Introduction

Modern Philosophy:
from Descartes to Marx

0.1 Introduction

Whatever the definition given to philosophy, it is assumed that this activity wouldnt exist unless rationality exists. Rationality is possible only in as far as it is embodied in an action, whether linguistic or non-linguistic, and in thought, whether expressed or simply potentially expressible. There are other types of rational objects, such as a rational law, or a rational policy; however, these objects are simply actions and thoughts of a higher kind. Thus it seems that a proper examination of what is rational is intimately related to an analysis of action and thought insofar as they embody reason.

The history of philosophy can be described as the history of humankind dealing with rationality. The philosopher relates to rationality in two ways. First, he attempts to act and think in accordance with what is rational.1 Second, he makes rationality the subject-matter of philosophy. In this sense, recalling Hegels critique of Kant, rationality can be the instrument or medium of philosophical activity, but also the object investigated by that very instrument or medium. In the first type rationality is present, it may be said, only in the background of the philosophical activity; in the second type, it is brought to the foreground.

It is commonly accepted that with the beginning of modernity, the issue of rationality acquired a new dimension. It was brought to the foreground of the philosophical activity. Descartes, who is usually accredited with beginning modernity, attempted to show the independence of reason from dogma. The position of self-sufficient rationality dominated

A particular example would be logic; to think rationally, in this case, would mean to think logically or in accordance with logic.

the thoughts that followed the Cartesian revolution.2 As such, it can be said that modern rationality is at the same time emancipatory rationality. But Modernity is also characterised by the formalisation or instrumentalisation of reason; reason was reduced to mere effective application of means to given ends.

The focus of this work is Habermass reconstruction of reason; that is to say his response to the rationality issue that culminated in the modern period, and also to matters that surround this same issue. A proper investigation of his response necessitates a prior review of the contributions put forward by his predecessors. This chapter deals with the issues that stemmed in the modern period, from Descartes to Marx. This will be followed, in Chapter 1, by a discussion of the thoughts of Habermass more proximal predecessors, i.e. the Frankfurt School theorists. But before dealing with the particular contributions of modern philosophers, some remarks will be made on modernity itself and on the rationality issue that took over the philosophical scene of modernity.

Modernity and Rationality

The word modern is derived from a Latin word meaning in this time. In the English language, the term has two meanings. First, it denotes contemporary, present time. Second, it refers to a particular epoch in history that followed the medieval and postmedieval eras. (Kolb, 1986, pp. 1-2) These two senses of modern are sometimes used interchangeably, implying that the period that followed medieval and post-medieval period
2

This idea is highlighted in the work of both Spinoza and Leibniz (usually associated with Leibniz), who employ the principle of sufficient reason. This principle states that nothing can be so without there being a reason why it is so. (Blackburn, 1996, p. 367)

is still on. Other times, the period that we are living in today is termed postmodern, implying that there is something in our present era that is radically different from the modern period. In this work, the first categorisation will be used, however without refuting the thesis that in our contemporary, present time something radically different is taking place.

Modernity is said to have begun with Ren Descartes (1596 1650) in France and Francis Bacon (1561 1626) in England. (Copleston, 1960a, p. 1) The former, usually referred to as the father of modern philosophy, sought to free certainty or truth from dogma. He aimed to attain truth by the use of reason alone. The latter, promoted instrumental efficacy as the criterion that ought to guide science. (Taylor, 1991, p. 104) He was highly critical of the Aristotelian science as it has contributed nothing to relieve the condition of mankind. (Taylor, p. 104) While these two thinkers can be said to stand in opposition with regard to the theory-practice dialectic as Descartes made theoretical reflection the primary characteristic of the human being, and Bacon outlined the principles of the new empiricalpractical scientific method (the novum organum, new instrument), thus making the empirical and the practical as fundamental both, in their own different way, paved the way for the instrumentalisation of reason.

This last theme, the instrumentalisation or formalisation of reason3, highlights the principal distinctive feature that sets modernity apart from earlier eras. In modern social theory, the discussion of the formalisation of reason was made famous by Max Weber. Weber argued
3

The two terms, instrumental reason and formal reason, have similar meanings, albeit different ones. Instrumental reason refers to the usage of reason in a means-end situation. In this context, reason is conceived as a tool or instrument necessary to attain a particular goal. Formal reason refers to a kind of rationality that follows from the application of formal rules. Formal rules are the type of rules that govern artificial systems, from the functioning of a simple electronic device to the functioning of capitalist systems and modern law. In the modern period, rationality can be said to have become instrumental through formalisation.

that modern life is characterised by the prominence given to formal rationality over substantive rationality. (Kolb p. 11) Substantive rationality establishes the values and goals that ought to guide our actions. On the other hand, formal rationality, deals with the maximum efficient application of a set of means to given ends, which makes efficiency and consistency the final tribunal of legitimation. In the case of the latter, the ends are not established by reason itself, but are self-chosen. (Kolb p. 11)

While it may be argued that the prominence given to formal rationality over substantive rationality is modernitys principal distinctive feature, it should also be noted that it is not the sole one. It is in fact, related to other major characteristics that helped to modernise the western world. The prominence of instrumental or formal rationality over substantive rationality gave the individual greater power in three principal spheres of life: the individual sphere, the social-political sphere and the technical-scientific sphere.

In the individual sphere, the individual became master of his own life. If no world-view can be inferred using reason, then it follows that it is up to the individual to decide on how to shape his or her own life. In other words, with modernity, the individual acquired more individual freedom. This individual freedom, is related to, and cannot exist without, a freedom that is granted and protected by a liberal state. Thus if the individual has more freedom, it is because society in general has been emancipated from the fetters of dogma (Habermas would later refer to this phenomenon as the rationalisation of the lifeworld, see Chapter 3). Finally, with the disenchantment of the world, that is to say with the sterilisation of substantive rationality, things are in sense up for grabs. (Taylor p. 5) They become mere raw materials or instruments for our projects. (Taylor p. 5) 5

A proper review of the themes just mentioned requires much more space than it was dedicated above. This introduction should suffice only to direct the reader to the themes that will be discussed in this work. More will be said in the chapters that follow. For now attention shall be turned to the major thinkers that dominated the early part of the modern period, i.e. from Descartes to Marx.

0.2 The subject as foundation: Descartes and the rise of the modern subject

Ren Descartes is considered the founder of a new kind of philosophy, a philosophy that posits the thinking subject at the basis of any rational and scientific inquiry. Inspired by the exactness and success of mathematics, Descartes attempts to develop a philosophical system using the deductive method employed in mathematics, where certain propositions are to be derived from a single, self-evident proposition. The system developed by Descartes was to have a profound impact on subsequent thought.

In the Meditations on First Philosophy Descartes sets himself the task of revising all his formerly held opinions. In the First Meditation he develops a number of arguments through which he casts everything he believes he knows, including his own existence, into doubt. He however argues in the Second Meditation, that while every proposition he had previously accepted could in theory be doubted, the very fact that he exists could not. There must be someone or something that performs the act of thinking for there to be doubt at all. Thus he concludes that the I exists, and that this I exists insofar as it thinks. 6

The importance of the Cartesian project lies in the fact that with Descartes the meaning of old concepts are given a new formulation. In this way, Descartes sets the philosophy of modernity into a particular direction. In his lectures on Nietzsche4, Heidegger argues that four central philosophical concepts, that is to say the concepts of man, thinking, other beings and rationality, are given a new formulation in the Cartesian system.

With Descartes, man becomes essentially a disengaged subject, i.e. an entity whose nature is characterised by its subjective experiences. This subjectivist approach is evidenced by the style employed in The Meditations on First Philosophy. This work is characterised by usage of the subjective pronoun I, and by a particular self-reflective approach.

The subject is according to Descartes essentially a thinking subject. In the Second Meditation of The Meditations, after casting everything into doubt, Descartes claims: So that, after having thought carefully about it, and having scrupulously examined everything, one must then, in conclusion, take as assured that the proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true, every time I express it or conceive it in my mind. (p. 103)

Thinking thus becomes the experience which confirms the existence of the subject. The verification of the existence of the subject is only possible because the subject is able to think. However, thinking is not simply a means to verify the subjects existence, but also that which characterises the subject. Later on, in the same meditation, he makes this point clearly, when he says: I am, I exist: this is certain; but for how long? For as long as I thinkI am therefore, precisely speaking, only a thing which thinks. (Descartes, p. 105)
4

Heidegger argues that with the Cartesian method, the following were given a new formulation: i. beings become objects; ii. truth becomes certainty; iii. man becomes subject; iv. relation between faith and reason becomes emancipation; v. understanding of the world becomes representation as picture. For a detailed discussion see Messinese, L. Heidegger e la Filosofia dellEpoca Moderna, pp. 159 -176.

The reduction of man to a disengaged subject requires that other beings become the objects with which the subject is opposed and contrasted. A subject can only be postulated if and only if objects are also postulated. There is no subject unless there are objects, or at least, one object.5 Moreover, a subject is always related to, or relates with, its objects. Thinking, which as said above is the fundamental characteristic of the Cartesian subject, is that act which relates the subject with its objects. But the thinking that Descartes seems to have in mind, as Heidegger points out, is representational thinking. (Messinese, 2000, p. 167) In any thinking act, there is always an object that is being represented, whether the object exists in reality or not.

If man becomes a disengaged subject, and other beings its objects, and thinking is reduced to mere representation, then rationality is also given a new formulation. It becomes nothing other than the correct representation of objects by the subject. Rationality is reduced by Descartes to perceiving something in a clear and distinct manner. To perceive something in a clear and distinct manner means to have a proposition whose certainty is beyond doubt. Heidegger points out that Descartes model prepares the groundwork for a rationality that would go instrumental. He argues that the subject in representing (thinking) secures the certainty of the object represented. (Messinese, p. 170) In this way, the thinking subject also becomes the subject that controls objects through representation. Consequently, according to Heidegger, rationality becomes defined as the disengaged application of thinking,

One may object that in the Second Meditation, where the meditator is only certain of his existence and of the fact that he thinks, no objects are postulated, thus rendering the above thesis incorrect. On the contrary it should be argued that the meditator, in establishing the existence of the subject that thinks, also objectifies the subject that is performing the thinking. In an act of self-reflection, the subject objectifies himself through thinking. Therefore, in so far as the subject is the object of thought and not just that which performs the thinking, it is also an object.

understood as representation, with the aim of theoretically controlling objects. (Messinese, p. 164)

Although recent thinkers have criticised the Cartesian conception of the subject and rationality, it must be acknowledged that Descartes was one of the earliest thinkers who recognised the Enlightenment principle that the subject has sufficient rational ability to decide on what is rationally acceptable. While de facto, he was probably influenced by the dominating powers of the time, namely the Church6, he nonetheless, at least on a theoretical level, sought to show the independence of rationality from dogma. Of this opinion is Charles Taylor, who in his Ethics of Authenticity says that Descartes disengaged subject is grounded in a moral ideal, that of a self-responsible, self-controlling reasoning. He goes on to say that this ideal of rationality is at the same time an ideal of freedom, of autonomous, self-generating thought. (pp. 103 4) Thus, in a sense, Descartes can be said to be a precursor of the Enlightenment thinking.

0.3 The Enlightenment

The Enlightenment, sometimes referred to as the Age of Reason, was a historical period that brought remarkable social, cultural and intellectual changes in the western world. It was a period where man, as Kant puts it, started to emerge from his self-imposed immaturity, where immaturity is understood as the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. (Kant, par. 1) The period can be characterised and defined by reference to
6

Evidence of this is the fact that he withheld the publication of the Treatise on the Universe in 1633, after he came to know of Galileos condemnation. (Scruton, 1995, p. 29)

two distinct, yet related philosophical 'facts': the acceptance of reason as the final arbiter of all issues i.e. religious, scientific and political matters, and the belief that reason and knowledge lead to enlightenment, which in turn leads to emancipation.

Probably, one of the most incisive expressions of free thinking in the Enlightenment period was the publishing of the Encyclopaedia, edited by Denis Diderot (1713 - 84) and Jean le Rond D'Alembert (1717 - 83). (Copleston, 1960b, p. 43) The contributors of this work, such as Diderot and D'Alembert themselves, Voltaire, Montesquieu and d'Holbach, differed considerably in the views held. For example Voltaire, at the time of the Encyclopaedia subscribed to Deism; on the other hand, d'Holbach, was an outspoken materialist. But the importance of the Encyclopaedia, which as its editors admitted, left much to be desired (Copleston, p. 39), lies not in its contribution to knowledge, but rather in its ideological statement: it is reason, and the liberty to use ones own reason freely, and not the Church or the State, which should be the final judge of religious, scientific and moral issues.

The idea that reason can lead to enlightenment, and then to emancipation, was of great importance to the philosophers of the period. The connection between enlightenment and emancipation, however, was not a new idea to western philosophy. The first philosopher to articulate this idea was Plato, who in the Republic had argued that enlightenment was a state that only philosophers could attain, and consequently he concluded that the best rule is rule performed by philosophers. The intellectuals of the Enlightenment were however, much more confident in the average mans ability to be enlightened. (Ingram, 1990, p.3)

The Enlightenment was also characterised by two important intellectual controversies, which 10

can be called the epistemological and the moral. Philosophers debated on the proper source of true knowledge. This debate is known as the rationalist-empiricist debate. Empiricists argued that there is nothing in the mind which was not first perceived by the senses. On the other hand, the Rationalists, contrary to their intellectual adversaries, maintained that proper knowledge is acquired through intellectual and deductive methods. The other controversy, the moral, was how to reconcile free-will with a reality that is seemingly subject to the law of cause and effect. If one accepts the scientific dictum that for every cause there is an effect and vice-versa, how is it possible for human actions to transcend causal necessity? (Ingram pp. 2-6) Both controversies where tackled by Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804), one of the finest minds of the Enlightenment period.

0.4 The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant

Two major contributions of Immanuel Kant are his postulation of an active mind with regards to perception, and his insistence that a valid moral theory requires an a priori deduced principle. In a sense, he keeps the Cartesian distinction between the subject, in Kant's work a transcendental ego, and the object or world. Like Descartes and the thinkers of the Enlightenment, he argues for the independence of reason from dogma. However, unlike the French philosopher, he attempts to show the limitations of reason and its inability to deal with metaphysical issues.

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On the proper source of Knowledge

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was written as a response to the rationalist-empiricist debate. The rationalists, as explained above, had claimed that proper knowledge is acquired through deductive methods. Descartes, one of the major exponents of rationalism, in his Meditations, provides the wax argument to make his rationalist case. He says that no one would doubt that the same wax remains when it is brought close to fire and melts even though the wax changes all its observable properties. Thus, he contends, the conclusion that the melted wax is the same one that was previously solid cannot be based on empirical observation but on the inspection of the mind alone. (Descartes, pp. 108 - 9)

The empiricists, on the other hand, had claimed that scientific knowledge can only be attained through empirical observations. David Hume (1711-1776), the most radical exponent of the school, maintained that truths of reason, such as '3 + 3 = 6' and 'He will either pass the exam or not' are mere tautologies, that although certain, are not informative. Informative propositions are what Hume called 'matters of facts' i.e. beliefs regarding the existence of things and their properties. These, Hume contended, by contrast to tautologies, have their origin in sense-experience. However, Hume agreed with Descartes in that senseperception does not provide solid knowledge. (Ingram, 1990, p. 7) Starting from an empirical standpoint, Hume ends up accepting sceptical conclusions.

Hume argued that certain notions we take for granted are in actual fact highly doubtful and cannot be ascertained. He denied that there is a necessary link between what we see as a cause and its perceived effect. The link, he maintained, is constructed by the mind out of 12

habit, and cannot be rationally inferred that future events will conform to past events. (Ingram p. 7) Apart from casual necessity, Hume also deconstructed the Cartesian Ego, and maintained that the postulation of a permanent ego is unfounded. He pointed out that whenever it is asked the question 'what am I?', the only rational answer that can be given is that 'I am all the ideas I have together'. In other words, there is no observable object which corresponds to the 'I'. (Scruton, 1995, p. 130) Finally, Hume also denied moral freedom, and argued that reason was handmaiden to passions (Ingram, 1990, p. 8)

Kant agrees with Hume in that causal necessity is not something inherent in reality, but he was not ready to accept his sceptical conclusion. He argues that the problem with the rationalists and empiricists was that both assumed a passive mind whose sense-impressions are imposed on it from the outside. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant proposes a revolution similar to the one put forward by Copernicus. (Scruton, 1995, p. 142) He argues that the mind organises experience by imposing its own innate structure on sense-perception. Thus, for example, the mind is a priori equipped, or knows a priori, that for every cause there must be an effect; when perceiving two distinct events, say a melting ice-cream and the heat of the sun, the mind structures the two events in such a way that the melting is conceived as an effect of the heat. In this way, the mind is envisaged as actively organising experience according to its own, innate, logical knowledge. However, innate knowledge on its own, or what Kant terms the categories, are empty; on the other hand, unstructured experience is blind. This productive notion of reason that Kant develops, as will be explained below, must also assume a unity of consciousness, without which no active organisation of experience would ever be possible.

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The Unity of Apperception, Freedom, Morality

In The Critique of Pure Reason Kant deals with a number of antinomies of reason. An antinomy is a paradox that arises when two contradictory positions can be shown to be reasonably acceptable. (Copleston, 1960b, p. 286) In resolving the rationalist-empiricist debate Kant argues that the mind makes sense of the information captured through the senses by organising it according to an a priori structure. Thus, it was said above, that every event is conceived as having a cause, and as causing a further event (its effect). In contrast, actions, as opposed to events, seem to be caused by a spontaneous ego. These two contradictory positions, however, create a contradiction, an antinomy - how can an action, which is always also an event, be caused spontaneously by the ego, and at the same time be determined by an antecedent cause?

Kant argues that experience is only possible if there is a permanent ego that provides a ground for uniting experience (a unity of apperception). The ego is a necessary condition for any experience whatsoever. Since experience is real, Kant argues, its necessary condition must mutatis mutandis be real as well. However, he also agrees with Hume in that the permanent ego is never given in experience. Therefore, on the one hand a permanent ego seems to be a necessity for experience, while on the other hand, a permanent ego is never empirically observed. To resolve this contradiction, Kant distinguishes between an empirical ego, an ego given in experience but which is not permanent, and a transcendental ego, a necessary permanent ego for experience. By postulating a transcendental ego as the guarantor of the unity of apperception, Kant was able to free the ego from the rigid determinism that the understanding seems to impose. The ego, says Kant, as an empirical 14

ego, is subject to the deterministic law of cause and effect. As a transcendental ego (whose existence cannot nonetheless be verified), however, it is not. (Copleston, 1960b, pp. 284 6)

To show that the two egos can exist even if they seem to be mutually exclusive, Kant also distinguishes between the phenomena and the nuomena.7 The distinction between the empirical and the transcendental ego holds only if a distinction between phenomena and nuomena is also made. The phenomena refer to sense-experience as organised according to the categories. Phenomena are observable events and objects. The nuomena, on the other hand, refer to the things in themselves. So, the empirical ego, Kant argues, is the ego as perceived by the senses and organised according to the categories, while the transcendental ego is the ego in itself. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that the human being can never access the nuomena, since he are confronted only with already structured senseperception. In fact, in The Critique of Practical Reason, he acknowledges that we can never prove that we are free (i.e. that a transcendental ego exists); but on other hand, he argued, we can show that freedom is not logically impossible. As such, since practical reason demands that we are free, for unless we are free we can never act morally, we ought to think of ourselves as free.

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant develops the necessary structure of possible experience, in other words, the categories through which sense is made of the world. Similarly, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he attempts to develop the a priori principles that are
7

There are various interpretations of what Kant actually meant when he distinguished between the nuomena and phenomena. In this work, we will stick to the widely accepted interpretation that by nuomena and phenomena, Kant meant that there is one object but two different standpoints. This is usually called the Two Standpoint/Aspect Theory, as opposed to the Two World/Object Theory. For a discussion of the issue, one can see Robert Hannas work, where the author develops a third view, which he calls the Two Concept/Property Theory see. Hanna, R. (2006). Kant, Science and Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon. Press.

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applicable to morality. Such a principle is called by Kant the categorical imperative. To explain what the categorical imperative is, it is useful to first distinguish it from the hypothetical imperative. An imperative is hypothetical if it is dependent on an antecedent condition that needs to be satisfied. For example, If you want to live a happy life, then you ought to act morally is a hypothetical imperative. Thus, a hypothetical imperative has the logical form of If a then b. For Kant, such an imperative cannot be adequately universalised; a truly a priori imperative, that is applicable to all actions, must be categorical i.e. not depending on any antecedents. (Copleston, 1960b, p. 322)

Kant said that there is only one categorical imperative. However, he also said that there are three formulations of the categorical imperative, and he then gives five formulations. Copleston interprets this apparent contradiction as meaning that Kant gave various formulations of the same, categorical imperative in order to explicate further the categorical imperative. (1960b, p. 326) The important point to bring out here is that according to Kant reason can offer a rational guide to morality.

0.5 Philosophy of History: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Hegels philosophy represents a departure from Kant's transcendentalism towards a more worldly definition of reason. Unlike Kant, Hegel conceives reason as developing in interaction and labour. It can be said, that the most important notions that Hegel introduces in relation to Critical Theory are his ideas that reason is shaped and influenced by the historical conditions it is faced with, and that it is dialectical, or dynamic. With regard to the 16

first, Engels, Marx's colleague, had said: What distinguishes Hegel's mode of thinking from that of all other philosophers was the exceptional historical sense underlying it. However abstract and idealist employed, the development of his ideas run always parallel to the development of world history, and the latter is indeed supposed to be only the proof of the former. (Singer, 1983, p. 123)

Both ideas, the dynamism of reason and the historicity of reason, are related to yet another important Hegelian notion: freedom. For Hegel, as it will be argued below, the development of reason in history is also the development of freedom.

Criticism of Kant

In the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel deals with the philosophical problem of finding a valid starting-point for philosophy. He says that philosophers have attempted to find rational criteria that would demarcate proper knowledge from mere apparent knowledge. (Norman, 1991, p. 9) Such an approach has been undertaken by both rationalists and empiricists alike. Descartes, for example, in the Discourse on Method, had developed a number of rules that have to be followed if one is to make correct use of the intellect. However, while what Hegel says in the Introduction applies to any philosophical endeavour which seeks to establish a set of criteria before engaging in any philosophical activity, it is clear that he has Kant in mind. (Norman, p. 11)

Hegel argues that the sceptical8 approach that seeks to delimit the use of reason has to presuppose three particular assumptions. First, that knowledge is itself fundamentally a sort

The sceptical approach is the approach that attempts to establish the limits of reason and the understanding before making any constative proposition.

17

of instrument or medium, and consequently, one must first examine its appropriateness before making use of it. Second, that there exists a real distinction between knowledge, or what Kant called knowledge of the phenomena, and real knowledge, or what Kant called knowledge of things-in-themselves (and what Hegel calls Absolute knowledge). Third, it must also assume that knowledge of the phenomena can properly be called knowledge. (Norman p. 11) Presuppositions, however, are themselves claims to knowledge, and any genuine sceptical approach requires that such suppositions are critically examined. Thus, any attempt to delimit the use of reason, is bound to lead either to an infinite regress or to circularity. (Norman p. 12)

In the Lesser Logic, Hegel presents a very clear criticism of the above mentioned approach, this time with an explicit reference to Kant: We ought, says Kant, to be acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is to be employed; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our trouble will be spent in vain Unless we wish to be deceived by words, it is easy to see what this amounts to. In the case of other instruments, we can try and criticise them in other ways than by setting about the special work for which we are destined. But the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim. (The Logic of Hegel in Norman, p. 11)

Since philosophy cannot proceed by first establishing the limits of the knowing subject, as this would lead either to an infinite regress or circular reasoning, Hegel proposes instead to begin philosophy by immediately examining phenomena. In this way, he avoids the dilemma of epistemology that haunts the Kantian approach.

The phenomenology of Hegel differs from the Kantian approach in two main respects. First, 18

it recognises the historical nature of reason. For Hegel, reason is an objective historical force that must be conceived dynamically or developmentally (Ingram, 1990, p. 11) Second, Hegel conceives the dialectic tension in thought as being productive, unlike Kant who regarded contradictions as resulting out of a mis-usage of the cognitive faculties. (Ingram, p. 12) To appreciate these two characteristics of Hegels philosophy, it is necessary to make some remarks on Hegels Phenomenology.

The Odyssey of the Mind

In the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel writes the detailed history of the process of training and educating consciousness itself up to the level of science. (Singer, 1983 p. 169) While for Kant science was the starting point of any valid philosophy, for Hegel it was the end of the philosophical process. He envisages the Mind as passing through a number of stages in a struggle to understand itself, to attain knowledge of the whole (the Absolute Idea). (Ingram, 1990, p. 13)

For Hegel, contradictions or dialectic tensions are conceived as an opportunity for the Mind to attain positive knowledge. (Ingram, 1990, p. 13) They are part and parcel of the minds progression towards absolute knowledge. The Mind first accepts an idea that it thinks explains reality. However, it soon realises that the accepted idea, the thesis, is countered by another idea, the antithesis, and which thus invalidates the content of the former. The Mind thus rejects the thesis and instead upholds the antithesis. Then again, a moment comes when the Mind understands that the antithesis is also faulty. It thus unites the two opposing ideas, into a higher more correct idea: the synthesis. This process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis 19

is repeated until the Mind appropriates the absolute idea.

The dialectical process is related to another very important Hegelian notion: the idea that reason manifests itself in society. Hegel argues that the progress achieved by the Mind in the logical sphere, is manifested in society as institutional and political change. For Hegel the logical and the historical are two sides of the same coin. (Ingram, 1990, p. 13) He views history as being powered by the contrast between the real (say a thesis), that is society organised according to a particular idea, and the ideal (say the antithesis). When philosophers or religious leaders make explicit or articulate the contradiction that exists between the cultural sphere (the social sphere) and the ideal (the logical sphere), a rationality crisis occurs. This leads to a revolution that attempts to adjust the real in accordance with the ideal. The process goes on until Absolute knowledge is achieved and society is made to correspond in accordance to the absolute idea. (Ingram, p. 14)

Hegel's odyssey of Mind is thus rooted in his philosophy of history. In the Philosophy of History, Hegel states that The history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom. (Singer, p. 125) Hegel conceives history as having a purpose, and consequently he engages into a philosophy of history, or reflection about the significance and purpose of history. His basic idea is that the development of Mind shouldnt be understood only logically, as in his Phenomenology of Mind, but should also be traced historically through different historical periods, as has been hinted above. Thus, for example, from the Persian period to the Greek period, he sees a development of consciousness, where in the Persian Empire only one consciousness has freedom, that being the emperor, in Ancient Greece the development of individual freedom takes place, even though this 20

freedom is limited to male citizens. For Hegel, the history of consciousness is thus also the history of freedom.

0.6 Marxs Historical Materialism

Karl Marx (1818 1883) was influenced by Hegel's philosophy of history. He, like Hegel, accepts the thesis that history can be understood and consequently explained with reference to particular historical and social realities. Moreover, he accepts the dialectical approach. Evidence of this is the way his monumental work Capital is structured. However, contrary to Hegel, he does not think that ideas stand at the basis of development; on the contrary, he argues that ideas are mere expressions of existing material conditions. This section deals with three main Marxist themes, these being his concept of alienation, historical materialism and his ideas on ideology and exploitation. In Chapter 2, the issue of whether Marx was a determinist or not, linking this debate with the schism that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century between orthodox Marxists and Western Marxists will be dealt with.

Alienation

One Marxian commentator9 argues that Marxs system of alienation stands at the core of the Marxian system. (Wood, 2004, p. 5) The concept of alienation occurs throughout Marxs work; however, it is clear that in Marxs later writings, the concept of alienation loses the

The commentator in question is Istvan Meszaros. See Wood p. 4.

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centrality Marx had assigned to it in his early works. In his fragment Estranged Labour' 10, Marx seems to be arguing that all types of alienation are but different aspects of a single system, where each type is based on one paradigm form of alienation: alienated laboring activity. (Wood, p. 4) In this text, alienation is assigned a basic explanatory role. Wood argues that although the concept of alienation occurs in many of Marxs later writings, such as in the Grundrisse and in Capital, in the later writings it takes a more peripheral role. If in Marxs early writings alienation is explanatory, in his later writings, it becomes descriptive or diagnostic. (Wood, p. 7)

Marx owes the concept of alienation to both Hegel and Feuerbach. Hegel, as explained in the previous section, conceives the history of humanity as a process of de-alienating Mind. On the other hand, Feuerbach argues that man is alienated when he projects an imaginary God, and directs his affirmation and love to this imaginary deity. The postulation of a God requires, Feuerbach contends, the degradation of human beings. To enrich God, he says, the human being must become poor; that God may be all, the human being must be nothing. (Wood, p. 12) While Feuerbach is critical of Hegels quasi-mystical philosophy, he however agrees with the latter in equating alienation with false consciousness i.e. an erroneous conception of mans relation to ultimate reality. (Wood, p. 10) Both thinkers thus, consider alienation as being essentially a theoretical mistake. Consequently, both argue that the remedy to alienation resides in a correction of such false consciousness.

From his early writings, Marx makes it clear that his understanding of alienation has to do

10

The fragment in question makes part of The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, which are sometimes referred to as The Paris Manuscripts.

22

with the practical productive life of the workers. In his famous fragment Estranged Labour, Marx says that the medium through which estrangement takes place is itself practical. (Marx, XXV) For Marx, alienation results from the kind of labouring activity that takes place within the capitalist society.

The early Marx, in the Estranged Labour fragment, develops a four-fold typology of alienation: alienation from ones product, from the labouring activity, from ones humanity or species being, and finally from other men. In capitalism, man, Marx argues, confronts the product as something alien, as a power independent of him. (Marx, XXII) The product that man produces in a capitalist society is never owned by the producer who makes it. Alienation in this sense shows the unnatural separation that takes place in capitalist production. The product thus appears as loss of realization for the workers. (Marx, XXII) The product is estranged from the worker only because the production act itself is alienating. The alienated product is just the summation of the alienating labouring activity. (Marx, XXIII) Thus the first form of alienation, alienation from the produced product, is in reality a result of the second type, that is, alienating labour activity. Thirdly, man is also alienated from his own nature, his own species being. What is supposed to be an expression of mans essential being, in capitalism becomes merely and exclusively a means for subsistence. Marx says that different from animals, man can produce in freedom and in accordance with the laws of beauty. (Wood p. 7) In capitalistic production, this distinctive characteristic of man, which sets him apart from other animals, is lost. Thus in this kind of production, Marx says, what is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal. (Marx, XXIV) Finally, man is also alienated from other man. The product that the workers produce is at the end of the day owned by other men. (Marx, XXIV) 23

Wood points out that Marxs conception of alienation rests on a particular understanding of human nature. This, however, does not mean that Marx thinks that man has an objective nature independent of any social formation. On the contrary, he asserts that the human condition cannot be grasped apart from the social structure within which it exists, especially the economic structure. Nevertheless, Marx argues that there is something distinctive about human beings that set them apart from the rest of nature. (Wood, p. 17) This distinctive feature is production. Wood interprets Marx as saying that human beings are essentially productive beings. (p. 28) What is distinctive in human production is that man produces consciously and purposively. (p. 32)

If human beings are fundamentally productive beings, Wood argues, it follows that human self-fulfilment is achieved in production. (p. 28) However, not any kind of production is selffulfilling. According to Marx, as he writes in Estranged Labour, man fulfils his nature when he produces freely. It is production free from physical need. In this fragment, Marx argues that in capitalist societies, the workers most humane characteristic, their ability to duplicate themselves in reality through the product produced, is reduced to a mere means for subsistence. (Marx, XXIV) This creative element in human nature is frustrated. Thus, argues Wood, alienation results when human essential powers are frustrated, stopped from developing. (Wood, p. 24) In this way, the workers experience a life that lacks meaning and self-worth. (Wood, p. 8)

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Historical Materialism

Marx disagrees with Hegels claim that social progress is an effect of progress in the realm of ideas. Hegel had argued that when the Mind ascents to a more accurate conception of reality, social organisation adjusts itself to the newly acquired understanding. On the contrary, Marx maintains that social life in general is determined by material production. Accordingly, economic reality stands at the base, of which social formation is just an effect. (Wood, pp. 63 - 4) He claims that his materialist conception of history turns Hegels dialectic rightside up. (Ingram, 1990, p. 19)

Marx maintains that material production is determined by what he calls forces of production. In the narrowest sense, forces of production include the labour power of the workers and the tools and instruments used to perform the work. In a wider sense, forces of production also include the organisation of the work done, or the division of labour. Marx asserts that the forces of production, understood as instruments, determine a particular division of labour. (Wood p. 67) Productive forces in the wider sense, i.e. workers labour power, instruments, as well as a particular division of labour, determine a particular set of relations of production, i.e. a certain set of social and economic institutions, relationships of power, authority and ownership within which labor is carried on. (Wood, p. 68) Thus for Marx, within the economic structure (which is itself more fundamental when compared to the superstructure), productive forces are the most fundamental element.

In the Marxian materialist conception of history, relations of production always adjust to changes in the forces of production. Marx conceives material progress as being dominated 25

by a dialectical tension between developing forces of production and relations of production. When the former expand to the extent that their unfulfilled potential is constrained by the kind of production relations that exist in a given society at a particular point in time, a revolution occurs. The revolution changes the relations of production that hinder the fulfilling of the potential of the forces of production. Thus, for example, according to Marx, capitalist relations of production prevailed over feudal relations of production because the latter got in the way of the developing forces of production. Similarly, socialism would emerge out of capitalism once the latters relations of production begin to hinder the expression of the developing forces of production. (Wood, p. 81) Relations of production are thus conceived by Marx as changing in accordance with the necessities of the ever developing forces of production. However, he does not claim that change is automatic. Counter-forces, such as ideologies and social institutions (which pertain to the superstructure), tend to back the current relations of production and delay the above mentioned adjustment.

While Marx definitely claims that at the basis of the economic base stand the developing forces of production, he does not explain change as occurring with an absence of mind. At the end of the day, it is people that bring change; more specifically classes. In fact Marx regards history as a history of struggles between social classes. In this respect, individual motives and actions become secondary to a general understanding of a dynamic history of classes. (Wood, p. 89)

Marx never completed the section on classes in Capital. However, by class, he seems to have understood a group of individuals with a common situation and common interests that 26

arise out of definite relations of production. (Wood, p. 90) Conflicts between classes, rather than conflicts within classes are considered by Marx to be historically determining. (Wood, p. 91) History, as he sees it, can be explained as a struggle between two major classes: that which owns the means of production, and that which has labour to offer in exchange for money. It must be said though, that for Marx a true class is a class in itself; a class that is conscious of its own interests. (Wood, p. 92) This does not mean that for a class to be for itself it must develop a sophisticated theoretical analysis, but it does imply some kind of political organisation. (Wood, p. 94) Each class has a particular goal in history, this being the establishment of a particular set of production relations that favour the interests of that particular class. (Wood, p. 95) A class in-itself is a class that manages to recognise its interests together with the kind of production relations that would actualise these same interests.

Ideology and Exploitation

Wood discerns three basic uses of ideology in the Marxian corpus. (p. 118) The first use of the concept of ideology is found in The German Ideology, a work co-authored with Engels. In this work, ideology refers to the idea that the principal determining factor of historical change is the idea. (p. 119) As has been explained above when discussing alienation, both Hegel and Feuerbach argued that alienation is merely a false consciousness, and the overcoming of alienation requires the correction of such a mistake. Marx and Engels consider such views as those upheld by Hegel and Feuerbach ideological.

The second usage of ideology is called by Wood functional ideology. As the term implies, 27

functional ideology is an ideology that serves a specific purpose. In this sense, ideology refers to the materialist thesis that socially prevalent or influential ideas can be explained by showing how they either sanction the social relations determined by the existing stage of productive powers or express and promote class interests. (p. 120) It is in this sense that Marx says that jurisprudence, religion, art and morality in general are ideological. (p. 120) The third usage of ideology is called by Wood ideological illusion. Here ideology means consciousness which is ignorant of its own real social and historical significance. (p. 120) In other words, ideology in this sense refers to ignorance with regards the materialist basis of reality.

These three uses of ideology are intimately related. For example, historical idealism can be both functional ideology, serving the interests of particular class, and also ideological illusion, as it negates the materialist basis of reality. (Wood, p. 121) Moreover, it must be said that ideological illusion is always functional ideology, but functional ideology need not be ideological illusion. (Wood, p. 121) In fact, Wood claims that in principle the materialist conception of history can be functional ideology as it serves the interests of a particular class, the proletariat. (p. 121)

In capitalism, ideological illusions serve to justify the exploitative nature of capitalistic relations of productions. The concepts of ideology and alienation are closely related to the concept of exploitation in the Marxian corpus. In a capitalist society, the capitalist owns the means of production, while the worker owns nothing except his labour power. Exploitation, according to Wood, results from the fact that labour power is vulnerable to capital and not

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simply from an unfair exchange.11 The workers have no option but to yield to the current system of exchange if they dont they would starve to death. Thus, according to Marx, as interpreted by Wood, exploitation results from the fact that the worker is always in weak bargaining position. (p. 251).

0.7 Conclusion: Habermas, Critical Theory and the Philosophical Problems of Modernity

The outline of the thought of the philosophers of early modernity (from Descartes to Marx) provides a panoramic view of the problems raised in philosophical modernity. It was argued that the main problem that modern thinkers dealt with was that of reason; however, the addressing of such an important concept requires the tackling of the web of issues to which rationality relates. The school of thought that is usually referred to as the Frankfurt School, the school of thought to which Habermas belongs, developed in part12 as a reaction to the philosophical heritage of modern European philosophy. In this brief conclusion of the Introduction, a preliminary discussion of the problems of philosophical modernity and the way critical theorists responded, in particular Habermas, will be presented.

The problem of rationality is thus the fundamental problem of modernity itself. An understanding of modernity requires an understanding of modern reason, that is to say, the

11

Wood criticises the idea that exploitation refers to the fact that the workers spend only a part of their working day for their own subsistence. On the other hand, Ingram seems to argue exactly the contrary. For a comparison see Ingram p. 22 and Wood p. 250. 12 Critical Theory is normative, in the sense that it seeks to change the cultural, social and political formation in which it is begotten. If this were not the case, then at most it would be critical philosophy. As such, any kind of critical theory reacts to both the philosophical and political heritage in which it develops.

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way modern philosophers conceived and understood reason. This does not mean however that early modern philosophers (from Descartes to Marx), had a univocal understanding of what it means to be rational. On the contrary, it may be argued that in philosophical modernity there are various conceptions of reason. In fact, it will be argued that in the early modern period, there are at least three different conceptions of reason: a subjectivist conception, which was roughly embraced by Descartes and Kant, a developmental conception of reason which however gives priority to the realm of ideas over the material realm, which was developed by Hegel, and another developmental conception of reason which gives priority to the material condition over the realm of ideas, which was developed by Marx.

Apart from the theoretical problem of rationality, the early modern period also presents the practical problem of rationality. Modern philosophers were not simply interested in developing a consistent conception of rationality, but also sought to provide ways in which reason can be consistently applied to moral and social-political issues. These two types of practical rationality can be separated conceptually, but are in reality intimately related. A conception of practical rationality is usually developed to be applied to interactions between human beings, understood as being normatively regulated and as belonging, directly or indirectly, to the social-political sphere of human life. Central to the problem of practical rationality is the issue of how to bridge theory with practice, that is to say, how to ground or justify normative claims. In fact, the issue of justification is central to any critical theory.

Finally, the philosophical issues that stem from early modernity can make the project of modernity itself an issue: is modernity, as expressed in the tradition that makes the human 30

being and his rational capabilities at the centre of any moral, social and political endeavour, misconceived, and thus ought to be abandoned? This third issue has been raised by various contemporary philosophers who saw an anti-human element in the tradition of modernity.

The three philosophical problems just outlined - the problem of a theoretical definition of reason, the problem of how to bridge theory and practice, and the issue of the project of modernity itself have been tackled by Habermas and other critical theorists. In what follows in this introduction, these three problems will be discussed in order to introduce the early critical theorists and Habermas.

The Theoretical Conception of Rationality

Before delving into the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, it is imperative to clarify what is meant by the theoretical conception of rationality. When the question what is rationality? is posed, the expected answer would be a theoretical elaboration of what rationality is. To be sure, one may seek to define rationality by giving examples of what it means to be rational (ostension), but the ultimate answer would be a conception, in strictly theoretical terms, of the idea of rationality.

Early critical theorists refuted both the conception of rationality offered by the subjectivists (Descartes and Kant), and by Idealism (Hegel). First generation critical theorists offered two different criticisms to the subjectivist conception of reason: one such criticism is found in Marcuses Philosophy and Critical Theory, whereas the other is found, amongst other works, in Horkheimers and Adornos Dialectic of Enlightenment. 31

In Philosophy and Critical Theory, Marcuse argues that the subjectivist13 and idealist conception of rationality is complacent to the status-quo; this is because as a conception it is limited to the realm of ideas. In his criticism of Rationalism and Idealism, Marcuse contends that real freedom is freedom from material oppression. Basically here Marcuse is rehashing the Marxist critique of Hegel. The criticism offered by Marcuse and other early critical theorists will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1.3. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno equate the subjectivist conception of rationality with the instrumental conception of rationality.14 The authors argue that the barbarism experienced in the twentieth century is nothing other than a consequence of an instrumentalistsubjectivist conception of reason that goes back to the ancient world. The arguments presented in the Dialectic of Enlightenment (and Habermass critique) will be discussed in Chapter 1.7 and 1.8.

Habermas refutes all the three conceptions of rationality discussed above, that is to say, the subjectivist, the idealist and the materialist. He argues that his predecessors, most notably Horkheimer and Adorno, while understanding that the subjectivist conception of reason is faulty and limited, fail to make the necessary paradigm shift towards a fuller conception of reason. In his Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas is particularly critical of Horkheimer and Adorno. He argues that the criticism levelled by Horkheimer and Adorno against the subjectivist conception of reason (as will be argued below, against the project of

13 14

Marcuse uses the term rationalist to refer to the subjectivist conception discussed here. In this they agree with Martin Heidegger who sees the philosophy of Descartes as preparing the groundwork for a conception of reason that would go instrumental. This theme is tackled by Heidegger in various works, most notably in his lectures on Nietzsche and in Being and Time. The critique of instrumental reason is then radicalized by Heidegger in his famous paper The Essence of Technology. In this paper, Heidegger calls for a different attitude of the human being towards Being from that found in the technological-instrumental disclosure of Being.

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modernity itself), commits them to a performative contradiction. Following Nietzsche, Horkheimer and Adorno provide a radical critique of reason with the result being that they leave no rational criterion which can justify their critique.

Habermas argues for a paradigm shift from the philosophy of the subject to the philosophy of language. In The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. I & II Habermas distinguishes between communicative action and strategic action. This distinction is necessary to understand Habermass reconstruction of reason. Communicative action refers to action that aims at reaching understanding and agreement. On the other hand, strategic action is action that is goal oriented, and thus subjects understanding and agreement to the attaining of ones goals. The following is a reconstruction of Habermass argument: i. ii. Speech has a rational basis. There are at least two types of social action involving speech: communicative action and strategic action. iii. Communicative action is fundamental, whereas strategic action is parasitic on communicative action. iv. Therefore communicative rationality, which is the kind of rationality that governs speech, is fundamental.

i.

Speech has a rational basis.

Habermas argues that whenever a speaker engages in communicative action through the uttering of a speech act, he is simultaneously raising four different validity claims: a truth claim, a normative claim, a truthfulness claim and comprehensibility claim. In essence, this 33

means that the speaker must if the need arises, justify or ground what he says. This expectation is inherent in speech, meaning that it is immanent, and effective communication cannot by-pass such expectation of grounding.

ii.

There are at least two types of social action involving speech: communicative action and strategic action.

Communicative action is not the only possible social action. There are other forms, amongst them strategic action. Strategic action is when a speaker utters a speech act knowingly that he is being insincere. So whereas communicative action, that is, action oriented towards mutual understanding, requires that all four validity claims are raised, the actor who engages in strategic action suspends (without revealing what his real intention is) the truthfulness claim.

iii.

Communicative action is fundamental, whereas strategic action is parasitic on communicative action

The fact that strategic action requires the suspension of one of the four validity claims that are on in communicative action, shows that communicative action is fundamental.15

iv.

Therefore communicative rationality, which is the kind of rationality that governs speech, is fundamental.

If communicative action is fundamental, and strategic action is derivative, it follows that the kind of rationality that governs communicative action is fundamental and that which governs
15

Habermas offers other arguments to support this claim, which will be discussed in full in Chapter 2. For the time being it is enough to note that strategic action is parasitic on communicative action.

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strategic action is derivative as well. The rationality that governs communicative action is termed by Habermas communicative rationality. On the other hand, the rationality that governs strategic action is instrumental. So this means that instrumental rationality that is equated by Horkheimer and Adorno with subjectivist rationality, is not the only conception of rationality, and more than that, is not even fundamental as they assume in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. So through his conception of communicative rationality Habermas is able to transcend previous conceptions - the subjectivist-instrumental, the idealist and the materialist.

Theory and Practice

The issue of grounding is an important theme in critical theory. Any critical theory must ground the critique it makes, in order to avoid infinite regress or circular reasoning. First generation critical theorists have made used of a technique immanent critique, which they borrow from Hegel and Marx. Basically this means comparing the real material situation to the ideals that were used to justify the current system of production. For example, capitalism is usually justified because it enhances justice and equality. A critical theorist who makes use of immanent critique would compare the real situation with the promised ideal. Habermas refutes such an approach, as he argues that in late capitalism such ideals are no longer used to legitimate current relations. Thus, if Habermas is correct here, immanent critique loses the critical thrust it relied on before. This will be discussed in Chapter 1.5.

Marcuse, attempts to develop a different argument to ground his critique in Eros and Civilization. In this work he attempts to unite Freudianism with Marxism. His main 35

argument, which will be discussed in Chapter 1.6, is that whereas some needs are real, other needs are constructed by the system. Critical theory thus can use the tension between real needs and false needs to critique the system. Habermas, again, refutes this argument; one of the main objections that he levels against Marcuse is that needs are always linguistically mediated, and so it is practically impossible to distinguish between the two. Language, which is fundamental for human identity, cannot be removed in a sort of epoch as envisaged by Husserl. In other words, needs are mediated linguistically, meaning that they can only be articulated and thus comprehended linguistically.

Instead of immanent critique and biological grounding, Habermas makes use of his theoretical conception of reason in order to ground his critique. Through the theoretical conception of communicative rationality, Habermas is able to provide a theory that can guide practice. Habermass contribution in this regard is twofold. On the one hand, the theory of communicative action can serve as a conceptual scheme from where to diagnose and offer cures for the pathologies of modernity. In fact the theory of communicative action is used by Habermas to offer a critical analysis of the domination by what he calls systems of power and money (state and economy) in late modernity. This will be the subject-matter of Chapter 3. On the other hand, the theory of communicative action can serve as the basis of discourse ethics. Habermas argues for a cognitivst morality that is rooted in communication and dialogue, contrary to moral scepticism. This will be the subject-matter of Chapter 4.

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The Project of Modernity

Habermass reconstruction of reason, which he develops in The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. I & II, cannot be understood in isolation from his theory of modernity. Horkheimer and Adorno in the Dialectic of Enlightenment provide a radical critique of reason but also a radical critique of the possibility of enlightenment and emancipation. Habermas argues that the rejection of the project modernity is based on a misconception of reason. Modernity should not be understood as being dominated by instrumental reason.

Horkheimer and Adorno of the Dialectic of Enlightenment mis-conceptualise modernity as they follow the one-sided analysis of Max Weber. Weber considers modernity to be characterised by a rise of formal or instrumental rationality, which he concludes led the moderns in an iron cage. Habermas argues that the problem with Webers conceptualisation lies in the fact that he fails to see that there were two rationalisation processes, and not one. For Weber, modern rationalisation is simply the rise of instrumental reason, which resulted from the disenchantment of religious and metaphysical narratives. Habermas contends, contrary to Weber (and Horkheimer and Adorno), that such a view is one-sided. Modernity for Habermas, is characterised by a rationalisation of the lifeworld, which refers to the unleashing of the potential inherent in communicative action, and by a rationalisation of systems of power and money, which function on a principle of rationality that is strictly instrumental (or functional). Thus, Habermas sees modernity and modern western society as being guided by two different rational principles, communicative rationality in the lifeworld, and instrumental rationality in administrative and economic systems, both of which are necessary for the effective functioning of modern society. 37

Problems arise, Habermas argues, when the instrumental principle encroaches upon areas that ought to function in accordance with communicative rationality. A practical example of such an encroachment would be when areas like school and family disputes, are subjected to instrumental rationality. This will be discussed in Chapter 3.

For Habermas modernity is thus an unfinished project, which can, through communicative rationality, be completed or improved. However, such progress requires first and foremost a proper conceptualisation of the development that occurred in modernity with the aid of proper concepts that are lacking in theorists like Weber, Horkheimer and Adorno.

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