Current Issues in Indonesian Islam

Published online 20 February 2007 Journal of Islamic Studies 18:2 (2007) pp.
202240
doi:10.1093/jis/etm001
CURRENT ISSUES IN INDONESIAN ISLAM: ANALYSING THE 2005 COUNCIL OF INDONESIAN ULAMA FATWA NO. 7 OPPOSING PLURALISM, LIBERALISM AND SECULARISM
PIE R S GI LL ES PI E Asia Law Centre, University of Melbourne
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the more signicant developments in Indonesian Islam over the past thirty years has been the appearance of a specialized committee, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (The Council of Indonesian Ulama, hereafter MUI), funded by government and tasked with collective fatwa giving. Like similar Islamic institutions that have appeared in other countries, the MUI has played an important role at the interface between the secular Indonesian government and the Indonesian umma during a time of great change in the worlds most populous Islamic country.1 Recently, it aroused considerable controversy with a fatwa on pluralism, secularism and liberalism, released during the seventh MUI National Congress in July 2005. This paper argues that this fatwa2 was a predictable attempt by the MUI to demarcate a role more aligned with the umma,3 after the
1 Similar Islamic institutions include the Majilis Agama Islam in Malaysia, the Council of Islamic Ideology in Pakistan, and the World Muslim League in Makka. See M. Masud, Brinkley Messick and David Powers, Muftis, Fatwas and Islamic Interpretation in M. Masud and David Powers (eds.), Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 28. 2 Hereafter referred to as MUI No. 7 (2005), followed (for citations from the text) by section number and letters (a, b, c) indicating clauses within the section, then page number. 3 The term umma in this paper will mean the Indonesian umma.
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current issues in indonesi an islam
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fall of President Suharto in 1998 and the extraordinary societal changes that ensued. Suhartos downfall resulted in an eforescence within the Indonesian nation that precipitated the need for a signicant reassessment by the MUI of its role as the public arena opened up, in an unprecedented manner, to previously restricted groups and thinkers. Through analysis of these recent developments in Indonesia, the paper will demonstrate that the conservative thinking underpinning the fatwa has long been close to the surface, but it was the rapidly changing political and religious environment, coupled with the MUIs building resentment over the dominance of pluralist religious thought in Indonesia, that resulted in MUI Fatwa No. 7 being released. The conservative push by the MUI at this time was accentuated by the growing public dissatisfaction with the reformasi period. Certainly the weakening of state controls in nearly all arenas of national life following the dissolution of the authoritarian New Order regime played a large part in the growing acceptance of greater religious and societal pluralism. The failure of the Habibie, Wahid and Soekarnoputri administrations to deal with fundamental issues relating to law and order, rising unemployment, the spiralling costs of basic necessities (sembako), or to correct the endemic corruption meant that many Indonesians yearned for leaders who could provide a way out of the protracted national crisis. The inability to deal with these issues and the prolongation of the economic crisis was deating for Indonesians who, after Suhartos fall, were riding a wave of optimism and freedom, and whilst many of the expectations had been unrealistic, the disillusionment felt at the national inertia was nonetheless palpable. Concurrent with the general dissatisfaction was the growing popularity of a number of prominent Islamicist politicians and public gures as they articulated the need for a greater role for Islam in Indonesia in the immediate years after the New Order. Islam, it was asserted, was the only way to escape from the multidimensional crisis affecting the country.4 Strident calls for the implementation of Shar;6a by numerous new Muslim parties and in regions as diverse as Aceh, South Sulawesi, Banten and Central Java echoed throughout the nation, whilst on the toll roads leading out of Jakarta, young men in owing Islamic robes continually collected money for the Islamic jih:d in Ambon
4
This was an ongoing message from many of the Islamicist groups, from the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) in Jakarta to the KPPSI (South Sulawesi Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Shari6ah) in Makassar.
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and Kalimantan.5 Such occurrences were a visible manifestation of certain sections of Indonesian society advocating the implementation of conservative Islamic beliefs in Indonesia. However, after 1999 there was a distinct reversal in this trend, with the Islamicist6 parties failing to make any profound inroads into the wider Indonesian community. In the political arena, individually and collectively, they experienced disappointing results both in the 1999 and 2004 elections, and a constitutional amendment in 2002 to make Indonesia an Islamic state failed.7 The weakening Islamic inuence was once again a great setback for the Islamic movementas had happened before, the movement failed to unite and appeal to the wider Indonesian umma.8 The small but visible segment of the population promoting conservative Islam remained, gravitating towards Salast and other ideologically literal constructions of Islam, later to be endorsed by the dominant elements within the MUI. However, the movement remained a disjointed and inceptive minority largely unable to exercise inuence in the wider Indonesian social or political sphere.9 Another signicant novelty during this time was the broader movement for decentralization throughout the archipelago. A number of regionsEast Timor, Papua, Aceh, Riau and otherswere demanding an increased say in regional issues through greater regional autonomy with, in some cases, an accompanying threat of secession. There was a renewed interest in local :dat law and a clear move away from the
5
The groups collecting funds for the perceived struggle in Ambon and Kalimantan were, among others, the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and Laksar Jihad Indonesia (LJI). 6 Islamicist here means those radical Islamic groups that subscribe to the ideology of radical salasm and have the aim of establishing a single khil:fa (caliphate) for all Muslims. For a useful typology of these radical groups, see Azyumardi Azra, Islam in South East Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism (Miegunyah Public Lecture, Melbourne University, 6 April, 2005), 9. 7 An overview of this constitutional debate appears in Arskal Salim, The Islamisation of Indonesian Law: Shariah in Indonesia 19992005 (unpublished PhD thesis: University of Melbourne, 2006), 3240. 8 Discord between Indonesian Islamic parties has always been a stumbling block for the Islamic movementfrom the 1950 general elections, when the Islamic parties failed to unite, through to the 2002 parliamentary debate on amending the 1945 Constitution to include the word Islamic, a proposal soundly defeated due to Islamic party rivalries. See Arskal Salim, The Islamisation of Indonesian Law, 613, 6374. 9 F. J. Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, Gerakan Sala Radikal di Indonesia (Jakarta: Raja Grando, 2004), 15.
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centrist policies of the Jakarta-based national government, whose regulations were perceived as having demanded too much from the regions for too long. These rapid changesthe expansion of regional autonomy; the opening up of public space for liberal discussion across all elds; the cynicism towards, and public rejection of, the Jakarta-based leadership; the broader pattern of dissatisfaction with the way things had been run; and the perpetuation of krismon (the economic crisis) were all developments complicating the claims and goals of those sections of the Indonesian community who sought a greater Islamization of Indonesia. By 2005, Indonesia had become, in Bowens terms, very much a nation criss-crossed by competing claims about how people ought to live and about what kind of society Indonesia ought to become.10 At a macro level, the controversy emanating from MUI No. 7 highlighted not only these wider debates about the kind of society Indonesia should become, but also the different exegetical interpretations existing within Indonesian Islam. Whilst most Indonesian religious scholars agree that in interpreting the Qur8:n one must distinguish between general commands or exhortations and specic rules, they disagree profoundly on which is which.11 Indeed, as one observer notes, getting Muslims to agree on matters relating to when the fasting month of Rama@:n begins and ends is already a difcult enough task, let alone binding the umma to a single unied codication of Islamic law.12 The response to MUI No. 7 exemplies the different Indonesian interpretations relating to cultural contextualization and the wide divergence on the interpretation of the Qur8:nic text, and the validity of analogy (qiy:s) and consensus (ijm:6) for deriving Islamic rulings. At a more micro level, much of the criticism of the fatwa focused around the MUIs interpretation and explanation of the terms liberalism, pluralism and secularism. This paper will address some of these heuristic criticisms, focusing on those put forward by the Muslim intellectuals Dawam Rahardjo and Azymuradi Azra and the responses of the two major Indonesian Islamic parties, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Section II of the paper gives contextual background on the MUI and its relationship with state power, explains how pluralism is embedded in the MUIs process of collective itjih:d, and then briey
10
John Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 5. 11 Ibid, 151. 12 Bachtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2003), 219.
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discusses the 1999 and 2004 general elections as background to the MUIs growing conservatism. Section III provides a detailed account of MUI Fatwa No.7 on liberalism, pluralism and secularism and the opposition it generated. Section IV considers why such a fatwa was issued, and, through an analysis of contemporary Indonesian Islamic thought, demonstrates that it was an effort by the MUI to a) redene its role in a rapidly changing environment; b) arrest the slide in relevance it was experiencing; and c) respond to the frustration of 25 years of the dominance of neo-modernist Islamic thought in Indonesia. The paper will conclude by explaining why the challenges that MUI currently will continue into the future.
II. THE MUI AND THEIR FATWAS: AN OVERVIEW

Fatwas state prescriptions.13 They are given in order to dene appropriate religio-legal responses to issues faced by community members in their daily life and are often seen as part of the growth and adaptability of Islamic law.14 The ulema who give fatwas do so on the basis of texts that are knowable through the exercise of reason. As MUI No.7 shows, the simplicity of a fatwa is deceptive. For a fatwa to be accepted it needs to have the appropriate authority, which it only gets if it is accepted by a known circle (Aalaqa) of eminent jurists.15 Only then does it become what has been described as the meeting place of law and fact, and may then be released to the public.16 In Indonesia, fatwa giving is different from other Islamic regions in that in the absence of a grand or classical mufti gure, it is done collectively by Islamic organizations. There are four main fatwa-issuing
13
M. B. Hooker, Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2003), 240. 14 Syamsul Anwar, Fatwa, Purication and Dynamisation: A Study of the Tarjih in Muhammadiyah, Islamic Law and Society 12 (2005), 32; Mehdi Mozaffari, Fatwa: Violence and Discourtesy (Aarhus Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1998), 16. See also Wael Hallaq, From Fatwa to Furu: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law, Islamic Law and Society 1 (1994), 2965. 15 Hooker, Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa, 1. 16 Masud, Messick and Powers, Muftis, Fatwas and Islamic Interpretation, 3.
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bodies: Persatuan Islam (Persis), NU, Muhammadiyah and the MUI. Because the organization and not an individual issues the fatwa, the characteristics of pluralism are apparent through the process of collective itjih:d (itjih:d jam:6;), a process that was previously unusual in many parts of the world.17 Additionally, as religious authority and political power have long been bound together in Indonesia, the ulema have consistently played an important role in forming political parties and advising Muslims how to act in political situations.18 Throughout the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial order, they have been involved in political affairs, whether in government, in political parties, or in rebellions against central authority.19 The major Islamic parties NU and Muhammadiyah, and the MUI itself, have all engaged in such a role on a number of occasions. Despite the ongoing discourse about the dangers of politicizing religion in this manner, such behaviour has been more of a norm than an exception in recent Indonesian history, and the MUI Fatwa No. 7 can be seen as the latest example.20 The MUI was established, after much discussion, in 1975 at the initiative of a government that had been seeking for some years to emasculate and control Islamic political activities in Indonesia.21 Essentially, President Suharto wanted the MUI to be an ofcially condoned religious authority that could monopolize religious orthodoxy, guide the Muslim community and guard it against heterodox doctrines.22 It was engineered to be the national authority on Islam, with four roles outlined for it: (1) to serve as the translator for the activities and concepts of national or local development for the people; (2) to be a form of advisory council to the government on religious affairs; (3) to mediate between the government and the ulema; and (4) to function as
17
Nadirsyah Hosen, Fatwa and Politics in Indonesia in Arskal Salim and Azymuradi Azra (eds.), Sharia and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 168. 18 Ibid, 170. 19 Nur Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, Islamic Law and Society, 12.1 (2005), 456. 20 Hosen, Fatwa and Politics in Indonesia, 170. 21 Donald Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 7981. The idea of an ulema council was not new, with a number of local ulema councils predating the MUI in West Java (1958), West Sumatra (1961) and South Sulawesi (1970). See Martin van Bruinessen, Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question, in Studia Islamika 2.3 (1995). For more on the history of the MUI, see Ibrahim Hosen, Sekitar Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia Mimbar Ulama 230 (1997). 22 Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, 80.
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a forum for the ulema to discuss the problems related to the duties of the ulama.23 As an institution it was not a statutory body but independent of government, with chairperson and board members not appointed by the government but selected by the MUIs own members.24 Given that it was established and nanced by the national Indonesian government, the MUI has always had to suffer a certain awkwardness regarding the impartiality of its fatwas.25 Criticism has turned on the accusation that the MUI furnished religious dicta primarily to satisfy the New Order regimes wishes.26 However, the relationship with the government did not create a simple role for the MUI; the organization was required to maintain good relations with both government and various Muslim organizations for the sake of wide acceptance in society.27 Hookers description of the relationship between the MUI and the New Order government as one in which a MUI fatwa was not wholly government-oriented, but in which the hand of government remained over the MUI is an accurate representation.28 In terms of religious process, the MUI originally proceeded from the internal premises of qh and then converted this into a government-related objective.29 On some occasions, indeed, the process of MUI qh could not be followed at all because of its adherence to
Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, 48. The contextual background to the development of the MUI was ongoing religious controversy, the overwhelming dominance of the New Order government and the political weakness of the Islamic movement. The reconciliation of these towards the dominant government point of view meant an increasing bureaucratization of Islam, and it is this, in its most extreme form, which the MUI represents. See Hooker, Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa, 60. 24 Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, 168. 25 The MUI also produces several non-fatwa discourses, including Tausiyahs (Recommendations), Tadzkirah (Admonitions), Amanah (Instructions), Pernyataan Sikap (Position Statements), Himbuaun (Appeals), and Sumbangan Pikiran (Thought Contributions). See Ichwan, Ulama, State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, 152. 26 Many examples of this exist. A pertinent one is from 1988 when the MUI controversially sided with the Government on an issue relating to rumours that pork extract was found in canned food and milk powders. See Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, 79. 27 Mohammad Atto Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia, 19751988 (Jakarta: The Indonesian-Netherlands Co-operation in Islamic Studies, 1993), 120. 28 Hooker, Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa, 235. 29 Ibid.
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state policy.30 However, despite much criticism of the MUI, its survival as a functioning body since inception has ensured that it retains an important position in modern Indonesian Islam. The organizations heritage in outlasting four presidencies, including the very government that established it in the 1970s, has only added to its enduring societal and political relevance, poignantly demonstrated when current Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, decided to personally open its 2005 national congress. This is not to say that the MUI has not struggled in the years after the New Order. After 1998, the strengthening of civil society and the relaxing of the governments hand over the MUI provided a profound new challenge for the organization in terms of its relevance to a society desperately seeking to move forward after the repression of the Suharto years. Indeed, the new discourses in Indonesia after 1998 were articulated through the open debate of many issues hitherto virtually tabootopics as diverse as regional autonomy or the role of the Indonesian army in politics, all the way through to more esoteric social issues relating to the popular female singer Inul Daristas controversial drilling-dancing and the recent wider discussion about pornography and sexuality in society.31 Within this cathartic release there has been a marked growth in the cosmopolitan modulations and interpretations of Indonesian cultural life, and a wider ranging and enduring debate that has directly
Ibid. Mudzhar has previously attempted a spirited defence of the MUI on this point, suggesting that it was not always supportive of the government and that the majority of the MUI fatwas are neutral. He notes a number of fatwas that have opposed the government, such as the use of condoms by unmarried couples (see Jakarta Post, 25 November, 1991), mixed marriages (see Kompas, 1317 January, 1992), and attending Christmas celebrations (see The Council of Indonesian Ulama on Muslim Attendance at Christmas Celebrations, in Masud, Messick and Powers, Islamic Legal Interpretation, Muftis and their Fatwas, 23042; and MUI, Himpuan Keputusan dan Fatwa (Jakarta: Sekretariat MUI, 1995), 912). However, as Nur Ichwan points out, the MUIs relationship with the government was articulated not only through its tausiyahs and fatwas, but also through its silence on certain state policies and programmes. Such silence often reected the powerlessness felt by many Muslims in relation to the state, and is perhaps more telling than the content, neutral or otherwise, of the fatwas themselves. See Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama, 1202; Ichwan, Ulama, State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, 151. 31 The anthology by Julia Suryakusuma, Sex, Power and Nation (Jakarta: Metafor Publishing, 2005) is a useful example of this. See also Mohamad Goenawan, RUU Porno: Arab atau Indonesia?, Tempo (Jakarta, 8 March, 2006), 78.
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questioned the relevance and type of Islam most appropriate to the nations future. One reason for this is that Indonesian Muslims growing up in the New Order period have had increased interactions with international ideas and inuence; a process that has resulted in a de-confessionalized contemporary spirituality that has been accepted and embraced by a great number of Indonesians.32 It should not be much of a surprise therefore if the previous formula of delimited religious pluralism (Pancasila) is now being stretched in decidedly liberal directions.33 Given this new atmosphere, with different religious and political parties capturing public attention across a whole variety of issues, the MUI has struggled at times to be heard. This dynamic environment in Indonesia has coincided with what Hefner describes as the participatory revolution sweeping the Muslim world.34 The revolution has provoked erce debates on questions of Islams social meaning and whose authority denes it, and unleashed competition over how to interpret religious symbols and who is in control of the relevant institutions.35 One observer has described modern Indonesia as:
a public room that is open for all. Fundamentalists who were previously not allowed to enter the room are now free to enjoy it. Hizbut Tahrir, FPI (Front Pembela Islam), MMI (Majelis Mujahaddin Indonesia) and others have the same legal status as JIL (Islamic Liberal Network). I cannot imagine FPI or MMI being allowed in the 1970s or 1980s . . . now all groups are being given an opportunity to talk.36
Amidst this ebullience, the MUI began the process of marking out a role that it believed would ensure its future relevance and moral inuence. For a number of years conservative elements within the MUI had been disturbed by the diminishing role for Islam in Indonesian politics, the moral ssures that seemed to be opening up in Indonesian society, and the inability of the umma to embrace a more conservative Islamic outlook for state and society in the post-New Order era. The MUI sought to move clearly away from the government and to delineate
Julia Day Howell, Muslims, the New Age and Marginal Religions in Indonesia: Changing Meanings of Religious Pluralism, Social Compass, 52 (2005), 47393. 33 Ibid. 34 Robert Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 10. 35 Ibid. 36 Ulil Asbar-Abdalla, Masa Depan Pikiran Islam (Jakarta: Jaringan Islam Liberal, 2005), 5.
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a far more conservative outlook, and one forcefully articulated by the senior MUI leadership. Given the plurality of the Indonesian umma in both doctrine and practice and the history of the MUI, this shift was to prove a complex task. With the end of the New Order, the MUI sought to reposition itself as intrinsic to the wider movement for change so as to avoid the stigma of being seen simply as a New Order supporter. However, the MUI was also eager to dene a role for itself in the new Indonesiabelieving that it had become more of a moral force . . . for social rehabilitation in the modern eraa role that pitted it against the perceived weakening of Islamic beliefs allegedly attributed to the teachings of liberal Islam.37 A number of exhortations by the more liberal Indonesian Islamic groups over the past few years had at times appeared to the MUI to be offensive and anti-ethical.38 The growth of liberal Islamic movements had been signicant and was considerably aided by a number of well-nanced international grants from Western nations who saw liberal and moderate Muslims as a key to strengthening ties with the worlds most populous Islamic country in the wake of the Bali and Marriott terrorist bombings.39 The wider debate between those who held a more liberal interpretation of Islam and those believing that only a more literal
MUI, Wawasan dan PD/PRT Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta: Sekretariat MUI, 2000), 3. 38 Some of these will be discussed later in the paper. I am referring here to the groups related to the Liberal Islam movement in Indonesia although it was also commentary by the Indonesian President Abdurahmann Wahid during 19992001 that frequently angered the MUI. 39 There is much debate and misunderstanding about the funding for liberal Islamic movements in Indonesia. The Islam and Civil Society (ICS) programme (through which JIL are funded) was implemented by The Asia Foundation with a grant from USAID. It commenced in 1997long before 9/11 and the Bali/ Marriott bombings. The Asia Foundation insists it is independent of any US foreign policy agenda, although it is a point that is often misunderstood by opponents of liberal Islam quick to generalize and obfuscate the links between the US and liberal Islam in Indonesia (personal correspondence with Asia Foundation Regional Director for Islam and Development, 9 November, 2005). As will be elaborated later, for the radical-puritan Islamist element, the fact that groups such as JIMM (Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah) and JIL have received nancial support from aid organizations such as the Ford Foundation and the Asia Foundation automatically equates to a form of new neo-colonial strategy. See Suaidi Asyari, Muhammadiyah and Radical Islam: Identity Metamorphosis and a Real Threat from within (University of Melbourne: unpublished paper given at the Centre for the Study of Contemporary Islam Conference, 22 November, 2005).
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interpretation of the Qur8:n would help Indonesia with its intractable problems was a discourse that had continued throughout the New Order and reformasi period. It was a microcosm of a debate that echoed throughout the Islamic world and one that had been in Indonesia since the arrival of Islam. In many ways, the MUI fatwa No. 7 needs to be understood in the context of this enduring debate. The MUI national congress was seen as a further opportunity for MUI to reafrm its central role in Indonesian Islamic affairs. The Chairman of the MUI, Sahal Mahfudz, in an opening address to the congress stated that the MUI saw itself as representative of the entire spectrum of the Indonesian umma and served as an ethical yardstick for the entire nation.40 In a sign of what was to come, he said:
although the MUI tries to position itself in the middle of all Muslim groups in Indonesia, the council is also required to take a rm stance in dealing with religious deviation. We are determined to win the war of ideas against liberal Islam.41
One way to demonstrate the MUIs conservative shift is by observing the organizations fatwas and tausiyahs during the Habibie and Wahid presidencies. Unlike a fatwa, a tausiyah is an informal document in the nature of a general opinion, not a learned, researched response to a specic question.42 From 1998 to 1999, President Habibie, as a New Order crony and a Golkar loyalist, was supported by the MUI and characterized as a Muslim representative.43 In contrast, President
Pikiran Rakyat, Presiden MUI Mangambil Peran Sentral (2005) Pikiran Rakyat (Jakarta), <www.pikiran rakyat.com/cetak/2005/0705/27/0102.htm4 at 15 September, 2005. 41 Chairman of the MUI, Sahal Mahfudz, quoted in Rendy Witular, MUI to formulate edicts against liberal thoughts, Jakarta Post (27 July, 2005). 42 Although the MUI released the recommendations as tausiyahs, general ignorance meant that most people regarded the tausiyahs as fatwas: see Nadirsyah Hosen, Fatwa and Politics in Indonesia, 157. The basic difference between a fatwa and a tausiyah is that a special commission produces a fatwa, whereas the leadership board alone, member meetings, conferences, or the Islamic Brotherhood forum can issue a tausiyah. A fatwa is stronger than a tausiyah because it deals with legal issues. Ichwan (Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, 50) describes a tausiyah as a much less formal document resembling a letter or press release. 43 The MUI indirectly supported Habibie both for the presidency and during the Bank Bali corruption scandal, when there was strong suspicion as to his involvement. Also, the MUI blamed the UN for the East Timor crisis, although Habibie played a fundamental role in enabling the referendum. Golkar Golongan Karyais the New Orders political party.
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Abdurrahman Wahidalthough a Muslim 6al;m himselfwas consistently cast aside as a secularist.44 This signalled two important changes for the MUIthat it was no longer the reliable rubber stamp for the Indonesian President and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (the acrimonious relationship between President Wahid and the MUI showed this clearly); and that it was opposed to the neo-modernist thinking that Wahid expressed during his Presidency.45 Neo-modernist thinking attempted to combine progressive liberal ideas with a deep religious faith by arguing for a new approach to itjih:d and hermeneuticsthis,
44 The conict between President Wahid and the MUI had had a long lineage. Part of the reason that he was rejected as a secularist (i.e. someone who holds that religion should be excluded from government and education) was that he had been advocating Pancasila as the state ideology since as early as 1969, something rejected by those Muslims who were advocating the implementation of Shari6a in various areas of Indonesia. Wahid began to criticize the MUI more openly in 1998 when it began using its Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (the Community Islam Forum) to widen linkages with the umma by inviting activists from newly established movements with distinctly radical Islamic orientations. As a result, groups such as Front Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah, Hizbut Tahrir and Front Pembela Islam formed a much closer relationship with the MUI than ever before, to the extent of even discussing tausiyahs with the MUI. Ichwan believes that tausiyahs better reected the political role of the MUI than its fatwas, so enlisting the support of such groups, some of which had connections to the most extreme Islamic organizations in Indonesia. See Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, 178. 45 Ibid. I acknowledge the limitations of the label neo-modernist to describe the thinking of Abdurrahman Wahid. The phrase is unpopular with many Indonesian academics, who link it with the tendency to attribute reform or developments within Indonesian Islam solely to the neo-modernist movementthis is a short-sighted, problematic assumption given that much of the progressive thinking has actually emanated from traditionalist circles. Nevertheless, Indonesian Islamic scholars with considerable experience continue to use the terms modernist and traditionalist to describe different streams of Islamic thought in Indonesia. See Douglas E. Ramage, Prepared statement, Islam in Asia: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacic of the Committee on International Relations, Serial 108134 (Washington: Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations, 2004). Ramage suggests modernist and traditionalist are also problematic, but they remain widely used. See also Eric Kolig, Modernisation without Secularisation: Civil Pluralism, Democratization and Re-Islamisation in Indonesia, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 3.2 (December 2001).
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for many in the MUI, went far beyond Indonesian Islamic modernism.46 It was rejected by many conservative elements in Indonesia, and the opposition to this neo-modernism was to be one of the foundations for MUI Fatwa No. 7. Equally indicative of the MUIs conservative shift is the organizations updated vision statement for the year 2000, marking itself off from the government. It outlined ve major roles: (1) to spread Islamic teachings and support efforts for the construction of an Islamic life; (2) to be a fatwa-giver; (3) to work as a guide for the Muslim community; (4) to be an agent of reform and renewal; and (5) to uphold the Qur8:nic command of bidding for good and forbidding from evil.47 These roles contrast signicantly with its founding goals in 1975, which predominantly related to mobilizing Muslim support for the governments development policies. By 2000, no mention was made of the government, and the goals had become more Islam-oriented than hitherto.48 A: The MUI and the process of itjih:d Traditionally, MUI fatwas can be divided into three levels of effort (itjih:d) by the MUI: new topics not covered by the legacy of qh; fatwas somewhat adapted from the legal dicta in that legacy; and fatwas that repeat/re-present those dicta.49 The majority of the MUI fatwas fall into the last group, with the authorities referred to being the Qur8:n and Sunna, ijm:6 and qiy:s.50 MUI fatwas begin by quoting Qur8:nic verses before moving on to relevant hadith(s), and then nally referring
Greg Barton, Neo Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia, Studia Islamika 2.3 (March 1995), 6. Although the term neo-modernism is not ideal, it distinguishes it from both traditionalism and Islamic modernism while also alluding to its origins in the latter stream of thought. 47 MUI, Wawasan dan PD MUI (Jakarta: MUI Sekretariat, 2000), 1415. 48 Martin van Bruinessen, Indonesias Ulama and Politics: Caught between Legitimizing the Status Quo and Searching for Alternatives, Prisma The Indonesian Indicator, 49 (1990). The MUI website explains that the MUI mission is to: Drive Islamic leadership and institutions effectively, so that they are able to direct and supervise the Moslem community in implanting and fostering Islamic belief, as well as to form Islamic law, and make the ulama as a model in building excellent character in order to create an al-ummah society. See MUI website: <www.majelisulama.com/mui_en?about.php?id 4&PHPSESSID4efb109a79a21dd415b4 at 24 September, 2005. 49 Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, 159. 50 Ibid.
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to qh texts.51 Fatwa No. 7 follows this typical pattern. The discussion part of the fatwa often takes into account the varied opinions of Islamic leaders of different schools of thought on Islamic law, although the nal text is invariably sourced from the Sh:6; madhhab.52 The discussion process is a method for determining which Qur8:nic exegesis is stronger and more benecial for the Islamic community. In the event that an issue cannot be addressed by reference to the standard authorities as above, it is determined through a process called itjih:d jam:6;, collective itjih:d.53 Itjih:d is not consistently used in MUI fatwas. A number of MUI fatwas since 1975 have re-presented opinions from the classical qh books with little or no interpretation. The MUI are, however, open to other appropriate ulema undertaking itjih:d, believing that those who are capable of doing itjih:d have the right to do so.54 Because the MUI recognizes specialization in itjih:d as lawful, they believe that a limited knowledge of uB<l al-qh is sufcient to allow a jurist to practise itjih:d.55 This is controversial in that while the approach should in principle extend legitimacy to do itjih:d to others suitably qualied in uBul al-qh, in practice such legitimacy is not extended to more liberalist Indonesian interpretation of Islam, regardless of the individual 6:lims knowledge. The past thirty years have shown that the MUIs itjih:d jam:6; process does not result in rapid ideological changes. The MUI have not developed a methodology for the derivation of legal judgement away from the spirit and letter of the primary sources in order to enable constructive engagement with a rapidly changing world.56 It is not a dynamic Islamic organization; as Hosen notes, the MUI as a collective mujtahid does not reach the highest rank in itjih:d, that of the founders of the four Sunni schools of Islamic law and their great disciples. It does however attain the middle ranks of itjih:d, where scholars strive not just to consolidate the tradition, but also to sustain it and keep it alive.57 Given that the MUIs process of itjih:d has not lent itself to much variety of religious interpretation, its embrace, since 1998, of a more literalist
For a list of the qh books to which the MUI most often refer see Nadirsyah, Hosen, Fatwa and Politics in Indonesia, in Arskal Salim, and Azymuradi Azra, (eds.) Sharia and Politics in Indonesia (2003), 161. 52 Hooker, Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa, 61. 53 Ibid. 54 Hosen, Fatwa and Politics in Indonesia, 159. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid, 178. 57 Ibid.
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position resulted in a pronounced hermeneutic rift between it and more liberal Muslim Indonesians. B: MUI and the 1999/2004 elections Both the 1999 and 2004 elections are contextually useful for the 2005 MUI fatwa, with the 1999 elections demonstrating the diminishing inuence of an MUI fatwa in Indonesia, and the 2004 elections demonstrating a shift away from the major political parties and an increase in the primary vote of the Islamic parties. In the 1999 election, the MUI took the highly unusual step of releasing three tausiyahs (Arabic, tawBiya: recommendation) in the space of two months in the lead up to the elections. The rst recommended that voters, especially the umma, should vote for the party they believe capable of leading the nation towards a harmonious, united, peaceful and prosperous life.58 The second, entitled Advice of the MUI Executive Leading up to the 1999 Election suggested that the umma should prioritise Islamic brotherhood and abstain from involvement in conict and friction.59 The third was issued just six days before the election, citing Qur8:n 3. 28:
Let the believers not take as friends or supporters unbelievers rather than believersif any do that, in nothing will there be help [for them] from God except by way of precaution, that you may guard yourselves from them.
This was a more direct appeal for Islamic voters to choose those parties that struggle for the aspiration and interests of the umma, nation and state and not vote for non-Muslim political leaders and parties dominated by non-Muslims.60 However, the political parties with little explicit connection to Islam were the ones that had the best election results, with Golkar, PDIP and PAN dominating.61 Professor Ali Yae of the MUI rejected the interpretation that Muslims did not follow the MUI directive, arguing that PDIP voters were not strong Muslims in any
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Himbauan Majelis Ulama Indonesia untuk Suksesnya Pemilihan Umum 1999, Mimbar Ulama 248 (1999), 30, cited in Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, 55. 59 Ibid, 56. 60 A direct reference to Megawatis PDIP party, which was allegedly dominated by non-Muslim politicians. 61 Golkar, PDIP and PAN cumulatively received around 60 percent of the vote, whereas the Islamic parties fared badly: Partai Keadilan, the Islamic Justice Party, obtained only 1.3 percent, PBB 1.8 percent and PPP 10.7 percent.
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event, but the results strongly suggested that even by 1999 the Indonesian umma were listening to MUI less than before.62 The MUI took a more circumscribed approach in its public pronouncements during the 2004 elections, the rst to be held under the amended 1945 Constitution, with the new rules relating to political parties and to the method of election of the parliament and the president.63 In terms of how the Islamicist vote panned outIslamicist here meaning the Islamic parties seeking to bring Islamic ideals directly into politicsthe primary vote increased from 16 percent in 1999 to 21 percent in 2004.64 There were, however different interpretations of this result, some observers suggesting that it demonstrated a weakening of the appeal of Islam to the wider population, others that it meant that political Islam might not be as weak as many commentators suggest.65 Some observers feared a growing rigidication of boundaries around the presently recognized religions and the imposition of increasingly narrow constructions of Islam in Indonesia.66 Others believed that, although there was an increased salience of Islamist politics in Indonesia since 1998, there appeared nevertheless to be some development in religious tolerance amongst the moderate middle class urban elite of Indonesian Muslims, and a rejection of the rigid limitations conservatives would
Nadirsyah Hosen, Behind the Scenes: Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia 19751998, Journal of Islamic Studies, 15.2 (May 2004), 159. 63 Angus McIntyre, The Indonesian Presidency: The Shift from Personal towards Constitutional Rule (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littleeld Publishers, 2005), 261. The MUI pronounced that it was time for Indonesia to choose an honest, effective President able to ensure that Indonesia could come out of the ongoing multidimensional crisis, and emphasized that Muslims had a special responsibility to ensure that the best person is chosen for the job. See <www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0403/12/PolitikHukum/908020.html4 at 8 February, 2006. 64 This is how the term is used by Greg Fealy; see his comments in McIntyre, The Indonesian Presidency, 261. The election numbers are outlined on p. 263. Fealys 2004 election comments may also be seen at <www.usindo. org/briefs/2005/Greg%Fealy%20on%20Radical20%Islam%208-18-05.htm4 at 15 February, 2005. 65 Both positions are articulated by Greg Fealy: in his talk to the United Sates Indonesia Council (Washington) at ibid; also in McIntyre, The Indonesian Presidency, 264. 66 Julia Day Howell, Muslims, the New Age and Marginal Religions in Indonesia, 481. Day Howell cites, as an example of this concern, Luth Assyaukanie (2004) Konservatisme dan Islam Kaki Lima at <www.islamlib.com/ id/page.php?pagearticle&modeprint&id7274 at 8 December, 2004.
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place on their understandings of their religion.67 This observation was backed in annual polling by the Indonesian Survey Institute from 20022005, which concluded that traditional (dened in the survey as relating to the two major Islamic parties, NU and Muhammadiyah) Indonesian religious institutions remained dominant, and that over seven out of ten Indonesians polled rejected violence in any form as a way of furthering religious or political goals.68 At a party level, Megawati Soekarnoputris PDIP suffered a substantial decline in the primary vote at the 2004 elections, whilst the presidential aspirations of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono were done no harm with his Democrat Party garnering nearly eight percent of the vote in the short time it had been running.69 Such an increase in the Islamicist vote would not have gone unnoticed by the MUI as the voters demonstrated their disillusionment with non-Islamic political parties, particularly in relation to the issue of corruption, on which the Islamic parties were perceived as being more trustworthy.70 In this way, the 2004 election reinforced the MUIs determination to move further towards being a more conservative Islamic organization, one now openly calling itself a servant of the Indonesian umma.71
III. FATWA NO. 7 AND ITS OPPONENTS

A: The Consideration and Reminder sections MUI Fatwa No. 7 (2005) created controversy by re-opening in a modern Indonesian context an Islamic debate that had been ongoing since the Hijra.72 The debate spans the spectrum of Islamic jurisprudence from a position afrming an immutable sacred text to the idea of reasoning from
Day Howell, Muslims, the New Age and Marginal Religions in Indonesia, 490. She uses an analysis of the growth of three organizations, Salamullah, the Brahma Kumaris and the Anand Ashram, to demonstrate this broadening out of religious notionality within Indonesia. 68 See Lembaga Survei Indonesia, Survei Nasional: Dukungan dan Pennolakan Terhadap Radikalisme Islam (Jakarta: LSI Sekretariat, 2005), 1044. 69 McIntyre, The Indonesian Presidency, 261. 70 Asia Foundation, Democracy in Indonesia: A Survey of the Indonesian Electorate (Jakarta: Asia Foundation, 2003). 71 Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, 71. 72 Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 255.
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external values and current social needs. The issues were discussed by both the general public as well as the Indonesian umma.73 The fatwa articulated the MUIs increasingly hard-line position on the tension between human reasoning on the one hand, and literal interpretation of sacred texts on the other.74 All eleven fatwas released at the July 2005 congress demonstrate the growing conservativism within the MUI.75 However, it was Fatwa No. 7, on secularism, pluralism and liberal Islamic movements, that gained the most attention. It consisted of three sectionsa Reminder, Clarication, and a Considerations section which comprised three statements. The three statements set out the MUIs interpretation of the prevailing Indonesian Islamic environment and why a fatwa on this subject was necessary. The statements noted:
(a) Recently there has been a growth of religious pluralism, liberalism and secularism which has been understood in a variety of ways in the community; (b) This growth of religious pluralism, liberalism and religious secularism within the society has created an uneasiness and a concern to the extent that part of the community has asked the MUI to give some clarication by means of a fatwa in relation to this problem; (c) Therefore, the MUI feel that it is necessary to formulate a fatwa about the understanding of pluralism, liberalism and religious secularism in order for it to provide guidance to the Islamic community.76
Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia, 151. Hallaq, History of Islamic Legal Theories, 255. 75 One fatwa banned interfaith prayers unless led by a Muslim; one outlawed interfaith marriage; another ruled that children of a different religion from their parents could not receive any inheritance. See Abdul Mosquith Gazali, Oligarchy in the Interpretation of Religion (2005), Wahid Institute website (Jakarta) <www.gusdur.net/English/index.php?optioncom_content&taskview&id733& Itemid1.html4at 1 September 2005. One of the most controversial was a fatwa that labelled the Ahmadiyyah, a group that had existed peacefully in Indonesia for over 60 years, as outside Islam. The phrase outside Islam was one used by Hasanuddin, the Secretary of the MUI Fatwa Commission in Majelis Ulama Menyoal Ahmadiyah (2005) Republika Online (Jakarta) <http://www.repub likaonline.co.id/suplemen/cetak_detail.asp?mid5&ad282391&kat_id10. html4 at 10 August, 2005. For an overview of the Ahmadiyyah in Indonesia, see Patricia Horvatich, The Ahmadiyya Movement in Simunul in Robert Hefner (ed.), Islam in an Era of Nation States (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 183202. 76 MUI Fatwa No. 7 (2005). Translations are mine.
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With clause (b) the MUI positioned itself as responsive to the communitys needs and concerns. Describing the background to the fatwa in this manner enables the MUI to give legitimacy to its choice of what topic is appropriate for discussion, whilst at the same time projecting its own societal role. Furthermore, by describing the growth of religious pluralism as a problem that requires a fatwa, the MUI is able to dene the topics parameters. After the Considerations, the Reminder section contains over ten quotations from the Qur8:n whose function is to justify the fatwa.77 The quotations focus on two main instructions: that, in respect of religion, there is only one choice; and in respect of Islam, there is only one way to believe and live it. The fatwa cites 2l 6Imr:n, 3. 19 and 3. 85
The religion in Gods presence is al-isl:m . . . And whoever desires/seeks a religion other than al-isl:m, it shall not be accepted from him, and in the hereafter he shall be among the losers.
The fatwa also cites al-AAC:b 33. 36:

It is not [tting] for a believing man or believing woman, when God and His Messenger have pronounced on a matter (qa@:), that there should [remain] for them any choice (khayra) in their affair. And whoever disobeys God and His Messenger he has manifestly gone astray [lit. erred in a plain erring].
Of direct relevance to the pluralist debate is the way the Reminder section warns against following those who may be on a pluralist or liberalist path. One of the nal Qur8:nic citations in the section is from al-An6:m 6. 116:
And if you follow [ie. obey] the lead of the greater number [of the people] in the earth, they will misdirect you from the path of God. They are indeed following only conjecture (Cann); they are indeed only making surmises (kharaBa).
At one level, this citation may be understood as aiming at those individuals who choose to follow other religions, or to follow those who would misdirect you from the path of God.78 However, given that the fatwa previously provides clear approval of freedom of religionFor you your religion, and for me my religion (Qur8:n, 109. 6) and God does not forbid you, in respect of those who do not ght you in religion
The use of Qur8:nic verses to authorize/legitimize fatwas is normal practice. In MUI No. 7, a number of statements underline the importance, in an environment of religious plurality, of tolerance and fairnessfor example, al-MumtaAana, 60. 89, cited in MUI No.7 (2005), 1. 78 Ibid.
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(f; l-d;n) and do not drive you out of your homes, that you deal kindly with them and behave fairly with them: God indeed loves those who are fair (muqsi3;n) (al-MumtaAana, 60. 89)it can also be interpreted as aiming at those within the Indonesian umma who are misleading followers via the articulation of liberal and plural beliefs.79 The fact that the fatwa incorporates a Qur8:nic statement about the dangers of following conjecture supports this interpretation, as much of the criticism consistently levelled at Indonesian pluralists by the Islamicists is that the liberal interpretations have been heavily focused on a select number of public individuals and personalities who have been promoting them.80 B: Fatwa No. 7: the Clarifications section The Clarications section is the core of the fatwa, divided into public and legal certainty sections. The public certainty section denes the relevant issues to be discussed based on the public concern arising from the growth of religious pluralism and secularism and its myriad interpretations.81 The section denes what is meant by religious pluralism, and its understanding of the term is key to why the MUI rejected religious pluralism. Religious pluralism is dened as:
An understanding that all religions are the same and because of this (truth), that every religion is relative. Because of that, every follower of religion cannot claim that only their religion is true and correct whilst other religions are wrong. Pluralism also stipulates that all followers of religion will enter and live side by side in heaven. (MUI Fatwa No. 7 (2005), 1 (1), 2).
Apart from this statement, which suggests that religious pluralism means that there is no germane differentiation between religions, no further interpretive elaboration from the MUI is forthcoming. Issues of both a heuristic and practical nature remained unaddressed, with the fatwa reader left to decide whether this is an appropriate denition, and if so, what it actually means for an individual Muslim living in the multicultural and multi-religious Indonesian society. By not elaborating
Cited in MUI No.7 (2005), 1. The public individuals meant here are scholars such Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Djohan Effendi, Dawam Rahardjo, Abdurrahman Wahid and the recently deceased Nurcholish Madjid. Islamicists here means those Indonesian Muslims who favour a strictly literal interpretation of Qur8:n and Sunna, as opposed to the individuals above who also believe in the concurrent importance of contextuality. I acknowledge that the term conjecture in the Qur8:n has a broader signicance that will not be addressed here. 81 MUI No.7 (2005) Considerations section, 1.
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further on the meaning of religious pluralism, the MUI failed to provide a basis for understanding one of the most important aspects of the fatwa. Whilst the fatwa accepted what it called the reality of a modern multireligious Indonesia as there are a number of different religious followers that live together side by side, it rejected equality between different religions (MUI Fatwa No. 7 (2005), 1(2), 2). This was a difcult position to maintain: in order to do so, the MUI differentiated between plurality, which was dened as an everyday reality, and pluralism, which was described as a awed mode of thinking.82 The (then) Muhammadiyah party member and Muslim intellectual Dawam Rahardjo rejected the inherent dissonance between the two positions. In addressing the fatwa, Rahardjo stated that pluralism and plurality were intimately connected because pluralism was a belief system based on the reality of a plural society. By accepting the reality of plurality within society as the MUI had done, Rahardjo believed that a de facto acceptance of pluralism had to follow.83 That in turn meant that no one religion may stand atop others, but must stand only alongside the others in the name of freedom and plurality.84 He criticized the theoretical premises behind the MUIs notion of pluralism, stating:
In regards to pluralism, (the MUI) said that it is based on an opinion that all religions are the same. And the consequence of that is that the truth of all religions is relative. Pluralism is not that. Pluralism is the opposite; it respects differences in religion and therefore accepts them. That does not mean that all religions are the same. MUI do not know what is meant by pluralism.85
Rahardjo also argued that the MUIs interpretation of liberalism was fallacious:
The (MUI) fatwa . . . interprets liberalism as meaning that human reasoning takes precedence over the Quran and Hadith. But thats not liberalism. Liberalism is simply a doctrine that places a high value on the individual, and as a consequence, it seeks to minimize the role of government. Its a pretty clear denition, so what is there to criticize? For me, the MUI dont understand this not just misunderstand it, but dont understand it.86 Dawam Rahardjo, Kala Mengharamkan Pluralisme (2005) Tempo Interactif (Jakarta) <www.tempointeractive.com/hg/search/?weldbasic&tab &txtsearchrahardjodawan4 at 10 August, 2005. 83 Ibid. 84 Dawan Rahardjo, Saya Pernah Kecewa Pada Agama, Tempo, 30 (5 February, 2006, Jakarta). 85 Ibid. 86 Dawam Rahardjo on Radio Berita 68h 89.2 fm, Transkrip diskusi radio 68h: Menyikapi perbedaan pasca fatwa MUI, 4 August, 2005.
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Rahardjos criticism of the manner in which the MUI had skimmed over key heuristic terms within the fatwa earnt him considerable enmity. Nevertheless, by not addressing these key terms more broadly, the MUI left itself open to the criticism that it didnt understand the nuances of the key terminology. Having dened the topics, albeit unsatisfactorily, the legal certainty section then moved on and provided the guidance of the fatwa. Point 2 of the guidance stated:
It is forbidden (Aar:m) for the Islamic community to follow the understanding of pluralism, secularism and religious liberalism. (MUI Fatwa No 7, 2 (2), 2).
Point 3 then continued by stating (2 (3), 2):

In regards to matters of 6aq;da and 6ib:da [creed and worship], it is compulsory for the Islamic community to have an exclusive attitude, meaning that it is forbidden to mix Islamic creed and worship with the creed and worship of the followers of other religious faiths.
The two statements were qualied by the nal point in the fatwa (2 (4), 2) that provided a practical interpretation for the umma in their everyday interactions with other religious followers, but the comments did little to offset the gravity of points 2 and 3. C: The critiques of the fatwa In releasing Fatwa No. 7, the MUI managed to ignite divisive passions not seen publicly within the Indonesian umma for many years.87 The immediate aftermath saw a veritable line up of those for and against the fatwa. Indonesian Islamic liberalists quickly organized to defend their notions of pluralism against what they interpreted as a direct attack on themselves and their thinking. Their approach was articulated by, among others, Rahardjo and Azymuradi Azra and circulated in a hasty media release issued by them and other prominent Indonesian Islamic liberal thinkers such as Hasyim Wahid, the Head of NU, and Ulil Abshar Abdalla, the Head of the Islamic
The only other recent issues that have provoked a high level of anger and division centred on the issue of whether a woman could be President in the lead up to the 1999 elections, and the issue of interest in late 2003. See Republika Online, Kita Terbuka Untuk Dialog (2005) Republika Online. <http:// www.republikaonline.co.id/suplemen/cetak_detail.asp?mid5&id209195_id 10.html4 at 2 September 2005. For an excellent indication of the level of anger, see the transcript (referred to earlier) of the discussion on Radio Berita, Menyikapi perbedaan pasca fatwa MUI.
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Liberal Network.88 Their approach focused on both the importance of interpretative contextuality within modern Islam, and on the enduring relationship to Pancasila, the Indonesian notion of nationhood and development that had been used so successfully as a tool for political control throughout the New Order period. In contrast, the MUI received support from the literalists and conservatives, who do not generally allow for contextuality in their religious interpretations of the Qur8:n as law. Prominent conservatives who spoke publicly for the fatwa included the Muhammadiyah leader, Din Syamsuddin, and the Head of the MUI, Makruf Amien, who were bolstered by a number of groups quick to agree with the fatwas conclusions.89 One of Indonesias leading secular Islamic academics, Azymuradi Azra, rector at the State Islamic University, was outspoken in his condemnation of the thinking behind the fatwa. He suggested that the MUIs understanding of the issues relating to pluralism was too literal and rested solely on medieval qh, without taking any account of the sociological and political realities of Indonesia.90 Whilst it could be argued that the fatwa did take note of the multi-religious reality of Indonesia, Azras comments were founded on the sheer fact of Pancasila
See Todung Mulya Lubis, Nono Anwar Makarim, Azyumardi Azra, Musdah Mulia, Hasyim Wahid, Ulil Abshar Abdalla and Syai Anwar, Utamakan Rasa Kebangsaan dan Hak-Hak Konstitusional Kewarganegaraan! (Media Release, Jakarta, 5 September, 2005). http://islamlib.com/id/index.php? pagearticle&modeprint&id867.html at 10 September, 2005. 89 These organizations included the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII). 90 Azyumardi Azra, cited in Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio, Fatwas Raise Concerns of Growing Divisions, Radio Australia, 12 September, 2005 <www.radioaustralia.net.au/asiapac/programs/s1429648.html4 at 12 September, 2005. See also Azra,Mutual Existence and Religious Harmony, Jakarta Post (25 August, 2005). Azras argument is not limited to the secular realities of a pluralistic Indonesia. He holds that, theologically and doctrinally, Muslims have always known difference and plurality due to multiple and conicting interpretations of the Qur8:n and hadith. He uses a number of Qur8:nic verses to offer a distinctly modern perspective on tolerance, pluralism and mutual recognition in a multi-ethnic and multi-community worldjust as the MUI have selected and used their own verses. Azra describes Indonesian Islam as the middle way of Islam, which resulted in the adoption of the national ideology of Pancasila, and states that Muslim scholars should disentangle Quranic perspectives on pluralism from medieval interpretation in order to elaborate and formulate new Muslim participation in a global society. Opponents of this view dismiss his writing outright.
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as the ofcial state ideology, and Indonesia not being an Islamic state. In arguing this way, Azra implied that other Indonesian Islamic theological or societal interpretation also needed to accept the reality of Indonesian communal pluralism as a fundamental starting point. Azras responses to the fatwa provided an overview of the recurrent issue in Indonesian Islam of contextuality in interpreting the religious texts, the legitimacy of interpretation (ta8w;l), and the validity of analogy and consensus in dealing with questions of law.91 The MUI fatwa focused on the divide between liberalists and literalists, each camp rejecting outright the others viewpoint. Azra suggested that although Indonesia has adopted the middle path of Islam, the MUI have a different interpretation of Islams role in Indonesia and their understanding of the three isms was informed by taking the Qur8:n and hadith literally without any rationality or logic.92 He went on to argue that the fatwa was regrettable because it appeared to have been issued without consulting relevant Muslim gures. Azra stated that in future he would like to see the MUI consult with all stakeholders in the Muslim community before issuing fatwasan ironic statement, in view of the fact this fatwa is one that seeks to reduce the consultation and sh<r: that Azra is commending.93 Unsurprisingly, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Indonesias largest Islamic party, responded immediately to the fatwa with a erce94 public
91 Tauk Abdullah, The Formation of a New Paradigm: A Sketch of Contemporary Islamic Discourse in Mark Woodward (ed.), Towards a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1996), 74. 92 Azyumardi Azra, MUIs Fatwa Encourages the Use of Violence, Jakarta Post (25 August, 2005). 93 Azyumardi Azra, Mutual Existence and Religious Harmony, Jakarta Post (25 August, 2005). 94 I have used Zulhairi Misrawis description of the response as erce; see Zulhairi Miswari, Humanist Fatwa or Violent Fatwa? (2005) Islamlib website <http://www.islamlib.com/en/page/php?pagearticle&modeprint&id874.html4 at 8 September, 2005. Some brief comments need to be made concerning the diversity of opinion and complexity that exists within NU, and indeed, most other Islamic organizations in Indonesia. Although the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) in Indonesia is seen as a traditionalist Islamic party, to see it as a unied stream of thought is unrealistic, given that the philosophical distance between individuals within the party is often greater than between the NU and Muslims outside it. Simplistic summaries of what party said what are therefore often misleading; whilst NU members Masdar Masudi and Zuhaeri Misrawi are quoted in this paper as representing NU positions on the MUI fatwa, Masdar does not really have the authority to put forward NUs ofcial position. Equally, Kyai Maruf
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statement that directly criticized the MUI and offered a determined defence of both Indonesian plurality and the secular state. The NU board suggested the fatwa was based on a formalist reading of qh and declared that it was intended solely for Muslims and not non-Muslims, who need not worry about such a fatwa, particularly as Indonesian Muslims will make up their own minds with the full awareness that positive law is the dominant law in the country and our country is not an Islamic state.95 NUs response underlined how, for those advocating a more pluralist interpretation of the Qur8:n, the Indonesian constitution and Pancasila provided the appropriate legal guidance, and, in a direct criticism of the MUI, stated that it would have been more appropriate if the fatwa had provided what it termed substantive values rather than:
[m]ere legal formalism, because we are in a plural society with diversity both within the Islamic umma, let alone within the context of other religions, communities, cultures and customary laws. It would be more effective if a reason-based approach were used incorporating advice, dialogue, and argumentation. This approach would avoid conict within our unitary state of Indonesia.96
NU thus criticized the way in which the MUI dened the terms secularism, pluralism, and liberalism, arguing that such mis-denition could lead to conict.97 The MUI fatwa stated that secularism entails separating the world from religion so that religion is only to be useful to assist arrange ones private relationship with God, whilst relationships between people are arranged only on the basis of a social contract.98 The NU argued that this denition made it appear as if the MUI were rejecting the way the Indonesian state
Amin, a central architect of the MUI fatwa, is an NU board member and would no doubt disagree with my description of NUs position. Generalizations about the relative positions of the main Islamic parties are therefore difcult. That difculty itself underlines the pluralism within the modern nation of Indonesia and the range of different positions on offer. 95 NU online, Tangappan PBNU atas Fatwa MUI (2005) NU website <www.nu.or.id/data_detail_print.asp?id_data55004 at 15 September, 2005. 96 NU online, Tanggapan PBNU atas Fatwa MUI (2005) NU website http:// www.nu.or.id/data_detail_print.asp?id_data5500.html at 15 September, 2005. The NU here was referring to groups like the Ahmadiyyah, an Islamic sect recently the target of harassment and intimidation by more hard-line Indonesian Islamic groups. 97 Ibid. 98 MUI No.7 (2005), 1(4), 2.
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maintains the separation between religious and secular authority, and ensures that religion is an individual matter and not one intrinsically related to citizenship in the nation. The MUIs understanding and consequent rejection of secularism appeared to advocate some sort of Islamic statehood, an option that the NU has consistently rejected throughout its history, instead upholding the role that secularism has played in sustaining Indonesia as a unitary nation since independence.99 The NU were equally critical of MUIs denition of liberalism. The MUI dened liberalism as an understanding of the religious texts that is attained by combining such texts with the use of logical thinking; and only recognizing religious doctrines that are consistent with (their) own subjective understanding.100 This was a clear rejection of modern interpretative Islamic approaches in Indonesia as little more than illegitimate subjective reasoningexemplied for some within the MUI by a number of Abdurrahmann Wahids more unique exhortations during his Presidency.101 In contrast, the NU adopted a more positive stance on liberalism, with more focus on the concept of general public welfare (maBlaAa 6:mma) within a unied Indonesia, while retaining the pre-eminence of the religious texts. The NU response accordingly called for Indonesian Muslims to embrace moderate beliefs and avoid hardline responses, and urged them to deepen Islamic brotherhood across the internal differences within the modern umma102a clear defence of liberalism, secularism and religious pluralism. NUs afrmation of Pancasila was echoed in many of the critical liberal responses. The manner in which Pancasila was used by many of the liberals opposed to the MUI fatwa as a shield to defend Indonesia
See Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds.), Nahdlatul Ulama: Traditionalist Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Clayton: Monash University Asia Institute, 1996). 100 MUI No.7 (2005), 1(3), 2. 101 Three issues that saw President Wahid at odds with the MUI were when he suggested strengthening ties with Israel, repealing the ban on the Communist party in Indonesia, and when, during the Ajinomoto casea Japanese food additives company accused of using pork in its preservativeshe sided with Ajinomoto even before product samples had been tested. 102 Interestingly, the NU also used their response statement to the MUI fatwa to speak tangentially about the importance of avoiding or using the symbols of Islam as a justication to injure or oppress other people, either nationally or internationally. Such a use of Islamic symbols, NU argued, enabled those already opposed to Islam to take a further hard line and beneted Islamophobia in general.
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and Indonesian values is an intriguing feature of the debate.103 The Pancasila account of Islam, whilst it has varied enormously through the years from Sukarno (195966) through the New Order (196798) and now in the post-Suharto era, ultimately carries little conviction from a religious perspective, because it makes Islam essentially only one component in the wider national ideology.104 Throughout its history, the ideology has upheld a very narrow interpretation of religious freedom, and one that did not include polytheistic, agnostic and atheist stances. Nevertheless, in criticizing the MUI fatwa, many Islamic liberals sought to move the debate away from religion and towards Pancasila and the realities of a modern Indonesia. This is ironic, as the state ideology of Pancasila is not, and never has been, a conceptual tool permitting unrestricted religious and political freedoms in Indonesia. Indeed, on many occasions throughout the New Order, it was used precisely to justify repressive control and circumscription of political beliefs and social freedoms. It is incongruous that many of the liberals opposed to the MUI fatwa opposed it on the basis of an ideology that had been used in the past to control the liberal positions being advocated in many of the critiques. Indonesias second largest Muslim party, Muhammadiyah, found itself in an awkward situation as a result of the MUI fatwa, with much of the awkwardness resulting from the selection during the 2005 Muhammadiyah Congress of Dien Syamsuddin to lead Muhammadiyah. Syamsuddin, an authoritative conservative Islamic gure, was also the General Secretary of the MUI, a position he held since 2000, during which time the MUI released a number of conservative fatwas. Syamsuddins success demonstrated the signicant ideological shift at
Many observers used Pancasila as the most legitimate and appropriate reason for rejecting the MUI fatwa. The comments of Father Weinata Sairin, the Chairman of the Indonesian Church Association were typical: As long as we still have Pancasila, freedom of religion is a fact and a reality that cannot be denied. Father Weinata Sairin, quoted in (2005) indosiar website (Jakarta) <http://www.indosiar.com/forum/topic.asp?/TOPIC_id17099.html4 at 15 August, 2005. 104 M. B. Hooker, Islamic Law in South East Asia, Studia Islamika 10 (2003), 32; Islamic Law in South East Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984); Islamic Law in South East Asia, Journal of Asian Law, 4 (2002). It is hard for many devout Muslims to see Pancasila as anything other than theologically heterodox; many Muslims have viewed it as a secular ideology that is incompatible with Islam. Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance (New York: Routledge, 1996), 229.
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the most senior level of the Muhammadiyah organization. Although both conservative and liberal elements have long been a part of Muhammadiyah, and in modern times particularly since the Aceh Congress in 1995, the recent senior level conservative shift has been concurrent with the development of a number of young progressive intellectuals who have initiated new individual networks within the organization. By 2005, there was already a signicant liberal element within the organization called the Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (JIMM, or Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals Network), a third generation Muhammadiyah group that was supported by second generation Muhammadiyah members such as Moeslim Abdurrahman and Syai Maarif.105 As a result, Asyari describes the modern Muhammadiyah as an organization roughly divided into three camps: the liberal; the radical-puritan; and the remainder, described as pragmatic-political.106 The MUI fatwa brought to the foreground the existing inter-party conict over Muhammadiyahs future. Whilst the JIMM faction opposed the MUI fatwa, many within Muhammadiyah saw JIMMs liberal outlook as a serious ideological threat to the organization itself. Adijani al-Alabji, the vice-chair of the Makassar Muhammadiyah branch, stated that the reformist ideas (from the seminal thinkers MuAammad 6Abd<h, R:shid Ri@: and Jam:l al-D;n al-Afgh:n;) on which Muhammadiyah was founded have nothing to do with liberalism.107 Equally, the dissonance within Muhammadiyah and the reason why the 2005 MUI fatwa was going to be such a difcult issue for the organization was demonstrated by Answar Muktis comments in 2004. In a way that pregured the central issue of the 2005 MUI fatwa, Mukti rhetorically asked his party during a pre-selection discussion: How can Muhammadiyah be led by those who acknowledge that all religions are the same?108a revealing insight into how many within Muhammadiyah would actively support the MUIs rejection of liberalism less than a year later. As the key spokesperson of the MUI, Syamsuddin was a busy gure after the release of the MUI No. 7. As Muhammadiyah leader, he consistently defended the MUI denitions of liberalism, pluralism, and secularism. He reinforced the MUI notion that Islamic
Asyari, Muhammadiyah and Radical Islam, 4. Ibid. Asyari himself notes that his division is somewhat arbitrary, as there are other tendencies on the rise, but his analysis is nonetheless useful. 107 Al-Alabji, quoted in Asyari. 108 Ibid, 5.
106 105
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liberalism can use limited liberal thinking in its exegetical interpretation, but cannot propose or suggest that all religions come from the same base or foundation.109 He similarly reasserted the MUI characterizations of secularism and religious pluralism, rejecting the idea that religion was only a private matter between individual and God and independent of the state, and rejecting the notion that religious pluralism meant that all religions are the same and therefore could not be ranked.110 In an inimitable irony, Syamsuddin proposed himselfpresumably under the guise of Muhammadiyah leaderas a mediator between those backing the MUI pluralism fatwa (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, Hizbut Tahir Indonesia, Al Irsyad and others) and those against it (Abdurrahman Wahid, Dawan Rahardjo, Johan Effendi and others).111 His role as both MUI spokesman and Muhammadiyah leader left many within his party both deeply satised and aggrieved. One individual dejected by the Muhammadiyah position on various MUI fatwas was Dawan Rahardjo. Rahardjo criticized the MUI fatwas interpretation of religious pluralism and defended the Ahmadiyya sect, a move that brought him into direct conict with Syamsuddin. The conict resulted in Rahardjo being indirectly expelled by Syamsuddindipecat secara tidak langsungfrom an organization in which my mother and father are members and in which he had been a member all his life.112 Rahardjos extraordinary interview in the Indonesian political magazine Tempo (February 2006) provides insight into how the ideological ssures within Muhammadiyah at the time were brought to the fore by the MUI fatwa. In Muhammadiyah, Rahardjo noted, there were two competing trendsa Wahhabi-inuenced group that sought the purest form of Islam and rejected any form of local slametan traditions, and a second modernist group that sought reform on the lines of the teachings of MuAammad 6Abd<h, and the broader struggle for knowledge and education. Rahardjo expressly placed Syamsuddin in the conservative group and believed that the more radical outlook was occurring as a result of the failure of dialogue.113 His confused exit from Muhammadiyahhe was never sent a formal letter but simply heard
Din Syamsuddin, cited in Muhammadiyah Tawarkan Diri Jadi Mediator Dialog Fatwa MUI, Kompas Cyber Media (Jakarta): <www.kompas.com/ utama/news/0508/06/200356.htm4 at 10 February, 2006. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. For an example of how the different parties lined up both for and against the fatwa see Dukungan Fatwa MUI <http://www.mail-archive.com/ is-lam@milis.isnet.org/msg00800.html4 at 15 February, 2006. 112 Dawan Rahardjo, Saya Pernah Kecewa Pada Agama, 37. 113 Ibid.
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that he had himself resigned because of his extant defence of Ahmadiyyawas a very public manifestation of the exegetical struggles within the party. D: Defence of the MUI Defence of the MUI fatwa brought together many Indonesian Islamic groups that had previously not always aligned on Islamic issues. It is unclear whether some of these groups defended the fatwa because they believed it to be right, or because of the frustration they felt at the manner in which liberal Indonesian Muslims had responded to the fatwa. Certainly, many of them expressed anger at Islamic liberal groups who were working to undermine the fatwa and to further circulate their own ideologies.114 Organizations such as the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir and the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) broadly welcomed the fatwa, with general comment to the effect that the fatwa should be accepted as it had been issued by experts.115 This attitude was also prevalent in more mainstream Islamic associations such as ICMI (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia), the Association of Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals, whose leader stated:
ICMI support the MUI and the MUI fatwa as (they) are a competent religious institution. If we dont believe in the MUI, then whom else are we going to believe in? We call upon those who are not Islamic, dont get involved . . .116
The MUIs own response to the controversy aroused by the fatwa was to maintain that they had a moral obligation to the Indonesian umma to continue to promote the fatwa across Indonesia.117 They downplayed
See Dandy Koswaraputra, MUI Fatwa Gets Mixed Reaction in Indonesia (2005) islamonline.net <http://198.65.147.194/English/News/2005-08/06/ article06.shtml4 at 6 August, 2005. 115 Ibid. The Islamic Brotherhood Movement spokesperson Ahmad Soemargono stated: We are ready to support the MUI fatwa. By any means. We can support it by law, but if (they) use methods outside the law then we will use the same methods. There is no backing off from the defence of Islam. See Amhad Soemargono (2005), indosiar website. <http://www.indosiar.com/ welcome/forum/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID170994 at 23 August, 2005. 116 ICMI was a New Order Islamic group chaired for many years by the previous vice president Jusuf Habibie and consisted of intellectuals discussing Indonesian Islamic issues. See <http://www.indosiar.com/welcome/forum/topic. asp?TOPIC_ID170994 at 23 August, 2005. 117 Republika Online, Kita Terbuka Untuk Dialog (2005) http://www. republikaonline.co.id/suplemen/cetak_detail.asp?mid5&id209195_id10 at 18 August, 2005.
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the controversy, stating regularly that semantic differences were to blame for any misunderstanding.118 Statements by the Head of the MUI, Makruf Amien were indicative: what is controversial about the fatwa is the response, (and) not the fatwa itself.119 Only days after the fatwas release, the MUI Chairman, Amidhan, indicated that the MUI was ready to hold an open national dialogue in order to ensure that the public were aware of the meaning of the fatwa.120 This suggests that while the MUI may have been expecting some controversy, they were surprised by the intensity of it. The national dialogue idea was of course what had been avoided before and during the congress itself, and what liberals such as Azymuradi Azra had been recommending all along.
IV. WHY WAS THE FATWA RELEASED AND WHY WAS IT SO CONTROVERSIAL?
A: The external environment: pluralist thought in Indonesia If, as this paper suggests, part of the reason for MUI Fatwa No. 7 was the frustration of 25 years of the dominance of neo-modernist Islamic thought in Indonesia, then the related questions of how the liberal Islamic movement was able to become dominant, and why its position was so objectionable to the MUI in 2005, need to be considered. In order to address these questions, it is necessary rst to look back briey at Islamic history in Indonesia and second, to move forward to the rapid changes that have occurred in modern Indonesian Islamic thought over the past 35 years. From the very beginning of its entry into the Malay world, Islam in Indonesia was exible, syncretistic and multi-voiced.121 Two key factors
118 Ibid. The Muhammadiyah leader, Din Syamsuddin frequently deployed this argument, blaming semantics (which) had created a problem in interpreting the fatwa and confusion in regards to the philosophy of meaning behind the fatwa itself. In a sense this is true, but the semantic differences demonstrate the severe ideological differences rifts between the differing opinions. Hera Diani, Moderates, Conservatives Dispute Freedom of Thought, Jakarta Post (14 September, 2005). 119 See the radio transcript, Menyikapi perbedaan pasca fatwa MUI. 120 See Republika Online, Majelis Ulam Menyoal Ahmadiyah: <http:// www.republikaonline.co.id/suplemen/cetak_detail.asp?mid5&ad282391& kat_id104 at 5 August, 2005. 121 Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 12; M. B. Hooker, Islam in South East Asia (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 268.
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in this were, rstly, the manner in which Islam spread across Indonesia, and secondly, the development of a series of distinct Malay and Javanese qh texts in the seventeenth century. These factors were inuential in creating a plurality of beliefs within Indonesian Islam from the literal to the interpretive.122 Historically, there never was a simple, uniform transplant of Arabic Islamic interpretation directly to the archipelago:
the archipelago had never been conquered by invading armies, smothered under a centralised regime, or supervised by an omnipotent empire. The striking feature of political organisation in the modern archipelago was that it was organised around a pluricentric pattern of mercantile city-states, inland agrarian kingdoms and tribal hinterlands.123
Apart from the trading stations of North Sumatra, where the simplicity and austerity of Islamic rule superimposed itself locally, across the rest of Indonesia pre-Islamic institutions encountered a good deal of difculty in accommodation, largely due to the presence of local custom (:dat).124 Against such a backdrop, Islam demonstrated an ability to come to some accommodation with other systems of belief, which in turn assisted in its spread and maintained a plurality of belief systems functioning interconnectedly with one another.125 The Sh:6; doctrine which came to dominate in Indonesia, was known through sixteenth-century commentaries on qh by al-Raml; (Nih:ya) and Ibn Eajar (TuAfa).126 These and other materials were translated in the
122 For more on Islam moving to Indonesia, see Brian Harrison, South East Asia: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1963). 123 Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, 14. 124 M. B. Hooker, Adat Law in Modern Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978), 92. Regional Indonesian :d:t differences were critical to how Islam was received across different areas of the archipelago. Contrary to much of the early Dutch studies, :d:t and Islam had a shared existence long predating the intervention of the colonial powers in Indonesian legal affairs and a relationship that was in general based on respect and coexistence. For more on this topic, see Ratno Lukito, Law and Politics in Post-Independence Indonesia: A Case Study of Religion and Adat Courts, Studia Islamika 6 (1999), 4. In the early years of Islam in Indonesia, :d:t were seen by many as the natural expression of Indonesian justice: Hooker, Adat Law in Modern Indonesia, 93. 125 M. B. Hooker, A Concise Legal History of South East Asia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). 126 Mohammed Atho Mudhzar, Islam dan Hukum Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies, 2003), 14.
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sixteenth century and allowed for seventeenth-century Malay and Javanese hybrid texts in which qh elements were incorporated into local rules.127 The complex texts allowed for Indonesian versions of such abstracts as duty, rule, sovereignty and authority.128 They were not adaptations or copies of the Arabic but original works empowering a local understanding of Islam. Thus, from the very beginning, and in even the most technical acts of prescription, the Indonesian material was not a simple copying of the original Arabic sources.129 Its interpretation and incorporation of Islam was pluralistic in nature and balanced throughout the archipelago by :dat practices and beliefs.130 The result was the paradox that is Indonesia: a population that simultaneously embraces Islam whilst revering the Javanese wayang shadow puppetry, and where for most of the people, Indonesian law, :dat, and Islam are all considered sources of law.131 By the twentieth century, Islamic reform across the world was developing in response to contemporary demands and the need to integrate modern thought and institutions with Islam.132 The modernist tradition was inuential in independent Indonesia, and by the 1950s traditional Islam and its leaders were being steadily pushed from the limelight by modernists.133 Neither traditionalists nor modernists were at ease crossing into the others domain and the mid-century
127 Hooker, Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa, 10. For more on these texts see van Bruinessen, Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question, or M. B. Hooker, Laws of South East Asia (Singapore: Butterworth, 1986). 128 Hooker, Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa, 10. 129 Ibid. See also Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reform in South East Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesia and Middle Eastern Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century (Leiden: KILTV Press, 2004) and Jajat Burhanudin, Aspiring for Islamic Reform: South East Asian Requests for Reform in Al Manar, Islamic Law and Society, 1 (2005), for Indonesian interpretations of Arabic Islam. 130 Hooker, Adat Law in Modern Indonesia, which describes the religion of Islam everywhere in Indonesia as culturally dened. I have examined this balancing in an unpublished paper (2005): The Effectiveness of Regional Attempts to Revive Shari6ah in Indonesia: South Sulawesi. 131 Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia, 12. 132 Fazlur Rahman, Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method and Alternatives, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1 (1970). 133 Greg Barton, Indonesias Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in neo-Modernist Thought, Studia Islamika, 4.1 (January 1997), 39.
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preoccupation with modernity accentuated this ill-ease.134 The mercantile and industrial development of Indonesia over this period went hand in hand with a distinctly Indonesian form of modernist Islam,135 a form which Hefner called civil pluralist Islam, as it denied the wisdom of a monolithic state and instead afrmed democracy, voluntarism and a balance of countervailing powers a state and a society.136 It is unsurprising that this outlook was able to ourish during the Suharto regime. His favouring one form of Islam over another caused considerable irritation amongst those Muslims in Indonesia who followed a more traditional, stricter reading of the religious texts.137 The scriptualists tenaciously opposed the dominant pluralist paradigm in Indonesia throughout the New Order period.138 Their resilience continued the ongoing lineage of conservative thinking in Indonesia, to which is connected the thinking behind the 2005 MUI fatwa, and of the many groups vocal in its defence. An example is Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), the group that most vociferously upheld the MUIs Ahmadiyya fatwa.139 Throughout the 1980s and 90s, through their monthly scriptualist magazine, the Dewan Dakwah, the DDII remained the strongest voice opposing the neomodernists.140 Unlike the latter, they did not advocate adaptation
134 Ibid, 41. Mohammed Natsir, a traditionalist Indonesian thinker who played a fundamental role in Indonesias independence, explained the relationship between the modernists and traditionalists as one in which they treated us like cats with ring worm. It shows the deep-seated animosity and suspicion that already existed. 135 Kolig (Modernisation without Secularisation, 23) notes that by the time of the Suharto years, neo-modernism generally enjoyed tacit toleration by the Suharto regime, enabling it to ourish while other more traditional and conservative strands of Islamic thought had to contend with restrictions. 136 Robert Hefner, Varieties of Muslim Politics: Civil versus Statist Islam in Fuad Jabali and Jamhari (eds.), Islam in Indonesia: Islamic Studies and Social Transformation (2002), 14. 137 William Liddle, Media Dakwah Scriptualism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia in Mark Woodward (ed.), Towards a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought (Tempe, AR: Arizona State University, 1996), 329. 138 Ibid. 139 Republika Online, Majelis Ulam Menyoal Ahmadiyah (2005): <www. republikaonline.co.id/suplemen/cetak_detail.asp?mid5&ad282391&kat_ id104 at 29 September 2005. 140 Liddle, Media Dakwah Scriptualism, 329.
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of Islam to modern conditions, believing instead that it sufced to apply Qur8:n and Sunna conscientiously.141 DDIIs magazine was openly hostile to Nurcholish Madjid in particular, a leading neomodernist Indonesian thinker, whom it accused of abandoning central Islamic beliefs and offering only a vague theosophist-style of spiritualism.142 These criticisms of Madjid are very similar to those now being faced by the Indonesian liberals currently opposing the MUI fatwa. B: The rise and rise of Indonesian neo-modernism Over the past 35 years in Indonesia, the new Islamic intellectual movement called neo-modernism arose out of the well-established Islamic modernism.143 Neo-modernism sought to move on from Islamic institutions and symbolism and focus more on the substantive nature of Islamic political struggle, which was why as early as 1969 its advocates in Indonesia were suggesting that Pancasila be accepted as the political
141
Ibid. The scriptualist thinking reected the outlook of Mohammed Natsir, a prominent Indonesian modernist Muslim intellectual who repeatedly clashed with Indonesias rst President Sukarno regarding the relationship between religion and the state in the early 1950s. For a translation of one of the debates, see Hooker, Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa, 37. I believe that the scriptualists thinking is also intimately connected to the critiques of Sidi Gazalba, an Islamic teacher of the 1970s, on what he confusingly terms both westernization and modernization. He represents a typical example of presentday Islamic resentment of the cultural aspects of modernizationderiding the nations capital, and bundling modernism, gambling, prostitution and immorality all together. Gazalbas critique can be read in Muhammed Kamal Hassan, Muslim Ideological Responses to the Issue of Modernisation in Indonesia in Ahmad Ibrahim (ed.), Readings on Islam in South East Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 370. 142 Liddle, Media Dakwah Scriptualism, 329. 143 While not all Indonesian Muslims who t into the movement broadly dened by Fazlur Rahman as neo-modernism would want to be identied by it, it is still useful. Nevertheless I do acknowledge the limitations of the terminology used here. Arguably the two leading neo-modernists gures, Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid, come from what is a traditionalist background. To describe them as either modernist, neo-modernist or traditionalist is inadequate, for neither of them is solely one of these. See Greg Barton, The Impact of Neo Modernism on Indonesian Islamic Thought: The Emergence of a New Pluralism in David Bourchier and J. Legge (eds.), Democracy in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1990s (Calyton, Vic.: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994).
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ideal in Indonesia.144 The neo-modernists held that the older leaders and activists of political Islam had at some point xed a religious view of worldly affairs that was too formulaic, legalistic and scriptualistic in orientation.145 For them, the connection between the revealed text and modern society did not turn upon a revealed hermeneutic, but rather upon an interpretation of the spirit and broad intent behind the specic language of the texts.146 Whilst the majority of the Indonesian ulema rejected such thinking, it has been a major inuence within broader Indonesian society today.147 The growth of liberalism and the myriad of new interpretations of Indonesian cultural life in Indonesia during the rst ve years of the twenty-rst century was a source of much resentment for conservative Muslims in Indonesia. One small liberal clique, the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) has proven to be a vocal irritant with its coordinator, Ulil Abshar Abdalla, provoking considerable controversy in early 2000 by recommending an itjih:d; methodology that put the importance of contextuality above the Sunna itself.148 Abdallas slogango beyond the text, that is the challengemade him very unpopular amongst members of the hard line Islamic groups now close to the MUI, and his ideas stood in stark contrast to senior
144 The Indonesian Islamic Student Organization under Nurcholish Madjdid advocated this in particular during the 1970s. See Nurcholish Madjid, Islamic Roots of Modern Pluralism: Indonesian Experiences, Studia Islamika, 1.1 (January 1994). 145 Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, 70. This argument may be likened to that of the prominent Islamic reformers such as Jam:l al-D;n al-Afgh:n; and MuAammad 6Abd<h. 146 Ibid. The neo-modernists were seeking a universal methodology for Qur8:nic exegesis, exegesis that was rational and sensitive to the historical and cultural contexts of both the original scriptures and the modern societies that now seek their guidance. Greg Barton, Neo Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist, 6. 147 Muhammed Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to New Order Modernization in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kementerian Pelajaran, 1982). Ch. 4 provides an overview of the ulemas response to this movement. 148 Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Avoiding Bibliolatry (2002) at <http://www. islamlib.com/en/page.php?pagearticle&id399.html4 at 10 August, 2005. The word small is used intentionally; JIL is less known than almost every other Islamic group within Indonesia. See Lembaga Survei Indonesia, Survei Nasional: Dukungan dan Pennolakan Terhadap Radikalisme Islam (2005).
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MUI discourse.149 The MUI believe that whilst the role of 6aql (reason) is signicant, it prefers not to reason freely, particularly for matters already regulated in the Qur8:n and Sunna.150 From their inauguration in 1975, the MUI have consistently held the Qur8:n and Sunna to be the exegetical sources used in evolving their fatwas, demonstrated by the oft-repeated phrase (from Sunan al-Tirmidhi): I have left upon you two weighty things. You will not be in error if you hold [to] them; the book of Allah and my Sunnah.151 By 2004, conservative Indonesian Islamic individuals were publicly expressing the MUIs great disappointment with the offensive liberal thinking occurring within the country.152 The disjuncture between the liberalists and the literalists helped perpetuate the long-held notion of a conspiracy, with an increasing number of Indonesians suspicious of what they saw as a US-led plan to defeat Islam as part of a JewishZionist plot.153 This conspiracy theory has existed in Indonesia since the days of the Dewan Dakwah magazine and been fed by similar theories held within the worldwide umma. In Indonesia, the fact that JIL was sponsored by USAID was used repeatedly to justify
Ibid. By suggesting a process that at times circumvented the Sunna, Abdalla was suggesting a method that was in direct opposition to that which had been used by the MUI for 35 years. Abdalla gained further notoriety in 2001 when he became the target of two death fatwas by rival Indonesian Islamic groups. Whilst the groups issuing the fatwas lacked credibility and were easily dismissed, what could not be denied was the level of hateful anger in certain sections of the Indonesia umma towards liberal and pluralist Islam. The kyai issuing the fatwa, Athian Ali Mohammed Dai stated in his fatwa: It is too minimal if all we do is eliminate Ulil. What we want to do is tear down the motif behind JIL, the organisation that he leads. See Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Menangkal Bahaya Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) dan FLA (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautzar, 2004), 2. 150 Hosen, Fatwa and Politics in Indonesia, 159. 151 Hosen, Behind the Scenes: Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia 1975 1998, citing two fatwasin 1983 and 1980 that use the same or similar text. 152 Din Syamsuddin, MUI Deputy Chairman quoted in Hera Diani, Moderates, Conservatives Dispute Freedom of Thought in Jakarta Post (14 September, 2005). 153 This is not a new idea and has been articulated by many over the years. For the most recent indication that this idea is alive and well, see Sidney Jones, Transcript JI: Terror again in Indonesia, Lateline Program, 3 October 2005 or see International Crisis Group, Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, (Asia Report, 92 (2005).
149
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this accusation.154 A typical comment was that by MUI board member Ali Mustafta Ya6qub who, in defending the fatwa, stated:
The fatwa will not be recalled. The liberals can keep on protesting. We are not afraid of their protests. We know who is paying them. We know where they get their food.155
By 2005, there had been years of political upheaval and widespread religious reection but the permutations had not lessened the hold liberal Indonesian Muslims had on the broader Indonesian Islamic agenda and its relationship to the secular state. The frustration felt as a result of this situation was a considerable part of the motivation for the release of MUI Fatwa No. 7 in 2005. Indeed, upon looking back at the circumstances that had led to its release, perhaps the only surprise is that it took the MUI so long to issue such a fatwa.
V. CONCLUSION
Historically, the Indonesian social system has always shown itself to be resistant to Islamic activism. Whether this is because of the lack of religious hierarchy among Sunni Muslims, the accomodationalist attitude that endures towards local values, or in more modern times, because of the general acceptance of Pancasila, Indonesia continues to be a nation that largely embraces Islam within a pluralist context.156
154
Ali Mustafta Ya6qub, cited in <www.indosiar.com/welcome/forum/ topic.asp?TOPIC_ID17099.html4 at 15 September, 2005. The sentiment was also heard in a controversial radio debate after the fatwa on Radio Berita. During the debate, Fauzan Al Ansyari, the Head of Data and Information for the MMI, stated: What surprises us is that the people who are attacking the fatwa are those NGOs and institutions that receive their funding from the USAID, the Ford Foundation, and the Asia Foundation. See the transcript, Menyikapi perbedaan pasca fatwa MUI; Jaiz, Menangkal Bahaya Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) dan FLA, 21. It was also articulated by Abu Bakar Baasyir in an interview in September 2005 with Scott Atran, The Emir: An Interview with Abu Bakar Baasyir, Alleged Leader of the Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiyah Organization in Global Terrorism Analysis: Spotlight on Terror, 15 September, 2005 3(9) at <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid2369782.html4 at 3 October, 2005. 155 Ya6qub, www.indosiar.com/welcome/forum/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID 17099.html4 at 15 September, 2005. 156 Mudzhar, Islam dan Hukum Islam di Indonesia, 194.
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This paper has demonstrated such pluralism by analysing both the MUI fatwa and the diverse responses to it. There has been a lineage of conservative thinking in Indonesia that has been frustrated, at rst by the liberal Islamic movement during the New Order regime, and then more recently by neo-modernism and the liberal Islam movement. This growing frustration inuenced (if it did not inspire) the release of Fatwa No. 7; it links the scriptualist thinking of the Dewan Dakwah magazine days in the 1970s to arguments of the groups that defended the fatwa. From the discussion of the links to this historical lineage, two further important points emerge. Firstly, though more appealing to Westerners and Indonesian Islamic liberals, neo-modernist understanding of pluralism and liberalism is only one of a multiplicity of possible understandings of Islam.157 Secondly, although at best an inchoate and spluttering assemblage of voices, the conservatives who were so outspoken in defence of the fatwa cannot simply be ignored or dismissed as ignorant polemicists, as some of the Indonesian liberals have attempted to do. The way they refer to Qur8:nic texts is similar to the liberalists, and the scriptualist outlook remains genuinely appealing to a consistent segment of the Indonesian Muslim community. As the controversy aroused by the fatwa begins to recede, the MUI will continue to face the challenge of dening their role and articulating their position in modern Indonesian society. Whilst the 2005 congress and the resultant fatwas positioned the organization as conservative within the scale of modern Indonesian Islamic thought, the paper has shown that Indonesian society has changed extraordinarily over the past few years. The MUI will need to deploy new concepts and approaches to inform the Indonesian umma of their position on relevant societal and political matters. The MUI will continue to shoulder the historical baggage of an Islamic organization that for many years sided with the New Order regime policies rather than aligning itself more closely with the Indonesian umma. Further, the MUIs continuing reliance on government funding will mean that the organization will either encounter accusations of collusion and bias when it agrees with unpopular government policy, or that it will have an uneasy and difcult relationship with the government when it disagrees with its policies. Given these signicant challenges, it remains to be seen how successful the MUI will be in demarcating a new role for itself in a rapidly changing Indonesia. E-mail: p.gillespie2@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au
157 Mark Woodward, Towards a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought, 47.

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Current Issues in Indonesian Islam

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Published online 20 February 2007 Journal of Islamic Studies 18:2 (2007) pp.

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

II. THE MUI AND THEIR FATWAS: AN OVERVIEW

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

III. FATWA NO. 7 AND ITS OPPONENTS

current issues in indonesi an islam

The fatwa also cites al-AAC:b 33. 36:

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

Point 3 then continued by stating (2 (3), 2):

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

current issues in indonesi an islam

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