Tanada vs Tuvera GR no.

L-63915 (Apr 24, 1985) Facts: Petitioners seek to compel the publication of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamation, executive orders, letters of implementation, and administrative orders through a writ of mandamus. Held: General rule is that writ of mandamus can be invoked by a private person only when he has a private of particular interest to be subserved, or a right to be protected, which right is independent of that which he holds with the public. EXCEPTION is when the question is one of public right and the mandamus is intended to procure enforcement of a public duty, in which case, the people are considered as the real parties in interest. Publication is necessary to inform the people of the existence of laws under which they are to be bound. Failure to do so takes away the basis for application of ignorantia legis non excusat. It is the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern. Presidential issuances that apply to the general public and provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for their violation must be published. Those that apply only to particular persons or a class thereof need not be published. People of the Philippines vs. Que Po Lay GR no. L-6791 March 29, 1954 Facts: Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange amounting to about 7000 USD. He failed to sell the same to the Central Bank within one day following their receipt, which was a violation of the requirement of Circular no. 20. The circular was issued in 1949 but was not published until November 1951, which was 3 months after Que Po Lays conviction of its violation. Held: Circular no. 2 was not binding at the time Que Po Lay failed to sell the foreign exchange he possessed in pursuant thereof.

Even though Central Bank circular no. 2 is not a statute, it has the force and effect of law, it binding the public to its provisions and it providing penalties for their violation. Phil. Intl Trading Corp. Vs. Judge Angeles; Remington; and Firestone GR no. 108461 (Oct 21, 1996) Facts: PITC is a branch of the DTI with the function of regulating imports and exports. It required in AO no. SOCPEC 89-08-01 that RP application for import of goods from PROC should be balanced by an export of Philippine products of equal value. When Remington and Firestone failed to adhere to the export of Philippine products requirement, their applications to import from PROC were subsequently denied by PTIC. However, when a new trade agreement was entered into between RP and PROC encouraging liberalization of trade, the DTI was directed to cease the implementation of SOCPEC. Thereafter, PTIC did away with the trade balancing requirement and allowed respondents to import anew from PROC. The lower courts held that PTICs authority to process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations has already been repealed by EO 133 (Feb 27, 1987). The constitutionality of SOCPEC is also assailed. Held: EO 133 did not repeal PTICs authority to issue rules and regulations. There is no indication of the removal of PTICs regulatory functions. While it does not grant regulatory power, EO 133 is also silent as to the abolition or limitation of such powers. The general repealing clause in EO 133 does not hold in the case at bar, there being no repeal absent irreconcilable inconsistency [relating to PTICs regulatory powers]. In sum, PTIC derives its authority from the DTI (which was granted quasi-legislative powers), of which it is an implementing arm. The AO, however, while issued in valid exercise of authority, is invalid for violation of the publishing requirement under Art. 2 of the Civil Code. The original AO being issued on Aug 30, 1989, and its amendments filed in the UP Law Center, and published in the National Administrative Register only on March 30, 1992, the respondents are not bound by

the said AO, their application to import having been filed before march 30, 1992. Quoting Tanada vs Tuvera: ...Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Roy vs. CA GR no. 80718 (Jan 29, 1988) Facts: Petitioners firewall collapsed and destroyed the neighbouring tailoring shop owned by respondents, resulting in physical injuries and death. The RTC found petitioners guilty of negligence and awarded damages accordingly, which decision was echoed by the CA. On the last day to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the basis of a 1985 jurisprudence that the 15-day period to file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. On August 30, 1986, the SC resolution clarifying the matter was enforced. Held: Petitioners motion was filed on September 9, 1987. It is no longer covered by the grace period running from June 30August 30, 1986. SC decisions do not have to be published in the Official Gazette for them to be binding and effective. It is Counsels duty to keep informed on the recent developments in the judiciary. Mun. Govt of Coron vs. Carino GR no. L-65894 (Sept 24, 1987) Facts: Then Pres Marcos directed the mayor of Coron to clear a certain space the government then needed. The clearing of that space would require the demolishment of respondents structures. The case was brought to court. After a series of

postponements, a date for the final hearing was set, during which respondents and their counsel failed to appear. Upon petitioners motion that respondents failure to appear be construed as a waiver of their right to cross-examine petitioners witnesses and to present evidence, the case was submitted for decision. Respondents appealed but failed to submit the required printed copies of their record on appeal. Respondents also failed to act on the appellate courts directive to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed. The resolution dismissing respondents appeal became final and executory on September 27, 1982, and a writ of execution issued on February 1, 1983. BP 129 (Sec. 39): No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal... Interim of Rules of Court promulgated on Jan 11, 1983 (Secs. 18): ...the filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with... (Sec. 19b): ...In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be 30 days, a record of appeal being required. In a supplemental motion dated April 12, 1983, respondents maintained that since, under the present law, printed records on appeal are no longer required, the rule on technicalities should be relaxed and their right to appeal upheld. On July 29, 1983, the appellate court issued a resolution seeking to revive the case. Held: The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law. Quoting Alday vs. Camilon, Statues regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural rules are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. Benzonan vs. CA GR no. 97973 (Jan 27, 1992) DBP vs CA and Pe GR no. 97998 (Jan 27, 1992) Facts:

Pe obtained a parcel of land through Free Patent issued on Oct 29, 1969. He mortgaged the land to secure a commercial loan, the proceeds of which he used to build improvements upon the land. Upon failure to pay back his loan, DBP foreclosed the mortgage on June 28, 1977 and was the highest bidder. The certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds on Jan 24, 1978. Pe leased the lot and its improvements from DBP but failed to redeem it within the one year period. DBP then sold the lot to spouses Benzonan on Sept 24, 1979. On July 12, 1983, Pe offered to repurchase the land from DBP. Upon denial, he filed a complaint for repurchase under Sec 119 of CA 141. RTC and CA upon appeal both affirmed that the land should be reconveyed to Pe. Spouses Benzonan raised the issue of when to count the five-year period for repurchase from date of foreclosure sale or from expiration of one year period to redeem foreclosed property? Section 119 of CA 141 provides: Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provision, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance. In the Mongan and Tupas cases prevailing at the time the lot was mortgaged, acquired in a foreclosure sale, and sold subsequently to the Benzonan spouses, it was held that the five-year period should be counted from the date of the foreclosure sale. Reversing this decision was the Bellisiano case (1988) which held that the five-year period should be counted from the day after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure. Held: Monge and Tupas cases hold in the instant case for when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. People vs. Pimentel GR no. 100210 (Apr 1, 1998) Facts:

In 1983, Antonio Tujan was charged with subversion under RA 1700. A warrant of arrest was issued but not served because he could not be found. On June 5, 1990, Tujan was arrested on basis of the 1983 warrant. During the arrest, he was discovered to have in his possession firearms and ammunition and was subsequently charged with Illegal possession of Firearms and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under PD 1866. Tujan filed motion invoking his right to a preliminary investigation, but during the hearing, his counsel withdrew the same, stating his intention to file a motion to quash on ground of double jeopardy. The same motion was granted insofar as subversion is concerned without prejudice to the prosecution for Illegal Possession of firearms. Held: At the time of Tujans arrest, the prevailing laws were PD 1866, which punished the illegal possession of firearms and makes the violation, when done in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with, the crime of rebellion, insurrection, or subversion, a qualifying circumstance to increase penalty to death; and RA 1700, which penalizes any person who knowingly, wilfully, and by overt act affiliates with, becomes or remains a member of a subversive association or organization. No double jeopardy was found because Tujan was arrested for two different offenses springing from two different laws. The effectivity of RA 7636 on September 22, 1992 totally repealed RA 1700 while the present petition was pending in the SC; and on June 6, 1997, RA 8294 amended PD 1866 to the effect that violation thereof becomes bailable and the death penalty was replaced by 4 years 2 months 1 day to 6 years imprisonment and a fine of 15,000. Amending laws were held to have a retroactive effect because (1) they are favourable to the accused (2) who is not a habitual offender. The charge of subversion, now decriminalized, should be dismissed, and the penalty under RA 8294 applied to the illegal possession charge. Aguillon vs. Director of Lands Facts: Held:

People vs. Patalin GR no. 125539 (July 27, 1999) Facts: Respondents were found guilty of robbery with multiple rape and were sentenced to death by the RTC. At the time of the commission of the crimes (1984) robbery with rape was punishable by death. However, the ratification of the 1987 Constitution caused the death penalty to be abolished with the qualifier that Congress may thereafter provide for it for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. On January 1, 1994, Congress restored death penalty by virtue of RA no. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law. When the 1987 Constitution immediately took effect upon its ratification, the case was still in its trial stage. Held: The constitutional provision abolishing death penalty obviously intended to give it a retroactive effect with the clause ...any death penalty imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Since the retroactivity of a penal provision can be made effective during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution (1-commission of the crime and start of the prosecution; 2-sentence has been passed but service not yet begun; and 3-sentence is being carried out), the death sentence meted in the present case shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Also, the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested (in this case, the accuseds rights to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty). [Hence] the rule that all statues are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. Cui vs. Arellano University GR no. L-15127 (May 30, 1961) Facts: Cui was a scholar of Arellano University. As a condition of his scholarship grant, he was made to sign a

contract waiving his right to transfer to another school without refunding Arellano the equivalent of his scholarship in cash. He studied in Arellano until the first semester of his fourth year whereupon he transferred to Abad Santos University and finished his law course there. In order to take the bar exam, he needed the transcripts of his records from Arellano, which were released only after he had paid the monetary equivalent of the tuition fees refunded to him by virtue of the scholarship grant. On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, where in was stated that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to [these] scholarships should not be subsequently charges to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Cui asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue of his right to secure his transcripts without need of refunding Arellano. The Bureau upheld his position and advised Arellano, who, nonetheless, refused to issue the transcripts without refund. Arellano questioned the validity of the Memorandum, holding that it was not a law; that the provisions are advisory, not mandatory; that the Director of Private Schools had no authority to issue it and that, further, it has not been approved by the corresponding department head not published in the Official Gazette. Held: The SC did not find it necessary to pass upon the validity of the Memorandum since it found the disputed clause in the contract to be contrary to public policy; hence, null and void, since the main purpose of awarding scholarships is to reward merit or to aid gifted students, not to attract and keep them in school for the schools private propaganda. Leal vs. IAC GR no. L-65425 (Nov 5, 1987) Facts: On March 21, 1941, a compraventa was entered into between Vicente and Luis Santiago and Cirilio Leal, involving three parcels of land. Therein was contained the phrase (orig in Spanish) they shall not sell to others these three lots but only to the seller Vicente Santiago or to his heirs or successors, referring to Cirilio Leals heirs.

When Cirilio died in 1959, his children inherited the subject lands, which they then either mortgaged or leased. Vicente Santiago approached the Leals and offered to repurchase the properties, but was refused. His complaint for specific performance was dismissed by both the trial court and the IAC, there being no sale or alienation equivalent to a sale yet. Later on, however, the IAC reversed its decision, ordering the Leals to accept the offer of repurchase. The issue now raised is whether the clause gives Santiago a right of repurchase. Held: Provisions that restrict the right of ownership, indefinite as to time, are null as being against public order, under Art 1255 of the Civil Code of Spain and Art 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Even assuming the validity of the provision, the law requires the vendor to reserve his right to repurchase the thing sold in no uncertain terms, in order for a conventional redemption to take place. There was no such reservation, express or implied, in the compraventa. Furthermore, the phrase en caso de venta should be construed to mean should the buyers wish to sell and not the buyers should sell, in which case, Art 1508 of the Civil code of Spain (Art 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines), applies, wherein is stated that the right to redeem of repurchase in the absence of an agreement as to time, shall last four years from the date of the contract. Repurchase under this should have been done in 1945. Assuming again that the phrase siempre y cuando estos ultimos puden hacer de compra (when the buyer has money to buy) can be construed to be an agreement as to time, the second paragraph of the same Articles provide that the right should exercised within ten years because the law does not favour suspended ownership. In this second case, Santiagos right to repurchase has already expired, 1966 being 25 years from the date of contract.

property, as well of her fathers who was senile at that time. Upon the death of Juan, his illegitimate children petitioned for administration of his estate, which was opposed by Rosalia. The parties entered into and executed a compromise agreement wherein they agreed to divide the enumerated properties of Juan. Item (8) of the same agreement stated that the Sanchezes absolutely and irrevocably waive all their rights, interests, and shares in the property in favour of Rosalia, who was later named administratrix of her fathers estate. In 1970, Rosalia and the Sanchezes entered into and executed a memorandum of agreement modifying the compromise agreement. However, in 1979, the Sanchezes filed a motion to defer the approval of the compromise agreement, praying for its annulment on ground of fraud. Issues raised were (1) the propriety of certiorari as a remedy, (2) the validity of the compromise agreement, and (3) the presence of fraud in the execution of the compromise and/or collation of the properties sold [to Rosalias children by Juan and Maria during their lifetime]. Held: Certiorari was the proper remedy because the lower courts exceeded its jurisdiction when, being only a probate court, it adjudicated on the title to properties when all it had power to do was to determine whether the disputed properties should be included in the inventory to be administered. The compromise agreement and all the waivers therein contained were binding. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Hence, judicial approval is not required for its perfection. In the present case, however, the so-called compromise agreement actually partakes more of the nature of a deed of partition. But since all its requisites are present (1-no will left by decedent; 2-no debt or all debts settled; 3heirs and liquidators all of age or duly represented if minors; and 4-partition done through public instrument of affidavit duly filed with the register of Deeds) the compromise agreement/partition is valid. The contested waiver is also deemed valid because the heirs waived a known and existing interest (their hereditary right vested in them by the death of their father). Furthermore, there is not legal obstacle to an heirs waiver of his/her hereditary share even if the actual extent of such

Sanchez vs. CA and Lugod GR no. 108947 (Sept 29, 1997) Facts: Spouses Juan and Maria begot an only child, Rosalia. Maria died first. Rosalia was named adminitratrix of her

share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. The Sanchezes have also already availed themselves of the benefits of the compromise. They are thus barred by judicial principle from asking for a recission of a compromise after enjoying their benefits. Compromise entered into and carried out in good faith will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact.. Finally, with regards the alleged fraud, there was no sufficient evidence proving the same. It cannot be presumed. Even arguing to the contrary, the alleged errors and deficiencies regarding the delivery of shares, concealment of properties and fraud are questions of fact not reviewable by the SC. Allied Banking Corp vs CA GR no. 123871 (Aug 31, 1998) Facts: Two crossed checks drawn against Allied in favour of Meszellen were deposited with the ComTrust. The checks were cleared through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) and then the proceeds thereof were paid by Allied to ComTrust. Allied was later sued by Meszellen who alleged that payment had been made by somebody else. Almost ten years later, Allied filed a third party complaint against BPI, successor-in-interest of ComTrust, for reimbursement in the event that it would be judged liable in the main case to pay Mezellen. Central issue was whether trial court had authority to admit a third party complaint filed by one bank against another involving a check cleared through PCHC. Held: Trial court had no such authority. PCHC rules and regulations hold that disputes between two or more clearing participants involving items cleared through PCHC should be submitted to the Arbitration Committee without prejudice to recourse to the courts in case of an adverse decision. A banks participation in the clearing operations of PCHC is deemed its written and subscribed consent to the binding effect of the arbitration agreement. The doctrine that a trial court that has jurisdiction over the main action also had jurisdiction over the third party complaint, even if said court would have none of that jurisdiction had the third party complaint been filed as an

independent actions admits of an exception in the case of banks that have given written and subscribed consent to arbitration under PCHC. Third party complaint is merely a procedural device allowed when the court so permits. Valenzuela hardwood vs. CA and Seven Brothers GR no. 102316 (June 30, 1997) Facts: Valenzuela entered into an agreement with Seven Brothers for the latter to ship its logs to Manila as a private carrier. The same were insured with South Sea Surety and Insurance Co. The Seven Brothers ship sank, resulting in the loss of Vvalenzuelas logs, which sinking was due to the negligence of the captain. Seven Brothers maintained that it was not liable for the loss because of stipulation in the charter party exempting the ship owner from liability in case of loss. The validity of the clause exempting Seven Brothers from liability is assailed. Held: The invalidity of contractual stipulations stating that ship owners shall not be liable for loss even due to the negligence of his employees/agents is applicable only for common carriers, in which case the stipulation is invalidated for being contrary to public policy. The same is, however, not true for private carriers whose contracts are not contracts of adhesion but one wherein both parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations. In the latter case, such stipulations shall be binding upon them. Whatever rights Valenzuela had under Articles 586 and 587 of the Code of Commerce it waived when it entered into the charter party wherein obligation to bear the loss was shifted to it. Pleasantville Devt Corp vs Ca, et al. GR no. 79688 (Feb 1, 1996) Facts: Jardinico bought vacant subdivision Lot 9 and later discovered that improvements have been introduced to it by Kee. Kee bought Lot 8 from C.T. Torres Enterprises (CTTE), the exclusive real estate agent of Pleasantville. However,

CTTEs employee, instead of pointing out Lot 8, pointed out Lot 9, which Kee relied upon. The issues raised are (1) whether Kee was a builder in good faith; (2) the liability, if any, of Pleasantville and CTTE. Held: Kee is a builder in good faith. He applied and paid for a relocation of the lot as well the lot plan of the subdivision and, accompanied by CTTEs employee, set out to survey the lot he bought. The steps he had taken to protect his interests were reasonable. Pleasantvilles contention that Kee cannot claim the erroneous pointing out of the lot to him because of the provision in the Contract of Sale on Installment stating that the vendee has personally examined or inspected the property as to its location, contours, as well as the natural condition of the lots and...expenses for fillings (should the vendee wish it) owing to consequential changes due to erosion should be borne by the vendee should not be construed to man that Kee contracted away his right to recover damages resulting from Pleasantvilles negligence, since the same provision refers only to shouldering of expenses due to change from erosion. Pleasantville is to be liable for the negligence of its agent. The principal must still be responsible for acts done by its agent within the scope of that latters authority, and should bear damages caused to third persons. The agent who exceeded his authority, however, may be personally liable for the damage. Thus, Pleasantville and CTTE are solidarily liable for damages due to negligence. People vs Veneracion GR no. (Oct 12, 1995) Facts: Held:

Facts: Honoration Catindig adopted his illegitimate daughter. As a consequence of which, her name was changed to Stephanie Nathy Catindig. The issue on the childs middle name, however, was untouched, so Catindig petitioned that she be allowed to use her mothers surname of Garcia as a middle name. Issue raised is whether a child adopted by her natural father may use the surname of her mother as her middle name. Held: The law is silent as to what middle name an adopted natural child may use. The Civil Code and Family Law Committees, however, agreed that the initial or surname of the mother shall immediately precede the surname of the father, which is the established Filipino way. Furthermore, adoption statues should be liberally construed in favour of adoption. Therefore, it was held that there being no law expressly prohibiting the adopted natural childs use of her mothers surname as a middle name, it is allowed. Van Dorn vs Romillo GR no. 68470 (Oct 8, 1985) Facts: Reyes-van Dorn is a Filipino citizen while Upton is an American. They were married in Hong Kong and later absolutely divorced in Nevada, the court there having obtained jurisdiction over both parties. Upton later filed suit against Reyes-van Dorn alleging that, since divorce decrees obtained abroad are not binding in the Philippines, her shop in Manila is still considered their conjugal property and that he should be declared to have the right to manage it also. Explicitly stated in Uptons Power of Attorney executed in Nevada, he stated that his [then] spouse sought divorce, that there is neither community property nor community obligations to be adjudicated by court. Issue raised is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines. Held: Upton, being an American citizen, is bound by the divorce decree obtained in his country. The same is

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia Honoration B. Catindig GR no. 148311 (March 31, 2005)

recognized in the Philippines, he being an alien. Thus, according to his national law, he is no longer the husband of Reyes-van Dorn and therefore bereft of the standing to sue as her husband. The decision of his countrys court (which validly obtained jurisdiction over him) binding upon him, and which he does not repudiate, estoppes him from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. [Note: non-binding of divorce decree upon Filipino citizens applies only insofar as remarriage is concerned?] Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, et al. GR no. 80116 (June 30, 1999) Facts: Pilapil and Geiling were married and absolutely divorced in Germany, the divorce decree made by a court locally and internationally competent for divorce proceedings and that the dissolution of the marriage was legally founded upon and authorized by the law of that foreign jurisdiction. After the decree of divorce, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery against Pilapil. The same were raised to the Office of the secretary of Justice. Issue raised as to whether the charge for adultery may be filed by one who is no longer a spouse at the time of filing the same. Held: American jurisprudence was resorted to wherein was ruled that in cases where statue provides that the innocent spouse has the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery, such innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the guilty spouse after a divorce has been decreed. Even in Philippine law, a charge for adultery must be initiated by the offended spouse who has the status, capacity, or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. The reason for this is that the charge of adultery is allowed because the innocent spouse has a family or marriage to protect, or is interested in preventing the introduction of spurious heirs into the family. After the dissolution of a marriage, that reason naturally disappears. Llorente vs CA GR no. 124371 (Nov 23, 2000)

Facts:

Lorenzo was a US serviceman who married Paula. In 1943 he was granted US citizenship. When he returned from the US he discovered that Paula was having an illicit affair and was pregnant. Lorenzo returned to the US where he filed for, and was granted, a [absolute] divorce effective 1952. He later married Alicia and had three children all surnamed Llorente, with her during their 25-year marriage. Alicia did not know of Lorenzos first marriage. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a last will and testament bequeathing all his properties to Alicia and their three children. The will was admitted to probate by the trial court, but Lorenzo died before the proceedings could be terminated. Paula then filed for letters of administration over Lorenzos property, contending that she was his surviving spouse and, therefore, compulsory heir; that the property in his will were acquired during their marriage; and that Lorenzos bequeathment encroached upon her legitime and share in the conjugal property. Issues raised as to the validity of Lorennzos divorce in the Philippines, and, subsequently, as to who should inherit from him. Held: Since Lorenzo was an American citizen at the time of his divorce from Paula, marriage to Alicia, execution of his will, and death, the same should all be governed by applicable foreign law. Paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Civil Code was cited: ...intestate and testamentary succession...shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. Lorenzos will, executed in the Philippines according to the formalities required under Philippine law and admitted to probate by the local court, is declared extrinsically valid. The intrinsic validity of the provisions thereon are left to the determination of the applicable foreign law. The divorce obtained by Lorenzo was also declared valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Garcia vs. Recio GR no. 138322 (Oct 2, 2001) Facts:

Recio was a Filipino citizen when he married Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. Their marriage was subsequently dissolved by a divorce decree issued by an Australian family court. In 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and in 1994 married Garcia, a Filipino citizen. They began living separately in 1995, and their conjugal assets in 1996 were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. In 1998 Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, alleging the existence of a subsisting marriage at the time Recio married her. Recio was later able to secure a divorce decree in Australia dissolving his marriage to Garcia, and prayed that the complaint be dissolved on the ground that it stated no cause of action. Issues raised were (1) whether the fist divorce was proven, and (2) whether Recio was proven to be legally capacitated to marry Garcia. Held: There are two kinds of divorce: (1) absolute divorce (vinculo matrimonii) that terminates the marriage; and (2) limited divorce (mensa et thoro) that suspends the marriage but leaves the bond in full force. The Australian divorce decree Recio presented contained the restriction that A party to a marriage who married again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy. From this it can be concluded that Recio obtained a limited divorce that did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Furthermore, Recios failure to present a certificate establishing his legal capacity to remarry prevents the court from concluding that he was legally capacitated to remarry. The trial court erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed Recio with legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to present evidence regarding Australian personal law governing his status, or at least proving his legal capacity to remarry. However, neither can Garcias petition to declare her marriage null and void on ground of bigamy be granted because Recio may, after all, turn out to be capacitated to remarry under Australian law. The case should therefore be remanded to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, showing Recios legal capacity to marry petitioner. Only upon

failure of that can the marriage be declared null and void on the ground of bigamy. The court also ruled that divorce is a question of fact that must be proved by the one alleging it as a defense before it can be admitted in evidence. A writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and (b) authenticated by seal of his office. Although insufficient with regards to the above requirements, the divorce decree between Recio and his first wife Samson was admitted as evidence due to Garias failure to properly object to its admissibility. Roehr vs. Rodriguez GR no. 142820 (Jun 30, 2003) Facts: Roehr and Rodriguez were married in Hamburg, Germany, and then had their marriage subsequently ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Rodriguez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, to which Roehr filed a motion to dismiss. The latter was denied by the trial court. Roehr meanwhile obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese wherein custody of both their children was granted to him through summary proceedings. Records remain unclear as to Rodriguezs participation in the proceedings. The decree of divorce was recognized by the RTC when it endowed Roehr the capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Issue raised as to the effects of the divorce decree, especially on custody. Held: A foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as the foreign spouse is concerned in view of the nationality principle in Philippine civil law on status of persons, provided that such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.

However, legal effects as to custody, care, and support of the children must still be determined by Philippine courts. Before res judicata can be given to a foreign judgment, there must be sufficient proof that the parties opposed to such foreign judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so (ie. may repel such judgment by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact). Also, with respect to actions in personam, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of a partys claim, and is subject to proof to the contrary. Republic vs. Crasus L. Iyoy GR no. 152577 (Sept 21, 2005) Facts: Crasus married Fely and had five children with her. In 1984, Fely left for the US, leaving their children with Crasus. She sent divorce papers to Crasus not long after, around which time Crasus also learned that she was married to an American and bore a child with him. Fely returned to the Philippines on several occasions, flaunting her American family and American last name. She claimed to have become an American citizen in 1988. Crasus filed for declaration of nullity of marriage in 1997 under grounds of psychological incapacity. Issues raised as to the continued validity of the marriage between Crasus and Fely. Held: Quoting Santos vs cA, psychological incapacity was defined as a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly [in]cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage...[including] their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. Psychological incapacity should be characterized by: (1) Gravity must be so serious that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (2) Juridical antecedence must be existing before the marriage although the overt manifestations may emerge only thereafter;

(3) Incurability either incurable, or the cure must be beyond the means of the party involved. In republic vs. CA and Molina: (1) Burden of proof to show nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favour of the validity of marriage; (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) Medically or clinically identified, (b) Alleged in the complaint, (c) Sufficiently proven by experts (d) Clearly explained in the decision (e) Incapacity must be psychological, although manifestations may be physical (3) Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of celebration of the marriage, or prior thereto, even though manifestations need not be perceivable at such time; (4) Incapacity must be medically or clinically incurable; may be absolute or only in regard to the other spouse; and must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations; (5) Such must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) Affected marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68-71 and 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code; (7) Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines, while not controlling nor decisive, to be given great respect by the courts; (8) Trial court must order appearance of prosecuting attorney or fiscal and SolGen as counsel for the State. No decision shall be handed down without SolGen certification stating his reasons for approval or opposition to the petition. (9) (from Marcos vs Marcos) there is no requirement for the respondent spouse to be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for declaration of nullity based on psychological incapacity. Such incapacity, however, must be established by evidence during trial.

As to the divorce allegedly obtained by Fely, it was ruled invalid for Fely was a Filipino citizen at the time she filed for divorce. Thus, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity. Since Philippine laws do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses, the divorce she obtained couldnt have been valid. The marriage between parties continues to exist. Republic vs Orbecido III GR no. 154380 (Oct 5, 2005) Facts: At the time of marriage, Orbecido and his wife were both Filipino citizens. The wife went to America, became a naturalized citizen, obtained a divorce decree, and married an American instead. Orbecido is petitioning that the court grant him the capacity to remarry under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code that recognizes a divorce obtained by an alien spouse abroad. Issue raised as to whether said Article 26 also covers cases wherein both parties were Filipinos at the time of celebration of marriage. Held: Orbecido should be considered capacitated to remarry. The legislative intention behind Article 26 was to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse is still considered married to an alien spouse who is no longer considered married to him by virtue of a divorce decree obtained abroad. Jurisprudence cited was Quita vs CA wherein the court hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. These, however, must be proven s that Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity to remarry: (1) Naturalization of the alien spouse; (2) Fact of the divorce and its conformity to the foreign law allowing it; (3) The fact of such foreign law; and

(4) That under such foreign law, the alien spouse is also capacitated to remarry. Cebu Country Club vs. Elizagaque GR no. 160273 (Jan 18, 2008) Facts: San Miguel Corp, a special company proprietary member of CCCI, designated Elizagaque as a special nonproprietary member, which was approved by CCCIs BOD. Elizagaque later filed an applicationfor proprietary membership, purchased proprietary shares and was issued a Proprietary Ownership Certificate. The application was disapproved, prompting Elizagaque to write several letters of reconsideration and inquiry as to the status of his application. No reply was made by the BOD. Elizagaque filed for damages. Held: CCCIs BOD members are liable for damages under the principle of abuse of rights. They failed to print the amended procedure (amended 20 years ago) for admission to the Eligible-For-Membership list on the application form filled out by Elizagaque. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Damnum absque injuria doesnt apply in abuse of rights. RCPI vs. CA GR no. 79578 (March 13, 1991) Facts: Spouses Timan sent a telegram of condolence through RCPI. The telegram, however, was typed on a Happy Birthday card and placed inside a Christmasgram envelope. Spouses sued for damages. Held:

RCPI is guilty of gross negligence, wanton misconduct, and breach of contract. The Timan spouses chose to send the telegram through a social form which provides for an especially decorated form and envelope, and for which they paid a premium. RCPIs excuse that it ran out of condolence cards and envelopes is untenable, for it could have delivered the message in ordinary form and reimbursed the difference of costs. In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be awarded if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Gross carelessness or negligence constitutes wanton misconduct, which misconduct, performed by RCPI employees, must hold the company liable, for punitive damages may be recovered for wilful or wantonly negligent acts in respect of messages, even though those acts are neither authorized nor ratified. Meralco vs CA GR no. L-39019 (Jan 22, 1988) Facts: The Chaves family was a customer of Meralco. They were presented with two overdue bills by Yambao, a Meralco bill collector, who was told that the bills would be paid at the Meralco head office. One of the bills was thus paid on April 2, 1965, but the other was not. Past 2:30 pm on April 21, 1965, the electricity was cut off in the Chaves residence. The following day, the second bill was paid and the electric service restored. Chaves family sued for damages arising from failure of Meralco to give the required notice of disconnection before it cut off their electrical service. Held: Meralco has the absolute right to disconnect the electrical service of a delinquent customer, but it should give a written notice of disconnection 48 hours in advance. Furthermore, under Revised Order no. 1 of the Public Service Commission, disconnections shall not be made after 2 pm of any working day, amongst other qualifications. Failure to give such notice amounts to a[n independent] tort as the prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering...This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code...

Meralcos reliance on the clean hands doctrine (he who comes to court in demand of equity must come with clean hands) also finds no application. At most, it can be considered a mitigating circumstance in ascertaining the amount for damages. Garciano vs. CA GR no. 96126 (Aug 10, 1992) Facts: Garciano is a teacher at ICI. She filed for an indefinite leave of absence, which was approved by the BOD President. Before the opening of the following school year, the school principal, through Garcianos husband, wrote her that her services were being terminated by the schools founder, Fr. Wiertz, concurred in by the PTA, because of (1) absence of a written contract of employment due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) difficulty of getting a substitute teacher for her on temporary basis since no one would accept the post without a contract. Upon her return, Garciano received a letter signed by the BOD, with the exception of Fr. Wiertz, reinstating her to her duties and invalidating previous letters of termination for not being approved by the BOD. Six of nine members of the BOD later resigned because of the ICI facultys acid reaction to the reinstatement of Garciano. Garciano sued for damages, discrimination, and unjust and illegal dismissal. Held: There was no termination in the first place, the letter purportedly terminating her services being null and void for being invalid. Hence, Garcianos failure to report for work even after receiving the BODs letter should be construed as voluntary desistance from her teaching job, from which she is not entitled to recover damages. Furthermore, there is no evidence showing that the members of the faculty she impleaded [physically] prevented her from reporting for work. Their threat to resign en masse does not make them liable for damages, for it was simply an exercise of their right of free speech to dissent from the BODs decision. It was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, or public policy. Volenti non fit injuria. Article 21 should also be construed as granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who are not

themselves at fault (clean hands doctrine). This was not the case at present. Garciano could be faulted for her indefinite leave of absence and failure to report back in time for regular opening of class, her refusal to sign a written contract of employment, and her ignoring the BODs order for her to report to duty. Bunag, Jr. Vs. CA GR no. 101749 (July 10, 1992) Facts: Bunag and Cirilo were sweethearts who had a fallingout. Bunag, abducted Cirilo, raped her, and thereafter promised to marry her. They cohabited in the house of Bunags grandmother for 21 days, during which they filed their respective applications for marriage license, only for Bunag to later file an affidavit withdrawing his application for the marriage license. Cirilo sued for damages based on breach of promise to marry. The criminal case against Bunag was dismissed by resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. Held: Breach of promise to marry is generally not actionable, per se, except when plaintiff has already incurred expense for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. However, moral damages are allowed in specified cases or in those analogous to Article 2219, paragraph 10. Article 21 also allows for damages to be collected from one who causes loss or injury to another in a way contrary to good morals, good customs, or public policy. In the present case, the SC stuck to the factual findings of the CA, where Bunag was found guilty of abduction with rape. The dismissal of the criminal case does not preclude an action for civil liability, for there was no declaration in final judgment that the fact from which the civil case arises did not exist. Criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Hence, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist.

Finally, in Rillon, et al, vs Rillon, it was held no longer necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favour of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment. This is owing to the difference in quantum of evidence required. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA and Gonzales GR no. 97336 (Feb 19, 1993) Facts: Gonzales and Baksh became sweethearts, after which the latter proposed to her. He went to meet with her parents to ask for her hand. They later began to live together, during which time Gonzales surrendered her virginity to him. Baksh, however, began maltreating Gonzales. Yet still she continued to remind him of his promise to marry her. Eventually, Baksh said he couldnt marry her because he was already married to another girl. Gonzales left him and upon consultation with her lawyer, sought the help of the barangay, which sent tanods to try to convince Baksh to keep his promise to marry Gonzales. He continued to refuse. Sole issue is whether or not Baksh is liable for damages under Article 21. Held: The court adheres to the factual findings of the lower court, for only questions of law can be raised on appeal to it except when: (1) Conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures (2) inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible (3) there is grave abuse of discretion (4) judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (5) findings of fact are conflicting (6) CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, which are contrary to the admissions of both parties (7) CA findings are contrary to that of the trial courts (8) findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence upon which they are based (9) facts set forth in the petition as well as in petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondents

Finding of fact of the CA is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record. Article 21 has the purpose of expanding the concept of quasi-delicts, which are acts or omissions that cause damage to another, there being fault or negligence nor preexisting contractual relations between the parties, but which give rise to an obligation to pay for the damage done. In Spanish, these are culpa aquiliana (civil law concept). In Anglo-American common law concept, these are torts and cover assault and battery, false imprisonment, and deceit. Although breach of promise to marry is generally not actionable, the law admits of exception where there is seduction and where preparations for the wedding have already been done. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of said promise or inducement... In other words, if the CAUSE is the promise to marry, and the EFFECT is carnal knowledge, there is a chance of the existence of criminal or moral seduction...if it is the other way around, mutual lust is [considered to have] intervened. Moral damages may be recovered in the former, but not in the latter. Lastly, Bakkshs contention that Gonzales cannot recover damages because she was in pari delicto for allegedly receiving his love because of her desire for economic security is unaccepted. Pari delicto requires equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault. At fault, she can only be considered to be in delicto. The principle is: Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud. Loreta Serrano vs CA GR no. 45125 (April 22, 1991) Facts: Ribaya sold Serrano pieces of jewellery which the latter sent her private secretary Rocco to pawn to Long Life Pawnshop. The pawnshop ticket issued stipulated that it was redeemable on presentation by the bearer. Rocco disappeared with the loan.

(10)

Three months later, Ribaya was informed that a pawnshop ticket issued by Long Life was for sale, which ticket probably covered the jewellery she sold. Ribaya informed Serrano, who went to Long Life and verified that it was her missing jewellery. She told the owner Yu An Kiong not to allow anyone to redeem the jewellery because she was the lawful owner thereof, to which Yu An Kiong agreed. Serrano reported the loss to the police and charged Rocco for estafa. Detective Corporal Mateo thereafter left a note asking Yu An Kiong to hold the jewellery and to notify the police in case someone should redeem the same. The next day, however, Yu An Kiong, allowed redemption of the jewellery by one de Leon, upon her presentation of the appropriate pawnshop ticket. Serrano sued Long Life for failure to hold the jewellery and for allowing its redemption without first notifying her or the police. Held: Long Life was duty bound under Article 21 to hold the items in question and to notify the owner thereof or the police of any effort to redeem them because he had been duly notified that it was either stolen or involved in an embezzlement of the proceeds of the pledge. Instead of allowing redemption, Long Life should have filed an interpleader, impleading both Serrano and de Leon, where it can demand payment of the loan upon assumption that it gave the loan in good faith and was not a fence for stolen articles nor a conspirator with Rocco or de Leon. The pawnshop ticket is not a negotiable instrument nor a negotiable document of title. The pawnshop is therefore liable for damages, without prejudice to its right to recover from Rocco. Buenaventura vs CA GR no. S 127358, 127449 (March 31, 2005) Facts: Noel and Isabel Buenaventura were married. Noel filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage wherein he pleaded that he was psychologically incapacitated. The same was granted by the trial court, along with Isabels prayer for moral and exemplary damages.

Issues raised as to whether said damages should be awarded. Judgment includes how the common property should be divided between the parties. Held: Isabel depends on the provisions of Art 2217, which allows for moral damages from physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, social anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and the like, and Art 21, which makes a person who WILFULY causes loss or injury to another be liable for damages. The above is inapplicable. For damages to be awarded under Article 21, the injury must have been done wilfully. Such is contrary to a finding of psychological incapacity for the products of psychological incapacity are caused by an innate inability and, hence, beyond the control of the party. For moral damages to be awarded, there should be evidence that the injury was deliberately and maliciously done by a party who knew of his disability and yet wilfully concealed the same. And since exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral damages, the negation of the latter necessarily carries with it the negation of the former. As to property relations, it is held that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio (or when a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live together exclusively as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage), the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. In this, unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couples separate property are not included in the co-ownership. The provisions regarding the family home (Title V, Chapter 2 Family Code), however, remain in force regardless of the property regime of the spouses. Void marriages are inexistent from the beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity EXCEPT for purposes of remarriage, in order to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden and Ruby Lim vs Reyes aka Amay Bisaya GR no. 154259 (Feb 28, 2005) Facts:

Lim, the Executive Secretary of the Nikko Hotel, organized an exclusive party to which Filart was invited. Reyes alleged that he was a friend of Filarts and that when they met at the lobby of the Nikko Hotel, she invited him to said party, and that she could vouch for him. During the party, however, he was loudly asked to leave by Lim, causing much embarrassment and humiliation. Lim, on the other hand, testified that she discreetly and privately asked Reyes to leave, and that it was he who made a scene. Although she did not ask Filart as to whether or not Reyes was of her (Filarts) party, Lim did speak to Filarts sister, who said that Filart did not invite Reyes. When Reyes sued for damages, the trial court found in favour of Nikko Hotel and Lim, while the CA held for Reyes. Held: Upon review of the facts, the SC found Lims testimony more credible. She, having been in the hotel business for 20 years, cannot be conceived to be so rude, as such is frowned upon in favour of politeness and discretion. Furthermore, Reyes himself testified that when Lim asked him to leave, she was very, very close to him. The court found it hard to believe that she should be shouting at him from such distance. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria finds application. The doctrine refers to self-inflicted injury, or to the consent to injury, which precludes recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even though he is not negligent in doing so. Article 19, containing the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Its standards are: (1) acting with justice; (2) giving everyone his due; and (3) observing honesty and good faith. Its elements are: 91) the existence of a legal right or duty; (2) exercise in bad faith of such legal right or duty; and (3) doing so for the sole INTENT of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and have the elements: (1) legal act; (2) such is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; (3) such is done with INTENT to injure. Thus, no recovery may be made under either article because supposing Lim were guilty, it would only be of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith. Complaints based on either Article must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendoes and conjectures.

Antonia de Jesus, et al. vs Cesar Syquia GR no. L-39110 (Nov 28, 1933) Facts: Antonia begot a male child with Syquia. She presented evidence of Syquias recognition of the child by way of letters to the priest who was christen it and several letters addressed to Antonia while she was pregnant. When the child was born, he caused a doctor friend of his to attend to Antonia, shouldered expenses during her confinement at the hospital, and thereafter lived with her as a common law wife. One year later, when Antonia was showing signs of a second pregnancy, Syquia left her and subsequently became married to another girl. Antonia sued for recognition of her two children, for breach of promise to marry, and payment for their maintenance. Held: Acknowledgement of a natural child does not necessarily have to be done in a single document, addressed to one, or to any particular individual. The only requirement is that the writing be indubitably that of the recognizing fathers. As to the second child, there was no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize it. There is likewise no basis for damages for breach to promise, the same not having been satisfactorily proven. Furthermore, breach of promise is not actionable, except for the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Magbanua, et. al., vs IAC and Perez GR nos. L-66870-72 (Jun 29, 1985) Facts: Petitioners are tenants of the private respondents, who diverted the free flow of water from their farm lots, which caused portions of their landholdings to dry up to their great damage and prejudice, after which they were told to vacate their respective areas for they could no longer plant palay for lack of water.

The trial court adjudicated in petitioners favour, which was echoed by the CA with an amendment deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages. Held: Petitioners entitled to moral damages under Article 21, for it appears that the private respondents denied water for their farm lots in an attempt to make them vacate said landholdings. They are likewise entitled to exemplary damages because private respondents acted in an oppressive manner. Ledesma vs CA GR no. 96914 (Jul 23, 1992) Facts: Violeta Delmo was treasurer of their schools Student Leadership club. In connection with such office and according to the procedures laid down in the club Constitution and Bylaws, she disbursed funds to members and officers in the club as loans, monetary aid, and for other humanitarian purposes. Ledesma, president of her school, learnt of such activities, said that they were against school rules and regulations, and sent Delmo a letter informing her that she was dropped from membership of the club and that she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school. It was shown that Delmo and the other implicated officers acted in good faith upon their club advisers assurance that the latter would cause the approval of their constitution and by-laws. Also, the implicated officers were inducted into office by the Superintendent and the club itself was allowed to cosponsor a school affair. The Director of Public School ruled in favour of Delmo. The decision and records of the case, however, were mis-sent to Ledesma, who was asked to return the records. Ledesma, who had already read the decision, construed it to mean that the decision was also to be returned, and complied with the same. Much later, the Director ordered him to furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision, but Ledesma said he sent it back. On the day of graduation, Ledesma received a telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honours due her. Since Delmos name could no longer be included in the program, Ledesma let her graduate without honours, and only later instructed the registrar to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo her honour.

Delmo and her parents sought damages, but in the course of the proceedings, Delmo passed away. Her parents thus represented her. Held: Ledesma is liable for damages. Even though he could not furnish Delmo a copy of the Directors decision, he should have informed her of the same and included her name in the list of honour students, or at least met with her father to inform him of the decision, or graduated Violeta Delmo with honours. His disobedience to the order of the Director, his superior, prejudiced Delmos rights. Such disobedience smacks of contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. Exemplary or corrective damages have the purpose of proving an example or correction for the public good. UE vs Jader GR no. 132344 (Feb 17, 2000) Facts: Jader was a law student of UE. On his first semester of his last year, he received an incomplete grade for missing the regular final examination in Practise Court I. During the second semester, he enrolled as a fourth year student and filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade, which was approved by Dean Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the exam he lacked and received a grade of 5. During the deliberations for candidates of graduation, Jaders name was included in the Tentative List of Candidates for Graduation. He took part in the graduation ceremonies and prepared himself for the bar exams only to find out that he still had a deficiency. He had to drop out of review classes and thereafter sued for damages. Held: It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each student as to whether he had already complied with all requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate. UE, in informing Jader of the result of the removal exam only when had begun preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith, which connotes an

honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. The want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations couple with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them, and conscious indifference to the rights or welfare of the person(s) who may be affected by ones act or omission can support a claim for damages by the one thus injured. Allied Banking Corp vs Lim Sio Wan GR no. 133179 (March 27, 2008) Facts: Lim Sio Wan deposited a money market placement with Allied. Before its maturity, however, an officer of Allied received a phone call instructing her to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wans placement, issue a check representing the proceeds thereof, and to give the check to one Santos, who was going to pick it up. The check was crossed For Payees Account Only and thus delivered to Santos. The same check was deposited in the account of FCC at Metrobank with Lim Sio Wans indorsement. FCC had earlier deposited a money market placement with Producers Bank, with Santos handling their account. When placement matured, FCC demanded the proceeds. On the same day the Allied officer received the phone call, the mangers check was deposited in FCCs account, purportedly representing the proceeds of its placement in Producers. Metrobank guaranteed the check, which was funded by Allied without checking the authenticity of Lim Sio Wans purported indorsement. It was only after more than six months after funding the check that Allied informed Metrobank that the signature was forged. Upon the supposed maturity of the placement, Lim Sio Wan went to Allied to withdraw it, only to be informed that it had been pre-terminated upon her instructions. This Lim Sio Wan denied, and upon which she sued Allied. Held: Allied and Metrobank were both found guilty of negligence. The relationship between a bank and its client is one of debtor-creditor. The bank deposit (as well as a money

market placement) is in the nature of a simple loan or mutuum. Until the client has been paid upon request or upon maturity of the placement, the banks obligation to said client remains unextinguished. Furthermore, it has been held that: Payment made by debtor to a wrong party does not extinguish the obligation as to the creditor, if there is no fault or negligence which can be imputed to the latter. Even when the debtor acted in utmost good faith and by mistake as to the person of his creditor, or through error induced by the fraud of a third person, the payment to one who is not in fact his creditor, or authorized to receive such payment, is void...such payment does not prejudice the creditor, and accrual of interest is not suspended by it. The last indorser is liable for the amount in the negotiable instrument even if a previous indorsement was forged (by virtue of sections 65 and 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Code). Thus, a collecting bank that indorses a check bearing a forged indorsement and presents it to the drawee bank guarantees all prior indorsements, including the forged indorsement, and ultimately should be liable therefor. The exception is when the issuance of the check itself was attended with negligence, in which case th4e institution issuing the check becomes just as, or more, liable than the collecting bank. The question to be asked in determining proximate cause is: If the event did not happen, would the injury have resulted? If the answer is NO, then the event is the proximate cause. As to the question of unjust enrichment. Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires of comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just cause or legal ground, shall return the same to him. Producers was unjustly enriched (when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience) because the deposit made to FCC had the effect of terminating its indebtedness to FCC. FCC, on the other hand, cannot be held to have been unjustly enriched, for when the check was deposited in its account purportedly from Producers, its placement with Producers had already matured, thus justifying the deposit. Also, as it was not a party in any stage of the negotiation of the check, the forgery cannot be raised against it.

Allied and Metrobank are to pay Lim Sio Wan on a proportion of 60:40, and Producers is held liable to both Allied and Metrobank for the amount of the check plus 12% interest per annum, moral damages, attorneys fees, and costs of the suit. Rolando Landicho vs Hon Relova GR no. L-22579 (Feb 23, 1968) Facts: Landicho was charged with bigamy by his first wife Makatangay for allegedly contracting a second marriage with Pasia. Pasia filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Landicho on grounds of his alleged use of force, threats, and intimidation, and for its bigamous character. Landicho thereafter filed a third-party complaint against Makatangay seeking to have his marriage with her declared null and void on grounds of her allegedly employing threats, force, and intimidation. Landicho then moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the hearing of both annulment suits. Issue raised as to whether or not those suits constitute a prejudicial question. Held: The court ruled in the negative. Supposing the first marriage really was null, said nullity must still be declared so that the marriage can be held as void. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for... Parties should not be allowed to judge the nullity of a marriage by themselves. [As to the petition of the second wife, supposing that the second marriage was declared null, it would still have no bearing on the resolution of the case because Landicho cannot be allowed to use his own misdeed to defend himself.] A prejudicial question is (1) that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and (2) the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. Alano vs CA GR no. 111244 (Dec 15, 1997)

Facts: Alano sold a piece of lot to Carlos and then sold the same piece of lot to Dandoy. Carlos filed a complaint seeking the annulment of the second sale, but Alano brought up the defence of forgery. Five years later, Carlos brought an estafa suit against Alano, who moved for its suspension pending the civil case, which he claimed was a prejudicial question. In the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial during the criminal action, Alano admitted the validity of his signature in the first deed of sale as well as his acknowledgement of his signature in 23 cash vouchers evidencing Carlos payment. He even wrote to Carlos, offering to refund whatever the latter had paid. Held: A prejudicial question exists when both a civil and criminal question are pending and the civil action involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, and has an issue that must be resolved before the criminal action may proceed because such resolution would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action. It was been previously held that a criminal action for estafa (for alleged double sale of property) is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and the defence of the alleged vendor that his signature thereon was forged. Also, a stipulation of facts by the parties in a criminal case is recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding, upon the parties, by virtue of which...defense waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the statement contained in the exhibit. No proof need be offered as to any facts admitted during pre-trial. Thus, Alanos admission during the pre-trial constitutes a waiver of his defence of forgery in the civil case. Beltran vs People GR no. 137567 (June 20, 2000) Facts: Beltran filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Felix on the ground of psychological incapacity. Felix filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against him.

Held: The rationale behind the prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The same, however, does not apply in the present case. For purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage null is a judicial declaration thereof. For purposes other than remarriage, however, other evidence is acceptable. Hence, Beltran could present evidence attesting to the nullity of his marriage as his defence in the concubinage case and need not necessarily rely on a proof of final judgment of the same. As long as there is no judicial declaration, the marriage is presumed to exist for all intents and purposes. Bobis vs Bobis GR no. 138509 (July 31, 2000) Facts: Held: