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DR HAMID HUSSAIN ON AFGHAN

WAR ISI ,MI , CMI AND MAJOR


GENERAL HAMID GUL
MY DEAR FRIEND DR HAMID HUSSAIN ON ISI ,MI , CMI AND MAJOR
GENERAL HAMID GUL

AGHA .H.AMIN

DR HAMID HUSSAIN , A PASHTUN INTELLECTUAL


BASED IN THE US IS A GREAT FRIEND

July 11, 2012

Thanks for forwarding an interesting summary of career of Lt. General


Hamid Gul based on your personal interaction. Such personalities
generate extreme responses from admirers and detractors. We must
remember that senior officers are just poster child of their respective
organizations. Many dedicated and professional officers serve with
dignity and honor and many sacrificed their lives in the line of duty. We
must differentiate between the acts of omission and commission of the
poster child and work of countless other good folks especially in
intelligence outfits. I greatly respect personal choices and beliefs of
officers and will limit my comments only to professional aspect. As you
are one of the officers well versed and interested in history, therefore
I'm taking the liberty to add my few cents. My comments are in red &
italics. Published sources are cited and where no citation that is based on
my own work and interviews with several Pakistani and non-Pakistani
sources much familiar with the theme.
Warm Regards,
Hamid
-----------------------------------------------------------Lieutenant General Hamid Gul
Agha.H.Amin
First meeting with Major General Hameed Gul 11 June 1985
Major General Hameed Gul visits our regimental field mess 11 JUNE
1985. This was at Shershah south of Multan
Person with sharp features sitting on Guls right and clean shaved is then
Lt Col Khwaja Mohammad Nasir (later Brig and with Pakistan cricket
team). A dashing officer who commanded a tank squadron in Battle of
Bara Pind Jarpal and was praised by Indian Armoured Corps historian
Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu as a brave officer. (Mohammad
Nasir of 13 Lancers is a fine officer. He was commanding a Squadron of
13 Lancers against 17 Poona Horse in 1971 war. Lt. Arun Khetrapal of
17 Poona Horse died fighting his squadron. Later, Arun's father
Brigadier ML Khetrapal visited Pakistan and stayed with Nasir. This is
an amazing and heart wrenching story and I may dwell on it sometime

later.) He is brother of Lt Gen Javed Nasir (once DG ISI) who was my


fathers student

THE ONLY MAN I SUCCESSFULLY


CONVINCED IN 1985 NOT TO SAY
PRAYERS WITH HAMEED GUL WAS MY
DEAR FRIEND SECOND LIEUTENANT
MOSIN ABBAS-PICS BELOW-MAY GOD
BLESS IS SOUL

GROUP PHOTO OF OFFICERS 58 CAVALRY MULTAN JUNE 1987

I MET HIM RACING TOWARDS PANJKOT WALLA ON HIS TANK-WHEN HE SAW ME ON THE JEEP HE STOPPED
AND I MOUNTED HIS TANK TO SAY HELLO NOVEMBER 1987

RELAXING ON SEATS FROM RR JEEPS AT END OF WINTER COLLECTIVE TRAINING NEAR TAMEWALI RAILWAY
STATION 28 NOVEMBER 1987

The general when I last saw him in 1986 was all praise for USA .It appears
that once the USA opposed his promotion in 1990 or 1991 he became anti
USA. (This is correct assessment but needs some clarification. When Gul took over
ISI in 1987, Pakistan and U.S. were still working together on Afghan adventure.
Gul worked and cooperated with CIA as part of his job and later when relations
soured, this connection was severed. American ambassador Arnold Raphael used
to call him our 'plucky little general'. CIA station chief of Islamabad Milt Bearden
who interacted with Gul respected him for his military virtues and of the view that
'Gul would have been a tough armor officer in anybody's army'. However, I tend to
agree with Bearden's assessment that 'Gul could make the slide from daring and
bold to plucky or even harebrained'. This is what exactly happened and the slide of
a 'daring and bold' military career to a 'plucky and harebrained' during his
intelligence stint was quite dramatic. Gul candidly told Bearden that he was a
'moderate Islamist'. The two discussed about which university Gul's son should

attend in U.S. Both agreed on Texas A&M University but this didn't materialize as
things fell apart. Bearden gave a US cavalry sword to Gul as a gift. (Milt Bearden
& James Risen. The Main Enemy) I don't know whether he keeps this sword under
his bed or display it on the wall of his living room like a memento from a previous
love affair. Many Pakistani generals have commissioned life sized portraits copying
the pose of great military leaders. A more befitting portrait will be Gul posing as a
holy warrior, sitting on a white charger with flowing Arab robes and brandishing a
US cavalry sword. In some cases, anti-American rhetoric has been used by many to
avoid any responsibility for their own actions. Bottom line is that every officer has a
right to criticize U.S. and its policies and there are one thousand and one genuine
reasons for such an exercise but this should not cloud the facts when analyzing the
performance of a particular officer.)
My Personal Impressions about Major General Hameed Gul
We did not professionally agree on many things and I do not agree with his
political views ! His ideas are rabid and unworkable.
He may not have liked my not joining him in prayers which 99 % officers were
doing to please him. A pathetic practice in an army full of sycophancy and
flattery and apple polishing .
In an army in order to rise you have to do what your senior does ! If he prays you
pray as in tinpot Zia era. If he boozes you booze with him as in Musharraf era !
On the conspiracy against boldness in Pakistan Army and how generally windbags
rise please see the scientific proof of this on link below.

A man of humble origins who self educated himself Gul had intense personal
likes and dislikes and could be vindictive. He did not tolerate dissent and
punished then Captain Tariq Khan (now LTG and Pakistan Armys best general)
over a minor tactical difference. Tariq Khan later made history by defying
illegitimate orders to act as a conducting officer at Guls daughters wedding. This
was a bold decision as Gul was a very powerful man in 1987.
While from May 1985 to April 1987, on various , then , Major General Hamid
Gul on many occasions praised the US as a great strategic ally, in exercise
debriefings and on dinner nights and visits to units of his division. He bragged
while addressing officers that the US 8 Inch SP Howitzers and the US 155 mm SP
guns were far superior to anything that the Indians had. (When you are inside the
tent, you know the realities and thought process is more rational and calculated.
Emotions usually take a back seat. Simple reason is that you have to face the
consequences of your decisions. In addition, future career prospects also dampen
the wild side of the man. In this regard Gul is no different than any other officer.
A close confidant of Mussharraf worked at key positions raking all perks and

privileges and reaching dizzying hights. When a mid-level officer suggested some
thinking through about close cooperation with U.S., he threw a temper tantrum and
lectured on the virtues of alliance with U.S. After retirement, he got his marbles
back about how bad America is to Pakistan's health. After hanging the boots, one
is free of facing any consequences. Add to this personal interests and emotions and
you can get a pretty confused soul at your hand. Once you are outside the tent, you
are free to piss any amount inside the tent.)
The Americans no doubt feared him and were apprehensive about having a
Pakistani COAS who was not a yes man! (Any Pakistani Chief will look for
Pakistan's interests. Sometimes he will cooperate while at other times he will resist
pressures from Washington. This has been the case all along. It depends on the
individual personality, how he achieves this balance. As far as Gul is concerned,
Arnold Raphael; a political animal had some inkling in early 1987 about how
things will unfold in Washington and it was not due to any grand conspiracy or
grand visions but he had some knowledge of how the game is played in
Washington. This mainly relates to internal wars of various government agencies
and Congress. Raphael said, "we can expect attacks on about everything Gul and
ISI do from now on. As long as it was about winning a war, the hill was quite. But
with it looking like the Soviets are quitting, the sharks have already started circling
your plucky little general". (Bearden. The Main Enemy). Fast forward to two
decades down the road and same thing is happening again. By the way, if someone
is paying for all the expensive 'boy toys', then he will try to influence which boys
should be allowed to play with the toys. On their part, the boys will try their own
hand saying to the bully that 'hey; just give us the toys and leave us alone'. This is
the nature of the game played between Washington and Islamabad for the last
several decades. In fact, this is the only game played between nations. Smart ones
either stay far away from elephants no matter whether they are mating or fighting
or try to extract maximum benefits from the transactions. There is no third way.)
An aviation officer who went for an official visit to Pentagon in 1991-92 confirmed
that the US DOD and State Department had deep apprehensions about Guls
geopolitical views filled with extreme Pan Islamism and were instrumental in
insuring , through their own means not to appoint him as army chief. To do this it is
likely that they used their influence in the Pakistani establishment. In the interview
below Gul admits that his anti Americanism dates from the US opposition to his
promotion to army chief. I am not advocating that Gul should have become the
army chief at all but merely making a general observation about how things
should not be.
Pakistan may be brimming with anti Americanism but at the highest level it

remains a US mistress and keep since the US has deep penetration. An Islamist
coup or any nationalist coup is most unlikely as the majority Punjabi officers are
spinless and do not have the fire of Khosti Pashtuns like my dear friend Aslam
Watanjar. (Coup is bad whether right or left. Similarly, depending on any one
power whether capitalist or Communist is also not a sound policy for a developing
country. They may be well intentioned but they put the country called Afghanistan
in a free fall and the results of that crash landing are visible to everybody. I
personally disagree with views of Communist officers, however majority of
Communist leaders of Afghanistan were much more patriotic and not corrupt.
Many lived humble lives and some died penniless in exile despite being at the helm
of affairs of Afghanistan. They were head and shoulders above the so called
warriors of Islam who took handouts from foreigners and happily destroyed their
country. The destruction, killings and rapes committed by these warriors of Islam
were thousand times worse than the atheist Soviets. This is the tragic chapter of
Afghan history that no one in Afghanistan & Pakistan is willing to read.)
It is a tragedy that USA decides who should be or should not be an army chief in
this country , if it can be called one ! Pathetic place! (In my view, US role in
selection of army chief or any other senior officer is exaggerated in Pakistan. U.S.
has very limited role if any in this. Off course, they may show displeasure about any
particular officer but even that has its limits. See Exhibit A: General David
Petraeus during one of his visits to Pakistan complained about COS of XI Corps
Brigadier Amir Riaz that he was not cooperating (Wiki leaks Cables). General
Kayani took a note of this. Amir was promoted Major General and given command
of prestigious Lahore Division. The only one case that I'm aware of is probably
that of DGISI Lt. General Javed Nasir. US showed its extreme displeasure and that
may have prompted General Kakar to ease this chap out. If this is true then it was
actually a US favor to Pakistan as Nasir had truly become a loose canon. Almost
all officers have a very low opinion of Nasir both on professional and personal
grounds. Many think that his tenure was disastrous for ISI. Those who worked
with him considered him extremely self righteous and highly opinionated. He was
more interested in proselytization rather than any professional chores. He
embarrassed fellow delegates during foreign visits by his 'bizarre' behavior. In his
own words, he presents his resume with the statement that 'I was the first Pakistani
Lt. General with full beard'. It is up to Pakistanis to figure this out but outsiders
'pee in their pants' at the thought of such folks at the helm of important
institutions. That such luminaries have served as instructors & Chief Instructors at
prestigious National Defence College where senior officers are trained makes one
wonder at the selection criteria. By the way, Gul claims that Gulbadin Hikmatyar
met President Ishaque and advised him to appoint Gul as army chief. (Shuja

Nawaz. Crossed Swords). Well, if Gul can decide about a major Afghan military
operation sitting with U.S. ambassador in a room where no Afghan is present then
probably it is appropriate that an Afghan militia commander is meeting President of
Pakistan and suggesting to him who should be appointed the commander in chief
of Pakistan army.)
My personal differences aside the general was one of the few really outstanding
professionals that I saw General Hameed Gul was miles above Kakar and
Musharraf who were pygmies when compared to Hameed Gul ! An outstanding
trainer of troops and extremely sharp and intelligent (Evaluation of officers who
serve at higher positions at ISI and MI should be split between their normal
military career and their career as intelligence officers. The criteria for these jobs
are different. Gul's military career was excellent and I agree that he was an
intelligent and professional officer. This should be qualified by what is the
definition of a good officer? Many would agree that it is performance in war and
not running peacetime exercises that defines if an officer is good or bad. By this
criterion, I liked this comment about Gul from an astute observer, 'well in his thirty
plus year military career, he was asked only ONCE to plan and execute a military
operation; i.e. Jalalabad operation 1989 and the results are for every one to see.
When President Najib was asked what happened in Jalalabad, he smiled and said
'they (Pakistan) had a great plan; the only thing missing was that they never
calculated what we will do'. I think this sums up the whole security policy of the
last sixty years. His thought process and actions as DGISI were dangerously
flawed and his own organization and country paid a heavy price. In my view, with
very few exceptions, the hubris at that level is such that they are not willing to
dispassionately analyze any given policy option. I'll give example of Jalalabad
operation. Veteran Pushtun leader Ghafar Khan died in 1988 and he was buried in
Jalalabd. A large number of Pushtuns from Pakistan accompanied the funeral.
Several ISI officers also went with the funeral and gave a detailed report after their
trip. They provided detailed accounts of city's defenses. Later when operation was
planned, they advised against it citing city's defenses and inability of Mujahedeen
to wage a conventional assault on a fortified town. No one bothered about these
crucial operational 'distractions' as decision was already made. It will not be fair to
simply blame one individual no matter how influential for a flawed policy. Benazir
pushed for the offensive. Gul had a fair share in the failures but he was not the
only one responsible for the fallout from a policy. I think Lt. General Asad
Durrani's case is similar. He is well respected by peers and juniors and considered
a cerebral officer. His military career was very good. However, his stint at
intelligence organizations and associated 'extra curricular activities' cast a long
shadow over his personality. The case of Pakistan is unusual in view of posting of

serving officers to run intelligence organizations with no clear defined boundaries.


In addition, same organizations are directly involved in operations. In some cases,
no written orders are issued but crucial operations are performed simply on verbal
orders. ISI and MI now resemble coalmines. Otherwise fine officers rotating
through these outfits get a lot of soot on their hands.)
The then corps commander Raja Saroop Khan, his direct senior then , in league
with an intriguing brigade commander serving under Gul did his best to undermine
Gul ! However Gul was so outstanding that nothing could stop him from getting
promoted to three star and going on to head the ISI !
Colonel Sardar Yahya Effendi and Brigadier Sikandar Ahmad (brother of Akbar
S Ahmad ) both close friends served with him in the ISI rated him very highly !
Gul was initially dead against Sikandar in 1984 when Sikandar was placed on
adverse report by his brigade commander Jafar Khan. My regimental officer and
close friend Colonel Sardar Yahya Effendi also served with my father as a GSO2 in
1974 in the Military Operations Directorate (photo below) .
Effendi was not promoted because of biased non professionals like General
Rahimuddin famous for absenting himself from his brigade in 1971 war ! Effendi
was an outstanding officer and was simply not the windbag who rises to two or
three star ranks in indo pak armies barring few exceptions !
Effendi then serving in ISI narrated that General Akhtar Abdul rahman was
so professionally jealous of Hameed Gul that he had many documents destroyed
so that Hameed Gul could not do as well or one should say as bad as
Akhtar ! (Some background is essential to understand the dynamics. Gul was at
MI when Akhtar was at ISI. Akhtar was close to Zia but Zia was shrewd enough
not to depend on a single powerful 'spook'. Zia moved some 'eggs' to MI basket
and Gul developed a direct line with Zia. In any organization, friction of
personalities as well as turf battles are norm. In case of intelligence outfits,
multiply this by 100. Akhtar and Zia were the architects and implementers of
Pakistan's Afghan policy. Even other senior officers were kept out of the loop.
They were given short formal briefings during corps commanders conferences but
there was no meaningful discussion or input from other 'knights at the table'.
When Gul replaced Akhtar, he brought his own thought process to ISI. After
playing the game so long, it is very hard to let it go and this happened to Akhtar.
He continued his regular meetings with Islamabad CIA station chief to get updates
about Afghan adventure. In return, station chief got juicy details about inner
workings of senior brass. (Bearden. The Main Enemy) On part of Gul,

continuation of 'close circuit' Afghan policy run by DGISI and COAS helped him
enormously after the death of Zia. VCOAS General Aslam Beg was not fully in the
loop and when he took over after Zia's death, he depended heavily on Gul to
understand and run Afghan policy. This gave Gul great advantage over others and
brought him close to Gul. When Benazir complained to Beg about Gul's 'extra
curricular activities', instead of reprimanding Gul, Beg not only promoted him but
gave him the command of prestigious II Multan Corps.)
General Asif Nawaz was deeply professionally jealous of Gul and deliberately
posted him to the tank factory at Taxila. So that Gul may retaliate and Asif may
then sack him. This is what actually happened in January 1992. That this
incident could have links with US machinations cannot be ruled out. At that time
Pakistan also had a president ghulam ishaq who is alleged to be a one time US
sponsored man. (To better understand Asif and Gul tango, we need to rewind a
little back to the time of selection of successor of General Beg. The cast included
the all powerful 'old daddy' President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, rising star Prim
Minister Sharif and three knights in the arena; Lt. Generals Shamim Alam, Asif
and Gul (in that seniority order). Gul claims that there were six names on the list
with him on top and Asif at bottom while Sharif states that there were only three.
(Shuja Nawaz. Crossed Swords). Ishaque selected Asif. Asif was an ace himself
but he was also a person with strong views and quite blunt. The clash of Asif and
Gul was inevitable in view of their personalities and in the background of selection
process for the top slot just narrated above any outside factor may be negligible. As
I pointed earlier that once used to the powers of head of all pervasive intelligence
outfit makes adjustment very difficult. Once appointed Corps Commander of
Multan, it was expected that Gul will stay in his lane of military profession and
discipline. However, Gul had maintained his 'spook days' connections with Afghan
players and Pakistani politicians. Asif was greatly suspicious about the motives of
Gul. In January1992, Asif was getting ready for his visit to Washington. Now
Asif's dilemma was that as a norm senior Corps Commander and not a PSO serves
as acting COAS when Chief is outside the country. The senior most corps
Commander was Gul. Asif deeply suspicious about Gul's motives and his continued
hobnobbing with politicians decided to strike first. He ordered transfer of Gul to
Heavy Mechanical Complex at Taxila to remove him from the command of troops.
He promoted Jahangir Karamat and asked him to take over from Gul and headed
towards Washington. Gul managed to contact Prime Minister Sharif and tried to
override Asif's decision. CGS Farrukh Khan called Asif in Washington informing
him that Gul had refused to move on. Asif told him to put Gul at the disposal of
Ministry of Defence and if he declines he will stand retired. How military brass
came to know about Gul's decision? Gul called Sharif who probably in his usual

way may have given some vague sympathetic view and Gul called his wife telling
her that they will not be moving from Multan. This call was picked up by MI.
(Shuja Nawaz. Crossed Swords). Barnett Rubin (in my opinion the best authority
on Afghanistan) gives additional clue to Gul's another uncalled for interference
with affairs that were no more his business. A Russian prisoner of war was with
Hikmatyar. Russian Vice President Alexander Rostov (himself at one time guest of
Pakistan when his SU-25 was shot down inside Pakistan) was visiting Pakistan and
Pakistan had agreed to get the prisoner released and send him with Rostov as a
goodwill gesture. Gul prevailed on Hikmatyar not to release the prisoner deeply
embarrassing civilian government. (Barnett Rubin. Fragmentation of
Afghanistan). If Barney's assertion is true then it was an extremely reckless
behavior by Gul. Ghulam Ishaq and Sharif may have not liked this 'middle finger'
from Gul. Although Sharif was groomed for politics by former DGISI Ghulam
Jilani and Gul had given Sharif more than helping hand to reach at the top, but
Sharif had enough common sense. He could never allow the fox to come into the
coop. This is the reason that he gave the name of Lt. General Shamim Alam as his
choice of Beg's successor and not Gul.)
Ishaq was instrumental in not giving General Aslam Beg extension in tenure as
army chief in 1991 as Beg was by that time deadly anti American. (Off course
Americans had no love for Beg but problems between Beg and Ishaq as well Sharif
started during Gulf war. Pakistan had agreed to Saudi Arabia's request to send a
token contingent to liberate Kuwait. Beg started to openly support Saddam Hussain
causing embarrassment for the government. Saudis got pissed off and asked
Pakistan to withdraw its contingent (Shuja Nawaz. Crossed Swords). Idea of
empowering Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee - CJCSC was also floated
with the hope that Beg will be appointed to this newly strengthened CJCSC
position. Nobody showed any enthusiasm for this idea and neither Ishaq nor Sharif
was interested in extension of Beg's tenure. In fact, Ishaq made Beg a 'lame duck
Chief' by announcing his successor four months before Beg's retirement.)
In his later age Ishaq did become anti American , as happens with an ex wife or
ex mistress who has now been ditched !
MUCH OF PAKISTANS ANTI AMERICANISM IS LINKED WITH THE US
IGNORING ITS KEY COLLABORATORS AND BENEFICIARIES AFTER
USING THEM.THE US STYLE OF DITCHING ITS FRIENDS IS RATHER
ABRUPT AT BOTH PERSONAL AND STATE LEVEL.IF THE US HAD NOT
WITHDRAWN FROM AF PAK IN THE ABRUPT WAY THAT IT DID MANY
OF TODAYS GREAT PROBLEMS IN AF PAK COULD HAVE BEEN
AVOIDED. 90 % PAKISTANIS WANT TO GO TO AMERICA LIKE

MEXICANS BUT ARE ANTI AMERICAN TOO ! THE HISTORY OF THIS


REGION IS THAT YOU CAN BUY ANYONE ! BUT IF YOU DONT SHOWER
DOLLARS ISLAM WILL BECOME ALIVE AND ANTI AMERICANISM
WILL START. JUST LIKE A DITCHED MISTRESS .
However as DG MI (DIRECTOR GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE)
Hameed Gul failed to assess Indian intrusion in Siachen which was no doubt an
intelligence failure ! However my later research indicates that Major General Pir
Dad Khan and Lieut Gen Zahid Ali Akbar had a greater role in this
failure! (This is a whole separate bedtime story for another time. Suffice to say that
Lt. General Zahid Ali Akbar had just taken over from Lt. General Jahandad Khan
in March; probably Indians were already across by that time. Major General Pir
Dad Khan was rewarded with third star for his 'great performance'.)
My close friend Brigadier Khalid ,then serving as aide de camp with the vice
chief narrates that whenever anyone mentioned Siachen Gul did not like the
word. Major Saeed Tiwana a great military scholar and a decorated officer
revealed that Gul admired the radiacal poet Faiz Ahmad Faizs verse as a captain
and major which indeed was a surprise ! (This is nothing unusual. In later days of
old age, Gul bumped into an Awami National Party Pushtun leader close to Afghan
leaders during a seminar. A bubbly and excited Gul told him, "We need a
revolution; We need a revolution". Pushtun gentleman calmly replied, 'well we
tried to do exactly that in Afghanistan but you thwarted it with the help of your
American friends; Now good luck to you.")
Major Agha H Amin (Retired)
---------------------------------------------------This is all history. What can the institution learn from the careers of such officers.
Well here are few pearls from an arm-chair Subedar Major;
Strengthen Corps of Military Intelligence (CMI) and make it a
technical arm like Corps of Engineers. Officers should be groomed in
the 'dark art' by training and rotations through military intelligence
outfits. Just like other technical arms, few officers from CMI should
rise to two and three star ranks to keep promotion lane open for them
similar to Engineers, Air Defence etc. MI & ISI have already been
expanded to an extent where these outfits can accommodate good
number of one and two stars.

DO NOT, repeat DO NOT mix and match command of intelligence


and troop formations. This has been disastrous as far as inner cohesion
of officer corps is concerned. There is deep suspicion and mistrust
between intelligence and operational commanders due to different
nature of the tasks. The only remedy is to keep everybody in their own
lane. An officer with no intelligence background when comes for 2-3
year rotation at MI or ISI at Brigadier or Major General rank does not
bring any intelligence experience to the organization. He is solely
dependent on his juniors. End result is bureaucratic lethargy. Another
problem is that now stint at intelligence outfits has become essential
for promotion to higher ranks and the result is that a rotation at these
outfits has now become like another step at the promotion ladder and
nothing more. With this mindset, interest in the field, competency,
capability, enthusiasm etc. are not necessary requisites.

Separate policy 'recommendation' task of CMI from policy


'formulation' and 'implementation' phases. If CMI has hand in all the
three cookie jars of recommendation, formulation & implementation,
confusion will continue to reign supreme. End result; More china will be
broken in the process.

Improve discipline and professionalism in CMI. Too many from


Subedar to Lt. General serving at MI & ISI talk loosely. Many use 'juicy
gossip' acquired during their stint at 'spook land' to curry favors and
advance their own careers. Remove the dead wood, punish indiscipline
vigorously and if you are lucky, you will get a robust CMI at some point.

Set up an Internal Affairs Division (IAD) keeping a close watch


on professional and financial discipline.

Streamline process with culture of record. STOP all operations


without written authorization. This loophole has been used by many to
avoid any shred of responsibility. More importantly, this creates sense
of insecurity among junior members. In case of an 'egg on face', seniors
simply throw a junior under the bus and move on with their career.

Only good spooks are those who are invisible and


unidentifiable. In view of target killing of officers, one option is to give
cover assignments (i.e. some desk job at GHQ in pension or cantonment
land section) to those CMI officers who are involved in crucial
operations especially anti-terrorism intelligence.

Coordinate with everyone but streamline intelligence


operations. Operational part should be separated from MI & ISI. CMI
should be restricted to intelligence collection & analysis. Operational
help should be from other trained entities. i.e. arrest through Defence
Security Guards (DSG), Military Police (MP) or even SSG. Detention
operations need to be separated from CMI immediately. Train
interrogators from MP and all detention operations should be handled
by MP.

This is just a very short wish list. Is this going to solve all the problems? Simple
answer is NO but may be things will look a little better.

PUBLICATIONS , RECOMMENDATIONS AND TESTIMONIALS AGHA H


AMIN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/92399986/Testimonials-Recommendations-andPublications

http://www.scribd.com/doc/83916444/Agha-H-Amin-Publications

BRIEF HISTORY OF PAVO 11 CAVALRY


http://indopakmilitaryhistory.blogspot.com/2011/09/pavo-11-cavalry.html