROL SUCCEEDS

FAULT TREE SYMBOLS

FAULT TREES USE PROGRAMMING SYMBOLS FOR EACH TYPE OF JUNCTION

EXAMPLE SHOWING FAULT TREE FOR LOSS OF COOLING WATER SUPPLY DUE TO FAILURE OF ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLIES. http://www.s-2s.org/modules.php?na me=s2s_wp4&idpart=2 &op=v&idp=1476 SEE NEXT PAGE FOR MORE DETAIL.

EXAMPLE SHOWING FAULT TREE FOR LOSS OF COOLING WATER SUPPLY DUE TO FAILURE OF ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLIES. http://www.s-2s.org/modules.php?nam e=s2s_wp4&idpart=2&o p=v&idp=1476

http://www.s-2s.org/modules.php?nam e=s2s_wp4&idpart=2&op =v&idp=1476

EXAMPLE SHOWING P&ID DIAGRAM FOR COOLING WATERSUPPLY http://www.s-2s.org/modules.php?name=s 2s_wp4&idpart=2&op=v&idp =1476

PROBABILITY ANALYSIS FROM HAZAN

PROBABILITIES ARE MULTIPLIED FOR EACH LEVEL OF JEOPARDY
FOR 2 EVENTS IN SERIES, EACH WITH A 0.5 PROBABILITY, PROBABILITY OF BOTH OCCURRING IS 0.25 SEVERITY MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR IN CONSIDERING DOUBLE JEOPARDY SITUATIONS

www.cobalt.chem.ucalgary.ca

PRIMARY SOURCES OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS

HUMAN ERROR MISLABELING TRIP FAILURES STATIC ELECTRICITY WRONG MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION FAULTY OPERATING PROCEDURES UNEXPECTED REVERSE FLOW COMPUTER CONTROL PROBLEMS IGNORANCE
http://www.processforusability.c o.uk/safety/images/larsen.jpg

INHERENT SAFETY
OBJECTIVES ELIMINATE HAZARDS
Eliminate the hazardous material Substitute a non-hazardous material Discontinue the operation http://www.acusafe.com/Hazard_Analysis/Hazard _Analysis-talks.htm#Talks%20and%20Papers

INHERENT SAFETY
REDUCE CONSEQUENCES
Reduce the quantity of the hazardous material Provide a curbed area with a drain to contain and evacuate a spill and produce a smaller pool area of a spill Separate the operation by adequate spacing to reduce exposure to adjacent operations and personnel http://www.acusafe.com/Hazard_Analysis/Hazard_Analysi s-talks.htm#Talks%20and%20Papers
http://altermondialisme.free.fr/monde/Etats_unis.jpg

INHERENT SAFETY
REDUCE LIKELIHOOD OF INITIATION
Reduce the potential for human error through simplicity of design Control ignition sources Provide redundant alarms http://www.acusafe.com/Hazard_Analysis/Hazard _Analysis-talks.htm#Talks%20and%20Papers

INHERENTLY SAFE DESIGN

GUIDELINES TO REVIEW PROCESS DESIGN FOR SAFETY
INTENSIFICATION SUBSTITUTION ATTENUATION LIMITATION OF EFFECTS SIMPLIFICATION

KLETZ, TREVOR, PLANT DESIGN FOR SAFETY, HEMISPHERE PUBLISHING 1991

INTENSIFICATION POLICIES
REDUCE QUANTITIES OF MATERIALS IN THE SYSTEM REACTORS
TUBE FLOW VS. CSTR VAPOR PHASE VS. LIQUID PHASE

DISTILLATION
LIMIT INVENTORIES USE IN-COLUMN HEAT EXCHANGERS

HEAT EXCHANGERS
SHELL & TUBE VS. PLATE PROCESS FLOW IN TUBES
http://www.inl.gov/featurestories/i/scwr.gif

INTENSIFICATION POLICIES
STORAGE
MINIMAL VOLUME STORAGE TANKS PIPELINES

NUMBER OF TRAINS

http://rphrm.curtin.edu.au/2006/iss ue1/defense05.png

SINGLE TRAIN HAS SMALLER OVERALL INVENTORY THAN MULTIPLE TRAIN SINGLE TRAIN HAS FEWER LEAK POINTS SINGLE TRAIN HAS ECONOMY OF SCALE

SUBSTITUTION POLICIES
USE LESS HAZARDOUS RAW MATERIALS USE LESS HAZARDOUS NON-REACTIVE COMPONENTS
REPLACEMENT OF CFCs IN REFRIGERATION SYSTEMS AND AEROSOLS WITH HFCs AND N2 USE OF SUPERCRITICAL CO2 IN PLACE OF METHYLENE CHLORIDE FOR EXTRACTION USE OF WATER-BASED SOLVENTS FOR SEMICONDUCTOR PROCESSING USE STEAM AND WATER AS HEAT TRANSFER MEDIA INSTEAD OF HYDROCARBONS

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ATTENUATION POLICIES
USE LESS HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS FOR PROCESSES
LOWER PRESSURES LOWER TEMPERATURES MULTIPLE STEPS

NORMALLY COST EFFECTIVE SINCE PROCESS CONDITIONS ARE CLOSER TO AMBIENT

ATTENUATION POLICIES
AMMONIA SYNTHESIS (KHARBANDA &
STALLWORTHY, SAFETY IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, HEINMANN PROFESSIONAL PUBLISHING,1988) N2 + 3H2 2NH3 1930S CASALE PROCESS AT 450 600 atm 1950S ICI PROCESS 300 350 atm 1960S KELLOGG PROCESS 150 atm 1982 ICI AMV PROCESS 80 - 100 atm
http://www.topsoe.com/site.nsf/vIMAGESBYNAME/Ammonia28---PVCdiagram.gif/$file/Ammonia28---PVC-diagram.gif

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LIMITATION OF EFFECTS
CHANGE PROCESS SEQUENCE TO LIMIT HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS

KLETZ, TREVOR, PLANT DESIGN FOR SAFETY, HEMISPHERE PUB, 1991

SEQUENCE OF PROCESSES NUMBER OF STEPS IN A SINGLE VESSEL

USE OF SUBMERGED PUMPS TO REDUCE LEAK IMPACTS

http://www.savinobarbera.com/images/istal lazione-pompa-immersa-bg.gif

SIMPLIFICATION POLICIES
STRONGER EQUIPMENT TO REPLACE RELIEF SYSTEMS MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION THAT RETAIN DUCTILITY (LOW TEMPERATURES) ELIMINATE EXCESS INSTRUMENTATION MINIMIZE NUMBER OF PIECES OF EQUIPMENT BY COMBINING SERVICES
KLETZ, TREVOR, PLANT DESIGN FOR SAFETY, HEMISPHERE PUB, 1991

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