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easyJet Fuel Policy Angus Hogg v3.4 dated 24
th
Oct 10
Page 1 of 2 (Valid for OM A Issue 2 Rev 15 & OM B Issue 3 Rev 3 [both 6
th
Sep 2010])


EasyJet policy is to carry CFP fuel - must have specific purpose to carry EXTRA. Basic Fuel Planning (BFP) is the norm
Alternative Fuel Planning (AFP) only to be used when performance or payload restrictions exist. If flight is well planned and
executed, then a diversion is not considered a failure.

PLANNING WEATHER MINIMA to be satisfied 1 hr ETA in all cases except for departure where current conditions apply.

TERMINOLOGY
Taxi Expected fuel use prior to T/Oincl start, taxi & APU. Do not exceed max ramp wth Taxi Fuel on board.
Trip T/O, Climb, Cruise, Descent using likeliest SID, STAR & ldg. May reduce by 4kg/nm or increase by 5kg/min
Contingency Higher of 5% Trip Fuel or 5 mins at holding speed @ 1500 ft above dest in ISA conditions. (8.1.7.3.1 p8.31)
Alternate Fuel used in G/A from MDA/DH, Missed App Proc, Climb, Cruise, Descent to en-route transition point, longest
STAR to MAP, app and landing. Calculated at LRC speeds and planned landing weight at destination. If 2
alternates required, fuel used must be the greater of the two. Fuel Alternate: If diversion to alternate is
unlikely, it is the closest operational. If marked with *, may not be H24. Commercial Alternate: If diversion
likely at the planning stage or in-flight, this fuel reqd. Likely means TS, Dest wx at/near limits, x-wind out of
limits or FZRA/DZ & SN removal in winter ops.
Not required Not permitted with Basic Fuel Planning.
One required if destination MET above planning minima 1 hr ETA, ceiling above MDA for NPA or circling.
Two required if forecast Wx at Destination below planning minima 1 hr ETA or no Met available. Fuel
required is for furthest alternate.
Note: T/O Alternate requd if: if Met or performance precludes a return to departure airport.
Met above landing minima 1 hr ETA & S/E limitations taken into account.
T/O: Cat IIIA limits within 320nm (OM B p5-7)or 1hr (ie S/E considered). Cruise: 380/400nm A319/320 (OM B
p5-1)
Destination
Planning
Minima
At planning stage destination weather only has to be good enough for aids available. For example, if a/c and
airfield supports Cat IIIb approaches, the weather only has to be at or above Cat IIIb minima. And so on for
Cat II, Cat I etc. The one better criteria below only apply for alternates and not the destination.
Alternate
Planning
Minima
Approach Type Minima
Cat II & III Cat I (RVR if n/a factored Met Vis may be used)
Cat 1 Non-Precision (RVR + ceiling above MDA)
Non-Precision Non-Precision (ceiling +200/RVR + 1000m)
Circling Circling
Additional

1. (Alternative Fuel Planning Only Not permitted with Basic Fuel Planning) Fuel reqd to fly for 15 mins at
1500 AAL @ hold speed, ISA conditions, MLW. (Only applies if no div selected). 2. Also considered for
engine failure or loss of pressurisation only considered if fuel below from Trip to Final Reserve is not
sufficient. Therefore not normally a factor.
Extra
(penalty 3%
of extra/hr)
Only carried if strong possibility of use ie TS, Dest wx at/near limits, unsched r/w closure due wx, x-wind,
contam r/w, ATC dep/arr delays, poss extra apps at dest, fcst icing en-route. Also allow for following:
LVOs Recommended 30 mins holding fuel if LVOs likely at ETA, Push & Hold/Slow Taxi 600kg/hr or
10kg/min, APU Usage - 50kg/hr airborne, 125kg/hr on ground, EAI 45kg/hr, EAI & WAI - 140kg/hr
Final
Reserve
Fuel reqd to fly for 30 mins fuel at 1500 AAL, @ hold speed, ISA conditions and holding speed. Calculated
using estimated landing weight at alternate aerodrome.
CNR Company Normal Reserve (CNR) = Alternate + Final Reserve. Min CNR = 1500kg.

BASIC FUEL PLANNING (8.1.7.3 p8-30)

Fuel Required = (Taxi +Trip + Contingency + Alternate + Additional (if reqd) + Final Reserve +Extra).

ALTERNATIVE FUEL PLANNING [Only used if performance or payload restrictions exist & at Commanders
discretion]

1. Taxi Fuel Reduction (8.1.7.4.2 p8-33)

May reduce statistical taxi fuel to take account of expected taxi times on day of operation.

2. Trip Fuel Reduction (8.1.7.4.3 p8-34)

4kg/nm based on FMGC distance (or increase by 5kg/min OM B 5.4 p5-19/20).

3. Reduction of 5% Contingency Fuel to 3% Using En-route Alternate (ERA) (8.1.7.4.4 p8-34)

ERA is alternate used in addition to destination alternate. Allows reduction in contingency fuel to 3% of trip or fuel to fly for
5 mins whichever is greater. Must be within circle centred on planned route at a distance equal to 25% of the total plan
easyJet Fuel Policy Angus Hogg v3.4 dated 24
th
Oct 10
Page 2 of 2 (Valid for OM A Issue 2 Rev 15 & OM B Issue 3 Rev 3 [both 6
th
Sep 2010])

distance from destination or 20% of the total flight plan distance from destination plus 50nm, whichever is the greater. Radius
of circle must be equal to 20% of the total flight plan distance.

4. No Destination Alternate Aerodrome Procedure (8.1.7.4.5 p8-35)

Only if flight time less than 6 hours and 2 separate runways available at destination and min forecast wx 1 hr of ETA =
Ceiling 2000 ft or circling ht + 500ft (whichever greater) plus viz 5km. (8.1.2.3.3 p8-13) Must also take additional fuel of
15 mins @ 1500 in ISA conditions. Must take Contingency Fuel as per BFP. Note: Separate runways exist when each has
separate app with own app aid and if surfaces cross, blockage of one runway does not close the other (0-27). Fuel = Taxi +
Trip(*) + Contingency(*) +Additional + FINAL RES + Extra fuel. (*) trip and contingency fuel as per Basic Fuel Planning.

5. Reduced Contingency Fuel (RCF) Procedure (8.1.7.4.6 p8-35) Note: Procedure reserved wef Sep 10

The Reduced Contingency Fuel (decision point) fuel planning is the greater of F1 or F2:

F1 = Taxi + Trip AB + 5% DB + BX + FINAL RES + Additional fuel + Extra fuel
F2 = Taxi + Trip AE + 3% AE + FINAL RES + Additional fuel + Extra fuel

6. Predetermined Point (PDP) Procedure (8.1.7.4.7 p8-36) Note: Procedure reserved wef Sep 10

The predetermined fuel planning is the greater of F1 or F2:
F1 = Taxi + Trip AB + 5%(*) AB + 2 hours cruise + Extra fuel
F2 = Taxi + Trip AE + 5%(*) AE + FINAL RES + Extra fuel
(*) contingency fuel as per Basic Fuel Planning


Tanker: Calculated on CFP. Carefully consider performance limitations at destination (field length and approach
performance). Tankering in excess of fuel reqd on subsequent sectors uneconomic. Tankering not advised if t/o or ldg
anticipated on contaminated or icy/slippery runways.

IN-FLIGHT (8.3.7 p8-104-107)

Note: Penalties for flying 4000/8000 below optimum are 5%/10% of trip fuel respectively.(OM B 2.3.2.5 p2-15).
Never land anywhere with less than Final Reserve Fuel! Written fuel checks requd every hour, verbal every half hour. At
least one written fuel check per flight unless < 20 mins. Landing is assured if in the judgement of the Flight Crew it could be
completed in the event of any forecast deterioration in the weather and plausible single failures in the ground and/or airborne
facilities (eg Cat II/III to Cat I.)

Case 1: Est FOB at landing > CNR: OK to continue.

Case 2: - Est FOB at landing < CNR but > Final Reserve: (In all cases consider reducing speed, more direct route,
optimum FL, closer alternate or land/refuel.)

Max delay not known & no EAT: OK to continue but it must be possible to reach both the destination and an
alternate where landing is assured. FOB must be Final Reserve at landing.
Max delay known or EAT received: May continue to destination or hold only if landing at destination is assured. FOB
must be Final Reserve at landing.

Note: If landing not assured at destination or at any alternate, plan landing at best option and consider declaring MAYDAY.

Case 3 - Est FOB at landing < Final Reserve (8.3.7.2 p8-108): If it is apparent that the aircraft MAY land with less than
Final Reserve, a PAN call to ATC must be made reporting estimated fuel time in minutes. If its evident the aircraft WILL land
below Final Reserve a MAYDAY call must be made reporting estimated fuel time in minutes. If aircraft lands with less than
Final Reserve a MOR must be raised.

On a flight using RCF Procedure (8.3.7.3.1 p8-109) Note: Procedure reserved wef Sep 10

In order to proceed to Dest 1, Min FOB at DP to continue must be sum of: (1) Trip fuel from DP to Dest 1 (2) Contingency of
5% of above (3) Alternate fuel to an available alternate from Dest 1 (4) Final Reserve fuel.

If above fuel not available at DP must initiate immediate diversion to a closer suitable aerodrome.

easyJet Airbus Memory Items Angus Hogg v1.9 dated 26
th
Oct 2010
Page 1 of 4
MEMORY ITEMS FCOM 3.2.1 p2a The following procedures are to be applied without referring to paper : Windshear,
windshear ahead, TCAS, EGPWS, loss of braking, immediate actions of EMER DESCENT, immediate actions of
UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION/ADR CHECK PROC, CREW INCAPACITATION. (+Stall Recovery/Warning @ T/O)

WINDSHEAR (FCOM 3.2.80 p28, QRH 1.26, OM B 2.3.90.10)

A red flag "WINDSHEAR" is displayed on each PFD associated with an aural synthetic voice "WINDSHEAR" repeated
three times. If windshear is detected either by the system or by pilot observation, apply the following recovery technique:
At take-off:
If before V1:
The takeoff should be rejected only if significant airspeed variations occur below indicated V1 and the pilot decides that
there is sufficient runway remaining to stop the airplane.
If after V1:
Announce: WINDSHEAR TOGA
THR LEVERS TOGA
REACHING V
R
ROTATE
SRS ORDERS FOLLOW

Airborne, initial climb or landing:

Announce: WINDSHEAR TOGA
THR LEVERS AT TOGA SET OR CONFIRM
AP (if engaged) KEEP
SRS ORDERS FOLLOW (This includes the use of full back stick, if demanded.)

Note:
1. If engaged, the autopilot disengages when is greater than prot.
2. If the FD bars are not available, use an initial pitch attitude up to 17.5 with full backstick, if necessary. If needed, to
minimize the loss of height, increase this pitch attitude.
DO NOT CHANGE CONFIGURATION (SLATS/FLAPS, GEAR) UNTIL OUT OF SHEAR.
CLOSELY MONITOR FLIGHT PATH AND SPEED.
RECOVER SMOOTHLY TO NORMAL CLIMB OUT OF SHEAR.


WINDSHEAR AHEAD (FCOM 3.2.80 p29, QRH 1.27)

The "W/S AHEAD" message is displayed on each PFD. The colour of the message depends on the severity and location
of the windshear.
W/S AHEAD red
Take-off:
Associated with an aural synthetic voice "WINDSHEAR AHEAD, WINDSHEAR AHEAD".
Before take-off: Delay takeoff, or select the most favourable runway.
During take-off run Reject takeoff. Note : Predictive windshear alerts are inhibited above 100 knots
until 50 feet.
When airborne
THRUST LEVERS TOGA
As usual, the slat/flap configuration can be changed, provided the windshear is not entered.
SRS ORDERS FOLLOW
Note : If engaged, the autopilot disengages when is greater than prot.

Landing:
Associated with an aural synthetic voice "GO AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD".
Note : If a positive verification is made that no hazard exists, the warning may be considered cautionary.

THRUST LEVERS TOGA
ANNOUNCE GO AROUND FLAPS
FLAPS RETRACT ONE STEP
L/G UP SELECT
Note : This includes the use of full backstick, if demanded.
1. If engaged, the autopilot disengages when is greater than prot.
easyJet Airbus Memory Items Angus Hogg v1.9 dated 26
th
Oct 2010
Page 2 of 4
2. If the FD is not available, use a pitch initial attitude up to 17.5. If necessary to minimize the loss of height, increase
this pitch attitude.


TCAS WARNINGS (FCOM 3.2.34 p17, QRH 1.15 & OM B 2.3.90.10, 3.2.80.4,
CAP413 Ch 5 p7)


Traffic Advisories: : "TRAFFIC" messages
Do not manoeuvre based on a TA alone.
Attempt to see the reported traffic.
As soon as TRAFFIC warning is triggered Announce: TCAS, I have control

Resolution advisory : All "CLIMB" and "DESCEND" or "MAINTAIN VERTICAL SPEED MAINTAIN" or "ADJUST
VERTICAL SPEED ADJUST" or "MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED" type messages
- Announce: TCAS, I have control (PNF R/T: EZY xx TCAS RA)
- AP (if engaged) OFF
- BOTH FDs OFF (PNF Duty)
- Respond promptly and smoothly to an RA by adjusting or maintaining the vertical speed, as required, to reach the
green area and/or avoid the red area of the vertical speed scale.
Note : Avoid excessive manoeuvres while aiming to keep the vertical speed just outside the red area of the VSI, and
within the green area. If necessary, use the full speed range between V max and Vmax.
- Respect stall, GPWS, or windshear warning.
- Notify ATC (Note phraseology: clear of conflict, returning to FLxx, FLxx resumed, unable TCAS RA)
- When "CLEAR OF CONFLICT" is announced :
- Resume normal navigation in accordance with ATC clearance
- AP/FD can be re-engaged as desired.
GO AROUND procedure must be performed when a RA "CLIMB" or "INCREASE CLIMB" is triggered on final
approach
Note : Resolution Advisories (RA) are inhibited below 900 feet.


EGPWS ALERTS (FCOM 3.2.34 p15, QRH 1.14 & OM B 2.3.90.10


CAUTION
During night or IMC conditions, apply the procedure immediately. Do not delay reaction for diagnosis. During daylight
VMC conditions, with terrain and obstacles clearly in sight, the alert may be considered cautionary. Take positive
corrective action until the alert stops or a safe trajectory is ensured.

PULL UP TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP TERRAIN AHEAD PULL UP OBSTACLE AHEAD PULL UP:
Simultaneously:
Announce: PULL UP TOGA
AP OFF
PITCH PULL UP (Pull up to full backstick and maintain)
THRUST LEVERS TOGA
SPEEDBRAKE LEVER CHECK RETRACTED
BANK WINGS LEVEL TO INITIATE PULL UP THEN ADJUST AS REQD

To be efficient and safe, the flight crew must initiate the PULL UP manoeuvre at wings level. Then, for "TERRAIN
AHEAD PULL UP" only, and if the crew concludes that turning is the safest way of action, a turning manoeuvre can be
initiated.

When flight path is safe and
GPWS warning stops :
Decrease pitch attitude and accelerate.
When speed is above VLS,
and vertical speed is positive :
Clean up aircraft, as required.
"TERRAIN TERRAIN" -
"TOO LOW TERRAIN"
Adjust the flight path, or initiate a go-around.
"TERRAIN AHEAD" -
"OBSTACLE AHEAD"
Adjust the flight path. Stop descent. Climb and/or turn, as necessary, based on
analysis of all available instruments and information.
"SINK RATE" - "DON'T
SINK"
Adjust pitch attitude and thrust to silence the alert.
"TOO LOW GEAR" - "TOO
LOW FLAPS"
Perform a go-around.
"GLIDE SLOPE" Establish the aircraft on the glideslope, or switch OFF the G/S mode pushbutton, if
flight below the glideslope is intentional (non precision approach (NPA)).

easyJet Airbus Memory Items Angus Hogg v1.9 dated 26
th
Oct 2010
Page 3 of 4


LOSS OF BRAKING (3.2.32 p11, QRH 1.13 & OM B 2.3.90.10)


Announce: LOSS OF BRAKING

If autobrake is selected:
BRAKE PEDALS PRESS (This will override the autobrake.)

If no braking available:
REV MAX
BRAKE PEDALS RELEASE
(Brake pedals should be released when the A/SKID & N/W STRG selector is switched
OFF, since the pedal force or displacement produces more braking action in alternate
mode than in normal mode.)
A/SKID & N/W STRG OFF (Braking system reverts to alternate mode.)
BRAKE PEDALS PRESS
(Apply brake with care, since initial pedal force or displacement produces more
braking action in alternate mode than in normal mode.)
MAX BRK PR 1000 PSI
(Monitor brake pressure or BRAKES PRESS indicator. Limit brake pressure to
approximately 1000 psi and, at low ground speed, adjust brake pressure as required.)

If still no braking:
PARKING BRAKE SHORT AND SUCCESSIVE APPLICATIONS
(Use short successive parking brake applications to stop the aircraft. Brake onset
asymmetry may be felt at each parking brake application. If possible, delay the use of
the parking brake until low speed, to reduce the risk of tire burst and lateral control
difficulties.)

CREW INCAPACITATION (3.2.80 p9 & OM E 3.21, p3-32)
If a cockpit crew member becomes incapacitated, the remaining crew member must call a cabin attendant as soon as
practicable. Use Standard PA, Senior Cabin Crew Member to the Flight Deck. Alternatively in event of PA failure use 3
double chimes. First Cabin Crew member to enter the flight deck will carry out standard drill to ensure incapacitated pilot
is secured and not in contact with flight controls. First aid will then be administered. Check if a type qualified company
pilot is on board to replace the incapacitated crew member.

EMER DESCENT (FCOM 3.2.80 p7, QRH 1.25, OM B 2.3.90.10, 3.2.80.2 p3.8-11)

IMMEDIATE ACTONS
Both Pilots:
CREW OXY MASKS ON, Establish Communications


PF 1
st
Loop:
Descend with the autopilot engaged :
Announce: EMERGENCY DESCENT
ALT selector knob Turn and pull
HDG selector knob Turn and pull
SPD/MACH selector knob Pull
Mach/Spd Changeover button Push if necessary to select speed (Mach would increase airspeed
during descent structural integrity may be in doubt)
FMAs Check, ensure THR IDLE/OPEN DES/HDG
THR LEVERS (if A/THR not engaged) IDLE
SPD BRK FULL (allow speed to increase before using speedbrakes)

PNF 1
st
Loop: [(SITRO) Seatbelts, Ign (Mode Sel), Txponder, Radio Call, Oxy for Pax]
Seatbelt Signs On
Engine Mode Selector: Ignition
Transponder Set Code 7700
Radio Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, XXX Control, EZY xxxx Pressurisation
problem, Emergency Descent, STANDBY
Pax Oxygen Mask Switch On (if cab alt going to exceed 14,000)
easyJet Airbus Memory Items Angus Hogg v1.9 dated 26
th
Oct 2010
Page 4 of 4

PF 2
nd
Loop:
Refine Altitude 10,000ft or MSA if higher
Refine Heading Alter as required to avoid high terrain, other aircraft or if possible to
comply with ATC requests
Review Speed If NO structural damage, consider increasing speed as appropriate,
use of the Expedite Switch is permitted with autopilot. If in doubt
maintain speed.
Announce: My radios, Emergency Descent Checklist (QRH 1.25)

At Level off Altitude (safe altitude for crew to breathe without use of oxygen)
Remove Oxygen Masks Reset boom headset mike (close left door & reset slide controller)
PA SCCM to the Flight Deck Check pax/crew injuries and damage - then give NITS brief

UNRELIABLE SPEED INDIC/ADR CHECK PROC (3.2.34 p20, QRH 2.15 & OM B 2.3.90.10)

Announce: UNRELIABLE SPEED
AP/FD OFF
A/THR OFF
THRUST/PITCH
If the failure occurs
Below THR RED ALT TOGA/15
Above THR RED ALT CL /10 BELOW FL100
Above THR RED ALT CL/5 ABOVE FL100
FLAPS Maintain Current CONFIG
SPEEDBRAKES Check Retracted
L/G UP
When at, or above MSA or Circuit Alt Level off for troubleshooting

SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE PROC (QRH 1.07)

In any event where there is perceptible smoke or fumes in the cockpit perform the following recall actions:
Announce: SMOKE / FUMES EMERGENCY PROCEDURE"
CREW OXY MASKS ON/100%/EMERG
Rotate the EMERGENCY pressure selector knob if positive pressure is required to repel contaminated air.


STALL RECOVERY (QRH 1.25A)


As#soon#as#any#stall#indication#(could#be#aural#warning,#buffet...)#is#recognized,#apply#the#immediate#actions#:
! NOSE&DOWN&PITCH&CONTROL APPLY&&This#will#reduce#angle#of#attack
NOTE#:#In#case#of#lack#of#pitch#down#authority,#reducing#thrust#may#be#necessary
- BANK Wings Level
&When%out%of%stall%(no%longer%stall%indications)%:
- THRUST& INCREASE&SMOOTHLY&AS&NEEDED
NOTE#:#In#case#of#one#engine#inoperative,#progressively#compensate#the#thrust#asymmetry#with#rudder
- SPEEDBRAKES CHECK&RETRACTED
- FLIGHT&PATH RECOVER&SMOOTHLY
&If%in%clean%configuration%and%below%20%000%feet%:%
- FLAP 1 SELECT
NOTE#:#If#a#risk#of#ground#contact#exists,#once#clearly#out#of#stall#(no#longer#stall#indications),#establish#smoothly#a#positive#climb#
gradient.


STALL WARNING AT LIFT-OFF (QRH 1.25A)

%
Spurious#stall#warning#may#sound#in#NORMAL#law,#if#an#angle#of#attack#probe#is#damaged.#In#this#case,#apply#immediately#the#
following#actions#:
- THRUST TOGA
At the same time:
- PITCH ATTITUDE 15
- BANK Wings Level
NOTE#:#When#a#safe#flight#path#and#speed#are#achieved#and#maintained,#if#stall#warning#continues,#consider#it#as#spurious.

easyJet A319 Reduced Viz/LVO Brief Angus Hogg v4.9 dated 24
th
Oct 2010
(Valid for Ops A Issue 2 Rev 15 [Sep 10], Ops B Issue 3 Rev 03 [Sep 10 ])
General
Note:
LVPs Airfield Ops,
LVOs - Aircraft Ops
Company policy that all Cat II/III approaches are planned to use autoland (8.4.9 p8-146).
T/O: Min RVRs for departure given on Jeppesen Airport Taxi Chart (10-9).
Landing: List of autoland approved airfields with specific DHs and RVRs at front of Jeppesen Text Manual.
Note: Cat 2/3 etc. refers to aircraft landing capability, Cat II/III refers to approach type & met conditions.
A/C Serviceability
(0-20)
Fail Operational (CAT3 DUAL): Will always autoland with failure. Reverts to Fail Passive above Alert Ht (100) but
no downgrade occurs below Alert Height.
Fail Passive (CAT3 SINGLE/CAT 2): With failure, a/c remains in trim but manual landing reqd.
T/O Alternate If reqd, Cat IIIA limits within 320nm or 1hr (ie single engine considered) (OM p5-7)
LVPs in Force LVOs consist of take-offs where RVR <400m (if <150m special trg reqd) & landings where RVR <550m (Cat II/III).
ATC will initiate LVPs at latest by: Ceiling 200ft or RVR 600m. Note: If RVR<400m LHS Pilots T/O (p8-145)
Take-off Minima
Abbreviations:
HIRL- High intensity
runway edge lights
HICL High intensity
centre line lights RL
Runway edge lights
CL Runway centre
line lights RCLM
Runway centre line
markings
Min RVRs/Visibility (8.1.3.3 p817)
Facilities Touch Mid Stop Remarks
HICL spaced 15m or less.
HIRL spaced 60m or less.
(Use LPC to reduce runway
length if reqd if Stop end u/s)
125m 125m 125m LVPs in force. Both crew members Cat 3 qualified.
90m vis segment to be avail from cockpit at the start of
T/O. Reqd RVR to be achieved for all relevant RVR
reporting points (ie segments reqd for T/O or ldg).
RL & CL, Multiple RVRs 150m 150m 150m The reported RVR/VIZ of the initial part of the take-off
run can be replaced by pilot assessment.
RVR/VIZ200m multiple RVRs not reqd. Night ops: At
least RL & stop end lights reqd
RL & CL 200m
RL &/or RCLM 250m
Nil (day only) 500m
Approach Ban
(8.4.3 p8-139)
May$commence$an$instrument$approach$regardless$of$the$reported$RVR/Visibility$but$the$approach$shall$not$be$
continued$below$1000$ft$above$the$aerodrome,$if$the$reported$RVR$/$Visibility$is$<$applicable$minimum.
Auto Call Out 500, 50, 40, 30, 20, 10. Also 100 above and minimums but not for Cat IIIB approaches with no DH
Crew
Calls/Actions
(FCOM 4.5.70)
Note key heights:
1000: G/A for
faults below 1000
800: Ldg Inhibit
700: Data Lock
500: Stable
350: Land Green
only exit by G/A
200: Red Autoland
100: Alert Height
40: Flare on FMA
30: Thrust redn.
10: Auto call out
Retard
Event PF (Capt) PNF (F/O)
ATC calls during departure Transmit to ATC Entering Runway.
Rolling, Airborne as appropriate
Passing 1000 abv TDZE Checked One Thousand
Auto Call Out 500 ra Checked/ Go Around Flaps Stable / Not Stable Go Around
FMA LAND by 350 ra Cx ILS Course, Land Checked
If DH set & Auto call Out 100 above Checked Looks for Vis Refs Monitor Auto Call Out
If DH set & Auto Call Out Minimums Continue / Go-around Flaps Monitor Auto Call Out
If no DH set and at 100 ra Continue One Hundred
FMA FLARE by 40 ra If no Flare call, go-around Flare
Auto Call Out 30ra Monitor thrust redn/flare by instr Monitor Auto Call Out
Auto Call Out Retard @ 10 ra Retard throttles & monitor
lateral guidance externally
Monitor engine parameters
Touchdown Select & control rev thrust Check FMA ROLLOUT, Rollout
Disengage APs at end of rollout Gnd spoilers, Rev Green, Decel, 70kts
ATC calls during autoland (if no
surface movement radar available)
Transmit to ATC On ground, RW
Vacated as appropriate
Met Viz to RVR
(8.1.3.9, p8-20)
Lighting Elements in Operation (RVR = Met Viz x stated factor) Day Night
HI Approach and Runway Lightings 1.5 2.0
Any type of lighting installation other than above 1.0 1.5
No lighting 1.0 N/A
NB: Table not usable for requd viz <800m, calculating T/O or Cat II/III minima or when a reported RVR is available
Autopilot Limits
(FCOM 3.1.22)
Slope limits: 2.5-3.15. In emergency Autoland acceptable up to 69.0T. Automatic rollout performance has been
approved on dry and wet runways, but performance on snow-covered or icy runways has not been demonstrated.
Non-prec: applicable MDH, Circling: applicable MDA-100, ILS with Cat 1 FMA: 160agl, Cat II: 80agl for man ldg.
Minima and Visual
References
Cat I:
Vis Refs (8.4.5)
DH &RVR (p8-18)
Cat II/III:
Vis Refs (8.4.9)
DHs (p8:18-19)
RVRs (p8:18-19)


Cat I
DH: 200
RVR: 550m (inc with DH)
App light sys elements.
Threshold or threshold
markings, lights or ident
lights. Visual glideslope
inds. Touchdown zone,
zone markings or lights.
Runway edge lights.
Cat II
DH: 100
RVR: 300/75*/75
3 consecutive lights
from:
CL of app lts, TDZ
lts, CLs or RLs
Lateral ref reqd
Cat IIIA
DH: 50
RVR:200/75*/75
(Fail Passive)
3 consecutive lights from: CL
of app lts, TDZ lts, CLs or RLs
No lateral ref reqd
Cat IIIB
DH: <50 DH or No DH
RVR: 75/75/75
1 CL with DH
No vis ref if No DH
No lateral ref reqd


*No Rollout for BSCU Ch, A/Skid, NWS faults or Contaminated RW - midpt RVR 125m
Note: Only Touchdown RVR required if speed in other zone(s) <60kts
NB: Circling minima - MDA 600, Min Met Viz: 2400m (F/O 5km). Vis App - Min RVR: 800m (p8-35)
Wind Limits Headwind 30kts, Crosswind 20kts, Tailwind 10kts (Limits FCOM 3.1.22)
RVR Tx Failure On landing, minimum of one reading required from either of Touchdown or Mid Point but if only Touchdown
available then the speed must be expected to be below 60kts in Stop End. (8.1.3.8.2+3)
Failures
OM B p2-95
(Gnd Equipt:
8.1.3.10 , p8-22 see
next page)
QRH 5.04 Equipment list check before approach only required with ECAM/local caution to check landing capability
Above 1000
Between 1000 & 100
Below Alert Ht (100)
Autoland Light (<200)
Sort by 1000 or GA. (If reversion occurs, you must re-enter new DH in Perf App Page)
GA for triple click or any failure (except ISIS) then reassess capability
Continue (except for red autoland light!)
GA. (AP loss, LOC/GS sigs, LOC abv 15, GS abv 100, radalts diff >15, A/C off beam)
Landing Config 3 or FULL, Roll Out Guidance. Disconnect autopilot at safe spd and autobrakes at taxi spd (but by 20kts).
If no Auto ROLLOUT with Cat2 or Cat 3 Single, disconnect AP at Touchdown
Note: CL lighting alternate red/white for last 900m & all red for final 300m

easyJet A319 Reduced Viz/LVO Brief Angus Hogg v4.9 dated 24
th
Oct 2010
(Valid for Ops A Issue 2 Rev 15 [Sep 10], Ops B Issue 3 Rev 03 [Sep 10 ])
Failed'or'downgraded'equipment'2'Effect'on'landing'minima'(8.1.3.10,'p8222)'

Failed'or'downgraded'
equipment
Effect'on'landing'minima

CAT'IIIB CAT'IIIA CAT'II CAT'I Non'precision
ILS$standby$transmitter Not$allowed No$effect
Outer$Marker No$effect$if$replaced$by$published$equivalent$position Not$applicable
Middle$Marker No$effect No$effect$unless$used$as$
MAPT
Touch$down$zone$RVR$
assessment$system
May$be$temporarily$replaced$with$midpoint$RVR$if$approved$by$the$state$of$the$airport.$
RVR$may$be$reported$by$human$observation
No$effect
Midpoint$or$Stopend$RVR$ No$effect
Anemometer$for$runway$in$use$ No$effect$if$other$ground$source$available
Celiometer No$effect
Approach$lights$ Not$allowed$for$operations$with$DH$>$50$ft Not$allowed Minima$as$for$nil$facilities
Approach$lights$except$the$last$
210$m
No$effect Not$allowed Minima$as$for$nil$facilities
Approach$lights$except$the$last$
420$m
No$effect Minima$as$for$intermediate$facilities
Standby$power$for$approach$
lights
No$effect$ RVR$as$for$CAT$I$basic$facilities$ No$effect
Whole$runway$light$system$ Not$allowed Day$T$minima$as$for$nil$facilities$
Night$T$not$allowed
Edge$lights$ Day$only;$Night$T$not$allowed
Centreline$lights$ RVR$300$m$day$only$
Night$T$not$allowed
Day:$RVR$300m$
Night:$550m
No$effect
Centreline$lights$spacing$
increased$to$30$m
RVR$150$m No$effect
Touch$down$zone$lights$ Day:$RVR$200m$
Night:$300m
Day:$RVR$300$m$
Night:$550$m
No$effect
Standby$power$for$runway$
lights
Not$allowed$ No$effect
Taxiway$light$system No$effect$T$except$delays$due$to$reduced$movement$rate

Page 1 of 2
PFD SPEED SCALE MANAGEMENT (1.22.40 Flt Envelope Function)
The FAC controls the speed scale on the PFD. When both FACs are operative, FAC1 supplies data to PFD1 and
FAC2 supplies it to PFD2. The FAC computes :
1. Minimum and maximum speeds (VSW (stall warning), VLS, VFE and VFE for the next configuration, VLE,
VMO/MMO).
2. Manoeuvring speeds (Green Dot Speed, S speed, F speed)
The FAC also computes the speed trend and displays it as an arrow on the PFD speed scale. The PFD displays
these various speeds as appropriate, and they also go to the FMGEC to be used as limits for various guidance
modes. Note : The principle of the speed computation is as follows : First, the FAC computes VS1G (stall speed).
From VS1G it computes the Gross Weight (GW) which is also sent to the Elevator Aileron computers. When the
aircraft is below 14 500 feet and 250 knots, it computes this from current angle of attack, speed/Mach, altitude, thrust,
and CG. When the aircraft is above 14 500 feet or 250 knots, it computes this out of the GW, which it has memorized
and updated with a fuel consumption model set in the FAC. The accuracies of the various minimum and maximum
speeds are functions of the accuracy with which the FAC computes aircraft gross weight. Normal accuracy for VLS in
CONFIG FULL is about 3 kt.
CHARACTERISTIC SPEEDS (FCOM 3.4.10 (Supplementary Techniques))
The characteristic speeds displayed on the PFD are computed by the FAC (Flight Augmentation Computer) according
to aerodynamic data. VLS (of normal landing configuration : CONF 3 or FULL), F, S and Green Dot speeds are also
displayed on the MCDU TAKEOFF and/or APPR pages. These values are computed by the FMGC, based on the
aircraft gross weight (which is computed according to the entered ZFW and the FOB) or predicted grossweight (for
approach or go around).
VS: Stalling speed. (Not displayed.)

For a conventional aircraft, the reference stall speed, VSmin, is based on a load factor that is less than 1g. This gives
a stall speed that is lower than the stall speed at 1g. All operating speeds are expressed as functions of this speed (for
example, VREF = 1.3 VSmin). Because aircraft of the A320 family have a low-speed protection feature (alpha limit)
that the flight crew cannot override, the airworthiness authorities have reconsidered the definition of stall speed for
these aircraft. All the operating speeds must be referenced to a speed that can be demonstrated by flight test. This
speed is designated VS1g. Airworthiness authorities have agreed that a factor of 0.94 represents the relationship
between VS1g for aircraft of the A320 family and VSmin for conventional aircraft types. As a result the authorities
allow aircraft of the A320 family to use the following factors :

V2 = 1.2 0.94 VS1g = 1.13 VS1g VREF = 1.3 0.94 VS1g = 1.23 VS1g
These speeds are identical to those that the conventional 94 % rule would have defined for these aircraft. The A319,
A320 and A321 have exactly the same manoeuvre margin that a conventional aircraft would have at its reference
speeds. The FCOM uses VS for VS1g.
VLS: Lowest Selectable speed.
Represented by the top of an amber strip along the airspeed scale on the PFD. Computed by the FAC based on
aerodynamic data, corresponds to 1.13 VS during takeoff or following a touch and go. Becomes 1.23 VS after
retraction of one step of flaps. Becomes 1.28 VS when in clean configuration. Note : If in CONF 0 VLS were 1.23 VS
(instead of 1.28 VS), the alpha protection strip would hit the VLS strip on the PFD. Above 20000 feet, VLS is
corrected for Mach effect to maintain a 0.2g buffet margin.
Note: FCOM 1.22.30 (AUTOTHRUST): When in SPD/MACH mode, the A/THR does not allow speed excursions
beyond the following limits, regardless of the target speed or Mach number :
For a selected speed target, the limits are VLS and VMAX (VMO-MMO, VFE-VLE, whichever applies). For a managed
speed target, the limits are manoeuvring speed (Green Dot, S, F, whichever applies) and maximum speed (340/.80-
VFE-VLE, whichever applies).
F: Minimum speed at which the flaps may be retracted at takeoff. In approach, used as a target speed when the
aircraft is in CONF 2 or CONF 3.Represented by "F" on the PFD speed scale. Equal to about 1.26 VS of CONF 1 + F.
S: Minimum speed at which the slats may be retracted at takeoff. In approach, used as a target speed when the
aircraft is in CONF 1. Represented by "S" on the PFD airspeed scale. Equal to about 1.23 VS of clean configuration
Page 2 of 2
0: Green dot speed. Engine out operating speed in clean configuration. (Best lift to drag ratio speed). Corresponds
also to the final takeoff speed. Represented by a green dot on the PFD scale. Below 20000 feet equal to 2 weight
(tonnes) + 85. Above 20000 feet add 1 knot per 1000 feet
PROTECTION SPEEDS
V PROT, V MAX and VSW are computed by the FAC, based on aerodynamic data. They are only used for display
on the PFD, and not for flight control protection (the activation of the protections is computed by the ELAC).
V PROT Angle of attack protection speed. Corresponds to the angle of attack at which the angle of attack protection
becomes active. Represented by the top of a black and amber strip along the PFD speed scale, in normal law.
VSW Stall warning speed. Represented by a red and black strip along the speed scale when the flight control normal
law is inoperative.
VMAX. Represented by the bottom of a red and black strip along the speed scale. Determined by the FAC according
to the aircraft configuration. Is equal to VMO (or speed corresponding to MMO), VLE or VFE.
LIMIT SPEEDS
VMCG Minimum speed, on the ground during takeoff, at which the aircraft can be controlled by only using the
primary flight controls, after a sudden failure of the critical engine, the other engine remaining at takeoff
power.
VMCA Minimum control speed in flight at which the aircraft can be controlled with a maximum bank of 5, if
one engine fails, the other engine remaining at takeoff power (takeoff flap setting, gear retracted).
VMCL Minimum control speed in flight, at which the aircraft can be controlled with a maximum bank of 5, if
one engine fails, the other engine remaining at takeoff power (approach flap setting).
VFE Maximum speed for each flap configuration.
VLE Maximum speed with landing gear extended.
VLO Maximum speed for landing gear operation.
VMO Maximum speed.
VFE NEXT Maximum speed for the next (further extended) flap lever position.
OTHER SPEEDS
V1: The highest speed, during takeoff, at which the flight crew has a choice between continuing the takeoff or stopping
the aircraft. Represented by "1" on the airspeed scale (or the V1 value when it is off the airspeed scale). Inserted
manually through the MCDU by the crew. Displayed on the MCDU TAKEOFF page.
VR: The speed at which the pilot rotates in order to reach V2 at an altitude of 35 feet at the latest after an engine
failure. Inserted manually through the MCDU by the crew. Displayed on the MCDU TAKEOFF page.
V2: Takeoff safety speed that the aircraft attains at the latest at an altitude of 35 feet with one engine failed and
maintains during the second segment of the takeoff. Represented by the SPEED SELECT symbol on the speed
scale. Minimum value equal to 1.13 VS for the corresponding configuration. Inserted manually through the MCDU by
the crew. Displayed on the MCDU TAKEOFF page.
VREF: Reference speed used for normal final approach. Equal to 1.23 VS of configuration FULL. Displayed on the
MCDU APPR page if landing is planned in CONF FULL (VLS CONF FULL).
VAPP: Final approach speed. Displayed on MCDU APPR page. Calculated by the FMGCs. Represents : VAPP =
VLS + wind correction. The wind correction is limited to a minimum of 5 knots and a maximum of 15 knots. The flight
crew may modify VAPP through the MCDU.
VAPP TARGET: During autoland or when A/THR is on or in case of ice accretion or gusty crosswind greater than 20
knots, VAPP must not be lower than VLS + 5 knots. For landing in configuration 3 with ice accretion VAPP must not
be lower than VLS + 10 knots. Represented by a magenta triangle. Calculated by the FMGCs. Gives efficient speed
guidance in approach during various windy conditions. Represents :VAPP TARGET = GS mini + actual headwind
(measured by ADIRS)
GS mini = VAPP - TOWER WIND (headwind component along runway axis calculated by FMGC from tower wind
entered on MCDU).
Contaminated Runway Operations v1.5 dated 14
th
Mar 2011 by Angus Hogg
Page 2 of 2
necessary, use differential braking to regain the centreline when stopping distance permits.
Do not lift the nose wheel before VR in an attempt to avoid splashing slush on the aircraft, because this produces
additional aerodynamic drag.
Rotate, lift off and retract gear and high lift devices in the normal manner.

APPROACH
If holding is performed in icing conditions, maintain clean configuration. Ice accretion: Min Spd Clean: VLS+15, Conf
Full: VLS +5, Ldg Dist x1.1. Conf 3 (or less): VLS+10, Ldg Dist x1.15.

LANDING
Captains only landing
Avoid landing on contaminated runways if the antiskid is not functioning. The use of autobrake LOW or MED is
recommended provided that the contamination is evenly distributed.
Approach at the normal speed.
Automatic rollout performance on snow-covered or icy runways has not been demonstrated. Autolands are not
disallowed but could only be accomplished by disconnecting a/p at touchdown consider RVR from QRH 8.04.
Make a positive/firm touchdown after a brief flare.
As soon as the aircraft has touched down, select maximum reverse thrust as soon as the main landing gear is on
ground. Do not hold the nose wheel off the ground but lower the nose wheel onto the runway and
If necessary, the maximum reverse thrust can be used until the aircraft is fully stopped.
If the runway length is limiting, apply the brakes before lowering the nose gear onto the runway, but be prepared
to apply back stick to counter the nose down pitch produced by the brakes application. (The strength of this
pitching moment will depend on the brake torque attainable on the slippery runway).
Maintain directional control with the rudder as long as possible, use nose wheel steering with care.
When the aircraft is at taxi speed, follow the recommendations for taxiing.

DIRECTIONAL CONTROL
During rollout, the sidestick must be centered. This prevents asymmetric wheel loading, resulting in asymmetric
braking and an increased tendency to weathercock. The rudder should be used for directional control after
touchdown, in the same way as for a normal landing. Use of the tiller must be avoided above taxi speed, because it
may result in nosewheel skidding, and lead to a loss of directional control. When required, differential braking must be
applied by completely releasing the pedal on the opposite side to the expected direction of the turn. This is because,
on a slippery runway, the same braking effect may be produced by a full or half-deflection of the pedal. Landing on a
contaminated runway in a crosswind requires careful consideration due to directional control problems. If the aircraft
touches down with some crab and the reverse thrust is selected, the side force component of reverse adds to the
crosswind component and causes the aircraft to drift to the downwind side of the runway. As the braking efficiency
increases, the cornering force of the main wheels decreases and this adds to any directional control problems.

REVERSE THRUST CONSIDERATIONS
The use of more than idle reverse thrust below 70 kts may cause blowback of snow, ice or sand & gravel onto the
wings and into the slats. Ensure reversers are stowed by 40kts on contaminated runways unless an emergency stop
is required. This will prevent ingestion of snow or ice, which can cause fan damage and/or engine flame-out.
If there is a problem with directional control, reduce reverse thrust to idle in order to reduce the reverse thrust side-
force component and release the brakes in order to increase the cornering force. Return to the runway centreline,
reselect reverse thrust, and resume braking.

BRAKING CONSIDERATIONS
The use of auto brake is usually preferable because it minimizes the number of brake applications and thus reduces
brake wear. Additionally, the auto brake provides a symmetrical brake pressure application, which ensures an equal
braking effect on both main landing gear wheels on wet or evenly contaminated runway. More particularly, the auto
brake is recommended on short, wet, contaminated runways, in poor visibility conditions and in Auto land. The use of
LO auto brake should be preferred on long and dry runways whereas the use of MED auto brake should be
preferred for short or evenly contaminated runways. The use of MAX auto brake is not recommended. On very
short runways, the use of pedal braking is to be envisaged since the pilot may apply full pedal braking with no delay
after touch down.

It is possible that the DECEL light on the AUTO BRK panel will not come on, as the predetermined deceleration may
not have been achieved. This does not mean that the auto-brake is not working. In the case of uneven contamination
on a wet or contaminated runway, the auto brake may laterally destabilize the aircraft. If this occurs, consider
deselecting the auto brake. The landing distances, indicated in the QRH, provide a good assessment of the real
landing distances for specific levels of contamination.
Contaminated Runway Operations v1.5 dated 14
th
Mar 2011 by Angus Hogg
Page 1 of 2
References: FCOM 1.32.20, 2.4.10, 3.1.22, FCTM SI-010 P 1-8, EOM B 2.4.91, 4.5 & 4.6.
This document summarises ops on runways covered with contaminants such as standing water, slush or snow.

Crosswinds (Contaminted R/W Perf FCOM 2.04.10)
Reported Braking Action Reported r/w
Friction Coef.
Max x-wind (kts) Equivalent r/w condition*
valid for max x-wind only T/O Ldg
Good 0.4 29G38 33G38 1
Good/medium 0.36 to 0.39 29 1
Medium 0.3 to 0.35 25 2/3
Medium/poor 0.26 to 0.29 20 2/3
Poor 0.25 15 3/4
Unreliable 5 4/5
Narrow Runway 20
Contaminated Narrow Runway 10
*1. Dry, damp or wet:<3mm water. 2. R/W covered with slush 3. R/W covered with dry snow. 4. R/W covered
with standing water with risk of hydroplaning or wet snow respectively. 5. Icy r/w or high risk of hydroplaning.
LPC Equivalents- Dry: Damp. Wet: x, 3mm Standing Water(SW), 3mm Slush(Sl), 4mm Wet Snow(WS),
15mm Dry Snow(DS). Water (6.3mm): < 6.3mm SW. Water (12.7mm): <12.7mm SW. Slush (6.3mm): x,
12.7mm WS, 50.8mm DS. Slush (12.7mm): x, 25.4mm WS, 101.6mm DS. Compacted Snow: x. Icy: x.

DEFINITIONS
Runway is considered to be contaminated when > 25% of the runway surface area (whether in isolated areas or not)
within the required length and width being used is covered by: > 3 mm of surface water, slush or loose snow
equivalent to more than 3 mm of water, compacted snow or ice (including wet ice). Note: R/W is icy if friction
coefficient is 0.05. If R/W may be slippery when wet with no other info, max crosswind is 20kts & takeoffs in wet
conditions should only be considered when dist avail dist required for icy R/W. If any section of R/W notified as may
be slippery when wet includes R/W portions with poor or unreported braking action then the crosswind limit is 15 kt.

PERFORMANCE ASSUMPTIONS
The contaminant is in a layer of uniform depth and density over the entire length of the runway.
Antiskid and spoilers are operative, and reverse thrust is used for the deceleration phase.
The friction coefficient is based on studies and checked by actual tests.
The screen height at the end of takeoff segment is 15 feet, not 35 feet.

TAXIING
No single-engine taxi procedures on contaminated runways.
Avoid high thrust settings.
When taxiing on slippery surfaces, stay well behind preceding aircraft.
Taxi at low speed. Note that antiskid does not operate at low taxi speeds (<20kts).
On slippery taxiways during turns with large nose wheel steering angles, noise and vibration may result from the
wheels slipping sideways. Keep speed as low as possible to make a smooth turn with minimum radius.
Differential power may be needed.
If taxiing in icing conditions with precipitation on runways and taxiways contaminated with slush or snow, keep
flaps/slats retracted until reaching the holding point on the takeoff runway to avoid contaminating the mechanism.
If in icing conditions >30mins or sig eng vibriation occurs - 70%N1 for 30 secs/30mins. Repeat prior to takeoff.
If in freezing rain, freezing drizzle, freezing fog or heavy snow, momentary run ups to 70%/10mins to shed ice.
When taxiing in after landing, do not retract the flaps/slats to avoid damage of the structure.
After shutdown, make a visual inspection to determine that the flap/slat mechanism is free of contamination.
Note:
On contaminated runways and taxiways, the radio altitude indications may fluctuate and auto call outs or GPWS
warnings may be activated. Disregard them. During taxi on snowy runways, the radio altimeters may not compute any
data and the ECAM warnings 'DUAL ENG FAILURE', 'ANTI ICE CAPT TAT FAULT', 'ANTI ICE F/O TAT FAULT', 'L/G
SHOCK ABSORBER FAULT' may be triggered. Disregard these warnings.

TAKEOFF
Captains only T/O.
No T/O: >12.6mm standing water, >25.3mm wet snow, > 101.5mm dry snow, compacted snow or icy RW.
Never use Flex Thrust, always select MAX TO (ie TOGA).
Do not abort takeoff for minor deficiencies even at low speeds.
If you have to abort takeoff, maintain directional control with the rudder and small inputs to the nose wheel. If
easyJet Pilot/Cabin Crew Calls Page 1 of 1
(v1.9 dated 20
th
Apr 10 [Correct to EOM-CSPM Issue 2 Rev 5 dated 26
th
Jan 09])
easyJet Pilot PAs to Cabin Crew (All references are to EOM-CSPM (OM E)

Types of Emergency Landing (p3-2 Sec 3.2 )

PRE-PLANNED EMERGENCY
A pre-planned emergency is a situation where time is available to plan for an emergency, ie the Commander will inform
the Cabin Crew the nature of the emergency, the intention, the time available and any special instructions (NITS).

The Cabin Crew will then have all the information needed to prepare passengers and secure all cabin and galley
equipment.

UNPLANNED EMERGENCY
An unplanned emergency is a situation where time is not available to plan for an emergency, eg on take-off or on landing.

EMERGENCY LANDING AND DITCHING
A forced landing on the ground is referred to as an Emergency Landing and a forced landing on water as a Ditching.

PRECAUTIONARY LANDINGS
A precautionary landing is one where under normal circumstances there will be no requirement for the Cabin Crew to
evacuate the passengers after landing.

Scenario Flight Deck Call Reference
Normal Operations:

10 Minutes before landing CABIN CREW, PREPARE THE CABIN FOR LANDING. p2-54
Sec 2.7

Abnormal Operations:

Slow decompression CABIN CREW RETURN TO STATIONS. WE ARE
COMMENCING A DESCENT. RETURN TO YOUR SEATS AND
FASTEN YOUR SEATBELTS.
p3-34
Sec 3.22.2
Rapid decompression LADIES AND GENTLEMEN THIS IS THE CAPTAIN SPEAKING.
WE HAVE LOST CABIN PRESSURE AND ARE DESCENDING
TO A LOWER ALTITUDE. PUT YOUR OXYGEN MASKS ON
AND OBEY THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CABIN CREW.
p3-35
Sec 3.22.5
Descent complete following
decompression
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE HAVE EXPERIENCED A LOSS
OF CABIN PRESSURE. THE AIRCRAFT HAS LEVELLED OFF
AT A SAFE ALTITUDE WHERE PRESSURISATION IS NOT
REQUIRED. THERE MAY BE A SMELL OF BURNING FROM
THE OXYGEN GERATORS, THIS IS QUITE NORMAL AND
THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR CONCERN. PLEASE REMAIN
SEATED WITH YOUR SEATBELT FASTENED, MORE
INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED SHORTLY.
p 3-35
Sec 3.22.5

(Made by any
Cabin Crew
Member or
Commander)
Severe turbulence CABIN CREW AND PASSENGERS BE SEATED
IMMEDIATELY
p2-52
Sec 2.6.8.4
Once conditions allow: CABIN CREW, NORMAL OPERATIONS.
On ground when possible
emergency identified
ATTENTION, CREW AT STATION. p3-13
Sec 3.9
Alert Call following emergency
initiated by flight crew in flight
or on the ground
SENIOR CABIN CREW MEMBER TO THE FLIGHT DECK or
SENIOR CABIN CREW MEMBER TO THE INTERPHONE or
3 Double Chimes
p3-3
Sec 3.3
On ground upon deciding to
evacuate
EVACUATE, UNFASTEN YOUR SEATBELTS AND GET OUT. p3-13
Sec 3.9
At 2,000 in pre-planned
emergency landing/ditching
CABIN CREW TAKE UP LANDING POSITIONS. p3-7
Sec 3.5 (7)
At 500 in pre-planned
emergency landing/ditching
BRACE, BRACE. p3-8
Sec 3.5 (8)
Unplanned Emergency with
crash landing
ATTENTION, CREW! BRACE, BRACE. p3-10
Sec 3.6
Emergency over CABIN CREW, NORMAL OPERATIONS. p3-13
Sec 3.9

CreatedbyJPetts&DHeath

DONOTRUSH
DODAR

READ
ECAM
OEB / RESETS / QRH FCOM
CHKLSTS
STS Summaries / FCOM / MEL

Airport Weather Considerations

FuelENDURANCE

TOTALFOB @TIME
2eng=35Kg/min
1eng=35Kg/min
APPROX500Kg/15min

WEATHER
ENDURANCE
TERRAIN
NOTAMS
AIRPORT
PERFORMANCE

AVIATE FLY a/c

check FMA
NAVIGATE TERR
Wx
COMMUNICATE

LANDASAP

CreatedbyJPetts&DHeath

DONOTRUSH
DODAR
AIRPORT

WEIGHT MAXLW Vref

1/4
ALD
3/4
QRH80.1680.18A DRY|WET|CONTA| |REV|NOREV
corrections
FAILURE1

FLAPLVR

Vref
FACTOR
FAILURE2

FLAPLVR

Vref
FACTOR

USELOWEST
FLAPLEVER
USETABLE80.16
AndADD
APPRCORRECTION

IFALL*USEHIGHEST
IFNOTMULTIPLYALL
Table80.16for*/**

FORLANDING
USECONFIG
FLAPLVR

Vapp
Forlanding

MINREQDLD
(thresholddistance)

LIST
STATUS
CONSIDERATIONS

APPROACH
CONSIDERATIONS

QRHchecklists
LONGESTRWY JAMMEDFLAP/SLAT
OVERWEIGHT ADR1+2+3QRH
L/GGRVTYEXT FAILEDFCU=RESET
DUALFMGCFAIL/MCDUFAIL=FCOM4
IFDUALRADALTFAIL
DIRECTLAWRLDcalc
APPbuttonNOTavailable
LANDING
CONSIDERATIONS

GOAROUND
CONSIDERATIONS

FLAP/SLAT
GEAR
SPEED
MAP
G/AALT
Required
Assistanceonground.
121.6(fire)

COMMS ATC CC PAX EZY

AP1or2
STILLINOP?

ADD
HIGHEST
Vref
!
! Created!by!J!Petts!&!D!Heath!
!
DO#NOT#RUSH!
DODAR#
!
!
#
TYPES#of#CABIN#PREPARATION#
EMERGENCY#LANDING/DITCHING#
PRECAUTIONARY#LANDING##_#
NORMAL#LANDING###_#
!
!
!
#
#
Ladies#and#gentlemen,#this#is#the#Captain.#We#have#a#technical#problem#
(brief#explanation),#the#situation#is#being#assessed,#and#you#will#be#given#
further#information#as#soon#as#possible.##Please#follow#the#Cabin#Crews#
instructions!
!
!
Emergency!
At!2000!Cabin!Crew!take!up!landing!positions!
At!500!Brace,!Brace!
!
Unplanned;!Attention!Crew,!brace,!brace!
!
#
!
!
!
Diversion!
Ladies!and!Gentlemen,!this!is!your!Captain.!We!have!
experienced!a!technical!problem!with!XXXX.!The!situation!is!
under!control!and!there!is!no!cause!for!alarm!but!unfortunately!
we!will!not!be!able!to!continue!our!journey!to!XXX.!We!will!be!
returning!to!/!diverting!to!XXX.!Please!follow!the!instructions!
given!to!you!by!the!Cabin!Crew.!We!will!be!landing!in!
approximately!XX!minutes!from!now!and!then!I!will!be!able!to!
update!you!on!the!situation.!Thank!you!for!your!cooperation.!!
!
Nature!
Intentions!
Type!of!landing!
Special!Instructions!
Senior!Cabin!Crew!Member!
to!the!Flight!Deck!
!
! Created!by!J!Petts!&!D!Heath!
!
DO#NOT#RUSH!
DODAR#
!
!
Go!Around!
Ladies!and!Gentlemen,!this!is!the!Captain.!As!I!am!sure!you!
have!noticed!we!were!unable!to!complete!our!approach!and!
landing.!We!have!discontinued!the!approach!due!to!XXXX.!We!
will!now!fly!another!approach!/!be!diverting!to!XXX!and!expect!
to!land!at!HH/MM.!I!will!give!you!more!information!after!
landing.!Thank!you.!!!
!
!
Slow!Decompression!
Cabin!Crew!return!to!your!stations.!We!are!commencing!a!
descent.!Return!to!your!seats!and!fasten!your!seat!belts.!
!
Rapid!decompression!
Ladies!&!Gentlemen,!this!is!the!Captain!speaking.!We!have!lost!
Cabin!pressure!and!are!commencing!a!descent!to!a!lower!
altitude.!Put!on!your!masks!and!obey!the!instructions!of!the!
cabin!crew.!
!
When!Level:!Ladies!and!Gentlemen,!we!have!experienced!a!loss!
of!cabin!pressure.!We!have!now!levelled!off!at!a!safe!altitude!
where!pressurisation!is!not!required.!There!may!be!a!smell!of!
burning!from!the!oxygen!generators,!this!is!quite!normal!and!
there!is!no!cause!for!concern.!Please!remain!seated!with!your!
seatbelts!fastened,!I!will!give!you!more!information!shortly.!
!
Severe!Turbulence:!
Cabin!crew!and!passengers!be!seated!immediately!
!
Medical:!
! ! Age!/!Sex!/!Symptoms!/!Level!of!Consciousness!
!
1
Airbus Technical Notes
Table of Contents
1. AircraIt general ...................................................................................................... 3
1.1. Dimensions ............................................................................................... 3
1.2. Unpressurised areas .................................................................................... 3
1.3. Misc ........................................................................................................ 3
1.4. Lighting .................................................................................................... 3
2. Auto Ilight ............................................................................................................. 4
2.1. Overview .................................................................................................. 4
2.2. FCU ......................................................................................................... 4
2.3. FMA ........................................................................................................ 5
2.4. Flight director/ Autopilot ............................................................................. 5
2.5. Autothrust ................................................................................................. 6
2.6. Flight management ..................................................................................... 6
2.7. Rules Ior use oI autoIlight systems ................................................................ 7
2.8. Guidance principals .................................................................................... 8
2.9. Protections ................................................................................................ 9
3. Air conditioning .................................................................................................... 10
3.1. Cockpit and cabin ..................................................................................... 10
3.2. Cargo compartments .................................................................................. 12
4. Pressurisation ....................................................................................................... 13
5. Avionics ventilation ............................................................................................... 14
6. Electrics .............................................................................................................. 16
7. Pneumatics ........................................................................................................... 19
8. Communications ................................................................................................... 21
9. APU ................................................................................................................... 22
9.1. Limitations .............................................................................................. 22
10. Cabin ................................................................................................................ 23
11. Navigation .......................................................................................................... 25
11.1. Air Data and Inertial ReIerence System (ADIRS) .......................................... 25
11.2. Radio navigation ..................................................................................... 26
11.3. Standby instruments ................................................................................. 26
11.4. EGPWS ................................................................................................. 26
11.5. Radio altimeter ....................................................................................... 27
12. Fire protection .................................................................................................... 28
12.1. Engine and APU ..................................................................................... 28
12.2. Cargo .................................................................................................... 28
12.3. Other .................................................................................................... 28
13. Ice & rain protection ............................................................................................ 29
13.1. Wing anti-ice .......................................................................................... 29
13.2. Engine anti-ice ....................................................................................... 29
13.3. Window heat .......................................................................................... 29
13.4. Probe heat ............................................................................................. 29
13.5. Other .................................................................................................... 29
14. Hydraulics .......................................................................................................... 31
15. Landing gear ...................................................................................................... 33
16. Flight controls ..................................................................................................... 36
16.1. Overview ............................................................................................... 36
16.2. Side sticks ............................................................................................. 37
16.3. Normal Law & protections ....................................................................... 38
16.4. ReconIiguration laws ............................................................................... 39
17. Fuel .................................................................................................................. 41
18. Oxygen .............................................................................................................. 43
Airbus Technical Notes
2
19. Power plant ........................................................................................................ 44
19.1. General description .................................................................................. 44
19.2. FADECS ............................................................................................... 44
19.3. Thrust control system .............................................................................. 45
19.4. Engine Iuel system .................................................................................. 45
19.5. Engine oil system .................................................................................... 46
19.6. Engine bleed air system ........................................................................... 46
19.7. Reverse thrust system .............................................................................. 46
19.8. Ignition and start ..................................................................................... 47
19.9. Engine indications ................................................................................... 47
19.10. Engine handling .................................................................................... 49
20. EIS ................................................................................................................... 50
20.1. EFIS ..................................................................................................... 50
20.2. ECAM .................................................................................................. 51
20.3. ReconIiguration ...................................................................................... 53
21. LVO .................................................................................................................. 54
Airbus Technical Notes
3
1. Aircraft general
1.1. Dimensions
Table 1. Aircraft dimensions
Wingspan 34.1m
Length 33.84m
MTOW 75.5t
Max range 3000nm
Min pavement
width Ior 180 turn
20.5m
Turn extremity Wing tip
1.2. Unpressurised areas
The radome, air conditioning compartment, main gear bay, nose gear bay and tail cone are unpres-
surised
1.3. Misc
3 cargo compartments - Iorward, aIt and bulk.
1.4. Lighting
The dome light is the only cockpit lighting with battery protection. The dim position is thereIore
recommended Ior takeoII.
The sliding potentiometers under the FCU control FCU lighting. The leIt controls integral lighting
oI labels, knobs and switches. The right controls the FCU display brightness.
II the strobe lights are set to AUTO, they will come on automatically at liIt oII. There are two sets
oI navigation lights, and the NAV light switch has a seperate position Ior each.
The AUTO position oI the NO SMOKING sign puts the no smoking and exit signs on when the gear
is extended and oII when it is retracted. No smoking signs are always on on easyJet aircraIt.
The "No Smoking", "Fasten Seat Belt", "Return to seat" and "Exit" lights automatically come on
with excessive cabin altitude.
The EMER EXIT LT switch has OFF, ON and ARM positions. In the ARM position (the normal
setting), the escape path lighting, EXIT signs and overhead emergency lighting come on automati-
cally when normal electric supply is lost.
Taxi lights, takeoII lights and runway turnoII lights extinguish automatically when the landing gear
is retracted.
Extension oI the landing lights gives a LDG LT memo on the E/WD.
Airbus Technical Notes
4
2. Auto flight
2.1. Overview
Main processing is carried out by two identical Flight Management Guidance Computers (FMGC)
which normally work in tandem. Together they are known as the Ilight management guidance system
(FMGS). The pilots provide inputs to the FMGS using two Multipurpose Control and Display Units
(MCDUs) on the center pedestal and a Ilight control unit (FCU) on the glare shield.
The Ilight management part oI the FMGS controls navigation, Ilight planning, perIormance opti-
mization, predictions and display management. The Ilight guidance part provides Ilight director, au-
topilot and auto-thrust commands. The Ilight augmentation part provides Ilight envelope computa-
tion, maneuvring speed computation, windshear detection, u-Iloor protection and various yaw Iunc-
tions.
The FMGCs normally receive inIormation Irom "on-side" sensors, and communicate between them-
selves to validate data. The FCU Ieeds both FMGCs.
The master FMGC is determined by autopilot and/or Ilight director engagement. FMGC1 is master
iI AP 1 is on, both autopilots are on or both Ilight directors are on. The autothrust is driven by the
master FMGC. The Ilight directors are always driven Irom their on side FMGC.
II the cross talk between the two FMGCs is lost, the FMGCs can operate independently. This mode
oI operation is indicated by an amber IND light at the top oI each MCDU. In independent mode, the
same inIormation must be entered into both MCDUs to receive the same guidance.
In the event oI loss oI an FMGC, the remaining FMGC continues to operate normally. II the lost
FMGC was master, the A/P and A/THR will disengage. The AP oI the healthy FMGC can be en-
gaged, and subsequently the A/THR can be engaged. This situation, known as single mode, is indi-
cated by an amber FM1 light at the top oI the MCDU on the Iailed side. The MCDU will now be
copy oI the MCDU driven by the healthy FMGC. The FMA will annunciate e.g. 2FD2 to indicate
that both Ilight directors are being driven Irom one FMGC. The healthy FMGC also tunes the oIIside
navaids. To restore the ND on the Iailed side, the range and mode must be set identically to that set
on the healthy side.
II an FMGC has a soItware problem, the FMGS will temporarily revert to single mode while the
aIIected FMGC auto resets. This may result in autopilot and autothrottle disconnect and reversion
to selected modes. MAP NOT AVAIL is shown on the ND oI the aIIected side and the status page
with a "PLEASE WAIT" message appears on both MCDUs. Use oI the MCDUs should be avoided
during the reset as it will increase the reset time. Reset usually takes a Iew seconds.
The FCU display is driven by two redundant FCU controllers. A single Iailure will have very little
eIIect. A double FCU Iailure will lead to the loss oI both autopilots, both Ilight directors and the
autothrust. The autothrust will revert to thrust locked until the thrust levers are manually moved.
All targets are lost on the PFD. The EFIS control panels are lost, leading to a reversion to STD,
rose NAV 80nm on the NDs and a reversion needle selection oI VOR1 and ADF2. Weather radar
image is also lost.
A locked MCDU may be recovered by turning it oII, then back on aIter Iive seconds. This Iailure is
not automatically detected. An amber FAIL on the MCDU requires the same procedure.
2.2. FCU
TODO: Add picture oI FCU}
The FCU has two channels, each able to drive the entire FCU.
In general, turning a knob will select a guidance target and pulling it will then engage a mode to
guide the aircraIt to that target. Pushing a knob, on the other hand, engages a mode managed by the
FMGS. When pushed, dashes and a white dot appear in the associated window.
Airbus Technical Notes
5
Change over between speed and mach occurs automatically at approximately FL300, although this
can be overridden with the SPD MACH button.
The HDG-VS/TRK-FPA button toggles the lateral mode between heading and track and toggles
the vertical mode between vertical speed and Ilight path angle. It also toggles the display oI the
Ilight path vector (FPV) (or "bird") and Flight Path Director (FPD) on the PFDs. FMA lateral mode
annunciation are HDG and TRACK respectively. The FCU displays HDG and V/S legends when in
attitude mode and TRK and FPA legends when in Ilight path mode.
The altitude window contains the next applicable clearance altitude selected by the crew with the
target altitude knob and is never dashed. Pushing the knob engages a managed mode which guides
the aircraIt to the target altitude while adhering to altitude constraints set in the FMGS. Pulling the
knob gives a selected mode that disregards these FMGS altitude constraints.
The VS/FPA knob diIIers Irom the other three in that there is no associated managed mode. Pulling
this knob commands an immediate level oII. Negative indications on the FPA/VS display on the
FCU indicate descent.
The "EXPED" button temporarily sets speed to best climb or best descent speed in order to expedite
towards the target altitude.
The AP buttons engage one or both autopilots. The A/THR button engages or arms the autothrust.
Disengagement oI autopilot or autothrottle may be acheived by pressing a lit button, but this is not
a recommended procedure.
2.3. FMA
The Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) is displayed at the top oI the PFD. It is split into 5 columns:
Thrust
Vertical
Lateral
Approach capability and DA/MDA
FMGS engagement status
In certain modes the vertical and lateral columns combine to display "common modes" where the
lateral and vertical modes are closely linked.
Each column has three lines. In the Iirst three columns, the Iirst line shows engaged mode, the second
line shows armed modes and the third line shows reminders or messages.
When a mode changes, the mode is boxed on the FMA. A star next to a mode indicates a capture
phase.
2.4. Flight director/ Autopilot
The Ilight directors come on automatically when the aircraIt is Iirst powered.
The AP can be used Irom just aIter liIt oII until the end oI the landing roll-out. In most cases only one
autopilot may be engaged at a time. The exception iI on a coupled ILS approach, where the second
autopilot may be engaged aIter arming approach.
Autopilots are disconnected by pushing the red pushbutton on either sidestick. Disconnection trig-
gers a single aural alert and a temporary master warning with AP OFF message on the E/WD. A
second push on the button cancels these warnings. Autopilots may also be disconnected by signiIi-
cant movement oI the sidestick or rudder pedals, or by pushing a lit AP button on the FCU. This is
Airbus Technical Notes
6
treated as an involuntary disconnection and leads to a repeating aural warning and permanent master
warning and message.
When Ilying manually with reIerence to the FD, the symbols Ior each PFD are driven by their on-
side FGMC.
When taking oII or landing on an ILS equipped runway, the Ilight director bars are replaced by a
vertical green yaw bar to assist centerline tracking in LVOs.
When the bird is displayed, FD indications change to give FPA commands. The objective becomes
to centre and align the bird with the green triangles at the wing tips. II TRK/VPA is selected when
the basic modes are in Iorce (HDG/VS), these modes automatically change to TRK and FPA.
2.5. Autothrust
Autothrust modes are automatically linked to AP/FD vertical modes. Autothrust speed mode, where
the autothrust adjusts thrust to maintain a speed, is linked to trajectory type AP/FD vertical modes.
Autothrust Iixed mode is linked to AP/FD vertical modes where the speed is controlled by adjusting
the aircraIt attitude.
There are Iour detents on the throttle quadrant:
IDLE
CL Gives max climb thrust
FLEX/
MCT
Gives FLEX thrust Ior takeoII or max continuous thrust
TOGA Give max takeoII or go around thrust.
The thrust levers do not move when autothrust adjustments are made. Instead, the thrust lever posi-
tion controls the maximum thrust available to the autothrust system. It thereIore does not operate
when the thrust levers are at IDLE or in the reverse range.
The autothrust automatically arms when TOGA or FLEX/MCT is set Ior takeoII. At this point the
thrust is still under manual control, indicated my a MAN indication in the FMA thrust segment.
The autothrottle engages when the thrust levers are set to CL. Engagement is indicated by THR
CLB appearing in green in the FMA thrust segment and A/THR appearing in the FMA engagement
segment. In normal ops, the thrust levers are leIt at CL until retarded in the Ilare. Increased thrust
may, however, be manually selected at any time by advancing the thrust levers beyond the CL detent.
II an engine Iailure occurs, the autothrottle range is automatically extended to include the range
between CL and MCT.
II autothrust disconnection is desired in Ilight, retard the thrust levers until the thrust lever position
symbol roughly matches the present N1, then push the disconnect button on the side oI the thrust
lever. Autothrust may be completely inhibited Ior the remainder oI the Ilight by holding one oI these
buttons down Ior more than 15 seconds.
2.6. Flight management
Each FMGC independantly calculates the aircraIt position based on data Irom the ADIRS, the radio
navigation aids and the GPS receivers. In normal ops, each FMGC uses the average position oI the
three IRSs. This is called Mix IRS. II an IRS Iails, each FMGC uses a single IRS, either on-side
or IRS3 as available. Each IRS also calculates a GPIRS position based on its own position and the
average position indicated by the two GPS receivers. The FMGC uses only one oI the three GPIRS
positions which is automatically selected according to merit. The GPIRS data is subjected to integrity
criteria, and iI it Iails, the GPS mode is rejected and the system Ialls back on radio position updating
based on on-side auto-tuned radio navigation aids (DME,VOR and ILS). II this occurs, an amber
GPS PRIMARY LOST message appears in the ND and the MCDU scratchpad.
Airbus Technical Notes
7
The FMGC continually calculates a vector, known as BIAS, which represents the oIIset oI the GPIRS
or radio position (as available) Irom Mix IRS. The last known value oI this vector is used to calculate
the aircraIt position iI GPS and radio data become unavailable.
The FMGC also calculates an estimated position error (EPE) Ior RNP navigation purposes. EPE
and FMGS database derived RNP are displayed on the MDCU. An ACCUR value is also provided.
This is usually HIGH, but indicates LOW iI EPE~RNP. II ACCUR is LOW, a RNPA NAV ACCUR
DOWNGRAD warning is shown on the ND. II this occurs, or iI GPS PRIMARY is lost, FM position
should be manually cross checked with raw data. II the position is within 3nm, the FM position may
continue to be used, but hourly raw data checks should be made.
The FMGS allows both a primary and a secondary Ilight plan to be entered. The secondary Ilight
plan can be quickly activated when required.
When Ilying in NAV mode the aircraIt is guided on a leg deIined by a Irom and to waypoint. The to
waypoint is shown in white on the MCDU and in the top right corner oI the ND.
The Ilight plan is entered using the INIT page on the MCDU. It may be entered using a company
route, a departure detination pair and manual entry oI route or by sending a request Ior an active
F-PLN initialization.
2.7. Rules for use of autoflight systems
Rules regarding FM navigation and flight planning
1. Crosscheck FM navigation accuracy periodically iI GPS is not primary and whenever GPS PRI-
MARY LOST or NAV ACCUR DOWNGRADE messages occur. This is done by comparing the
FMS bearing and distance to a beacon against raw data.
2. Ensure proper waypoint sequencing by monitoring the TO waypoint. II in heading mode with
a large cross track error, waypoints will not be sequenced and will thereIore require clearing
manually.
3. Keep a Ilight plan discontinuity only when desired.
4. Anticipate your actions on the MCDU.
Rules regarding predictions
1. Predictions are based on the assumption that the F-PLN route is Ilown in managed modes. II the
aircraIt is oII Ilight plan, a realistic trajectory Ior recapture is assumed.
2. Vertical deviation is shown on the altimeter as a round symbol (yoyo) in descent and against a
scale as a brick in approach. In the latter case, 1 dot indicates 100It deviation.
Rules regarding guidance
1. Engagement oI the managed vertical modes (CLB and DES) is not possible in non managed lateral
modes (HDG or TRK). II the lateral mode is changed to a non managed mode, the vertical mode
will revert to a non managed mode (OP CLIMB in climb, V/S or FPA in descent).
2. NAV mode may be armed when HDG or TRK mode is used Ior F-PLN interception iI the track
crosses the active leg beIore the TO waypoint.
Rules regarding the displays
1. II GPS is not primary and the FM accuracy check is Iailed, raw data must be displayed on the ND.
2. Monitor FMS in managed modes. When NAV mode is used, monitor status on the FMA and
adherence to required trajectory on ND. When CLB or DES modes are used, monitor altitude
targets, speed targets and VDEV indications on PFD and pseudo waypoints on ND.
Airbus Technical Notes
8
2.8. Guidance principals
A star aIter a mode on the FMA indicates a transitive capture mode, e.g. LOC* is displayed during
the localiser capture maneuvre.
CLB is always associated to ALT mode. ALT will appear in the armed line in magenta iI climb
restrictions are associated with waypoints in the Ilight plan, otherwise it will appear in blue.
In DES mode, iI the aircraIt becomes high, the FMS prediction Ior regaining the proIile assumes
that halI speed brakes will be extended.
When the aircraIt reaches the cruise altitude set in the MCDU, ALT CRZ is displayed in the FMA.
II the aircraIt levels oII prior to reaching this level, ALT is displayed.
RWY lateral mode provides lateral guidance Irom the start oI the takeoII roll up to 30It iI a suitable
LOC signal is available.
SRS (speed reIerence system) vertical mode provides vertical guidance up to acceleration altitude.
As long as slats are extended and V
2
is available to the FMS, SRS engages automatically when power
is applied Ior takeoII. It commands a speed oI V
2
10 during normal operations. II an engine Iails,
V
2
is commanded. SRS also maintains a minimum rate oI climb without regard to speed control to
provide windshear protection. At acceleration altitude SRS is automatically replaced by CLB mode,
which accelerates the aircraIt to initial climb speed.
NAV mode engages automatically at 30It provided a RWY and SID have been inserted in the Ilight
plan.
Thrust reduction is indicated by a Ilashing LVR CLB message in the message area oI the FMA thrust
segment. Thrust levers must be manually moved to the CLB detent, wherupon the autothrottle will
engage.
The localiser may be intercepted in NAV mode providing that accuracy is HIGH (i.e. epe~rnp) or
GPS is primary.
In order to arm approach, the ILS and RA must be serviceable, both ILS receivers must be tuned
to the same Irequency and have the same course and the aircraIt must be above 400It. G/S* will
generally not engage unless LOC* or LOC modes are active.
II the ILS ground transmitter becomes unserviceable during an approach, the deviation bars are
removed, and the FD bars Ilash. The AP does, however, remain engaged in G/S and LOC modes.
II the aircraIt suIIers a dual ILS receiver Iailure, the deviation bars are replaced by Iailure Ilags, the
guidance reverts to basic modes and the autopilot trips out.
LAND mode engages below 400It when LOC and G/S modes are engaged. When LAND mode is
engaged, inputs on the FCU are disregarded. It can only be disengaged by a go-around.
FLARE mode engages at 40It. The FD bars are replaced by the yaw bar and the AP/FD commands
a suitable pitch angle Ior the Ilare. II A/THR is active, an automatic RETARD call is made at 10It.
Below 200It, a red AUTOLAND warning will be triggered iI:
both autopilots trip oII
there is a loss oI or excessive deviations in LOC (inhibited below 15It)
there is a loss oI or excessive deviations in G/S (inhibited below 100It)
there is a disagreement in RA indications
The FMGS allows non precision approaches to be Ilown in managed mode as long as the approach
is available in the nav database and the required aids and courses are manually set in the MCDU
Airbus Technical Notes
9
RADIO NAV page. Unless GPS PRIMARY is displayed, accuracy must be checked against raw data.
Also, selected modes must be used iI accuracy is LOW. The managed mode approach is armed with
the APPR pb. II the lateral mode at this time is NAV, APP NAV will immediately engage. Otherwise
it will arm, and will engage Iollowing the standard rules oI NAV engagement. The vertical mode
will arm FINAL and the FINAL APPR combined mode will engage when the preplanned decent
path is intercepted. A V/DEV scale to the right oI the attitude indicator then shows deviations Irom
this path. The FINAL APPR mode disengages at MDA-50It or 400It AGL iI MDA was not entered.
2.9. Protections
Engine failure compensation
II an engine Iails with the AP on, the FMGC provides automatic yaw compensation. This is acheived
using the yaw damper during take-oII and go-around and the automatic rudder trim in all modes.
SRS pitch mode automatically adjusts the target speed iI an engine Iails during take-oII or go-around.
Low speed protection
The A/THR will not Ily speeds below V
ls
, even iI selected by the pilot.
When between 100It and 2000It and in conIiguration 2,3 or FULL, a drop in speed that is signiIi-
cantly below V
ls
, taking into account deceleration rate and Ilight path angle, will trigger a repetetive
"SPEED, SPEED, SPEED aural warning.
II angle oI attack increases above a given threshold known as the alpha Iloor and the aircraIt is above
100It, the A/THR engages in A FLOOR mode and commands TOGA thrust. This occurs even iI
the A/THR is turned oII. Alpha Iloor protection is usually available Irom liIt oII until 100It RA on
approach, but may be lost in cases oI multiple Iailures and when an engine-out occurs above CONF
1. When A FLOOR mode exits, TOGA LK mode engages which locks the thrust at TOGA without
regard to thrust lever position. To regain control oI the thrust, the auto-throttle must be disengaged.
Windshear
Reactive windshear warnings are available Irom liIt oII to 1300It at take oII and Irom 1300It down to
50It on landing, provided at least CONF 1 is selected. It triggers an aural "WINDSHEAR, WINDS-
HEAR, WINDSHEAR" alert and a red WINDSHEAR message is displayed on the attitude indicator.
When SRS mode is engaged a minimum rate oI climb is commanded regardless oI speed. II the angle
oI attack gets too great, the autopilot disengages, but pilot assistance is still provided by the Ily by
wire maximum angle oI attack protection.
In approach, the GS mini Iunction adjusts speed with wind variation, ensuring that ground speed
does not drop below a minimum value.
Mode reversions
When an altitude that is lower than the current altitude is selected during climb or an altitude higher
than the current altitude is selected during descent, the vertical mode reverts to VS at the current
rate oI climb or descent.
II the lateral mode is changed Irom a managed to an unmanaged mode when the vertical mode is
CLB, it will revert to OP CLB. The aircraIt attitude will not change, but altitude constraints will be
lost. Similarly a change to unmanaged lateral mode in descent leads to DES changing to VS with
the current rate oI descent. Again, aircraIt attitude is unchanged.
With FDs engaged and AP disengaged, iI Iailure to Iollow Ilight director commands with the A/THR
in THR IDLE mode results in speed dropping to V
ls
-2kt (V
ls
-17kt with speedbrakes extended), the
Ilight director bars are removed. This causes the A/THR mode to revert to SPEED and the target
speed to be recaptured. Similarly, iI the aircraIt speed reaches V
max
4kt with the A/THR in THR
CLB mode, the A/THR will revert to SPEED to recapture the target speed.
Airbus Technical Notes
10
3. Air conditioning
3.1. Cockpit and cabin
Figure 1. Air conditioning controls
Figure 2. Simplified air conditioning schematic
Pack 1 Pack 2
Mixer
LP Gnd air
Emerg ram air
Pack flow
control valve
Pack flow
control valve
Hot air press
reg valve
Cabin
Air
Cabin
Air
Cockpit Fwd cabin
Aft cabin
Trim air valves
The air conditioning system is controlled by two dual lane air conditioning system controllers. They
provide inputs to the pack Ilow control valves, the packs, the hot air pressure regulating valve (con-
troller 1), the cockpit trim air valve (controller 1) and the cabin trim air valve (controller 2). There
is no eIIect Irom a single lane Iailure, as the backup lane takes over all duties.
The pack Ilow control valves regulate Ilow oI warm pre-conditioned air (originating Irom the pneu-
matic system) to the packs. They are pneumatically operated, electrically controlled and spring load-
ed to the closed position. They automatically close when a pack overheats, during starting or when
either the Iire or ditching push buttons are pressed. They can also be manually closed by pushing
the related PACK button (Figure 1, 'Air conditioning controls|10| (3)). The amber light in
this button indicates valve position disagreement or pack overheat (monitored at compressor outlet
and pack outlet).
Airbus Technical Notes
11
The PACK FLOW selector (Figure 1, 'Air conditioning controls|10| (4)) allows the selection
oI Ilow rate Irom 80 to 120. II only one pack is in use or the APU is supplying bleed air, the
system will deliver high Ilow regardless oI this selection.
Each pack consist oI an air cycle machine and a ram air duct Ior the heat exchangers. The air cycle
machine turbine also drives a cooling Ian that draws cool air over the heat exchangers. Temperature
in the pack is regulated by bypassing air around the air cycle machine via a turbine by-pass valve
and by modulating the ram air intake Ilaps. These Ilaps are closed during take-oII (take-oII power
set, main gear struts compressed) and landing (main gear struts compressed, speed above 70kt until
speed less than 70kt Ior 20 seconds) to avoid FOD ingestion. In the event oI Iailure oI the air cycle
machine the pack may still be operated with reduced Ilow using the heat exchanger only.
The cooled air Irom the packs is then Ied into a mixer unit where it is mixed with recirculated air
Irom the cabin. The mixer then supplies air to three independent zones, the cockpit, the Iorward
cabin and the aIt cabin.
Temperature requirements oI between 18C and 30C are set on the air conditioning panel (Figure 1,
'Air conditioning controls|10| (1)), and cabin zones may be trimmed +2.5C by controls on the
Iorward attendants panel. The output temperature Ior each zone is a Iunction oI actual temperature
(measured by sensors in the cockpit and in the lavatory extraction circuit and galley ventilation sys-
tems) and demanded temperature. Controller 1 regulates cockpit temperature and controller 2 regu-
lates cabin temperature. The packs are controlled to provide air at the lowest temperature required,
then the temperature oI the other zones is trimmed by mixing in hot air that has bypassed the packs
via the hot air pressure regulating valve and trim air valves. II temperature requirements cannot be
met the system will attempt to increase Ilow. II LO Ilow is selected, the system will override to
NORM Ilow. The system can also increase Ilow by increasing bleed pressure by requesting increases
in engine minimum idle or APU Ilow output as required.
The hot air pressure regulating valve is pneumatically operated, electrically controlled and spring
loaded to the closed position. It closes automatically in the case oI a duct overheat (which also closes
the trim valves), iI either the cockpit trim valve Iails or both cabin trim valves Iail, or iI both lanes
oI a system controller Iail. It can be closed manually with the HOT AIR button (Figure 1, 'Air
conditioning controls |10| (2)). II the hot air pressure regulating valve Iails open, there is no
eIIect as the trim valves take over its duties. II it Iails closed, optimized regulation is lost and the
packs are used Ior all regulation (pack 2 controls to the mean oI FWD and AFT temperatures). The
amber FAULT light in the HOT AIR button indicates duct temperatures in excess oI 88C. It will
extinguish once temperature drops below 70C and OFF is selected.
Control oI zone temperature is provided by a Zone Control Computer. This computer controls the
trim valves and provides data to the pack controllers. It is dual channel. Failure oI a single channel
gives a ALTN MODE indication on the ECAM COND page. II a dual channel Iailure occurs, there
is no trimming and zone temperature is purely a Iunction oI pack outlet temperature. A dual channel
Iailure produces a PACK REG legend on the ECAM COND page, with amber crosses shown Ior
the trim system and zone temperatures.
The mixer may also be supplied with ram air. This is controlled with the RAM AIR push button
(Figure 1, 'Air conditioning controls|10| (5)) and is used in the case oI double pack Iailure or
smoke removal. A check valve located in the ram air duct opens only when cabin diIIerential is less
than 1 psi, thus preventing backIlow iI the cabin is pressurised. The RAM AIR push button also opens
the outIlow valve to approx. 50 iI the outIlow valve is under automatic control and diIIerential
pressure is less than 1 psi. Since operation oI the ram air valve leads to aircraIt depressurisation, it
should not normaly be operated above FL100/MORA. Opening oI the ram air duct is inhibited iI the
DITCHING button has been pressed. When parked, low pressure conditioned air may be Ied into the
ram air duct to allow ground conditioning. The packs must be turned oII when LP ground air is used.
Airbus Technical Notes
12
3.2. Cargo compartments
Figure 3. Simplified schematic of cargo bay air conditioning
Cargo compartment
Hot bleed air
Cabin ambient air
nlet isolation valve
Outlet isolation valve Extractor fan
Trim air valve
Cargo compartment air conditioning is Iully automatic. Ambient cabin air enters the compartment
via an inlet isolation valve. An extractor Ian or diIIerential pressure is used to exhaust the air over-
board via an outlet isolation valve. Operation oI the two valves and the extractor Ian is controlled
automatically by a cargo ventilation controller.
Cargo compartment heating is provided by hot bleed air that enters via a trim air valve. This valve
is controlled by a cargo heating controller. The bleed air source Ior trimming the Iorward hold is the
same duct that is used Ior trimming the cockpit and cabin and thus uses the same hot air valve. The
rear compartment has its own independent hot air valve.
The cargo heat panel is on the right hand side oI the overhead panel. Two rotary selectors set tem-
perature in the compartments, with the normal 12 o'clock position being approx. 16C.
Airbus Technical Notes
13
4. Pressurisation
Figure 4. Pressurisation controls
Pressurisation control is provided by an outIlow valve and two saIety valves, one to prevent over-
pressurisation (~8.6 psi), the other to prevent under-pressurisation (~1 psi below ambient).
Two identical cabin pressure controllers, one acting as master, the other as a reserve, provide auto-
mated control oI pressurisation. Each controller has an associated motor with which to modulate the
outIlow valve. A third motor provides Ior manual control. The pressure controllers exchange roles
70 seconds aIter each landing.
The LDG ELEV selector (Figure 4, 'Pressurisation controls|13| (1)) can be set to AUTO or to
an altitude. In AUTO the controller uses the landing elevation Irom the FMGC. II using a manually
selected landing elevation, the CAB ALT on the ECAM PRESS page should be used rather than
the coarse scale.
The landing QNH is usually sourced Irom the FMGC. II this is not available, the captain's baro
reIerence Irom the ADIRS is used.
The automatic pressurisation control operates in 6 modes:
Ground(GN) BeIore takeoII and 55 seconds aIter landing, the outIlow valve is Iully opened.
At touchdown any residual cabin pressure is released at a cabin vertical speed
oI 500 Ipm.
TakeoII(TO) The aircraIt is pre-pressurised to 0.1 psi diII at a rate oI 400 Ipm.
Climb(CL) Cabin altitude iI a Iunction oI actual rate oI climb.
Cruise(CR) The higher oI cabin altitude at level-oII or landing Iield elevation is maintained.
Descent(DE) Cabin rate oI descent maintained so that cabin pressure equals landing Iield pres-
sure, with a maximum R.O.D. oI 750Ipm.
Abort(AB) Cabin pressure set to take-oII altitude 0.1 psi.
II a single pressure controller Iails, the other automatically takes over. II both pressure controllers
Iail, an amber FAULT light appears on the MODE SEL push button (Figure 4, 'Pressurisation con-
trols |13| (2)). Pressing this button puts the pressurisation in manual mode, and the spring load-
ed MAN V/S CTL toggle switch (Figure 4, 'Pressurisation controls|13| (3)) must be used to
control the pressurisation. When in MAN mode, the CAB V/S display on the ECAM CRUISE page
changes to a gauge Iormat to assist with manual control. Changing to manual mode Ior 10 seconds
and then back to auto mode will cause the pressure controllers to swap roles.
The outIlow valve is below the ditching water line. Pressing the ditching button (Figure 4, 'Pressuri-
sation controls |13| (4)) closes the outIlow valve unless it is under manual control. Note that
use oI the ditching button and low pressure ground air will cause a build up oI diIIerential pressure.
Airbus Technical Notes
14
5. Avionics ventilation
Figure 5. Simplified avionics cooling schematic
Avionics
Eqpt
Skin
Heat
Exch
Cockpit panel
ventilation
Cargo underfloor
Air cond duct
Overboard
Air cond from cockpit
Avionics bay
Skin air
inlet valve Blower
fan
Extract
fan
Skin exchange
isolation valve
Skin air
extract valve
Air con
inlet valve
Skin exchange
inlet bypass valve
Skin exchange outlet
bypass valve
Exterior
Open-circuit shown
Smoke
Detector
Ventilation oI the avionics is primarily provided by two Ians, one acting as a blower, the other as
an extractor. Control is provided by the Avionics Equipment Ventilation Computer (AEVC). The
system's normal modes are:
Close-circuit Used when skin temperature is low. The skin exchange outlet bypass, inlet
bypass and isolation valves (shown in blue in Figure 5, 'SimpliIied avionics
cooling schematic |14|) are open and all other valves are closed. This
leads to air being drawn Irom the avionics bay and exhausted into the under-
Iloor oI the cargo bay, with a return loop via the skin heat exchanger.
Intermediate Used in Ilight when skin temperature is high. This is similar to close-circuit
except the skin air extract valve is partially opened to allow some air to exhaust
overboard.
Open-circuit Used Ior ground operations (oleo compressed, thrust below TO) with a high
skin temperature. In this mode only the skin air inlet and extract valves (shown
in red in Figure 5, 'SimpliIied avionics cooling schematic|14|) are open,
meaning air Irom outside the aircraIt is moved across the avionics equipment
and then exhausted externally.
The skin temperature thresholds are diIIerent Ior Ilight and ground cases and incorporate a dead band
to prevent rapid mode switching. The bands are 9C to 12C on the ground and 32C to 35C in Ilight.
Cooling oI the cockpit panels is provided by drawing air conditioned air Irom the cockpit over the
panels in all modes.
Airbus Technical Notes
15
Figure 6. Avionics ventilation controls
II a Iault occurs with one oI the Ians, a FAULT light will illuminate on the associated button (Figure 6,
'Avionics ventilation controls |15| (1)). The BLOWER FAULT light is also used to indicate
a duct overheat. Selecting OVRD puts the system in closed-circuit conIiguration and opens the air
conditioning inlet valve so that air conditioned air assists with the cooling. II the BLOWER button
is in OVRD, the blower Ian is stopped. II the EXTRACT button is in OVRD, the extract Ian is
controlled directly Irom the pushbutton and both Ians continue to run. TODO: There appears to
be a conIlict between the text and the diagram with regards to the action oI the skin exchange inlet
bypass valve when EXTRACT is in OVRD. The diagram essentially indicates air con as sole intake
and no exhaust!}
A smoke detector is situated immediately upstream oI the extract Ian. II smoke is detected both
FAULT lights come on. Selecting OVRD on both buttons puts the system in smoke removal mode.
This is similar to open-circuit except the intake air is provided by the air-conditioning rather than
Irom outside the aircraIt and the blower Ian is stopped.
TODO: Controller Iailure - manual is very unclear what happens here.}
Airbus Technical Notes
16
6. Electrics
Figure 7. Simplified schematic of electrical system
Gen
1
Gen
2
APU
Gen
Ext
pwr
Ess
TR
AC Bus 1 AC Bus 2
Emerg
Gen
TR2 TR1
AC Ess Bus
DC Bus 1 DC Bus 2 DC Ess Bus
Bat
1
Bat
2
Hot Bus 1 Hot Bus 2
DC Bat Bus
Inv
GLC1 GLC2 EPC AGC
AC Ess
feed 1
AC Ess
feed 2
DC Tie
Cont 1
DC Tie
Cont 2
Bat
cont 1
Bat
cont 2
Stat
Inv
Cont
BTC BTC
The electrical system consists oI a three phase 115/200V 400Hz AC system and a 28V DC system.
Primary AC supply is Irom two 90 KVA engine driven integrated drive generators (IDGs). Each IDG
has an associated generator control unit (GCU) which provides Irequency, voltage and generator
line contactor (GLC) control. A third 90 KVA generator is driven by the APU. This generator, along
with ground power, is controlled by the Ground and Auxiliary Power Control Unit (GAPCU). Each
oI the three main generators is capable oI supplying the power requirements oI the entire system.
The generators cannot be connected in parallel, and are automatically brought on line according to
priority rules. The IDGs are highest priority, Iollowed by EXT PWR when connected, Iollowed by
the APU generator.
A 5KVA hydraulically powered (blue system) constant speed emergency AC generator and associ-
ated GCU provide power in the event oI Iailure oI normal sources. In addition a 1KVA static inverter
supplies emergency power to part oI the AC essential bus iI the batteries are the only remaining
power source.
Primary DC power is provided by two 200A transIormer rectiIier units with automatic protection
circuits that disconnect the TR in the event oI overheat or minimum current. A third identical TR,
the "essential" TR provides power Ior the DC Essential bus in the event oI loss oI all normal AC
generators (the Ess Tr is capable oI drawing power Irom the emergency AC generator) or in the
event oI loss oI one or both oI the main TRs.
Two 23Ah batteries are also provided Ior emergency DC power. Each has an associated battery
charger limiter (BCL) to monitor charging and control its battery contactor. The minimum required
Airbus Technical Notes
17
oIIline battery voltage is 25.5V. II the battery voltage is below minimum, they can be recharged
by connecting the batteries to the battery bus and applying external power Ior approximately 20
minutes. In the event oI Iailure oI all other power sources, the batteries can provide emergency power
Ior approximately 30 minutes.
Two types oI CB are Iitted. Monitored CBs are green and trigger ECAM warning messages when
out Ior more than one minute. Non-monitored CBs are black and do not cause ECAM warnings. The
Wing Tip Brakes (WTB) CBs have red caps to prevent them being reset.
In normal Ilight, the AC Busses are supplied via a their associated generator and the AC Ess Bus is
supplied Irom AC Bus 1 (i.e. AC Ess Ieed 2 is open). TR1 supplies DC Bus 1, the battery bus and the
DC essential bus, and TR2 supplies DC Bus 2 (i.e. DC Tie Cont 2 is open). When battery charging
is required the BCL closes the required battery contactor to connect the battery to the DC Bat Bus.
II a single engine driven generator is lost, the system will automatically replace it with the APU
generator iI available, or else it will shed part oI the galley load and route power Irom the other
engine driven generator. II all main generators are lost, AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 2 are lost. II aircraIt
speed is suIIiciently high (~ 100kt) a ram air turbine (RAT) automatically deploys. This powers the
blue hydraulic system which, in turn, powers the emergency AC generator. Once this generator is
online (approx 8 seconds Ior RAT deployment and generator coupling), it powers the AC Ess bus,
the Ess TR and hence the DC Ess bus. II the RAT stalls or the aircraIt speed is below 100kt, the AC
Shed ESS and DC shed ESS buses are shed and the remains oI the essential system are powered via
the batteries and static inverter. Once on the ground, the DC bus is automatically connected to the
batteries below 100kt and the AC Ess Bus is shed below 50kt.
A "smoke conIiguration" is provided that sheds 75 oI electrical equipment, the remaining 25
being controlled by easily accessible CBs on the overhead panel (with the exception oI equipment
attached to the hot busses). It is essentially the same as Ior the loss oI all main generators, except the
Iuel pumps are connected upstream oI the Gen 1 line connector.
II AC bus 1 Iails, power Ior the AC Ess bus must be re-routed Irom AC bus 2. Automatic re-routing
is available on some aircraIt. Manual re-routing is achieved by pressing the AC Ess Ieed pushbutton.
TR1 is lost causing the Ess TR to supply the DC Ess bus and, aIter a 5 second delay, DC bus 2 to
provide power to DC bus 1.
II both main TRs are lost, DC Bus 1, DC Bus 2 and the DC Bat bus are lost. The DC Ess bus is
powered by the Ess TR.
With the engines shut down on the ground, either the APU or external power may be used to supply
the entire system. In addition, external power can supply the AC and DC GND/FLT buses directly
without supplying the entire system using the MAINT BUS switch in the Iorward entrance area.
Figure 8. Electrical controls on overhead panel
Airbus Technical Notes
18
When an IDG must be disengaged, the IDG button should be pressed and held until the Gen FAULT
light comes on, but should not be held Ior more than 3 seconds.
In the event oI a generator having out oI limit load but continuing to power its AC bus, the amber
FAULT light in the GEN button will not illuminate.
Pressing the BUS TIE button (OFF position) manually opens the bus tie contactors (BTCs). In this
case, only IDG 1 can supply AC 1 and only IDG 2 can supply AC 2. This may be used to isolate
a short circuit that has aIIected both halves.
Airbus Technical Notes
19
7. Pneumatics
The pneumatic system provides high pressure air Ior:
Air conditioning
Wing anti icing
Water pressurisation
Hydraulic resevoir pressurisation
Engine starting
Figure 9. Simplified schematic of pneumatic system
Bleed valve
HP valve
P port HP port
Pre-cooler
Cross bleed valve
APU
APU bleed valve
Ground ASU
The sources oI air are:
The engines
The APU
High pressure gound air
Two Bleed Monitoring Computers, one per engine, control and monitor the pneumatic system. They
are partially redundant, so in the event oI a Iailed BMC, the other BMC can take over most oI its
Iunctions.
Sensors in the vicinity oI the hot air ducts detect leakage. II leakage is detected, the BMCs are
signalled and they automatically shut down the aIIected area.
Engine bleed air is tapped at two compressor ports known as the Intermediate Pressure (IP) port and
the High Pressure (HP) port. The HP port only provides air when the IP pressure is insuIIicient. The
system automatically controls the delivery oI air Irom the HP port using an HP valve.
The pre-cooler uses cold air Irom the engine to cool the bleed air.
The APU bleed air has priority over the engine bleed air. The engine bleeds valves will thereIore
remain closed whenever the APU bleen is ON.
Airbus Technical Notes
20
The GND indication on the ECAM bleed page is always displayed on the ground, even iI no ground
HP unit is connected. Its purpose is solely as an indication as to where ground HP air would enter the
system. The presence oI ground HP air can be determined by examining the bleed pressures relative
to attached sources. APU bleed air should not be connected when HP ground air is in use.
A single engine bleed can supply both packs. It can only supply one pack, however, when supplying
the wing anti ice system.
Airbus Technical Notes
21
8. Communications
Three radio management panels (RMP), two on the center pedestal and one on the overhead panel,
and three audio control panels (ACP), each located next to an RMP, control radio communications.
The RMPs also provide a backup Ior radio nav aid tuning.
Each RMP can tune any communication radio. Usually, however, RMP1 is dedicated to VHF1,
RMP2 to VHF2 and RMP3 to VHF3 or HF. A white SEL light illuminates when a radio that is not
dedicated to an RMP is selected. Note that the standby Irequency is speciIic to the RMP, not the
radio currently being tuned.
The ACPs incorporate SELCAL and interphone call alerts. When any oI these calls occurs, a buzzer
sounds and the relevant transmit button Ilashes amber. The RESET button is used to silence these
alerts. The VOICE key supresses a nav aid's ident so that voice transmissions can be heard more
clearly.
A CALLS panel situated in the leIt lower corner oI the overhead panel.The MECH button illumi-
nates a light on the external power panel and sounds an external horn. Pressing either the FWD or
AFT buttons causes a high/low chime in the cabin and a "CAPTAIN CALL" message to appear at
the selected cabin station. The ALL button does the same, except the message appears at all cabin
stations. Activation oI the emergency call system, either initiated by the Ilight crew by pressing the
EMER button or initiated by the cabin crew, causes the CALL light in the EMER button to Ilash
amber and the ON light to Ilash white. II the call is to the cabin, three high/low chimes sound in the
cabin. II it is Irom the cabin, three long buzzers sound on the Ilight deck.
The CVR, when activated, records the last two hours oI communications and aural warnings Irom the
cockpit. It is controlled Irom the RCDR panel. In AUTO mode, it runs Ior Iive minutes aIter power
is applied to the aircraIt, then automatically shuts down. It then restarts aIter Iirst engine start and
continues running until Iive minutes aIter the last engine has been shut down. Pushing the GND CTL
pushbutton manually powers the CVR on the ground. The CVR ERASE and CVR TEST buttons are
inhibited unless GND CTL is ON, the aircraIt is on the ground and the parking brake is set. Pushing
the CVR ERASE button Ior two seconds erases the CVR recording. Pushing the CVR TEST button
sounds a tone through the loudspeakers iI the CVR is serviceable.
The system monitors the communication radios and will produce an ECAM warning iI there is
continuous transmission.
A switch on the overhead panel allows Ior deselection oI a Iailed ACP and its replacement by ACP3.
Airbus Technical Notes
22
9. APU
The APU may be started with DC Irom the batteries or with AC. The APU panel is located at the
bottom centre oI the overhead panel. External APU controls are located on the external power panel
in the nose gear bay.
To start the APU, Iirst press the master switch button, then the start button. The start sequence begins
when the APU inlet Ilap is Iully open.
To shut down the APU, turn oII the master switch. II the APU bleed has been used, the shutdown
sequence incorporates a delay oI between 60 and 120 seconds beIore shutting down. As long as the
AVAIL light is still displayed, the shut down sequence can be cancelled by turning the master switch
back on. II APU bleed has not been used, the shutdown is immediate.
The APU control is completely automatic. Auto-shutdown is available whenever the APU is running.
Automatic deployment oI the APU extinguisher is also available on the ground. APU emergency
shutdown is initiated by pressing the APU Iire button or by pressing the APU SHUT OFF button
on the external panel. An APU Iire in Ilight will show the APU FIRE procedure on the ECAM,
Iollowed by the APU EMER SHUT procedure. On the ground, a Iire will cause the APU AUTO
SHUT DOWN procedure to be shown aIter the APU Iire procedure.
The LOW OIL LEVEL on the ECAM indicates that the APU can only be used Ior a Iurther 10 hours
beIore maintenance is required. The amber FUEL LOW PR indication occurs during start iI Iuel
pressure is low. It is only an advisory.
9.1. Limitations
Table 2. APU limitations
APU bleed air with 2 packs 15,000It
APU bleed air with 1 pack 20,000It
Battery restart limit 25,000It
Operation and restart ceiling 39,000It
APU elec power 39,000It
Airbus Technical Notes
23
10. Cabin
The Cabin Intercommunication Data System (CIDS) consists oI two directors, one active and one
hot standby. The CIDS communicates with cabin, passengers and crew via Decoder Encoder Units
(DEUs) and is programmed and tested via a Programming and Test Panel (PTP).
The Forward Attendant Panel (FAP) is located at the purser station and consists oI:
An optional air conditioning panel
A lighting panel
An audio panel
A water and miscellaneous panel
The PTP is located behind a hinged access door to the leIt oI the FAP. It is equipped with a Cabin
Assignment Module (CAM) containing airline speciIic data. It is the PTP communicates system
status to the crew.
The AIt Attendant Panel (AAP) is located at the rear leIt crew station. It allows control oI a subset
oI cabin systems.
An Attendant Indication Panel (AIP) is located near each main cabin crew station. It displays com-
munication and system related messages.
Area Call Panels (ACP) are located in the ceiling at either end oI the cabin. Their indications are:
Pink steady or pink Ilashing Crew communication
Blue steady Passenger call
Amber steady Lavatory call
Amber Ilashing Lavatory smoke detection
The controls on the main doors consist oI an opening handle with an associated mechanical door
status indicator located towards the top oI the door and a slide arming lever with associated status
indicator just above the lever. An emergency opening cylinder and assocated pressure gauge are
situated in the door support and a white gust lock button is located on top oI the door support. Each
door has an observation window, and two indicators are Iitted at the bottom oI this window. The
Iirst is a cabin pressure indicator which Ilashes red iI the cabin is still pressurised when the engines
are shut down and the slide is disarmed. A white indicator illuminates as the opening handle is Iirst
moved iI the slide is armed.
The overwing exits have a single opening handle with a protective cover. II the cover is removed,
a white "SLIDE ARMED" light will illuminate.
The slides deploy automatically iI the doors are opened when the slide is armed. A red manual
inIlation handle is provided on the right side oI the girt bar Ior the main doors and in the exit Irame Ior
the overwings. The main door slides are single lane, and the overwing slides are dual lane. All slides
are Iitted with integral lighting and emergency lights are Iitted to the aircraIt below the overwing
exits to illuminate the route to the slide. Red handles are Iitted to the sides oI the slide near the
bottom to allow the slide to be used as a rag slide in case oI pressure loss. The main door slides have
a white handle under the girt bar cover that allows the slide to be quickly detached Irom the aircraIt.
It will remain attached to the aircraIt by a tether, and a kniIe is provided to cut this tether. In case oI
ditching, it is possible to transport a slide Irom an inoperative door and deploy it Irom an operative
door once that door's slide has been detached.
Emergency oxygen generators are Iitted above each row oI passenger seats, above each cabin crew
station and in the lavatories. The generators start automatically when any oI the masks attached to
it are pulled down.
Airbus Technical Notes
24
An emergency evacuation system is Iitted, with contols on the FAP, AAP and cockpit. An EVAC
panel is situated on the leIt oI the overhead panel. The CAPT & PURS/ CAPT switch determines
which stations can initiate an evacuation alert.
Airbus Technical Notes
25
11. Navigation
11.1. Air Data and Inertial Reference System (ADIRS)
There are three identical Air Data Intertial ReIerence Units (ADIRU). In general ADIRU 1 and
ADIRU 2 supply on-side systems and ADIRU 3 is a hot spare. Each ADIRU combines an Air Data
ReIerence (ADR) computer and a laser gyro based Inertial ReIerence (IR) system. The two sub-
units are completely independent. The ADR part gathers data Irom aircraIt probes and sensors, and
provides the Iollowing data to other systems:
Airspeed and Mach number
Temperature
Barometric altitude
Angle oI attack
Overspeed warnings
The IR part provides the Iollowing data:
Attitude
Heading
AircraIt position
Track
Acceleration
Ground speed
Flight Path Vector
The ADIRS control panel is located at the top leIt oI the overhead panel. ADR controls are at the
bottom oI the panel and IR controls are at the top, with the rotary selectors aIIecting both sub-
systems. The ON BAT light indicates that the IRs are being powered by the aircraIt batteries. This
light will illuminate Ior a short time during the selI-test at the start oI the alignment sequence. The
ALIGN lights are illuminated steady during the alignment sequence, and should extinguish aIter
approximately ten minutes when the sequence is complete. The lights will Ilash white under the
Iollowing conditions:
IRU alignment Iault
No present position entered on the INIT page oI the MCDU aIter 10 minutes Irom the start oI
alignment sequence.
The entered position diIIers Irom the shutdown position diIIers by more than 1.
A display, keypad and selectors are provided Ior viewing IR inIormation directly on the ADIRS
panel. The TEST position tests the lights on the keypad and provides a test pattern on the display. II
HDG is selected on the display during alignment, a time to navigation (TTN) readout is shown.
IR realignment is usually uneccessary on turn arounds. II an IR has a residual ground speed ~5kt
(shown on one oI the NDs Ior IR1 and 2 and on the ADIRS panel Ior IR3) a quick align should
be carried out. This is acheived by selecting the OFF position on the IRS selectors then reselecting
NAV within 5 seconds.
The ADIRS have a comparator Ieature and will alert the crew to diIIerences in the attitudes displayed
on the PFDs. The Iaulty data can be determined by cross checking with the standby attitude indicator
and the third ADIRU can then be selected as required.
Airbus Technical Notes
26
11.2. Radio navigation
FMGCs auto-tune VORs, ILSs and DMEs Ior position updating. The ADFs are only auto tuned
under speciIic circumstances. Manual tuning oI the aids is via the RAD NAV MCDU page. When
aids are manually tuned, FMGC auto tuning continues in the background. II an ILS approach is
selected the PFDs show the on-side ILS and the NDs show the oII-side ILS.
II both FMGCs Iail, radio aids may be tuned using the nav mode oI RMP1 and RMP2. The RMPs
tune their on-side VORs, DMEs and ADFs. The ILS Irequency tuned on either RMP is sent to both
ILSs. When a NAV key is pressed on an RMP, the RADIO NAV page blanks, showing only the titles.
DME inIormation will ot be displayed on the PFD Ior an ILS/DME tuned on an RMP.
Standby display oI radio data is provided on the DDRMI. This combines a traditional RMI presen-
tation with raw DME data Ior any selected VORs. The compass card displays the bearing supplied
by ADIRU 1.
11.3. Standby instruments
A standby ASI, altimeter and attitude indicator are provided to the right oI the captain's ND and
a pull down standby compass is Iitted on top oI the windshield centre post. The standby attitude
indicator is the only standby instrument requiring electrical power. It will operate Ior approximately
Iive minutes aIter a total electrical Iailure.
11.4. EGPWS
The EPGWS normal inputs are:
RA1
ADIRS1
ILS1
FMGC1
LGCIU1
The basic GPWS has no Iorward looking capability - it mainly monitors RA1 Ior potentially hazer-
dous values or trends. The warnigs and alerts provided are:
Condition Alert Warning
High descent rate at low level "Sink rate" "Whoop whoop pull up"
Rising ground "Terrain, Terrain" "Whoop whoop pull up"
Rate oI descent during initial climb
or go around
"Don't sink" None
Gear and/or Ilaps retracted close to
ground
"Too low terrain", then
"Too low gear" or iI gear
is down "Too low, Ilaps"
None
SigniIicantly below ILS glideslope "Glideslope" "Glideslope" (louder)
The "Glideslope" alert and warning are accompanied by an amber G/S light on the GPWS warning
light. All other alerts and warnings give a red GPWS warning.
Some basic GPWS warnings may be supressed using the GPWS panel on the leIt side oI the overhead
panel. The most common supression is GPWS FLAP 3, used Ior Ilap 3 landings. FLAP MODE
OFF is used Ior landings below Ilap 3. G/S MODE inhibits glideslope warnings. The system can be
completely deactivated by pressing the SYS button.
Airbus Technical Notes
27
The EGPWS system provides a look ahead capability by comparing caution and warning terrain
envelopes generated Irom a terrain database to FMGS position data and baro data Irom the Captain's
altimeter. Both en-route terrain and runway clearance Iloor envelopes are provided. The extended
Iunctions are inhibited when navigation perIormance is LOW.
The terrain is displayed on the ND when the TERR ON ND putton on the center panel is pressed.
Areas not included in the database are color coded magenta. Dotted red areas are more than 2000It
above the aircraIt, dotted orange areas more than 1000It above the aircraIt and amber areas are
between 1000It above and 500It below (250It below with gear down) the aircraIt.
The EGPWS derived en-route caution generates a "Terrain Ahead" aural alert combined with an
GPWS red light, a TERR AHEAD amber message and conIlicting terrain displayed solid yellow on
the ND. The en-route warning generates "Terrain ahead, pull up" and the message and terrain are
displayed in red in the ND. The clearance Iloor alert generates a "Too low terrain" aural alert. The
terrain display is automatically shown in all cases TODO: check true Ior CF case}.
The enhanced Iunctions may be inhibited with the TERR button on the GPWS panel. A Iailure in
the extended Iunctions will cause an amber FAULT light on the SYS button, but this will not aIIect
basic GPWS Iunctions.
EPGWS warnings are overridden by stall or windshear warnings.
The system can be tested by pushing the GPWS/GP warning light.
11.5. Radio altimeter
There are no cockpit controls Ior the radio altimeters. They selI test when AC power is Iirst applied
to the aircraIt, then enter a standby mode. They become active at liIt oII and operate continuously
until touchdown.
Rad alt data is displayed whenever below 2500It radio height. This consists oI color coded digits at
the bottom oI the attitude indicator, a red ground bar on the altimeter scale and a white ground bar
on the attitude indicator. The ground bar merges with the horizon at touch down. Radio heights are
also announced by a synthetic voice during approach.
II a single radio altimeter Iails, data Irom the remaining one will be displayed on both screens.
Airbus Technical Notes
28
12. Fire protection
12.1. Engine and APU
Each engine has an identical Iire detection system, comprising two parallel detection loops monitored
by a Iire detection unit (FDU). Normally, both loops must indicate a Iire to produce a warning. The
loops are monitored and automatically disabled iI they malIunction. Loss oI a single loop produces
a level 1 ECAM warning. Loss oI both loops, or loss oI an FDU, leads to a level 2 ECAM warning
indicating loss oI Iire detection capability on that engine. II both loops break within 5 seconds, a Iire
warning is triggered. Each engine has a guarded Iire button on the overhead Iire panel. This lights
up to provide Iire indications. When pushed, the Iire button pops out as a physical indication oI
activation. Pushing the Iire button arms the squibs and closes the Iollowing on the aIIected engine:
Pneumatic bleed valves
Pack valves
Fuel valves
Hydraulic valves
The APU has an identical Iire detection to the engine. When pushed, the APU button ... TODO}
Each engine has two Iire bottles and the apu has a single Iire bottle. These are discharged by pressing
one oI the AGENT buttons situated near their respective Iire buttons. The APU Iire extinguisher
may also be discharged automatically in the case oI an APU Iire on the ground. Secondary engine
Iire indications are provided by Iire lights on the pedestal ENG panel, and a secondary external APU
Iire indication, together with a guarded APU SHUT OFF button, is provided on the EXTERNAL
POWER panel. Once a Iire is extinguished, the light in the Iire button will extinguish.
Test buttons Ior each system are situated near their respective Iire button.
12.2. Cargo
There are two detector loops Ior the cargo compartments. Each loop has two detectors in the aIt
cargo compartment and one in the Iorward. A Smoke Detection Control Unit (SDCU) receives indi-
cations Irom these detectors and Iorwards them to the FWC which displays warnings on the CAR-
GO SMOKE panel. II smoke is detected, the inlet and exhaust valves Ior the aIIected cargo bay are
automatically closed. A single Iire bottle is provided Ior both compartments. The aIt compartment
has two nozzles, and the Iorward compartment only one. When a DISCH button is pushed on the
CARGO SMOKE panel, the bottle is completely emptied into the selected compartment. Smoke
warnings will not extinguish once a Iire is extinguished as the smoke will remain isolated in the
cargo compartment and the smoke detectors are sensitive to the extinguishing agent.
12.3. Other
A smoke detector is provided Ior the avionics in the air extraction duct. Its operation is detailed in
Section 5, 'Avionics ventilation |14|.
Each lavatory has a smoke detector. These are conected to another SDCU which transmits data to the
Ilight warning computer (FWC) and cabin intercommunication data system (CIDS). Each lavatory
waste bin has an automatic Iire extinguishing system.
Airbus Technical Notes
29
13. Ice & rain protection
13.1. Wing anti-ice
The three outboard slats oI each wing are anti-iced using hot bleed air Irom the pneumatic system.
APU bleed air must not be used Ior wing anti-icing. Each wing has a single electrically (DC ESS
SHED) operated valve that controls Ilow oI air to the slats. Both valves are controlled by a single
WING button on the anti-ice panel. The valves Iail closed in the event electrical power is lost.
Selecting wing anti-ice causes the FADECS to decrease N1 limit and increase idle N1.
II a hot air leak is detected, the wing anti-ice valve on the aIIected side automatically closes.
II the WING button is pushed on the ground, a 30 second selI test oI the wing anti-ice system is
initiated. II leIt on, the valves will open automatically once airborne.
13.2. Engine anti-ice
The engine air intakes are anti iced using an independent air bleed Irom the HP compressor. For
each engine, hot air is routed via an electrically controlled (DC1 and DC2), pneumatically operated
engine anti-ice valve to the intake. These are controlled by the ENG1 and ENG2 buttons on the
anti-ice panel. The valves close iI no air is available, but Iail open iI electrical power is lost.
The Ian blades are not anti-iced. II icing conditions last longer than 30 minutes or signiIicant icing
induced engine vibrations occur, the Ian ice can be shed by running the engines up to 70 N2 Ior
30 seconds |FCOM 3.3.9.1000| (n.b. parking brake limitation oI 75 N1 |FCOM 3.1.32.1000|).
This run up should also be carried out just prior to takeoII iI conditions require it. In Ireezing rain,
Ireezing Iog or heavy snow, ice shedding can be enhanced by momentary run ups to 70 at intervals
oI less than 10 minutes.
13.3. Window heat
The windshield and side windows are heated electrically. Each side has an independent Window
Heat Computer (WHC) that automatically regulates the system and provides overheat protection and
Iault detection. The window heat operates whenever at least one engine is running. On the ground,
the windshield heat operates in a low power mode, with an automatic changeover to normal power
once airborne. The windows only have one heating level. II window heat is required beIore engine
start it can be switched on manually with the PROBE/WINDOW HEAT button on the anti-ice panel.
13.4. Probe heat
The pitot heads, static ports, AOA probes and TAT probes are elecrically heated. The Captain's
probes, F/O's probes and standby probes each have an independent Probe Heat Computer (PHC).
These provide automatic regulation, overheat protection and Iault detection. The probes are heated
whenever at least one engine is running. On the ground, the pitot heating operates at low level and the
TAT probes are not heated. Changeover to normal heating is automatic once airborne. II probe heat
is required beIore engine start it can be switched on manually with the PROBE/WINDOW HEAT
button on the anti-ice panel.
13.5. Other
Each Iront windshield has a two-speed electric wiper controlled by a rotary selector. The maximum
speed Ior wiper use is 230kt |FCOM 3.1.20|.
In moderate to heavy rain only |FCOM 3.4.30.4000|, rain repellent can be applied to the windshield.
Each windshield has an independent RAIN RPLNT button that applies a measured quantity when
pressed. The rain repellent is stored in a nitrogen pressurised bottle in the rear cockpit. II the pressure
gauge is in the yellow or the REFILL Iloat is visible, the bottle needs replacing. A smell oI orange
peels in the cockpit may indicate a toxic leak oI rain repellent Iluid. A smell oI pine needles may
indicate a non-toxic leak |FCOM 3.2.26.6000|.
Airbus Technical Notes
30
An external lighted visual ice detector is installed between the two windshields.
The water drain masts are electrically heated. This heat is reduced when on the ground.
Airbus Technical Notes
31
14. Hydraulics
Figure 10. Simplified schematic of hydraulic system
Green
Reservoir
Blue
Reservoir
Yellow
Reservoir
Eng 1 fire
shutoff valve
Eng 2 fire
shutoff valve
RAT
PTU
Eng 1
pump
Eng 2
pump
Accumulator
Hand
pump
AC1
pump
AC2
pump
There are three continuously operating hydraulic systems, designated green, yellow and blue.
Each hydraulic system has its own reservoir. The reservoirs are pressurized by bleed air to prevent
cavitation. The normal source is engine 1, but iI pressure becomes low bleed air is taken Irom the
cross-bleed duct. The reservoirs are monitored Ior low Iluid level, low air pressure and overheat.
The green and yellow systems are normally pressurized by engine driven hydraulic pumps. These
pumps have a upstream shutoII valve that cuts oII the Ilow oI hydraulic Iluid when the associated
engine Iire button is pushed. The yellow hydraulic system may also be pressurized by an electric
pump. This pump may be powered by either AC2 or external power. It operates automatically to
partially pressurize the yellow system when the cargo doors are moved. It may be selected on man-
ually using a switch on the hydraulics panel, in which case it Iully pressurizes the yellow system.
Operation is signiIied on the ECAM HYD page by the hollow white triangle next to the word ELEC
becoming solid green. A hand pump is provided to partially pressurize the yellow system and enable
the cargo doors to be opened in the absence oI electrical power.
The blue system is normally pressurized by an electric pump powered by AC1. This pump operates
whenever AC power is available unless the aircraIt is on the ground with both engines shut down. In
this case it may be operated using the BLUE PUMP OVRD pushbutton on the maintenance panel.
In an emergency situation, the blue system may also be pressurized by a Ram Air Turbine (RAT).
The RAT deploys automatically iI both AC BUS 1 and AC BUS 2 are lost. It may also be deployed
manually using the RAT MAN ON button on the hydraulics panel. The RAT cannot be restowed in
Ilight. Deployment oI the RAT is indicated on the ECAM HYD page by the hollow white triangle
next to the word RAT turning solid green.
The engine driven pumps and the electric pumps supply 3000psi. The RAT supplies 2500psi. The
pumps are all monitored Ior low output pressure. The electric pumps are also monitored Ior overheat.
A Power TransIer Unit (PTU) allows cross pressurization between yellow and green systems without
transIer oI Iluid. It activates automatically when diIIerential pressure between the two systems is
greater than 500psi. The PTU is inhibited during the Iirst engine start and selI tests during the second
engine start sequence. The PTU is also inhibited during, and Ior 40 seconds aIter, automatic operation
oI the yellow electric pump. Operation oI the PTU is indicated by a HYD PTU memo appearing
on the E/WD.
Airbus Technical Notes
32
An accumulator is provided Ior each system to help maintain constant pressure during transient
demands. Each system also has a priority valve to cut oII heavy users (Ilaps, slats, gear, emergency
generator) iI system pressure gets too low to operate the Ilight controls.
Each system has a leak measurement valve upstream oI the primary Ilight controls. These can be
closed by operation oI switches on the maintenance panel. The eIIect oI closing these valves is to
shut oII hydraulic supply to the primary Ilight controls.
The Ilight controls all receive hydraulic power Irom at least two sources. This is detailed in TODO:
add Ilight controls xreI here once its done}. The other hydraulic systems are powered as Iollows:
Table 3. Hydraulic power source of systems (excluding flight controls)
Green Yellow Blue
Landing gear
Normal brakes
Eng 1 reverser
Yaw damper 1
Nose wheel steering
Alternate and parking
brakes
Eng 2 Reverser
Yaw damper 2
Cargo doors
Emergency generator
Airbus Technical Notes
33
15. Landing gear
The main gear are dual wheel and retract inboard. The nose gear is also dual wheel, and retracts
Iorward.
The main gear are equipped with:
Carbon brakes
An anti-skid system
An automatic braking system
A brake Ian
A Tyre Pressure Indicating System
The nose gear is equipped with a nose wheel steering system.
The gear and gear doors are controlled by two Landing Gear Control and InterIace Units (LGCIUs).
Gear sequencing is electrical and actuation is hydraulic (green system). A complete gear cycle is
controlled by a single LGCIU, with an automatic toggle to the other LGCIU at the end oI each
retraction. There is also an automatic switchover iI a Iailure is detected. A seperate saIety valve is
also incorporated. This shuts oII hydraulic pressure to the actuators when the aircraIt exceeds 260kt,
and restores pressure only when the gear lever is selected down with the aircraIt below 260kt.
Emergency extension oI the gear is possible. This is acheived through a cut oII valve that isolates
the landing gear Irom the hydraulics and by manually removing gear and door uplocks. The gear
extends via a combination oI gravity, aerodynamic Iorces and locking springs. The gear doors will
remain open aIter extension. Emergency extension is controlled by a crank located at the rear oI the
center pedestal. Reset is possible in Ilight.
The LGCIUs also gather and processes data Irom proximity detectors on:
Gear locks
Shock absorber struts
Gear doors
Cargo doors
Flaps (Ilap disconnect only)
Gear lock position and gear door position are presented on the ECAM WHEEL page and on the LDG
GEAR indicator. On the ECAM page, each gear is represented by two triangles, one per LGCIU.
When down and locked, the triangles are green. When unlocked, the triangles are red. When Iully
retracted, the triangles are not shown. A green indication on either triangle is suIIicient to determine
that the gear is down and locked. The lights on the LDG GEAR indicator are controlled by LGCIU
1 only, and have their standard meanings.
The LGCIUs uses the shock absorber position to supply air/ground data to various client systems.
The gear, gear door and shock absorber proximity detectors are monitored Ior electrical Iailure. II
a proximity detector suIIers an electrical Iailure, Ilight condition is assumed Ior the detector (i.e.
shock absorber extended, landing gear uplocked), and the unaIIected LGCIU takes over landing
gear operation. Mechanical Iailure oI proximity detectors is not monitored. In the event oI electrical
Iailure oI an LGCIU some client systems may receive incorrect air/ground data.
A subset oI the cargo door proximity detectors are monitored Ior electrical Iailure. When these Iail,
a non locked condition is assumed.
Airbus Technical Notes
34
Data Irom the Ilap disconnect proximity switches is Iorwarded to the SFCCs. SFCCs are not mon-
itored by the LGCIUs.
The nosewheel steering is controlled electrically by a dual channel Brake and Steering Control Unit
(BSCU) and actuated hydraulically (yellow system). The BSCU receives steering requests Irom the
steering handwheels, the rudder pedals and the autopilot. The steering handwheels have authority
Ior 75 oI nose wheel deIlection up to 20kt, reducing linearly to 0 at 80kt. II inputs are made on both
handwheels, the request generated is the sum oI the deIlections requested. The rudder pedals have
authority Ior 6 oI deIlection up to 40kt, reducing linearly to 0 at 130kt. The steering servo valve
is electrically inhibited when the aircraIt is on the ground and when neither engine is running. It
may also be inhibited with the ASKID NWSTRG switch or with the towing contol lever. When the
steering is deactivated with the towing control lever "NW STRG DISC" is displayed on the memo
display and the nosewheel can be moved through 95.
A switch is provided on the steering handwheel to electrically disconnect the rudder pedals Irom the
BSCU in order that rudder control checks may be carried out.
The nosewheel is centered aIter takeoII by an internal cam mechanism.
Two braking systems are provided. The normal system utilises green system hydraulics, and the
alternate system uses the yellow system. The alternate system also has a backup hydraulic accumu-
lator designed to supply at least seven Iull brake applications or provide parking brake pressure Ior
a minimum oI 12 hours.
Braking requests may be initiated by rudder pedal deIlection, by the autobrake system or automati-
cally during gear retraction. When the normal system is active, these requests are processed by the
BSCU. When the alternate system is active, they are processed by the Alternate Braking Control Unit
(ABCU). The alternate system is activated automatically when green system pressure is insuIIicient
or manually using the ASKID NW STRG switch.
The BSCU also provides:
Antiskid (available with both systems via seperate servo valves)
Residual pressure checking
Brake temperature monitoring
Wheel speed monitoring
The master BSCU channel automatically toggles at each DOWN selection oI the landing gear lever,
or when a Iault is detected.
The anti-skid system determines wheel slip ratio by comparing aircraIt speed Irom the ADIRUs with
tyre speed Irom tachometers on the wheel. When tyre speed resuces to 0.87 oI aircraIt speed, a servo
valve is actuated to release the brakes. II all ADIRUs have Iailed, the maximum main gear speed
may be used to approximate aircraIt speed. The anti-skid will be unavailable with complete BSCU
Iailure or when yellow and green hydraulic sytems are both lost. It may also be turned oII with the
ASKID & NW STRG switch. II the anti-skid system is not available, brake pressure is automatically
limited to 1000psi.
The autobrake system allows braking to be applied on a deceleration schedule. It is only available
with the normal braking system. It is armed by selecting the LO, MED or MAX autobrake pushbutton
switches (MAX is Ior RTO and can only be selected on the ground). Activation is linked to ground
spoiler extension. The autobrake system will thereIore not activate on an RTO where speed remains
less than 72kt since the ground spoilers will not automatically deploy below this speed. LO mode
applies the brakes 4 seconds aIter ground spoilers deploy and decelerates the aircraIt at 1.7m/s.
MED mode applies the brakes 2 seconds aIter ground spoilers deploy and delerates the aircraIt at 3m/
s. MAX mode applies maximum brake pressure as soon as the ground spoilers deploy. The green
DECEL light on the AUTOBRK selector indicates that at least 80 oI the required deceleration
Airbus Technical Notes
35
rate has been acheived. The system is deactivated when the ground spoilers retract, or when it is
disarmed. Disarming occurs automatically when the landing gear is Iully retracted. The system may
also be disarmed by manually braking or by deselecting the armed autobrake pushbutton.
The parking brake applies Iull pressure Irom either the yellow hydraulic system or accumulator via
the parking brake control valve. II no pressure is available Irom these sources, the normal braking
system is enabled and the brake pedals may be used.
THE BSCU also sends brake temperature data to the ECAM WHEEL page. II any brake is ~100C,
a green arc appears on the ECAM page. II the temperature exceeds 300C, an amber arc appears,
indicating that takeoII must be delayed to let the brakes cool. II the brake Ians are on, the brake
temperature sensors are not accurate. TakeoII must be delayed iI brake temperatures are over 150C
with the brake Ians on. AIter landing, iI the brake temperatures on one gear diIIer by more than
150C or the diIIerence in the mean temperature oI each gear exceeds 200C, maintenance action
is required.
Brake wear indicators are provided on the brakes. They must be checked with the parking brake on.
II any oI the brake wear indicator is showing, the brake unit is serviceable.
During gear retraction, the main gear is automatically braked. The nose gear is braked by a brake
band.
Various messages may be displayed on the ECAM WHEEL page. The UPLOCK message on the
ECAM WHEEL page indicates that the landing gear is down and locked with an uplock engaged. The
L/G CTL message on the ECAM wheels page indicates a discrepancy between demanded landing
gear position and actual position.
Airbus Technical Notes
36
16. Flight controls
16.1. Overview
The primary Ilight controls consist oI:
Ailerons
Elevators
Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS)
Rudder
Ground spoilers/ Speed brakes
The ten spoilers (Iive each side) have several Iunctions, each using diIIerent surIaces:
Speed brakes Use the 3 central surIaces to increase drag.
Roll control Use the Iour outer spoilers to assist in rolling the aircraIt.
Ground spoilers Deploy all spoilers to dump liIt to get weight on the wheels.
Seven Ilight control computers take input Irom the sidestick, analyse it to ensure it is a saIe command,
then use it to manage the control surIace servos. There are:
Two Elevator and Aileron Computers (ELAC)
Three Spoiler and Elevator Computers (SEC)
Two Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC)
Two Flight Control Data Concentrator computers (FCDC) process data Irom the ELACs and SECs
Ior use by the EIS. The FACs send their data directly. The FCDCs are redundant. Failure oI both
FCDCs will lead to Ilight control data not being available to the EIS.
Two FLT CTL panels, one on either side oI the overhead panel, are used to control the Ilight control
computers.
Each pair oI Ilight control computers is redundant. The SEC3 is only used Ior spoiler control, and
does not participate in Ilight control system reconIiguration.
The ailerons, elevators and pitch trim are powered by two independent actuators, each powered by
a seperate hydraulic source. The rudder is powered by three independent actuators. Each actuator
is controlled by a diIIerent computer. At any one time, one actuator will be in active mode, and
the other will be in damping mode. In the event oI a Ilight control computer Iailure, the actuators
controlled by that computer will automatically be switched to damping mode, and those controlled
by the other computer will become active.
II both ELACs Iail, active control oI the ailerons is lost and they revert to damping mode. SEC2
takes over control oI the elevators and the stabilizer. Roll Iunction is provided by the spoilers. II
SEC2 also Iails, it will be replaced by SEC1.
With an elevator Iault, the remaining elevator remains operative, but its deIlection limits are reduced
to prevent excessive torsional loads on the tail. Normal Ilight is possible in this conIiguration. II the
elevators are lost entirely, they are automatically set to the neutral position.
Providing suitable hydraulic power is available, mechanical control oI the stabiliser and rudder is
always available.
Each spoiler is Iitted with a single actuator. II a hydraulic system Iails, its associated spoiler will
remain in its last position unless pushed down by aerodynamic Iorces. Spoiler control is shared by
Airbus Technical Notes
37
the three SECs. Failures are shown on the ECAM F/CTL page by an amber number above the Iailed
spoiler. An amber triangle above the number indicates a Iailure in the extended position. II possible,
the spoiler will be automatically retracted by its controlling SEC and then it and its symmetrical pair
on the opposite wing will be inhibited.
Under certain conditions, speed brake extension is inhibited and spoilers are automatically retracted.
This may lead to a SPD BRK DISAGREE ECAM caution.
Auto ground spoilers are armed by pulling the spoiler lever up to expose a white collar. A memo
on the E/WS conIirms arming.
Rudder trim is isolated in Ilight when the autopilot is engaged. Its position is shown by a blue line
on the ECAM F/CTL page.
When the autopilot is engaged, speed brakes will not deploy past approximately halI, even iI the
speed brake lever is moved to Iull.
The "SPEED BRK" memo on the E/WD will Ilash amber iI speed brakes are extended and any
engine is above idle.
Auto ground spoilers deploy automatically when both main gear are compressed and thrust levers
are at idle or behind. II only one main gear is compressed, the spoilers only partially deploy. They
will automatically retract iI power is applied Ior a go-around.
LiIt augmentation devices consist oI:
Five slats on each leading edge
Two Ilaps on each trailing edge
The liIt augmentation devices are hydraulically actuated. They are electrically controlled by two Slat
Flap Control Computers (SFCC). Each SFCC has two channels, one Ior the slats and one Ior the Ilaps.
The SFCCs are redundant, but a system associated with a Iailed channel will move at halI speed.
When Ilaps are selected, both ailerons are dropped by about 5. This is indicated on the ECAM F/
CTL page by the aileron position indicatord pointing to a boxed position on the scale rather than
there normal double dashed position.
The Ilaps have an auto retract Iunction. In conIiguration 1F, the Ilaps will automatically retract
when airspeed reaches 210kt. There is no corresponding automatic slat retraction, so this is known
as conIiguration 1.
When deploying Ilaps when airborne, selecting 1 on the Ilap lever only moves the slats - i.e. conIig-
uration 1 is acheived rather than 1F.
Flap and slat Iaults are indicated in amber on the Ilap/ slat display on the E/WD. Locked Ilaps or slats
may be caused by the Wing Tip Brakes (WTB) locking the aIIected surIace movement iI assymme-
try, overspeed, symmetrical runaway or uncommanded movement are detected. WTBs cannot be
released in Ilight. The slats and Ilaps have independant WTBs, so locked Ilaps will not cause locked
slats, and vice versa. An ALIGNMENT FAULT indicates Ilap attachment Iailure.
A-LOCK pulsing blue on the E/WD indicates that the slats have been locked due to high angle oI
attack and/or low speed.
The rudder deIlection is limited depending on speed by the rudder travel limiter. The current rudder
travel limit is shown on the F/CTL ECAM page by white ticks below the rudder scale.
16.2. Side sticks
The side sticks are spring loaded to neutral and do not provide Ieedback. They are not interconnected.
II both side sticks are operated at the same time, their inputs are added algebraically. II this happens,
Airbus Technical Notes
38
a "DUAL INPUT" aural warning is activated and green lights show on the SIDE STICK PRIORITY
warning lights. Dual inputs are not recommended.
When the autopilots are engaged, the side sticks are locked in neutral. II the lock is overcome, the
autopilot is disconnected.
The button on the side stick is dual Iunction. II an autopilot is engaged, pushing the button will dis-
connect the autopilot and pushing it a second time will silence the associated warning. II no autopilot
is engaged, pressing and holding the button prioritises the side stick. This results in a "PRIORITY
LEFT/RIGHT" message and a red arrow indication on the opposite side stick priority warning light.
Moving the low priority sidestick now just results in a green light in the side stick priority light on the
prioritised side. II both priority buttons are pushed, the last pressed will give priority. The opposite
sidestick can be permanently deactivated by pressing and holding the button Ior 40 seconds. In this
case, a momentary push on either button will reactivate the deactivated side stick.
On the ground, a combined side stick deIlection indicator is shown as a white cross on the attitude
indicator. This only indicates side stick positions, not control surIace positions. Control surIace po-
sitions are shown on the ECAM F/CTL page, which is automatically called iI either the sidesticks or
the rudder pedals are moved on the ground. The side sticks become operable on the ground as soon
as hydraulic power becomes available (i.e. aIter Iirst engine start).
16.3. Normal Law & protections
Normal law operates in three modes:
Ground mode Conventional controls when the aircraIt is on the ground and electrically and
hydraulically powered.
Flight mode Operates in the air aIter a gradual transition Irom ground mode, commencing at
liIt oII.
Flare mode Introduces conventional Ieel to the landing phase. This is acheived by memoriz-
ing the aircraIt attitude at 50It, then progressively reducing this attitude, meaning
the pilots must perIorm a gentle Ilare.
In Ilight mode, control surIace deIlection is not directly proportional to side stick deIlection. Instead,
side stick input is a rate oI roll demand in roll and a load Iactor demand in pitch. Control surIace
movement will occur with no input on the side stick. An attitude is set with the sidestick and the
sidestick is then allowed to return to its neutral position. As pitch and roll rate demands are now
zero, the Ilight control computer holds the attitude until Iurther inputs are made with the sidestick.
Yaw control is conventional, but turn co-ordination and dutch roll protection are provided, meaning
rudder inputs are not generally required.
Normal law provides the Iollowing protections:
Load Iactor limitation Structural load is limited to:
2.5g to -1g in clean conIiguration
2g to 0g in Ilaps extended conIiguration
Pitch attitude protection Pitch is restricted to a maximum oI between 20 and 30 nose
up (depending on conIiguration and speed) and a maximum
oI 15 nose down. The current limits are indicated by green
dashes on the attitude indicator.
High angle oI attack protection Prevents the aircraIt stalling and ensures optimum perIor-
mance during extreme maneuvres. It takes priority over all
other protections. V
u-prot
is displayed as the top oI an amber
barber pole on the speed scale. This is the lowest speed that
the aircraIt is allowed to reach with the stick neutral. The pi-
Airbus Technical Notes
39
lot can override V
u-prot
using the side stick and reduce to V
u-
max
, which is represented by the top oI the solid red bar on
the speed scale. In the protection range, normal law demand
is modiIied to be an angle oI attack demand rather than a load
Iactor demand. II the sidestick is released at V
u-max
the speed
will increase to V
u-prot
.
High speed protection Prevents exceedance oI V
MO
/M
MO
. This is shown on the
speed scale as the bottom oI the red barber pole. Green dashes
indicate the speed at which protection activates. Momentary
exceedance oI V
MO
/M
MO
is allowed Ior maneuvring, but the
speed will then return to protection speed. With stick released,
the speed returns to V
MO
/M
MO
. When high speed protection
is active, roll stability is augmented so that the aircraIt will
roll wings level iI the sidestick is released.
Bank angle protection Bank angle is limited to 67, shown by green dashes on the
bank angle scale on the PFD. The FD bars will disappear iI
bank angle exceeds 45. II the side stick is released and the
bank angle is ~33, the bank angle will return to 33. Autotrim
is inhibited above 33. II the angle oI attack or the high speed
protection is active, bank angle is limited to 45.
16.4. Reconfiguration laws
Overview
Whilst a single Iailure will not result in degradation oI normal law, it is possible that multiple Iailures
may.
Alternate law
Degradation to alternate law is annunciated on the E/WD as F/CTL ALTN LAW (PROT LOST).
The eIIects are:
Ground mode As in normal law,
Flight mode Pitch as in normal law. Conventional roll control, i.e surIace deIlection propor-
tional to side stick deIlection. In yaw, turn coordination is lost and damping has
limited authority.
Landing mode Direct law when landing gear is selected down.
Load Iactor limitation is provided similarly to normal law. Pitch attitude protection is lost, indicated
by the green pitch limit dashes on the attitude indicator being replaced by amber crosses. Bank angle
protection is lost. Again, this is indicated by the green dashes on the bank angle scale being replaced
by amber crosses.
The high angle oI attack protection is replaced by low speed stability. Stall warning speed, V
SW
indicated by a red baber pole on the speed indicator replaces the V
u
indications. As speed approaches
V
SW
a progressive nose down pitch input is introduced. This can be overridden with side stick inputs.
A "STALL,STALL" aural warning sounds at V
SW
, and the aircraIt will stall iI the warning is ignored.
Alpha Iloor protection is also inoperative in alternate law.
High speed stability replaces high speed protection. A nose up input is added when speed is above
V
MO
/M
MO
. This can be overridden with sidestick inputs. As in normal law, an aural over speed
warning is triggerred when V
MO
/M
MO
is exceeded.
According to the Iailures, it is possible that the stabilities will also be lost. In this case only load
Iactor limitation and the stall and overspeed warnings remain.
Airbus Technical Notes
40
Direct law
Direct law is indicated by the ECAM message FCTL DIRECT LAW (PROT LOST). In direct law,
there is a direct relationship between side stick and control surIace positions. There are no protections
available, although stall and over speed warnings are still available. Auto-trim is not available. A
"USE MAN PITCH TRIM" message appears on the FMA. Auto turn coordination and dutch roll
damping are also lost.
Mechanical backup mode
Pitch is controlled solely through the use oI manual pitch trim. "MAN PITCH TRIM ONLY" appears
on the FMA. Lateral control is solely through the use oI the rudder pedals. In most cases, action can
be taken to recover to either alternate law or direct law.
Abnormal attitude laws
In the event the aircraIt attitude leaving the protected envelope, the Ilight controls revert to alternate
law without the stability enhancements. Once the aircraIt is recovered, it stays in alternate law. It
will not, however, revert to direct law when the gear is deployed.
Airbus Technical Notes
41
17. Fuel
Figure 11. Simplified schematic of the fuel system
Cross-feed valve
Engine LP
valve
Fuel
pump
Transfer
valves
Center tank
Left nner tank
Left outer tank
Right inner tank
Right outer tank
APU
APU LP valve
DG DG
Gravity
feed
Spill
pipe
Surge
tank
Defuel/
transfer
valve APU pump
Each wing incorporates an inner tank, an outer tank and a vent surge tank. A center tank is incorpo-
rated into the Iuselage.
The outer tanks are used Ior wing bending and Ilutter relieI. There are two electrical transIer valves
connecting each outer tank to its associated inner tank. These are controlled by level sensors in the
inner tanks. Each inner tank has two sensors, and each oI these sensors controls a symmetrical pair oI
transIer valves. When any sensor detects the Iuel level in an inner tank Ialling below approximately
750kg, it opens its pair oI transIer valves, allowing the outer tank Iuel to transIer simultaneously to
the inner tanks. This event is indicated by the E/WD memo "OUTER TK FUEL XFRD" and green
triangles appearing in the outer tanks on the ECAM FUEL page. The transIer valves, once open,
remain open until the next reIueling operation.
The outer tanks are also connected to the inner tanks by a spill pipe. This allows Iuel returned to
the outer tanks by the Iuel recirculation system (see below) to Ilow to the inner tanks iI the outer
tanks are already Iull. It is also used during reIueling, since Iuel destined Ior the inner tanks is routed
via the outer tanks.
The vent surge tanks protect against thermal expansion oI Iuel. Fuel may expand by at least 2
(equivalent to A20C) without spilling. There are no cockpit indications Ior these tanks.
The inner, outer and vent tanks each have overpressure protectors. The center tank has an overpres-
sure protector connected to the leIt inner tank.
There are six electrical Iuel pumps, two in the center tank and two in each inner tank. Under normal
conditions the Iuel system is split, with one center tank pump and the two same side wing tank pumps
supplying each engine. A double motor cross Ieed valve, controlled by the X FEED button, allows
the Iuel system to be uniIied. A green OPEN light in this button indicates that the valve is in the
Iully open position.
The inner tanks incorporate suction valves that allow Ior gravity Ieeding oI Iuel in the event oI loss
oI both pumps. The service ceiling oI the aircraIt may be aIIected iI the Iuel has not had time and
altitude to deaerate. Gravity Ieeding is not available Irom the center tank.
The wing tank pumps operate continuously unless switched oII with their associated TK PUMPS
button. The #1 pump in each tank is powered by AC1 and controlled by DC1, and the #2 pump is
powered by AC2 and controlled by DC2. The #1 pump in each tank also has an alternate power Ieed
directly Irom its associated IDG, and an alternate control Ieed Irom DC ESS. The pumps incorporate
Airbus Technical Notes
42
pressure relieI sequence valves in order that Iuel is delivered preIerentially Irom the center tank iI
the associated center tank pump is producing normal output pressure. An amber FAULT on their
associated button indicates low delivery pressure with the button in the "On" position.
The center tank pumps have automatic and manual modes, controlled by a single MODE SEL button.
The FAULT light in this button indicates that Iuel is being burnt out oI sequence, inIerred Irom
~250kg in the center tank with 5000kg in one oI the wing tanks. In general, when in automatic mode
a pump is inhibited whenever slats are extended, whenever its associated wing tank is Iull (with a
latch until 500kg has been burnt Irom the tank) or once 5 minutes have elapsed since the center tank
reached low Iuel level. The exception is that Ior two minutes aIter its associated engine has been
started, the pump is only inhibited by the center tank low Iuel condition. This allows the center tank
Iuel lines to be pressurized iI center tank Iuel is going to be used. In manual mode, all "auto stop"
logic is inhibited and the crew must provide the logic directly using the CTR TK PUMP buttons.
The FAULT light in each oI these buttons indicates low delivery pressure with the associated pump
operating. The #1 pump is powered by AC1 and controlled by DC1, and the #2 pump is powered by
AC2 and controlled by DC2. Note that takeoII with the center tank pumps operating is prohibited.
On the ECAM FUEL page, iI a Iuel pump is shown as an amber boxed LO, the pump is on but it
is not producing adequate pressure. An amber box with a cross line indicates that a pump has been
switched oII manually.
Fuel pressure Ior APU startup is normally provided by the leIt hand side oI the Iuel system. II pressure
is unavailable due to loss oI tank pumps or loss oI normal AC supply, an APU Iuel pump can be
used. This is normally powered by the AC ESS SHED BUS, but has an alternate Ieed directly Irom
the AC STAT INV BUS.
The design oI the engine Iuel system (see Section 19.4, 'Engine Iuel system|45|) and the
requirement Ior IDG cooling leads to some Iuel being returned to the tanks. This is routed to the
outer tanks and Irom there to the inner tanks via the spill pipe or transIer valves depending on the
conIiguration oI the Iuel system. OverIilling is prevented by controlling the center tank pumps.
OverIilling (and hence venting) is possible with the center tank pumps in manual mode.
The reIuel coupling is situated under the wing outboard oI the #2 engine, near the leading edge. The
reIuel panel is situated on the Iuselage below the right wing. Fueling is usually automatic, controlled
by setting the required quantity with the preselector rocker switch and selecting the MODE SELECT
switch to REFUEL. Manual control is available by selecting the REFUEL VALVES switches to
OPEN and SHUT as required. Fueling with battery power is available by momentarily selecting the
BATT POWER switch to ON. Gravity Iueling is also possible. The REFUELG memo on the E/WD
only indicates that the reIuel panel door is open.
A de-Iuel/ transIer valve connects the right hand side oI the Iuel system to the reIueling/ de-Iueling
gallery. It is opened by selecting the MODE SELECT switch to DEFUEL. An amber light illuminates
next to the switch to indicate that the valve is open.
A Fuel Quantity Indication (FQI) system provides Iuel mass, quantity and temperature data to the
ECAM and controls automatic reIueling. This system comprises an FQI computer, a set oI capaci-
tance probes to measure Iuel level and temperature, a densitometer and a Capacitance Index Com-
pensator (CIC) (used in case oI densitometer Iailure).
Degradation oI a Iuel quantity sensor is indicated by two amber dashes across the last two digits oI the
FOB value. On the ECAM FUEL page, the aIIected tank also shows the dashes on its quantity value.
Fuel temperature exceeding a limitation results in a master caution and the Iuel temperature oI the
aIIected tank being shown in amber on the ECAM FUEL page.
A shroud drain mast is situated under the Iuselage. This drains any Iuel that leaks Irom the system.
Each tank has a magnetic Iuel level indicator to allow Iuel to be measured manually. These should
normally be Ilush with the aircraIt surIace. Each tank also has a water drain valve. These should
be checked Ior leaks.
Airbus Technical Notes
43
18. Oxygen
Both crew and passenger oxygen systems are pretty much identical to the Boeing. They are contolled
by the OXYGEN panel located on the overhead panel. The system is monitored on the ECAM DOOR
page.
Passenger oxygen automatically deploys when cabin altitude~14,000It. It can also be manually re-
leased by the gaurded button on the OXYGEN panel. The PASSENGER SYS ON light illuminates
when masks are deployed. There are approximately 13 minutes oI passenger oxygen available.
The OXY legend on this page is amber until the crew oxygen supply is turned on. A halI amber box
is displayed underneath the unregulated oxygen pressure on this page when it is below 1500psi. This
indicates that the MIN FLT CREW OXY CHART should be checked beIore Ilight.
II the amber REGUL LO PR is displayed, the oxygen pressure at the regulator is low, and mainte-
nance should be called.
The mask microphone is automatically energised when oxygen is Ilowing, either when being worn
or when the test and emergency buttons are pushed together.TODO: This is only inIerred - check
it is true}
Airbus Technical Notes
44
19. Power plant
19.1. General description
Figure 12. Simplified schematic of CFM56-5B
The engines are designated CFM56-5B. Each engine has two rotors. The low speed N1 rotor consists
oI a Iront Ian, a Iour stage compressor and a Iour stage turbine. The high speed N2 rotor consists oI
a nine stage compressor and a single stage turbine. The N2 rotor also drives an accessory gearbox
located at the bottom oI the Ian case. The combustion chamber has 20 Iuel nozzles and two igniters.
19.2. FADECS
Each engine is controlled by a two channel Full Authority Digital Engine Control System (FADEC),
also known as the Engine Control Unit (ECU). One channel is active, the other is a standby with
automatic Iailover. The active channel toggles aIter each Ilight TODO: this is an assumption - check
it}.
The FADECS are selI powered by an internal magnetic alternator when N2~58. Channel A may
also be powered by DC ESS. Channel B may also be powered by BAT BUS Ior engine 1 and DC BUS
2 Ior engine 2. Pushing the FIRE button Ior an engine disconnects the FADECs Irom their external
power sources. AIter power is Iirst applied to the aircraIt the FADECs power up Ior 5 minutes to
allow selI testing TODO: again an assumption - to check}, then power down until IGN/START is
selected on the ENG MODE switch. They continue to be powered Ior 5 minutes aIter their respective
engine master switch is turned oII.
Data Ior the FADECs is directly sourced Irom the ADIRS, engine sensors and thrust levers. All other
required data is amalgamated and supplied by an Engine InterIace Unit (EIU).
The primary Iunction oI the FADECs is responding to thrust demands Irom the thrust levers or
autothrust system whilst respecting thrust rating, idle settings and N1 and N2 limitations. This is
acheived by controlling Ilow oI Iuel both to the engine and back through the recirculation system to
Airbus Technical Notes
45
the tanks. Engine perIormance is Iurther optimised through control oI variable bleed valves, variable
stator vanes and turbine and rotor clearances.
During a start sequence, the FADEC also controls the start valve, HP Iuel valve and ignition. For
automatic starts N1, N2, Iuel Ilow and EGT are actively monitored, and automated abort and recycle
is provided. Passive monitoring oI these parameters is provided Ior manual starts.
When reverse thrust is selected, the FADECs control the blocker doors.
19.3. Thrust control system
The thrust levers can only be moved manually. There are 2 detents and 3 stops on the thrust quadrant.
These are the TOGA stop, MCT/FLX detent, CL detent, Idle stop and Max reverse stop. In addition
there is a notional (i.e. non-phyiscal) reverse idle detent acheived by pulling up the reverse levers
and selecting a position slightly behind the idle stop.
In normal operation, autothrust is available when the thrust levers are in the range between the idle
stop and CLB detent. When an engine out condition is detected, autothrust is available between the
idle stop and MCT/FLX detent. When the autothrust is not engaged, either because it is not armed
or because the thrust lever is set outside the autothrust range, the Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) maps
directly to an N1 demand. Each oI the detents/stops maps to its given limit, and there is a straight
line TLA to N1 relationship between these positions.
The N1 Ior the MCT/FLX detent will be MCT except when on the ground with a FLEX temperature
set, in which case it will be the computed FLEX N1. Once airborne the detent reverts to MCT when
the thrust levers are either moved to the TOGA stop or moved to or through the CL detent.
The N1 Ior the idle detent is normally "modulated idle", a value regulated according to bleed system
demand. When in Ilight with the Ilap lever not at zero position, the idle detent is "approach idle". This
is an idle setting designed to allow rapid acceleration to TOGA thrust and it is regulated according
to aircraIt altitude without regard to bleed conIiguration. The N1 Ior the notional reverse idle detent
is "reverse idle", a value slightly higher than Iorward idle thrust.
When the autothrust is engaged, the N1 it can command is limited to between the N1 Ior the TLA
set and the N1 at the idle detent.
A special case is alpha Iloor protection. II a very high angle oI attack is detected, TOGA thrust is
set regardless oI TLA. See TODO: cross reIerence once done}.
19.4. Engine fuel system
Figure 13. Simplified schematic of engine fuel system
LP fuel
shutoff
valve
From
fuel
tank
To Fuel
nozzles
LP
Pump
Fuel/ Oil
heat
exchanger
Filter HP
pump
Fuel
Metering
valve
HP fuel
shutoff
valve
Fuel
flow
sensor
To fuel tank
To servos
Servo/ Fuel
Heater
Wash
filter
DG oil
cooler
By-pass
valve
Fuel
return
valve
The engine Iuel system is pressurised by two engine driven pumps TODO: engine driven is inIerred
Irom the diagram in 1.70.40.1000- check its true}, a low pressure (LP) pump and a high pressure
(HP) pump. These provide a supply oI high pressure Iuel to the inlet oI a Fuel Metering Valve (FMV).
The FADEC controls this valve to provide the Iuel Ilow required to satisIy the N1 demand and keep
Airbus Technical Notes
46
all other engine parameters within their deIined limits. A bypass valve located immediately beIore
the FMV modulates to maintain a constant pressure drop across the FMV in order to maintain a
linear relationship between FMV position and Iuel Ilow acheived. This bypass valve is also used by
an independent overspeed governor that limits N2 to 107.2 in the event oI FADEC malIunction.
The FMV, along with other actuators under the control oI the FADEC (variable stator veins, variable
bleed valves etc) are operated hydro-mechanically using high pressure Iuel tapped Irom the Iuel
lines aIter the HP pump.
Two shut oII valves are incorporated into the Iuel line, a low pressure shut oII valve located beIore
the LP pump, and a high pressure shut oII valve located aIter the FMV. Both these valves are closed
when the engine master switch is selected oII, but only the low pressure shut oII valve is closed by
the Iire button.
Fuel is also used to provide IDG cooling. The FADEC modulates the bypass valve and Iuel return
valve to control Ilow oI Iuel through the IDG oil cooler to acheive the required cooling.
19.5. Engine oil system
The supply side oI the engine oil system consists oI an oil supply pump that draws oil Irom the oil
tank and passes it through an oil Iilter to the bearings and gearbox. The oil Iilter incorporates a by-
pass valve in case oI clogging. Oil pressure and temperature are monitored downstream oI the Iilter.
The scavenge side consists oI Iour scavenge pumps TODO: inIerred Irom diagram 1.70.50},
through a scavenge Iilter then back to the oil tank via the servo Iuel heater and Iuel/oil heat exchang-
er. The scavenge Iilter incorporates a bypass valve in case oI clogging.
19.6. Engine bleed air system
Bleed air is tapped at the 5th and 9th stages oI the HP compressor and Irom the Ian. It is used to
supply the pneumatic system (see Section 7, 'Pneumatics |19|) and to provide cooling air to the
active clearance control systems. The active control clearance systems are a Iunction oI the FADEC
which uses Iuel pressure to modulate bleed air control valves in order to control the temperature,
and hence size, oI the turbine casings and the HP compressor casing. The LP Turbine Clearance
Control (LPTCC) system uses Ian air to cool the LP turbine case. The Rotor Active Clearance Control
(RACC) system uses 5th stage bleed air to cool the HP compressor case. The HP Turbine Clearance
Control (HPTCC) system uses both 5th and 9th stage bleed air to cool the HP turbine case.
19.7. Reverse thrust system
Reverse thrust is acheived using Iour pivoting blocker doors per engine which are used to deIlect the
airstream Irom the Ian Iorward. Each blocker door has a hydraulic actuator, a latch and a position
switch. The FADEC moves the doors using a Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) consisting oI a pres-
surizing solenoid valve and a directional solenoid valve. An independent hydraulic shut oII valve
controlled by the spoiler elevator computers (SECs) controls inlet pressure to the HCU.
Actuation required input Irom a number oI systems. Firstly the SECs must receive a signal Irom the
thrust levers to open the shut oII valve and allow pressure to the HCU. Secondally, the EIU must
receive a signal Irom the thrust levers to enable the directional solenoid valve, which will otherwise
be inhibited. Finally, at least one channel oI the FADEC must receive the correct signals Irom the
thrust levers, N2 sensor and LGCIU (via the EIU). II it detects the TLA is in the reverse segment,
N2~50 and both main gear compressed, the FADEC signals the HCU to open the blocker doors.
When on the ground with the engine running and N170, an auto restow Iunction is available.
This stows any door that is detected unstowed with reverse thrust not selected.
Idle protection is available in all Ilight phases when reverse thrust is not selected. This selects idle
thrust iI pressure is detected in the HCU and any door is detected unstowed or with an indeIinite
position. It also selects idle thrust regardless oI HCU pressure iI all Iour blocker doors are detected
unstowed.
Airbus Technical Notes
47
19.8. Ignition and start
The FADEC start module receives input Irom the engine master switches, the engine mode selector,
the manual start buttons and the LGCIU, all via the EIU. It controls the start valve, the igniters and
the HP Iuel valve. The engine master switch also independenly inhibits the opening oI the HP Iuel
valve when selected oII.
Each engine has two identical independent igniter systems. Normally, each FADEC channel controls
a single igniter system, but in Iailure cases both igniter systems can be controlled by a single FADEC
channel.
For automatic starts on the ground, a single igniter is used. It is energised at 16 N2 and de-energised
at 50 N2. The FADEC toggles between the Iour channel/igniter system permutations aIter each
start.
For manual starts and in Ilight starts, both igniters are energised when the master switch is turned
on. De-energisation at 50 remains automatic.
Automatic continuous ignition is provided iI a Ilame out is detected. It is also provided iI the EIU Iails
whilst the engine is running.TODO: There is a third case: Engine running and ignition delay during
start - this doesn't seem to make much sense} Continuous ignition can also be selected manually
using the engine mode selector.
Engine spin up is provided by an air turbine starter that is powered by the pneumatic system. Supply
oI air to the turbine is controlled by a start valve which is controlled electrically by the FADEC.
There is also a handle on the engine to allow the start valve to be operated manually iI electrical
control Iails. In an automatic start sequence, iI the starter is required (i.e. on the ground or insuIIicient
windmilling speed), the FADEC opens the start valve at the start oI the sequence and closes it at
50 N2. In a manual start sequence the FADEC still closes the start valve at 50 N2, but opening
oI the valve is acheived by pressing the manual start push-button. All manual start sequences are
starter assisted.
For automatic starts, the FADEC opens the HP Iuel valve at 22 N2 on the ground and 15 N2 in
Ilight. For manual starts, the HP Iuel valve opens when the engine master switch is turned on.
The FADEC also provides start monitoring. It will detect hot starts, hung starts, stalls and wet starts
and provide an appropriate ECAM message. II these conditions are detected during an automatic
start, the FADEC will automatically run an abort sequence including dry cranking and then attempt
Iurther starts. An automatic start can be aborted at any time by turning the engine master switch
oII. This closes both Iuel valves and signals the FADEC to close the start valve and de-energise
the ignition. Dry cranking, iI required must then be done manually using the crank position oI the
engine mode selector and the manual start button. For manual starts, the FADEC has very limited
authority to abort a start. The sole case is when on the ground and a start EGT exceedance occurs
beIore 50 N2. In all other cases, it is the pilot's responsibility to interrupt the start sequence by
either deselecting the manual start button or turning the engine master switch oII as appropriate.
The completion oI the start sequence is indicated by the grey background on the N2 indicator disap-
pearing. The stable N2 value is approximately 58. It is recommended that the engines are operated
at or near idle Ior at least two minutes aIter start.
19.9. Engine indications
The warning lights below the engine master switches have two segments, a red FIRE segment and
an amber FAULT segment. The FIRE segment aids the crew in selecting the correct master switch
during an engine Iire drill. The amber segment indicates an aborted automatic start or an HP Iuel
valve position disagreement.
The N1 gauges display a caution range by an amber line representing TOGA N1 and a warning range
by a red arc. The lower end oI the red arc represents max N1 (104). II N1 enters the caution range,
the N1 needle and digital indication, which are normally steady green, pulse amber. II N1 enters
Airbus Technical Notes
48
the warning range, they pulse red, and a red tell tale is leIt at the maximum acheived N1. A blue
circle above the index indicates the N1 corresponding to the current TLA. II the autothrust is active,
trend indications are displayed as green triangles next to the needle. The longer oI the two triangles
represents the diIIerence between the demanded and actual N1. The smaller oI the two triangles
shows the direction and rate oI current N1 changes. II the last digit oI the digital display is a dash,
it indicates that N1 data is degraded due to Iailure oI both N1 sensors.
The status oI the reverses is also indicated on the N1 gauge. An amber REV indicates that at least
one door is unstowed or unlocked. In Ilight this indication will initially Ilash Ior 9 seconds. The REV
becomes green when all the reverser doors are Iully deployed.
The current thrust limit mode and N1 rating limit are displayed to the right oI the N1 gauges. II a
FLX takeoII is selected, the FLX temperature will also appear here.
The EGT, like the N1 gauge, has a caution range indicated by an amber line and a warning range
indicated by a red arc. The bottom oI the red arc is at max permissable EGT (950C). II EGT exceeds
this value, the needle and digital display pulse red, and a red tell tale is leIt behind at maximum
acheived EGT. The amber line is the start limit (725C) during the start sequence. Otherwise, except
when operating at high power, it is 915C. II actual EGT is above the amber line value, the needle
and digital display pulse amber.
N2 is represented as a digital value only. This is normally green, but turns red with a red cross next
to it iI N2 exceeds 105. II both N2 sensors Iail the last digit is replaced by an amber dash. The
numbers have a grey background during the start sequence. The removal oI this grey background
indicates completion oI the sequence.
Fuel Ilow is also indicated as a digital value only.
An amber CHECK indication below the N1, N2, EGT or Iuel Ilow values indicates a discrepancy
between the values on the FADEC-DMC bus and those displayed. TODO - how does this occur?}.
Fuel used, oil quantity, oil pressure, oil temperature, N1 vibration, N2 vibration and nacelle temper-
ature are displayed on the ECAM Engine page. During the start sequence the nacelle temperature is
replaced by indications oI start valve position, available bleed pressure and ignitor status.
The Iuel used indication is reset when the master switch Ior the engine is selected on. II Iuel Ilow
data is lost Ior more than one minute, the last two digits are dashed. An amber CLOG indication
below the Iigures indicates clogging oI the Iuel Iilter.
The oil quantity gauge will pulse when oil quantity Ialls below 3 qt, with a dead band up to 5 qt.
The oil pressure gauge will pulse when oil pressure exceeds 90 psi, with a dead band down to 85
psi, or when the oil pressure is below 16 psi, with a dead band up to 20 psi. The indication turns red
when pressure Ialls below 13 psi. An amber CLOG below the gauge indicates clogging oI the main
scavenge Iilter. TODO - is there monitoring oI the Iilter on the supply side oI the oil system?}
The oil temperature numbers will pulse when temperature exceeds 140C, with a dead band down to
135C. They turns amber (with accompanying ECAM message) when temperature reaches 155C
or iI temperature is ~140C Ior more than 15 minutes.
The vibration numbers pulse when above 6 units Ior N1 and above 4.3 units Ior N2, although these
thresholds may be reduced to the maximum vibration experienced during the last Ilight by an MCDU
procedure.
The nacelle temperature gauge pulses when temperature exceeds 240C (indicated by a white dash).
During the start sequence, IGN in white and the letters A,B or AB indicate energisation oI the indi-
cated ignitor. Start valve position is indicated in the standard way. The bleed pressure reading is the
bleed pressure upstream oI the precooler. II it drops below 21 psi with N2 ~ 10, or iI there is an
overpressure, it will turn amber.
Airbus Technical Notes
49
19.10. Engine handling
TakeoII thrust is normally applied in two stages. The thrust is Iirst set to approximately 50, and the
engines are allowed to stabilise. Either FLX or TOGA is then set. This is modiIied to three stages
in strong crosswinds.
At thrust reduction altitude, thrust is set to CL, and the autothrust becomes active.
II heavy rain or turbulence is expected aIter take oII or during initial approach, the ignitors can
be switched on by selecting the END MODE selector to IGN START. The E/WD memo area will
display IGNITION. Continuous ignition is automatically selected when engine anti-ice is turned on.
TODO: This is Irom CBT and I'm not sure that it is correct}
REV IDLE should be selected on landing when speed reaches 70kt.
A three minute cooling period is recommended Iollowing the use oI maximum reverse thrust.
Airbus Technical Notes
50
20. EIS
20.1. EFIS
Overview
Data Irom the ADIRS and FMGC is Ied directly into three display management computers (DMCs).
Normally DMC1 supplies the Captain's EFIS and DMC2 supplies the FO's EFIS, with DMC3 being
used as a backup.
PFD
Do not Ily with only one Ilight director selected on.
Rad alt displayed below 2500It
On the PFD, items colour coded magenta indicate that the FMGS is managing the item and blue
items indicate that an item has been manually selected on the FCU.
Airspeed index is yellow line and triangle. A speed trend arrow, also yellow, gives the speed in 10
seconds time.
During take-oII, V
1
is shown in blue and V
2
is shown in magenta. They are shown as numbers when
they are above the displayed scale, and appear on the scale as a blue "1" and a magenta triangle
respectively. Immediately aIter take-oII, the Ilight director commands V
2
10 kt, so the aircraIt speed
will be greater than the magenta triangle. Minimum Ilap retraction speed (F speed) is shown as a
green F. Flap limit speed is shown by a barber's pole. As Ilaps are retracted to Ilap 1, minimum slat
retraction speed (S speed) is indicated by a green S.
Once Ilaps are retracted the barber's pole indicates V
mo
oI 350kt when below approximately 25,000It
and M
mo
oI M0.82 when above. A MACH indicator appears once M0.5 is achieved.
When clean, a green circle indicates "green dot speed. This is the best liIt:drag.
During FMGS managed decent, the magenta managed speed indicator splits to indicate that a range
oI speeds may be used to maintain correct path.
When below 15,000It ?in a descent?, two amber bars indicate "V
Ie
next", the maximum speed Ior
deployment oI the next stage oI Ilap.
Protection speeds are displayed as a solid red bar and two amber hollow boxes (see TODO: get
reIerence}).
On the altimeter scale, the red ribbon indicates a ground reIerence derived Irom the rad alt. In the
Iinal stages oI approach, this is augmented with an FMGS database landing elevation indicated by
a blue line across the altimeter. When outside the displayed scale, the target altitude is shown either
above or below the altimeter as applicable. It will show in Ieet when QNH is selected and as a Ilight
level (e.g. "FL330" when STD is selected). When within the displayed scale, it is shown on the
altimeter with a target box to the leIt. It will be magenta iI the restriction originates Irom the FMGS
and blue iI selected on the FCU. The baro setting is shown in blue below the altimeter. Standard
pressure setting is indicated by "STD" when the baro reIerence selector is pulled.
The vertical speed is displayed in amber when high.
On the compass display, a green diamond indicates track and a yellow line indicates heading. Select-
ed heading appears as a blue triangle or a Iigure on the appropriate side iI outside the displayed scale.
When an ILS is selected, the Irequency and ident appear in magenta in the bottom leIt corner, along
with DME range iI available. The Iront course appears on the compass display in magenta, either
as a Iigure when outside the compass scale or as a dagger when within. Localiser and glideslope
deviation is shown by a hollow magenta diamond on deviation bars.
Airbus Technical Notes
51
ND
Ground speed, air speed and wind data are displayed in the top leIt oI the ND in all modes. Magnetic
heading is a Iixed yellow line. Selected heading or track is displayed as a blue triangle when within
displayed scale or blue digits when not. Actual track is shown by a green track diamond.
Rose ILS mode shows standard magenta course bar incorporating localiser deviation and white
glideslope deviation scale with a magenta diamond indicator. Frequency course and ident are shown
in the top right corner.
Rose VOR mode gives a blue course deviation bar. Course must be set in the MCDU RAD NAV
page. VOR data is shown in the top right oI the ND.
Bearing pointers are selected on the EFIS control panel and are shown in white Ior VOR and green
Ior ADF. #1 pointers are single lined and #2 pointers are double lined. Ident and range inIormation
are shown in the bottom corners oI the ND. A small white M next to this inIormation indicates
manual selection oI the aid.
Rose NAV mode dispalys a map oriented to the aircraIt. The range selector sets the diameter oI the
map. Planned track is shown in green and waypoints are shown in blue. Id, range and ETA Ior the
next waypoint are shown in the top right corner.
Arc mode is the normal mode, displaying the Iorward 90 oI the map shown by rose NAV mode.
The range selector now sets the distance Irom the aircraIt to the edge oI the map.
Additional data points Ior airports, NDBs, VORs and Waypoints can be shown in map modes by
selecting pushbuttons on the EFIS control panel. These data points show in magenta.
20.2. ECAM
Overview
Data Irom certain aircraIt system sensors is routed directly to the ECAM channel in the three DMCs.
The majority oI the data, however, is routed to the two System Data Acquisition Concentrators
(SDACs), Ior processing. The SDACs then provide system page data to the DMCs. Normally, DMC1
supplies the E/WD, DMC2 supplies the SD and DMC3 is available as a backup. Two Flight Warning
Computers (FWCs) receive data directly Irom aircraIt sensors to generate red warnings and receive
data Irom the SDACs to generate amber warnings. The FWCs control the attention getters and aural
alerts and send data to the DMCs Ior display oI alert messages.
Failure oI a single FWC generates a Level 1 caution, since there is a redundant system available.
This will, however, downgrade the aicraIt to Cat III single. It will also lead to only one halI oI the
Master Caution and Master Warning lights illuminating. The loss oI both FWCs will remove all
automatic monitoring oI the aircraIt systems. The ECAM system pages and overhead panels must
be monitored Ior local Iailure indications.
The EMER CANC button can be used to supress the caution associated with an intermittant nuisance
warning. Pressing and holding the RCL key Ior 3 seconds will unsupress the caution.
InIormation on the ECAM displays is colour coded:
Green A normal condition
Amber Abnormal indication requiring crew awareness but not immediate action.
Red Serious parameter exceedance or warnings that requires immediate crew action.
The ECAM system divides the Ilight into various stages. II a warning occuring in the take-oII or
landing phase can be delayed, it is inhibited until a less critical stage oI Ilight is reached.
ECAM warnings are presented in various ways depending on severity:
Airbus Technical Notes
52
ECAM advisory II a parameter approaches its limit, the relevant SD page is brought up and
the parameter pulses, but remains green to indicate that no exceedance has yet
taken place.
Level 1 A loss oI redundancy or a loss oI a system that does not aIIect the saIety oI
the Ilight has occured. An amber message is displayed on the E/WD. As the
Iault only requires crew awareness, the handling oI the Iault can be delayed
iI required. Pressing the CLR key on the ECAM control panel will move the
message to the status page, which will be brought up. The status page is then
reviewed and subsequently removed by pressing either a CLR key or the STS
key.
Level 2 A Iailure that hasn't any direct consequence on Ilight saIety. This is similar to
a level 1 alert, except the crew is alerted by illumination oI the master caution
light and an aural warning. Pressing the master caution light extinguishes it.
Level 3 A Iailure that requires immediate crew action. The red master warning illumi-
nates and a continuous chime sounds. Pressing the master warning light ex-
tinguishes it, stops the chimes and resets the alerting system. In this case, the
messages shown on the E/WD are in red.
ECAM displays the Iailure message on the E/WD in order oI priority, so that high priority Iailures
are dealt with beIore low priority Iailures. It is possible that a high priority Iailure will be placed
above a Iailure that you are currently running the actions Ior.
A white MAINTENANCE message on the ECAM status page does not mean that the aircraIt is
unserviceable, only that a particular procedure is required at the next programmed servicing.
A boxed Iailure indication is a primary Iailure that has associated secondary Iailures. The secondary
Iailures are indicated in the right hand column by starred items.
E/WD
The upper area oI the E/WD display is used Ior main engine parameters, Iuel on board (FOB) and
slat/Ilap positions. The lower part oI the E/WD display is normally used to show memos. II a Iailure
occurs, the memos are replaced by warning/ caution messages and a series oI blue action items.
Boxed Iailures indicate a primary Iailure that will aIIect other systems. Starred Iailures on the right
oI the memo area are secondary Iailures.
Approximately two minutes aIter engine start, a takeoII memo appears. The items on this memo put
the aircraIt into a suitable conIiguration Ior takeoII.
During the takeoII phase, a magenta T.O. INHIBIT message appears. This indicates that some warn-
ings and cautions are now inhibited. T.O. INHIBIT is in eIIect Irom application oI T.O. thrust up to
1500It AAL or 2 minutes aIter liIt oII.
On passing 1500It in the descent, a landing memo is displayed.
At approximately 800It, a LDG INHIBIT message appears. This indicates that the vast majority oI
warnings and cautions have been inhibited Ior the landing phase.
SD
There is a permanent area at the bottom oI the SD. This always displays TAT, SAT, time and gross
weight.
The SD page automatically provides pilots with inIormation on a "need to know basis".
An aircraIt STATUS page may be displayed to check the state oI the aircraIt. The content oI this page
varies depending on what Iailures are present, but may contain limitations, approach procedures,
inIormation and inoperative systems. II the status page is not clear, a white boxed STS legend appears
Airbus Technical Notes
53
at the bottom oI the E/WD display, and, iI there are any messages aIIecting approach and landing,
the status page will automatically be displayed when the slats are extended. II the status page has a
green overIlow arrow at the bottom, pressing a CLR key will display the next page.
Controls
The pilot interIace Ior the ECAM display is the ECAM Control Panel on the pedestal. The middle two
lines oI buttons manually bring up their associated ECAM page. When manually selected, the button
lights up, and pushing it again will remove the page and allow the automatic sequencing oI pages.
The RCL button, when pressed Ior at least three seconds, recalls any warnings or cautions that have
been cleared since the last power up. II there is nothing to recall, a NORMAL message will be
displayed on the E/WD.
The T.O. CONFIG key is used to carry out a takeoII conIiguration check prior to takeoII. This
simulates setting oI takeoII power, and generates a warning iI the aircraIt is not in a proper takeoII
conIiguration.
20.3. Reconfiguration
In general, the PFD has priority over the ND and the E/WD has priority over the SD.
Normally, DMC1 supplies the Captain's PFD and ND, and the E/WD. DMC2 supplies the FO's PFD
and ND, and the SD. DMC3 is a backup.
II a DMC Iails, all inIormation is removed Irom the displays it controls and replaced by a white
diagonal line to indicate a working display with a Iailed source. ECAM will detect the Iailure and
provide a sequence oI alerts. Due to the priority rules, the E/WD display will move to the lower DU
iI it was DMC1 that Iailed. The EIS DMC switch is used to replace the Iailed DMC with DMC3.
In the event display Iailures, there will be no white diagonal. The displays have priority rules so that
the remaining displays are utilised most eIIectively. The PFDs have priority over the NDs unless
a PFD/ND switch on the misc panels is pushed. The E/WD has priority over the SD. The ECAM
screens can be given priority over an ND with the ECAM/ND XFER switch.
A single screen ECAM mode is available. This displays the E/WD, but can be made to display an SD
page Ior a maximum oI 30 seconds by pushing and holding the relevant page button on the ECP. II
an advisory condition occurs, the page is not automatically displayed. Instead the page button lights
up and a boxed ADV message is shown on the E/WD. II an ECAM warning or caution is triggered,
again there is no automatic page display. The normal aural and visual indications are given. The
underlined word in the warning indicates which SD page needs to be viewed. The page should be
checked both beIore and aIter running the ECAM actions, and the status page will have to be called
manually. The status page can be displayed Ior a maximum oI three minutes. On the approach, the
STS message pulses to indicate that the crew should manually call and review the status page.
Airbus Technical Notes
54
21. LVO
The approach may be broken down into phases, with the response to a Iailure determined by the
phase. The phases are:
Above 1000It A reversion to a lower category oI approach can be made as
long as the required minimas are available, all ECAM actions
are completed by 1000It and the reversion is brieIed.
Between Alert Height and 1000It Go around Ior any master caution, master warning, mode re-
version or instrument Ilag. A new approach to higher mini-
mas may be attempted once rebrieIed.
Below 200It Go around in the event oI an AUTOLAND light.
By 350It LAND should be displayed at 400It RA. II it is not displayed
at 350It, go around. In addition, ILS course should be checked
by 350It. II it is incorrect, a reversion to Cat II minimas Iol-
lowed by autopilot disconnect by 80It and a manual landing
is permissable.
1
Airbus A320 Family
Non-Normal Notes
Table of Contents
1. Operating techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1. Rejected TakeoII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. Failures during takeoII when above V1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3. EOSID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1. Emergency descent (memorv item) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2. Windshear (memorv item) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3. Unreliable airspeed (memorv item) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4. Incapacitation (memorv item) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5. Ditching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6. Forced landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.7. Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.8. Overweight landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.9. Immediate VMC recovery with single engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.10. Engine inoperative approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.11. Engine Iailure in cruise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.12. Single engine circling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.13. Bomb on board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.14. Stall recovery (memorv item) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.15. Computer reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3. Air conditioning, pressurisation and ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1. Cabin overpressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4. Electrical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1. Emergency conIiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2. Battery only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3. IDG low oil pressure/ high oil temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4. Generator Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.5. Battery Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.6. AC Bus 1 Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.7. AC Bus 2 Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.8. AC Ess Bus Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
2
4.9. AC Essential Shed Bus lost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.10. DC Bus 1 Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.11. DC Bus 2 Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.12. DC Essential Bus Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.13. DC Essential shed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.14. Loss oI DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.15. Generator overload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.16. Loss oI TR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.17. Battery bus Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.18. DC Emergency conIiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.19. Static inverter Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.20. Generator 1 line oII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.21. Tripped circuit breakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5. Flight controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1. Elevator Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2. Stabilizer jam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.3. Aileron Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.4. Spoiler Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.5. Rudder Jam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.6. Flaps and/or slats Iault/locked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.7. SFCC Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.8. ELAC Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.9. SEC Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.10. FCDC Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.11. Direct Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.12. Alternate Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.13. Wingtip brake Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.14. Flap attach sensor Iailure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.15. Flight control servo Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.16. Speed brake disagree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.17. Speed brake Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.18. StiII sidestick/ rudder pedals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6. Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.1. Smoke and Iumes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2. Smoke/ Iumes removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.3. Engine Iire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7. Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1. Fuel leak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.2. Fuel imbalance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.3. Gravity Iuel Ieeding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.4. Wing tank pump(s) low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
3
7.5. Center tank pumps low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.6. Auto Ieed Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.7. Low Iuel level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.8. Outer tank transIer valves Iailed closed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.9. Outer tank transIer valve open out oI sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.10. Cross-Ieed valve Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.11. Low Iuel temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.12. High Iuel temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8. Landing gear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.1. Loss oI braking (memorv item) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.2. Residual braking procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.3. Gravity extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.4. Asymmetric braking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.5. Landing with abnormal landing gear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.6. Flight with landing gear extended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.7. Gear shock absorber Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.8. Gear not uplocked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.9. Gear not downlocked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.10. Gear doors not closed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.11. Uplock Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.12. LGCIU disagreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.13. LGCIU Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.14. Gear not down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.15. Park brake on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.16. Nosewheel steering Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.17. Antiskid nosewheel steering oII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.18. Antiskid nosewheel steering Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.19. Brake system Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.20. Brakes hot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.21. Auto brake Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.22. Hydraulic selector valve Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.23. Failure oI normal braking system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.24. Failure oI alternate braking system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.25. Failure oI normal and alternate braking systems . . . . . . . . . 47
8.26. Brake accumulator low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.27. Released brakes, normal system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.28. Released brakes, alternate system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.29. Minor nosewheel steering Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.30. Brake temperature limitations requiring mainte-
nance action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
9. Power plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
4
9.1. Dual engine Iailure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
9.2. Engine relight in Ilight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
9.3. Engine stall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
9.4. Engine tailpipe Iire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
9.5. High engine vibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
9.6. Engine shut down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
9.7. Low engine oil pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10. Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
10.1. EGPWS alerts (memorv item) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
10.2. TCAS warnings (memorv item) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
10.3. RNAV downgrades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
10.4. ADR Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
10.5. ADR disagree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
10.6. RA Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
10.7. IR Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
10.8. IR disagree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
10.9. IR alignment in ATT mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
10.10. FM/GPS position disagree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
11. Auto-Ilight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.1. FAC Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.2. Yaw damper Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.3. Rudder trim Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.4. Rudder travel limiter Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
11.5. FCU Iaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
12. Hydraulics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
12.1. Green system low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
12.2. Yellow system low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
12.3. Blue system low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
12.4. Blue yellow systems low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
12.5. Green blue systems low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
12.6. Green yellow systems low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
12.7. Engine driven pump low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
12.8. Electric pump low pressure or overheat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
12.9. Low reservoir air pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
12.10. Reservoir overheat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
12.11. Low reservoir Iluid level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
12.12. PTU Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
12.13. RAT Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
13. Ice and rain protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
13.1. Double AOA heat Iail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
13.2. Single pitot probe heat or static port heat Iault . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
5
13.3. Multiple pitot heat Iailures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
13.4. Single AOA or TAT heat Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
13.5. Probe heat computer Iailure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
13.6. Window heat Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
13.7. Engine anti-ice valve Iault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
13.8. Wing anti-ice valve open when commanded closed
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
13.9. Wing anti-ice valve closed when commanded open
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
13.10. Wing anti-ice valves Iail to close aIter 30 second
selI-test on ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
13.11. High pressure detected when wing anti-ice turned
on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
14. Indicating/ Recording . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
14.1. Display unit Iailure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
15. Pneumatic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
15.1. Dual bleed Iailure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
16. Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
16.1. Failure oI two-way radio communication equip-
ment in UK airspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
6
1. Operating techniques
1.1. Rejected Takeoff
|EOM B.3.2.10, FCOM 3.2.10.1000|
The decision to reject rests solely with CM1. This decision is communicat-
ed with the words "Stop" or "Continue". "Stop" implies that CM1 is taking
control oI the aircraIt. Below 100kt the RTO is relatively risk Iree and a
decision to stop should be made Ior any ECAM and most other problems.
Above 100kt the RTO may be hazardous and stopping should only be con-
sidered Ior loss oI engine thrust, any Iire warning, any uninhibited ECAM
or anything which indicates the aircraIt will be unsaIe or unable to Ily.
II a stop is required, CM1 calls "Stop" while simultaneously bringing the
thrust levers to idle, then to max reverse. II the stop was commenced below
72kt the ground spoilers will not automatically deploy and the autobrake
will thereIore not engage. Monitor automatic braking, and iI there is any
doubt, apply manual braking as required. II normal braking Iails, announce
"Loss oI braking" and proceed with the loss oI braking memory items (see
Section 8.1, 'Loss oI braking (memorv item) |40| ). II the reason Ior
the stop was an engine Iire on the upwind side, consider turning the aircraIt
to keep the Iire away Irom the Iuselage. II there is any chance oI requir-
ing evacuation, bring the aircraIt to a complete halt, stow the reversers,
apply the parking brake, and order "Attention, crew at stations" on the PA.
II evacuation will deIinitely not be required, once the aircraIt's saIety is
assured, the RTO can be discontinued and the runway cleared. In this case
make a PA oI "Cabin crew, normal operations".
During this initial phase, CM2 conIirms reverse ("Reverse green"), con-
Iirms deceleration ("Decel"), cancels any audio warnings, inIorms ATC
and announces "70 knots" when appropriate. CM2 then locates the emer-
gency evacuation checklist.
Once the aircraIt has stopped, CM1 takes the radios and asks CM2 to car-
ry out any required ECAM actions. Whilst the ECAM actions are being
completed, CM1 will build up a decision as to whether to evacuate. II an
evacuation is required see Section 2.7, 'Evacuation |14| . Otherwise
order "Cabin crew, normal operations".
II the aircraIt has come to a complete halt using autobrake MAX, the brakes
can be released by disarming the spoilers.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
7
1.2. Failures during takeoff when above V1
|FCOM 3.2.10.2000|
II an engine has lost thrust, apply rudder conventionally on the runway.
At V
r
rotate to 12 at a slightly reduced rate. When airborne, select TO-
GA (FLX may be used but this tends to allow speed to decay unless pitch
is reduced), adjust and trim rudder to maintain target and request "pull
heading". II the EOSID Iollows the track oI the cleared SID, NAV may be
used, but this is very rare with easyJet EOSIDs. Bank angle should be lim-
ited to 15 when more than 3kt below maneuvering speed Ior the current
conIiguration. Engage the autopilot once gear is up and rudder is trimmed.
Whilst below 400It, the only Iailure related actions should be:
II applicable, PNF should announce "Engine Iailure" or "Engine Iire"
without speciIying an engine.
Cancellation oI master warning or master caution when both pilots con-
Iirm they are aware oI it.
Heightened awareness oI the possibility oI missing essential normal ac-
tions, such as calling rotate or raising the gear due to the distraction oI
the Iailure.
Once above 400It with saIe Ilight path assured, decide on an initial strategy.
In general, where a loss oI thrust has occured or is anticipated, the strategy
will be to Ily the EOSID with a level acceleration segment (see Section 1.3,
'EOSID |8| ). Otherwise, it will be to remain on the normal SID and
Ily a normal climb proIile. Any deviation Irom the cleared SID will require
ATC to be inIormed as a priority, usually as part oI a PAN or MAYDAY
message. In rare cases where the cleared SID requires a very early turn it
may be necessary to determine and action a strategy when below 400It. II
this is the case, it must be thoroughly brieIed.
Once the Ilight path strategy has been agreed and actioned, the Iailure can
be diagnosed and dealt with. II the Iailure has resulted in an ECAM warn-
ing, PF initiates this phase by asking PNF to "Read ECAM". Once the
ECAM is conIirmed, PF will take the radios and request PNF to carry out
ECAM actions. When applying ECAM procedures, PF is responsible Ior
moving the thrust levers once conIirmed by PNF. PNF is responsible Ior
everything else, but movement oI engine master switches, IR selectors and
any guarded switch must be conIirmed with PF.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
8
1.3. EOSID
BeIore the divergence point (the last common point between the SID and
the EOSID), iI the aircraIt detects a loss oI thrust the EOSID will be dis-
played as a temporary Ilight plan. In this case the temporary Ilight plan
can be inserted and NAV mode used. Otherwise it will be necessary to pull
heading and manually Iollow either the yellow line or bring up a pre-pre-
pared secondary Ilight plan and Iollow the white line.
II beyond the divergence point, pull heading and make an immediate turn
the shortest way onto the EOSID. Airbus speciIically recommends against
this in FCOM 4.4.30, but easyJet states it as policy in EOMB 4.2.3.
Electing to Ily the EOSID implies a level acceleration segment:
Initially Ily a TOGA climb at the higher oI V
2
or current speed, up to
a limit oI V
2
15kt. II a FLEX takeoII was carried out, a FLEX climb
is permissable. This climb is continued until all high priority tasks are
complete and the aircraIt is at or above acceleration altitude. For the
engine Iailure and the engine Iire cases, EOMB 4.2.3 speciIically deIines
the high priority tasks. For an engine Iailure, all ECAM actions up to
and including the master switch being turned oII must be completed. For
the engine Iire case all ECAM actions up to and including Iiring the Iirst
squib must be completed. II the Iire warning light does not extinguish
both squibs must be Iired.
The next segment is a TOGA level acceleration and clean up, either to
ConI 1 and S speed iI an immediate VMC return is desired or to ConI 0
and green dot. Again FLEX may be used iI a FLEX takeoII was carried
out. Level acceleration is usually acheived by pushing V/S. The phrases
"Stop ECAM" and "Continue ECAM" can be used to interupt ECAM
procedures in order to initiate this segment.
The Iinal segment is a MCT climb segment to MSA, either at S speed
iI in ConI 1 or at green dot speed iI in ConI 0. This is usually acheived
in open climb.
TOGA may be used Ior a maximum oI 10 minutes.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
9
2. Miscellaneous
2.1. Emergency descent (memory item)
|EOM B.3.2.80, QRH 1.25, FCOM 3.2.80.4000|
II an emergency descent is required, the Captain should consider taking
control iI not already PF.
Don oxygen masks, set them to the N position and establish communica-
tion.
Descent with autopilot and autothrottle engaged is preIerred. The conIig-
uration is thrust idle, Iull speed brake and maximum appropriate speed,
taking into account possible structural damage. Target altitude is FL100 or
MORA iI this is higher. II speed is low, allow speed to increase beIore de-
ploying Iull speedbrake to prevent activation oI the angle oI attack protec-
tion. Landing gear may be used below 25,000It, but speed must be below
V
LE
when it is extended and remain below V
LO
. II on an airway, consider
turning 90 to the leIt.
PNF should, Irom memory, turn seatbelt signs on, set continuous ignition
on the engines, set 7700 on the transponder and inIorm ATC oI the descent.
II cabin altitude will exceed 14,000It, he should also deploy the cabin oxy-
gen masks.
Once the memory actions are complete and the aircraIt is descending, PF
should Iinesse the target altitude, speed and heading. He should then take
over communications and call Ior the emergency descent checklist. Once
this is complete, the Captain should make the Iollowing PA:
"Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the Captain. We have
lost cabin pressure and are descending to a lower alti-
tude. Put your oxygen masks on and obey the instruc-
tions oI the cabin crew"
Once level, restore the aircraIt to a normal conIiguration. When saIe to do
so, advise cabin crew and passengers that it is saIe to remove their masks.
2.2. Windshear (memory item)
Reactive
|FCOM 3.2.80.13000|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
10
The windshear detection system is a Iunction oI the Flight Augmentation
Computer (FAC). It only operates during the takeoII and landing phases
with at least CONF 1 selected. In the takeoII phase, warnings are provided
Irom 3 seconds aIter liIt oII until 1300It RA is acheived. In the landing
phase warnings are provided between 1300It RA and 50It RA. A warning is
indicated by a red "WINDSHEAR" Ilag on the PFD and a "WINDSHEAR,
WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR" aural warning.
When on the ground, windshear is onlv indicated by signiIicant airspeed
variations. It is possible that these Iluctuations may cause V1 to occur sig-
niIicantly later in the takeoII run then it should. It thereIore Ialls to the
Captain to make an assessment oI whether suIIicient runway remains to
reject the takeoII, or whether getting airborne below V
r
would be the bet-
ter option. II the takeoII is to be continued in windshear conditions, call
"Windshear, TOGA" and apply TOGA power. Rotate at V
r
or with suIIi-
cient runway remaining and Iollow SRS orders. TODO: This is Boeing
advice - Airbus oIIers no advice iI there is insuIIicient runway available
to rotate at normal speeds}. SRS will maintain a minimum rate oI climb,
even iI airspeed must be sacriIiced.
II a warning occurs when airborne, call "Windshear, TOGA", apply TOGA
power and maintain current conIiguration. The autopilot can Ily the escape
maneuvre as long as u
req
u
prot
. II the autopilot is not engaged, Iollow the
SRS orders on the FD. II the FD is not available, initially pitch up to 17.5,
then increase as required.
In severe windshear, it is possible that ALPHA FLOOR protection will
activate. As TOGA will already be selected, this will have no immediate
eIIect. Once clear oI the windshear, however, TOGA LK will be active,
requiring the autothrust to be disconnected to avoid an overspeed.
Predictive
|FCOM 3.2.80.14000, FCOM 3.4.91|
When below 2300It AGL, the weather radar scans a 5nm radius 60 arc
ahead oI the aircraIt Ior returns indicating potential windshear.
Alerts are categorised as advisory, caution or warning, in increasing order
oI severity. Severity is determined by range, position and phase oI Ilight.
Alerts are only provided when between 50It and 1500It, or on the ground
when below 100kt.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
11
All types oI alert produce an indication oI windshear position on the ND,
providing the ND range is set to 10nm. A message on the ND instructs
the crew to change range to 10nm iI not already set. Cautions also give an
amber "W/S AHEAD" message on both PFDs and an aural "MONITOR
RADAR DISPLAY" warning. Warnings give a red "W/S AHEAD" mes-
sage on the PFDs and either a "WINDSHEAR AHEAD, WINDSHEAR
AHEAD" or "GO AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD" aural message.
II a warning alert occurs during the takeoII roll, reject the takeoII. II it oc-
curs during initial climb, call "Windshear, TOGA", apply TOGA thrust and
Iollow SRS orders. ConIiguration may be changed as long as the winds-
hear is not entered.
II a warning alert occurs during approach, carry out a normal go-around. II
positive veriIication is made that no hazard exists, the crew may downgrade
the warning to a caution. II a caution alert occurs during approach, consider
use oI CONF 3 and increasing V
APP
to a maximum oI V
LS
15.
2.3. Unreliable airspeed (memory item)
|QRH 2.15, FCOM 3.2.34.30000|
Unreliable airspeed indications may result Irom radome damage and/or un-
serviceable probes or ports. Altitude indications may also be erroneous iI
static probes are aIIected.
The FMGCs normally reject erroneous ADR data by isolating a single
source that has signiIicant diIIerences to the other two sources. It is possi-
ble that a single remaining good source may be rejected iI the other two
sources are erroneous in a suIIiciently similar way. In this case, it Ialls to the
pilots to identiIy and turn oII the erroneous sources to recover good data.
The Iirst problem is recognition oI a Iailure, since the aircraIt systems may
be unable to warn oI a problem. The primary method oI doing this is corre-
lation oI aircraIt attitude and thrust to displayed perIormance. Correlation
oI radio altimeter and GPIRS derived data (available on GPS MONITOR
page) may also aid identiIication. The stall warning (available in alternate
or direct law) is based on alpha probes, so will likely be valid. Other clues
may include Iluctuations in readings, abnormal behavior oI the automatics,
high speed buIIet or low aerodynamic noise.
II the aircraIt Ilight path is in doubt, disconnect the automatics and Ily the
Iollowing short term attitude and thrust settings to initiate a climb:
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
12
Condition Thrust Pitch
Below Thrust Reduction Altitude TOGA 15
Below FL100 Climb 10
Above FL100 Climb 5
Flap conIiguration should be maintained except when a go-around is initi-
ated with Ilap Iull, in which case CONF 3 should be selected. The gear and
speedbrake should be retracted. II there is any doubt over the validity oI
altitude inIormation, the FPV must be disregarded. II altitude inIormation
is deIinitely good, the FPV may be used.
Once the Ilight path is under control and a saIe altitude is attained, reIer
to the table on page 2.15 oI the QRH to extract a pitch and thrust combi-
nation Ior your weight and conIiguration. Speed should be adjusted until
the aircraIt Ilies level with these parameters set. Level Ilight can be estab-
lished using the VSI, which is an inertial instrument unless there is there is
an amber box around the numerical indication on the V/S scale TODO:
ConIirm this - QRH indicates that VSI should not be used iI altitude is in
doubt}. Once stabilised, an attempt should be made to recover good data
by switching oII Iaulty ADRs.
II good ADR inIormation cannot be recovered, tables are provided on page
2.17 and 2.18 oI the QRH to enable all phases oI Ilight to be Ilown using
just pitch and thrust settings. The approach conIiguration should be Ilown
in level Ilight, stabilising each conIiguration beIore the next conIiguration
is selected.
2.4. Incapacitation (memory item)
|FCOM 3.2.80.6000|
Take control, using the stick priority button iI necessary. Contact cabin
crew ASAP. They should strap the incapacitated pilot to his seat, move the
seat back, then recline the seat. II there are two members available, the
body can be moved. Medical help should be sought Irom passengers, and
the presence oI any type rated company pilots on board ascertained.
2.5. Ditching
|QRH 1.23, QRH 1.16, QRH 1.20 FCOM 3.2.80|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
13
The QRH 1.23 procedure applies iI the engines are running. II the engines
are not running, reIer to QRH 1.16 or QRH 1.20 which include ditching.
Preparation Ior ditching involves notiIying ATC in order to expedite res-
cue, preparing survival equipment and securing the aircraIt Ior impact. The
GPWS should be inhibited to prevent nuisance warnings. The crew oxygen
should be turned oII below FL100 to prevent potentially dangerous leaks
TODO: this is an assumption}.
The engines operative ditching conIiguration is gear up, conIig Iull, 11
pitch and minimal V/S. II both engines are inoperative, use conIig 3 (only
slats available) and maintain at least 150kt. In strong winds, land into wind.
In lighter winds, land parallel to swell. The bleeds are all turned oII and
ditching button pushed (ensure pressurisation is in auto Ior this to work) in
order to close all openings below the waterline and reduce water ingress.
At 2000It, make a PA "Cabin crew, landing positions". At 500It, make a
PA "Brace, brace"
At touchdown, turn the engine and APU masters oII. AIter coming to a stop,
notiIy ATC, push all Iire buttons, discharge all agents (engine agent 2 may
not be available) and evacuate the aircraIt. TODO: There is a discrepancy
between engines operative/ inoperative regarding use oI the Iire buttons
aIter stopping}
2.6. Forced landing
|QRH 1.24, QRH 1.16 & 1.20, FCOM 3.2.80.3000|
The QRH 1.24 procedure applies iI the engines are running. II the engines
are not running, reIer to QRH 1.16 or QRH 1.20 which include Iorced
landing.
Preparation Ior Iorced landing involves notiIying ATC in order to expedite
rescue, preparing survival equipment and securing the aircraIt Ior impact.
The GPWS should be inhibited to prevent nuisance warnings. The crew
oxygen should be turned oII below FL100 to prevent potentially dangerous
leaks TODO: this is an assumption}.
The engines operative Iorced landing conIiguration is gear down, conIig
Iull, spoilers armed. II the engines are inoperative, use conIig 3 (only slats
available) and maintain at least 150kt. The ram air button is used to ensure
that the aircraIt will be completely depressurised at touchdown. At 2000It,
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
14
make a PA "Cabin crew, landing positions". At 500It, make a PA "Brace,
brace"
At touchdown, turn the engine and APU masters oII. This will leave accu-
mulator braking only. AIter coming to a stop, set the parking brake, notiIy
ATC, push all Iire buttons, discharge all agents (engine agent 2 may not
be available) and evacuate the aircraIt.TODO: There is a discrepancy be-
tween engines operative/ inoperative regarding use oI the Iire buttons aIter
stopping}
2.7. Evacuation
|EOM B.3.2.80, QRH 7.01, FCOM 3.2.80, FCTM 03.020|
Evacuation should be carried out in accordance with the emergency evac-
uation checklist. The easyJet procedure is Ior CM1 to call Ior the checklist
and then send a Mayday message to ATC beIore commencing the check-
list. TODO: this strikes me as a bit oI an odd order to do things - check
its correct}
The Iirst two items conIirm the RTO actions oI stopping the aircraIt, setting
the parking brake and alerting the cabin crew. The next item conIirms ATC
has been alerted.
The next Iour items prepare the aircraIt Ior evacuation. II manual cabin
pressure has been used, CM2 checks cabin diII is zero, and iI necessary
manually opens the outIlow valve. CM2 then shuts the engines down with
their master switches, and pushes all the Iire buttons (including the APU).
ConIirmation is not required beIore carrying out these actions TODO:
This is not clear Irom EOM B, but incorporates the FCTM instruction}.
CM1 does, however, respond "ConIirmed" in response to the checklist
items once they have been actioned. In response to the next checklist item,
"Agents", CM1 decides iI any extinguishing agents should be discharged
and instructs CM2 to discharge them as required. Engine agent 2 will not
be available. Agents should only be discharged iI there are positive signs
oI Iire.
Finally, order the evacuation. This is primarily done with the PA "Evacu-
ate, unIasten your seat belts and get out", with the evacuation alarm being
triggered as a backup.
2.8. Overweight landing
|QRH 2.25, FCOM 3.2.80.5000|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
15
A landing can be made at any weight, providing suIIicient landing distance
is available. Automatic landings are certiIied up to MLW, but Ilight tests
have demonstrated autoland capability to 69000kg in case oI emergency.
The preIerred landing conIiguration is CONF FULL, but lower settings
may be used iI required by QRH/ECAM procedures or iI aircraIt weight
exceeds the CONF 3 go around limit (see QRH 2.25). Packs should be
turned oII to provide additional go around thrust. II conIiguration is less
than FULL, use 1F Ior go-around.
It is possible that S speed will be higher than V
FE next
Ior CONF 2. In this
case, a speed below V
FE next
should be selected until CONF 2 is acheived,
then managed speed can be re-engaged.
In the Iinal stages oI the approach, reduce speed to acheive V
LS
at run-
way threshold. Land as smoothly as possible, and apply max reverse as
soon as the main gear touches down. Maximum braking can be used aIter
nosewheel touchdown. AIter landing, switch on the brake Ians and monitor
brake temperatures careIully. II temperatures exceed 800C, tyre deIlation
may occur.
2.9. Immediate VMC recovery with single engine
Fly circuit in CONF 1. Select CONF 2 at start oI base turn. Gear will usu-
ally be extended once Ilaps have run to 2, but may be delayed until Iinal
approach iI perIormance is an issue. Select CONF 3 once gear is down and
CONF Iull when on Iinal approach. TODO: Check how climb gradient/
Ilap decision is determined.}
2.10. Engine inoperative approach
Landing conIiguration is Ilap Iull unless a level oII is required during Iinal
approach. In this case CONF 3 should be used. Selection oI Iull Ilaps should
be delayed until Iinal descent. It is not permissable to use the autopilot to
perIorm single engine NPAs in FINAL APP, NAV V/S or NAV FPA modes.
These modes may, however, be used with the FDs.
2.11. Engine failure in cruise
Set MCT on live engine then disconnect the autothrust. Start ECAM actions
and notiIy ATC. Decide on strategy - standard strategy increases the chance
oI an engine relight, whilst obstacle strategy maintains the greatest possi-
ble obstacle clearance. II using standard strategy select speed .78/300kt.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
16
II using obstacle strategy select green dot speed. Select altitude to LRC
ceiling or green dot ceiling as appropriate to allow driIt down once speed
is reached. II obstacles remain a problem, MCT and green dot speed can
be maintained to give a shallow climbing proIile. Once obstacles are no
longer a problem, descend to LRC ceiling (use V/S iI 500 Ipm descent
rate), engage the autothrust and continue at LRC speed.
2.12. Single engine circling
It may not be possible to Ily level in the standard circling conIiguration oI
CONF 3 gear down. This can be ascertained by checking the table in Vol
3. Gear extension may be delayed until Iinal approach iI required.
2.13. Bomb on board
The primary aim is to get the aircraIt on the ground and evacuated ASAP.
The secondary aim is to prevent detonation oI the device. This is acheived
by preventing Iurther increases in cabin altitude through the use oI manual
pressure control and by avoiding sharp maneuvres and turbulence.
The tertiary aim is to minimise the eIIect oI any explosion, This is acheived
by reducing the diII to 1 psi, by descending to a level 2500It above cabin
altitude, and by Ilying at suitable speeds. As Iurther descent is required,
the manual controls should be used to maintain the 1 psi diII Ior as long as
possible. The aircraIt should be conIigured Ior landing as early as possible
to avoid an explosion damaging landing systems.
In the cabin, procedures are laid down Ior assessing the risks oI moving
the device and Ior moving the device to the LRBL at door 2R.
2.14. Stall recovery (memory item)
Airbus have determined that there may be insuIIicient longitudinal control
authority to recover Irom a stall iI TOGA is selected. The generic stall re-
covery is thereIore simply to pitch the nose down to break the stall and level
the wings. Once there are no longer any indications oI the stall, smoothly
apply thrust, check speedbrakes retracted and iI appropriate (clean and be-
low 20,000It) deploy the slats by selecting Ilaps 1.
II a stall warner sounds on takeoII it is likely to be spurious since you are
almost certainly in normal law. The procedure in this case is essentially to
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
17
initially assume unreliable airspeed and Ily TOGA, 15, wings level until
it can be conIirmed that the warning is spurious.
A stall warning may occur at high altitude to indicate that the aircraIt is
reaching u
buIIet
. In this case simply reduce the back pressure on the side-
stick and/or reduce bank angle.
2.15. Computer reset
Abnormal computer behaviour can oIten be stopped by interupting the
power supply oI the aIIected computer. This can be done either with cock-
pit controls or with circuit breakers. The general procedure is to interupt
the power supply, wait 3 seconds (5 seconds iI a C/B was used), restore
the power, then wait another three seconds Ior the reset to complete. Spe-
ciIic procedures are detailed in the computer reset tables on page 2.36 oI
the QRH.
On the ground, almost all computers can be reset. The exceptions are the
ECU and EIU while the associated engine is running and the BDCU when
the aircraIt is not stopped.
In Ilight, only the computers listed in the reset table should be considered
Ior reset.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
18
3. Air conditioning, pressurisation and ventilation
3.1. Cabin overpressure
|QRH 2.01, FCOM 3.2.21.27000|
There is no ECAM in the case oI total loss oI pressure control leading to
an overpressure, so apply the QRH procedure. The basic procedure is to
reduce air inIlow by turning oII one oI the packs and put the avionics ven-
tilation system in its smoke removal conIiguration so that it dumps cabin
air overboard. The AP is monitored, and the remaining pack is turned oII
iI it exceeds 9 psi. 10 minutes beIore landing, both packs are turned oII
and remain oII, and the avionics ventilation is returned to its normal con-
Iiguration.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
19
4. Electrical
4.1. Emergency configuration
|QRH 1.01 & 1.05, FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.17000, red
ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG|
Attempt to restore normal power by recycling the main generators. II that
Iails, try again aIter splitting the systems with the BUS TIE button.
II normal power cannot be restored, ensure that the emergency generator is
on line (deploy the RAT manually iI required) and maintain speed ~140kt to
avoid RAT stall. Cycling FAC 1 will recover rudder trim. Once 45 seconds
have elapsed and when below FL250, the APU can be started.
So much equipment is lost in the emergency conIiguration that QRH 1.01
provides a table oI surviving equipment. Notable losses are all the Iuel
pumps (so ignition on, avoid negative G, center tank Iuel is unusable), the
anti-skid and three IiIths oI the spoilers. Landing speeds and distances are
increased signiIicantly.
QRH 1.05 provides a paper summary which should be applied once ECAM
actions are complete.
4.2. Battery only
|QRH 1.01, FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.19000. red ECAM: ELEC
ESS BUSES ON BAT|
Power is available Ior approximately 30 minutes TODO: Can't Iind a reI-
erence Ior this - must have been part oI CBT}. QRH 1.01 provides details
oI remaining equipment. This is very similar to the emergency electrical
conIiguration (see Section 4.1, 'Emergency conIiguration |19| ) with
the additional loss oI FAC1 and FMGC1. An attempt should be made to
bring the emergency generator on line by ensuring speed is ~140kt and
deploying the RAT with the EMER ELEC PWR MAN ON button.
4.3. IDG low oil pressure/ high oil temperature
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.1000, amber ECAM: ELEC IDG 1(2)
OIL LO PR/OVHT|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
20
The IDG should be disconnected. Assuming the associated engine is run-
ning, press the IDG button until the GEN FAULT light comes on. Do not
press the button Ior more than 3 seconds.
The APU generator should be used iI available.
4.4. Generator fault
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.2,4}000, amber ECAM:
ELEC(APU) GEN (1)(2) FAULT|
Try to reset the generator by turning it oII, then aIter a short pause, turning
it on again. II unsuccessIul, turn it back oII.
II an engine driven generator cannot be recovered, the APU generator
should be used iI available.
Single generator operation leads to shedding oI the galley. Loss oI an en-
gine driven generator leads to loss oI CAT III DUAL capability.
4.5. Battery fault
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.5000, ELEC BAT 1(2) FAULT|
The aIIected battery contactor opens automatically. APU battery start is
unavailable with a single battery.
4.6. AC Bus 1 fault
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.8000, ELEC AC BUS 1 FAULT|
Some or all oI the equipment on AC bus 1 becomes unavailable, including
TR1. DC Bus 2 is powered Irom DC Bus 1 via the battery bus. Power
must be re-routed to the Essential AC bus via AC bus 2. This is automatic
on some aircraIt. Manual re-routing is achieved with the AC ESS FEED
button. Once Essential AC is powered, the Essential TR powers the DC
Essential bus.
Notable lost equipment includes the blue hydraulic system and associated
services (including spoiler 3), radio altimeter 1 (and hence Cat III capabil-
ity), halI the Iuel pumps, the nose wheel steering, the avionics blower Ian
and p1 windshield heat. Landing distance will increase by up to 25 TO-
DO: There is a discrepancy between QRH 2.32 and FCOM 3.2.80.12000
- check once new FCOM 3 is issued}.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
21
4.7. AC Bus 2 fault
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.9000, ELEC AC BUS 2 FAULT|
Some or all oI the equipment on AC bus 2 becomes unavailable, including
TR2. DC bus 2 is powered Irom DC bus 1 via the battery bus. The majority
oI this equipment has a redundant backup, the loss oI the FO's PFD and
ND and a downgrade to Cat I being the major issue. Landing distances are
unchanged.
4.8. AC Ess Bus fault
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.10000, ELEC AC ESS BUS FAULT|
It may be possible to recover the bus by transIerring its power source to
AC BUS 2 with the AC ESS FEED button. II this is unsuccessIul, some or
all oI the equipment on the AC ESS bus will be lost. The majority oI this
equipment has a redundant backup, with the loss oI the Captain's PFD and
ND and a downgrade to Cat I being the major issues. Landing distances
are unchanged.
4.9. AC Essential Shed Bus lost
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.11000, ELEC AC ESS BUS SHED|
Some or all oI the equipment on the AC ESS SHED bus is lost. The ma-
jor issue is the loss oI the passenger oxygen masks. Landing distances are
unchanged.
4.10. DC Bus 1 fault
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.12000, ELEC DC BUS 1 FAULT|
Some or all oI the equipment on DC Bus 1 is lost. Most oI the equipment
loss causes loss oI redundancy only. Landing distances are unchanged.
4.11. DC Bus 2 fault
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.13000, ELEC DC BUS 2 FAULT|
Some or all oI the equipment on DC Bus 2 is lost. The F/O's static probe
sensor is lost, so ADR3 should be selected on the F/O's side. FCU2 is lost,
so check that the baro reI on the FCU and PFD agree. Landing distance
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
22
increases by up to 35 due to the loss oI 3 ground spoilers per side and
one reverser. Autobrake is also unavailable. Due to the loss oI SFCC2, the
slats and Ilaps will be slow and the engines will remain in approach idle.
FAC2 is lost, so the characteristic speeds on both PFDs are provided by
FAC1. F/O window heat, wipers and rain repellant is lost.
The other lost systems either have redundant backups or are non-essential.
It should be noted that the only Ilight computers remaining are ELAC 1,
SEC 1 and FAC 1.
4.12. DC Essential Bus fault
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.14000 , ELEC DC ESS BUS FAULT|
Some or all oI the equipment in the DC Essential Bus is lost. OI particu-
lar note, the audio cards connecting VHF2 and VHF3 to the Audio Man-
agement Unit are lost. Since VHF1 is also lost, the ECAM suggests using
VHF2 and VHF3, but this will not work, and all comms are lost. Airbus
is working on a Iix, apparently.
FCU1 is lost, so the baro reIs should be checked. The GPWS is lost and
should be turned oII.
Landing distances are increased due to the loss oI reverser 2 and the loss oI
the blue hydraulic system (and hence spoiler 3). Wing anti-ice is also lost,
so landing distances will also increase signiIicantly iI ice is accreted and
increased approach speeds are required.
Slats and Ilaps are slow due to the loss oI SFCC1. This also leads to the
engines reverting to approach idle.
Landing capability is Cat 2 due to the loss oI the auto-thrust. The ECAM
status page incorrectly reports Cat 3 single.
4.13. DC Essential shed
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.15000, ELEC DC ESS BUS SHED|
The only major issue is the loss oI wing anti-ice. ThereIore, avoid icing
conditions, and apply landing distance procedure iI ice accretes.
4.14. Loss of DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24. , ELEC DC BUS 12 FAULT|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
23
Some or all oI the systems supplied by DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2 are lost.
Both channels oI the BSCU are lost (leads to loss oI anti-skid) along with
3 spoilers Irom each side and both reversers. This signiIicantly increases
landing distances, particularly in the wet.
Also oI note is that both center tank pumps are lost. As the center tank
cannot gravity Ieed, the Iuel in it becomes unusable.
Finally, loss oI SFCC2 means that Ilaps and slats are slow, and engine idle
control reverts to approach idle.
All other systems are relatively insigniIicant or have redundant backups.
4.15. Generator overload
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.21000 , ELEC GEN 1(2) or APU
GEN OVERLOAD|
Shed some load by switching oII the galleys.
4.16. Loss of TR
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.22000 , ELEC TR 1(2) or ESS TR
FAULT|
No systems are lost as a result oI Iailure oI a single TR. II the Iault is with
TR1 or TR2, only Cat 3 single will be available.
4.17. Battery bus fault
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.23000 , ELEC DC BAT BUS
FAULT|
Some or all oI the equipment on the Battery bus is lost. The only major
items lost are APU Iire detection and APU battery start.
4.18. DC Emergency configuration
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.24000 , ELEC DC EMER CONFIG|
DeIined as the loss oI DC BUSSES 1 2, DC ESS BUS and DC BAT BUS.
The check list assumes that DC ESS BUS can be recovered by deploying
the RAT with the EMER ELEC PWR button.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
24
The lost equipment is the sum oI loss oI DC BUS 1, DC BUS 2 (see Sec-
tion 4.14, 'Loss oI DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2 |22| ) and the battery bus
(see Section 4.17, 'Battery bus Iault |23| ), so all comments regard-
ing these Iailures apply. In addition, a minimum oI 140kt must be main-
tained to avoid RAT stall. This combination leads to an extreme increase
in landing distance requirement.
4.19. Static inverter fault
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.25000 , ELEC STAT INV FAULT |
Normal operations are not aIIected.
4.20. Generator 1 line off
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.26000 , ELEC EMER GEN 1 LINE
OFF|
The GEN 1 LINE button on the emergency electrical panel manually opens
the generator 1 line contactor, leaving generator 2 to supply GEN 2. It is
used Ior the smoke drill. II it's not meant to be oII, turn it on.
4.21. Tripped circuit breakers
|FCOM 1.24.20.5000, FCOM 3.2.24.27000 , C/B TRIPPED|
It is generally not recommended to reset circuit breakers in Ilight. It is,
however, acceptable to attempt a single reset iI it is judged necessary Ior
the saIe continuation oI the Ilight.
On the ground, any circuit breakers other than those Ior the Iuel pumps
may be reset as long as the action is coordinated with MOC.
The ECAM warning will be triggered iI a green circuit breaker trips.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
25
5. Flight controls
5.1. Elevator faults
|FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.25000, amber ECAM:F/CTL L(R)
ELEV FAULT|
|FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.23000, red ECAM:F/CTL LR
ELEV FAULT|
II a single elevator Iails, the SECs use the remaining elevator to provide
pitch control in alternate law (see Section 5.12, 'Alternate Law |30| ).
In addition, speed brake should not be used and the autopilots are unser-
viceable TODO: Find out why}.
II both elevators Iail, the only mechanism Ior pitch control available is
manual pitch trim, so pitch reverts to mechanical back up and roll reverts to
direct law. For the approach Ily a long Iinal, initiating the descent Irom at
least 5000It AAL. Do not try to Ilare using trim and do not remove power
until aIter touchdown. From 1000It AAL, try to keep power changes to
within 2 N1. In the event oI a go-around, power must be applied very
slowly iI control is not to be lost.TODO: This is Boeing advice - check
iI it is relevant to Airbus}
5.2. Stabilizer jam
|QRH 2.07, FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.32,33}000, amber
ECAM:F/CTL STABILIZER JAM|
Manual pitch trim is a mechanical connection to the stabilizer actuator. It
may be possible to use manual pitch trim when the ELACs have detected
a stabilizer jam, although it may be heavier than normal. II it is useable,
trim Ior neutral elevators.
The Ilight controls will revert to Alternate Law. II the stabilizer could not
be moved, gear extension should be delayed until CONF 3 and V
APP
are
acheived so that the elevators are properly trimmed.
II the jam is caused by the mechanical connection, it is possible that the
ELACs will not detect the problem. The procedure in this case is similar,
but Normal Law will remain.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
26
5.3. Aileron faults
|FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.22000, amber ECAM:F/CTL L(R)
AIL FAULT|
The lateral aircraIt handling is not adversely aIIected even iI both ailerons
Iail, as the systems compensate by using the spoilers. Fuel consumption
will, however, increase by approximately 6.
5.4. Spoiler faults
|FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.26,27}000, amber ECAM:F/CTL
(GND) SPLR (12)(34) FAULT|
Spoiler Iaults should not adversely aIIect handling, although they may
cause some buIIeting. A CONF 3 landing may reduce this buIIeting. Speed
brake should not be used iI spoilers 3 4 are aIIected. The loss oI ground
spoilers will increase landing distances by up to 55 (details in QRH 2.32).
5.5. Rudder 1am
|QRH 2.06, FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.34000, amber ECAM:F/
CTL RUDDER JAM|
The main indication oI jammed rudder is undue and adverse pedal move-
ment during rolling maneuvers caused by the yaw damper orders being Ied
back to the pedals when they are no longer sent to the rudder.
Crosswinds Irom the side that the rudder is deIlected should be avoided,
and a cross wind limit oI 15kt applies. Control on the ground will require
diIIerential braking until the steering handle can be used (below 70kt), so
landing distances are increased. Do not use autobrake.
5.6. Flaps and/or slats fault/locked
|QRH 2.03, FCOM 1.27.50.3000, FCOM 3.2.27.1,2,3,4}000, amber
ECAM:F/CTL FLAPS(SLATS) FAULT(LOCKED)
The most pressing concern Iollowing a Ilap or slat problem is to establish a
max operating speed that will avoid overspeeding the device in its locked
position. A table is provided on page 2.05 oI the QRH Ior this purpose, but
a quick estimation can be made by establishing what Ilap lever position
would be required to get the device into its current position and using V
FE
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
27
Ior the conIiguration associated with that Ilap lever position as V
MO
. In
doing this, it must be remembered that slat deployment in CONF 2 and
CONF 3 is the same (tip: think oI available slat positions as being 0, 1,
Intermediate or Full). The barber's pole displayed Ior V
FE
on the PFD is
a Iunction oI the Ilap lever position, so it may be worth initially selecting
the Ilap lever to the matching CONF to have this reIerence available. For
minimum speeds, the V
LS
displayed on the PFD is calculated Irom actual
Ilap and slat position and can be trusted.
Unless there is an obvious reason not to (e.g. wing tip brake on, alignment
Iault or Iault due to dual hydraulic Iailure), the Ilap lever can then be re-
cycled.
II normal operation cannot be restored, there are two major issues that must
be quickly addressed. Firstly, Iuel burn will be dramatically higher when
Ilying with a locked device. With slats extended, Iuel burn will increase
by 60, with Ilaps extended 80 and with both extended Iuel burn will
double. The paragraph at the bottom oI page 2.05 oI the QRH provides
these Iigures. The second issue is that landing distances are signiIicantly
increased, in the worst case by a Iactor oI 2.2. Landing distance can be
assessed using the tables on page 2.32 and 4.03 oI the QRH. It may be that
the combination oI these Iactors requires a Iairly prompt diversion decision.
The Ilap and slat systems are largely independent, so the Ilap lever will
continue to move the slats iI the Ilaps are locked and vice versa. In general,
Ilap 3 should be selected Ior landing. There are two exceptions. II Ilaps are
locked at ~3, Ilap Iull should be used. II both slats and Ilaps are locked at 0,
Ilap 1 should be used so that the AP/FD go-around is armed. ConIigurations
and V
REF
increments are available on page 2.32 oI the QRH. II a Ilapless
and slatless landing is required, the threshold speed in may be below V
LS
.
This is necessary as the landing speeds in this conIiguration are very close
to tyre limit speeds.
During conIiguration, V
LS
is computed Irom actual conIiguration and V
FE
next
is computed Irom Ilap lever position. This may lead to a situation where
V
LS
~V
FE next
. It is thereIore acceptable to set the next Ilap lever position
when above V
FE next
and reduce the speed to Iollow V
LS
as the surIaces
extend. Use oI managed speed is not recommended during conIiguration.
It is worth noting that Iailure oI the slat channels oI both SFCCs appears
to result in the loss oI characterisic speed display on both PFDs. This is
not mentioned in the FCOM but occurs in the sim. The upshot oI this is
that neither V
LS
nor V
SW
are available at all, since they are not displayed
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
28
and there is no way to calculate them. This is oI particular concern when
trying to conIigure to Ilaps 2 since the aircraIt must be slowed to V
FE(conI
2)
-5 when still clean (remember conI 1 is slats only when conIiguring Irom
conI 0). It is highly likely that the stall warner will activate during the tran-
sition, and iI not anticipated, the subsequent recovery will overspeed the
Ilaps. The solution is to brieI that speed will be reduced very slowly and iI
the stall warning occurs the speed will be maintained whilst allowing the
deployment oI the Ilaps to recover the stall margin.
The autopilot may be used down to 500It AAL, but since it is not tuned Ior
the abnormal conIiguration it must be closely monitored.
For the go-around, initially maintain Ilap/ slat conIiguration. A speed 10kt
lower than max operating speed should be Ilown. II it is the slats that are
jammed or iI the Ilaps are jammed at 0, clean conIiguration can be used to
transit to a diversion airIield.
Other issues include the possible loss oI the automatic operation oI the
centre tank pumps (which is sequenced to the slats) and possible reversion
to Alternate Law.
5.7. SFCC faults
|FCOM 1.27.50.3000, FCOM 3.2.27.5,6}000, amber ECAM:F/CTL
FLAP(SLAT) SYS 1(2) FAULT|
Each SFCC has Iully independent slat and Ilap channels. A Iailure oI a
channel in a single controller will lead to slow operation oI the associated
surIaces. In addition, the Ilap channel oI SFCC1 provides input to the idle
control part oI the FADECs and to the EGPWC.
Failure oI both Ilap channels or Iailure oI both slat channels is covered in
Section 5.6, 'Flaps and/or slats Iault/locked |26| .
5.8. ELAC fault
|FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.11,12}000, amber ECAM:F/CTL
ELAC 1(2) FAULT|
In normal operations, ELAC 1 controls the ailerons and ELAC 2 con-
trols the elevators and stabiliser. Failure oI a single ELAC will result in
Iailover to the remaining computer. Provided no uncommanded maneuvres
occured, an attempt can be made to reset the Iailed ELAC.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
29
Failure oI both ELACs leads to loss oI ailerons and hence Alternate Law.
One oI the SECs will take over control oI the elevators and stabiliser.
Again, an attempt can be made to reset the computers.
II the Iault is designated a pitch Iault, only the pitch Iunction oI the asso-
ciated ELAC is lost.
5.9. SEC fault
|FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.14000, amber ECAM:F/CTL SEC
1(2)(3) FAULT|
Each SEC controls either 1 or 2 spoilers per wing. SEC 1 and 2 also provide
back up Ior the ELACs (see Section 5.8, 'ELAC Iault |28| ). Loss
oI a SEC leads to loss oI its associated spoilers. SEC 1 provides spoiler
position to the FACs. II speedbrakes are deployed with SEC 1 u/s and SEC
3 operative, spoiler 2 will deploy without a corresponding increase in V
LS
.
ThereIore, do not use speedbrake iI SEC 1 is aIIected (it won't do much
anyway!).
Pairs oI SECs also provide the signal Ior reverse thrust lever angle to the
reversers and spoiler deployment to the autobrake. A dual SEC Iailure will
thereIore lead to a loss oI a reverser and loss oI autobraking.
II all SECs are lost, all the above holds true. Furthermore the Ilight controls
revert to Alternate Law due to the complete loss oI spoilers. Also, due to
routing oI LGCIU data to the ELACs via the SECs, Direct Law will occur
at slat extension rather than gear extension.
An attempt should be made to reset the aIIected SEC(s).
5.10. FCDC faults
|FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.20000, amber ECAM:F/CTL FCDC
1(2)(12) FAULT|
The two FCDCs are redundant, so a single Iailure has no immediate eIIect.
II both FCDCs Iail, the ELACs and SECs can no longer supply data to the
EIS. The major eIIect oI this is that F/CTL ECAM warnings are no longer
generated. The warning lights on the overhead panel continue to give valid
inIormation and should be monitored. The aircraIt remains in normal law
with all protections, but protection indications (bank and pitch limits, V
u-
prot
and V
u-max
) are not shown and the stall warning system becomes active.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
30
5.11. Direct Law
|FCOM 1.27.40.15000, FCOM 3.2.27.000, amber ECAM:F/CTL DIRECT
LAW|
In Direct Law, deIlection oI the control surIaces is a linear Iunction oI de-
Ilection oI the side-stick and trimming must be done manually. The controls
are very sensitive at high speeds. Use oI manual thrust is recommended
as power changes will result in pitch changes. Similarly, use oI the speed
brake will result in nose up pitch changes so it should be used with care.
Protections are unavailable, so speed is limited to 320kt/0.77M and care
must be taken in GPWS or windshear maneuvres. Approach speed is in-
creased by 10kt and landing distances increase by a Iactor oI 1.2.
5.12. Alternate Law
|FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.18000, amber ECAM:F/CTL ALTN
LAW|
In alternate law, pitch is as in normal law, but roll is as in direct law. Load
Iactor protection is retained, but other protections are either replaced with
static stability or are lost, depending on the nature oI the Iailure. Stall warn-
ings and overspeed warnings become active.
The main eIIects are that speed is limited to 320kt and stall warnings must
be respected when carrying out EGPWS maneuvers.
Expect Direct Law aIter landing gear extension (see Section 5.11, 'Direct
Law |30| ), and hence increased approach speeds and landing dis-
tances (see QRH 2.32).
5.13. Wingtip brake fault
|FCOM 1.27.50.3000, FCOM 3.2.27.7000, amber ECAM:F/CTL
FLAP(SLAT) TIP BRK FAULT|
The wingtip brakes activate in case oI assymetry, mechanism overspeed,
symmetrical runaway or uncommanded movements. This protection is lost.
5.14. Flap attach sensor failure
|FCOM 1.27.50.3000, FCOM 3.2.27.9000, amber ECAM:F/CTL FLAP
ATTACH SENSOR|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
31
The Ilap attach sensor detects excessive diIIerential movement between the
inner and outer Ilaps which would indicate Iailure oI a Ilap attachment.
This protection is lost.
5.15. Flight control servo faults
|FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.21,24}000, amber ECAM:F/CTL
AIL(ELEV) SERVO FAULT|
All Ilight controls have redundant servos. In the case oI an elevator servo
Iault, a restriction to not use speedbrake above V
MO
/M
MO
applies.
5.16. Speed brake disagree
|FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.28000, amber ECAM:F/CTL SPD
BRK DISAGREE|
This indicates that the spoiler positions do not correspond with the speed-
brake lever position. This may be as a result oI automatic retraction (alpha
Iloor activation or speed brakes deployed when Iull Ilap selected) or as a
result oI spoiler malIunction. In both cases retract the speedbrake lever and
in the case oI spoiler malIunction consider the speedbrakes unserviceable.
5.17. Speed brake fault
|FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.29000, amber ECAM:F/CTL SPD
BRK (2)(34) FAULT|
This indicates a Iailure oI the speedbrake lever transducers rather than
a problem with the spoilers. Ground spoiler activation may be expected
on selection oI reverse, so providing reversers are used, landing distances
should not be aIIected.
5.18. Stiff sidestick/ rudder pedals
|QRH 2.07, FCOM 3.2.27.42000|
This may aIIect both sidesticks at the same time, but not the rudder pedals
or it may aIIect the rudder pedals and one sidestick. Control Iorces will
remain moderate and the aircraIt remains responsive. ConIirm autopilot
disengagement and consider transIerring control iI one oI the sidesticks is
unaIIected.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
32
6. Fire
6.1. Smoke and fumes
|QRH 1.06, FCOM 3.2.26.6000, amber ECAM: AVIONICS SMOKE|
The QRH procedure should be applied when smoke is detected and the
crew suspect the avionics, air conditioning or cabin equipment as the
source. The paper procedure includes all the steps oI the avionics smoke
ECAM procedure, so iI this caution is triggered, the paper procedure should
be applied aIter completing the immediate actions oI the ECAM procedure.
In the case oI other smoke related ECAMs, the relevant ECAM procedure
should be applied Iirst and then the use oI the paper checklist considered.
Rain repellent Iluid leaks are not covered. Orange peel smells are toxic,
pine needle smells non-toxic.
The SMOKE/ FUMES/ AVNCS SMOKE checklist attempts to isolate the
source oI the smoke. It is possible that it may become impossible to carry
out this checklist due to smoke density. In this case, interrupt the checklist
and carry out the smoke removal drill (see Section 6.2, 'Smoke/ Iumes
removal |33| ). It is also possible that the situation may deteriorate
to a level that an immediate Iorced landing becomes the preIerable option.
In general, unless the source oI the smoke is obvious and extinguishable, a
diversion should be initiated immediately. The smoke removal drill is most
eIIective and adaptable at lower levels, so a descent to 10,000It or MSA
is also a priority.
The Iirst priority is to protect yourselI, so get an oxygen mask on.
The most likely sources are the avionics, the cabin Ians and the galleys.
ThereIore immediate initial actions are to turn oII the cabin Ians and galleys
and put the avionics ventilation in smoke removal mode by selecting both
Ians to OVRD.
Where the smoke source is not immediately obvious and the initial actions
have not caused it to cease, the QRH provides drills Ior suspected air con-
ditioning smoke, suspected cabin equipment smoke or suspected avionics/
electrical smoke. In addition the avionics/ electrical smoke drill includes
undetermined and continuing smoke sources.
Suspect air conditioning smoke iI it initially comes out oI the ventilation
outlets. Several ECAM warnings are also likely to occur as sensors de-
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
33
tect the smoke in other areas. The displayed ECAM procedures must be
applied. Following an engine or APU Iailure, smoke may initially enter
the air conditioning system but should dissipate quickly once the Iailure is
contained. The air conditioning drill starts by turning the APU bleed oII
in case this is the source. The packs are then turned oII one at a time to
determine iI the source oI the smoke is a pack.
The cabin equipment smoke drill involves selecting the commercial button
oII and searching Ior Iaulty cabin equipment.
Suspect avionics smoke iI the only triggered ECAM is AVIONICS
SMOKE. II an item oI electrical equipment Iails immediately prior to the
appearance oI the smoke, that piece oI equipment should be suspected as
the source. The avionics/ electrical drill (which includes the undetermined
source drill) involves shedding the AC buses one at a time by preventing
bus transIers and turning generators oII. This allows signiIicant portions
oI the electrical equipment to be isolated in blocks. Note that iI AC bus
1 is shed, the Captain's instruments and the STBY instruments are both
supplied Irom non de-iced sensors and should be suspected iI there is any
disagreement. II this does not work, the emergency electrical conIiguration
is adopted (see Section 4.1, 'Emergency conIiguration |19| ).
6.2. Smoke/ fumes removal
|QRH 1.06, FCOM 3.2.26.7000|
Smoke removal procedures initially use the pressurisation system to draw
smoke and Iumes overboard by increasing the cabin altitude. II there are
no Iuel vapours present, the packs are used to drive the smoke overboard.
Otherwise it is driven overboard by residual pressure.
The Iinal target conIiguration is packs oII, outIlow valve Iully open and
ram air on. As this depressurises the aircraIt, it can only be acheived at
lower levels (preIerably FL100). II in emergency conIiguration, turning the
APU master switch on connects the batteries Ior a maximum oI 3 minutes
and allows manual control oI the DC powered outIlow valve motor. Once
at a suitable level and below 200kt, as a last resort PNF's cockpit window
can be opened.
6.3. Engine fire
The basic sequence is to bring the thrust lever oI the aIIected engine to idle,
turn oII its engine master, push its Iire button, wait 10 seconds then deploy
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
34
its Iirst Iire bottle. II the Iire is not extinguished aIter 30 seconds, indicated
by the Iire button remaining lit, deploy the second bottle. This sequence is
modiIied on the ground in that both Iire bottles are Iired immediately, and
the remaining engine is then also shut down.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
35
7. Fuel
7.1. Fuel leak
|QRH 2.08, FCTM 3.2.28.24,25}000, amber ECAM FUEL F USED/FOB
DISAGREE|
Whenever a non-normal Iuel event occurs, the possibility that the under-
lying cause oI the event is a Iuel leak should be considered. Only when a
Iuel leak has been categorically ruled out should the cross-Ieed valve be
opened.|FCTM 3.28|
The primary method used to detect Iuel leaks is a regular check that actual
Iuel remaining corresponds to expected Iuel remaining and that Iuel used
plus Iuel remaining corresponds to Iuel at engine start. The latter parameter
is monitored on some aircraIt and may trigger an ECAM warning. Other
indications oI a leak include Iuel imbalance or excessive Iuel Ilow Irom an
engine. It also possible that a Iuel leak may be detected visually or by a
smell oI Iuel in the cabin.
II a leak can be conIirmed to be coming Irom an engine or pylon, the aI-
Iected engine must be shut down. In this case, cross-Ieeding is allowable.
Otherwise, the cross-Ieed must be kept closed.
II the leak cannot be conIirmed to be originating Irom an engine or pylon,
an attempt should be made to identiIy the source oI the leak by monitoring
the inner tank depletion rates with the crossIeed valve closed and the center
tank pumps oII.
II depletion rates are similar, a leak Irom the center tank or Irom the APU
Ieeding line should be suspected. II there is a smell oI Iuel in the cabin, it
is likely that the APU Ieeding line is at Iault and the APU should be turned
oII. Fuel Irom the center tank should be used once one oI the inner tanks
has 3000kg. TODO: I don't understand the logic here - surely an APU
Ieeding line leak would cause the leIt tank to decrease Iaster than the right,
and why not put the center tank pumps in AUTO and use the Iuel as soon
as possible iI you suspect a leak Irom the center tank?}
II, aIter 30 minutes, one tank has been depleted by 300kg more than the
other, the location oI leak is narrowed down to the engine or the wing on
the more depleted side. To conIirm which it is, shut down the engine. II the
leak then stops, an engine leak is conIirmed and the cross Ieed can be used.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
36
II not, a leak Irom the wing is most likely. In this case, an engine restart
should be considered.
In an emergency, a landing may be carried out with maximum Iuel imbal-
ance.
7.2. Fuel imbalance
|QRH 2.09, FCOM 3.28.26000, FCOM 3.1.28|
All Iuel balancing must be carried out in accordance with QRH 2.09, pay-
ing particular attention to the possibility oI a Iuel leak. Any action should
be delayed until suIIicient time has passed Ior a Iuel leak to become appar-
ent. FCOM 3.2.28.26000 adds a note not Iound in the QRH that "there is
no requirement to correct an imbalance until the ECAM Iuel advisory lim-
it is displayed", an event that occurs when one inner tank holds ~1500kg
more than the other. The limitations Ior Iuel imbalance in FCOM 3.1.28,
however, show that the Iuel advisory does not necessarily indicate that a
limitation is likely to be breached. In particular, when the outer tanks are
balanced and the heavier inner tank contains _2250kg, there are no imbal-
ance limitations. Furthermore, the aircraIt handling is not signiIicantly im-
paired even at maximum imbalance.
To balance the Iuel, open the cross-Ieed valve and turn the lighter side
pumps and the center tank pumps oII.
7.3. Gravity fuel feeding
|QRH 2.09, FCOM 3.2.28.28000|
Turn on ignition in case oI Iuel interruption and avoid negative G. The
ceiling at which Iuel can be reliably gravity Ied depends on whether the
Iuel has had time to deaerate. II the aircraIt has been above FL300 Ior more
than 30 minutes, the Iuel may be considered deaerated and the current Ilight
level maintained. Otherwise, the Iuel must be considered aerated and the
gravity Ieed ceiling is FL300 iI the aircraIt exceeded FL300 or FL150 iI it
didn't. II gravity Ieeding is required, descend to the gravity Ieed ceiling.
It is also possible to gravity cross Ieed by side slipping the aircraIt with a
bank angle oI 2 to 3 should this become necessary.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
37
7.4. Wing tank pump(s) low pressure
|FCOM 3.2.38.1,2}000, FCOM 1.28.20.7000, amber ECAM FUEL L(R)
TK PUMP 1(2)(12) LO PR|
Failed pumps should be turned oII.
Failure oI a single pump in either tank results in reduced redundancy only.
Failure oI both pumps in a given tank means that the Iuel in that tank is
only available by gravity Ieeding. Pressurized Iuel may be available Irom
the center tank (use manual mode iI necessary) or by cross-Ieeding. A de-
scent to gravity Ieed ceiling may be required (see Section 7.3, 'Gravity
Iuel Ieeding |36| ).
7.5. Center tank pumps low pressure
|FCOM 3.2.28.21,22}000, FCOM 1.28.20.7000, amber ECAM FUEL
CTR TK PUMP(S)(1(2)) LO PR|
Failed pumps should be turned oII.
Failure oI a single center tank pump results in a loss oI redundancy. The
crossIeed should be opened until the center tank Iuel has been exhausted
so that the remaining pump can supply both engines.
Failure oI both center tank pumps makes the Iuel in the center tank unus-
able.
7.6. Auto feed fault
|FCOM 3.2.28.23000, FCOM 1.28.20.7000, amber ECAM FUEL AUTO
FEED FAULT|
The center tank pumps must be managed manually. They must be switched
oII whenever slats are extended, wing tank Iuel ~5000kg or center tank
Iuel is exhausted.
7.7. Low fuel level
|FCOM 3.2.28.3,4}000, FCOM 1.28.20.7000, amber ECAM FUEL L(R)
(LR) WING TK LO LVL|
The ECAM is triggered at approximately 750kg. The warning may be spu-
rious iI the ECAM is triggered just beIore the wing cell transIer valves
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
38
open. II center tank Iuel remains, it should be used by selecting the center
tank pumps to manual mode. II there is a Iuel imbalance and a Iuel leak
can be ruled out, crossIeed Iuel as required.
II both tanks are low level, about 30 minutes oI Ilying time remain. Declare
a PAN iI the possibility exists that there will be less than Iinal reserve on
landing. Declare a MAYDAY iI it is certain that there will be less than Iinal
reserve on landing.|EOMA 8.3.7.2|
7.8. Outer tank transfer valves failed closed
|FCOM 3.2.28.6000, FCOM 1.28.20.7000, amber ECAM FUEL L(R)
XFR VALVE CLOSED|
II both transIer valves Iail to open when a wing tank reaches low level,
the Iuel in that outer tank becomes unusable. The Iuel balance will remain
within limits since maximum outer tank imbalances are acceptable iI the
total Iuel in either wing is the same |FCOM 3.1.28.1000|.
7.9. Outer tank transfer valve open out of sequence
|FCOM 3.2.28.7000, FCOM 1.28.20.7000, amber ECAM FUEL L(R)
XFR VALVE OPEN|
Maximum outer tank imbalances are acceptable iI the total Iuel in either
wing is the same |FCOM 3.1.28.1000|, so no action is required.
7.10. Cross-feed valve fault
|FCOM 3.2.28.8000, FCOM 1.28.20.7000, amber ECAM FUEL X FEED
VALVE FAULT|
II the valve has Iailed open, Iuel balance can be maintained through selec-
tive use oI Iuel pumps. II it has Iailed closed, crossIeeding is unavailable.
7.11. Low fuel temperature
|FCOM 3.2.28.11,12}000, FCOM 1.38.20.7000, amber ECAM xxx TK
LO TEMP|
ECAM is triggered at approx -43C. II on the ground, delay takeoII until
temperatures are within limits. II in Ilight, descending or increasing speed
should be considered.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
39
7.12. High fuel temperature
|FCOM 3.2.28.14000. FCOM 1.38.20.7000, amber ECAM xxx TK HI
TEMP|
This ECAM is known to be triggered spuriously by interIerence Irom com-
munication equipment. The procedure should only be applied iI the mes-
sage has not disappeared within 2 minutes.
The ECAM temperature triggers on the ground are 55C Ior the outer cell
and 45C Ior the inner cell. In the air they are 60C Ior the outer cell and
54C Ior the inner cell.
The temperature oI Iuel returning to the tanks is primarily a Iunction oI
IDG cooling requirement. The immediate action, thereIore is to turn the
galley oII to reduce the IDG load.
On the ground, the engine on the aIIected side must be shut down iI the
outer cell reaches 60C or the inner cell reaches 54C. An expeditious taxi
may, thereIore, be advantageous.
In the air, iI only one side is aIIected, Iuel Ilow can be increased so that less
hot Iuel is returned to the tanks. II the temperature gets too high (~65C
outer or ~57 inner), IDG disconnection will be required. The engine must
be running when the IDG button is pressed, and it must not be held Ior
more than 3 seconds.|FCOM 1.24.20.1000|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
40
8. Landing gear
8.1. Loss of braking (memory item)
|QRH 1.13, FCOM 3.2.32.20000|
II it is simply an autobrake Iailure, just brake manually. Otherwise, apply
max reverse and attempt to use the alternate brake system. To do this, re-
lease the brake pedals and turn oII the ASKID & NW STRG switch. II the
alternate system also appears to have Iailed, short successive applications
oI the parking brake may be used. Use oI the parking brake in this way
risks tire burst and lateral control diIIiculties (due brake onset assymetry)
so delay until low speed iI at all possible.
8.2. Residual braking procedure
|QRH 2.10B, FCOM 3.2.32.23000|
Residual brake pressure must be checked aIter landing gear extension as
there is no ECAM warning. TODO: This is in 3.3.18 but not in ezy-b -
check whether our brake systems are modiIied}. A brieI brake pressure in-
dication is expected as the alternate system selI tests aIter the gear is down
locked, but pressure should quickly return to zero. II the triple indicator
shows residual pressure aIter this test, try to zero it by pressing the brake
pedals several times. II a landing must be made with residual pressure in the
alternate braking system, use autobrake MED or immediate manual brak-
ing to prioritise the normal system. Anticipate brake assymetry at touch-
down.
8.3. Gravity extension
|QRH 2.11, FCOM 3.2.32.4000|
Gravity extension is acheived by turning the GRAVITY GEAR EXTN
handcrank clockwise three times until a mechanical stop is reached. Once
the gear is down, the LG lever should be set to down to extinguish the UN-
LK lights and remove the LG CTL message Irom the WHEEL page.
Availability oI landing gear indications depends on the nature oI the Iailure
that resulted in the requirement Ior gravity extension. LDG GEAR control
panel indications may still be available iI LGCIU 1 is otherwise unservice-
able, providing that it is electrically supplied.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
41
Gear doors may show amber on the WHEEL page aIter gravity exten-
sion. There may also be spurious LGCIU 2 FAULT or BRAKES SYS 1(2)
FAULT ECAM warnings.
8.4. Asymmetric braking
|QRH 2.11, FCOM 3.2.32.32000, FCOM 1.32.30|
II brakes are only available on one side (indicated by amber brake release
indicators on both wheels oI one main gear TODO: check this} ), apply the
remaining brake progressively whilst countering swing with rudder. Do not
use the reverse on the same side as the working brake. Landing distances
will increase signiIicantly so check QRH 2.32 Ior landing distance Iactor.
8.5. Landing with abnormal landing gear
|QRH 2.12, FCOM 3.2.32.11000|
A landing should be carried out on a hard surIace runway using any avail-
able landing gear. Foaming oI the runway is recommended. Manual brak-
ing should be used. Reverse thrust should not be used as it will cause ground
spoiler extension. The GRVTY GEAR EXTN handcrank should be turned
back to normal to allow the landing gear down actuators to be pressurised
and thus reduce the chance oI gear collapse.
II the nose gear is not available, move the CG aIt by moving passengers
to the rear oI the aircraIt. Use elevator to keep the nose oII the runway,
but lower the nose onto the runway beIore elevator control is lost. Braking
must be progressive and balanced against available elevator authority. The
engines should be shut down with the ENG MASTER switches prior to
nose impact.
II one main gear is not available, consider crossIeeding to remove the Iuel
Irom the wing with the unserviceable gear. The anti-skid system cannot
operate with a single main gear extended and must be switched oII to avoid
permanent brake release. The ground spoilers should not be armed in order
to maintain the maximum possible roll authority. The engines should be
shut down at touchdown. AIter touchdown, use roll control to keep the
unsupported wing Irom touching down Ior as long as possible.
II both main gear are unavailable, the engines should be shut down in the
Ilare. Pitch attitude at touchdown must be ~6.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
42
All doors and slides are available Ior evacuation in any oI the normal gear
up attitudes.
8.6. Flight with landing gear extended
|FCOM 2.4.25|
Flight into expected icing conditions is not approved. Gear down ditching
has not been demonstrated. FMGC predictions will be erroneous - selected
speed should be used Ior all phases except approach. Altitude alerting will
not be available. Any Iailure that normally causes a degradation to alternate
law will instead cause a degradation to direct law.
The dual engine Iailure scenario is modiIied to reIlect the gear limiting
speed. Assisted start should be preIerred. II the APU is not available, gear
limit speeds should be disregarded to achieve a windmill start. Do not select
Ilaps or slats below 200kt TODO: Iind out why this is.}
PerIormance in all phases will be aIIected. In particular, approach climb
limiting weights Ior go-around (see FCOM 3.5.35) must be reduced by
14. Fuel burn will increase (approximate Iactor is 2.3). Engine out ceil-
ing and take-oII perIormance are also impacted. Tables Ior calculation are
available in FCOM 2.4.25.
8.7. Gear shock absorber fault
|FCOM 3.2.32.1000, FCOM 1.32.10.4000, amber ECAM: L/G SHOCK
ABSORBER FAULT|
A shock absorber did not extend when airborne or did not compress on
landing. II airborne the gear cannot be retracted. Respect the gear extended
limit speed oI 280kt and see Section 8.6, 'Flight with landing gear extend-
ed |42| .
8.8. Gear not uplocked
|FCOM 3.2.32.2000, FCOM 1.32.10.4000, amber ECAM: L/G GEAR
NOT UPLOCKED|
Landing gear retraction sequence has not completed within 30 seconds. II
the gear doors have closed, the gear will rest on the doors so avoid excess g
loads. II the doors have not closed, recycle the gear. II this does not work,
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
43
select the gear down and see Section 8.6, 'Flight with landing gear extend-
ed |42| .
8.9. Gear not downlocked
|FCOM 3.2.32.3000, FCOM 1.32.10.4000, red ECAM: L/G GEAR NOT
DOWNLOCKED|
Landing gear extension sequence has not completed within 30 seconds.
Retract the gear and wait until it has Iully stowed, then redeploy. II this
is not successIul, attempt to deploy the gear by gravity (see Section 8.3,
'Gravity extension |40| ).
8.10. Gear doors not closed
|FCOM 3.2.32.5000, FCOM 1.32.10.4000, amber ECAM: L/G DOORS
NOT CLOSED|
A gear door is not uplocked. Recycle the gear. II the doors cannot be closed,
speed is limited to 250kt/M0.6.
8.11. Uplock fault
|FCOM 3.2.32.6000, FCOM 1.32.10.4000, amber ECAM: L/G GEAR UP-
LOCK FAULT|
An uplock is engaged when the corresponding gear is downlocked. As the
uplock will not move to accept the gear the gear must be leIt down. See
Section 8.6, 'Flight with landing gear extended |42| .
8.12. LGCIU disagreement
|FCOM 3.2.32.8000, FCOM 1.32.10.4000, amber ECAM: L/G SYS DIS-
AGREE|
The LGCIUs disagree on the position oI the gear. In the absence oI other
ECAM warnings, the gear position can be assumed to agree with the gear
lever position.
8.13. LGCIU fault
|FCOM 3.2.32.9000, FCOM 1.32.10.4000, amber ECAM: L/G LGCIU
1(2) FAULT|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
44
The FADECs use LGCIU input to determine idle mode. II a LGCIU is
determined to be Iaulty, the system IailsaIes to approach idle mode, and
modulated idle and reverse idle (and hence reversers) will not be available.
TODO: This is inIerred Irom the inIormation in FCOM 1.70.40 - check
that it's true}.
The GPWS uses LGCIU 1 to determine landing gear position. II this
LGCIU is Iaulty, the GPWS will need to be inhibited to prevent spurious
warnings.
II both LGCIUs are lost, normal landing gear control and indicating sys-
tems are lost. The gear must be gravity extended (see Section 8.3, 'Gravity
extension |40| ). TODO: Autopilot and autothrust are also lost - Iind
out why this is}
8.14. Gear not down
|FCOM 3.2.32.10000, FCOM 1.32.10.4000, red ECAM: L/G GEAR NOT
DOWN|
Indicates that the landing gear is not downlocked when radio altitude is
below 750It rad alt and N1 and Ilap setting indicate that the aircraIt is on
approach. II rad alt data is not available, it indicates gear is not down when
Ilap 3 or Ilap Iull is selected. In some cases the warning may be cancelled
with the emergency cancel pushbutton.
8.15. Park brake on
|FCOM 3.2.32.12000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, red ECAM: CONFIG PARK
BRK ON|
The parking brake is set when the thrust levers are set to FLX or TOGA.
Check the position oI the brake handle position and Ior pressure indications
on the brake triple gauge.
8.16. Nosewheel steering fault
|FCOM 3.2.32.14000, FCOM 1.32.20.3000, amber ECAM: WHEEL N/
W STRG FAULT|
Nosewheel steering is unavailable so diIIerential braking must be used to
steer the aircraIt. The nosewheel may not be aligned iI the L/G shock ab-
sorber ECAM is also displayed, in which case delay nosewheel touch down
as long as possible. Cat III dual will not be available.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
45
8.17. Antiskid nosewheel steering off
|FCOM 3.2.32.15000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: BRAKES
ANTI SKID/NWS OFF|
The A/SKID & NW STRG switch is oII. The ABCU controls braking
through the alternate braking system. Antiskid is not available so landing
distance will increase signiIicantly. Autobrake and nosewheel steering will
also not be available.
8.18. Antiskid nosewheel steering fault
|FCOM 3.2.32.15000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: BRAKES A/
SKID NWS FAULT|
Either:
both BSCU channels have Iailed or
the normal brake system has been lost and the yellow hydraulic pressure
is low.
EIIects are as Ior Section 8.17, 'Antiskid nosewheel steering oII |45| ,
although iI yellow hydraulic pressure is low braking will be accumulator
only.
8.19. Brake system fault
|FCOM 3.2.32.17000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: BRAKES
SYS 1(2) FAULT|
A Iault has been detected in one channel oI the BSCU. Loss oI redundancy
only.
8.20. Brakes hot
|FCOM 3.2.32.18000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: BRAKES
HOT|
At least one brake temperature is ~300C. Check Section 8.30, 'Brake tem-
perature limitations requiring maintenance action |48| iI the temper-
ature is excessive or the brake temperatures are not reasonably even.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
46
Temperature must be 300C Ior takeoII to prevent ignition oI any hy-
draulic Iluid that leaks onto the brake. Use brake Ians as necessary to bring
the temperature down in time Ior the next takeoII. The brake Ians also cool
the temperature sensor, so assume the real brake temperature is twice that
indicated iI they have recently been used. TODO: Check whether we use
chocks and release the parking brake}.
II the warning appears in Ilight, providing that perIormance permits, the
landing gear should be extended to allow the brakes to cool.
8.21. Auto brake fault
|FCOM 3.2.32.19000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: BRAKES
AUTO BRK FAULT|
A Iailure was detected when the autobrake was armed. Brake manually.
8.22. Hydraulic selector valve fault
|FCOM 3.2.32.21000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: WHEEL HYD
SEL FAULT|
This ECAM message may indicate two completely diIIerent conditions:
1. The normal brake selector valve has Iailed in the open position. The
normal servo valves (downstream oI the selector valve) will have con-
tinuous Iull pressure at their inlets, but, as long as anti-skid is operative,
will control brake pressure and anti-skid normally.
2. The steering selector valve has Iailed in the open position. This means
that the steering will remain pressurised as long as there is pressure in
the yellow hydraulic system. This has obvious implications iI towing is
attempted, but will also mean that the nosewheel will go to maximum
deIlection iI the A/SKID & N/W STRG switch is selected oII or the
BSCU is reset.
8.23. Failure of normal braking system
|FCOM 3.2.32.26000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: NORM BRK
FAULT|
Normal braking is lost, but alternate braking and anti-skid are available.
Landing distance increases slightly.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
47
8.24. Failure of alternate braking system
|FCOM 3.2.32.30000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: BRAKES AL-
TN BRK FAULT|
Loss oI redundancy only.
8.25. Failure of normal and alternate braking systems
|FCOM 3.2.32.25000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: NORM AL-
TN FAULT|
The only braking remaining is the parking brake. See Section 8.1, 'Loss oI
braking (memorv item) |40| Ior method.
8.26. Brake accumulator low pressure
|FCOM 3.2.32.27000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: BRK Y AC-
CU LO PR|
Braking is not available unless either the green or yellow hydraulic sys-
tems are pressurised. II the engines are shut down, attempt to recharge the
accumulator using the yellow system electrical pump. When parking the
aircraIt, use chocks.
8.27. Released brakes, normal system
|FCOM 3.2.32.28000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: BRAKES RE-
LEASED|
II normal braking is active and at least one engine is running, the BSCU
selI tests when it receives a "gear downlocked" signal Irom either oI the
LGCIUs. The BRAKES RELEASED ECAM is provided iI at least one set
oI brakes on a main wheel is incorrectly released during this test. The Iailed
brake is shown by an amber release symbol on the WHEEL page. Loss oI a
brake leads to increased landing distances. II both brakes on the same gear
are released, see Section 8.4, 'Asymmetric braking |41| .
8.28. Released brakes, alternate system
|FCOM 3.2.32.28000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: ALTERNATE
L(R) RELEASED|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
48
The ABCU selI tests the brakes in a similar manner to the BSCU (see Sec-
tion 8.27, 'Released brakes, normal system |47| ). II this test is Iailed,
normal braking can be expected as long as the normal braking system is
active. II the alternate braking system is active, braking will be asymmetric
(see Section 8.4, 'Asymmetric braking |41| ).
8.29. Minor nosewheel steering fault
|FCOM 3.2.32.29000, FCOM 1.32.30.3000, amber ECAM: BRAKES-N/
WS MINOR FAULT|
TODO: Its not very clear Irom the FCOM what this reIers to}
8.30. Brake temperature limitations requiring mainte-
nance action
|FCOM 3.4.32.3000|
Maintenance is required iI:
One brake temp is ~600C and the other brake on the same gear is 150C
less
One brake temp is 60C and the other brake on the same gear is 150C
more
The average temp oI one gear is 200C more than the average temp oI
the other
Any brake temp exceeds 900C
A Iuse plug has melted
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
49
9. Power plant
9.1. Dual engine failure
|QRH 1.16 & 1.20, FCOM 3.2.70.53000, FCOM 1.70.90.4000, red
ECAM: ENG DUAL FAILURE|
It is recommended that the QRH paper procedure on page 1.16 is used
rather than the ECAM.
First priority, assuming Iuel remains, is to attempt a relight by turning the
ignitors on and setting the thrust levers to idle. The speed should initially
be increased to 300kt to increase windmilling and improve the chance oI a
relight. At this speed, the aircraIt will cover approximately 2nm Ior every
1000It lost. With this in mind, a suitable plan should be constructed to cover
the possibility that relight is not possible.
Whilst awaiting a relight, ensure that the emergency electrical generator is
on line and recycle FAC1 to recover characteristic speed display and rudder
trim. For communications, VHF1 and ATC1 are available in the emergency
electrical conIig. Due to lack oI engine bleeds, a slow depressurisation will
be occuring, so be ready to don oxygen masks.
II there has been no relight aIter 30 seconds, the combustion chambers
should be ventilated by turning both engine masters oII Ior 30 seconds.
Another attempt can then be made by turning them back on. This sequence
should be repeated until successIul or until APU bleed air becomes avail-
able at FL200.
Once below FL250, the APU can be started. Once below FL200, speed
should be reduced to green dot and assisted starts should be attempted. At
green dot speed, 2nm will be covered Ior every 1000It lost. Attempt to
start one engine at a time in the normal manner.
II a landing must be made without power, CONF 3 slats are recommended
(Ilaps are unavailable). V
app
should be V
reI
25kt or 150kt, whichever is
higher. The gear is available with gravity extension. The stabilizer will be
Irozen once engine driven hydraulics are lost and elevator trimming will
cease with transition to direct law at gear extension. ThereIore, gear exten-
sion should be delayed until CONF 3 and V
app
are reached. II ditching, do
not extend the gear.
II an airIield can be reached, cross the outer marker at twice the normal
height with CONF 1, gear up. For a clean aircraIt, the Iollowing rules oI
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
50
thumb apply TODO: these are Boeing rules - check that they hold Ior
Airbus}:
A standard hold loses 8000It
An orbit loses 4000It
400It is lost per nm
CONF 3, gear down will give a glide ratio oI 800It per nm.
II an airIield cannot be reached, reIer to Section 2.5, 'Ditching |12| or
Section 2.6, 'Forced landing |13| as appropriate.
9.2. Engine relight in flight
|QRH 2.22, FCOM 3.2.70.31000|
A graph showing the in Ilight relight envelope is provided on page 2.22
oI the QRH. The ceiling is 27000 It. Automatic start is recommended, but
crew action is required in case oI abnormal start.
To prepare Ior the start, ensure the aIIected engine master switch is turned
oII and the aIIected thrust lever is at idle. Select ignition on the engine mode
selector and open the cross bleed. II it is anticipated starter assist may be
required, ensure wing anti ice is selected oII.
To begin the start sequence, select the aIIected master switch on. The
FADEC will determine whether starter assist is required and will open the
start valve as needed. Both ignitors are energised as soon as the master
switch is turned on, and the HP Iuel valve opens at 15 N2. Closure oI the
start valve and de-energisation oI the ignitors occurs at 50 N2 as normal.
Light oII must occur within 30 seconds oI Iuel Ilow initiation. II uncertain
about successIul relight, move the thrust lever to check Ior engine response.
The START FAULT ENG STALL ECAM may be disregarded iI all other
parameters are normal.
9.3. Engine stall
|QRH 2.23, FCOM 1.70.90.5000, FCOM 3.2.70.15000, amber ECAM
ENG 1(2) STALL|
A stall is indicated by abnormal engine noise, Ilame Irom the engine ex-
haust (and possibly inlet in extreme cases), Iluctuating perIormance param-
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
51
eters, sluggish thrust lever response, high EGT and/ or rapid EGT rise when
the thrust lever is advanced. The ECAM warning will be triggered when
N2 is between 50 and idle. II N2 is above idle, the QRH should be used.
The ECAM simply instructs the master switch to be turned oII, and then
secures the engine using the aIter engine shut down procedure (see Sec-
tion 9.6, 'Engine shut down |52| ). This procedure should also be
Iollowed iI a stall occurs on the ground.
In Ilight, iI no ECAM is triggered, the aIIected thrust lever should be re-
tarded to idle. II the engine parameters remain abnormal, shut the engine
down with the master switch. II the parameters are normal, turn on all the
anti-icing to increase bleed demand TODO: This is inIerred - check it}
and slowly advance the thrust lever. II the stall recurs, the engine can be
operated at low thrust settings, otherwise it can be operated normally.
9.4. Engine tailpipe fire
|QRH 2.23, FCOM 3.2.70.62000, reverse side oI normal checklist|
An internal engine Iire may be encountered during engine start or shut-
down. It will either be seen by ground crew or may be indicated by EGT
Iailing to decrease aIter the master switch is selected oII.
Start by getting the engine to a known state by ensuring the man start button
is selected oII and the aIIected engine master is selected oII.
The concept is to blow the Iire out by dry cranking the engine. It is there-
Iore essential that the Iire button is not pressed, as this will remove exter-
nal power Irom the FADEC and prevent dry cranking. Firstly, a source oI
bleed air must be available to power the starter. Possibilities, in order oI
preIerence, are the APU, the opposite engine or a ground air cart. II using
the opposite engine, the source engine bleed must be on, the target engine
bleed should be oII, the cross bleed should be opened and thrust increased
to provide 30 psi oI pressure. TODO: This is just the crossbleed start pro-
cedure Irom 3.4.70.4000 - check that there are no diIIerences}. II using
ground air, both engine bleeds should be oII and the cross bleed opened.
Once high pressure air is available, select the engine mode selector to crank
and select the man start button to on. Once the Iire is extinguished, select
the man start button oII and the engine mode selector to normal.
As a last resort, external Iire suppression agents may be used. They are,
however, highly corrosive and the engine will be a write oII.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
52
9.5. High engine vibration
|QRH 2.24, FCOM 3.2.70.63000|
The ECAM VIB advisory (N1_6 units, N2_4.3 units) is simply an indica-
tion that engine parameters should be monitored more closely. High VIB
indications alone do not require the engine to be shut down.
High engine vibration combined with burning smells may be due to contact
oI compressor blade tips with associated abradable seals.
II in icing conditions, high engine vibration may be due to Ian blade or
spinner icing. The QRH provides a drill to shed this ice, aIter which normal
operations can be resumed.
II vibrations rapidly increase above the advisory level, the engine should be
operated at lower power settings to keep the vibrations below the advisory
level.
9.6. Engine shut down
|FCOM 1.70.90.5000, FCOM 3.2.70.35000, amber ECAM ENG 1(2)
SHUT DOWN|
This ECAM warning indicates that an engine master switch is oII between
the start oI the takeoII roll and the completion oI the landing roll, or that a
Iire button has been pushed in the other phases. It deals with the subsequent
issues arising Irom single engine operation.
The most pressing issue is that a single engine cannot support wing anti-ice
and two packs, so iI wing anti-ice is in use, one oI the packs must be turned
oII. This will generally be the pack on the aIIected side, but will need to
be pack 1 in electrical emergency conIiguration. The cross bleed must be
opened Ior symmetrical wing anti-icing. II a Iire button has been pushed,
the cross bleed cannot be opened, and wing anti-ice is unavailable.
The remaining engine must be saIeguarded. To this end, continuous igni-
tion should be selected.
A Iuel imbalance may develop. Fuel imbalance limitations are detailed in
FCOM 3.1.28, but an inner tank imbalance oI 1500kg will never be lim-
iting iI the outer tanks are balanced. Fuel may still need to be crossIed
to prevent Iuel starvation oI the remaining engine. TODO: Where is the
cross Ieed procedure?}
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
53
TCAS should be selected to TA to avoid unIlyable climb RAs.
II a reverser is unlocked with associated buIIet, speed should be limited
to 240kt.
II the remaining engine is operated at maximum power with the aircraIt
at low speed (e.g. responding to windshear) it is possible that directional
control may be lost beIore the Ilight computer protections apply. Be cau-
tious about reducing speed below V
LS
on one engine.
The main systems lost are the generator, bleeds and hydraulic pump asso-
ciated with the engine. Other systems may be lost depending on the reason
Ior the shutdown.
9.7. Low engine oil pressure
|FCOM 3.2.70.6000, FCOM 1.70.90.4000, red ECAM: ENG 1(2) OIL LO
PR|
The sources Ior the gauge on the ECAM ENG page and the ECAM warning
are diIIerent. II there is a discrepancy between the two, a Iaulty transducer is
the most likely cause and the engine can continue to be operated normally.
II both sources agree, the engine should be shut down by retarding its thrust
lever and selecting its master switch oII and the aIter shutdown procedure
applied (see Section 9.6, 'Engine shut down |52| ).
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
54
10. Navigation
10.1. EGPWS alerts (memory item)
|QRH 1.14, FCOM 3.2.34.23000|
EPGWS alerts can be categorised into warnings and cautions. A warning
is any alert with the instruction "Pull up" attached. All other alerts are cau-
tions. A warning may be downgraded to a caution iI Ilying in daylight
VMC and positive visual veriIication is made that no hazard exists |EOM-
A 8.3.5|.
The response to a warning is to call "Pull up, TOGA", disconnect the au-
topilot and simultaneously roll the wings level, apply Iull backstick and
set TOGA power. The speedbrake should then be checked retracted. Once
the Ilight path is saIe and the warning stops, accelerate and clean up as
required.
The response to a caution is to correct the Ilight path or aircraIt conIigu-
ration as necessary. A conIiguration warning will almost always require a
go around.
10.2. TCAS warnings (memory item)
|QRH 1.15, FCOM 3.2.34.26000, CAP413 1.7|
TCAS warnings may be either traIIic advisories ("TraIIic, TraIIic") or res-
olution advisories (anything else). The Iirst response to either advisory is to
call "TCAS, I have control" to unequivocally establish who will be carrying
out any maneuvers. II it is a resolution advisory, the autopilot should be dis-
connected and the Ilight directors turned oII. The autothrottle remains en-
gaged and reverts to speed mode. A vertical maneuver should then be Ilown
to keep the V/S needle out oI the red areas shown on the V/S scale. ATC
should then be notiIied (e.g "Radar, Easy 123 - TCAS RA"). When clear
oI conIlict, return to assigned level and re-engage the automatics (ATC
phraseology: "Radar, Easy 123 - clear oI conIlict, returning to FL XXX").
II a climb resolution advisory occurs on Iinal approach, a go around must
be Ilown.
10.3. RNAV downgrades
|EOM A.8.3.2, EOM B.2.4.51|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
55
II an ECAM or MCDU message indicates navigation accuracy is com-
promised whilst Ilying in RNP-5 (BRNAV) airspace, a navigation check
should be made using the GPS MONITOR page or raw radio aid data. II
a single FMGC is at Iault, navigation can be continued using the other
FMGC. II RNP-5 ability has been lost, inIorm ATC and continue with con-
ventional navigation. The IRS provides RNP-5 required accuracy Ior two
hours Irom last alignment regardless oI MCDU ENP.
In an RNP-1 (PRNAV) environment, loss oI navigation accuracy may be
more serious as the aircraIt may be below MSA when it occurs. The initial
response is to notiIy ATC with the phrase "Unable RNAV due equipment"
and request reclearance. It is important to be aware that terrain clearance
may be compromised, so an immediate climb above MSA should be con-
sidered iI a suitable alternative navigation method (e.g. radar vectors) is
not available.
In general, an RNP-1 approach only requires the availability oI a single
RNAV system consisting oI one FMGC, one MCDU, one sensor (GPS,
VOR or DME), one IRS and one FD in NAV mode. GPS PRIMARY is not
normally a requirement, but iI it is not available ensure that RNP is set to
1, NAV ACCURACY is high and a raw data check is carried out prior to
commencement oI the procedure.
Some RNP-1 procedures include extra restrictions such as the mandatory
use oI GPS or the availability oI two RNAV systems. II a Iailure occurs
that breaches one oI these restrictions, procede as Ior a loss oI navigation
accuracy.
10.4. ADR faults
|QRH 2.20, FCOM 3.2.34.6000, FCOM 1.34.10.3000, amber ECAM:
NAV ADR 1(2)(3)(12)(13)(23) FAULT|
A single ADR Iault simply requires switching to the hot spare and turning
the aIIected unit oII. Loss oI ADR1 will lead to the loss oI the extended
Iunctions oI the EGPWS. Loss oI ADR2 will lead to both baro reIerence
channels being driven by the same FCU channel TODO: Find out details
oI this}, so the baro reIs should be checked.
Loss oI two ADRs will lead to Alternate Law with associated speed restric-
tions and landing conIiguration considerations. Air data switching is used
as necessary, and the aIIected ADRs are turned oII. ATC switching may be
required to restore transponder. II ADR 1 and 3 are lost, the landing gear
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
56
saIety valve is controlled closed, so the gear must be gravity extended and
cannot subsequently be retracted.
Loss oI all ADRs requires reversion to standby instruments. Disregard
ECAM actions as the ECAM procedures shown will be Ior single ADR op-
eration and will direct you towards meaningless air data and ATC switch-
ing. ReIer instead to page 2.20 oI the QRH. In addition to the Iailures as-
sociated with dual loss, the stall warning is lost, the rudder travel limiter is
Irozen (Iull rudder travel will be recovered at slat extension) and automatic
cabin pressure control is lost. In case oI go-around, auto Ilap retraction is
not available.
10.5. ADR disagree
|FCOM 3.2.34, FCOM 1.34.10.3000, amber ECAM: NAV ADR DIS-
AGREE|
The ECAM message indicates that, Iollowing an ADR Iault or rejection,
there is a speed or angle oI attack disagreement between the two remaining
ADRs. This will cause a degradation to alternate law. II there is a speed
disagreement, see Section 2.3, 'Unreliable airspeed (memorv item) |11| .
II the speed does not disagree, an AOA sensor is providing incorrect data
and there is a risk oI spurious stall warnings.
10.6. RA faults
|FCOM 3.2.34.8000, FCOM 1.34.40.2000, amber ECAM: NAV RA 1(2)
FAULT
A single RA Iault results in degradation oI approach capability to Cat II.
Loss oI both RAs will lead to direct law at landing gear extension and a loss
oI ILS APPR mode capability. ThereIore, landing will be CONF 3 with
associated corrections, the approach should be Ilown in LOC and FPA and
autopilot disconnect should be anticipated at gear extension.
10.7. IR faults
|FCOM 3.2.34.8000, FCOM 1.34.10.3000, amber ECAM: NAV IR 1(2)
(3)(12)(13)(23) FAULT|
In case oI simultaneous loss oI the ADR and IR associated with an ADIRU,
apply the ADR FAULT procedure Iirst.|FCOM 3.2.24.6000|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
57
A single IR Iault will simply require ATT/HDG switching. This may lead
to loss oI the extended Iunctions oI the EPGWS and/or loss oI TCAS. It
may be possible to recover the IR in ATT mode using the procedure on
page 2.21 oI the QRH.
A dual IR Iault will lead to loss oI PFD indications on at least one side so
use ATT/HDG switching to recover. It will also lead to Alternate Law and
associated speed restrictions and landing conIiguration considerations.
10.8. IR disagree
|FCOM 3.2.34.13000, FCOM 1.34.10.3000, amber ECAM: NAV IR DIS-
AGREE|
Following rejection or Iailure oI an IR, there is disagreement between the
two remaining IRs. Normal and alternate laws are lost, but alternate law
with reduced protections can be recovered by isolating the Iaulty IR (use
standby horizon to cross-check) and resetting the ELACs.
10.9. IR alignment in ATT mode
|QRH 2.21, FCOM 3.2.34.10000|
II IR alignment is lost, it may be possible to recover attitude and heading
inIormation by switching the ADIRU selector to ATT and maintaining lev-
el constant speed Ilight Ior 30 seconds. The magnetic heading will need to
be entered, the exact method being dependent on the ADIRS CDU Iitted.
10.10. FM/GPS position disagree
|QRH 2.19, FCOM 3.2.34.15000, EOMB 2.3.15|
This can be disregarded iI on an ILS or LOC approach. On an overlay
approach, revert to raw data. On an RNAV approach, go around unless
visual.
In other Ilight phases, manually tune a VOR and check against either the
needle and DME on the ND or the BRG/DIST TO Iield on the PROG page.
II the error is 3nm or less, disregard the message. II the error is greater
than 3nm use HDG/TRK and raw data navigation. TODO: Iurther advice
is given regarding checking FM position on POSITION MONITOR page
and either switching APs or deselecting GPS, but it is not clear whether
this recovers NAV}.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
58
11. Auto-flight
11.1. FAC faults
|FCOM 1.2.22.60.2000, FCOM 1.2.22.7,8}000, amber ECAM: AUTO
FLT FAC 1(2)(12) FAULT|
Failure oI a single FAC results in loss oI redundancy and hence loss oI Cat
3 Dual. In particular, a single FAC provides all the characteristic speeds
(V
SW
, V
LS
, V
FE
, V
FE-next
, V
LE
, V
MO
/M
MO
, Green dot, S speed and F
speed). It may be worth cross-checking against QRH page 4.01.
II both FACs are lost characteristic speed calculation is not available. All
FAC controlled systems are lost, with the combined eIIects detailed in
Section 11.2, 'Yaw damper Iaults |58| , Section 11.3, 'Rudder trim
Iaults |58| and Section 11.4, 'Rudder travel limiter Iaults |59| .
TODO FCOM has a 12kt crosswind limit Ior rudder travel limiter Iailure,
but none Ior dual FAC Iailure - is it implicit or do you get multiple ECAMs}
11.2. Yaw damper faults
|FCOM 1.2.22.60.2000, FCOM 1.2.22.1,2}000, amber ECAM: AUTO
FLT YAW DAMPER 1(2)(SYS)|
A single Iailure leads to loss oI redundancy, and hence loss oI Cat 3 Dual.
On some airIrames a reset oI the aIIected FAC can be attempted.
With a dual Iailure a reset oI the FACs should be attempted. II the yaw
damper is not recovered, the Ilight controls revert to alternate law (see Sec-
tion 5.12, 'Alternate Law |30| ). Unless the Iailure occured below alert
height, only Cat I wil be available.
11.3. Rudder trim faults
|FCOM 1.2.22.60.2000, FCOM 1.2.22.3,4}000, amber ECAM: AUTO
FLT RUDDER TRIM SYS(1(2) FAULT)|
Loss oI a rudder trim Irom a single FAC leads to loss oI redundancy and
hence loss oI Cat 3 Dual.
II complete loss oI rudder trim occurs, an attempt should be made to reset
the FACs. II this is not successIul, only Cat I is available.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
59
11.4. Rudder travel limiter faults
|FCOM 1.2.22.60.2000, FCOM 1.2.22.5,6}000, amber ECAM: AUTO
FLT RUD TRV LIM 1(2)(SYS)|
Loss oI rudder limit Iunctionality Irom a single FAC leads to loss oI redun-
dancy only.
The eIIect oI complete loss oI rudder limiter Iunctionality depends on when
the Iailure occured. In general, the rudder should be used with caution when
above 160kt. Full rudder travel authority can be recovered at slat extension
TODO: FCOM says "can" not "will" - Iind out iI this means "may not"}.
An attempt should be made to recover the limiter by resetting the FACs.
II this is ineIIective, the crosswind limit oI the aircraIt is reduced to 12kt,
and diIIerential braking may be required on the landing roll.
11.5. FCU faults
|FCOM 1.2.22.60.2000, FCOM 1.2.22.9,10}000, amber ECAM: AUTO
FLT FCU 1(2)(12) FAULT|
Loss oI a single channel will result in the spare channel automatically tak-
ing over. All that is required is a cross check oI the baro reIs.
Loss oI both channels leads to loss oI all FCU and EFIS panels. The au-
topilots and autothrust are lost and parameters that are normally controlled
by the panels revert to sensible deIault values. II the weather radar image
remains displayed, disregard it since the scale will be incorrect.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
60
12. Hydraulics
12.1. Green system low pressure
|FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.8000, amber ECAM: HYD G SYS
LO PR|
The major lost systems are normal landing gear operation (gravity exten-
sion is available) and the normal brake system, including the autobrake
(alternate braking is available). Landing distance will be increased due to
loss oI two spoilers per wing and reverser 1. Flap and slat deployment will
be slow.
12.2. Yellow system low pressure
|FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.8000, amber ECAM: HYD Y SYS
LO PR|
It may be possible to recover the yellow system by using the yellow electric
pump.
Two spoilers per wing and reverser 2 are lost, so landing distance will in-
crease slightly. Nose wheel steering is lost. Flap deployment will be slow.
As the alternate braking system is only available through the brake accu-
mulator, ensure there is suIIicient pressure when the parking brake is set.
12.3. Blue system low pressure
|FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.11000, amber ECAM: HYD B SYS
LO PR|
One spoiler per wing will be lost but this has negligible eIIect on landing
distance. Slats will be slow to deploy. Deployment oI the RAT is not rec-
ommended unless another system is lost. II the system is lost due to low
reservoir level, emergency generation capability is lost.
12.4. Blue + yellow systems low pressure
|QRH 1.10, FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.6000, red ECAM: HYD
B Y SYS LO PR|
It may be possible to recover the yellow system using the yellow electrical
pump or the blue system using the RAT. Systems lost because oI low air
pressure in the reservoir will be recoverable at lower altitudes. Systems
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
61
lost due to reservoir overheats may be usable Ior the approach once they
have cooled down.
This is the least signiIicant dual hydraulic loss. The systems lost include
the union oI losses Ior the single hydraulic system losses described in Sec-
tion 12.3, 'Blue system low pressure |60| and Section 12.2, 'Yel-
low system low pressure |60| . In addition the right elevator is lost,
the speedbrake is unusable due to losing spoilers 234 and the gear will
be gravity extended to protect the green system (gear retraction becomes
unavailable). The Ilight controls remain in Normal Law, but the autopilots
are not available. Landing will be CONF FULL, but distances are approx-
imately doubled.
A paper summary is available on page 1.10 oI the QRH, and this should be
applied once all ECAM actions are completed.
12.5. Green + blue systems low pressure
|QRH 1.11, FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.4000, red ECAM: HYD
G B SYS LO PR|
II the blue system has been lost due to the loss oI its electrical pump, it
may be recovered by deploying the RAT. Systems lost because oI low air
pressure in the reservoir will be recoverable at lower altitudes. Systems
lost due to reservoir overheats may be usable Ior the approach once they
have cooled down.
The systems lost include the union oI losses Ior the single hydraulic
system losses described in Section 12.1, 'Green system low pres-
sure |60| and Section 12.3, 'Blue system low pressure |60| .
In addition, the slats are jammed (see Section 5.6, 'Flaps and/or slats Iault/
locked |26| ) and the ailerons and leIt elevator are lost. This leads to Al-
ternate Law and hence loss oI autopilots. Whilst the autothrust is available,
it should be disconnected early in the approach as it is not able to cope with
the quantity oI Iailed systems. The gear should be gravity extended (hence
Direct Law) at 200kt in order to improve contollability with the single ele-
vator. The speed brake should not be used since the diIIerential spoilers are
required Ior roll control. Due to the single elevator and lost ailerons, expect
slightly sluggish response in the Ilare. Landing will be CONF 3 (Ilaps only)
and landing distance is approximately doubled.
A paper summary is available on page 1.11 oI the QRH, and this should be
applied once all ECAM actions are completed.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
62
12.6. Green + yellow systems low pressure
|QRH 1.12, FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.5000, red ECAM: HYD
G Y SYS LO PR|
It may be possible to recover the yellow system using the yellow electrical
pump. Systems lost because oI low air pressure in the reservoir will be
recoverable at lower altitudes. Systems lost due to reservoir overheats may
be usable Ior the approach once they have cooled down.
This is the worst case dual hydraulic loss. The systems lost include the
union oI losses Ior the single hydraulic system losses described in Sec-
tion 12.1, 'Green system low pressure |60| and Section 12.2, 'Yel-
low system low pressure |60| . In addition, the Ilaps are jammed (see
Section 5.6, 'Flaps and/or slats Iault/locked |26| ), the reversers are lost,
the yaw damper is lost, the stabiliser is Irozen, and the braking is by accu-
mulator only (7 Iull applications available, anti-skid lost). The lost systems
lead to reversion to Alternate Law. With the stabiliser Irozen, the transi-
tion to Direct Law at gear extension should be delayed until CONF 3 and
V
app
are achieved to allow the elevators to be trimmed correctly Ior the
approach. Landing will be CONF 3 (slats only), and landing distances are
almost tripled.
A paper summary is available on page 1.12 oI the QRH, and this should be
applied once all ECAM actions are completed.
12.7. Engine driven pump low pressure
|FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.8000, amber ECAM:HYD G(Y)
ENG 1(2) PUMP LO PR|
Turn oII the aIIected pump. The PTU will pressurise the aIIected system.
12.8. Electric pump low pressure or overheat
|FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.7,11}000, amber ECAM:HYD
Y(B) ELEC PUMP LO PR or OVHT|
Turn oII the aIIected pump. In the case oI an overheat, the pump may be
re-engaged Ior the approach providing the relevant FAULT light on the
overhead panel has extinguished.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
63
12.9. Low reservoir air pressure
|FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.1,2,3}000, amber ECAM:HYD
G(Y)(B) RSVR LO AIR PR|
Loss oI air pressure to a hydraulic reservoir may lead to pump cavitation
and hence Iluctuating pressures. II this occurs, turn oII the aIIected pump,
and iI applicable, turn oII the PTU. Cavitation reduces with altitude, so it
may be possible to reinstate the system during the descent.
12.10. Reservoir overheat
|FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.1,2,3}000, amber ECAM:HYD
G(Y)(B) RSVR OVHT|
Turn oII all aIIected pumps and iI applicable, turn oII the PTU. The system
should be reinstated Ior the approach iI it has cooled suIIiciently. This is
indicated by the FAULT light going out on the overhead panel.
12.11. Low reservoir fluid level
|FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.1,2,3}000, amber ECAM:HYD
G(Y)(B) RSVR LO LVL|
Turn oII all aIIected pumps and, iI applicable, turn oII the PTU. The aI-
Iected system is not recoverable. In the case oI low reservoir level in the
yellow system, it is possible that the Iluid Irom the brake accumulator may
also be lost. This usually occurs within 10 minutes oI the initial warning.
Without the brake accumulator, the parking brake is not available, so chock
the aircraIt beIore shutting down engine 1.
12.12. PTU fault
|FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.9000, amber ECAM:HYD PTU
FAULT|
In Ilight this indicates that either the green or yellow system is low on
Iluid and has low system pressure. The PTU must be turned oII to prevent
overheating the supplying system.
12.13. RAT fault
|FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.10000, amber ECAM:HYD RAT
FAULT|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
64
Indicates that either the RAT is not Iully stowed, pressure is present in the
RAT stowing actuator or that the RAT pump is not available. No action is
required.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
65
13. Ice and rain protection
13.1. Double AOA heat fail
|QRH 2.10, FCOM 3.2.30.11000|
II two AOA probes are aIIected by icing, the computers may erroneous-
ly deselect the remaining good ADR. Switching oII one oI the aIIected
ADRs leaves the system in the state described in Section 10.5, 'ADR dis-
agree |56| .
13.2. Single pitot probe heat or static port heat fault
|FCOM 1.30.50.3000, FCOM 3.2.30.3,5,9}000, amber ECAM: ANTI
ICE CAPT(F/O)(STBY) PITOT or L(R) STAT|
The ADR associated with the Iailed probe or port should be considered un-
reliable. ADR1 or ADR2 can be replaced with ADR3 using air data switch-
ing. II using standby instruments with ADR3 unreliable, air data inIorma-
tion must be monitored closely.
13.3. Multiple pitot heat failures
|FCOM 1.30.50.3000, FCOM 3.2.30.22,23,24,25}000, amber ECAM:
ANTI ICE ALL(CAPT(F/O)F/O(STBY)) PITOT|
The issue with loss oI anti-ice on more than one pitot probe is that it is
possible that the two unprotected pitot probes will ice up at the same time
and provide erroneous but coherent data. This leads to a situation where the
ADR associated with the remaining protected probe is locked out despite
being the single correct source.
Obviously, the Iirst thing to do is to avoid icing conditions. II there is a
working ADR connected to a protected probe, turn one oI the ADRs as-
sociated with an unprotected probe oII. This ensures that an "ADR DIS-
AGREE" ECAM caution is triggered by signiIicant speed discrepancies
and ensures that the protected ADR will not be automatically deselected.
II pitot heat is lost on all probes, one oI the ADRs should, again, be turned
oII to ensure the "ADR DISAGREE" ECAM caution is provided. II icing is
expected, turn oII a second ADR and be ready to apply unreliable airspeed
procedures (see Section 2.3, 'Unreliable airspeed (memorv item) |11| ).
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
66
13.4. Single AOA or TAT heat fault
|FCOM 1.30.50.3000, FCOM 3.2.30.7,9}000, amber ECAM: ANTI ICE
CAPT(F/O)(STBY) AOA or TAT|
No immediate operational eIIect.
13.5. Probe heat computer failure
|FCOM 1.30.50.3000, FCOM 3.2.30.12000, amber ECAM: ANTI ICE
CAPT(F/O)(STBY) PROBES|
II applicable, deselect the aIIected ADR.
13.6. Window heat fault
|FCOM 1.30.40.3000, FCOM 3.2.30.1,2}000, amber ECAM: ANTI ICE
L(R)(LR) WINDSHIELD(WINDOW)|
No immediate operational eIIect.
13.7. Engine anti-ice valve fault
|FCOM 1.30.30.3000, FCOM 3.2.30.13,14}000, amber ECAM: ANTI
ICE ENG 1(2) VALVE OPEN(CLSD)|
II a valve Iails to open when commanded, avoid icing conditions. II it Iails
to close when commanded, a thrust limit penalty applies TODO: Check
this is automatically applied by the relevant FADEC}.
13.8. Wing anti-ice valve open when commanded closed
|FCOM 1.30.20.3000, FCOM 3.2.30.18000, amber ECAM: WING ANTI
ICE L(R) VALVE OPEN|
In the air, just allow the Iailed side to be continually anti-iced and use wing
anti-ice on the working side when required. A thrust limit penalty will ap-
ply. On the ground, isolate and depressurize the pneumatic system on the
Iailed side.
13.9. Wing anti-ice valve closed when commanded open
|FCOM 1.30.20.3000, FCOM 3.2.30.20000, amber ECAM: WING ANTI
ICE SYS FAULT|
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
67
The wing anti-ice must be turned oII to avoid asymmetrically de-icing the
wings. Avoid icing conditions. II ice accretion does occur, landing dis-
tances and V
app
adjustments are in the "Bleed" section oI QRH 2.32. Speed
must be maintained above V
u-prot
(top oI amber and black striped band) iI
ice has accreted as stall margins may be reduced.
13.10. Wing anti-ice valves fail to close after 30 second
self-test on ground
|FCOM 1.30.30.3000, FCOM 3.2.30.19000, amber ECAM: ANTI ICE
OPEN ON GND|
Simply switch oII the wing anti-ice with the push button. II the valves still
do not close, see Section 13.8, 'Wing anti-ice valve open when commanded
closed |66| .
13.11. High pressure detected when wing anti-ice turned
on
|FCOM 1.30.20.3000, FCOM 3.2.30.21000, amber ECAM: WING ANTI
ICE L(R) HI PR|
A thrust limit penalty is applied automatically. TODO: Check that this is
automatic}
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
68
14. Indicating/ Recording
14.1. Display unit failure
|QRH 2.10, FCOM 3.2.31|
TODO
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
69
15. Pneumatic
15.1. Dual bleed failure
|QRH 2.02, FCOM 3.2.36.6000, NTC 1.106|
A known problem with the A319 is that the load on a single bleed supplying
two packs at high altitude may be suIIicient to cause it to trip oII. In this
case, turning oII one pack may allow a bleed reset.
There is no ECAM associated with a dual bleed Iailure. The QRH 2.02
procedure applies both to the case where the aircraIt has dispatched with
an inoperative bleed IAW MEL, and in the case where an in-Ilight Iailure
has leIt a single bleed remaining.
In the case oI an isolated bleed duct (due bleed air leak, engine Iire or Iailed
open start valve), the bleed associated with the duct is clearly unrecover-
able. Since the remaining bleed would only have been supplying a single
pack, the overload case does not apply. Hence, this bleed is also considered
unrecoverable, and a bleed reset should not be attempted. II, on the other
hand, both ducts are available and a single bleed has been supplying two
packs, an overload may be suspected and an attempt can be made to reset
the overloaded bleed once one oI the packs is turned oII.
II an engine bleed cannot be recovered, providing #1 bleed duct is avail-
able, the APU bleed may be used to supply a single pack when below
FL225. II the #2 bleed duct is isolated, only pack 1 can be used since the
cross bleed will be closed. Otherwise, either pack may be used. Note that
the APU bleed is not capable oI supplying bleed air Ior wing anti-ice.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
70
16. Communications
16.1. Failure of two-way radio communication equipment
in UK airspace
|UKAIP ENR 1.1.3.2.4|
Initial actions
As soon as loss oI communication is recognized, squawk 7600, and start
timing. Any timings detailed in the rest oI this section start now.
SID
Fly the published lateral and vertical proIiles, including any step climb, un-
til the last waypoint oI the procedure is reached. Maintain current speed and
last assigned level (or MSA iI this is higher) until 7 minutes have elapsed.
Then adjust speed and level in accordance with current Ilight plan. This
procedure also applies to RNP-1 (PRNAV) departures.
Under radar vectors without specified limit
Continue in accordance with last instructions Ior 3 minutes, then proceed
in most direct manner to rejoin current Ilight plan route. II necessary, climb
to MSA.
Under radar vectors from Approach Control Radar
Comply with instructions on radar vectoring chart.
STAR
Follow lateral proIile. Maintain current speed and last assigned level (or
MSA iI higher) Ior 7 minutes, then arrange descent to be as close as possible
to published planning proIile. II no proIile is published, arrange to be at
the IAF at minimum published level. This procedure also applies to RNP-1
(PRNAV) arrivals.
SRA
Continue visually or by using an alternate approach aid. II this is not pos-
sible, carry out a missed approach and continue to the holding position oI a
suitable aerodrome with a notiIied instrument approach and carry out that
procedure.
Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes
71
Other
Maintain current speed and last assigned Ilight level (or MSA iI higher)
Ior 7 minutes, then adjust speed and level in accordance with current Ilight
plan.
Further actions
Destination ETA is either last ETA Ior the destination acknowledged by
ATC or an ETA calculated Irom the last acknowledged position report plus
the Ilight planned times Ior the remainder oI the Ilight. Arrange to be at the
appropriate designated landing aid at this time.
Destination EAT is either the last acknowledged EAT or destination ETA.
II "delay not determined" has been acknowledged, divert to alternate spec-
iIied in current Ilight plan. Otherwise commence approach at destination
EAT and land within 30 minutes. Watch Ior visual signals Irom the tower.
1
Summary of
easyJet manuals
Airbus Edition
Table of Contents
1. Authority, Duties and Responsibilities of a Commander ........................ 3
2. Crew composition .......................................................................... 5
2.1. Flight crew ....................................................................... 5
2.2. Cabin crew ....................................................................... 5
2.3. Positioning crew ................................................................ 6
2.4. Flight Ops Inspectors .......................................................... 7
3. Qualification and Recency Requirements ............................................ 8
4. Crew Health Precautions ................................................................ 10
4.1. Alcohol .......................................................................... 10
4.2. Cosmic radiation .............................................................. 10
4.3. Medication ...................................................................... 10
4.4. Disease and Immunisation .................................................. 11
4.5. Blood donation ................................................................ 11
4.6. Diving ............................................................................ 11
4.7. Surgery .......................................................................... 12
4.8. Hypoxia .......................................................................... 12
4.9. Food poisoning ................................................................ 12
5. Flight Time Limitations Scheme ...................................................... 13
5.1. Definitions ...................................................................... 13
5.2. Days Off ........................................................................ 13
5.3. Required rest ................................................................... 14
5.4. Maximum Flight Duty ....................................................... 15
5.5. Consecutive night, early start and late finish duties .................. 16
5.6. Cumulative limits ............................................................. 17
5.7. Standby .......................................................................... 18
5.8. Transitions ...................................................................... 19
5.9. Pre and post flight duties ................................................... 19
Summary of easyJet manuals
2
6. Flight preparation instructions ......................................................... 20
6.1. Minimum flight altitudes ................................................... 20
6.2. Usability of airports .......................................................... 22
6.3. Aerodrome Operating Minima ............................................ 23
6.4. Selection of alternates ....................................................... 25
6.5. Pre-flight fuel planning ...................................................... 26
6.6. Weight and Balance .......................................................... 28
6.7. Operational Flight Plans .................................................... 31
6.8. Aircraft Technical Log ...................................................... 31
6.9. Documents to be carried .................................................... 35
7. Ground Handling Instructions ......................................................... 37
7.1. Fuelling procedures .......................................................... 37
7.2. Passenger groups .............................................................. 38
7.3. Baggage and freight .......................................................... 41
7.4. Ground ice protection ........................................................ 43
8. Flight procedures .......................................................................... 45
8.1. VFR/IFR policy ............................................................... 45
8.2. Navigation policy ............................................................. 45
Summary of easyJet manuals
3
1. Authority, Duties and Responsibilities of a Commander
The commander has overall responsibility for the safety of the aircraft, its occu-
pants and its cargo, and the authority to issue any commands required to secure
this. He has the authority to increase any safety margin, including aerodrome op-
erating minima, as he sees fit. In an emergency situation, he has the authority to
override any rule or procedure in the interest of safety.
He must ensure that:
1. All SOPS are fully complied with.
2. The weather will not infringe operating minima and the required alternates
are available.
3. Ground facilities and services required for the planned flight are available
and adequate.
4. The correct types and quantities of fuel and oil are carried, and uplifts are
recorded.
5. The aircraft and required equipment are serviceable or only have unservice-
abilities that comply with the CDL or MEL. If third party maintenance is
required whilst away from base, the procedures referred to in EOM-A 8.1.11
must be followed.
6. The preflight inspection has been completed, and that all required docu-
ments, maps and charts are onboard and valid.
7. The aircraft is within its weight and balance envelope and the load is properly
secured.
8. The available aircraft performance is sufficient for all phases of the proposed
flight.
9. Any person, or any part of the cargo, which may represent a potential hazard
to the safety of the aircraft or its occupants is disembarked. This includes:
Persons under the influence of alcohol or drugs, to the extent that they pose
a risk.
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Inadmissible passengers, deportees or persons in custody if they pose any risk.
10. A full safety briefing, including exits and equipment carried, is given to the
passengers.
11. Crew members are not permitted to perform any activity during take-off,
initial climb, final approach and landing except those duties required for the
safe operation of the aircraft.
12. A continuous listening watch is maintained on the appropriate radio frequen-
cies.
13. The cabin is secured (passengers secured and cabin baggage properly
stowed) for taxi, take-off, landing and whenever turbulence is expected.
14. The cabin crew are secured in their allocated seats for takeoff, landing and
when not carrying out essential duties whilst taxiing.
15. The flight data recorder is not disabled, switched off or erased during flight
nor erased after flight in the event of an accident or an incident subject to
mandatory reporting.
16. The flight deck door is locked at all times between engine start and engine
shutdown, with the exception of when it must be opened for physiological
reasons.
17. A post flight debrief is carried out.
18. A journey log or equivalent ACARS is completed.
[EOM-A 1.4, EOM-A 8.1]
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2. Crew composition
2.1. Flight crew
The minimum flight crew is two pilots, at least one of whom must be a Captain.
The commander must sit in the left seat unless the commander is a training Captain
and is required to occupy the right seat for a training detail.
A training Captain may carry out both PNF and PF roles from either seat. Other
Captains may only carry out the PNF role from the right seat.
If an aircraft is only being taxied, the occupant of the right seat may be a non-type
rated pilot or a suitably qualified ground employee. The occupant of the left seat
must, however, be a fully type qualified commander.
Inexperienced (***) crew must not operate together. A Captain is considered in-
experienced until he has successfully passed his first recurrent simulator check.
A First Officer is considered inexperienced until he has completed the amount of
flying detailed in EOM-A 4.1.2.
[EOM-A 4]
2.2. Cabin crew
The minimum cabin crew is normally one for every 50 installed seats. In extreme
circumstances this may be reduced by one cabin crew member providing that:
Authorisation is received from the duty pilot
The aircraft does not dispatch from its originating base.
The applicable sectors are either part of the original series of flights or are
associated diversions.
A maximum of 50 passengers (not including infants) per cabin crew member
is carried.
All passengers are seated in a position where they can adequately view the
safety demonstration.
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If the reduction in cabin crew results in no SCCM being carried there are addi-
tional procedures detailed in EOM-A 4.1.4g.
It is permissible to board with one cabin crew member absent provided that:
The operating SCCM is present.
A member of the flight crew is on the flight deck. In case of emergency a mem-
ber of flight crew will assist at the front of the cabin.
The front and rear doors each have at least one attendant cabin crew member.
The aircraft is not being fuelled.
A maximum of 50 passengers per cabin crew member are boarded.
It is also permissable to board with a non operating crew member provided that
they are fully qualified on type, in uniform and fit to operate. They are not re-
quired to have taken part in the pre-flight brief, but must be briefed on their duties
during boarding and must have answered one SEP and one First Aid question.
The non operating crew member must remain with the aircraft until the rostered
crew member arrives.
During disembarkation, once there are less than 20 passengers remaining on board
the required crew complement is reduced to the SCCM and one member of flight
crew.
If a cabin crew member is incapacitated due to sickness, injury, tiredness or fa-
tigue, they must be offloaded. They will then be considered unfit to fly until cer-
tified fit by a doctor or paramedic. This rule may be overridden at the Captain's
discretion if "extraordinary circumstances" apply.
[EOM-A 4.1.3, EOM-A 4.1.4]
2.3. Positioning crew
Positioning crew will normally be booked as passengers and procede through nor-
mal passenger channels. When arriving on a domestic flight it is permissable for
crew to transfer aircraft on the ramp, but if arriving on an international flight crew
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must clear immigration and customs before proceding to the aircraft via security
search.
In exceptional circumstances staff may be carried as "extra crew". This requires
the authorisation of the duty pilot or the Network Duty Manager. In this case,
crew must be shown on the crew list.
[EOM-A 4.5, EOM-A 4.6]
2.4. Flight Ops Inspectors
Flight Ops Inspectors may, at any time, board any easyJet aircraft and enter and
remain on the flight deck unless it is the commander's opinion that this would
endanger the safety of the aircraft.
Flight Ops Inspectors may act as operating crew with the approval of the duty
pilot, but may only fly with a training Captain.
[EOM-A 4.7]
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3. Qualification and Recency Requirements
The minimum qualifications to act as a commander are:
1. A UK JAA-FCL ATPL with relevant type rating
2. Class I medical
3. Valid ATQP recurrent checks:
Test/ Training Validity
Licence Proficiency Check
a
12 months
bc
Line Oriented Evaluation
d
12 months
bc
Line check 24 months
bc
Dangerous Goods 24 months less 1 day
Aviation Security 12 months
b
Annual Emergency and Safety Equipment Check 24 months
bc
Triennial Emergency and Safety Equipment
Check
3 years
b
a
Incorporates Operator Proficiency Check, Instrument Rating renewal, and elements of Ground
and Refresher Training.
b
The period of validity starts on the last day of the month in which the training and/or test was
completed.
c
For renewals, the period of validity can start on the expiry date of the current check. To be
considered a renewal, the training and/or test must be completed a maximum of three months
before that expiry date.
d
Incorporates elements of Ground and Refresher Training.
4. Three take-offs and three landings as PF in the preceding 90 days.
5. For Cat III, two landings, possibly in a simulator, using Cat III procedures
within 12 months. This requirement is usually satisfied by the LPC.
6. 3000 factored hours of which 500 hours must be on a medium or large jet
transport (see EOM-A 5.2.1 for factored hours table).
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7. Successful completion of a Command Course.
[EOM-A 5]
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4. Crew Health Precautions
4.1. Alcohol
Do not consume any alcohol within 10 hours of a duty, and consume no more that
5 units of alcohol within 24 hours of a duty.
Crews are obliged to comply with random breathalysing, but should ensure that
it is not carried out in front of passengers.
Alcohol must never be consumed whilst in uniform in a public place.
Alcohol must not be taken onto the flight deck during flight.
[EOM-A 6.1.1]
4.2. Cosmic radiation
Statutory directives state that the acceptable radiation exposure of aircrew is
6mSv/yr. Radiation exposure is modelled by easyJet to try to prevent exposure
above this level. At easyJet's operating latitudes, 1mSv exposure is equivalent to
200 hours at 35000 feet.
Embryos and foetuses are particularly susceptible to harm from cosmic radiation.
Crew should not fly when pregnant.
[EOM-A 6.1.3]
4.3. Medication
The use of non-prescribed narcotics or sleep inducing drugs is forbidden.
Do not operate within 48 hours of a general anaesthetic or within 24 hours of a
local anaesthetic.
It is aceptable to operate whilst taking non drowsy cold remedies such as Sudafed.
Seek medical advice before operating whilst taking any other medication.
[EOM-A 6.1.2, EOM-A 6.1.4]
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4.4. Disease and Immunisation
Crew who are operating overseas must satisfy any statutory requirement for vac-
cination and be able to produce a WHO approved "Certificate of Vaccination" if
required.
Immunity after vaccination is not immediate and it will reduce with time. Ap-
proximate effectiviness is as follows:
Vaccination Effective after Ineffective after
Yellow Fever 10 days 10 years
Cholera 7 days 6 months
Typhoid 7 days 30 years
Poliomyelitis 3 vaccinations 10 years
Tetanus 3 vaccinations 10 years
Crew should not operate within 24 hours of receiving immunisation.
When operating in maleria infected countries, crew members are responsible for
obtaining and applying appropriate medication.
[EOM-A 6.1.5, EOM-A 6.1.16]
4.5. Blood donation
Crew should not donate blood within 24 hours of a duty.
[EOM-A 6.1.6]
4.6. Diving
Crew should not fly within 48 hours of diving to a depth exceeding 10m. Crew
should avoid any diving requiring the use of an aqua-lung within 24 hours of a
duty.
Crew who have been treated for decompression sickness must not fly within 72
hours of recovery.
[EOM-A 6.1.7]
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4.7. Surgery
Aeromedical advice should be sought before returning to duty following any sur-
gical procedure.
[EOM-A 6.1.11]
4.8. Hypoxia
Table 1. Time of useful consciousness
Pressure altitude Time
18000ft 30 minutes
25000ft 2-3 minutes
30000ft 45-75 seconds
45000ft 12 seconds
[Human Factors For Pilots, Green et al.]
4.9. Food poisoning
Crew who are operating together should not have the same meals. This includes
crew food and eating together when downroute or on airport standby.
If food poisoning from crew food is suspected, a Food Safety Report form must
be completed and medical tests carried out to identify the strain.
[EOM-A 6.1.8]
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5. Flight Time Limitations Scheme
5.1. Definitions
Duty period: Any continuous period where a crew member is required to carry
out a task associated with easyJet business.
Flight duty period: The period between reporting to operate a flight or series of
flights and the on blocks time of the last sector operated.
Day off: A period of at least 34 hours that is free from duty and contains two
consecutive local nights, a local night being a period of 8 hours in the period 22:00
to 08:00 local time.
Discretion event: The use of either commander's or individual's discretion to re-
duce a rest period, extend a duty period, ignore a cumulative limit or reduce a
report time.
5.2. Days Off
For crew operating under the "easyJet Variation Phase IV" (a.k.a 5/4/5/3), FTL
days off restrictions will always be satisfied by the fixed pattern, even when a
day off has been violated by a delay on the last day of a block of late duties.
The rostering agreement specifies that 10 days off must be achieved in the 28
day reserve period, 3 of these being the final three days. In addition the variation
specifies that two consecutive days off must be achieved within any 10 day period
and that two consecutive days off must be achieved after any 7 consecutive duties.
Crew who are not operating under a variation require 7 days off in 4 consecutive
weeks and 24 days off in 12 consecutive weeks. No more that 7 days can be
worked between days off, and two consecutive days off must be achieved in any
14 day period.
Section 5.5, Consecutive night, early start and late finish duties details addi-
tional days off restrictions for consecutive duties which overlap the period 01:00L
to 06:59L.
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Ignoring days off restrictions
The commander may, at his discretion, choose to allow the violation of days off
restrictions.
The company may, due to unforseen circumstances, position a crew member back
to base when this forms their eighth consecutive duty.
5.3. Required rest
For flight crew, the rest required before operating a duty is 12 hours or the length
of the previous duty period, whichever is greater. For cabin crew, the rest required
is one hour less than the flight crew.
Reducing required rest
At home base, flight crew may, at their discretion, reduce their required rest period
by a maximum of one hour providing that the rest period is still at least 12 hours.
Cabin crew may similarly reduce their rest providing the rest period is still at least
11 hours. All crew members must inform the commander at the start of a duty if
individual discretion has been used to reduce rest.
When not at home base:
The commander may, at his discretion, reduce rest by an unlimited amount
provided that at least 10 hours are spent in suitable accommodation.
Where a commander is not available, such as when a crew has split, individuals
may, at their own discretion, also reduce rest by an unlimited amount provided
that at least 10 hours are spent in suitable accommodation. The commander in
charge of the subsequent duty period must be informed of this occurance prior
to the first sector.
Where the preceding duty was less than 12 hours, easyJet may roster a reduction
in rest equal to the amount that actual total accommodation transfer time was
less than two hours, up to a maximum of one hour.
Exercise of discretion to reduce rest must be reported on the journey log of the
subsequent duty. If the reduction is greater than one hour, a Discretion Report
form must also be completed to allow CAA audit.
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There are additional limitations if the rest reduction forms part of a series of dis-
cretion events.
5.4. Maximum Flight Duty
The maximum allowable flight duty for flight crew is governed by the number of
sectors flown and the report time in local time:
Table 2. Maximum flight duty
Sectors
a
Local time 1 2 3 4
06:00 - 07:59 13:00 12:15 11:30 10:45
08:00 - 12:59 14:00 13:15 12:30 11:45
13:00 - 1759 13:00 12:15 11:30 10:45
18:00 - 21:59 12:00 11:15 10:30 9:45
22:00 - 05:59 11:00 10:15 9:30 9:00
a
For 5 or more sectors, refer to the full table in EOM-A 7.1.12.8
The maximum allowable duty for cabin crew is one hour longer than the flight
crew.
Increasing maximum flight duty
The commander may, at his discretion, increase the maximum flight duty detailed
in Table 2, Maximum flight duty by up to 2 hours. If required by a delay occur-
ing during the turnaround before the final sector of a duty, the maximum flight
duty may be extended by a further hour. Whenever this discretion is used it must
be reported via the journey log. Where the discretion is greater than two hours a
Discretion Report Form must also be completed to allow mandatory reporting to
the CAA. There are additional conditions when exercising this discretion as part
of a sequence of discretion events.
Reporting times may be delayed by up to 4 hours if the crew member is informed
of the change before leaving their place of rest. In this case the report time used
in Table 2, Maximum flight duty will be the original report time, but the flight
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duty will be deemed to start at the delayed report time. Where a delay is greater
than 4 hours, the more restrictive of the original and delayed report time will
be used when calculating max FDP, and the flight duty will be deemed to have
commenced 4 hours after the original report time.
Where a flight duty is scheduled such that a rest period of between 3 and 10 con-
secutive hours may be taken between sectors, the company can increase the max-
imum flight duty by one half of that rest period. If this method is used, any po-
sitioning journeys count as sectors. The allowance for inter-sector pre and post
flight duties and the type of accommodation required are specified in EOM-A
7.1.13.
easyJet has also negotiated FTL exemptions that allow the maximum flight duty
lengths in Table 2, Maximum flight duty to be extended by either 30 minutes
or 60 minutes at the planning stage. To utilise either of these exemptions a long
list of conditions (detailed in EOM-A 7.1.12.9) must be met. Affected duties are
annotated on rosters.
5.5. Consecutive night, early start and late finish duties
If any part of a duty falls within the period 02:00 to 04:59 local time, then it
is a "night duty". Consecutive night duties are only allowed with the following
resitrictions:
If two consecutive night duties are scheduled, the preceding duty must finish
by 23:59 local time.
If three consecutive night duties are scheduled, the preceding duty must finish
by 21:00.
If four or five consecutive night duties are scheduled, the Table 2, Maximum
flight duty limits are replaced by an 8 hour limit, regardless of sectors; in
addition, 24 hours rest must be taken prior to the series and 54 hours rest must
be taken post the series.
No more than three consecutive duties are allowed where any part of a duty falls
within the period 01:00 to 06:59, nor will more than 4 such duties occur within
any 7 day period. There are the following exceptions to this rule:
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Crew operating under the "easyJet Variation Phase IV" (a.k.a 5/4/5/3) may op-
erate four or five consecutive "early start duties" where max flight duty is as per
Table 2, Maximum flight duty. Only one of the series may have a report time
between 03:00 and 04:59 and that duty must be 2 sectors or less. In addition, 2
days off must be achieved before any series of 4 early starts, 3 days off must be
achieved before any series of 5 early starts and 72 hours must be achieved after
either series. The rostering agreement further stipulates that 4 days off must be
achieved before any block of earlies in the fixed pattern. Generally, a maximum
of 5 consecutive FDPs is allowable under this variation, but exceptionally a
sixth may be operated in accordance with the terms in EOM-A 7.3.3.8.
Crew not operating under a variation may operate four or five consecutive "ear-
ly start duties" where the Table 2, Maximum flight duty limits are replaced
by a 9 hour limit, regardless of sectors; in addition, 24 hours rest must be taken
prior to the series and 63 hours rest must me taken post the series.
Any run of consecutive night, early start or late finish duties can be broken by a
period of 34 hours free from such duties.
Note
The definition of an "early start duty" is inconsistent between EOM-A
7.1.4.7 and the variation approval, but my interpretation is a duty that
commences between 01:00 and 06:59
Ignoring consecutive night, early start and late finish duty limits
The commander may, at his discretion, allow violation of any of the consecutive
night, early start and late finish duty limits.
5.6. Cumulative limits
Table 3, Cumulative limits shows the cumulative duty time and block time lim-
itations applicable to flight crew operating under the "easyJet Variation Phase
IV" (a.k.a 5/4/5/3) and to cabin crew operating without variations:
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Table 3. Cumulative limits
Flight Crew Cabin Crew
Period Duty
hours
Block
hours
Duty
hours
Block
Hours
7 days 55
a

b
60
c

14 days 95
d

b
105
28 days 190 100 210
12 weeks 480 270
6 months 550
9 months 750
12 months 1880 900
a
Can be increased to 60 hours where unforseen delays occur on the day of operation.
b
This limitation is in the Rostering and Crewing Agreement, amended 01/08/2008, which supercedes
the limit in EOM-A 7.3.3.4.
c
Can be increased to 65 hours where unforseen delays occur in a duty block.
d
Can be increased to 100 hours where unforseen delays occur on the day of operation.
Duty time spent on "contactable" does not count towards cumulative duty hours,
nor does a "duty break" of over 6 hours (but less than minimum rest) in suitable
accommodation prior to positioning home. When not called out, time spent on
standby during the period 22:00 to 08:00 local time only counts half.
Ignoring cumulative limits
The commander, at his discretion, may allow violation of any cumulative limit.
In this case a Discretion Report Form must be completed to allow CAA audit.
5.7. Standby
The maximum planned standby duration is 12 hours.
In general, the local time used to determine max flight duty in Table 2, Maximum
flight duty will be the most restricting of standby start time and report time. If,
however, both standby start time and report time occur in the period 22:00-08:00,
report time is used.
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The maximum flight duty must be reduced by the amount that the time between
starting the standby and reporting exceeds 6 hours.
A "contactable" is a special case of standby. It's duration must be less than an
hour, it must occur between 06:00L and 22:00L and the minimum time between
call out and report must be 10 hours. The required rest period after a contactable
is reduced to 10 hours, and the time spent on contactable does not count towards
cumultive duty limits.
5.8. Transitions
A "morning start duty" (MSD) is a duty with a report time between 03:00L and
09:29L. An "evening finish duty" (EFD) is either a duty finishing between 18:00L
and 03:00L or a duty with a report time between 18:00L and 03:00L that finishes
between 03:00L and 17:59L. A transition occurs when an EFD occurs immedi-
ately after an MSD or vice versa. It is possible for a single duty to be both an MSD
and an EFD, and this also constitutes a transition.
When crew are operating under the "easyJet Variation Phase IV" (a.k.a 5/4/5/3),
only one transition is allowed per duty block. In addition, the August 2009 Ros-
tering resolution prohibits transitions on day 5 of a duty block, and easyJet has
made a commitment via pmail to limit rostered transitions to one per month.
5.9. Pre and post flight duties
For normal flight duty periods, a minimum of 1 hour must be planned for pre-
flight duties, and a minimum of 30 minutes planned for post flight duties. For
training and positioning refer to EOM-A 7.1.12.
The practice of using non-standard reporting times to move a duty into a less
limiting FDP band is prohibited.
The commander may, at his discretion, reduce these times. The company may
not. If the commander reduces standard reporting time by more than 15 minutes,
a Discretion Report form must be completed to allow CAA audit.
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6. Flight preparation instructions
6.1. Minimum flight altitudes
Definitions
When operating on a defined route segment, national authorities may have pub-
lished the Minimum Enroute IFR Altitude (MEA) for that segment. This altitude
(or flight level) ensures obstacle clearance and navaid reception. On Jeppesen
enroute charts it is shown below the approximate center of the route segment in
small red font. Where a segment is wholly contained within controlled airspace,
the MEA will provide a buffer of at least 500ft from uncontrolled airspace {TO-
DO: This information comes from an FAA handbook and comparison of Jepp en-
route charts and UK AIP airway specification. Confirm that it is correct}. Where
applicable, national authorities may also publish a lower segment safety altitude
which provides obstacle clearance only. This is called the Minimum Obstruction
Clearance Altitude (MOCA). On Jeppesen charts, MOCA is presented adjacent
to, and in the same font as, MEA; a suffix of "T" (e.g. 4200T) is used to distin-
guish it. Where MOCA is not presented, it may be assumed that it has the same
value as MEA.
When national authorities have not defined MEA, Jeppesen instead presents a
value known as the Minimum Off-Route Altitude (MORA). This is in the same
font as the MEAs, and is distinguished by an "a" suffix (e.g. 4200a). Jeppesen de-
rives this value by examining charts or databases of known obstacles and terrain.
The value should ensure at least 1000ft clearance of all obstacles within 10nm
of any point on the route segment. When the obstacles are over 5000ft altitude,
2000ft of clearance is provided. MORA is also presented on the LIDO OFPs.
When not operating on a defined route segment, Jeppesen presents area obstacle
clearance data in the form of a Grid Minimum Off-Route Altitude (Grid MORA).
This is again a Jeppesen derived value. It should provide the same obstacle clear-
ance as MORA within the area enclosed by the latitude and longitude lines of a
Jeppesen enroute chart. It is presented in large green or red font near the centre
of the applicable area
1
.
1
Red is used when the value is greater than 14,000ft
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Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) is the minimum altitude that provides 1000ft of
obstacle clearance within 25nm (unless otherwise specified) of a specified navi-
gation facility. It is published as a circle on Jeppesen plates. Where the circle is
divided into segments, the altitudes are referred to as Minimum Sector Altitudes.
It is for emergency use only, and does not necessarily guarantee navaid reception.
Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) is the lowest altitude at which an IFR air-
craft will be vectored by a radar controller (excepting SRAs etc.); it may only be
utilized upon the controller's determination that an adequate radar return is being
received.
[EOM-A 8.1.1, Jeppesen Text Manual - "Introduction"]
Corrections
All published altitudes must be corrected for low temperatures. Altitudes within
5000ft of the elevation of the source of a QNH measurement can be corrected for
temperatures below 0C using the table presented in EOM-A 8.1.1.3.1.
2
A graph is
presented below this table to correct higher altitudes for temperatures below ISA.
When operating within 20nm of terrain that has an elevation greater than 2000ft,
a correction must be applied for wind. This is done using the table presented in
EOM-A 8.1.1.3.2, although a correction of 2500ft will always be conservative.
When operating in low atmospheric pressure conditions with an altimeter setting
of 1013, the aircraft will be ~30ft below the indicated altitude for every millibar
that the QNH is below 1013. This can be applied as a positive increment to a
published minimum altitude to calculate a minimum flight level.
Note that the MORAs presented on the LIDO OFPs do not have any of these
corrections applied.
[EOM-A 8.1.1.3]
Operational requirements
When operating under IFR
3
, the minimum enroute altitudes should be the higher
of the corrected MOCA and the corrected MORA. EOM-A 8.1.1.2.3.1 states:
2
This table is also available on page 8.02 of the QRH.
3
Authorisation from the post holder flight operations is required to fly VFR.
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"During flight preparation, the en-route minimum altitudes
must be established for all the route segments".
The OFPs provide uncorrected MORAs only. Therefore, as part of pre-flight
preparation, MOCAs for each route segment should be extracted from the Jeppe-
sen en-route charts and compared to the OFP MORAs, and the higher of these
values should then be corrected for temperature and wind to establish en-route
minimum altitudes {TODO: this is clearly impractical - check whether my inter-
pretation is incorrect}.
Engine failure or loss of pressurisation may lead to a requirement for en-route
descent. Currently, the highest obstacle affecting easyJet routes is Mont Blanc
at 15,771ft. This is at least 2000ft below the A319 green dot one engine ceiling
assuming MTOW and ISA+20. Thus, there are currently no special drift down
diversion procedures in place. In the case of emergency descent following loss of
pressurisation, all obstacles must be cleared by at least 2000ft. It is worth noting
that the time of useful consciousness without supplementary oxygen is 30 minutes
at 18,000ft.
Obstacle clearance for take-off and initial climb phase is provided by a combina-
tion of LPC performance calculation and SID and Engine Out SID design. Note
that easyJet SOPs for loss of thrust after divergence point are contrary to the spe-
cific Airbus recommendations in FCOM 4.4.30.4000; this can lead to some un-
welcome grey areas in obstacle clearance.
For the approach phase, unless in visual contact with the ground with flight visi-
bility sufficient to identify all relevant obstacles, flight below MSA should only
be conducted on promulgated routes or instrument approach procedure or when
being vectored at levels not less than MVA.
[EOM-A 8.1.1]
6.2. Usability of airports
easyJet is responsible for ensuring that all airports selected as destinations or alter-
nates are adequate in all respects, including runway dimensions, obstacles, ATS,
lighting, approach procedures, weather reporting and emergency services.
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For the A319 and A320, fire and rescue category 6 is the normal minimum ac-
ceptable level of cover. Temporary reductions to category 4 at departure and des-
tination and to category 5 at alternates are acceptable on a temporary basis; no
crew action is required. A321 categories are 1 higher than A319.
easyJet will categorise aerodromes from A to C in order of increasing difficulty.
The category of an aerodrome is promulgated in the easyJet Aerodromes Brief-
ing Supplement. Operation to a category B aerodrome requires self-briefing from
EOM-C. Signing the OFP confirms that this has been done. Operation to a cat-
egory C aerodrome requires a briefing and then either a visit in an operating ca-
pacity or aerodrome specific training in an approved flight simulator.
[EOM-A 8.1.2]
6.3. Aerodrome Operating Minima
All easyJet aircraft, with the exception of certain A321s, are Category C for the
purpose of calculating operating minima. The A321s with MLW of 77,800kg are
Category D.
Aerodrome specific take-off minima are presented on Jeppesen chart 10-9. The
required RVR must be achieved for all relevant reporting points
4
. When operating
with RVR < 150m, LVPs must be in force, crew must be LVO qualified and a
90m visual segment (equivalent to 6 centre line lights at standard 15m spacing)
must be available.
Straight in visual approaches require RVR 800m. A visual circuit requires Met
Visibility 5km and cloud base 2,500ft. Visual approaches at night are autho-
rised unless prohibited in the Aerodrome Briefings Supplement. Visual circuits
must be flown at a height greater than 1500ft that ensures at least 500ft separation
from obstacles.
Minima for instrument approaches (including circling approaches) are presented
on the relevant Jeppesen approach plates (11- to 18-). easyJet is authorised to
4
If operating to RVR minima 150m, pilot assessment of the RVR for the initial part of the take-off
roll is acceptable.
Summary of easyJet manuals
24
use these minima whenever the minima block is titled "JAR-OPS", "JAA MIM-
IMUMS" or "STANDARD". Where none of these titles appear, the authorised
minima will be presented seperately on plate 10-9X. Minima for Cat II and III op-
erations are presented in their own section at the start of the Jeppesen Text man-
ual. Only RVRs applicable to segments of the runway where speed is expected to
be above 60kt need to be considered for landing.
When RVR is not reported, and provided that required RVR 800m, the following
table may be used to convert Met Visibility to RVR for the purposes of complying
with landing minima:
Table 4. Met Visibility to RVR conversion
Lighting Elements in Operation RVR = Met Visibility x
Day Night
HI approach and runway lighting 1.5 2.0
Any other type of lighting installation 1.0 1.5
No lighting 1.0 N/A
Where minima for non-precision approaches are presented in terms of a Minimum
Descent altitude, 50ft should be added to create an effective Decision Altitude.
Circling minima should be used unmodified. It is permissable to descend prior to
the final turn. However, descent below circling minima should only occur once
the landing threshold has been identified and all surrounding terrain is in sight.
If standby ILS transmitters, markers, meteorological measuring equipment or
lighting systems are downgraded, approach minima may need to be modified. A
table is presented at EOM-A 8.1.3.10 for this purpose.
MDA and DA must always be above OCA and must therefore be adjusted if OCA
is increased by NOTAM.
[EOM-A 8.1.3, EOM-A 8.1.5, EOM-A 8.4.2.1]
Summary of easyJet manuals
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6.4. Selection of alternates
Take-off and destination alternates
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Origin
Performance and
minimas suitable
for S/E return?
Destination
Flight <6 hours and
2 independent runways and
Minima @ ETA1hr:
Cloudbase > Circling +500'
Cloudbase > 2000'
Visibility > 5km
Take-off alternate required:
- Within 320nm of origin
- >S/E minima @ ETA1hr
Destination alternate not required.
- Add 15 minutes holding fuel.
Destination
Minima @ ETA1hr
suitable for expected
approach?
Single destination alternate required:
- Minima @ ETA1hr:
Cat II/III = Cat I
Cat I = Non-precision
Non-precision = add 200ft/1000m
Circling = circling minima
Two destination alternates required:
- Minima @ ETAhr:
Cat II/III = Cat I
Cat I = Non-precision
Non-precision = add 200ft/1000m
Circling = circling minima
No
Note
1. Dispatch with no destination alternate should only be considered
when payload or performance is limiting.
Summary of easyJet manuals
26
2. Two destination alternates are required when landing performance
cannot be assured due to wind or runway state or when no meteo-
rological information is available for the destination.
3. A table for interpretation of TAFs with regards these requirements
can be found at EOM-A 8.1.6.1.
4. Runways may be considered independent if each runway has a
seperate approach procedure based on a seperate approach aid and
no conceivable blockage of one runway would render the other un-
usable. If a destination is isolated these restrictions do not apply.
[EOM-A 8.1.2]
Cruise alternates
In the case of an engine failure at any point along the planned route an adequate
aerodrome must be available within 60 minutes single engine flying time. The
equivalent distances are:
Table 5. Cruise alternate distances
A319 380nm
A320 400nm
A321 385nm
[EOM-B 5.1]
6.5. Pre-flight fuel planning
The OFP presents the following values for use in pre-flight fuel planning:
TAXI Fuel expected to be used prior to takeoff, including engine start, taxi
and APU consumption. This figure should be adjusted when signif-
icantly increased APU burn is likely (e.g. ATC slots) or when sig-
nificantly increased taxi times may occur (e.g. remote de-icing).
TRIP Fuel required for all phases from take-off at departure aerodrome
to landing at destination aerodrome. The assumed runways and as-
Summary of easyJet manuals
27
sociated SIDs and STARs can be found on the OFP under "OFP
ROUTE". This figure will need to be increased by 5kg per nm that
actual routings are potentially longer than these assumed routings.
The OFP also provides trip fuel corrections for carriage of more than
minimum fuel and flight at non optimal levels.
CONT The greater of 5% of planned trip fuel or 5 minutes holding over
destination at 1500ft.
ALTN Fuel for all phases from a go-around at applicable MDA/DA at desti-
nation to a landing at first alternate. The assumed runways and rout-
ings can be found on the OFP below the Nav Log block. This figure
will need to be increased by 5kg for each nm that actual routings
are potentially longer than these assumed routings. Where two alter-
nates are required (see Section 6.4, Selection of alternates), this
figure should be increased to the greater of the two alternate fuel
burns. Note that this does not allow for flight to a second alternate
after arriving at the first alternate.
FINRES Final reserve fuel. This is the amount of fuel required to hold at
1500ft for 30 minutes assuming the tanks will be dry at the end of
this period.
ADDNL Usually zero. This is mainly used to add 15 minutes holding time
when operating without a destination alternate under the terms of
Section 6.4, Selection of alternates. It may also be used on routes
where there will be insufficient trip fuel available to divert to an ad-
equate alternate in the event of engine failure or loss of pressurisa-
tion at the most critical point.
EXTRA Additional fuel loaded at the discretion of the flight crew. There is
not much official guidance as to amounts; my personal ballpark fig-
ures for the A319/A320 are:
40kg per minute of potential extra holding
500kg per potential extra approach
30 minutes extra holding when LVPs are expected at destination
Summary of easyJet manuals
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3kg per minute of extra anticipated anti-ice usage
2kg per minute of extra anticipated APU usage
TANKER Extra fuel that may be carried due to fuel price differential between
origin and destination. Note that take-off and landing performance
is not considered, and the planned margins against structural limits
can reflect over-confidence in predicted ZFW data.
[EOM-A 8.1.7, EOM-B 5]
Reducing fuel loads to allow increased payload
Where payloads are such that the carriage of normal fuel loads results in excee-
dence of structural or performance limitations, EOM-A 8.1.7.4 presents a number
of methods of reducing fuel requirements below those that would normally apply.
The simplest method is to reduce the trip fuel requirement once it is certain that
the SID and/or STAR that will be flown requires less track mileage than those
anticipated in the OFP route. The adjustment is 4kg per nm.
More significant reductions can be acheived when the conditions for not requiring
a destination alternate (see Section 6.4, Selection of alternates) are met. In this
case, the alternate fuel can be replaced with 15 minutes of holding at destination.
Finally, for sectors of over 1000nm, contingency fuel can be reduced from 5%
to 3% providing that a suitable en-route alternate is specified. The procedure is
detailed at EOM-A 8.1.7.4.4. Note that a new OFP should be used; OCC were
unable to provide one last time I asked.
[EOM-A 8.1.7.4]
6.6. Weight and Balance
Structural weight limitations
The aircraft operating manual specifies maximum ramp, take-off, landing and
zero fuel weights. The maximum take-off weight may also be reduced by easyJet
to take advantage of reduced ATC charges; where this has been done, the new
Summary of easyJet manuals
29
MTOW must be treated as a structural limit. These limitations are also presented
in the weights block of the OFP.
The basis for calculations to determine compliance with these structural limits is
the Dry Operating Weight (DOW). The DOW is the total weight of the aircraft
with no usable fuel or payload. It is available at the top of the OFP, but the canon-
ical value is that contained in the LPC database unless otherwise notified by a
flight brief notice. Other weights are calculated as follows:
Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) = DOW + payload
Ramp weight (RW) = ZFW + total fuel
Take-off weight (TOW) = RW - taxi fuel
Landing weight (LW) = TOW - trip fuel
In addition to the main structural weights, there are maximum load limits for the
cargo compartments. These may be found in FCOM 2.1.20.5000.
[EOM-A 8.1.8.1]
Payload calculation
The following standard weights may be used when calculating payload:
Table 6. Standard weights for passengers with hand baggage
Type Weight
Male 93kg
Female 75kg
Child (Age 2-11 inclusive) 35kg
Infant(Age<2) 0kg
Table 7. Standard weights for checked baggage
Type of Flight Weight
Domestic
a
11 kg
Summary of easyJet manuals
30
Type of Flight Weight
Within the European Region 13 kg
Intercontinental 15 kg
All Other 13 kg
a
Domestic flights are those where origin and destination are within the same state
Table 8. Standard weights for crew
Crew Position Weight
Flight Crew 85 kg
a
Cabin Crew 75 kg
a
a
An allowance for hand baggage is included. Any additional crew baggage must be taken into account.
Table 9. Guide weights for other items
Item Weight
Guide Dog 35kg
Cello 10kg
easyJet generally uses standard weights for passengers and crew and actual
weights for baggage. It is not permissable to use standard weights for baggage
if this leads to a value less than known actual weights. Freight must always be
weighed.
[EOM-A 8.1.8]
Balance calculation
Compliance with balance limitations is acheived using the LPC Weight and Bal-
ance modules. If this is not available, weight and balance data should be sourced
from OCC. When passenger load is more than 115 the default LPC passenger split
may be used. Otherwise the correct split (e.g. rows 1-9, 10-18, 19-26 for A319)
should be used.
[EOM-B 7.1.1]
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31
Last minute changes
For the Airbus fleet, the following last minute changes do not require new LPC
calculations:
5 Passengers
500kg fuel
500kg load in CP 2,3 or 4
100kg load in CP 1 or 5
A new ZFW must be calculated and entered for all LMC changes. Where the LMC
is positive, take-off performance must be recalculated; a 1 reduction in FLEX
(assuming the new value is greater that ISA+30) will suffice for changes up to
250kg.
[EOM-B 7.4]
6.7. Operational Flight Plans
Operational Flight Plans (OFP) are usually obtained via the crew room computers.
OCC also have the ability to provide OFPs by email, fax or SITA if required. OFPs
may be modified by OCC without crew notification until 30 minutes before crew
report. The status of OFPs must be checked prior to acceptance; contact OCC if
the OFP status is not annotated "Final". In the event of failure of the flight planning
system, OCC will provide still air OFPs to the crew rooms via fax or email.
[EOM-A 8.1.10]
6.8. Aircraft Technical Log
Standard of entries
All entries must be completed in block capitals.
Any signature must be accompanied by a printed surname, the date and any ap-
plicable authorization or approval numbers.
Summary of easyJet manuals
32
If an entry is changed, the incorrect entry must have a single line drawn through
it, the reason for the alteration entered next to the original text and a signature.
The Tech Log must be cross checked for errors after the final sector of a duty.
[EOM-A 8.1.11.2, EOM-A 8.1.11.3, EOM-A 8.1.11.5]
Layout and usage
The tech log is divided into prologue pages and a main section.
The prologue pages include the Certificate of Release to Service, records of Ac-
ceptable Deferred Defects (ADD), the Damage Register and "Briefing Notes to
Crew". These must all be checked prior to accepting an aircraft.
Each page in the main section is divided into a defect section and four tear-off
sector record strips. Unused strips on the current page should be struck out if any
entry has been made in the defect section or when a crew change occurs without
a direct handover.
The top half of each sector record strip is for recording details of a sector after it
has been completed. The "Log Time" and "Landings brought forward" boxes are
no longer used and should be struck through. The "Full Rated Thrust T/O" and
autoland reporting are only relevant to the 737 fleet. If the record of the previous
sector is found to be incorrect or incomplete the duty pilot must be contacted for
authorisation to continue.
The bottom half of the strip is used to record pre-departure data and acceptance
of the aircraft. The "Oil Check" and APU oil level boxes are not relevant to flight
crew and should be struck through. The ambient temperature fuel uplift should be
recorded rather than the temperature corrected figure. To calculate approximate
uplift in kg, multiply the uplift in litres by 0.8. If anti-icing is carried out more
than once it will be necessary to use multiple strips; each strip must have a copy
of all the pre-departure data.
Each main section page has three coloured carbon copy sheets. The pink page is
used to comply with regulations requiring retention of documentation at departure
station. The pink strip with the commander's acceptance signature must always
be left behind. The entire pink page should be left behind when there are no more
Summary of easyJet manuals
33
usable strips, including when the strips have been struck out in accordance with
the paragraph above. All other pages belong to engineering.
[EOM-A 8.1.11.5, EOM-A 8.1.11.6, EOM-A 8.2.1.3]
Defect management
All defects should, with the following exceptions, be immediately entered into
the tech log:
Recording of ECAM maintenance status messages may be deferred until the
aircraft is next at a "main base". Consultation of the MEL is still required.
Cabin defects must be immediately entered into the Cabin Defects Log. If the
defect does not affect airworthiness (consult MOC if there is any doubt), then
it does not need to be transferred to the tech log.
MOC must be contacted whenever a defect is entered in the tech log. Where pos-
sible MOC will arrange for engineering to rectify the defect or clear it to an ADD
sheet in accordance with the MEL.
When no engineering support is available, MOC may request that flight crew
either carry out certain limited engineering tasks in accordance with EOM-A
8.1.11.5 or clear a defect to the ADD pages. Deferral of defects by flight crew is
only possible when the defect is assessed by MOC as having no effect on airwor-
thiness or when the relevant MEL entry has no maintenance actions specified.
To defer a defect the commander should make an entry in the "ACTION TAKEN"
column with the MEL reference, repair interval and ADD number. The comman-
der signs for this in the "ACTION TAKEN" column; MOC will arrange for the
Release to Service column to be signed off by a licenced engineer at the earliest
opportunity. The relevant ADD entry should then be completed. If the defect does
not affect airworthiness, it should be entered on the level 2 (blue) ADD sheet.
Otherwise, it should be entered on the level 1 (pink) sheet. The complete tech log
defect description should be transferred, along with the tech log page reference
and item number, any MEL/CDL reference number and limiting criteria (e.g. ex-
piry date). The ADD sheet should not be signed by the commander; it will be
signed off by the engineer who signs the release to service.
Summary of easyJet manuals
34
Successful computer resets should be recorded by making a suitable entry in the
defect section, e.g.
CREW RESET: COM CIDS 1 + 2 FAULT ON THE
GROUND, SUCCESSFUL RESET AS PER QRH
Information that may be useful but which does not require immediate engineering
action may, with MOC's agreement, be recorded as a "FOR INFO" entry in a
similar way, e.g.
FOR INFO: FMGC1 FAILED. RECOVERED WITH NO
CREW INTERVENTION.
These entries do not count as open defects, so signatures should be placed below
the entry and the associated "Action Taken" and RTS sections should be struck
through.
[EOM-A 8.1.11, EOM-B 2.3.25.2, EOM-B 3.3]
Recurrent engineering checks
The validity of recurrent engineering checks must be confirmed prior to accepting
an aircraft. This is done for most checks by checking that the Certificate of Release
to Service is valid. Completion of the daily check is recorded via an entry in the
defect column; it is valid until 23:59 on the day after the daily check was signed
off.
[EOM-A 8.1.11.4]
Cabin defect log
The SCCM enters details of cabin defects in the cabin defect log and presents it to
the commander at the end of the flight. The commander must review the defects
and transfer any airworthiness items to the technical log.
[EOM-A 8.1.11.17]
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35
6.9. Documents to be carried
Certificates
Certificate of Registration
Certificate of Airworthines
Noise Certificate (may be a copy)
Air Operator Certificate (may be a copy)
Aircraft Radio Licence
Third Party Liability Insurance Certificates (may be copies)
Flight Crew Licences
Manuals
Those parts of the Operations Manual relevant to the duties of crew
Maps and Charts required to complete the flight
Search and Rescue procedures
Other
Technical Log
Journey Log
Operational Flight Plan (includes Air Traffic Service Flight Plan)
Weather and Notam brief
Loadsheet
Forms to comply with reporting procedures
Notification of special loads (if applicable)
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Notification of special passengers (e.g. deportees)
Any other documentation required by states concerned with the flight
Crew passports
[Ezy-A 8.1.12]
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7. Ground Handling Instructions
7.1. Fuelling procedures
The fuel supplier is responsible for ensuring that all fuel quality checks are com-
pleted, that the bowser is properly earthed to the aircraft and that fuel caps are
properly secured.
Whilst fuelling, no smoking may take place within 15m of the aircraft and the
strobe lights must not be operated. There may also be local restrictions regarding
starting the APU. If fuel vapour is detected inside the cabin or any other hazard
arises, fuelling must be suspended immediately. In the unlikely event that it be-
comes necessary to uplift wide cut fuel there are extra safety restrictions detailed
in EOM-A 8.2.1.
Refuelling may take place with passengers on board, but the following restrictions
apply:
Local restrictions must be checked.
At least one pilot must be on the flight deck.
A full cabin crew compliment is required. There must be at least one cabin crew
member at each set of floor level exits.
Passengers must be informed that refuelling is taking place, instructed to have
their seatbelts unfastened and told the toilets are out of use. Cabin crew should
make a visual check that passenger seatbelts remain unfastended. The "No
Smoking" sign should be on and the "Fasten Seatbelts" sign should be off.
Door 1L must be open with steps or airbridge attached. Door 2L should ide-
ally also be open with steps attached, but it may remain closed provided the
slide is servicable. The ground area beneath exits and slide deployment areas
must remain clear and the positioning of fuelling equipment must not impede
evacuation
Defuelling is not permitted with passengers on board.
The fuel card may be used to expedite the fuelling process, but fuel requirement
must also be passed in person. Display of the fuel card authorises the commence-
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38
ment of fuelling; if any passengers remain on board it must be delayed until all
relevent restrictions have been met. Communication between flight deck and re-
fueller is required prior to commencement of refuelling. Positive acknowledge-
ment of the fuel card by the refueller is deemed sufficient to fulfill this require-
ment, but the member of flight crew on the flight deck must remain in "visual
contact" with the refueller whenever any passengers are on board. {TODO: EOM-
A is incredibly wooly on this; confirm meaning}. The fuel card must be stowed
once fuelling is complete.
The flight crew must monitor the fuel gauges during fuelling.
[EOM-A 8.2.1]
7.2. Passenger groups
Able Bodied Passengers
Able bodied passengers (ABP) are those adult passengers that are deemed fit and
strong and thus likely to assist evacuation. Designated seats near emergency exits
are for the use of ABPs only.
[EOM-A 8.2.2.1]
Persons of Reduced Mobility
A passenger is considered a Person of Reduced Mobility (PRM) when their phys-
ical, medical or mental condition would make them likely to impede an evacua-
tion. The number of PRMs on board must not exceed the number of ABPs. PRMs
should be pre-boarded and seated where they will not obstruct emergency exits
or impede crew carrying out emergency procedures.
Certain conditions entirely preclude carriage. A list is presented in EOM-A
8.2.2.2.
[EOM-A 8.2.2.1, EOM-A 8.2.2.2]
Infants and children
Infants (children under two years) may fly free of charge if they sit on the lap of the
accompanying person. A maximum of two infants is allowed per accompanying
person. The maximum total number of infants on laps is 10% of the number of
Summary of easyJet manuals
39
seats on the aircraft. Infants under two weeks of age are not permitted to fly.
Premature babies are not permitted to fly until six months post expected date.
A child is defined as a person aged between 2 years and 14 years inclusive. Chil-
dren must be accompanied by a person aged 16 years or older at a maximum ratio
of 10:1.
In exceptional circumstances the carriage of an unaccompanied minor may be
authorised by the ALO. Under no circumstances may an unconnected passenger
be allowed to accept responsibility for an unaccompanied minor.
The following restraints are acceptable:
Table 10. Acceptable restraints for infants and children
Restraint Age range
Infant extension seatbelt 2 weeks to 2 years
Suitable car-type safety seat
a
6 months to 3 years
Child retraint device (CARES) Approx 1 to 4 years
b
Normal seatbelt 2 years or more
a
See EOM-E 2.4.12.3 for guidance on suitability
b
Specifically the child must be between 10kg and 20kg and capable of sitting upright unaided.
[EOM-A 8.2.2.4, EOM-E 2.4.12]
Expectant mothers
Between 28 and 35 weeks (inclusive) of pregnancy, a medical certificate signed
by a doctor or midwife confirming pregnancy stage and fitness to fly is required.
Passengers cannot be accepted for travel on or after week 36 of pregnancy.
Infants may travel on the laps of expectant mothers.
[EOM-A 8.2.2.4, EOM-E 2.4.12]
Escorted passengers
Prisoners will only be accepted for carriage on the authority of the Network Duty
Manager. Normally a maximum of one prisoner will be allowed per flight.
Summary of easyJet manuals
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They must be accompanied by either police, prison officers or members of a
recognised and apponted Civilian Security Firm. Convicted prisoners will nor-
mally be accompanied by two prison officers, others may have a single escort.
Escorts will travel in plain clothes and will carry restraints, but not firearms.
Prisoners and escorts should board first and disembark last. They should be seated
at the rear of the aircraft.
[EOM-A 8.2.2.6]
Deportees
When immigration authorities refuse a passenger admission, an Order to remove
the passenger may be served on easyJet, possibly through the relevant comman-
der. The commander retains the right to refuse the Order on safety grounds. UK
immigration authorities have the power to require that an unacceptable passenger
be detained on board.
The Commander must be informed on all occasions when a deportee is carried,
and the deportee must be identified to the Commander and SCCM
The passport and other travel documentation of the deportee, including any "Form
of Authority", should be retained in flight by the SCCM and passed to the han-
dling agent on arrival. The deportee must not be permitted to disembark at any
point within the deporting territory unless escorted by a dispatcher or passenger
handling staff. The deportee may disembark at a destination other than that in
their ticket provided immigration authorities are contacted prior to arrival.
If the deportee is escorted, seating should be as per escorted passengers. Otherwise
it should be as per PRMs.
This section does not apply to the class of deportees referred to as "non-satisfied
genuine visitors", who should be treated as normal passengers.
[EOM-A 8.2.2.7]
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Stowaways
If a stowaway is discovered the police should be requested to meet the aircraft on
arrival so that the stowaway may be detained. The company should be informed
and an ASR filed.
[EOM-A 8.2.2.1]
Human remains
Only ashes are permitted. They must be be appropriately packaged, carried in
hand baggage and accompanied by copies of the death and cremation certificates.
[EOM-A 8.2.2.5]
Live animals
The only permitted live animals are official Assistance and Guide Dogs. These
may be carried on flights within and between Croatia, Switzerland and the EU
nations. UK International flights are subject to the UK Pet Passport Scheme and
dogs may therefore only be carried on flights originating from or arriving at LTN,
STN, NCL, BRS and BFS.
Dogs must be accompanied by official documentation; the identity tag attached
to the dog's official harness plus the owner's identity card will suffice. Larger
dogs will be accomodated on the cabin floor; smaller dogs may be carried on
the owner's lap. The owner must provide a suitable harness that attaches to their
seatbelt and provides an effective level of restraint during take-off, landing and
turbulence. It is acceptable for the dog to be subject to less restraint during cruise.
[EOM-E 2.4.10]
7.3. Baggage and freight
Cabin baggage
Each passenger may bring one piece of hand baggage with maximum dimensions
of 560mm x 450mm x 250mm. Cabin baggage may only be stowed in the over-
head lockers or under the seats.
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42
Underseat stowage should not be used in overwing exit rows, if the seat's restraint
bar is insufficient to be effective given the size of the baggage or if the baggage
would restrict egress from a seat row.
Placarded weight limitations on overhead stowages must be respected, and bulk
should not prevent secure closing of the doors. Where there is emergency equip-
ment stowed in the overhead lockers, it must not be impeded.
Carriage of personal medical oxygen bottles less than 500mm long and 250mm in
diameter is permitted. Details of correct stowage may be found in EOM-E 2.4.9.2.
[EOM-A 8.2.2.15, EOM-E 2.4.9]
Musical instruments
Small musical instruments (max 300mmx1170mmx380mm) may be stowed in
overhead lockers. One extra small piece of hand baggage is allowed to be carried
in this case.
Large musical instruments may be carried providing the passenger has purchased
a seat for the instrument. A maximum of two instruments may be carried. An
instrument must weigh less than 75kg and have a centre of mass less than 30cm
above the seat cushion. It must be secured to a non-restricted window seat.
[EOM-A 8.2.2.15]
Aircraft spares
OCC may authorise carriage of spares for AOG easyJet aircraft except on routes
to and from Switzerland. Spares must not be classified as dangerous goods. Indi-
vidual items over 60kg require specific handling arrangements to be made. easy-
Jet engineering are responsible for delivery, labelling, security screening and pro-
vision of a special load NOTOC. Engineering must oversee the offload of the
spares on arrival.
[EOM-A 8.2.2.15]
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FDM Data
FDM data cards/ disks may be carried in the flight deck. They are transported in
blue padded zip sealed bags, and will already have been x-rayed before loading.
They will be delivered and collected by engineering personnel.
If the zip seal is broken or missing, the bag may still be carried if it is thoroughly
searched. The broken seal should be reported to the FDM department.
[EOM-A 8.2.2.15]
Human Organs for Transplantation
These will arrive at the aircraft in a box sealed with tamper-proof tags. They are
exempt security screening, but the police will have verified the origin of the con-
signment before accepting the delivery. The box should be carried in the flight
deck under the Captain's supervision.
[EOM-E 2.4.11]
7.4. Ground ice protection
Types of fluid
ISO Type I fluid has a high glycol content and low viscosity. De-icing perfor-
mance is good, but protection from freezing precipitation is poor. It is best used
for removing frozen deposits as part of a two stage process or when precipitation
has stopped. Type I fluids are usually clear or light orange.
ISO Type II fluid includes a pseudo plastic thickening agent. This allows it to re-
main on the surface after application to provide protection from freezing precip-
itation. Shearing of the fluid allows it to flow off the critical surfaces as airspeed
increases. Type II fluids are usually straw coloured.
ISO Type IV fluid is similar in operation to Type II fluid, but uses more advanced
thickening systems to give longer holdover times. Type IV fluids are usually
green.
Heated water may be used as the first step of a two step process. All fluids may
be diluted with water. Required Type I fluid concentration is a function of OAT
Summary of easyJet manuals
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only, as dilution has a negligible effect on holdover. Required Type II and Type
IV concentrations are a factor of OAT and holdover requirements.
[EOM-A 8.2.4.3.2]
Holdover times
Guideline holdover time tables are presented on the LPC and at the front of the
NTC book. Definitions of precipitation type for use in the tables are presented
at EOM-A 8.2.4.2. For a two step process, the holdover time begins at the com-
mencement of the second step. The lower time limit indicates holdover time for
"moderate" precipitation, the higher for "light" precipitation. Holdover times will
be shortened by high winds, jet blast or when the skin temperature is less than
OAT.
[EOM-A 8.2.4.3.3, EOM-A 8.2.4.3.4]
Precautions
De-icing fluid should not be used where it could cause loss of vision while being
shed during the take-off roll.
A walk-round inspection should be completed by a qualified person after de-icing
is completed. Flying and control surfaces should be clear of deposits, intake and
drain holes should be clear of obstructions and a check should be made that de-
icing fluid that has been diluted by the removed deposits has not refrozen on other
parts of the aircraft. Undercarriage components should be checked for cleanliness
and microswitches and uplocks should be checked for normal operation. If possi-
ble, compressors should be rotated by hand to ensure they have not frozen.
The flight crew should also move the control surfaces over their full range to
ensure that they are free of obstruction.
[EOM-A 8.2.4.3.4]
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45
8. Flight procedures
8.1. VFR/IFR policy
When controlled airspace exists between departure and destination airports,
flights will be planned to remain within that airspace. Where controlled airspace
does not exist, advisory airspace will be used if available.
Where a flight is planned to remain within controlled or advisory airspace, flight
outside that airspace should only be considered for safety reasons.{TODO: EOM-
A then goes on to contradict itself, saying that you can fly outside controlled
airspace after all e.g. if you are VMC in sight of airfield or flying in airspace
known to be clear of other traffic}. The maximum level of radar service should
be sought whenever outside controlled airspace.
VFR flight should be considered exceptional and must be authorised by the post
holder flight operations.
[EOM-A 8.3.1, EOM-A 8.1.1.1]
8.2. Navigation policy
Required Navigation Performance
Navigation requirements for a given phase of flight are defined in terms of Re-
quired Navigation Performance (RNP). RNP is a value with units of nautical
miles. To comply with a given RNP, an aircraft must have a maximum naviga-
tional error equal to RNP for 95% of flight time. In addition, the probability of an
unannunciated navigational error of greater than double the RNP value must be
less than 10
-5
per flight hour and the probability of an annunciated loss of RNP
capability must be less than 10
-4
per flight hour.
All easyJet aircraft are capable of the most restrictive RNP 0.3, but this may be
downgraded when navigational equipment is defective. The MEL will detail any
downgrades to RNP capability caused by deferred defects.
The FMS continuously calculates a value known as Estimated Position Error
(EPE) by cross checking data from all the navigation sensors. The FMS also cal-
Summary of easyJet manuals
46
culates a default RNP value
5
and produces an ECAM warning when EPE exceeds
it. This FMS calculated RNP may be manually overridden if required.
[EOM-A 8.3.2.4]
Basic RNAV
Basic RNAV (BRNAV) is defined as RNP 5. BRNAV capability is mandatory
throughout ECAC airspace above FL95. Some states also use BRNAV on selected
routes into and out of terminal airspace; the BRNAV portions of these routes will
be above applicable safety altitudes.
The INS system will maintain BRNAV capability for 2 hours after alignment,
independantly of estimated accuracy displayed on the MCDU.
[EOM-A 8.3.2.7, EOM-B 2.4.51]
Precision RNAV
Precision RNAV (PRNAV) is defined as RNP 1. PRNAV may be used for depar-
tures and arrivals, and may involve flight below relevant safety altitudes.
It is essential to check that each procedure loaded from the navigation database
is both current and accurate. It is acceptable to add altitude and speed restrictions
that have not been included. OCC must be contacted immediately if any discrep-
ancies are discovered so that they can promulgate restrictions on the use of the
route. NOTAMs should be checked to confirm the status of any required naviga-
tional aids. Where GNSS updating is not available, a navigation reasonableness
check must be carried out and care should be taken to correctly use takeoff shift
functionality.
In general a single navigation system will suffice for PRNAV, but some proce-
dures stipulate two RNAV systems. Some procedures also mandate GPS avail-
ability; the availability of RAIM should be confirmed in this case.
PRNAV procedures may mandate an altimeter change passing a waypoint, in
which case ATC will not provide the usual trigger.
5
0.3nm for GPS approaches, 0.5nm for other approaches, 1.0 when below 15,000ft and within 51nm of
destination and 2.0nm at all other times.
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47
Managed modes are preferred for PRNAV procedures. Selected vertical modes
may be used, but altitude restrictions must be respected. Direct routings may be
accepted, but modification of the procedure with manually created waypoints is
not permitted. It is acceptable to intercept an ILS localiser in NAV as long as GPS
PRIMARY is available.
[EOM-A 8.3.2.8, EOM-B 2.4.51]
Contingencies
In-flight failure of navigation equipment may lead to downgrade of RNP capabil-
ity. The QRH details required equipment for RNP 5 and RNP 1 on page 8.07. If
one RNAV system is degraded provided that the procedure does not mandate dual
systems it is acceptable to continue with the remaining system; a raw data check
will determine which, if any, system remains accurate.
Loss of relevant RNP capability must be reported to ATC as soon as practical.
The correct phraseology is "Unable RNAV due equipment, request re-clearance".
If RNP 1 is lost below MSA but above MVA, it may be possible to continue
with radar vectors; otherwise an expeditious climb above safety altitude will be
required. Where possible navigation should be continued using conventional aids.
Where weather precludes continuation of a PRNAV routing, ATC should be in-
formed using the phrase "Unable RNAV due weather". Radar vectors or climb
should then be requested as appropriate.
[EOM-A 8.3.2.7, EOM-A 8.3.2.8, EOM-B 2.4.51]
48