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Does the Coalition Forces embrace of the tribal councils in Anbar Province point the way to a more stable Iraq?
When Iraq becomes strong enough in our opinion to stand alone, we shall be in a position to state that our
task has been fulfilled, and that Iraq is an independent sovereign state. But this cannot be said while we are forced year after year to spend very large sums of money on helping the Iraqi government to defend itself and maintain order. Winston Churchill 1922

This paper aims to study the cause and effect of the Coalition Forces embrace of the tribal councils in Anbar Province and the subsequent emergence of the ad-hoc armed force known variously as Sons of Iraq, Sunni Awakening Movement and Concerned Local Citizens. The issue of Iraqi self governance and stability has long been of great concern both to western democracies and neighbouring Arab states. One of the major historic obstacles to unified governance in the country is the complex Iraqi tribal system. Tribal affiliations are particularly strong in rural communities where under the former regime tribal autonomy was often a reward for loyalty and during times of great duress even previously non-tribal Iraqis are likely to turn to the system for support and stability. Al Anbar Province occupies most of western Iraq and is the largest province in the country, it shares borders with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Containing vast tracts of the Syrian desert the region is largely rural with the exception of the two major population centres of Ramadi and Fallujah; the population is largely Sunni Arab with a strong and disparate tribal network. The Sunni insurgency in Anbar began soon after the occupation of Iraq by the US led coalition in 2003 and quickly gathered pace with former regime loyalists joining forces with foreign jihadists and disgruntled tribesmen in order to fight the occupying forces. By late 2004 resistance in Anbar had intensified and key cities such as Fallujah were under the control of the Sunni Insurgents leading to a series of bloody US led offensives aimed at crushing the Sunni extremists and restoring the authority of the fledgling Iraqi Government. The close of 2004 saw Fallujah and Ramadi in ruins with sporadic fighting continuing until January 2005, many insurgents had dispersed across the country taking their rhetoric with them and thus spreading the insurgency. The destruction of Fallujahs infrastructure and public services coupled with a high civilian death toll cast a shadow over the US presence with many Anbaris viewing the US Forces as foreign occupiers and therefore legitimate targets in a just struggle for freedom. Despite isolated successes such as the killing of insurgent leader Abu Musab al-Zaqawi in neighbouring Diyala on 6th June 2006 the US Military position in Anbar was growing increasingly precarious. With casualties mounting many in the high echelons of US command feared the situation irredeemable while the attitude of sub unit commanders in the province grew steadily more pessimistic, confirmed by a USMC report that stated The prospects for securing that country's (Iraqs) western Anbar province are dim and there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do there 1 . And yet on 1st September 2008 not two years after the USMCs damning observation Al Anbar became the tenth, and first Sunni, province to transition into Provincial Iraqi Control. But just how did what came to be known by many in the western media as the Anbar Miracle 2 come to pass?

1 Dafna Linzer and Thomas E. Ricks, Marines' Outlook in Iraq: Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker, Washington
Post (28 November 2006), A1.

2 James Kitfield, Can The 'Anbar Miracle' Be Repeated? National Journal (19 July 2010)

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By 2006 Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) was the most powerful and cohesive insurgent group operating in Anbar and appeared to be gathering support from previously disparate groups uniting them under the AQI banner in their opposition to US occupation. But early in 2007 AQIs increasingly hardline Islamist stance coupled with its reliance on foreign Jihadists began to isolate areas of the population. The subtle shift from Mudjahadeen style guerilla fighting against US forces to sectarian killings and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) targeting, unnoticed at first began to gather pace and many smaller terror groups when absorbed by AQI were instructed to focus future attacks on members of the Government and ISF, those groups that refused to engage in attacks against their countrymen were pronounced Apostates by AQI and were ordered to be beheaded 3. Around this time Anbar began to see a pronounced increase in attacks on Anbaris working within Government with Governor Mamoon Sami Rashid surviving 29 assassination attempts alone; anarchy appeared to be descending upon Anbar orchestrated it seemed by AQI. With crumbling infrastructure, an impotent Government and factional foreign Jihadists vying for supremacy many Iraqis began to return to traditional tribal groupings for comfort and advice, as one prominent Anbari put it: If we had a modern state, we wouldn't have to rely on the rule of tribes, [but until then] a little bit of evil is better than more. 4 Historical enmities were put aside as Tribal leaders began to meet in greater numbers presenting a unified front eventually to become known as Awakening Councils or Sahwa in an attempt to fight AQI who offered, as one Anbari Sheikh put it Only death 5 In January 2007 at roughly the same time as tribal militias were fighting AQI in Anbar, General David Petraeus took command of the Multi National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). Soon after assuming command Petraeus embarked on a program of Surge operations, destroying the power bases of AQI whilst simultaneously offering reconciliation to disillusioned insurgent fighters. So by flying in the face of conventional wisdom and accepted Counter insurgency Operations (COIN) doctrine 6 (of which he was the co-author) General Petraeus created in Al Anbar what the New York Times described as a Golden opportunity for tribal engagement. The Awakening Councils finally felt able to accept the reconciliation overtures offered by USF-I and soon Sahwas across Anbar were integrating their tribal militias into the ISF taking on duties such as the manning of checkpoints thus freeing up police and troops for other, more strategic duties. Sahwa were initially paid by the US Government and trained by USF-I, weapons were not provided and many simply utilised the weapons once used to target US soldiers. Stability rapidly descended on Anbar and despite early set backs such as the murder of one of the founding fathers of Sahwa Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, the Sahwa phenomena spread quickly across the country providing both stability and employment to former insurgents many of whom due to Baathist connections had no alternative but the insurgency. However, not all those within the the Iraqi Government and ISF are in favour of the continued existence of the Sons of Iraq (as Sahwa are now more commonly known). A source close to the insurgency claims that some 40% of the Sahwa are insurgent spies whilst an anonymous senior Government figure, whilst accepting the claims of Sahwa infiltration

3 Tareq Maher, New York Times (2 September 2008) 4 Anthony Shadid, Iraq Election Highlights Ascendancy of Tribes, Washington Post (25 January 2009) 5 Jeff Emanuel,Concerned Local Citizens' Program Grows into a Bona-Fide Phenomenon Human Events (18 December 2007)

6 United States Army Field Manual 3-24

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places the figure at 20% 7. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki himself has warned that the 'concerned local citizens' are an armed Sunni opposition in the making, and has argued that such groups should be under the command of the Iraqi Army or police. Whilst the absorption of Sahwa into the ISF continues apace integration falls well short of promised targets and does not look set to improve; at the time of writing there is estimated to be somewhere in the region of 50,000 Sahwa across Iraq. It is the authors view that the tribal councils have been a unifying influence on the fractious peoples of Iraq. History has shown time and again that Iraqis, particularly those in rural areas value tribal loyalties highly and that continued tribal engagement leads to a greater understanding of the regional differences and grievances of this disparate people. However, the presence of an armed militia of this size is clearly counter intuitive to the promotion and maintenance of democracy; indeed, as recently as 2009 some Sahwas threatened armed uprising and revolt in the wake of poor electoral performances. There can be no doubt that the present incarnation of the Sahwa is increasingly infiltrated by AQI and unless dealt with within strict timescales is ripe for exploitation by the very forces it was created to fight.

Mark Sekula 30 March 2011

7 Rania Abouzeid,Al-Qaeda Infiltrating Pro-U.S. Militias in Iraq, Sources Say Time Magazine, 31 March 2009

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