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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
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IN REPLY REFER TO
. (M) (10 May 68) FOR OT RD 68D006 14 May 1968
\\..i 1'\ 'J
SUBJECT: After Action Report - TF CHICAGO, Headquarters, III Corps and
.i) 4-13 April 1968 (U)
Cc.c.y)\-l \-. ---- _______
--
?O REG\S1R---
SEE DISTRIBUTION
1. Subject report is forwarded for information at Inclosure 1. Additional
Signal "Lessons Learned" for TF CHICAGO is attached at Inclosure 2.
2. Subject report does not promulgate Department of the Army doctrine.
However, the lessons cited and implied may be adapted for use in devel
oping training material and in evaluating current or proposed doctrine.
FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances and Disasters, provides doctrinal gUidance
and should be consulted by all active Army and Reserve component organi
zations assigned civil disturbance control missions or required to con
duct training or planning in that subject area.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: Zl
De .... t .. -tA ..,.. J -- Q r'l ,
Go ' ..........
2 Inc! KENNETH G. WICKHAM
as Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
2 Office, Secretary of the Army
2 Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
5 Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
2 Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
2 Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
2 Comptroller of the Army
2 Chief of Research and Development
2 Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics
8 Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
2 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
10 Chief, Office of Reserve Components
2 The Adjutant General
2 The Inspector General
2 The Surgeon General
10 The Provost Marshal General
2 Chief of Engineers
104 Chief, National Guard Bureau
2 Chief of
2 Chief of Military History
2 Chief, Army Reserve
SUBJECT: After Action Report - TF CHICAGO
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
2 Chief of Support Services
2 Chief of Personnel Operations
6 Directorate for Civil Disturbances Planning & Operations
Commanding Generals
2 US Continental Army Command
375 CONUS Armies
2 Military District of Washington
2 US Army Materiel Command
50 US Army Combat Developments Command
2 US Army Strategic Communications Command
2 US Army Security Agency
2 US Army Intelligence Command
5 US Army, Alaska
5 US Army,_ Hawaii
5 US Army, Japan
5 US Army, Ryukyu Is lands
5 US Army, Vietnam
5 Eighth US Army
10 US Army Training Centers
5 US Army Forces Southern Command
5 Superintendent, US Military Academy
Commandants
5 US Army War College
5 US Army Command and General Staff College
3 US Army Adjutant General School
3 US Army Air Defense School
3 US Army Armor School
3 US Army Artillery and Missile School
3 US Army Aviation School
3 US Army Chaplain School
3 US Army Chemical Corps School
3 US Army Civil Affairs School
3 US Army Engineer School
5 US Army Infantry School
3 US Army Intelligence School
3 US Army Medical Field Service School
5 US Army Military Police School
3 US Army Missile and Munitions School
3 US Army Ordnance School
3 US Army Quartermaster School
3 US Army Security Agency School
3 US Army Signal School
3 US Army Southeastern Signal School
3 US Army Special Warfare School
3 US Army Transportation School
3 US Army CBR Weapons Orientation Course
2
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SUBJECT: After Action Report - TF CHICAGO
Copies furnished:
2 Chief of Naval Operations
2 Chief of Staff, US Air Force
2 Commandant of the Marine Corps
2 Director, Joint Staff, JCS
Commanders-iu-Chief
2 Alaska
2 Atlantic
2 Pacific
2 STRIKE Command
2 Pacific Fleet
2 Southern Command
2 US Air Force, Pacific
Commanders, US Military Assistance Command
5 Korea
5 Taiwan
5 Thailand
5 Vietnam
Commandants
5 Armed Forces Staff College (Library)
5 Industrial College of the Armed Forces
5 National War College
5 Naval War College
5 Marine Corps School
5 Air University
Directors
2 TAG Library
2 The Air University Library
2 Military Assistance Institute
2 Senior Army Representative, Marine Corps Development & Education Command
1 Joint Action Control Office
Commanding Generals
25th Infantry Division (Mech)
2 82d Airborne Division
21st Armored Division
2 2nd Armored Division
Commanding Officers
24th Brigade, 6th Infantry Division
26th Armored Cavalry Regiment
2 CG, III Corps and Fort Hood
3
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS III CORPS AND FORT HOOD
FORT HOOD. TEXAS 76544
"Task Force Chicago"
IN REPLY' REFER TO
AKPHO-G3-0P 18 April 1968
SUBJECI': After Action Report of Task Force Chicago RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)
Headquarters, Department of the Army
A'ITN: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Developnent
Washington, D. C. 20310
1. References:
a. AA 525-15, Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Deparrrnent
of the Army, dated 26 Jan 68.
b. OPlAN 563, Garden Plot (U), Fourth United States Army, dated
5 Feb 68.
c. Appendix 11, Annex R, USCONARC!USAAsrRlKE OPlAN Garden
Plot (U) dated 22 Har 68.
d. USCONARC FOUO message 55787, Subj: Civil Disturb:mce Operations,
dated 11 April 1968.
e. Fourth United States Army, FOUO message XOll, Subj: Civil Dis
turbance Operations, dated 12 Apr 68.
2. Inclosed is the After Action Report RCS CSF'OR-65 (RI) of operations
conducted by Task Force Chicago from 4-13 April 1968.
FOR THE COtl'1ANDER:

\v.
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff, Task Force Chicago
.
AKPRO-G3 -oP
SUBJECT: After Action Report of Task Force Chicago RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)
Copies furnished:
CINCSTRIKE, Mac Dill AFB, F1a (5)
CG, USCONARC, Ft Monroe, Va (10)
CINCAFSTRIKE (5)
CG, MOW, Wash D. C. (2)
CG, First USA. Ft Meade, Md. (2)
CG, Third USA, Ft McPherson, Ga (2)
CG. Fourth USA, Ft Sam Houston, Tex (5)
CG. Fifth USA. Ft Sheridan, 111 (10)
CG, Sixth USA. Presidio of San Francisco. Calif (2)
AG. 111 State National Guard (5)
OG, 1st Armd Div. Ft Hood. Tex (2)
CG, 5th Inf Div (M), Ft Carson, Colo (2)
.2
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AFTER ACTION REPORT
TASK FORCE CHICAGO
4 - 13 APRIL 1968
RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)
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FaR- () r R. 1)
6 f D O O ~
TABLE OF CONTESTS
Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities . . . . . . 1
Situation . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Operational Summary . . . . . . 2-11
SITMAP - 061800
Annex D
SITMAP - 071800 Annex E
SITMAP - 081800 Annex F
SITMAP - 091400 Annex G
Section 2. Lessons Learned, Commanders Observation and
Evaluations and Recommendations 12
12
13
13
13
15
. . . . 15
. . . 15
. . . . . 18
Command and Control
Organization
Training
Operations
Communications
Intelligence
Logistics
Personnel
Annexes:
A. G2-G3 Staff Journal E. SITMAP 071800
B. G1 Staff Journal F. SITMAP 081800
C. G4 Staff Journal G. SITMAP 091400
D. SITMAP 061800
SECTION 1 OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES
SInJAT10N
Racial tensions throughout the Continental United States were sharply
increased on 4 April 1968 when Dr. Luther King was assassinated in
Memphis, Tennessee. Prior to the assassination, racial tension in the
country was relatively low. However, with Dr. King's assassination that
afternoon, came burning and looting in Washington, D. C.j Chicago, Illinois;
Hartford, Connecticut, and many other cities. On 5 April 1968, civil dis
turbances occurred in over 40 cities throughout CONUS. National Guard
units were alerted or activated in California, Illinois and Maryland.
Federal forces were alerted and deployed to Chicago, Illinois and Washing
ton, D. C. on 5 and 6 April. By 6 April,. it became that organized
black militant groups were active in Chicago and Washington, the primary
centers of disturbances. A few incidents were reported in Oakland, Cali
fornia; Denver, Colorado; Detroit, Michigan; New York City; and Nashville,
Tennessee, however most of the rioting occurred in the eastern half of the
nation.
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
Following notification of the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
at 1900 hours, 4 April, CONUS installations were alerted to the possi
bility of execution of OPLAN 563. At 0045 hours, 5 April, Fort Hood
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was informed that Fourth United States
Army (FUSA) ECC was activated. Fort Hood gave FUSA updated information
on OPLAN 563 forces at this time.
At 1050 hours, 5 April, FUSA directed this headquarters to place a
battalion of a brigade of OPLAN 563 forces on a six hour alert status
and the brigade (-) on a twelve hour alert status, both effective at
1700 hours, 5 April. At 1105 hours, G3, this headquarters, requested
clarification from FUSA. The following alert status effective 1700 hours
5 April was ordered:
IRE - two hour alert
Battalion (-) - six hour alert
Brigade (-) - twelve hour alert
2d Armored Division, MAJ laFosse, was notified of the alert status at
1140 hours. At 1145 hours, this headquarters reported untt designations
to FUSA as follows:
IRE (two hour alert) - Co A, 2/50 Infantry
Battalion (-) (six hour alert) ~ 2/67 Armor
Brigade (-) (twelve hour alert) - 2d Brigade, 2d Armored Division
At 1305 hours, the alert battalion, 2/67 Armor was changed to 2/50 Infantry
by the 2d Armored Division.
The situation in the primary target cities of Fort Hood's OPLAN 563
forces began to deteriorate rapidly. The Michigan Governor had called
almost all of the state guard forces to duty effective at 1215 hours and
the Governor of Illinois was considering similar action.
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The activation of the Illinois National Guard was accomplished on 5
April in response to the mayor's request fcr assistance in a steadily
worsening situation in Chicago. Daylight shootings and fires occurred,
and the ~ 22 was leading organized
demonstrations.
At 2356 hours, 5 April, FUSA announced that all brigades designated
under OPLAN 563 are alerted effective 060430Z (0522308). One battalion
in each brigade will be placed on six hour alert status and the brigade
(-) on a twelve hour alert status. At 0025 hours, 6 April, this headquar
ters reported battalions on six hour alert status as follows:
1st Armored Division 2d Armored Division
4/46 Infantry 6/1 Cavalry
1/13 Armor
At 0120 hours, 6 April, 5th Army EOC informed this headquarters that
the disturbances in Detroit had been contained, but in Chicago, ten per
sons had been shot, resulting in three negro fatalities. During 6 April,
the situation was expected to deteriorate with an increase in fire-bombing,
looting and sporadic shooting.
At 0150 hours, FUSA directed that one battalion from the 1st Armored
Division be placed on a two hour alert status and the parent brigade on a
six hour alert status effective 0605008 hours. Bergstrom Air Force Base
(AFB), was designated as the on-load base and Chicago was indicated as the
target city.
3
This headquarters informed FUSA at 0215 of the alerted battalion
and brigade.
4/46th Infantry - two hour alert status
3d Brigade (-) 1st Armored Division - six hour alert status
At 1656 hours, FUSA directed this headquarters to provide a 1,000 man
force prepared for departure from Bergstrom in four hours on two hours
notice at Fort Hood. The force will be organized as follows and may in
clude:
Task Force III advance party
Brigade headquarters with support elements
One battalion
Prior to the alert of units discussed above, this headquarters initia
ted transportation planning and directed.a Task Force (TF) headquarters
assembly test for 0930 hours 6 April. In addition, this headquarters
monitored prepositioning of aircraft at Bergstrom Air Force Base. Con
tact with Air Force elements was established by Air Liaison Officer (ALO),
this headquarters.
At 1000 hours, FUSA directed a change in the alert status of OPLAN
563 forces as follows:
Task Force III Headquarters and
one brigade - one hour alert status
a second brigade - two hour alert status
a third brigade - four hour alert status
4
Task Force II Headquarters and
one brigade - one hour alert status
a second brigade - two hour alert status
At 1342 hours, FUSA directed that the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division
move to Bergstrom AFB, load aircraft (C-141) and on further order take off.
This headquarters notified 1st Armored Division (LTC Saa1berg, G3) 1345
hours: Commanding Officer, 3d Brigade, COL Green was notified at 1347 hours.
At 1515 hours, the 4/46 Infantry by LTC Kennedy, departed Fort
Hood en route to Bergstrom AFB.
LTG George R. Mather and Task Force III advance party departed Robert
Gray Army Airfield (RGAAF) 1626 hours en route to Chicago. At 1650 hours,
Department of the Army (DA) was notified that LTG Mather was en route to
Chicago. DA informed this headquarters that President Johnson had ordered
5,000 federal troops to Chicago.
At 1722 hours, FUSA directed that the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division
launch upon loading at Bergstrom AFB.
At 1728 hours, FUSA directed reinforcement of 3d Brigade, 1st Armored
Division with two battalions from 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. The
1st Armored Division, (LTC Saa1berg, G3) notified at 1729 hours.
1/13 Armor and 16th Engineer Ba ttalion ""ere ordered to move to Bergstrom
AFB.
of 1800 hours, 6 April, a total of 6,783 Illinois National Guard
troops deployed in Chicago, primarily in the section of
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metropolitan Chicago. (See SITMAP as of 061800) Following LTG Mather's
arrival in Chicago, at 1910 hours, a conference concerning establishment
of Task Force Chicago was held with Mayor Daley; Deputy Police Superinten
dent James Rochford; Deputy Attorney General, US, Mr. Warren Christopher;
Brigadier General Dunn, Commander, Illinois Emergency Operations Headquar
ters (EOR); Major General Turner, personal representative of the Chief of
Staff, Army; and DA liaison staff. Task Force Chicago forces were to be
as follows:
Task Force Headquarters - Task Force III Headquarters
EOH Illinois National Guard commanding all National Guard troops
to the City of Chicago.
3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division (+)
3d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M)
At 0115 hours, 7 April, Chief of Staff, Army, General Johnson, informed
LTG Mather that the order authorizing federalization of the Illinois National
Guard was signed and that the National Guard would be federalized upon noti
fication by LTG Mather that he was prepared to assume command.
At 0130 hours, the Illinois National Guard was federalized under the
command of LTG Mather, Commanding General, Task Force Chicago. Task Force
Chicago OPLAN 563, became effective for as OPORD 563.
During the evening of 6 April, the situation in western metropolitan
Chicago, designated as sector 3, had been stabilized by actions of the
Illinois National Guard. Sniping, attempted arson and looting were in
creasing in Police Districts 3 and 7 where 2/122 Artillery was deployed.
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These factors led to the early committment of 4/46 Infantry elements
in District 3. The 4/46 Infantry was given a warning order at approxi
mate1y 0230 and was subsequently committed in Police District 3 to re
1ieve elements of the 2/122 Artillery. Between 0600 hours and 0630 hours
motorized patrol elements were committed in the District. At 1000 hours
dismounted patrols were committed, and at approximately 1100 hours, the
4/46 Infantry committed two companies in the streets to disperse two mobs
reported on 63d and 67th street. By 1150 hours, these mobs were dispersed.
As the remainder of the 3d Brigade closed O'Hare International Airport,
it was deployed to Police District 3. The Brigade Headquarters element
and the 2/52 Infantry closed Jackson Park in District 3 at 1745 hours,
(See SITMAP as of 071800).
By 1930 hours, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division elements, including
the 1/13 Armor and one company of the 16th Engineer Battalion had closed
in Chicago. Two companies of the 16th Engineer Battalion had been cut
out of the force structure at Bergstrom AFB to hold the federal troop
strength in Chicago to the announced figure of 5,000. The remaining com
pany of the 16th Engineer Battalion was attached to 1/13 Armor. The 1/13
Armor (+) closed in the Fireman's Gym at Navy Pier at 2138 hours. The
3/1 Cavalry was ordered to move to the Clarendon Park Building and began
movement at 0630, 8 April closing at 0835. Throughout 7 April and the
morning of 8 April, Illinois National Guard elements were actively guard
i08 firemen fighting several fires in the western section and had taken
necessary action to prevent looting in that area.
7
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At 2126 hours, 7 April, 3d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M) closed
Glenview Naval Air Station (NAS). 3d Brigade, 5th Infantry (M) was di
rected to remain at Glenview NAS in reserve. As of 2130 hours, Task Force
Chicago Task Organization was as follows:
EOH (Illinois National Guard) Hq. 3d Bde. 1st Armored Division
2/122 Arty 4/46 Inf
Trp E. 106 Cav 2/52 Inf
33d MP Bn 3/1 Cav
108th Med Bn 1/13 Arm (+)
3 ~ p Avn Co One Co. 16th Engr Bn
433d Sig Co
l344th Trans Co (LMT) Hq. 3d Bde. 5th Inf,Div (M)
Hq, 33d Bde (-) 2/10 Inf
108th Spt Bn 3/10 Inf
233d Engr Co 7th Engr Bn (-)
1/178 Inf
1/131 Inf
2/129 Inf
TF Hallberg
1544th Trans Co (LMT)
1/129th Inf
1/123d Inf (M)
8
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As of 2130 hours 7 April, 14 company sized units were committed in
the streets in Chicago.
At 2350 hours, 2/122 Artillery (Illinois National Guard) was placed
OPCON 3d.Brigade, 1st Armored Division and was c o ~ i t t e d in Police Dis
trict 7, adjacent to District 3.
I
1
At 0830 hours, 9 April, 3/1 Cavalry closed Clarendon Park Building
and at 1945 hours, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division was ordered to assume
control of Police District 7 and pass OPCON of 2/122 ArtillerY to Illinois
National Guard EOH. By 1330 hours, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored had relieved
2/122 Artillery (Illinois National Guard) and assumed control of District
7. By 1715 hours, two companies of 2/52 Infantry were committed in that
district. 2/122 Artillery was placed in reserve in Washington Park (See
SITMAP as of 081800).
Although the level of incidents decreased on the evening of 8 April,
on 9 April, several intelligence reports were received indicating that
anti-war militants would attempt to conduct a rally in Grant Park at
091400 hours and march either on city hall or on the East Chicago National
Guard Armory. Task Force Chicago elements were alerted at 0930 hours and
at 1100 hours, 3/1 Cavalry, 2/10 Infantry and 3/10 Infantry were ordered
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to move into the Grant Park area, (See SITMAP as of 091400). The Illinois
National Guard deployed three companies to protect the National Guard
1
Armory. Although a crowd of 450-500 individuals gathered in Grant Park,
no incidents occurred. Additionally, a small crowd formed south of Chi-
cago's Loop area in a Lakeside Park, however, no demonstrations or
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incidents occurred. In both instances, Police Department Officials de
termined that employment of troops was not necessary. At 1700 hours,
LTG Mather ordered withdrawal of forces from the Grant Park Area per
agreement' with Police Superintendent Conlisk and Mayor Daley. By 2200
hours, 9 April, incidents reported in Chicago were the lowest since oper
ations besan in that city. LTG Mather's assessment of the situation at
0830 hours, 10 April was as follows: "The city has remained calm for
the past 48 hours and the Chicago Police Superintendent agrees there is
a strong possibility that dismounted patrolling in most areas can be dis
continued today leaving surveillance to random motorized patrols."
Operations during 10 and 11 April were aimed at a gradual reduction
of troop strength committed on the At 1715 hours,'ll April,
less than 60 federal troops were committed in patrolling actions and
National Guard Forces were employing only motorized patrols. By 1240
hours, 11 April, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division no personnel
committed and the Illinois National Guard had withdrawn their motorized
patrols.
At 1533 hours, LTG Mather received authority from DA to begin movement
to home stations. By 1616 hours, 11 April, the first aircraft with ele
ments of 3d Brigade, 5th Mech departed Glenview NAS. The Illinois
Guard was de federalized effective 112400 Apr, but planned to remain in the
city under state control until 13 April. At 0947 hours, 12 April, the
first aircraft with elements of Task Force Headquarters and elements of
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3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division departed O'Hare International Airport
for Bergstrom AFB. The last Task Force Chicago element closed home sta
tion at 1700 hours, 13 April 1968.
11

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SECTION 2. LESSONS LEARNED, COMMANDER'S
OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Command and Control
a. Observation: Task Force Headquarters operational staff elements
were en route to Chicago from 2120 hours 6 April to 1030 hours 7 April.
During this period, Task Force assumed control of Illinois
National Guard and committed elements of 4/46 Infantry in Chicago without
benefit of a functioning staff element other than the advance party. The
advance party to 12 was severely taxed to accomplish
necessary planning l1nd liaison with city officials and National Guard
elements.
Evaluation: It is imperative that sufficient staff personnel accom
pany the advance party element to permit immediate and continuous p1an
ning upon initiation of operations.
Recommendation: A staff element capable of 12-24 hours operations
should accompany the commander as part of the advance party.
b. Observation: FM radios, specifically AN/GRe 46 and 47 were completely
effective in operations throughout the metropolitan area of Chicago.
Evaluation: Use of PM radio permits the same flexibility in civil
disturbance operations as in normal field
Recommendation: FM communications capability 6hou1d be integrated
into the communications plan up to Task Force This provides
a capability parallel to that of the local Police Department.
12
Organization
Observation: Task Force and Brigade Headquarters as currently organ
ized are effective and will require only minor modifications to the estab
lished structure.
Evaluation: Almost all modifications considered may be accomplished
within present strength levels of headquarters elements.
Recommendation: That present of Task Force 111 and sub
ordinate units be retained with mfnor modification.
Trainins
Observation: The "Control of Civil Disturbance" training program is
to prep3re units and personnel for civil disturbance operations.
Evaluation: No significant changes in the training program are necessary.
Recommendation: That the program of for civil dis
turbance control include lessons learned from recent operations.
v
Operations
a. Observation: Responsiveness of military units and coordination of
effort was greatly enhanced by assigning unit boundaries identical
Police District boundaries. Additionally, co-location of military unit
(Battalion) Tac CP with Police District Headquarters was essential for
effective operations.
Evaluation: This arrangement permitted the military commanders and
the Police District Commanders in Districts 3 and 7 to act immediately
13
on local intelligence, reduced coordination problems between militalj
units and Police Districts and engendered a high degree of mutual respect
between the Police and tpe military.
Recommendation: When the situation permits, co-location of. military
and local Police Headquarters at battalion/Police District level should
be effected.
b. Observation: During operations in Chicago, the mere presence of fed
eral troops in an area was observed to have a quieting effect and to assist
in bringing the under control.
Evaluation: The corrmittment of federal troops in a hotly contested
section generally reduced the level of violence in the surrounding area.
Recommendation: Based on experience gained in this operation, it is
apparent that where a choice is available, federal troops should be
mitted to the most hotly contested areas first.
c. Ohservation: In movement of Task Force III elements to Chicago, no
use of at Robert Gray Army Airfield was made.
Evaluation: Use of RGAAF would reduce reaction time from Fort Hood
by two hours and would reduce logistics operations inherent in transpor
ting and maintaining a force at a distant marshalling area.
Recommendation: As a minimum, the IRE, Force Headquarters and
lead battalion of Task Force III as constituted in Fort Hood OPLAN 563
should deploy from RGAAF.
14
,
Communications
Observation: In Chicago, the magnificent efforts of the telephone
company in providing and maintaining commercial and autovon service to
higher and lower headquarters, insured effective communications at all
times',
Evaluation: Effective telephone communications are essential to
successful civil disturbance control operations,
Recommendation: That maximum advantage be made of local telephone
company capabilities in target cities.
, Intelligence
Observation: Inil:ially, a tendency to over-react to incident reports
was encountered since riot/civil disturbance connected incidents were not
easily from the normal volume of incidents that occur in
large cities.
Evaluation: Police and other city officials can be of great help in
establishing normal incident rates.
Recommendation: Increased liaison with city, state, and federal
agencies in target cities prior to force deployment is desirable.

a. Observation: Initially, supply of federalized National Guard units
was a problem area.
15
Evaluation: Early. well defined instructions are needed concerning
logistical support of the Federalized National Guard by the active Army
in order to avoid confusion and loss of time in accomplishing supply
action.
Recommendation: That specific instructions concerning logistical
support to Federalized National Guard units be issued on a timely basis
to both the National Guard and the active Army.
b. Observation: National Guard elements lacked some items of equipment
such as armored vests deemed necessary for riot control duty.
Evaluation: Items deemed for riot control duty should be
readily available to both the active Army and the National Guard so that
the operation at hand can be efficiently conducted.
Recommendation: That items of deemed necessary for riot
control duty be expeditiously provided to the National Guard.
c. Observation: time of Task Force III elements in moving to
Chicago could be improved by prior Airlift-Army coordination.
Evaluation: Plans should be made early to identify and configure
aircraft to be used. to adopt standard personnel and cargo loading plans
acceptable to all loadmasters and to rotate aircraft crews to eliminate
aircraft down-time involving crew rest.
Recommendation: That every effort be made to determine and announce
the type and configuration of aircraft the airlift when troops
are alerted for movementj that standard type cargo and personnel loads be
16
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predetermined by type aircraft; and that sufficient air crews be provided
to eliminate aircraft down-time for crew rest.
d. Observation: Maximum utilization was not made of facilities at Robert
Gray Army Airfield.
Evaluation: Extensive use of airport facilities located long distances
away from Fort Hood complicates subsistance, billeting and marshalling re
quirements, introduces a movement system that wastes precious time, creates
undue hardships on all units and individuals, and generates problems for
control personnel.
Recommendation: That maximum utilization of RGAAF be made for deploy
ing aircraft within the capabilities of that field.
e. Observation: Initially, difficulty in reporting of logistical information
was encountered.
Evaluation: All units d m ~ n to and jncluding battalioR and separate com
pany level must be familiar with and capable of reporting the desired
logistical information directed in plans of higher headquarters.
Recommendation: That all plans and requirements of each higher head
quarters be disseminated to all units including the National Guard, which
can be anticipated to support these plans, and that sufficient copies and
sufficient time be allowed for implementing instructions from intermediate
headquarters.
f. Observation: Reliance on local commercial laundry facilities to provide
service to troops engaged in riot control operations is not dependable since
laundries available were operating at 50% less capacity because of the riot.
Evaluation: A military laundry service facility would be more effective;
17
Recommendation: That appropriate field quartermaster laundry faci1
ities to provide free laundry service to committed forces be provided.
g. Observation: Local transportation sources providing troop movement
capability in the objective area are not sufficiently responsive.
Evaluation: . A military facility or unit can provide a more respon
sive transport capability.
Recommondation: That subject to local availability, stake and p]at
form vehicles be used to transport troops rather than city bus transpor
tation.
Personnel
a. Observation: There were a number of cases where off duty personnel
.
were apprehended by both civilian and Military Police for having privately
owned weapons in their possession.
Evaluation: Situations such as this cannot be tolerated, particularly
in areas where incidents involving weapons and sniping are rndemic.
Recommendations:
(1) That directives be issued that no personnel (Active Army, National
Guard and any Reserve Unit) will carry privately owned weapons on their
person while on Active Duty. either at the A r ~ r J or in the bivouac area.
(2) Unit Commanders institute a shakedown immediately upon call to
Active Duty to insure that there are no privately o ~ n e d weapons.
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(3) That a system for the control of government owned weapons be
instituted immediately upon call to Active Duty and that an accountability
be established, i. e. sign out registers for all weapons.
b. It appears that Active Duty personnel of the National
Guard either were n0t issued identification forms or were not in posses
sion of them at the time they were called to active duty.
Evaluation: This poses an extremely awkward situation when attempting
to identify personnel in uniform.
Recommendation: If there are identification forms that are issued to
National Guard/Reserve Forces, some effort should be made to insure that
those National Guard and Reserve Forces that are called to Active Duty for
the purpose of controlling civil dist4rbances have proper identification.
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PATE - TDiE
4 April 1968
2145
5 April 1968
1050
G2 - G; STAFF JOURNAL EXTRACT
COL Blalock FITS! DO at 042145 Apr requested names of
Task Force Commanders for OfLAN 56;, if they were on
post and name of Commander of 2d Me 1st AD. The
information was given immediately and COL Barrow notified
of the inquiry.
COL Bryant FUSA notified this headquarters tliey had
received instructions from CONARC to activate their
EOC, he suggested someone familiar with OPLAN'o 56;
be available on short notiqe to answer q ~ ~ s t i o n s con
cerning number of troops available, etc. G; on call
offioer notified and would be available On a 5 minute
notice.
At 051050 April this headquarters received notification
from FITSA (COL Briggs) placing one (1) battalion of
each Brigade on a six hour alert s tatus The remaining
portion of the brigade was placed on a twelve (12) hour
alert with all effective 17005 (5 April).
At 1105 hours a clarification of the above was requested
by G3 to FU::.i!.. IRE is on a two hour alert, B:J.tta1ion
1105
(_) on a six bour alert and Erigade on 12 hour alert
with all effective 1700 hours. Major LaFoSse (G; rep
2 Armd Div) was informed of the alert at 1140 hours.
1145
FUSA was notified 1145 hours 2/67 Armor as being the
6 bour alert Bn and Co A 2/50 Infantry as the IRE and
that the battalion was last exercised on 25"March 1968
with a rating of Satisfactory.
1305
A change of alert battalion from 2/67 Armor to 2/50
Infantry by LaFosse (2d Armd Div) at 1305 hours.
This information was immediately relayed to COL Briggs
FUSA. At 1300S Major Merill c(-llled from EOO headquarters
5th Army with the information that the Governor of
Michigan had. called. "Just about the complete state
guard force" to state dut,y effective 1215 hours. The
un1ts had been directed to assemble and stand by at
their home state armory. The principle trouble spots
in Michigan were considered to be Detroit, Kalamazoo
and Flint. It was also stated that the Governor of
the state of Illinois was oonsidering action to be
taken with respect to the National Guard, and that head
quarters 5th ArI'lV vill advise this headquarters 8S soon
&S azl,Ything develcps so far as Chicago and Illinois
Guard 1s concerned. The CG, Cars, DeS/O, G3 t G3 Ops
and G3 plans were notified.
2'
1900
MAJ Merrill (51 EOC) notified this headquarters at 19005
of committment of troops to Detroit. MAJ Davis (5A EOC)
wanted to knO\:l if' we were in receipt of current infor
ma.tion. At the present time 16 block area in Chieago
is burning. MAJ Irving, G2, was notified to contact
5th Army. Upon contact he gained the information that
National Guard troops (6,000) were called into Chicago.
The G3 was informed and G2 personally informed DOS/O.
2030 Twelve (12) C-1418 were inbound from Travis Air Force
Base (AFB) to Bergstrom at 20303. COL Barrow instruoted
G3 Air to iniorm Travis they should refuel at Bergstrom
and then report to Robert Gray Army Airfield. (RGAAF).
2230 LTC Robinson reported at 22305 that 13th Support Brigade
was prepared to provide lifts to 2d Armored Division
forces to RGAAF on 2 hour notice. Forty-Five (45) 2t
ton trucks & 7 busses W ~ G available to irransport 1;68
personnel in one lift.
2315
LTC Goeken (FUSA) telephoned at 2}15 announcing that
all brigades designe.ted for Garden Plot not presently
on alert are alerted effeotive 0522305. :Brigades w111
be on 12 hour alert and one Battalion in each Brigade,
will be on six hour alert. 1st and 2d Arm:l Div were
notified ~ ~ d the time of notification was r e l ~ e d to FUSA.
2355
6 April 1968
0025
0120
0130
0150
Message received from DA at 23555 announcing the
death of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.
The designation of the division's six (6) hour reaction
forces received and forwarded to FUSA (let Armd Div
4/46 Inf & 1/1;; 2d ArOO Div - 6/1 Cav.) 0609255 Apr.
A message received at 01205 6 Apr from MSG Jett (5th
USA) indicated disturbance in Detroit had been halted
21;2 houre, 5 Apr 68, however, Chicago reports continued
violence. 2700 national Guards axe on duty in Chicago
wi th 700 to arrive from Jolliet and Aurora and 700
reserv'cs ready to move. Increased violence is expected
to start 0600 6 Apr & gain momentum throughout the day.
Scott Air Force Base (COL Pinjuv) reported at 0601306
computars being progrs.m!Jed wi. th data concerning pick
up of 2055 persons and 835.9 tons of equipment Bergstrom
AFB. The plan inoludee 60 sorties landing at :Bergstrom
at approximately ~ minute intervals.
060150 - LTC Flash (FUSA) directed one battalion to
be placed on two hour alert and the parent brigade on
a six hour alert from 1st Armored Division as of 0605005
April 1966. The onload base is Bergstrom AFD with
4
....
possible destination of Chicago. FUSA was notified at
0215 that the 3d Brigade tst Armored Division had been
placed on six hour ale,rt and 4/46 Inf'antry on wo hour
alert. Remaining battaJ.ions of the brigade and com
menders wara identified.
0656
LTC Flash (FUSA) 0656. Provide 1,000 Iran force prepared
for departure from Bergstrom in 4 hours on 2 hours
notice at Fort Hood. Forces will be one (1) :Battalion,
Brigade Headquarters with Support Elements and may
include Task Force III advance party.
0855 Message from 51 EOC ( l ~ J Daniels) General situation
report of Chicago incident rate down, will increase
,
d ~ i n g day, Detroit still under control of Polico and
National Guard.
1000 Received from FUSA EOC (LTC Bryant) a.lertt.:i.Ess for
Task Force III and Task Force II, effective 061700Z 1968.
Task Force III HQ &: 1st Bde - 1 hr alert.
2d Me
- 2 hr alert.
3d Bde - 4 hr alert.
Task Foroe II HQ. &: 1st Bde - 1 hr alert.
2d Bde - 2 hr a.lert.
Task Force III &: II were notified as of 1030 hours.
5
,
1342
Telephone conversation from li'USA .. mOvl) 3d Bri{ftde 1st
Armored Division to load aircraft and
take off on order.
1345
1345 hours directed 1st Armored Division (LTC Saalberg)
to move 3d Brigade 1st to Borgstrom end load
aircraft. tat Armcred Division notified COL Breon,
oommanding 3d Brigade, at 1341 hours.
1415
Received telephone conversation f:com F'USA. (LTC Bryant)
contact National Chief of Polioe & of
Chicago vrhen a.nd if' CG III Corps Departs Fort Hood.
1445
Coordination was mado with LTC Johns at Berg3trom li'B
. ,
for 2100 maals for Fort Hood elements at
1515 The lead element of 1st Armored Division departed Fort
Hood. for Bergstrom A..li'B (LTC Saalbarg)
1530 Called 5th informed. them 1st Brigade was en route
to Bergntrom and roquested that they notify GlcnviGv
Air Sta.tion, also that BrieR::'.) would noed transportation
at Glenviw.
FUSA requested data on whan ! of Brigad. is closed at
Bergstrom, and When all of is closed at Bergstrom.
Genoral depa.rted Bsrgatrom 16265, ti1113 in flight
1645
should be 3i hours estimated timo of arrival in Glenview
19255 hours. Notified 5th Arrrcr.
1650
LTC Holland notified DA (COL Cartru) of LTG Mather's
departure, received information from President JQbnson
ordering 5000 troops to Chioago.
1659
15 Airc&aft rep;;;.rted on the gL'otU.'ld. at Bergstrom, .AF.B.
17
2
2
Received froE FUSA (COL Bryant) load and launclJ iml:!l9di
ately the 1st Brigade t."le.t is on route to Bergstrom.
1728
Received telephone conversation from FUSA (COL Bryant)
. ,
adding 2 battalions from 1st Brigade to 3d Brigado,
move to Bergstrom ASAP. Report battalion designation
and battalion commanc!er name to FUSA. COL saalberg was
notified at 17295.
1855
The fi.na.l element of the 3/1 Cs:v departed Fort Hood.
-Closed at Bergstrom A.FB at 2105. Commanders vare advised
to take no Ilo:ee than plannGd. This info:;:-
mation was provided FUSA (COL Goekan) at 2115 hours.
1910
LTG Mather and Task Force IIJ: advance party &rJ:1ved :in
Chicago. J. conference con.cerning establishment of Task
7

..
/'
'l,J
Chicago was held with the following att
endiu
80
Chicago Hayor - Richard Daley
Dop Attorney General US - Warren Christopher
MG Turner - personal rep of CS/A
Dep Police Suporintendant - l1r Rochford
l-Iembers of DA Liaison Staff
1930
Initial elements of 3d Brigade, 1st )-rmored departed
Bergstrom !FE for Chicago by C-141 aircraft.
2120
Task li'orce III headquarters began moveIllant to Bergstrom
AFB.C01 GCGdwin had been directed to integrate Task
Force headquarters into air stream on arrival at
Bergstrom.
2215 Actual strength count of Task Force III
Forces HQ
- 228
3d Me
-
15
4/46 - 612
2/5
2
- 612
3/1 - 612
2/46 - 612
3150
Total 3150, was sent to FUSA. EOC (l'!AJ Jones)
- Task
2;;0 COL (TF III Chicago)
8

wes contacted end made
7 April :1;968
0400
0115
0130
0230
aware ot LOI (meg DA 858698) to GO Mather. COL Clarke
vill get copy from 51h Army. To insure receipt ot
above message, 'ort Hood Communication Center will Re
Transmit above message to Task Foroe III.
Reoeived message from COL Flash (roSA)a UndeX' dire<.ttion
ot the Preaident there \1111 be maximum ot 5000 troops
in ChicB.GO, only 3150 are to leave from Bergstrom to
Chicago. 150 from ill Corps Task Force headqus.rters
3000 from 13rigade Bargat;rC)JB An was called (MAJ W'h1ta
man and control) 2 companies from 16 Engineer
Battal1o-11 were removed from movement to bring the
original toW of to 3150.
CS/A informed LTG Mather that the order authoriz1ng
tederalizat10n of Illinois liational Guard was eiBDed
and that Guard would be federalized upon notification
by LTG Mather that he vas prepared to assume commam.
Illinois National Guard under command or
LTG Mather. Task Force Chica6"O OPLAN 563 effective
for execution 8S OPQRD
\'&rDing Order to CO, 4/46 Intanu-y. Ba prepared
0325
0600-0630
1000
1120
1150
1453
for cornmittment on closure of 4/46 Infantry a.t O'Hare.
4/46 Infantry closed O'Hare Airport.
Motorized patrol elements of 4/46 committed
in Police District 3, vicinit,y of 63d Street.
Foot patrol elements of 4/46 Infantry cO!l".mitted, one
on 63d Street and the other on 67th Street to br&ak
up mobs of approximat0ly 100 parsona. EOH, Illinois
Irational Gue.rd to commit 2/122 Artillery in
33d shifted boundary of 1/178 Infantry to
include all of Douglas Park.
The mob on 63d Street dispersed. No mob encountered
on 67th Street. Company B, 4/46 Infantry in reserve
at Jackson Park.
3d Brigade, 1st Division en route
Jackson Park. (41 a.ircraft so;;:ties from Bergstrom AF:B,
Texas to Chicago completed and personnel delivered,
largely from 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division and Ta.sk
Force Chicago headquarters).
10
1530 2/52 Infantry, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division en
route to Jackson Park.
1630 57th Signal Bat talion (-), the signal support element
or Task Force Chioago headquarters closed Illinois National
Guard Armo17
1745
Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division and 2/52
tnrantr,y Battalion closed Jackson Park.
1754
7 Aircra.!'t loaded ready to move at Bergstrom An but
holding due to weather in Chicago. 57 sorties to
Chicago completed.
1930 3d Brigade closed O'Hare International Airport.
2000 1/13 Armor with one 16th Engineer Battalion
attached is in route Fireman's Gym on Navy Pier.
2005 EOH Illinois National Guard boundary or 1/178
Intantry to include area bounded by West 16th Street
on Westa Cermak on Southa Albany on East and Kilbourn
on West.
2035 EOH Illinois 1&tional Guard shifted souUl I)oundary or
11

1/118 Infantry to W. Ogden A.ve - V. Cermak Road.
2126 'd Brige.de, 5th Infantry (JrI) closed Glenview Naval Air
Station.
HQ ;d :Brigade
- 181
2/10 Infantry
- 621
;/10 Infantry - 621
7th Engineer (-)
- 476
21}8 1/n Armor (+) closed Navy Pier
12
.11
.
2210
2350
8 April 1968
0000
0455
0515
0630
0830
0945
1350
1500
4/46 Infantry reported two Compan1:es conmdtteo., one
company in reserve Jackson Park.
2/122 Artillery, Illinois National Guard OPCON 3d Brigade
1st Armored Division. Committed in Police District 7.
Chicago Police Department reported 1140 Men, 88 women
and 220 juveniles arrested since beginning of domestic
disturbance operations.
64 aircraft sorties from Bergstrom Air Force Base
completed, two aircraft weatheredin at Bergstrom Air
Force Base.
Status of conmitted troops reported to COL Hendry, DA
EOO.
1. No of Natioilal Guard troops in city - 6772
2. No of RA troops in city - 2397
3. No of National Guard troops outsiae city - 98
4. No of Ra troops outside city - 2442
5. Tot a1 11,710
3/1 Cav, 3d Brigade, 1st Armdred Division in route
Clarendon Building, ETA 0830.
3/1 Cav slosed Clarendon
3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division directed to relieve
2/122 Artillery in Police District 7.
Company C, 2/52 Infantr-j' closed in Police District ?
3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division assumed control of
Police District 7.
13
3z,
1715
2010
2010
9 April 1968
0145
0930
1100
2/52 Infantry olosed in Police Distriot 1, one company
committed, two companies in reserve.
Anonymous phone calls reported by G2. Blacks tone Rangers
will destroy 6}d Street and Halstead aroa toniGht. Tvo
oarloads of Negroes buying gasoline in portable containers
at 121th and Ashland. Rioting will occur in Cabrini
Housing Project rollowing Dr. King's funeral.
A Bam operator mon! tored a short \lave broadcas t to Havana,
Cuba, in vhich a Mike Speigal, who identined himself as
affiliated with "Students ror a Democra.tic Sooiety" stated
th&t }OOO-4000 people will march on the Eas t Chicago Ar:llory
(HQ TF Chicago) on 9 April 1968.
Received report G2 that anti-war militants would attempt
'to divert rally in Grant Park to a march on National
Guard Armory.
Task Force Chioago elements alerted tor possible deployment
in Grant Park.
Following Tesk Force Chicago elements directed to deploy
&s indicatedl
3/1 CaVI Move immediately to Aehsah Bond Drive. Prepare
to reinforce 2/10 In!'antry or 3/10 Infantry, 3d
Brigade, 5th Division (M). Establish liaison
wi th 3d Brigade, lst Armored Division and 3d
Brigade, 5th In!'.s.ntry Division (M).
14
-33
2/10 Infantry, 3d Brigade 5th Infantry Division (M):
Move to loop area of Chicago, west of Grant Park.
Conduct patrol operations il'l area with 40 squad
size patrols, accompanied by city Police. Maintain
a two-platoon reserve.
3/10 Infantry, 3d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M):
Move to Grant Park area, dismount on Columbus Avenue
between Jackson and Monroe Drive. Be prep.ared to
patrol block from the south, and
block overpasses from Grant Park on Monroe Drive,
Jackson Drive, Congress street, and Drive.
1130 3/1 Cav moving to Grant Park area.
1200 2/10 Infantry moving to Chicago u>op area.
1203 Provost Marshall directed to position road blocks
block from Armory to block traffic on order.
1230 3/10 Infantry moving to Grant Park Area.
1300 Two lOUdspeaker trucks reported at the Bandshell il'l
Grant Park.
1305 3/1 Cay closed on Achsah Bond Road.
15
1335
2/10 Inf and 3/10 In! closed in Loop area and Grant Park
area
1340
EOH, III Nat' 1 Gel reported Armory secured by one Company
(MP) on entrances, one Company on waet ani E, 106 Cav
on east.
1405
PD in wop area requested delay in deployment of 2/10 In.
150 personnel gathered at Bandshell.
1415
CO, 3d Bde directed 1/13 Armor to move one pIt to Jackson
Park for CP security.
l425
EOH directed 2/122 Arly to place one battery on- 5 minute
standby alert and one battery on 15 minute standby alert.
1430
Deputy Pollee Superintendant Mr Rochford requested 2/10
In! patrols not be deployed.. 350 persozmel in Bandahell,
50 more enroute.
1500 Persormel in Grant Park dispersing peacefully-no incidentB
1700 Three fires on Madison st. CG directed withdrQ\'la1 of
forces from wop area per agreement with Mr Conlisk,
Police Superintendant.
1835 3/1 CaY closed. Clarendon Bldg.
1955 3d Bde, 5th In! Div (M) elements closed Glenview NAS.
Incidents reported were lowest since TF Chicago initiated
operations
10 April 1908
~
0830 Statue of troop deployment:
RA in city
RA at Glenview
TarAt.
Patrolling 4/46
2/52
8 April
2397
2442
4S39
360
160
9 April
4323
682
5005
550
320
10 April
3091
1914
5005
180
2m
NG in city 6772 6973 6973
NG patrolling 3220 3900 2300
0935
0940
09.50
eG's asaessment: The city has remained calm for the past
48 hours and Clucago Police Superintendent
agrees there is a strong possibility that
that dismounted patrolling in most areas
can be discontinued today leaving surveil
lance to random motorized. patrols.
PIt of 1/13 Armor (50 personnel) closed Navy Pier from Hq
3d Bele.
CS/A wants Co A, 7th Engr Bn, 5th In! Div (M), a D-l unit,
returned to Ft Carson today provided no effect on operationS
in Chicago.
CG approved reduction of dismounted. patrols. Details to
be worked out bi-lateraJJ.y beth"een police and military.
1020 1020
This H4, advised DA that Co A, 7th Engr would return to Ft
Carson this afternoon.
1025
Co A, 4/46 In! closed new location at Grant Crossing P.ark.
1155
Representatives of TF Hq, 3d Bele, 1st Armored and 3d
Bele, 5th In! Div (M) held redeployment planning meeting
at the National Gd Armory.
1315
SITREP:
a. Dismounted patrols being discontinued. in
coordination with police distticts.
b. NG has discontinued all dismounted patrols but
will continue mounted patrols.
c. 4/46 displaced to Grant Crossing Park.
d. Co A, 7th Engr will displace to Ft Carson planes
C3 C-l.30) to. arrive 1015158 Ap1'l 68.
e. Situation relatively quiet; no major incidents
reported.
f. 2/52 returns in total (less 6 sqds) to Ogden Park.
1510 Mag from DA, Subj: Civil Disturbance. Issue of CS to
imposters. Positive identification must be made before
issue of CS
1515 1. Notified EOC DA and EOO 5th Army that 3 C-130s for
transport of A Co 7th Engr had arrived Glenview llAS at 1503.
2. Notified EOC DA and EOC 5th Army that curfew on taverns
and personnel under 21 has been lifted.
18
1545
Airoraft with A, 7th Engineer !attallon departed
GlenTiew M follow.
1st acft 2d acft 1538; 3d aoft 1546.
1945
In response to question by LTC Emery, LTC Dennis AOC
oalled and said trans to Bergstrom will probably be in
planes other than C-141. C-141' s are baing placed back
on higher priorit,y missions.
2345
Following telephoned to DA AOC: Soquence of departure
of units in Chicago area:
I. 3d Bde, 5th Mech Div
1. Command Group, 3d Bde
2. 2/10th Inf
3. BRO, 3d Bde
4. 3/10th Inf
5. 7th Bngr Bn (-)
n. 3d Me & HQ. TF III
1. Elements of HQ. TF III
2. 1/13th Armor
' . ~ ' \
11 April 1968
0015
0025
0030
0055
0200
3. 4/46th In!
4. Elements of H<.l TF III
5. 2/52d In!
b. HHC
I
3d Bde
7. Elements of HQ TF III
8. 3/lst Cav
9. Elements of HQ TF III
SITREP: From H<.l 3d Bde
l
5th Inf. Intelligence:
negative. Operations: working on loa.d.ine plans
W/loading team l"rom TAC. log-Neg. Commo-Neg.
Per Telcon w/5th Army' AOC, A Co, 7th Engrs closed Pederson
field at 0045Z.
Rec I d call from LT Creta, CONARc eEOC) who said that
Off loading of TF III will be at Bergstrom per TAC.
Reason is fuel and runway capability at Robert Gray.
SITREP from 3d Bde
l
1st AD. Only Bns committed are 4/4bth
& 2/52il. 2/52 conducting mounted patrols. Personnel:
Current Perstat. logistics: Normal. Communications:
No change.
COL Frauenheim, OIC AOC 5th A ~ called and asked if III
Corps planned on using own persormel for airfield departure
control group. Answer: ~ will use own elements.
20
0720
The follwing questions were posed to LTC Jones, ',AOCI "
1. Ref para 9 DA Meg 85926
t
a) To meet the requirement
of para 9 it will require (1) positioning a brigade at
Bergstrom or (2) maintaining a brigade on ti hours alert
at Fort Hood (2i hours travel time to Bergstrom)(C-nO
can be landed at Gray AFB), b) Is the brigade quick
reaction force in addition to the Bde of 2d Armored
Division presently at Bergstrom? If so, is it within
the ca.pa.bility of Bergstrom to simul taneouly deploy
both Bde within presently established times? 2. What
are the compelling reasons why the Air Force cannot
deliver troops at Gray AAF? ;. CG desires delivery
to RGAAF if at all possible.
07:50
Received SITREP by telephone from 3d Brigade, 1st Armored
Division (LT Beck). SITREll No.6 as of 110700 Apr 68.
Reporting period 11<0001 to 110800 Apr 68 ;d Bde, 1st
Armd Div. 1. IntelligenceI Current Intelligence
report in effect. 2. Operations I No change. ;.
1>ersonnell No Change. 4. LogisticsI No change.
5. Communications I No change.
0730
COL Magnotti DA AOe I Request aotifica.tion as soon as
decision to release troops in made. Aircraft are standing
by on a hold basis. Following aircraft are available I
38 - 0-1;0; 19 - 0-124; 6 - 0-97; 6 - 0-121. Some aircraft
will be on the ground 4 hours after notifiea.tion. Exact
21
.fo
'1-':\
. """ .
0905
0905
0940
1110
1240
1530
1616
number and t,ype will be given later.
3/1 Cav directed to move to O'Hare National Guard Armory
as soon as transportation is availbble to act as airfield
control element. 3d Br:igade, 1st Armored Division also
notified.
CG infermed COL :Barrow that Mayor Daley concurs in wi th
drawal of forces from Chicago.
3/1 Cav except for mess and cleanup detail d ~ t e d for
O'Hare.
3/1 Cav closed O'Hare 130 hours.
From 3d Brigade, 1st Armd Div, SGM Avery, 2/52 Infantry
pulled last two mounted patrols off the streets at 1200
hours. 3/1 Arrrd Div ha.s nothing on the streets a$ this
time.
Notified by LTG lr1ather to begin movement back to Fort
Hood, Texas.
First acft with elements of 3d Brigade, 5th Infantry
Division (M) departed Glen'View lIAS.
22
1627
Notified. DA.AOC of first acft departure. Notified 5th
1740
2040
2130
12 April 1968
0015
Aoe at 1630.
From COL Brookshire, DA AOC - C-141 acft have bsen released
at Bergstrom for !light to O'Hare to piok up 3d Brigade,
1st Amd. Div. .Airoraft presently unloading at Bergstrom.
ETA for O'Hare unknown. COL McNoty, AOC requested total
troop strength National Guard &Regular with Task Force
Chicago. At 111430 he was given figure of 11,867.
Notified by LTC Sparks, 20 - C-141s would be on ground.
at O'Hare 120800 .Apr 68. Advance party should arrive
at O'Hare 0630. 3d Brigade informed. 3d Brisade will
alert 1/13 Axmor . ,
COL l>lu,ndingar AOC, DA stated all 21 C-141 aircraft directed
into Bergstrom. ibid discussion was passed from STRICOM
to General Knowle. at AOC this m. He stated hetd
recheck but pending this check we should not plan for
any aircraft to terminato at RGAAF Fort Hood.
CPr Carlson stated that Air Force rs:rca.ining
loads 3/5 Mach and estimate 42 (C-130) sorties required.
Estimated closure tice of 5th Mech Element de;arting
Glenviev HAS I 1302000 J..;pr 68. n.is was a cb.a.n.g3 frC::l
f\
") .
the pravioU3 eatimate of 27 sorties and completion
time of 1207005 Apr 68.
0500 3d Brigade SITREP
at 0500.
- 1/13 Armor began movement to O'Hare
0815 4/46 Infantry began movement to O'Hare.
0950 Notified DA AOC & 5 A:my AOC of departure of 18t 8eft
wi th 3d Brigade personnel at 0941.
1241 Notified 3d Brigade to move to O'Hare at 1345.
3d llriga.de Headquarters'departed Jackson Park for
1630 Journal closed, Chicago Armory.
24
--
'SJ

DA , NO .... a 15 94
.
DAllY STAfF JOURNAL OR DUTY OfFICER'S lOG
PAGE NO
INO 2" Poc;ES
(AR no-I J)
1
OIltClAN, Z A TION OR INaT ALt.A TtON t.OCATION
PERIOO COVEREO
G1 &: AG III Corps
East Side Armory
r:ROM TO
Chicago, Illinois
",200 Iof T
Apr 68 2400 If1pr
68
'TEM
TIME IN' ..
NO
INCIOENTS. MESSAGES. OROERS. ETC
ACTION TAKEN
T'.
'H
OUT ._,
1 1200 Log opened

2 1200 ACofS, G1 and
AG became operational in pre-
NA
sent location:
East Side Armory
} 1450
First statistical report
on casulties as
COL L. STl:!.\ol ART
required by para 2b &: c, Appendix 4 (Per-
(AG III Corps)
-<
sonnel Status Heport)
to the DA Civil
I
phoned DSCPER
Disturbance Plan (4).
next report is due Represe"1tative
-
at 1600 hours, local time, this date and AOC, DA.
every 2 hours thereafter.
haMer. Ft. Sheridan will provide continu-
Worchol
4 1430
Final action
on PX trucks for O'Hare NG
Noted by lolAJ
.
service; snacks. soda and convenience
items' elaborate
selections as troops
movements slacken.
5 1800 Salvation Army has volunteered to furnish 5th
Army notifie 1
two (2) mobile
units which serve free snack PIO informed
coffee. etc if escort can be provided. Units Called
I
One unit sent to Glenview for 5th Mech;
one flcmt to Jackson Park for III Corps. DF
on above sub.iect sent to 10.
6 1810 Received offer for Red Cross assistance.
Notified AG Rear !..JW
Arranged
for assignment of full time rep.
which states spe. /::;e
available
H" ..S; "NO G""OS; 0" ON OuT ...
Uvf1rf
NEIL G. STt."WARl', Colonel, GS, ACofS, G-1

'ORIII
-
DAILY STAFF JOUIilHAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
PAGe: NO
INO
(AR :120-15)
2
OAGANIZA'TION OR INSTALLATION LOC A TtON PERIOD COVERED
G1 & AG III Corps
.
East Side Armory
I'ROl,4 TO
Chicago, Illinois
I0
7
68
\1" 68
ITEN
TlIolE
IN'
INCIOENTS. NESSAGES. OROERS. ETC ACTION TAKEN
NO
'N
OUT

7
2220 5th LNO at Glenview reminds that De- NG Notified to
federalization of the Guard will require begin work
some planning, and prestockage of forms, et

8 2400 Log sheet for 1 Apr 68 (Closed Out) Routine L.JW
-
.
.
,
---- -
.
f::O "AWE AND GRADE 0,. O",.'CI:R OR O""'C'AL ON DUTY \SIGNATURE
&-<1/?--
NBIL G. S'Th""ART, Colonel, GS, ACors, G-1

EDITION 01' THI& ..... I. O.SOLTK..
4S'
-
DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
.. AlOE NO
INO
PAC.F.,
(AR 220-15)
1 3
ORGANIZATION OR INSTAL.L.ATION L.OCATION
PERIOD COVERED
G1 &AG III Corps
.
East Side Armory
FROM TO
Chicago, Illinois

68
H
2
4'&> I0
68
ITEM
TIME
ACTION TAKEN
INI
INCIDENTS. MESSAGES. ORDERS. ETC

NO
IN OUT
1 0001 New Log Opened Routine JEH
2 0845
3rd Bde 1st AD Closed 1930 7 AJr
-
(except No further actio
2 a/c at Bergstrom) 5th Mech Bde Closed required NS
2126, 7Apr.
3 0900
Courier flight from Peters AFB, Colorado Lt Stultz, S1
daily to Chicago for of delivering 3/5th notified l,iw
mail to 3rd Bde 5th Mech.
4
1050 CoCaCola Co will send Mobile Soft Driruc

Units into a.ll troop bivouc areas.
NS
5
1200 Dr. Lorraine Sullivan. Board of Ed-
Info passed to
.
,
ucation_ District 8. Area C ( Van Brusen cis
I
6-4162 ). states that Marshal School
was scheduled to Walk-out at 1150 but
accordinl>t to the school principal. was not.
Dr. Sullivan will keep- us informed on walk
outs along with normal Civil Notifications NS
6 1250 SPA Brnest Davis. US 55814746, ID# C07
11
5
1
Exp 1Feb 68. formerly assigned to 1/50th
Inf was apprehended by police for loitering
He was accompanied by another man not appre
-.
hended in fatigues ...'ho had a carbine Asked
Hood for info on whether or not he reeB1ist
as he had discharge papers dated Oct 67. L5
p:\EO N ..... E "NO """Ot< 0" 0""1 C: .. " 0" O"""'AL. ON ouTy
_
NBIL G. Colonel,CS, ACofS, G--1
'OAIII ...... \lIOUI EOITION 0" Tlo4la "0111\'" ,. a OL-IILTII..
7

, NO Y .a
DA 1594
-- PAGE NO
INO 0; PAGllt DAILY STAPF JOUwNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOC
(AI' 720-15) 2
OJtG ...... IZ .. TIO... OR I.... T ... ... TION PERIOD COVERED
J
.. TIO...
TO FRO'"
East Side Armory G1 & AG III Corps
"OUR 10.. TE
"2400 IOs Tl
pr 68 Chicago, Illinois 0001 8 Apr 68
T1 ... E
ITEW INI.
INCIDENTS.... ESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC ACTION T"KEN
TIALS NO
IN OUT
1310 At a'Pprox 1100 hrs, following school enroll- Info passed on
ment figures were obtained from Mr. Robert
7
DCS/O. School
Kelley, Statistical Section, Chicago Dept leaders auth to
of Education, Elem school: 431,108 call this Hq, if
General H.S.: 112,162 desired, but not
Vocational HoS.: 13,3
1
3 to circumvent
_. Handicap HoS.: 1.235 their civilian
SUB TarAL H.S.: 126,710 reporting proc.
Apprentice II.ti.:
3.253
Completion(1 Day wk): 2,666
0
TarAL: 569.737
8 Col Warner, 926- 32
1
9/3259, 5A Engr states
hotel bills will be paid for this operation
Col Warner detailed Mro Moo+e with 5A LNO
team at Glenview as his project officer;
LTC Fletcher was detailed III Corps TF pro
ject officer to handle details.
1335
TLW
COL Stewart
Mr. Moore, 5th Army Laison Gp states Hr.
John Vo"el. ChicaJ2'o District Enp;r. 353-7443
or 485-1055, has been instructed to contrac
for billets in the Pearsbn &Kisherbacker
Hotels.
( COL Fletcher informed)
10
9 1425
Haskins, 04 reply on a question on
1937
T .-I:O N .... E "NO G.... OIl 0111 ON OuT. ISIGN .. TURE
L80NAiill J 0 Wt:;R<;.iWL, MAJ, G1-XO TF III Chicago, nJj

-U

INO OF?JPAGF.I
DAILY$TAt'P DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
IPAU ;0
(AI'! Uo-l $)
PERIOO COVEREO
TlON
OIll.AN'IAT'ON OA
TO FROM
East Side Armory G1 & AG III, Corpa
HOUA 10ATF.
Chicago, Illinois
;0;;0 I
68 0001 8 Apr 68
11011 TillE
ITEW ACTION TAKEN
INCIDENTS. MESSAGES, ORDERS. ETC
TIALS
NO,
.101 OUT
10 (Con It laundry servicS': Air lift to Ft Riley
,
24 hr service. word will out 082100 hrs.
11 Notified by Ft Hood that 4USA is requesting
for CONARC a twice daily report: (a) Has
ACS support been supplied? (b) Mail Svc?
2030
(0) Current leave policy? (d) Have unit
Exchange Officers been appointed? (e) Wel
fare support? (f) Lenal
Chaplains? (h) Special Svcs? Replies
,
(a) Not applicable' only for dependents
(b) Daily courier svc established with Hood
& Carson. (0) Bmergency Lv Only. (d) No. &
willnot be. (e) Salvation AxfIN Trucks full
time Hed Cross Ren etc. (f) Two JAG Office B
on station (pJ 9 Chaplains aElsigned. more
001!liru<. svcs all faiths. Fri. Sat, Sun.
, .
(h) Forced issue of books. athletic equip;
1---
movies cemL?Ut etc. msc: SUPlJort is ovel"!'" .
whelming, Nothing lackingl No further repor
can be expected. LJ'W
12 Journal Closed Routine JEH
,
ANO GAAc. 0" O .... lc.1Il Oil O.... IC'AL. ON liGNA, TUlllE
LEONARD J. W,$CHOL, l"..AJ , G1-XO TF III Chicago, III
d..
\

'
ItDI T '.0 NO'" T Mil "0,. .... I. 0 OJ- K:T It. 1,1 .....
,
_OE
DAILV STAv1' .mU&U4AL OR DUTY OPFICER"S LOG
P ... OIl "0',
1..
0
0;
(All UC>-I $) 1
OI14I ... HI''''TIO'' 0'" ' ... T ... L.L. ... TIOH L.OC'" TIO"
pERIOD COVERED.
' ..
.
G1 & AG III Corps
,
East Side Armory
P'ROIo4 TO
Chicago, Illinois
I
68
;0;;0 1
68
ITEM
TlM
INI
NO,
INCIDENTS, ME5SAGI!S, O"'OERS, ETC ACTION T"'KEN
TI ... LS
IN ,OUT
1 0001' Log opened
Routine JEH
2 0045
Courier flight coordinated to leave from
Gray/Killeen airport at approx 1000 hra,
arrival time at Glenview, approx 1500 hra,
estimated time of departure is 1700 hra,
rtn time anprox 2200 hrs. Mail will be here
-
tomarrow on
JEH
.
'3 0810 Chaplain. 3d Bde, 1st Armd Div states' he
.
,
can get Catholic Chaplains from nearby
Monastarv & this will provide services in
.
,
";'11 unH.-areas. He will furnish schedule
of Chaplain activities. No Action JD1
4
1115 Received word from Sheridan PX that Chanute
'won't fly out PX trucks due to lack of
drivers/employees. MAJ Butler, 5USA LNO
tasked by MAJ Warchol to get the retail
trucks with employees as a As Shown Ij'o
r; 200') report receipt of Free C.hicago
Times Newspapers.
'Noted 1,;'0
6 2120 . Movie nro.iectors issued Noted
Ijt,
7 2400 i
JournaJ. Closed
Routine
JCf
T""i:D ,.AWK. 4NO G ..... DIE 0" oJt O"ICIAL ON OUT ... aIGN4TU,."
J. NAJ, G1-XO TF III Chicago, II

._
" ....T C"ICI .11610- .... ,,,
Dl\ .. 15 94
"19

r
AOE
INO
DAILY STb.Ff .wmn"lAL OR DUTY OfFICER'S LOG
;0
(AN. niH J)
..._._,-;"
PERIOD COVERED
.
---
O"CSAN1ZATION OR I.... IT ..
.
LOC" TlO"
I
TO ,.ROt,!
:baat Side k;:-'fOOf3'
ca &e AG III
MOU" DATE
Chicago, III
68
0001 10 Am 6S
TIIolE IN'
ITEM ACTION TAKEN
INCIDENTS, MESSA.GI!S. ORDERS, ETC
TIALS
NO
OUT 'N
JCR Rolitine
J OUl'llsJ. op!lned. 0001 1.
CaJl from Lt eun.th. at Ft
Sheridan that attendance figures bE
kept for all ehom...'!'lg of the Arrrry end AF
'Motion PieyurEJ Fili.:;. This is a noI"ll".al
A&JJrJ>S nrocedure for tr(j$ and paid movie3.
2 1515
LrW Noted
Flmu mads for 5th Army Band
concert for this evening in various Chicago
3 1745
Coordinatod &.
locations.
LJW noted
Call from 5th USA I..'W Ma1 &J.tler with list
of itW3 that can bo ordered ssa. for
J.&R. 'lb be conl'Outed M to S1:.ounts and a
1910 L.
f
visit to Ft, Sheridan Qa,de for purchaDe and
nn LJW Noted
Fbon-ed Ft Hood Gl :EDC (LTC ROl'T1ey) to i.n!ort
1950
of need of Op3 c tr at &rgatrom uP;:>'
arri-ro.l of TF to r..'Jui3t in p;roCC-;.3:lng end
giving statistical info of arrivalB. He 1dJ;l
cheek cmt n1"Ment Et3r8tro?;1 onort\t101'',;3 a:a.d
geo 1.t" set up with Gl aUg.:.lantat1on
will iln t.nl'l 10b
5
LJW Noted
ad
200ft-103E-\: to Ft Carson thia aftm-noon.
f.. In!omed that AI7 :E}:gr, 3Bde 5th depl0
LJU'
U15ed. in Perstat
m coni':erencC': Gl selected
for teams to rl3port and man stations; O'har'
R...,...,.... +......,., .. nn m",,,,vi ...,..,.
7 21L.O
L.Ttl JIotsd
C"ntry) Approximately 1000 books e.rr1 -ed
this Fa and diitributod to
)h.j l1arehol
S 1900 Delave"
LJW
C(;z::l'oleted ccll."1 to all Ullits to turn in all
movie NtT 1000 hours II Ap:o 68.
r!;"ed r;t.h Maeh toO rm1.nd thC';:l. ot the &1
9
LJW
10 LJW
.T""" ........ '
"'.M
NAIrrroolE ANO GRAOE 0' o"'rca" 0" OP'''-,CIAL, ON OuT.,.

LEO:H}l:D J WARCHOL, KJ.J
. ,
G-1 - XO, '!1 III
.. aYlou. ECtTION Orr THla prO",'" I. OaJOi...ETa. .ul 6OIJI'W".U'""l1fUIlCiO""tCt: '''IQ-'''IU
D
"\ 1594
F' , NOY .2
-
.
DAllYSTAFf JOUllHAl OR DUTY OFFICER'S lOC
PAGII NO
r
O
lPA.. U
1P
(AR 220-J ')
1
O"CSANIZATION OR INITALLATION LoOt ATOOH PERIOD COVERED
. f"ROlo4 TO
Gl and AG III Corps East Side ArmoTy'
68
H;;' I;';'TE
APr Chicago, Ill. 68
ITEM
TIME
IN'
INCIDENTS, MESSAGES. ORpERS, ETC ACTION TAKEN
NO
'N OuT
TIALS
1 0001 Journal opened. Maj Warchol I.rW
2 1040 Per telecon between Col L. stewart and Maj
Everhart, AOC DCSPm Rep, tollowing applies:
(1) Discontinue 2 hour casualty report as ot
this time.
(2) Perstat will continue as 10M lU5 troops
remain here; report will be made by telephon
with tollow-up electric messap;e as 10M as
possible; tollowing breakdown ot electric
conmnmieations. renorts will be made by
phone only. Continue to include casuallty
f-.
tiRures in Perstat. Lt Rotrer JrM
.3 1045
Hq Comdt requested billet space at/vicinity
od. O'hare for 22 Officers & 21 EM to be TF M: vements

Control Rear Deteh. G4 Talked
4 lSL.S Lt Stultz. Ad.1.5th Meeh. states they have
.
,
the word to load and m. Col stewart NGS
I)
1805 TF Advance party placed on 3 hr alert per
.
Rn
Noted LJW
6 12k.00 Journal c1c>sed. SSG Ables I.JW
-
."
TYPIII.D ........ ....... D GJIt"DE 0" O"'''ICIAL ON DuTY .'GNATU"&
--J 'It .-J,,-- r.IDNARD J WA.'tl.GHOL. Gl-IO TF In Chicago
-:f..
v
-

0'- PAGI:S
TPAGE i
O
INO
DAILY STAFF JOURHAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
(AR "0-1 $)
1
PERIOD COVERED
.... OC.T10N OlllGAHIZATIOH OR
TO F"RO"4
East Side Armory
HOUR
Chicago, Ill. 01 and AG III Corps
0001
I 68
68
TI"4E INI
ITEM ACTION TAI<EH
INCID[IoITS. "4ESSAGES. ORDERS. ETC
T1ALS
NO IN OUT
I.TW Haj Warchol
Journal opened 1 0001
Olhare element
requested info as to the number of short
CONARC roc (autovon 555-3900 x 212 Lt Creta) 0205 2
advised at xM/45
tons and personnel to be shipped for 3 Bdas
1st AD and HHHG III Corpis Obtained personn 1
data from PERSTAT a.rrl b tonna.'!:e from CO as
5$1. Pers-282+2803. Advised that 20 ea
Cm at 0 'hare approx 0800 hra. Total of
40 sorties.
LJli
Advance party departs for O'hare: ma.ioritv
0530 3
JCR Lt Rohrer 'or nersonnel transported in bus.
JCM SGM Martin It.fai.n nartv ddparted for O'hare 1630 k.
JCM SGM Hartin Closedlo!: S 16'30
Slc;NA TuJltI TyPED .... "ME AND GRADE 0" OFFICIAL, ON OUTY

LIDNARD J WARCHOL, HAJ, Gl-XO TF III Chicago, III
.. & "IOUS E. 01 T JON 0'" T MIS FO ....... II 0 0 L. IE. T &. II I .0'118......, o"lel 1' .1 O-,.... tU
,.
.
NO.
DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
INO. OF
1
(AR 110-346 Tid 101-S)
OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED
.
TO FROM
Glenview NAB HQ, Task Force Chicago
HOUR IDATE HOUR IDATE
lllinois Rear 2200 10 Apr 68 103) 7 Apr 68
TIME
INCIDENTS. MESSAGES. ORDERS. ETC.
ITEM
ACTION TAKEN INL
NO.
IN OUT
Notified TF Main
1 103) TF G4 became operational
and 5A LLT
CPr Howell, LLT nJ reque sted approval to use POL credit 2 1120
ok t d on interim
cards
basis
I 'Pin ,.,n+iN ",.:l
COL Clark briefed LT<l Mi chael1s 1 00 Fifth A:rmy visited TF Rear
LLT & TF Main
Headquarters
ll40
3
in:f'onned
Inf'onned LLT of reefer van requirements 4 ll55
and desired locations
.
:
all units notifie Rqrnt fr LLT to have Log Stat Rpt in by 1425
5
2300 hra
.
S- 3 3d Bde 5th Mech rptd final element closed Infonned LLT
6 173)
a TF Main
Glenview 0955 hrs
Specific instr
Meeting conducted w/G4 & of NG Units
1900
concerning proce
7
'(EOH) concerning procedures for procurement
dures to be fo1
lowed upon Feder
& distribution of all classes of supply.
alization were
issued to the EOH
G4 & staff.
CoordiIlP.ted l1/LLT :Bath unit fran Ft Carson arrived 2200 a
Acct If acquired 3d Pile 5th Mech requested self serv:L
ce
2250
from CPr Craven,
supply account for expendables
9
LLT
Inc1 in TF Log
Log Stat rpt rec t d fran NJ
10 2350
Stat
a Apr 68
Resubmitted as
LLT rptd Log Stat rpt incomplete and in
0100 II
per instructions
need of refinement
TYPED NA... E AND OF OFFIC!!:" OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY
SIGJi7(;.
EDITION OF THIS FOIlt ... Is.oeSOLETE.
c.. 53
1\
.
-
-
INO. 0; PAG-:J DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
PAGE NO.
(J;R 220-J46 FM 101-S)
2
ORGANIZATION OR INSTAL.L.ATION L.OC" TION PERIOD COVERED
FROM TO
HOUR
IO.. TE
HOUR
IO.. TE
ITEM
TIME
NO.
IN OUT
INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS. ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
2 0125
r;ur req info on nr of rounds ammo, by type, Units queried,infc
transmitted. to IJl1

expended
3 0315
LLT requested info on NG requi sitions for Queried MAJ Ne1sor
I
in EOC G4 body' armor & protective masks
4 0320
Inf'onned LLT that ID had. expended 305 rounds
of srnall arms ammo, other units none.
5
1030
5A ammo inspector arrived to observe safety Scheduled to visi
and handling procedures all units
6 1130
.
3/5 Mech requested site for conduct of riot
Coordinated with
,
base cpns-use
control tng
unused run"''8.y.
7 1133
3/5 Mech concerned about barrier material.
trJr queried.Statec
material 'Will CornE
from CP McCoy.
8 1135
Maint contact Team req by III Corps for
Supt req from LLT
repair
9
1220 Bus & truck supt req for 3/1 Cav & 1/13 Arm,
fuses acquired fre
1m
6 bus, 2 trks per unit
r.:t. Dispatched
'W trucks
16 1315
TF provided 8 POL tankers for use Coord .,,/LIJr.Remai
17 1515 3/5 Mech bas 2 radios down,
requests on call at Ft She
immediate support on parts. 2 ea GS7
LIJr informed part
will come from
for VRc49 and GRc46 receiver.
heme sta (Carson)
18 1710 BA 279s requested by 3/1 Bde.
2765-1 required.
Submitted to LLT
19
1810
3/5 lI.ech requested. 125 chemical toilets. Informed LLT. Toil ts

delivered:
I
TyPED.N .... E: ... ND GR"DE OF OFFICER OR OFFICI .. L. ON DUTY

DA I 94
-
--
DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
PAGE NO.
INO. 0"5
PA

(AR :221>-146 .. FM 101-S)
3
ORGANIZATION 0" INSTAL.L.ATION L.OCA TION PERIOD COVERED
.
FROM TO
HOUR
IPATE
HOUR
IOATE
ITEM
TIME
NO.
INCIDENTS. MESSAGES. ORDERS. ETC. ACTION TAKEN INL
IN OUT
20 1810 Iaundry procedures and facilities finalized All units notifie
by LDr& TFG4 procedureS outlin d.
21 2015 3/1 Div has M-151 w/broken
Coord w/IJI.Jr. Infon ed
clutch rod. Req
to contact 108
maint spt Spt :En
22 2350 I.J.Jr informed TF G4 that tents, stoves, cots Reque sting units
'
and sleeping bags requested will arrive infonned
,
from Cp McCoy at 090800
9 April 68
1 0040 DA msg 858704 recd. Concerns support for Clarification req of
SJA and DA Rep
m units
(IJro Wester)
.
2 Need assist on repair of 11 ea ton M21l CPI' Howell, 0900
LI..Ir notified trucks, fr trk co from Cp McCoy
Notified ur Burke LI..Ir informed us that 6 barrells of CS-1 t, 1030 3
agent ready for pickup at Ft 501 S&T
4 Hand carried to Ltr to IJI.Jr req SS Supply acct for all TF 1035
CPT Craven, I.J.Jr III units
Passed to IJI.Jr.Rqrn: Req for chaplain supplies from G1 at TF Main 1045
filled from offic
5
IJI.Jr indicates expendable requests frpm m
6 1200
of EJA Cha'D1a1n
un!ts will be processed on 2765-1 thru TF G4 D G4 notified
to LIII'. They will be returned to TF G4 for
return to units. Approved items to be
I 'Picked u:P at Ft Sheridan.
Notified Mr Lee,
urc Voss, 3/5 Mech stated Bcle needs only
109 cehmical toilets at present time
1300 7
LLT
HAWE AND c;"'ADE OF OFFICER OR oFFICIAL ON DUTY

'{ifi CJf}
.({ .
P ....v'OU. EDITION 0'" THI. FO ..... I' oeaoL TK. u.s. IO'U._bT ""ITI onlCl; tHl o-w.&lW
SS-
.
I INO, OF P5
GES
P"'GE N'4
DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
(AR :1:10-345 " I'M 101-S)
ORG ... NIZ'" TION INST ... LL'" TION
PERIOD COVERED
LOC ... TION
IO
TO FROM
HOUR ... TE HOUR
, IO... TE
TIME
ITEM INL ACTION TAKEN INCIDENTS. MESSAGES. ORDERS. ETC.
NO,
IN OUT
All units & LIJr
CONARC msg 55431 recd. Directs addn items
to be included in future Log Stat rpts. Inc1
8 1630
notified
gas masks, body armor.. M25A2 grenades, Kr
greriades, E-24, 40MM cartridges
Ltr on laundry services hand carried to
1815
9
rm
written answer Answer to CONARC query on body armor
provided LIJr by COL Clark
10 2245
band carried to LI rr
-
All units notifiec COL Moberg, LIJr brought reply back on
laundry service. Info provided by CONARC
II 2320
.
entered on Log stt:t
MAJ Kane1, NG a4 rpts every man bas
a protective mask but not necessarily
in his hand
10 April 68
1
12 2345
Informed DTC Burch of status of BA 279s.
60 in late last night will be delivered, early
today, remainder to arrive this AM
2
0600
Requested from
TF main daily
Request for mobile PX vans to call on
0845
LLT
TF.HQ & LLT infon ed. TF rear vi 8ited by !JIG Mather.
Briefed by COL CU
ll40
3
rk
4 Info passed to ill
Reefers relocated
Request for relocation of reefers 1230
TYPED N"'ME "'ND 0'" O ...... O ...... ICI ... L. ON DUTY
SIZ?:
" "C

- --
PAGE NO.
DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
5
' INO. 0;
(AR 220-'46 .. FM 101-$)
LOCATION O"GANIZATION 0" INSTALLATION PERIOD COVERED
"
FROM TO
HOUR HOU"
IDATE 1DATE
TIME
ITEM
INCIDENTS. MESSAGES. ORDERS, ETC. ACTION TAKEN IHL
NO.
IN OUT
Ltr to LLT dispatched. Requests additions
to self service accounts.
12
11 1530
Rpt transmitted Status of: chemical and riot control munitionl
requested by LTC Wester, DA Liaison Teem.
1730
to LTC Wester
all units
LTC Emery1 G3 Opns1 rpts that STRICOM
has inf'o:rmed them that should "We dpt
2200
15
notified
before noon, 12 Apr 68, "We will get a mix
of 0-119, C-121 & 0-124 alc
8N TYPI:D NAMI: AND G"ADI: OP" OP"P"ICI!" 0" OP"P"ICIAL ON DUTY
S' 7&
,
.......
THIS P"O"'" IS O.SOLI:TIl.
__ u ........... ,.; ; ;.> ~
I 1'1:::__._
1600 N.AOl)'SOH n.
J., l A ~ ~
." -.
,. ... ,1
" " " . ~ . - ,
,. ..
'.. ..
t-t ..... -
.......
- ~
-..
, t....
_ ".
...,... , .
........
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS III CORPS AND FORf HOOD
FORT HOOD. TEXAS 76544
N REPLY REFER TO
aKPHO-G3-oP
4 MAY 1968
SUBJECT I
Signal "Lessons Learned" to After Action Report, Task Force
Chicago
ACofS for Force Development
Department of the ArrIff
Washington, D. C. 20310
1,. Reference I After Action Report, Task Force Chicago, dtd 18 April
1968.
2. Additional Signal Operationa "Lessons Learned" are attached for
limited distribution. The information contained in the report may be
of assistance in planning communications for Control of Domestic
Disturbance Operations.
FOR THE COMl-1ANDER:
Copies furnished I
Fourth US Arrrry
CONARC
IL Natl Gd
Fifth US Army
F-0R aT RD
68D006
SEC'.rrON 2. LESSONS WARNED: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations and
Recommendations
a. PERSONNEL.
(1) A total of 5 officers and 16 enlisted men broken down in
subparagraph (2) below staffed the '.J.1F Main and Rear signal staffs and
operating sections to include HF Radio, FN Radio, VID'Radio, Switchboard,
Radio Wire Integration, Photographic and Hotor Hessenger Operations.
(2) Personnel came from the following organizations :
Officers 1!11
(a) III Corps Staff 2
3
(b) 51th Sig Bn 2 12
(c) 141st Sig Bn
1
1
5 16
(3) A review of required operating means of communication has
resulted in the addition of 2 officers and a reduction of 13 EH from
future Garden Plot plans providing a new required total of 1 officers
and 63 Et. Reasons for these changes will be discussed under operations.
b. OPEr1ATIONS.
(1) :EN Radio. Command Net #1 was operated between TFC l"lain,
Tro Rear, the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division CP and the 3d Brigade, 5th
Division. From the beginning this net operated extremelY well pro
viding reliable voice communications. The Net Control Stb.tion at TF Main
also operated as a Radio Wire Integration (R\f.I) Station as did the station
at TIt' Rear. Once established the integration of the radio net into the
switchboard worked well with much operational traffic being passed.
(2) ill' Radio. Command Net #2 was operated between Tro Nain, TFC
Rear, the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division and the 3d Brigdde, 5th Mech
Division. This net worked fairly well during daylight hours but faded
out completely during the hours of darkness even though all assigned fre
quencies from 2-12 HHz were used. This was due to the location of the
NUS in downtown Chicago where the van and its antenna were completely
surrounded by 20-100 story buildings. No traffic was passed over the net
during the operation as no requirement for this means existed that could
not be handled by HI Radio, Commercial Telephone or botor Nessenger.
-.L=;.;c I :;2.
(3) VHF (AU/TRC-24) Radio. The capability to install one 12
voice channel syster:: with one relay was taken tb Chicago but never utilized
as the Illinois Bell Telephone Comoany was able to provide all trunk cir
cuits required. AlSO, sufficient service from Glenview NAS was available
on a day-to-day basis.
(4) Teletype Service. Teletype service to Tl!'C was provided by
one full duplex circuit from the Department of the Army Communication
Center (.DAClJ), room 5A910 the Pentagon. This circuit operated at a speed
of 100 words per minute using KW-26 cryptographic equipment which provided
the ability to pass secret information. The van was
installed and operated by a Strategic Com unications Command (STRATCa1)
team from Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The DACe acted as a relay into the
worldwide Defense Comlinmications System (OOS) and no problems were en
countered during the entire operation. 2d III' Casey and his team operated
in a professional manner and are to be commended for their attitude and
technical ability. Traffic sent and receivee. by precedence was as follows:
T01'AL OUTGOING - 24 TOl'AL INC(lilING - 74
Flash 0 Flash 0
Immediate 0
Immediate - 15
Priority - 24 Priority - 59
Routine 0 Routine 0
(5) Switchboard.
(a) 11ain - A President of the United States (P01'US)
switchboard was installed by the Illinois Bell Telephone Company at T.l!'C
!'Jain on the morning of 7 April 1968. Switchboard operators were provided
by This facility worked well during the operation as did the
operators after some initial training. Two hotline trunks from the AOC,
two AU'fOVON trunks and five commercial dial trunks were terminated in the
board. Additionally, 39 local telephones off the P01'US switchboard were
installed.
(b ) Rear (Glenview NAS) - .An SB-22 awitchbcard was in
stalled with 2 trunks from the attendants position of the government owned
dial central office. This switchboard provided service to units being
held at Glenview NAS for possible later commitment into an objective area
as well as administrative sections operating in the rear area. Primary
communications was provided by use of dial telephones (20) connected "to
the Glenview NAS dial central office. Through this central office 8
AUT OVON circuits were immediately a vailable as we11 as intra-city dial
trunks. No problems were experienced at TFC Rear.
(6) Intra-City Telephone Faoilities. The Illinois Bell Tele
phone facilities were used as the primary means of communication through
out the operation. Hotline telephones were utilized between T F ~ G3 op
erations center and subordinate brigade operation centers and from brigade
operation centers to battalion operation centers. Additionally, dial tel
ephones were installed at all echelons to the nearest dial central office
and to police headquarters as required. See inclosure 1 for a breakdown
of all trunks, dial telephones and parus switchboard telephones installed.
The reaction of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company to the requirements
of TFC was outstanding.
(1) AN/TSC-25 SSB Radio. STRATCCl1 provided a high power, high
frequency single side band (SSB) radio terminal and operating team which
was installed at Glenview NAS. This facility, which provides 4 voice chan
nels plus teletype, was terminated at the Fast Coast Defense Communication
System entry point with channels extended to the DA AOC and the DACC.
Throughout this operation the facility worked well on the transmit side
but was only usable on the receiver side for 30 minutes just before ter
mination of TFC. No requirement for utilization of this capability arose
during the operation and the requirement for this facility is questionable.
(8) Motor Messenger Service. Motor Messenger Service was provided
between TFC Main and Rear (1 run) and Between TFC Jain and subordinate bri
gades (1 run). This service proved invaluable and still constitutes a re
liable and in this case a quick communication means. Five i ton vehicles
with 2 man teams were taken to Chicago and this proved to be too many. It
is planned to take 3 teams in the future.
(9) DA required hotlines.
(a) Seven hotline telephones came into the Chicago area
from Washington, D.C. These are:
1. 2 to TFC switchboard.
l. 1 to TF CG hotel room.
1 to CSA Representatives hotel room.
i
1 to TF CG office.
40
,2. 1 to Assistant Attorney General.
2
1 to TF G2 from ACSI G2.
I
~
(b) Two hotline telephones came from HcDill AFB to control
troops being airlifted back to their home stations. One terminated at
O'Hare Air Reserve Operations building and one in building 25 at Glenview
liAS.
(c) For additional detail see inclosure 2.
c. ORGAlITZATION AND EQUIPHclfr.
(1) Five signal organizations, in addition to organic brigade
communications personnel, were involved in the TFC signal "effort. These
were: the III Corps Signal Section, the 57th Signal Battalion, 141st
Signal Battalion, the STRATCCN, and one officer from the ACofS C-E, DA.
(a) The STRATCON team provided personnel ani equipment to
install and operate:
1. One AlIljMSC-29 teletype van.
,g. One switchboard (porUS) operations team.
,2,. One ANjrSC-25 SSB radio terminal.
4,. Five sedans with KW}1-2 SSB radio equipment.
(b) The 141 st Signal Battalion provided one officer and
one EN who staffed the signal office at TFC Rear.
(c) The 57th Signal Battalion provided personnel and equip
ment for :FU Radio, RWI, HF Radio, VHF Radio, Motor Messengers, and the
teletype terminal at rear.
(d) The III Corps Signal Staff (2 officers and 3 ~ ~ )
staffed the TFC 11ain Signal Office.
(e) The officer (mc) from ACofS C-E, nA served as the Sig
nal Officer to the personal representative of the CofS Army. This officer
provided invaluable assistance to the TF Signal Officer and is to be com
mended for his knowledge and attitude.
(2) Two officers and 72 Er1 from the 57th Signal Battalion were
employed. As a result of the experience gained in Chicago a new organ
ization requiring 7 officers and 63 Et1 has been formed for future opera
tions. This reduction has been made possible t h r o ~ ~ h reduction of switch
board personnel at rear, I'lotor Messenger teams (2) and use of HF Radio.
4
Some additions have been made to the TF signal section and :El-l Radio opera
tions.
(3) Twenty-five (25) vehicles (12 1t ton and 13 i ton) and 8
trailers (3 i ton, 2 3/4 ton, 3 1i ton) were taken to Chicago. Future
requirements for vehicles and trailers as a result of changes to com
munication plans are: 1 11- ton trucks with trailers; 5 1i- ton trucks
without trailers; 2 t ton trucks with 5 t ton trucks without
trailers. This constitutes a reduction of six i ton trucks and the ad
dition of one trailer.
(4) Equipment reductions as follows were made as a result of
experience gained during the TEe operation:
(a) One AN/GRC-46 ill' Radio vehicle.*
(b) One switchboard vehicle for Rear.
(c) Two Motor l'1essenger teams with vehicles.
(d) Two administrative vehicles with .Ali/VRC-41 radios.
d. AND RECOl'!l;ENDATIONS.
(1) Commercial wire should continue to be used as the principal
means of communication.
(2) Rvl Radio is required in the objective area as soon as the
first troop units arrive and a conmand and control group is established.
This will provide an early communications means and once wire circuits
are established will operate as the principal back-up means as well as
for Radio Wire Integration which proved invaluable during the recent
Chicago operation.
(3) One full duplex teletype circuit to the Department 0': the
Army Communication Center (DACC) in the Pentagon proved to be more than
sufficient for teletype traffic. Some consideration should be given to
terminating this circuit at a DOS relay station so that the task force
can use this circuit for all outgoing traffic and not require the DACC,
which is a terminal station, to act as a relay station.
(4) Hotline telephones into the area from Washington, D.C. pro
vided excellent command and control of Task Force Chicago.
* Two AN/GRC-46s will be on-call at Fort Hood plus brigade AN/GRC-46s.
5
(5) High Frequency (HF) Badio did not work well in the Chicago
area. ]bring daylight hours the circui. t was operative to brigade and
Task Force Rear but at night the system completely faded out due to lo
cation area interference. No traffic was passed on this net and the
requirement appears to be somewhat superfluous. As a result of this,
it is recommended that the HF Radio be brOUBht into the objective area
only after a need becomes apparent 'and on-call of the TF Signal Officer.
(6) STBATCOM provided HF SSB Radio (KWM-2) equipped sedans (5)
for use of the commanrl group. This means operated fairly well after
it was once established; however, the time it takes to establish the
means is great and due to hasty installation, operational problems were
noted. It is recommended that two telephone company cars using UHF :EM
Radio and equipped with a dial capability be provided at the airport
for use of the CG and his staff upon arrival in the objective area.
This means was checked while in Chicago and two long distance calls
were made to Washington with ease. DA (ACofS C-E) was verbally re
quested to investigate the possibility of providing & clear channel
in each target city for this requirement.
(7) STRATCOloi provided a high powered, SSB Radio at TFC Rear.
The need for this equipment, which never worked as it should except
for 30 minutes, should be reviewed by :DA.. Informal information re
ceived from DA (19 Apr 68) indicated this equipment would not be prp
vided in the future.
(8) Maintenance support was provided by 5th Army at the Fort
Sheridan Command Radio Shop. The support provided was good; however,
equipment bad to be evacuated by the requiring uni t to Fort Sheridan
and then picked up when the equipment was repaired. The turn-around
time was excessive. It is strongly recomT:ended that the supporting
army provide one or two van mounted electronic repair trucks in the
objective area in order to reduce the turn-around time.
(9) A requirement existed during the TFC operation to resupply
BA-279 batteries for the AN/PRC-10 radios. The 5th Army supply team
reacted well to this requirement and had a portion of the requirement
was air-lifted .into Chicago. The batteries received, however, were from
Camp McCoy, Wisconsin and were old or outdated as were the batteries
taken by the TF from Fort Hood. It is recomr.:ended that stockage of dry
cell batteries at Fort Hood and 5th Army be reviewed to assure issuance
of batteries that will have at least a life of one day.
(10) Close coordination is required between the TF G3 Operations
6
Center to assure requirements are known at the earliest
possible when decisions are made to employ or move any troop unit
of the task force.
(11) Support for (mess and billets) is required early in the
operation. Also, administrative information which affects the control of
troops needs wide distribution as soon as possible.
7
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