Les Cahiers Du RETEX - Supplément À Doctrine NR 10

AVERTISSEMENT AU LECTEUR
LES CAHIERS DU RETEX N 10
En plus de deux articles lis au sujet dOBJECTIF-DOCTRINE (la dfense NRBC), ce 10 numro des Cahiers du RETEX vous propose exceptionnellement deux articles sur le contrle des foules. En effet, la rdaction a souhait publier rapidement ces deux libres rflexions sur ce sujet important quest le contrle des foules.
LE GROUPE DE DEFENSE NBC AU KOSOVO

par le lieutenant-colonel KOVALEVSKY, commandant en second du GDNBC
rsent ds lengagement de la force au Kosovo en mai 1999, au travers dun module Gupard 1000 (1/1/2), le Groupe de Dfense NBC sest retrouv rapidement devoir grer des risques NBC particuliers : les risques NBC dorigine industrielle. Des lments projets de larme franaise avaient dj t confronts une situation de cet ordre Dakar face un vnement impliquant un wagon dammoniac. Mais au Kosovo, un tissu industriel de conception ancienne, laiss labandon pendant les annes de guerre civile, donne une ampleur toute autre ces risques NBC mergents. Dans la tache qui lui est impartie de prvenir et de grer tout incident NBC et de restaurer la capacit de la force si besoin est, le module du GDNBC(1) doit valuer la ralit et lintensit du danger, concevoir des plans de rponse face lvnement et les actions de rduction de risques dans son domaine mais surtout convaincre que la manuvre, laction reste possible face ce danger NBC pernicieux que lhritage de nombreuses annes tournes face au pacte de Varsovie rend particulirement incapacitant. LESPACE DU COMBATTANT AU KOSOVO : UN ENVIRONNEMENT SUBURBAIN ET INDUSTRIEL A RISQUES. Une opration de matrise de la violence, de rtablissement de la paix et de scurisation des populations limite immanquablement la libert daction et en particulier celle de limplantation de la force. Quelles que soient les nationalits, les choix dimplantation des units obissent des compromis. La priphrie des agglomrations reste le terrain privilgi des zones de dploiement, bien videmment sy retrouvent les zones industrielles : Camp Monteith (US) stend quelques centaines de mtres dune usine de batteries au Cadmium-Nickel, Feldlager " Progress " (GE) occupe le cur dune usine chimique, ltat-major de la Brigade Nord trne 800 mtres du MIP (Mitrovica Industrial Park).
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Province industrielle, le Kosovo voyait toute son conomie lie au Kombinat TREPCA. A partir dune extraction minire forte activit, avait t dveloppe toute une industrie de valorisation et de transformation dont la conception, sur le mode sovitique, date des annes cinquante. Dj obsoltes avant lclatement de la Yougoslavie, les installations industrielles ont t laisses labandon pendant la guerre civile, bon nombre ont t dvastes. Des quantits importantes de produits chimiques restent dans des conditions de stockages dplorables. Des paratonnerres radioactifs gisent terre. Afin de satisfaire ses besoins durgence, la population nhsite pas faire de la rcupration dans les installations abandonnes. Tout est runi pour que laccident survienne : mlanges de produits incompatibles toxicit leve, installations lectriques dangereuses, infiltrations deau importantes, volont, mme sans comptence, de relancer lactivit industrielle en mode dgrad. Dans ce contexte le module du GDNBC, inclus au BATGEN(2) mais pour emploi aux ordres de G3 2D (3) de ltat-major de la brigade, doit valuer le risque et proposer les mesures adopter en cas dmergence de la menace. EVALUER LA MENACE : NI ANGELISME, NI CATASTROPHISME. Etablir un inventaire des plus exhaustifs est une tche essentielle et difficile. Un produit mme en faible quantit peut ragir avec dautres composs de faon irrversible avec des consquences dramatiques. Il convient de sparer les ractifs susceptibles dinteragir de manire violente ou toxique pour lindividu. Ltiquetage des composs sous leur nom commercial serbe rend lexercice plus ardu. La cartographie de tous les produits prsents reste la premire action entreprendre. Elle demande une sensibilisation aux notions de chimie et de physico-chimie et prend en compte particulirement la toxicit potentielle, les quantits et les conditions de stockage. Engage peu aprs linstallation de la Brigade franaise Mitrovica, cette action permet dvaluer la menace et de dfinir les mesures de prcaution adopter par la force projete. Lexemple donn par le Gupard 1000 du GDNBC dans la zone daction de la Brigade Nord ne sera suivi qu partir de mai 2001 par les autres brigades multinationales.
(1) Groupe de Dfense Nuclaire Biologique et Chimique. (2) Bataillon du Gnie. (3) Gestion de lespace terrestre.
A partir de cette cartographie le risque pour la force peut tre valu. A chaque produit sassocie un primtre de danger lintrieur duquel les effets de protection adquats doivent tre revtus et pour lequel la population devra tre vacue ou confine en fonction de la volatilit du toxique. Lexemple de lacide cyanhydrique, dcouvert dans une usine de Mitrovica, illustre toute ambigut possible pouvant natre lors de lvaluation de la menace. Lacide cyanhydrique, connu galement sous les noms dacide prussique ou, tristement clbre depuis 1944, de Xylon B est un toxique trs puissant (dose ltale : 3 mg/m3) dont le seul nom fait frmir et a focalis les craintes. Mais il peut sagir galement dun intermdiaire de synthse dissous dans un solvant organique ou aqueux dont la toxicit instantane est beaucoup plus faible (dose ltale : 1930 mg/m3).

Lexamen du contenant montre quil ne peut sagir dun compos gazeux (Xylon B) mais que le produit est un liquide. La menace peut tre alors ramene son juste niveau qui nest pas celle de lagent de guerre non persistant dtenu par les forces de lex-PAVA mais celle dun produit industriel, toxique et dangereux certes, mais dans une proximit immdiate exclusivement.
PREVENIR ET REAGIR FACE A LEVENEMENT : DES POSTURES A ADAPTER EN FONCTION DE LA CONJONCTURE. Si chaque produit correspondent des mesures de protection et de prvention adaptes (type de protection respiratoire et corporelle, ncessit dexclusion ou de confinement), il est ncessaire de dfinir des postures gnrales de faon simplifier le processus de raction pour lensemble des troupes tout en conservant des procdures cibles pour les quipes dintervention in situ (quipes NBC et pompiers) : lincendie dun transformateur au pyralne ncessitera le port de lANP pour les units en zone sous le vent mais celui dun appareil respiratoire isolant pour ceux (quipes NBC et pompiers) qui ont voluer proximit immdiate du sinistre. Le niveau de protection retenu ou dvacuation sappuie sur la dfinition dun seuil dexposition tolrable. Dautre part, la prise en compte de limage de laction de la force et des ncessits de communication peuvent obliger conduire des actions que laspect purement technique ne ncessite pas. La rupture dune canalisation sur un rservoir dacide sulfurique de plus de 1000 tonnes provoquant son dversement dans la rivire Stinica, toute proche, nappelle techniquement aucune action conduire si ce nest linformation des populations de lacidification temporaire de la rivire. Mais dverser de la chaux au dbouch des effluents de lusine, en amont de la rivire tmoigne de la prise en charge de lvnement ; Cette action favorise limage de la force dans sa mission de scurisation. Afin de ne pas annuler cet effet positif, il convient de protger ceux qui manipulent la chaux contre les risques de brulures et intoxication respiratoire.
REDUIRE LES RISQUES : DES ACTIONS COMBINEES AVEC LUNMIK (4), KFOR MAIN (5) ET LE KPC (6) Lorsque que la paix est rtablie, que la violence est matrise, une phase de normalisation intervient. La vie reprend ses droits, en particulier la vie conomique. Les acteurs sont alors nombreux : UNMIK, J9, ACM, reprsentants rgionaux et locaux des diffrentes ethnies en prsence. Le respect de lenvironnement devient alors un sujet de controverse pour lequel le module Gupard 1000 est concern au titre des risques dorigine industrielle. Concourir un environnement plus sain et rduire les risques reprsentent alors la proccupation de la grande majorit des acteurs internationaux et parfois celle des parties prenantes locales. Tous saccordent dire, chacun ayant ses raisons propres, que le stockage dans des fts en mauvais tat, dans " lusine de batterie " de Mitrovica, dun propergol explosif et vraisemblablement cancrigne nest pas acceptable. Mais que faire ? Il appartiendra au dtachement NBC de concevoir laction. Aprs avoir refroidi, avec prcaution, les fts en chambre froide afin de se placer au-dessous du seuil dexplosivit, transvaser le produit en container tanches en vue de son vacuation. Aprs avoir agr le concept technique, il appartiendra lUNMIK de financer lopration et de la conduire en faisant appel une socit civile allemande qui prconise lutilisation dazote liquide pour le refroidissement mais qui se contentera de la chambre froide du commissariat de lArme de terre, faute de moyens. Ce type daction, dans la mesure o il sinscrit en phase de normalisation ne peut tre conduit en cavalier seul par la force et demande immanquablement lagrement et le concours de lautorit lgitime et des partenaires locaux. Le confinement sur le site de Prvitnel des matires radioactives trouves sur lAOR de la brigade qui avait t dcid par la force fin 1999 en labsence de toute reprsentation civile a d en avril 2002, refaire lobjet dun confinement avanc en impliquant toutes les parties prenantes locales et rgionales.
(4) United nations mission in Kosovo (mission des nations unies au Kosovo MINUK). (5) Etat-majormultinational des Forces au Kosovo Pristina. (6) Kosovo Protection Corps, rassemble lex-UCK aprs son dsarmement.
De mme, la restauration du site dIBG Factory Gnijlane dans la zone de responsabilit amricaine, si elle a t conduite par lquipe NBC franaise, excute par les personnels du KPC avec le soutien logistique de lUS Army a ncessit laval et lappui financier de lUNMIK. Cette opration " Clean up Gnijlane ", premire de cette envergure (579 tonnes de produits toxiques manipuls en 46 jours) montre quil est possible pour des Franais de diriger une action NBC chez et avec les Amricains et demployer les anciens membres de lUCK des tches concourant la scurisation de lenvironnement. Elle souligne galement les capacits reconnues des lments NBC franais au Kosovo en matire de NBC ROTA(7) tant par lUNMIK que par les autres nations, en particulier les reprsentants US.

NBC ENTRE MENACE INVISIBLE ET " SYNDROMES " : CONVAINCRE DE LA FAISABILITE DE LACTION RESTE UN DEFI. Nous avons tous en souvenir ces exercices quune frappe nuclaire ou quune attaque chimique venaient clore, le port de lANP et de la plerine prcdait de peu le FINEX. Il en reste le sentiment que le NBC hypothque la manuvre. Sy ajoute une menace impalpable et pernicieuse dautant plus inquitante quelle est mal connue et que la presse nhsite pas la surligner loccasion des chos quelle donne aux " syndromes du Golfe ou des Balkans ". Ceci fait quune lgitime rticence sexprime ds que des actions NBC sont envisageables. Les mandats ne durant que quatre mois, la tentation est forte de repousser lchance pour le mandat suivant. Le module NBC doit pour convaincre de la faisabilit affuter ses arguments techniques et scientifiques, maximaliser les mesures de scurit, estimer les effets potentiels et dvelopper une stratgie de communication interne et externe et enfin convaincre en terme de plus-value lchelon le plus lev de lautorit militaire et de ladministration civile. La destruction par explosion et dispersion de 400 litres dacide cyanhydrique le 16 aot 2001 dans le massif dOstropolje a montr quune solide tude technique sappuyant sur la DGA et lchelon central NEDEX, la dfinition dune stratgie de mesures prcises avant et aprs laction, limplication dquipes de contrle trangres et un dispositif de scurit redondant ne suffisent pas emporter la dcision concernant lexcution du projet. Toutes les parties prenantes, commandement, service de sant, KFOR MAIN, UNMIK poseront des interrogations et certaines jusqu la veille de lopration. La prcision de ltude technique de faisabilit nest que le prambule incontournable du processus de prise de dcision. Les lments prponderants demeurent la mise en scurit des acteurs et de la population, les avantages gagner de la ralisation de lopration et ltude exhaustive de toutes les consquences possibles.
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Force est de constater que la France a montr quelle est en avance de phase sur toutes les autres nations contributrices de la force projete au Kosovo dans le domaine des risques technologiques et du NBC ROTA. Il en va de mme pour lintervention sur les risques biologiques : le dtachement franais est reconnu en tant que ple de comptence et mandat pour intervenir sur tout le Kosovo. Lexemple franais est suivi avec deux annes de retard tant concernant lvaluation de la menace que la mise au point de systmes daide la dcision en cas dvnement NBC. Cette avance est due une prise de conscience prcoce de lArme de terre qui a command une tude sur " les capacits dintervention des units NBC dans les missions de sauvegarde face aux risques technologiques " et a dcid en 2000 de la mise sur pied dquipes de reconnaissance et dvaluation (ERE) dans ce domaine pour septembre 2002. Les lments du GDNBC au Kosovo montrent leur savoir-faire quodidiennement, cependant subsiste lombre des " syndromes ". A mme dvoluer dans des ambiances toxiques, de manipuler des produits souvent inconnus parfois dangereux, dtre exposs exceptionnellement des rayonnements, les personnels des modules Gupard 1000 du GDNBC ne voient pas la spcificit de leur travail reconnue. Seuls les accidents font lobjet dinscriptions au registre des constatations. Il nest pas arrt de procdures officielles denregistrement des dures dexposition des matires toxiques. La volont affiche de prendre en compte les questions dhygine et de scurit en oprations, au travers du processus HSO (8) ltude, pourrait rpondre au besoin dune ncessaire traabilit de lexposition des individus aux produits risques. Les capacits de dtection et danalyse du GDNBC et son aptitude voluer en ambiance toxique pourraient faire de lui un acteur important dans la dmarche HSO pour apporter la quantification essentielle la surveillance du milieu et la prise de dcision
(7) Release other than attack, recouvre tous les incidents NBC autres que lemploi militaire darmes de destruction massive. (8) Hygine et scurit en OPEX.
NOTE TO THE READER
THE NBC DEFENSE GROUP IN KOSOVO

by lieutenant-colonel KOVALEVSKY, second in command of the NBC Defense Group
In addition to the two articles linked to the Objectif doctrines main topic (NBC defense), this issue #10 of the Cahiers du RETEX includes exceptionnally two articles that deal with crowd control. Indeed the editorial staff wished to publish as quick as possible these two important Freedoms of speech about this subject of paramount importance wich is crowd control.
lready present in theater since the Force was committed in Kosovo in May 1999, with a Gupard 1000 (1/1/2) module, the NBC Defense Group had rapidly to manage specific NBC risks: NBC hazards of industrial origin. Projected elements of the French Army had already been confronted with such a situation in Dakar when facing an event implying an ammonia wagon. But in Kosovo, an old-design industrial network, left completely in a neglected state during the civil wars years, provided a very different scope to these emergent NBC hazards. In the task assigned to it, i.e. preventing and managing any NBC incident and restoring the Force capability if necessary, the GDNBC1 module had to evaluate how actual and important the danger was, to draft plans meeting the threat and to carry out actions in order to reduce risks in its field; but above all it has to convince everybody that maneuver and action remain possible towards this pernicious NBC hazard that the heritage of so many years facing the Warsaw Pact make so particularly incapacitating. THE COMBATANT'S AREA IN KOSOVO: A HAZARDOUS SUBURBAN AND INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT. Necessarily, Violence Mastering, PE (Peace Enforcement), and protecting populations reduced freedom of action, and in particular force deployment. Whatever the nationalities are, selecting units' facilities meet compromises. The outskirts of built-up areas are particularly favored as deployment areas, but obviously industrial parks are located there too: Camp Monteith (US) was located a few hundreds meters from a cadmium-nickel battery plant, Feldlager " Progres " (GE) was placed at the very heart of a chemical plant, and the headquarters of the Northern Brigade was located imposingly 800 meters from the MIP (Mitrovica Industrial Park). As an industrial area, all the economy in Kosovo was linked to the TREPCA Kombinat. From a very active mining extraction, a whole valorization and transformation industry had been developed, whose design on the Soviet mode, dated back to the fifties. Already obsolete before Yugoslavia breakdown, industrial facilities were neglected during the civil war, and lot of them were destroyed. Significant quantities of chemicals remained in deplorable storage conditions. Radioactive lightning conductors lay on the ground. In order to meet its emergency needs, the population did not hesitate to recover stuff in abandoned facilities.
All conditions were met for an accident to occur: mix of incompatible highly toxic products, dangerous electric installations, significant water infiltrations, and a will to resume the industrial activity in a degraded mode, even without any competency. In this context the GDNBC module, included within the Engineer battalion (BATGEN)2, but placed under the responsibility of the ground space management cell (G32D)3 of the brigade's headquarters, had to make risk assessment and propose the measures to be taken in case of an emerging threat. THREAT ASSESSMENT: NEITHER ANGELISM NOR CATASTROPHISM. Establishing a most comprehensive inventory is an essential and difficult task. Any product, even in small quantity, can react with other ones in an irreversible way with dramatic consequences. It is advisable to separate the agents likely to interact in a violent or toxic way, as regards individuals. Composite agents labeled with their Serb commercial names made the exercise more difficult. The cartography of all existing products remained the first action to be carried out. It required a basic knowledge in chemistry and physical chemistry, and in particular it took potential toxicity into account, as well as stored quantities and storage conditions. Started shortly after the French Brigade deployment in Mitrovica, this action allows to evaluate the threat and to define precautionary measures to be taken by the projected force. The example set up by the Gupard 1000 of the GDNBC in the Northern Brigades AOR was to be followed by the other multinational brigades only from May 2001.
1 Biological Chemical, and Nuclear Defense Group. 2 Engineer Battalion. 3 Ground Space Management.
From this cartography the risk for the force can be evaluated. For each product a danger perimeter is associated, within which the relevant protection kits must be wear on, and for which the population will have to be evacuated or confined according to the poison's volatility. The example of the hydrocyanic acid, discovered in a Mitrovica plant, illustrated all possible ambiguity that could arise during a threat assessment. Hydrocyanic acid, also known under the names of prussic acid or of Xylon B - sadly famous since 1944 - is a very powerful poison (lethal dose: 3 mg/m3), whose sole name makes quiver and focuses all fears. But it could also be a synthetic item dissolved in an organic or aqueous solvent, whose instantaneous toxicity is much lower (lethal dose: 1930 mg/m3).

The examination of the container showed that it cannot be a gas compound (Xylon B), but that the product is a liquid. Then, the threat is bring back to its right level, which is not the one of the non persistent war agent held by the former WP forces, but that of an industrial, though toxic and dangerous, product, but within an immediate proximity exclusively.
PREVENTING AND REACTING TOWARDS THE EVENT: POSTURES TO BE ADAPTED ACCORDING TO THE SITUATION. If adapted protection and prevention measures corresponding to each product (types of respiratory and body protections, requirements for exclusion or containment) exist, it is necessary to define general postures in order to simplify the reaction process for the whole of troops, while keeping specific procedures for in situ operating teams (NBC teams and firemen): the fire of a pyralen transformer will require to wear a gas mask4 (ANP) for units located within the area under the wind, but that of an insulating breathing gear for those (NBC teams and firemen) who have to move in the immediate vicinity of the disaster. The retained protection or evacuation level is based on the definition of an accepted exposure threshold. In addition, taking into account the force action picture and PIO requirements could compel to carry out actions, which are not essential from a purely technical aspect. The break of a pipe on a over 1000-ton sulfuric acid tank resulting into its spilling out into the close Stinica river, implied no action to be taken from a technical point of view, but to inform the population about the temporary acidification of the river. But dumping lime at the effluent outlet of the factory, upstream of the river, shows that the event was taken into account; this action strength the image of the force when carrying out its protection mission. In order not to cancel this positive effect we have to protect those who handle lime against the risks of burns and respiratory intoxication.
REDUCING THE RISKS: ACTIONS CARRIED OUT WITH UNMIK5, KFOR MAIN6, AND KPC7. When peace is restored, and violence mastered, a normalization phase occurred. Life is rightfully resuming, in particular economic life. Actors are then numerous: UNMIK, J9, and CIMIC, regional and local representatives of the various involved ethnic groups. Then, acting in accordance with the environment rules become a subject of controversy in which the module Gupard 1000 was involved when considering the risks of industrial origin. Contributing to a healthier environment and reducing the risks are then a major concern for most of the international actors and sometimes also for local parties. Everyone agree - each one having its own reasons - that storage using barrels in poor conditions, in the Mitrovica " battery plant " of an explosive and probably carcinogen propellant, cannot be acceptable. But what to do? The NBC detachment has to conceive the action as follows. After carefully cooling the barrels in a cold room in order to set them below the explosion threshold, to decant the product into proof containers for its evacuation. After having approved the technical concept, the UNMIK had to finance the operation and to carry it out by calling out a German civil company, which recommended the use of liquid nitrogen for cooling but was satisfied with the cold room of the Army's catering corps, as no other option be available. This kind of action insofar as it takes place in the normalization phase, cannot be carried out alone by the Force and it necessary requires the agreement and the help of the legitimate authority and of local partners. Containment of radioactive materials on the Prvitnel site, found in the brigade's AOR, which had been decided by the Force at the turn of 1999 in the absence of any civil representation, had to be the purpose of an advanced containment, involving all the local and regional parties, in April 2002.
4 5 6 7
(translator's note): ANP = Appareil Normal de Protection Gas mask. MINUK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo). Multinational Forces Headquarters in Kosovo in Pristina. The Kosovo Protection Corps included the former UCK after its decommissioning.
Similarly, the restoration of the IBG plant site in Gnijlane, in the American AOR, even conducted by the French NBC team, and carried out by KPC personnel with the the logistical support of the US Army, required the UNMIK agreement and financial support. This " Clean up Gnijlane " operation, the first one of this scale (579 tons of toxic products handled in 46 days), showed that it was possible for French personnel to manage a NBC operation within and with the US, and to employ UCK former members in tasks concurring to environment protection. It also underlined the recognized capabilities of the French NBC elements in Kosovo concerning NBC ROTA8, as well by UNMIK and other nations, especially the US representatives.
NBC BETWEEN INVISIBLE THREAT AND "SYNDROMES": CONVINCING OF THE ACTION'S FEASIBILITY REMAINS A CHALLENGE. We all bear in mind these exercises ending with a nuclear or a chemical strike; wearing gas mask and protective kits occurred hardly before ENDEX. The feeling remains that NBC jeopardizes the maneuver. An impalpable and pernicious threat is added to it, all the more worrying as not well known and as the Press does not hesitate to highlight it when echoing to the " syndromes of the Gulf or of the Balkans ". It results into a legitimate reluctance expressed as soon as NBC actions are envisaged. As mandates last only four months, we are very much tempted to postpone the deadline until the following mandate. To convince of the feasibility, the NBC element has to sharpen its technical and scientific grounds, to optimize safety measures, to assess potential effects, and to develop a strategy of internal and external communication and finally to convince in terms of bonus the highest administrative and military leaders. The destruction of 400 liters of hydrocyanic acid by explosion and dispersion in the Ostropolje mountains on August 16, 2001, showed that an important technical study relying on the French DGA9 and on the EOD10 central echelon, the definition of a strategy of specific measures before and after action, the commitment of foreign checking teams and a redundant security organization were not enough to win the decision concerning the project's implementation. All the actors, commanders, medical department, KFOR MAIN, UNMIK will continue to ask questions, and some of them until the day before the operation. The accuracy of the technical feasibility study is only the preamble to the process of decision-making. The most important factors remain actors' and population's security, as well as the advantages to gain from the operation's achievement and the comprehensive study of all possible consequences.
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There is no doubt that France showed to be well ahead of all the other contributing nations of the force projected to Kosovo in the field of technological risks and NBC ROTA. This is also true as regards interventions pertaining to biological risks: the French detachment is recognized as a pole of competence and is authorized to intervene in the whole of Kosovo. The French example is followed two years later, for the threat assessment as well as for the development of computerized decision-making systems in the occurrence of NBC event. This overhang is due to the Armys early involvement; which orders a study on " the commitment capabilities of NBC units in safeguard missions towards technological risks " and decides in 2000 to set up reconnaissance and evaluation teams (ERA) in this field for September 2002. The GDNBC elements in Kosovo show their know-how on a daily basis; however the " syndromes " dark remains. Able to operate in toxic environments, to handle often unknown and sometimes dangerous products, to be exceptionally exposed to radiations, the personnel of the GDNBC Gupard 1,000 modules do not see any legal recognition for their work's specificity. Only accidents are recorded into the observations register. Official procedures for recording exposure times to toxic matters have not been decided. The expressed will to take hygiene and safety (HSO) issues during operations into account, through the HSO11 process under study, could meet the requirements for a necessary exposure traceability of individuals to hazardous products. The GDNBC detection and analysis capabilities and its ability to operate in toxic environment could make it a significant actor in the HSO issue to bring in the quantification element essential to environment monitoring and to decision-making
8 ROTA = Release Other Than Attack - it encompasses all NBC incidents other than the military use of weapons of mass destruction. 9 (translator's note): DGA=Dlgation Gnrale l'Armement French Defense Procurement Agency. 10 (translator's note): NEDEX=Neutralisation des Explosifs EOD = Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 11 Hygiene and security in overseas operations.
LEXPLOSION DE LUSINE A.Z.F. TOULOUSE

Septembre 2001 Retour dExprience
par le lieutenant-colonel COURAL et le lieutenant FEIGNEUX
*
Lunit dinstruction et dintervention de la Scurit Civile n1 de Nogent-le-Rotrou, unit militaire mise pour emploi la disposition du ministre de lintrieur, de la scurit intrieure et des liberts locales et place sous lautorit du directeur de la dfense et de la scurit civiles, entretient depuis 1990 des savoir-faire dans le domaine des risques technologiques. Une compagnie, unique en France, forte de plus de 130 personnes, est prte intervenir dans des dlais trs courts (gnralement en moins dune heure pour certains dtachements) pour renforcer, en configuration chimique et/ou radiologique, lchelon local de premire intervention des sapeurs pompiers. Le 21 septembre 2001, dix jours aprs lexplosion des deux tours jumelles du World Trade Center, une terrible explosion dvaste 10 h 15 le site de lusine AZF de " grande paroisse " (groupe ELF ATOCHEM) dans la priphrie de Toulouse. A 11 h 15, lunit dinstruction et dintervention de la Scurit Civile n1 reoit lordre du centre oprationnel de gestion interministriel des crises (COGIC1) de mettre sur pied un dtachement pour rejoindre immdiatement, par voie arienne, les lieux du sinistre. Cest ainsi que pendant prs de trois semaines, les units militaires de Scurit Civile (UIISC1 et UIISC7) vont uvrer aux cts des sapeurs-pompiers territoriaux, volontaires et professionnels, des personnels des SAMU et des services de lEtat ainsi que des bnvoles de diverses associations pour porter secours et scuriser le site.

1 Structure de commandement et de veille oprationnelle dpendant de la sous-direction de lorganisation des secours et de la coopration civilo-militaire (SDOSCCM) de la Direction de la Dfense et de la Scurit Civiles (ministre de lintrieur, de la scurit intrieure et des liberts locales).
e prsent tmoignage ne traite que des aspects relatifs aux missions caractre technologique. Lorganisation et le droulement des missions dassistance aux personnes confies au reste du dtachement (soit prs de trois cents sapeurs des UIISC) ny sont pas abordes. Toutefois, il convient de noter limportance des moyens mis en uvre par les formations militaires de Scurit Civile et la rapidit de leur action compte tenu des conditions dengagement rendues difficiles par le retour quasi simultan des units de la campagne feux de fort en Corse et sur le littoral mditerranen. Lvaluation de la situation et le recueil de renseignements Dans la salle oprations de lunit o la monte en puissance est instantane compte tenu de lampleur du sinistre et de son caractre national, le tltexte puis les premires images des chanes dinformation dfilent sur lcran du tlviseur et nous informent. De leur ct, les officiers " oprations " du commandement des formations militaires de Scurit Civile (ComForMiSC) tentent dobtenir des renseignements sur la situation pour nous les transmettre. Mais ils ont beaucoup de difficults obtenir eux-mmes des informations caractre technique. Les relais et antennes de la zone sud de Toulouse qui permettent habituellement les liaisons tlphoniques dinfrastructure et les communications par mobiles sont en grande partie endommags. Les premiers acteurs des secours prouvent de grandes difficults transmettre leurs demandes et leurs comptes-rendus. En outre, pour les services de secours, lurgence consiste porter assistance aux nombreux blesss et commencer organiser au plus vite leurs vacuations. A cet effet, le prfet a dclench le plan rouge et le plan blanc pour runir les moyens ncessaires. Dans une situation de crise de cette importance, les renseignements qui sont ncessaires tout engagement de forces arrivent le plus souvent sous forme fragmentaire. Il convient ds lors danalyser rapidement les risques et de " jeter " un premier dispositif sur le terrain. Il faut agir trs vite tout en adaptant les moyens acheminer la menace relle. Quelle est-elle ? La prsence dun nuage toxique sur la ville est voque, mais les moyens de la cellule mobile dintervention chimique (CMIC) des sapeurs-pompiers permettent didentifier le produit et dcarter tout risque. Les journalistes voquent lhypothse dun attentat terroriste compte tenu du contexte international, mais l encore, linformation est dmentie par les autorits comptentes. Faut-il donc acheminer des moyens de dcontamination et/ou se prparer dautres " frappes " ? La nature des produits chimiques en cause a sans doute t dtermine assez rapidement par les moyens de la CMIC des sapeurs-pompiers mais les informations ne sont que partielles lchelon central. Le grand nombre de produits sur le site, la complexit de certaines substances de synthse et la prsence ventuelle de produits drivs obtenus par raction chimique rendent lanalyse initiale encore plus complexe. Ltendue relle de la zone potentiellement dangereuse est, elle aussi, mal connue au dbut de lintervention puisque plusieurs socits jouxtent lusine AZF : la socit nationale des poudres et explosifs (SNPE) possde en particulier des stocks de phosgne qui ont fait craindre le pire. Lunit mobile de spectromtrie de masse de lunit quitte la garnison trente minutes aprs lalerte pour rejoindre Toulouse avec pour mission didentifier les produits en cause. Cette unit constitue dans ce type dintervention un atout prcieux pour le commandant des oprations de secours2, qui dans un temps trs court dispose des capacits danalyse dun vritable petit laboratoire. A lpoque des faits, ce matriel permettait lidentification de prs de 70 000 produits contenus dans sa banque de donnes. Depuis peu, lunit dispose dun appareil encore plus performant capable didentifier jusqu 370 000 produits. Les militaires, comme les diffrents intervenants en charge des situations de crise, connaissent la valeur du renseignement " terrain " et savent quil convient de lanalyser rapidement et avec prcision. Dans une situation de crise de ce type, les renseignements prliminaires notre engagement nous font dfaut cause notamment de la saturation des rseaux tlphoniques et radio et de limprcision de certains comptes-rendus. Il faut donc adapter au mieux le dispositif de lUIISC1.
Lacheminement des moyens et la prparation de lengagement Unit de renfort national, lUIISC1 doit pouvoir tre projete dans les meilleurs dlais partout dans le monde ; cest pourquoi les vecteurs ariens sont systmatiquement recherchs ds que la zone dengagement est lointaine. Sur la base dOrlans, les oprations de prparation des fardeaux et de chargement bord des Transalls3 de lArme de lair dbutent environ quatre heures aprs le dclenchement de lalerte. Le conditionnement pralable des matriels, lexprience de lunit dans ce domaine et la mise disposition trs rapide de ces aronefs permettent de gagner des dlais considrables. Lexprience et lentranement des hommes sont, dans ce domaine aussi, particulirement prpondrants.
2 Le COS, commandant des oprations de secours, est un officier ou un sous-officier de sapeurs pompiers. 3 Ces moyens militaires ont t mis disposition par le centre oprationnel des armes (COIA).
Une fois les avions poss sur la base arienne 101 de Toulouse-Francazal, il faut que le chef de dtachement et " lofficier risques technologiques " prennent contact avec le COS pour recevoir leurs missions et proposer des modes daction. En effet, les moyens dont dispose lUIISC1 dans les domaines chimiques et radiologiques sont peu connus des officiers de sapeurspompiers dpartementaux. Une mission dassistance en situation de crise (MASC) compose dofficiers du COMFORMISC, de personnels administratifs et sapeurs-pompiers professionnels est dj en place pour renforcer la cellule de crise de la prfecture et conseiller le prfet. Le travail de reconnaissance dbute ds le vendredi soir et se poursuit samedi matin. Situe 3 kilomtres au sud de Toulouse, entre la Garonne, le priphrique urbain et la route nationale 20, la zone sinistre reprsente le tiers de la surface totale de lusine. Dans un rayon de 100 mtres autour de lentrept de stockage du nitrate dammonium les destructions sont totales : des poutres mtalliques de 30x20 ont t projetes plus de 200 mtres sous la violence de lexplosion, les structures mtalliques des btiments industriels sont tordues voire souffles 29 personnes ont t tues, 3 385 autres ont reu des soins et 441 ont t hospitalises. Prs de 10 000 logements sont endommags mais les oprations de scurisation du site doivent commencer. Larticulation des moyens et les missions du dtachement dintervention technologique Compte tenu des renseignements initiaux, la composante technologique du dtachement de lUIISC1 est constitue de la manire suivante : Un lment de commandement. Un lment mdical (dont deux mdecins). Le dtachement dintervention technologique (13 personnes). Le dtachement du module de dcontamination prhospitalier (MDPH).
Cette organisation des moyens technologiques sera conserve dans les premiers jours de lintervention qui sest articule en trois phases principales : Phase 1 : mesures conservatoires pour soutenir les quipes de sauvetage dblaiement4. Il sagit alors pour les personnels de lUIISC1 de rduire les principales fuites notamment celles des acides dont les dgagements gazeux reprsentent un danger pour les sauveteurs non quips et dtre en mesure dintervenir au profit de ces personnels lors de leur progression sur un incident caractre chimique (poches de gaz par exemple). Phase 2 : participation aux oprations de " dpotage " des produits restants sur le site. Il sagit, de la mme faon, dassurer la scurit des personnels des socits charges de ce travail tout en restant en mesure de pouvoir les vacuer, de colmater dventuelles fuites et/ou de neutraliser les flaques cres. Phase 3 : rle de conseil auprs des industriels en charge de lvacuation du reste des produits encore sur le site : il sagit de la phase postaccident.
Le dtachement est autonome pour ses communications puisquil possde une valise INMARSAT et des postes portatifs compatibles avec les frquences utilises par les moyens du service dpartemental dincendie et de secours (SDIS). En revanche, les dplacements sont assurs dans les premires heures de lengagement grce aux moyens militaires des units de la garnison (1er RTP et 4e GLCAT). Les bus, poids lourds et vhicules lgers de commandement seront utiliss jusqu larrive des moyens en provenance de Nogent-le-Rotrou. Les oprations peuvent commencer.
4 Il sagit dquipes spcialises dans la recherche de victimes ensevelies dans des dcombres.
Le souffle de lexplosion a notamment endommag les cuves dacide nitrique et il faut rduire les fuites au niveau des brides et des vannes. Ce produit, lorsquil est concentr, dgage des vapeurs potentiellement toxiques pour les voies respiratoires. Des semi-remorques contenant de lacide sulfurique pur 98% (concentration qui endommage les tenues scaphandres des personnels) ont galement fait lobjet dune attention particulire puisquil a fallu neutraliser le produit rpandu sur le sol avant de dpoter les citernes. Tout au long de ces oprations, des prlvements sont effectus pour valuer la concentration en polluants de lair pour renseigner les autorits prfectorales. Ces mesures sont effectues par tubes colorimtriques en trois points de lusine sous le vent (mesures dammoniac, de vapeurs nitreuses, dacide nitrique et de chlore). Les conditions de stockage de la plupart des produits ayant t modifies, il faut galement intervenir sur certains dentre eux. Ainsi, le nitrate dammonium en solution chaude (NASC), stock une temprature suprieure 150C, ne prsente quun risque moindre. Sans alimentation lectrique, le produit contenu dans la cuve se refroidit et se solidifie tandis que le PH baisse, ce qui rend son vacuation plus dangereuse. En effet, lopration de dilution avant pompage du produit na encore jamais t ralise dans de telles proportions. Le module de dcontamination prhospitalier, quant lui, nest pas dploy sur site puisquil ny a pas de victimes par contamination chimique et que la dcontamination ventuelle des intervenants est assure par les personnels du dtachement dintervention technologique. Un tel module, employ principalement en lment prpositionn, permet de traiter jusqu 6 7 victimes en une heure. Compte tenu de la diversit des produits utiliss sur ce site et des conditions tout fait inhabituelles de leur stockage, il est essentiel de disposer sur site de tous les renseignements ncessaires sur les produits et de personnels parfaitement qualifis. En effet, les procdures dintervention doivent tre parfaitement connues et les intervenants doivent tre entrans voluer dans des tenues de protection trs lourdes qui rendent tous les gestes et les liaisons radios plus difficiles. Une telle opration montre que les spcialistes des UIISC (ou des services dincendie et de secours), doivent tre parfaitement forms pour ce type dinterventions afin de pouvoir la fois scuriser le site et conseiller au mieux les autorits de lEtat responsables de la conduite des oprations.
* * *
Lopration AZF a confirm limportance des moyens susceptibles dy tre consacrs notamment lchelon des dpartements (sapeurs-pompiers, SAMU). Elle a permis galement de vrifier la complmentarit des moyens territoriaux, zonaux et nationaux et le rle toujours actuel des UIISC
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EXPLOSION OF THE TOULOUSE AZF FACTORY

September 2001 Lessons learnt
by lieutenant-colonel COURAL and lieutenant FEIGNEUX

The Civil Defense/Disasters and Emergency Training and Intervention Unit #1 (French abbr.: UIISC1) garrisoned in Nogent-le-Rotrou, a military formation under operational control of the Department of the interior, also in charge of domestic security and of local liberties, and placed under the authority of the Civil Defense and Security director, has been maintaining the know-how to face technological hazards since the year 1990. A company-size unit, the only one in France, 130 personnel strong, immediately ready for action (most often within less than one hour for some detachments) is able to reinforce, with chemical and/or radiological capabilities, the first echelon of the local fire department. On September 21, 2001, ten days after the destruction of the World Trade Center twin towers, at 10.15 p.m a tremendous explosion destroys the "grande paroisse" AZF factory site (ELF ATOCHEM industrial group) in Toulouse outskirts. At 11.15 p.m the Disasters and Emergency Training and Intervention unit #1 is ordered by the Interdepartmental Crisis Management Operational Center (French abbr.: COGIC1) to set up a detachment to immediately rejoin, by air, the disaster location. Then, for about three weeks, the Civil Defense military units (UIISC1 and UIISC7) are to work alongside territorial volunteer and professional firefighters, emergency medical service personnel, and public services workers as well as with various association members to rescue people and to secure the place.

1 Command and operational watch structure placed under control of the Division in charge of Rescue Organization and of Civil-Military Cooperation (French abbr.: SDOSCCM) at the civil defense and security management office (Department of the Interior also in charge of domestic security and of local liberties).
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The present account only deals with those aspects related to missions of a technological nature. The organization and sequence of events of rescue missions to the people, tasked to the rest of the detachment (i.e. about three hundred UIISC soldiers), are not tackled here. However it is worth noting the significance of the resources committed by the Civil Defense military formations, and their speed of reaction considering the difficult commitment conditions because, at the time, most units were simultaneously on their way back from fighting fires in Corsica and on the Mediterranean coast.
Situation assessment and information gathering

In the operations room of the unit where the build-up is instantaneous because of the scope of the disaster and because of its national character, teletext and soon the first pictures from the media come through the TV screen and provide us with pieces of news. For their part the G3ops officers, acting within the command structure of the Civil Defense military formations (French abbr.: ComForMiSC), try to get pieces of information about the situation that they could forward to us. However they have a hard time getting for themselves some information of a technical nature. The relay stations and the antennas in the area South of Toulouse that usually carry out the infrastructure telephone connections and mobile communications have been damaged to a large extent. The first among the rescuers have great difficulties in sending their requests and their reports. In addition, to the emergency services, the urgency is rather to assist the many injured people and to start organizing their evacuation as quickly as possible. In order to do so the prefect has initiated the red and the white plans to gather the necessary means. In such an important crisis situation, the necessary information to commit any force usually comes through in a fragmentary manner. It is then necessary to quickly analyze the risk elements and to urgently set up a first disposition on the ground. It is necessary to react very quickly while adapting the means to be moved to the reality of the threat. What is it? A toxic haze floating over the city is mentioned, however the fire department Chemical Intervention Mobile Cell (French abbr.: CMIC) identifies the product and dismisses any risk. Journalists speculate about a possible terrorist attack because of the international context, but again this piece of news is denied by the concerned authorities. So is it necessary to move decontamination resources and/or to prepare for further "strikes"? The fire department chemical intervention mobile cell certainly has identified the nature of the concerned chemicals rather quickly, however the central echelon only gets fragmentary information. The great number of chemicals over the site, the complex nature of some synthetic products and the possible emergence of derived products generated through some chemical reaction make the analysis all the more complex. The actual extent of the potentially dangerous area itself is not well identified at the beginning of the intervention as various plants are next to the AZF factory: the powder and explosives national company (SNPE) in particular detains stockpiles of phosgene that let fear the worst. The mass spectrometry mobile unit departs its garrison thirty minutes after the alert to rally Toulouse with the mission to identify the concerned products. This unit is a valuable asset to the rescue operation commander2 involved in this kind of intervention; as he has very quickly at his disposal the analysis capabilities of a real small-sized laboratory. At the time, this equipment made possible to identify about 70,000 products registered in its database. Recently, this unit has got an even more effective asset able to identify up to 370,000 chemical products. The military, as well as the various bodies in charge with crisis situations, know about the value of information collected on the spot and they know that they should quickly and accurately analyze it. In that kind of crisis situation, we are lacking preliminary information before commitment because the telephone and radio nets are overloaded and because some reports are lacking accuracy. Consequently we have to adapt the disposition of the UIISC1 in the best possible way.
Assets transportation and commitment preparation

As a national reinforcing unit, the UIISC1 has to be projectable to any place worldwide as soon as possible; that is why air carriers are systematically looked for when the commitment area is located in the distance. On the Orleans airbase, the packing preparation and loading onboard Transall air force carriers3 start about four hours after the alert is set off. The preconditioning of equipments, the expertise of the unit in that matter and the very quick availability of air carriers make possible to reduce delays very significantly. The experience and training of the men also are particularly predominant in that matter.
2 The rescue operation commander is an officer or an NCO from the fire department. 3 Those military assets have been made available through the Joint Operations Center (JOC).
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When the air carriers are landed on the Toulouse-Francazal airbase, the detachment commander and the "technological hazards officer" contact the operation center to receive their missions and propose courses of action. As a matter of fact the means available to the UIISC1 for chemical and radiological interventions are not familiar to the local fire department officers. A technical support team for crisis situations (French abbr.: MASC) made up of officers from the COMFORMISC (command structure of the civil defense military formations), from administrative personnel and from professional firefighters is already set up to reinforce the Prefecture crisis management cell and to advise the prefect. Reconnaissance works starts from Friday night and is continued on Saturday morning. Located 3 kilometers south of Toulouse, in between the Garonne River, the ring, and highway 20, the disaster area covers one third of the total factory area. Within a 100 meters. radius around the ammonia nitrate warehouse there is a total destruction: 30x20 size metal girders have been thrown more than 200 m. away by the blast power, metallic structures of industrial buildings have been twisted or blown off 29 people have been killed, 3,335 have been given medical treatment, and 441 have been hospitalized. About 10,000 apartments have been damaged however the securing operations of the area have to start.

Task organization of resources and missions given to the technological intervention detachment
Considering the initial pieces of information, the technological element of the UIISC1 detachment is task organized as follows: One command element. One medical element (comprising two doctors). The technological intervention detachment (13 people). The detachment from the pre-hospital decontamination module (French abbr.: MDPH).
That task organization of the technological resources was kept on during the first days of the intervention that was structured in three main phases: Phase 1: protective measures to support the rescue teams in charge with area clearing4. To the UIISC1 personnel the matter is to take control of the main leakages, in particular those of acids the gas discharge of which is dangerous to non-protected rescuers, and then to be ready to intervene to help those personnel when involved into an accident of a chemical nature. (Gas pockets for instance). Phase 2: Taking part to the operations for decanting and clearing the remaining products from the site. In the same way, the matter is to secure personnel from companies in charge with that job while standing ready for their evacuation, for sealing off possible leakages and/or neutralizing the created puddles. Phase 3: Advising the manufacturers in charge with clearing the products remaining on the site: that is the postaccident phase. The detachment is self-sufficient in matter of communications as it gets an INMARSAT pack and portable radio sets compatible with those frequencies used by the teams from the departmental fire and rescue services (French abbr.: SDIS). On the other hand, movements are made possible during the first hours of commitment thanks to the resources of the garrison military formations (1er RTP 1st Airborne Transport Battalion - and 4e GLCAT 4th Quartermaster General Logistic Group). The buses, trucks, and command cars were used until the assets coming from Nogent-le-Rotrou arrived. Operations can begin.
4 Teams specialized in searching casualties buried into the rubble.
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The blast of the explosion has damaged the nitric acid tanks in particular, and leakages have to be repaired at joints and floodgates. When in concentrated solution, this chemical lets out fumes that are potentially toxic to the respiratory tract. Trailers filled with 98% pure nitric acid (a concentration level damaging the protective suits) required a specific attention, as it has been necessary to neutralize the spread acid before decanting the tanks. All along these operations, samples have been taken to assess the concentration of air polluting agents in order to keep the prefectoral authorities informed. These measures are carried out using colorimetric tubes in three downwind points in the factory (measures looking for ammonia, nitrous fumes, nitric acid, and chlorine).
The stockpiling conditions of most products having been modified, it is also necessary to take steps for some of them. Thus, the ammonia nitrate in hot solution (NASC), when stocked at a temperature exceeding 150C, only shows a reduced risk. Lacking electricity, the product in the tank gets cold and solidifies while its pH. gets lower levels, what makes its evacuation more dangerous. The dilution operation before pumping had never indeed been achieved in such proportions. As for the detachment from the pre-hospital decontamination module, it has not been deployed on the site because there were no casualties from a chemical contamination and because the possible decontamination of participating personnel was planned to be carried out by the personnel from the technological intervention detachment. Such a module, mainly used as a pre-positioned element, is able handling 6 to 7 casualties per hour. According to the variety of products used on that site and to their very unusual conditions of stockpiling, it is essential to get available on the site every necessary information about the products and fully qualified personnel. Intervention procedures should indeed be perfectly known and all actors should be trained to work wearing very heavy protective clothes that hamper any movement as well as radio communications. Such an operation demonstrates that specialized personnel from the UIISCs (or from the fire and rescue services) should be perfectly trained for that kind of interventions so that they are able both to secure the site and to advise the State authorities responsible for the control and conduct of the operations
* * *
The AZF operation confirmed how significant are the resources likely to be committed at departmental level (firefighters, Emergency Medical Services). It also contributed to check the complementarity of the territorial, zone, and national resources, and the importance of the UIISCs role to-day
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LIBRES REFLEXIONS CONTRLE DES FOULES - MAINTIEN DE LORDRE UNE DIFFRENCE CONCEPTUELLE MAJEURE
De nombreux articles, parus le plus souvent dans des revues militaires, sattachent rfuter cette diffrence smantique entre la notion de maintien de lordre et celle de contrle des foules. Mais peut-on saffranchir, lanalyse de cette problmatique, du cadre gnral de laction ? Ltude de ses paramtres apparat indispensable : o se situe laction ? Pourquoi se justifie-t-elle ? Quelle y est la place de la foule ? La localisation mme de laction de la Force est un paramtre essentiel. Baptiser cette action " maintien de lordre ", ds lors quelle se situe hors des frontires, est irraliste. Le maintien de lordre sappuie sur un cadre juridique. Dans une telle configuration, ce cadre juridique se transforme en casse-tte inextricable. Le retour dexprience nous en donne de multiples exemples. Lorsque les armes agissaient, la fin du XIXe sicle, face aux mineurs des bassins houillers ou face aux viticulteurs, elles taient engages sur rquisition et dans un but prcis : celui de maintenir ou rtablir lordre public. Cette action se situait sur le territoire mtropolitain et sous couvert du droit national. Un demi-sicle plus tard, ctait en janvier 57, le gnral MASSU commandant la 10e DP, recevait la responsabilit du maintien de lordre dans les dpartements algriens. Quelques mois aprs ce transfert dautorit, le gnral ALLARD commandant le corps darme dAlger crivait au Commandant suprieur interarmes, " Il est certain que, faute dune lgislation adapte aux conditions particulires du conflit algrien, les autorits militaires responsables du maintien de lordre se heurtent des difficults des plus grandes pour appliquer les directives et instructions du ministre de lAlgrie et du Commandement. " En fait, le transfert dautorit du civil au militaire en matire dordre public na jamais rsolu les problmes lis au flou juridique dune action militaire mene dans un cadre autre que celui du droit des conflits arms. On constatera pourtant que le droit national sappliquait sur ces dpartements, fussent-ils situs hors mtropole. Alors, que reste-t-il de cette notion de maintien de lordre, quand laction se situe sur un territoire extrieur, o le soldat se trouve au carrefour du droit local, quand il peut sexprimer, du droit de son propre pays et de surcrot, du droit international, celui des rgles dengagement (ROE) ? Le mandat de la Force engage na jamais t celui de rtablir lordre public.
ans les oprations extrieures, Balkans notamment, les forces terrestres travaillent en troite collaboration avec les units de la gendarmerie nationale. Ceci fait suite au protocole traitant de la complmentarit, protocole sign par le Directeur de la gendarmerie et par le CEMAT. Malgr cela, une confusion certaine apparat. Certains acteurs engags, dans cette problmatique, assimilent encore le concept du " contrle des foules " celui du " maintien de lordre ". Aborder le problme de la sorte est lvidence rducteur au regard de laction de la Force. Comprendre le distinguo qui diffrencie ces deux concepts est capital au regard de laction conduite sur le terrain. Cest prcisment le but de cet article.
par le colonel de Laforcade - CREDAT/B3

A lheure o de nombreux soldats franais sont engags sur des thtres dopration extrieures, alors que ces mmes soldats sont souvent confronts aux phnomne des masses, il apparat ncessaire de clarifier les notions de " maintien de lordre " et " contrle des foules ". Bien que laction, dune manire ou dune autre, soit conduite en direction dune foule, ltude du cadre dengagement, des objectifs poursuivis au regard de chacune de ces notions et du rcent protocole Arme de terre/gendarmerie dmontrent quil ny a pas damalgame possible entre ces deux concepts, malgr lapparence dune certaine similitude.
15
LIBRES REFLEXIONS
La nature mme du mandat de la Force dpasse largement lpisode ponctuel dune situation sapparentant peu ou prou au maintien de lordre. Il ne sagit pas de rprimer un trouble li un conflit social ou quelque revendication. Il sagit dapporter une rponse globale de multiples questions : pourquoi des courants de rfugis fuyant les combats ? Pourquoi des flots de populations chasses ou des combattants en droute ? Pourquoi des masses de refus, opposant une rsistance collective ? Pourquoi des masses de renforcement, aux fins dune prise de pouvoir ? Le maintien de lordre nest quun piphnomne face ces multiples interrogations. Cette seule actionrponse de la Force serait une solution simpliste et illusoire dans un pays dont les structures tatiques sont en plein dlitement.

Dans un tel environnement, il convient donc de remettre les choses leur juste place. La rponse densemble la problmatique de la Force nest que la somme de multiples rponses lies elles-mmes de nombreux facteurs ou paramtres " polluants ". Lun dentre eux est relativement nouveau la rsolution des crises daujourdhui : cest la population. Nos hommes la ctoient en permanence : contacts quotidiens avec tel ou tel groupe ethnique ou confessionnel, rencontre avec un leader, partenariat ponctuel ou assistance. Ds lors quil sagit dun vnement la rassemblant en masse, cette population devient alors une foule. Et dans une opration extrieure, dans un pays en proie une violence diffuse o la force publique est affaiblie ou inexistante, cette foule doit toujours tre considre comme un adversaire potentiel et anonyme. Elle nest pas uniquement la runion, en un mme lieu, dun trs grand nombre de personnes mais peut tre enclin entraver volontairement ou non laccomplissement de la mission de la force. Cest pour cette raison et pour cette seule raison que la Force peut tre appele traiter cette foule, la " contrler ". En effet, la Force a reu une mission, un mandat (qui peut inclure la protection des populations civiles) et cette foule devient lun des paramtres de laction. Face cette foule, le " maintien de lordre ", nest donc pas prcisment une fin en soi. Il sagit de contourner, dune manire ou dune autre, lobstacle que reprsente ou pourrait reprsenter cette foule au regard de la mission reue. Cela nest pas du maintien de lordre ! Il faut donc bien diffrencier ces notions dont les buts savrent bien distincts. Dans un cas, il y a conjonction entre laction et la mission ; dans lautre, il y a dcouplage entre mission et action.
Le maintien de lordre se dfinit comme lensemble des actions mener, dans un but bien dfini : faire cesser les troubles. Autrement dit, mission et action sont confondues. La dfinition officielle figure au TTA 185 (EMA/EMPLOI de 1997), relative au maintien de lordre et sinscrit dans le prolongement de linstruction ministrielle n500/SGDN/MPS/OTP du 9 mai 1995 : " Le maintien de lordre a pour objet de prvenir les troubles sur la voie publique ou dans les lieux publics et, sils se produisent, de les faire cesser au besoin par la force ". Ce maintien de lordre est assur par des forces spcialises qui sont dune part, les compagnies rpublicaines de scurit et, dautre part les escadrons de gendarmerie mobile (forces armes de 2e catgorie), complmentairement, par les diffrentes composantes de la police nationale, la gendarmerie dpartementale et la garde rpublicaine et, enfin, par les armes en tant que forces de 3e catgorie. Il sagit donc de considrer le maintien de lordre (dont il faut rappeler quil sexerce en milieu urbain ou rural, sur terre et sur mer, uniquement en mtropole et dans les DOM-TOM) comme tant une mission particulire qui nest pas dvolue, en premier lieu, aux forces armes. De surcrot, lIM 500 prcise que les missions de maintien de lordre sortent du cadre habituel et normal des attributions des armes, telle enseigne que la formation dispense aux armes pour remplir ce type de mission sapplique des missions de soutien, de renfort ou dappui et, exceptionnellement, dintervention. On comprendra, la lecture de ces lments issus des lois franaises combien la proccupation de la Force est loigne de cette notion de maintien de lordre. Il ne sagit donc pas de maintenir lordre, il sagit, en fait dappliquer, le cas chant, certaines modalits pratiques dans des oprations de maintien de lordre.
Le contrle des foules se dfinit comme lensemble des actions mener, dans un but bien dfini : remplir la mission dvolue la Force. il sagit donc dune action diffrente de la mission premire. La russite de cette mission spcifique, conjugue dautres, permettra au chef tactique de remplir toute ou partie dune mission de son mandat. La force est appele contrler une foule quand celle-ci " reprsente un obstacle laccomplissement de la mission confie la force terrestre et, dautre part, elle reprsente un danger pour lintgrit physique de son personnel ou de celui qui est plac sous sa protection ". Pour remplir cette mission, le chef tactique dispose notamment dun manuel de doctrine: " manuel demploi des forces terrestres dans le contrle des foules (TTA 950) ".
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LIBRES REFLEXIONS
Ce manuel ne dcrit pas les actions spcifiques conduites par les units spcialises dans les oprations de maintien de lordre, il met en relief laction du chef tactique en matire de renseignement, prvention-dissuasion et contrle. Il sagira de matriser la situation, en amont du contact donc avant que la foule ne commence se rassembler. Les effets obtenir ont un caractre cumulatif dont dpend directement le rglement final de la crise. Leffet final recherch visera donc viter lengagement des units contre la foule. En effet, le degr de la violence exerce par la foule sera, le plus souvent, inversement proportionnel la rusite des actions entreprises en amont du contact. Mais, malgr la pertinence de ces actions, la Force peut avoir agir directement lencontre de cette foule. Cest bien pour cette raison qua t tabli le protocole Arme de terre/gendarmerie : la Force peut tre appele utiliser, en complmentarit, certaines modalits techniques du maintien de lordre. Lexpertise de la gendarmerie, pour une phase bien prcise, est une aide non ngligeable. Il sagit donc dun complment, qui a ses propres exigences pour chacune des parties prenantes. Cette complmentarit sinscrit dans la rsolution dun problme ponctuel qui ne saurait prfigurer de laction globale ultrieure des forces armes.

Ce protocole est extrmement clair. Il prcise dune part combien la conduite doprations de maintien de lordre doit faire lobjet de rgles dactions adaptes, les modalits daction des forces militaires tant par ailleurs fixes au regard de leurs propres missions, et dautre part, il stipule que lengagement des units de lArme de terre doit tre avant tout envisag au regard de leur mandat et de la part que prennent les foules au rglement de la crise.
Il sagit donc dune affirmation claire et nette, cosigne le 20 octobre 2000 par Monsieur Pierre Steinmetz, alors Directeur gnral de la gendarmerie nationale et le Gnral darme Yves Crne. Cest tout simplement lesprit mme de la mission qui est ici cit. Le chef militaire, toute situation tant unique, doit disposer pour y faire face d'une large palette d'options tactiques ; parmi celle-ci figure notamment lexpertise dvolue aux units de gendarmerie, dans tout le spectre de leur savoir-faire : action du dispositif prvtal adapt aux structures de la force projete, souvent en mesure de jouer un rle essentiel dapaisement et dinterface dans les situations de contentieux avec la population (PGSI notamment) et action des escadrons de gendarmerie mobile le cas chant. Cette complmentarit est exigeante et ncessite la mise en uvre dune expertise partager. Il sagit de faciliter la coopration entre les forces terrestres et la gendarmerie, en conformit avec leurs principes demploi respectifs : commandement, interoprabilit des moyens de transmission et dispositif dacquisition du renseignement. Il sagit aussi de dvelopper des apprentissages communs : ces apprentissages sont collectifs ou individuels. Cest la ncessit de faire acqurir aux units de lArme de terre un complment dinitiation, dinstruction sur les techniques dautoprotection avec des quipements spcifiques (entranement des compagnies de rserve oprationnelles, les CRO). Cest aussi la ncessit, pour une unit de lArme de terre, davoir grer des mouvements de foule, avant lintervention des escadrons de gendarmerie mobile notamment ; il sagit aussi dacqurir les capacits en matire dappui mutuel et de relve. Le chef militaire sait aussi que la situation peut dgnrer, il sait aussi que la foule nobserve pas tacitement certaines limites lexpression de la violence. Il sinscrit donc en permanence dans une logique de rversibilit soudaine pouvant le mettre en situation de combat urbain. Il est donc impratif de ne pas cder la tentation du raccourci, visant considrer que laction face la foule est unique, quelle se situe en mtropole ou lextrieur, cest--dire sans prendre en considration le facteur essentiel : le possible changement de situation sur le terrain. L encore, cela est au cur du protocole : " les forces militaires (essentiellement Arme de terre) ont vocation constituer le dispositif de puissance, dispositif lourd qui empche le retour laffrontement arm". Le retour dexprience est riche dexemples montrant toute la dangerosit dune telle situation. Cela a t le cas Mogadiscio, cest encore le passage de la FORPRONU lIFOR en 1995. Cette rversibilit indique pour la force quelle doit tre en mesure de passer sans pravis dun mode daction au contact dune foule vers un mode daction de combat, ncessitant lemploi de larmement organique incluant lemploi de la force ltale
17
FREEDOM OF SPEECH CROWD CONTROL LAW and ORDER A major conceptual difference
by colonel de Laforcade - CREDAT/B3
Numerous articles, most often published in military magazines attempt to refute this semantic difference between the notion of ensuring law and order and that of crowd control. However is it possible when analysing this problematics to get rid of the general framework of the action? The study of these parameters seems essential: where does the action take place? Why is it justified? What is the place of the crowd?
uring overseas operations, notably in the Balkans, the Land forces work in close cooperation with the French National Gendarmerie units. This is the result of the protocol dealing with complementarity, a protocol signed by the Gendarmerie Director and the Army chief of staff. Despite this fact some confusion is appearing. Some players engaged in this problematics still put the crowd control concept into the same category as the law and order s one. Tackling the problem in that way is of course simplistic as regard to the action conducted in the field. Understanding the difference between the two concepts is vital as regard to the action carried out in the field. This is precisely the aim of this article.
At a time when many French soldiers are engaged on overseas TOA, whereas these same soldiers are often facing the phenomenon of masses, it seems necessary to clarify these notions of law and order and crowd control . Although the action, a way or another, is conducted towards a crowd the study of the engagement framework, of the pursued goals as regard to each of these notions and to the recent Army/Gendarmerie protocol demonstrate that there is no room for confusing these two concepts despite the appearance of some similarity.
The location itself of the Force action is an essential parameter. Calling this action ensuring law and order is unrrealistic as soon as it is located outside our borders. Maintaining law and order is based on a judicial framework. In such a configuration, this judicial framework is transformed into an inextricable headache. The experience feed-back provides us with multiple examples At the end of the XIXth century when the armed forces acted against the miners from the coal fields or against the wine growers, they were engaged upon commandeering and for a precise goal: to maintain or restore public order. This action was taking place on national territory and covered by the national law. Half a century later, it was in January 57, General MASSU, commanding the 10th Airborne division was given the responsibility to maintain law and order in the Algerian departments. Some months after this transfer of authority, General ALLARD commanding the Algiers Army Corps wrote to the supreme joint Commander, it is certain that, due to the lack of law adapted to the particular conditions of the Algerian conflict, the military authorities responsible for maintaining law and order are coming up against the highest difficulties to apply the orders and instructions of the ministry in charge of Algeria and of the Command structure .
In fact, the transfer of authority from the civilian to the military for public order never solved the problems linked to the l vagueness of the law for a military action performed within a different framework than the one covered by the armed conflicts law. Nevertheless it can be established that the national law was applying to these departments even if they were located outside the mother country. Then what does remain of that notion of ensuring law and order when the action takes place on an overseas territory, where the soldier is placed at the junction of the local law when it is possible to implement it, of his own country law and furthermore of the international law, the one of the ROE (Rules of Engagement)? The mandate of the committed force has never been to restore public order.
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The nature itself of the Force mandate largely exceeds the limited episode of a situation looking more or less like law and order. The goal is not to repress a disorder linked to a social conflict or to some claim. The goal is to bring a global answer to multiple questions: Why streams of refugees flying away from the combats? Why flows of populations forced to flee or of routed combattants? Why masses of refuse opposing a collective resistance? Why masses for reinforcement, to take power? Ensuring law and order is only an epiphenomenon against these multiple questions. This only actionresponse by the Force would be a simplistic and illusive solution in a country where the state structures are collapsing.

In such an environment it is therefore necessary to put things back to their proper places. The overall response to the problematics of the Force is only the sum of multiple answers linked themselves to many polluting factors or parameters. One of them is quite new in the resolution of to-days crises: it is the population. Our men are permanently next to it: daily contacts with such or such ethnic or confessionnal group, meeting a leader, one-off partnership or assistance. As soon as an event gathers it en masse, this population is then becoming a crowd. And in an overseas operation, in a country plagued with a diffuse violence where the Police is weakened or unexisting, this crowd must always be considered as a potential and anonymous adversary. It is not only the gathering, on a single location, of a large number of persons but it may be inclined to voluntarily or not hinder the force mission s fulfilment. For that reason and for that reason only, the Force may be called upon to deal with that crowd, to control it. Indeed the Force has received a mission, a mandate (which may include protecting the civilian populations) and that crowd becomes one of the parameters of the action. Against this crowd law and order is therefore not precisely an end in itself. The aim is to bypass, a way or another, the obstacle represented or possibly represented by that crowd as regard to the mission received. This is not ensuring law and order! We need therefore to make a clear difference between these notions, the goals of which prove to be very distinct. In one case there is a conjunction between the action and the mission; in the other, there is a decoupling between the mission and the action. Ensuring law and order is defined as all the set of actions to be carried out, for a very well defined goal: to bring an end to disorders. In other words, mission and action are merged. The official definition appears in the FM 185 (EMA/EMPLOI dated 1997) dealing with maintaining law and order and is the result of the ministerial instruction n500/SGDN/MPS/OTP dated 9th May 1995. " The goal of ensuring law and order is to prevent disorders on the public highway or in public places and if they occur to make them cease by force if need be . Law and order is ensured by specialized forces which are, on the one hand the republican security companies, and on the other hand the mobile gendarmerie squadrons (2nd category armed forces), and as a complement the various components of the national police, of the departmental gendarmerie and republican guard, and finally by the armed forces as 3rd category forces. We need therefore to consider ensuring law and order (about which we must remind that it is performed in urban or country environment, on earth or at sea only in the mother country and in the DOM-TOM) as a specific mission which is not assigned, on first, to the armed forces. In addition, the IM 500 specifies that the missions of ensuring law and order are out of the usual and normal framework of the armed forces responsibilities so that the training given to the armed forces to carry out this type of mission applies only to support, reinforcement or combat support and exceptionally to intervention missions. When reading these elements issued from the French laws, one will understand how far the force concern is from that notion of ensuring law and order. The goal is not therefore to maintain public order but in fact to apply, should the occasion arise, some modalities used during law and order operations. The force has to control a crowd when this one represents an obstacle to the accomplishment of the mission assigned to the Land force and, on the other hand a danger for the physical integrity of its personnel or of the one placed under its protection . To fulfil this mission, the tactical commander is provided with notably one doctrine manual: Employment manual for Land Forces in Crowd Control (TTA 950).
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH
This manual does not describe the specific actions conducted by the specialized units in law and order operations, it emphasizes the action of the tactical leader as regard to intelligence, prevention, deterrence and control. The goal is to master the situation, upstream from the contact, thus before the crowd begins to gather. The effects to be obtained have a cumulative nature which will affect the final settlement of the crisis. The final expected effect will thus aim at avoiding the engagement of units against the crowd. In fact, the degree of violence exerted by the crowd will be, most often, inversely proportional to the success of the actions undertaken upstream from the contact. But, despite the relevance of these actions, the Force may have to act directly against that crowd. It is definitely for that reason that the Army/Gendarmerie protocol has been established: the Force can be requested to use, as a complement, some law and order. technical modalities. The expertise of the Gendarmerie, for a very precise phase, is a non negligible help. It is therefore a complement which has its own requirements for each of the involved parties. This complementarity is part of the resolution of a specific problem which cannot prefigure the subsequent global action of the armed forces. This protocol is extremely clear. It precises on the one hand how much the conduct of law and order operations must be subject to adapted rules of action, the action modalities of the armed forces being furthermore established as regard to their own missions, and on the other hand, it stipulates that the commitment of Army units must above all be envisionned from their mandate point of view and from the part that the crowds take in the crisis settlement. It is thus a straight and clear statement, co-signed on the 20th October 2000 by Mr Pierre Steinmetz, then general Director of the national Gendarmerie and General Yves Crne. It is the true spirit of the mission which is quoted here. The military commander, every situation being unique, must have at his disposal a wide range of tactical options in order to face it; among them appears notably the expertise assigned to the Gendarmerie units within the whole range of their know-how: action of the military police disposition adapted to the structures of the projected force, often able to play an essential appeasing and interface role in situations of dispute with the population (Investigation Platoon notably) and action of the mobile gendarmerie squadrons if need be. This complementarity is demanding and requires the implementation of an expertise to share. The aim is to facilitate the cooperation between the Land forces and the gendarmerie, in accordance with their respective employment principles: command and control, interoperability of communication assets and intelligence collecting disposition. The aim is also to develop common training: either collective or individual. It is essential for the Army units to acquire a complement of initiation, of training about self-protection techniques with specific equipments (training of the operational l reserve companies, the CROs). It is also essential for an Army unit to manage the crowd movements, notably before the intervention of the mobile gendarmerie squadrons; they also have to acquire the capabilities concerning mutual support and relieves. The military commander also knows that the situation may deteriorate, he also knows that the crowd does not tacitly comply with some limitations to the expression of violence. He is therefore permanently acting within a logic of sudden reversibility that might put him in a situation of urban fighting. It is therefore imperative not to give way to the temptation of the short-cut, aiming at considering that the action against the crowd is unique, either in the mother country or overseas, i.e. without taking into consideration the essential factor: the possible change of situation in the field. There again, this is the core of the protocol: " the military forces (mainly Army) are dedicated to constitute the combat power disposition, a heavy one denying any return to the armed confrontation ". The experience feed-back is rich with examples showing all the dangerousness of such a situation. This has been the case in Mogadiscio, it was also the shift from UNPROFOR to IFOR in 1995. This reversibility shows the force that it must be ready to switch without notice from one course of action in contact with a crowd to a fighting course of action, requiring the use of T&E armament including the use of lethal force
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LIBRES REFLEXIONS
LE CONTRLE DE FOULES - UNE DISCIPLINE DIFFICILE

par le commandant BRUHN, stagiaire de la 115e promotion du CSEM Arme de terre danoise

es guerres civiles et les catastrophes humanitaires jouent un rle de plus en plus important pour les missions des forces armes en Europe. Concernant le Danemark, lArme de terre a d ladmettre et se prparer ces nouveaux contextes. Elle sest adapte, durant la dernire dcennie, au travers des missions de maintien de la paix.
Dans la doctrine militaire, les missions de maintien de paix sont classes sous le terme " oprations autres que la guerre "1). Il y a 15 ans, le seul terme " missions non-guerrires " aurait sonn faux aux oreilles dun soldat. Or de nos jours, celles-ci figurent parmi les missions les plus importantes de lArme de terre danoise. Notamment en ce qui concerne la structure organique, la formation et la technologie. Cette ralit a donn de nouveaux cadres et des exigences diffrentes envers les soldats tous les niveaux. La coopration entre des autorits politiques, les organismes dtat, non-tatiques et les units militaires font partie du quotidien dun soldat. Aujourdhui, on attend dun soldat quil soit capable deffectuer sa mission avec la prsence desprit des fantassins et, en mme temps, quil exploite et prenne en considration des lments qui taient par le pass uniquement du ressort de la hirarchie. Les exigences de ce nouveau contexte sont justifies. Les conditions ncessitent dans de multiples cas la prsence dun " super-soldat " qui ne participe pas seulement aux missions lies au maintien de la paix entre deux tats mais qui doit aussi avoir la capacit dagir dans le cadre du contrle des forces armes belligrantes. Aujourdhui, le " super-soldat " agit dans un environnement extrmement fragment, o les dirigeants peuvent tre difficiles ou impossibles identifier. Le Kosovo est un bon exemple de ce nouveau type de missions. L-bas des conflits ethniques sont susceptibles de transformer des petits vnements en conflits beaucoup plus complexes. La capacit dempcher la violence et les confrontations, de contrler les sources dinstabilit et les troubles est un critre de succs. Ce critre de succs ne peut tre ralis que par un " super-soldat ". Il ny a pas moyen de faire autrement pas de solutions faciles. Dans de nombreux cas, des soldats danois se sont trouvs dans des situations extrmement difficiles o des foules mcontentes, des rfugis frustrs ou tout simplement la prsence dune autorit internationale telle que lOTAN ou lONU, ont provoqu des agressions violentes auxquelles les soldats devaient faire face. Nous appelons ce phnomne " contrle des foules " (RIOT CONTROL). Dans ce paragraphe, je dcrirai une partie des conditions que le soldat rencontre dans un tel environnement. Je dcrirai galement les expriences et mthodes que les units du niveau section, compagnie et bataillon, ont vcu et dvelopp en augmentant les efforts pour rsoudre ces missions difficiles et prparer au mieux les futures units la situation. Cet article ne peut en aucun cas tre exhaustif et ne prsente que des considrations personnelles ainsi que des vnements vcus lors de mon affectation au sein du Bataillon danois au Kosovo. Le sujet est continuellement analys et trait par le Commandement du Matriel de lArme de terre danoise, lEcole de Combat de lArme de terre danoise, la Brigade Internationale danoise et la police militaire. Mon unit a tir profit des efforts de prparation consentis par le Danemark afin doptimiser la formation des units dployes. Je me souviens encore de lexpression de surprise et dtonnement sur le visage dun de mes soldats, un soir au mois de fvrier, alors que la compagnie tait dploye pour protger une station de police MINUK proximit de Mitrovica. Une femme dun certain ge et une petite fille ont couru vers le soldat et, une distance de 4 5 mtres, lui ont jet des pierres. Ici " TOUT LE MONDE " tait contre lui, pas seulement les jeunes gens de 20 30 ans. Le lendemain, tout tait calme. Nous ralisions nos missions de patrouille dans la ville et ses environs, sans constater le moindre changement de la population locale suite aux troubles violents de la veille. Ils nous disaient gentiment " bonjour " comme dhabitude.
1 Guide sur la doctrine des oprations interarmes , Forsvarsakademiet [CID danois] 1999, page 21-1.
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LIBRES REFLEXIONS
Comme dans la plupart des missions militaires, la connaissance de lenvironnement o lon volue est dterminante pour le succs de la mission. Au Kosovo, un bon contact avec la population locale tait une condition pour lexcution des missions ordonnes. Les soldats taient tous les jours amens tre en contact avec la population locale. La scurit et la sret dans les petites communauts dpendaient du dialogue et de la coopration entre chaque partie. Lune des contraintes les plus pesantes, pour les soldats et lunit, tait le contraste entre lenvironnement trs violent et imprvisible et la tranquillit qui ressemblait celle de nimporte quel petit village europen. Un effort dadaptation intellectuel et physique tait ncessaire. La coopration entre units, de nationalits, expriences et matriels diffrents, devenait rapidement dune importance vitale. Chacune avait des mthodes diffrentes, en particulier au niveau de la section. Pour la mme raison, des officiers du bataillon franais, voisin du danois, ont t invits assister une dmonstration des mthodes et matriels danois. Suite cette dmonstration, un accord pour des changes hebdomadaires a vu le jour. De petits exercices de contrle de foules (RIOT CONTROL) taient un lment obligatoire. Les enseignements tirs de ces rencontres taient trs riches. Les soldats ont vite trouv leurs repres. Des amitis se sont lies et la confiance mutuelle sest installe. Bientt, cette coopration se montrait dune grande utilit. La capacit faire face une confrontation directe tait ainsi rapidement renforce. Mais il restait toujours difficile, voire impossible, de prvoir quand et o allaient clater les troubles, de les isoler, de les contenir et par la suite les " dsarmer ". En outre, le bataillon constatait une importe dispersion dinformation sur la population locale travers les secteurs de responsabilit. Cest ainsi que des rumeurs pouvaient en moins dune vingtaine de minutes devenir des troubles publiques, des manifestations ou des blocus avec une centaine de personnes. Dans le but de crer les meilleures conditions possibles pour ce genre de missions, le bataillon dveloppait la matrice (simplifie) ci-dessous pour les dploiements des forces : 1re phase : reconnaissance afin de donner la rserve mobile un ordre prparatoire suffisant en vue dun dploiement de forces, et pour tenir continuellement informes les units dployes sur la situation dans la zone dintrt (valeur dune compagnie en alerte 15 minutes). 2me phase : cloisonnement de la zone de dploiement en vue dempcher une affluence supplmentaire de la population locale, opportunment ralis par des units dinfanterie car des confrontations pouvaient subvenir lors de ces blocus. 3me phase : dploiement dune unit dans la zone de dploiement pour rompre le blocus, disperser la manifestation, protger llment en question ou dautres missions semblables. 4me phase : maintien de la situation et rtablissement du calme et de lordre. Cela tait assur par la rserve mobile 300 m avec la mise en place de check points et de patrouilles dans la zone de proximit. Lunit disolation tait releve par lunit de rserve en alerte 15 minutes pour ensuite reprendre une autre mission de rserve 30 minutes. Les phases dcrites ci-dessus ont t dveloppes et 1re phase testes lors de plusieurs 1re phase vnements. Aprs quelques ajustements, le 2me phase 2me phase bataillon a trouv la matrice trs utile. 3me phase 3me phase Nanmoins, le bataillon a constat que les missions en question, bien que militaires, se droulent dans un environnement civil avec des acteurs civils qui influenceraient certainement les conditions dans lesquelles la mission serait excute.
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LIBRES REFLEXIONS
Celles-ci taient le plus souvent : La prise en compte de la POLICE de la MINUK, savoir leur capacit et leur mandat lors des interventions etc.. Les ractions de ladministration locale de la MINUK qui ne voulait en aucun cas des confrontations avec la population locale. Les ONG dans la Zone et leurs relations, souvent proches, avec les parties en prsence. Pour la mme raison, les ONG agissaient rarement dune manire objective et impartiale.

Le souci de linfrastructure locale et de la circulation. Les conditions de lenvironnement taient souvent un obstacle pour la libert de la manuvre. Le rle des mdias.
La plupart des facteurs pouvaient tre prvus lors de la planification de la mission : en crant des quipes de liaison spciales auprs des autorits et organismes concerns. grce aux " information operations " dans les groupes de population dans la zone de proximit. en crant des quipes spciales rapidement prtes ngocier, immdiatement aprs avoir atteint lobjectif. Cependant, il est trs difficile, voire impossible, de prendre en considration et prvoir tous les facteurs. Cest pourquoi la phase cloisonnement tait suivie la lettre. Cest ce moment prcis quil faut interdire tout renforcement de la manifestation, car la zone de dploiement doit tre le plus possible contrle. Depuis quelques temps, plusieurs tudes sont menes par lexploitation de toutes ces expriences et mthodes dans la formation des soldats, units et tats-majors. Doit-on continuer mettre laccent sur une formation militaire de base concentre sur les savoir-faire traditionnels ou alors les missions dans les Balkans ont-elles cr de telles exigences que la formation de base devrait plutt viser une prparation spcifique ? Cela veut dire que les aptitudes traditionnelles de linfanterie, telles que lattaque, le combat stationnaire, le combat rtrograde, le combat dans un terrain avec un champ de vision restreint, devraient-elles tre de priorit secondaire ou peut-tre seulement tre tudies dune manire trs brve ? Selon ma perception, les aptitudes telles que la reconnaissance, le commandement et lentranement, sont des fondements irremplaables pour un dploiement russi et le dveloppement des facults dadaptation mentale. Dans le mme temps, il faut combiner celles-ci avec les aptitudes dinfanterie lmentaires comme la capacit de cooprer entre groupes et avec le Service de Sant. Un fondement que nous avons, tous niveaux, dvelopp travers une longue tradition militaire qui garantit lendurance, la rsistance, et notamment la rflexion quand la situation saggrave et devient dangereuse. Cest donc une condition dterminante quand lunit a une matrise parfaite des mthodes traditionnelles de combat tactique et que chaque soldat peut agir de faon exprimente dans ce cadre. Cest dans ces conditions que lidentit, la confiance et la capacit de jugement du soldat sont cres. Cela est le dbut du fondement qui permet la flexibilit et ladaptation, critres trs importants au Kosovo. Il prpare le soldat et lunit le mieux possible la formation visant spcifiquement de telles missions. En revanche, cette formation doit se fonder sur les faits rels. Tous les lments du quotidien, les interprtes, les ONG, et les " Rules of Engagement " (ROE) doivent tre exploits afin de forcer le soldat apprendre les nouvelles conditions et rgles du jeu et ce avant quelles ne deviennent une cruelle ralit. Cest lun des dfis les plus importants mais aussi une confirmation du fait que la formation actuelle a le bon contenu et la bonne intensit. Le plus important retenir et comprendre, est quune unit ne sera jamais forme 100 % et quelle peut toujours samliorer. Une formation continue dans la zone de dploiement est vitale pour tre efficace dans le cadre des units multinationales. Des changes, des exercices et des expriences rciproques font partie des moyens tests et prouvs, et on peut beaucoup apprendre lun de lautre, lors dune pause caf sur le flanc dune montagne
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH
CROWD CONTROL - A DIFFICULT DISCIPLINE
by Major BRUHN, 115th class of the Army Command and General Staff College Danish Army
ivil wars and humanitarian disasters play an increasingly significant role for the armed forces missions in Europe. As far as Denmark is concerned, the Army had to admit it and to get prepared to these new contexts. During this last decade, it adapted to it through PK (Peace Keeping) missions.
In military doctrine, PK missions are categorized as " Operations Other Than War " or OOTWs1. 15 years ago, the very " non-warlike missions " term would have sounded false in soldiers' ears. However, they are listed nowadays among the most significant missions for the Danish Army, especially regarding organization, training and technology. This reality has provided us with new officers and NCOs as well as with different requirements towards soldiers at all levels. Co-operation between political authorities, governmental bodies, non-governmental organizations and military units are part of a soldier's daily activity. Today, we expect soldiers to be able to carry out their missions with an infantryman's presence of mind, and simultaneously, to exploit and take into account elements which were previously managed only by the hierarchy. Requirements from this new context are justified. In many cases, conditions require the presence of a " supersoldier ", who does not only take part in missions related to peace-keeping operations between two nations, but who should also have the capability to operate within the framework of belligerent armed forces control. Today, a " super-soldier " operates in an extremely fragmented environment, where it might be difficult or impossible to identify leaders. Kosovo is a good example for this new type of missions. Over there, ethnic conflicts are likely to transform small events into much more complex conflicts. The capability to prevent violence and confrontations, to control sources of instability and disorders is a criterion of success. This success criteria can only be achieved by a " super-soldier ". It is impossible to operate differently - no easy solutions exist. In many cases, Danish soldiers were in extremely difficult situations where malcontent crowds, frustrated refugees or quite simply the presence of an international authority, such as NATO or the UN, caused violent aggressions that soldiers had to face. We call this phenomenon " crowd control " (RIOT CONTROL). In this paragraph, I am going to describe part of the conditions that soldiers encounter in such an environment. I will also describe the experiences and methods that units lived through and developed at platoon, company and battalion levels, by increasing efforts to resolve these difficult missions, and to prepare future units for this situation as well as possible. This article can in no way be comprehensive and only personal considerations are presented, as well as real-life events at the time of my assignment within the Danish Battalion in Kosovo. This issue is permanently analyzed and processed by the Ordnance Corps Command of the Danish Army, the Danish Army Warfare School, the International Danish Brigade and the Military Police (MP) force. My unit took advantage of preparation efforts carried out by Denmark in order to optimize deployed units' training. One evening in February, I still remember the expression of surprise and astonishment on the face of one of my soldiers, whereas the company was deployed to protect a MINUK police station near Mitrovica. An elderly woman and a young girl ran towards the soldier and, within a distance of 4 to 5 meters, threw stones at him. Here " EVERYONE " was against him, and not only young men between 20 and 30. On the following day, everything was quiet. We carried out our patrol missions in the city and its vicinity, without noticing the slightest change in the local population's attitude, following the violent disorders of the previous day. They said to us " hello " nicely, as usual.
1 Memento about joint operations' doctrine , Forsvarsakademiet [Danish CID] 1999, page 21-1.
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As in most military missions, the knowledge of the environment where we operate is critical for the success of the mission. In Kosovo, a good contact with the local population was a prerequisite to carry out tasked missions. Every day, soldiers had to be in contact with the local population. Safety and security in small communities were dependent on the dialogue and the co-operation between each party. One of the heaviest constraints, for soldiers and the unit, was the contrast between a very violent and unforeseeable environment and the quiet atmosphere, which was looking like any small European village. An effort of intellectual and physical adaptation was necessary. Soon co-operation between units, from different nationalities, experiences and equipment became of vital importance. Each one had different methods, in particular at platoon level. For the same reason, some officers from the French battalion, next to the Danish one, were invited to attend a demonstration of the Danish methods and equipment. Following this demonstration, an agreement for weekly exchanges was set up. Some small exercises of crowd control (RIOT CONTROL) were a compulsory element of this co-operation. Lessons learned from these meetings were very rich. Soldiers quickly found their reference marks. Friendships were set up and mutual confidence was established. Shortly, this co-operation happened to be very useful. Thus the capability to meet a direct confrontation was quickly reinforced. But it always remained difficult, even impossible, to anticipate when and where disorders were about to burst out, to isolate them, to contain them and " to disarm or neutralize " them thereafter. Moreover, the battalion noted an important dissemination of information in the local population through the sectors of responsibility. Thus rumors could become public disorders, demonstrations or blockades with about a hundred people in less than twenty minutes. Aiming at creating the best possible conditions for this kind of missions, the battalion developed the (simplified) matrix below for deploying forces: 1st phase: reconnaissance in order to provide the mobile reserve with a warning order sufficient to deploy forces,and to keep deployed units permanently informed about the situation in the area of interest (company size at 15-minutes warning). 2nd phase: isolation of the Assembly Area (AA) in order to prevent an additional flow of local population, opportunely carried out by infantry units, as confrontations could occur during these blockades. 3rd phase: deployment of a unit in the Assembly Area (AA) to break the blockade, to disperse the demonstration, to protect the element in difficulty or other similar missions. 4th phase: upholding the situation and re-establishing calm and order. This was carried out by the mobile reserve by setting up check points and patrols in the close area. The isolation unit was replaced by the reserve unit at 15-minutes warning in order to carry out again another mission of reserve at 30 minutes warning. 300 m The different phases described above were developed and tested during several events. After some adjustments, the battalion found the matrix very useful. Nevertheless, the battalion noted that missions in question, 1st phase although military 1re phase ones, take place 2nd phase phase within a civilian 2me environment with civil actors who 3me 3rd phasephase would certainly influence the conditions in which the mission would be carried out.
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These ones were generally the following: Taking the MINUK POLICE FORCE into account, namely their capability and their mandate during commitments, etc...
Reactions of the MINUK local administration, which, in no case, did want confrontations with the local
population.

NGOs in the area and their often close links with the involved parties. For the same reason, NGOs seldom acted
in an objective and even-handed way.

Concern about the local infrastructure and road traffic. Environment's conditions were often an obstacle to the freedom of maneuver. The role of media.
Most of these factors could be anticipated during mission planning: by creating special liaison teams with the concerned authorities and organizations.
thanks to " information operations " in the groups of population in the close area. by creating special teams quickly ready to negotiate, immediately after having reached the objective.
However, it is very difficult, even impossible, to take all the factors into account and to anticipate all of them. This is the reason why the isolation phase was carried out to the letter. It is at this very precise time that any reinforcement of the demonstration should be prohibited, because the Assembly Area (AA) should be kept under control as much as possible. For some time, several studies have been undertaken by taking advantage of all these experiences and methods to train soldiers, units and headquarters. Should we continue to rely heavily on a basic military training focusing on traditional know-how while missions in the Balkans created such requirements that basic training should rather aim at a specific preparation? This means that traditional infantry's capabilities, such as attack, static combat, backward combat, combat on a terrain with limited views, should be of secondary priority or perhaps be only studied very shortly? In my own view, capabilities, such as reconnaissance, Command and Control (C2), and training, are irreplaceable bases for a successful deployment as well as for the development of mental adaptation capabilities. Simultaneously, it is necessary to combine these ones with basic infantry capabilities, such as the ability to cooperate between groups and units, and with the Medical Corps. This is a basic know-how that we have developed at all levels, through a long military tradition which guarantees endurance, resistance, and notably thinking about it when the situation worsens and becomes dangerous. Thus it is a deciding condition when the unit is perfectly mastering the traditional methods of tactical combat and when each soldier can act in a professionalway within this framework. If these conditions are met, the soldier's identity, confidence and good judgment capability can be created. This is the first step of the foundation, which enables flexibility and adaptation, a very significant criteria in Kosovo. It best prepares a soldier and a unit for training aiming specifically at such missions. On the other hand, such training should be based on actual facts. All elements of the day-to-day life, interpreters, NGOs, and " Rules of Engagement " (ROEs) should be exploited in order to compel soldiers to learn the new conditions and rules of the game, and this before they become a cruel reality. This is one of the most significant challenges but also a confirmation of the fact that current training includes the right contents and has the right intensity. Most significant to keep in mind and to understand, is that a unit will never be 100 % trained and that it can always improve its capability. Training permanently in the Assembly Area (AA) is vital to be efficient within the framework of multinational units. Reciprocal exchanges, exercises and experiences are part of tested and proven means, and we can learn much from one another, during a coffee break on a hillside
26

Dans ce site : - Le CDES et ses organismes : prsentation du CDES et des organismes qui le composent. - La base documentaire : sont regroups dans cette base des documents de doctrine de lArme de terre. - Forum Doctrine : un lieu modr o changer des points de vue et des informations sur la doctrine militaire franaise. - Les grandes lignes de la doctrine militaire franaise : permet une premire introduction la doctrine militaire franaise. Ce texte reprend les bases de la doctrine et, grce des liens hypertextes, permet daccder des dfinitions de termes militaires et daller plus en profondeur. - Les matriels : plus de 150 fiches techniques et une douzaine de vidos sur les matriels de lArme de terre.
On this site : - The French CDES (French command Army Doctrine and Higher Military education) and its different components: presentation of the CDES as well as of the different agences which are part of it. - The documentary database: doctrine documents about the French Army are grouped in this database. - The headlines of the French military doctrine: it enables to get a first approach to the French military doctrine. This text encompasses doctrine basics, and thanks to hypertext links, it also enables to have access to the definitions of military terms and to deepen this approach. - Assets: more than 150 technical sheets and a dozen videos pertaining to the French Army assets.
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Les Cahiers Du RETEX - Supplément À Doctrine NR 10

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AVERTISSEMENT AU LECTEUR

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LE GROUPE DE DEFENSE NBC AU KOSOVO

Supplment Objectif Doctrine 35

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NOTE TO THE READER

THE NBC DEFENSE GROUP IN KOSOVO

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Supplment Objectif Doctrine 35

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Supplment Objectif Doctrine 35

LEXPLOSION DE LUSINE A.Z.F. TOULOUSE

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par le lieutenant-colonel COURAL et le lieutenant FEIGNEUX

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Supplment Objectif Doctrine 35

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Supplment Objectif Doctrine 35

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EXPLOSION OF THE TOULOUSE AZF FACTORY

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by lieutenant-colonel COURAL and lieutenant FEIGNEUX

Supplment Objectif Doctrine 35

Situation assessment and information gathering

Supplment Objectif Doctrine 35

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Assets transportation and commitment preparation

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4 Teams specialized in searching casualties buried into the rubble.

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Supplment Objectif Doctrine 35

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par le colonel de Laforcade - CREDAT/B3

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by colonel de Laforcade - CREDAT/B3

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Supplment Objectif Doctrine 35

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Supplment Objectif Doctrine 35

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LE CONTRLE DE FOULES - UNE DISCIPLINE DIFFICILE

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CROWD CONTROL - A DIFFICULT DISCIPLINE

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Supplment Objectif Doctrine 35

Supplment Objectif Doctrine 35

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in an objective and even-handed way.

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