Judith Hauptman Introduction illustration from Sanhedrin 39a an apostate/ the Caesar (a matrona in another version) asks how

ow God could have taken the rib of man; is that not thievery? the daughter of Rabban Gamliel (or maybe it is the apostates daughter, or the Caesar's daughter) says that just as someone can take your silver goblet and replace it with a gold one, so too God can make his rib into Eve in order to serve Adam in another version, the answer comes from the mouth of a Rabbi from our modern perspective, the Talmudic attitude towards women is morally offensive we could just throw it away were it not for the fact that the rabbis literary and legal legacy rests at the foundation of Judaism as it is practiced today what is the best way to view the laws about women in the Talmud? in comparison with contemporaneous Greco-Roman standards in comparison with the Torah which they were working with they were not feminists, rather helpful to women it was a benevolent patriarchy the dissenters voice is not an aberration of the system we should not use law to write history, or vice versa we need to look at the sources in context challenges will come from both sides traditionalists will think she is misreading the Rabbis because they were not innovators feminists will say she is an apologist Chapter 1: Sotah introduction at the same time that it regards the suspected adulteress with such contempt, it sets up legal procedures that virtually guarantee that the ordeal...will never be implemented or that it will be ambiguous and therefore useless the Rabbis did not need to fear putting an innocent woman to death, since the water determined that she was guilty Biblical Basis for Sotah and Problems in Ancient Near Eastern trial-by-ordeal, the woman was thrown into a river a man does not go through with this procedure the lover goes off scott free The Warning and Seclusion debate about whether the warning needs to be done with 2 witnesses (as well as the amount of witnesses to subject her to the ordeal) (Sotah 1:1-2) R. Eliezer: the warning must be in the presence of 2 witnesses, the next stage does not

R. Joshua: both stages need 2 witnesses if she stays long enough to defile herself with the second man, she is forbidden to her husband (Tosefta Sotah 1:2, Sotah 4a) interesting points Rabbis take to mean warn Rabbis take to mean closeting the Rabbis were trying to make the procedure fit with standard judicial procedure we will see that the Rabbis were bothered by the discriminatory nature of the ordeal, not its barbaric nature a man should not be too tough on his wife, but also not to be too lenient with her (Tosefta Sotah 5:9) in the Talmudic period, even casual conversation with a woman was enough to arouse a man do not talk excessively with women (PA 1:5) it could lead to adultery (Nedarim 20a) The Ordeal in Detail begins 1:4-7 and continues in 2nd and 3rd paragraphs she was abused in a sense by the priest she was verbally berated her garments were torn and the priest would let her hair down reminiscent of other pagan cultures (see Hosea 2:5) she was clothed in black and her jewelry was removed all who wanted could come and see measure for measure is in place with her R. Gamliel: just as she acted like an animal her offering is the food of animal since she dressed for sin, God undresses her since she exposed herself to sin, God will expose her to all if the words had been erased and she said I will not drink, she is forced to drink it immediately upon drinking, her face would turn yellow how does this square with the more sympathetic passages this is older material Merit and its Protection if she had merit then she would be protected from the effects of the water (3:4-5) Ben Azzai says from this a father should teach his daughter Torah so she knows that merit can protect her R. Eliezer says teaching her Torah is like teaching her lewdness R. Joshua says a woman prefers one measure of lewdness to 9 of separation

R. Simon says merit does not protect Rebbe says it does protect what is pushing Ben Azzai? he is not happy with the Sotah ritual and wants the womans fear to be alleviated knowing that merit protects he is someone who only had a desire for Torah and not women (Tosefta Yevamot 8:4) opinion of R. Eliezer maybe means that she will be tempted to commit sexual transgressions best understood as attested to his belief about the intellectual capabilities of women (see story of R. Eliezer in the JT) opinion of R. Joshua women are incapable of serious learning since they are so focused on sex when men are with women for too long, they will not be able to stop themselves from some sort of sexual involvement (Kiddushin 4:12) the ritual is almost rendered useless since the husband knows nothing until years later if she has merit The Paramour she is forbidden to paramour and husband (Sotah 5:1) lest the woman tries to get a divorce and marry the paramour (Nedarim 11:12) the paramour will suffer the same fate at the same time as the woman (Rambam MT Sotah 3:17) Abolishing the Ordeal it was abolished by R. Yochanan ben Zakkai (Sotah 9:9) the husbands were themselves guilty of this self-same act (Sotah 47b) it was public knowledge (Tosefta Sotah 14:2) was it ever actually practiced? see Eduyot 5:6, JT Sotah 2:5, Yoma 3:10 Conclusions the Rabbis add the aspect of witnesses the Rabbis severely limited the cases it could happen the Rabbis got the paramour punished too the Rabbis introduced the concept of merit into the mix because of hypocrisy (in that the men were all adulterers) the ritual was abolished Chapter 2: Relations Between the Sexes Men and Women Alone Together a man cannot be alone with two women, his mother, or his older daughter unless they are in separate garments (Kiddushin 4:12) dealing with a case in which the man is sexually aroused but not

by being enticed a bachelor may not train children in Bible, nor may a woman (Kiddushin 4:13) maybe he would molest them? This answer is rejected (Kiddushin 82a) Tosefta Avodah Zarah 3:2 is concerned about this with Gentile teachers any woman, even married, will arouse a man a bachelor cannot pasture cattle or sleep with another bachelor in one garment according to R. Judah (Kiddushin 4:14) the Rabbis say that Jewish men are not suspected of this (Tosefta Kiddushin 5:10); Gentiles are (Avodah Zarah 2:1) also, should not be alone with women if you work with them, nor should you teach your son a trade to be with them too much the two men can be Cutheans (Tosefta Kiddushin 5:9) cannot be gentiles or minors cannot be in with sister, mother-in-law, etc. (Tosefta Kiddushin 5:10) the concepts of private/public domain were blurred in those days women were seen in the public sphere even though they were more domestic the reason men cannot be alone with women is because (Kiddushin 80b) also used to say that when tortured, women will divulge the information easily (Shabbath 33b) shifts the blame onto the women in a sense if your brother, the son of your mother, tries to entice you in Deuteronomy 13:7, comes to teach you that you can be alone with your mother Abba Shaul says that one man and two woman can bury the child (since he will be in deep mourning and not be sexually aroused) only non-promiscuous men are counted to be alone with a woman 10 men once took out a woman pretending that she was dead and raped her Rav said that fit men did not mean like himself and R. Judah, but like R. Hanina bar Pappi and his colleagues (Kiddushin 81a) Rav Amram the Pious once moved a ladder that 10 people needed to carry by himself because of sexual desire depicts the sexual desire as the Satan, an evil external force at first R. Meir and R. Akiva mocked sinners, then when they were going to succumb to sin the Satan stopped them because of the merit of their studies so too, perhaps the merit discussed in Sotah is that of Torah study

men are mocked for thinking they are above temptation (Kiddushin 81b) R. Hiyya bar Ashi always prayed to not have his sexual drive anymore; his wife (from whom he had separated himself) disguised herself as a prostitute when he was learning and he succumbed to her temptation and gave her a pomegranate; his wife proved that it was her by showing it to him; he went on the oven to punish himself and fasted regularly until he died shows that men have the competing desires of learning and sexual drive (see Yoma 35b that it is no excuse that you were handsome and had to attend to your sexual desires such that you did not study Torah, because Joseph was handsome) R. Hiyya bar Ashis wife and Tamar chastise men for unethical behavior gemara discusses next part of the Mishnah (being alone with female relatives) R. Judah said in the name of R. Assi: one can be alone with his sister but not live alone with her Samuel said one cannot be alone with any consanguineous women sexual arousal by female relatives was a controversial and real issue for the rabbis when does the child mature such that two separate garments are needed? R. Adda b. R. Azza: girl= 9 and 1 day, boy= 12 and 1 day others say: girl= 12 and 1 day, boy= 13 and 1 day there must be breasts and pubic hair this ends with an anecdote R. Aha b. Abba took his grand-daughter to bed with him; his sonin-law (R. Hisdah) got upset saying: you didnt ask if she was betrothed!; R. Aha b. Abba said: she should not be engaged, she is a minor!; he retorted: but one should not make use of women!; R. Aha b. Abba says: as long as it is for the sake of Heaven R. Hisdah says elsewhere that 3 years and 1 day is the oldest age for girls (Berachot 24a) also says he prefers daughters (BB 141a) seems to out of a desire to restrict the mishnah JT discusses sexual arousal in the family (4:11, 66c) limits the age to 3 years and 1 day for girls like the BT, it allows seclusion with a sister conclusions women are not portrayed as intentionally trying to entice men Philo and Ben Sirah describe women this way

Kiddushin 39b-40a: 3 stories of a matrona trying to seduce men, one preferring suicide to succumbing Attitudes to Sexual Sin if when a man refrains from eating blood which is repulsive to him, he is rewarded, all the more so with sexual desire which he lusts after (Makkot 3:15) the ban of women for learning was to not have the men be in relations with the women (Hauptman) a woman was considered fair game if she did not have a man to protect her (Tosefta Kiddushin 1:11) Mans Perception of Womens Sexuality which women do not get their ( ?Ketubot 7:6) if she violate the law Mosaic: feeing him untithed produce, sleeping with him as a ,not separating hallah, taking a vow and not keeping her word Jewish practice: going out with the head uncovered, spins in the marketplace, who engages in conversation with any man if a husband made an inappropriate vow to his wife (Tosefta Ketubot 7:6); they are both accused of violating he must divorce her she has to give the burnt food to everyone she has to engage in non-procreative sexual intercourse she has to speak about intimate matters with others she goes out w/o the head uncovered immodest clothing no modesty spins in the marketplace baths with others a man can vow not to sexual relations with his wife; too long and he must divorce her (Ketubot 5:6) one week according to BH two weeks according to BS frequency of sexual relations men of leisure: every day workers: twice weekly donkey drivers: weekly camel drivers: monthly sailors: once every 6 months the Rabbis say a scholar can leave for 2-3 years without permission see Ketubot 62b, in which R. Rehumi died for not coming back for YK to his wife

womens sexual desires are mostly kept to themselves (Ketubot 64b) Conclusions the seclusion was also to protect women and children from sexual exploitation others think the Talmudic depiction of women is that of a seductress; they are only weaving together certain aggadic passages and not reading halachic passages in context the Rabbis were engaged in a continuous battle with their libido Chapter 3: Marriage The Framework of Jewish Marriage called one of the most progressive pieces of rabbinic legislation (Neusner) in the Roman marriage, she only received the dowry she came in with when they got divorced the amount of the ( Ketubot 1:2) 200 zuz for a virgin 100 zuz for a non-virgin chapter 4 of kiddushin deals with her lineage, with along with her virgin status, is important the woman has the responsibility to do certain chores (Ketubot 5:5) cooking, cleaning, nursing, making the bed, sewing, etc. the husband also has obligations to her (Ketubot 4:4) to redeem her, bury her, support her he also has the right to her earnings the relationship is uneven he controls her money, time, and activity The Marriage Contract: From Bride-Price to Ketubah the was derived from the law of the seducer (Ketubot 10a) R. Simon says it is a man used to be able to pay the upfront (Ketubot 8:8) had it established that he would leave the in her fathers house (Ketubot 82b) then in her father-in-laws house then R. Simon b. Shetah said that he writes for her that all of his assets are responsible for the solved young men not having the funds upfront solved men easily divorcing their wives since it did not cost anything men are portrayed as impulsive with divorce; with priests, they cannot just take the woman back (BB 160b) Beit Hillel said he could divorce her even if she just burnt the food (Gittin 9:10) the 100 versus 200 zuz seems to be a remnant in some ways to when it was a bride-price

became almost obselete when he could add to it (Ketubot 5:1) were also crucial in giving the woman rights (Ketubot 2:9) he will redeem his wife and take her back, even if she was raped (except a priest- 4:8) provide her with medical care (4:9) her sons inherit her ketubah (4:10) after his death, her daughters can live in the house until they get married after his death, she can live in the house and take from his assets as long as she wants the shift from bride-price to led from a shift from a purchase to a form of negotiation The Betrothal: From Purchase to Social Contract a woman is bought by..., a Hebrew slave is bought by, a Canaanite slave is bought by..., real estate is bought by... it is the same in form but not content the value shows it is purely symbolic Consent to the Betrothal if he gave it to her and she threw it in the sea, she is not betrothed (Tosefta Kiddushin 2:8-9) she says, give it to John Doe, she is not betrothed; she says, let him accept it on my behalf, she is if he is counting out money into her hand she can change her mind until the end both of their consent is necessary (Tosefta Yevamot 2:1) the Mishnah never mentions that her consent is needed The BT discusses different signs of her consent (Kiddushin 9a) give, give has no legal validity give me a drink has no legal validity throw, throw has no legal validity Womens Initiation of Betrothal Tosefta restricts a woman from participating in the betrothal ceremony (1:1) she cannot initiate it BT says that if he said and she gave, it is a doubtful marriage (Kiddushin 5b) statements of Rava (Kiddushin 6b-7a) she says: give 100 zuz to John Doe and I will betrothed to you he says: here is 100 zuz, be betrothed to John Doe she says: give 100 zuz to John Doe, and I will be betrothed to him if she gives to him it is valid according to Mar Zutra in the next generation it is limited to a case of a man with means in which she gets pleasure from his receiving of the

gift because of Rav Ashis critic we do find cases in which women choose their husbands (Ketubot 22a) Conclusions the deferral of the payment was the most crucial step in the transformation Chapter 4: Rape and Seduction Introduction the Rabbis understand open country and city metaphorically the crime was mostly against the father, since he could not give her over as a virgin Rabbis, by allowing her to choose the marriage or not, made it less about this Rape and Seduction in the Torah the father chooses if he is to marry her or give over the bride-price in a case of seduction (Exodus 22:15-16) the rapist on the other hand must marry her forever, with no option of divorce (Deuteronomy 22:28-29) if he rapes a betrothed virgin, he gets the death penalty Temple Scroll conflates the cases and substitutes seduce for rape perhaps he does not belief in such a concept, thinking that she always succumbs in the two cases in the Bible (Tamar and Dinah), the brother(s) kill the rapist and she never gets married The Rabbinic Paradigm Shift: From Crime Against Father to Crime Against Daughter if one sees someone about to rape a betrothed virgin, he should kill him before he gets the chance (Sanhedrin 8:7) he must pay for boshet and pegam (Ketubot 3:4) based on how she was affected (see BK 8:1) Rambam derives the laws of pain payments from the case of rape (Hovel UMaziq 1:7) her consent is also needed (Ketubot 3:7) beraita says that in neither case does the girl have to marry the man (Ketubot 39b) the Mishnah never mentions this he must marry her even if she is lame, blind, or covered with boils (Ketubot 3:5) From Fixed to Variable Fine the kenas was removed from many cases in order to impose the variable fine (Ketubot 3:8) pegam depended on how much he affected her going price (Ketubot 3:7) the father of Samuel said it has to do with how much one would

want to have intercourse with a non-virgin over a virgin (Ketubot 40a) in certain cases, the fine goes to her (Ketubot 4:1) Mens Understanding of Womens Pain question of what the pain the woman goes through is (Ketubot 39a-39b) the father of Samuel: he threw her down to the ground he was objected to, because this implies that if he threw her on pillows, he would be exempt R. Simon says the pain is not much different from her having normal, consensual intercourse R. Simon says the pain is throwing her down on a bed of thorns the case of the seducer the pain is that of having her legs forced apart R. Nahman said of Rabbah b. Abuha: the wise women say that woman who is seduced does not suffer pain Abbaye: that the pain of a virgin having her first intercourse is like hot water on a bald head Rava: it is like the prick of the bloodletters lancet R. Pappa: like dry crust on the gums the JT compares R. Simons opinion to someone cutting off a wart of a friend, or cutting down his tree that he was going to anyway (JT Ketubot 3:5, 27c) if she said afterwards that she wanted it, she is not believed and she can go back to her husband (Ketubot 51b) Creation of a New Legal Category: The Bogeret the Bible depicts her as going from her fathers domain to her husbands with no interim period her father does not have consent over her her stages of maturity are compared to a fig (Niddah 5:7) Ketubot 4:1 a mature girls hymen disappears (Yebamot 59a) Sex with a Minor R. Simon bar Yohai: a kohen can marry a girl that converted under the age of 3 (Yebamot 60b) does not condone it necessarily; it only describes the difference in eligibility between when she converts before/after the age of 3 a certain kohen did this and R. Nahman b. Isaac got upset either he married a girl under three or, he married a girl who converted under 3 and he was concerned about lineage see Kiddushin 78b and JT Bikkurim 1:5, 64a if sexual relations were had with a girl that was less than 3, her hymen would be repaired

having relations with a girl under the age of 3 is like sticking ones finger in his eye [and has no legal consequences] (Niddah 5:4) 9 years old is a turning point for a boy (Niddah 5:5) his actions as a levir are valid he cannot issue a get until puberty if he has a forbid relationship, he is exempt but she is liable anecdotes about sexual relations with a minor; in both, the women said they liked it (Niddah 45a) Justinia got married at 6 and got pregnant at 7; she regretted the 3 years at her fathers house a girl gave an analogy to R. Akiva: a child of 3 dips its finger into honey; the 1st and 2nd time, he gets angry, the 3rd time, he sucks it (she was saying that she liked it); R. Akiva said she was forbidden to a kohen, he only said this to test his students they are only saying that the girls derive pleasure from it; as in the case of rape according to Rava (Ketubot 51a) find in a beraita (in Babylonian and Palestinian Talmud, as well as Tosefta) debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai about whether or not sexual contact between a mother and her young son, without ejaculation, disqualifies her from marrying a kohen (Tosefta Sotah 5:7, JT Gittin 8:10-49c) the JT above discussing if women who mutally arouse eachother are fit for marrying a kohen (Yebamot 76a and Shabbath 65a debate Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai whether or not an 8year-old boy can cause conception (Sanhedrin 69b) those who sport with children delay the messiah (Niddah 13b) The Rabbis did not think that little children caused sexual arousal (Kiddushin 4:12) Paul says that children should be married off close to puberty (Corinthians 7:36) cf. Kiddushin 41a, Yebamot 62b in all the above passages, the Rabbis are only discussing the legal consequences of these actions, not sanctioning them Conclusions the Rabbis made some important changes money from him to her crime against her, not him recognize her pain and suffering does not have to marry either one what about an unbetrothed non-virgin? they did not deal with it the Rabbis still viewed the whole thing more a marital matter than a

criminal one Chapter 5: Divorce introduction the most common problem back then was the former husband trying to reclaim his remarried wife The Biblical Basis of Divorce Law and Grounds for Divorce if he finds something unseemly in her, he can divorce her (Deuteronomy 24:1-4) ervat davar might be that she is sexually promiscuous, or something obnoxious a kohen cannot marry a divorcee (Leviticus 21:7), a high priest cannot marry a widow (Leviticus 21:14) a divorcees vows cannot be annulled (Numbers 30:10) debate about what is grounds for divorce (Gittin 9:10) Beit Hillel: anything; even burning the food Beit Shammai: only sexual promiscuity R. Akiva: even if he found someone better looking deeper look at above it is the last Mishnah of the mesechta, which is often aggadic only place where grounds for divorce is discussed it was not easy to divorce a wife; a large sum had to be paid; the Rabbis joked that a bad wife was one who had a large ketubah (Ketubot 63b) even though the men had a lot of power, they should think twice about divorce see Ketubot 7:1-5 for grounds for divorce and cases where she does not get her ketubah (7:6) and 7:9-10 in which she has grounds for divorce Roman law had the same concept that if she did an offense, she got no compensation The ketubah was instituted to make divorce not be done on a whim (Tosefta Ketubot 12:1) Standardization of the Get and Comparison with the Writ of Manumission A get may be written on anything; R Yossi says one may not write on animate objects and food (Gittin 2:3) Anyone can bring it except a deaf-mute, a mentally impaired person, and a minor (2:5) Gittin 9:3 gives the text of the get Marriage is not slavery A woman always owns herself She may own property while married She has a right to some of his property when the marriage is dissolved He has an obligation to support her Who is trying to discredit the get? R. Hisda: the first husband who is trying to get back at her (Gittin 9a)

Yebamot 10:1-3 Recurrent Themes: The Vacillating Husband and Compatible Divorce in 5/9 chapters, a husband that changes his mind is brought up divorce caused by the exigencies of life they were abroad and did not want their wives to be alone to help their wives get out of levirate marriage, they gave a get that would be affective before death (Gittin 6:5, 6; Tosefta Gittin 5:1) conditional get if he does not come back before a certain time (Gittin 7:7) Annulment of Marriage men used to cancel the get with a court in another city; Rabban Gamliel disallowed this for tikkun olam (Gittin 4:2, Gittin 33a) R. Yochanan: to decrease mamzerim Resh Lakish: to decrease agunot JTs understanding of RL (JT Gittin 4:2, 45c) the woman was afraid that he had revoked the marriage; thus she would consider herself tied to him, even though she was not really in Roman law, the marriage could be dissolved by either one saying: take your things for yourself Rebbe says the get would nonetheless be cancelled after Rabban Gamliels enactment (Gittin 33a) if the get is cancelled on a Torah-level, then how can we say that to upstand the power of the Rabbis we will allow her to get remarried yes, since they get married with the consent of the Rabbis Forced Divorce only one mishnah deals with a forced divorce (Gittin 9:8) non-Jewish courts let women initiate the divorce a deaf woman can be divorced and a deaf man can give one (Yebamot 14:1) if either lost their mind, they cannot get a divorce Rav Yochanan b. Nuri: why can a woman who lost her hearing be divorced, but a man who lost his hearing not give a get? a woman leaves if she wants it or not, a man sends her away only if he wishes to Hauptman says that Rav Yochanan b. Nuris statement/question is really rhetoric; he is asking: how is that fair?!? same Rav Yochanan b. Nuri who thought that R. Akiva and R. Meirs standards of women needing to be overly modest if they do not want to get divorced are too extreme (Gittin 89a) Forced donation of sacrifices and divorces (Arachin 5:6;cf. BB 48a) probably originally only about sacrifices and was later applied to divorce (first seen in Midrash Halachah) JT Kiddushin 3:11, 64c speaks of the Rabbis seducing the man into writing the get The amoraim used to force a get on people, but not necessarily with his will R. Mesharshaya says a get compelled by a secular court is valid (Gittin 88b) The Rabbis nullified that so that women could not go to the

secular court and get them to force the divorce The statement of R. Mesharshaya was fabricated the case of a woman forcing the divorce is limited to when he should divorce her according to the law if she wants to move to Israel and he does not (Ketubot 110b) they have not have kids in 10 years (Yebamot 65b) made a man write a get 3 times (Gittin 34a) if he has bad odor we force a divorce, all the more so if he refuses to support her (JT Gittin 9:9, 50d)