De Knecht v CA G.R. No. 108015.

May 20, 1998 FACTS: Cristina de Knecht and Rene Knecht- owners of a land in which they constructed 8houses: 7 leased out , 1 occupied by them. 1979 RP initiated a civil case for expropriation of their property for the purpose of using it to complete the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. CFI of Pasay issued a writ of possession but was annulled for an arbitrary choice for EDSAs extension. 1982 City Treasurer sold the property at public auction for failure of petitioners to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. Spouses Babieras and Spouses Sangalangs were the highest bidders. 1985 they sold the property to Salem Investment Corporation. The property was part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension, passed on 1983. 1990 RP filed Civil Case 7327 for determination of just compensation for expropriated properties. Writ of possession was issued by the trial court. 7 of the 8 houses built on the property were demolished. The Knechts refused to leave their house so Salem filed a case against them for unlawful detainer. Court ordered Knechts ejectment. 1991 the Knechts filed for a Motion to Intervene and to Implead Additional Parties after the trial court issued an order fixing the compensation of all the lands sought to be expropriated by the govt. The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision after finding that petitioners had no legal interest over the property. ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to just compensation. HELD: NO. Since B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the procedure for expropriation, reference must be made to the provisions on eminent domain in the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1. The complaint.-- The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. "Owner" when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refers, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation. The Knechts insisted that although they were no longer the registered owners of the property at the time Civil Case No. 7327 was filed, they still occupied the property and therefore should have been joined as defendants in the expropriation proceedings and entitled to a share in the just compensation. 4 months prior filing of Civil Case No. 7327, a case for reconveyance was dismissed with finality which resulted to the Knechts loss of whatever right or colorable title they had to the property. The fact that the Knechts remained in physical possession was based on their claim of ownership, not on any juridical title such as a lessee, mortgagee, or vendee. Since the issue of ownership was put to rest in the civil case of reconveyance, they had no legal interest in the property by the time the expropriation proceedings were instituted. They had no right to intervene and the trial court did not err in denying their "Motion for Intervention and to Implead Additional Parties.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. KER AND COMPANY LIMITED, respondent. G.R. No. 136171. July 2, 2002 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J Facts: Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City a petition for expropriation of portions of two parcels of land owned by respondent. Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening of the road component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City. The Regional trial court rendered decision of a fair just compensation for defendant Ker Corporation. However, it was challenged by Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways alleging that just compensation for site must be reduced. Petitioner alleged that when the petition for expropriation was filed, the tax declaration of the property indicated its assessed value at a lower price.

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking or the filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct in disregarding petitioner's claim. Manosca v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 106440 FACTS: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, MM, which was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo. NHI, passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of PD 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners argued that the intended appropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia Ni Cristo. ISSUE: Whether or not taking of a private property to be used for historical landmark is under the scope of eminent domain. HELD: Affirmed the decision of the lower courts. Public use, not having been otherwise defined by the Constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. It is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which the condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a public advantage or public benefit accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the two adjacent sites warrant different valuations 2. Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a fair just compensation.

Held: 1. The court held that there are no substantial distinctions between the lot in Site I and the lot in Site II to warrant different valuations. 2. The Supreme Court held that the valuation for Site I was excessive and unreasonable. Just compensation cannot be measured by the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration and schedule of market values. For the purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of the property is taken into account and such value refers to the highest price in terms of money which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public market. In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint which should be taken into consideration. Section 4, Rule 67 of

GR L-14355 The City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.

Facts: - Dec. 11, 1916: Petitioner presented a petition in its CFI, praying that certain lands (within Block 83 of the district of Binondo) be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement (extension of Rizal Avenue).

In this case*, YES. - The power of expropriation is not an inherent power of the City of Manila because it is a municipal corporation. Thus, the judiciary may review whether:

(a) it was given authority to exercise such power > Sec. 2429, Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) states that: "the city (Manila)... may condemn PRIVATE PROPERTY for PUBLIC USE. Hence, petitioner was given authority to exercise the power.

- Answer of defendant: 1. It is a corporation under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese community of the City of Manila 2. It owns of two parcels of lands petitioned for expropriation (it had a Torrens title for the land which was used for cemetery purposes) 3. Denied necessity or expediency of the expropriation 4. The expropriation would disturb the resting place of the dead and require a great deal of expenditure for the removal and transfer of the bodies

(b) its exercise of the power is in accordance with law > The land involved was PUBLIC LAND. It was established under Spanish governmental authority for the indigent Chinese. At the time of the petition, the land was being used by the general community (not just by a particular family). > There is NO NECESSITY for the exprorpriation given the public purpose because adjoining and adjacent lands were being offered for free.

* The answer would be no if the expropriation was ordered by law. - Answer of Tambunting (defendant): Offered and still offers to grant a right of way over other land without cost to the plaintiff People vs. Fajardo, et al. PONENTE: BENGZON, J. Facts: Juan F. Fajardo, former mayor,and his son-in-law, Pedro Babilonia, violated Ordinance No. 7 Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without permit from the municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza. Sec. 1 Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. Sec. 3 x x x If said building destorys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. Fajardo and Babilonia sought to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located

- Plaintiff appealed from the decision rendered by the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario (who said there was no necessity for the expropriation)

Issue: May the courts inquire into and hear upon the the NECESSITY of an expropriation?

Held:

along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. They filed a written request, but the same was denied. However, they proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and they had been living on leased property. Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is one of police power or eminent domain. Whether or not the issuance of such ordinance was within the province of the issuing authority. Held: The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive in that it operates to permanently deprive the persons affected of the right to use their own property; it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. The state may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. To do so would let the lands of the persons affected by the ordinance to remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. The power of the municipal council to require the issuance of building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As there is absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits or set standards for the kind of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not promulgated under the sec 2243 of the revised administrative code, and hence the issuance was beyond the authority of the municipality to enact. Said ordinance is NULL AND VOID. G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987 EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY (CFI Judge of Cebu ) & SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS: San Antonio Development Corporation owns 4 parcels of land in the City of Lapu-lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu. Upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1811, EPZA offered to purchase this property from the respondent for the establishment of an export processing zone. The petitioner filed for the expropriation of the respondents property to the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The respondent judge resolved this petition by ordering the condemnation of the land in favor of the petitioner and appointed certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. Thereafter, the 3 commissioners recommended the amount of P15/sq meter as the fair and reasonable value for the just compensation of the said land. However, the petitioner contended that PD 1533 has already superseded Rule 67 of the Rules of Court (appointment of commissioners who will assess the appropriate value) and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by PD 1533. The trial court denied his petition. ISSUE: WON the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining the just compensation in PD 1533, is valid and constitutional. HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed this petition and declared that PD 1533 (and that of PD 96,464 and 794*) on just compensation, as unconstitutional and void. The method of ascertaining just compensation on the Presidential Decree cited renders the Court inutile. It impairs the courts independence in ascertaining as to what is just and fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute a judge in the determination of just compensation. The trial court correctly stated that the decree may serve as a guiding principle, but cannot substitute to the courts judgment as to what amount should be awarded. Just Compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be well considered.

In the present case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as the basis for just compensation were made, long before martial law when the assessed values of the properties constitute a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the said property at that time. To keep the value of the lots on the basis of the documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost would be arbitrary and confiscatory. Tax values can serve as a guide but can never be absolute substitute for just compensation. It is violative of the due process, to deny the owner, the opportunity to prove that the valuation of the tax is wrong. It is contrary to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a clerk to prevail over the judgment of the court only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments were presented and after all the factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated. *the basis for payment of just compensation shall be, the lower value between the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator; and that of the market value determined by the Assessor (they basically have same content-PD 96,464 & 794) AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA 43 SCRA 360 G.R. No. L-26400 Feb 29, 1972 Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of

any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.

Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the taking. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents. FACTS: Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF The ordinance provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be

determined by competent City Authorities. The Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. Expropriation, requires payment of just compensation. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations. The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

REPUBLIC v. PLDT Jan. 27, 1969 FACTS: The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines set up its own Government Telephone System through the Bureau of Telecommunications, which was created (under EO 94, July 1,1947) pursuant to a state policy reorganizing the government offices to meet the exigencies attendant and for promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in its operation. This was done by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the defendant PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The application for the use of trunk lines was in the usual form, containing a statement that the Bureau will abide by the rules and regulations of the PLDT (on file with the Public Service Commission), one was that it prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948. On Mar. 5, 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications Inc. (not a party to the case, an american corporation authorized to transact business in the country and is engaged in reception and transmission of long distance wireless messages as well as broadcasting, radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic communications services) for joint overseas telephone service. PLDT sent a notice to the Bureau complaining for violating its conditions because the latter had used the trunk lines not only for government offices but also served private persons or general public, which makes it in competition with its business. As the defendant received no reply, it disconnected the rented trunk lines which resulted to the isolation of the country from the rest of the world except U.S. Then the Bureau proposed that they enter into an interconnecting agreement in which PLDT was willing to enter provided that the former would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission. It was not accepted by either party. ISSUE: W/N the Bureau has the right to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, in order for the former to utilize its lines and facilities. HELD:

The parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract without agreement as to its principal terms and conditions. However, while the Republic may not compel PLDT to enter into a contract, in the exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain, it may require PLDT to permit interconnection of the Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the governement service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Said power can be availed of even without loss of title, imposing only a burden upon the property owner. Under Art. XIII sec.6, the State may, in the interest of the national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation. The condemnation would be for public use as its beneficiaries would be the users of both telephone systems. Moreover,the theses of PLDT that Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair competition and was guilty of fraud and abuse are untenable because they were merely hypothetical and PLDT'S acceptance of the payment of rentals implies assent to its extended public use. The main reason for PLDT'S objection was the fact that the Bureau's telephone system expanded rapidly and to uphold its contention would be to make the needs of the general public subordinate to its right to derive profit from futrure expansion. Decision appealed is affirmed but the petition to compel PLDT is dismissed. Reyes vs. National Housing Authority GR 147511 Jan 20, 2003 Puno, J: Facts: in 1977, NHA filed complaints for the expropriation of former sugarcane lands (namely Lots 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and 6199) belonging to petitioners in the CFI of Cavite, the stated public purpose of which is to relocate squatters from Metro Manila. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of expropriation and ordered respondent to pay just compensation, with the expropriation court issuing an Order in Feb 24, 1989 instructing the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer in NHA's name the lots mentioned, ordering respondent to pay just compensation and ordering the defendants to pay capital gains tax on the properties. In 1992, petitioners filed a case for forfeiture of rights before the RTC of QC alleging that NHA had not relocated squatters from Metro Manila on the expropriated lots in violation of the stated public purpose of the expropriation and that they failed to pay just compensation. They are praying that the rights vested upon the NHA be forfeited in favor of the

condemnees and that NHA should be enjoined from disposing said lands. NHA answered, stating that expropriation cannot prosper on account of the defendant's failure to pay capital gains tax and other fees and expenses for the transfer of title to NHA and that they have spent large sums paying just compensation.Trial court dismissed the complaint in Sept. 29, 1995. On appeal, the CA also dismissed the complaint in Sept 29, 2000. Hence the case at bar. Issues: WON CA has erred in ruling that as expropriation court did not include a condition that should property be not used for intended purpose, it reverts to condemnee, as action to declare the forfeiture of rights under expropriation jufgement cannot occur. WON CA erred when it ruled that non-payment of just compensation is not a ground for forfeiture. WON CA erred in ruling against forfeiture in light of the usage of the property for a different purpose than that stipulated. Held: The court is not impressed with merit. The concept of "public use" is not limited to clear cases of use by the public, as public use is now synonymous with "public interest", "public benefit" and "public welfare". Expropriation of private lands for slum clearance and urban develpment is for a public purpose even if said lands are sold to private entities and is considered a furtherance of "public use", not a deviation therefrom. Also, the Constitution allows the state to undertake "A continuing program of urban land reform and housing" for the nation's needy in furtherance of the social justice provision under Sec. 1, Art XIII. Court also ruled that when land has been acquired for public use unconditionally in exchange for just compensation, former owners retain no rights therein and non-payment of compensation cannot lead to a case of recovery in favor of former owners. This is so as the lands are still appropriated for public use despite non-payment. As long as the purpose of taking is for public use, eminent domain comes into play. However, as the expropriation judgment states that paying of JC is not subject to any condition, the court found the CA erring in not awarding interest computed from the time property is acquired to when compensation is fully paid.The court ordered NHA to pay the unpaid balance of P1,218,574.35 with interest of 12%/ annum computed from the time of taking in 1977 untl fully paid, as well as the petitioners to pay CGT and to surrender the dup;icate certificates of title for the expropriated lands.