MANOTOC VS CA (2006) FACTS: In the case of Trajano vs.

Manotoc for wrongful death of the deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by Military Intelligence under the command of Ma. Imelda M. Manotoc. Based upon the complaint the Regional Trial Court issued a summons at the house of Manotoc. A certain Mackey dela Cruz (caretaker) received the summons. Manotoc was declared in default for failure to answer. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquire a valid jurisdiction for the service of summons over the petitioner. HELD: The Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner, because the substituted service of summons was defective in nature or invalid at the first place. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted. A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of "on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons. The main fact that the summons was not sent in the petitioners dwelling, The said caretaker was not a person of suitable age and discretion and was not resided in the said address. Hence the requisites of substituted summons was not followed, therefore the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner at the first place. SEC. 8. 21 Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Gentle Supreme Philippines, Inc. vs Consulta Facts: Gentle Supreme Philippines, Inc. (GSP) filed a collection case with application for a writ of preliminary attachment against Consar Trading Corporation (CTC), its president, Consulta, and its vicepresident, Sarayba. The sheriff failed to serve the summons and copies of the complaint on any of CTCs authorized officers as well as on Consulta and Sarayba, so he left copies of such documents with Canave who, according to the sheriffs return, was Saraybas secretary and an authorized representative of both Sarayba and Consulta. The defendants failed to file an answer and they were declared in default. A property owned by Consulta was also attached. The RTC eventually ruled in favor of GSP. Consulta now claims that he was not properly served with summons because, although his address stated in the complaint was his regular place of business, Canave, who received the summons, was not in charge of the matter. Issue: W/N there was a valid service of summons YES. Doctrine: It is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendants regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be incharge. In this case, Canave, a secretary whose job description necessarily includes receiving documents and other correspondence, would have the semblance of authority to accept the court documents. Sec. 7 (b) (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. ROBINSON v. MIRALLES (510 SCRA 678, 2006) FACTS: Respondent Celita Miralles filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioner Remelita Robinson, alleging that $20,054 was borrowed by Robinson, as shown in the MOA they both executed. Summons was served on Robinson at her given address. However, per return of service of the Sheriif, petitioner no longer resides there. Thus, the trial court issued an alias summons to be served at Muntinlupa City, petitioners new address. Again, the Sheriff reported twice thereafter that the summons could not be served on petitioner. Sheriff Pontente, who was to serve the summons interposed that he was stopped by the Security Guard of Alabang Hills Village because they were allegedly told by Robinson not to let anyone proceed to her house if she is not around. Despite the explanations of the Sheriff, the guards didnt let him in. Thereafter,

the Sheriff just left a copy of the complaint to a guard, who refused to affix his signature on the original copy, so he will be the one to give the summons to petitioner Robinson. Eventually, petitioner Robinson was declared in default for her failure to file an answer seasonably despite service of summons. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Miralles ordering Robinson to pay her obligations plus cost of damages. A copy of the court Order was sent to petitioner by registered mail at her new address and a writ of execution was also issued. Robinson filed a petition for relief from the judgment by default. She claimed that summons was improperly served upon her, thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her and that all its proceedings are void. Petitioner Robinson contends that the service of the summons upon the subdivision guard is not in compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to her or staying at her residence, as required by the rule. ISSUE: Whether the substituted service of summons effected is valid. RULING: YES. Although the SC have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective, the Court frowns upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons upon petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriffs declaration. Nor did she deny having received the summons through the security guard. Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons has been properly served upon petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended. Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over substituted service, the latter mode of service being a method extraordinary in character. For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;

(b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the partys residence or upon a competent person in charge of the partys office or place of business. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

Spouses Santiago vs BPI Facts: Spouses Lim failed to pay their indebtedness with FEBTC now BPI, due to nonpayment, private respondent filed an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Petitioners filed a complaint for injunction, damages and accounting with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against private respondent as successor-in-interest of FEBTC. Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on private respondent through the managers of its branches located in San Jose Street and Percedes Street, Dumaguete City. Issue: Whether or not the service of summons on the branch managers of private respondent's two separate branches in Dumaguete City constitutes substantial compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Ruling: Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case. Where the court held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11,

Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Moreover, in the recent case of Bank of Philippine Islands v. Santiago,[30] it was ruled that service of the original summons upon the branch manager of BPI's Sta. Cruz, Laguna branch did not bind the corporation, for the branch manager was not included in the enumeration in the statute of the persons upon whom service can be validly made in behalf of the corporation; thus, such service was therefore void and ineffectual. SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT vs. RICAFORTE 293 SCRA 661 [August 5, 1998] J. Davide FACTS: Solar Team filed before the RTC a complaint against Felix Co. Summons and copies of the complaint were forthwith served on Co. Co then filed his answer. A copy thereof was furnished counsel for Solar Team by registered mail; however, the pleading did not contain any written explanation as to why service was not made personally upon Solar Team, as required by Section 11 of Rule 13. Solar Team filed a motion to expunge the answer and to declare Co in default, alleging therein that Co did not observe the mandate of Section 11. RTC issued an order stating that under Section 11 of Rule 13, it is within the discretion of the RTC whether to consider the pleading as filed or not, and denying, for lack of merit, Solar Teams motion to expunge. HELD: Pursuant to Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other papers MUST, whenever practicable, be done personally; and if made through other modes, the party concerned must provide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally. Note that Section 11 refers to BOTH service of pleadings and other papers on the adverse party or his counsel as provided for in Sections 6, 7 and 8; and to the filing of pleadings and other papers in court. Personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or, upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered parcel containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all,

thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers. If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily, consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever practicable. We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11: Personal service and filing is the GENERAL RULE, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the EXCEPTION. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. Of course, proximity would seem to make personal service most practicable, but exceptions may nonetheless apply such as when: the adverse party or opposing counsel to be served with a pleading seldom reports to office and no employee is regularly present to receive pleadings, or service is done on the last day of the reglementary period and the office of the adverse party or opposing counsel to be served is closed, for whatever reason. However in view of the proximity between the offices of opposing counsel and the absence of any attendant explanation as to why personal service of the answer was not effected, indubitably, Cos counsel violated Section 11 and the motion to expunge was prima facie meritorious. However, the grant or denial of said motion nevertheless remained within the sound exercise of the RTC's discretion. To Our mind, if motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for violation of Section 11 were to be indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of Rule 1, then Section 11 would become meaningless and its sound purpose negated. Nevertheless, We sustain the challenged ruling of the RTC, but for reasons

other than those provided for in the challenged order. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1 Jul 1997, while the answer was filed only on 8 Aug 1997, or on the 39th day following the effectivity of the 1997 Rules. Hence, Cos counsel may not have been fully aware of the requirements and ramifications of Section 11. It has been several months since the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect. In the interim, this Court has generally accommodated parties and counsel who failed to comply with the requirement of a written explanation whenever personal service or filing was not practicable, guided, in the exercise of our discretion, by the primary objective of Section 11, the importance of the subject matter of the case, the issues involved and the prima facie merit of the challenged pleading. However, as we have in the past, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, strictest compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 is mandated one month from promulgation of this Decision. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED considering that while the justification for the denial of the motion to expunge the answer (with counterclaims) may not necessarily be correct, yet, for the reasons above stated, the violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 may be condoned. UCPB vs. Beluso (2007) Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: In 1996, UCPB granted the spouses Beluso a Promissory Notes Line under a Credit Agreement whereby the latter could avail from the former credit of up to a maximum amount of P1.2 Million pesos for a term ending in April 1997. In addition to the promissory notes, the spouses Beluso also constituted a real estate mortgage over parcels of land in Roxas City. Subsequently, the said Credit Arrangement was amended to extend the amount of the Promissory Notes Line to a maximum of P2.35 Million pesos and to extend the term thereof to February 1998. The spouses executed three promissory notes which were renewed several times. In 1997, the payment of the principal and interest of the latter two promissory notes were debited from the spouses Belusos account with UCPB; yet, a consolidated loan for P1.3 Million was again released to the spouses Beluso under one promissory note with a due date of 28 February 1998. To completely avail themselves of the P2.35 Million credit line extended to them by UCPB, the spouses Beluso executed two more promissory notes for a total of P350 thousand. However, the spouses Beluso

alleged that the amounts covered by these last two promissory notes were never released or credited to their account and, thus, claimed that the principal indebtedness was only P2 Million. In any case, UCPB applied interest rates on the different promissory notes ranging from 18% to 34%. During the term of these promissory notes, the Belusos were able to pay the total sum of about P760 thousand. However, they failed to pay for the interest and penalty on their obligations. As a result, UCPB demanded that they pay their total obligation of P2.9 million but the spouses Beluso failed to comply therewith. Thereafter, UCPB foreclosed the properties mortgaged by the spouses Beluso to secure their credit line, which, by that time, already ballooned to nearly P3.8 million. Two months after the foreclosure, the spouses Beluso filed a Petition for Annulment, Accounting and Damages against UCPB with the RTC of Makati City. UCPB moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the spouses Beluso instituted another case before the RTC of Roxas City, involving the same parties and issues. UCPB claims that while the Roxas City case initially appears to be a different action, as it prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction to stop foreclosure of spouses Belusos properties, it poses issues which are similar to those of the present case. The spouses Beluso claim that the issue in the Roxas City case is the propriety of the foreclosure before the true account of spouses Beluso is determined. On the other hand, the issue in the Makati case is the validity of the interest rate provision. The spouses Beluso claim that the Roxas City case has become moot because, before RTC Roxas City could act on the restraining order, UCPB proceeded with the foreclosure and auction sale. As the act sought to be restrained has already been accomplished, the spouses Beluso had to file a different action, that of Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale with RTC Makati. RTC ruled in favor of the Belusos. CA affirmed. Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed due to forum shopping Held: YES. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument, however, that only one cause of action is involved in the two civil actions, namely, the violation of the right of the spouses Beluso not to have their property foreclosed for an amount they do not owe, the Rules of Court nevertheless allows the filing of the second action. The case in Roxas City was dismissed before the filing of the case with RTC Makati, since the venue of litigation as provided for in the Credit Agreement is in Makati City. Rule 16, Section 5 bars the refiling of an action previously dismissed only in the following instances:

(a) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (b) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; and (c) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds. When an action is dismissed on the motion of the other party, it is only when the ground for the dismissal of an action is either of those aforementioned that the action cannot be refiled. As regards all the other grounds, the complainant is allowed to file same action, but should take care that, this time, it is filed with the proper court or after the accomplishment of the erstwhile absent condition precedent, as the case may be. The MR filed by the Belusos in the Roxas City case that has not yet been resolved upon the filing of the Makati case does not change the SCs findings. It is indeed the general rule that in cases where there are two pending actions between the same parties on the same issue, it should be the later case that should be dismissed. However, this rule is not absolute. In the case of Allied Banking v. CA, it was ruled that: Even if this is not the purpose for the filing of the first action, it may nevertheless be dismissed if the later action is the more appropriate vehicle for the ventilation of the issues between the parties. Applying the said ruling in the case at bar, the Court found that the Makati City case is the more proper action in view of the execution of the foreclosure sale. Moreover, Makati is the proper venue of the action as mandated by the Credit Agreement. Hence, the Court deemed that the Makati Case is the more appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties, as compared to the Roxas City case.

Abelardo and Margarita executed an Agreement of Separation of Properties, which was duly granted by the RTC Makati. Meanwhile, Abelardo commenced the proceeding on the voiding his marriage with Margarita on account of psychological incapacity. As Margarita was in the US, Abelardo initially moved that summons be served through the International Express Courier Service. The court a quo denied the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. An Officers return was duly submitted declaring the completion of the service of summons. Finally, the marriage was declared void through Article 36 Family Code by the RTC. Margarita appeared before the Consulate Office in San Francisco to sign the agreement on separation of property. Abelardo allegedly threatened to cut off all financial and material support to their children if Margarita did not sign the documents. 9 years later, Margarita contested such declaration of nullity of marriage on account of extrinsic fraud and questioned the court that it did not acquire jurisdiction over her, hence such decision is void and ineffectual. Issue: WON Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo? YES WON there was extrinsic fraud in the preparation and filing by Abelardo of the Petition for Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains and its annex, the Agreement of Separation of Properties? NO Held: As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is not essential. Jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not necessary. The trial and appellate courts made a clear factual finding that there was proper summons by publication effected through the Department of Foreign

ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS vs. LICAROS G.R. No. 150656 April 29, 2003 Rule 14 Sec 15(Extraterritorial Service) Summons. Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Facts: Abelardo and Margarita were lawfully married. Marital differences, squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired between the spouses, such that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate from bed and board. Margarita then left for the United States with her children. She filed with the courts of California a petition to divorce her husband, and it was granted.

Affairs as directed by the trial court. Thus, the trial court acquired jurisdiction to render the decision declaring the marriage a nullity. Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a nonresident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1)when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines. In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendants last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient. The trial courts prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. On the Issue of Fraud: A meticulous perusal of the Petition and Agreement readily shows that Margarita signed the same on the proper space after the prayer and on the portion for the verification of the petition. In the instant case, Margarita acknowledged the Agreement before Consul Cortez. The certificate of acknowledgment signed by Consul Cortez states that Margarita personally appeared before him and acknowledged before me that SHE executed the same of her own free will and deed. Thus, there is a prima facie presumption that Margarita freely and voluntarily executed the Agreement. Margarita has failed to rebut this prima facie presumption with clear and convincing proof of coercion on the part of Abelardo.