Lester Nazarene V. Ople G.R. No.

L-38962 September 15, 1986 (144 SCRA 116) IN RE: MOTION TO CORRECT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-672 COVERING LOT NO. 4569 CAUAYAN CAD. FRANCISCA SOTO petitioner-appellant, vs. MARINA S. JARENO, JOSEFINA S. MEDEL and LILIA S. ALILAIN, oppositorsappellees. Facts: Sergio Serfino was married to Francisca Soto in January 1933. In 1939, he filed an application for a homestead patent, describing himself as "married to Francisca Soto," but in 1953, when the original certificate over the homestead was issued, it was in favor of "Sergio Serfino, widower." Serfino died in 1965, and soon thereafter the petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First instance of Negros Occidental praying that his description as a "widower" be changed to "married to Francisca Soto." Two daughters of the couple opposed the motion. While conceding that their parents were married in 1933, the oppositors nonetheless pointed out that their mother had abandoned them in 1942 to live with another man. Later, they said, she had adulterous relations with still a second man by whom she begot eleven children. According to these oppositors, it was their father himself who had described himself as a widower in 1953 because he had not heard from the petitioner since 1942. The trial court originally granted the motion and ordered the change prayed for, but later it reconsidered its decision and held itself without jurisdiction to act on the matter. Its reason was that there was no observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The case was elevated from the CA to the SC on a pure question of law. Issue: Whether or not the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is sufficient ground to strip the trial court of jurisdiction to act on the case at bar Ruling: NO. Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the courts can then take cognizance of the case and try it. The proper procedure is to institute the intestate proceedings of the Sergio Serfino, where the appellant may file against its administrator the corresponding ordinary action to claim her alleged rights over the lot in question.

G.R. No. 126332 November 16, 1999 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARCIA E. RAMOS, respondents. Facts: Marcia E. Ramos inherited from her father two (2) parcels of land in Barangay Macatbong, Cabanatuan City. Both were classified as ricelands in their tax declarations for 1985. On 15 June 1988, RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It provided for an additional five percent (5%) cash payment for landowners who would voluntarily offer their lands for sale to the government for distribution to farmer-beneficiaries. On 3 April 1989, induced by the incentive, private respondent and her husband wrote then Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary Philip Ella Juico offering for sale her lands. Private respondent however manifested her intention to retain twenty-nine (29) hectares for herself, her husband and their eight (8) children. Photocopies of two (2) land titles, latest tax declarations, Listasaka and voluntary offer to sell forms and other documents accompanied the letter. The Listasaka form and letter of intent indicated a price of only P40,000.00 per hectare because private respondent was allegedly in a tight financial bind with six (6) of her eight (8) children taking long courses in college. She thought that a low valuation for the lands would facilitate payment of just compensation to her by the government. On 24 July 1991, after a two (2)-year hiatus, DAR Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa sent a notice of acquisition to private respondent informing her that the DAR had decided to acquire a portion of the first parcel of land, classified as idle and abandoned, was placed under the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) program. On 28 August 1991 Nuesa sent private respondent another notice of acquisition where she was informed that the DAR had decided to acquire under its Compulsory Acquisition (CA) scheme a portion of the second parcel of land, also classified as idle and abandoned. Meanwhile, Lolita C. Cruz, Head of the Land Bank of the Philippines Land Valuation and Landowners Compensation Office, wrote private respondent on 24 July 1991 requiring her to submit a Sworn Statement of Average Production and Net Income. In compliance, Ramos sent an affidavit stating the lowest average yield of eighty (80) cavans per hectare. On 18 November 1991 Nuesa notified private respondent of the DAR valuation of P395,591.44 or P9,944.48 per hectare, subject to price adjustments to conform with the actual area covered as determined by a final land survey. The valuation was based on the ocular inspection report dated 13 May 1991 of which private respondent denied having been notified. On 23 December 1991 private respondent wrote Nuesa rejecting the valuation offer of the DAR as it was not the just compensation she expected for her lands. Thus, the case was elevated to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which ordered two (2) ocular inspections of subject two (2) parcels of land. On 2 January 1992 Nuesa sent a memorandum-letter to the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator instructing the latter to conduct summary administrative proceedings for the final valuation of the lands of private respondent. LBP Valuation Manager Cruz was also requested to open a trust account in the name of private respondent for the cash portion of the value of the property as determined by the DAR.

Private respondent was then required by the DARAB to file her memorandum in order to counter the initial findings of the DAR. The LBP also submitted its memorandum. Another ocular inspection was thereafter ordered and finally conducted on 22 May 1992. On 1 July 1992 the government through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Bureau of Lands, together with private respondent and her husband, identified, surveyed and segregated subject lands. On 24 August 1992 the complete survey returns on the lands were submitted by the DENR through its Community Environment and Natural Resources officer of Cabanatuan City Romeo Buenaventura. On 12 October 1992 Nuesa ordered the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City to transfer ownership of subject lands from private respondent to the Republic of the Philippines. However, before the transfer of ownership could be effected, the DARAB issued an order of revaluation dated 30 October 1992 based on its findings that five (5) to nine (9) hectares of subject lands were actually being cultivated on a rotation basis and not idle as earlier classified. The foregoing, more particularly Nuesa's order to transfer ownership over subject lands without waiting for their revaluation, prompted Ramos to file a complaint for just compensation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), on 23 November 1992. The complaint was filed against Jesli Lapus, in his capacity as President of LBP, Ernesto D. Garilao, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of DAR, Lolita C. Cruz, in her capacity as Head of LBP Land Valuation and Landowners Compensation Office, and Antonio M. Nuesa, in his capacity as Regional Director of DAR. LBP officials Lapus and Cruz filed a joint answer dated 8 February 1993 claiming that agrarian reform did not partake of an eminent domain proceeding so that the doctrine of just compensation would not apply. They prayed for the dismissal of the complaint because of private respondent's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies available to her before filing the case with the SAC. DAR officials Garilao and Nuesa, for their part, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the SAC was not the proper forum to hear and decide the case because of private respondent's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On 13 April 1993 the SAC denied the motion to dismiss. On 25 September 1995 the SAC rendered its decision ordering the LBP and the DAR to pay private respondent just compensation for her lands in the amount of P2,146,396.90 or P53,956.67 per hectare with legal interest from 3 April 1989 when the offer was made until fully paid. The SAC also declared private respondent entitled to the additional five percent (5%) cash payment under Sec. 19 of RA 6657 8 by way of incentive for her voluntarily offering subject lands for sale. Both parties, private respondent Marcia E. Ramos on one hand, and the DAR through Secretary Garilao and DAR Regional Director for Region III Nuesa on the other, filed their respective petitions for review with the Court of Appeals. The LBP did not appeal but filed its comment on the petitions. The DAR questioned the jurisdiction of the SAC contending that the latter could not take cognizance of the case pending its resolution before the DARAB as the preliminary determination of just compensation by the DARAB was a condition sine qua non before the filing of the case of this nature with the SAC.

On 27 June 1996 the Court of Appeals granted the petition of private respondent but denied that of the DAR. The appellate court acknowledged the primary jurisdiction of the DARAB in the determination of just compensation but ruled that such jurisdiction was not exclusive as the courts of justice, particularly the RTCs acting as Special Agrarian Courts, could also acquire jurisdiction as provided under Sec. 57 of RA 6657. It further declared that noncompliance with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies did not affect the court's jurisdiction but only deprived private respondent of a cause of action. Nevertheless, it noted that the doctrine recognized certain exceptions which could be applied to the instant case, i.e., that ownership over private respondent's property was already transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines prior to the final determination of just compensation by the DARAB. Issue: Whether or not the contention of the DAR is correct that the filing of a petition for judicial review is improper, given that the DARAB proceedings on the final valuation of the property is not yet terminated Ruling: NO. It is clear that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials the original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to the CARL (Sec. 57) and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid. With the issue of jurisdiction of SAC already settled, this Court finds it unnecessary to determine whether the order to transfer ownership of subject lands from private respondent to the Republic of the Philippines before the DARAB had settled with finality the matter of their proper valuation qualifies as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable when the issue is rendered moot and academic, as in the instant case where the DARAB dismissed the valuation proceedings before it on 29 November 1993.

G.R. No. 85439 January 13, 1992 KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM), TERESITA A. FAJARDO, NADYESDA B. PONSONES, MA. FE V. BOMBASE, LOIDA D. LUCES, MARIO S. FRANCISCO, AMADO V. MANUEL and ROLANDO G. GARCIA, incumbent members of the Board, AMADO G. PEREZ and MA. FE V. BOMBASE, incumbent General Manager and Secretary-Treasurer, respectively, petitioners, vs. HON. CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ, Secretary of Agriculture, Regional Director of Region IV of the Department of Agriculture ROGELIO P. MADRIAGA, RECTO CORONADO and Municipal Mayor IGNACIO R. BUNYE, both in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila and as Presiding Officer of Sangguniang Bayan ng Muntinglupa, and JOHN DOES, respondents. G.R. No. 91927 January 13, 1992

IGNACIO R. BUNYE, JAIME R. FRESNEDI, CARLOS G. TENSUAN, VICTOR E. AGUINALDO, ALEJANDRO I. MARTINEZ, EPIFANIO A. ESPELETA, REY E. BULAY, LUCIO B. CONSTANTINO, ROMAN E. NIEFES, NEMESIO O. MOZO, ROGER SMITH, RUFINO B. JOAQUIN, NOLASCO I. DIAZ, RUFINO IBE and NESTOR SANTOS, petitioners, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE OMBUDSMAN and ROGER C. BERBANO, Special Prosecutor III, respondents. Facts: On 2 September 1985, the Municipality of Muntinlupa, thru its then Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr., entered into a contract with the KILUSANG BAYAN, represented by its General Manager, Amado Perez, for the latter's management and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market. The contract provides for a twenty-five (25) year term commencing on 2 September 1985, renewable for a like period, unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties, at a monthly consideration of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000) to be paid by the KBMBPM within the first five (5) days of each month which shall, however, be increased by ten percent (10%) each year during the first five (5) years only. Following his assumption into office as the new mayor, Ignacio Bunye, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the "virtual 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to law and the "patently inequitable rental," directed a review of the aforesaid contract. He sought opinions from both the Commission on Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) on the validity of the instrument. In separate letters, these agencies urged that appropriate legal steps be taken towards its rescission. The MMC even granted the Municipality authority "to take the necessary legal steps for the cancellation/recission of the above cited contract and make representations with KBMBPM for the immediate transfer/takeover of the possession, management and operation of the New Muntinlupa Market to the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa. Consequently, upon representations made by Bunye with the Municipal Council, the latter approved on 1 August 1988 a Resolution abrogating the contract. To implement this resolution, Bunye, together with his co-petitioners and elements of the Philippine Constabulary, proceeded, on 19 August 1986, to the public market and announced to the general public and the stallholders thereat that the Municipality was taking over the management and operation

of the facility, and that the stallholders should henceforth pay their market fees to the Municipality, thru the Market Commission, and no longer to the KBMBPM. On 22 August 1988, the KBMBPM filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati a complaint for breach of contract, specific performance and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers. The complaint was premised on the alleged illegal take-over of the public market effected "in excess of his (Bunye's) alleged authority" and thus "constitutes breach of contract and duty as a public official." The writ applied for having been denied, the KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over; they continued holding office in the KBS building, under their respective official capacities. In the early morning of 29 October 1988, respondents, allegedly accompanied by Mayor Bunye and the latters' heavily armed men, both in uniform and in civilian clothes, together with other civilians, and other unidentified persons, allegedly through force, violence and intimidation, forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners located at the second floor of the KBS Building, new Muntinlupa Public Market, purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture dated 28 October 1988, and to implement the same, by taking over and assuming the management of KBMBPM, disbanding the then incumbent Board of Directors for that purpose and excluding and prohibiting the General Manager and the other officers from exercising their lawful functions as such. Such Order from the Sec. of Agriculture claimed to draw its power from PD 175 (the old Cooperative Movement Decree) giving the Secretary of Agriculture power to regulate cooperatives. Issue: Whether or not suit brought by KBMBPM is premature due to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, on the ground that KBMBPM should have petitioned directly the Secretary of Agriculture to reverse the Order stripping the KBMBPM Board of its authority Ruling: NO. Petitioners have the personality to file the instant petition and ask, in effect, for their reinstatement as Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, defining an action for mandamus, permits a person who has been excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled, to file suit. Petitioners, as ousted directors of the KBMBPM, are questioning precisely the act of respondent Secretary in disbanding the board of directors; they then pray that this Court restore them to their prior stations. As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.