87 Moldova - La Rascruce-1

FUNDAIA SOROS ROMNIA
MOLDOVA.
LA RSCRUCE
Autori: Ioana Avdani, tefan Cndea,

Marian Chiriac, Cristian Ghinea, Sergiu Panainte
Volum coordonat de Sergiu Panainte
OCTOMBRIE 2009
Sumar
Introducere
SISTEMUL POLITIC DIN REPUBLICA MOLDOVA I EVOLUIA
LUI (Cristian Ghinea, Sergiu Panainte) ........................................................................
De la pluralism incoerent la autoritarism neconsolidat ........................................
Revoluia din mintea lui Vladimir Voronin .........................................................
Mimarea integrrii europene Moldova i UE nainte de alegerile din aprilie
2009 ..............................................................................................................................
Pregtirea alegerilor din aprilie 2009. Semnale externe ........................................
Alegerile din aprilie 2009. Forele politice ..............................................................
Partidul Comunitilor din Republica Moldova (PCRM) ......................................
Partidul Liberal Democrat din Republica Moldova (PLDM) ..............................
Partidul Liberal (PL) ...................................................................................................
Aliana Moldova Noastr (AMN) ............................................................................
Partidul Democrat din Moldova (PDM) .................................................................
Violenele din aprilie .................................................................................................
Reacia UE, Moldova reapare pe agend ................................................................
Blocajul politic, repetarea alegerilor. Explicaii ......................................................
Noua campanie electoral nou. Alte alegeri .........................................................
Noua alian politic perspective ..........................................................................
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RELAIILE MOLDOVEI CU UNIUNEA EUROPEAN I ROLUL

ROMNIEI (Cristian Ghinea, Sergiu Panainte) .......................................................
Perspectivele de integrare european .......................................................................
Rolul Romniei ca stat membru al UE ....................................................................
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PEISAJUL MASS-MEDIA: STOP I DE LA CAPT (Ioana Avdani) ......

Mass-media n Moldova: mult politic,puin interes public ...............................
Statul - juctor i arbitru ............................................................................................
Comunitatea internaional prea puin, prea politicos, prea prietenos ...........
Cazul Unimedia: despre cum ar putea s arate viitorul ........................................
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REPUBLICA MOLDOVA DEMOCRAIA SE AMN (Marian

Chiriac) ..........................................................................................................................
Respectarea drepturilor i libertilor fundamentale ale cetenilor ....................
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Context .........................................................................................................................
Evenimentele din 7 aprilie 2009 - nclcri ale drepturilor omului .....................
ngrdirea dreptului la alegeri libere i corecte ......................................................
Libertatea de exprimare i de ntrunire - progres n legislaie, discriminare n
practic .........................................................................................................................
Hruirea aprtorilor drepturilor omului ...............................................................
Funcionarea deficitar a sistemului juridic ............................................................
MEDIUL DE AFACERI IN REPUBLICA MOLDOVA PARTIDUL
COMUNIST SA (tefan Cndea) .............................................................................
Sistemul ........................................................................................................................
Srcie i corupie .......................................................................................................
Propaganda i lipsa transparenei..............................................................................
Presa de profil, oglinda mediului de afaceri ............................................................
Teroare .........................................................................................................................
Transnistrizarea Republicii Moldova .......................................................................
Aparatul de stat ...........................................................................................................
Forme de presiune ......................................................................................................
Uneltele statului n mna familiei prezideniale .....................................................
Sistemul juridic corupt ...............................................................................................
Cazuri i modele detaliate ..........................................................................................
Mentalitatea sovietic a sistemului i a afaceritilor ...............................................
Raideri pentru Sistem .............................................................................................
Model de afaceri profitabile ......................................................................................
Carmez, o preluare forat ........................................................................................
Cazuri CEDO .............................................................................................................
Fr reacie ...................................................................................................................
Schimbarea ...................................................................................................................
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Introducere
2009 Fundaia Soros Romnia (FSR)

Toate drepturile sunt rezervate Fundaiei Soros Romnia. Nici publicaia i nici fragmente din ea nu pot fi reproduse fr permisiunea Fundaiei Soros Romnia.
Fundaia Soros Romnia
Str. Cderea Bastiliei nr. 33, sector 1, Bucureti
Telefon: (021) 212.11.01
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Web: www.soros.ro
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Coninutul prezentei publicaii i/sau opiniile prezentate n cadrul acesteia nu
reflect, n mod necesar, vederile Fundaiei Soros Romnia.
ISBN 978-973-0-07059-0
Un studiu realizat n anul 2005 de ctre Institutul de Politici Publice din Romnia
arta c doar 25% dintre romni considerau c Romnia trebuie s aib relaii strnse
cu Republica Moldova1. La acest lucru se aduga faptul c 50% dintre respondeni
considerau c pn la acel moment politica Romniei fa de vecinul de peste Prut
fusese una ineficient i prost inspirat. Combinaia de dezinteres i scepticism de la
acea dat era probabil explicabil prin ntoarcerea ctre vest a ateniei publicului
romnesc, captivat de obiectivul aderrii la 1 ianuarie 2007 la Uniunea European. La
care se aduga perceperea Republicii Moldova ca fiind un stat blocat la est, ntr-o
inerie politic i social strine de orice dinamic european i din care ieirea era greu
previzibil.
La nivelul Uniunii Europene optica a fost, n toi aceti ani, una de natur a ngrijora
i mai mult pe susintorii integrrii europene a Republicii Moldova. Eurobarometrul
din 2007 privind interesul statelor membre UE pentru rile nvecinate demonstra
c doar 20% din europeni manifestau interes pentru statele din vecintatea UE, iar
procentul celor care cunoteau faptul c Moldova este un vecin al Uniunii era de doar
4%2. Poate i mai deranjant a rmas obstinaia instituiilor europene de a aborda
Republica Moldova ntr-o logic de factur geopolitic, care includea obligatoriu
relaia cu regiunea separatist Transnistria, cu Rusia i Ucraina. La adpostul acestei
abordri precaute i minimaliste a dosarului moldovenesc, democraia din Republica
Moldova a cunoscut un regres semnificativ - n mare msura ignorat sau tolerat de
ctre comunitatea internaional.
ns interesul publicului romnesc fa de statul vecin a cunoscut un reviriment
remarcabil, probabil i ca urmare a mediatizrii intense a evoluiilor neateptate ce au
urmat alegerilor parlamentare desfurate n Moldova n aprilie 2009. n iunie 2009,
52% dintre romni credeau c Romnia ar trebui s sprijine prin toate mijloacele
posibile aderarea Republicii Moldova la Uniunea European, iar 47% erau de acord
n mare i foarte mare msur cu acordarea ceteniei romne moldovenilor care i
pot dovedi originile romneti3. Cu siguran c nu vom regsi acelai entuziasm la
nivelul ntregului public european i cu att mai puin n rndurile birocraiei de la
Bruxelles n special cu privire la delicata problem a ceteniei. ns n ceea ce privete
ntmpinarea aspiraiilor europene ale Republicii Moldova, devine din ce n ce mai clar
c, n msura n care pentru acestea exist o doz de receptivitate la nivelul decizional
al UE, ateptrile comunitare se opresc asupra nimnui altcuiva dect asupra Romniei.
1 Voinescu Sever, Dobre Gabriela: Percepia opiniei publice din Romnia asupra politicii externe i a relaiilor
internaionale, Institutul de Politici Publice Bucureti, Octombrie 2005, p. 47
2 The EUs relations with its Neighbours, Special Eurobarometer, September 2007, p.4
3 Newsletter-ul Studii Electorale Romneti al Fundaiei Soros Romnia, nr.1, iulie 2009, disponibil la www.
soros.ro
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Diplomaia romn are acum de ales ntre a regndi radical dosarul moldovenesc sau
a continua politica hiper-precaut fa de statul vecin.
n ateptarea unei implicri reale a comunitii europene i internaionale n Republica
Moldova (cu sau fr aportul Romniei), raportul de fa i propune s contribuie la
o nelegere mai profund a strii de fapt de la grania estic a Romniei i a Uniunii
Europene. Evacuarea de la guvernare a lui Vladimir Voronin i a Partidului Comunitilor
nu nseamn mai mult dect un prim pas n demontarea unei piramide de putere care
a corupt n profunzime societatea moldoveneasc. Raportul scoate n eviden o serie
de probleme structurale, instituionale i normative cu care se confrunt statul vecin,
aa cum puteau fi ele observate la mijlocul anului 2009, n preajma alegerilor repetate
de la finalul lunii iulie. Momentul ales pentru efectuarea acestei diagnoze s-a dovedit a
fi optim: multe dintre derapajele de la standardele democratice n funcionarea statului
moldovenesc erau uor sesizabile nc dinaintea alegerilor, ns tensiunea generat de
scrutinele repetate din 2009 le-a acutizat i le-a fcut mult mai vizibile pentru cei dispui
s le observe i s le consemneze.
Suprapunerea organelor statului cu cele de partid i concentrarea tuturor prghiilor
de conducere n minile preedintelui i a unui cerc restrns de apropiai ai acestuia;
corupia generalizat n rndurile aparatului administrativ i funcionresc de la toate
nivelele; limitarea i restrngerea drepturilor i libertilor fundamentale ale cetenilor;
controlul mass-media publice i private i reprimarea celor cteva rmase independente;
compromiterea cvasi-total a actului de justiie prin subordonarea puterii judectoreti
de ctre puterea politic; subordonarea i acapararea mediului de afaceri toate
contureaz nivelul de degradare a statului de drept i funcionrii democraiei din
Republica Moldova.
n momentul redactrii acestui raport Republica Moldova se afl ntr-o situaie pe ct
de dificil, pe att de important din punct de vedere al transformrilor pe termen lung.
Schimbarea balanei de putere politic de la vrf poate constitui punctul de pornire pe
drumul reabilitrii democraiei i a revenirii pe un traseu de la care Republica Moldova
a fost deturnat ncepnd din a doua jumtatea a anilor 90. Lucrarea de fa poate servi
ca reper n evaluarea viitoare a calitii schimbrilor prin care va trece statul vecin.
Echipa care a realizat acest raport a fost compus din: Cristian Ghinea (Director,
Centrul Romn de Politici Europene), Ioana Avdani (Director Executiv, Centrul
pentru Jurnalism Independent), Marian Chiriac (Director Executiv, Balkan Investigative
Reporting Network, Romnia), tefan Cndea (Director adjunct, Centrul Romn
pentru Jurnalism de Investigaie) i Sergiu Panainte (coordonator de programe la
Fundaia Soros Romnia).
Raportul a fost realizat n cadrul Programului Bridging Moldova al Fundaiei
Soros Romnia, program care are drept scop consolidarea relaiilor ntre societatea
civil din Romnia i Republica Moldova, educarea interesului public i influenarea
politicilor ce pot contribui la democratizarea i ancorarea societii din Republica
Moldova n spaiul european.
8
Sistemul politic din Republica Moldova

i evoluia lui
Cristian Ghinea
Sergiu Panainte
Moldova a trecut ntre 2001 i 2009 de la o democraie incoerent la instaurarea unui
autoritarism nc neconsolidat, o situaie des ntlnit n spaiul fost sovietic. Preedintele
Vladimir Voronin a concentrat deciziile majore n minile sale i a mutat centrul de
greutate al politicii la Preedinie, asta dei Moldova este, conform Constituiei, o republic
parlamentar. Sursa puterii lui Voronin nu este funcia de ef al statului n sine, ci
controlul exercitat asupra Partidului Comunitilor din Republica Moldova, partid care la
rndul su controleaz statul. Valul de revoluii colorate din 2003 - 2004 a provocat
o micare oportunist din partea lui Voronin de apropiere de UE, ceea ce muli au numit
revoluia din capul lui Voronin.
Dar planul de aciuni Moldova - UE care presupunea democratizare i reforme amenina
verticala puterii, baza puterii lui Voronin, i astfel a intervenit contrarevoluia din
capul lui Voronin. Libertatea presei a fost limitat, intimidarea opoziiei prin folosirea
abuziv a statului a devenit fapt obinuit. Europenizarea Moldovei a rmas la un nivel
superficial, autoritile adoptnd o mulime de legi cu specific european, dar fr a le
implementa.
Anul electoral 2009 a venit peste o ruptur politic ireconciliabil ntre PCRM i
opoziie, violena politic mutndu-se n strad n aprilie 2009. Opoziia a reuit s
preia iniiativa prin repetarea alegerilor n iulie i preluarea majoritii parlamentare, dei
insuficient pentru alegerea unui nou Preedinte.
n toate aceste evenimente, UE a rmas un actor major, dei puin coerent. Reprezentatul
special al UE la Chiinu a devenit o figur controversat, miznd eronat pe comuniti
pentru asigurarea stabilitii la Chiinu. UE rmne de departe cea mai importan surs
de fonduri n Moldova, iar noul acord Moldova - UE care va fi negociat n toamn va
constitui momentul de revitalizare a relaiilor. Parteneriatul Estic reprezint o oportunitate
pentru Moldova pentru adncirea relaiei cu UE, dar exist i pericolul tratrii celor ase
ri partenere ca un bloc cu destin comun, fapt care ar dezavantaja Moldova.
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
De la pluralism incoerent la autoritarism neconsolidat

Sistemul politic din Republica Moldova este intens personalizat, iar o simpl citire
a Constituiei explic foarte puin din funcionarea sa real. Conform Constituiei,
Moldova este o republic parlamentar, cu un preedinte ales de Parlament cu
majoritate calificat (trei cincimi) care are n general atribuii protocolar-simbolice,
dar poate dizolva relativ uor Parlamentul, un guvern care exercit puterea executiv
i un Parlament care legifereaz, dar al crui preedinte deine i atribuii de numire
n funcii cheie n stat. Aceast schem constituional complicat i predispus la
blocaje este un produs al istoriei recente: n 2000 Constituia a fost schimbat astfel
nct Preedintele s nu mai fie ales direct, ci de ctre Parlament. Totui, atribuiile
sale nu au fost modificate n sensul celor deinute de preedinii din republicile
parlamentare clasice. Pe lng litera constituional, practica politic stabilit dup
declararea independenei n 1991 a acordat preedinilor moldoveni drept de decizie
asupra numirilor n domeniile ce in de securitate, ordine public i politic extern.
Primii doi preedini ai rii au uzat de aceast cutum, la fel a fcut i Vladimir
Voronin, iar practica n sine nu s-a modificat dup ce Constituia a fost schimbat,
iar eful statului a nceput a fi ales de ctre Parlament.
n mod ciudat, Preedintele este concurat la nivel formal de eful Parlamentului,
care deine dreptul constituional de a numi procurorul general al republicii i pe eful
Curii de Conturi (numirea este fcut de Parlament, la propunerea Preedintelui
legislativului). Astfel se explic atracia exercitat pentru preedinia Parlamentului la
ultimele negocieri politice.
Teoria politic comparativ susine c republicile prezideniale sunt cele mai
predispuse s alunece spre autoritarism, concluzie influenat statistic de numrul
mare de astfel de cazuri petrecute n America Latin. n mod logic, republicile
parlamentare, acolo unde puterea se disipeaz la mai multe niveluri de decizie colegial,
ar fi cele mai capabile s previn apariia unor autoritarisme. Republica Moldova este
exemplul viu c aceast teorie nu este mereu valabil. n anii `90, n afar de statele
Baltice, Republica Moldova avea cea mai dinamic i competitiv democraie din
spaiul fost sovietic. Doi dintre preedinii alei direct au pierdut scrutinul pentru
un nou mandat, conform regulilor democratice ale jocului - mai mult dect n orice
alt stat fost-sovietic1. Coincidena istoric face ca odat cu alegerea Preedintelui de
ctre Parlament, n 2001, Moldova s alunece uor din zona democraiilor fragile spre
zona autoritarismelor neconsolidate, lucru confirmat de degradarea ratingurilor pe
care le primete n clasamentele internaionale privind democratizarea2. Spunem c
este vorba despre coinciden istoric pentru c nu schimbarea modului de alegere a
efului statului a provocat deteriorarea democraiei din Moldova, ci monopolizarea
1 Lucan A. Way , Pluralism by default and the Sources of political Liberalization in Weak States, Temple
University
2 De pilda, raportul anual Nations in transit, Freedom House
10
puterii de ctre Partidul Comunitilor din Republica Moldova (PCRM) n acelai an.
Din acel moment, forma constituional a devenit puin relevant, pentru c liderul
PCRM Vladimir Voronin, ales Preedinte de ctre Parlament n 2001, a exercitat
puterea prin ceea ce studiile de sovietologie numeau verticala puterii adic o
modalitate de control politic asupra administraiei i statului exercitat n general
prin emanarea deciziilor de la cabinetul efului partidului. Puterea real a lui Vladimir
Voronin n toi aceti ani a fost mult peste limitele mandatului su constituional, iar
baza acestei puteri nu a fost funcia decorativ de Preedinte, ci controlul exercitat de
el asupra PCRM, care la rndul su a controlat statul i resursele acestuia.
Dominaia PCRM a nceput la 25 februarie 2001, atunci cnd partidul a obinut
71 de mandate din cele 101 locuri ale Parlamentului, ceea ce i-a conferit controlul
asupra tuturor poziiilor cheie n stat. Acest rezultat spectaculos obinut de un partid
care proclama n mod deschis nostalgia pentru Uniunea Sovietic are dou explicaii
majore:
Primii 10 ani de dup proclamarea independenei au adus o cdere
economic traumatizant pentru majoritatea populaiei. Puterea de cumprare
nominal a czut cu 80% fa de ultimii ani ai URSS. Producia a sczut
cu 60% ntre 1991 i 19993. Moldova fusese anterior complet integrat n
circuitul economic al spaiului sovietic, iar ruperea legturilor politice plus
conflictul transnistrean care a izolat partea cea mai industrializat a rii a dus
la cderea produciei i comerului. Statul fragil i nereformat n primii 10
ani a accentuat sentimentul general de instabilitate, ratele criminalitii fiind
foarte mari. Inflaia i lipsa banilor au fcut ca plata pensiilor i a salariilor s
se fac de multe ori n natur, ceea ce a lsat traume nc vizibile n rndul
populaiei (n cadrul celor dou campanii electorale din 2009, PCRM a marat
pe ideea c revenirea opoziiei la putere ar nsemna revenirea la plata salariilor
n magiun).
Minoritatea rusofon (etnici rui, ucraineni, gguzi) s-a simit nstrinat
de construcia identitar a noului stat moldovenesc i a devenit un electorat
captiv pentru PCRM. Ruptura din cadrul majoritii ntre promotori ai
moldovenismului ca identitate separat dect cea romneasc, pe de o parte,
i promotori ai romnismului, pe de alt parte, a blocat dezbaterea politic n
chestiuni identitare, avantajnd din nou PCRM, care a atras voturi att de la
minoriti, ct i de la moldoveniti.
Vladimir Voronin i partidul su au avut norocul istoric de a prelua puterea atunci
cnd marile reforme economice fuseser deja demarate, efectele negative fuseser
resimite i o nou economie deja creat. Creterea economic care s-a instalat de
la nceputul anilor 2000 n tot spaiul fost comunist (att Romnia, ct i Rusia, cei
mai mari parteneri comerciali ai Moldovei i-au reluat creterea n aceeai perioad)
3
Moldova: Hooked on Remittances , bussines week, aprilie, 2008.
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MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
a adus de atunci beneficii electorale PCRM, care s-a prezentat ca partidul care a
scos ara din criz i a instaurat ordinea. Politica de mn forte a lui Voronin a dus
la scderea criminalitii, chiar dac metodele au fost mai degrab sovietice dect
specifice unei ri democratice (Moldova pierde acum cazuri la CEDO din cauza
metodelor utilizate atunci).
Alegerile din 2005 au pstrat dominaia politic a PCRM, dei partidul a sczut
la 56 de mandate parlamentare. Era insuficient pentru un al doilea mandat al lui
Vladimir Voronin n fruntea statului, dar destul ct s resping orice formul de
guvernare fr PCRM. n plus, lipsa de unitate a opoziiei a fcut ca orice variant de
construcie politic fr Vladimir Voronin s fie imposibil.
Revoluia din mintea lui Vladimir Voronin
Relaiile cu Rusia s-au ameliorat n 2007. Momentul decisiv al acestei turnuri au fost
alegerile locale din 2007, cnd PCRM a obinut 37% din voturile pentru primari
i 41% din voturile pentru consiliile raionale, cel mai slab rezultat din istoria sa.
Victoria unui nou venit pe scena politic, Dorin Chirtoac, membru al Partidului
Liberal, n faa candidatului PCRM la primria Chiinu a fost un oc. Cei mai muli
comentatori de la Chiinu cred c atunci s-a convins liderul PCRM c deschiderea
spre Vest i afecteaz chiar baza puterii. Reformele n administraie, libertatea presei,
libertatea economic sunt incompatibile cu verticala puterii i cu stilul de conducere
impus de PCRM. n 2007 2008 au fost impuse noi restricii pentru pres, pentru
partidele politice, iar controlul politic al mediului de afaceri s-a nrutit.
Mimarea integrrii europene Moldova i UE nainte de

alegerile din aprilie 2009
Alegerile din 2005 au venit pe un fond extern nefavorabil PCRM. n Ucraina,

Serbia i Georgia avuseser loc spectaculoasele rsturnri de la putere a unor partide
cu accente autoritariste, aa-numitele revoluii colorate. n acel moment prea ca
apruse un nou val de democratizare n spaiul fost sovietic, unde o nou generaie de
politicieni i activiti se manifesta mpotriva consolidrii regimurilor nereformiste i
cu accente autoritariste. Alegerile din 2005 au creat un blocaj politic la care Vladimir
Voronin a rspuns printr-o capacitate uimitoare de adaptare i disimulare. Eecul
planului Kozak de rezolvare a conflictului din Transnistria (plan susinut de Rusia i
iniial acceptat de Voronin, apoi respins) l-a ndeprtat pe Voronin de administraia
lui Vladimir Putin. Atunci s-a petrecut micarea inspirat numit de cineva revoluia
din mintea lui Vladimir Voronin. Preedintele a declarat c va ndrepta Moldova
spre integrarea n Uniunea European. n Chiinu, nc se mai vd panourile
publicitare masive care promoveaz viitorul european al rii. Preedintele nou ales
la Bucureti, Traian Bsescu, a crezut c apare o oportunitate de nclzire a relaiilor
dintre cele dou ri i o serie de ntlniri cu Voronin a dus la declaraii optimiste de
ambele pri. Liderii portocalii de la Kiev i Tbilisi au fcut i ei vizite la Chiinu.
Noul plan de Aciuni Moldova UE presupunea asisten financiar i tehnic din
partea UE pentru Moldova, care n schimb se angaja la implementarea unor aciuni
amnunite de reform, modernizare i democratizare. Unii dintre liderii opoziiei
au fost convini (unii chiar la rugmintea personal a Preedintelui romn Bsescu)
s voteze pentru realegerea lui Vladimir Voronin. Amintirea acelei perioade acum,
dup evenimentele petrecute n 2009, mrete i mai mult nencrederea ntre forele
politice de la Chiinu. Cum ne spunea un interlocutor la Chiinu n timpul vizitei de
documentare, Voronin i-a pclit atunci pe toi, pe Bsescu, pe aakavili, Uniunea
European.
Treptat, n mintea lui Vladimir Voronin pare c a avut loc o contrarevoluie.
Planul de msuri convenite cu UE n februarie 2005 a fost aplicat doar la nivel
formal, controlul politic asupra presei, administraiei, mediului de afaceri s-a nsprit.
Dac aderarea la NATO este o chestiune controversat la Chiinu, aderarea la

Uniunea European ntrunete unanimitate cel puin la nivel formal. Sondajele de
opinie arat o majoritate de 67% favorabil acestei idei4. Cu toat contrarevoluia
din capul su din ultimii ani, Vladimir Voronin declar n continuare c Moldova are
ca obiectiv aderarea la UE, chiar dac adaug c asta ar trebui s se ntmple printr-o
relaie strategic cu Rusia5. Planul de aciuni UE Moldova a fost o constant
a jocului politic de la Chiinu n toi aceti ani, guvernele lui Vladimir Voronin
plasnd aciunile convenite cu UE printre prioritile programelor de guvernare. S-a
dezvoltat astfel un proces paradoxal la prima vedere, dei recunoscut academic n
sfera studiilor de europenizare, de mimare a integrrii, caracterizat printr-o avalan
de schimbri legislative cu efect limitat n practic.
n timp ce donatorii vestici cheltuiesc sume impresionante pentru reformarea
administraiei din Moldova (de pild, un proiect finanat de Banca Mondial,
guvernele suedez i britanic n valoare de apte milioane de euro i propune
asistena pentru reformarea administraiei centrale), controlul politic discreionar
asupra administraiei locale s-a nrutit. Primriile conduse de reprezentani ai
partidelor de opoziie acuz o politic de falimentare din partea guvernului central,
care folosete discreionar o lege centralist i i discrimineaz la alocarea fondurilor
publice. Primria din Chiinu a pit astfel n mod constant dup preluarea
mandatului de ctre Dorin Chirtoac, pe 2009 primind un buget cu 40 de milioane
de lei moldoveneti mai mic dect n 20086.
Una dintre cerinele UE a fost crearea unui corp profesionist de funcionari
publici, stabili pe funcie, angajai prin concurs i protejai de ingerinele politice.
Legea a fost adoptat abia n iulie 2008, publicarea sa n monitorul oficial fiind
12
13
4 Barometrul Opiniei Publice iulie 2009, realizat de Institutul de Politici Publice din Moldova. http://www.ipp.
md/barometru1.php?l=ro&id=37
5 Voronin vrea tratat cu Romnia i integrare european n relaie strategic cu Rusia, Romnia liber, Miercuri,
15 Iulie 2009
6 Agenia Info-Prim Neo, 10 septembrie 2008
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
amnat i nici un efort serios de implementare nu a fost fcut7. De altfel, oricine

citete rapoartele ntocmite de Comisia European8 privind aplicarea planului de
aciuni, rapoartele independente regulate realizate de organizaiile ADEPT i Expert
Group (finanate de Fundaia Soros Moldova), ct i rapoartele oficiale realizate
de autoritile moldoveneti constat uluitoarea cantitate de legislaie votat i
disproporia dintre numrul de legi votate i puinele rezultate pe care le au n
practic, fie din cauza amnrii aplicrii, fie din cauza portielor legale intenionat
introduse n legi, fie pur i simplu din cauza proastei implementri. Iat doar cteva
dintre cele aproximativ 2009 de legi votate pentru a pune n aplicare planul de aciuni
UE Moldova: schimbarea legii privind declaraiile de avere i venit, schimbarea
statutului judectorilor, elaborarea unui cod de etic pentru judectori, legea privind
transparena decizional n sectorul public, legea privind protecia martorilor, codul
etic al funcionarilor publici10. Centrul pentru Combaterea Crimelor Economice i
Corupiei a fost creat ca organism extraordinar de lupt cu corupia, dar n ciuda
unor programe externe de asisten pentru mbuntirea capacitii administrative,
Centrul se rezum la anchetarea unor funcionari mruni.
Moldova primete un rating din categoria weak (slab 68 de puncte pe o scal
de la 0 la 100) n msurtoarea Global Integrity Index pe 200811. Msurtoarea GI
este mai relevant dect clasicele raportri privind percepia corupiei, deoarece nu
msoar o realitate subiectiv percepia, ci pune un panel de experi s analizeze
barierele pe care fiecare ar le construiete n calea corupiei (de la legi la coduri etice
i aplicarea lor). Ratingul total al Moldovei este obinuit pentru spaiul fost sovietic,
dar interesant n acest caz este c primete 88 de puncte pentru criteriul general
cadrul legal i doar 48 de puncte pentru criteriul implementare propriu-zis.
Metodologia GI msoar astfel i distana dintre realitatea legal i starea de fapt.
n cazul Moldovei, aa numitul implementation gap/discrepan n implementare
intr n categoria huge (uria). Problema Moldovei n acest moment nu este att
cadrul legal, ct implementarea sa. Asta nu nseamn c toate aceste legi nu produc
anumite efecte, de pild legea privind accesul la informaii a dus la ctigarea ctorva
cazuri n instan mpotriva instituiilor, dar efectele produse sunt limitate i se fac mai
degrab n pofida autoritilor dect cu sprijinul lor activ. Uneori, distana dintre legi
i practic atinge nivele ridicole. n februarie 2008, a fost adoptat o nou legislaie
privitoare la libertatea de ntrunire, printr-un proces de consultare cu societatea civil.
Salutat de Comisie i de alte rapoarte la momentul respectiv, noua legislaie a fost
ignorat un an mai trziu, n timpul manifestaiilor din aprilie 2009 i nu a schimbat
nimic din comportamentul forelor de ordine.
7 EUROMONITOR, nr. 3 (12), ediia III, Implementation of reforms initiated accordingly to the EU-Moldova
Action Plan, Assessment of progress made in July-September 2008; ADEPT i EXPERT-GRUP
8 Ultimul raport trateaz starea de fapt din 2008: Implementarea Politicii Europene de Vecintate n anul 2008 Raport de Progres, Republica Moldova, Comisia European, 2009
9 Estimare realizat la cererea autorilor raportului de ctre experi independeni de la Chiinu
10 Ultimul raport de progres al Comisiei Europene menioneaz n majoritatea cazurilor, ca o formul tip, c e
nevoie de msuri reale de implementare a acestor modificri legislative.
11 http://report.globalintegrity.org/Moldova/2008
14
Strategia guvernanilor de la Chiinu a fost de a spune ca UE i a face cum vor

ei, Moldova fiind un caz clasic de europenizare formal sau de faad. Acest proces
apare atunci cnd dorina autoritilor naionale de a se apropia de UE este ridicat,
dar costurile politice ale implementrii reformelor sunt foarte mari pentru guvern.
De unde o tendin de a mima reformele cerute de UE. Dat fiind c exist un acces
dezechilibrat la informaie (autoritile naionale tiu mai multe despre situaia de
fapt dect pot afla misiunile de experi ale Comisiei Europene), aceast strategie
poate funciona pe termen scurt. Cert este c acum experii Comisiei au realizat
distana dintre form i practic, iar viitorul acord UE Moldova, care urmeaz a fi
negociat n toamna lui 2009, va acorda mai mult atenie implementrii.
La nivel formal, regimul Voronin i-a manifestat intenia de a se apropia de
Europa n toat aceast perioad. n mai 2008 a fost adoptat o Agend privind
prioritile integrrii europene i tot atunci a fost modificat12 componena Comisiei
Naionale pentru Integrare European. Vladimir Voronin a dorit s dea un semnal
politic prelund personal conducerea acestei Comisii, care ar trebui s supervizeze
aplicarea cerinelor europene i alocarea de resurse. Prin implicarea sa personal i
prin excluderea din Comisie a Preedintelui Parlamentului (Marian Lupu ddea deja
semne de diziden n PCRM) i a reprezentanilor organizaiilor neguvernamentale,
impresia general a fost c Vladimir Voronin ntrete funcionarea verticalei puterii
i n domeniul integrrii europene.
Pregtirea alegerilor din aprilie 2009. Semnale externe

Deteriorarea situaiei politice de la Chiinu i lipsa de progrese reale n relaia
cu Moldova a fcut ca Uniunea European s atepte alegerile parlamentare din
aprilie ca pe un moment de posibil reaezare a relaiei cu Moldova. n octombrie
2008, Consiliul CAGRE al UE (reuniunea minitrilor de Externe) a adoptat un
set de concluzii privind Republica Moldova. Fiind n primul rnd un produs al
eforturilor diplomaiei de la Bucureti, aceste concluzii fac promisiunea unei relaii
mai aprofundate13 ntre UE i Moldova, punnd n acelai timp accent pe nevoia de
reforme n Moldova i de respectare a regulilor democratice. Concluziile leag n mod
explicit progresele nregistrate de Moldova de aprofundarea relaiei, desfurarea
alegerilor fiind o condiie esenial: UE acord n mod special importan organizrii
alegerilor parlamentare din primvara lui 2009 ntr-o manier democratic. Temerile
legate de organizarea alegerilor veneau pe fondul schimbrilor legislative introduse
de tandemul PCRM-PPCD care a modificat regulile electorale n avantajul su, de
altfel un lucru practicat i de guvernrile anterioare.
12
Decret privind constituirea Comisiei naionale pentru integrare european, nr. 1663-IV din 16.05.2008,
Monitorul Oficial nr.91/345din23 iunie 2008
Frazarea exact este: UE este pregtit s dezvolte o relaie aprofundat cu Moldova n cadrul Politicii Europene
de Vecintate i s negocieze un accord nou i ambiios cu Moldova. Acest nou acord va merge dincolo de cadrul
actualului Acord de Parteneriat i Cooperare.
13
15
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Codul electoral a fost adoptat la 21 noiembrie 1997 i de atunci a suferit diverse

modificri, care nu ntotdeauna au fost conforme cu normele internaionale din
domeniu. Ultimele modificri au fost operate cu mai puin de un an naintea alegerilor
parlamentare din 5 aprilie a.c. i au avut la baz raionamente politice mai degrab,
dect unele democratice i pluraliste. Cele mai importante modificri realizate de
coaliia PCRM-PPCD n aprilie 2008 au fost majorarea pragului electoral de la 4 la
6% [(art. 86, alin. (2), lit. a)], interzicerea alianelor electorale [(art. 41, alin. (2), lit. b)]
i restricia impus persoanelor cu dubl cetenie de a deine funcia de deputat sau
oricare alt funcie public [art. 13, alin. (2), lit. b1)]14. Majorarea pragului electoral a
fost condamnat de ctre Comisia de la Veneia a Consiliului Europei pe motiv c nu
se asigur reprezentarea tuturor cetenilor n parlament, Republica Moldova fiind
constituit ca o singur circumscripie electoral la nivel naional15.
Interzicerea alianelor electorale pare a fi o lecie nvat de PCRM dup
experiena blocului Moldova Democrat care a reunit mai multe partide de
opoziie la alegerile parlamentare din 2005, acumulnd 28,53% din sufragii. Pe
fundalul unei descreteri a popularitii comunitilor, crearea unui nou bloc electoral
pentru alegerile din 2009 ar fi periclitat serios ansele acestora de a obine o victorie
detaat. n aceast privin, Comisia de la Veneia a apreciat c blocurile electorale
servesc partidelor cu puine anse de a accede n Parlament, care, crend o astfel de
alian pre-electoral, ar putea fi reprezentate n legislativ. Interzicerea lor odat cu
creterea pragului va fi condus la creterea numrului de buletine pierdute, adic
voturi pentru partide care nu trec pragul electoral. Recomandarea Comisiei de la
Veneia a fost i revenirea la pragul de 4%16.
Interdiciile stabilite pentru persoanele cu dubl cetenie vin pe fundalul
nrutirii relaiilor bilaterale dintre Republica Moldova i Romnia, fiind cunoscute
multiplele acuze aduse de Vladimir Voronin vecinului vestic. Noua interdicie avea o
int bine stabilit, avnd n vedere c unii din liderii partidelor din opoziie dein i
cetenia romn. n aceast privin, Comisia de la Veneia a remarcat c drepturile
ceteneti nu pot fi limitate pe motivul multiplei cetenii. De asemenea, aceast
restricie poate constitui o violare a art. 3 al Primului Protocol al Conveniei pentru
Drepturile Omului i Libertile Fundamentale i a art. 14 al aceleiai Convenii17.
Politicienii Dorin Chirtoac (PL) i Alexandru Tnase (PLDM) au atacat aceast
decizie la Curtea European a Drepturilor Omului (CEDO). Curtea a examinat
cazul n regim de urgen, dat fiind apropierea alegerilor. Hotrrea CEDO a dat
ctig de cauz lui Alexandru Tnase, care era vizat direct de aceast nou prevedere
a Codului Electoral i n cazul alegerii sale n calitate de deputat ar fi trebuit s
renune la cetenia romn sau la mandatul de deputat. CEDO nu a acordat ctig
14
de cauz i lui Dorin Chirtoac, deoarece acesta i-a exprimat public intenia de a nu
prelua mandatul de deputat, deinnd deja funcia de primar al Chiinului18.Pe lng
aceste modificri, au mai fost operate i altele ce in de dreptul la vot al deinuilor,
tragerea la sori pentru stabilirea locului n buletinul de vot, prevederi referitoare la
suspendarea activitii funcionarilor care particip n campania electoral19.
Au fost ncepute anchete judiciare mpotriva liderilor opoziiei, unele pentru cazuri
vechi de zece ani (cazul mpotriva liderului Partidului Liberal Democrat, Vlad Filat)
sau pentru decizii de natur politic (cazurile mpotriva lui Serafim Urechean, liderul
Alianei Moldova Noastr i mpotriva lui Dorin Chirtoac, primarul Chiinului).
Guvernul central s-a implicat n organizarea listelor electorale, gestionate anterior de
primrii, dar procesul a rezultat ntr-un numr de alegtori cu 400.000 de mare dect
la alegerile din 2007, ceea ce a trezit suspiciunile i a alimentat acuzaiile de fraud
electoral. Toate aceste msuri au contribuit la inflamarea atmosferei politice i la
radicalizarea discursurilor, de ambele pri.
n noiembrie 2008, eful Delegaiei Comisiei Europene la Chiinu, Reprezentantul
Special al UE i civa ambasadori ai statelor UE importante au dat publicitii o
declaraie comun n care au exprimat ngrijorri privind organizarea viitoarelor
alegeri, criticnd schimbrile legislative privind partidele politice i cazurile de
anchete penale mpotriva liderilor opoziiei. n decembrie 2008, comisarul european
pentru relaii Externe, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, a fcut o declaraie n care i exprima
ngrijorarea fa de refuzul Consiliului Coordonator al Audio-Vizualului (echivalentul
CNA n Moldova) de a prelungi licena pentru postul Pro-TV Chiinu, singura
televiziune critic fa de regimul PCRM, subliniind c libertatea de exprimare este
un principiu fundamental, mai ales n aproprierea alegerilor. Toate aceste semnale au
fost ignorate de ctre guvernul moldovean.
Alegerile din aprilie 2009. Forele politice

Anul 2009 s-a anunat a fi unul foarte important pentru Republica Moldova din
perspectiva alegerilor parlamentare. Spre deosebire de ali ani electorali acest scrutin
a devenit i mai important pe fundalul crizei economice globale i a repercusiunilor
acesteia asupra economiei moldoveneti.
De asemenea, n plan politic aceste alegeri au fost catalogate de instituiile
europene de profil, n principal Uniunea European (UE), Consiliul Europei (CoE)
i Organizaia pentru Securitate i Cooperare n Europa (OSCE) a fi testul care
s demonstreze ataamentul Republicii Moldova la normele i valorile democratice,
decisive pentru viitorul relaiilor cu aceste instituii.
n plan intern majoritatea populaiei s-a artat nemulumit de starea economic
a rii (57%), de activitatea conducerii n cele mai importante domenii (peste 70%) i
lipsa ncrederii n viitorul apropiat20. Cu toate acestea, personalitile care se bucurau
Codul Electoral al Republicii Moldova intrat n vigoare la 08.12.1997, http://www.cec.md/i-ComisiaCentrala/

userimages/upload/codul.pdf
15 Joint Opinion on the Election Code of Moldova as of 10 April 2008, http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2008/
CDL-AD(2008)022-e.asp
17 Ibidem
18 http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=MOLDOV
A%20|%20Chirtoaca&sessionid=28160567&skin=hudoc-en
19 http://www.e-democracy.md/e-journal/20080415/
20 Datele Barometrului de Opinie Public martie 2009 realizat de Institutul de Politici Publice din Moldova,
16
17
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
de cea mai mare ncredere n rndurile populaiei rmneau a fi liderii PCRM:

Vladimir Voronin (48%), Zinaida Greceani (43%) i Marian Lupu (36%)21.
n cursa electoral pentru alegerile din 5 aprilie s-au nscris 15 partide politice i
6 candidai independeni22. Ulterior, civa concureni electorali s-au retras din curs
n favoarea altor candidai cu anse mai mari de a intra n Parlament. Campania s-a
desfurat cu multiple nclcri ale legislaiei printre care: utilizarea resurselor administrative de ctre partidul de guvernmnt, acces inegal la mijloacele mass-media
publice a concurenilor electorali, limitarea dreptului la ntrunire pentru desfurarea
aciunilor de campanie ale partidelor, vandalizarea i distrugerea afiajului electoral etc.
Prin urmare, PCRM era partidul creditat cu cele mai multe anse de a obine un
scor bun la alegeri, dar i cel mai contestat concurent electoral pe motivul utilizrii
abuzive a resurselor administrative, a favorizrii sale la posturile TV i radio publice,
precum i a msurilor de intimidare ntreprinse mpotriva celorlali concureni electorali.
Rezultatele alegerilor au consemnat o victorie clar i detaat pentru PCRM,
care a obinut majoritatea mandatelor n Parlament. Pragul electoral de 6% a fost
trecut de alte 3 formaiuni Partidul Liberal (PL), Partidul Liberal Democrat din
Moldova (PLDM) i Aliana Moldova Noastr (AMN)23:
Concureni electorali
Voturi
Procente
Mandate
Partidul Social Democrat
56,866
3.7
Partidul Liberal
201,879
13.13
15
Aliana Moldova Noastr
150,155
9.77
11
Partidul Popular Cretin Democrat
46,654
3.04
Partidul Comunitilor din Republica Moldova
760,551
49.48
60
Partidul Liberal Democrat din Moldova
191,113
12.43
15
Partidul Democrat din Moldova
45,698
2.97
Uniunea Centrist din Moldova
42,211
2.75
Micarea social-politic Aciunea European
15,481
1.01
Partidul Dezvoltrii Spirituale Moldova Unit
3,357
0.22
Partidul Conservator
4,399
0.29
Sergiu Banari
8,759
0.57
tefan Urtu
2,803
0.18
Victor Rilean
667
0.04
Partidul Republican din Moldova
1,436
0.09
Tatiana mbalist
2,467
0.16
Alexandr Lomakin
2,591
0.17
http://ipp.md/barometru1.php?l=ro&id=35
21 Ibidem
22 OSCE 2009 parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova: interim report 2, http://www.osce.org/
documents/html/pdftohtml/37033_ro.pdf.html
23 http://www.e-democracy.md/elections/parliamentary/2009/results/
18
n mod oficial, 28 de partide sunt nregistrate n Republica Moldova24. Mare

parte dintre acestea sunt simple vehicule electorale minore pentru lideri cu ambiii
mrunte. Partidul Comunitilor din Republica Moldova domin scena politic, iar
opoziia dur anti-PCRM este constituit din cele trei partide mari, care au reuit s
depeasc pragul electoral n aprilie 2009.
Partidul Comunitilor din Republica Moldova (PCRM)

Partidul Comunitilor din Republica Moldova a fost format n actuala componen
n 1993 din fotii membri ai Partidului Comunist din Moldova, interzis prin lege n
199125. Avnd n vedere timpul scurt de la destrmarea Uniunii Sovietice, partidul
a pstrat muli simpatizani, mai ales n rndurile populaiei n vrst i cu nostalgii
dup trecutul sovietic. n frunte cu liderul Vladimir Voronin, PCRM-ul reactivat a
urcat rapid n preferinele electorale ale populaiei. Anul de graie pentru PCRM
a fost 2001, atunci cnd dup alegerile parlamentare anticipate din 25 februarie,
partidul a ctigat detaat i a obinut 71 mandate n Parlament.
n esen, PCRM26 este un partid puin transparent, dominat de Vladimir Voronin
i apropiaii acestuia, emannd o mentalitate de cetate asediat. Organele de pres
controlate de PCRM (o majoritate a staiilor de televiziune, publice i private) acuz
n mod constant opoziia de trdare a intereselor statului. Partidul se prezint ca o
formaiune disciplinat, iar titulatura sa de comunist reflect mai degrab nevoia
de a atrage votul nostalgicilor fostei URSS (aproximativ 20% din populaie) dect
programul real al partidului. n ciuda numelui, PCRM a fost deschis privatizrii
controlate a economiei, mprind controlul economic n mare parte n interiorul
clanului Voronin (conform afirmaiilor presei moldoveneti, fiul preedintelui, Oleg
Voronin, este de departe cel mai bogat cetean al republicii). Sunt dou grupri
active la vrful PCRM, garda veche a nostalgicilor vremurilor de dinainte de
independen, compus n mare parte din demnitari foti comuniti, i lupii tineri
interesai mai degrab de mprirea beneficilor puterii. Aceasta a doua grupare pare
a fi reprezentat de Mark Tcaciuk, vzut ca eminena cenuie i strategul electoral al
partidului.
Campania pentru alegerile parlamentare din 2009 a fost abordat de PCRM
prin prisma aceleiai retorici europene: Moldova European O Construim
mpreun!27. Acest program a pus n prim plan realizrile guvernrii comuniste din
ultimii opt ani, att din domeniul social, ct i economic i eforturile de consolidare
a statalitii.
24
25
26
http://www.justice.gov.md/index.php?cid=167
http://www.pcrm.md/md/about.php
Atunci cnd alte surse nu sunt indicate ca atare, datele privind partidele din Moldova sunt preluate de pe site-ul
www.e-democracy.md (datele oficiale i performanele electorale), din materiale de pres i din date culese de autorii
raportului n timpul vizitei de documentare la Chiinu, august 2009.
27 Programul Partidului Comunitilor din Republica Moldova Moldova european o construim mpreun!
http://www.pcrm.md/main/index_md.php?action=program
19
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Dei multe segmente sociale nu mai credeau aceast retoric, PCRM putea miza
n continuare pe vrstnici, mediul de afaceri apropiat puterii, funcionarii publici,
angajaii organelor de for etc. De asemenea, ambiguitatea promovat n politica
extern, adic integrarea european i valorificarea potenialului integraionist al
Comunitii Statelor Independente28 nu asigura un suport real nici din partea UE,
nici din cea a Rusiei. Mai mult dect att, condiionarea politicii externe i interne
de soluionarea conflictului transnistrean, a transformat guvernarea comunist i
pe Voronin n ostatici ai politicii i intereselor Rusiei n regiune. n pofida tuturor
acestor neajunsuri programatice, PCRM avea cele mai importante atuuri: controlul
resurselor administrative ale statului, dominaia n peisajul media i controlul asupra
organelor de for ca instrument de intimidare a concurenilor electorali.
n mod paradoxal, radicalizarea politic i nrdcinarea clivajului pro/anti PCRM
a dus la consolidarea partidelor de opoziie. n mod tradiional divizat i marcat
de conflicte personale, opoziia s-a consolidat n jurul a trei partide mari: Partidul
Liberal Democrat, Partidul Liberal i Aliana Moldova Noastr. Partidul Popular
Cretin Democrat, care reprezentase altdat principala formaiune anti-comunist,
a pierdut suportul electoral n urma colaborrii cu PCRM dup 2005 i a devenit
irelevant politic. Analistul Nicu Popescu observa c opoziia din Moldova este mai
consolidat instituional, mai bine pregtit i mai popular comparativ cu alte ri
din spaiul post-sovietic dominate de partide-stat ca PCRM29 i n acelai timp a fcut
pai importani n schimbarea liderilor la vrf fa de anii `90.
Partidul Liberal Democrat din Republica Moldova (PLDM)

Partidul Liberal Democrat din Moldova (PLDM) a fost creat la sfritul lui 2007 i
nregistrat oficial n ianuarie 2008. Partidul a fost constituit de Vlad Filat care a prsit
rndurile Partidului Democrat din Moldova din partea cruia a candidat la alegerile locale
din 2007. PLDM este o formaiune de centru-dreapta, cu doctrin popular european
modern30. Beneficiind de fondurile puse la dispoziie de liderul su (Filat este i un om
de afaceri cu investiii n imobiliare i comer, att n Moldova, ct i n Romnia, asupra
sa plutind acuzaii c i-a folosit funcia de ef al departamentului privatizrii pentru a
pune bazele viitoarei averi), de o echip dinamic i de un mesaj dur anti-comunist31,
PLDM a depit rapid partidele mai vechi de pe scena politic. Campania sa electoral
pentru alegerile din aprilie a fost apreciat ca fiind cea mai profesionist. Dei Filat nu este
un lider cu carism, de la fondarea partidului a pus accent pe construcia instituional
n teritoriu, partidul su fiind n multe zone rurale i orae mici singurul competitor real
28
Programul Partidului Comunitilor din Republica Moldova Moldova european o construim mpreun!
http://www.pcrm.md/main/index_md.php?action=program
29 Nicu Popescu; Elections in Moldova. Again, European Council on Foreign Relations, 27 iulie 2009.
30 http://pldm.md/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=157&Itemid=49
31 PLDM a fost iniiatorul campaniilor Moldova fr Voronin Moldova fr comuniti, Vot direct pentru
alegerea preedintelui, Libertatea de circulaie la frontiera UE.
20
pentru PCRM. Tot PLDM a iniiat cooperarea instituionalizat cu celelalte partide mari
din opoziie, printr-un Consiliu pentru Dialog i Cooperare.
Vlad Filat este acuzat penal n dou cazuri separate, unui privind presupusul trafic
de igri i un altul privind privatizarea fabricii de ciment Rezina, presupusele delicte
ntmplndu-se n 1998, cnd a ocupat poziia de ef al departamentului privatizrii
n guvernul de alian condus atunci de premierul Ion Sturza. Totodat, guvernul a
deposedat o companie controlat de Filat de proprietate asupra complexului imobiliar
IPTEH din centrul Chiinului. Tentativele precedente de anulare a privatizrii s-au
finalizat cu eecuri n instane, iar redeschiderea cazului n perioada preelectoral a
fost interpretat ca o msur de intimidare politic i ca un semnal negativ privind
stabilitatea mediului de afaceri din ar32. Un caz la Curtea European de Justiie a
fost deschis n acest caz mpotriva guvernului.
Partidul Liberal (PL)

Partidul Liberal (PL) este succesor al unei formaiuni nfiinate n 1993, Partidul
Reformei. Numele formaiunii a fost schimbat n 2005, cnd a adoptat actuala formul.
Partidul a fost un juctor minor de-a lungul anilor `90, la alegerile parlamentare din
1998 i 2001 avnd sub 1% din voturi. PL este o formaiune politic de dreapta care
declar c promovarea valorilor liberale este singura cale care poate asigura depirea
crizei social-politice i poate apropia Republica Moldova de integrarea n Uniunea
European i NATO.33
Primul succes major a aprut n 2007, prin ctigarea fotoliului de primar al
Chiinului de ctre Dorin Chirtoac. Acest succes a fost obinut n faa unui
candidat al PCRM, partid care de fiecare dat a pierdut btlia electoral pentru
capitala rii. Chirtoac este un lider tnr, cu alur modern, educat n Romnia,
carismatic i cu apel electoral semnificativ n rndul tinerilor i a populaiei cu
orientare pro-romneasc. Dorin Chirtoac este nepotul preedintelui PL, Mihai
Ghimpu. Dei Ghimpu conduce formaiunea, cu mn forte chiar, Chirtoac
este de fapt locomotiva electoral. Partidul Liberal este ntr-o situaie oarecum
invers dect cea a PLDM. Dac PLDM nu are un lider carismatic, dar dispune
de structur organizatoric solid, PL mareaz pe imaginea lui Chirtoac (actor
n clipurile electorale ale partidului), dar nu are structur solid n teritoriu, fiind
susinut mai degrab de entuziasmul electoratului su tnr, situat mai ales n
Chiinu.
Ca i ceilali lideri ai opoziiei, i Chirtoac are deschis un dosar penal pe numele
su, n acest caz fiind vorba de acuzaii de depire a atribuiilor de serviciu. Dup
32
EUROMONITOR, nr. 3 (12), ediia III, Implementation of reforms initiated accordingly to the EU-Moldova
Action Plan, Assessment of progress made in July-September 2008; ADEPT i EXPERT-GRUP
33 Ibidem
21
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
alegerea n funcie, a acuzat numeroase presiuni financiare i ncercri de a sugruma

financiar municipalitatea de ctre guvernul central. ntreprinderea de distribuie
a energiei termice, controlat de guvern, a schimbat modul de tarifare i a mrit
preurile n ora, msur vzut ca un mod de pedepsire a alegtorilor din Chiinu
pentru alegerea fcut.
Aliana Moldova Noastr (AMN)

Partidul Aliana Moldova Noastr (AMN) a avut un parcurs ndelungat de
constituire, fuziuni i restructurri. n formula actual, partidul s-a constituit n
2005, cnd la conducere a venit Serafim Urechean, fostul primar n Chiinu34.
AMN a adoptat doctrina social-liberal, poziionndu-se spre centru-dreapta pe axa
electoral.
n alegerile parlamentare din 2005, AMN a fost la baza blocului electoral Blocul
Moldova Democrat care s-a plasat pe locul doi dup PCRM. Dup alegeri ns,
cteva componente ale blocului au prsit formaiunea i au votat pentru candidatura
lui Vladimir Voronin la funcia de preedinte. Ca urmare a acestui episod, AMN n
frunte cu Serafim Urechean au declarat c ei nu vor trda i vor lupta n continuare
cu PCRM. Astfel, AMN s-a situat clar n tabra anti-comunitilor.
Serafim Urechean a ocupat dou mandate de primar al Chiinului. nainte de
alegerile din acest an, a fost i el acuzat de falsificare a documentelor oficiale, din
vremea cnd ocupa funcia de primar, parte din irul de procese penale deschise
liderilor opoziiei. AMN se bucur de o structur teritorial dezvoltat, dar istoria
sa complicat a dus la acumulri succesive de cadre i activiti, unii cu interese
divergente i cu conflicte personale, fapt care pare a-i marca eficiena. Cert este c
dei se dorea la nfiinare o mare alian care s strng toate forele anti-comuniste,
AMN a pierdut iniiativa n favoarea partidelor mai tinere i mai dinamice PL i, mai
ales, PLDM. Dei s-a comportat ca un partener loial celor dou partide n timpul
crizei din 2009, declinul lent al AMN pare a semnifica mai degrab declinul lent al
curentului moldovenist care a fondat statul, o platform centrist i conservatoare
n esena sa. Radicalizarea politic din 2009, preferinele clare pro-occidentale ale
partidelor mai tinere i vehemena anti-PCRM a electoratului urban tnr par a fi
fost defavorabile AMN.
Partidul Democrat din Moldova (PDM)

PDM provine din micarea Pentru o Moldov Democratic i Prosper,
formaiune aprut n 1997 pentru susinerea politic a preedintelui Petru Lucinschi,
ales n 1996 n fruntea statului. Formaiunea a participat la guvernrile de alian din
1997 1999 i n 2000 i-a luat actualul nume, fiind condus de la nfiinare de Dumitru
34
http://www.amn.md/pagini-0-2-0.html
22
Diacov. La alegerile din 2005 a participat pe o list comun cu alte formaiuni (ntre
care AMN) anti-comuniste, trimind opt parlamentari proprii n legislativ. Partidul
este membru cu drept de vot consultativ n Internaionala Socialist, fiind tratat pe
plan extern ca alternativa de stnga acceptabil la PCRM. Vlad Filat, vicepreedinte
al PDM se va retrage n 2007 pentru a pune bazele PLDM, fiind urmat de o serie
de activiti i consilieri locali. La alegerile din aprilie 2009, PDM nu a trecut pragul
electoral, ntrunind doar 2,9% din voturi. Drept urmare, partidul a fost un juctor
minor n criza politic ce a urmat alegerilor. A urmat ns revenirea spectaculoas
prin aducerea n partid a lui Marian Lupu, fost preedinte al Parlamentului din partea
PCRM.
Marian Lupu a fost remarcat de PCRM cnd deinea funcia de ef de secie n
Ministerul Economiei i Reformelor. n aceast capacitate, a condus negocierile de aderare
a Republicii Moldova la Organizaia Mondial a Comerului n 2001. Ca recunoatere a
acestor merite el a fost promovat n funcia de Vice-ministru al Economiei i ulterior
Ministru al Economiei n 200335. Cariera politic a lui Marian Lupu a cptat orizonturi i
mai mari cnd PCRM a propus candidatura lui la funcia de preedinte al Parlamentului.
Astfel, PCRM a fost partidul care a alimentat constant ambiiile politice ale lui Marian
Lupu, iar acesta la rndul su a urmat iniial cu fidelitate politica partidului i a lui Vladimir
Voronin. Totui, n cteva rnduri Lupu i-a permis s nu fie de acord cu Vladimir Voronin,
dnd dovad de viziuni diferite de cele ale grzii vechi a PCRM. Fiind un tehnocrat i
nicidecum un comunist convins, Lupu fcea parte din aripa reformatoare a PCRM care
milita pentru reaezarea intern a partidului pe principii noi, pentru a ctiga n imagine
i credibilitate n relaia cu partenerii occidentali.
Lupu l-a urmat pe Voronin chiar i n timpul evenimentelor de la 7-8 aprilie,
atunci cnd a fost printre primii care au declarat c a avut loc o tentativ de lovitur
de stat36. Fiind contient c trebuie s fie n graiile lui Voronin pentru a fi nominalizat
la funcia de Preedinte al statului, Lupu a continuat s fac jocul acestuia. Decizia
partidului de a o nominaliza ns pe Zinaida Greceani la funcia suprem n stat a
demonstrat c Lupu nu se bucura de ncrederea total a liderilor partidului. Conform
unor opinii, Marian Lupu nu era destul de docil, fiind o persoan inteligent, colit
i n Rusia i n Occident, destul de ambiioas i greu controlabil de ctre tandemul
Voronin-Tkaciuc37.
n final Lupu a plecat din PCRM dup ce a susinut o conferin de pres n care a
explicat motivele plecrii sale din partid38. Incertitudinea fa de rolul su real se pstra,
deoarece Voronin a ezitat s-l critice dur dup plecare, iar opoziia s-a artat rezervat fa
35
Graham Stack: Moldovas turncoat president? http://businessneweurope.eu/story1731/Moldovas_turncoat_

president
36 http://www.stireazilei.md/2009-4-7-153
37 Mark Tkaciuc este consilierul lui Vladimir Voronin pentru probleme de politic intern i eful staff-ului electoral
al PCRM. De asemenea, este considerat eminena cenuie a partidului.
38 http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4316512,00.html
23
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
de acest gest. Dup multe speculaii, la numai o sptmn de la plecarea sa din PCRM,
Marian Lupu a devenit noul lider al Partidului Democrat din Moldova (PDM)39. Lupu a
venit cu o ntreag echip i i-a impus agenda proprie n cadrul partidului. Prin urmare,
crma PDM-ului a fost ferm preluat de Lupu, iar siglei formaiunii i s-a adugat sintagma
M.LUPU. Era clar c pentru a ajunge n Parlament, imaginea i bagajul de ncredere de
care se bucura Marian Lupu n rndurile populaiei vor fi principalele arme n alegeri.
Violenele din aprilie

Alegerile din 5 aprilie au produs rezultate mixte. PLDM, PL i AMN i-au
consolidat prezena parlamentar, n acelai timp PCRM a obinut aproape jumtate
din voturi, insuficient ns pentru alegerea preedintelui republicii. Anunarea
rezultatelor a produs frustrare n rndul electoratului partidelor de opoziie, sondajele
preelectorale dnd comunitilor scoruri variind ntre 35 i 40%. Diferena pn la
scorul oficial anunat a fost pus pe seama fraudelor electorale. Frustrarea politic
s-a mutat n strad. nc din seara zilei de 6 aprilie, cteva mii de manifestani,
majoritatea covritoare fiind foarte tineri, s-au adunat n cele dou piee din centrul
Chiinului, piaa Marii Adunri Naionale, n faa cldirii guvernului i, la cteva
sute de metri distan piaa aflat ntre cldirea Preediniei i cea a Parlamentului.
Autoritile au fost complet luate prin surprindere, iar anchetele ulterioare au artat
c manifestrile nu au fost organizate, ci au pornit de la un flash mob spontan la statuia
lui tefan cel Mare (ntre cele dou piee). n seara de 6 aprilie, cldirea Parlamentului
era aprat doar de civa poliiti n uniforme de strad, iar mulimea ar fi putut uor
intra n incint. Unul din autorii acestui capitol din raport a asistat n seara acelei zile
la ncercarea reuit a liderului Vlad Filat de a calma mulimea care era pe cale de
a asalta Parlamentul. Liderii opoziiei nici nu au organizat manifestrile, dar nici nu
au fost capabili s le controleze. A doua zi, pe 7 aprilie, manifestanii n numr mult
mai mare s-au mprit n dou grupri distincte. n Piaa Marii Adunri Naionale
a avut loc o manifestaie panic, cu cereri politice (repetarea alegerilor, investigarea
presupuselor fraude). Paralel, la cteva sute de metri distan, atmosfera a degenerat.
Manifestanii au devastat dimineaa etajele inferioare ale Preediniei, apoi au asaltat
pe parcursul zilei cldirea Parlamentului. Impresia general a celor aflai la faa
locului a fost c au existat grupuri organizate care au devastat cldirile, sub privirea
mai multor mii de privitori pasivi. Trupele de scutieri aduse la faa locului au fost n
general pasive i n permanent retragere din faa manifestanilor violeni. Adunarea
panic din piaa MAN, mai numeroas i organizat politic de ctre opoziie, a
fost deplin ignorat n relatrile evenimentelor, care s-au concentrat pe aciunile mai
spectaculoase din cealalt pia. Impresia celor care nu s-au aflat acolo a fost c a
existat o singur manifestaie violent, ceea ce e departe de adevr. Evenimentele
39
din 7 aprilie de la Chiinu sunt un caz de manual despre cum grupuri minuscule
violente pot deturna o manifestare politic legitim.
Pe tot parcursul zilei, liderii opoziiei au fcut apel la calm i au chemat oamenii
s se alture manifestaiei panice din piaa MAN. Regimul Voronin a profitat
imediat de violene i a declarat c opoziia ncearc o lovitur de stat, organizat
din Romnia. Ambasadorul romn a fost expulzat, puinii ziariti romni aflai la
faa locului trimii peste grani, a fost anunat introducerea de vize pentru cetenii
romni care vor s circule n Moldova (msura este nc n vigoare la ora cnd
redactm acest raport). Acuzaiile mpotriva Romniei nu au fost niciodat probate,
singurul indiciu oferit de guvernul moldovean fiind steagurile Romniei purtate de
unii manifestani. Argumentul este unul bizar, ntruct muli ali manifestani purtau
steagurile Uniunii Europene, iar pe aceast logic UE ar trebui s fie i ea complice
la tentativa de lovitur de stat. Mai mult chiar, tricolorul rou-galben-albastru este
steagul comun al celor dou ri i reprezint mai degrab un semn al naionalitii
romneti dect un semn oficial al statului romn (drapelul Romniei nu conine nici
o stem, iar drapelul Moldovei conine exact aceleai culori, dar cu stema statutului
n mijloc un mare numr de participani avnd aceast variant a tricolorului). De
altfel, drapelul tricolor romnesc poate fi cumprat uor n librriile din Chiinu, ca
i steagurile UE i Rusiei. n iulie 2009 procurorul general al Republicii Moldova a
declarat c Romnia ca stat nu a fost implicat n protestele din 7 aprilie40. Este
singura revenire oficial i la un nivel nepolitic fa de acuzaiile grave aduse Romniei
atunci. n noaptea de 7 spre 8 aprilie, forele de ordine au trecut la represiune fr
a avea un obiectiv clar, arestnd la ntmplare sute de persoane care se mai aflau pe
strzi. Dou persoane au decedat n arestul poliiei, avnd urme de violene. n 8
aprilie, autoritile controlau ferm situaia i un numr mare de ageni de ordine n
civil nconjuraser cldirile afectate n ziua precedent.
Reacia UE, Moldova reapare pe agend

Reprezentanii Uniunii Europene la Chiinu au fost i ei surprini de evenimente
i au reacionat cu ntrziere. Reprezentantul special al UE pentru Moldova, Kalman
Miszei, i-a concentrat activitatea pe rezolvarea conflictului cu Transnistria i a tins
s ignore problemele interne ale Moldovei, strnind revolta partidelor de opoziie.
Imediat dup ncetarea violenelor, autoritile au organizat un tur al cldirilor distruse
pentru diplomaii statelor Occidentale, cu rezultate mai degrab contrare celor vizate.
Misiunea de monitorizare a alegerilor din partea Parlamentului European, condus de
europarlamentuarul estonian Marianne Mikko s-a ntlnit cu ambele pri imediat
dup violene, dar a strnit i ea indignare n rndul opoziiei prin atitudinea critic
adoptat fa de ei. n disperare de cauz, liderii opoziiei au pus-o n faa faptului
40
Romnia nu a fost implicat n protestele din 7 aprilie, ca stat - procurorul general al Republicii Moldova,
Hotnews, 22 iulie 2009.
http://www.unimedia.md/?mod=news&id=11459
24
25
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
mplinit i au organizat n cldirea primriei Chiinu, fr s anune n prealabil,

o ntlnire ntre efa delegaiei i cteva zeci de rnii i rude ale celor arestai de
poliie. Dei i-a acuzat pe liderii opoziiei c i-au organizat un spectacol politic,
Mikko a prut c i schimb atitudinea dup aceast ntlnire, raportul final al PE
condamnnd reacia disproporionat a forelor de ordine. Modul n care Mikko
s-a plasat fa de alegeri i de evenimentele ulterioare, a strnit critici din partea
colegilor din PE, att din partea europarlamentarilor romni, ct i a altora interesai
de Moldova, cum este europarlamentara britanic Emma Nicholson, i ea membr
a delegaiei. n faa valului de arestri, treptat atitudinea la Bruxelles fa de guvernul
moldovean a devenit mai dur. Au fost reluate n PE criticile la adresa OSCE, a
crei misiune de monitorizare a alegerilor a observat ca de obicei c scrutinul a
fost n general corect, dar cu probleme de organizare. Asta a sporit nemulumirea
unor parlamentari europeni asupra colaborrii cu OSCE n mai multe ri, Armenia,
Georgia, Azerbaidjan unde Parlamentul European a considerat standardele OSCE
prea laxe41. PE a adoptat n data de 8 mai o rezoluie privind situaia din Moldova,
care:
1. condamn n mod ferm campania de hruire, grave violri ale
drepturilor omului i alte aciuni ilegale comise de guvernul moldovean dup
alegerile parlamentare
2. cere anchetarea cazurilor de decese petrecute n cadrul evenimentelor
i anchetarea cazurilor de rele tratamente i violuri comise mpotriva celor
deinui de poliie
3. constat c acuzaiile c un stat membru al UE42 a fost implicat n
evenimente par a fi nefondate i nu au fost nici discutate, nici reluate n cadrul
ntlnirilor pe care delegaia PE le-a avut cu oficialii de la Chiinu
4. consider c este inacceptabil ca toate actele de protest s fie clasificate
drept infraciuni i parte dintr-un complot anticonstituional, dei actele de
vandalism trebuie i ele s fie condamnate
5. consider c pentru a-i pstra credibilitatea n faa cetenilor Moldovei,
UE ar trebui s se implice n mod pro-activ i profund n gestionarea situaiei
i cere Consiliului UE s ia n considerare trimiterea unei misiuni speciale
n Moldova privitoare la respectarea legalitii, care s asiste reformarea
autoritilor de aplicare a legii, mai ales poliia i magistratura43.
Pentru oricine este obinuit cu limbajul diplomatic al rezoluiilor PE, acest
document reprezint o condamnare dur a autoritilor pentru reacia lor. Ca
rspuns la cererile venite din Parlamentul European i a rapoartelor propriei delegaii
la Chiinu, Comisia European a propus imediat un pachet de msuri de urgen
n valoare de 4 milioane de euro. Aa numitul Democracy support package,
41
42
43
Blogul analistului Nicu Popescu, 17 iulie 2009, Moldova versus Parlamentul European.
Referin evident la Romnia
n mod indirect, PE recunoate eecul fostelor misiuni ale UE n acest domeniu.
26
cuprinde o serie de aciuni de susinere a reformei forelor de ordine, libertii de

exprimare, reconciliere politic i restaurarea ordinii de drept. Acest pachet urmeaz
nc a fi implementat de Delegaia Comisiei n Moldova. n iunie, minitrii de
Externe ai UE reunii n Consiliul CAGRE au dat publicitii o serie de concluzii
referitoare la Moldova, unde se arat: Consiliul este serios ngrijorat de nclcarea
drepturilor omului care a avut loc dup 5 aprilie, n urma alegerilor parlamentare din
Republica Moldova. Chemm la o investigare transparent, imparial i eficient
a nclcrilor drepturilor omului i a evenimentelor din 7 aprilie, prin intermediul
unui proces care include opoziia i experi internaionali. Consiliul subliniaz c
utilizarea violenei n scopuri politice nu este acceptabil. Consiliul, de asemenea,
este ngrijorat de deteriorarea libertii exprimrii i libertii mass-media i
ndeamn Republica Moldova s asigure acces egal al tuturor partidelor politice la
mijloacele de informare publice, s asigure o distribuire transparent a licenelor
mass-media i s se abin de la utilizarea presiunii administrative mpotriva massmedia independente, organizaiilor societii civile i partidelor politice.n acelai
timp, Consiliul a delegat Comisia s nceap negocierea unui nou acord cu Moldova
ndat ce circumstanele vor permite acest fapt. Urmtorul paragraf face referire
indirect la relaia dintre Moldova i Romnia: n acest context,i n scopul lansrii
negocierilor, Consiliul face apel ctre Republica Moldova s asigure atitudine egal
fa de toi cetenii UE n politica sa de vize i subliniaz importana principiului
de relaii de bun vecintate.Oficiali europeni intervievai pentru acest raport au
exprimat unanim opinia c la nivel practic, nceperea negocierilor pentru un nou
acord este condiionat de ridicare vizelor pentru cetenii romni, aceasta fiind
interpretarea curent fcut de Comisie concluziilor mai sus citate.
Nu este clar ce anume a urmrit guvernul de la Chiinu prin impunerea vizelor
pentru romni, cert este c a avut efecte contrare la nivel european. Cel puin n
aceast chestiune, Romnia a fost susinut de restul rilor din UE, iar condiionarea
nceperii negocierilor pentru un nou acord de rezolvarea unui diferend bilateral ntre
Bucureti i Chiinu este o dovad fr precedent n aceast direcie. Vom scoate
vizele pentru romni atunci cnd Europa ne va da acces liber a spus44 Voronin,
declaraie care a strnit zmbete condescente la Bruxelles. Efectele pe teren ale
noii politici s-au vzut imediat, numrul de persoane i autovehicule care au trecut
grania comun fiind, dup impunerea vizelor, la jumtate fa de aceeai perioad
a anului trecut45. Din 2008 Romnia a depit Rusia n calitate de cel mai mare
partener comercial al Moldovei, iar Moldova se afl ntr-o recesiune sever (FMI a
prognozat o cdere economic de 9% pentru 2009). Astfel, politica de vize pare a
fi sinuciga, mergnd contra fluxurilor comerciale. De altfel, nu e singura msur
44
Presa rus: Declaraiile lui Voronin pun la ndoial nu numai nivelul lui de cultur, dar i starea lui psihic,
HotNews.ro, 24 iunie 2009
Cifrele exacte pot fi gsite n articolul Regimul vizelor a njumtit tranzitul prin vmile de la Prut, Romania
libera, 27 iulie 2009
45
27
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
bizar a regimului de la Chiinu n noul context economic. Tot Vladimir Voronin a

fcut declaraii cu tent obscen la adresa FMI46, o instituie de care Moldova va avea
nevoie pentru a face fa plilor sociale n aceast toamn.
Blocajul politic, repetarea alegerilor. Explicaii

Evenimentele care au urmat alegerilor din 5 aprilie au radicalizat i mai mult
forele politice. PCRM avea nevoie de un singur vot n Parlament pentru alegerea
Preedintelui, ceea ce a devenit cunoscut sub numele de votul de aur. Candidatul
PCRM pentru efia statului a devenit premierul Zinaida Greceani, Vladimir Voronin
ar fi urmat s devin preedinte al Parlamentului, caz n care centrul de putere real ar
fi migrat spre aceast funcie, dat fiind controlul pe care Voronin l exercit asupra
partidului. Cele trei partide de opoziie intrate n Parlament au boicotat cele dou
tururi de scrutin, iar PCRM a euat n alegerea unui nou preedinte. A fost o perioad
de intense speculaii i tensiuni la Chiinu, foarte muli observatori ateptnd ca
PCRM s gseasc votul de aur prin mituirea sau antajarea unor deputai din
opoziie. Nu s-a ntmplat astfel i explicaiile cele mai vehiculate la Chiinu sunt
urmtoarele:
hruirea declanat de PCRM mpotriva politicienilor din opoziie
nainte de alegeri, inclusiv printr-o serie de dosare penale, a instaurat o logic
de cetate asediat i de atac personalizat n cadrul opoziiei. Politicienii din
opoziie au perceput astfel o prelungire a regimului PCRM ca un pericol
pentru sigurana lor personal;
seria de acuzaii de dup 7 aprilie (trdare, conspiraie mpotriva ordinii
de stat mpotriva opoziiei versus orchestrarea violenelor i represiune contra
PCRM) au fcut imposibil orice dialog politic ntre cele dou tabere, iar
politicienii din ambele tabere au devenit ostaticii propriei retorici dure;
precedentul PPDC a funcionat ca un factor de inhibare a oricrei
tentative de colaborare. PPDC condus de Iurie Roca a fost muli ani unul
dintre partidele fanion ale forelor de dreapta de la Chiinu, dar cooptarea
la guvernare dup 2005 a dus la pierderea susinerii populare i la ieirea din
Parlament.
Pentru a prentmpina orice dezertare individual a parlamentarilor n
cadrul votului secret, liderii celor trei partide s-au pus de acord ca deputaii
lor s nu participe deloc la edinele de vot, astfel putnd fi identificai uor
46
Voronin enun obsceniti despre opoziie i FMI, Jurnal de Chiinu, 24 iunie 2009
28
eventualii trdtori care s-ar fi prezentat la Parlament. n imposibilitatea de

a alege un nou Preedinte, a fost declanat potrivit Constituiei procedura
alegerilor anticipate. Aceast procedur n sine a fost un succes pentru
opoziie, principala cerere a manifestanilor panici din 6 7 aprilie fiind
alegeri repetate.
Noua campanie electoral nou. Alte alegeri

n data de 15 iunie, Vladimir Voronin a semnat decretul de dizolvare a Parlamentului
i stabilirea alegerilor anticipate la 29 iulie, lucru care a strnit multe controverse.
Unul din motive a fost alegerea unei zile de miercuri pentru desfurarea alegerilor,
n timp ce toate celelalte scrutine n Republica Moldova s-au desfurat n zile de
duminic. n al doilea rnd PCRM s-a grbit s stabileasc alegerile n cursul verii,
cnd majoritatea populaiei active este n concediu, acesta fiind de fapt electoratul
non-comunist. n al treilea rnd, studenilor, dintre care majoritatea i fac studiile
n Chiinu i care la 29 iulie se aflau n vacan, le-a fost interzis s voteze la adresa
domiciliului permanent. Comisia Electoral a motivat decizia prin faptul c studenii
au viz de edere temporar la locul unde i fac studiile i acolo trebuie s-i exercite
dreptul la vot. La rndul lor, cetenii moldoveni aflai peste hotare nu au putut
vota ntr-o zi de munc n condiiile n care cei mai muli nu s-au putut deplasa la
ambasade sau consulate. Solicitrile opoziiei de a organiza alegerile n toamn au
fost ignorate, PCRM fiind contient c n septembrie electoratul non-comunist ar fi
fost mult mai numeros.
n edina Parlamentului din 15 iunie Codul Electoral a fost modificat din nou,
fiind sczut pragul electoral de la 6 la 5%, iar prezena la vot obligatorie pentru
validarea scrutinului sczut de la 50%+1 vot la 1/3 din alegtori. Realiznd c
pragul electoral mare a avut efectul invers de a exclude i eventuale partide mici cu
care se putea alia, PCRM spera ca n Parlament vor accede mai multe partide, ansele
de a crea aliane crescnd.
n consecin, o replic adecvat la iniiativele comunitilor impunea existena
unei forme de coalizare a celorlali actori politici importani. Unificarea partidelor
de orientare liberal a fost ncercat i anterior alegerilor de la 5 aprilie, dar fr prea
mult succes, fiecare partid venind cu propria sa viziune. Scenariul minimalist pe care
cei mai muli l vehiculau era ca cel puin PL, PLDM i AMN s mearg n alegeri pe
o list comun, lucru care ar fi crescut ansele la un scor bun. Totui, cele trei partide
au ales s candideze pe baza listelor separate, pentru a putea nominaliza trei membri
n comisiile electorale, cu scopul de a descuraja orice tentativ de fraudare.
29
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Campania electoral a decurs cu aceleai nclcri semnalate i n cazul scrutinului

din aprilie utilizarea resurselor administrative de ctre PCRM, intimidarea
concurenilor electorali de ctre organele de ordine, infiltrarea de provocatori la
ntlnirile opoziiei cu alegtorii, vandalizarea panourilor electorale, favorizarea
liderilor PCRM n buletinele tiri la posturile publice de radio i TV etc. Esena
campaniei nu a fost dat de competiia ntre programele partidelor, ci culpabilizarea
pentru evenimentele din 7-8 aprilie.
PCRM a fost cel care a inflamat spiritele i a dat tonul prin documentarul Atac
asupra Moldovei, realizat de un post TV afiliat puterii, n care liderii opoziiei sunt
prezentai drept principalii vinovai pentru provocarea protestelor i vandalizarea
Parlamentului i Preediniei. Nu au ntrziat s apar i replicile, fiind lansate
consecutiv documentarele n aprarea Moldovei realizat de AMN, Adevrul
despre 7 aprilie realizat de PL i Cutia neagr a Moldovei realizat de PLDM. n
dezbaterile televizate de la postul public de televiziune Moldova 1, liderii opoziiei
ncercau s dovedeasc implicarea forelor de ordine care acionau la ordinele PCRM
n acele evenimente. Pierdui n retorica zilei de 7 aprilie, partidele au uitat s ofere
soluiile pe care cetenii le ateptau de la viitoarea guvernare.
n aceast lupt dintre putere i opoziie, PDM i Marian Lupu au optat pentru
o poziie echilibrat i au acuzat ambele pri de provocarea crizei politice, venind
cu sloganul Rzboiul politic trebuie oprit. PDM i-a concentrat campania
asupra criticrii modului n care a fost condus ara n ultimii opt ani, necesitatea
demonopolizrii puterii i refacerea echilibrului dintre puterile statului.
i n aceast campanie PCRM a mizat pe sprijinul extern, n special de la Moscova.
Vladimir Voronin a efectuat o vizit n Rusia i a anunat contractarea unui credit
de 500 milioane de dolari pentru a putea face fa crizei economice. Puin lume a
fost ns impresionat la Chiinu, mai ales c dobnda i condiiile nu erau clare, iar
Voronin a lsat s se neleag c banii Moscovei ar depinde de o victorie a PCRM.
Per total, campania pentru anticipatele din 29 iulie a fost cea mai dur i murdar
campanie din istoria Moldovei. A lipsit de multe ori discursul civilizat, a abundat
discursul acuzator, de multe ori fr probe sau argumente concrete, s-au folosit
tehnici electorale murdare, iar autoritile competente au taxat mai mult opoziia
dect PCRM.
Au existat probleme i cu acreditarea observatorilor internaionali, cum ar fi cazul
organizaiei ENEMO, observatorii creia au fost arestai i ulterior ntori acas47.
Cu toate acestea, observatorii naionali i Misiunea Internaional de Observare a
Alegerilor (MIOA), au putut monitoriza procesul electoral.
47
30
Ultimele dou sptmni de campanie s-au dovedit hotrtoare, astfel c exit

poll-ul realizat dup consumarea alegerilor a furnizat cifre foarte aproape de cele
oficiale48. Comunitii preau totui ncreztori, conform declaraiei liderilor PCRM
ei ar fi cunoscut cu o zi nainte rezultatele acestui exit poll i c sondajul de regul
greete cu circa 5-7% scorul pe care l nregistreaz PCRM dup numrtoarea
oficial49.
Rezultatele oficiale au adus mici modificri fa de cele ale exit poll-ului, dar nu att
de substaniale nct s genereze speculaii despre o nou fraudare a alegerilor50:
Concureni electorali
Voturi
706,732
Partidul Comunitilor din Republica Moldova

Partidul Popular Cretin Democrat
Aliana Moldova Noastr
Partidul Liberal
Partidul Liberal Democrat din Moldova
Partidul Democrat din Moldova
Partidul Social Democrat
Partidul Ecologist Aliana Verde din Moldova
Procente
44.69
Mandate
48
-53,819 (7,08%)
30,236
-4,79
1,91
-12
0
-16,418 (35,19%)
116,194
-1,13
7,35
0
7
-33.961 (22,62%)
232,108
-2,42%
14.68
-4
15
+30,299 (14,97%)
262,028
+1,55%
16.57
0
18
+70,915 (37,11%)
198,268
+4,14
12,54
+3
13
+152,570 (333,87%)
29,434
+9,57
1,86
+13
0
-27,432 (48,24%)
-1,84
6,517
0,41
n comunicatul su din 30 iulie MIOA a declarat: Alegerile parlamentare

anticipate din 29 iulie 2009 din Moldova au fost n general bine administrate,
permind competiia partidelor politice care reprezint o pluralitate de opinii. Au
fost ndeplinite multe angajamente ale OSCE i ale Consiliului Europei; cu toate
acestea, mediul de desfurare a campaniei a fost afectat negativ de intimidare
subtil i tratament preferenial n reflectarea n mijloacele de informare n mas.
Procesul electoral a subliniat necesitatea continurii reformelor democratice pentru
restabilirea ncrederii publice51. Ca de fiecare dat, MIOA a evitat un diagnostic clar
i rspicat, meninnd acelai discurs diplomatic, detaat i care nu oblig. Multiplele
48
Exit Poll iulie 2009, realizat de Institutul de Politici Publice din Moldova http://ipp.md/files/Barometru/Exit_
Poll_29.07_ora_21_final.pdf
49 http://stireazilei.md/2009-7-29-1071
50 http://www.alegeri.md/
51 Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions for the 29 July 2009 early parliamentary elections in Moldova
http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/39083_ro.pdf.html
31
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
ntrebri cu privire la corectitudinea alegerilor adresate reprezentanilor MIOA n

timpul conferinei de pres au rmas fr rspuns. La insistena jurnalitilor de a afla
dac alegerile au fost libere i corecte, moderatorul conferinei pur i simplu a pus
capt conferinei de pres52.
n schimb, Coaliia civic pentru alegeri libere i corecte Coaliia 2009, format
din apte ONG-uri din Moldova a declarat c alegerile au fost incorecte i parial
libere. Motivele invocate au fost: intimidarea concurenilor electorali, multiplele
cazuri de tratament discriminatoriu, utilizarea resurselor administrative, oferirea
de cadouri electorale, manipularea masiv a opiniei publice, ntocmirea incorect a
listelor electorale, cazuri de votare frauduloas etc.53
Problema listelor electorale a existat i la 29 iulie, deoarece n majoritatea seciilor
de votare au fost folosite aceleai liste de la 5 aprilie. Un studiu realizat de Institutul
pentru Drepturile Omului din Moldova a recomandat consolidarea cadrului legislativ
n materie electoral, necesitatea de training pentru autoritile publice locale n
ceea ce privete alctuirea listelor electorale i coordonarea acestui proces de ctre
CEC, punerea la punct a unui mecanism de verificare a listelor de ctre populaie i
partidele politice i definitivarea crerii registrului electronic al alegtorilor54.
Noua alian politic perspective

Rezultatele scrutinului din iulie au dus la un blocaj politic de sens invers celui
provocat dup alegerile din aprilie. Atunci, PCRM avea o majoritate parlamentar
simpl care i-ar fi permis s guverneze, dar nu putea alege Preedintele rii. Dup
iulie, opoziia, mpreun cu PDM, se afl n exact aceeai situaie: are majoritate
simpl, 53 de mandate, dar nu poate alege un Preedinte fr 8 voturi de la PCRM.
Iniiativa a trecut ns n partea opoziiei i acum aceasta se afl n cutare de
trdtori de la comuniti. Dintre cele patru partide, PLDM i PDM i disput
deocamdat doar amical ntietatea, fiecare cu argumentele sale: PLDM pentru c
obinut cele mai multe voturi, PDM pentru c e mai bine situat pentru a atrage voturi
de la PCRM.
Scenariile vehiculate la Chiinu sunt multiple, de la schimbarea Constituiei
pentru alegerea direct a efului statului (dei e nevoie de o majoritate parlamentar
chiar mai larg pentru schimbarea Constituiei i de avizul Curii Constituionale,
dominat de oameni numii de Voronin) pn la oferirea unor avantaje concrete n
funcii i avantaje economice aripii tinere i pragmatice din PCRM. La rndul su, n
52
53
54
Conferina de pres a MIOA organizat la 30 iulie, ora 14.00 n incinta Hotelului LeoGrand din Chiinu.
http://alegeliber.md/index.php/ro/declaratii-comunicate/110-alegeriincorecte
Raportul Institutului pentru Drepturile Omului din Moldova Raport privind monitorizarea ntocmirii i
verificrii listelor electorale n 33 localiti din Republica Moldova http://idom.md/files/admin/Raport_final_%20
Liste_Electorale.pdf
32
PCRM se manifest dou curente de opinii, unul care dorete rmnerea la putere cu
orice pre i un altul care mizeaz pe faptul c o coaliie fr PCRM va fi divizat, va fi
spulberat electoral de criza economic i PCRM se va ntoarce triumfal la conducere
dup eventuale alegeri anticipate (repetnd scenariul din 2001, cnd a ctigat masiv
pe fondul eecului autoprovocat al coaliiei de dreapta). Deocamdat, liderii PLDM,
PDM, PL i AMN au anunat crearea unei coaliii politice, numit la propunerea
liderului PL Mihai Ghimpu, Aliana pentru Integrare European (AIE). Aliana i
propune n programul constitutiv restabilirea ordinii de drept i reformarea statului,
depirea crizei economice, realizarea autonomiei locale, reluarea negocierilor pentru
rezolvarea conflictului transnistrean, integrarea european (semnarea unui nou acord
cu UE, restabilirea relaiilor amicale cu Romnia, eliminarea vizelor pentru romni,
semnarea acordului privind micul trafic de frontier cu Romnia).
Liderii celor patru partide au fost destul de reinui n declaraii i puine informaii
au ieit public privind negocierea funciilor. Se pare c cel mai rvnit post este cel
de Preedinte al Parlamentului, care asigur bun vizibilitate public i stabilitate
(preedintele poate fi demis doar cu trei cincimi din voturile deputailor). Paradoxal,
postul de ef la guvernului e mai puin rvnit, poate i pentru c exist ateptri
pesimiste privind criza economic. De altfel, negocierile ntre cele patru partide
au fost impulsionate de o ntlnire avut cu reprezentanii Bncii Mondiale i cu
reprezentantul special al UE la Chiinu unde li s-a prezentat situaia economic
a rii. Dup evaluri optimiste exist fonduri pentru plata pensiilor, beneficiilor
sociale i pentru salariile bugetarilor doar pn n septembrie octombrie, iar
Moldova are disperat nevoie de un mprumut extern de urgen. FMI, alturi de
Banca Mondial i de Comisia European, are pregtit un pachet de urgen care
graviteaz n jurul sumei de 1 miliard de euro. Dup spusele unui oficial European
intervievat pentru acest raport, suntem pregtii s-i ajutm i va fi nevoie de o
intervenie indiferent cine face guvernul, oricine va avea nevoie de acest ajutor, dar
am prefera s fie opoziia. Puin lume n afara susintorilor fanatici ai lui Voronin
din pres crede la Chiinu c promisiunea unui mprumut rusesc de 500 milioane de
dolari, vehiculat de Voronin n campania electoral, este una realist. De altfel, din
puinele informaii concrete care au reieit, era vorba despre 150 de milioane doar
mprumut n bani, restul urmnd a fi ajutor material i resurse energetice, puin utile
n contextual crizei bugetare.
Scenariile nu sunt optimiste nici n condiiile n care AIE va putea aduna voturile
necesare pentru alegerea unui Preedinte i pentru crearea guvernului. Analizele care
abordeaz subiectul oscileaz ntre pesimism cu accente catastrofice55 i pesimism cu
ceva sperane ataate56. Moldova nu are o tradiie pozitiv a guvernrilor n coaliie.
55
Florin Ni, Alegeri n Republica Moldova: Patru scenarii pesimiste i cum pot fi ele evitate, Centrul Romn
de Politici Europene, august 2009
56 Nicu Popescu, Demonopolizarea puterii n Moldova, Timpul, 10 August 2009
33
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
n urm cu 10 ani, Aliana pentru Democraie i Reform a adunat fore diverse care
doreau stoparea PCRM. ADR a nregistrat ceva succese n reformarea economiei,
dar a fost sabotat de nenelegerile dintre parteneri. Oricum ar fi, prioritatea unei
eventuale guvernri non-PCRM ar trebui s fie demontarea monopolului puterii57
PCRM prin reforma administraiei, reformarea structurilor de for ale statului,
liberalizarea presei i diversificarea patronatului n media, reforma justiiei. n varianta
pesimist moderat, un guvern AIE ar trebui s fac nite progrese ireversibile n
aceste domenii nainte s piard puterea.
Relaiile Moldovei cu Uniunea European

i rolul Romniei
Cristian Ghinea
Sergiu Panainte
Perspectivele de integrare european

Violenele din aprilie i criza politic general din acest an au repus problemele
Moldovei pe agenda Uniunii Europene. Bruxelles-ul a fost luat prin surprindere de
evenimentele din aprilie, ntr-o ar considerat rtcit undeva ntre europenizare
superficial i autoritarism post-sovietic. Dei la Chiinu integrarea european este
o tem de dezbatere i de sperane, dinspre Bruxelles Moldova tinde s fie vzut
doar ca o pies dintr-un mare joc de ah care e relaia UE Rusia. Cum spunea un
oficial european intervievat pentru acest raport, dorim apropierea Moldovei de UE,
dar menajnd suspiciunile Rusiei. Pe harta mental a celor de la Bruxelles, Moldova
intr n zona de interes a Moscovei. Acest lucru nu trebuie s duc la resemnare cu
valene geostrategice, pe principiul suntem prea mici i prini n jocul celor mari.
De fapt depinde de Moldova s-i urmeze destinul european, iar reforme interne
susinute i voina politic pot schimba percepia europenilor, la fel cum s-a ntmplat
cu statele baltice i alte zone din Europa fost comunist n trecut.
57
n articolul citat deja, Nicu Popescu propune cteva prioriti binevenite.
34
UE nu este nc un actor coerent la Chiinu. n Moldova exist att o Delegaia

a Comisiei Europene, ct i un reprezentant special al UE, subordonat naltului
Reprezentant pentru Politic Extern (Javier Solana) i secretariatului Consiliului
UE. Delegaia Comisiei este cea care gestioneaz programele i fondurile UE
n Moldova i partea bun cu birocraia Comisiei este c tinde s funcioneze cu
proiectele deja stabilite indiferent de fluctuaiile geostrategice. Italianul Cesare de
Montis a ocupat funcia de ef al delegaiei n ultimii ani i a preferat un rol public
puin activ. n schimb, faa UE la Chiinu a fost reprezentantul special Kalman
Miszei. Dei nu are control asupra programelor europene acolo, ci mai degrab o
funcie simbolic de reprezentare, reprezentantul special a devenit n simbolistica
35
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
public purttorul de cuvnt al Uniunii la Chiinu. ns aceast dualitate, precum

i greelile fcute de Miszei ncep s aib rezultate negative. Pentru Solana i deci i
pentru Miszei, conflictul din Transnistria a fost prioritatea n toi aceti ani. Se pare
c au considerat acest conflict ca cel mai uor de rezolvat dintre conflictele care
marcheaz relaia cu Rusia i au dorit s fac din Transnistria un exemplu. Pentru
asta, era nevoie de un guvern stabil la Chiinu. Punnd Transnistria i stabilitatea
la Chiinu nainte de orice, Miszei a fcut greeala de a-i nstrina opoziia de
acolo. Este acuzat c a ignorat constant semnalele negative privind autoritarismului
lui Voronin i s-a comportat mereu ca i cum ar fi fost convins c fr PCRM nu se
poate guverna. n timpul vizitei noastre de documentare la Chiinu am fost uimii
de gradul de nencredere i frustrare manifestat n rndurile opoziiei, jurnalitilor i
activitilor anti-Voronin mpotriva lui Kalman Miszei. A fost omul loial a PCRM,
Noi l nelegem ca un personaj care apr interesele Rusiei aici doar cteva
dintre calificativele aprute la adresa sa n timpul interviurilor de la Chiinu. O
alt acuzaie este c dup blocajul politic din aprilie a ncercat s conving partidele
din opoziie s acorde PCRM votul de aur care ar fi dus la alegerea unui nou
preedinte din partea comunitilor i, deci, la asigurarea stabilitii. Dei acest lucru
este negat oficial, cert este c reprezentantul UE s-a implicat mai mult dect era cazul
ntr-un moment n care PCRM avea iniiativa politic i c a spus lucruri diferite
diverilor interlocutori. De altfel, aceasta este impresia n rndul staff-ului Comisiei
(cu care biroul su are o relaie de concuren amical i o comunicare dificil) att
la Chiinu, ct i la Bruxelles.
Alte analize au criticat inclusiv reacia sa dup violenele din aprilie58, cnd
ar fi ncercat s tempereze criticile ambasadorilor rilor UE la adresa regimului.
Reprezentarea Uniunii la Chiinu este deficitar n momente foarte sensibile. Noul
ef al Delegaiei Comisiei va prelua funcia abia n noiembrie. Kalman Miszei este o
figur mai degrab controversat i asta cnd criza politic nu este finalizat, iar ocul
economic abia urmeaz.
Prioritar acum este negocierea unui nou acord ntre UE i Moldova. Aa cum
am artat deja, ridicarea vizelor pentru cetenii romni este n acest moment o
condiie pentru nceperea negocierilor, deci orice guvern va veni va trebui s fac
acest pas. Se ateapt n acest moment ca noul acord s:
1. creasc asistena financiar a UE pentru Moldova
2. s cuprind o serie de condiionri concrete privind implementarea
3. s ofere Moldovei o perspectiv de integrare european, n logica nou
lansatului Parteneriat Estic, prin asumarea reformelor necesare Vom analiza
n detaliu fiecare dintre cele trei puncte.
58
Balazs Jarabik, Moldova between Elections: Europe or Isolation?, FRIDE Policy Brief Nr. 16, iulie 2009
36
n ce privete asistena financiar, UE este de departe cel mai important donator

extern din Moldova. Din partea Uniunii sumele anuale trec de 50 milioane euro n
diverse programe bilaterale i regionale. Pe lng asta, Moldova este un receptor
de asisten de dezvoltare din partea rilor membre, cele mai active fiind Suedia,
Marea Britanie, Danemarca (Romnia este deocamdat un donator minor de fonduri
de dezvoltare n Moldova, cu sume de 800.000 euro anual). n total, estimm c
banii europeni care ajung n Moldova (UE + statele membre) ajung n jurul a 90
milioane euro anual. Iar suma va crete consistent n viitor. Estimri fcute de oficiali
europeni arat c fondurile directe alocate de Uniune vor crete substanial, mergnd
pn spre 72 75 milioane euro anual din 2009 (aici nu intr banii alocai de statele
membre, care foarte probabil vor crete n urma problemelor din acest an). Din
2008, UE a nceput s fac alocri bugetare directe, ceea ce l singularizeaz printre
donatorii internaionali. Nu e puin lucru s i intre bani din afar n buget, bani care
nu reprezint mprumuturi, ci donaii i asta cu att mai mult ntr-un stat srac cum
este Moldova. Deocamdat, plile bugetare ale UE au avut ca destinaie ajutoare
sociale i investiii pentru instalarea de ap curent la sate. Din 2009 se va aduga
un ajutor financiar de macrostabilizare, iar Comisia European va fi juctor activ n
eventualul pachet financiar de urgen al FMI i al Bncii Mondiale. Cu toate c nu
are un profil politic solid i c pare mereu partenerul mai slab n jocul geostrategic
cu Rusia, UE rmne un donator esenial pentru Moldova. Comparnd banii pe care
Uniunea deja i pltete Moldovei pe proiecte concrete i n condiii clare cu iluzoriul
mprumut rusesc promis lui Vladimir Voronin n campania electoral, fr a fi clare
condiiile i sumele, se vede diferena de calibru ntre un sistem funcional cum este
UE i un sistem bazat pe pariuri strategice. Uniunea European va ctiga Moldova
pe termen lung.
UE ar trebui s nvee din aplicarea fostului plan de aciuni cu Moldova i s
treac la condiionaliti legate de implementarea reformelor convenite. Imaginaia
debordant n a face schimbri legislative nu va mai ine loc de integrare european.
Noile condiionaliti trebuie nsoite de beneficii clare pentru Moldova59. Din pcate,
Moldova nu are o perspectiv de integrare clar, deci atractivitatea UE n Moldova
nu se poate compara cu situaia n care s-a aflat Romnia de pild nainte de 2007.
Totui, UE va trebui s lase deschis aceast posibilitate i s i asume angajamente
clare pentru aceast etap: fonduri de asisten, extinderea facilitilor comerciale de
care Moldova s-a bucurat i prin vechiul acord pentru integrarea economic UE
Moldova ntr-o Zon Aprofundat i Comprehensiv de Comer Liber, perspectiva
clar de ridicare a vizelor pentru cetenii moldoveni care intr n UE.
59
Victor Chiril, R. Moldova risc s devin o `misiune imposibil` pentru Uniunea European, Unimedia, 5
august 2009
37
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Parteneriatul Estic (PEst) are avantaje i dezavantaje pentru Moldova. PEst este
o platform de colaborare ntre UE i statele din fosta URSS cu valene europene:
Ucraina, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, Georgia, Belarus i Moldova. Relaiile dintre UE
i aceste state ar urma s fie prevzute n acorduri de asociere. Spre deosebire ns
de acordurile de asociere stabilite cu rile din Balcanii de Vest (Serbia, Albania),
acordurile din PEst nu includ explicit perspectiva aderrii la UE, dar recunosc
aspiraiile europene ale acestor ri. ntr-o interpretare generoas, acest lucru
ar trebui coroborat cu tratatele UE care recunosc dreptul fiecrei ri europene
care ndeplinete anumite condiii de a adera la Uniune, deci implicit PEst ar fi o
promisiune pentru viitor. Marele pericol pentru Moldova este ca PEst s creeze
un nou bloc de ri care ar putea adera (sau nu) la UE ca un grup de state. Aceast
posibilitate este negat de declaraia comun semnat de UE i rile partenere la
Summitului Parteneriatului Estic de la Praga, 7 mai, care spune c Parteneriatul va fi
guvernat de principiile de difereniere i condiionalitate. n acest moment deci, este
preferat principiul c fiecare stat din PEst se va apropia de UE n funcie de meritele
proprii, indiferent de performanele celorlalte. De altfel, diplomaia moldovean a
insistat pentru acest principiu atunci cnd i s-a cerut opinia asupra PEst, nainte
de a fi lansat60. State importante din UE cum sunt Germania i Olanda resping
orice abordare pe grupuri n relaiile externe ale UE, considernd c aderrile la
pachet din 2004 i 2007 au avut efectul pervers de a ascunde lipsa de pregtire a
unor state candidate n spatele meritelor altor ri. Moldova, i Romnia ca membru
al UE interesat de aderarea Moldovei, va trebui s insiste ca principiul diferenierii
s primeze n cadrul PEst, altfel va risca s rmn captiv evoluiilor din ri
dezavantajate de politica intern (Belarus) sau de geografie (Armenia). n concluzie,
PEst reprezint pentru Moldova ansa de accede pe o etap superioar n relaiile cu
UE, dar trebuie evitat pericolul de asociere pe termen lung cu rile din PEst ca un
grup cu destin comun.
Rolul Romniei ca stat membru al UE

Romnia a fost pus ntr-o postur ingrat dup evenimentele din aprilie. n
mod tradiional, diplomaia romneasc ducea o politic de susinere a integrrii
Moldovei n UE, chiar n ciuda rcirii relaiilor oficiale dintre cele dou state. De
altfel, Romnia este singurul stat membru UE cu un interes clar n Moldova, iar
apariia referinelor la Moldova n concluziile diferitelor Consilii Europene s-a datorat
exclusiv diplomaiei romneti. Dar aceast politic tradiional a devenit dificil de
60
Victor Chiril, Parteneriatul Estic o posibil etap de tranziie/pregtire spre aderarea la UE, 11 decembrie
2008, Asociaia de Politic Extern
38
aplicat i necredibil dup ce Chiinul a expulzat ambasadorul romn i a acuzat

Bucuretiul de orchestrarea unei lovituri de stat. A urmat o perioad de confuzie
pentru diplomaia romneasc, dar ntre timp o decizie politic a fost luat la nivelul
Preediniei i Ministrului de Externe pentru o susinere condiionat a Moldovei.
Rezultatul bun obinut de opoziie la 29 iulie ofer de altfel prilejul nclzirii relaiilor
bilaterale. La nivelul Uniunii Europene s-a manifestat solidaritate cu Romnia n
faa exceselor guvernului de la Chiinu, att Parlamentul European, ct i statele
membre respingnd ferm acuzele la adresa Romniei i introducerea vizelor pentru
cetenii romni. Mai puin apreciat a fost anunul fcut de preedintele Bsescu
privind acordarea ceteniei romneti pentru urmaii celor care au avut-o nainte de
invadarea Basarabiei de ctre URSS. Nu acordarea ceteniei n sine a fost problema
(Polonia a fcut asta cu fotii ceteni polonezi din Ucraina i Belarus), europenii au
fost mai degrab intrigai de:
lipsa de consultri nainte de a face acest anun (dat fiind c cetenia
romn nseamn i cetenie european s-ar fi ateptat s fie consultai)
lipsa de detalii tehnice (Romnia nu a anunat exact cte cetenii vor
fi acordate, n ce perioad de timp etc.). Ironia situaiei const n faptul c
acordarea acestor cetenii s-a blocat n incapacitatea birocraiei romneti de
a prelucra cererile depuse nc nainte de aprilie.
n plus, momentul acestui anun a fost considerat nepotrivit, dup ce Rusia
acordase n mas cu cteva luni n urm cetenia pentru cei din Abhazia i Osetia.
Dei cele dou situaii sunt incompatibile, ideea de acordare a ceteniei pe criterii
istorice nu era tocmai popular n Europa la acel moment. O problem spinoas
aflat pe agenda comun este semnarea tratatelor dintre cele dou ri (tratatul de
baz i tratatul privind micul trafic de frontier). Vladimir Voronin a condiionat
semnarea tratatului privind traficul de semnarea primului tratat, dei o liberalizare
a comerului la grani ar fi avantajat Moldova mai mult dect Romnia. La rndul
su, preedintele Bsescu a declarat c Romnia recunoate de jure i de facto grania
cu fosta URSS i un nou tratat nu este necesar. O schimbare a puterii la Chiinu ar
putea debloca negocierile, iar guvernul de la Bucureti s-ar putea arta mai flexibil
fa de chestiunea tratatului comun, care nu ar aduce nici o schimbare n practic,
dar ar scoate din defensiv partidele necomuniste de la Chiinu, obligate mereu s
se apere de acuzaiile c ar dori unirea cu Romnia. n plan european, Romnia i
consolideaz statutul de ar membr UE interesat de Moldova i cu expertiz n
zon. Cum spunea un expert independent de la Bruxelles intervievat pentru acest
raport, dac Romnia nu pune Moldova pe agenda UE, nimeni altcineva nu are nici
interes, nici expertiz pentru a o face. Spania filtreaz relaia UE cu America Latin,
39
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Frana face acelai lucru cu Africa de Nord, iar Polonia ncearc asta n relaia cu
Belarus i Ucraina, probabil Romnia se va instala ntr-o poziie similar n poziia
UE Moldova. Totui, pentru a fi credibil n UE pe acest subiect, Romnia ar
trebui s caute un parteneriat cu alte state membre interesate de subiect. Aflat n
vizit la Chiinu nainte de alegeri, Ministrul de Externe polonez a declarat c ara
sa va fi reprezentantul Moldovei n forurile UE dac alegerile vor decurge bine.
Aceasta poate fi nceputul unui parteneriat romno-polonez pentru Moldova.
Peisajul Mass-Media:
Stop i de la capt
Ioana Avdani
Peisajul mediatic moldovenesc este strbtut de dou linii de demarcaie extrem de
puternice i de vizibile: una lingvistic (romnofonie/rusofonie) i una politic (linia procomunist/linia anti-comunist). Adeseori, aceste dou linii se confund i, n percepia
observatorului din afara Moldovei, aceast suprapunere se face, eronat, automat i fr
nuane. Tensiunea politic a rii se reflect puternic asupra agendei mass-media, punnd
n plan secund problemele legate de profesionalism. Statul este un actor important n piaa
de mass-media din Moldova, iar politicienii (indiferent de zona eichierului politic din care
provin) nu se sfiiesc n a utiliza mecanisme administrative pentru a interveni n sectorul
mediatic att n zona editorial, ct i n cea economic. Prghiile economice sunt adeseori
utilizate pentru a influena coninutul editorial, ceea ce ridic mari semne de ntrebare fa
de libertatea real a presei moldoveneti (dincolo de cadrul legal care o reglementeaz).
nc o dat, aceste practici deplaseaz prioritile de intervenie spre problema libertii
presei, lsnd pe plan secund chestiunea profesionalismului jurnalitilor. Ca urmare a
acestor influene, mass-media este oarecum deconectat de publicul su, fiind folosit mai
degrab ca instrument de influen politic dect ca mijloc de informare corect, onest,
comprehensiv, a publicului. Comunitatea internaional s-a oprit, n eforturile sale de
asisten, la elementele de suprafa i la formele tradiionale. Deseori, de dragul prezervrii
unor raporturi funcionale cu autoritile, comunitatea internaional a fcut alegerea
pragmatic de a ignora problemele semnalate de activitii n domeniul libertii presei,
instaurnd astfel standarde duble de apreciere. Presa din Republica Moldova are, fr
ndoial, resorturile energetice i capitalul de experien necesare evoluiei spre normalizare
i, ulterior, performan. Noile tehnologii i dezvoltarea unor forme alternative de pres
care se bazeaz pe acestea deschid o perspectiv promitoare de reconectare cu publicul,
de rectigare a ncrederii acestuia. n contextul unei schimbri de paradigm politic i
cu condiia schimbrii practicilor informale, presa moldoveneasc se afl n faa unui nou
nceput, care i-ar putea permite dezvoltarea pe criteriile fundamentale ale oricrei industrii
mass-media sntoase: respectarea interesului public i profitabilitatea economic.
40
41
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Mass-media n Moldova: mult politic, puin interes

public
Rezultatele recensmntului populaiei din 2004, Biroul Naional de Statistic, disponibil la http://www.statistica.
md/newsview.php?l=ro&idc=168&id=2358
din mers trecerea la grafia latin aceasta fiind populaia tnr, cea activ i
preponderent urban. Pentru restul, grafia latin este virtual inaccesibil. Conform
datelor Biroului Naional de Statistic, R. Moldova are o populaie predominant
rural (58,6% din populaie triete n mediul rural). Extrapolarea datelor privind
structura pe vrste a populaiei relev c populaia sub 35 de ani (cei care au fost
educai n uzul grafiei latine ca grafie oficial n cursul anilor de coal) se ridic la
circa 53,5%. Fr a avea pretenii de rigurozitate, aceste date indic ns sugestiv
dimensiunea grupei demografice care este analfabet n grafie latin.
n esen, chestiunea limbii ar trebui s fie n primul rnd una de accesibilitate a
informaiei. O abordare pragmatic a circulaiei informaiei ar sugera maximizarea
audienei prin oferirea aceluiai coninut n ambele limbi. Chestiunea lingvistic
este, ns, att de intens politizat nct abordarea pragmatic este respins cu
argumente emoionale. Cnd i s-a sugerat inserarea unui fascicul de limb rus n
ziarul su de limb romn, directorul unei publicaii reputate pentru abordarea sa
pro-romneasc a replicat c aa ceva ar fi perceput de publicul su drept un act
de trdare. Plasndu-se ferm pe baricadele lingvistice, majoritatea covritoare a
presei de limb romn i limiteaz n mod deliberat penetraia n rndul publicului,
se abine de la accesarea unor categorii de public neabordate pn n prezent i,
prin aceasta, i restrnge perspectivele de dezvoltare economic. Mai pragmatic
n abordare, presa de limb rus nu i impune singur astfel de restricii i livreaz
coninut n limba romn.
La fel de important i inflexibil este i linia de divizare politic. Pluralismul
politic i diversitatea opiniilor constituie premizele unei democraii solide, iar
confruntarea de idei un ferment valoros pentru rezolvarea problemelor societii.
Cu toate acestea, polarizarea extrem care se nregistreaz pe scena politic
moldoveneasc duce, n mod paradoxal, chiar la dispariia dialogului i a necesarei
confruntri de idei. De data aceasta, diviziunea politic nu mai urmeaz marile familii
ideologice i diferenele doctrinare, ci se reduce, brutal i radical, la poziionarea
fa de comuniti. Lunga perioad de dominare politic a comunitilor, n cei opt
ani de guvernri succesive, a radicalizat gndirea politic, mass-media i societatea,
reducnd opiunile la poziiile pro-comuniste sau anti-comuniste. Nici mcar
distincia pro-guvernamental versus anti-guvernamental nu mai este operant,
dat fiind penetrarea tuturor structurilor guvernamentale de elemente apropiate
Partidului Comunitilor din Republica Moldova (PCRM). Mass-media reflect din
plin aceast polarizare, coninutul editorial fiind la fel de radicalizat ca i discursul
politic. Acest aspect a fost agravat de contextul electoral dramatic al anului 2009, cu
cele dou rnduri de alegeri parlamentare i violenele care au urmat alegerilor din
5 aprilie.
Cele dou falii cea lingvistic i cea politic s-au suprapus aproape automat
n contextul anului 2009, dnd natere unei oferte politice i mediatice debalansate,
n detrimentul informrii corecte a publicului moldovenesc. Dintre partidele active
42
43
Se spune c presa nu poate fi mai bun dect societatea n care funcioneaz i pe

care o reflect. Nimic mai adevrat n ceea ce privete peisajul mediatic al Republicii
Moldova, care reflect, n detalii aproape caricaturale prin exacerbare, tendinele,
tulburrile i disfunciile societii moldoveneti. Ca i societatea moldoveneasc
nsi, mass-media din R. Moldova este strbtut de dou falii majore: cea
lingvistic i cea politic. Aceste linii de demarcaie sunt att de profunde i
determin comportamente att de specifice nct polarizeaz profund societatea i,
ca atare i mass-media din R. Moldova.
De-a lungul faliei lingvistice gsim polarizate grupul romnofon i cel
rusofon. Exist pres de limb romn (sau moldoveneasc, dup denumirea
oficial a limbii, i ea, la rndul ei, o chestiune cu determinare politic) i pres
de limb rus. Populaia rusofon este, de regul, dar greit, asimilat cu ruii.
n realitate, populaia rusofon este mult mai divers i mai nuanat constituit.
Potrivit datelor oficiale61, moldovenii constituie 75,8% din totalul populaiei. Alturi
de ei se regsesc ucraineni, (8,4%), rui (5,9%), gguzi (4,4%), romni (2,2%),
bulgari (1,9% ), precum i alte naionaliti (cu o pondere de 1% din numrul total
al populaiei rii). Pentru 0,4% din locuitori, naionalitatea nu a fost nregistrat.
Aceeai surs relev c, din numrul total al locuitorilor, 58,8% vorbesc de obicei
n limba moldoveneasc, 16,4% n limba romn, 16,0% n limba rus, 3,8% n limba
ucrainean, 3,1% n limba gguz i 1,1% n limba bulgar. Un procentaj de 0,8%
din populaie fie vorbete o alt limb, fie nu a indicat limba utilizat de obicei.
n plus, fiecare al doilea ucrainean, fiecare al treilea bulgar i fiecare al patrulea
gguz vorbesc de obicei limba rus. Moldovenii care vorbesc de obicei limba rus
constituie 5% din total, se arat n documentul citat.
Datele recensmntului evideniaz obinuinele curente de comunicare, care
conduc la concluzia c limba de stat este predominant. Pentru orice vizitator al
Republicii Moldova devine repede evident, ns, c limba rus este frecvent utilizat
pentru comunicri interpersonale i interaciuni sociale curente.
Un alt aspect pe care datele recensmntului nu au cum s-l releve este cel legat de
accesibilitatea grafiei latine n rndul populaiei. ntrebrile recensmntului au vizat
limba vorbit, lsnd n umbr problemele ridicate de trecerea la grafia latin. n
perioada sovietic, limba moldoveneasc desemna un produs de sorginte ideologic,
care ngloba limba romn transpus n caractere chirilice. Limba moldoveneasc
era studiat n coal ca limb secundar, limba oficial de comunicare la nivelul
republicii fiind limba rus. De aceea, o parte a populaiei Republicii Moldova a fcut
61
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
n confruntrile electorale din aprilie i iulie 2009, doar PCRM a avut o ofert
politic adresat att vorbitorilor de limb romn, ct i celor de limb rus. Restul
partidelor s-au meninut n spaiul romnofon, atribuind populaiei rusofone,
aproape automat, simpatii pro-moscovite i comuniste i, pe cale de consecin,
sentimente anti-moldoveneti. Fenomenul a fost subliniat i de analitii moldoveni.
Astfel, Arcadie Barbroie, directorul executiv al Institutului de Politici Publice,
citat de Moldova.org62 arat c n cele dou campanii electorale, comunitii au
luptat pentru fiecare vot, intind fiecare posibil segment al electoratului, inclusiv
minoritile naionale. Ei trimit mesaje, inclusiv minoritilor etnice, ncercnd s
conving acest segment de electorat s-i susin la alegeri. Exist ns i un alt aspect
al problemei care nu mi se pare normal faptul c partidele de opoziie nu intesc
segmentul respectiv, a concluzionat Barbroie. Doar cu cteva sptmni nainte
de alegerile din 29 iulie 2009, Partidul Liberal Democrat din Moldova (PLDM) l-a
inclus pe listele sale electorale pe Dumitru Ciubaenko, redactorul ef al publicaiei
de limb rus Moldavskie Vedomosti, ziar cu orientare anti-comunist, ntr-un gest
de ultim moment menit s apropie electoratul anti-comunist rusofon.
Este greit s credem c toi vorbitorii de limb rus sunt cripto-comuniti.
Intelectualitatea rus nu este parte a sistemului, a declarat Petru Macovei, director
al Asociaiei Presei Independente (API), intervievat pentru prezentul raport63. El
a amintit de alte medii de limb rus, precum ziarul local Spros i Predlojenie din
raionul Bli, postul TV 7, canal care redifuzeaz programele postului de televiziune
rus NTV, cu inserii locale preponderent n limba romn sau publicaia online ava.
md, care au avut poziii echilibrate n campanii.
Cu toate acestea, Vasile Botnaru, directorul biroului Europa Liber de la Chiinu,
vede situaia mai nuanat. Percepia creeaz realitatea, ntr-o oarecare msur, a
declarat el ntr-un interviu pentru prezentul raport64. Lsat fr informaie alternativ,
publicul de limb rus primete informaii doar dintr-o anumit zon a spectrului
politic i, pe cale de consecin, i va forma opiniile electorale n concordan cu
mesajul acesteia. Astfel, un alegtor nehotrt de limb rus va vota mai probabil cu
comunitii dect cu partidele de opoziie, a cror ofert politic i este necunoscut.
Modelul este cel al arpelui lui Saint-Exupry, care ia forma obiectului pe care
l nghite, adaug i Igor Munteanu, directorul executiv al Institutului pentru
Democraie i Iniiative Sociale IDIS Viitorul.
Indiferent de limb, campaniile electorale ale anului 2009 s-au remarcat prin
cteva trsturi definitorii: un puternic dezechilibru editorial, un marcat partizanat
politic, accenturi ale virulenei discursului politic, o activ implicare a statului n
coninutul i economia mijloacelor de informare n mas.
62
Moldova.org este un portal administrat de Fundaia Moldova din Statele Unite, mpreuna cu IDIS Viitorul
din R. Moldova. Articol disponibil la http://politicom.moldova.org/news/comunitii-singurii-avocai-ai-minoritileetnice-202510-rom.html
63 Interviu cu Petru Macovei, Chiinu, august 2009
64 Vasile Botnaru, Chiinu, august 2009.
44
Principala surs de informare a publicului din R. Moldova este televiziunea. De

aceea, actorii politici i-au ndreptat atenia fa de acest mediu, care a avut de suferit
i cele mai mari influene. Centrul pentru Jurnalism Independent de la Chiinu
a monitorizat, n cadrul unui proiect al Coaliiei pentru alegeri libere i corecte
Coaliia 2009, campania pentru alegerile din iulie derulat de principalele posturi de
televiziune, cu acoperire naional i cvasi-naional. Sptmn dup sptmn,
rapoartele de monitorizare au relevant c majoritatea posturilor urmrite Moldova
1 i Radio Moldova, Prime TV, NIT, EU TV au continuat s admit abateri grave
de la principiile etice i deontologice, n unele cazuri nclcnd prevederile Codului
Audiovizualului i ale Regulamentului privind reflectarea campaniei electorale, aprobat
de Comisia Electoral Central65. nclcrile semnalate de CJI privesc prezentarea
de tiri eminamente pozitive despre partidul de guvernmnt i membrii guvernului,
n condiiile n care tirile despre candidaii i partidele de opoziie ori vizau aspecte
negative, ori lipseau cu totul. Posturile de televiziune au recurs la tehnici care
permiteau supraexpunerea unui partid, pstrnd aparenele pluralismului (se prelua o
informaie dintr-o conferin de pres a opozanilor, formaiunea atacat era invitat
s-i prezinte punctele de vedere ntr-un timp mai lung dect presupusa acuz i prin
vocile a mai multor personaje). Relatrile de la conferinele de pres ale opoziiei vizau
mai puin temele discutate, ci se axau de regul pe ridiculizarea ideilor prezentate, a
persoanelor prezente sau a conjuncturilor de moment. Partidele de opoziie nu au
beneficiat, de regul, de drept la replic atunci cnd PCRM lansa acuze la adresa lor.
De asemenea, relatrile de la evenimentele puterii erau mai bine plasate n economia
programelor de tiri dect cele ale opoziiei. Campania electoral s-a ncheiat cu un
apel de dou minute al preedintelui Voronin care i eticheta negativ oponenii i i
chema pe moldoveni s-i voteze pe comuniti.
Un element distinctiv al campaniei electorale din iulie (comparativ cu cea
pentru alegerile din aprilie) a fost deteriorarea calitii discursului public, creterea
agresivitii, a violenelor de limbaj, ajungndu-se pn la accente de hate speech66.
Potrivit lui Petru Macovei, aceast escaladare i are rdcina n campania virulent a
tuturor partidelor, de guvernmnt sau de opoziie, de dinaintea alegerilor din aprilie,
preluat i accentuat n campania din iulie. Schimbul de idei politice, criticile asupra
actului de guvernare i soluiile alternative au fost nlocuite de atacuri la persoan,
de propagand, de acuze grave formulate ntr-o retoric specific luptei politice
din timpul rzboiului rece (spionaj, trdare de neam, hidra galben referire
la Partidul Liberal, criminal, element anti-statal etc.). Violenele de limbaj au
vizat, n egal msur, elemente antisemite (romnii fiind asemnai cu jidovii) i
homofobe (politicienii acuzai c s-au purtat ca ntr-o baie armeneasc).
65
Monitorizarea CJI, disponibil la http://www.ijc.md/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=463&I

temid=1
66 Conform rapoartelor de monitorizare ale Centrului pentru Jurnalism Independent, Chiinu.
45
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Una dintre liniile principale de atac ale comunitilor, reflectat ca atare de presa
care i sprijinea, a fost poziia anti-romneasc i identificarea Romniei ca rdcin
a tuturor relelor i principal beneficiar al unei eventuale victorii a opoziiei anticomuniste de la Chiinu. Un exemplu gritor este filmul Atac asupra Moldovei67,
produs i difuzat (n limba rus) de mai multe televiziuni, n care opoziia (n
spe Dorin Chirtoac, primarul liberal al Chiinului) este acuzat de punerea la
cale a violenelor postelectorale, de tentativa de a desfiina grania de peste Prut
i de a realiza unirea cu Romnia68. Acuzele sunt aduse n baza interceptrii unei
convorbiri telefonice realizate, aparent legal, de Serviciul de Informaii i Securitate
(SIS), n cursul unei proceduri de urmrire penal mpotriva lui Chirtoac. n film
apar preedintele Vladimir Voronin, procurorul general al Moldovei i eful SIS,
Artur Reetnicov.
Tot astfel, Moldova Suveran, ziar care, dei dezetatizat n 2004 a rmas o portavoce
a guvernului, scria n ediia din 22 iulie 2009, comentnd vizita la Bucureti a unei
delegaii a societii civile moldoveneti: ntlnirea moldovenilor cu oficialii
romni a avut loc naintea repartizrii bugetului de stat al Romniei, fapt ce
ne face s credem c n-au revenit n Moldova cu buzunarele goale. Sigur ca
scopul principal al vizitei are de-a face cu lupta personal a lui Bsescu de a aduce la
putere n Moldova o grupare politic servil lui69. n acea perioada nu s-a fcut, n
Romnia, nici un fel de vorbire de bugetul de stat.
La rndul su, presa pro-opoziie a abordat o critic de joas factur. Astfel,
Jurnalul de Chiinu, un ziar cu o atitudine altfel echilibrat, scria, n 20 iulie: Vladimir
Voronin este sigur c Marian Lupu nu mai ajunge preedinte. <<Nu mai
ajunge Marian Lupu preedinte! Muli vor, dar nu toi pot! Femeile tiu mai
bine, nu-i aa?>>, a spus Voronin la o ntlnire cu alegtorii din satul Pleeni,
r. Cantemir, scrie Unimedia. Ne permitem s nu fim de acord cu dl. preedinte
n exerciiu. El o fi fost probabil, n momentul respectiv, lovit de insolaie, dac a
spus aa ceva. Cci de unde s tie femeile din Pleeni ce poate Marian Lupu? De
altfel, exprimat la persoana nti, ideea lui Voronin <<muli vor, dar nu pot>>
sun astfel: <<de multe ori vreau, dar nu ntotdeauna pot>>. Ceea ce e total diferit.
Secretele limbii, cum ar spune Monica Lewinski
La o lectur n diagonal a presei scrise din R. Moldova pe timpul campaniei
electorale se observ lesne diferena stilistic dintre tiri care sunt, de cele mai multe
ori, anoste i materialele de opinii, care sunt virulente, colorate i prin aceasta mai
atractive pentru cititorii fideli ai respectivelor publicaii. Din aceast diferen de
tensiune editorial a rezultat un al doilea nivel de manipulare electoral, publicul
fiind mai degrab expus mesajelor puternic negative i profund umorale.
67
68
Disponibil la http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ngCLiWjW2b4
Cf. Cotidianul, Bucureti, 9 iunie 2009, disponibil la http://www.cotidianul.ro/voronin_superstar_in_atac_
asupra_moldovei-87566.html
69 http://www.moldova-suverana.md/arh.php?subaction=showfull&id=1248278408&archive=1248364571&sta
rt_from=&ucat=7&
46
Aceste trsturi au putut fi observate att la presa central, ct i la cea local.

Astfel, potrivit API, presa local, n special cea susinut de autoriti, a tins s i
asume culoarea politic a formaiunii dominante n raionul respectiv. Acelai lucru
l-au fcut i o seam de publicaii independente, asumndu-i fi simpatiile politice.
ntr-o pres dominat de influene pro-comuniste, vocile pro-opoziie au avut rol
de echilibrare a informaiei. Cu toate acestea, luate individual, publicaiile locale
respective nu i-au respectat obligaiile de imparialitate. Directorul API, Petru
Macovei a declarat c organizaia va lua n dezbatere cazurile unor ziare independente
locale care n campania electoral au nclcat principiile echidistanei i echilibrului
editorial.
Dar poate cel mai dramatic este cazul mediilor publice, televiziunea Moldova 1
i Radio Moldova. Potrivit rapoartelor de monitorizare ale CJI, cele dou posturi
publice, care au prin definiie obligaia de informare corect i de promovare
a pluralismului politic, au respectat selectiv principiile reflectrii echitabile,
echilibrate i impariale a alegerilor parlamentare. Mediilor publice moldoveneti li
se reproeaz o obedien evident fa de structurile puterii i nclcarea principiilor
deontologice ale echidistanei, echilibrului i obiectivitii. Astfel, PCRM a beneficiat
de supraexpunere cantitativ i de reflectare pozitiv intens. De exemplu, doar n
ultima sptmn a campaniei electorale, programul Mesager, principalul program
de tiri al postului, a difuzat 27 de materiale care au favorizat PCRM i autoritile
publice centrale i 4 cu caracter neutru. n aceeai perioad de referin, alte partide
au avut o prezen mai modest n buletinele informative de la Moldova 1, iar
reporterii au dat dovad de mai mult imparialitate i spirit critic atunci cnd au
relatat despre activitile lor, afirm raportul. n perioada de referin, partidele de
opoziie (PL, PLDM, AMN, PD, PSD, Partidul Ecologist Aliana Verde) au fost
protagoniti n 21 de materiale cu caracter neutru i n 10 cu caracter negativ70.
ntr-o ncercare de a salva aparenele unei campanii corecte, preedintele Vladimir
Voronin, care este i liderul PCRM, a cerut posturilor publice s nu relateze despre
activitatea sa i a nalilor oficiali guvernamentali care candidau n alegeri (dup
exemplul fostului preedinte rus, Vladimir Putin). n aparen, postul Moldova 1 a
inut cont de solicitarea preedintelui. Cu toate acestea, ediiile de tiri au abundat
n reportaje de la evenimente cu caracter social, care au favorizat n mod clar
guvernarea i partidul de guvernmnt. Raportul citat menioneaz c: n perioada
respectiv (n.r. 20-28 iulie), Moldova 1 a difuzat 25 de materiale cu caracter electoral
indirect. Acestea au avut drept subiect activitile Guvernului (achitarea plilor
sociale, discuii pe marginea creditelor rus i chinez, compensaii pentru victimele
represiunilor politice, inaugurarea terminalului cerealier de la Giurgiuleti etc.), dar i
70
Monitorizarea mass-media n campania electoral pentru alegerile parlamentare anticipate din 29 iulie 2009,
Raport nr. 5
20 28 iulie 2009, disponibil la http://www.ijc.md/Publicatii/monitorizare/monitorizare_raport_anticipate_5.pdf
47
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
aciuni cum ar fi asfaltarea unor poriuni de drum, darea n exploatare a unui apeduct
i lucrrile de reparaie a unei case de cultur. Merit atenie seria de materiale despre
deschiderea dup renovare a unor centre ale medicilor de familie din diferite localiti
despre care Moldova 1 a realizat cinci reportaje. n toate materialele a fost menionat
de mai multe ori c banii au fost alocai de Guvern i doar n unul se spune c
guvernul a repartizat utilaj medical procurat cu ajutorul Uniunii Europene71.
Potrivit Corinei Cepoi, director al colii de Studii Avansate n Jurnalism,
coordonat de CJI, televiziunea Moldova 1 a fcut n mai multe ocazii, pe parcursul
campaniei electorale, dovada capacitii sale profesionale, realiznd tiri echilibrate
i echidistante. O astfel de situaie relev faptul c nu capacitatea profesional este
deficiena major a postului public de televiziune, ci comanda politic ce i mpiedic
pe jurnaliti s-i practice meseria cu onestitate, conform propriilor standarde
profesionale.
Eecul televiziunii publice de a relata corect i imparial campania electoral vine
la finele multor ani de sprijin din partea comunitii internaionale, de programe de
asisten i de investiii de ncredere n capacitatea postului de stat de a se reforma,
transformndu-se n post public. Acest eec a fost recunoscut explicit, dup alegerile
din 5 aprilie, i de Marianne Mikko, fost co-preedinte al Comitetului de Cooperare
UE - R. Moldova. Marianne Mikko a declarat ntr-o conferin de pres : Lupta
pentru libertatea de exprimare pentru postul public de televiziune Moldova 1 este,
dup mine, una pierdut. De aceea, consider c reforma necesar trebuie s nceap
de urgen, pentru c de cinci ani de cnd monitorizez evoluiile din R. Moldova, nu
am observat nici un progres n acest sens.72
Statul - juctor i arbitru

Dac analizm legislaia R. Moldova, este greu de neles cum s-au produs aceste
abuzuri i dezechilibre editoriale. R. Moldova nu are doar o legislaie modern,
apropiat de standardele democratice, ci i instituii presupus autonome, chemate s
asigure att respectarea legii, ct i sancionarea derapajelor, atunci cnd se produc.
Una dintre aceste instituii de salvgardare a interesului public, arbitru al jocului
electoral este Consiliul Coordonator al Audiovizualului (CCA)73. Abuzurile semnalate
de organizaiile de monitorizare a presei, de organizaiile de drepturile omului sau de
cele cu interes n derularea corect a procesului electoral (inclusiv a campaniei) nu
au fost puine i era de ateptat s pun presiune pe CCA, determinndu-l la reacii
ferme. Cu toate acestea, CCA a emis, pe tot parcursul campaniei electorale, doar dou
71
72
Ibid.
Conform
http://www.actualpress.md/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=351:mariannemikko-moldova-1-a-pierdut-lupta-pentru-libertatea-de-exprimare&catid=45:politic&Itemid=70
73 http://www.cca.md
48
comunicate de pres. n 13 iulie, CCA emite un comunicat prin care recomand

radiodifuzorilor s asigure n programele de tiri imparialitatea, echilibrul i
favorizarea liberei formri a opiniilor prin prezentarea principalelor puncte de vedere
ale oponenilor, iar n cazul subiectelor ce vizeaz situaii de conflict, s respecte
principiul de informare din mai multe surse, n conformitate cu prevederile art. 7 al
Codului audiovizualului74. Comunicatul subliniaz c este deosebit de important
pentru instituiile audiovizuale de a nu admite ingerine n coninutul i forma
serviciilor de programe din partea autoritilor publice, concurenilor electorali sau a
altor persoane din afara instituiei audiovizualului75 i le cere acestora s asigure timpi
de anten n condiii egale pentru toi concurenii electorali, n condiiile legii. Trei
zile mai trziu, n 16 iulie, ca rspuns la semnale din partea mai multor consumatori
de programe potrivit crora, n cadrul serviciilor de programe ale unor radiodifuzori
locali aflai sub jurisdicia Republicii Moldova sunt plasate emisiuni cu caracter
electoral care nu corespund grilelor de emisie i Regulamentelor interne aprobate76,
CCA revine cu un alt comunicat prin care reitereaz necesitatea respectrii de ctre
radiodifuzorii i distribuitorii de servicii aflai sub jurisdicia Republicii Moldova a
prevederilor Codului audiovizualului, condiiilor licenelor de emisie i autorizaiilor
de retransmisie, grilelor de emisie i listelor de canale aprobate de CCA77. Aceste
comunicate survin ca singure, palide reacii - scrisorii adresate de Coaliia pentru
Alegeri Libere i Corecte Coaliia 2009 care solicita CCA s prezinte rezultatele
monitorizrii, concluziile i eventualele msuri luate de CCA n legtur cu difuzarea
filmului documentar Atac asupra Moldovei de ctre mai multe posturi TV (NIT,
N4, Prime, EuTV, Moldova 1), n perioada 5 14 iunie 200978.
Dac CCA se remarc prin blndeea admonestrilor i total pasivitate, alte
instituii ale statului s-au remarcat prin opacitate i lips de apeten n aplicarea legii
accesului la informaii. Asociaia Presei Independente a solicitat Potei Moldovei
bilanul anual, pentru a verifica declaraiile administratorului acesteia precum c
Pota ar fi fcut acte de binefacere de un million de lei. Pota Moldovei a refuzat
s furnizeze aceste informaii, declarnd c ele au caracter comercial. Refuzul a
determinat API s acioneze instituia n justiie, obinnd ctig de cauz printr-o
decizie a Curii Supreme. Un proces similar se deruleaz n prezent ntre API i Cile
Ferate ale R. Moldova, privind sumele marcate n buget ca investiii n gri. Un alt
exemplu de lips de transparen este dat de Inspectoratul Fiscal, care a refuzat s
pun la dispoziia API informaii privind candidaii cu datorii la stat. Inspectoratul
Fiscal a refuzat aceste informaii motivnd c restanele la plata impozitului nu sunt
infraciuni. Curtea de Apel, care a judecat procesul, a dat ctig de cauz API. Am
74
75
76
Comunicat CCA din 13 iulie 2009, http://www.cca.md/sites/default/files/com_presa_13_07_2009.pdf

Ibid.
Comunicat CCA din 16 iulie 2009, disponibil la http://www.cca.md/sites/default/files/com_presa_16_07_2009.
77
78
Ibid.
Textul scrisorii disponibil la http://www.alegeliber.md/files/declaratii/Adresare_catre_CCA.pdf
pdf
49
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
ctigat procesul, dar informaiile tot nu le-am primit, a declarat Petru Macovei,
director al API, intervievat pentru acest raport.
n mod similar, Camera nregistrrilor a retras, dup numai dou sptmni, dreptul
acordat jurnalitilor de a accesa informaiile referitoare la firme fr s plteasc taxa
necesar. Privilegiul a fost pstrat doar pentru API pn cnd, n iunie 2009, ziarele
din asociaie au publicat o anchet care dezvluia situaia de conflict de interese n
care se afla ministrul Construciilor, Vladimir Baldovici, dup ce firma de construcii
la care acesta deinea pachetul majoritar de aciuni a ctigat licitaia public pentru
lucrrile de reconstrucie la sediului Parlamentului R. Moldova. Ancheta avea la baz
informaii obinute din datele de la Registrul nregistrrilor. Accesul gratuit la date a
fost ulterior reluat, n urma unor negocieri ntre registru i API.
Au existat, ns, i forme mai agresive de utilizare a prghiilor administrative
ale statului pentru intimidarea oponenilor. Astfel, un numr de jurnaliti reputai
pentru tonul lor critic la adresa autoritilor, printre care Vasile Botnaru, director
Europa Liber Chiinu, Rodica Mahu, redactor-ef al ziarului Jurnal de Chiinu,
Oleg Brega, reporter la Jurnal TV i Alexandru Vakulovski, redactor-ef al revistei
Stare de Urgen au fost invitai, la nceputul lunii august, la procuratura militar a
municipiului Chiinu, pentru discuii pe marginea evenimentelor violente din
7 aprilie. n opinia lui Vasile Botnaru, aceste invitaii au scop de intimidare i
exist precedente consistente cnd audieri care au nceput cu subiecii n poziie
de martori au sfrit prin acuzarea lor. Eu am experien, eu am o organizaie
puternic n spate, am avocai, pe mine nu m sperie, pot ei s m cheme ct vor. Dar
pentru jurnalitii mai tineri, pentru cei care depind de bunvoina statului, un astfel
de interogatoriu poate fi foarte traumatizant, a declarat Vasile Botnaru, intervievat
pentru acest raport.
O tactic asemntoare a fost aplicat i n aa numitul Dosar al forumitilor.
La finele lunii mai 2008, procuratura Chiinu a cerut mai multor furnizori de servicii
online printre care i portalul Unimedia liste de IP-uri de pe care au fost postate
mesaje cu caracter anti-statal pe diverse forumuri. Administratorii Unimedia au
refuzat s dezvluie aceste date, motivnd c nu au obligaia s le pstreze mai mult
de 24 de ore. Ulterior, procuratura a deschis dosar penal mpotriva a 12 tineri care
i exprimaser pe forumuri opoziia fa de apropierea de Rusia i preferina fa
de unirea cu Romnia. Tinerii fuseser identificai n baza informaiilor furnizate
de ctre un furnizor de internet. Procuratura a procedat atunci la audierea tinerilor,
la percheziionarea locuinelor i sechestrarea computerelor. Dosarele au rmas n
adormire, fr vreo soluie concret i fr a fi nchise. Ele au fost reactivate i
cercetrile reluate n iunie 2009. Refuznd pe mai departe s coopereze, nedezvluind
identitatea forumitilor, Unimedia a primit ameninri cu retragerea domeniului
din partea firmei MoldData, care gestioneaz domeniile moldoveneti. Cercetrile
sunt n continuare n derulare, tinerii riscnd pedepse cu nchisoarea ntre trei i
apte ani. Acum am scpat. Dar a existat un proiect de lege care ar fi reglementat
50
retenia datelor de trafic, confom directivei europene. Dac ar fi fost n vigoare, nu

am mai putea motiva c nu avem datele, a declarat Tudor Darie, unul dintre cei
patru proprietari ai portalului Unimedia.md.
Nu au lipsit nici atacurile mpotriva jurnalitilor, reporterii incomozi fiind dai
afar din slile unde susineau conferine de pres reprezentanii Guvernului. Astfel,
la 9 iulie 2009, garda de corp a premierului a interzis accesul unei echipe de jurnaliti
de la postul de televiziune TV-Prim din oraul Glodeni la o ntlnire a funcionarilor
din raion cu Zinaida Greceani. Jurnalista Rodica Nimerenco a fost mbrncit de
bodyguarzi care au ameninat-o c vor scoate arma din dotare, iar cameramanul
a fost mpiedicat s filmeze intrarea premierului n sala de edine. La 12 iulie, la
Dondueni, jurnalitii Igor Melnic i Vladimir Thorik de la ziarul Moldavskie vedomosti
au fost scoi cu fora de ofieri din garda de corp a premierului Greceani i de poliia
local din Palatul Culturii, unde avea loc o reuniune electoral a PCRM. 79
n preajma alegerilor din iulie, autoritile moldovene au reluat practicile
antidemocratice de interzicere a accesului pe teritoriul Republicii Moldova, pe motive
necuprinse n nicio procedur legal sau administrativ, a unor jurnaliti. Astfel,
trimisului special al Ageniei Agerpres din Romnia, Gabriel Apetri, care urma s
relateze despre campania electoral i alegerile parlamentare anticipate din 29 iulie, i
s-a interzis accesul n R. Moldova, invocndu-se faptul c nu are adeverin medical
care s ateste c nu este infectat cu HIV/SIDA, chiar dac, conform legii, pentru a
intra n R. Moldova nu este nevoie de un asemenea document80.
Alte tipuri de intervenii ale administraiei de stat sunt mai discrete i mai greu
de dovedit. Astfel de intervenii privesc condiionarea publicitii de stat de relatarea
pozitiv a aciunilor guvernului sau ameninarea cu refuzul de rennoire a licenei de
transmisie la adresa posturilor care retransmit Radio Europa Liber.
Mai mult, potrivit celor intervievai, chiar i publicitatea oferit de firmele
comerciale este controlat indirect pe linie politic. Publicitatea este direcionat de
ctre guvernarea comunist, prin presiuniasupra agenilor economici, ctre mediile
de informare loiale Puterii. Agenii economici se tem s dea publicitate presei
carecritic guvernarea, pentru c ulterior se confrunt cu probleme: controale de
la organele de drept i fiscale, dosarefabricate, etc., a declarat Cornelia Cozonac,
de la Centrul pentru Jurnalism de Investigaie din Chiinu, intrevievat pentru
prezentul raport. ntr-o astfel de situaie s-a aflat, n timpul campaniei electorale
pentru alegerile din iulie, i Centrul pentru Jurnalism Independent, care a dorit s
deruleze o campanie de sensibilizare a populaiei n problema libertii de exprimare.
n contextul Zilei Mondiale a Libertii Presei, Centrul Independent de Jurnalism
intenioneaz s mediatizeze pe larg mai multe prevederi din Constituia Republicii
79
Conform Declaraiei organizaiilor mass-media n legtur cu inrutirea climatului de funcionare a presei,

citnd informaii Monitor Media, disponibil la http://www.ijc.md/index.php?option=com_content&task=view
&id=460&Itemid=1
80 Ibid.
51
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Moldova, Legea Presei, dar i din Convenia European pentru Drepturile Omului,
cu privire la drepturile i libertile fundamentale ale omului. Dei articolele vizate
se refer la libertatea presei i neadmiterea cenzurii n mass-media (art. 1, Legea
Presei), la dreptul persoanei la informaie i obligaia mass-media de a informa
corect opinia public (Art. 34, Constituia RM), la garantarea libertii de opinie i
libertii de exprimare (Art. 32, Constituia RM, Art. 10, Convenia European pentru
Drepturile Omului) i nu au vreo conotaie politic, dou agenii de publicitate din
Chiinu, care dein o reea de panouri publicitare pe bd. tefan cel Mare i Sfnt,
au refuzat s arendeze CJI panourile solicitate, invocnd diverse motive, ntre care i
cel privind mesajul politic pe care, n opinia lor, l-ar transmite pasajele respective,
se arat n Declaraia privind unele consecine ale instaurrii climatului de fric n
R. Moldova81. Potrivit observaiilor CJI, spaiile de afiaj vizate au rmas goale pe
perioada campaniei electorale.
O alt prghie de presiune asupra presei sunt controalele fiscale la redaciile
ziarelor, care deseori se soldeaz cu penaliti, sechestrare de conturi etc. Aciunile n
instan sunt i ele utilizate mpotriva presei, Justiia devenind astfel un instrument
pentru scoaterea de pe pia a publicaiilor necooperante. Dacprocesele privind
accesul la informaie intentate de jurnaliti sau redacii mpotriva structurilor de
stat pentru ngrdirea accesului la informaiile de interes public dureaz un an sau
doi, apoi procesele pornite de funcionari mpotriva presei dureaz foarte puin.
De la primele edine sedecide sechestrarea conturilor, ceea ce pune redaciile n
imposibilitatea de a funciona. Apoi sunt i daunele enorme pe care le stabilesc
instanele n cazul presei. Pentru orice redacie este de ajuns s piard un singur
proces n instan ca s falimenteze. Au existat asemenea cazuri n ultimii ani, a
declarat Cornelia Cozonac.
Intervenia statului n sectorul mass media are efecte nu numai asupra pieei,
ci i, n termeni mai largi, asupra comunitii jurnalistice. n R. Moldova, munca
jurnalitilor deinvestigaie a devenit riscant. Din aceast cauz, muli jurnaliti buni
se dezic de investigaii, merg s lucreze pe proiecte, cu organizaiile neguvernamentale
sau pentru instituii internaionale, unde sunt mai bine pltii. Alii, dup ce trec prin
procese interminabile, recurg la autocenzur, explic Cornelia Cozonac.
Nu numai mass-media este vizat de aceste forme de presiune i intimidare, ci
i organizaiile neguvernamentale interesate de buna derulare a alegerilor. Astfel, n
28 aprilie, la mai puin de o lun de la primele alegeri parlamentare din acest an i
revoltele violente ce le-au urmat, autoritile fiscale din Chiinu au lansat o campanie
de controale financiare la un numr de 18 organizaii civice din cadrul Coaliiei 2009
(printre care Centrul pentru Jurnalism Independent, Institutul de Politici Publice,
Institutul IDIS Viitorul, Transparency International, Amnesty International).
81
Disponibil la http://www.ijc.md/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=438
52
Comunitatea internaional prea puin, prea politicos,

prea prietenos
Comunitatea internaional a constituit, mult timp, cel mai puternic sprijin
uneori chiar singurul de care s-a bucurat mass-media din R. Moldova. Prin
programele de asisten profesional, tehnic i financiar rile occidentale,
n special cele din Uniunea European, precum i Statele Unite, au contribuit la
consolidarea independenei presei moldoveneti. n ultimul timp ns activitii
media din R. Moldova, jurnalitii, par a fi tot mai frustrai de ceea ce Vasile Botnaru
a numit miopie politic i lips de perspicacitate. Ei au acuzat, n primul rnd,
creditul politic nsemnat de care s-a bucurat Vladimir Voronin n calitate de ef de
stat cu aparente aspiraii europene. Au ncercat s joace dup regulile democratice
cu un partener care nu respect nicio regul. i au continuat s se poarte la fel i
dup ce s-a vrsat snge, de parc nici nu s-ar fi ntmplat, a declarat Alexandru
Canr, directorul grupului Imedia, fost director al biroului BBC de la Chiinu.
Mai muli dintre cei intervievai i-au descris experienele dezamgitoare n ceea ce
privete reacia slab, politicoas a reprezentanilor comunitii internaionale n
faa crizei post-electorale. Astfel, Josette Durrieu co-raportor al Consiliului Europei
pentru Republica Moldova declara, n septembrie 2008 : Sunt bucuroas s spun
c lucrurile au nceput s se schimbe spre bine n Moldova i aceasta este vizibil.
Totodat, mi pare bine c expunei i problemele existente cu o ambiie rezonabil,
fapt remarcat i la Bruxelles82. Dup alegerile din aprilie, acelai co-raportor declara
n faa Adunrii Parlamentare a Consiliului Europei, la Strasboug: Legitimitatea
alegerilor a fost confirmat. Acum exist necesitatea unui dialog ntre pri, ntre
guvernare i opoziie. () Dac au fost alegerile fraudate? Nu suntem siguri. Dac
ne uitm la alegeri un lucru este sigur: opoziia a pierdut pentru c nu s-a putut
organiza. n opinia Corinei Cepoi (CJI) astfel de declaraii fac un mare ru, pentru
c pot fi scoase din context i pot fi utilizate ca instrumente de propagand. Corina
Cepoi a relatat i un episod n care, pe cnd i se expunea, ntr-o edin la Parlament,
situaia presei din Moldova i rolul important pe care l joac preedintele Voronin n
sprijinirea, prin mijloace informale, dar care utilizeaz autoritatea statului, a anumitor
canale mediatice, acelai co-raportor european a replicat c i n Frana presa este
dependent de grupuri economice i nu trebuie s se atepte altceva de la Moldova.
O frustrare asemntoare a strnit i vizita secretarului general al Consiliului
Europei, Terry Davis, sosit la Chiinu cu doar o lun naintea alegerilor din 5 aprilie.
Conform informaiilor oficiale, pe agenda discuiilor dintre oficialul CE i preedintele
82
Conform Communicate.md, disponibil la http://www.comunicate.md/index.php?task=articles&action=view

&article_id=56
53
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
moldovean se aflau chestiuni legate de independena justiiei, combaterea corupiei,

splrii banilor i finanrii terorismului, libertatea presei, dezvoltarea societii civile,
susinerea comunitii rome i organizarea unor alegeri libere i corecte. Tendinele
care au minat campania electoral pentru alegerile din aprilie erau deja vizibile, se
nscriau pe agenda oficial i nu erau necunoscute secretarului general al CE. Cu
toate acestea, vizita a cptat un strict caracter festivist, Terry Davis fiind decorat de
chiar preedintele cruia venise s i mprteasc ngrijorrile forului european.
Cazul Unimedia: despre cum ar putea s arate viitorul

Revolta tinerilor din Chiinu, din 7 aprilie, a dus la lupte de strad, incendierea
unor cldiri guvernamentale i represiuni violente din partea autoritilor. ntr-un
reflex de pur sorginte totalitar, guvernul comunist a ncercat s limiteze libertatea
presei, suspendnd canalele de comunicare pe care le putea controla (conexiunea
la Internet a fost ntrerupt, legturile de mobil au funcionat cu intermitene) i o
serie de arestri extrem de agresive la adresa unor jurnaliti, moldoveni sau strini. n
condiiile unei astfel de prigoane asupra mediilor tradiionale, informaia despre
mersul evenimentelor de la Chiinu a circulat pe ci informale i, din fericire,
necunoscute i necontrolate de guvern: reele sociale, reeaua de micro-blogging
Twitter etc. Accesul la aceste reele a fost blocat serviciile twitter, facebook,
odnoklassniki nu au fost accesibile timp de o sptamn i ceva. Noi le-am folosit
prin proxy, instruii de colegi din alte ri unde se ntlnete aceeai problem. Din
pcate, furnizorii de servicii Internet, n marea lor majoritate, s-au conformat i au
blocat liste de adrese IP oferite de Departamentul de Securitate i informaii, a
declarat Corina Cepoi.
Evenimentele de la Chiinu din aprilie au demonstrate importana pe care noile
tehnologii le capt n asigurarea vehiculrii informaiei i modul n care ele ataeaz
o nou dimensiune libertii de exprimare.
Unimedia.md este un portal de tiri pornit din iniiativa a patru tineri moldoveni
i care a devenit o referin n informaia despre Moldova i o posibil poveste de
succes. Unimedia a pornit n 2007, ca o digest agency. n timp, a nceput s produc
i coninut propriu. n prezent furnizeaz text, video, transmisii live (text sau/i
imagine). Pornind de la 250 de vizitatori unici pe zi, n 2007, Unimedia are acum
un trafic de 15-20.000 de vizitatori unici pe zi. La scandal ajungem i la 40.000
de unici, a declarat Tudor Darie, unul dintre coproprietarii portalului, intervievat
pentru acest raport83. Ceea ce distinge Unimedia de mediile tradiionale este spiritul
83
Tudor Darie, Chiinu, august 2009
54
antreprenorial, constructiv, orientat spre includerea tuturor sectoarelor pieei.

Identificnd lipsa unei oferte suficiente de informaie echidistant pentru publicul
de limb rus, proprietarii Unimedia au lansat un portal asemntor n limba rus.
Moldova are, n materie de mass-media, o ofert dihotomic: ori cu limba romn,
ori cu limba rus. Publicul s-a obinuit aa, a mai declarat Darie. Respectnd liniile
de demarcaie socio-lingvistice, Unimedia a lansat un portal separat de limb rus,
vesti.md, care preia n proporie de 80% coninutul Unimedia (n traducere), restul
fiind coninut nou, adaptat cerinelor i ateptrilor populaiei rusofone. n plus,
Unimedia a mai lansat i un site pentru publicul feminin, Lady Club, care vine n
completarea site-ului principal, al crui public este predominant masculin.
Unimedia nu a fost scutit de ncercri de presiune din partea autoritilor, cea
mai vizibil fiind solicitarea procuraturii de a colabora la identificarea elementelor
anti-statale care posteaz mesaje cu coninut pro-romnesc pe forumul Unimedia.
Noi nu ne temem de asta. Noi am hotrt s ntoarcem fiecare presiune n avantajul
nostru. Ne cheam ei la procuratur, dm i noi tire i spunem i ne crete traficul,
aa c tot noi ieim mai ctigai, a declarat Darie.
Profilul cititorului Unimedia descrie un public tnr (un sfert dintre vizitatori
au ntre 15-24 de ani, i 35% ntre 25-40 de ani), preponderent masculin. Cel mai
mare flux de cititori este diminea ceea ce semnaleaz c majoritatea vizitatorilor
acceseaz site-ul de la birou.
Unimedia mizeaz editorial pe relatrile n direct, de la faa locului, care satisfac
nevoia de imediat specific utilizatorului de internet. Tehnologia folosit este
nesofisticat (filmrile se fac cu telefoanele mobile), rspunznd astfel unei tendine
recunoscute internaional: utilizatorii de internet sunt dispui s accepte o pierdere n
calitatea imaginii/sunetului dac prin aceasta capt acces n timp real la evenimentele
care l intereseaz.
Proiectul Unimedia nu este doar un exerciiu antreprenorial al unor tineri entuziati.
Mobilitatea, dinamismul, numrul i calitatea publicului au fcut ca Unimedia s atrag
cel mai mare volum de publicitate electoral dintre publicaiile online. Acest lucru a
permis aezarea ntreprinderii pe baze economice sntoase, ba chiar obinerea unui
oarecare profit.
Potrivit lui Darie, publicaiile online sunt adevratul viitor al presei din R. Moldova.
Rata de penetrare a Internetului este n cretere84. Internetul scutete editorii de
84
La nceputul anului 2009, n Chiinu i Bli, rata de penetrare a serviciilor de acces la Internet n band larg
s-a ridicat la 30,8% i, respectiv, 10,6%, iar n majoritatea raioanelor aceast rat a oscilatntre 2,2 i 3,2%. Media pe
ar rmne cea mai sczut din Europa, la 4,9%, la serviciile de acces la Internet la puncte fixe i respectiv 4,2%, la
serviciile de acces la Internet n band larg, cf. Ageniei Naionale pentru Reglementare n Comunicaii Electronice
i Tehnologia Informaiei (ANRCETI), vezi http://unimedia.md/?mod=news&id=12822
55
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
problemele legate de difuzare, de distribuia la sate, de presiunile legate de obinerea

licenei sau pstrarea ei. Ziarele au neles i ele asta i au trecut la actualizarea n
timp real, chiar dac ediia pe hrtie apare doar de cteva ori pe sptmn. La fel
a fcut i Pro TV Chiinu. Crete concurena online, dar nou ne pare bine, c ne
silete s fim inventivi, a conchis Darie.
Republica Moldova
democraia se amn
Marian Chiriac
Situaia respectrii drepturilor omului rmne ngrijortoare n Moldova, ar care se
afl cumva la rscruce, blocat ntre drumul spre Europa sau un alt drum, ce poate duce la
izolare. Acum, poate mai mult ca niciodat, Moldova are de ales: poate deveni urmtoarea
Transnistrie sau Belarus, ori poate deveni o ar normal, din familia european.
Evenimentele dramatice de la 7 aprilie 2009 au scos la iveal probleme care fuseser
semnalate i anterior, respectiv c la Chiinu exist un regim autoritar care atunci cnd
i simte ameninat poziia recurge la violene i pentru care nu este important s permit
propriilor ceteni s i exprime opinia, liber i n mod public.
n acest context, devine imperios ca viitoarele autoriti (Parlament, guvern, Preedinte),
rezultate n urma alegerilor parlamentare, s permit efectuarea de cercetri rapide i eficiente
asupra cazurilor de nclcare a drepturilor omului i s trag la rspundere vinovaii. E
nevoie totodat de aciuni educative i informative pentru ceteni i funcionari, orientate
spre cunoaterea propriilor drepturi i obligaii, astfel nct s se reueasc stoparea cazurilor
de nclcare a drepturilor omului.
Respectarea drepturilor i libertilor fundamentale ale

cetenilor
Republica Moldova rmne cel mai adesea o terra incognita, un trm
necunoscut pentru europeni, inclusiv pentru majoritatea romnilor, iar atenia
asupra acestei ri se ndreapt mai ales n momentele sale critice, fie c este vorba de
tulburri sociale, crize economice sau alegeri politice.
Un astfel de moment critic l reprezint, fr ndoial, alegerile parlamentare
de la 5 aprilie 2009, evenimentele violente din zilele urmtoare, dar i perioada de
campanie premergtoare alegerilor anticipate organizate n data de 29 iulie a.c.
56
57
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Lund ca reper temporal intervalul de timp din preajma acestor evenimente,

raportul de fa i propune s analizeze principalele tendine existente n ceea ce
privete respectarea drepturilor omului n Republica Moldova.
Concluzia noastr nu este deloc mbucurtoare: regimul de la Chiinu nu reuete
deloc s respecte majoritatea standardelor n domeniul proteciei drepturilor omului,
dei acest lucru este cerut tot mai insistent de ctre cetenii republicii sau este,
totodat, liber asumat n urma aderrii rii la actele normative internaionale n
domeniu.
Cu toate c n ultimii ani Guvernul Republicii Moldova a fcut eforturi n ce
privete respectarea drepturilor omului legislative, de natur material sau chiar
legate de schimbarea cutumelor administrative ori a mentalitilor rmn nc
nerezolvate o serie de probleme majore.
Dintre principalele probleme care, n continuare, afecteaz serios funcionarea la
standarde democratice normale a statului moldovean menionm:
influena excesiv a politicului n actul de justiie;
nerespectarea ntru totul a legislaiei ce prevede libertatea de ntrunire;
existena a numeroase cazuri de arestri abuzive sau motivarea
nentemeiat a cazurilor de reinere;
promovarea torturii i a maltratrii ca metode acceptabile de audiere
a persoanelor reinute sau de colectare a informaiilor de ctre serviciile
secrete;
promovarea unor hotrri judectoreti arbitrare sau nemotivate;
lipsa de independen a presei i implicarea politicului n audio-vizual;
totodat, sunt probleme n ce privete acoperirea imparial a mesajelor
politice.
probleme cu dreptul de proprietate
lipsa de protecie a refugiailor, solicitanilor de azil i a emigranilor
nerespectarea drepturilor economice i sociale ale majoritii
populaiei.
Lista aceasta nu i propune s fie complet, ci doar s scoat n eviden principalele
carene ale statului moldovean. n ciuda declaraiilor oficiale, a unor eforturi mai mult
sau mai puin reale, Republica Moldova rmne un stat autoritarist, dominat de un
partid-stat, care dei a reuit s asigure stabilitatea, ordinea i ntr-o oarecare msur
s stopeze degringolada economic, este n continuare dator propriilor ceteni n
ceea ce privete respectarea principalelor drepturi i liberti fundamentale. Totodat,
rmne o distan imens ntre inteniile asumate sau declarative ale Moldovei n ce
privete integrarea european i realitile existente n ar.
Context
Republica Moldova este stat membru al Consiliului Europei (CE) nc din anul
1995 i, de atunci, a nregistrat progrese la capitolul respectrii, proteciei i promovrii
drepturilor omului. Din momentul aderrii sale la CE, Moldova a ratificat 62 din cele
200 de convenii existente ale Consiliului Europei.
n 2003 a fost adoptat un nou Cod de procedur penal i un nou Cod penal,
care au racordat legislaia intern a Republicii Moldova cu standardele Consiliului
Europei, iar n 2005 Codul penal a fost amendat prin includerea unui articol care se
refer n mod special la tortura aplicat de ctre persoanele cu funcii de rspundere
din cadrul autoritilor de stat, articol care este n acord cu Convenia ONU
mpotriva torturii. n iulie 2006, Republica Moldova a ratificat Protocolul opional al
Conveniei Naiunilor Unite mpotriva torturii i a pedepselor sau tratamentelor cu
cruzime, inumane sau degradante.
Pe data de 22 februarie 2005, Republica Moldova i Uniunea European (UE) au
adoptat Planul de Aciuni Moldova-UE n cadrul Politicii Europene de Vecintate,
care stabilete un numr de obiective, care prevd apropierea Republicii Moldova
de standardele Consiliului Europei, inclusiv n ce privete respectarea drepturilor
omului85.
Ulterior, autoritile de la Chiinu au adoptat un Plan Naional de Aciuni n
domeniul drepturilor omului, Moldova fiind una dintre cele doar nici 20 de ri din
lume care au adoptat un asemenea plan. Planul a acoperit perioada 2004 2008
i a stabilit obiective concrete n ce privete ameliorarea condiiilor de detenie a
persoanelor, prevenirea torturii i a maltratrii. Pentru aceasta s-a plecat de la premiza
c este nevoie, nti de toate, de rectigarea ncrederii populaiei n statul moldovean:
Contiina legal deformat, observat n ultima decad, neglijarea nrdcinat a
drepturilor omului i a libertilor, ca i a fiinei umane n general, nihilismul legal i
lipsa ncrederii n stat au condiionat sentimentul de nesiguran al populaiei, lipsa ei
de ncredere fa de abilitatea statului de a-i proteja drepturile86.
Dac ar fi s lum n considerare doar informaiile oficiale, se poate spune c, pe
hrtie cel puin, Republica Moldova arat ca un stat care ieit cu greu din perioada
comunist face eforturi serioase privind respectarea drepturilor i libertilor
fundamentale ale propriilor ceteni. Numai c aceste eforturi s-au reflectat mai rar
dect ar fi fost necesar n realitatea concret.
n acest sens, Raportul de ar al Departamentului de Stat al SUA privind drepturile
omului n 2008, arat c Guvernul Moldovei, n general, respect drepturile omului,
ns, totodat, forele de ordine aplic fora fa de persoanele inute n detenie i
izolatoare, iar mass-media este intimidat i influenat de ctre autoriti.
85
Informaii preluate din raportul Amnesty International Tortura i maltratarea din partea poliiei: E doar
normal., octombrie 2007
Citat din Planul Naional de Aciuni n domeniul drepturilor omului al Republicii Moldova pentru perioada
2004 2008, pag. 2
86
58
59
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
n raport se mai arat c condiiile de detenie n Moldova rmn dure, iar forele
de ordine au hruit i intimidat opoziia politic. Au fost nregistrate cazuri de
corupie judiciar i n rndul poliiei, reineri arbitrare a persoanelor de ctre poliie
i percheziii ilegale. De asemenea, guvernul a ncercat s influeneze mass-media, a
intimidat jurnalitii, a meninut unele restricii privind dreptul la libertatea ntrunirilor
i a refuzat nregistrarea oficial a unor grupe religioase.
n Moldova persist violena social, precum i discriminarea femeilor i a copiilor,
traficul de femei i fete n scopul exploatrii lor sexuale, discriminarea romilor, se
mai arat n raport. De asemenea, minoritile religioase au ntmpinat dificulti la
nregistrare. Au fost raportate limitarea dreptului angajailor i probleme legate de
munca minorilor.
n regiunea transnistrean drepturile omului nu sunt respectate. Autoritile
impun restricii la libera circulaie i mpiedic exercitarea dreptului la vot a cetenilor
moldoveni n cadrul alegerilor din Moldova. Tortura i arestrile arbitrare persist,
iar condiiile de detenie rmn foarte dure n regiune. Autoritile transnistrene
continu s hruiasc presa i opoziia, limiteaz dreptul la libera asociere i religie
i discrimineaz vorbitorii de limb romn.
n raport se menioneaz c din cele 3,47 milioane de persoane (inclusiv 528,6
mii din regiunea transnistrean), aproximativ 900 mii de ceteni, dintre care 250
mii din regiunea transnistrean, se afl peste hotare. De asemenea, documentul
noteaz c dei Moldova este o republic parlamentar, cele trei ramuri ale puterii
(parlamentul, guvernul i justiia) sunt foarte puternic influenate de preedintele
Vladimir Voronin87.
n replic, Viceministrul justiiei, Nicolae Eanu, a ncercat la scurt timp dup
publicarea raportului Departamentului de Stat s ofere o explicaie la situaia
semnalat. Astzi statul nu are capacitate de a asigura implementarea legilor,
pentru c exist probleme de ordin financiar, exist probleme chiar de ordinul
organizrii, exist probleme la capitolul competen. Noi nu am declarat niciodat
c s-a mbuntit cu mult capacitatea de a implementa legi. Ct privete respectarea
drepturilor omului n foarte mare parte noi suntem dependeni de capitolul condiii
materiale. i asta nu se va mbunti nici anul acesta, nici la anul i nici peste doi
ani., a spus Eanu, citat de Radio Europa Liber88.
O atitudine critic a avut i organizaia Amnesty International, care n raportul
su privind situaia din Moldova pe anul 2008 remarca o nrutire la capitolul
respectarea drepturilor omului. Autorii raportului constat c n Moldova continu
s fie raportate cazuri cu privire la tortur i alte forme de maltratare, ns fptaii
continu s rmn nepedepsii; c n pofida eforturilor organizaiilor locale i
internaionale de a face public pericolul traficului de persoane, brbaii, femeile i

copii au continuat s fie traficai, iar desfurarea anchetelor penale era mpiedicat
de condiiile de protecie inadecvat a martorilor. Statul a continuat limitarea libertii
de exprimare89.
Evenimentele din 7 aprilie 2009 - nclcri ale drepturilor

omului
Cazuri de nclcare a drepturilor omului se ntlnesc aproape pretutindeni n
lume. Ceea ce individualizeaz ns Moldova este faptul c aici nu te poi apra
mpotriva imixtiunilor puterii sau n situaiile n care i sunt nclcate drepturile
fundamentale. Organizaiile civice au spus n dese rnduri c autoritile nu respect
drepturile omului i c este o mare ruptur ntre legile pe care le adopt i felul n care
le aplic. Iar ceea ce s-a ntmplat dup manifestaiile ulterioare anunrii rezultatelor
alegerilor parlamentare din primvar este cel mai bun exemplu n acest sens.
Cuvintele avocatului Alexandru Postic exprim succint momentul de turnur pe
care l reprezint evenimentele din 7 aprilie 2009 n aprecierea gradului de respectare
a drepturilor omului n Moldova90.
S rezumm ns ce s-a ntmplat la acea dat. La dou zile dup alegerile
parlamentare care au consemnat victoria oarecum neateptat a Partidului
Comunitilor din Republica Moldova (PCRM), numeroase persoane ndeosebi
tineri au ieit n strad pentru a protesta fa de acest rezultat.
n condiii nc neelucidate pe deplin, protestele panice au degenerat n aciuni
violente, nregistrndu-se ciocniri ntre protestatari i poliie, forele de ordine
folosind bastoane de cauciuc, gaze lacrimogene i bombe acustice, tunuri de ap etc.
Unii demonstrani au devastat cldirile Preediniei i a Parlamentului, n contextul
n care forele de ordine s-au dovedit neputincioase s asigure desfurarea panic
a manifestaiei91.
Se estimeaz c n urma violenelor din 7 aprilie au decedat dou persoane (unele
rapoarte menioneaz cifra de trei persoane), dintre care cel puin una (este vorba
de Valeriu Boboc) ar fi decedat n urma folosirii abuzive a forei de ctre poliie.
Presa a relatat c moartea lui Boboc ar fi fost cauzat de leziunea difuz a creierului
provocat de vtmrile corporale grave n regiunea capului, potrivit expertului
Derrik John Pounder, din Marea Britanie. Datele acestea nu au fost fcute publice
pn la ora redactrii acestui raport (mijlocul lunii august) dei expertul britanic a
prezentat raportul de expertiz nc de la sfritul lui iunie92.
89
Raportul de ar al Departamentului de Stat al SUA privind drepturile omului n Moldova pe anul 2008, vezi
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119093.htm
Declaraie a viceministrului Justiiei, Nicolae Eanu, fcut pe 29 mai 2009, vezi http://www.europalibera.org/
content/article/1742718.html
Raport Amnesty International, disponibil n variant rezumat la adresa

http://amnesty.md/library/yearreports.php?ln=ro&report=19&country=26
90 Interviu cu Alexandru Postic, avocat, jurist n cadrul organizaiei Promo-Lex, Chiinu, august 2009.
91 Aceast ndatorire este specificat n Legea privind ntrunirile, nr. 26-XVI din 22.02.2008 (articolele 21 si 22).
92 Conform publicaiei Ziarul de Gard, ediia din 13 august, text disponibil la adresa http://www.zdg.md/
investigatii/e-oficial-v-boboc-a-fost-omorat
60
61
87
88
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Pe de alt parte, cazul celeilalte persoane decedate, respectiv a lui Ion buleac,
ridic unele semne de ntrebare, dar este posibil ca moartea sa s fi fost cauzat de
gazele lacrimogene folosite contra manifestanilor.
Totodat, n noaptea dintre 7-8 aprilie i n zilele urmtoare, poliia a efectuat
numeroase arestri, fiind reinute ntre 166 de persoane (conform datelor oficiale
ale Ministerului moldovean al Afacerilor Interne) i circa 700 de persoane (conform
estimrilor organizaiilor civice)93. Multe din persoanele reinute au fost minori.
n schimb, Viceministrul de interne, Valentin Zubic, prezenta alte cifre, respectiv
c n arest administrativ au fost reinute 206 persoane. Potrivit acestuia, n cazul unor
persoane poliitii au fost obligai s aplice fora. Analiznd aceste evenimente,
am constatat c impactul loviturilor poliiei nu a fost att de puternic precum se
ntmpl n alte state, chiar i n Europa, a declarat acesta, preciznd c expertizele
medico-legale arat c doar n cazul a ase persoane leziunile cauzate de poliiti
sunt medii, restul fiind de o gravitate insignifiant. Viceministrul moldovean a
mai spus c nu s-au adeverit cazurile de viol n comisariate, ns n cazul a trei tinere
reinute de poliie au fost admise careva aciuni nedemne, njositoare din partea
colaboratorilor de poliie, iar n aceste cazuri urmeaz s se pronune Procuratura.
Printre msurile de redresare a situaiei, Zubic a menionat instalarea mai multor
camere de luat vederi n penitenciare94.
Pe de alt parte, Procurorul General Valeriu Gurbulea arta n luna iulie c doar
96 dintre persoanele reinute au depus plngeri, acestea acuznd c au fost maltratate
de oamenii legii. Doar zece cereri au fost examinate, fiind pornite patru cauze
penale privind excesul de putere, cauzare de leziuni corporale medii etc. Mersul ncet
al anchetelor s-a datorat aglomeraiei din jurul acestor subiecte, declara Procurorul
General Valeriu Gurbulea95.
Conform datelor organizaiilor civice, persoanele reinute pentru proteste au fost
sancionate administrativ cu arest pe o perioad de 10-20 de zile (n 36% din cazuri),
urmat de o perioad de arest de 30 de zile (n 26% din cazuri).96
Totodat, au fost arestai ziarista Natalia Morari i activistul civic Ghenadie Brega,
dar i persoane publice (omul de afaceri Gabriel Stati i eful echipei de paz a acestuia,
Aurel Marinescu, fostul consilier prezidenial Sergiu Mocanu, Anatol Mtsaru etc.),
despre situaia acestora din urm presa apreciind c e vorba de arestri politice97.
93
MAI moldovean a vorbit de 172 persoane reinute i amendate (http://www.mai.md/stirile-min-ro/216738/).

Primria Chiinu a constituit un birou de eviden a cazurilor de abuzuri contra persoanelor, iar n evidenele sale
au fost luate 318 persoane. n schimb, Institutul pentru Drepturile Omului (IDOM) i Centrul de Resurse pentru
Drepturile Omului (CReDo) au efectuat propriile cercetri, identificnd circa 655 persoane. Datele de mai sus se
bazeaz pe documente puse la dispoziia noastr.
94 Conform relatrilor ageniei de pres Info-Prim Neo, disponibile la adresa http://www.info-prim.md
95 Conform relatrilor ageniei de pres Info-Prim Neo, disponibile la adresa http://www.info-prim.md
96 Conform datelor din investigaia realizat de Institutul pentru Drepturile Omului (IDOM) i Centrul de Resurse
pentru Drepturile Omului (CReDo).
97 Vezi, spre exemplu, o relatare a Europa Liber din 13 aprilie 2009, disponibil la http://www.europalibera.org/
62
n plus, au fost fcute presiuni i asupra liderilor politici din opoziie, spre exemplu
pe numele preedintelui Partidului Liberal Democrat, Vladimir Filat, fiind iniiat un
dosar penal pentru participarea la dezordini n mas.
Puterea de la Chiinu a ncercat s se arate preocupat de rezolvarea rapid
i corect a acestei situaii. Astfel, pe data de 11 aprilie, Ministerul moldovean al
Afacerilor Interne (MAI) a dat publicitii lista persoanelor reinute n urma aciunilor
de protest din 6-7 aprilie, precum i lista persoanelor arestate administrativ. Lista
respectiv a fost totui intens contestat, pe motiv c nu ar oferi datele minimale
despre toate persoanele reinute.
Pe 15 aprilie, ntr-un apel televizat al Preedintelui Vladimir Voronin, eful statului
a anunat c va iniia o amnistie total i ncetarea oricrei forme de urmrire a
participanilor la aciunile de protest stradal, cu excepia reprezentanilor lumii
interlope i a recidivitilor98.
n cteva zile, Procuratura General a pornit procedurile legale de eliberare a
persoanelor reinute, cu anumite excepii. Toate persoanele reinute n legtur cu
evenimentele de la 7 aprilie, cu excepia lui Anatol Mtsaru care este n continuare
reinut, dar ntr-o alt cauz penal au fost eliberai treptat. Perioada lor de detenie
a variat foarte mult, spre exemplu, politicianul Sergiu Mocanu aflndu-se pentru 65
de zile n arest preventiv, iar ntre 12 iunie i 31 iulie n arest la domiciliu.
Abuzurile n cazul persoanelor reinute au avut repercusiuni i pe plan internaional.
Astfel, la Curtea European a Drepturilor Omului (CEDO) se afl depuse cinci
dosare mpotriva Republicii Moldova, n care petenii - Anatol Mtsaru, Gabriel
Stati i Aurel Marinescu, Sergiu Mocanu i alte dou persoane care au dorit s rmn
n anonimat pe durata anchetei - s-au plns de aplicarea de rele tratamente sau lipsa
probelor pentru aplicarea arestului.
ntre timp, prin decret prezidenial a fost constituit o Comisie de stat pentru
elucidarea cauzelor, condiiilor i consecinelor evenimentelor din 7-8 aprilie 2009,
prezidat de deputatul comunist Vladimir urcan. Att formaiunile de opoziie, ct
i reprezentanii societii civile au criticat componena acestei comisii, solicitnd
crearea unei comisii independente, cu participarea unor experi europeni. Aceeai
poziie a fost asumat i de ctre mai multe oficialiti europene. Activitatea Comisiei
a fost sistat pe perioada alegerilor parlamentare anticipate din 29 iulie, iar subiectul
elucidrii evenimentelor din 7 aprilie a fost puin dezbtut n perioada ulterioar,
menionndu-se n context asumarea unui moratoriu pn la rezolvarea situaiei
politice.
Situaia din Republica Moldova nu avea cum s lase indiferente nici organismele
internaionale. ONG-urile moldovene au alertat Comisarul European pentru
Drepturile Omului, Adunarea Parlamentar a Consiliului Europei, ONU, OSCE,
Uniunea European, Comitetul European pentru Prevenirea Torturii, tratamentelor
98
Conform relatrilor ageniei de pres Info-Prim Neo, disponibile la adresa http://www.info-prim.md
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MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
inumane i degradante i altele, cernd guvernului Moldovei s investigheze foarte

corect fiecare caz n parte.
Astfel, n aprilie-mai Comisia pentru Afaceri Externe a Parlamentului European a
avut cinci reuniuni la care s-a discutat situaia de la Chiinu. n 26-29 aprilie, Moldova
a fost vizitat i de o delegaie a Parlamentului European, care s-a documentat la
faa locului privind situaia post-electoral, pentru a pregti un proiect de Rezoluie
al acestui for. Ca urmare a vizitei de documentare a eurodeputailor, precum i a
dezbaterilor din comisia de specialitate, pe 7 mai Parlamentul European a aprobat
Rezoluia referitoare la situaia din Republica Moldova99.
Rezoluia insist asupra respectrii statului de drept i a drepturilor omului,
condamnnd ferm toate devierile i nclcrile n acest sens nregistrate dup alegerile
parlamentare. Astfel, a fost exprimat ngrijorarea vizavi de arestrile ilegale i
arbitrare, de numeroasele nclcri ale drepturilor omului ale persoanelor arestate,
ndeosebi n ceea ce privete dreptul la via, dreptul de a nu fi supus abuzului fizic,
torturii, tratamentelor inumane, degradante sau punitive, dreptul la libertate i la
securitate, dreptul la justiie i dreptul la libertatea de adunare, de asociere i la libera
exprimare.
Parlamentul European a solicitat lansarea unei investigaii speciale n cazurile
persoanelor decedate n timpul evenimentelor ce au urmat alegerilor, precum i n
cazul tuturor acuzaiilor de viol sau rele tratamente n timpul deteniei, i a arestrilor
operate pe criterii politice, dorind totodat ca responsabilii de brutalitate i violene
ndreptate mpotriva persoanelor reinute s fie adui n faa justiiei. De asemenea,
s-a propus crearea unei comisii independente de investigare a evenimentelor postelectorale, cu participarea experilor din partea Uniunii Europene i a Consiliului
Europei100.
Nu n ultimul rnd, trebuie spus c evenimentele din 7 aprilie au constituit un
motiv pentru puterea de la Chiinu de a expulza mai muli jurnaliti strini (altora
nefiindu-le permis accesul n ar), de a limita accesul la informaie sau de a lansa
acuze de implicare n treburile interne ale Republicii Moldova din partea unor
state precum Romnia. n cele din urm, totui, autoritile moldovene aveau s i
nuaneze acest ultim punct de vedere101.
Ca o concluzie, putem spune c n timpul i mai ale dup terminarea demonstraiilor
de la 7 aprilie 2009 s-au nregistrat nenumrate situaii de nclcare a drepturilor
omului n condiiile n care, cel mai adesea, poliia a acionat foarte brutal, a recurs la
99
reineri nejustificate i a folosit pe scar larg btaia sau intimidarea. Rezumnd, au

fost identificate urmtoarele situaii:
Arestul i detenia au fost folosite pe scar larg i sistematic.
Conform investigaiei Institutului pentru Drepturile Omului (IDOM) i
a Centrului de Resurse pentru Drepturile Omului (CReDo), bazat pe
identificarea a circa 655 persoane reinute sau arestate, dintre acestea 47% au
fost nvinuite de dezordini n mas, 28% de jaf sau 13% de huliganism
sau nesubordonarea poliiei.
Accesul la asisten juridic nu a fost asigurat ntr-un numr
mare de cazuri. Astfel, conform aceleai investigaii citat anterior, 40%
dintre persoanele reinute susin c nu au avut acces la avocat n limitele
prevzute de lege (respectiv trei ore n cazul adulilor i o or pentru minori);
totodat, 64% dintre persoanele deinute susin c au fost obligate s semneze
documentele de acuzare i procesuale n absena asistenei legale; altfel, 20%
dintre persoanele acuzate afirm c nu au primit asisten juridic n cadrul
procedurilor judiciare, iar alte 38% susin c nu li s-au explicat motivele de
detenie.
Poliia a procedat foarte brutal. Numrul cazurilor de bti, maltratri
sau intimidri a fost foarte mare. n acest sens, investigaia IDOM i CReDO
relev c circa 64% dintre persoanele deinute susin c au fost btute sau
abuzate cnd se aflau n arestul poliiei. Altfel, 7.5% dintre persoanele deinute
au afirmat c au fost btute n mainile poliiei n momentul transportrii ctre
locul de detenie; dintre persoanele maltratate, 56% au declarat c au fost
btute cu picioarele sau lovii, iar 42% au fost btute cu bastoanele. Au mai
fost semnalate cazuri n care deinuii au fost lovii cu sticle de plastic pline
cu ap. n fine, trebuie spus c 2% dintre persoanele reinute susin c au fost
abuzai sexual de ctre poliie. n aceste condiii, multe persoane au urmat
tratamente de spitalizare sau de ambulator.
Au fost reinui muli minori i, totodat, accesul la serviciile
medicale nu a fost asigurat ntr-un numr mare de cazuri102.
Conform datelor colectate de Biroul de eviden a cazurilor de abuzuri contra
persoanelor, deschis de ctre Primria Chiinu, au fost documentate 43 de cazuri de
tratament inuman i tortur. n schimb, Procuratura General a Republicii Moldova
a anunat c a deschis doar un singur dosar penal, pe numele ceteanului Hnc
Damian, n privina aplicrii torturii, ca urmare a depunerii a 24 de plngeri103. Totui
Conform Euromonitor nr. 6, Implementarea reformelor iniiate conform Planului de Aciuni UE-RM,
Evaluarea progresului n perioada aprilie-iunie 2009, raport realizat de organizaiile Adept i Expert-Grup.
100 Textul rezoluiei este integral disponibil la urmtoarea adres: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2009-0384&language=RO .
101 Romnia, ca stat, nu a participat la protestele din 7 aprilie, a declarat pe 22 iulie a.c. procurorul general al
din Republica Moldova, Valeriu Gurbulea, care a adugat ns c au fost nregistrate doar unele forme, precum
un atac cibernetic asupra serverelor instituiilor de stat provenite din Romnia i ncercri de trecere a frontierei
moldo-romne, conform portalului de tiri Unimedia.md.
102 Informaii dintr-un raport pus la dispoziie de ctre Institutul pentru Drepturile Omului (IDOM) i Centrul
de Resurse pentru Drepturile Omului (CReDo), document care nu fusese fcut nc public la ora redactrii acestui
material.
103 Conform unei relatri a postului de radio Europa Liber (http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/1614813.
html), menionat n raportul Euromonitor nr. 6 Implementarea reformelor iniiate conform Planului de Aciuni
UE-RM, Evaluarea progresului n perioada aprilie-iunie 2009, realizat de ctre organizaiile Adept i Expert Grup.
Acest din urm raport este disponibil n format PDF pe site-ul www.expert-grup.org.
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MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
numrul plngerilor avea s creasc ulterior, meritnd s fie citat n acest sens cazul
preotului ortodox Johnattan Jerusalayem Netanyahu, cetean romn i american,
acuzat iniial de organizare a aciunilor de dezordine n mas, i care dup eliberare
s-a plns procurorilor c a fost btut de poliiti i a declarat c va insista n justiie
ca poliitii vinovai s fie pedepsii pentru c au aplicat tortura.
Situaiile, deloc puine, de nclcare a drepturilor omului n urma interveniei
poliiei dup evenimentele din 7 aprilie, sunt confirmate i de ctre o instituie public
din Moldova, respectiv cea a Avocailor parlamentari (ombudsman). Astfel, ntr-un
raport ntocmit de aceast instituie se arta: Unii dintre deinuii intervievai au
fcut referin la aplicarea violenei excesive din partea colaboratorilor de poliie la
reinere i n incinta comisariatelor de poliie din sectoarele municipiului Chiinu,
iar asupra altora au fost depistate leziuni corporale la momentul instalrii n locurile
de detenie. () S-a constatat c dreptul la aprare n linii generale le-a fost asigurat
prin posibilitatea acordat de a alege un avocat sau de a beneficia de asisten juridic
garantat de stat. () Totodat, s-a constatat c n unele cazuri procesele verbale de
reinere au fost ntocmite cu nclcri, nefiind indicat fie data, fie ora reinerii, pe
care motiv este imposibil de a determina timpul reinerii. n alte cazuri proceseleverbale de reinere au fost ntocmite dup expirarea a trei ore din momentul reinerii
persoanei, fapt ce contravine prevederilor art.167 din Codul de Procedur Penal.
() Un alt cadru legal care a fost aplicat defectuos se refer la acordarea posibilitii
deinuilor de a informa una din rudele apropiate sau o alt persoan despre locul
unde se dein, ceea ce vine n contradicie cu prevederile legale104.
ngrdirea dreptului la alegeri libere i corecte

Organizarea i desfurarea unui proces electoral conform criteriilor democratice
este unul din obiectivele liber asumate de ctre Republica Moldova, att n baza
legislaiei interne, ct i a aderrii la standardele OSCE i ale Consiliului Europei.
Alegerile parlamentare de la 5 aprilie, dar i cele anticipate de la 29 iulie, au fost
apreciate de cvasitotalitatea observatorilor i a rapoartelor independente ca fiind
parial libere i democratice. Desigur, n Moldova nu s-au ntlnit situaii precum
n ri din Asia Central, unde votul multiplu este curent sau unde liderul la putere
obine cel puin 90 de procente din toate voturile din ar. Numai c n Moldova
iregularitile au fost mai numeroase dect media acceptabil ntr-un stat care nu
este totui pe deplin democratic, neregulile fiind complexe i sofisticate, la limita
standardelor europene n domeniu105.
Deoarece numrul cazurilor care pot fi ncadrate la capitolul nerespectrii

dreptului la alegeri libere i corecte este mare, vor fi prezentate doar situaiile cele
mai relevante sau cazurile cu impact major106.
Astfel:
n campania electoral au fost folosite intimidri, s-au exercitat presiuni
i agresiuni fizice, inclusiv cu arme albe. Au fost cazuri n care funcionari
locali au invocat faptul c au fost intimidai de ctre efii lor pentru c nu
ar asigura prezena alegtorilor la ntlnirile cu unii concureni electorali. De
asemenea, unii alegtori au fost ameninai cu rfuiala de ctre reprezentanii
administraiei publice locale, n situaia n care vor participa la ntlnirile cu
unii concureni electorali. n acelai context, unii ageni economici s-au plns
de presiunile exercitate de autoriti pentru faptul c presteaz servicii unor
concureni electorali din opoziie.
nerespectarea legislaiei privind afiajul electoral a constituit cea mai
frecvent nclcare a tuturor concurenilor electorali. Nici cadourile electorale
nu au lipsit n aceast perioad electoral, precum i tratamentul difereniat al
concurenilor electorali din partea unor reprezentani ai autoritilor publice
locale.
resursele administrative puse la dispoziia circumscripiilor electorale
au fost folosite adesea n scopuri politice. Reprezentani ai partidelor
politice au fcut cadouri alegtorilor, precum organizarea de concerte
gratuite, amenajarea teritoriului sau dotarea gratuit cu echipamente, oferirea
de ajutoare umanitare.
mesajele din campania electoral au avut adesea un caracter agresiv,
ceea ce a mpiedicat pe muli alegtori s aib o opiune clar i raional.
Nu o dat au fost promovate discursuri ale urii sau mesaje electorale total
distorsionate. Agresivitatea discursului electoral s-a accentuat n campania
premergtoare alegerilor anticipate, violenele din 7-8 aprilie fiind principalul
leit-motiv.
mass-media a reflectat adesea prtinitor campania electoral.
Campioan negativ n acest sens s-a dovedit compania public TeleradioMoldova. Totodat, au fost plasate afie electorale n locuri nepermise sau au
fost distruse panouri electorale.
nu a fost soluionat problema votului pentru cetenii moldoveni
de peste hotare sau din Transnistria. Pentru acetia din urm au fost
deschise 11 secii de votare, ns nu li s-a asigurat o campanie de informare.
implicarea minorilor n campania electoral. Partidele politice au
implicat copii n campanie, folosindu-i la distribuirea de informaii ctre
alegtori sau n organizarea de concerte cu caracter electoral.
Conform Raportului preliminar privind respectarea drepturilor persoanelor reinute n legtur cu evenimentele
din 7 aprilie 2009, disponibil la adresa http://ombudsman.md/file/Rapoarte/tematice/Pentru%20Presa.doc
105 Conform declaraiilor tuturor experilor consultai i a reprezentanilor organizaiilor civice. O concluzie
asemntoare se regsete i n rapoartele de monitorizare a procesului electoral.
106 Pentru o detaliere a cazurilor concrete vezi: Rapoartele I i II ale Ligii pentru Aprarea Drepturilor Omului
privind monitorizarea campaniei electorale pentru alegerile parlamentare din 29 iulie; Rapoartele I i II ale Asociaiei
Promo-Lex privind monitorizarea alegerilor parlamentare anticipate din 29 iulie; Raportul trimestrial (6) privind
accesul la informaiile oficiale n Republica Moldova, realizat de ctre un grup de experi sub conducerea Asociaiei
Acces-Info (aprilie-iunie 2009).
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MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
La doar o zi dup alegerile parlamentare din 5 aprilie, observatorii OSCE au

prezentat un raport - apreciat ulterior drept superficial - n care artau c alegerile
din Moldova au fost libere i corecte, cu unele nclcri minore. Dup violenele
din 7-8 aprilie, observatorii OSCE, misiunea comun internaional au fost ns mult
mai prudeni n aprecieri, au ncercat s aib o prezen masiv i n afara Chiinului
i n acelai timp s neleag exact ce au n vedere observatorii naionali sau partidele
politice de opoziie atunci cnd vorbesc de utilizarea resurselor administrative sau de
folosirea abuziv a mijloacelor media107. Aa c la o sptmn dup raportul iniial,
OSCE a publicat o not adiional n care a recunoscut deficienele de supraveghere
a scrutinului, ceea ce a fcut imposibil contabilizarea unor nclcri semnificative.
Pe 30 iulie, spre deosebire de rapoartele din aprilie, observatorii occidentali de
la Parlamentul European i de la OSCE au susinut c alegerile anticipate au fost
incorecte, parial libere i c au fost nregistrate multe nclcri ale legislaiei. O
opinie identic au avut i observatorii naionali din cadrul Coaliiei 2009, asta n
timp ce observatorii din misiunea Comunitii Statelor Independente au considerat
c alegerile s-au desfurat n deplin conformitate cu legislaia electoral n
vigoare108.
Observatorii internaionali au notat c dei ziua alegerilor a fost bine organizat
i alegerile s-au desfurat panic, abuzurile n utilizarea resurselor administrative au
avut un efect negativ asupra egalitii de oportuniti n cursul campaniei electorale.
La capitolul puncte negative, observatorii au notat i c autoritile au folosit metode
subtile de presiune i intimidare, iar principalele canale de televiziune nu au oferit o
informaie echilibrat, favoriznd partidul de guvernmnt.
eful misiunii de observatori ai OSCE, Petras Efthymiou, a declarat pe 30 iulie
c dei campania electoral s-a desfurat n general ntr-un mediu pluralist, a fost
afectat totui de ncercrile partidului de guvernmnt s mpiedice ntrunirile
opoziiei: Utilizarea abuziv a resurselor administrative de ctre unele partide
politice a avut un efect negativ asupra egalitii oportunitilor de desfurare a
campaniei109. De asemenea, postul public de televiziune nu a reuit s ofere informaie
imparial i echilibrat n programele sale, favoriznd Partidul Comunitilor. Petras
Efthymiou s-a artat ngrijorat de faptul c au fost confirmate i cazuri de intimidare
a candidailor i alegtorilor de ctre poliie110.
Marian-Jean Marinescu, reprezentantul Misiunii de observatori din partea

Parlamentului European, a declarat c n pofida eforturilor depuse de administraia
electoral pentru a nltura neregulile depistate n aprilie la elaborarea listelor cu
alegtori, la scrutinul din 29 iulie a lipsit transparena n procesul afirii listelor
electorale i nregistrrii alegtorilor: Observatorii pe termen lung ne-au anunat c
putem vorbi despre unele mbuntiri, ns per ansamblu campania electoral s-a
desfurat ntr-o atmosfer mai tensionat dect n aprilie, fapt foarte regretabil.
Mai muli observatori au subliniat c listele de alegtori constituie nu doar o
problem tehnic, ci una de ordin politic, ce trebuie s fie soluionat prin mijloace
adecvate.
Pe de alt parte, potrivit Coaliiei 2009, n campania electoral au fost nregistrate
zeci de cazuri grave de intimidare a concurenilor electorali i nu a fost asigurat un
climat de campanie nemarcat de violene.
Potrivit Coaliiei 2009, listele electorale nu au fost ntocmite corect, iar accesul
la informaiile privind listele a fost limitat. n consecin, n ziua alegerilor au fost
nregistrate multiple cazuri de includere a persoanelor necunoscute n locuinele
alegtorilor, cazuri de votare frauduloas n locul altor persoane, cazuri de nscriere
multipl a unor alegtori n listele electorale, uneori chiar cu date diferite ale buletinului
de identitate111.
Libertatea de exprimare i de ntrunire - progres n

legislaie, discriminare n practic
Pe hrtie, Republica Moldova are una dintre cele mai moderne i permisive legi
n ceea ce privete libertatea de ntrunire. Noua lege cu privire la ntruniri a fost
adoptat de ctre Parlamentul de la Chiinu pe data de 22 februarie 2008 i a intrat
n vigoare pe 22 aprilie, acelai an.
Conform legii112, pentru a organiza o ntrunire e nevoie doar de informarea
primriei despre intenia de desfurare a ntrunirii (mai devreme pentru organizarea
ntrunirii era nevoie de permisiunea primriei), iar adunrile de mai puin de 50 de
persoane pot avea loc spontan, fr notificare. Legea prevede totodat c Primria
poate interzice desfurarea ntrunirilor doar prin intermediul justiiei (mai devreme
putea interzice desfurarea ntrunirilor prin decizie proprie). Nu n ultimul rnd,
poliia este obligat s protejeze participanii ntrunirii de contramanifestani.
Progresul legislativ nu a fost nsoit ns, n realitate, i de o eliminare a practicilor
discriminatorii, asta deoarece aciuni ale poliiei i primriilor din Republica Moldova
vorbesc despre un refuz real de a respecta legislaia n vigoare. Potrivit rapoartelor
107 Interviu cu analistul Igor Munteanu (IDIS Viitorul), disponibil la adresa: http://politicom.moldova.org/
news/imunteanu-neregularitile-la-alegeri-complexe-i-sofisticate-203045-rom.html
108 Informaii publice, prezentate de presa de la Chiinu.
109 Cazul care a suscitat cea mai mare atenie din partea presei a fost cel al reinerii primarului de Chiinu, Dorin
Chirtoac. Pe 18 iulie, acesta a fost reinut cteva ore de ctre poliie pe motiv c ntlnirea sa cu alegtorii, la care a
fost proiectat un film despre incidentele de pe 7 aprilie, a durat prea mult, trecnd de ora 22. Chirtoac a spus c se
atepta s-i fie aplicat o amend din moment ce a fost acuzat de tulburarea linitii publice, ns poliitii care l-au
interogat nu au ntocmit nici mcar un proces-verbal de constatare a contraveniei.
110 Vezi n acest sens relatarea postului Europa Liber, disponibil la http://www.europalibera.org/content/
article/1789201.html. Dintre cazurile de nclcare evident a drepturilor omului trebuie menionat expulzarea a
cinci observatori din Georgia i Ucraina (ulterior s-au retras toi observatorii din cadrul Misiunii Reelei Europene a
Organizaiilor de Monitorizare a Alegerilor - ENEMO), a apte ceteni strini (patru danezi i trei belarui) membri
ai unei organizaii civice sau icane la grani la adresa jurnalitilor.
111
Vezi relatrile postului Europa Liber, disponibile la urmtoarea adres: http://www.europalibera.org/
112 Textul complet al Legii cu privire la ntruniri poate fi gsit pe site-ul http://lex.justice.md/.
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MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
organizaiilor civice, prezena poliiei la manifestaii, numrul persoanelor arestate i

folosirea forei au crescut de cnd noua lege a intrat n vigoare113.
n acest sens, ar merita menionate cazurile n care membri ai organizaiei Hyde
Park au fost bruscai, reinui doar pentru c i exercitau dreptul de a se exprima
liber. Elocvent n aceast privin este cazul cnd, pe 30 aprilie 2008, Oleg Brega,
membru al organizaiei menionate a fost arestat pentru c a protestat panic, singur,
n centrul Chiinului, la aniversarea nfiinrii televiziunii de stat. Poliia a ncercat s-l
mpiedice s protesteze i l-a acuzat de huliganism. Pe 9 mai, justiia l-a condamnat
la trei zile de nchisoare pentru c a njurat n public. Fratele su, Ghenadie Brega, a
fost amendat pentru c a protestat n public fa de arestarea lui Oleg114.
Pe de alt parte, la 8 mai 2008, primria din Chiinu a interzis pentru al treilea
an consecutiv o manifestaie a persoanelor de alt orientare sexual. ONG-ul
Genderdoc-M a informat biroul primarului despre intenia sa de a organiza acest mar
n faa Parlamentului, n favoarea unei noi legi anti-discriminare. Biroul primarului a
spus c organizaiile religioase, elevii i localnicii au reacionat negativ la acest plan i
acuz minoritile sexuale de agresivitate i nclcare a valorilor morale i spirituale
i de aceea, pentru a se evita tensiuni n societate, a fost necesar interzicerea
marului. Militanii au sosit totui la Parlament, dar au fost imediat nconjurai de
circa 300 de persoane agresive, care i-au mpiedicat s coboare din autobuz. Foarte
puinii poliiti prezeni n zon nu au intervenit deloc115.
nclcarea contient i premeditat a legii ntrunirilor avea s ajung ns la apogeu
cu ocazia evenimentelor de la 7 aprilie 2009. Imediat dup alegerile parlamentare,
pe 6 aprilie, un grup de activiti civici (printre care s-au numrat Natalia Morari i
Ghenadie Brega, ca persoane fizice i membri ai grupului de iniiativ Sunt anticomunist) a organizat un eveniment panic, intitulat ziua de doliu naional, ca
protest fa de rezultatele alegerilor. Acetia au informat autoritile despre planurile
lor, n conformitate cu legea, iar aciunea de protest preconizat a fost mediatizat
prin intermediul reelelor sociale de internet, prin mesaje pe telefoane mobile,
precum i din gur n gur116. Organizatorii se ateptau s vin doar cteva sute de
tineri, ns au rmas uimii s vad cum s-au strns mii de oameni, inclusiv liderii
tuturor partidelor de opoziie majore. Noi, ca iniiatori ai mitingului, am ncercat s
calmm oamenii i am declarat demonstraia ncheiat la ora convenit cu autoritile.
Nu suntem deloc responsabili pentru ceea ce s-a ntmplat ulterior, a declarat unul
dintre organizatori117.
113 Vezi n acest sens Raportul Amnesty International pe anul 2008 privind Moldova, din care se citeaz la adresa
http://www.gibcluj.ro/index.php/news/items/rmoldova-se-face-vinovata-de-tortura-rele-tratamente-si-nerespec.
html
114 n urma unui interviu cu Ghenadie Brega, lider al Hyde Park, a reieit c membri i simpatizani ai organizaiei
au desfurat demonstraii cu diferite pretexte (n faa ambasadei romne, pentru a milita pentru dreptul de a nva
n limba romn; sau miting comemorativ n faa ambasadei Rusiei la Chiinu) i de fiecare dat au avut probleme
cu poliia dei, n accepia lor, mereu au respectat legea. Pentru amnunte vezi site-ul www.curaj.net.
115 Vezi relatrile presei moldovene din acea perioad.
116 Interviu cu Ghenadie Brega, lider informal al organizaiei Hyde Park, Chiinu, iulie 2009
117 Interviu cu Ghenadie Brega, lider informal al organizaiei Hyde Park, Chiinu, iulie 2009
70
Autoritile au acionat ns n for. Pe 7 aprilie, Procuratura General anuna

c a deschis un dosar penal pe numele lui Ghenadie Brega, iar o zi mai trziu fratele
lui, Oleg, este btut de ctre poliiti n civil. Pe 9 aprilie, sediul asociaiei Hyde
Park este percheziionat de poliie de unde sunt confiscate mai multe computere,
documente, materiale media etc118. Cam n aceeai perioad este arestat i jurnalista
Natalia Morari, acuzat fiind de organizarea dezordinilor n mas. Pe 12 iunie,
Dorin Chirtoac, primarul Chiinului este i el acuzat de organizarea dezordinilor
n mas i de tentativ de lovitur de stat, infraciune pasibil de pedeapsa maxim de
15 ani privaiune de libertate. Avocatul acestuia a declarat c primarul a fost prezent
la demonstraiile din 6-7 aprilie, dar convingea oamenii s nu recurg la violen.
ntr-un rspuns standard la apelurile organizaiei Amnesty International n
susinerea Nataliei Morari i a lui Ghenadie Brega, Procuratura General a declarat
c doar participanii activi la aciunile ilegale, calificai de legea penal i anume
persoanele care au aplicat violen mpotriva reprezentanilor forelor de ordine,
au distrus sau au ndemnat la incendierea i distrugerea proprietii publice, au
fost reinui i urmrii penal. Conform Amnesty International, Natalia Morari,
Ghenadie Brega i Dorin Chirtoac au fost acuzai de comiterea de infraciuni penale
pentru exercitarea legitim a dreptului acestora la libertatea de exprimare, iar dac
acetia ar fi fost condamnai, Amnesty International i-ar fi considerat prizonieri de
contiin119. Ulterior, toate persoanele arestate aveau s fie eliberate i avea totodat
s li se ridice interdicia de a prsi ara.
n luna mai, Asociaia Hyde Park a trimis la Curtea European a Drepturilor
Omului (CEDO) plngerea pe subiectul percheziiei i a sechestrrii ilegale a
bunurilor din sediul organizaiei. De menionat c asociaia sau membri ai acesteia au
depus 16 plngeri la CEDO privind diferite forme de nclcare a drepturilor omului,
dintre care pn n acest moment au avut ctig de cauz n patru dosare.
Hruirea aprtorilor drepturilor omului

Tot la capitolul privind libertatea de exprimare i de ntrunire ar merita ncadrate
situaiile n care mai multe organizaii moldovene ale societii civile au fost supuse
unor presiuni nepermise din partea autoritilor.
Astfel, ntr-o scrisoare ctre Primul Ministru, la 29 aprilie 2009, organizaia
Amnesty International i exprima ngrijorarea fa de faptul c cel puin apte ONGuri au primit scrisori din partea Ministerului Justiiei, n care li se cerea s-i explice
poziia vizavi de revoltele din 7 aprilie, i s expun msurile luate de organizaie
pentru prevenirea i oprirea violenei, precum i pentru asigurarea respectrii legii cu
privire la ntruniri.
118
119
Idem. O cronologie a evenimentelor este disponibil pe site-ul www.curaj.net.

Vezi n acest sens http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGEUR590062009&lang=e
71
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Aceste apte organizaii i altele patru au primit de asemenea somaii neateptate

din partea inspectoratelor fiscale locale, datate cu 24 aprilie, n care li se cerea s
prezinte pn la 28 aprilie documentele financiare pentru anii 2008 i 2009, i s
identifice sursele lor de venituri i cheltuieli.
La 28 aprilie, oficiul Amnesty International n Moldova a fost vizitat de
reprezentanii inspectoratului fiscal local, care au cerut ca organizaia s prezinte o
copie cu lista membrilor care au depus cotizaii de membru. n plus, timp de cteva
zile ncepnd cu 9 aprilie, oficiul Amnesty International Moldova a fost supravegheat
de persoane neidentificate120.
ntr-un rspuns adresat Amnesty International pe 22 mai, Ministerul Justiiei a
declarat c aciunile autoritilor fiscale de stat nu au legtur cu aciunile Ministerul
Justiiei i c Ministerul Justiiei a acionat n conformitate cu legea. Autoritile
fiscale de stat nu au dat nici o explicaie.
Presiunea a cunoscut i forme mai subtile. Astfel, sediul Institutului pentru Drepturile
Omului, care a nceput o investigaie privind victimele violenelor din 7 aprilie, a nceput
s fie supravegheat de anumite persoane necunoscute, care urmreau la intrare cine vine,
cnd vine i cnd pleac de la noi. Legtura telefonic a nceput s funcioneze foarte
prost, chiar i mobilul meu personal, sunt sigur, era i mai este interceptat. Atunci cnd
am anumite discuii importante cu anumite persoane n legtur cu evenimentele din
aprilie, descopr o legtur foarte proast sau sunt nevoit s sun de mai multe ori, ca s
dau de acea persoan. Deseori, dup ce ncep convorbirea, aud un semnal electronic n
telefon. E un semnal pe care nu-l aveam pn la evenimentele din aprilie 2009121.
Presiunile la adresa organizaiilor non-guvernamentale au sczut n intensitate
n perioada premergtoare alegerilor parlamentare anticipate, dar din discuii
cu reprezentani ai ONG-urilor de la Chiinu a reieit c aciunile de hruire i
intimidare au reprezentat o constant din partea puterii.
Funcionarea deficitar a sistemului juridic

n Republica Moldova, consens exist doar ntr-o singur privin: drepturile
omului sunt departe de a fi respectate, nici mcar la standarde minimale.
n rndul experilor i al activitilor civici exist unanimitate n ceea ce privete
cauza acestei stri de fapt: funcionarea deficitar a sistemului juridic, influena
prea mare a politicului, subordonarea aproape total a justiiei fa de partidul de la
putere. Sistemul juridic este aproape total subordonat politicului, consider Vanu
Jereghi, director al Institutului pentru Drepturilor Omului (IDOM) i vicepreedinte
al Consiliului Consultativ pentru Prevenirea Torturii. Partidul i neprofesionalismul

sunt marile probleme ale justiiei. E nevoie ca judectorii, poliia, procuratura s
respecte standardele europene. Avem o legislaie bun, mai sunt unele legi care
ar trebui modificate pentru a se anula anomalii, ns cel mai important e ca legile
existente s fie implementate, este i opinia avocatului Alexandru Postic, jurist n
cadrul organizaiei Promo-Lex. O opinie asemntoare mprtete i Igor Boan,
director executiv al Asociaiei pentru Democraie Participativ-ADEPT: Verticala
puterii de stat genereaz cazurile de nclcare a drepturilor omului i menine corupia.
Cei de sus se simt protejai, i permit orice, n timp ce cei din afara sistemului sufer.
Drepturile omului sunt nclcate pentru protejarea actualei puteri. Nu n cele din
urm, avocatul Vlad Gribincea de la Asociaia Juritii pentru Drepturile Omului a
spus: Problemele n Moldova nu sunt generate de legislaie, ci de aplicarea ei. E
nevoie de funcionari oneti, care s nu fie supui presiunii politice122.
Exist numeroase carene n sistemul judiciar din Moldova:
vulnerabilitatea la presiunile factorului politic. Lipsa independenei
procuraturii duce la implicarea acesteia n intimidri i la instrumentarea
dosarelor cu tent politic;
vulnerabilitatea la corupie;
finanarea i remunerarea insuficient;
depirea termenului rezonabil de examinare a cauzelor;
dotarea tehnic proast;
numrul semnificativ al hotrrilor judectoreti neexecutate;
pregtirea profesional insuficient i calitatea nesatisfctoare a
personalului auxiliar;
sistemul juridic rmne nchis, fr control extern eficace123.
Toate acestea prejudiciaz n mod evident imaginea justiiei, afecteaz dezvoltarea
economic, social a statului moldovean i reduce credibilitatea lui n plan extern.
Existena deficienelor n sistem este resimit acut i de ctre oamenii simpli, lucru
dovedit i de sondajele de opinie, ce atest o ncredere redus a populaiei n justiie
(de circa 30%)124.
Nu n ultimul rnd, faptul c exist numeroase cazuri de nclcare a drepturilor omului
i c justiia moldoveneasc se dovedete incapabil s le soluioneze se vede n numrul
tot mai mare de cazuri deschise la Curtea European pentru Drepturile Omului (CEDO).
122
123
Vezi n acest sens: http://www.amnesty.md/news/news.php?ln=ro&id=248

Interviu cu Vanu Jereghi, director al Institutului pentru Drepturilor Omului (IDOM) i vicepreedinte al
Consiliului Consultativ pentru Prevenirea Torturii, Chiinu, august 2009
Interviuri cu juriti i activiti civici, Chiinu, iulie-august 2009.

Sintez a problemelor realizat pe baza interviurilor cu juriti i activiti civici. Pentru o prezentare exhaustiv
a problemelor din sistemul juridic al Republicii Moldova vezi i Alexandru Cocr, Reforma justiiei n contextul
implementrii Planului de Aciuni UE-Moldova, Chiinu 2009, ADEPT (www.e-democracy.md)
124 A se vedea seria de Barometre ale Opiniei Publice realizate de Institutul de Politici Publice, http://www.
ipp.md
72
73
120
121
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Astfel, numrul de cereri depuse la CEDO mpotriva Republicii Moldova a crescut de

la 212 (n anul 2001) la 1147, anul trecut. n acelai timp, numrul de cereri declarate
admisibile a crescut de la 3 la 29, n acelai interval de timp. Dar ceea ce arat gravitatea
situaiei este dat de numrul de condamnri ale Moldovei de ctre CEDO, nu mai puin
de 138 de cazuri (cele mai multe referindu-se la situaii de nclcare a drepturilor omului)
fiind soluionate n defavoarea Chiinului. Prin aceste decizii ale CEDO, Republica
Moldova a fost obligat s achite aproximativ 4,5 milioane de euro n calitate de prejudicii
materiale, prejudicii morale i cheltuieli de judecat125.
Mediul de afaceri n Republica Moldova

Partidul Comunist SA
tefan Cndea
n Republica Moldova afaceri majore au fost nchise sau preluate cu fora. Privatizri
importante au fost anulate, iar companiile respective naionalizate. n domeniile de importexport profitabile s-au creat monopoluri, anihilnd competiia unei piee libere. Toate
acestea s-au fcut n detrimentul oamenilor de afaceri i al banului public, antrennd
nclcri grave ale drepturilor omului. Beneficiarii abuzurilor asupra mediului de afaceri
sunt grupai n jurul familiei prezideniale, minitrilor sau parlamentarilor apropiai.
Nepotismul i conflictul de interese, oficiali i demnitari acestea sunt caracteristicile
marilor afaceri de la Chiinu.
n Republica Moldova s-au investit din exterior peste 50 milioane EUR n ultimii
2 ani n programe anticorupie. Expert anticorupie: raportat la bani, rezultatele sunt
foarte slabe. nainte de alegerile din aprilie situaia se mbuntea. Dup alegeri ns,
totul s-a distrus. Nu se poate lupta mpotriva corupiei ntr-un stat totalitar.
Dac o afacere devine profitabil, ea cade rapid n mna raiderilor, adic este
preluat cu fora. O mn de oameni se mbogete peste msur, un aparat represiv este
ncurajat s se ntrein din corupia mic i medie i o ar ntreag srcete. Voronin
a creat o vertical politic direct i conduce tot. Raportul de fa identific o serie de
arme ale statului folosite n acapararea afacerilor altora: CCCEC; Parchetul General
cu dosare penale deschise pentru antaj; anularea privatizrilor i naionalizarea; instituia
prezidenial sau Voronin nsui; ordonane i directive ale guvernului pentru crearea
de situaii de monopol; dirijarea de bani publici ctre firmele fiului preedintelui, Oleg
Voronin.
Sistemul
Situaia n care se gsete mediul de afaceri din Republica Moldova este urmtoarea:
din fruntea partidului-stat PCRM - i cu ajutorul organelor statului familia Voronin
a monopolizat pentru ea i pentru o mn de oameni de afaceri apropiai afacerile
profitabile, att cele private, ct i cele care implic bani publici.
Bogia acumulat de Oleg Voronin n anii n care tatl su a condus cu o mn
de fier Moldova a intrat deja n folclor126. ns situaia n care se gsete mediul de
Vezi rapoartele de activitate ale Curii Europene pentru Drepturile Omului, la adresa: http://www.echr.coe.
int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Reports/Annual+Reports
126 Discuia legat de mediul de afaceri din Republica Moldova ncepe invariabil cu una din versiunile bancului
despre fiul preedintelui Voronin care deine toate afacerile prospere din Chiinu si este comptimit de mama sa
pentru c este singurul care muncete n republic. Merg Vladimir Voronin i soia sa, Taisia, prin Chiinu i se
74
75
125
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
afaceri nu este nici nostim i nici folclor. Afaceri majore au fost nchise sau preluate
cu fora. Privatizri importante au fost anulate, iar companiile naionalizate. n
domeniile de import-export profitabile s-au creat monopoluri, anihilnd competiia
unei piee libere. Toate acestea s-au fcut n detrimentul oamenilor de afaceri i
al banului public, cu nclcri grave ale drepturilor omului. Beneficiarii abuzurilor
asupra mediului de afaceri sunt grupai n jurul familiei prezideniale, minitrilor sau
parlamentarilor apropiai. Nepotismul i conflictul de interese sunt la ordinea zilei.
ncet dar sigur, politicul a acaparat domeniile profitabile ale privatului i a ncasat
totodat n interes personal ceea ce trebuia sa fie cheltuit n interes public. Sistemul
dup care s-a derulat acapararea afacerilor importante n ultimii ani este urmtorul127:
Politicul controleaz Executivul, Executivul hruiete Privatul, Privatul este forat s
ntoarc mare parte a profitului att ctre funcionarii Executivului prin mit, ct i
ctre structuri-faad ale Politicului. Afacerile mai mari sunt pur i simplu confiscate
de aa numiii raideri128. Banii publici sunt deturnai i ei n buzunarele private ale
conductorilor.
Politicul i Executivul sunt familia Voronin. Vrfurile executivului sunt persoane
foarte apropiate lui Voronin, de cele mai multe ori persoane antajabile sau cu diverse
lucrri penale ngropate n sertarele procurorilor. Structurile private intermediare
sunt controlate de maxim 5 familii din jurul lui Voronin. Sistemul format din poliie,
parchet, justiie este cureaua de transmisie prin care sunt controlai oamenii de
afaceri.
Sistemul implic ordine executate orbete i permis n alb de a ncasa mit.
Voronin a creat o vertical politic direct i conduce totul ne-a declarat un ziarist
specializat pe economic129. Voronin a comasat structurile de control n Ministerul de
Interne, pentru a-i crea o bt eficient130. Uneltele de presiune: Parchetul General,
CCCEC, MAI, SIS. Comanda pentru atacarea unui om de afaceri sau a unei firme o
d nsui Voronin, unul dintre consilierii prezideniali sau una din familiile din jurul
preedintelui131. Oamenii de afaceri au un nume pentru acest mecanism: Sistemul.
n Sistem intr invariabil afacerile medii i mari cine refuz este prelucrat pn la
desfiinare de organele de control ale statului.
Srcie i corupie
Republica Moldova este o ar srac, n pragul colapsului. De cteva luni de
zile, n mare parte a rii nu s-au mai pltit pensiile. Ajutorul cetenilor moldoveni
care lucreaz n strintate este esenial. Ei trimit peste un miliard de dolari anual
minuneaz de cte bnci, pizzerii i farmacii noi sunt n ora. A cui e banca asta?, ntreab prima doamn. A fiului
nostru, Oleg, rspunde dl. preedinte. i restaurantul cela?. Tot a lui. Dar farmacia din col? . Pi tot a
lui, Taisia! , i spune iritat Vladimir Nikolaevici. Srmanul, se vicrete femeia, se pare c numai biatul nostru
muncete n ara asta
127 Interviu avocat Vladislav Gribincea
128 Firme sau persoane fizice care preiau forat o afacere privat n numele unor politicieni
129 ziarist economic, anonim
130 interviu cu Nicolae Bivol, primul ef al Inspectoratului Fiscal de Stat
131 vezi caz preluare Carmez
76
ctre familiile lsate acas. Orice iniiativ privat n Republica Moldova este sufocat
de un sistem juridic profund corupt i o legislaie contradictorie, care genereaz
birocraie i nesfrite ocazii de corupie.
Transparency International (TI) monitorizeaz de mai muli ani corupia n
Republica Moldova i realizeaz sondaje att n rndul oamenilor de afaceri, ct i n
rndul persoanelor fizice. Sondajele TI public grile cu informaii despre domeniile
unde exist corupie frecvent, ct i sumele care se pltesc pentru diverse servicii.
Conform preedintelui TI Moldova, Lilia Carasciuc, unii dintre indicatorii privind
mica corupie au avut slabe mbuntiri. ns n Republica Moldova s-au investit
din exterior peste 50 milioane de euro n ultimii 2 ani n programe anticorupie.
Raportat la bani, rezultatele sunt foarte slabe. Banii au fost investii n sistemul
fiscal, n departamentul vamal i n CCCEC. nainte de alegerile din aprilie situaia
se mbuntea. Dup alegeri ns, totul s-a distrus. Nu se poate lupta mpotriva
corupiei ntr-un stat totalitar. n opinia lui Carasciuc, corupia mic e o problem
important, dar rezolvabil. Marea problem este ns corupia politic, un drum
sigur ctre dictatur.
Metodele prin care este sufocat mediul de afaceri sunt reprezentative pentru starea
n care se gsete societatea moldoveneasc. Cifrele sunt dezolante. Investitori strini
aproape nu exist, marile investiii au venit nainte de instaurarea regimului comunist
i privesc n general utiliti (energie, comunicare). Moldovenii plecai n strintate
sunt cea mai mare investiie strin direct132 - ei trimit anual peste 1 miliard de dolari
n ar. 70% din ncasrile la buget sunt asigurate de ctre Serviciul Vamal. 70% din
firmele care produc un oarecare profit sunt active n Chiinu. Felul discreionar n
care dispune de ara sa Voronin (impunerea regimului de vize pentru Romnia) a
dus la prbuirea exporturilor romneti ctre Republica Moldova i la suspendarea
activitii a 200 de firme din ara vecin133. Valoarea importurilor din Romnia a
sczut brusc la jumtate, vduvind bugetul de stat de o sum important.
Un ziarist specializat pe domeniul economic ne-a descris mecanismul corupiei:
Maina birocratic a fost motenit, dar apoi a fost perfecionat i consolidat
de ctre comuniti. Pentru orice hrtie se d mit, care se mparte pe fiecare nivel
superior n funcie de mrimea afacerii. Fiecare pre e cunoscut (conform grilei din
sondajul TI134). Pentru afaceri atipice sau mai mari se merge cu mita direct la niveluri
superioare, n funcie de afacere.
Pentru orice afacere nou se calculeaz planul de afacere oficial i n paralel cel
neoficial, cu cheltuieli la negru i bani de mit. De aceea firmele strine i aleg
reprezentani locali care cunosc mecanismul corupiei i au buget de cheltuit pe aa
ceva. Astfel apar afacerile cu cas neagr salarii la negru, bani de fcut rapid i de
ascuns la fel de rapid. Aceste afaceri sunt din start vulnerabile n faa sistemului.
132 Vezi ECOnomist: Nr. 229/22 iulie 2009, Pag. 5 Moldovenii care muncesc n strintate continua sa fie pilonii
economiei.
133 http://www.transparency.md/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=480&Itemid=49
134 http://www.transparency.md/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=14
77
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
Prerea unanim a celor intervievai este c principala problem n Republica

Moldova pentru mediul de afaceri este sistemul judectoresc extrem de corupt, dar
i sistemul juridic n ansamblul lui (poliie, parchet, judectori). De altfel, n sondajele
TI judectorii sunt cea mai recent apariie i cea mai spectaculoas cretere n grila
legat de mita pe care oamenii de afaceri trebuie s-o plteasc. Legislaia este n
mare parte n regul, ns implementarea este deficitar. Mai mult, legislaia a fost
completat cu prevederi contradictorii de ctre regimul comunist. Scopul acestor
completri a fost protejarea funcionrimii incompetente i sporirea puterii guvernului
chiar i la nivel local. Exist desigur i specialiti la nivelul poliiei, a serviciilor secrete
dar acetia sunt copleii de sistemul condus de efi promovai i numii politic
ori pe baz de dosar. Dosarul trebuie s fie ct mai ptat, adic persoanele s fie
antajabile135. Funcionarii sunt forai de sistemul aberant s se descurce i s
produc bani negri136.
Dup alegerile din iulie se ntrevede o speran, deocamdat la nivel declarativ.
Opoziia promite s ndrepte legislaia: Vom modifica legislaia acolo unde a fost
schimbat de comuniti pentru a duce la sfrit aberaiile i monopolul existent. Sunt
pentru transparen total trebuie s ajungem ca politica s se despart de afaceri137.
Sunt pentru un registru al comerului disponibil online. Poate aa s se descopere
legturile dintre minitri i rudele lor cu afaceri profitabile. Nu suntem nc la etapa
asta dar avem nevoie de un corp de funcionari care s fie motivai financiar i
s uite de afaceri declar Dorin Chirtoac. Practic, aceasta este marea problem:
O clic de oameni de afaceri controlat de comuniti, n jur de 5 familii, au preluat
cu fora controlul i monopolul pe tot ceea ce nseamn bnci, import export,
transport, desfacere, parial pe comunicare, construcii i privatizri dubioase.
Propaganda i lipsa transparenei

Informaia obiectiv, vital pentru un mediu de afaceri sntos, se pierde n peisajul
media polarizat138, slab din punct de vedere profesional i abuzat constant de ctre
statul concentrat pe dezinformare. ntr-un astfel de mediu de afaceri viciat, presa
economic nu-i gsete rostul. Nimeni nu o dorete. Statul este total netransparent.
La fel i mediul de afaceri. Mai mult, statul folosete statisticile pentru a manipula
i refuz s furnizeze informaiile legate de domenii i afaceri sensibile. Astfel presa
nu poate furniza dect frnturi de informaie, mult neverificat, iar ceteanul este
dezinformat constant.
135
136
interviu Dorin Chirtoac

Exemplu 1 pentru poliie rutier, nu se deconteaz nimic pe deplasri totui la final de lun se vede c un
poliist de la rutier se deplaseaz n valoare de trei ori ct salariul lui i nimeni nu-i deconteaz. De unde are bani?
Exemplu 2 grnicer obligat s se mute din vest la nord est. A scris memoriu c nu are bani de mutare i c nu
primete nimic (2 copii, soie n vest la munc). Demis, dosar penal de neexecutare ordin. S-a adresat unui avocat
pe drepturile omului, care a ameninat cu conferina de pres. Panic n sistem, au schimbat rapid totul. Sistemul e
aberant, foreaz s ia mit pe cont propriu.
137 vezi articol din Timpul, mari 28 iulie, nur 136 an 8 Fabrica de milioane a lui Igor Dodon prim viceprimministru si ministrul economiei o reea de nepotism, cu suflete moarte, a furat milioane din banii publici
138 Vezi capitol separat Media
78
Informaiile economice brute lipsesc ori sunt greu accesibile. Datele economice
prezentate de ctre instituii ale statului sunt false sau interpretate special greit139.
Banca Naional e singura instituie mai corect, dar alte informri oficiale sunt pur
propagand.
Un exemplu despre felul n care sunt prezentate informaii despre chestiuni
importante: Voronin a decretat nc la sfritul anului 2006 c n Republica Moldova
nu mai exist crim organizat. Pur i simplu, aceasta s-a evaporat peste noapte140,
dei corupia n justiie a crescut.
Mediul de afaceri nu e transparent, aflm de tranzacii la un an dup ce s-au
realizat, sau aflm din presa strin ori romn. Nu exist informaii legate de
companii, n unele cazuri trebuie s mituim pentru obinerea de informaii141.
Chiar dac e legiferat, accesul la informaii de interes public nu funcioneaz.
Rspunsuri birocratice fr substan ocolesc datele sensibile. Institutul de statistic
refuz furnizarea de informaii, solicit bani sau furnizeaz informaii trunchiate.
Marea problem a jurnalitilor e c lipsete informaia. Se aud zvonuri, dar e
greu s le verifici. Aa apar materiale generaliste slab argumentate cu fapte. Numai
cnd exist legturi cu alt ar mai putem verifica.
Presa de profil, oglinda mediului de afaceri

M informez din toate prile: Curaj.net, Unimedia, Jurnal i Pcrm.md. Media e prea
polarizat, nu sunt informaii uor accesibile, unii nu neleg fenomenul, alii sunt
obligai de patron s ia partea cuiva142 ne declar un avocat specializat pe tranzacii
financiare.
Presa economic are un juctor de mare calibru n Capital Market (CM), o
revist care aparine statului (fondator este Comisia Naional a Pieei Financiare
- CNPF). Pentru un concurent privat, cum este ECOnomist, este dificil s se
menin pe pia, pentru c reclama de stat i este inaccesibil, la fel ca i reclama
privat. Reclama de stat merge numai la publicaiile guvernamentale. n plus, firmele
pe aciuni sunt obligate s publice n orice publicaie rapoartele trimestriale i anuale.
nainte era specificat n lege s intre n Capital Market, n rus i romn. A fost
scoas din lege obligativitatea, dar tot aa se ntmpl. Este o competiie neloial cu
alte publicaii de profil, independente143.
Dei un juctor cu potenial pe piaa media economic, acum CM merge strict
pe linia guvernului. Jurnalitii din interior recunosc o autocenzur draconic. CM
139 ziaritii relateaz din discuiile cu specialitii institutului cum institutul de statistica modifica algoritmi, calcule i
raportare pentru ca cifrele s pun ntr-o lumin bun guvernul
140 http://politicom.moldova.org/news/voronin-in-moldova-nu-exista-crima-organizata-21789-rom.html
142 avocat specializat pe comercial, fuziuni, due dilligence
79
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
se susine singur financiar, nu primete bani de la stat, pltete chiar dividende de

30%. i totui CM tiprete doar 1.200 de exemplare din care jumtate se vnd prin
abonament, un sfert se vnd la chioc, iar restul este retur. Profitul nu este public,
dei ziarul aparine statului.
Mentalitatea omului de afaceri este s-i ascund la maxim att afacerea, ct
i profitul. La fel face i CM. Este invers ca n alte ri, de fric s nu i ia cineva
afacerea. CM a ncercat s mearg pe tiri de companie. Cnd sunam dup tiri
patronii se minunau, credeau c trebuie s dea mit ca s apar tirea. E foarte greu
pentru jurnaliti, chiar i cei de la ziare guvernamentale, din cauz c nu exist cultura
transparenei144.
Am identificat o deosebire major fa de rile din jur: bazele de date cu informaii
legate de acionariat, proprietate, alte informaii financiare circul contra cost peste
tot n fosta Uniune Sovietic, pe dvd-uri sau online. Este o reacie fireasc la blocajul
informaional impus de diverse guverne. n Republica Moldova astfel de informaii
nu circul pentru c nu exist cerere. Competiia aproape nu exist. Aici este un
alt mod de a face afaceri, n care fiecare primete rolul su din care nu are voie s
ias: Dac ai nevoie de o informaie ca afacerist, o primeti. Dac nu o primeti
nseamn c nu ai nevoie145.
Teroare
Mediul de afaceri se afl sub teroare. La fel i canalele de comunicare ctre
public, dar i eventualii aprtori ai oamenilor de afaceri (avocai sau ONG-uri
specializate).
Mediul de afaceri face o echilibristic periculoas ntre propriul interes i interesul
instituiilor statului. Nu numai oamenii de afaceri sunt n pericol constant, dar i cei
cu care acetia vin n contact: avocai, media, ONG-uri.
Presa a fost supus din ce n ce mai multor presiuni n anii de guvernare comunist.
Totul a culminat cu alegerile din 5 aprilie i micrile de protest din zilele urmtoare.
Mai muli jurnaliti au fost arestai la domiciliu, alii au fost rpii din strad i inui
captivi ore sau chiar zile ntregi, zeci de jurnaliti strini au fost expulzai sau nu au
fost lsai s intre n Republica Moldova. Climatul instalat a fost unul de teroare.
Arestrile i btile le-au operat angajai ai MAI i SIS, muli dintre ei n civil,
deplasndu-se n vehicule cu numere de Transnistria. n lunile care au urmat, ziaritii
locali s-au plns de interceptri de telefoane i emailuri, ct i de urmriri.
Nici ONG-urile nu au scpat, chiar dac unele dintre ele participau n programe
finanate internaional n parteneriat cu diferite instituii ale statului. Dup alegeri,
la toate ONG-urile i la partidele de opoziie au venit controale de la Fisc. Noi am
144
145
interviu cu ziarist CM
interviu ziarist CM
80
avut trei tipuri de controale: Ministerul Justiiei (de ce nu am intervenit s restabilim

ordinea), Fiscul (nu tiau nici ei ce caut, doar au rsfoit dosare) i compania de paz
care opera sistemul nostru de alarm, trimis de Ministerul de Interne i ncercnd s
monteze ceva n sediu. Acetia au venit de mai multe ori, pn am reziliat contractul
cu ei146.
Exist mai multe companii de avocai specializai pe domeniul comercial, ns
chiar i acetia vor s stea n umbr. Noi nu am putut face articole despre ei pentru
c au refuzat constant147.
Pentru avocaii care reprezint clieni la instanele internaionale mpotriva statului
moldovean, tensiunea este de lung durat: Au fost presiuni asupra mea personal,
dar i asupra cabinetului nostru. Ne-am plns imediat Curii. Au mai continuat cu
icanri. Spre exemplu, Moldtelecom a blocat pe 2 ani faxul nostru ctre CEDO
i de la CEDO ctre noi. Foloseam tot timpul alte numere de fax. Am nceput s
investigm i s facem interpelri oficiale i brusc faxul a fost deblocat148.
Chiar i autorii acestui raport au fcut cunotin cu aparatul represiv al statului
comunist. Doi experi au fost refuzai s intre n ar n timpul alegerilor, viza
turistic fiind eliberat pentru sptmna ulterioar. Unul dintre experi a solicitat
viza din Londra, tocmai pentru a ocoli blocada impus romnilor. La sosirea pe
aeroportul Chiinu a fost atent interogat i controlat n cel mai mic amnunt. Dup
care pe urmele lui au fost depistai cel puin 6 ageni n civil, care au desfurat
operaiuni de filaj n schimburi pentru urmtoarele zile149. Un alt expert, sosit n chiar
seara alegerilor, a fost la rndul lui reinut mai mult timp pe aeroport i interogat n
legtur cu scopul vizitei n Republica Moldova.
Cei mai muli dintre cei care au acceptat s acorde interviuri pentru realizarea
acestui raport au solicitat s rmn anonimi.
Transnistrizarea Republicii Moldova

Orice analiz legat de RM nu poate face abstracie de existena problemei
autoproclamatei Republici Transnistrene (PMR) o gaur neagr de contraband i
frdelege, unde prosper o clic-stat, cu arma n mn, i mpotriva creia nimeni
nu a fcut nimic n ultimii 18 ani. Transnistria funcioneaz de 18 ani dup un model
neschimbat: familia Smirnov ocup cele mai importante funcii n stat, dar controleaz
i domeniul privat. Un stat ilegal care i-a creat unelte specifice oricrui stat: poliie,
armat, servicii secrete, grniceri, vam, fisc, sistem de pensii, salarii, moned etc.
Democraia este mimat, libertatea de expresie nu exist, afacerile se fac numai de
ctre clica de la putere. O regiune unde 500 de mii de oameni triesc doar pentru
146
147
148
149
interviu Lilia Carasciuc, TI, implicat n programe anticorupie cu instituii ale statului.
ziarist economic, anonim
interviu Vladislav Gribincea
vezi http://jurnal.md/article/18586/ si http://www.evz.ro/articole/detalii-articol/861410/Jurnalist-romanfilat-si-amenintat-de-agentii-lui-Voronin/
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MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
a mbogi clica de la putere, impus cu ajutorul armelor. Acesta este modelul spre
care s-a ndreptat i Republica Moldova n ultimii 8 ani, evident ncurajat de lipsa de
reacie internaional. PMR influeneaz mediul de afaceri, dar i comportamentul
statului vecin n probleme ca drepturile omului, media, democraie tocmai pentru
c mpotriva PMR comunitatea internaional nu a ntreprins nici o aciune ferm.
De aceea a devenit posibil ca PMR s fie privit ca un model de succes. Cu siguran
a fost replicat la scar mai larg de ctre regimul Voronin, sub privirile apatice ale
comunitii internaionale.
Aparatul de stat
Forme de presiune
Uneltele de lucru ale acestui sistem sunt monopolul, anchetele i dosarele penale,
naionalizarea, nepotismul. Dac o afacere devine profitabil ea cade rapid n mna
raiderilor, adic este preluat cu fora. O mn de oameni se mbogete peste
msur, un aparat represiv este ncurajat s-i sporeasc veniturile din corupie i
o ar ntreag srcete. Ironic, dac sistemul acesta nu ar fi alimentat de cetenii
moldoveni care lucreaz n strintate, s-ar prbui. Anual, cei care au fugit de regimul
Voronin n afara rii, trimit peste un miliard de dolari ctre rudele rmase n ar.
Banii lor se duc pe consum, consum alimentat masiv din importuri. Din interviurile
purtate n Chiinu, rezult c operaiunile profitabile de import-export au fost
acaparate cu ajutorul statului de ctre firme paravan ale familiei Voronin150. Pentru
a nelege ct de bnoas este afacerea de import export, am consultat raportul de
activitate pe anul 2008 al Serviciului Vamal: operaiunile vamale constituie 70% din
ncasrile la bugetul de stat151.
Prelurile forate nu au ca singur scop profitul. Al doilea motiv major pentru
care anumite afaceri au fost nchise abuziv sau preluate cu fora a fost pentru a
mpiedica finanri importante ctre partide de opoziie. Adic pentru a mpiedica
orice tentativ de a schimba sistemul actual.
Cum s-a ajuns n Republica Moldova la starea de fapt descris mai sus, ntr-un
timp relativ scurt Voronin a creat o vertical politic direct i conduce tot este
afirmaia cea mai des ntlnit n discuiile cu oameni de afaceri, avocai sau ziariti.
nclcrile constituionale nu au fost amendate, astfel c Voronin a acionat organizat
la adpostul majoritii politice din Parlament152.
150
151
152
Uneltele statului n mna familiei prezideniale

Raportul de fa identific o serie de arme ale statului folosite n acapararea
afacerilor private: CCCEC; Parchetul General care instrumenteaz dosare
penale doar pentru antaj; anularea privatizrilor i naionalizarea; instituia
prezidenial sau Voronin nsui; ordonane i directive ale guvernului pentru
crearea de situaii de monopol; dirijarea banilor publici ctre firme ale familiei
preedintelui.
Pentru ca instituiile statului s funcioneze la comand politic, nu se nregistreaz
cazuri n care funcionari sunt trai la rspundere pentru abuzuri (n poliie, politic,
administraie, guvern etc).
O unealt principal n lupta pentru controlul afacerilor este Centrul de
Combatere a Crimelor Economice i Corupiei (CCCEC). Structura este subordonat
guvernului i reprezint o comasare de foste instituii independente, din ministere
diferite (precum Garda Financiara) sub o singur structur153. Voronin a comasat
fosta Gard Financiar i alte structuri MAI pentru a avea o bt eficient154.
Astfel, la momentul acesta, nu exist structuri independente care s instrumenteze
cazuri de corupie sau de criminalitate economic. Mai mult, la conducerea acestei
superstructuri a fost adus un pion principal din Serviciul de Informaii i Securitate.
Nenumrate voci acuz c CCCEC este o structur specializat n preluarea afacerilor
profitabile i n hruirea oamenilor de afaceri nesubordonai politic.
O alt metod de presiune asupra oamenilor de afaceri sunt dosarele penale
deschise de ctre Parchetul General i lsate n lucru, netrimise niciodat n instan.
Aceste dosare constituie o unealt de antaj n preajma alegerilor sau n cazuri de
preluri forate, cnd subiectul dosarului este ncarcerat pentru o perioad de timp,
pentru a fi deposedat de aciuni sau alte afaceri.
Voronin nsui se implic punctual mpotriva oamenilor de afaceri sau a firmelor.
Spre exemplu, acesta a pornit o campanie mpotriva omului de afaceri Anatol Stati,
patron al grupului Ascom. Deoarece afacerile Ascom se deruleaz n Kazakstan,
Voronin a atenionat public autoritile i pe preedintele din Kazakstan s aib
grij cu cine fac afaceri155. mpotriva firmelor Ascom din Kazakstan au nceput
imediat controale care s-au soldat cu amenzi. Totodat, Parchetul General l-a arestat
pe Gabriel Stati, fiul preedintelui Ascom, acuzndu-l de organizarea de proteste i
finanri netransparente ale opoziiei. Att de mult i-a dorit Voronin arestarea lui
Stati nct acesta a fost extrdat printr-o procedur de urgen din Ucraina. Avocaii
si consider att arestarea, ct i procedura de extrdare ilegale. n cele din urm,
Gabi Stati a fost eliberat din arest n arest la domiciliu.
153
154
vezi note interviu

http://www.customs.gov.md/index.php?id=1603
vezi Jurnal de Chiinu. Voronin a uzurpat puterea de stat? i Curtea Constituional ncalc legea
Nicolae Osmochescu, judector la Curtea Constituional, afirm ca Voronin prezideaz neconstituional i edinele
de guvern
http://www.cccec.md/history
declaraie Nicolae Bivol, fost eful Inspectoratului Fiscal Principal de Stat. n trecut a organizat o structur
similar cu Garda Financiar din Romnia. Acum reprezint oameni de afaceri n instan mpotriva abuzurilor
Fiscului.
155 http://www.azi.md/ro/story/1757
82
83
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
TI observ o strategie de creare de monopoluri pe importuri, pe diverse nie i

o presiune politic asupra Vmii: Am notat o declaraie interesant a lui Nicolae
Vlcu156, director general al Departamentului Vamal, care a spus c asupra lui se fac
presiuni mari care dac nu vor nceta el va da declaraii incomode. Aceste monopoluri
pe operaiuni de import export sunt iniiate de ctre guvern, care inventeaz noi
reguli de liceniere pentru fiecare ramur. Birocraia nou-creat acioneaz ca un
filtru. Numai firme agreate de conductorii comuniti trec de acest filtru. Competiia
este eliminat. Am ncercat s iau licena de import pe carne, fiind cel mai mare
combinat de procesare din ar. Am pus 3 angajai s se ocupe numai de hrtii
i de tot procesul birocratic, i s lucreze non-stop. Am reuit s trecem termene
imposibile i totui dosarul a fost respins fr absolut nici un motiv. A doua zi a
urmat un control de intimidare de la Ministerul de Interne i mi s-a spus s nu mai
depun niciodat cerere de licen pentru import de carne, pentru c o s avem cu
toii mari probleme157. Au fost acaparate, prin hotrri de guvern sau completri
la legislaia anterioar, toate ramurile de import - export profitabile: pete, cereale,
carne, industrie, zahr, transport. Aa sunt impui intermediari care cresc preurile
cu 20-30 de procente158.
Anularea privatizrilor i naionalizarea sunt fenomene la ordinea zilei de cnd
s-au instalat comunitii la putere. Republica Moldova a fost deja condamnat n mai
multe astfel de cazuri de ctre CEDO. Dei vina pentru o privatizare frauduloas
aparine i funcionarilor publici, nimeni nu a fost pn acum mcar cercetat.
Dosarele privatizrilor s-au fcut doar pentru acapararea respectivelor afaceri.
Dirijarea banilor publici ctre afacerile controlate de Oleg Voronin in prima
pagin a ziarelor de opoziie. Cele mai recente: renovarea simultan a cldirilor
Palatului Parlamentului i a Preediniei, afectate de protestele din aprilie. Contractul
se ridic la 100 milioane de dolari; conturile ministerelor i a altor instituii de stat
au fost transferate cu fora ctre bncile controlate de Oleg Voronin; companiile
private au fost marginalizate n favoarea celor de stat, n domenii ca asigurri sau
comunicaii.
Din postura de avocat al oamenilor de afaceri aflai n conflict cu statul, Gribincea

scoate n eviden principalele probleme: Avem mari probleme de impozitare pentru
c Fiscul hruiete contribuabilul. Nu te poi apra pentru c nu exist o practic
judiciar constant. Nu te poi lupta cu Satul, cu Fiscul este de neimaginat. Nici
mcar judectorii nu crtesc, dei sunt n degradare din 2006 i bugetul de investiii
alocat lor nu a fost deblocat. Nu se pot face afaceri mari n Republica Moldova
fr s dai ceva pe sub mn Puterii. Totul se rezum la interesele Executivului,
interese ale lui Voronin. Nici cadrul legislativ nu e bun n totalitate, exist prevederi
care se bat cap n cap. Problema major este ns funcionrimea care aplic legea.
Funcionarii au und verde s ia mit, deci devin antajabili. Nici un judector de
vrf, nici un ministru nu are o imagine integr toi sunt controversai i de-aia
sunt pui n poziii cheie. Nu putem vorbi de poliie independent, de procurori
i judectori independeni. Comunitii au avut ca strategie n 8 ani acapararea sau
subordonarea ntreprinderilor profitabile, de talie medie i mare. Au avut 8 ani i
70% din mandate, adic majoritatea constituional le-au folosit doar n interes
propriu. Din ce am observat, uneltele care asist n prelurile forate sunt CCCEC i
Parchetul General.
Gribincea identific o serie de problem majore ale sistemului:
se fac procese i dosare la comand rmn deschise ca unelte de antaj.
abuzuri nesancionate ale poliiei, ale procurorilor
nemotivarea sentinelor
dreptul la proprietate nclcat flagrant deposedare prin anularea
privatizrii
scopul reinerii abuzive e deposedarea de bunuri
frica de Executiv i corupia mpiedic Justiia s funcioneze
imposibil de ctigat un dosar n instan mpotriva voinei Guvernului159
Pentru a realiza ct de mult se concentreaz statul cu toate uneltele sale n
acapararea mediului de afaceri, ne uitm la procentajul proceselor care au ca obiect
anularea privatizrilor: pn n iunie 2008, 15% din aciunile pe rol la Curtea Suprem
de Justiie, la Colegiul Economic, au ca obiect anulare privatizare.
Sistemul juridic corupt

Din interviurile realizate un fapt este unanim recunoscut: sistemul juridic n
Republica Moldova este profund corupt. Orice avocat specializat pe comercial va
recomanda clienilor s caute cale de mpcare sau s se judece oriunde altundeva,
ns n afara Republicii Moldova.
Vladislav Gribincea a reprezentat la CEDO mai multe firme private care au fost
deposedate abuziv de ctre stat de companii pe care le-au achiziionat prin privatizare.
156
157
158
Decedat n 2006
Anatolie Cislaru, CARMEZ
avocat Vladislav Gribincea
Cazuri i modele detaliate

Mentalitatea sovietic a sistemului i a afaceritilor
Mentalitatea omului de afaceri local este nc mentalitatea sovietic, n care
proprietarul ncearc s fac bani ct mai n umbr, pentru a nu strni curiozitatea
organelor statului sau a politicienilor aflai la conducere. La noi nu exist cultur
fiscal, muli au ignorat sistemul legal, treaba a mers i au ajuns ntr-un cerc vicios,
159
84
imediat dup alegeri, situaia a nceput s se schimbe, deinuii politici ca Mocanu au fost eliberai.
85
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
cu bani negri imposibil de justificat160. n multe cazuri proprietarii se ascund

cnd dein o afacere pentru c au fric de proveniena banilor. Ei nu se consult
cu avocatul, pun un om de faad i gata. E boala celor care au fcut bani n anii
90161.
Legea amnistiei fiscale din 2008 a rmas fr efect din dou motive: taxa n
schimbul amnistierii era 5%, o taxa foarte ridicat; oamenilor de afaceri le era fric
s nu fie o capcan cu scopul de a-i identifica i persecuta.
Nu mai sunt asasinate, dar odat ce afacerea merge mai bine trece n alte mini,
obligatoriu. Orice afacere profitabil este victima sigur a raiderilor. Am trecut prin
asta i am nceput din nou de la zero. Pentru c lucrez totul transparent i fr bani
negri, i pentru c afacerea mea e n media, nu au reuit s-mi nchid biznisul, dar
am ani de zile de presiuni n spate162.
Raideri pentru Sistem

Oamenii de afaceri intervievai susin c n acest moment n Republica Moldova
funcioneaz un Sistem n care eti obligat s cotizezi, sistem pzit i controlat
de ctre 5 familii din jurul lui Voronin, cu ajutorul organelor statului. Organele
de stat au nceput s fie implicate n dispute private n urm cu 4 ani. Ce ne prea
slbatic n 2000, acum ni se pare normal. Mentalitatea noastr s-a schimbat foarte
mult, sistemul de valori la fel, acceptm uor abuzuri inimaginabile163. Oamenii de
afaceri din Chiinu vorbesc despre o ofensiv a organelor statului, dup alegerile
din aprilie, n care firmele au fost vizitate de poliie sau fisc i au primit amenzi din
oficiu, fr nici un control. Firme de calibru mai mare au fost forate s plteasc
impozite n avans.
Auzi exemple de preluri de afaceri cu fora la tot pasul. Un taximetrist mi-a
povestit experiena fratelui sau, distribuitor al unei mrci de cafea, care a primit o
vizita de la 3 brbai care i-au spus c le place afacerea lui i c trebuie s o predea,
ca s nu aib mari probleme. El a predat-o, a cedat ameninrilor. La linia fierbinte
pentru corupie a TI, am avut un caz cu 2 tineri care s-au ntors n ar i au deschis
un restaurant. A venit un inspector n construcii care a cerut 100 de euro mit, ei
s-au ncpnat i n-au dat. Au urmat presiuni att de mari, nct unul din tineri a
fugit din Moldova i i-a schimbat numele. Al doilea a lsat toate actele la TI credea
c va fi lichidat. Pentru c TI a fcut cunoscut cazul i a fcut presiuni n cele din
urm cel care a pornit campania de ameninri a fost nchis164.
Ziaritii aud constant despre cazuri n care familia Voronin sau demnitari
comuniti preiau cu fora diverse afaceri: de curnd a fost o conferin de pres
160
161
162
163
164
interviu Liliana Carsciuc, TI

avocat comercial, anonim
om de afaceri, anonim
om de afaceri, anonim
Lilia Carasciuc, TI
n care proprietarii unei exploatri, Cariera Micui, se plngeau de acelai lucru. A

urmat o ntreprindere avicol. Acum este cazul Carmez. n unele afaceri proprietarul
dezminte public, dar exist indicii c a fost deja forat s colaboreze, ca n cazul
Andys Pizza, unde reeaua de pizzerii se bazeaz pe sediile nchiriate de la stat165.
Un avocat specializat n drept comercial: eti inta unui atac de raider cnd ai
o organizaie proast, sau ai probleme n acte, sau nchiriezi de la stat. Cteodat e
vorba i de lcomie: patronul nu accept s fac totul legal i s ctige mai puin.
Este greu s faci lumin n avalana de zvonuri i informaii. Spre exemplu, un
ziarist care vrea s investigheze averea familiei Voronin se lovete de o mulime de
obstacole. n afacerile familiei Voronin gseti o mulime de structuri off-shore sau
de interpui, persoane de faad. O simpl cerere la Camera nregistrrilor risc s
rmn fr rspuns, sau fr un rspuns complet. Au fost desigur i interceptri de
telefoane i de emailuri, sau accidente la tipografie cnd materialul trebuie sa fie dat
publicitii166.
Model de afaceri profitabile

Interviurile au scos la iveal doar dou reete de afaceri de succes, valabile pentru
Republica Moldova: familiile din jurul clanului Voronin sau multinaionale puternice.
Multinaionalele au venit n anii dinaintea guvernrii comuniste. Pentru strini,
dac nu se implic n politic, nu au probleme. n plus, sediile centrale nu sunt aici,
sunt ori la Kiev, ori la Bucureti, pentru c dac intervin probleme n Republica
Moldova, s poat avea asigurat o pia mai larg pn i rezolv problemele. n
general au doar un distribuitor i nu o reprezentan. Distribuitorul face munca i se
descurc pe plan local. Multinaionalele nu-i asum nc riscuri cu o reprezentan,
sau au maxim 5 angajai, cu laptopuri, cu buget fix. Restul se face de la distan sau
cu localnici. Cei mai mari (Orange, Union Fenosa etc) au intrat corect n afaceri. Au
fcut totul corect i totui n 2000 au fost dai n judecat. A costat foarte mult s fac
totul ca la carte, dar altfel ar fi pierdut investiia. Parchetul le-a deschis dosar imediat
dup ce statul a ncasat banii de privatizare167.
Carmez, o preluare forat

Cum s explici logic c un asociat care a ajuns la 12 % preia ntreaga firm cu
fora i nscrie ilegal aceast preluare n aceeai zi? Este vorba de firma Carmez168,
cel mai mare procesator de carne din Republica Moldova. Afacerea se ridic la 24
milioane euro pe an cu un profit de 1 milion de euro. Carmez deine 70% din piaa
165
166
167
168
86
interviu ziarist economic, anonim

Vitalie Clugreanu, seria despre Voronin http://www.crji.org/news.php?id=150&l=1 si alte 3 materiale
avocat specializat comercial, anonim
vezi si http://www.curaj.net/?p=18131
87
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
naional de carne i mezeluri. Asociat i director general este Anatolie Claru: n

decembrie fac 20 de ani de cnd lucrez la firma asta. De ceva vreme triesc pe
pielea mea atacul unor raideri. GlobAuto, o firm mic, a cumprat 6 % din aciunile
Carmez. A nceput s preseze peste tot s se fac controale, s se anuleze privatizarea,
totul ca s preia restul de aciuni cu fora. A mai reuit achiziionarea a 6%, dar
procentele adunate nu-i ajungeau pentru convocarea unei Adunri Generale (AGA).
Singurul rspuns la presiunile GlobAuto a venit de la Preedinie, printr-o scrisoare
a consilierului prezidenial n probleme financiare, Sergiu Pucu169. Rspunsul
consilierului a fost trimis la Parchetul General i la CNPF, pentru examinare i
ntreprinderea aciunilor corespunztoare. Anul acesta au anulat ilegal privatizarea
Carmez, iar n 21 aprilie au arestat toat conducerea. Cu toat conducerea n
nchisoare, s-a convocat o AGA.
Nicolae Bivol, prieten al directorului Claru, s-a dus n AGA s-i reprezinte pe
cei aflai n arest: AGA a fost plin de nereguli, am descoperit i mori la semnatari,
calcule greite. Au fost aduse forele speciale ale MAI i mascai, s asiste la AGA,
la intimidare. Cu toate neregulile, acionarul minoritar GlobAuto a dus AGA pn
la capt, a preluat firma i a nchis edina la ora 17. i totui, a reuit s ajung la
Camera nregistrrii de Stat i s nscrie modificrile, dei acolo programul era pn
la ora 16.
Directorul Anatolie Claru a stat 42 de zile n arest, ceilali directori au stat 2 zile.
Nici unul dintre ei nu a trecut pe la interogatoriu. Conform lui Claru, adevratul
scop al reinerii a fost intimidarea, izolarea i indisponibilizarea aciunilor pentru a
lsa loc de aciune firmei minoritare, GlobAuto. n spatele GlobAuto este firma
Basarabia Nord, concurent cu noi, i sunt persoane care au lucrat cu Oleg Voronin i
familia lui urcanu fostul ministru de interne. Ei acapareaz de fapt Carmez.
Cazuri CEDO
- EDUARD MUUC proprietar al MEGADAT COM, firma cea mai dezvoltat

n domeniul internet. Muuc era n opoziie, iar firma avea o cretere enorm. Muuc
a fost arestat i afacerea i-a fost spulberat. A ctigat la CEDO i ulterior s-a neles
cu comunitii pentru un post de consilier.
- AIR MOLDOVA o companie german a privatizat operatorul, aerian dar
comunitii au anulat privatizarea. CEDO a dat ctig firmei germane i a obligat
Republica Moldova s plteasc napoi firmei suma investit, plus despgubiri.
- OFERTA PLUS companie din domeniul energetic. CEDO menioneaz c
i-a fost pornit un dosar penal abuziv, la comanda actualului prim ministru.
- HOTEL DACIA firma care a ctigat privatizarea a fost expropriat din cauz
c preul de cumprare era diminuat, n viziunea comunitilor. Omul de afaceri care a
cumprat hotelul era ntr-un conflict personal cu Voronin. A ctigat la CEDO.
IPTECH un centru comercial evaluat, ca afacere i cldire, la 40 de milioane
de euro. A fost deschis dosar penal i s-a contestat privatizarea din momentul n care
patronul din umbr, Vlad Filat, s-a lansat n politic.
Fr reacie
Pe plan internaional se poate meniona reacia constant a CEDO, de a condamna
abuzurile autoritilor de la Chiinu. n rest, ultimii 8 ani au fost scufundai n
tcere. Politica internaional nu a reacionat ferm mpotriva sistemului corupt care a
transformat ara ntr-un sistem totalitar. Uniunea European i Statele Unite au tratat
foarte blnd regimul comunist al Republicii Moldova, ntotdeauna ateni la reacia
Rusiei, n acelai mod n care au tratat i Transnistria. Este adevrat c opoziia a
nceput foarte trziu s se organizeze sistematic i s adune dovezi legate de abuzuri,
corupie, folosirea organelor statului ca instrumente n interesul politicienilor
comuniti. Practic momentul care a artat ct de grav este situaia n Republica
Moldova a fost n timpul protestelor din acest an.
La rndul ei, Romnia nu a tiut cum s abordeze relaia cu Republica Moldova i
nu a denunat cu o voce prea energic abuzuri concrete, cel puin pn la protestele
din aprilie anul acesta. Practic, abuzurile i nclcrile flagrante ale drepturilor omului
din primvar au atras atenia i asupra monopolizrii sistemului de afaceri de ctre
regimul politic.
Cazuri de acaparare a unei afaceri, similare cu Carmez, sunt din ce n ce mai

multe n ultimii ani. O arat i avalana de procese la CEDO. Vladislav Gribincea,
de la Juritii pentru Drepturile Omului: n 2008 am avut cu 29% mai multe cazuri
la CEDO fa de anul precedent; n 2007, cu 40% mai mult fa de 2006. Dac
dm la o parte Slovenia i Georgia, care au cte o problem punctual, Republica
Moldova este pe primul loc la numrul de cauze naintate la CEDO, cauze din toate
domeniile. Foarte multe cazuri au de fapt un substrat economic, o afacere distrus.
Practic CEDO a devenit a patra instan pentru Republica Moldova i nimeni nu mai
ateapt o soluie echitabil n ar.
Gribincea ne-a trecut rapid n revist cteva exemple de cauze economice n care
Republica Moldova a pierdut la CEDO:
Schimbarea
169 Cererea Nr. 19/1-10-7 din 3 Februarie 2009, semnata Sergiu Pucu (acestea este fost director al CCCEC i al
Inspectoratului Fiscal de Stat)
170 Spre exemplu, la o zi dup alegeri, a fost eliberat din arest la domiciliu Sergiu Mocanu, acuzat de comuniti de
organizare a protestelor din aprilie, inut fr temei legal in arest preventiv.
88
89
n contrast cu gravitatea situaiei, muli dintre cei intervievai sunt optimiti i

sunt de prere c lucrurile se vor aeza de la sine, odat ndeprtat presiunea din
vrful sistemului adic familia Voronin170. Dac se schimb regimul, clica lui
Voronin o s accepte linitit s fie obligai s se retrag din diverse afaceri ca s
MOLDOVA. LA RSCRUCE
fac loc noii puteri crede un jurnalist economic. O s fie foarte multe procese de
recuperare n cazul afacerilor preluate cu fora. Se poate s asistm i la episoade
destul de violente crede un om de afaceri. Astfel de reacii confirm ns impresia
c sistemul democratic n Republica Moldova este profund viciat, iar funcionarea
statului depinde n prea mare msur de persoana care deine postul de preedinte.
Republica Moldova se trezete dintr-un comar n care s-a afundat de-a lungul
ultimilor 8 ani. Partidul comunist a avut majoritatea, a putut schimba legi, iar Voronin
s-a comportat ca un dictator: i-a arogat ct mai multe funcii, a jucat rolul statului
i a exercitat totodat un monopol asupra economiei private. Afacerile de succes au
fost preluate cu fora att pentru a genera profit, ct i pentru a sufoca orice tentativ
de finanare a unei opoziii organizate. Cel mai afectat de regimul comunist pare
sistemul juridic, profund corupt. Aventura comunist a fost posibil i din cauz c
din exterior nu au venit reacii ferme.
90
SOROS FOUNDATION ROMANIA
MOLDOVA.
AT THE CROSSROADS
Authors: Ioana Avdani, tefan Cndea,

Marian Chiriac, Cristian Ghinea, Sergiu Panainte
Edited by Sergiu Panainte
OCTOBER 2009
MOLDOVA. AT THE CROSSROADS
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM FROM THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
AND ITS EVOLUTION (Cristian Ghinea, Sergiu Panainte) ...............................
From incoherent pluralism to unconsolidated authoritarianism .........................
The revolution in the head of Vladimir Voronin .............................................
Miming the European Integration Moldova and the EU before the elections
from April 2009 ..........................................................................................................
The preparation of the elections from April 2009. External signals .................
The elections from April 2009. The political forces .............................................
The Party of Communists from the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) .................
The Liberal Democrat Party of the Republic of Moldova (LDPM) .................
The Liberal Party (LP) ...............................................................................................
Our Moldova Alliance (OMA) .................................................................................
The Democrat Party of Moldova (DPM) ..............................................................
The violence from April ...........................................................................................
The reaction of the EU, Moldova is back on the agenda ....................................
The political deadlock, the repetition of the elections. Explanation ..................
The new electoral campaign. Other elections ........................................................
The new political alliance the perspectives .........................................................
95
97
98
100
101
104
105
108
109
110
111
112
113
115
117
118
122
MOLDOVAS RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND

THE ROLE PLAYED BY ROMANIA (Cristian Ghinea, Sergiu Panainte) ..... 125
The European integration perspectives .................................................................. 125
The role of Romania as a EU Member State ......................................................... 128
THE MASS-MEDIA ENVIRONMENT: STOP AND REWIND (Ioana
Avdani) ........................................................................................................................
Mass-media in Moldova: a lot of politics, little public interest ............................
The state player and referee ...................................................................................
The international community too little, too polite, too friendly ......................
The Unimedia case: how the future could look like .............................................
131
132
139
143
145
Respecting the citizens fundamental rights and freedoms ..................................

Context .........................................................................................................................
The events from April 7th 2009 violations of human rights ...........................
The limitation of the right to free and fair elections ............................................
Freedom of speech and of meeting progress in legislation, discrimination in
practice .........................................................................................................................
Harassment of the human rights defenders ...........................................................
The flawed functioning of the legal system ...........................................................
THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF
MOLDOVA PARTY OF COMMUNISTS LTD (tefan Cndea) ...............
The system ...................................................................................................................
Poverty and corruption ..............................................................................................
The Propaganda and the lack of transparency ......................................................
The specialised press, a mirror of the business environment .............................
Terror ...........................................................................................................................
The Transnistrisation of the Republic of Moldova ..........................................
The state apparatus ....................................................................................................
Forms of pressure ......................................................................................................
The state instruments in the hand of the presidential family .............................
The corrupt judicial system ......................................................................................
Detailed cases and models ........................................................................................
The Soviet mentality of the system and of the businessmen ..............................
Raiders for the System ...........................................................................................
Model of profitable businesses ................................................................................
Carmez, a forced takeover ........................................................................................
Cases submitted to the European Court of Human Rights ................................
No reaction ..................................................................................................................
The change ..................................................................................................................
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA DEMOCRACY IS POSTPONED

(Marian Chiriac) ............................................................................................................ 147
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Introduction
A survey conducted in 2005 by the Romanian Institute for Public Policies showed
that only 25% of Romanians believed that Romania should have close relationships
with the Republic of Moldova1. Moreover, one should add that 50% of the respondents
believed that, by that time, the Romanian policy towards its Eastern neighbour had been
inefficient and poorly inspired. The combination of lack of interest and scepticism at
that time could probably be explained by the fact that the Romanian public was turning
its attention to the West and was absorbed by the objective of joining the European
Union on January 1, 2007. Furthermore, the perception of the Republic of Moldova
was that of a state trapped to the East, struggling in deep political and social inertia
outside any European dynamics and with no foreseeable way out.
During the last years, the European Unions perspective has worried even more the
supporters of Moldovas EU aspirations. The 2007 Eurobarometer on the interest of
the EU Member States in the neighbouring countries showed that only 20% of the
Europeans expressed interest for EUs neighbours, while the percentage of those aware
of the fact that Moldova was a neighbour to the EU represented a mere 4%2. Maybe
even more disturbing was the stubbornness of European institutions to approach
the Republic of Moldova from a geopolitical logic, which necessarily included the
relationship with the separatist region of Transnistria, with Russia and Ukraine. In the
context of an overly cautious and minimalist international approach to the internal
situation of the country, democracy in the Republic of Moldova suffered a significant
decline fact mostly ignored or tolerated by the international community.
However, there has been a remarkable revival of the interest of the Romanian
public in its Eastern neighbour , probably as a result of the intense media coverage
of the unexpected developments following the April 2009 parliamentary elections in
Moldova. In June 2009, 52% of the Romanians believed that Romania should support,
by every means possible, the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European
Union. Another 47% agreed, to a large and very large extent, to granting Romanian
citizenship to Moldovans who can prove their Romanian ethnic background3. It is
most likely that the same pro-Moldovan enthusiasm is not going to be found among
the wider European public, and certainly not in Brussels particularly on the delicate
matter of citizenship. Nevertheless, insofar as a degree of interest exists among
European decision-makers for Moldovas European aspirations, expectations are
1 Voinescu Sever, Dobre Gabriela: Percepia opiniei publice din Romnia asupra politicii externe i a relaiilor
internaionale [The Romanian Publics Perception of Foreign Policy and International Relations], Institutul de
Politici Publice Bucureti [the Institute for Public Policy in Bucharest], October 2005, p. 47
2 The EUs Relations with its Neighbours, Special Eurobarometer, September 2007, p.4
3 The newsletter entitled Studii Electorale Romneti [Romanian Electoral Studies] of the Soros Foundation
Romania, no.1, July 2009, available at www.soros.ro
94
95
placed on nobody else but Romania. Romanian diplomacy has now to choose between
radically re-thinking the Moldovan file and continuing the hyper-cautious policy
towards its neighbour.
Anticipating the genuine involvement of the European and international community
in the Republic of Moldova (with or without Romanias contribution), this report is
intended to contribute to a deeper understanding of the present state of affairs at
the Eastern border of Romania and of the EU. The ejection of Vladimir Voronin
and the Party of Communists from government is no more than a first step towards
dismantling a pyramid of power that has profoundly corrupted the Moldovan society.
The report highlights a number of structural, institutional and normative flaws and
pitfalls that Moldova struggles with, as they could be observed by the time around
the repeated elections held at the end of July 2009. The time chosen to carry out this
diagnosis has proven to be optimal: many deviations from democratic standards in
the functioning of the Moldovan state could be noticed even before the elections, but
the tensions generated by the repeated polls of 2009 aggravated them and made them
much more visible to those willing to observe and expose them.
The overlap between state and political party structures; the concentration of all
the levers of power in the hands of the President and a small circle of intimates;
the widespread corruption among the administrative apparatus and civil servants
at every level; the limitations and infringements of basic rights and freedoms of
citizens; the control of the public and private mass-media and the harassment of
the few independent ones; the quasi-voiding of sense of the very act of justice by
subordinating the judiciary to the political power; the subordination and seizure of the
business environment all these highlight the level of degradation of the rule of law
and democracy in the Republic of Moldova.
At the time of drafting this report, the Republic of Moldova is facing a situation
which is both difficult and critical for the long-term perspective. The change in the
balance of top political power may be the starting point on the way to reinstating
democracy and returning on a course from which Moldova was hijacked in the second
half of the 90s. This report can serve as a benchmark for assessing the quality of the
transformations that are to occur in the neighbouring country.
The team that prepared this report included: Cristian Ghinea (Director, the
Romanian Centre for European Policies), Ioana Avdani (Executive Director, the
Centre for Independent Journalism), Marian Chiriac (Executive Director, Balkan
Investigative Reporting Network, Romania), tefan Cndea (Deputy Director,
the Romanian Centre for Investigative Journalism) and Sergiu Panainte (Program
Coordinator at the Soros Foundation Romania).
The report has been issued under the Bridging Moldova Program of the Soros
Foundation Romania, a program aimed at strengthening the relationships between the
Romanian and Moldovan civil societies, developing public awareness and influencing
the policies that may contribute to the democratisation and anchoring of the Moldovan
society well within the European space.
Between 2001 and 2009 Moldova has passed from an incoherent democracy to the instauration
of a yet unconsolidated authoritarianism a commonly seen situation in the former Soviet space. Its
President, Vladimir Voronin has concentrated the major decisions in his hands and moved the
politics centre of weight to the President, in spite of the fact that Moldova is, according to the
Constitution, a parliamentary republic. The source of Voronins power is not his position of chief
of state in itself, but the control he has on the Party of Communists from the Republic of Moldova
which in its turn, controls the state. The wave of coloured revolutions from 2003 2004 caused
an opportunistic movement by which Voronin tried to get closer to the EU, which many named the
revolution in Voronins head.
But the Moldova EU Action Plan, which meant democratisation and reforms, threatened
the power vertical, the base of Voronins power and thus emerged the counter-revolution from
Voronins head. The freedom of the press was limited; the intimidation of the opposition through
the abusive use of the state became a usual activity. The Europeanization of Moldova remained
at a superficial level and the authorities adopted a great many European-specific laws, which they
never implemented.
The 2009 election year came during an irreconcilable political break-up between the Party of
Communists from the Republic of Moldova and the opposition and the political violence moved on
the streets in April 2009. The opposition managed to take initiative and repeat the elections in July,
taking over the parliamentary majority, although not enough to elect a new President.
During all those events, the EU remained a major, although not a very coherent actor. The
special EU representative at Chiinu became a controversial figure when he mistakenly betted on
the communists to ensure stability in Chiinu. The EU remains by far the most important source
of funds for Moldova and the new Moldova EU agreement, which will be negotiated in autumn,
will be the proper moment to revive the relations. The Eastern partnership is an opportunity for
Moldova to strengthen its relation with the EU but there is also the danger to treat the six partner
countries as a common destiny block which would be a disadvantage for Moldova.
96
97
The political system from the Republic of

Moldova and its evolution
Cristian Ghinea
Sergiu Panainte
From
incoherent
authoritarianism
pluralism
to
unconsolidated
The political system of the Republic of Moldova is intensely personalised and

a simple reading of the Constitution explains very little of its real functioning.
According to the Constitution, Moldova is a parliamentary republic where the
President is elected by the Parliament with a qualified majority (three fifths) and he
generally has formal-symbolic duties but may dissolve the Parliament relatively easy;
the republic also has a Parliament which passes the laws but whose President also
holds the power to appoint people in key positions in the state. This complicated
constitutional scheme with a predisposition towards deadlocks is a product of the
recent history: in 2000, the Constitution was changed so that the President would
no longer be chosen directly, but by the Parliament. However, his duties were not
modified to resemble those of the classical parliamentary republic presidents. Besides
the constitution, the political practice set after the declaration of independence of
1991 gave the Moldovan Presidents the right to decide who to appoint in sectors
related to security, public order and external relations. The first two presidents of the
country made use of this custom and so did Vladimir Voronin hence the practice in
itself did not change after the amendment of the Constitution so that the chief of
state should be elected by the Parliament.
Oddly enough, the President is in competition, at a formal level, with the head of
the parliament who holds the constitutional right to appoint the general prosecutor
of the Republic and the head of the National Audit Office (the appointment is made
by the Parliament, at the proposal of the legislatures President). This explains the
attraction held by the Parliaments presidency during the last political negotiations.
The comparative political theory states that presidential republics are most likely
to swing towards authoritarianism and this conclusion is statistically influenced by the
large number of such cases occurred in Latin America. Logically, the parliamentary
republics where power is shared by several levels of peer decision should be one of
the most capable to prevent the emergence of an authoritarian regime. The Republic
of Moldova is the living example that this theory is not always valid. During the 90s,
except for the Baltic states, the Republic of Moldova used to have the most dynamic
and competitive democracy of the former Soviet space. Two of the directly elected
Presidents lost the ballot for a new mandate, according to the democratic rules of the
game more than in any other former Soviet state1. Historical coincidence made that
with the election of the President by the Parliament, in 2001, Moldova gently swung
from the area of fragile democracies to that of unconsolidated authoritarianism, a
thing also confirmed by the degradation of the ratings given in the international
1
Lucan A. Way , Pluralism by default and the Sources of political Liberalization in Weak States, Temple
University
98
classifications on democratization2. We call it a historical coincidence because

it is not the change in the method of electing the head of state that caused the
deterioration of democracy in Moldova, but the monopolization of the power by
the Party of Communists from the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) in the same year.
From that moment on, the constitutional name became of little relevance, because
the PCRM leader, Vladimir Voronin, elected President by the Parliament in 2001,
exercised the power thorough the so-called vertical of power, as the Sovietology
studies called it i.e. a method of political control on the administration and the
state exercised in general by issuing decisions from the partys head cabinet. The real
power of Vladimir Voronin during all these years significantly exceeded the limits
of his constitutional mandate and the basis of such power was not the decorative
position of President, but the control he exercised on the PCRM which, in its turn,
controlled the state and its resources.
The PCRM domination started on February 25th 2001, when the party got 71
mandates of the 101 seats in Parliament, which offered them control over all the
key positions in the state. This spectacular result achieved by a party which openly
proclaimed its nostalgia for the Soviet Union has two major explanations :
The first 10 years after the proclamation of independence brought
a traumatising economic downfall for most of the population. The rated
purchase power dropped by 80% compared to the last years of the USSR.
Production dropped by 60% between 1991 and 19993. Previously, Moldova
had been completely integrated in the economic circuit of the Soviet space
and the breaking of the political connections plus the Transnistrian conflict,
which isolated the most industrialised part of the country, led to the fall of
production and commerce. The fragile state, unreformed in the first 10 years
emphasized the general feeling of instability and the crime rates were very
high. Inflation and lack of money led to wages and pensions often being paid
in kind, which led to traumas among the population which are still visible
today (during the two electoral campaigns from 2006, PCRM marched on the
idea that the return of the opposition to power might mean that wages would
be paid in jam, again).
The Russophone minority (ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Gagauz)
felt alienated by the construction of the new Moldovan state identity and
they became a target electorate for the PCRM. The break-up of the majority
into promoters of Moldovenism as a separate identity from Romanian, on
the one hand and promoters of Romanization, on the other hand, blocked
the political debate in matters related to identity; PCRM benefited from this
also, drawing votes both from the minorities and from the Molovenists.
2
3
For instance the annual Nations in transit report, Freedom House

MOLDOVA: HOOKED ON REMITTANCES BUSSINES WEEK, APRIL, 2008.
99
Vladimir Voronin and his party had the historic fortune to take over power when
the great economic reforms had already been started, the negative effects had been
felt and a new economy had already been created. The economic growth installed
at the dawn of new millennium in the entire communist space (both Romania and
Russia, the most important commercial partners of Moldova resumed their growth
in the same period) brought electoral benefits to the PCRM, who introduced itself
as the party having taken the country out of its crisis and having established order.
The strong hand policy of Voronin led to a fall in the crime rate, although his
methods were more Soviet than democratic (Moldova is now loosing cases at the
ECHR because of the methods having been used back then).
The elections from 2005 kept the political dominance of the PCRM, although
the party dropped down to 56 parliamentary mandates. It was insufficient for a
second mandate of Vladimir Voronin as head of the state, but enough to reject any
form of government without the PCRM. Moreover, the oppositions lack of unity
made any option of political construction without Vladimir Voronin impossible.
The revolution in the head of Vladimir Voronin
2009, only emphasizes the lack of trust in the political forces from Chiinu. As one
interlocutor from Chiinu was saying during our research visit, Voronin fooled
everybody then: Bsescu, Saakashvili, the European Union.
Gradually, a counterrevolution seems to have occurred in Vladimir Voronins
mind. The measures plan agreed upon with the EU in February 2005 was only
applied at a formal level, the political control on the press, the administration and the
business environment grew worse. The relations with Russia improved in 2007. The
decisive moment of this turn were the local elections from 2007 when the PCRM
got 37% of the votes for mayors and 41% of the votes for the district councils, the
weakest result in its history. The victory of a newcomer on the political stage, Dorin
Chirtoac, member of the Liberal Party, in front of the PCRM candidate for the
position of mayor of Chiinu was a shock. Most commentators in Chiinu believe
that it was then that the PCRM leader became aware that his openness to the West
affects the very foundation of his power. The administrative reforms, the freedom
of the press, the economic freedom are incompatible with the vertical of power
and with the leadership style imposed by PCRM. In 2007 2008 they imposed new
restrictions to the press and to the political parties and the political control over the
business environment grew worse.
The elections from 2005 came during an external climate which was unfavourable
to the PCRM. In Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia there were spectacular overthrows of
parties with authoritarian emphasis, the so-called coloured revolutions. At that
moment it seemed that a new wave of democratization was emerging in the former
Soviet space, where a new generation of politicians and activists was manifesting
against the consolidation of the non-reforming regimes with authoritarian emphasis.
The elections from 2005 created a political deadlock to which Vladimir Voronin
responded through an amazing capacity of adaptation and dissimulation. The failure
of the Kozac plan to solve the Transnistria conflict (plan supported by Russia and
initially accepted by Voronin, later rejected) alienated Voronin from the administration
of Vladimir Putin. Then occurred the movement so inspiredly called by someone
the revolution in Voronins head. The President declared that he would direct
Moldova towards the integration into the European Union. In Chiinu, one can still
see the massive boards promoting the countrys European future. The newly elected
President from Bucharest, Traian Bsescu, thought he saw an opportunity to warm
up the relations between the two countries and a series of meetings with Voronin led
to optimistic statements made by both parties. The orange leaders from Kiev and
Tbilisi also went to visits to Chiinu. The new Moldova EU Action Plan implied
the EU had to give Moldova financial and technical assistance and in exchange the
latter undertook to implement detailed reform, modernization and democratization
actions. Some of the opposition leaders were convinced (some even at the personal
request of the Romanian President Bsescu) to vote for the re-election of Vladimir
Voronin. The remembrance of that period now, in the light of the events from
If accession to NATO is a controversial issue in Chiinu, accession to the

European Union is unanimously favoured, at least at a formal level. Polls show that
a majority of 67% is in favour of this idea4. With the entire counterrevolution from
his head from the recent years, Vladimir Voronin continues to declare that Moldovas
objective is to join the EU, even if he later ads that this should happen through a
strategic relation with Russia5. The EU Moldova Action Plan was a constant of
the political game in Chiinu as during all these years the governments of Vladimir
Voronin placed the actions agreed upon with the EU among the priorities of the
governing programs. Thus, a process emerged which is paradoxical at a first glance
although it is academically recognised within the studies of Europeanization, as
miming the integration, characterised through an avalanche of legislative changes
with a limited effect in practice.
While the Western donors spend impressive amounts to reform the Moldovan
administration (for instance, a project financed by the World Bank, the Swedish
and British governments which amounts to seven million euro aims at providing
100
101
Miming the European Integration Moldova and the EU

before the elections from April 2009
4The
Public Opinion Barometer July 2009, made by the Public Policies Institute in Moldova.
http://www.ipp.md/barometru1.php?l=ro&id=37
5 Voronin vrea tratat cu Romnia i integrare european n relaie strategic cu Rusia, Romnia liber, Wednesday,
15 July 2009
assistance for the reform of the central administration), the discretionary political
control over the local administration got worse. The town halls led by representatives
of the opposing parties accuse a bankruptcy policy led on behalf of the central
government which makes discretionary use of a central law and discriminates them
when allocating the public funds. This happened on a constant basis to the Chiinu
town hall after Dorin Chirtoac became mayor; in 2009, the budget of this town hall
was 40 million Moldovan lei lower than in 20086.
One of the EU requirements was to create a professional body of civil servants
who should have stable positions, should be hired through competition and protected
from political interferences. The law was adopted only in July 2008, its publication in
the official journal was postponed and no serious effort of implementation was made7.
Besides, any person reading the reports compiled by the European Commission8
on the enforcement of the Action Plan, the regular independent reports compiled
by the ADEPT and Expert Group organisations (financed by the Soros Moldova
Foundation) and the official reports compiled by the Moldovan authorities discovers
the amazing quantity of voted laws and the disproportion between the number of
laws voted and the few results obtained in practice; this is due to the postponement
of their enforcement, to the legal loop holes which were intentionally introduced
in the law or simply to bad enforcement. Here are just a couple of the approximately
2009 laws voted to enforce the EU Moldova Action Plan: changing the law
concerning the statements of fortune and income, changing the statute of the
judges, developing an ethic code for the judges, the law on decisional transparency
in the public sector, the law on the protection of witnesses, the ethic code of civil
servants10. The Centre for the Fight against Economic Crimes and Corruption was
created as an extraordinary corruption fighting body but in spite of some external
assistance programs for the improvement of the administrative capacity, the Centre
only deals with insignificant servants.
Moldova receives a weak category rating (weak 68 points on a scale from 0 to
100) in the Global Integrity Index measurement for 200811. The GI measurement
is more relevant than the classical reports on the perception of corruption as it
does not measure a subjective reality perception but it has a panel of experts
analysing the barriers each country builds in the face of corruption (from laws
and ethic codes to their enforcement). The total rating of Moldova is common for
6
Info-Prim Neo Agency, 10 September 2008

EUROMONITOR, no. 3 (12), 3rd edition, Implementation of reforms initiated accordingly to the EU-Moldova
Action Plan, Assessment of progress made in July-September 2008; ADEPT and EXPERT-GRUP
8 The last report treats the state of fact from 2008: The Implementation of the European Neighbouring Policy
in the year 2008 Progress Report, Republic of Moldova, The European Commission, 2009
9 Estimation made at the request of the authors of the report by independent experts from Chiinu
10 The last progress report of the European Commission mentions in most of the cases, as a standard formula, that
real measures are needed to implement these legislative amendments.
11 http://report.globalintegrity.org/Moldova/2008
7
102
the former Soviet space, but what is interesting to notice is that Moldova receives
88 points for the general criterion legal framework and only 48 points for the
criterion actual implementation. Thus, the GI methodology also measures the
distance between the legal reality and the actual situation. In the case of Moldova,
the so-called implementation gap falls within the huge category. Presently, Moldovas
problem is not so much the legal framework as its implementation. This does not
mean that all those laws do not cause certain effects; for instance, the law on access
to information led to people winning a couple of cases in court in front of the
institutions; however, the effects are limited and they are mostly achieved in spite
of the authorities than with their active support. Sometimes, the distance between
laws and practice reaches ridiculous levels. In February 2008 the Parliament adopted
a new legislation on freedom to gather, through a consultation process with the
civil society. Saluted by the European Commission and by other reports, the new
legislation was ignored one year later during the events from April 2009 and it did
not change a thing in the behaviour of the law enforcement agencies.
The strategy of the Chiinu government was to say things as the EU and do
them as they please; Moldova is a classic case of formal or apparent Europeanization.
This process occurs when the national authorities are very much into getting closer
to the EU, but the political costs of implementing the reforms are very high for
the government. The result is a tendency to minimize the reforms requested by the
EU. Since there is an unbalanced access to information (the national authorities
know more about the actual situation than the expert missions of the European
Commission may find out), this strategy may function on the short term. However,
it is certain now that the experts of the Commission acknowledged the distance
between form and practice and the next agreement between the EU and Moldova
which is to be negotiated in the autumn of 2009 will pay much more attention to
implementation.
At a formal level, the Voronin regime has showed its intention to get closer
to Europe during all this period. In May 2008 they adopted an Agenda on the
priorities of the European integration and they also modified12 the competence of
the National Commission for European Integration. Vladimir Voronin wished to
give a political signal by leading personally this Commission which should supervise
the implementation of the European requests and the allocation of the resources.
Through his personal involvement and the exclusion from the Commission of the
Parliament speaker (Marian Lupu was already showing signs of rebellion within the
PCRM) and of the non-governmental organisations representatives, the general
impression was that Vladimir Voronin is strengthening the functioning of the
vertical of power in the field of European integration, as well.
12
Decree on the constitution of the National Commission for European Integration, no. 1663-IV from 16.05.2008,
The Official Journal no.91/345 from 23 June 2008
103
The preparation of the elections from April 2009. External

signals
The deterioration of the political situation in Chiinu and the lack of real progress
in the relation with Moldova made the European Union wait for the parliamentary
elections in April as a moment of possible redefinition of the relation with Moldova.
In October 2008, the GAERC Council of the EU (the reunion of the ministers of
foreign affairs) adopted a set of conclusions on the Republic of Moldova. Being
first a product of the efforts of the Bucharest diplomacy, these conclusions promise
a more profound13 relation between the EU and Moldova, also stressing Moldovas
need of reforms and of compliance with the democratic rules. The conclusions
explicitly connect the progress made by Moldova with the strengthening of the
relation while the development of the elections is seen as an essential condition:
The EU gives a special importance to the organisation of the parliamentary elections
in the spring of 2009 in a democratic manner. The fears related to the organization
of the elections were triggered by the legislative changes introduced by the PCRMPCDP duo which modified the election rules to its advantage, just like the previous
governs did.
The Election Code was adopted on November 21st 1997 and since then it suffered
various amendments which were not always in accordance with the applicable
international rules. The last amendments were made less than one year before the
parliamentary elections from April 5th this year and they were based on political
reasons rather than democratic and pluralist ones. The most important amendments
made by the PCRM-PCDP coalition in April 2008 were the increase of the electoral
threshold from 4 to 6% [(article 86, paragraph (2), point a)], the banning of electoral
alliances [(article 41, paragraph (2), point b)] and the restriction imposed to people
with dual citizenship to hold a position of deputy or any other public position [article
13, paragraph (2), point b1)]14. The increase of the electoral threshold was criticised
by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe who stated that this does not
ensure the representation of all citizens in the Parliament, the Republic of Moldova
being considered a single electoral constituency at a national level15.
The banning of electoral alliances seems to be a lesson learnt by PCRM after the
experience of the Democrat Moldova block which reunited several opposition
parties at the parliamentary elections from 2005, accumulating 28.53% of the votes.
Due to the decreased popularity of the communists, the creation of a new electoral
13
The exact wording is: The EU is prepared to develop a close relation with Moldova within the European
Neighbouring Policy and to negotiate a new ambitious agreement with Moldova. This new agreement will go
beyond the framework of the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
14 The Election Code of the Republic of Moldova become effective on 08.12.1997, http://www.cec.md/iComisiaCentrala/userimages/upload/codul.pdf
104
block for the elections from 2009 would have seriously jeopardized their chances to
get a detached victory. In this sense, the Venice Commission stated that the electoral
blocks serve the parties with few chances to get into the Parliament who, by creating
such a pre-election alliance could be represented in the legislature. Their banning
accompanied by the raising of the threshold would have led to an increased number
of lost ballots, i.e. votes for parties who do not pass the electoral threshold. The
Venice Commission also recommended going back to the 4% threshold16.
The bans set for people with dual citizenship are caused by the worsening of the
bilateral relations between the Republic of Moldova and Romania; the numerous
accusations made by Vladimir Voronin against their western neighbour are well
known. The new interdiction had a well established target since some of the
opposition parties leaders already have Romanian citizenship. In relation to this,
the Venice Commission noted that citizens rights cannot be limited due to their
multiple citizenships. Moreover, this restriction may constitute a violation of article
6 of the First Protocol of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and of
article 14 of the same Convention17. The politicians Dorin Chirtoac (The Liberal
Party) and Alexandru Tnase (LDPM) attacked this decision at the European Court
of Human Rights. The court examined the case as a matter of urgency, given the
close date of the elections. The courts decision was in favour of Alexandru Tnase
who was directly targeted by this new provision of the Electoral Code and if he were
elected deputy he would have had to give up his Romanian citizenship or his deputy
mandate. The court did not pronounce a judgment in favour of Dorin Chirtoac, as
well as he had expressed publicly his intention not to take the mandate of deputy as
he was already mayor of Chiinu18. Besides these amendments there were others,
as well related to the inmates right to vote, the casting of lots to establish the place
in the ballot, to the suspension of activity of the civil servants who take part in the
electoral campaign19.
Legal investigations were started against the leaders of the opposition, some
for cases who were ten years old (the case against the Liberal Democrat Party, Vlad
Filat) or for political decisions (the cases against Serafim Urechean, the leader of the
Our Moldova Alliance and against Dorin Chirtoac, the mayor of Chiinu). The
central government got involved in organising the electoral lists previously managed
by the town halls, but the process resulted in a number of electors with 400.000
higher than during the 2007 elections raising suspicions and fuelling accusations of
election fraud. All these measures contributed to the inflammation of the political
atmosphere and to the radicalization of the speeches on both sides.
In November 2008 the head of the Delegation of the European Commission in
Chiinu, the special EU Representative and a few ambassadors of the important
16
Joint Opinion on the Election Code of Moldova as of 10 April 2008, http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2008/

17 Ibidem
105
EU states made public a common statement expressing their concerns on the

organisation of the next elections, criticising the legislative changes related to
the political parties and the criminal investigation cases against the leaders of the
opposition. In December 2008, the European commissioner for external relations
Benita Ferrero-Waldner made a statement expressing her concern in relation to the
refusal of the Broadcasting Coordinating Council (the Moldovan equivalent of the
National Broadcasting Council) to extend the licence for the Pro-TV Chiinu station,
the only TV station which was critical towards the PCRM regime; the statement
underlined that freedom of speech is a fundamental principle, especially so close to
the elections. All these signals were ignored by the Moldovan government.
The elections from April 2009. The political forces

The year 2009 promised to be very important for the Republic of Moldova from
the perspective of the parliamentary elections. Unlike other electoral years, this
ballot became even more important because of the global economic crisis and its
repercussions on the Moldovan economy.
Moreover, on a political level these elections were catalogued by the specialised
European institutions, mainly the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe
(CoE) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as the
test proving the Republic of Moldovas commitment to the democratic rules and
values, decisive for the future of the relations with these institutions.
Internally, most of the population showed discontent with the countrys economic
condition (57%), with the governments activity in the most important domains
(over 70%) and with the lack of trust in the close future20. However, the important
persons who enjoyed the highest confidence among the population remained the
PCRM leaders: Vladimir Voronin (48%), Zinaida Greceani (43%) and Marian Lupu
(36%)21.
In the electoral race for the elections from April 5th entered 15 political parties
and 6 independent candidates22. Later, several electoral opponents withdrew from the
race to the benefit of other candidates with higher chances to enter the Parliament.
The campaign developed with many breaches of the legislation, among which: the
use of the administrative resources by the governing party, unequal access of the
electoral opponents to the public media means, limitation of the right to gather for
the development of the parties campaign actions and destruction of the electoral
posters etc.
20
The Data of the Public Opinion Barometer March 2009 made by the Public Policies Institute from Moldova,
http://ipp.md/barometru1.php?l=ro&id=35
Ibidem
OSCE 2009 parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova: interim report 2, http://www.osce.org/
21
22
106
As a consequence, PCRM was the party credited with the highest chances to get
a good score during the elections but also the most contested electoral opponent
due to the abusive use of the administrative resources, to its being favoured by the
public TV and radio stations and also to the intimidation measures taken against the
other electoral opponents.
The results of the elections showed a clear detached victory for the PCRM who
got most of the Parliament mandates. The 6% electoral threshold was passed by
other 3 political parties The Liberal Party, the Liberal Democrat Party of Moldova
(LDPM) and the Our Moldova Alliance (OMA)23:
Electoral opponents
Votes
The Social Democrat Party
Percentages Mandates
56,866
3.7
The Liberal Party
201,879
13.13
15
The Our Moldova Alliance
150,155
9.77
11
46,654
3.04
The Party of Communists from the Republic of

Moldova
760,551
49.48
60
The Liberal Democrat Party of Moldova
191,113
12.43
15
The Democrat Party of Moldova
45,698
2.97
The Centrist Union of Moldova
42,211
2.75
The European Action Social-political Movement
15,481
1.01
The United Moldova Spiritual Development Party
3,357
0.22
The Conservative Party
4,399
0.29
Sergiu Banari
8,759
0.57
tefan Urtu
2,803
0.18
667
0.04
The Peoples Christian Democrat Party
Victor Rilean
The Republican Party of Moldova
1,436
0.09
Tatiana mbalist
2,467
0.16
Alexandr Lomakin
2,591
0.17
Officially, there are 28 parties registered in the Republic of Moldova24. However,

most of them are simple minor election vehicles for leaders with small ambitions.
The Party of Communists from the Republic of Moldova dominates the political
stage and the tough anti-PCRM opposition is made up of the three big parties who
managed to exceed the electoral threshold in April 2009.
23
24
http://www.e-democracy.md/elections/parliamentary/2009/results/
http://www.justice.gov.md/index.php?cid=167
107
The Party of Communists from the Republic of Moldova

(PCRM)
The Party of Communists from the Republic of Moldova was set up in its current
form in 1993 by former members of the Communist Party of Moldova, banned by
law in 199125. Taking into account the short time passed from the disintegration
of the Soviet Union, the party still has many sympathisers especially among the
elderly population who is nostalgic for the Soviet past. Led by their leader Vladimir
Voronin, the revived PCRM mounted rapidly in the electoral preferences of the
population. The PCRMs greatest year was 2001 when after the early parliamentary
elections from February 25th the party won a detached victory and got 71 mandates
in the Parliament.
In essence, PCRM26 is a very little transparent party dominated by Vladimir
Voronin and its close circle which emanates a besieged fortress mentality. The
press bodies controlled by PCRM (most of the public and private TV stations)
constantly accuse the opposition of treason against the state interests. The party
is seen as a disciplined group and its communist title reflects the need to attract
the vote of the former USSR nostalgics (approximately 20% of the population)
rather than the real party program. In spite of its name, the PCRM was opened to
the controlled privatisation of economy, distributing the economic control mostly
inside the Voronin clan (according to the statements of the Moldovan press, the
Presidents son, Oleg Voronin, is by far the richest citizen of the Republic). There
are two active groups at the top of the PCRM the old guard of those nostalgic
for the times before the independence, mostly made up of dignitaries and former
communists and the young wolves who are rather interested in sharing the benefits
of power. This second group seems to be represented by Mark Tcaciuk, seen as the
partys brain and election strategist.
The 2009 parliamentary electoral campaign was approached by the PCRM from
the perspective of the same European rhetoric: European Moldova We Build it
Together!27 This program brought in front the achievements of the communist
government from the last eight years both in the social and in the economic sectors
and the efforts made to consolidate the state.
Although many social segments no longer believed in this rhetoric, the PCRM
could continue to bet on the elderly, the business environment close to the power,
the civil servants, the employees of the law enforcement agencies and so on. Besides,
the ambiguity caused in the foreign policy, i.e. the European integration and the
25
26
promotion of the integrationist potential of the Community of Independent States28

did not provide a real support neither from the EU nor from Russia. Moreover, the
conditioning of the foreign and domestic policy by the resolution of the Transnistrian
conflict turned the communist government and Voronin in hostages of Russias
politics and interests in the region. Despite all these programmatic shortcomings,
PCRM had the most important assets: the control over the states administrative
resources, the domination of the media and the control over the law enforcement
agencies as an instrument to intimidate any electoral opponent.
Paradoxically, the political radicalization and the striking root of the pro/anti
PCRM divide led to the consolidation of the opposition parties. Traditionally divided
and marked by personal conflicts, the opposition consolidated around three major
parties: The Liberal Democrat Party, the Liberal Party and the Our Moldova Alliance.
The Peoples Christian Democrat Party who had been the main anti-communist
group lost the electoral support following its collaboration with the PCRM after
2005 and it became politically irrelevant. Analyst Nicu Popescu notes that the
opposition from Moldova is more institutionally consolidated better prepared and
more popular compared to other countries from the post-Soviet space dominated
by state-parties like the PCRM29 and that at the same time it made important steps
in changing the leaders on top during compared to the 90s.
The Liberal Democrat Party of the Republic of Moldova

(LDPM)
The Liberal Democrat Party of the Republic of Moldova (LDPM) was created
at the end of 2007 and registered officially in January 2008. The party was set up
by Vlad Filat who left the Democrat Party of Moldova for which he had stood as
candidate at the local elections from 2007. LDPM is a centre-right group with a
modern European popular doctrine30. Benefiting from the funds put at their disposal
by their leader (Filat is also a businessman with investments in real estate and trading
both in Moldova and in Romania; he was accused that he had used his position as
head of the privatisations department to put the basis for his soon-to-be fortune),
with a dynamic team and a tough anti-communist message31, LDPM soon exceeded
the older parties on the political stage. Their campaign for the elections in April was
considered the most professional one. Although Filat is not a charismatic leader,
ever since the creation of the party he highlighted the institutional construction in
the territory; in many rural areas and small towns his party is the only real opponent
When there are no other sources indicated as such, the data concerning the Moldova parties are taken from
the website www.e-democracy.md (the official data and the election performances), from press materials and from
data collected by the authors of the report during their research visit to Chiinu in August 2009.
27 The Program of the Party of Communists from the Republic of Moldova European Moldova We Build It
Together! http://www.pcrm.md/main/index_md.php?action=program
28 The Program of the Party of Communists from the Republic of Moldova European Moldova We Build It
Together! http://www.pcrm.md/main/index_md.php?action=program
29 Nicu Popescu; Elections in Moldova. Again, European Council on Foreign Relations, 27 July 2009.
31 LDPM was the initiator of the campaign Moldova without Voronin Moldova without communists, Direct
vote for the election of the president, Freedom of circulation at the EU frontier.
108
109
of the PCRM. It was still the LDPM who initiated the institutionalised cooperation
with the other major opposition parties through a Council for Dialogue and
Cooperation.
Vlad Filat is criminally charged in two separate cases, one related to the assumed
smuggling of cigarettes and another one concerning the privatisation of the Rezina
cement factory; the assumed offences occurred in 1998 when he took the position
of head of the Privatisations Department in the alliance government led then
by prime-minister Ioan Sturza. At the same time, the government dispossessed a
company controlled by Filat of possession over the IPTEH real estate complex
from the centre of Chiinu. All previous attempts to cancel the privatisation ended
with failures in the courts of law and the reopening of the case before the elections
was interpreted as a measure of political intimidation and as a negative signal on the
stability of the countrys business environment32. An action against the government
was brought to the European Court of Human Rights related to this matter.
The Liberal Party (LP)

The Liberal Party is a successor of a group created in 1993, The Reform Party. Its
name was changed in 2005 when they adopted the current formula. The Party was a
minor player throughout the 90s, during the parliamentary elections from 1998 and
2001 when it collected less than 1% of the votes. The Liberal Party is a right wing
political group who declares that the only way to surpass the social political crisis
and to get Moldova closer to the integration into the European Union and NATO
is to promote the liberal values33.
Its first major success was registered in 2007 when Dorin Chirtoac won the
chair of mayor of Chiinu. This victory was won in front of a PCRM candidate,
party who has always lost the elections for the countrys capital. Chirtoac is a
young leader with a modern appearance, educated in Romania, charismatic and with
a significant electoral appeal among the young generation and the pro-Romanian
oriented population. Dorin Chirtoac is the nephew of the president of the Liberal
Party, Mihai Ghimpu. Although Ghimpu runs the party with a very strong hand,
Chirtoac is actually the electoral engine. The Liberal Party is in a rather opposite
situation to that of the LDPM. If LDPM has no charismatic leader but does have
a solid organisational structure, the Liberal Party counts on the image of Chirtoac
(actor in the partys election clips), but it does not have a solid structure in the
territory, being supported mostly by the enthusiasm of its young electors who are
generally located in Chiinu.
32 EUROMONITOR, nr. 3 (12), 3rd edition, Implementation of reforms initiated accordingly to the EU-Moldova
Action Plan, Assessment of progress made in July-September 2008; ADEPT and EXPERT-GRUP
33 Ibidem
110
Just like the other leaders of the opposition, Chirtoac also has a criminal case
initiated on his name; the case deals with accusations of having exceeded his job
duties. After having been elected mayor, he accused numerous financial pressures
and attempts made by the central government to put financial constraints on the
municipality. The heat distribution company, controlled by the government, changed
the method of calculating the rates and increased the prices in the city; this was seen
as a measure of punishment of the Chiinu voters for their choice in the elections.
Our Moldova Alliance (OMA)

The Our Moldova Alliance Party had a long path of set-up, fusions and
restructuring. In its current form, the party was set up in 2005 when Serafim
Urechean, the former mayor of Chiinu became its leader34. OMA adopted the
social-liberal doctrine, placing itself towards centre-right on the electoral axis.
In the parliamentary elections from 2005, OMA was at the basis of the electoral
block Democrat Moldova Block which came second after the PCRM. However,
after elections some components of the block left the group and voted for the
candidacy of Vladimir Voronin in the position of President. Following this episode,
OMA led by Serafim Urechean declared that they will not commit treason and
they will continue to fight against PCRM. Thus, OMA clearly placed itself in the
anti-communist camp.
Serafim Urechean had two mandates of mayor of Chiinu. Prior to this years
elections he was accused of having falsified official documents while acting as
mayor part of the series of criminal trials brought against the opposition leaders.
OMA enjoys a well developed territorial structure but its complicated history led to
successive accumulations of executives and activists, some with divergent interests
and personal conflicts and this seems to have marked its efficiency. It is obvious
that although initially OMA wished to be a great alliance bringing together all the
anti-communist forces, it lost initiative to the benefit of the younger and more
dynamic parties LP and especially LDPM. Although it behaved as a loyal partner
of the two parties during the crisis from 2009, the slow decline of OMA seems
to signify more likely the slow decline of the Moldovenist current which founded
the state, a platform which is centrist and conservative in its essence. The 2009
political radicalization, the clear pro-western preferences of the younger parties and
the vehement anti-PCRM orientation of the young urban electorate seem to have
been unfavourable to the OMA.
34
111
The Democrat Party of Moldova (DPM)

DPM originates in the movement For a Democratic and Thriving Moldova,
which appeared in 1997 to provide political support to President Petru Lucinschi
elected in 1996 as head of state. The group participated in the coalition government
from 1997 1999 and in 2000 it took its current name; its leader has been Dumitru
Diacov, ever since its creation. At the 2005 elections it participated on a common list
together with other anti-communist groups (among which the OMA) and sent eight
members of parliament of their own to the legislature. The party is a member in the
Socialist International with the right to cast a consultative vote; externally, it is seen
as the acceptable left-wing alternative to the PCRM. Vlad Filat, vice-president of
the DPM withdraws in 2007 to set the basis of the LDPM, followed by a series of
activists and local councillors. At the elections from April 2009 DPM did not pass the
electoral threshold as it only received 2.9% of the votes. In consequence, the party
was a minor player in the political crisis which followed after the elections. However,
the fact of bringing Marian Lupu, former PCRM president of the Parliament to
their party triggered a spectacular comeback.
Marian Lupu was noticed by PCRM while he was in the position of Head of
section in the Ministry or Economy and Reforms. In this capacity, he led the accession
negotiations of the Republic of Moldova to the World Trade Organisation in 2001.
As recognition of his merits, he was promoted vice-minister of the Economy and
later Minister of Economy in 200335. Marian Lupus political career gained even
larger horizons when PCRM proposed him as candidate for the position of speaker
of Parliament. Thus, PCRM was the party who constantly fuelled Marian Lupus
political ambitions; in his turn, the latter followed the partys and Vladimir Voronins
policy with loyalty at first. However, there were a couple of occasions when Lupu
allowed himself to disagree with Vladimir Voronin, showing different visions from
those of the PCRMs old guard. Being a technocrat and in no way a convinced
communist, Lupu was part of the PCRMs reformist wing who was militating for
the internal rearrangement of the party on the basis of new principles in order to
improve its image and credibility in the relation with the western partners.
Lupu followed Voronin even during the events from April 7th 8th when he
was among the first to declare that there was an attempted coup dtat36. Aware of
the fact that he must be into Voronins good graces to be nominated as President
of the state, Lupu continued to play the formers game. But the partys decision to
nominate Zinaida Greceani to the supreme position into the state proved that Lupu
did not have the total confidence of the partys leaders. According to some, Marian
Lupu was not obedient enough; he was smart, he had gone to university in Russia
35
36
Mark Tkaciuc is Vladimir Voronins councillor for issues of internal politics and the head of PCRMs election
staff. He is also considered the partys brain.
112
and in the west, he was rather ambitious and difficult to control by the VoroninTkaciuc duo37.
Finally, Lupu left the PCRM after a press conference in which he explained why
he was leaving the party38. His real role still remains uncertain, as Voronin avoided
any tough critics against him after he left and the opposition treated his gesture with
reserve. After many speculations, only one week after leaving PCRM, Marian Lupu
became the new leader of the Democrat Party of Moldova (DPM)39. Lupu came
with an entire team and he imposed his own agenda within the party. In consequence,
the helm of the DPM was firmly taken over by Lupu and the group acronym was
added the words M.LUPU. It was obvious that in order to reach to Parliament,
Marian Lupus image and degree of confidence among the population will be their
main weapons during the elections.
The violence from April

The elections from April 5th produced mixed results. LDPM, LP and OMA
consolidated their parliamentary presence while PCRM got almost half of the votes;
however, this was insufficient to elect the President of the republic. The announcing
of the results caused frustration among the electorate of the opposing parties, as
the pre-election polls had given communists scores varying from 35 to 40%. The
difference up to the official score announced was claimed to be a consequence of
the election frauds. The political frustration moved into the streets. Even from the
evening of April 6th a couple of thousands of demonstrators, most of them very
young, gathered in the two squares from the centre of Chiinu The Great National
Assembly square in front of the government building and the square between the
Presidency and the Parliament buildings, a couple hundreds meters away. The
authorities were caught completely off guard and subsequent investigations showed
that the events were not organised but they had started from a spontaneous flash
mob at the statue of Stephen the Great (located between the two squares). On the
night of April 6th the Parliament building was defended only by a few policemen
in street uniforms and the mob could have easily entered the premises. One of the
authors of this chapter of the report assisted that evening at the successful attempt
of Vlad Filat to calm the masses who were about to assault the Parliament. The
opposition leaders did not organise the demonstrations but they were not able to
control them, either. The second day, on April 7th, the demonstrators whose number
had increased significantly divided themselves into two separate groups. In the Great
37
Mark Tkaciuc is Vladimir Voronins councillor for issues of internal politics and the head of PCRMs election
staff. He is also considered the partys brain.
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4316512,00.html
38
39
113
National Assembly Square they organised a peaceful demonstration with political

requirements (to repeat the elections, to investigate the assumed frauds). In parallel,
a couple of hundred meters away, the atmosphere degenerated. In the morning, the
demonstrators devastated the first floors of the Presidency building then during the
day they assaulted the Parliament building. The general impression of those present
was that there were organised groups who devastated the buildings under the eyes
of several thousands passive watchers. The police forces brought to the place of
the incidents were generally passive and under permanent retreat from the violent
demonstrators. The peaceful gathering from the Great National Assembly Square,
more numerous and politically organised by the opposition was completely ignored
in the accounts of the events which focussed on the more spectacular actions from
the other square. The impression of those who were not there was only one violent
demonstration and this is far from true. The events which took place in Chiinu
on April 7th are a case study on how small violent groups may hijack a legitimate
political demonstration.
Throughout the day, the leaders of the opposition called for calmness and asked
people to join the peaceful demonstration in the Great National Assembly Square.
The Voronin regime immediately took advantage of the riots and declared that the
opposition is trying to cause a coup dtat organised from Romania. The Romanian
ambassador was expelled, the few Romanian journalists present were sent over the
border, the government announced that they would introduce the visa obligation for
the Romanian citizens who wish to travel to Moldova (the measure is still effective
on the date when this report is being compiled). The accusations against Romania
were never demonstrated; the only indication offered by the Moldovan government
was the Romanian flags carried by some demonstrators. The argument is bizarre
as many other demonstrators were carrying the flags of the European Union and
based on the same logic, the EU should also be accomplice to the attempted coup
dtat. Further more, the red-yellow-blue tricolour is the common flag of the two
countries and it is rather a sign of the Romanian nationality than an official sign of
the Romanian state (the Romanian flag has no coat of arms and the Moldovan flag
has exactly the same colours with the coat of arms in the middle a great number of
the participants having this kind of flags). Besides, the Romanian tricolour flag may
easily be bought from any stationery shop in Chiinu just like the EU and Russian
flags. In July 2009 the General Prosecutor of the Republic of Moldova declared that
Romania as a state was not involved in the protests from April 7th40. This is the
only official denial at a non-political level of the serious accusations brought against
Romania at that moment. On the night between the April 7th and 8th the police
forces started the repressive measures; without any clear objective, they randomly
arrested hundreds of people who were still on the streets. Two people died while
40
ROMNIA NU A FOST IMPLICAT N PROTESTELE DIN 7 APRILIE, CA STAT - PROCURORUL

GENERAL AL REPUBLICII MOLDOVA, HOTNEWS, 22 JULY 2009.
114
in custody with traces of violence of their bodies. On the April 8th the authorities
were in firm control of the situation and a large number of police officers wearing
civilian clothes surrounded the buildings attacked the day before.
The reaction of the EU, Moldova is back on the agenda

The representatives of the European Union in Chiinu were also surprised by the
events and their reaction was late. The special representative of the EU for Moldova,
Kalman Miszei, focused his activity on solving the conflict with Transnistria and
tended to ignore Moldovas internal issues, thus rousing the revolt of the opposition
parties. Immediately after the violence stopped, the authorities organised a tour of
the destroyed buildings for the diplomats of the Western states; the results were
contrary to the ones expected. The European Parliament elections monitoring
mission led by the Estonian member of the European Parliament Marianne
Mikko met both parties immediately after the riots but she also caused indignation
among the opposition through her critical attitude towards them. Desperate for
understanding, the leaders of the opposition put her in front of a done deal by
organising without any prior notice, in the building of the Chiinu town-hall, a
meeting between the head of the delegation and a couple of dozens of injured
people and relatives of the ones arrested by the police. Although she accused the
leaders of the opposition of having organised a political show, Mikko seemed to
change her attitude after this meeting; the final report of the European Parliament
condemned the disproportionate reaction of the police forces. The way in which
Mikko placed herself in relation to the elections and the following events raised
critics from her MEP colleagues both Romanian members of the EP and others
interested in Moldova, like for instance Emma Nicholson, the British member of
the European Parliament who was also a member of the delegation. Confronted
with the wave of arrests, Brussels attitude towards the Moldovan government
gradually grew tougher. The EP resumed critics towards the OSCE whose mission
to monitor the elections noticed, as usual, that the ballot was generally correct but
faced organisational problems. This increased the dissatisfaction of some European
members of parliament on the collaboration with the OSCE in several countries
such as Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan where the European Parliament considered
that the OSCE standards were too permissive41. On May 8th, the EP adopted a
resolution concerning the situation in Moldova which:
1. Firmly condemns the harassment campaign, serious violations of
the human rights and other illegal actions committed by the Moldovan
government after the parliamentary elections.
2. Demands the investigation of the deaths occurred during the events
41
Blog of analyst Nicu Popescu, 17 July 2009, Moldova versus The European Parliament.
115
and of the cases of ill treatment and rapes committed against those held by
the police.
3. Finds that the accusations that an EU Member State42 was involved in
the events seem groundless and were not discussed nor resumed during the
meetings of the EP delegation with the Chiinu officials.
4. It is believed that it is unacceptable that all acts of protest be classified
as offences and part of an anti-constitutional plot, although the acts of
vandalism must be condemned.
5. it is considered that in order to preserve its credibility in front of the
Moldovan citizens, the EU should get more pro-actively and more profoundly
involved in the management of the situation and therefore asks the EU
Council to consider sending a special mission to Moldova; the mission would
deal with the observance of the law and assist with the reform of the lawenforcement authorities, especially the police and the public office43.
For anyone used to the diplomatic language of the EP resolutions, this document
is a serious condemnation of the authorities for their reaction. As an answer to
the requests made by the European Parliament and to the reports of its own
delegation in Chiinu, the European Commission immediately suggested a package
of emergency measures amounting to 4 million euro. The so-called Democracy
support package contains a series of actions aimed at supporting the reform of the
police forces, the freedom of speech, the political reconciliation and the restoration
of the rule of law. This package is yet to be implemented by the Commissions
Delegation in Moldova. In June, the EU ministers of external affairs reunited in
the GAERC Council released a series of conclusions concerning Moldova, which
show: The Council expresses its serious concerns for the violation of the human
rights occurred after the April 5th following the parliamentary elections from the
Republic of Moldova. We call for a transparent, impartial and efficient investigation
of the violation of the human rights and of the events from the April 7th through
a trial which should include the opposition and international experts. The Council
underlines that the use of violence for political purposes is not acceptable. The
Council is also concerned with the deterioration of the freedom of speech and of
the media and advises the Republic of Moldova to ensure the equal access of all
political parties to the public information means, to ensure a transparent distribution
of the media licences and to refrain itself from making use of the administrative
pressure against the independent mass-media, the civil society organisations and the
political parties. At the same time, the Council empowered the Commission to start
the negotiation of a new agreement with Moldova as soon as the circumstances
42
43
Obvious reference to Romania

Indirectly, the EP recognises the failure of the former EU missions in this matter.
116
will allow it. The next paragraph indirectly refers to the relation between Moldova
and Romania: In this context and for the purpose of starting the negotiations, the
Council appeals to the Republic of Moldova to show an equal attitude towards all
EU citizens in its visa policy and also underlines the importance of the principle
of good neighbourliness relations. The European officials interviewed for this
report expressed their unanimous opinion that on a practical level the beginning
of the negotiations for a new agreement is conditioned by the cancellation of the
visas for the Romanian citizens, this being the current interpretation given by the
Commission to its abovementioned conclusions.
It is not very clear what the purpose of the Chiinu government was by
imposing visas for the Romanians, but it is obvious that it had contrary effects at
European level. At least in this matter, Romania was supported by the rest of the EU
countries and the fact that the beginning of the negotiations for a new agreement
is conditioned by the solving of a bilateral disagreement between Bucharest and
Chiinu is an unprecedented proof in this direction. We will cancel the visas for
the Romanians when Europe gives us free access said44 Voronin, statement which
raised condescending smiles in Brussels. The in-field effects of the new policy
were seen immediately as the number of persons and vehicles having crossed the
common border were, after the imposition of the visas, half of that from the same
period of the last year45. Since 2008, Romania exceeded Russia as the most important
commercial partner of Moldova and Moldova is in a state of severe recession (The
IMF forecasted an economic downfall of 9% for 2009). Thus, the visa policy seems
to be suicidal, going against the commercial flows. However, this is not the only
bizarre measure of the Chiinu regime within the new economic context. The same
Vladimir Voronin made some somehow obscene statements concerning the IMF46,
an institution which Moldova will need if it wants to be able to cover this autumns
social payments.
The political deadlock, the repetition of the elections.

Explanations
The events which followed after the elections from the April 5th radicalised
even further the political forces. PCRM needed one vote in Parliament to elect
the President, which became known as the golden vote. The PCRM candidate
for the position of head of state became the Prime Minister Zinaida Greceani;
44
Presa rus: Declaraiile lui Voronin pun la ndoial nu numai nivelul lui de cultur, dar i starea lui psihic,
HotNews.ro, 24 June 2009
The exact figures are shown in the article Regimul vizelor a njumtit tranzitul prin vmile de la Prut, Romania
libera, 27 July 2009
46 Voronin enun obsceniti despre opoziie i FMI, Jurnal de Chiinu, 24 June 2009
45
117
Vladimir Voronin would have become President of the Parliament, case in which
the real power centre would have migrated towards this function, given the control
Voronin exercises over the party. The three opposition parties which entered the
Parliament boycotted the two ballots and the PCRM failed in the election of a
new President. This was a period of intense speculations and tensions in Chiinu
and very many observers waited for PCRM to find the golden vote by bribing
or blackmailing deputies from the opposition. This did not happen and the most
common explanations in Chiinu are the following:
The harassment launched by the PCRM against the politicians from the
oppositions before the elections including through a series of criminal cases
established a logic of besieged fortress and personalised attack among the
opposition. Thus, the politicians from the opposition perceived an extension
of the PCRM regime as a danger to their personal safety;
the series of accusations following the April 7th (treason, conspiracy
against the rule of law against the opposition versus the orchestration of
the riots and repression against the PCRM) rendered any political dialogue
between the two camps impossible and the politicians from both camps
became the hostages of their own harsh rhetoric;
Previously PCDP functioned as a factor inhibiting any attempt of
collaboration. PCDP led by Iurie Roca has been for many years one of the
flagship parties of the right wing forces in Chiinu, but their co-optation to
governing after 2005 led to the loss of peoples support and to their not being
elected in the new Parliament.
To prevent any individual desertion of the members of Parliament during the
secret vote, the leaders of the three parties agreed that their deputies should not
participate at the voting meetings at all; thus, any possible traitor going to the
Parliament was easily identifiable. As it was impossible to declare a new President,
the early elections procedure was launched, according to the Constitution. This
procedure in itself was a success for the opposition, as the main request of the
peaceful demonstrators from the April 6th and 7th was to repeat the elections.
The new electoral campaign. Other elections
electorate, is on holiday. Thirdly, students most of whom are studying in Chiinu

and who were on holiday on July 29th were forbidden to vote at the address of their
permanent residence. The Central Electoral Commission motivated this decision by
saying that students have temporary residence visas in the places where they study
and it is there that they should exercise their right to vote. In their turn, Moldovans
who were abroad could not vote on a working day as most of them could not travel
to embassies or consulates. The requests of the opposition to organise the election
in autumn were ignored as PCRM was aware that the non-communist electorate
would be much more numerous in September.
At the reunion of the Parliament from June 15th, the Electoral Code was modified
again and the electoral threshold lowered from 6 to 5% while the compulsory
attendance for the validation of the ballot was lowered from 50%+1 vote to one
third of the electors. Understanding that the high electoral threshold had the reverse
effect of excluding any small party with which they could ally, PCRM hoped that
more parties would enter the Parliament and the chances to create alliances would
increase.
As a consequence, a proper reply to the initiatives of the communists imposed
the existence of a form of coalition of the other important political actors. The
unification of the liberal oriented parties was attempted before the elections from
April 5th but without great success as each party came with its own vision. The
minimalist scenario circulated by most was for at least LP, LDPM and OMA to
enter the elections on a common list; this would have increased the chances for
a good score. But the three parties chose to candidate on separate lists to be able
to nominate three members in the electoral commissions so as to discourage any
attempted fraud.
The electoral campaign went on with the same violations signalled during the
ballot from April use of the administrative resources by the PCRM, intimidation
of the electoral opponents by the police forces, infiltration of agitators at the
meetings between the opposition and their electors, devastation of the electoral
boards, favouring the PCRM leaders in the news bulletins of the local radio and TV
stations etc. The essence of the campaign was not given by the competition between
the parties programs but the guilt for the events from April 7th and 8th.
On June 15th, Vladimir Voronin signed the decree dissolving the Parliament and
setting the early elections for July 29th; this raised a lot of controversy. One of the
reasons was choosing a Wednesday for the elections, while all the other ballots held
in the Republic of Moldova took place on Sundays. Secondly, PRCM hurried to set
the elections in summer, when most of the active population, i.e. the non-communist
PCRM was the one who inflamed the spirits and gave the tone with the
documentary Attack on Moldova made by a TV station affiliated to the power; in
this documentary, the leaders of the opposition are shown as the main responsible
for the protests and the devastation of the Parliament and of the Presidency building.
Soon came the replies to this through the consecutive releases of the documentaries
In Moldovas defence made by OMA, The Truth about the 7th of April, made
118
119
by LP and Moldovas Black Box made by LDPM. During the debates broadcasted
by the public TV station Moldova 1, the opposition leaders were trying to prove
the involvement of the police forces who were acting at the orders of the PCRM
in those events. Lost in the rhetoric of the April 7th, the parties forgot to offer the
solutions awaited by the citizens from the next government.
In this fight between the power and the opposition, DPM and Marian Lupu
took a balanced position and accused both parties of having provoked the political
crisis, inventing the slogan The political war must be stopped. DPM focused its
campaign on criticizing the way in which the country had been governed during
the last eight years, on the need to de-monopolize power and to rebuild the balance
between the state powers.
In this campaign, as well, PCRM bet on the external support, especially from
Moscow. Vladimir Voronin made a visit in Russia and announced that he contracted
a 500 million USD loan to face the economic crisis. However, few people in Chiinu
were impressed, especially since the interest and the terms of the loan were not clear
and Voronin let people understand that the money from Moscow would depend on
PCRMs victory.
All in all, the campaign for the early elections from July 29th was the toughest,
dirtiest campaign in the history of Moldova. It often lacked a civilised discourse,
while the incriminatory discourse was abundant, many times without any concrete
evidence or arguments; dirty electoral techniques were used and the competent
authorities punished the opposition more than the PCRM.
There were also problems with the accreditation of international observers, like
the ENEMO organisation, whose observers were arrested and then sent home47.
Nevertheless, the national observers and the International Elections Observation
Mission (IEOM) could monitor the electoral process.
The last two weeks of the campaign proved to be decisive so that the exit poll
made after the end of the elections provided figures which were very close to
the official ones48. However, the communists seemed confident; according to the
statement of the PCRM leaders, they had known the results of the exit poll one day
before and the poll is usually 5-7% wrong compared to the score registered by the
PCRM after the official counting49.
The official results brought small variations from those of the exit polls, but not
significant enough to generate speculations about a new electoral fraud50. 51
47
48
Exit Poll July 2009, made by the Public Policies Institute from Moldova http://ipp.md/files/Barometru/Exit_
Poll_29.07_ora_21_final.pdf
49 http://stireazilei.md/2009-7-29-1071
50 http://www.alegeri.md/
51 Red figures show the reduction of the number of voters compared to the April elections; the green figures show
an increase of the number of voters and respectively percents and mandates.
120
Votes 51
Electoral opponents
Percentes Mandates
The Party of Communists from the Republic

of Moldova
706,732
-53,819 (7,08%)
44.69
-4,79
48
-12
Peoples Christian Democrat Party
30,236
-16,418 (35,19%)
1,91
-1,13
0
0
The Our Moldova Alliance
116,194
-33.961 (22,62%)
7,35
-2,42%
7
-4
The Liberal Party
232,108
+30,299 (14,97%)
14.68
+1,55%
15
0
The Liberal Democrat Party of Moldova
262,028
+70,915 (37,11%)
16.57
+4,14
18
+3
198,268
+152,570 (333,87%)
12,54
+9,57
13
+13
29,434
-27,432 (48,24%)
1,86
-1,84
0
0
6,517
0,41
The Democrat Party of Moldova

The Social Democrat Party
The Green Alliance Ecologist Party of
Moldova
In its report from July 30th, IEOM stated: The early parliamentary elections
from July 29th 2009 from Moldova were generally correctly administered, allowing
for the competition of the political parties who represent a multitude of opinions.
Many engagements of the OSCE and of the Council of Europe were fulfilled;
nevertheless, the campaign environment was negatively affected by subtle
intimidations and preferential treatment in the reflection in the mass media. The
electoral process underlined the need to continue the democratic reforms needed
to re-establish the public confidence52. Like always, IEOM avoided a clear cut
diagnostic, maintaining the same detached diplomatic discourse which entails no
commitment. The multiple questions concerning the correctness of the elections
addressed to the IEOM representatives during the press conference remained
unanswered. As the journalists insisted to find out whether the elections were free
and fair, the conference moderator simply ended the press conference53.
On the contrary, the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections The 2009
Coalition made up of seven Moldovan NGOs declared that the elections were
incorrect and only partially free. The reasons invoked were: the intimidation of
the electoral opponent, multiple cases of discriminatory treatment, the use of the
administrative resources, the offering of electoral presents, the massive manipulation
of the public opinion, the incorrect compilation of the electoral lists, cases of
fraudulent voting etc.54
52
Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions for the 29 July 2009 early parliamentary elections in Moldova
The IEOM press confernce organised on 30 July, 2.00 p.m. in the LeoGrand Hotel from Chiinu.
http://alegeliber.md/index.php/ro/declaratii-comunicate/110-alegeriincorecte
53
54
121
The problem of the electoral lists also occurred on July 29th as most of the voting
sections used the same lists as on April 5th. A study carried out by the Human Rights
Institute in Moldova recommended the strengthening of the electoral legislative
framework, the need to train the local public authorities in relation to the compilation
of the electoral lists and the coordination of this process by CEC, the setting up of
a mechanism through which the population and the political parties should be able
to check the lists and the completion of the electronic electors register55.
The new political alliance the perspectives

The results of the July ballot led to a political deadlock completely different
from the one caused after the elections in April. Then, the PCRM had a simple
parliamentary majority which would have allowed them to govern, but they could
not elect the President of the country. After July, the opposition together with the
DPM are in exactly the same situation: they have a simple majority 53 mandates
but they cannot elect a President without 8 votes from the PCRM. But the initiative
was not on the oppositions side and now they are looking for traitors among the
communists. Of the four parties, so far only LDPM and DPM are amiably disputing
their supremacy, each with its own arguments: LDPM because they got the largest
number of votes, DPM because it is in a better position to attract votes from the
PCRM.
The scenarios circulated by Chiinu are numerous, ranging from changing
the Constitution to choose the head of state directly (although it takes an even
larger parliamentary majority to change the Constitution and the approval of the
Constitutional Court, dominated by the people appointed by Voronin) to offering
concrete advantages in positions and economic advantages to the young, pragmatic
wing of PCRM. In its turn, the PCRM experiences two currents of opinion: one
wishing to remain in power at any cost and another one betting on the fact that a
coalition without the PCRM would be divided and destroyed on an electoral level by
the economic crisis and PCRM will have a triumphal return after the early elections
(repeating the scenario from 2001, when they won a massive victory because of
the self-inflicted failure of the right wing coalition). For now, the LDPM, DPM,
LP and OMA leaders announced the creation of a political coalition called at the
proposal of the LP leader Mihai Ghimpu, The Alliance for European Integration
(AEI). Through its constitutive program, the alliance wishes to re-establish the rule
55
The report of the Human Rights Institute of Moldova Raport

ntocmirii
i
verificrii
listelor
electorale
n
33
localiti
din
http://idom.md/files/admin/Raport_final_%20Liste_Electorale.pdf
122
privind monitorizarea
Republica
Moldova
of law and the reform of the state, to surpass the economic crisis, to achieve local
autonomy, to resume negotiations for solving the Transnistrian conflict, to achieve
the European integration (by signing a new agreement with the EU, re-establishing
amicable relations with Romania, eliminating the visas for the Romanians, signing
the agreement on the small border traffic with Romania).
The leaders of the four parties were rather reserved in their statements and
little information was made public on the negotiation of the functions. It seems
that the most wanted position is that of President of Parliament, which ensures
a good public visibility and stability (the President may be removed from office
with only three fifths of the deputies votes). Paradoxically, the position of head
of government is less wanted maybe also because the expectations related to the
economic crisis are pessimistic. Besides, the negotiations among the four parties
were stimulated by a meeting held with the representatives of the World Bank and
with the special EU representative to Chiinu where they were shown the economic
situation of the country.
According to optimistic assessments, there are enough funds to pay the pensions,
the social benefits and the state employees only until September October and
Moldova desperately needs an emergency external loan. The IMF, together with the
World Bank and the European Commission has prepared an emergency package
ranging around the amount of 1 billion euro. According to the statements of a
European official interviewed for this report we are prepared to help them and an
intervention will be necessary regardless of who makes up the government, anybody
will need this help, but we would rather like it to be the opposition. In Chiinu,
few people apart from Voronins fanatic supporters in the press believe that the
promise of a 500 million USD Russian loan circulated by Voronin in the electoral
campaign is realistic. Besides, from the little concrete information that has come
out, the discussion was about 150 million USD in money while the rest consisted in
material aid and energetic resources, of little use in the context of the budget crisis.
The scenarios are not too optimistic either even if AEI could gather the votes
needed to elect a President and set up the government. The analysts discussing the
subject oscillate between pessimism with catastrophic emphases56 and pessimism
with some hope attached to it57. Moldova does not have a positive tradition of
coalition governments. 10 years ago, The Alliance for Democracy and Reform
brought together different forces who wished to sop the PCRM. ADR registered
some successes in reforming the economy but it was sabotaged by the disagreements
among the partners. Anyway, the priority of any non-PCRM government should
56 Florin Ni, Alegeri n Republica Moldova: Patru scenarii pesimiste i cum pot fi ele evitate, The Romanian
Centre for European Policies, August 2009
57 Nicu Popescu, Demonopolizarea puterii n Moldova, Times, 10 August 2009
123
be to destroy the PCRM monopole of power58 by reforming the administration

and the states force structures, liberalising the press, diversifying the media holders
and reforming the justice. In the moderate pessimistic version, an AEI government
should make irreversible progresses in these sectors before loosing power.
Moldovas Relations with the European

Union and the Role Played by Romania
Cristian Ghinea
Sergiu Panainte
The European integration perspectives
58
In the already quoted article, Nicu Popescu proposes a few welcomed priorities.
124
The riots from April and the general political crisis of this year brought Moldovas
problems back on the European Unions agenda. Brussels was taken by surprise by
the events from April in a country considered lost somewhere between superficial
Europeanization and post-Soviet authoritarianism. Although in Chiinu the
European integration is a topic for debate and a reason of hope, Brussels tends to
see Moldova only as a piece in a big game of chess which is the EU Russia relation.
As a European official interviewed for this report was saying, we want Moldova to
get closer to the EU, but without upsetting Russias suspicions. On the mental map
of the people from Brussels, Moldova is in Moscows area of interest. This must not
lead to a resignation with geostrategic significance based on the principle we are
too little and trapped in the big players game. In fact, it is up to Moldova to follow
its European destiny; sustained internal reforms and the political will may change
the perception of the Europeans as it happened with the Baltic States and other
areas from the former communist Europe in the past.
The EU is not a coherent actor in Chiinu, yet. In Moldova there is both
a Delegation of the European Commission and a special EU representative,
subordinated to the High Representative for External Affairs (Javier Solana) and to
the EU Council secretariat. The Commission Delegation is the one who manages
the EU programs and funds in Moldova and the good side of the Commissions
bureaucracy is that it tends to work with the already established projects no matter
the geostrategic fluctuations. The Italian Cesare de Montis was head of the delegation
in the last years and he preferred a less active public role. In exchange, the face
of the EU in Chiinu was the special representative Kalman Miszei. Although he
has no control over the European programs there but rather a symbolic position
of representation, the special representative became, in the public symbolism, the
Unions spokesman in Chiinu. However, this duality and the mistakes made by
Miszei started showing negative results. For Solana and therefore for Miszei, the
Transnistrian conflict has been the priority during all these years. It seems that they
125
considered this conflict to be the easiest to be solved of all conflicts marking the
relation with Russia and they wanted to turn Transnistria into an example. For this,
they needed a stable government in Chiinu. Putting Transnistria and Chiinu
stability before anything else, Miszei made the mistake of alienating the opposition.
He is accused of having constantly ignored the negative signals of Voronins
authoritarianism and having behaved as if he were convinced that one cannot
govern without the PCRM. During our research visit in Chiinu we were amazed
by the lack of trust and by the frustration manifested by the opposition and by the
anti-Voronin journalists and activists against Kalman Miszei. He was the loyal man
of the PCRM, We see him as a character defending Russias interest here just
a couple of the characterisations related to him expressed during the interviews
from Chiinu. Another accusation is that after the political deadlock from April he
tried to convince the opposition parties to give the PCRM the golden vote which
would have led to the election of a new President from among the communists,
therefore ensuring stability. Although this is officially denied, it is obvious that the
EU representative got too involved in a moment when the PCRM had the political
initiative and that he said different things to different interlocutors. Besides, this is
also the impression of the Commission staff (with which his office has a relation
of amicable competition and a difficult communication) both from Chiinu and
from Brussels.
Other analysis also criticised his reaction after the riots from April59 when he is
said to have tried to temper the critics of the EU countries ambassadors against
the regime. The EU Representation in Chiinu is showing a deficit in very sensitive
moments. The new head of the Commission Delegation will take office only in
November. Kalman Miszei is a rather controversial figure and this when the political
crisis is not over and the economic shock is yet to come.
The current priority is the negotiation of an agreement between the EU and
Moldova. As already shown, the cancellation of the visas imposed to Romanians is
now a prerequisite for starting the negotiations so any government formed will have
to take this step. At this point the new agreement is expected to:
1. Increase the financial assistance of the EU for Moldova,
2. Contain a series of concrete conditions related to implementation,
3. Offer Moldova a European integration perspective in the logic of the newly
launched Eastern Partnership by undertaking the necessary reforms. We shall analyse
in detail each of the three points.
As far as financial assistance is concerned, the EU is by far Moldovas most
important external donor. The annual amounts given by the EU exceed 50 million
euro in different bilateral and regional programs. Besides this, Moldova is a receiver
59
Balazs Jarabik, Moldova between Elections: Europe or Isolation?, FRIDE Policy Brief No. 16, July 2009
126
of development assistance from the Member States, the most active being Sweden,
the United Kingdom, Denmark (for now, Romania is a minor donor of development
funds to Moldova, with amounts of 800.000 euros per year). In total, we estimate
that the European money going to Moldova (EU + Member States) reach the
figure of about 90 million annually. And this amount will grow significantly in the
future. The estimations made by the European officials show that the direct funds
allocated by the Union will increase substantially, getting close to 72 75 million
Euros annually from 2009 (this does not include the money allocated by the Member
States, which are very likely to increase following this years problems). From 2008,
the EU started to make direct budgetary allocations which differentiate it from the
other international donors. It is not a little thing to receive money from abroad
directly into your budget not as a loan, but as a donation, especially for a poor state
like Moldova. For now, the EUs budget payments were destined to social aids and
investments for the installation of running water in villages. From 2009, a macrostabilisation financial aid will be added and the European Commission will be an
active player in any emergency financial package of the IMF and of the World
Bank. Even though it does not have a solid political profile and it always seems
to be the weaker partner in the geostrategic game with Russia, the EU remains an
essential donor for Moldova. Comparing the money that the EU is already paying
Moldova for concrete projects and under clear terms with the illusory Russian loan
promised to Vladimir Voronin in the electoral campaign, without clear amounts and
terms, one can see the difference in size between a functional system like the EU
and a system based on strategic bets. In the long run, the European Union will win
Moldova over.
The EU should learn from the enforcement of the former Action Plan
with Moldova and move on to conditions related to the implementation of the
agreed-upon reforms. The overactive imagination of making legislative changes
will not replace the European integration anymore. The new conditions must be
accompanied by clear benefits for Moldova60. Unfortunately, Moldova does not have
a clear integration perspective; therefore the EU attraction in Moldova cannot be
compared to the situation Romania found itself in before 2007. However, the EU
will have to leave this possibility open and undertake clear commitments for this
stage: assistance funds, extension of the commercial facilities enjoyed by Moldova
through the old agreement for the economic integration into the EU Moldova in
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, a clear perspective of cancelling the
visas for the Moldovan citizens entering the EU.
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) has both advantages and disadvantages for
Moldova. EaP is a collaboration platform between the EU and the former USSR
60 Victor Chiril, R. Moldova risc s devin o `misiune imposibil` pentru Uniunea European, Unimedia, 5
August 2009
127
states with European values: Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus and
Moldova. The relations between the EU and these states would be stated through
association agreements. However, unlike the association agreements set with the
Western Balkan countries (Serbia, Albania), the EaP agreements do not make
any explicit reference to the perspective of joining the EU; nevertheless, they do
recognise these countries European aspirations. In a generous interpretation, this
should be corroborated with the EU Treaties which recognise the right of each
European country which meets certain terms to join the Union; hence EaP is an
implicit promise for the future. The big danger for Moldova is that EaP could create
a new block of countries which could join the EU (or not) as a group of states.
This possibility is denied by the common declaration signed by the EU and the
partner countries at the Eastern Partnership Summit from Prague May 7th which
says that The partnership shall be governed by the principles of differentiation
and conditionality. Therefore, at this point the principle according to which each
state shall get closer to the EU depending on its own merits, regardless of the
performances of others is preferable. Besides, the Moldovan diplomacy insisted on
this principle when asked its opinion on the EaP, before being launched61. Important
EU states such as Germany and the Netherlands reject any group-based approach
in EUs external relations, considering that the group accessions from 2004 and
2007 had the perverse effect of hiding the lack of preparation of some candidate
states behind other countries merits. Moldova and also Romania, as an EU Member
State interested in Moldovas accession will have to insist that the differentiation
principle has priority within the EaP; otherwise it will risk remaining dependent of
the evolution of countries which are disadvantaged by the internal politics (Belarus)
or by geography (Armenia). In conclusion, EaP represents for Moldova the chance
to climb a higher step in the relations with the EU but they must avoid the danger of
long-term association with the EaP countries as a common destiny group.
dtat. This was followed by a period of confusion for the Romanian diplomacy but
in the mean time the Presidency and the Minister of External Affairs took a political
decision to give Moldova conditioned support. Besides, the good result obtained by
the opposition on July 29th offers a chance to warm up the bilateral relations. The
European Union showed solidarity with Romania in front of the exaggerations of
the Chiinu government; both the European Parliament and the Member States
firmly rejected the accusations brought against Romania and the introduction of
visas for the Romanian citizens. Less appreciated was the announcement made by
President Bsescu about granting Romanian citizenship to the descendants of those
who had such citizenship before the invasion of Bessarabia by the USSR. It was not
the granting of the citizenship in itself that caused problems (Poland had done it for
the former Pole citizens from Ukraine and Belarus); what intrigued the Europeans
was:
The lack of consultations before making this announcement (since
Romanian citizenship also means European citizenship they would have liked
to be consulted);
The lack of technical details (Romania did not announce exactly how
many people will receive citizenship would be granted, in what time period
etc.). The irony is that the granting of such citizenship was blocked by the
incapacity of the Romanian bureaucracy to take the applications submitted
since before April.
61 Victor Chiril, Parteneriatul Estic o posibil etap de tranziie/pregtire spre aderarea la UE, 11 December
2008, The External Affairs Association
Moreover, the moment of this announcement was considered inappropriate,

since Russia had just granted mass citizenship for people from Abkhazia and Ossetia
a couple of months before. Although the two situations are incompatible, the idea
to grant citizenship on historical grounds was not quite popular in Europe at that
moment. A delicate issue found on the common agenda is the signing of the treaties
between the two countries (the basic treaty and the treaty related to small border
traffic). Vladimir Voronin conditioned the signing of the treaty related to traffic to
the signing of the first treaty, although the liberalization of the border trade would
have brought more advantages to Moldova than to Romania. In his turn, President
Bsescu declared that Romania recognises de jure and de facto the border with
the former USSR and a new treaty is unnecessary. A change in the power from
Chiinu might break the negotiations deadlock and the government in Bucharest
could show more flexibility towards the issue of the common treaty which would
bring no practical change, but would calm the fears of the non-communist parties
from Chiinu which always have to defend themselves against the accusations that
they would wish an union with Romania.
At European level, Romania is consolidating its statute of an EU Member State
interested in Moldova and with an expertise in the area. As an independent expert
from Brussels has stated, in an interview for this report if Romania does not put
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129
The role of Romania as a EU Member State

Romania was put in a difficult posture after the events from April. Traditionally,
the Romanian diplomacy led a policy which supported Moldovas integration into the
EU in spite of the fact that the official relations between the two states had grown cold.
Besides, Romania is the only EU Member State with a clear interest in Moldova and
the occurrence of references to Moldova in the conclusions of different European
Council reunions was due exclusively to the Romanian diplomacy. However, this
traditional policy became difficult to apply and non-credible when Chiinu expelled
the Romanian ambassador and accused Bucharest of having orchestrated a coup
Moldova on the EU agenda, no one else has any interest or the expertise to do
it. Spain is filtering the EU relation with Latin America, France is doing the same
thing with Northern Africa and Poland is trying this in its relation with Belarus and
Ukraine; most likely that Romania will take a similar position in the EU Moldova
relationship. However, to have credibility within the EU on this mater, Romania
should look for a partnership with other Member States who have interest in the
matter. During his visit to Chiinu before the elections, the Pole Minister of
External Affairs declared that his country would be Moldovas representative in
the EU forums if elections went well. This may be the beginning of a RomanianPolish partnership for Moldova.
The Mass-Media Environment:

Stop and Rewind
Ioana Avdani
The Moldovan media environment is crossed by two very strong and visible separation
lines: a linguistic one (Romanian speaking population / Russian speaking population) and
a political one (the pro-communist line / the anti-communist line). Often, these two lines are
overlapped and in the perception of an observer outside Moldova, this overlapping is done
automatically, erroneously and without any nuances. The political tension of the country is
strongly reflected in the agenda of the media, putting the issues related to professionalism
in the second plan. The state is an important actor in the Moldovan mass-media and
the politicians (regardless of the political arena they come from) do not hesitate to use
administrative mechanisms to intervene in the media sector both in the editorial and in
the economic sections. The economic levers are often used to influence the editorial contents,
which raises big question marks related to the real freedom of the Moldovan press (beyond
the legal framework regulating it). Once again, these practices move the intervention priorities
towards the press freedom issue, leaving the matter of the journalists professionalism in the
second plan. Following these influences, the mass-media is somehow disconnected from its
public, being used as an instrument of political influence rather than as a means of correct,
honest, comprehensive information of the public. The international community stopped
its assistance efforts at the surface elements and traditional forms. Often, for the sake of
preserving functional relations with the authorities, the international community has made
the pragmatic choice to ignore the issues signalled by the activists related to the freedom
of the press, thus establishing double appreciation standards. No doubt, the press from
the Republic of Moldova has the energetic resources and the experience needed to evolve
towards normalisation and later on towards performance. The new technologies and the
development of alternative forms of press based on these, open a promising perspective to
reconnect with the public and to regain its trust. In the context of a change of the political
paradigm and provided the informal practices change, the Moldovan press finds itself facing
a new beginning which could allow its development based on the fundamental criteria of any
healthy media industry: respect of the public interest and economic profitability.
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131
Mass-media in Moldova: a lot of politics, little public

interest
62 The results of the population census from 2004, The National Statistics Bureau, available at http://www.
statistica.md/newsview.php?l=ro&idc=168&id=2358
characters. The Moldovan language was studied in school as a secondary language,

the official language of communication in the republic being Russian. This is why
a part of the population from the Republic of Moldova passed to the Latin script
on the go this is the young, active and mostly urban population. For the rest,
the Latin script is virtually inaccessible. According to the data of the National
Statistics Bureau, the Republic of Moldova has a predominantly rural population
(58.6% of the population lives in the rural environment). The extrapolation of the
data concerning the populations age structure reveals that the population under
35 (those who were educated to use the Latin script as the official script during the
school years) amounts to 53.5%. Without claiming to be rigorous, these data still
suggest the dimension of the demographic group who is illiterate in the Latin
script.
In essence, the language matter should first of all be a matter of accessibility to
information. A pragmatic approach of the circulation of the information would
suggest the maximization of the audience by providing the same contents in
both languages. However, the linguistic matter is so intensely politicised that the
pragmatic approach is rejected with emotional arguments. When suggested to insert
a Russian leaflet in his Romanian language newspaper, the manager of a publication
which is renowned for its pro-Romanian approach replied that this would be seen
by his public as an act of treason. Placing itself firmly on the linguistic barricades,
the overwhelming majority of the Romanian language press deliberately limits
its penetration of the public, refrains itself from accessing categories of public
which were not approached yet and therefore limits its perspectives of economic
development. With a more pragmatic approach, the Russian language press does
not impose such restrictions on it and does deliver some contents into Romanian,
as well.
Just as important and inflexible is the political division line. The political
pluralism and the diversity of opinions are the premises of a solid democracy and
the confrontation of ideas a valuable element for solving the societys problems.
Nevertheless, the extreme polarization registered on the Moldovan political scene
paradoxically leads to the very disappearance of the dialogue and of the necessary
confrontation of ideas. This time, the political division does not follow the great
ideological families and the doctrine differences but it is brutally and radically reduced
to the positioning in relation to the communists. The long period of communist
political dominance during the eight years of successive governments has radicalised
the political thinking, the mass-media and the society reducing the options to procommunist or anti-communist positions. Not even the distinction between progovernmental versus anti-governmental is functional anymore, because of the
penetration of all governmental structures with elements which are close to the
Party of Communists from the Republic of Moldova (PCRM). The mass-media
fully reflects this polarisation as the editorial contents is as radicalised as the political
132
133
It is said that the press cannot be better than the society it operates in and which
it reflects. This is perfectly true for the media environment from the Republic of
Moldova which reflects in almost grotesque details, through exacerbation, the
tendencies, the troubles and the dysfunctions of the Moldovan society. Just like the
Moldovan society itself, the media from the Republic of Moldova is crossed by two
major rifts: the linguistic one and the political one. These demarcation lines are
so deep and they trigger such specific behaviours that they profoundly polarise the
society and therefore the mass-media from the Republic of Moldova.
Along the linguistic rift we find the Romanian-speaking group and the Russianspeaking group. There is Romanian-language press (or Moldovan language press,
according to the official name of the language which is also a matter with political
determination) and Russian language press. The Russian-speaking population is
usually erroneously assimilated with the Russians. In reality, the Russian-speaking
population is much more diverse and more nuanced in its constitution. According to
the official data62, Moldovans represent 75.8% of the total population. Next come
the Ukrainians (8.4%), the Russians (5.9%), the Gagauz (4.4%), the Romanians
(2.2%), the Bulgarians (1.9%) and other nationalities (representing about 1% of the
total number of the countrys population). 0.4% of the inhabitants did not have
their nationality registered. The same source reveals that out of the total number of
inhabitants, 58.8% usually speak Moldovan, 16.4% speak Romanian, 16.0% Russian,
3.8% Ukrainian, 3.1% Gagauzian and 1.1% Bulgarian. A percentage of 0.8% of the
population either speaks another language or did not indicate the language they
usually speak in. Moreover, each second Ukrainian, each third Bulgarian and each
fourth Gagauz usually speak Russian. The Moldovans who usually speak Russian
make up 5% of the total shows the quoted document.
The data of this census highlight the current communication customs which led
to the conclusion that the state language is dominant. However, for any visitor of
the Republic of Moldova it rapidly becomes obvious that Russian is frequently used
for interpersonal communications and current social interactions.
Another aspect which the census data cannot reveal is related to the accessibility
of the Latin script among the population. The questions of the census referred
to the spoken language, forgetting about the issues raised by the passing to the
Latin script. In the Soviet period, the Moldovan language designated a product of
ideological origins which combined the Romanian language transposed into Cyrillic
discourse. This aspect was also emphasized by the dramatic electoral context of
the year 2009 with the two parliamentary elections and the riots which followed the
elections from April 5th.
The two rifts the linguistic and the political one overlapped almost
automatically within the context of the year 2009, giving birth to an unbalanced
political and media offer to the detriment of fair information of the Moldovan
public. Of the parties which were active in the electoral confrontations from April
and July 2009, only PCRM had a political offer addressed both to the Romanianspeaking voters and to Russian-speaking voters. The rest of the parties remained
in the Romanian-speaking space, almost automatically attributing to the Russianspeaking population pro-Moscow and communist sympathies and therefore antiMoldovan feelings. The phenomenon was also underlined by the Moldovan analysts.
Thus, Arcadie Barbroie, the executive manager of the Public Policies Institute,
quoted by Moldova.org63 shows that in the two electoral campaigns the communists
fought for each vote targeting each possible segment of the electorate, including
the national minorities. They send messages to the ethnic minorities, trying to
convince this segment of the electorate to support them in the elections. But there
is another aspect of the problem which I dont find normal the fact that the
opposition parties do not target this segment concluded Barbroie. Only a couple
of weeks before the elections from July 29th 2009 did the Liberal Democrat Party
of Moldova (LDPM) add Dumitru Ciubaenko to their list, the chief editor of the
Russian language publication Moldavskie Vedomosti, an anti-communist newspaper,
in a last minute gesture aimed at winning over the Russian-speaking anti-communist
electorate.
It is wrong to think that all the Russian-speaking People are crypto-communists.
The Russian intellectuality is not part of the system, declared Petru Macovei,
manager of the Independent Press Association (IPA) interviewed for this report64.
He reminded us of other Russian speaking environments, such as the local
newspaper Spros i Predlojenie from the Bli district, the TV 7 TV station, which
re-broadcasts the programs of the NTV Russian TV station with local insertions
mainly in Romanian or the online publication ava.md which had balanced positions
in the campaigns.
Nevertheless, Vasile Botnaru, the manager of the Free Europe office in Chiinu
sees the situation less black-and-white. Perception creates reality, to a certain extent,
he declared in an interview for this report65. Left without alternative information,
the Russian-speaking public receives information only from a certain area of the
63 Moldova.org is a portal administered by The Moldova Foundation from the United States together with IDIS
Viitorul from the Republic of Moldova. Article available at http://politicom.moldova.org/news/comunitii-singuriiavocai-ai-minoritile-etnice-202510-rom.html
64 Interview with Petru Macovei, Chiinu, August 2009
65 Vasile Botnaru, Chiinu, August 2009.
134
political spectrum and therefore they will form their electoral opinions according
to the latters message. Thus, a hesitating Russian-speaking voter is more likely to
vote with the communists than with the opposition parties whose political offer is
not familiar to him. The model is that of Saint-Exuprys snake which takes the
shame of the object it swallows adds Igor Munteanu, the executive manager of the
Institute for Democracy and Social Initiatives IDIS Viitorul.
Regardless of the language, the electoral campaigns of 2009 attracted attention
through a few defining features: strong editorial unbalance, marked political bias,
emphasized violence of the political discourse, an active involvement of the state in
the contents and the economy of the mass information means.
The main source of information of the public from the Republic of Moldova
is the television. Therefore, the politicians directed their attention towards this
environment which suffered the most significant influences. The Centre for
Independent Journalism from Chiinu monitored the campaign for the elections
from June led by the main national and quasi-national television stations within
a project of the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections Coalition 2009. Week
after week, the monitoring reports revealed that most of the monitored stations
Moldova 1 and Radio Moldova, Prime TV, NIT, EU TV continued to accept serious
deviations from the ethic and deontological principles, sometimes breaching the
Broadcasting Code and the Regulation on the reflection of the electoral campaign,
approved by the Central Electoral Commission66. The breaches notified by the CIJ
concern the presentation of mainly positive news about the governing party and the
members of the government while the news about the opposition candidates and
parties either presented negative aspects or were completely absent. The TV stations
used techniques which allowed them to overexpose one party, while keeping the
appearance of pluralism (they took an information from a press conference of
the opposition and the attacked party was invited to express its points of view in
a time frame which exceeded the assumed accusation and through the voices of
several persons). Accounts from the press conferences of the opposition talked less
about the topics covered and focused more on ridiculing the ideas presented, the
individuals present or the current circumstances. Usually, the opposition parties did
not benefit from the right of reply when the PCRM launched accusations against
them. Moreover, accounts from the events organised by the power were better placed
in the economy of the news programs than those of the opposition. The electoral
campaign ended with a two minutes appeal of President Voronin who put a negative
label on his opponents and called the Moldovans to vote for the communists.
A distinctive element of the electoral campaign from July (compared to the
one for the elections from April) was the deterioration of the quality of the public
discourse, an increase of aggressiveness and of violence of language which started
66
The monitoring of the Centre for Independent Journalism, available at http://www.ijc.md/index.

php?option=com_content&task=view&id=463&Itemid=1
135
reaching emphasis of hate speech67. According to Petru Macovei, this escalation has
its roots in the virulent campaign of all parties, be it governing or opposition party,
before the elections from April and which went a step further in the July campaign.
The exchange of political ideas, the critics against the act of governing and the
alternative solutions were replaced with personal attacks, propaganda, serious
accusations formulated in a rhetoric which is specific to the political battle of the
cold war (espionage, high treason, the yellow hydra reference to the Liberal Party,
criminal, anti-state element etc.). The violent language also targeted anti-Semitic
elements (Romanians were likened to Jews) and homophobic (the politicians were
accused of having behaved like in an Armenian bath)
One of the main lines of attack of the communists, reflected as such by the press
supporting them was the anti-Romanian position and the identification of Romania
as a root of all evils and main beneficiary of any victory of the anti-communist
opposition from Chiinu. An eloquent example is the movie Attack on Moldova68,
produced and broadcasted (in Russian) by several televisions; there, the opposition
(particularly Dorin Chirtoac, the liberal mayor of Chiinu) is accused of planning
the post-elections riots, of attempting to erase the border over the Prut and to unite
with Romania69. The accusations are brought on the basis of the apparently legal
interception of a telephone conversation by the Intelligence and Security Service
(ISS) during a criminal prosecution procedure against Chirtoac. The movie shows
President Vladimir Voronin, the general prosecutor of Moldova and the ISS chief,
Artur Reetnicov.
Similarly, Moldova Suverana, a newspaper which in spite of its denationalization in
2004 remained a speaking trumpet of the government, wrote in its edition from July
22nd 2009, commenting on the visit to Bucharest of a delegation of the Moldovan
civil society: The meeting of the Moldovans with the Romanian officials took
place before the distribution of the Romanian state budget; this leads us
to believe that they did not come back to Moldova with empty pockets. Of
course the main purpose of the visit is related to Bsescus personal battle to bring
to the Moldovan government a political group obedient to him70. There was no
discussion about the state budget at that time in Romania.
In its turn, the pro-opposition press retorted to very low criticism. Thus, Jurnalul de
Chiinu, a newspaper with a rather balanced attitude, wrote on July 20th: Vladimir
Voronin is certain that Marian Lupu will not become president. Marian
Lupu will not become president! Many want, but not all can! Women know
better, dont they? said Voronin at a meeting with the voters from the village
67
68
69
According to the monitoring reports of the Centre for Independent Journalism, Chiinu.
Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ngCLiWjW2b4
According to Cotidianul, Bucharest, 9 June 2009, available at http://www.cotidianul.ro/voronin_superstar_in_
atac_asupra_moldovei-87566.html
70 http://www.moldova-suverana.md/arh.php?subaction=showfull&id=1248278408&archive=1248364571&sta
rt_from=&ucat=7&
136
of Pleseni, in the district of Cantemir, writes Unimedia. However, we take the

liberty not to agree with the president in office. He must have been sunstroke to say
such a thing. For how could the women in Pleseni know what Marian Lupu can and
cannot do? Besides, spoken at first person, Voronins idea many want, but not all
can sounds different: I often want, but not always can, which is a totally different
thing. The secrets of the (mother) tongue, as Monica Lewinski would say
If one made a rapid scan of the written press of the Republic of Moldova during
the electoral campaign one could easily notice the stylistic difference between the news
which are often insipid and the materials of opinion which are virulent, colourful
and thus more attractive to the loyal readers of the publications in question. This
difference of editorial tension led to a second level of electoral manipulation as
the public was mostly exposed to strong, negative and deeply immoral messages.
These features were characteristic both for the central and for the local press. Thus,
according to IPA, the local press, especially the one supported by the authorities,
tended to take the political colour of the group which dominated that district. The
same method was used by some independent publications which openly declared
their political sympathies. In a press dominated by pro-communist influences, the
pro-opposition voices had the role of balancing the information. Nevertheless,
taken individually, the local publications in question did not fulfil their impartiality
obligations. The IPA manager, Petru Macovei, declared that the organisation will
debate the cases of some local independent newspapers which during the electoral
campaign violated the principles of equidistance and editorial balance.
But maybe the most dramatic is the case of the public media, the TV station
Moldova 1 and Radio Moldova. According to the CIJ monitoring reports, the two
public TV stations who are obliged to provide correct information and to promote the
political pluralism complied with the principles of equitable, balanced and impartial
reflection of the parliamentary elections on a selective basis. The Moldovan public
media are criticized for their obvious obedience towards the structures of power and
for breaching the deontological principles of equidistance, balance and objectivism.
Thus, PCRM benefited from quantitative overexposure and intense positive image.
For instance, only in the last week of the electoral campaign, the Mesager program,
the main news program of the station broadcasted 27 materials favouring PCRM
and the central public authorities and 4 having a neutral character. During the same
reference period, other parties had a more modest presence in the news bulletins
from Moldova 1 and the reporters showed more impartiality and critical spirit
when they spoke about their activities states the report. In the reference period,
the opposition parties (LP, LDPM, OMA, DPM, SDP and the Green Alliance
Ecologist Party) were the protagonists of 21 materials with a neutral content and 10
with a negative character71.
71 The monitoring of the mass-media during the electoral campaign for the early parliamentary elections from 29
July 2009, Report no. 5. 20 28 July 2009, available at http://www.ijc.md/Publicatii/monitorizare/monitorizare_
raport_anticipate_5.pdf
137
In an attempt to save the appearances of a fair electoral campaign, President

Vladimir Voronin, who is also the leader of the PCRM, asked the public TV stations
not to give accounts of his activity and of the activity of the high government
officials who were running for the elections (after the example of the former
Russian President Vladimir Putin). Apparently, the Moldova 1 TV station took into
account the Presidents request. Nevertheless, the news abounded in stories from
special events which were clearly favouring the government and the governing party.
The quoted report mentions that: In that period (July 20th 28th), Moldova 1
broadcasted 25 materials with indirect electoral character. The subject of these
materials were the activities of the Government (the payment of social benefits,
discussions about the Russian and Chinese loan, compensations for the victims of
political repressions, inauguration of the cereal terminal from Giurgiulesti etc.) but
also actions such as asphalting portions of road, commissioning of an aqueduct and
repairing a community arts centre. It is worth mentioning the series of materials
about the opening after renovation of some family doctors centres from
different towns about which Moldova 1 made five different stories. In all materials
it was mentioned several times that the money was allocated by the government and
only in one material it is said that the government distributed medical instruments
that had been purchased with the help of the European Union72.
According to Corina Cepoi, headmaster of the School of Advanced Journalism
Studies coordinated by the CIJ, on several occasions during the electoral campaigns
the Moldova 1 TV station showed proof of its professional capacity, by making
balanced and equidistant news. Such a situation reveals the fact that it is not the
professional capacity the major deficiency of the public TV station, but the political
control which prevents the journalists from practising their profession honestly,
according to their own professional standards.
The failure of the public TV station to give a fair and impartial account of electoral
campaigns comes at the end of many years of support given by the international
community, assistance programs and trustworthy investments in the capacity of the
state TV station to reform itself into a public TV station. This failure was explicitly
recognised after the elections from April 5th also by Marianne Mikko, former coPresident of the EU Republic of Moldova Cooperation Committee. Marianne
Mikko declared in a press conference: The fight for the freedom of speech at the
Moldova 1 public TV station is, in my opinion, a lost battle. Therefore I believe that
the necessary reform should start as soon as possible because during the five years in
which I have been monitoring the evolutions from the Republic of Moldova I have
not noticed any progress in this direction73.
72
73
Ibid.
According to http://www.actualpress.md/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=351:mariannemikko-moldova-1-a-pierdut-lupta-pentru-libertatea-de-exprimare&catid=45:politic&Itemid=70
138
The state player and referee

If we analyse the legislation of the Republic of Moldova it is hard to understand
how this abuses and editorial unbalances occurred. The Republic of Moldova not
only has a modern legislation, close to the democratic standards, but it also has
presumably autonomous institutions called to ensure both compliance with the law
and sanctioning of any possible irregularities.
One of these institutions whose purpose is to safeguard the public interest
as referee of the electoral match is the Broadcasting Coordinating
Council (BCC)74. The abuses notified by the press monitoring organizations,
the human rights organizations or by those who had an interest in the correct
development of the election process (and of the campaign) were not few in number
and it was expected they would put some pressure on the BCC, determining it to
take firm reactions. Nevertheless, during the entire electoral campaign BCC issued
only two press releases. On July 13th, BCC issues a press release through which it
recommends the broadcasters to ensure impartiality and balance and to favour the
free forming of opinions by presenting the main points of view of the opponents;
also, in the case of subjects discussing conflict situations, they should comply with
the multiple sources information principles, according to the provisions of article
7 of the Broadcasting Code75. The press release underlines that it is extremely
important for the broadcasting institutions not to allow interferences from the
public authorities, the electoral opponents or any other individuals from outside the
broadcasting institution into their contents and into the form of the programs76
and asks them to give equal antenna times to all electoral candidates, as per the legal
requirements. Three days later, on July 16th, as an answer to signals from several
consumers according to whom, the programs of certain local broadcasters falling
under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova broadcast electoral shows which
are not in accordance with their broadcasting schedules and approved Internal
Regulations77, BCC makes another press release, through which it reiterates the
need for the broadcasters falling under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova to
comply with the provisions of the Broadcasting Code, the terms of the broadcasting
licences and the rebroadcasting licences, the broadcasting schedules and the channel
lists approved by the BCC78. These press releases occur as sole and weak reactions
after the letter addressed by the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections Coalition
2009 who was asking the BCC to show the monitoring results, the conclusions and
any measures taken by the BCC in relation to the broadcasting of the documentary
74
75
76
77
http://www.cca.md
BCC press release from 13 July 2009, http://www.cca.md/sites/default/files/com_presa_13_07_2009.pdf
Ibid.
BCC press release fro16 July 2009, available at http://www.cca.md/sites/default/files/com_presa_16_07_2009.
pdf
78 Ibid.
139
Attack on Moldova by several TV stations (NIT, N4, Prime, EuTV, Moldova 1) in

the period June 5th 15th 200979.
If BCC attracted attention through the gentleness of the admonitions and
its sheer passivity, other state institutions did so through their opaqueness and lack
of appetence in the implementation of the law concerning access to information.
The Independent Press Association asked the Moldovan Post Office for its annual
balance sheet, to check the statements of its manager, according to whom the Post
Office had done acts of charity amounting to one million lei. The Moldovan Post
refused to provide this information, declaring that they do not have a commercial
character. Its refusal determined the IPA to attack the institution in court and
the Supreme Court of Justice passed a judgment to its favour. A similar process
is currently pending between the IPA and the Moldovan Railways concerning the
amounts marked into the budget as investments in railway stations. Another
example of lack of transparency is given by the Taxes Inspectorate who refused to
put at the disposal of IPA information concerning the candidates with debts to the
state. The Taxes Inspectorate refused to provide such information motivating that
arrears to the payment of the taxes are not crimes. The Court of Appeal which
examined the case passed a judgment to the favour of IPA. We won the trial, but
we still didnt receive the information declared Petru Macovei, manager of IPA, in
an interview for this report.
Similarly, the Chamber of Records withdrew the right granted to journalists to
access information concerning various companies without paying the necessary fee
after only two weeks. The privilege was kept for IPA only until June 2009 when the
newspapers from the association published an investigation showing the conflict
of interests in which the minister of constructions, Vladimir Baldovici, found
himself after the construction company where he held the majority shares package
won the public tender for the reconstruction of the Parliament of the Republic of
Moldova. The investigation was based on information got from the data provided
by the Chamber of Records. Free access to these data was later resumed, following
negotiations between the Chamber and IPA.
There were, however, more aggressive forms of using the state administrative
levers to intimidate the opponents. Thus, a number of journalists renowned for
their critical tone against the authorities among which Vasile Botnaru, manager of
Free Europe Chiinu, Rodica Mahu, chief editor of Jurnal de Chiinu, Oleg Brega,
reporter at Jurnal TV and Alexandru Vakulovski, chief editor of the magazine Stare
de Urgen were invited at the beginning of August at the military prosecutors office
of the municipality of Chiinu for discussions about the violent events from
April 7th. In the opinion of Vasile Botnaru, these invitations have the purpose of
intimidation and there are numerous precedents when hearings which started with
79
The text of the letter may be found at http://www.alegeliber.md/files/declaratii/Adresare_catre_CCA.pdf
140
listening to individuals as witness ended by turning them into accused. I have

experience, I have a strong organisation supporting me, I have lawyers, I am not
scared, and they may call me as often as they wish. But for younger journalists, for
those who are dependant upon the states goodwill such an interrogatory may be
very traumatising declared Vasile Botnaru, interviewed for this report.
A similar tactic was also applied in the so-called File of the forum users. At the
end of May 2008, the prosecutors office from Chiinu asked several providers of
online services among which the Unimedia portal for lists of the IPs from where
anti-state messages were posted on various forums. The Unimedia administrators
refused to disclose such data, motivating that they are not obliged to keep them for
longer than 24 hours. Later on, the prosecutors office opened a criminal file against
12 young people who had expressed their opposition to the close relation with
Russia and their preference for a union with Romania. The young people had been
identified on the basis of the information provided by an internet provider. The
prosecutors office had heard the 12 youngsters, searched their homes and ceased
their computers. The files remained pending without any concrete solution and
without being closed. They were reactivated and the investigation resumed in June
2009. As they continued to refuse any cooperation and disclosure of the forum
users identity, Unimedia was threatened by MoldData the company managing
the Moldovan domains that they would revoke their domain. Investigations
are still ongoing and the young people in question may face imprisonment from
three to seven years. Now they are out of danger. But there was a draft law which
would have regulated the preservation of the traffic data, according to the European
Directive. If this was in force, we could not motivate that we do not have the data
declared Tudor Darie, one of the four owners of the Unimedia.md portal.
There were also attacks against journalists; the troublesome reporters were
kicked out of the rooms where representatives of the government were holding
press conferences. Thus, on July 9th 2009, the prime-ministers bodyguard forbade
a team of journalists from the TV-Prim TV station from the town of Glodeni to
take part in a meeting of the civil servants from the district with Zinaida Greceani.
Journalist Rodica Nimerenco was pushed by the bodyguards who threatened to
use the gun and the cameraman was prevented to film the prime-ministers entry
into the meetings room. On July 12th, at Donduseni, journalists Igor Melnic and
Vladimir Thorik from the newspaper Moldavskie vedomosti were thrown out from
the Palace of Culture by the bodyguard officers of prime-minister Greceani and by
the local police during an electoral reunion of the PCRM80.
Around the elections from July, the Moldovan authorities resumed the antidemocratic practices of preventing certain journalists to enter the territory of
the Republic of Moldova for reasons which were not mentioned in any legal or
80 According to the Declaration of the mass-media organisations in relation to the worsening of the press climate
in which the press operates, quoting information from Monitor Media, available at http://www.ijc.md/index.
141
administrative procedures. Thus, the special envoy of the Agerpress Agency from
Romania, Gabriel Apetri, who was supposed to give accounts of the electoral
campaign and the early parliamentary elections from July 29th was forbidden to
enter the Republic of Moldova; the pretext invoked was that he did not have a
medical certification to state that he is not infected with HIV/AIDS even though,
according to the law, no such document is necessary for entrance into the Republic
of Moldova81.
Other types of interventions of the state administration are more discreet and
more difficult to prove. Such interventions concern conditioning the state publicity
on the positive presentation of the government actions or threatening not to renew
the broadcasting licence of the stations re-broadcasting Radio Free Europe.
Moreover, according to those interviewed, even the publicity offered by the
commercial companies is indirectly controlled politically. Publicity is directed by
the communist government through pressures on the economic agents towards
information means which are loyal to the Power. The economic operators are afraid
to advertise in the media which criticizes the government because then they will
be confronted with problems: inspections from the tax and state authorities, forged
files etc. said Cornelia Cozonac from the Centre for Investigation Journalism from
Chiinu, in an interview for this report. The Centre for Independent Journalism
found itself in such a situation during the electoral campaign for the elections from
July; the Centre wished to carry out an awareness campaign for the issue of the
freedom of speech. In the context of the World Day of Press Freedom, the Centre
for Independent Journalism wishes to give large publicity in the media to several
provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, the Press Law and
also of the European Human Rights Convention related to the fundamental human
rights and freedoms. Although the targeted articles referred to the freedom of the
press and the non-acceptance of censorship in the mass-media (article 1 of the Press
Law), to a persons right to information and to the obligation of the mass-media to
inform the public opinion correctly (article 34 of the Constitution of the Republic
of Moldova), to guaranteeing the freedom of opinion and of speech (article 32
of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, The European Human Rights
Convention) and do not have any political connotation, two advertising agencies
from Chiinu who hold a network of advertising panels on Stefan cel Mare si Sfant
Avenue refused to rent the requested boards to the CIJ; among the reasons invoked,
one was related to the political message which, in their opinion, would be conveyed
by the excerpts in question shows the Declaration on some consequences of the
instauration of a climate of fear in the Republic of Moldova82. According to the
observations made by the CIJ, the advertising boards in question remained empty
during the electoral campaign.
81
82
Ibid.
Available at http://www.ijc.md/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=438
142
Another pressure lever used against the press is the fiscal inspections at the
newspapers editorial offices which often end with penalties, sequestration of
accounts etc. The court actions are also used against the press; thus, the justice
becomes an instrument for putting uncooperative publications out of the market.
if lawsuits related to access to information brought by journalists or editorial staffs
against the state structures for limiting access to public interest information last
one or two years, those started by the civil servants against the press last very little.
Accounts are sequestrated from the first hearings and thus the newspapers cannot
function anymore. Then there are also the enormous damages the courts order the
press to pay. It is enough to lose one trial and any newspaper goes bankrupt. There
were such cases in the last years declared Cornelia Cozonac.
The intervention of the state in the mass-media sector has effects not only on the
market but also, in wider terms, on the journalistic community. In the Republic of
Moldova, the work of the investigation journalists became a risky job. For this reason,
many good journalists run from investigations and would rather work on projectbasis with the non-governmental organizations or for international institutions
where the money is also better. Others, after having gone through interminable trials,
retort to self-censorship explains Cornelia Cozonac.
It is not only the mass-media that is targeted by these forms of pressure and
intimidation, but also the non-governmental organizations interested in the good
development of the elections. For instance, on April 28th, less than a month after
this years first parliamentary elections and the violent riots which followed, the
fiscal authorities from Chiinu launched a campaign of financial inspections against
a number of 18 civic organisations which were part of the 2009 Coalition (among
which the Centre for Independent Journalism, The Public Policies Institute, The
IDIS Viitorul Institute, Amnesty International).
The international community too little, too polite, too

friendly
The international community has been for a long time the strongest support
sometimes even the only one of the mass-media from the Republic of Moldova.
Through their assistance programs professional, technical and financial the
Western countries, especially those from the European Union and the United States
contributed to the consolidation of the independence of the Moldovan press. But
lately, the media activists from the Republic of Moldova, the journalists, seem
to be more and more frustrated with what Vasile Butnaru called political shortsightedness and lack of perspicacity. They first accused the significant political
trust given to Vladimir Voronin as head of state with apparent European aspirations.
143
They tried to play by the democratic rules with a partner which does not respect
any rule. And they continued to behave the same even after there was blood, as
if it had never happened declared Alexandru Cantar, the manager of the Imedia
group, former manager of the BBC office in Chiinu. Many of those interviewed
described their discouraging experiences related to the weak, polite reaction of the
representatives of the international community in front on the post-elections crisis.
Thus, Josette Durrieu, co-rapporteur of the Council of Europe for the Republic
of Moldova was declaring in September 2008: I am happy to say that things have
started to change for the better in Moldova and this is visible. At the same time, I
am glad to see that you are also presenting the existing problems with reasonable
ambition and this was also noticed in Brussels83. After the elections from April,
the same co-rapporteur was declaring in front of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg: The legitimacy of the elections has been
confirmed. Now there is a need for a dialogue between the parties, between the
government and the opposition. () Were the elections rigged? We are not certain.
If we look at the elections, one thing is sure: the opposition lost because they could
not organise themselves. In the opinion of Corina Cepoi (CIJ) such statements
are very harmful, because they may be taken out of context and used as propaganda
instruments. Corina Cepoi also retold an episode in which while being presented
the situation of the Moldovan press and the important role played by Vladimir
Voronin in supporting certain media channels through informal ways which were still
making use of the state authority, during a Parliament reunion, the same European
co-rapporteur replied that in France, the press as well is dependant upon economic
groups and that one must not expect anything else from Moldova.
Similar frustration was raised by the visit of the General Secretary of the Council
of Europe, Terry Davis who arrived in Chiinu just one month before the elections
from April 5th. According to the official information, the agenda of the discussions
between the CE official and the Moldovan President contained issues related to the
independence of justice, the fight against corruption, money laundering and the
financing of terrorism, press freedom, the development of civil society, the support
of the Rroma community and the organisation of free and fair elections. The trends
which mined the electoral campaign for the ballot from April were already visible,
they were on the official agenda and they were not unknown to the General Secretary
of the CE. Despite all this, the visit had a strictly festive character. Terry Davis was
decorated by the same President to whom he had come to share the concerns of
the European institution.
83 As per Communicate.md, available at http://www.comunicate.md/index.php?task=articles&action=view&art
icle_id=56
144
The Unimedia case: how the future could look like

The riots of the young people from Chiinu on April 7th led to street fights, the
arson of government buildings and violent repression on behalf of the authorities.
In a purely totalitarian reflex, the communist government tried to limit press freedom
by suspending the communication channels it could control (the Internet connection
was cut, the mobile services functioned with interruptions) and making a series of
highly aggressive arrests on Moldovan or foreign journalists. In the circumstances of
such a persecution of the traditional means of communication, the information
about the events in Chiinu circulated through informal means which were luckily
unknown and uncontrolled by the government: the social networks, the Twitter
micro-blogging network and so on. Access to these networks was blocked Twitter,
Facebook, odnoklassniki were not accessible for over a week. We received them by
proxy, trained by our colleagues from other countries which face the same problem.
Unfortunately, the great majority of the Internet services providers complied with
the orders and blocked the IP address lists provided by the Intelligence and Security
Service declared Corina Cepoi.
The events that took place in Chiinu in April proved the importance the new
technologies are gaining in ensuring the circulation of the information and how they
attach a new dimension to freedom of speech.
Unimedia.md is a news portal which started at the initiative of four Moldovan
young people and became a reference in information about Moldova and a possible
success story. Unimedia started in 2007 as a digest agency. In time, it began to produce
its own contents, as well. Currently it provides text, video and live transmissions
(text and/or image). Starting from 250 unique visitors per day in 2007, Unimedia
now has web traffic of 15-20,000 unique visitors per day. When there are scandals
we go as high as 40,000 unique visitors per day declared Tudor Darie, one of
the co-owners of the portal, in an interview for this report84. What distinguishes
Unimedia from the traditional environments is the entrepreneurial, constructive
spirit oriented to the inclusion of all market segments. Identifying the lack of a
sufficient offer of equidistant information for the Russian-speaking public, the
owners of Unimedia launched a similar portal in Russian. As far as mass-media is
concerned, Moldova has a dichotomist offer: either in Romanian or in Russian. The
public got used to this added Darie. Respecting the socio-linguistic demarcation
lines, Unimedia launched a separate Russian portal, vesti.md which takes about 80%
of the Unimedia contents (translated); the rest consists of new contents, adapted to
the requirements and expectations of the Russian-speaking population. Moreover,
Unimedia also launched a site for the feminine public, Lady Club, which comes to
complete the main site whose public is mainly masculine.
84
Tudor Darie, Chiinu, August 2009
145
Unimedia was not exempted from attempted pressures from the authorities, the
most visible being the prosecutors request to collaborate to the identification of
the anti-state elements who are posting pro-Romanian messages on the Unimedia
forum. We are not afraid of this. We decided to use each pressure to our advantage.
They call us to the prosecutors office, we make a news out of it and increase our
traffic; so, in the end, we have more to win than they do declared Darie.
The profile of the Unimedia reader describes a young public (a quarter of the
visitors are between 15 and 24 years old and 35% between 25 and 40), mainly
masculine. The highest flow of readers is in the morning meaning that most of
our visitors access the website from the office.
Unimedia shows mainly live stories, on the spot which satisfy the need
for immediate information specific to the Internet user. The technology used is
unsophisticated (mobile phones are used as cameras) thus responding to an
internationally recognised trend: internet users are willing to accept a worse image/
sound quality if this gives them real-time access to events of interest for them.
The Unimedia project is not just an entrepreneurial exercise of a couple of
young enthusiasts. The mobility, dynamism, number and quality of the public
made Unimedia attract the largest volume of election-related publicity of all online
publications. This allowed the company to build itself healthy economic basis and
even to make some profit.
According to Darie, online publications are the real future of the Moldovan press.
The Internet penetration rate is growing85. The Internet spares the editors from all
problems related to broadcasting, distribution to villages or licence-related pressures.
The newspapers understood this as well and moved on to real-time updates, even
if the paper edition appears only a couple of times a week. Pro TV Chiinu did
the same thing. The online competition is thus increasing but we are glad because it
forces us to be inventive concluded Darie.
Republic Of Moldova
Democracy is Postponed
Marian Chiriac
The respect for human rights remains a concern in Moldova, country which is somehow
at a crossroads blocked on the way between Europe and another one, which may lead to
isolation. Now maybe more than ever, Moldova must make a choice: it may become the
next Transnistria or Belarus or it may become a normal country of the European family.
The dramatic events from April 7th 2009 highlighted the problems which had been
signalled before, i.e. that there is a totalitarian regime in Chiinu who retorts to violence
when it feels its position threatened and for whom it is not important to allow its own
citizens to express their opinions freely and publicly.
In this context, it becomes pressing for the future authorities (Parliament, government,
President) resulted following the parliamentary elections to allow rapid and efficient
investigations on the cases of human rights violation and to punish the guilty ones. There is
also a need for educational and informational actions for the citizens and the civil servants
oriented towards the knowledge of their own rights and obligations so as to manage to stop
the cases of human rights violations.
Respecting
freedoms
the
citizens
fundamental
rights
and
85 At the beginning of 2009, in Chiinu and in Bli, the penetration rate of the broadband Internet access
services was of 30,8% and respectively 10,6% and in most of the districts this rate oscillated between 2,2 and
3,2%. The country average remains the lowest in Europe, at 4,9% for the fixed points Internet access services
and respectively 4,2% for broadband Internet access services according to the National Agency for Regulation in
Electronic Communications and the Technology of Information (ANRCETI) , see
http://unimedia.md/?mod=news&id=12822
The Republic of Moldova remains most often a terra incognita, a land

unknown to the Europeans, and to most Romanians; attention is drawn to this
country especially at critic times, either for social troubles, economic crisis of
political elections.
Such a critical moment is doubtlessly the parliamentary elections from April
5th 2009, the violent events which followed but also the campaign before the early
elections organised on July 29th this year.
Taking the time interval surrounding those events as a time landmark, this report
wishes to analyse the main existing tendencies concerning the respect for human
rights in the Republic of Moldova.
Our conclusion is not optimistic at all: the regime from Chiinu does not succeed
at all in complying with most standards in the field of human rights protection,
146
147
although this is a growingly insistent request of the citizens of the republic or is, at
the same time, freely undertaken following the countrys adherence to the respective
international regulations.
Although during the last few years the Government of the Republic of Moldova
made efforts towards the respect of human rights be it legislative, material or
even related to changing the administrative customs or the mentalities remain yet
unsolved a series of major problems.
Among the main problems which continue to have a serious effect on the
functioning under normal democratic standards of the Moldovan state, we
mention:
- the excessive influence of the politics in the act of justice;
- the full non-compliance of the legislation sanctioning the freedom to
organise meetings;
- The existence of numerous cases of abusive arrests or the unreasonable
motivation of the arrest cases;
- The promotion of torture and maltreatment as acceptable methods of
hearing the arrested individuals or of collecting information be the secret
services;
- The promotion of arbitrary or unmotivated court decisions;
- The press lack of independence and the involvement of politics in the
broadcasting industry; there are also problems with the impartial coverage of
the political messages.
- Problems related to the right of property;
- Lack of protection for the refugees, the asylum applicants and the
emigrants;
- Lack of respect for the economic and social rights of most of the
population.
This list does not intend to be complete but only to highlight the main shortcomings
of the Moldovan state. In spite of the official statements, of some efforts more or
less real, the Republic of Moldova remains an authoritarian state dominated by a
state-party which although did manage to ensure stability, order and to some extent
to stop the economic collapse, continues to be in debt to its own citizens when it
comes to the respect of the main rights and fundamental freedoms. At the same
time, there remains a huge gap between Moldovas undertaken or declared intentions
in relation to the European integration and the realities on the ground.
Context
The Republic of Moldova is a Member State of the Council of Europe (CE) since
1995 and ever since it made progresses in the respect, protection and promotion
of human rights. From its accession to the CE, Moldova ratified 62 of the 200
conventions of the Council of Europe.
148
In 2003 it adopted a new Criminal Procedure Code and a new Criminal Code
which brought the internal legislation of the Republic of Moldova to the standards of
the Council of Europe and in 2005 the Criminal Code was amended by introducing
a new article which makes special reference to the torture applied by individuals with
responsible positions in the state authorities, which is in agreement with the UN
Convention against torture. In July 2006, Republic of Moldova ratified the optional
Protocol of the United Nations Convention against torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishments or treatments.
On February 22nd 2005, the Republic of Moldova and the European Union
(EU) adopted the Moldova-EU Action Plan within the European Neighbourhood
Policy which sets a series of objectives aimed at getting the Republic of Moldova
closer to the standards of the Council of Europe, including the respect for human
rights86.
Later on, the authorities in Chiinu adopted a National Actions Plan for human
rights, Moldova being one of the less than 20 countries in the world which adopted
such a plan. The plan covered the 2004 2008 period and set concrete objectives
in relation to the improvement of peoples detention conditions, the prevention of
torture and maltreatment. For this, they left from the premises that first of all they
need to regain the trust of the population in the Moldovan state: The deformed
legal consciousness noticed in the last decade, the deeply rooted neglect for human
rights and freedoms and of the human being in general, the legal nihilism and the
lack of trust in the state conditioned the peoples feeling of insecurity, their lack of
trust in the states ability to protect their rights87.
If we were to consider only the official information, we may say that at least on
paper Republic of Moldova looks like a state which although hardly come out of
the communist era is making serious efforts to respect the fundamental rights and
freedoms of its own citizens. Only that these efforts were too seldom reflected in
the concrete reality.
To this end, the Country report of the USA Department of State on human rights
in 2008 shows that Generally, the Government of Moldova does respect human
rights but at the same time the police forces use force against people in detention
and isolation and mass-media is intimidated and influenced by the authorities.
The report also shows that the detention conditions from Moldova remain tough
and the police forces harassed and intimidated the political opposition. There were
cases of legal corruption in the police forces, arbitrary arrests of individuals by the
police and illegal searches. Moreover, the government tried to influence the massmedia, intimidated the journalists, maintained some restrictions on the right to meet
freely and refused the official registration of certain religious groups.
86 Information taken from the Amnesty International report Tortura i maltratarea din partea poliiei: E doar
normal., October 2007
87 Quoted from The National Actions Plan in the field of human rights of the Republic of Moldova for the period
2004 2008, page 2.
149
The report also shows that in Moldova the social violence persists together with
the discrimination of women and children, the traffic of women and girls for sexual
exploitation, the discrimination of the Rroma. Further on, religious minorities
encountered difficulties with registration. There were reports about the limitation of
the rights of employees and problems related to the work done by minor children.
In the Transnistrian region, human rights are not respected. The authorities
impose restrictions on the freedom to travel and prevent the Moldovan citizens from
exercising their right to vote at the elections from Moldova. Torture and arbitrary
arrests are still an issue and the detention conditions remain very tough in the region.
The Transnistrian authorities continue to harass the press and the opposition, limit
the right to free association and religion and discriminate the Romanian-speaking
population.
The report states that out of the 3.47 million people (including 528.6 thousands
from the Transnistrian region), approximately 900 thousands citizens - of which
250 thousands from the Transnistrian region - are abroad. Moreover, the document
notes that although Moldova is a parliamentary republic, the three branches of power
(Parliament, Government and Justice) are very strongly influenced by President
Vladimir Voronin88.
In exchange, shortly after the publication of the report of the State Department
the vice-minister of Justice Nicolae Esanu tried to offer an explanation to the situation
reported. Today the state does not have the capacity to ensure the implementation
of the laws because there are financial issues, there are even organisational issues and
there are competence issues. We have never declared that our capacity to implement
laws improved significantly. In what concerns the respect for human rights we
depend greatly on the material conditions. And this will not improve this year or in
one or two years. said Esanu, quoted by Radio Free Europe89
The organisation Amnesty International also expressed a critical attitude, noticing
the worsening of the situation in relation to the respect for human rights in its
report on the situation from Moldova for the year 2008. The authors of the report
discover that in Moldova they continue to report cases of torture and other forms
of maltreatment but the authors continue to remain unpunished; that in spite of all
efforts of the local and international organizations to raise awareness on the danger
of human beings traffic, men, women and children continued to be trafficked and the
development of the criminal investigations was hindered by the inadequate witness
protection conditions. The state continued to limit the freedom of speech90.
The events from April 7th 2009 violations of human

rights
Cases of violation of human rights are seen almost everywhere in the world.
However, what individualizes Moldova is that here one cannot defend himself or
herself against the interferences of the power or when your fundamental rights are
being violated. The civil organisations have often said that the authorities do not
respect human rights and that there is a huge gap between the laws adopted and their
enforcement. And what happened after the riots which followed the announcement
of the results of the parliamentary elections from spring is a perfect illustration
of all this. The words of lawyer Alexandru Postic express briefly the landmark
moment represented by the events from April 7th 2009 in assessing the degree of
respect for human rights in Moldova91.
Let us resume what happened on that date. Two days after the parliamentary
elections which sanctioned the rather unexpected victory of the Party of Communists
of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), numerous people especially young people
went out on the streets to protest against this result.
Under circumstances which were not yet entirely clarified, the peaceful protests
degenerated into violent actions; there were clashes between the demonstrators
and the police which used rubber batons, tear gases and acoustic bombs, water
canons etc. Some demonstrators devastated the buildings of the Presidency and
of the Parliament and in this context the police forces could not ensure a peaceful
development of the demonstration92.
It is estimated that following the riots from April 7th two people died (some
reports mention three); of these two, at least one (Valeriu Boboc) seems to have
died following the abusive use of force by the police. The press said that the death
of Boboc was caused by the diffuse brain injury caused by grievous body injury
to the head region according to expert Derrik John Pounder from the United
Kingdom. These data were not made public until the completion of this report
(middle August) although the British expert had shown his expertise report at the
end of June already93.
On the other hand, the case of the other deceased person, respectively Ion
buleac raises some question marks but death may have been caused by the tear
gases used against the demonstrators.
At the same time, on the night between April 7th and 8th and during the following
days the police made numerous arrests, seizing between 166 people (according to the
official data of the Moldovan Ministry of the Interior) and 700 people (according
88 The Courtry report of the USA State Department on human rights in Moldova for 2008, see http://www.state.
gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119093.htm
89 Statement of vice-minister of Justice, Nicolae Eanu, mane on 29 May 2009, see http://www.europalibera.org/
90 Amnesty International Report, available in abridged version at the address http://amnesty.md/library/
yearreports.php?ln=ro&report=19&country=26
91 Interview with lawyer Alexandru Postic, legal consultant of the Promo-Lex organisation from Chiinu, August
2009.
92 This duty is specified in the Law concerning meetings, no. 26-XVI from 22.02.2008 (articles 21 and 22).
93 According to the publication Ziarul de Gard, the edition from 13 August, text available at the address http://
www.zdg.md/investigatii/e-oficial-v-boboc-a-fost-omorat
150
151
to the estimates of the civil organisations)94. Many of the people arrested were
minors.
In exchange, the vice-minister of interior, Valentin Zubic, showed other figures;
206 people were seized in administrative arrest. According to him, the policemen had
to use force against some people. When analysing these events, we discovered
that the impact of the police beating was not as heavy as in other states, even from
Europe he declared, mentioning that the forensic expertise showed that the injuries
caused by the policemen were average in the case of six persons while the rest of
the injuries were of insignificant gravity. The Moldovan vice-minister also said
that no cases of rape inside the police stations were proven; however, in the case of
three young women seized by the police there were some undignified, humiliating
actions of the police collaborators and the Prosecutors office will give a ruling in
these cases. Among the measures taken to rectify the situation, Zubic mentioned the
installation of several cameras in the penitentiaries95.
On the other hand, the General Prosecutor Valeriu Gurbulea was saying in June
that only 96 of those arrested filed complaints, stating that they were maltreated by
the law enforcement agencies of order. Only ten requests were examined and we
initiated four criminal cases for abuse of power, average body injuries and so on. The
slow development of the investigations was due to the agglomeration surrounding
these subjects declared the General Prosecutor Valeriu Gurbulea96.
According to the data of the civic organizations, the people seized for protests
were placed under administrative arrest for a period of 10-20 days (in 36% of the
cases) followed by another arrest period of 30 days (in 26% of the cases)97.
The journalist Natalia Morari and the civic activist Ghenadie Brega were also
arrested together with some public figures (businessman Gabriel Stati and the chief
of his bodyguards team - Aurel Marinescu, the former presidential councillor Sergiu
Mocanu, Anatol Mtsaru etc.); related to the situation of the latter category, the
press believed that these were political arrests98. Moreover, pressure was put on the
political leaders of the opposition; for instance against the president of the Liberal
Democrat Party, Vladimir Filat a criminal file was initiated for the participation in
mass disorders.
The power in Chiinu tried to show concern for the rapid and correct solving of
this situation. Thus, on April 11th, the Moldovan minister of interior made public
94 The Moldovan Ministry of Interior spoke of 172 persons arrested and fined (http://www.mai.md/stirile-minro/216738/). The Chiinu Town Hall created an office for registering the cases of abuse against people and made
318 registrations. In exchange, the Human Rights Institute (IDOM) and The Resources Centre for Human Rights
(CReDo) made their own investigations and identified around 655 people. The abovementioned data are based on
the documents put at our disposal.
95 According to accounts of the Info-Prim Neo press agency, available at the address http://www.info-prim.md
96 According to accounts of the Info-Prim Neo press agency, available at the address http://www.info-prim.md
97 According to the data from the investigation carried out by the Human Rights Institute (IDOM) and The Centre
of Resources for Human Rights (CReDo).
98 See, for instance, a story made by Free Europe on 13 April 2009, available at http://www.europalibera.org/
152
the list of those seized following the protest actions from April 6th -7th and the
list of those under administrative arrest. However, the list in question was intensely
contested as some said that it did not offer basic data about all people seized.
On April 15th, in a TV appeal of President Vladimir Voronin, the head of state
announced that he would initiate a total amnesty and the cessation of any form
of prosecution of the participants in the street protest actions except for the
representatives of the underground world and the recidivists99.
In a couple of days, the General Prosecutors Office started the legal procedures
of releasing the people seized, with certain exceptions. All people seized in relation
to the events from April 7th, except for Anatol Mtsaru who continues to be
detained for another criminal matter were gradually released. Their period of
detention varied a lot; for instance, the politician Sergiu Mocanu remained in custody
for 65 days and from June 12th to July 31st he remained in house arrest.
The abuses on the detained people also had international repercussions. Thus,
at the European Court of Human Rights there are five files against the Republic
of Moldova, in which the complainants Anatol Mtsaru, Gabriel Stati and Aurel
Marinescu, Sergiu Mocanu and two other persons who wished to remain anonymous
during the investigation complained against the use of ill treatments or the lack of
evidence to entitle arrest.
In the mean time, through a presidential decree Moldova set up a State Commission
for the clarification of the circumstances and consequences of the events from
April 7th 8th 2009, presided by the communist deputy Vladimir urcan. Both the
opposition parties and the representatives of the civil society criticised the structure
of this commission and asked for the creation of an independent commission, with
the participation of European experts. The same position was taken by several
European officials. The activity of the commission was interrupted during the early
parliamentary elections from July 29th and the clarification of the events from
April 7th was too little discussed in the following period except for the mention of
undertaking a moratorium until the political situation is clarified.
The situation from the Republic of Moldova could not have left indifferent
the international bodies, either. The Moldovan NGOs alerted the European
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, the UN, the OSCE, the European Union, the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and other bodies and
asked the Moldovan government to investigate each case very rigorously.
Thus, in April-May the Commission for External Affairs of the European
Parliament had five reunions during which it discussed the situation from Chiinu.
99
According to accounts of the Info-Prim Neo press agency, available at the address http://www.info-prim.md
153
On April 26th -29th, Moldova received the visit of a delegation of the European
Parliament which documented on the spot the post-election situation in order
to prepare a Draft Resolution of this institution. Following the research visit of
the members of the European Parliament and the debates from the specialised
commission, on May 7th the European Parliament approved The Resolution concerning
the situation from the Republic of Moldova100.
unjustified seizures and made extensive use of beating or intimidation tactics. To

resume, the following situations were identified:
Arrest and detention were used extensively and systematically.
According to the investigation of the Human Rights Institute (HRI) and of
the Resources Centre for Human Rights - CReDo based on the identification
of about 655 people detained or arrested, 47% of them were accused of mass
disorders, 28% of robbery or 13% of hooliganism or insubordination
to the police.
The resolution insists on the respect of the rule of law and of human rights, firmly
condemning all related deviations and violations registered after the parliamentary
elections. Thus, they express their concern about the illegal and arbitrary arrests,
the numerous violations of the human rights of the arrested people, especially in
what concerns the right to life, the right not to be subject to any physical abuse, to
torture, to inhuman, degrading or punitive treatments, the right to freedom and
security, the right to justice and the right to freedom of meeting, association and
speech.
Access to legal assistance was not ensured in a large number of

cases. Thus, according to the already mentioned investigation, 40% of those
detained affirm that they did not have access to a lawyer within the limits
provided by law (respectively three hours for adults and one hour for minor
children); moreover, 64% of those arrested say that they were forced to
sign the accusation and procedural documents without any legal assistance;
thus, 20% of the people accused state that they did not receive any legal
assistance during the legal procedures and another 38% state that they were
not explained why they were arrested.
The European Parliament asked to launch a special investigation in the cases

of those deceased during the events which followed the elections and also of all
accusations of rape or ill treatments during detention and of the arrests made on
political grounds, expressing its desire that those responsible of brutality and
violence against the detained persons should be brought to justice. Moreover, they
proposed the setting up of an independent commission for the investigation of the
post-elections events, with the participation of experts from the European Union
and the Council of Europe101.
The police was very brutal. The number of beatings, maltreatments or

intimidations was very high. To this end, the IDOM and CReDO investigation
reveals that about 64% of the people detained say that they were beaten or
abused while in police custody. Thus, 7.5% of those arrested say that they were
beaten in the police cars while being transported to the place of detention;
of the people maltreated, 56% declared having been beaten with the legs
or hit and 42% were beaten with the batons. There were also cases when
those arrested were hit with plastic bottles filled with water. To conclude, we
must say that 2% of those detained say that they were sexually abused by the
police. Under these circumstances, many people were hospitalised or treated
at home.
Last but not least, we must say that the events from April 7th gave the power in
Chiinu a reason to expel several foreign journalists (while others were not allowed
access into the country), to limit access to information or to launch accusations of
interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova by states such as
Romania. In the end, however, the Moldovan authorities would have moderated this
last point of view102.
In conclusion, one might say that during and especially after the end of the
demonstrations from April 7th 2009 numerous situations of violation of human
rights were recorded as the police most often acted very brutally, retorted to
100
According Euromonitor no. 6, Implementarea reformelor iniiate conform Planului de Aciuni UE-RM,
Evaluarea progresului n perioada aprilie-iunie 2009, report compiled by the organisations Adept and ExpertGrup.
101 The entire text of the resolution may be found at the following address: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2009-0384&language=RO .
102 Romania, as a state, did not participate at the protests from 7 April", declared on 22 July this year the
General Prosecutor of the Republic of Moldova, Valeriu Gurbulea, who added that "only some forms of actions
were registered", such as "a cyber attack on the servers of the state institutions" initiated from Romania and
"attempts to cross the Moldovan-Romanian border ", according to the Unimedia.md news portal.
154
A lot of minor children were detained and there was no access to

medical services in a large number of cases103.
According to the data collected by the Office for the registration of cases of
abuse against people, opened by Chiinu Town Hall, 43 cases of inhuman treatment
and torture were documented. In exchange, the General Prosecutors Office of
the Republic of Moldova announced having opened just one criminal file on the
name of citizen Hnc Damian for the use of torture, following the submission of
103
Information from a report put at our disposal by the Human Rights Institute (IDOM) and The Centre of
Resources for Human Rights (CReDo), document which was not yet made public when this report was compiled.
155
24 complaints104. However, the number of complaints would increase further on

and in this case it is worth mentioning the case of the orthodox priest Johnattan
Jerusalayem Netanyahu, a Romanian and American citizen initially accused of having
organised the mass disorder actions; after being released, the priest complained to
the prosecutors of having been beaten by the policemen and he declared that he
would insist for the justice to punish the guilty policemen for having retorted to
torture.
The rather numerous situations of human rights violation following the police
intervention after the events from April 7th are also confirmed by a public institution
from Moldova, i.e. that of the Ombudsman. Thus, a report of this institution was
saying: Some of the interviewed persons made reference to the use of excessive
violence by the collaborators of the police both during the arrest and in the police
stations of the Chiinu municipality districts and others were showing body injuries
when they were transferred to their places of detention. () It was discovered that
they were generally given the right to defend themselves by choosing a lawyer or
benefiting from state guaranteed legal assistance. () At the same time, it was
discovered that in some cases the arrest protocols were erroneously compiled as
they did not indicate either the date or the hour of the arrest, therefore making it
impossible to determine the duration of the detention, in total disagreement with
the provisions of article 167 of the Criminal Proceedings Code. () Another legal
framework which was erroneously implemented refers to the arrested being given
the possibility to inform one of their close relatives or any other person about where
they are being held; this again is in contradiction with the legal provisions105.
The limitation of the right to free and fair elections

The organization and the development of an electoral process according to
the democratic criteria is one of the objectives freely undertaken by the Republic
of Moldova both on the basis of its internal legislation and the adherence to the
standards of the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
The parliamentary elections from April 5th and also the early elections from
July 29th were assessed by quasi all the observers and independent reports as being
partially free and democratic. Of course, in Moldova there were no situations
similar to those from other Central Asian countries where the multiple voting is
a common procedure or where the leader in power obtains at least 90 percents of
all the votes in the country. Nevertheless, in Moldova the irregularities exceeded
104
According to a story of the Free Europe radio station (http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/1614813.

html), mentioned in the Euromonitor report no. 6 Implementarea reformelor iniiate conform Planului de Aciuni
UE-RM, Evaluarea progresului n perioada aprilie-iunie 2009, compiled by the organisations Adept and Expert
Grup. This last report is available in PDF format on the website www.expert-grup.org.
105 According to the preliminary Report on the respect of the rights of the people for the events from 7 April 2009,
available at http://ombudsman.md/file/Rapoarte/tematice/Pentru%20Presa.doc
156
the average acceptable level for a state which is not entirely democratic, while
such irregularities were complex and sophisticated, at the limit of the applicable
European standards106.
Since the number of cases which may be classified as breaches of the right to
free and correct elections is high, we will only present the most relevant situations or
the cases which have a major impact107.
Hence:
During the electoral campaign the candidates made use of
intimidations, exercised pressures and physical aggressions including with
weapons with blades. There were cases when the local civil servants said that
they were intimidated by their bosses that they did not ensure the presence of
the voters at the meetings with some candidates. At the same time, some voters
were threatened by some representatives of the local public administration if
they participated at the meetings with certain candidates. In the same context,
some economic agents complained about the pressures exercised by the
authorities for providing services for candidates of the opposition.
The non-compliance with the legislation on electoral publicity
was the most frequent violation of all candidates. The electoral gifts were also
present in this electoral campaign as well as the differential treatment applied
to the opponents by representatives of the local public authorities.
The administrative resources put at the disposal of the electoral
constituencies were often used for political purposes. Representatives
of the political parties provided various gifts to the electors such as the
organisation of free concerts, landscape development, free equipments, and
humanitarian aids.
The messages of the electoral campaign often had an aggressive
character, which prevented many voters from having a clear, reasonable
option. It was not just once there were promoted hate discourses or completely
distorted electoral messages. The aggressiveness of the electoral speech grew
worse in the campaign before the early elections, the main leitmotif being the
riots from April 7th 8th.
The mass-media often reflected the electoral campaign in a biased
manner. The negative champion of this was the public company TeleradioMoldova. There were also some electoral posters placed in unauthorised
places and others were destroyed.
106
According to the statements made by all consulted experts and by the civil organisations. A similar conclusion
may also be found in the reports monitoring the electoral process.
107 For details on the concrete cases please see: The 1st and 2nd Reports of the League for the Defence of Human
Rights on the monitoring of the elections campaign for the parliamentary elections from 29 July; The 1st and 2nd
reports of the Promo-Lex Association on the monitoring of the early parliamentary elections from 29 July; The
Quarterly report (6) on access to official information in the Republic of Moldova, compiled by a group of experts
under the management of the Acces-Info Association (April-June 2009).
157
No solution was found for the voting of the Moldovan citizens

from abroad or from Transnistria. For the latter 11 voting sections were
opened, but they were not ensured any information campaign.
The involvement of minor children in the electoral campaign.
The political parties involved children in the campaign, using them for the
distribution of information to their voters or in the organization of electoral
concerts.
Just one day after the parliamentary elections from April 5th, the OSCE observers
presented a report later assessed as superficial showing that the elections from
Moldova were free and fair, with some minor violations. After the riots from
April 7th 8th, the OSCE observers, the joint international mission were much
more careful in their assessments and tried to have a massive presence outside of
Chiinu, as well also trying to understand exactly what the national observers or
the opposition parties see when they talk about the use of administrative resources
or the abusive use of the media108. Therefore one week after the initial report,
the OSCE published an additional note in which it admitted the ballot monitoring
deficiencies which made it impossible to register any significant violations.
On July 20th, unlike the reports from April, the Western observers from the
European Parliament and the OSCE stated that the early elections were incorrect,
partially free and that many violations of the legislation took place. The same
opinion was expressed by the national observers from the 2009 Coalition while the
observers from the mission of the Community of Independent States considered
that the elections took place in entire conformity with the electoral legislation in
force109.
The international observers noted that although the day of the elections was
properly organised and the elections went on peacefully, the abuses in the use of
the administrative resources had a negative effect on the equality of opportunities
during the electoral campaign. As negative points, the observers also noted that
the authorities had used subtle pressuring and intimidation methods and the main
television channels had not offered balanced information, but rather favoured the
governing party.
The head of the OSCE observers mission, Petros Efthymiou, declared on
July 30th that although the electoral campaign generally developed in a pluralist
environment, it was still affected by the governing partys attempts to prevent the
opposition from meeting: The abusive use of the administrative sources by some
political parties had a negative effect on their equal opportunities to develop the
campaign110. At the same time, the public TV station did not manage to provide
108
impartial and balanced information through its programs, but rather favoured the
Party of Communists. Petros Efthymiou showed concern for the fact that cases of
intimidation of the candidates and the voters by the police were also notified111.
Marian-Jean Marinescu, the representative of the Mission of observers from the
European Parliament declared that in spite of all the efforts made by the electoral
administration to remedy the irregularities discovered in April during the compilation
of the lists of voters, the ballot from July 29th lacked transparency with regard to
the posting of the electoral lists and the registration of the voters: the long-term
observers informed us that there had been some improvements, but overall the
electoral campaign developed in a more tensed atmosphere than in April, which is
very regrettable.
Several observers underlined that the lists of voters are not just a technical
problem but a political one, which must be solved through adequate means.
On the other hand, according to the 2009 Coalition dozens of serious cases
of intimidation of the electoral opponents were registered during the electoral
campaign and the state did not ensure a violence-free campaign climate.
According to the 2009 Coalition the electoral lists were not compiled correctly
and access to the information concerning the lists was limited. Therefore, on the
elections day there were multiple cases of unknown persons reported living at other
voters addresses, fraudulent votes in the name of other persons, and cases of voters
multiple registration in the electoral lists, sometimes even different ID data112.
Freedom of speech and of meeting progress in legislation,

discrimination in practice
On paper, Republic of Moldova has one of the most modern and permissive
laws when it comes to freedom of meeting. The new law concerning meetings
was adopted by the Parliament in Chiinu on February 22nd 2008 and it became
effective on April 22nd the same year.
According to the law113, to organise a meeting one only needs to inform the
town hall about his or her intent to do so (before, one needed the approval of the
town hall to organise such meeting) and meetings of less than 50 people may occur
spontaneously, without prior notification. At the same time, the law states that the
town hall may ban the development of meetings only through a court decision
Interview with analyst Igor Munteanu (IDIS Viitorul), available at address: http://politicom.moldova.org/
news/imunteanu-neregularitile-la-alegeri-complexe-i-sofisticate-203045-rom.html
109 Public information, presented by the press from Chiinu.
110 The case which attracted most of the attention of the press was the one related to the retention of the mayor of
Chiinu, Dorin Chirtoac. On 18 July, he was retained for a couple of hours by the police for the assumed reason
that his meeting with the voters, during which a film about the incidents from 7 April was shown, lasted too much
and it extended over 10 p.m. Chirtoac said that he expected a fine as he had been accused of having disturbed the
public order, but the policemen who interviewed him didnt even draw up a minutes of the offence.
See the story of Free Europe available at http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/1789201.html. Of the

cases of obvious violation of the human rights one must mention the expelling of five observers from Georgia and
Ukraine (later on, all observers of the Mission of the European Network of the Elections Monitoring Organisations
- ENEMO withdrew), of seven foreign citizens (four Danes and three Belarusians) members of a civic organisation
or delaying tactics with the journalists at the border.
112 the stories of Free Europe available at: http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/1789201.html
113 The full text of the lawe on meetings may be found on the website http://lex.justice.md/.
158
159
111
(before, it could do so through a decision of its own). Last but not least, the police
must protect those participating at the meeting from any counter-demonstrators.
In reality, the legislative progress was not accompanied by the elimination of
the discriminating practices as the actions of the police and town halls from the
Republic of Moldova speak of a real refusal to comply with the laws in force.
According to the reports of the civic organisations, the presence of the police at the
demonstrations, the number of people arrested and the use of force have increased
since the new law became effective114.
To this end, it would be worth mentioning the cases in which members of the
Hyde Park organisation were treated rudely and detained only for exercising their
right to speak freely. Another eloquent case is that of Oleg Brega member of
the mentioned organisation who, on April 30th 2008 was arrested for protesting
peacefully by himself in the centre of Chiinu at the anniversary of the setting up
of the state television. The police tried to prevent him from protesting and accused
him of hooliganism. On May 9th, the court sentenced him to three days of prison
for swearing in public. His brother, Ghenadie Brega was fined for protesting in
public against Olegs arrest115.
On the other hand, on May 8th 2008 the town hall from Chiinu banned for the
third consecutive year a demonstration of people with different sexual orientation.
The Genderdoc-M NGO informed the mayors office about their intention to
organise this March in front of the Parliament, to support a new anti-discrimination
law. The mayors office said that the religious organisations, the students and the
locals had had a negative reaction to this plan and they accused the sexual minorities
of aggressiveness and violation of the moral and spiritual values and therefore, to
avoid any social tensions, they had to ban the march. The militants did arrive at
the Parliament but they were surrounded by around 300 aggressive people who
prevented them from getting off the bus. The few policemen that were in the area
did not have any intervention116.
The conscious and premeditated violation of the meetings law would reach its
peak on the occasion of the events from April 7th 2009. Immediately after the
parliamentary elections, on April 6th, a group of civic activists (among which
Natalia Morari and Ghenadie Brega as natural persons and members of the initiative
group I am anti-communist) organised a peaceful event entitled day of national
mourning as a protest against the results of the elections. They informed the
authorities about their plans in accordance with the law and the forecasted protest
action was promoted through the internet social networks, through text messages
on mobile phones and from person to person117. The organisers expected just a
couple of hundred young people, but they were amazed to see thousands of people
gathering, including the leaders of the major opposition parties. We, as initiators
of the meeting, tried to calm people and declared the demonstration closed at the
hour agreed upon with the authorities. We are not responsible for what happened
afterwards declared one of the organisers118.
But the authorities reacted in force. On April 7th, the General Prosecutors
Office announced that they had opened a criminal file on the name of Ghenadie
Brega and one day later his brother, Oleg, is beaten by policemen in civilian clothes.
On April 9th, the headquarters of the Hyde Park Association is searched by the
police and several computers, documents, media materials etc. are seized119. Around
the same period journalist Natalia Morari is also arrested and accused of having
organised mass disorders. On June 12th, Dorin Chirtoac, the mayor of Chiinu
is also accused of having organised mass disorders and of attempted coup dtat
for which he may get the maximum punishment of 15 years of prison. His lawyer
declared that the mayor had been present at the demonstrations from April 6th - 7th
but only to convince people not to make use of violence.
In a standard reply to the appeals of Amnesty International supporting Natalia
Morari and Ghenadie Brega, the General Prosecutors Office declared that only
those participants who took an active part in the illegal actions, qualified as such by
the criminal law, i.e. the individuals who used violence against the representatives
of the law enforcement agencies, destroyed or incited people to arson and destroy
public property were detained and criminally prosecuted. According to Amnesty
International, Natalia Morari, Ghenadie Brega and Dorin Chirtoac were accused of
having committed criminal actions for exercising their legitimate right to freedom
of speech and if they had been sentenced, Amnesty International would have
considered them prisoners of consciousness120. Later on, all those arrested would
be released and their interdiction to leave the country would be cancelled.
In May, Hyde Park Association sent to the European Court of Human Rights
a complaint against the illegal search and seizure of assets from its headquarters. It
is to be noted that the association or its members submitted 16 complaints to the
European Court of Human Rights which concern different forms of violation of
the human rights; so far, four files were given a favourable solution.
114
115
The full text of the lawe on meetings may be found on the website http://lex.justice.md/.
Following an interview with Ghenadie Brega, leader of Hyde Park, it resulted that members and sympathizers
of the organisation carried out demonstrations for various pretexts (in front of the Romanian Embassy, militating
for their right to education in Romanian; or a commemorative meeting in front of the Russian Embassy in Chiinu)
and they had problems with the police on each occasion although according to them they had always observed the
law, For further details, please see the website www.curaj.net.
116 Please see the stories of the Moldovan press from that period.
160
117
118
119
120
Interview with Ghenadie Brega, informal leader of the Hyde Park organisation, Chiinu, July 2009
Interview with Ghenadie Brega, informal leader of the Hyde Park organisation, Chiinu, July 2009
Idem. The chronology of these events is available on the website www.curaj.net.
Please see http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGEUR590062009&lang=e
161
Harassment of the human rights defenders

In the chapter related to freedom of speech and of meeting we should also
classify the situations in which several Moldovan organisations of the civil society
were subject to unacceptable pressures from the authorities.
Hence, in a letter to the Prime Minister dated April 29th 2009 the organisation
Amnesty International expressed its concern about the fact that at least seven
NGOs had received letters from the Ministry of Justice being asked to explain their
position in relation to the April 7th riots and to present the measures taken by the
organisation to prevent and stop the violence and to ensure the observance of the
law in relation to the meetings.
These seven organisations and four others also received unexpected summons
from the local tax inspectorates dated April 24th; through these summons they were
asked to submit their financial documents for the years 2008 and 2009 until April
28th and to identify their income sources and their expenses.
On April 28th, the office of Amnesty International in Moldova received the visit
of the representatives of the local tax inspectorate which asked the organisation to
show a copy of the list of members who had paid contributions. Then, starting from
April 9th the Amnesty International Moldova office was supervised by unidentified
individuals for several days121.
In an answer addressed to Amnesty International from May 22nd, the Minister
of Justice declared that the actions of the tax authorities have nothing to do with the
actions of the Ministry of Justice and that the latter had acted in accordance with
the law. The state tax authorities did not give any explanation.
There were also subtler pressures. For instance, the office of Human Rights
Institute which had started an investigation related to the victims of the riots from
April 7th started to be supervised by certain unidentified individuals who kept an
eye on who comes when and when they leave from us. The telephone line started to
work very badly; I am sure that even my personal mobile was and still is intercepted.
When I have certain important discussions with different individuals about the
events from April, the connection is very bad or I have to call several times until I
find that person. Often, once I start the conversation, I hear an electronic signal in
the telephone. I did not hear this signal before the events from April 2009122.
The pressures against non-governmental organisations grew less intense before
the early parliamentary elections but discussions with NGO representatives from
Chiinu showed that the harassment and intimidation actions were a constant
preoccupation of the government.
121
122
See: http://www.amnesty.md/news/news.php?ln=ro&id=248
Interview with Vanu Jereghi, manager of the Human Rights Institute (IDOM) and vice-president of the
Consultative Council for the Prevention of Torture, Chiinu, August 2009
162
The flawed functioning of the legal system

In the Republic of Moldova there is consensus only in one matter: human rights
are far from being respected, not even at the most basic standards.
The experts and the civic activists are unanimous when it comes to the cause of
this state of fact: the flawed functioning of the legal system, the too exaggerated
influence of the politics, and the almost total subordination of justice to the party
in power. The legal system is almost entirely subordinated to the politics believes
Vanu Jereghi, manager of Human Rights Institute (IDOM) and vice-president of
the Advisory Council for the Prevention of Torture. The party and the lack of
professionalism are the great problems of Justice. It is necessary that the judges,
the police, and the prosecution do observe the European standards. We have a
good legislation, there are some laws which need to be amended to cancel some
anomalies, but the most important thing is for these laws to be implemented
believes lawyer Alexandru Postic, legal consultant of the Promo-Lex organisation.
A similar opinion is shared by Igor Boan, executive manager of the Association for
Participative Democracy-ADEPT: The vertical of the state power generates the
human rights violation cases and maintains corruption. Those in high positions feel
protected; they can do anything, while those outside the system suffer. Human rights
are violated to protect those in power. Last but not least, lawyer Vlad Gribincea
from the Association Legal Consultants for Human Rights said: The problems of
Moldova are not generated by the legislation, but by its implementation. We need
honest civil servants which should not be subject to political pressures123.
There are numerous shortcomings in the Moldovan legal system:
Vulnerability in front of pressures coming from political factor. The
lack of independence of the prosecutors office leads to its involvement in
intimidations and in preparation of politically motivated dossiers;
Vulnerability to corruption;
Insufficient funding and payment;
Extension of the reasonable time needed to examine a case;
Bad technical equipment;
A significant number of unexecuted court decisions;
Insufficient professional training and unsatisfying quality of the auxiliary
staff;
The legal system remains closed, without any efficient external
control124.
123
124
Interviews with legal consultants and civic activists, Chiinu, July-August 2009.
Synthesis of the problems made on the basis of interviews with legal consultants and civic activists. For an
exhaustive presentation of the problems of the legal system of the Republic of Moldova, please see Alexandru
Cocr, Reforma justiiei n contextul implementrii Planului de Aciuni UE-Moldova, Chiinu 2009, ADEPT
(www.e-democracy.md)
163
All these bring an obvious prejudice to the image of justice, affect the economic
and social development of the Moldovan state and reduce its credibility on the
external arena. The existence of shortcomings in the system is acutely felt by the
ordinary people, also proven by the polls which show a low confidence of the
population in the institution of justice (around 30%)125.
Last but not least, the fact that there are numerous cases of human rights violation
and that Moldovan justice seems to be incapable to solve them is reflected in the
growing number of cases opened at the European Court of Human Rights. The
number of requests submitted against the Republic of Moldova at the European
Court of Human Rights increased from 212 (in 2001) to 1147, last year. At the same
time, the number of requests declared admissible increased from 3 to 29 in the
same time interval. But the seriousness of the situation is given by the number of
sentences passed against Moldova by the European Court of Human Rights no less
than 138 cases (most of them related to the human rights violations) being solved
to the disadvantage of Chiinu. Through these decisions of the European Courts
of Human Rights, the Republic of Moldova was obliged to pay approximately 4.5
million Euros as material damages, moral damages and legal expenses126.
125
md
Please see the series of Public Opinion Barometers made by the Public Policies Institute, http://www.ipp.
The Business Environment

In The Republic Of Moldova
Party Of Communists Ltd
tefan Cndea
In the Republic of Moldova major businesses were closed or taken over by force.
Important privatisations were cancelled and the companies in question were nationalized.
In the profitable import and export sectors monopoles were created and the free market
competition was cancelled. All these were done to the detriment of businessmen and of
public money, entailing serious breaches of the human rights. The beneficiaries of the abuse
on the business environment are grouped around the presidential family, the ministers or the
close members of parliament. Nepotism and conflicts of interest, officials and dignitaries
these are the characteristics of the big businesses in Chiinu.
In the last 2 years, over 50 million EUR were invested from abroad in the Republic
of Moldova for anticorruption programs. Anticorruption expert: related to the money
spent, the results are very poor. Before the elections from April, the situation was improving.
But after the elections, everything was ruined. One cannot fight against corruption in a
totalitarian state.
If a business becomes profitable, it falls immediately in the hands of the raiders, i.e.
it is taken over by force. A handful of people grow excessively rich, a repressive apparatus
is encouraged to support itself from the small and medium corruption and an entire country
grows poorer. Voronin created a direct political vertical and leads everything. The present
report identifies a series of state weapons used to take over others businesses: CCECC;
the General Prosecutors Office with criminal files opened for blackmail; cancellation
of privatisations and nationalisation; the presidential institution or Voronin himself;
government ordinances or directives for creating monopoles; directing public money towards
the companies of the presidents son, Oleg Voronin.
126
Please see the activity reports of The European Courts of Human Rights, at the address: http://www.echr.
coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Reports/Annual+Reports
164
165
The system
The situation faced by the business environment from the Republic of Moldova
is the following: from the head of the state-party PCRM and with the help of
the state bodies, the Voronin family monopolised profitable business for themselves
and for a handful of close businessmen; these business use both private funds and
public money.
The wealth accumulated by Oleg Voronin in the years in which his father led
Moldova with an iron hand has already became a legend127. But the situation of the
business environment is neither funny, nor a legend. Major businesses were closed
or taken over by force. Important privatisations were cancelled and companies were
nationalised. In the profitable import and export sectors monopoles were created
and the free market competition was cancelled. All these were done to the detriment
of businessmen and of public money, entailing serious violations of human rights.
The beneficiaries of the abuse on the business environment are grouped around the
presidential family, the ministers or the close members of Parliament. Nepotism and
conflicts of interest are on the daily agenda.
Slowly but certainly, the political sector took over the profitable domains of the
private sector and also collected for its personal benefit what it should have spent in
the public interest. The system which was at the basis of the takeover of important
businesses is the following128: The Political controls the Executive, the Executive
harasses the Private, and the Private is forced to turn most of the profit both towards
the civil servants of the Executive as a bribe and to the faade-structures of the
Political. Larger businesses are simply seized by the so-called raiders129. The public
money is embezzled in the leaders private pockets.
The Political and the Executive are the Voronin family. The top positions of
the Executive are individuals who are very close to Voronin, most often individuals
who may be blackmailed or have various criminal files forgotten in the prosecutors
drawers. The intermediary private structures are controlled by maximum 5 families
around Voronin. The system made up of the police, the prosecutors office and the
justice is the driving belt which controls the businessmen.
The system implies blindly executed orders and blank permits to take bribe.
Voronin created a direct political vertical and he leads everything declared a journalist
127
The discussion related to the business environment from the Republic of Moldova starts invariably with one of
the versions of the joke about President Voronins son who holds all prosperous businesses in Chiinu and is pitied
by his mother for being the only one who works in the Republic. Vladimir Voronin and his wife, Taisa were walking
through Chiinu, astounded to see how many new banks, pizzerias and drug stores were in the city. Whose bank
is this? asks the first lady. Our sons, Oleg, answers the President. And that restaurant?. Still his. How
about the drug store at the corner?. Well it is still his, Taisia!, answers Vladimir Nikolaevici irritated. Poor boy,
the woman laments, it seems that our son is the only one working in this country
128 Interview with lawyer Vladislav Gribincea
129 Companies or individuals whose private business is taken over by force on behalf of some politicians.
166
specialised in the economic sector130. Voronin merged the control structures

in the Ministry of Interior, to create an efficient club131. Pressure instruments:
The General Prosecutor, CCECC, The Ministry of Interior, the Intelligence and
Security Service. The order to attack a businessman or a company comes directly
from Voronin, from one of the presidential councillors or from one of the families
around the President132. Businessmen have a name for this mechanism: the system.
The system invariably takes over the medium and big businesses whoever refuses
to conform, is processed to dissolution by the state control bodies.
Poverty and corruption

The Republic of Moldova is a poor country, on the verge of collapse. In the last
several months, in most of the country no pensions were paid. The help provided
by Moldovan citizens working abroad is essential. They send over a billion dollars
annually to their families left home. In the Republic of Moldova, any private initiative
is suffocated by a deeply corrupted legal system and by a contradicting legislation,
which generates bureaucracy and countless occasions of corruption.
Transparency International (TI) has been monitoring the corruption in the
Republic of Moldova for several years and has been conducting polls both among
the businessmen and among the common individuals. The TI polls publish charts
with information about fields where the corruption is frequent and the amounts paid
for different services. According to the president of TI Moldova, Lilia Carasciuc,
some of the indicators of small corruption registered weak improvements. But in
the last 2 years, over 50 million EUR were invested from abroad in the Republic
of Moldova for anticorruption programs. Related to the money spent, the results
are very poor. The money was invested in the tax system, the customs department
and the CCECC. Before the elections from April, the situation was improving. But
after the elections, everything was ruined. One cannot fight against corruption in a
totalitarian state. In the opinion of Carasciuc, the small corruption is an important
issue, but it can be solved. The big problem is the political corruption, a safe route
to dictatorship.
The methods used to suffocate the business environment are representative
for the state of the Moldovan society. Figures are distressing. There are almost
no foreign investors, the big investments came before the instauration of the
communist regime and are generally related to utilities (energy, communication).
The Moldovans from abroad are the biggest direct foreign investment133 - they send
130
131
132
133
Anonymous economic journalist

Interview with Nicolae Bivol, the first chief of the State Tax Inspectorate
See the case of the Carmez takeover
See the ECOnomist: No. 229/22 July 2009, Page 5 Moldovans working abroad continue to be the pillars of
the economy.
167
over 1 billion dollars in the country annually. 70% of the budget returns are ensured
by the Customs Department. 70% of the companies which make some profit are
active in Chiinu. The discretionary manner in which Voronin uses his country (the
imposition of the visa regime for Romania) led to the collapse of Romanian exports
to the Republic of Moldova and to the suspension of the activity of 200 companies
from the neighbouring country134. The value of the imports from Romania dropped
abruptly to one half, depriving the state budget from important returns.
A journalist specialised in the economic sector described the corruption
mechanism for us: The bureaucratic machine was inherited, then perfected and
strengthened by the communists. One gives bribe for any paper and this is distributed
to each higher level, depending on the size of the business. Each price is known
(according to the chart from the TI poll135). For atypical or larger businesses bribe is
given directly at the higher levels, depending on the business.
Any new business calculates its official business plan and, in parallel, the
unofficial one, with expenses on the black market and a bribe account. This is why
foreign companies choose local representatives who are familiar to the corruption
mechanism and have a budget to spend on this. Thus emerge the black cash
register businesses wages paid on the black market, quickly-made money and
quickly-hidden money. These businesses are vulnerable to the system from the very
beginning.
The unanimous opinion of those interviewed is that the main problem of the
Republic of Moldova for the environment business is the extremely corrupted
judicial system but also the judicial system in its entirety (police, prosecution,
judges). Besides, in the TI polls judges are the most recent occurrence and the most
spectacular increase in the chart related to the bribe businessmen have to pay. The
legislation is all right in most of its part, but the implementation is flawed. Moreover,
the legislation was amended with contradicting provisions by the communist regime.
The purpose of these amendments was to protect the incompetent civil servants
and to increase the power of the government even at a local level. There are, of
course, specialists in the police and in the secret services but they are overwhelmed
by the system led by the heads promoted or appointed on political grounds or based
on their file. The file must be as dirty as possible, i.e. people should be prone to
blackmail136. Civil servants are forced by the absurd system to manage and to make
black money137.
134
135
136
137
http://www.transparency.md/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=480&Itemid=49
http://www.transparency.md/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=14
Interview with Dorin Chirtoac
1st example the travel expenses of the road police are not deducted however, at the end of the month it is
obvious that a traffic policeman spent on travelling three times his wages and he is given nothing back. Where does
he have the money from? 2nd example a customs officer who has to move from West to the North-East. In his
report he wrote that he did not have the money to move and he did not receive anything from the state (he has 2
children and a wife working in the West). He is dismissed and a criminal file is opened against him for not having
followed an order. He went to a human rights lawyer who threatened to call a press conference. Panic in the system,
everything is changed rapidly. The system is absurd and forces individuals to take bribe on their own.
168
However, there is a flicker of hope after the elections from July, although only
statement-wise for now. The opposition promises to correct the legislation: We will
amend the legislation where it was changed by the communists to lead to the existing
monopole and absurdities. I am in favour to total transparency we must separate
politics from business138. I am in favour of a Companies Register which should be
available online. Maybe this way we could discover the connections between the
ministers and their relatives with profitable businesses. We are not there yet but we
do need a body of civil servants which are financially motivated and should forget
about the businesses declares Dorin Chirtoac. Practically, this is the big problem:
A clique of businessman controlled by the communists, around 5 families, took
over by force the control and monopole of everything related to banks, import
and export, transport, sales, partial communication, constructions and questionable
privatisations.
The Propaganda and the lack of transparency

The objective information, which is vital for a healthy business environment is
lost in the polarized media landscape139 which is professionally weak and constantly
abused by the state focussed on disinformation. In such a polluted business
environment, the economic press is pointless. Nobody wants it. The state is totally
un-transparent. So is the business environment. Moreover, the state uses the statistics
to manipulate and refuses to provide information related to domains and sensitive
business. Thus, the press cannot provide anything but bits of information, much of
it unverified and the citizen is constantly misinformed.
Raw economic information is missing or difficultly accessible. The economic
data presented by the state institutions are fake or erroneously interpreted140. The
National Bank is the only institution rather fair, but any other official information
is pure propaganda.
An example about the way in which information about important matters is given:
At the end of 2006 Voronin declared that there was no more organised crime in the
Republic of Moldova. This just evaporated over night141 in spite of the growing
corruption.
The business environment is not transparent, we find out about transactions
one year after they took place or from the foreign or Romanian press. There is no
138 See the article from Timpul, Tuesday 28 July, no. 136 year 8 Fabrica de milioane a lui Igor Dodon
prim viceprim-ministru si ministrul economiei o reea de nepotism, cu suflete moarte, a furat milioane din banii
publici
139 See the separate chapter Media
140 Journalists are describing, following discussions with the Institute specialists, how the Statistics Institute is
modifying the algorithms, the calculations and the reposts so that figures show the government in a favourable
light.
169
information related to companies, in some cases we have to give bribe if we want

information142.
Even if it is legalised, access to public information does not work. The bureaucratic
answers without any substance avoid the sensitive data. The Statistics Institute
refuses to provide information, asks for money or provides truncated information.
The big problem of journalists is that they lack information. They hear rumours,
but it is difficult to verify them. This is how general materials emerge poorly
supported by facts. We can verify information only where there are links to another
country.
The specialised press, a mirror of

environment
the business
I take my information from everywhere: Curaj.net, Unimedia, Jurnal and Pcrm.

md. The media is too polarized, the information is not easily accessible, some do not
understand the phenomenon, and others are forced by the employer to take sides143
declares a lawyer specialised in financial transactions.
The economic press has a high calibre player in Capital Market (CM) a
magazine which belongs to the state (the founder is The National Financial Market
Commission CNPF). For a private competitor, such as the ECOnomist, it
is difficult to keep its position on the market because the state advertisement is
inaccessible to him and so is the private advertisement. The state advertisement
goes to governmental publications only. Moreover, shares companies must publish
the quarterly and annual reports in any publication. Before, the law specified that
these should go to Capital Market in Russian and Romanian. Although this
obligation was taken out of the law, this is still how things are done. There is unfair
competition with other similar independent publications144.
Although a player with potential on the economic media market, now the CM
sticks strictly to the government line. The insider journalists admit to a draconic selfcensorship. CM supports itself financially, it does not receive money from the state,
and it even pays dividends of 30%. Even so, CM prints only 1.200 copies of which
half are sold through subscription, a quarter at the newspapers stand and the rest is
returned. The profit is not public, although the newspaper belongs to the state.
The mentality of the businessman is to hide his business and his profit as much
as he can. The same does the CM. Things are different than in other countries,
for fear someone might take over your business. CM tried to write company news.
When we called to ask for news, owners were amazed; they thought they should
142
143
144
Economic newspaper, anonymous

Lawyer specialized in commercial law, mergers, due diligence
Economic journalist, anonymous
170
give bribe for a piece of news to be published. It is very tough for the journalists,
even for those from the governmental newspapers, because there is no culture of
transparency145.
We identified a major difference from the surrounding countries: the databases
with information related to shareholders, property, and other financial information
are circulated against a sum of money in the entire former Soviet Union either on
DVDs or online. There is a natural reaction to the informational blockade imposed
by different governments. In the Republic of Moldova, such information is not
circulated because there is no demand for it. There is almost no competition. We
have a different manner of doing business, where each is given his or her role and is
not allowed to deviate from it: If you need a piece of information as businessman,
you get it. If you dont get it, it means you dont need it146.
Terror
The business environment is under terror. So are the communication channels
addressed to the public and any defenders of the businessmen (lawyers or specialised
NGOs).
The business environment is rope-walking between its own interests and those
of the state institutions. It is not only the businessmen who are under constant
danger, but also those with whom they come into contact: lawyers, media, NGOs.
The press was subject to growing pressure during the communist governing years.
Everything culminated with the elections from April 4th and the protests which
followed. Several journalists were placed under house arrest, others were kidnapped
from the streets and held captive for hours or even days, and dozens of foreign
journalists were expelled or were not allowed to enter the Republic of Moldova.
The climate established was one of terror. Arrests and beatings were carried out by
employees of the Ministry of Interior and of the Intelligence Service, many of them
dressed as civilians and travelling in vehicles with Transnistrian plate numbers. In the
following months, the local newspapers complained that their telephones and emails
were being intercepted and they were being followed.
The NGOs were not spared, either, even if some of them were participants
in internationally financed programs in partnership with different state institutions.
After the elections, all the NGOs and the opposition parties were inspected by the tax
authorities. We had three types of inspections: from the Ministry of Justice (asking
us why we did not intervene to re-establish order), from the tax authorities (they did
not know themselves what they were looking for; they just skimmed through our
files) and the guard company which was operating our alarm system, sent by the
145
146
Interview with a CM journalist

Interview with a CM journalist
171
Ministry of Interior and trying to install something on our premises. They came on
several occasions, until we terminated the contract with them147.
There are several law firms specialised in commercial law, but even they want to
remain in shadow. We could not write articles about them because they turned us
down constantly148.
For lawyers who represent customers in the international courts against the
Moldovan state, tension is a long-term feeling: There were pressures on me
personally but also on our law firm. We complained to the Court immediately. They
continued with the teasing. For instance, Moldtelecom blocked our outgoing fax
messages to the ECHR and their incoming messages to us for 2 years. We started
investigating and making official inquiries and suddenly the fax started working
again149.
Even the authors of this report took knowledge of the repressive apparatus
of the communist state. Two experts were denied access to the country during the
elections as their tourist visa was issued for the following week. One of the experts
asked for his visa from London, precisely to go around the blockade imposed on
Romanians. When he arrived on the Chiinu airport, he was questioned and searched
in detail. They, he was followed by at least 6 agents in civilian clothes, who watched
them during the following days150. Another expert who arrived the evening of the
elections was in his turn detained for several hours on the airport and interrogated
about the purpose of his visit to the Republic of Moldova.
Most of those having agreed to give interviews for this report asked to remain
anonymous.
The Transnistrisation of the Republic of Moldova

Any analysis related to the Republic of Moldova makes abstraction of the existence
of the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Republic (TMR) a black hole of smuggling
and lawlessness, where a state-clique is prospering with guns in their hands and
against whom nobody has done anything in the last 18 years. Transnistria has been
functioning for 18 years on the basis of an unchanged model: the Smirnov family
occupies the most important positions in the state but also the private sector. An
illegal state which has created instruments specific to any state: police, army, secret
services, custom officers, customs service, tax authorities, pensions system, salaries,
currency etc. Democracy is mimed; freedom of expression inexistent, business is
the exclusive prerogative of those in power. A region where 500 thousands people
live only to enrich the clique in power, who imposed themselves with the help of
147
148
149
150
interview with Lilia Carasciuc, TI, involved in anticorruption programs with state institutions.
economic journalist, anonymous
interview with Vladislav Gribincea
see http://jurnal.md/article/18586/ and http://www.evz.ro/articole/detalii-articol/861410/Jurnalist-romanfilat-si-amenintat-de-agentii-lui-Voronin/
172
guns. This is the model towards which the Republic of Moldova has headed itself
in the last 8 years, obviously encouraged by the international lack of reaction. TMR
influences the business environment but also the behaviour of the neighbouring
state in issues such as human rights, media, democracy precisely because no firm
action has been taken by the international community against the TMR. This is why
it became possible for the TMR to be seen as a successful model. This was certainly
replicated at a larger scale by the Voronin regime, under the apathetic looks of the
international community.
The state apparatus

Forms of pressure
The work instruments of this system are monopole, investigations and criminal
files, nationalization and nepotism. If a business becomes profitable, it falls quickly
in the hands of the raiders, meaning that it is taken over by force. A handful of
people grow excessively rich, a repressive apparatus is encouraged to increase its
revenues from corruption while an entire country is getting poorer. Ironically, if this
system were not fuelled by the Moldovan citizens working abroad, it would collapse.
Annually, those having fled abroad from the Voronin regime send over one billion
dollars to their relatives remained in the country. Their money goes to consumption,
which is intensely supplied from imports. From the interviews we had in Chiinu,
it results that the profitable import-export operations were seized, with the help
of the state, by umbrella companies of the Voronin family151. To understand how
lucrative the import export business is, we consulted the 2008 Activity Report of
the Customs Service: the customs operations represent 70% of the state budget
returns152.
Forced takeovers do not have profit as sole purpose. The second major reason
for which certain businesses were closed abusively or taken by force was to prevent
important funds from going to the opposition parties. In other words, to prevent
any attempt to change the current system.
How did the Republic of Moldova reach the state of facts described above,
in a relatively short time? Voronin created a direct political vertical and he leads
everything is the most often occurring statement in discussions with businessmen,
lawyers or journalists. Violations of the constitution were not penalised, therefore
Voronin acted in an organised manner, sheltered by the political majority of the
Parliament153.
151
152
153
See interview notes

http://www.customs.gov.md/index.php?id=1603
See Jurnal de Chiinu. Voronin a uzurpat puterea de stat? and Curtea Constituional ncalc legea
Nicolae Osmochescu, judge at the Constitutional Court, says that Voronin chairs the government reunions nonconstitutionally.
173
The state instruments in the hand of the presidential

family
This report identifies a series of state weapons used in the seizure of private
businesses: CCECC; the General Prosecutor which documents criminal files
for blackmail only; cancellation of privatisations and nationalization; the
presidential institution or Voronin himself; government ordinances and
directives to create monopole situations; directing the public money to
companies of the Presidents family.
In order for the state institutions to function on political command, there are no
cases of civil servants being accused of abuses (in the police, politics, administration
or government etc.).
An essential tool in the fight for taking control of businesses is the Centre
for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (CCECC). The structure is
subordinated to the government and represents a merger of former independent
institutions, from different ministers (such as the Financial Guard) under one single
structure154. Voronin merged the former Financial Guard and other structures of
the Ministry of Interior to have an efficient club155. Hence, at this point there
are no independent structures dealing with cases of corruption or economic crime.
Moreover, to the management of this structure they brought a main pawn from the
Intelligence and Security Service. Numerous voices are accusing that CCECC is a
structure specialized in taking over profitable businesses and harassing politically
unsubordinated businessmen.
Another method to pressure businessmen is represented by the criminal files
opened by the General Prosecutor and left pending, never sent to court. These
files are a blackmail tool around elections or in cases of forced takeovers, when the
subject of the file is incarcerated for a period of time, to be dispossessed by his/her
shares or any other businesses.
Voronin himself sometimes gets involved against specific businessman or
companies. For example, he started a campaign against businessman Anatol Stati,
owner of the Ascom group. Because Ascom carries out its businesses in Kazakhstan,
Voronin notified publicly the authorities from Kazakhstan to be careful who they
are getting into business with156. Inspections ended in fines were immediately
initiated against the Ascom companies from Kazakhstan. At the same time, the
General Prosecutor arrested Gabriel Stati, the son of the Ascom CEO, accusing him
of having organised protests and non-transparent financing of the opposition. So
154
155
http://www.cccec.md/history
Statement of Nicolae Bivol, former chief of the Main State Tax Inspectorate. In the past he organised a
structure similar to the Romanian Financial Guard. Now he is representing businessmen in court against abuses of
the tax authorities.
174
much did Voronin wish to see Stati arrested, that the latter was extradited through
an emergency procedure from Ukraine. His lawyers consider that both the arrest
and the extradition procedure were illegal. Finally, Gabi Stati was transferred from
custody to house arrest.
TI notices a strategy aimed at creating monopoles on different niches of the
imports and a political pressure on the Customs: We noted an interesting statement
of Nicolae Vlcu157, general manager of the Customs Department, who had said
that there are big pressures on him and that if these do not stop, he would make
inconvenient statements These monopoles on the import export operations are
initiated by the government, which invents new redundancy rules for each branch.
The newly-created bureaucracy acts as a filter. Only companies which are approved by
the communist leaders pass this filter. The competition is eliminated. I tried to take
my import license for meat, as we are the biggest processing factory in the country.
I had 3 employees doing the paper work and going through the entire bureaucratic
process, working nonstop. We managed to meet the impossible deadlines and yet
our file was rejected for absolutely no reason. The second day we had an intimidation
control from the Ministry of Interior and I was told never to submit a license request
for the import of meat, because we would all face serious trouble158. All profitable
import export branches were seized through government decisions or completions
of the previous legislation: fish, cereals, meat, industry, sugar, transport. Thus, they
impose intermediaries who increase prices by 20-30 percents159.
The cancellation of privatisations and the nationalisation have been common
phenomena ever since the communists took power. The Republic of Moldova was
already condemned in several such cases by the European Court of Human Rights.
Although the fault for a fraudulent privatisation also falls with the civil servants, no
one was investigated, so far. The privatisation files were compiled only to take over
those businesses.
The public money directed to the businesses controlled by Oleg Voronin is on
the first page of the opposition newspapers. The most recent: the simultaneous
renovation of the Parliament Palace and of the Presidency building, affected by the
protests from April. The Contract amounts to 100 million dollars; the accounts of
the ministries and of other state institutions were transferred by force to the banks
controlled by Oleg Voronin; the private companies were marginalised to the benefit
of state companies in fields like insurances or communications.
The corrupt judicial system

From the interviews we took, there is one unanimously recognised truth: the
judicial system of the Republic of Moldova is profoundly corrupt. Any lawyer
157
158
159
Deceased in 2006
Anatolie Cislaru, CARMEZ
lawyer Vladislav Gribincea
175
specialised in commercial law will recommend his or her customers to reach an

agreement or to take the trial anywhere else outside the Republic of Moldova.
Vladislav Gribincea represented several private companies abusively dispossessed
by the state of companies purchased through privatization at the European Court
of Human Rights. As lawyer of the businessmen in conflict with the state, Gribincea
underlines the main problems: We have big taxation issues because the tax authorities
harass the taxpayer. One cannot defend oneself because there is no constant legal
practice. One cannot fight the state and the tax authorities - this is unimaginable.
Not even the judges murmur, although they are in constant degradation since 2006
and the investment budget allocated to them was not released. One cannot make
big businesses in the Republic of Moldova without giving something to the power
underhand. It all comes down to the interests of the Executive, which are the interests
of Voronin. The legislative framework is not all good, either; there are contradictory
provisions. But the major issue is the civil servants who enforce the law. The civil
servants are allowed to take bribe and this makes them prone to blackmailing. No
top judge, no minister is a man of integrity they are all controversial and have
hardly been given key positions. One cannot speak of independent police force,
prosecutors and judges. The 8 years strategy of the communists was to seize or
subordinate the profitable medium and big-sized companies. They had 8 years and
70% of the mandates, i.e. a constitutional majority they used them only for their
own interest. From what we observed, the tools which assist in forced takeovers are
CCECC and the General Prosecutor.
Gribincea identifies a series of major problems of the system:
Trials and files on command which remain open as blackmail tools.
Unpunished abuses of the police and the prosecutors.
Judgments given without presentation of reasons;
Flagrant violation of the right of property dispossession through
cancellation of the privatisation.
The purpose of any abusive detention is the dispossession of assets.
The fear of the Executive and the corruption prevents justice from
functioning.
It is impossible to win a trial in court against the will of the
Government160
To understand to what point is the state with all its tools focussed on seizing the
business environment, we take a look at the percents of the trials whose object is the
cancellation of the privatisations: until June 2008, 15% of the pending trials of the
Supreme Court of Justice, the Economic College have as object the cancellation
of the privatisation.
160
Immediately after the elections, the situation started to change and political prisoners such as Mocanu were
released.
176
Detailed cases and models

The Soviet mentality of the system and of the businessmen
The mentality of the local businessman is still the Soviet mentality according to
which the owner tries to make money as hidden as possible, so as not to raise the
curiosity of the state bodies or of the politicians in power. We have no tax-related
culture, many ignored the legal system, things went on and they reached a vicious
circle, with black money which they cannot justify161. In many cases, owners go
into hiding when they own a business because they are afraid of the source of the
money. They do not consult their lawyer, they put someone in front and thats it; it
is the disease of those who got rich in the 90s162.
The law of fiscal amnesty from 2008 remained without effect for two reasons:
the amnesty fee was 5%, a very high fee; businessmen were afraid this might be a
trap aimed at identifying and persecuting them.
There are no murders anymore, but once a business starts to work, it is better
to give it to someone else. Any profitable business is a clear victim of the raiders.
I went through this and I started again from scratch. Because I work in complete
transparency and without any black money and because my business is in the media
sector, they did not manage to close it, but I have years of pressure behind me163.
Raiders for the System

Interviewed businessmen state that at this moment there is a system functioning
in the Republic of Moldova; according to this system, you must contribute. The
system is guarded and controlled by 5 families surrounding Voronin, with the help
of the state bodies. The state bodies started to get involved in private disputes 4
years ago. What seemed wild in 2000 now seems normal. Our mentality changed a
lot and so did our system of values; we accept unimaginable abuses easily164. The
businessmen from Chiinu speak of an offensive of the state bodies, after the
elections from April; then, companies were visited by the police or the tax authorities
and they received fines ex officio, without any inspection. The bigger companies
were forced to pay taxes in advance.
You hear of forced business takeovers everywhere. A taxi driver told me about
his brothers experience; he was distributor of a coffee brand and he received the
visit of 3 men who told him that they liked his business and he must turn it over, to
stay out of trouble. He turned it over, giving in to their threats. At the TI corruption
hotline we heard the case of 2 young people who had returned to the country and
161
162
163
164
Interview with Liliana Carsciuc, TI

lawyer specialised in commercial law, anonymous
businessman, anonymous
businessman, anonymous
177
opened a restaurant. A constructions inspector came and asked a bribe of 100 euro.
They were obstinate and did not want to give it. The pressures which followed were
so big that one of them fled from Moldova and changed his name. The second left
all the documents with the TI he though they would kill him. Because the case was
brought to the attention of the TI who put pressure on the government finally the
one having started the threats campaign was imprisoned165.
Journalists constantly hear of cases in which the Voronin family or the communist
dignitaries have taken over by force different businesses: recently there was a press
conference in which the owner of the Micui Quarry, complained of the same
thing. Then it was an agricultural enterprise and now the Carmez case. In some
cases, the owner denies everything in public, but there are indications that he was
already forced to collaborate, like in the case of Andys Pizza, where the network of
pizzerias counts on the spaces rented from the state166.
A lawyer who specialises in commercial law says: you become the target of
a raider attack when you have bad organisation or you have problems with your
documents or you rent spaces from the state. Sometimes it is also about greed: the
owner does not accept to do everything legally and gain less.
It is difficult to make light in the avalanche of rumours and information. For
example, a journalist who wishes to investigate the fortune of the Voronin family
encounters many obstacles. In the businesses of the Voronin family one finds a lot
of off-shore structures or interposed agents, faade people. A simple request made
at the Registration Chamber risks to remain unanswered or to be given a partial
answer. There were, of course, telephones and emails intercepted or accidents at the
printing house when some material was supposed to be made public167.
Model of profitable businesses

The interviews brought out only two recipes for successful businesses valid for
the Republic of Moldova: the families surrounding the Voronin clan or the powerful
multinationals.
The multinationals came in the years before the communist government. If
they do not get involved in politics, foreigners do not have any problems. Besides,
the central offices are not here, they are either in Kiev or in Bucharest so that if
problems occur in the Republic of Moldova, they may have a larger market until
such problems are solved. In general, they have only one distributor and not a dealer.
The distributor does the work and manages locally. Multinationals do not take the
risk of creating dealerships yet or they have maximum 5 employees with laptops
165
166
167
Lilia Carasciuc, TI
Interview with an economic journalist, anonymous
Vitalie Clugreanu, the series about Voronin http://www.crji.org/news.php?id=150&l=1 and 3 other
materials
178
and a fixed budget. The rest is done from a distance or with the locals. The most
important (Orange, Union Fenosa etc.) entered into business correctly. They did
everything by the book and yet in 2000 they were sued. It cost a lot to do everything
by the book, but otherwise they would have lost the investment. The Prosecutor
opened a file against them immediately after the state took the money from the
privatisation168.
Carmez, a forced takeover

How to explain logically the situation when an associate who has 12% of the
shares takes over the entire company by force and illegally registers the take over
the very same day? This is the case of the Carmez169 Company, the biggest meat
processor from the Republic of Moldova. Business amounts to 24 million euro per
year with a profit of 1 million euro. Carmez holds 70% of the national meat and deli
market. Anatolie Claru is associate and general manager: In December there are
20 years since I work in this company. For a while now I have been living personally
the experience of some raiders attacks. GlobAuto, a small company, bought 6%
of the Carmez shares. They started pressuring me all the time and carrying out
inspections, asking to cancel the privatisation; all this to take the rest of the shares
by force. They managed to purchase 6% more but these were not enough to call
in a General Assembly. The only answer to the GlobAuto pressures came from
the Presidency, through a letter of the presidential councillor for financial matters,
Sergiu Pucu170. The councillors answer was sent to the General Prosecutors
Office and to the CNFP, for examination and taking proper actions. This year they
illegally cancelled the privatisation of Carmez and on April 21st they arrested the
entire management team. With all the management in prison, they called a General
Assembly.
Nicolae Bivol, a friend of manager Claru, went to the General Assembly to
represent those arrested: The General Assembly was full of irregularities; we
discovered that there were dead people among the signatories, that the calculations
were wrong. The special forces of the Ministry of Interior came to assist the
Generally Assembly, for intimidation. In spite of all the irregularities, the minority
shareholder GlobAuto chaired the Assembly to its end, took over the company and
closed the meeting at 5 p.m. And yet they managed to go to the State Registration
Chamber and register the modifications, although the Camber was working only
until 4 p.m.
168
169
170
Lawyer specialising in commercial law, anonymous

see also http://www.curaj.net/?p=18131
Petition No. 19/1-10-7 from 3 February 2009, signed by Sergiu Pucu (former manager of CCECC and of
the States Tax Inspectorate)
179
Manager Anatolie Claru spent 42 days in arrest and the other managers 2 days
only. None of them was interrogated. According to Claru, the true purpose of
the arrest was to intimidate and isolate them and to render then unavailable so as
to let the minority shareholder GlobAuto to play its cards. GlobAuto is backed by
Basarabia Nord, which is our competitor and there are people who had worked with
Oleg Voronin and the family of urcanu the former minister of the interior. They
are actually the ones seizing Carmez.
Cases submitted to the European Court of Human

Rights
The cases in which a business is seized, similarly to Carmez have been growing
more and more numerous in the last years. A proof of this is also the avalanche of
trials at the ECHR. Vladislav Gribnicea, from Legal Consultants for Human Rights:
In 2008, we had 29% more cases at the ECHR than in the previous year; in 2007,
there were 40% more than in 2006. If we remove Slovenia and Georgia, who have
some punctual issues, the Republic of Moldova is first when it comes to number of
cases brought to the ECHR from all sectors. Very many of them actually have an
economic real cause, such as a ruined business. Practically, the ECHR became the
fourth court for the Republic of Moldova and no one expects an equitable solution
in the country.
Gribnicea rapidly went through a couple of examples of economic cases in
which the Republic of Moldova lost at the ECHR:
- EDUARD MUUC owner of MEGADAT COM, the most well-developed
internet company. Muuc was in the opposition and the company was having an
enormous growth. Muuc was arrested and his business torn to pieces. He won at
the ECHR and agreed with the communists for a position of councillor.
- AIR MOLDOVA a German company privatised the air operator, but the
communists cancelled the privatisation. The ECHR gave a ruling in favour of the
German company and ordered the Republic of Moldova to return the invested
amount plus damages to the company.
- OFERTA PLUS a company from the energy sector. The ECHR mentions
that an abusive criminal file was opened against it, at the command of the current
Prime Minister.
- HOTEL DACIA the company which won the privatisation was expropriated
because the purchase price was too low, according to the communists. The
businessman who bought the hotel was in a personal conflict with Voronin. He won
at the ECHR.
EPTECH a shopping centre assessed at 40 million euro for the business and
the building. A criminal file was opened and privatisation was disputed as soon as
the shadow owner, Vlad Filat, launched into politics.
180
No reaction
Internationally, we may mention the constant reaction of the ECHR which
condemns the abuses of the authorities in Chiinu. For the rest, the last 8 years were
plunged into silence. The international politics did not react firmly against the corrupt
system which turned the country into a totalitarian system. The European Union
and the United States treated the communist regime of the Republic of Moldova
very kindly, always paying attention to Russias reaction, the same way as they treated
Transnistria. It is true that the opposition started to organise systematically and to
collect proofs about abuses, corruption, and use of the state bodies as instruments
serving the interest of the communist politicians very late. Practically, the moment
which showed just how serious things were in the Republic of Moldova was that of
the riots this year.
In its turn, Romania did not know what to make of its relation with the Republic
of Moldova and did not denounce the concrete abuses with too much energy, at
least not until the protests from April this year. Practically, the abuses and the
fragrant violations of human rights from this spring also attracted attention on the
monopolisation of the business system by the political regime.
The change
In contrast with the seriousness of the situation, many of those interviewed are
optimistic and believe that things will calm down by themselves once the pressure
from the top of the system is removed meaning the Voronin family171. If the
regime changes, Voronins clique will calmly accept to withdraw from different
businesses to make room for the new power thinks an economic journalist. There
will be very many recovery trials in the cases of businesses taken over by force. We
may even witness rather violent episodes believes a businessman. Such reactions
confirm the feeling that the democratic system from the Republic of Moldova is
profoundly vitiated and the functioning of the state largely depends on the person
holding the position of President.
The Republic of Moldova is awakening from a nightmare in which it has deepened
itself during the last 8 years. The party of communists had the majority, it could
change laws and Voronin behaved like a dictator: he assumed as many positions as
possible, he played the role of the state and at the same time he exercised a monopole
on private economy. The successful businesses were taken over by force both to
generate profit and to suffocate any attempt to finance an organised opposition.
The most affected by the communist regime seems to be the judicial system which
is deeply corrupted. The communist adventure was also possible because there were
no firm reactions from the exterior.
171
For example, one day after the elections Sergiu Mocanu was released from house arrest; he had been accused by
the communists of having organised the protests from April and was groundlessly held in custody.
181
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