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Abstract
There are many potential ignition sources in the oil and gas industry (drilling, petrochemical, refining and production). Some of them are hot work, internal combustion engines, improperly classified or maintained electrical equipment, lighting, and adjacent fire equipment. These are typically controlled using measures such as hot work permits for: - Welding/burning - Hot work or vehicle entry permit requirements to operate engines inside posted areas - Proper electrical classification along with maintenance programs - Programs/practices to prevent and detect releases of flammable materials A large number of diesel engines (in vehicles, lighting towers, power generators and other equipment) are used in the oil and gas industry for day-to-day operations. Diesel engine runaway is a serious hazard where flammable hydrocarbon emissions or leaks may occur. Hydrocarbons drawn into diesel engines through the air intake system act as an uncontrolled fuel source and can lead to dangerous engine overspeed or runaway. When an operator cannot shut down the engine using conventional methods (i.e. turning off the engine ignition switch) it could result in a total runaway engine. These could range from minor engine damage to engine and plant explosion, causing catastrophic damage to the equipment and surrounding facilities and/or death or injuries, such as the Texas City refinery and Deepwater Horizon explosions. Fortunately, there is simple, inexpensive technology available which can prevent a diesel engine runaway. The paper is presented to increase awareness and lessons learned from many accidents involving runaway diesel engines. The author will present what companies are doing around the world to avoid diesel engine runaway as an ignition source for explosions in the hydrocarbon industry.
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Vice-president Amot Controls Corporation
1. Introduction
High levels of uncertainty require larger margins of safety. The potential combinations of fuel-hydrocarbons, oxygen-air, and energy-ignition are highly complex; making exact predictions of what is safe and unsafe, difficult and often impractical. The science needed to prove conclusively if combinations near explosive limits will be safe is not yet available. The elimination of ignition sources is a well-known strategy to protect people, investments and the environment from fire and explosions because without the energy to ignite flammable gases, a hydrocarbon release (HCR) incident is far less likely to develop into a catastrophic failure situation. This is not to say that ignition source elimination strategies should act alone. Indeed, elimination of ignition sources must form part of an overall safety strategy. The elimination of the energy (ignition source) can avoid a serious hydrocarbon release becoming a fire and explosion. The oil and gas and refining industry has experienced a significant increase in vapor cloud explosions within the last five years. These explosions have resulted in a large number of fatalities and environmental damage. The BP Texas City refinery and Macondo Well/Deepwater Horizon incidents clearly demonstrate the risks associated with runaway diesel engines operating in hazardous environments. With the Shale gas drilling activity at all-time high, the risk of an unprotected diesel engine runaway causing fire and explosion is real and must be addressed. The intent of this paper is to raise awareness within the industries processing hydrocarbons about: The potential fire and explosion hazards associated with runaway diesel engines The time it takes for an overspeed condition to occur after initial vapor release Safe work practices operators should follow when operating diesel engines in hazardous areas Risk to oil and gas companies when they allow unprotected diesel engines into their facilities The responsibility of all employers to properly train employees and contractors on the safe operation of diesel engines. Oil, gas and petrochemical companies which handle, or are exposed to hydrocarbons or other combustible gases, should systematically identify hazards related to possible releases to the atmosphere of these materials. The results of the hazard identification process should be used to evaluate the consequences of hazardous events and to determine appropriate risk reduction. Risk reduction measures should focus on: Preventing incidents (i.e., reducing the probability of occurrence) Controlling incidents (i.e., limiting the extent and duration of a hazardous event) Mitigating the effects (i.e., reducing the consequences)
4. Release Causes
The following are common causes of releases and leaks that can contribute to a diesel engine overspeed condition: Hazardous area maintenance work Leaking control or safety relief valves Equipment failure Gasket failure/flange leak Operator errors Pump seal/valve packing/fittings leak Overpressuring process equipment Sight glass blowout Natural disaster (e.g., earthquake) Electrical problem Holes due to corrosion Gas and oil well blowouts Plant start-up/shutdown Instrument calibration and deviation Process upset Metal fatigue Power dip or interruption Leaking/broken lines/pipes/fittings 3
Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 Hazardous areas are classified into zones based on an assessment of the frequency of the occurrence and duration of an explosive gas atmosphere. Diesel engine should be protected for Zone 1 and Zone 2 areas.
8. Safe Distance
The global standards are based on technical studies that include gas dispersion modeling under different atmospheric conditions, surface roughness, wind speed, release hole location and size, wind speed and land topography. When you want to define a safety distance between a well bore and equipment, it is necessary to consider the worst case scenario where you evaluate the catastrophic failure, along with a more realistic or less severe scenario, that may occur more frequently. For instance, when a release occurs where the sun cannot heat the ground as fast as the ground cools, the mechanical turbulence by wind is suppressed by the influence from the buoyancy, which occasionally occurs during night time. This may lead to a worst case scenario even without the catastrophic failure. A good example of this was the Buncefield explosion where the atmosphere conditions were stable for the hydrocarbon vapors to disperse into the atmosphere, but rather started to propagate in ground level, causing worst consequences. All engines operating within 100 feet of the well bore or process area must be protected to prevent fire and explosion.
In addition, based on the Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE - Process Safety Beacon, October 2009 Safety Alert, the following steps can minimize or eliminate the safety risks associated with runaway diesel engines: 5
Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 Never drive into an area where you suspect there might be a flammable vapor cloud. Protect equipment driven by an internal combustion engine as this can also act as an ignition source. Such equipment might include mobile or portable generators, air compressors, engine driven pumps, and lawn mowers. Educate personnel that the normal engine shutoff methods will not work as long as flammable vapor continues to enter the intake system. Install an automatic overspeed shutdown system on stationary, mobile and vehicular diesel engines operating in hazardous environment. This system detects the speed and activates the shutdown system as the engine speed level reaches an unsafe limit. Train site security personnel that control access to applicable facilities or areas. Inspect applicable engines for an automatic overspeed protection device prior to entering the facility. Educate employees, contractors and other users on how to properly maintain a diesel engine overspeed protection device.
Figure 5 - Automatic overspeed shutdown system with manual override Manual systems are available in: Manual electric overspeed shutdown systems Manual electric to pneumatic shutdown systems Pneumatic manual shutdown systems 6
Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 Cable operated shutdown systems
Manual systems as shown in Figure 6, are typically installed on smaller, vehicular or portable engines where an operator is continually present to activate the toggle switch or pull the cable handle to shutoff the air to the engine.
Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 intervention at every step. Refineries, gas production facilities and petrochemical facilities should not depend solely on PSM standards to prevent runaway diesel engine incidents. Why? A runaway diesel engine, depending upon the richness of the environment, can explode in less than 60 seconds. Engine runaway can occur at any time and the gas cloud would typically reach the running engine in the area before the gas detector and will speed up the engine. If the engines air intake is not closed quickly, it could result in a valve bounce causing flames, spark, and ignition air and gas mixture travels through the intake. As the environment gains saturation and approaches the flammable limits, the engine runs faster and gets to the valve float / runaway condition sooner and explodes. When it explodes, the plume of flame ignites the air resulting in detonation. In case of a sudden hydrocarbon release, the goal is to protect workers and operators. In many documented cases, workers were severely injured or killed while trying to manually shut down diesel powered equipment or vehicles. The human instinct is for the operator or worker to use manual methods (clothing, books, piece of wood) to try to block the air intake to stop a diesel engine from overspeeding. This is very dangerous and is not an acceptable practice to control ignition sources in an oil and gas facility. Recent incidents confirm that the current PSM standards and Hot Work Permit programs by themselves cannot prevent runaway diesel engine explosion.
Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 first gas detector to sense the leak. Moreover, there is rarely enough confidence in gas detectors to allow them to automatically take any action. If a diesel engine is equipped with an overspeed shutdown valve, the engine will be shut down as soon as the engine crosses the safe speed limit preventing explosion.
Acknowledgements:
The Runaway Diesel-a side by side comparison-by C. Ferrone, Charles Sinkovits; Triodyne Inc. Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE-Process Safety Beacon, October 2009 James Thompson-ABS Consulting-Controlling Ignition Sources Dr. Sam Mannan-Mary OConnor Process Safety Center-Texas A&M Professor Trevor Kletz- Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering, the Royal Society of Chemistry, the Institution of Chemical Engineers, and the American Institute of Chemical Engineers.
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