Tecson vs.

COMELEC , GR 16134 , March 3, 2004 FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7) , Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case. ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates? RULING: No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or VicePresident. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

MERCADO VS. MANZANO [307 SCRA 630; G.R. NO. 135083; 26 MAY 1999]

Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.

Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.

Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was

Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws

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of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner. On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for disqualification. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners filing of a certificate of candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

HELD: R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: xxxx (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added) Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC observation on this point: While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General's Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay. For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopez's failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive

G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 LOPEZ VS COMELEC A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.

FACTS: Civil Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution and (2) Omnibus Order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as Barangay Chairman. Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007. On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer, petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003. He returned to the Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.

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mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in the Philippines. While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity Jacot vs. Dal Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vicemayor? HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship. CALILUNG v. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice DOCTRINE: RA No. 9225 is constitutional. It does not recognize dual allegiance. NATURE: Original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. FACTS: Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship. It seeks to enjoin respondent from implementing RA NO. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." It contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." The said law provides for the loss of Philippine citizenship upon acquisition of foreign citizenship; the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance; derivative citizenship; and the corresponding civil and political rights and liabilities of those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under the Act. Pertinently, the Act provides under Section 5 on Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or ISSUE/S: Whether or not Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional because Section 2 and 3 of the act taken together allows dual allegiance and not dual citizen HELD: RA No. 9225 is constitutional. Excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is: To do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries; To allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. The Court also held what the RA No. 9225 does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a selfexecuting provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of

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petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado v. Manzano had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship. FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC [174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO. 87193; 23 JUN 1989]

qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "naturalborn" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love. Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. Altarejos vs comelec Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. January 15, 2004 - Private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he] was not a permanent resident of or

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other

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immigrant to a foreign country." Private respondents alleged that based on a letter from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration. 2 January 26, 2004 - Petitioner filed an Answer stating, among others, that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition. Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of this case, recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor on the following grounds: The Local Government Code of 1991 requires that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not have acquired the right to reside abroad It has been established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Such fact is proven by his Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) issued on 3 November 1997 by the Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001 of then Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. Respondent has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. COMELEC First Division adopted the recommendations of Atty. Zaragosa and disqualified petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion of reconsideration, attaching documents that gave proof to his repatriation. This was subsequently denied by COMELEC en banc, on the grounds that it should have been submitted during the hearing. On May 2004, election day itself, petitioner filed for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set aside the Resolution promulgated by the COMELEC. Issues: WON registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation WON the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division. SC Ruling: On the first issue

Yes. Section 2 of RA 8171 is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." As to when citizenship would apply, the Court's ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one's application for repatriation subsists. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. On the second issue The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First Division, considering that petitioner failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. Petition is Denied. Bengzon III vs HRET

CITIZENSHIP, HOW ACQUIRED: (1) by birth and (2) by naturalization MODES OF REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP: (1) by naturalization; (2) by repatriation and (3) by direct act of Congress EFFECT OF REPATRIATION: Recovery of original citizenship NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN, DEFINED: A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On Nov. 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the US. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under sec. 1(4) of CA No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Then on June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as a US citizen, in connection with his service in the US Marine Corps. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. He ran against petitioner Bengson III for the office of Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections and was elected for said office. Bengson III then filed a case

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for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with HRET, claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House since he was not a natural-born citizen. HRET dismissed the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

direct act of Congress. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. Repatriation Results in Recovery of Original Nationality Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630 Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. What is a Natural-Born Citizen

HELD: Petition is without merit. Citizenship, How Acquired There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. Modes of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows: Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to

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perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship. The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. Romualdez v. RTC domicile; residence In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms thus: the term residence as used in election law is synonymous with domicile which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in the place. Domicile denotes a fixed, permanent residence. In order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur:

c. intention to abandon the old domicile otherwise stated, there must be animus manendi and animus non-revertendi. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC FACTS: In the run up to the 1995 Elections, former First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (IMR) filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for Congressperson of the 1st District of Leyte, which encompasses the city of Tacloban and the towns of the northeastern Leyte, including Tolosa, versus the incumbent Cirilo Roy Montejo In her COC, IMR stated that she had been a resident of Tolosa for several years prior to the election. CMR moved for her disqualification, arguing that IMRs residency fell short of the 1-year residency requirement. IMR sought to amend her COC entry to since birth (which is actually futile since she was born in San Miguel, Manila). The COMELEC refused the amendment, correctly holding that it was filed out of time, and disqualified IMR. IMR trounced CRM and appealed to the Supreme Court, on the contention that she did not lose her residency even when she went to Manila, married then Congressman Marcos, lived in Malacanang and fled to Hawaii, since she was only following the residence of her husband, who under the Civil Code then in force, had sole authority to determine the family residence. ISSUE: whether or not the petitioner has lost her domicile based on the foregoing facts to be a ground for disqualifying her for the congressional election. The Court ruled that: For purposes of election, residency and domicile are synonymous to each other. It is only in Civil Law that we keep the distinction between the two, which is: Residence where one stays at the moment Domicile where one stays permanently characterized by actual residence at one point, with animus manendi (intent to stay if present) or animus revertendi (intent to retun if absent). In the case of IMR, her domicile by operation of law or necessity (domicilium necessarium) is Tolosa, since, as a minor she could not choose her domicile, and her father chose Tolosa as their domicile. Her marriage to Ferdie did not necessarily result in the loss of that domicile in favor of a new one since (1) a woman follows only the actual residence of her husband and not his domicile and (2) as a rule, change of domicile is proved only by the concurrence of three elements, (1) actual removal from original domicile, (2) intent to abandon domicile, and (3) acts effecting that intent. IMR may have practically left Leyte, but the animus revertendi remained as evinced by her celebrating her birthdays, fiestas and important milestones in Tacloban and Tolosa, and her careful cultivation of a political base in that district, thereby negating the last two requirements. Assuming but not conceding that she lost her domicile when, by her acts she proved her intent to follow her husbands domicile, her act of writing the PCGG for the recovery of her ancestral house in Tolosa, and public announcement to represent the 1st District in Congress after she returned from US exile and almost three years before the 1995 elections, showed her decision to re-establish her domicile there (domicilium voluntarium or domicile of choice), satisfying the minimum residency requirement. Hence, the COMELEC erred in disqualifying her.

a. residence or bodily presence in the new locality b. intention to remain there

Nicholas-Lewis v. Comelec G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006

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Facts: Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections. Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus. On May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment, therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections. On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic. The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing duals to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains unresolved. Issue: Whether the petitioners and others who have retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189? Held: The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the petition. In a nutshell, Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a

system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote. In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL - identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it. Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional challenge on the ground. As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189. Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225. After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof. As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely nonresidents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. AKBAYAN-YOUTH v. COMELEC Facts: Petitioners in this case represent the youth sector and they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to them, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC. However, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 disapproving the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.

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Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed before the SC the instant which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELECs Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections. Issues: 1. 2. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution Whether or not the SC can compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.

Registration Board. It bears emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from contradicting each other. SC hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election. The provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the available period prior to election day.The stand-by power of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise. Moreover, the petitioners in the instant case are not without fault or blame. They admit in their petition that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean hands. Well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt. 2. NO

Held: 1. No SC believes that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters.

The right of suffrage invoked by petitioners is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act of 1996. Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, explicitly provides that No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election. The 100-day prohibitive period serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on the application. If we compromise on these safety nets, we may very well end up with a voters list full of flying voters, overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with shadows and ghosts Likewise, petitioners invoke the so called standby powers or residual powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of Sec. 28 of RA 8436 Designation of Other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts. The act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, (a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the Election

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