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War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence Author(s): Chris J. Cuomo Source: Hypatia, Vol. 11, No. 4, Women and Violence (Autumn, 1996), pp. 30-45 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Hypatia, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810390 . Accessed: 29/04/2011 12:15
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WarIsNot Justan Event: on Reflections the Significance of Violence Everyday


CHRIS J. CUOMO

is with my Although position in basicagreement thenotionthatwarandmilitarism to arefeministissues,I arguethatapproaches theethicsof war andpeacewhichdo are not consider violence inadequate feminist environand military "peacetime" for mentalistconcerns.Becausemuch of the militaryviolencedone to women and outsidethe boundaries declared wars,feministand environof ecosystems happens violence. mentalphilosophers to emphasize significance everyday the ought of military

Philosophicalattention to war has typicallyappearedin the formof justifiactivities withinwar. The into war, and over appropriate cations for entering used to referto war as a separate,bounded sphere indicate spatial metaphors assumptionsthat waris a realmof human activity vastlyremovedfromnormal conceived apartfromeveryday life, or a sort of happeningthat is appropriately most discussionsof the political and events in peacefultimes. Not surprisingly, ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event-an occurrence, or collection of occurrences,having clear beginnings and endings that are typically markedby formal, institutional declarations.As happenings,wars and militaryactivities can be seen as motivated by identifiable,if complex, intentions, and directly enacted by individualand collective decision-makersand agents of states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to violence affectswomen feminists-including how large-scale,state-sponsored and membersof other oppressedgroups;how military violence shapes genwhat dered,raced,and nationalisticpolitical realitiesand moralimaginations; such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies-cannot be adequately pursuedby focusingon events. These issuesare not merelya matterof good or bad intentions and identifiabledecisions.
Hypatiavol. 11, no. 4 (Fall 1996) ? by ChrisJ. Cuomo

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In "Genderand 'Postmoder' War,"Robin Schott introducessome of the ways in which war is currentlybest seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodem understandingsof persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary of warfareand the preponderance civil and nationalist wars,renderan eventbased conception of war inadequate,especiallyinsofaras gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverishedin a number of ways, and thereforefeminist considerationof the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilitiesfor resistancedemand a much of more complicatedapproach.I take Schott'scharacterization waras presence as a point of departure,though I am not committed to the idea that the constancyof militarism,the fact of its omnipresencein humanexperience,and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodernor postcolonial circumstances.1 Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarismcannot representor addressthe depth and specificityof the everyon day effects of militarismon women, on people living in occupiedterritories, membersof military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct genderedand national identity, and because they justifythe destructionof naturalnonhuman entities and communitiesduring peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing militaryviolence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodatethe connections among the constant presence of militarism,declaredwars,and other closely relatedsocial phenomena, such as nationalisticglorificationsof motherhood,mediaviolence, and current ideological gravitationsto militarysolutions for social problems. Ethical approachesthat do not attend to the ways in which warfareand militarypracticesare woven into the very fabricof life in twenty-firstcentury technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses.Forany feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-basedethics and politics are problematicbecause they distract attention fromthe need forsustainedresistanceto the enmeshed,omnipresent systemsof dominationand oppressionthat so often function as givens in most people'slives. Neglecting the omnipresenceof militarismallowsthe falsebelief that the absenceof declaredarmedconflicts is peace, the polaroppositeof war. It is particularly easy forthose whose lives are shapedby the safetyof privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realitiesof militarism,to maintainthis false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regardingarmed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarismthat are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistanceis then mobilizedwhen the "real" violence finally occurs,or when the stability of privilege is directly

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threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respondin ways that make resistersdrop all other political priorities.Crisis-drivenattention to declarations of war might actuallykeep resisterscomplacent about and complicitous in the generalpresenceof global militarism.Seeing war as necessarilyembedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, violence is happeningnearlyall over, all of the time, and that state-sponsored it is perpetratedby military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving awayfromcrisis-drivenpolitics and ontologies concerning warand militaryviolence also enables considerationof relationshipsamongseemingly disparatephenomena, and thereforecan shape more nuanced theoretical and practicalformsof resistance.Forexample, investigatingthe waysin which war is partof a presenceallowsconsiderationof the relationshipsamongthe events of war and the following:how militarismis a foundationaltrope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meaningsof gender;the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimesinvisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currentlyin the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances.It also providesa lens for consideringthe relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war."Given current Americanobsessionswith nationalism,guns,and militias,and growinghunger for the death penalty, prisons,and a more powerfulpolice state, one cannot underestimatethe need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "waron drugs,"the "waron crime," and other state-fundedmilitaristiccampaigns. I proposethat the constancy of militarismand its effects on social realitybe feminist attentions, and that reintroducedas a crucial locus of contemporary feministsemphasizehow warsareeruptionsand manifestationsof omnipresent militarismthat is a product and tool of multiply oppressive,corporate,technocraticstates.2Feministsshouldbe particularly interestedin makingthis shift because it better allows considerationof the effects of war and militarismon women, subjugated peoples, and environments.While giving attention to the of militarismin contemporarylife we need not neglect the imporconstancy the declaredmilitary tance of addressing specificqualitiesof direct, large-scale, conflicts. But the dramaticnatureof declared,large-scaleconflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasinglytechnologically sophisticatedways and the significance of military institutions and everydaypractices in shaping reality.Philosophicaldiscussionsthat focus only on the ethics of declaringand fighting warsmiss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declaredmilitaryconflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors.These approachesalso leave

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unquestionedtendencies to suspendor distortmoraljudgementin the face of what appearsto be the inevitabilityof warand militarism. Just-wartheory is a prominent example of a philosophical approachthat rests on the assumptionthat wars are isolated from everydaylife and ethics. Such theory, as developed by St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius, and as articulatedin contemporary dialoguesby many philosophers, includingMichael Walzer(1977), ThomasNagel (1974), and Sheldon Cohen to (1989), take the primary question concerningthe ethics of warfare be about when to enter into militaryconflicts againstother states. They thereforetake as a given the notion that war is an isolated, definable event with clear boundaries. These boundaries are significant because they distinguish the circumstancesin which standardmoral rules and constraints, such as rules against murderand unprovokedviolence, no longer apply.Just-wartheory assumesthat waris a separatesphereof human activity having its own ethical constraintsand criteriaand in doing so it begs the question of whether or not war is a special kind of event, or part of a pervasive presence in nearly all life. contemporary Becausethe applicationof just-war principlesis a matterof properdecisionwarsoccur,and before makingon the partof agents of the state, before military strikesare made, they assume that military initiatives are distinct events. In fact, declarationsof war are generallyoverdeterminedescalationsof preexisting conditions. Just-warcriteria cannot help evaluate military and related institutions, including their peacetime practices and how these relate to wartimeactivities, so they cannot addressthe ways in which armedconflicts between and among states emerge from omnipresent, often violent, state militarism.The remarkableresemblancesin some sectors between states of peace and states of warremaincompletelyuntouchedby theoriesthat areonly able to discuss the ethics of starting and ending direct military conflicts between and among states. Applications of just-warcriteria actually help create the illusion that the "problemof war" is being addressedwhen the only considerationsare the ethics of declaring wars and of military violence within the boundariesof declarationsof warand peace. Though just-warconsiderationsmight theoretavoid specific grosseruptionsof militaryviolence, ically help decision-makers the aspectsof warwhich requirethe underlyingpresenceof militarismand the direct effects of the omnipresenceof militarismremainuntouched.There may be importantdecisions to be made aboutwhen and how to fight war,but these must be considered in terms of the many other aspects of contemporarywar and militarismthat are significantto nonmilitarypersonnel,includingwomen and nonhumans.

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FEMINIST TO APPROACHES WAR AND MILITARY VIOLENCE

In a recent Hypatiaarticle,LucindaPeach arguesthat just-wartheory,which she takes to be more realistic and useful than pacifism,can be strengthened with feminist insights and analyses.Drawingprimarilyon the work of Sara Ruddick and Jean Bethke Elshtain, she reconstructs feminist responses to traditional just-warapproaches,and illustrates how a more thorough application of feminist principles might lead to "a more careful and considered appraisalof when the use of armedforce is morally justified" (Peach 1994, 167). Though she agrees with their criticisms of traditional just-war approaches, Peach finds Elshtain's and Ruddick's alternatives practically and theoretically lacking. Nonetheless, her'faith in just-war theorizing is unwavering: The feminist criticisms discussed do not suggest a need to develop radically new or different criteria for assessing the moralityor engagementin armedconflict fromthose offeredby traditionaljust-wartheory ... feminist criticismsand counterproposalssuggesta numberof specific proposalsfor modifying the practice more than the theory of the just-warapproachto armedconflict. (Peach 1994, 164) Peach states that one of the problemswith nonfeminist critiquesof war is their failureto address fact that "womenremainlargelyabsentfromethical the and policy debates regardingwhen to go to war, how to fight a war, and whether resorting to war is morally justifiable"(Peach 1994, 152). But a just-warapproachcannot successfullytheorize women'sroles in these events because formal, declared wars depend upon underlyingmilitaristic assumptions and constructionsof gender that make women'sparticipationas leaders nearly impossible. The limitations of Peach'sanalysismake clear some aspectsof the relationships between peacetime militarism and armed conflicts that cannot be addressedby even feminist just-warprinciples.Her five criticismsof just-war made theory,discussedbelow, are intended to both echo and revise appraisals by other feminists. But each fails to successfullyaddressthe complexity of feminist concerns. 1) Peach finds just-war theory's reliance on realism, the notion that human nature makes war inevitable and unavoidable,to be problematic. She believes just-wartheory should not be premisedon realist assumptions, and that it should also avoid "unduly unrealistic work. of appraisals" human and female nature,as found in Ruddick's Peach rightly identifies the pessimism,sexism, essentialism,and universalism at work in just-wartheorists'conceptions of human nature.Nonetheless,

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she fails to see that just-wartheoristsemployossifiedconcepts of both "human nature"and "war." Any interrogationof the relationshipsbetween war and and enactments of what "humannature,"or more benignly, understandings it means to be diverse human agents in various contexts, will be terribly limited insofar as they consider wars to be isolated events. Questions concerning the relationships between war and "human nature"become far more complex if we reject a conception of war that focuses only on events, and abandon any pretense of arrivingat universalist conceptions of human or female "nature." Feministethical questionsaboutwararenot reducibleto wonderinghow to avoid large-scalemilitaryconflict despite human tendencies towardviolence. Instead, the central questions concern the omnipresence of militarism,the possibilitiesof making its presencevisible, and the potential for resistanceto its physical and hegemonic force. Like "solutions"to the preponderanceof violence perpetrated men againstwomen that fail to analyzeand articulate by relationships between everyday violence and institutionalized or invisible systemsof patriarchal,racist,and economic oppression,analysesthat characterize eruptionsof militaryviolence as isolated, persistentevents, are practically and theoreticallyinsufficient. to 2) Peachfaultsjust-war theoryfor its failureto consideralternatives war, that "thefailure mostjust-war of theorists seriously to stating contemplate alternatives waris... radically to deficientfromthe perspectives pacifist of feminist and others opposed to knee-jerkmilitaristicresponseto civil strife"(Peach 1994, 158). She arguesthat feminist just-wartheorists, includingElshtain,shouldalsopaymoreattentionto pacifistarguments. When Peach discusses "alternativesto war," she is clearly referringto alternatives to entering into war, or to participating in "the escalation of conflicts."The avoidance of eruptionsof militaryviolence is certainlyimportant, and Peach is correctthat feminist insightsaboutconflict resolutioncould present significant recommendationsin this regard.However,feminist moral imaginationcannot end there. In thinking of alternativesto war,we need to continue to imagine alternativesto militaristiceconomies, symbolicsystems, values, and political institutions.The task of constructingsuch alternativesis far more daunting and comprehensivethan creatingalternativesto a specific event or kind of event. Pacifistwritersas diverse as Gandhi, Martin LutherKing, Jr.,and Barbara Deming have emphasizedthe fact that pacifismentails a critiqueof pervasive, systematichuman violence. Despite its reductionisttendencies, there is much to learnfromthe ways in which pacifistsconceive of waras a presence,as well as the pacifistrefusalto let go of the ideal of peace. Characterizing pacifismas motivatedby the desireto avoid specificevents disregards extent to which the pacifismaims to criticizethe preconditionsunderlyingevents of war.

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3) Following several influential moves in feminist philosophy, Peach rejects just-wartheory'sreliance on abstraction-of the realities, or of "horrors," war;of enemies as one-dimensionalevil, killable Others; the and of the ethical responsesneeded to address moralityof war,such as a privileging of justice and rights over love and caring. Following Elshtain,she believes that feminist just-warprinciplesshould be more contextualized,and individualized. particularized, of But the abstractionof the particularities war depends on an abstraction of war itself. The distance of such abstractionis created in partby willingness times. to think of war without consideringthe presence of war in "peaceful" Wars becomes conceptual entities-objects for consideration-rather than diverse, historically loaded exemplifications of the contexts in which they and occur.In orderto notice the particular individualrealitiesof war,attention must be given to the particular,individual, and contextualized causes and effects of pervasivemilitarism,as well as the patternsand connections among them. 4) Like other feminists, Peach criticizes the dualisms and dichotomies that underliewar and the other evils of patriarchy, including dichotomies between male and female, combatant and noncombatant, soldier and citizen, ally and enemy and state and individual which have dominated just-war thinking. Rather than relyingon traditionaldichotomies, a feminist application of just-warcriteriashould emphasizethe effects of going to war on the lives of particularindividualswho would be involved, whether soldier or civilian, enemy or ally, male or female. (Peach 1994, 166) As should now be obvious, though Peach rejects several relevant dualistic hierarchies,a stark ontological distinction between war and peace remains basicallyintact.3Thus Peach'srejection of dualismsis underminedby her own failure to question a starkontological distinction between war and peace. In considering the ways in which violence shapes women's realities, feminists might be better served by analyses of war as part of enmeshed continua or and racistviolence. and other systemicpatriarchal spectraof state-sponsored 5) Peach believes just-wartheory privilegesstate authorityand the good of the state over individual autonomy and well-being. Instead, she understandstates that just-wartheory should include "reformulated of the properrelationshipsbetween the individualand the state," ings considering "both the impact of war on individuals as well as the obligations of both men and women to defend the nation" (Peach 1994, 167).

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In raisingquestionsabout the relationshipsbetween individualsand states, Peach fails to question liberal,modernistconceptions of either. But if individual personsare socially constituted, often in conflicting ways,how can memIf loyalties,be determined? the state is alwaysinevitably bership,or appropriate a military,patriarchal,racist state, how ought alternative collectivities that will promote the well-being of individualsbe conceived without creating or relyingon militarypresence?Feministsconcernedwith resistancesto warneed to consider how the pervasivenessof militarismin the construction of the state implies the need to questionnationalismwhen theorizing contemporary about war. critically To give one very clear example of the waysin which just-warevaluationsof warsas events fail to addressfeminist questionsabout militarism,considerthe widespreadinfluence of foreignmilitarybaseson genderednational identities and interactions. In Bananas, Beachesand Bases: MakingFeministSense of International Politics(1990), Cynthia Enloe illustrateshow, while decisionand economic powerareheld primarily men, internationalrelations making by and politics are inevitably played out on women's bodies in myriad ways, racist,nationalist, and colonialist conceptions of femininity.One propagating "BaseWomen,"is devoted to a discussionof the ways in which local chapter, and global sexual politics shape and are shapedthroughthe constant presence of thousands of military bases worldwide-in the symbol of the soldier, the introductionof foreignconceptions of masculinityand femininity,the reproduction of familystructures militarybases,and throughsystemsof prostituon tion that universallycoexist alongsidemilitarybases. Enloe writes, "militarypolitics, which occupy such a largepart of international politics today,requiremilitarybases.Basesare artificialsocieties created out of unequal relations between men and women of different races and classes"and, one might add, differentnations (Enloe 1990, 2). The constant, global presence of these bases is an example of the mundane givenness and subtle omnipresenceof militaryviolence. Most bases have managed to slip into the daily lives of the nearby community. A military base, even one controlled by soldiersof another country,can become politically invisible if its waysof doing businessand seeing the worldinsinuatethemselves into a community'sschools, consumer tastes, housing patterns, children's games, adults' friendships,jobs and gossip.... Most have drapedthemselves with the camouflageof normalcy. . .. Rumors of a base closing can send shivers of economic alarmthrough a civilian community that has come to dependon basejobs and soldiers'spending.(Enloe 1990, 66) Just-wartheory-even feminist just-war theory-cannot bring to light the ways in which the politics of militarybases are related to the waging of war,

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how militarismconstructs masculinity and femininity, or how international politics are shaped by the microcosmicimpactsof militarybases. It therefore cannot addresssome of the most pressingways in which militarismand war involve and affect women.
ETHICS JUSTWAR AND ENVIRONMENTAL

I turn now to a discussion of the environmental effects of war, because I believe these effectsto be significantto feministsfortwo basicreasons.Though women are no more essentially connected to nature than any other organic beings,culturalconstructionsassociatewomenwith natureand help justifythe mistreatmentof both. Many feministsand ecological feministshave discussed these problematicconceptual connections as createdor fueled by the dichotomous thinking discussed above (Griffin 1989; King 1990; Warren 1990; Cuomo 1992; Plumwood1993). Others, includingVandanaShiva and Maria Mies (1993), focuson the practical,or materialconnections between environmental degradation and women's oppression. In any case, if women's oppression is connected to the unjustified destruction of nature, or if, as Karen Warren argues, feminists must be against oppression in any form, including the oppression of nature, it is arguablethat the ecological effects of war and militarism are feminist issues. Because military ecological destruction occurs primarily "during peacetime," and because it is so directly tied to other forms of ecological and social violence, attention to the ecological impacts of war further illustrates the limitations of only thinking of war in terms of events. Merrit for In "The MilitaryCommander's Responsibility the Environment," Drucker,a majorin the U.S. Army and philosophy instructorat the United States Military Academy at West Point, utilizes an expanded application of ought to protectnatural just-warprinciplesto arguethat militarycommanders The commander's environmentsduringpeace and warfare. peacetime responsibilities are founded on the commander's professionalresponsibilityas an agent of the state. Wartime responsibilitiesstem from the well-establishedprohibitionsagainst harmingnoncombatants and destroyingworksof art and objects of historicalor cultural value. (Drucker1989, 136) on Drucker's analysisrests primarily a sharpdistinction between peace and war, and a broad interpretationof the just-warprinciple of noncombatant militarydiscriminationbetween combatants immunity.This principlerequires and noncombatantsand statesthat it is justifiableto intentionallykill only the former.In essence, Druckerbelieves militarycommanders ought to protect the environment duringwar because, like noncombatantsand culturalartifacts,

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naturalentities are inherentlyvaluable,morallyinappropriate targetsof miliDruckerarguesfromanalogythat because "the environment" taryaggression. (which he representsas a unified, self-evident entity) is free of intention and cannot wage or fight in war, it is an innocent noncombatant in the realm of If human affairs. a just-warmustbe fought without intended or excessive harm to noncombatants,justice requiresthat warsalso be fought without intended or excessiveharmto environments.In fact, he believes restraintis due not only because of nature'slack of intention, but also becauseof its functions: The environment is remarkably a special groupof soldiers like who are considered to be noncombatants. Just as [medical personneland religiousprofessionals] protectand fosterlife, the environment, if treated properly,makes possible and sustains life in the most basic way imaginable . . . [and] should be accorded the considerations we grant human nurturersand healers. (Drucker1989, 147) Despite his characterizationof the rule of noncombatant immunity as "an establishedpartof our moraltraditionand internationallaw,"Druckerhimself admitsthat it is often violated (1989, 146). Drucker'sargumentpresupposesthe just-warprinciple of proportionality, which requiresthat the benefits of going to war,and of particular strategiesor missions within war, must outweigh its harms. The proportionalityrequirement, like a principle of utility, allows him to consider ecological damage without necessarilytaking an absolutist stance against any military activity that resultsin ecological harmor manipulation.In other words,proportionality enables a step back from strict observance of noncombatant immunity. Drucker concludes that military ecological damage (damage to nonhuman noncombatants) must be weighed as one of a number of significant factors determining the justifiabilityof a military action, but that it is ultimately allowable and reasonableto cause damageto the environment in the service of just ends. Summingup his position, he writes: If we accept the view that the environmentand its inhabitants all have inherent worth, then we need to give genuine consideration to the well-being of all-plants, animals,and persons. In addition to exercising due care I think commandersshould take at least minimal riskswith their soldiers'lives to protect the environment. (Drucker1989, 151) Like Peach, Druckerbelieves that amendedjust-warcriteria are adequateto criticallyassessthe ethics of war. A telling aspect of Drucker's argumentis his illustrationof environmentally sound warfare,which I'll quote extensively to provide a sense of his goals concerning militaryimpact on the environment:

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The German army in World War II serves as an excellent historical precedent for the compatibility of highly effective trainingand realprotection of the environment.The Germans used garrisontrainingareasnear towns for as much individual training as possible. Their largertraining areas, used for unit maneuvers,were carefullymanaged.They were usuallylocated on land unsuitablefor agriculture; however, much of the land had to be cultivatedto preventfood shortages. These cultivated areashelped make the trainingmore realistic. ... Largetraining exercises were held in the fall to prevent damageto crops and soil erosion. Becausethey were forcedto train a very large army in a very small area, the Germans developed training methods which were gentle on the land. (Drucker1989, 142) Druckercompletely abstractsspecific martialdecisions and events fromother aspectsof the Nazi militarycampaignin WorldWarII, includingits underlying xenophobic, hypemationalist,and imperialistcore. He thereforesees German militarypracticesas environmentalist,ratherthan as pragmatic,logical extensions of a near-religiousglorification of the Fatherland,implemented by an destructivemilitary.But thinking of warthrough efficient and extraordinarily environmental ethics is not a matter of conceiving of militarypracticesthat are less destructive to a nation's own land and economy. How does the blitzkriegfit into the ethos Druckerdescribesabove? Drucker'sisolation of German militarydecisions and events in his ethical assessmentis enabledby the complete abstractionof these decisionsfromtheir contexts, and the ways in which they were shaped by pervasiveNazi militarism.An obvious dangerof this approachto the ethics of war is the fact that one can arguefavorablyfor ecologically sound warfare-clean wars-without attention to the connections among the technologies of war,the motivations for war, and the social contexts of war. Connections between Nazi "environmentalism," and contemporaneous German implementation of measures that includedgenocide shouldnot eugenic and "population-control" be passed over lightly in efforts to construct an environmental ethic that promotesthe flourishingof human, as well as nonhuman, life. Drucker'sview depends on sharp distinctions: between combatants and noncombatants, between war and peace. But both human and nonhuman noncombatantsare alwaysharmedor otherwise affected by militarism,even when they are not directlyharmedin battles. This simple truth was captured in a popularVietnamWareraantiwarposterthat read,"Waris not healthy for children and other living things."Becausenaturalnoncombatantsare everywhere; their destructionis necessaryfor war and for the existence of military institutions, even when wars are not explicitly being fought. The ecological for realitiesof war,and of what it takesto be prepared warin the contemporary

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world,aremind-boggling.To take natureat all seriouslyentails acknowledging the effects of combat as well as the severe harm caused by everydaymilitary practices. OF IMPACTS WAR THEECOLOGICAL William In ScorchedEarth: The Military'sAssault on the Environment, Thomas, a U.S. Navy veteran, illustratesthe extent to which the peacetime practicesof militaryinstitutionsdamagenaturalenvironmentsand communiwar ties. Thomas arguesthat even "peace"entails a dramaticand widespread on nature, or as Joni Seager puts it, "The environmental costs of militarized peace bear suspiciousresemblanceto the costs of war"(Thomas 1995, xi). All told, includingpeacetime activities as well as the immensedestruction caused by combat, military institutions probablypresent the most dramatic threat to ecological well-being on the planet. The military is the largest generatorof hazardouswaste in the United States, creating nearly a ton of toxic pollution every minute, and military analyst Jillian Skeel claims that, "Globalmilitaryactivity may be the largestworldwidepolluter and consumer of preciousresources" (quoted in Thomas 1995, 5). A conventionallypowered aircraftcarrierconsumes 150,000 gallons of fuel a day. In less than an hour's flight, a single jet launched from its flight deck consumes as much fuel as a North American motorist bums in two years. One F-16 jet engine requires nearly four and a half tons of scarce titanium, nickel, chromium,cobalt, and energy-intensivealuminum(Thomas 1995, 5), and nine percentof all the iron and steel used by humans is consumedby the global military (Thomas 1995, 16). The United States Department of Defense generates 500,000 tons of toxins annually,more than the world's five chemical companiescombined. top The military is the biggest single source of environmental pollution in the United States. Of 338 citations issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency in 1989, three-quarterswent to military installations (Thomas 1995, 17). The feminization,commodification,and devaluationof naturehelps create a reality in which its destructionin warfareis easily justified.In imaginingan ethic that addressesthese realities, feminists cannot neglect the extent to which militaryecocide is connected, conceptuallyand practically,to transnational capitalism and other forms of human oppression and exploitation. Virtuallyall of the world'sthirty-fivenuclear bomb test sites, as well as most radioactive dumpsand uraniummines, occupy Native lands (Thomas 1995, 6). Six multinationalscontrol one-quarterof all United States defense contracts (Thomas 1995, 10), and two million dollarsper minute is spent on the global military (Thomas 1995, 7). One could go on for volumes about the effects of chemical and nuclear testing, military-industrial development and

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waste, and the disruptionof wildlife, habitats,communities,and lifestylesthat are inescapablylinked to militarypractices. There are many conceptual and practical connections between military practicesin which humansaim to kill and harmeach other for some declared "greatergood," and nonmilitary practices in which we displace, destroy,or seriouslymodifynonhumancommunities,species,and ecosystemsin the name of human interests. An early illustrationof these connections was made by Rachel Carson in the first few pages of The SilentSpring (1962), in which she describedinsecticides as the inadvertent offspringof WorldWar II chemical weaponsresearch.We can now also traceways in which insecticideswere part of the Western-defined of that helped kill off global corporatization agriculture the small family farm and made the worldwide system of food production dependent on the likes of Dow Chemical and Monsanto. Militarypracticesare no differentfromother human practicesthat damage and irreparably modifynature.They are often a resultof cost-benefit analyses that pretend to weigh all likely outcomes yet do not consider nonhuman entities except in termsof their use value for humans and they nearly always create unforeseeableeffectsforhumansand nonhumans.In addition,everyday military peacetime practices are actually more destructive than most other human activities, they are directly enacted by state power,and, becausethey function as unquestioned "givens,"they enjoy a unique near-immunityto enactmentsof moralreproach.It is worthnoting the extent to which everyday military activities remain largely unscrutinizedby environmentalists,especially American environmentalists,largelybecausefear allows us to be fooled into thinking that "national security"is an adequate excuse for "ecological militarymayhem"(Thomas 1995, 16). If environmentaldestructionis a necessaryaspect of warand the peacetime practices of military institutions, an analysis of war which includes its the embeddednessin peacetimemilitarismis necessaryto address environmental effects of war.Such a perspectivemust pay adequateattention to what is requiredto preparefor war in a technological age, and how women and other Others are affected by the realities of contemporarymilitaryinstitutions and practices.
CONCLUSIONS AND CAUTIONS

Emphasizingthe ways in which war is a presence, a constant undertone, of white noise in the background social existence, moving sometimescloser to the foregroundof collective consciousness in the form of direct combat yet remaining mostly as an unconsidered given, allows for several promising analyses. To conclude, I will summarizefour distinct benefits of feminist philosophicalattention to the constancyof militarypresencein most everyday life. contemporary

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1) By considering the presence of war and militarism,philosophers and activists are able to engage in a more effective, local, textured,multiplicitous discussion of specific examples and issues of militarism, especially during "peacetime"(when most military activities occur). These include environmental effects,such as the recent Frenchdecision to engage in nucleartesting; and effects on conceptions of gender and on the lives of women, such as the twelve-year-oldJapanesegirl who was recently raped by American soldiers stationed in Okinawa. 2) Expandingthe field of vision when consideringthe ethical issuesof war allows us to better perceive and reflect upon the connections among various effects and causes of militarism,and between aspects of everydaymilitarism and militaryactivitiesthat generallyoccurbetween declarationsof warand the signing of peace treaties. 3) As Robin Schott emphasizes,focusingon the presence of war is particularly necessary given current realities of war, in an age in which military technology makeswar less temporally,conceptually,and physicallybounded, and in which civil conflict, guerillawars,ethnic wars,and urbanviolence in responseto worseningsocial conditions are the most common formsof largescale violence. 4) Finally,to returnto a point which I raisedearlier,it is my hope that a more presence-basedanalysis of war can be a tool for noticing and understanding other political and ethical issuesas presences,and not just events. In a recent article in The New Yorker, Henry LouisGates relaysthe following: "You'vegot to start with the families,"[Colin Powell] says of the crisisin the inner cities, "andthen you've got to fix education so these little bright-eyedfive-year-olds, who are innocent as the day is long and who know rightfromwrong,have all the education they need. And you have to do both these things simultaneously.It's like being able to support two military conflicts simultaneously." Military metaphors, the worn currency of political discoursein this country,take on a certain vitality when he deploys them. (Indeed, there are those who argue that much of the General'sallure stems from a sort of transpositionof realms."Ithink people arehungryfora military solution to inner-city problems,"the black law professorand activist PatriciaWilliams says.) (Gates 1995, 77) How (where?when?why?)are institutionsof law enforcementlike military institutions? How is the presumed constant need for personal protection experienced by some constructedsimilarlyto the necessity of national security? How does the constancy of militarism induce complacency toward or collaborationwith authoritativeviolence? Looking at these questions might help interestedpartiesfigureout how to create and sustainmovementsthat are

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about war,about violence, and attentive to local realities and particularities about the enmeshment of varioussystemsof oppression. It is of coursecrucialthat the analysisI recommendhere notice similarities, patterns,and connections without collapsing all formsand instances of miliviolence into one neat picture.It is also important tarismor of state-sponsored to emphasizethat an expanded conception of war is meant to disruptcrisisbasedpolitics that distractattention frommundane,everydayviolence that is rooted in injustice.Seeing the constant presenceof militarismdoes not require that middle-classand other privilegedAmericanssuddenlysee themselves as constantly under siege. It does requirethe development of abilities to notice the extent to which people and ecosystems can be severely under siege by militaryinstitutionsand values, even when peace seems present.

NOTES I would like to thank Bat-Ami Bar On, Claudia Card, Robin Schott, and other participantsof the InternationalAssociation of Women Philosophers'Symposiumon War in Vienna, Austria,for their helpful comments on an earlierversion of this paper. Thank you also to MariaLugones,whose incrediblyhelpful face-to-faceconversations with me concerning the ideas in this paper made me realizewhat a tragedyit is that philosophydepartmentsseldom house more than one feminist philosopher. 1. I certainlybelieve that the presence of war and armedconflicts varies greatly acrosshistoryand space. I also think that an expansive conception of war as presence might shed light on many differentexamplesof warfareand militarysocieties, and on the ways in which war is experienced as a presenceby soldiersas well as "noncombatants." 2. Of course,warsmight be other things too, and they certainlyresultfromother kinds of circumstances, ideologies,and institutions.My point here is that consideration of militaryconflict cannot neglect the variousformsand aspectsof oppressionembedded in warand militarism. 3. Peach does acknowledgethat "Elshtainalso criticizesthe way just-wartheory dichotomizes war and peace because it leads to a conception of peace as simply the absence of war ratherthan a 'chastenedpatriotism'which would restrainthinking in warist terms" (1994, 161). Note that this particularquestioning of the dichotomy between warand peace does little to unsettle assumptionsthat war is merelyan event.

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Cuomo, Christine J. 1992. Unravelling the problemsin ecofeminism. Environmental Ethics15(4): 351-63. for Drucker,MerritP. 1989. The militarycommander's responsibility the environment. Environmental Ethics11(3): 135-52. and Elshtain,Jean Bethke. 1987. Women war.New York:Basic Books. and senseof international Enloe, Cynthia. 1990. Bananas,beaches, bases:Making feminist politics.Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress. 25 Gates, Henry Louis. 1995. Powell and the black elite. The New Yorker, September. Griffin, Susan. 1989. Split culture. In Healingthe wounds:The promise ecofeminism, of ed. JudithPlant. Philadelphia:New Society Publishers. Grotius, Hugo. 1962. The law of warandpeace.Trans.FrancisW. Kelsey.Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril. King, Ynestra.1990. Healing the wounds:Feminism,ecology, and the nature/culture the dualism.In Reweaving world:The emergence ecofeminism, IreneDiamond ed. of and Gloria FemanOrenstein. San Francisco: SierraClub Books. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Mies, Maria, and Vandana Shiva. 1993. Ecofeminism. Books. ed. Nagel, Thomas. 1974. War and massacre.In Warand moralresponsibility, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Peach, Lucinda. 1994. An alternative to pacifism?Feminism and just-war theory. Hypatia9(2): 152-72. and Plumwood,Val. 1993. Feminism themastery nature.New York:RoutledgePress. of Towards politics peace.Boston:Beacon Press. a Ruddick,Sara.1989. Maternal thinking: of Schott, Robin. 1995. Gender and postmoder war.Hypatia11(4): xx-xx. earth:The military's assaulton theenvironment. PhilaThomas, William. 1995. Scorched delphia:New Society Press. Walzer,Michael. 1977. Justandunjustwars.New York:BasicBooks. Warren,Karen. 1990. The power and promise of ecological feminism. Environmental Ethics12(3): 125-46.

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