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Moral Saints Author(s): Susan Wolf Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 8 (Aug., 1982), pp. 419-439 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026228 . Accessed: 28/07/2011 15:59
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME LXXIX, NO.

8,

AUGUST

1982

.~

..+I ~

MORAL SAINTS* are, I am glad thatneitherI nor those about whom I care most are among them. By moral saint I mean a person whose every action is as morally good as possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthyas can be. Though I shall in a momentacknowledge the varietyof typesof person thatmightbe thoughtto satisfy thisdescription, seems to me thatnone of thesetypesserveas unit equivocally compelling personal ideals. In other words, I believe in that moral perfection, the sense of moral saintliness,does not constitutea model of personal well-being towardwhich it would be particularlyrational or good or desirable fora human being to strive. Outside thecontextof moral discussion, this will strikemanyas an obvious point. But, within that context, the point, if it be granted,will be granted with some discomfort.For within that context it is generally assumed that one ought to be as morally good as possible and that what limits thereare to morality'shold of on us are setby features human natureof which we ought not to be proud. If,as I believe,theideals thatare derivablefromcommon sense and philosophically popular moral theoriesdo not support theseassumptions, then somethinghas to change. Either we must change our moral theoriesin ways thatwill make themyield more palatable ideals, or, as I shall argue, we must change our concepa tion of what is involvedin affirming moral theory. In this paper, I wish to examine the notion of a moral saint, to first, understandwhat a moral saint would be like and whysuch a being would be unattractive, and, second, to raise some questions about the significanceof this paradoxical figurefor moral philo*I have benefited fromthe commentsof many people who have heard or read an earlier draftof this paper. I wish particularlyto thank Douglas MacLean, Robert Nozick, Martha Nussbaum, and the SocietyforEthics and Legal Philosophy.

are DON'T knowwhether there anymoralsaints.But if there

0022-362X/82/7908/0419$02.lI0

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sophy. I shall look firstat the model(s) of moral sainthood that might be extrapolatedfromthe moralityor moralitiesof common sense. Then I shall consider what relations these have to conclusions thatcan be drawn fromutilitarianand Kantian moral theories. Finally, I shall speculate on the implications of theseconsiderationsformoral philosophy.
MORAL SAINTS AND COMMON SENSE

would count forus-contemConsider first what,pretheoretically, porarymembersof Western culture-as a moral saint. A necessary condition of moral sainthood would be that one's life be dominated by a commitment improvingthewelfareof othersor of soto mustplay in the cietyas a whole. As to what role thiscommitment accounts suggest individual's motivationalsystem, two contrasting to themselves me which mightequally be thoughtto qualifya person formoral sainthood. First,a moral saint mightbe someone whose concern forothers or, plays the role thatis played in mostof our lives by moreselfish, at any rate,less morallyworthyconcerns. For the moral saint, the promotion of the welfare of others might play the role that is the played for most of us by the enjoymentof material comforts, opportunityto engage in the intellectualand physical activitiesof our choice, and the love, respect,and companionship of people whom we love, respect,and enjoy. The happiness of the moral saint, then,would trulylie in the happiness of others,and so he would devote himselfto othersgladly,and with a whole and open heart. On the other hand, a moral saint might be someone for whom the basic ingredientsof happiness are not unlike those of most of the restof us. What makes him a moral saint is ratherthathe pays little or no attentionto his own happiness in light of the overriding importancehe gives to the widerconcernsof morality.In other words, this person sacrificeshis own intereststo the interestsof others,and feelsthe sacrifice such. as Roughly, these two models may be distinguishedaccording to whetherone thinksof the moral saint as being a saint out of love or one thinksof the moral saint as being a saint out of duty (or some other intellectual appreciation and recognition of moral principles). We may referto the firstmodel as the model of the Loving Saint; to the second, as the model of the Rational Saint. The two models differ considerablywith respectto the qualities of the motives of the individuals who conformto them. But this difference on would have limitedeffect thesaints' respective public

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personalities. The shared content of what these individuals are motivatedto be-namely, as morallygood as possible-would play the dominant role in the determinationof their characters.Of course, just as a varietyof large-scale projects,from tending the sick to political campaigning, may be equally and maximallymorally worthy, a variety characters compatible with theideal so of are of moral sainthood. One moral saint may be more or less jovial, more or less garrulous, more or less athletic than another. But, above all, a moral saint must have and cultivate those qualities which are apt to allow him to treatothersas justly and kindlyas possible. He will have the standardmoral virtuesto a nonstandard degree. He will be patient,considerate,even-tempered, hospitable, charitablein thoughtas well as in deed. He will be veryreluctant to make negativejudgmentsof otherpeople. He will be carefulnot to favor some people over others on the basis of propertiesthey could not help but have. Perhaps what I have alreadysaid is enough to make some people begin to regardtheabsence of moral saints in theirlives as a blessing. For therecomes a point in the listing of virtuesthata moral saint is likely to have where one mightnaturallybegin to wonder whetherthe moral saint isn't, afterall, too good-if not too good forhis own good, at least too good forhis own well-being.For the moral virtues, given that theyare, by hypothesis, presentin the all same individual,and to an extreme degree,are apt to crowdout the nonmoral virtues,as well as many of the interests and personal characteristics we generallythinkcontribute a healthy, that to wellrounded,richlydeveloped character. In otherwords,if the moral saint is devotingall his timeto feeding the hungryor healing the sick or raising money for Oxfam, then necessarilyhe is not reading Victorian novels, playing the oboe, or improvinghis backhand. Although no one of theinterests or tastesin the categorycontaining these latteractivitiescould be claimed to be a necessaryelement in a life well lived, a life in which none of these possible aspects of characterare developed barren. may seem to be a life strangely The reasons whya moral saint cannot, in general,encourage the and discoveryand developmentof significantnonmoral interests skills are not logical but practicalreasons. There are, in addition,a class of nonmoral characteristics thata moral saint cannot encourage in himselffor reasons that are not just practical. There is a more substantialtensionbetweenhaving any of thesequalities unashamedly and being a moral saint. These qualities might be de-

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scribedas going against the moral grain. For example, a cynical or sarcasticwit, or a sense of humor thatappreciates this kind of wit in others,requires thatone take an attitudeof resignationand pessimism toward the flaws and vices to be found in the world. A moral saint, on the other hand, has reason to take an attitudein opposition to this-he should tryto look for the best in people, give them the benefitof the doubt as long as possible, tryto improve regrettable situationsas long as thereis any hope of success. This suggeststhat,although a moral saint mightwell enjoy a good episode of Father Knows Best, he may not in good conscience be able to laugh at a Marx Brothersmovie or enjoy a play by George BernardShaw. An interest somethinglike gourmetcooking will be, fordifin ferent reasons, difficult a moral saint to resteasy with. For it for seems to me that no plausible argument can justify the use of human resourcesinvolved in producing a pate de canard en croute against possible alternative beneficent ends to which theseresources of might be put. If thereis a justificationforthe institution haute acevery cuisine, it is one which restson thedecision not to justify tivity against morallybeneficialalternatives, and this is a decision a moral saint will nevermake. Presumably, interest high fashin an ion or interiordesign will faremuch the same, as will, verypossibly, a cultivationof the finerartsas well. A moral saint will have to be very, verynice. It is importantthat he not be offensive. The worry that,as a result,he will have to be is dull-witted humorlessor bland. or This worryis confirmed when we considerwhat sortsof characters,taken and refinedboth from life and fromfiction,typically formour ideals. One would hope theywould be figureswho are morally good-and by this I mean more than just not morally bad-but one would hope, too, thattheyare not just morallygood, but talented or accomplished or attractivein nonmoral ways as well. We may make ideals out of athletes,scholars, artists-more out of cowboys, private eyes,and rock stars. We may frivolously, strivefor Katharine Hepburn's grace, Paul Newman's "cool"; we are attracted to the high-spiritedpassionate nature of Natasha Rostov; we admire the keen perceptivenessof Lambert Strether. Though thereis certainly nothingimmoral about theideal charactersor traitsI have in mind, theycannot be superimposedupon the ideal of a moral saint. For although it is a part of many of these ideals that the characters set high, and not merely acceptable, moral standardsfor themselves, is also essential to theirpower it

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and attractiveness that the moral strengths so to speak, alonggo, side of specific,independently admirable, nonmoral ground projects and dominant personal traits. When one does finallyturnone's eyestowardlives thatare dominatedbyexplicitly moral commitments, moreover, one findsoneself relievedat thediscovery idiosyncrasies eccentricities quite of not or in line with the pictureof moral perfection. One prefers blunt, the tactless,and opinionated BetsyTrotwood to the unfailinglykind and patient Agnes Copperfield; one prefersthe mischievousness and the sense of irony in Chesterton'sFather Brown to the innocence and undiscriminating love of St. Francis. It seems that,as we look in our ideals for people who achieve nonmoral varietiesof personal excellence in conjunction with or colored by some version of high moral tone, we look in our paragons of moral excellence for people whose moral achievements occur in conjunction withor colored by some interests traitsthat or have low moral tone. In other words, thereseems to be a limit to how much moralitywe can stand. One mightsuspect thattheessence of theproblem is simply that thereis a limit to how much of any single value, or any single type of value, we can stand. Our objection thenwould not be specificto a life in which one's dominant concernis morality, but would apply to any life that can be so completelycharacterized an exby traordinarily dominant concern. The objection in thatcase would reduceto therecognitionthatsuch a lifeis incompatiblewithwellroundedness.If thatwere the objection, one could fairly replythat well-roundedness no more supreme a virtuethan the totality is of moral virtuesembodied by the ideal it is being used to criticize. But I think this misidentifies the objection. For the way in which a concernformorality maydominatea life,or, more to thepoint, the way in which it may dominate an ideal of life,is not easily imagined by analogy to the dominance an aspiration to become an Olympic swimmeror a concernpianist mighthave. A person who is passionately committedto one of these latter to concernsmightdecide thather attachment it is strongenough to be worth the sacrificeof her ability to maintain and pursue a significantportion of what else life mightoffer which a properdevotion to her dominant passion would require. But a desire to be as morallygood as possible is not likelyto take the formof one desire among others which, because of its peculiar psychological strength, requiresone to foregothepursuitof otherweakerand separatelyless demanding desires. Rather, the desire to be as morally

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good as possible is apt to have the characternot just of a stronger, compete but of a higherdesire,which does not merelysuccessfully with one's other desires but which rather subsumes or demotes for them. The sacrificeof other interests the interestin morality, not of a choice, but of an imperative. then,will have thecharacter, Moreover,thereis somethingodd about the idea of moralityitself,or moral goodness,servingas theobject of a dominantpassion in the way thata moreconcreteand specificvision of a goal (even a concretemoral goal) might be imagined to serve. Moralityitself does not seem to be a suitable object of passion. Thus, when one reflects, example, on the Loving Saint easily and gladly giving for up his fishingtripor his stereoor his hot fudgesundae at thedrop of the moral hat, one is apt to wonder not at how much he loves morality, but at how littlehe loves theseother things.One thinks that,if he can give theseup so easily, he does not know what it is to trulylove them.There seems,in otherwords,to be a kind of joy which the Loving Saint, eitherby natureor by practice,is incapable of experiencing.The Rational Saint, on the otherhand, might retain strong nonmoral and concrete desires-he simply denies himselfthe opportunityto act on them. But this is no less troubling. The Loving Saint one might suspect of missing a piece of perceptual machinery,of being blind to some of what the world has to offer.The Rational Saint, who sees it but foregoesit, one problem-a pathological fear of suspects of having a different that interdamnation, perhaps, or an extremeformof self-hatred fereswith his ability to enjoy the enjoyable in life. In otherwords,theideal of a lifeof moral sainthooddisturbsnot simply because it is an ideal of a life in which moralityunduly dominates. The normal person's directand specificdesiresforobjects, activities, and events that conflict with the attainmentof suppressed, moral perfection not simplysacrificed removed, but are or subsumed. The way in which morality,unlike other possible for goals, is apt to dominate is particularlydisturbing, it seems to require eitherthe lack or the denial of the existenceof an identifiable, personal self. This distinctively troubling featureis not, I think, absolutely unique to the ideal of the moral saint, as I have been using that phrase. It is sharedby theconception of thepure aesthete,by a certain kind of religious ideal, and, somewhat paradoxically, by the model of the thorough-going, self-conscious egoist. It is not a coincidence that the ways of comprehendingthe world of which these ideals are the extreme embodiments are sometimes described as

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"moralities" themselves.At any rate, theycompete with what we ordinarilymean by 'morality'.Nor is it a coincidence that these ideals are naturallydescribedas fanatical. But it is easy to see that cannot serveas satisfactory personal theseothertypesof perfection ideals; fortherealizationof theseideals would be straightforwardly immoral. It may come as a surpriseto some thattheremay in addition be such a thingas a moral fanatic. moralSome will object thatI am being unfairto "common-sense ity"-that it does not reallyrequire a moral saint to be eithera disthereis gusting goody-goodyor an obsessive ascetic. Admittedly, no logical inconsistency betweenhaving any of the personal characteristics have mentionedand being a moral saint. It is not morI of ally wrong to notice the faults and shortcomings othersor to recognizeand appreciate nonmoral talentsand skills. Nor is it immoral to be an avid Celtics fan or to have a passion forcaviar or to be an excellent cellist. With enough imagination, we can always contrivea suitable historyand set of circumstancesthat will embrace such characteristics one or another specificfictionalstory in of a perfect moral saint. If one turnedonto the path of moral sainthood relatively late in thatcan be turnedto life,one may have alreadydeveloped interests moral purposes. It may be that a good golf game is just what is needed to secure thatbig donation to Oxfam. Perhaps the cultivation of one's exceptional artistictalentwill turnout to be the way one can make one's greatestcontributionto society.Furthermore, one mightstumbleupon joys and skillsin theveryserviceof morality. If, because the children are shorta ninth player for the team, one's generous offerto serve reveals a natural fielding arm or if one's part in the campaign against nuclear power requiresaccepting a lobbyist'sinvitation to lunch at Le Lion d'Or, thereis no moral gain in denying the satisfactionone gets fronithese activities. The moral saint, then, may, by happy accident,find himself with nonmoral virtues on which he can capitalize morally or which make psychological demands to which he has no choice but to attend.The point is that,fora moral saint, theexistenceof these interests and skills can be given at best the status of happy accidents-they cannot be encouraged for theirown sakes as distinct, independentaspects of the realizationof human good. It must be remembered thatfromthe factthat thereis a tension between having any of these qualities and being a moral saint it does not follow that having any of thesequalities is immoral. For it is not part of common-sense moralitythat one ought to be a

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moral saint. Still, if someone just happened to want to be a moral saint, he or she would not have or encourage thesequalities, and, on the basis of our common-sensevalues, this counts as a reason not to want to be a moral saint. One might still wonder what kind of reason this is, and what kind of conclusion this properlyallows us to draw. For the fact does not necessarily thatthe models of moral saintsare unattractive mean that theyare unsuitable ideals. Perhaps theyare unattractive because theymake us feel uncomfortable-theyhighlightour own weaknesses,vices, and flaws. If so, the fault lies not in the charactersof the saints,but in those of our unsaintlyselves. we To be sure, some of the reasons behind the disaffection feel for the model of moral sainthood have to do with a reluctanceto criticizeourselvesand a reluctanceto committingourselvesto trythatwe heartilyenjoy. These ing to give up activitiesand interests considerationsmightprovide an excuse forthe factthatwe are not moral saints, but theydo not provide a basis forcriticizingsainthood as a possible ideal. Since theseconsiderationsrelyon an appeal to the egoistic,hedonisticside of our natures,to use themas a basis forcriticizingthe ideal of the moral saint would be at best to features ourselves that of beg the question and at worst to glorify ought to be condemned. The fact that the moral saint would be withoutqualities which we have and which, indeed, we like to have, does not in itselfprovide reason to condemn the ideal of the moral saint. The factthat some of thesequalities are good qualities, however,and that they are qualities we ought to like, does provide reason to discourage otherideals in its place. In otherwords,some thisideal and to offer of the qualities the moral saint necessarilylacks are virtues,albeit who have them.The nonmoral virtues,in the unsaintlycharacters feats of Groucho Marx, Reggie Jackson, and the head chef at Lutece are impressiveaccomplishmentsthatit is not only permissible but positivelyappropriate to recognizeas such. In general, the admiration of and strivingtowardachieving any of a greatvariety of formsof personal excellence are charactertraitsit is valuable and desirable forpeople to have. In advocating thedevelopmentof thesevarietiesof excellence,we advocate nonmoral reasons foracting, and in thinking that it is good for a person to strivefor an and values that ideal that gives a substantial role to the interests correspond to these virtues,we implicitlyacknowledge the goodness of ideals incompatible with thatof the moral saint. Finally, if for we thinkthatit is as good, or even better a person to strivefor one of theseideals than it is forhim or her to striveforand realize

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the ideal of the moral saint, we expressa conviction thatit is good not to be a moral saint.
MORAL SAINTS AND MORAL THEORIES

I have triedso far to paint a picture-or, rather,two pictures-of what a moral saint mightbe like, drawing on what I take to be the attitudes and beliefs about morality prevalent in contemporary, common-sense thought. To my suggestion that common-sense morality generates conceptionsof moral saints thatare unattractive or otherwise unacceptable, it is open to someone to reply, "so much the worse forcommon-sensemorality."After all, it is often claimed that the goal of moral philosophy is to correctand improve upon common-sensemorality, and I have as yetgiven no attentionto the question of what conceptionsof moral sainthood,if any, are generatedfromthe leading moral theoriesof our time. A quick, breezyreading of utilitarianand Kantian writingswill of suggest the images, respectively, the Loving Saint and the Rational Saint. A utilitarian,with his emphasis on happiness, will the certainly prefer Loving Saint to theRational one, since theLoving Saint will himselfbe a happier person than the Rational Saint. A Kantian, with his emphasis on reason, on the other hand, will find at least as much to praise in the latteras in the former. Still, both models, drawn as theyare fromcommon sense, appeal to an impure mixtureof utilitarianand Kantian intuitions.A morecareful examination of these moral theories raises questions about whether eithermodel of moral sainthood would reallybe advocated by a believerin theexplicit doctrinesassociated witheitherof these views. Certainly,the utilitarianin no way denies thevalue of self-realitalzation. He in no way disparages the developmentof interests, traitsthat I have claimed the ents, and other personally attractive enmoral saint would be without. Indeed, since just thesefeatures hance the happiness both of the individuals who possess themand of those with whom theyassociate, theabilityto promotethesefeaturesboth in oneselfand in otherswill have considerablepositive weightin utilitariancalculations. This implies thatthe utilitarianwould not support moral sainthood as a universal ideal. A world in which everyone,or even a large number of people, achieved moral sainthood-even a world in which theystrove to achieve it-would probably contain less happiness than a world in which people realized a diversityof ideals involving a varietyof personal and perfectionist values. More pragmaticconsiderationsalso suggest that,if the utilitarian wants to influence more people to achieve more good, then he

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would do better encourage themto pursue happiness-producing to goals that are more attractive and more within a normal person's reach. These considerationsstill leave open, however,the question of what kind of an ideal the committedutilitarian should privately aspire to himself.Utilitarianismrequires him to want to achieve thegreatest generalhappiness, and thiswould seem to commithim to the ideal of the moral saint. One might tryto use the claims I made earlier as a basis foran argument that a utilitarianshould choose to give up utilitarianism. If, as I have said, a moral saint would be a less happy person both to be and to be around than many otherpossible ideals, perhaps one could createmore total happiness by not trying hard too to promote the total happiness. But this argumentis simply unconvincing in light of the empirical circumstancesof our world. The gain in happiness that would accrue to oneself and one's neighbors by a more well-rounded, richer life than that of the moral saint would be pathetically small in comparison to the amount by which one could increase the general happiness if one devotedoneselfexplicitlyto the care of the sick, the downtrodden, the starving, and thehomeless. Of course,theremay be psychological limits to the extent to which a person can devote himselfto such things without going crazy. But the utilitarian's individual limitationswould not thereby become a positive feature his perof sonal ideals. The unattractiveness the moral saint, then,ought not rationof ally convince the utilitarianto abandon his utilitarianism. may, It however,convincehim to takeefforts to wear his saintlymoral not aspirations on his sleeve. If it is not too difficult, the utilitarian will try not to make thosearound him uncomfortable. will not He want to appear "holier than thou"; he will not want to inhibit others'abilityto enjoy themselves. practice,thismightmake the In perfectutilitarian a less nauseating companion than the moral saint I earlierportrayed. But insofaras this kind of reasoningproduces a more bearable public personality, is at thecost of giving it him a personalitythat must be evaluated as hypocriticaland condescending when his privatethoughtsand attitudesare taken into account. Still, the criticismsI have raised against the saint of commonto sense morality should make some difference the utilitarian's conception of an ideal which neitherrequireshim to abandon his he utilitarianprinciples nor forceshim to fakean interest does not

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have or a judgment he does not make. For it may be thata limited allotmentof timeand energyto be devoted and carefully monitored or to the pursuitof some nonmoral interests to the developmentof to contributor some nonmoral talentswould make a persona better the general welfarethan he would be if he allowed himselfno indulgences of this sort.The enjoymentof such activitiesin no way to compromisesa commitment utilitarianprinciplesas long as the involvement with theseactivitiesis conditionedby a willingnessto give themup wheneverit is recognizedthat theycease to be in the general interest. This will go some way in mitigatingthe picture of the loving impresof saint thatan understanding utilitarianismwill on first sion suggest.But I thinkit will not go veryfar.For thelimitations on time and energywill have to be rathersevere,and the need to monitor will restrict not only the extent but also the quality of and traits.They are only weak one's attachmentto these interests and somewhat peculiar sorts of passions to which one can consciously remain so conditionallycommitted.Moreover,the way in aspects of which the utilitariancan enjoy these "extra-curricular" his life is simply not the way in which theseaspects are to be enjoyed insofaras theyfigureinto our less saintlyideals. The problem is not exactly that the utilitarianvalues these aspects of his life only as a means to an end, for the enjoymenthe and othersget fromtheseaspects are not a means to, but a part of, the general happiness. Nonetheless,he values thesethingsonly because of and insofaras theyare a part of the generalhappiness. He to values them,as it were,under thedescription'a contribution the with the various ways general happiness'. This is to be contrasted in which theseaspects of life may be valued by nonutilitarians.A because of theinsightsinto human naperson mightlove literature tureliterature Anothermight love the cultivationof roses affords. because rosesare thingsof greatbeautyand delicacy.It may be true thatthesefeatures therespective of activitiesalso explain why these activitiesare happiness-producing.But, to the nonutilitarian,this may not be to the point. For if one values theseactivitiesin these more direct ways, one may not be willing to exchange them for others that produce an equal, or even a greateramount of happiness. From thatpoint of view, it is not because theyproduce happiness that theseactivitiesare valuable; it is because theseactivities are valuable in more direct and specific ways that theyproduce happiness. To adopt a phrase of BernardWilliams', the utilitarian'smanner

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of valuing the not explicitly moral aspects of his life "provides (him) withone thoughttoo many".' The requirement thattheutilitarianhave this thought-periodically,at least-is indicativeof not only a weakness but a shallowness in his appreciation of the aspects in question. Thus, the ideals toward which a utilitarian could acceptablystrivewould remain too close to the model of the common-sensemoral saint to escape the criticismsof that model which I earlier suggested. Whethera Kantian would be similarly committed to so restrictive and unattractive range of possible a ideals is a somewhatmore difficult question. The Kantian believes that being morally worthyconsists in always acting frommaxims thatone could will to be universal law, and doing this not out of any pathological desire but out of reverence for the moral law as such. Or, to take a different formulation of the categorical imperative,the Kantian believes that moral action consists in treatingotherpersons always as ends and neveras means only. Presumably,and according to Kant himself,the Kantian thereby commitshimselfto some degreeof benevolenceas well as to the rules of fairplay. But we surelywould not will thatevery person become a moral saint,and treating othersas ends hardlyrequires bending over backwardsto protectand promote theirinterests. On one interpretation Kantian doctrine,then,moral perfecof tion would be achieved simply by unerringobedience to a limited set of side-constraints.On this interpretation,Kantian theory simply does not yield an ideal conception of a person of any fullness comparable to that of the moral saints I have so far been portraying. On the otherhand, Kant does say explicitlythatwe have a duty of benevolence, a duty not only to allow others to pursue their ends, but to take up theirends as our own. In addition, we have positiveduties to ourselves,duties to increaseour naturalas well as our moral perfection. These duties are unlimited in the degree to which theymay dominate a life. If action in accordance with and motivatedby the thoughtof theseduties is consideredvirtuous,it is natural to assume that the more one performssuch actions, the more virtuousone is. Moreover,of virtuein general Kant says, "it to is an ideal which is unattainablewhile yetour dutyis constantly approximate to it".2 On this interpretation, then, the Kantian
ed., The Identities Persons of '"Persons, Character and Morality"in Amelie Rorty, (Berkeley:Univ. of California Press, 1976), p. 214. 2Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, Mary J. Gregor, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964),p. 71.

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moral saint, like the othermoral saints I have been considering,is dominated by the motivationto be moral. Which of these interpretations Kant one prefers of will depend on the interpretation and the importanceone gives to the role of the imperfect duties in Kant's over-all system.Rather than choose betweenthemhere,I shall considereach briefly turn. in On the second interpretation Kant, the Kantian moral saint is, of not surprisingly,subject to many of the same objections I have been raising against other versions of moral sainthood. Though the Kantian saint may differ fromthe utilitariansaint as to which actions he is bound to perform and which he is bound to refrain fromperforming, suspect thattherange of activitiesacceptable to I the Kantian saint will remain objectionably restrictive. Moreover, the manner in which the Kantian saint must thinkabout and justifythe activitieshe pursues and the charactertraitshe develops will strikeus, as it did with the utilitarian saint, as containing "one thoughttoo many." As the utilitariancould value his activities and charactertraitsonly insofaras theyfell under the description of 'contributions thegeneral happiness', the Kantian would to have to value his activitiesand charactertraitsinsofaras theywere manifestations respectforthe moral law. If the developmentof of our powers to achieve physical, intellectual,or artisticexcellence, or the activitiesdirectedtoward making othershappy are to have any moral worth,theymust arise froma reverence the dignity for thatmembersof our species have as a resultof being endowed with pure practical reason. This is a good and noble motivation,to be sure. But it is hardlywhat one expects to be dominantlybehind a person's aspirations to dance as well as Fred Astaire,to paint as well as Picasso, or to solve some outstandingproblem in abstract algebra, and it is hardlywhat one hopes to find lying dominantly behind a father's action on behalf of his son or a lover's on behalf of her beloved. Since the basic problem with any of the models of moral sainthood we have been consideringis thattheyare dominatedby a single, all-important value underwhich all otherpossible values must be subsumed, it may seem that the alternativeinterpretation of Kant, as providinga stringent finiteset of obligations and conbut straints,might provide a more acceptable morality.According to this interpretation Kant, one is as morally good as can be so of long as one devotessome limited portion of one's energiestoward altruism and the maintenance of one's physical and spiritual health,and otherwise pursues one's independently motivatedinterests and values in such a way as to avoid oversteppingcertain

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bounds. Certainly,if it be a requirementof an acceptable moral obedience to its laws and maximal devotion to theorythat perfect its interestsand concerns be something we can wholeheartedly for strive in ourselvesand wish forin thosearound us, it will count in favorof this brand of Kantianism thatits commands can be fulfilled without swallowing up the perfectmoral agent's entire personality. if of Even this more limitedunderstanding morality, its connection to Kant's views is to be taken at all seriously,is not likely to give an unqualified seal of approval to the nonmorally directed ideals I have been advocating. For Kant is explicit about what he (69/70)-duties to ensure calls "duties of apathy and self-mastery" with calm, that our passions are never so strong as to interfere practical deliberation,or so deep as to wrestcontrolfromthe more rational part of ourselves. The tight and self-condisinterested, scious rein we are thus obliged to keep on our commitmentsto our value in specificindividuals and causes will doubtless restrict attenuatedplace. these things,assigning thema necessarily objection to this brand of Kantianism,howA more interesting ever,comes when we consider the implications of placing the kind of upper bound on moral worthinesswhich seemed to count in favor of this conception of morality.For to put such a limit on to one's capacity to be moral is effectively deny,not just the moral but the moral goodness of a devotion to benevolenceand necessity, the maintenance of justice that passes beyond a certain,required point. It is to deny the possibility of going morally above and set beyond the call of a restricted of duties. Despite my claim that all-consuming moral saintliness is not a particularlyhealthyand to desirable ideal, it seems perverse insistthat,weremoral saints to noble and adexist, theywould not, in theirway, be remarkably mirable figures.Despite my conviction thatit is as rational and as good fora person to take KatharineHepburn or Jane Austenas her role model instead of MotherTheresa, it would be absurd to deny person. that MotherTheresa is a morallybetter as I can thinkof two ways of viewing morality having an upper are inbound. First,we can think that altruism and impartiality but that theyare moral only if the deed positive moral interests, are degree to which theseinterests activelypursued remainswithin certainfixedlimits. Second, we can thinkthat thesepositiveinterand thattheessenceof ests are only incidentallyrelatedto morality or in, moralitylies elsewhere, say,an implicitsocial contract in the Accordingto thefirst recognitionof our own dignifiedrationality. line to the amount of alconception of morality,thereis a cut-off

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truismor to the extentof devotion to justice and fairnessthat is worthyof moral praise. But to draw this line earlier than the line that brings the altruistin question into a worse-off position than all those to whom he devoteshimselfseems unacceptablyartificial and gratuitous.Accordingto the second conception,thesepositive interests not essentiallyrelated to moralityat all. But then we are are unable to regarda moreaffectionate generousexpressionof and good will toward othersas a natural and reasonable extension of morality,and we encourage a cold and unduly self-centered approach to the developmentand evaluation of our motivationsand concerns. A moral theory thatdoes not contain the seeds of an all-consuming ideal of moral sainthood thus seems to place falseand unnatural limits on our opportunityto do moral good and our potential to deserve moral praise. Yet the main thrustof the argumentsof this paper has been leading to the conclusion that, when such ideals are present,theyare not ideals to which it is particularly reasonable or healthy or desirable for human beings to aspire. These claims, taken together, have the appearance of a dilemma fromwhich thereis no obvious escape. In a moment,I shall argue that,despiteappearances, theseclaims should not be understoodas describe constitutinga dilemma. But, beforeI do, let me briefly anotherpath which those who are convincedby myabove remarks may feel inclined to take. If the above remarksare understood to be implicitlycritical of the views on the content of moralitywhich seem most popular today,an alternativethat naturallysuggestsitselfis thatwe revise our views about the contentof morality.More specifically, remy or marksmay be taken to supporta more Aristotelian, even a more Nietzschean,approach to moral philosophy. Such a change in approach involvessubstantially broadeningor replacingour contemporary intuitions about which character traits constitutemoral virtuesand vices and which interests constitutemoral interests. If, or forexample, we include personal bearing,or creativity, sense of thenwe as to thatcontribute one's moral personality, style, features can createmoral ideals which are incompatiblewith and probably more attractive than the Kantian and utilitarianideals I have disthe cussed. Given such an alterationof our conceptionof morality, figureswith which I have been concerned above might,far from to being consideredto be moral saints, be seen as morallyinferior othermore appealing or more interesting models of individuals. This approach seems unlikelyto succeed,if forno otherreason, because it is doubtfulthatany single,or even any reasonablysmall

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numberof substantialpersonal ideals could capture the full range of possible ways of realizing human potential or achieving human good which deserveencouragementand praise. Even if we could provide a sufficiently broad characterization the range of posiof tive ways for human beings to live, however, I think there are strongreasons not to want to incorporatesuch a characterization more centrallyinto theframework morality of itself.For, in claiming that a charactertraitor activityis morally good, one claims thatthereis a certainkind of reason fordeveloping thattraitor engaging in that activity.Yet, lying behind our criticismof more conventional conceptions of moral sainthood, thereseems to be a recognitionthatamong theimmensely valuable traits and activities that a human life mightpositivelyembraceare some of which we hope that,if a person does embrace them,he does so not formoral reasons. In otherwords,no matterhow flexiblewe make theguide to conduct which we choose to label "morality,"no matterhow rich we make the life in which perfectobedience to this guide would result,we will have reason to hope that a person does not wholly rule and directhis life by the abstractand impersonalconsiderationthatsuch a life would be morallygood. Once it is recognized that moralityitselfshould not serveas a comprehensiveguide to conduct, moreover,we can see reasons to retain the admittedlyvague contemporary intuitionsabout what the classificationof moral and nonmoral virtues, and the interests, like should be. That is, thereseem to be importantdifferences between the aspects of a person's life which are currently considered appropriate objects of moral evaluation and the aspects thatmight be included under the altered conception of moralitywe are now considering,which thelatterapproach would tendwronglyto blur or to neglect.Moral evaluation now is focusedprimarily features on of a person's life over which that person has control; it is largely restricted aspects of his lifewhich are likelyto have considerable to effect other people. These restrictions on seem as theyshould be. Even if responsible people could reach agreementas to what constituted good tasteor a healthydegreeof well-roundedness, exfor ample, it seems wrong to insist that everyonetryto achieve these thingsor to blame someone who fails or refusesto conform. If we are not to respond to the unattractiveness the moral of ideals that contemporary theoriesyield eitherby offering alternative theorieswith more palatable ideals or by understandingthese theoriesin such a way as to preventthem fromyielding ideals at all, how, then,are we to respond? Simply, I think,by admitting

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that moral ideals do not, and need not, make the best personal ideals. Earlier,I mentionedone of theconsequences of regarding as a testof an adequate moral theory thatperfect obedience to its laws and maximal devotion to its interests somethingwe can wholebe heartedlystrivefor in ourselves and wish for in those around us. Drawing out the consequences somewhat further should, I think, make us more doubtful of the proposed test than of the theories which, on this test,would fail. Given the empirical circumstances of our world, it seems to be an ethical factthatwe have unlimited potential to be morallygood, and endless opportunityto promote moral interests. But thisis not incompatiblewith thenot-so-ethical fact that we have sound, compelling, and not particularlyselfish reasons to choose not to devote ourselves univocally to realizing this potential or to takingup this opportunity. Thus, in one sense at least, I am not reallycriticizing eitherKantianismor utilitarianism. Insofaras thepoint of view I am offering bears directly recentwork in moral philosophy,in fact,it bears on on criticsof these theorieswho, in a spiritnot unlike the spiritof most of this paper, point out that the perfect utilitarianwould be flawed in this way or the perfectKantian flawed in that.3The assumption lying behind these claims, implicitlyor explicitly,has been thattherecognitionof theseflawsshows us somethingwrong with utilitarianism opposed to Kantianism,or somethingwrong as with Kantianismas opposed to utilitarianism, somethingwrong or with both of these theoriesas opposed to some nameless thirdalternative. The claims of this paper suggest,however,that this asmasterof a moral sumption is unwarranted.The flaws of a perfect need not reflect theory flawsin the intramoral contentof the theory itself. In pointing out the regrettable featuresand the necessaryabsence of some desirable featuresin a moral saint, I have not meant to condemn the moral saint or the person who aspires to become one. Rather, I have meant to insist that the ideal of moral sainthood should not be held as a standard against which any other ideal must be judged or justified,and that the posture we take in response to the recognitionthat our lives are not as morallygood as
3See, e.g., Williams, op. cit. and J.J.C. Smartand BernardWilliams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (New York: Cambridge, 1973). Also, Michael Stocker,"The Schizophreniaof Modern Ethical Theories," this JOURNAL, LXIII, 14 (Aug. 12, 1976): 453-466.
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theymightbe need not be defensive.4 is misleading to insist that It one is permitted live a life in which the goals, relationships,acto tivities,and interests that one pursues are not maximally morally good. For our lives are not so comprehensively subject to the requirementthatwe apply forpermission, and our nonmoralreasons for the goals we set ourselves are not excuses, but may ratherbe positive, good reasons which do not exist despite any reasons that mightthreaten outweigh them.In otherwords,a person may be to perfectly wonderful withoutbeing perfectly moral. Recognizing this requires a perspective which contemporary moral philosophy has generallyignored. This perspectiveyields judgments of a typethatis neithermoral nor egoistic. Like moral judgments,judgmentsabout what it would be good fora person to be are made from a point of view outside the limits set by the values, interests, and desires that the person might actually have. And, like moral judgments,thesejudgmentsclaim forthemselves a kind of objectivity a grounding in a perspective or which any rational and perceptivebeing can take up. Unlike moral judgments, however, the good with which these judgments are concerned is not the good of anyone or any group other than the individual himself. Nonetheless, it would be equally misleading to say that these judgments are made for the sake of the individual himself. For thesejudgmentsare not concernedwith what kind of life it is in a it person's interest lead, but with what kind of interests would be to good fora person to have, and it need not be in a person's interest that he acquire or maintain objectivelygood interests. Indeed, the model of the Loving Saint, whose interests identifiedwith the are interests morality, a model of a person forwhom the dictates of is of rational self-interest the dictatesof morality and coincide. Yet, I have urged thatwe have reason not to aspire to this ideal and that some of us would have reason to be sorry our childrenaspired to if and achieved it. The moral point of view, we mightsay, is the point of view one takes up insofaras one takes the recognitionof the factthatone is just one person among others equally real and deservingof the
4George Orwell makes a similar point in "Reflectionson Gandhi," in A Collection of Essays by George Orwell (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1945), p. 176: "sainthood is . . . a thing thathuman beings mustavoid. . . It is too readily assumed that . . . the ordinaryman only rejectsit because it is too difficult; in other words, that the average human being is a failed saint. It is doubtfulwhether this is true. Many people genuinelydo not wish to be saints,and it is probable that some who achieve or aspire to sainthood have never felt much temptationto be human beings."

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good thingsin lifeas a factwith practicalconsequences,a factthe recognitionof which demands expression in one's actions and in theformof one's practicaldeliberations.Competingmoral theories or offer answersto thequestion of what themostcorrect alternative alternathe best way to express this factis. In doing so, theyoffer of tiveways to evaluate and to compare thevariety actions,statesof affairs, and so on thatappear good and bad to agents fromother, nonmoral points of view. But it seems that alternativeinterpretations of the moral point of view do not exhaust the ways in which and theirconsequences can be comprehenour actions, characters, evaluated. Let us call the point of view from sivelyand objectively which we consider what kinds of lives are good lives, and what kinds of persons it would be good forourselvesand othersto be, thepoint of view of individual perfection. Since either point of view provides a way of comprehensively evaluating a person's life,each point of view takesaccount of,and, in a sense, subsumes the other. From the moral point of view, the perfection an individual lifewill have some, but limited,valueof foreach individual remains,after just one personamong others. all, point of view, the moral worthof an indiFrom the perfectionist vidual's relation to his world will likewise have some, but limited, goodness of an invalue-for, as I have argued, the (perfectionist) dividual's life does not vary proportionally with the degree to which it exemplifiesmoral goodness. point of view is like It may not be the case that the perfectionist themoral point of view in being a point of view we are everobliged to take up and expressin our actions. Nonetheless,it provides us with reasons that are independent of moral reasons for wanting ourselvesand othersto develop our characters and live our lives in certain ways. When we take up this point of view and ask how much it would be good for an individual to act from the moral point of view, we do not findan obvious answer.5 The considerationsof this paper suggest,at any rate, that the answer is not "as much as possible." This has implications both forthe continueddevelopmentof moral theoriesand forthedevelopment of metamoralviews and forour conceptionof moral phil5A similar view, which has stronglyinfluencedmine, is expressedby Thomas Nagel in "The Fragmentationof Value," in Mortal Questions (New York: Camsuch apparently inbridge, 1979), pp. 128-141. Nagel focuses on the difficulties commensurablepoints of view create for specific,isolable practical decisions that and by societies.In focusingon the way in which mustbe made both by individtuals thesepoints of view figureinto the developmentof individual personal ideals, the questions with which I am concernedare more likely to lurk in the backgroundof any individual's life.

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osophy more generally. From the moral point of view, we have reasons to want people to live lives that seem good fromoutside that point of view. If, as I have argued, this means that we have reason to want people to live lives that are not morally perfect, thenany plausible moral theory mustmake use of some conception of supererogation.6 If moral philosophersare to address themselves the most basic at level to thequestion of how people should live, however,theymust do more than adjust the content of their moral theoriesin ways thatleave room fortheaffirmation nonmoral values. They must of examine explicitlythe range and natureof thesenonmoral values, and, in lightof thisexamination,theymustask how theacceptance of a moral theoryis to be understood and acted upon. For the claims of this paper do not so much conflictwith the contentof any particular currently popular moral theoryas they call into question a metamoral assumption that implicitly surroundsdiscussions of moral theory moregenerally.Specifically, theycall into question theassumptionthatit is always better be morallybetter. to The role morality plays in thedevelopmentof our characters and the shape of our practical deliberations need be neitherthat of a universal medium into which all other values must be translated nor that of an ever-present filterthrough which all other values must pass. This is not to say that moral value should not be an important, even the most important,kind of value we attendto in evaluating and improvingourselvesand our world. It is to say that our values cannot be fullycomprehendedon the model of a hierarchical systemwith morality the top. at The philosophical temperament will naturally incline, at this point, towardasking, "What, then,is at the top-or, if thereis no top, how are we to decide when and how much to be moral?" In other words, thereis a temptationto seek a metamoral-though not, in the standard sense, metaethical-theory that will give us
6The varietyof formsthat a conception of supererogationmight take, however, has not generallybeen noticed.Moral theoriesthatmake use of thisnotion typically do so by identifying some specificset of principles as universalmoral requirements and supplement this list with a further of directives set which it is morallypraiseworthybut not required foran agent to follow. [See, e.g., Charles Fried,Right and Wrong(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1979).] But it is possible thatthe abilityto live a morallyblameless lifecannot be so easily or definitely securedas this typeof theory would suggest. The fact that thereare some situations in which an agent is morally required to do somethingand other situations in which it would be good but not required foran agent to do somethingdoes not imply thatthereare specific principles such that,in any situation,an agent is requiredto act in accordancewith theseprinciplesand otherspecificprinciplessuch that,in any situation,it would be good but not required foran agent to act in accordance with those principles.

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on principles,or, at least,informaldirectives thebasis of which we can develop and evaluate more comprehensive personal ideals. thatdistinguishesamong the various roles a perPerhaps a theory as son is expectedto play within a life-as professional, citizen,as us, and so on-might give us some rules thatwould offer if friend, in framework which to thinkabout and disnothing else, a better cuss thesequestions. I am pessimistic,however,about the chances results.For I do to of such a theory yield substantialand satisfying which would could be constructed not see how a metamoraltheory parallel to thosewhich seem inhernot be subject to considerations as of entlyto limit theappropriateness regardingmoral theories ulguides foraction. timatecomprehensive This suggests that,at some point, both in our philosophizing and in our lives, we must be willing to raise normativequestions to froma perspectivethatis unattachedto a commitment any parsystemof values. It must be admittedthat,in ticular well-ordered answersthatdiverge doing so, we run theriskof findingnormative from the answers given by whatever moral theoryone accepts. This, I take it, is the grain of truthin G. E. Moore's "open question" argument.In the backgroundof thispaper, then,therelurks a commitmentto what seems to me to be a healthyformof intuitionism. It is a formof intuitionismwhich is not intendedto take developed, moral theothe place of more rigorous, systematically ries-rather, it is intended to put these more rigorousand systematic moral theoriesin theirplace. of University Maryland
SUSAN WOLF

ON DOING GOOD: THE RIGHT AND THE WRONG WAY

(i) Do as much good as we can. (ii) Save lives wherewe can. (iii) Refrainfromkilling. Recent ethicistshave tended to focus on the relation between (ii) and (iii), on the question of whetherthereis any intrinsicmoral difference betweenfailing to save a life (lettingsomeone die) and takinga life(killing someone). But though I shall oftenhave occaon sion to refer the literature this subject,one of my main conto
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? 1982 The Journalof Philosophy, Inc.

us thosebidding to moralinjunctions: fundamental

in N this paper I am interested the relations governingthree