The Objective Horizon

Je DeVore December 2010 (1st revision 01/16/2012)

Abstract The conditions by which realism can be understood as a valid qualier of objects registered via a group of observers is examined. It has been determined that Newtonian realism fails both in the relativistic realm and the quantum realm. A detailed exposition of the meaning of objective classication, and the conditions by which objective classication arise, are given with the purpose of establishing a general method of distinguishing dierent observer types and the form of associated realism.

Introduction
Relational quantum mechanics and quantum Darwinism are two recent developments in the study of the foundations of quantum mechanics. Relational quantum mechanics asserts that a physical system only has a description relative to some second system and that this is a complete description of the world [1]. Properties of physical systems are considered to be meaningful only with respect to an observer. Relational quantum mechanics makes the hypothesis that all observers are equivalent. Carlo Rovelli states [1]:

All systems are equivalent: Nothing distinguishes a priori macroscopic systems from quantum systems. If the observer O can give a quantum description of the system S, then it is also legitimate for an observer P to give a quantum description of the system formed by the observer O. Rovelli maintains that there is no distinction between a quantum mechanical system and some special system said to be intrinsically classical. This hypothesis

is not consistent with the ideas put forward in the Copenhagen interpretation, that measurements and measurement devices are essentially classical. This is generally included as one of the axioms of the Copenhagen interpretation. Rovelli objects to this axiom on the grounds that it assumes some special observer type [1]. Quantum Darwinism attempts to put an end to the measurement problem and give an account of how a classical picture emerges within a measurement environment. Quantum Darwinism seeks to account for the element of physical reality put forward by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in the well known EPR paper [2]:

If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity. [...] Regarded not as a necessary, but merely as a sucient condition of reality, this criterion is in agreement with classical as well as quantum-mechanical ideas of reality. Quantum Darwinism supports a relative objectivity which Wojciech Zurek gives as the condition [3]:

When many observers can independently gather compatible evidence concerning an event, we call it relatively objective. With this David Poulin, Harold Ollivier, and Zurek give an operational denition of objectivity [4]:

A property of a physical system is objective when it is 1. simultaneously accessible to many observers, 2. who are able to nd out what it is without prior knowledge about the system of interest, and 3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agreement. 2

The purpose of this paper will be to examine the property of objectivity in depth and how it relates to realism, in order to give a general method for the classication of observer types.

Objectivity
Does having objective classication mean being independent of mind.? According to general denition, it does. However, the argument can be made that in dening objective classication in this way, we are restricting ourselves to those cases where mind is a relevant factor. This restriction is implied within the denition. If we are to test the objectivity of something, then we must introduce mind in order to see if what we are testing is truly independent of mind. Mind is understood to be any cognitive process including awareness and observation. We could argue that there is no need to introduce mind, and that mind is always present in human understanding. Let us consider, for example, a colony of termites. Termites will behave according to their natural way (instincts), regardless of whether an independent observer has knowledge of this behavior or not (this will be the case unless the insects are interfered with by the observer). We could then say, that we have eliminated mind from the argument, and that because the termite colony will continue in its natural way regardless of the observer, there is no need to introduce mind. If this is the case, then what is the natural way these termites behave? If we attempt to address this question we must introduce mind. This is to say, a description involves both a potentially objective phenomenon, and an observer. Without these two elements we cannot attempt to dene objective phenomena. In this way a description is a relation between the phenomenon and the observer, or between observed and observer.

It may be useful, then, to extend the denition of objective classication as being independent of any mind in particular. We may even disregard the element of mind and speak in terms of anything registering information. In this way, barring the condition that the observer cannot register the phenomenon, we could say that having objective classication means that any involved observer will be correlated with any other involved observer, and that this correlation is the necessary information for the objective denition of the observed phenomenon. However, this is not a sucient condition for some phenomena to be classied objective. It must be that any independent set of involved observers produces a commensurate denition. Being that this set of involved observers is independent, there would be no relevant information shared a priori between this set of involved observers and any other set of involved observers. In this way objective classication is not absolute; it is relative to the correlation information of a set of involved observers that are not restricted from sharing information. It can then be said that objective reality is the commensurate reality of a given set of observers that is open to all potentially involved observers. This could be summed up with a quote by Einstein on the relationship between theory and experiment:

No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong. This statement tells us that there is no established convention on the number of observers required to verify a theory and at no time can it be said that the theory is absolutely true. That is, it can be veried and agreed upon by a given nite set or possibly innite set of observers; yet considering that the question is open to any number of observers, or to any number of observations, it cannot be said to be absolutely true, only to be consistently true. Considering that 4

the consistency condition is relative only to involved observers that are not restricted from sharing information, then this consistency condition concerns the case of multiple observations. Accordingly this consistency condition establishes a form of realism with respect to the group of involved and commensurate observers. However, this realism cannot be extended to observers which do not qualify as members of this group of involved and commensurate observers, namely the uninvolved observer. The uninvolved observer of the rst kind is the observer that has not shared any relevant information with any set of involved observers, or registered any relevant phenomenon. The uninvolved observer of the second kind being, those observers sharing information with involved observers yet remaining uninvolved (not directly registering any relevant phenomena). An observer may be an involved observer, and yet not share commensurate information with respect to the group classifying the objective phenomenon; that observer cannot be considered a member of this group. This is the case if a set of involved observers is isolated from another set of involved observers, both groups may respectively establish their own consistency conditions, considering the isolation factor these two sets of observers cannot be said to be commensurate. It may also be the case that two or more independent sets of involved observers have inconsistent models of the qualities and/or quantities determining a complete description of a particular phenomenon, or the registration domain of a set of involved observers may be limited to a reduced set of these qualities and quantities. Respectively, these are the conditions of isolation, model consistency, and reduced registration domain.

Rules, Registration, Paradox

We can now address the question of the relationship between objective rules and the observer this question is in two parts:

1. Do these rules exist if the observer has not come into contact with them? 2. Do these rules exist if the observer cannot register them as internal states? This brings to mind an interesting paradox. Stanislaw J. Lec. posed the question:

If a man who cannot count nds a four-leaf clover, is he lucky? This paradox can be solved if we take a relational perspective: according to an independent observer who can count and who knows about the luck condition, this man is lucky. According to the man, he knows about the luck condition of nding a four-leaf clover but cannot determine if the clover he has found has four leaves, his luck is undetermined. The rule for assigning luck to clovers is dependent on the observer internalizing a counting rule: this man cannot count, therefore with respect to this man the rule of assigning luck to clovers does not exist. This is a condition of reduced registration domain. Lets examine a second paradox, similar to the one given above: If a woman who picks up a penny heads up, does not know that it is heads up, is she lucky? Again this paradox is solved by considering an independent observer: according to someone who sees the penny heads up and knows about the luck condition, this woman is lucky. According to the woman, if she knows about the luck condition but not the state of the penny, then her luck is undetermined. This is a case of the uninvolved observer of the second kind. If she doesnt know about the luck condition, but knows the state of the penny, then her luck is neither determined nor undetermined by this. In other 6

words if she doesnt know about the luck condition then her knowledge of the state of the penny is irrelevant as a factor determining her luck. This woman has not come into contact with the rule of assigning luck to pennies, with respect to this woman this rule does not exist. This is a condition of isolation. If she doesnt know about the luck condition, and she doesnt know the state of the penny, then her luck is neither determined nor undetermined by this. This is a case of the uninvolved observer of the rst kind. From examining these two paradoxes, we can see that the question of which phenomenon are objectively classiable relative to a set of observers is not only a question of mutual and commensurate information; it is also a question of the observer type and conditions. What is physical law? This question can be restricted and posed in one of two ways as follows:

1. Is physical law separate from the physical phenomena that it describes? 2. Is physical law non-separate from the physical phenomena that it describes? We can answer this question by eliminating one of these two possibilities; it is either separate or non-separate. However there is a third possibility, being that it is possibly both separate and non-separate. In order to get to the core of this question, a clear exposition of registration is obligatory. Registration requires two conditions a susceptibility to stimuli and a respective set of states subject to perturbation. A massive object susceptible to force and having a state of motion subject to perturbation, will accelerate under the inuence of that force. The accelerating state is correlated with the force stimulus. A stimulus must be present in order that registration may occur, apparently. One subtlety concerning this is the nature of a stimulus with respect to susceptibility to this stimulus. Considering a collision interaction, it is clear 7

that the impact is the stimulus which transfers or transforms momentum. It is the capacity for both objects of this collision to carry momentum which satises the state perturbation condition; it is the mutual properties of mass, relative velocity, and substance which satisfy the susceptibility condition. So we see an abstract property common to both systems and associated with their respective states, which is dependent on an interaction or stimulus; which is dependent on a susceptibility condition associated with the respective systems having mutual properties, common conditions, or exhibiting some kind of symmetry. This is a sequence of factors in the process of registration; removing one of these three factors will compromise the process. These are interdependent factors, and they illustrate that the process of registration requires an interaction between two or more things. Such a registration process is an essential element of data acquisition, and it is this process by which empirical relations are revealed. According to the scheme of classical physics, these registration processes take place on the background of a Cartesian coordinate system. This coordinate system is the basis for cataloging the processes of registration, and the quantities involved; in this way the coordinate system constitutes the view of the observer. In order that we might distinguish between dierent classes of observers lets call this the Cartesian observer. The Cartesian observer doesnt alter the dynamics of the registration process. This is the approach of Newtonian physics, and it involves the view that we can study phenomena without inuencing the dynamics or properties of the observed system. Along with the idea of this ideal Cartesian observer, the ideal measurement is one in which the observer has no inuence and natural laws can be studied as they are without alteration. The Cartesian observer is unrestricted, and may catalog any physical phenomena in completeness; this

means the registration domain of the Cartesian observer is unbounded. This observer is also strictly non-relativistic such that the properties of absolute simultaneity, mass, and other non-relativistic absolutes hold true. This observer is also not restricted by time and space considerations; the restriction of the null cone doesnt apply.

Light speed
The inertial observer was identied in the construction of the theory of special relativity. Einstein saw that absolute simultaneity was not consistent with the universal constant of the speed of light. The inertial observer replaced the absolute space and time of the Cartesian observer with the relative coordinate systems of inertial observers. Relativity details that an event may not be considered simultaneous for all inertial observers, this is not the case with the Cartesian observer. Einstein claried the role of the universal constant of the speed of light as objectively classiable for all inertial observers regardless of the reference frame of that inertial observer. This is a case where the model consistency was seen to be violated, that is if we force the model of simultaneous events for all physical observers, then we must abandon the empirically veriable constant of the speed of light. Einstein understood that any observer within the universe has the capacity to verify the constant of the speed of light and that any realistic consistency condition for observers within this universe cannot violate this. All observers must agree, the speed of light is constant. The inertial observer is also subject to a further restriction which is not imposed on the Cartesian observer: the inertial observer is restricted in its registration domain to only those events that are within the null cone of that inertial observer. The group of inertial observers

within any null cone denes a consistency condition on any invariant, or any physical quantity that is unchanged under a Lorentz transformation. This consistency condition further restricts the set of objectively classiable phenomena, i.e. a space time interval is invariant under a Lorentz transformation and therefore such an interval is objective with respect to the group of inertial observers. The realism of the inertial observer is not equivalent to the realism of the Cartesian observer. The inertial observer gives us a more precise picture of our world through the exposition of the invariant properties of natural phenomena. Relativity has provided insight into what can and cannot be considered elements of universal reality.

Quantum realism?
In an attempt to dene the nature of the observer in quantum mechanics we encounter what is known as the measurement problem. The measurement problem concerns the so called wave function collapse; the issue of wave function collapse arises from the principle of the completeness of the wave function. This principle states that the wave function is a complete description of the quantum system, however the wave function does not account for the denite state of the system determined through measurement. The wave function only allows us to calculate probabilities, not denite states. So it seems that a contradiction arises, stemming from the principle of completeness and the discontinuous evolution of the wave function into a denite state. Being that the measurement devices are essentially classical we can treat these measuring devices as Cartesian observers and restrict our discussion to the non-relativistic domain. We consider measurement in terms of a quantum system associated with a wave function, and a classical measurement device

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having established properties such as denite position and momentum. Bohr was an eminent proponent of the correspondence of a quantum property with its classical analogue; this analogous relationship is exemplied by the use of operators in correspondence with observables such as position and momentum. Dening the measurement apparatus to be in the class of Cartesian observers we meet another road block. It is understood that the Cartesian observer does not inuence the results of any measurement. It is also understood that with regard to the Cartesian observer the properties of the systems measured are absolutes and have realistic properties, such that the properties being measured have an established quality apart from the measurement apparatus (the Cartesian observer). This is not consistent with wave function collapse. What does it mean to have an established property apart from a measurement apparatus? It must be that this property is established according to a consistency condition relative to a set of observers isolated from the measurement apparatus. This set of isolated observers persists in having an established model consistency relative to the measurement apparatus. Measurement then produces a result consistent with this; the property is established as commensurate with respect to the set of observers and the apparatus upon measurement. The object of measurement may then be considered to be a thing in itself, to have an element of formal reality. It is the goal of the approach known as quantum Darwinism to eliminate the inuence of the measurement apparatus, and restore what is known as an element of physical reality to measurement [4]. This is accomplished by allowing for the quantum system to interact with its environment, a preferred and complete set of commuting observables associated with the quantum system is then redundantly encoded in the environment through a process known as einselection [4]. The quantum system may then be measured indirectly via

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registration of the pointer states persisting in the environment [5]. In this program we see two types of observers: the involved observer accounted for by the systems environment; and the uninvolved observer of the second kind, accounted for by the observer involved in the indirect measurement. The uninvolved observer of the second kind shares information with the involved observer, yet does not perform direct measurement. The approach of quantum Darwinism has been shone to admit a form of indeterminism with respect to the uninvolved observer of the second kind. If we are to eliminate the possibility that the einselected pointer states are not due to some second system, then the measurement must be traced back to the system in question [6]. This is a process by which the uninvolved observer executes direct measurement, by which the observer is then directly involved. This trace alters the environment in such a way that destroys the pointer states of the environment [6]. So it seems that if we are to accept the quantum Darwinism approach we must also accept the indeterminate or non-local nature of the description that it provides. A certain degree of indeterminacy provides for a non-local picture of the quantum system. Here the term non-local is used to qualify the nature of the description of the quantum system in the environment. The description is not associated with any particular fragment of the environment, it is redundantly encoded in the environment. In this way the quantum system is objectively classied relative to the basis of its environment. Quantum Darwinism allows us to recover the so called element of physical reality attributed to the Cartesian observer at the price of admitting indeterminism, however recovering the realism of the Cartesian observer in the quantum world may not be a viable option. Lets return to the discussion of registration. In terms of quantum Darwin-

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ism, registration of the quantum system is due to the process of einselection [4]. Fragments of the environment are distinguished as having a nearly complete description of the system, and this description is a property of the pointer states of that fragment, in this way the system is registered with respect to the ensemble of particles constituting the environment [5]. The environment establishes a consistency condition on the quantum system relative to its basis; this constitutes an objective classication of the system relative to the environment. The objective classication is relative to this group (the environment) and it does not admit observers which catalog registration histories. What then are those observers which catalog registration histories? Also, what are those observers which do not? Lets take another look at the collision interaction used to illustrate the process of registration. In particular, lets examine the collision interaction in a manner which only involves a single massive body of the collision. How is the collision registered with respect to one of these massive bodies, can we say that this massive body registers the history of a collision? It seems that there should be some registered information corresponding to the history and accounting for the collision. Again we introduce an observer, but in this case the observer is dened only with respect to a single massive body of the collision, and does not catalog a priori the history of any collision or any second massive body potentially involved. What we have is an uninvolved observer of the second kind. This observer then nds the massive body to have a vibratory mode, translational momentum, and zero angular momentum; by induction the vibratory mode can be associated with a collision. The massive body also has some relative velocity; by induction this relative velocity can be associated with a collision. Taken together the velocity vector and the direction of propagation of the transverse/longitudinal vibratory modes of the massive body dene a plane

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in the 3-space of the observer. Any collision interaction which might have occurred before observation must also be in this plane. The model of conservation of momentum cannot be used in determining the details of a possible interaction because of the limitations we have placed on the observer (no reference to secondary bodies); it is because of this that the uninvolved observer of the second kind cannot account for the registration history of this massive body. Cataloging a registration history would involve information on a second massive body involved in a collision with the rst; this information is not available to this type of observer. One could argue that this could be accounted for by the reduced registration domain of the massive body, and if the massive body contains an accelerometer then we can account for the collision, in this way the registration history is accounted for. It is important to consider this, and it will be of particular importance to consider this at the level of quantum theory. Bells inequalities and the bell type EPR experiments, show that there are no-go theorems which can be constructed for certain classes of hidden variable theories of quantum mechanics. Through a thought experiment which is modeled after the GHZ experiment and constructed by David Mermin [7], it has been shone that the GHZ triplets do not carry instruction sets. The existence of instruction sets associated with any one of the triplets would allow the particle to encode a set of measurement interaction instructions relative to the states of the other two constituent particles of the triplet. This would explain the mysterious correlations produced in this type of experiment [7]. However, the existence of these instruction sets is excluded by considering the data of a second arrangement of the experimental set up; this data is not consistent with the model of instruction sets [7]. These instruction sets are known as non-contextual hidden variables. The existence of these instruction

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sets would account for a quantum mechanical cataloging of the registration history associated with each particle of the GHZ triplet. In order that any particle carry an instruction set it must catalog its registration history with respect to the other two members of the triplet. If this were the case this particle would know the states of the other two particles and thus respond to measurement accordingly. However, this is not the case. We have outlined how realism is established with respect to the environment of a quantum system through einselection; it becomes apparent that this form of realism is not established with respect to the triplet of the GHZ experiment. The GHZ experiment involves direct measurement; there is no procedure of allowing for einselection and indirect measurement. Furthermore the context of direct measurement establishes a priori that the basis of measurement will be consistent with the experimental apparatus itself and not relative to a set of pointer states of the environment. In this way the program of quantum Darwinism gives us a natural mechanism for the establishment of realism in the classical world. The GHZ experiment suggests that a quantum system can not be considered a thing in itself; that it is not established with respect to any consistency condition apart from an environment or measurement apparatus. Aage Petersen [8] gives an account of the philosophy of Niels Bohr:

There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract physical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to nd out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature...

According to the complementary principle a quantum system can be observed to have a particle nature or a wave nature but not both simultaneously. This is a principle relating to the model consistency of two sets of observers, if one set of 15

involved observers establishes that a quantum system exhibits wave properties a second set of uninvolved observers must verify this, or establish a new model. The involved observer objecties the consistency condition and establishes the model; any uninvolved observer must either verify this or establish an inconsistent model. All models are eectively classical, a model is not established in the quantum system, if it where then we could consider that quantum system to be a thing in itself, it is not, yet it is the object of the model. If it is the case that the uninvolved observer establishes an inconsistent model, this may only be the case if that uninvolved observer becomes an involved observer through direct measurement or direct alteration of the measurement context; this would then establish the rst observer to be of the uninvolved type. We see this interplay between involved and uninvolved observer in John Wheelers [9] delayed choice experiment. In the delayed choice experiment an observer may choose to alter the context of the experiment before measurement takes place. The experiment may then produce a wave model or a particle model, and an object of that model according to the choice of experimental context.

Symmetry
Is there some thing missing from this picture? There are models which are well established with respect to the group of all elementary particles. One such model is the conservation of lepton number. Charge conservation is another such model. As we saw with the redundantly encoded information of quantum Darwinism, the state of the quantum system is objectively classied with respect to its environment. We see this again with symmetry, however, in this case the pointer states constitute conserved quantities and the environment is the entire

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eld of matter, not simply the local environment performing einselection relative to its basis. The universe has picked out a preferred basis corresponding to a set of conservation laws, and as a result we see that all matter is objectively dened with respect to this universal basis. In this case model inconsistency does not play a role, due to the universal nature of the consistency condition, all observers agree. This idea may be interesting to examine in terms of symmetry breaking in the early universe.

Conclusion
Two types of observers have been identied, the involved and the uninvolved observer. The conditions of isolation, reduced registration domain, and model consistency are factors that may restrict the involved observer from inclusion in the group of observers dening a consistency condition. Under certain conditions the uninvolved observer of the second kind can be considered equivalent to an involved observer having a reduced registration domain. In dening the involved observer we included the condition that this observer have the capacity to register the phenomenon in question. If this condition is not satised, that observer is considered to be an uninvolved observer with respect to that phenomenon. Observers cataloging registration histories are those observers which record the processes of registration, involving three factors: interactions, sets of relative states, and susceptibility conditions. Any observer with an incomplete but partial picture of these processes is considered an uninvolved observer of the second kind with respect to these processes. This type of observer is considered in the illustration of the collision interaction; without an accelerometer or equivalent instrument attached to the massive body (the observer), the collision process is not given a complete description.

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This conception of registration is in the spirit of Machs [10] view of time:

It is utterly beyond our power to measure the changes of things by time. Quite the contrary, time is an abstraction at which we arrive by means of the changes of things. Any involved observer with the capacity to order a causal chain of events may infer a physical interaction or process through the registration of the initial and nal states of the system(s). A susceptibility condition may also be inferred from the initial and nal states of the systems; the states perturbed will correspond to the properties satisfying the susceptibility condition. We call this the causal observer. This causal observer will admit time reversal, and registers the eects of physical interactions or processes dependent on susceptibility conditions. This observer distinguishes events in the time domain according to changes associated with physical interactions or processes and does not necessarily distinguish a direction of time. Consider a class of observers without the capacity to order a causal chain of events (physical interactions and processes are determined through inference, by specication of an initial (nal) and nal (initial) state). This type of observer cannot give a complete description of a registration process due to the indeterminate nature of any process or interaction event associated with a set of initial and nal states. This, causal indeterminacy can be described as collapse of the observers time domain. Any observable state subject to time evolution would then simultaneously take on all values over its range; the time domain is reduced to a singularity, and the apparent state of the observed system would be indeterminate with respect to this type of observer. However, any static observable state would be uniquely determined. This class of observers denes a consistency condition on any mutual and commensurate static observable: in this case the consistency condition is not dened with respect to multiple obser-

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vations (the time domain has been reduced to a singularity), it is dened with respect to multiple observers, and with respect to all observers admitted in this group, the static observable is determined according to the consistency condition. This class of observers will not catalog any registration history, because it is not possible for this observer type to give a description of any physical interaction or process. This class of observers satises two conditions, it does not admit those observers which catalog registration histories, and it supports a universal consistency condition on a static observable or conserved quantity. It is suggested here that this observer type is the quantum observer. It should also be noted that a minimal registration domain of one bit would also not allow an observer to record any registration histories. With respect to an uninvolved causal observer of the second kind, this causal indeterminacy could be modeled as an apparent superposition of states. The system in question could be in multiple positions, have multiple energy values, et cetera; the static observable states would however be uniquely determined. If this causal observer performs direct measurement of the system, a denite state associated with a time value would be found upon measurement with respect to this involved casual observer (every causal observer need not have the same time model). The Feynman path integral formulation is one approach to quantum mechanics; this method requires that the quantum system be modeled as taking on all possible positions in a eld of position states. Furthermore, the quantum system is described according to the propagator over the measurement events. The eld of position states is made consistent with the causal model of measurement events via considering all paths over the eld of position states between the two measurement events, the model of paths is then consistent with the initial and nal measurement events. Here it is suggested that the quantum observer does not catalog registration

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histories because it is non-causal or time independent. A famous anonymous quote about the nature of time bears a great deal of resemblance to the picture of the complement between the causal and the quantum observer given in this discussion: time is what keeps things from happening all at once.

References
[1] Rovelli, Carlo. Relational Quantum Mechanics. arXiv, Feb. 1997. [2] Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen. Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete? physical review, 47, 777(Mar. 1935). [3] Zurek, Wojciech. Decoherence, Einselection, and the Quantum Origins of the Classical. arXiv, (Jan. 2003). [4] Poulin D., Ollivier H., Zerek W.. Environments as a witness: Selective Proliferation of Infromation and Emergence of Objectivity in a Quantum Universe. arXiv, (Nov. 2005). [5] Zurek, Wojciech. Relative States and the Environment: Einselection, Envariance, Quantum Darwinism, and the Existential Interpretation. arXiv, (Jul. 2007). [6] Fields, Chris. Quantum Darwinism requires an extra-theoretical assumption of encoding redundancy. arXiv, (May 2010). [7] Mermin, David. Quantum Mysteries Revisited. Am. J. Phys., 58 (8), (Aug. 1990): 731-734 [8] Aage Petersen. "The philosophy of Niels Bohr." the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 19, No. 7 (September 1963) [9] Wheeler, John. Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Theory: Proceedings of the New Orleans Conference on the Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Theory, edited by A. R. Marlow (Academic, New York, 1978). Reprinted in Quantum Theory and Measurement, edited by J. A. Wheeler and W. H. Zurek (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1983), pp. 182-213. [10] Mach, Ernst. The Science of Mechanics. Open Court, 1960.

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