Taylor vs. Manila Electric| Paras G.R. No. L-4977 March 22,1910| 16 Phil.

8 FACTS

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy. They walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding

that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds. Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.
ISSUE & ARGUMENTS W/N Manila Electric is liable for damages to the petitioners HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

No. The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover." In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other

explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away. True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances. The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things.
Vergara vs. CA G.R. No. 77679, September 30, 1987 FACTS

belonging to the petitioner, was insured by the third party defendant insurance company and asking that he paid paid whatever the court would order him to pay to Azarcon The trial court and the court of appeals ordered Vergara jointly and severally with Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation to pay to Azarcon (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs. On the third party complaint, the insurance company was sentenced to pay to the petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party liability under its comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b) P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Vergara is liable to pay damages. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes, he is liable.

The requisites (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. The acts which caused the damages to Azarcon can be attributed to Vergara. The fact that the vehicular accident occurred was well established by the police report describing the same. The contention of Vergara that the accident occurred because of mechanical failure of the brakes cannot be considered fortuitous and could have been prevented. Also, Vergara failed to adduce evidence to dispute the presumption of negligence in the selection of his driver.
Elcano vs. Hill | Barredo 77 SCRA 98 FACTS

On, 5 August 1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to Vergara, rammed "head-on" the store-residence of the Amadeo Azarcon, causing damages thereto which were inventoried and assessed at P53,024.22 Vergara filed a third party complaint against Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, alleging that said cargo truck involved in the vehicular accident,

Reginald Hill was a married minor living and getting subsistence from his father, codefendant Marvin. He killed Agapito Elcano, son of petitioners, for which he was criminally prosecuted. However, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action for recovery of damages against defendants, which the latter countered by a motion to dismiss. Trial court
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether the action for recovery of damages against Reginald and Marvin Hill is barred by res judicata. Whether there is a cause of action against Reginalds father, Marvin. Respondents: Marvin Hill is relieved as

same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Marvin Hill vicariously liable. However, since Reginald has come of age, as a matter of equity, the formers liability is now merely subsidiary.

guardian of Reginald through emancipation by marriage. Hence the Elcanos could not claim against Marvin Hill.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasidelict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

There is need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation, which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia (73 Phil. 607). In this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for civil liability arising from his crime. (p.617, 73 Phil.) Notably, Article 2177 of the New Civil Code provides that: Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the

Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. In the case at bar, Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the killing. The joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending children is in view of the parental obligation to supervise minor children in order to prevent damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Art. 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do not any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. Order appealed from
REVERSED. Trial court ordered to accordance with the foregoing opinion. Jarantilla vs. CA 171 SCRA 429 FACTS proceed in

Jose Kuan Sing was side-swiped by a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City. Said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen car, was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla and that private respondent sustained physical injuries as a consequence. Jarantilla was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207. Sing, as the complaining witness therein, did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor. Jarantilla was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt". Sing filed another complaint against the petitioner in the former CFI of Iloilo, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil action involved the same

subject matter and act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027 Jarantilla alleged as defenses that the Sing had no cause of action and, , that the latter's cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch as when said criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect. After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of Sing. Hence, this appeal by Jarantilla.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Sing can institute a separate action for civil damages based on the same act without reserving such right to institute such action in the criminal case. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Sing can file a separate civil action for damages despite failure to reserve such right in the previous criminal case

Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. In the case under consideration, Sing participated and intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit against Jarantilla. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronounce ment on the civil liability of the accused and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. Sing, filed a separate civil aciton after such acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code. In Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al.: In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the ground that 'his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt' the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a separate civil action to recover damages from the defendantsappellants. The wellsettled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may

still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist'. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. The civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. Under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasidelict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence. Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages.

SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS VS. PIZARDO G.R. no. 151452 July 29, 2005 Facts: Dionisio M. Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries due to the vehicle collision between Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a Lite Van Ace. However the municipal circuit trial court was no pronouncement of civil liability. The petitioners filed a complaint for damages to the respondents pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil action citing Sibayans judgment conviction. And it was moved to dismiss by the Viron Transit. The petitioners opposed and contends that the motion to dismiss that be ten (10) years from the judgment of criminal action is the prescription and therefore it is within the period since it was just barely two (2) years had elapse.

The complaint was dismissed by the trial court due to the ground that the cause of action had prescribed; based on quasi-delict that it prescribes four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Again the petitioners filed a reconsideration that the complaint is not based on quasi- delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years upon the finality of the judgment. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was denied by the trial court based on quasi-delict in Article 1146 of the Civil Code that the complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular activities therefore it prescribes already. On the petition for certiorari the petitioners filed to the Court of Appeals it was dismissed the same error in the choice or mode of appeal. It also denies the petitioners motion for and the petitioners failed to allege that the petition was brought within the recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal. Petitioners insist that it should be enforced in the complaint that arose in ex delicto and not based on quasi-delict. Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of conviction. Private respondents insisted, pointing out the averments in the complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict in Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period of four (4) years should be reckoned from the time the accident took place. Viron transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case, in sitting Art. 103 of Revised Penal Code the civil aspect of the case were instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil case was made. Respondents likewise allege that the petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of the trial court. Petitioners filed a reply and the private respondents also filled a rejoinder both in reiteration of their arguments. Hence this petition.

aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee. The trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, this does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil waives the other civil actions but this is merely an avoidance of multiple suits. The action for damages based on quasi- delict should be considered waived no occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondets as available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto.

Franco vs. IAC , October 5, 1989 FACTS

Yulo was driving a Franco Bus when he swerved to the opposite lane to avoid colliding with a parked truck. The Franco Bus took the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus driven by Lugue. The two vehicles collided, resulting in the deaths of both drivers and two passengers of the Mini Bus. The owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus, the wife of one of the passengers who died, and the wife of the driver of the Mini Bus filed an action for damages against Mr. and Mrs. Franco, owners of the Franco Transportation Company. The spouses set up the defense that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising their employees, including the deceased driver. The RTC held that this defense of due diligence could not be invoked by the spouses since the case was one for criminal negligence punishable under Article 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code and not from Article 2180 of the Civil Code. It held the spouses liable for damages to the family of the deceased. The CA agreed with the lower court.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N spouses Franco, as employer, may invoke the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in denying their liabilities against the victims. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. The action is predicated upon quasi delict, not upon crime. Hence, the defense of due diligence can be invoked by the defendants. However, in this case, the spouses were not able to prove such due diligence. Therefore, they are liable for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Issues: Whether or not the dismissal of the action was based on culpa aquiliana is a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer? Held: The dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the subsidiary liability of the employer. Because the Article 103 of the R.P.C. operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the

Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the RPC and the employers primary

liability under the Civil Code, which is quasidelictual or tortious in character. The first type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the RPC, which provide that employers have subsidiary civil liability in default of their employees who commit felonies in the discharge of their duties. The second kind is governed by Articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the Civil Code on the vicarious liability of employers for those damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. In this second kind, the employers liability ceases upon proof that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer is subsidiary to the liability of the employee. Before the employers subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action where the employees criminal negligence are proved. Without such criminal action being instituted, the employers liability cannot be predicated under Article 103. In this case, there was no criminal action instituted because the driver who should stand as accused died in the accident. Therefore, there is no basis for the employers subsidiary liability, without the employees primary liability. It follows that the liability being sued upon is based not on crime, but on culpa aquiliana, where the defense of the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family may be raised by the employer. The employers are liable since they failed to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and/or supervising the driver. They admitted that the only kind of supervision given to the drivers referred to the running time between the terminal points of the line. They only had two inspectors whose duties were only ticket inspections. There is no evidence that they were really safety inspectors.
CEREZO vs. TUAZON, March 23, 2004 Facts: Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo

("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda"). His complaint that the driver of the Country Bus willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle in a negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent loss of lives or injuries, his negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and becoming disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand being cut. Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. Subsequently, the trial court issued summons against Atty. Cerezo and Mrs. Cerezo ("the Cerezo spouses"). The Cerezo spouses filed a comment with motion for bill of particulars and granted by the court. Atty. Elpidio B. Valera appeared on behalf of the Cerezo spouses. Valera filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying for the resolution of Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and for the issuance of new summons on the Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper service in accordance with the Rules of Court. The trial court issued an order resolving Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and the Cerezo spouses urgent ex-parte motion. The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted testimony of the plaintiff that he is entitled to prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper under existing rules. Cerezo spouses filed an urgent ex-parte motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. The trial court issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file their answer within fifteen days from receipt of the order. The Cerezo spouses did not file an answer. Tuazon filed a motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in default. The trial court issued an order declaring the Cerezo spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to present his evidence. After considering Tuazons testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in Tuazons favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Forondas liability because there was no service of summons on him. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezos employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision. She filed before the trial court a petition for relief from judgment on the grounds of "fraud, mistake or excusable negligence." Testifying before the trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and Atty. Valera denied receipt of notices of hearings and of orders of the court. Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence to prove the participation of the Cerezo spouses in the case. The trial court issued an order denying the petition for relief from judgment. The trial court refused to grant relief from judgment because the Cerezo spouses could have availed of the remedy of appeal. The Cerezo spouses not only failed to prove fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence by conclusive evidence, they also failed to prove that

they had a good and substantial defense. The trial court noted that the Cerezo spouses failed to appeal because they relied on an expected settlement of the case. The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The Cerezo spouses filed before this Court of appeals a petition for review on certiorari the Court rendered a resolution denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure to attach an affidavit of service of copies of the petition and failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment, with prayer for restraining order. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment in a resolution records show that the petitioner having availed of a petition for relief, the remedy of an annulment of judgment is no longer available. Issues: (1) Whether or not the case needed to be reviewed (2) Whether or not the lower courts and the court of appeals gravely erred in rendering decision (3) Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages Held: (1) The Supreme Court held that the petition has no merit. The issues are interrelated. An examination of the records of the entire proceedings shows that It is either by sheer ignorance or by malicious manipulation of legal technicalities that they have managed to delay the disposition of the present case, to the detriment of pauper litigant Tuazon. For these reasons, the present petition should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. The issues raised in the present petition to clear any doubt about the correctness of the decision of the trial court. (2) The lower courts and the court of appeals did not erred in rendering their decision, and was infact competent to decide the case in favor of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo even in the absence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos contention, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the present case. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil action because he opted to file a civil action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for her own civil negligence. this court affirms the decision thereto.

A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the RTC for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and its president, VP, treasurer, and Chief of Security Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. Petitioners herein sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article The TC overruled the petitioners contention and dismissed their petition. This was affirmed by the CA The respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasidelicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the court erred petition. in dismissing the

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. (But the court did not agree with the premise of the CA for holding such)

(3) There is a modification that the amount due

shall earn legal interest at 6% per annum computed from 30 May 1995, the date of the trial courts decision. Phil. School of Business Administration v CA,

205 SCRA 729

FACTS

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. This material situation does not exist in the present case. However, this does not

necessarily follow that the school is exculpated from liability. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso, the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a firstclass seat aboard the petitioner airline. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence.
Air France v. Carascoso and CA, September 28, 1966

FACTS

On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims and therefore entitles to damages? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. If, as petitioner underscores, a first-classticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a

schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket. Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat or, if another had a better right to the seat? To authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.