Constitutional Law I. General considerations A.

Political Law That branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the state and defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. B. Branches of Political Law Constitutional Law I - powers and structure of Philippine Gov. II - Inherent powers of the State. Bill of Rights. Administrative Law Study of organization, powers and functions. Relationship between administrative bodies of the government. Law of Public Officers Election Laws Governs elections. Qualifications of candidates. Laws governing campaigns etc. Law on Municipal Corporations Local Government Law C. Constitutional Law, defined. Definition: Study of the structure and powers of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It also deals with certain basic concepts of Political law. Sinco refers to descent of law embodied in the constitution and the principles grooving out of the interpretation of the provisions. Nature of the state Supremacy of the Constitution Separation of Powers The rule of the majority

Types of constitutional law (p. 347): Written A constitution whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents. Unwritten Consists or rules which have not been integrated into a single, concrete form. These rules may include statutes of a fundamental character, judicial decisions, customs and traditions, and certain common law principles. Conventional An enacted constitution, formally struck off at a definite time and place following a conscious effort taken by a constituent body. Cumulative The result of political evolution not inaugurated at any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method. Rigid Can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process. Flexible Can be changed by ordinary legislation. FROM CLASS I. English Type E.g. UK. Constitution is unwritten/uncodified. Acts of the Parliament, Decisions of the Courts, Customs and traditions. Judiciary without judicial review. I.e. cannot declare a law unconstitutional. Judicial power resolution of conflicts brought before the courts, determining rights of parties through application of law. Parliamentary supremacy. II. Continental European Type E.g. France. Constitution is written/codified. Judiciary without judicial review. Judicial Preview. Constitutional Council determines whether the law is unconstitutional before the law is implemented. III. American Type E.g. The Philippines. Written/codified. Judiciary that can exercise judicial review. The Philippines have expanded judicial review. The constitution of the Philippines is written, conventional and rigid.

D. Constitutional Democracy and Constitutionalism. Constitutional Democracy (p.50 ff.): Section 1 of Art. II provides: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. Representative and democratic nature of government. The people are declared supreme. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation. Constitutionalism E. Constitution, defined. Constitution: That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised. [Cooley, Constitutional Limitations] With particular reference to the Constitution of the Philippines. That written instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments of their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. [Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law] The Social Contract Theory: Hobbes advocate for absolute authority/monarchy. State of nature is evil without authority. John Locke the waiver of rights was conditional. Natural rights were not waived. Rousseau Purpose and Role of a Constitution: Constitution limits the power of the government. To prescribe the permanent framework of a system of government, to assign to the several departments their respective powers and duties, and to establish certain first principles on which government is founded. Classifications of Constitutions: Written A constitution whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents. Unwritten Consists or rules which have not been integrated into a single, concrete form. These rules may include statutes of a fundamental character, judicial decisions, customs and traditions, and certain common law principles. Conventional An enacted constitution, formally struck off at a definite time and place following a conscious effort taken by a constituent body.

Cumulative The result of political evolution not inaugurated at any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method. Rigid Can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process. Essential Qualities of a Good Written Constitution: A) Broad Must be comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency. All areas relevant to governance. B) Brief Details more adjustable to change and easier to amend. C) Definite To prevent ambiguity in its provisions. Essential Parts of a Good Written Constitution: a) Constitution of Liberty The series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of sewing the enjoyment of those rights. b) Constitution of Government The series of provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain voles relative to its administration, and defining the electorate. c) Constitution of Sovereignty The provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about. Methods of Constitutional Interpretation and Construction: Getting the meaning of the Constitution. The Court interprets the Constitution. a) Verba legis - Wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. b) Ratio legis est anima Where there is ambiguity the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby. c) Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. A provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions

d) Self-executing provisions. A provision which lays down a general principle is usually not selfexecuting. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation. e) In case of doubt , the provisions should be considered self-executing, mandatory rather than directory, and prospective rather than retroactive. Textualism Textualists, like Antonin Scalia on the U.S. Supreme Court, agree with Strict Constructionists that the proper scope of inquiry into Constitutional interpretation begins and ends with the text itself--not with the "intent" of the writers, the philosophies of judges, or the consensus of society. However, Textualism differs from Strict Constructionism in its appreciation for context and its search for the understood meaning of constitutional language, as opposed to the literal meaning of the words in isolation. For example, Scalia cites the 1993 case Smith v. United States as an instance in which the literal interpretation strayed from the reasonable meaning of the law. In this case, the Smith had been arrested for purchasing drugs, and, in accordance with the applicable law, had received a harsher than usual sentence because he had "used a gun" while committing the crime. Scalia argues that the language is reasonably understood to mean the use of a gun as a weapon, whereas Smith had merely offered the unloaded gun in exchange for the drugs. The Supreme Court - employing a Strict Constructionist rationale - upheld the increased penalty. A textualist interpretation would have construed the law's language according to its natural meaning, instead of by its literal meaning. A central argument by adherents of both textualism and strict constructionalism is that less-strict interpretations of the constitution can become a method of legislative activism by judges, which they feel is an abuse of judicial power. This concern might be phrased as "making the law say what you think it should say, rather than submitting to what it does say." This would be a form of judicial usurpation of legislative power.

Originalism [From class: original understanding of the people and intent of the framers] The originalist approach aspires to interpret constitutional text in light of original intentions or understandings of the founding fathers who wrote the Constitution. Advocates of originalism are centrally concerned with discovering the subjective intentions of the figures who wrote or framed particular constitutional provisions. They tend to focus on the original public meaning or understanding of a constitutional provision for the generation that ratified or amended that provision. Originalism differs from Textualism in that it looks to the subjective intent of the lawmaker, instead of looking to the objective meaning of the language as understood (by any reasonably well-educated third party) at the time of its enactment.

Holistic, Political & Moral Right Theory (Dworkinian), Critical Theory) A holistic interpretation or reading of the Constitution entails an "integrated" analysis or a "unified" conception of the constitution. Rejects "clause-bound" or "blinkered" textualism as an incomplete and inappropriate approach to constitutional interpretation, because it examines and tries in vain to make sense of constitutional provisions in a piecemeal fashion-without regard to the rest of the constitutional text or structure. Instead constitutional interpretation should illuminate a given part of the Constitution in terms of how it fits within the whole.

Critical legal scholarship takes up the realist notion of legal uncertainty, but approaches it through a different line of inquiry in order to demonstrate that the law is indeterminate. This line of inquiry starts by identifying the "paired oppositions and standard sets of arguments" (24) embedded in legal discourse. Given any factual circumstance, the law is capable of grounding arguments that can lead to a number of differing results. Such inquiry, thus, demonstrates that legal rules and principles lack both structural integrity and predictive value. Instead, critical scholars claim substantive law is made up of conflicting principles. While the law may hold itself out to be a "seamless web of rules," (25) critical scholarship posits that it is an "unruly miscellany," (26) a collection of principles rife with gaps, contradictions and ruptures. Since the law is indeterminate, judicial interpretation amounts to an exercise in which some principles are privileged and others are suppressed. The work of legal arbiters is, thus, one of legislation: choosing between conflicting principles and imbuing the privileged ones with the normative force of the law. Their guide in this process of selection and suppression is ideology--a point to which I will return.

[Dworking: What is politically and morally right] Dworkins concern to escape the limitations of positivism is to affirm laws capacity to defend broad liberal values of individual freedom and autonomy, if necessary against majority wishes reflected in government policies. He sees a central task of law as to prevent, not aid, the tyranny of the majority. Dworkins position is not framed as a defence of common law thoughts. His emphasis is on the protection of rights and on the moral autonomy of the citizen. Rights, for Dworkin, are thus antecedent to and give meaning to legal rules; that law is more fundamental than rules and that rules are incomplete and problematic expression of the content of law. This position is close to classical common law thought which recognizes the essence of law in principles expressing the reason of law, not in rules. Once the task of the judge has been defined as to enforce rights and obligations whose present power is independent of the majority will judges are in no sense legislators. They do not derive authority, like democratic legislature, from their representing the will of the majority. Nor is it the judges task to

implement that will, however it is to be understood. Judicial authority must derive from a different source and support a different role from that of a legislature. Like Roscoe Pound, Dworkin see the judge as deriving both the authority to develop law and the resources to do so from within law itself, not from some external source such as Austinian sovereign whose policy defines this authority of which judges use in their task of interpreting hard cases. Principles are part of law in the sense that they control and regulate officials. Dworkins strategy is to show that principles, which cannot be reduced to legal rules, are treated in practice by courts as legal authorities which cannot be ignored: that they are essential elements in reaching decision in hard cases. Dworkin seeks to argue that in all cases a structure of legal principles stands behind and informs the applicable rules. The judge must make the law the best that it can be through creative interpretation of existing legal resources, but no non-legal materials are to be used in doing so. There is simply no room for the exercise of strong judicial discretion.

Francisco Jr. vs. House of Representatives: On July 22, 2002 , the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of

Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General. Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official.

Article XI of the Constitution SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice) (8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

Methods of Interpretation: First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the

people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. A provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions. ISSUE: The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order. "Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action". As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records. It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral. Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. DECISION: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.

Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Presumptions in Constitutional Interpretation Constitution is Self-Executing: Collector of Customs vs. Villaluz. On July 1, 1971, petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardo filed against Cesar T. Makapugay, a letter complaint with respondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court claiming that Cesar T. Makapugay "with malicious intention to defraud the government criminally, willfully and feloniously brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of "untaxed blue seal" Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch Whiskey, also "untaxed", without the necessary permit from the proper authorities. These were seized. Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary investigation, and on July 6, 1971, issued the challenged order, dismissing the case with prejudice and ordering the return of the seized property. Armed with said order, private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner release the articles so stated. Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the order due to the "prior institution of seizure proceedings thereon." Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul and set aside the order dated July 6, 1971 on the ground that respondent Judge has no power to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal complaints directly filed with him, cannot legally order the dismissal "with prejudice" of a criminal case after conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, and is without authority to order the return of articles subject of seizure proceedings before Customs authorities. Judges of the regular Courts of First Instance are expressly conferred the authority to conduct preliminary examination and investigation by Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court: Section 13. Preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the Court of First Instance. Upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance, without previous preliminary examination and investigation conducted by the fiscal, the judge thereof shall either refer the complaint to the justice of the peace referred to in the second paragraph of Section 2, hereof - for preliminary examination and investigation, or himself conduct both preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously in the manner provided in the preceding sections, and should he find reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed the offense charged, he shall issue a warrant for his arrest,

and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information. (emphasis supplied). Section 14. Preliminary examination and investigation by provincial or city fiscal or by state attorney in cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance. Except where an investigation has been conducted by a judge of first instance, justice of the peace or other officer in accordance with the provisions of the preceding sections no information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or city fiscal, or state attorney, without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him or by his assistant by issuing a corresponding subpoena. ... Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioners of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution, providing: 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Art. III, 1773 Constitution, emphasis supplied). It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited by the Philippine Constitution to judges exclusively, unlike in previous organic laws and the Federal Constitution of the United States that left undetermined which public officials could determine the existence of probable cause. The valid seizure of a person can only be executed through a lawful warrant of arrest. Arrest without a warrant can only be legally effected by a police officer or private individual a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; b) when an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1964 Revised Rules of Court). In all other cases, there must be a valid warrant of arrest. When the seizure of a person is made without a warrant of arrest or with a warrant of arrest which is not based on a determination by the judge of the existence of probable cause, the arrest becomes unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. 1. The challenged order of July 6, 1971 issued by the respondent Judge in G.R. No. L-34038 (Collector of Customs, etc. vs. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, et al.) dismissed the criminal complaint filed by petitioners therein against private respondent with prejudice, obviously meaning that the case may not be refiled without exposing the accused to double jeopardy. The respondent Judge seriously erred in so issuing said order, contravening as it does a basic legal principle on double jeopardy, and committing thereby a grave abuse of discretion. The constitutional right against double jeopardy exists, not after the first

preliminary examination or investigation, but only after the first trial which results either in conviction or acquittal or in the dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid complaint or information and after the accused had pleaded to the charge (Sec. 9, Rule 117, WHEREFORE, IN G.R. NOS. L-34243, 36376, 38688 AND 39525, THE PETITIONS ARE HEREBY DISMISSED AND THE WRITS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR RESTRAINING ORDERS ISSUED THEREIN ARE HEREBY LIFTED; IN G.R. No. L-40031, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED; AND IN G.R. NO. L-34038, THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED JULY 6, 1971 IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID INSOFAR AS THE SAME DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASE WITH PREJUDICE AND INSOFAR AS THE SAME DIRECTED THE RETURN TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT THEREIN OF THE ARTICLES SEIZED FROM HIM WHICH ARE NOW SUBJECT OF SEIZURE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES, AND THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREIN IS HEREBY MADE PERMANENT. NO COSTS.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS. The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollary, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution. The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986 , decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 1 A provision which lays down a general

principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-selfexecuting . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. 15 It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties. WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

Constitution is Mandatory: It is not itself subject to optional consent by individuals. (Reason and Morality, Alan Gewirth, University of Chicago Press)

Constitution is Prospective: Relating to or effective in the future. Prospective effect. As opposed to retrospective.

Amendments and Revision (ch. 18): Article XVII provides that the constitution may be changed either by amendment or revision. Amendment refers to isolated or piecemeal change only, as distinguished from revision, which is a revamp or rewriting of the whole instrument.

Methods of changing the Constitution: Change in the Constitution may be effected by a mere modification in its interpretation by the courts of justice. Some provisions, iron rules, cannot be altered except by formal amendment. E.g. The provisions on the age qualifications of certain officers of their term of office. Congress acting as Constituent Assembly. Upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members. Constitutional Convention. Peoples Initiative (Amendment only).

Defensor-Santiago vs. Comelec. The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections a "Petition to Amend the Constitution (Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution), to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; 2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; 3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13 On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments: (1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed. (2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. (3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication. (4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law. (5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative. (6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. This provision is not self-executory. The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2. The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition. Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. DECISION: This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered a) GRANTING the instant petition; b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation; c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

Lambino vs. Comelec. Peoples initiative, Amendment vs. Revision, Proposal (3methods). These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present BicameralPresidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. The Issues The petitions raise the following issues: 1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and 3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition. There is no merit to the petition. The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature." The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. [A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot. 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or (2) A constitutional convention. Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied) Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative. Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."39

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.40 Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered. However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution. In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153. Steps/Stages in Amendment/Revision Process Proposal (3 methods) In re Subido On 16 March 1967, acting pursuant to Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the Congress by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, passed Resolution No. 2 calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution. On 17 June 1969 the Congress in the same manner passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 and adding a new provision as Section 8 thereof, which reads: SEC. 8. Any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, That it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution.

The implementing legislation, Republic Act No. 6132 was approved on 24 August 1970. The petitioners assail the validity of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6132, and Section 8(a), paragraph 2, of the same Act on the grounds: (a) they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution No.2. Republic Act No. 6132 being an enactment of the Congress, sitting as a legislative body, which cannot validly amend the Resolution passed by it as a constituent assembly; (b) that Section 4 of the said Act constitutes class legislation which denies the equal protection of the laws, since in effect it disqualifies public officials and employees from serving as Delegates to the Constitutional Convention by considering them resigned from office upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy a disqualification that does not apply to persons employed in private enterprises

HELD 1. That Section 3 of Resolution No. 2, in providing that "the office of Delegate shall be honorary and shall be compatible with any other public office," is a mere declaration which does not affect the intrinsic nature of the Office of Delegate from the standpoint of its compatibility or incompatibility with any other public office within the meaning of the Constitution; that a compatible office does not necessarily preclude its being subject to such restrictions as may be imposed by the Congress in the exercise of its legislative power as long as such restrictions do not contravene the Constitution 2. That viewed in this light there is no inconsistency between the declaration in Section 3 of Resolution No. 2 and the provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6132, and that in fact this Section, as well as Section 8(a), paragraph 2, are in accord with Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits officers and employees in the Civil Service, including members of the armed forces, from engaging "directly or indirectly in partisan political activities" or taking part "in any election except to vote" 3. That whatever the Congress (as a constituent assembly) might have intended by the declaration aforesaid it could not have been to allow government officials and employees, without exception, to run for or hold the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention without relinquishing the positions, considering that the Congress itself (as a constituent assembly), in line with the prohibition in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, provided in Section 2 of the same Resolution No. 2 that "The Delegates to the Convention shall be elected in an election to be held on the second Tuesday in November, 1970, in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Election Code; 4. That although the aforequoted clause of Section 2 of Resolution No. 2 was subsequently omitted in Resolution No. 4, it is nevertheless indicative of the intent of the Congress (as a constituent assembly in respect of Section 3, the two sections having been passed at the same time and in the same Resolution, and that in fact the said omission was left to be filled by implementing legislation, as it was in effect

filled by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6132, in conformity with Section 8 of Resolution No. 2, which latter section was added by Section 3 of Resolution No. 4. 5. That while Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6132 applies exclusively to officials and employees of the government or of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, it does not constitute discriminatory legislation which offends against the equal protection clause of the Constitution, since the classification is germane to the purpose of the Act and is based on substantial differences between the situation of said officials and employees and that of persons outside of the government of the government service.1 6. Finally, that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6132 government officials and employees are not absolutely barred from becoming candidates for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, the only condition being that when they do so they should relinquish their positions; that this condition is imposed for reasons of public interest, among the most important of which are, first, that there are certain government offices which afford their occupants many built-in advantages not available to others and which may be used or abused to enhance their own candidacies, contrary to the very spirit of the equal protection clause invoked by the petitioners; and second, that to allow government officials and employees to campaign for the Convention and, if elected, to sit as Delegates therein without vacating their positions would be clearly detrimental to the government and to the public at large, which would thereby be deprived of their services for the unpredictable length of time that the Convention may last, without such positions being filled through new appointments, resulting in disruption of public service. The acts were not invalid. Imbong vs. Comelec From book: It was held that the Congress, acting as a constituent body, may with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, call a constitutional convention in general terms only. Thereafter, the same Congress, acting this time as a legislative body, may pass the necessary implementing law providing for the details of the constitutional convention, such as the number, qualifications, and compensation of its members. This statute may be enacted in accordance with the ordinary legislative process. Congress passed Resolution No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen. Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives," 1 "and that any

other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution." Two separate but related petitions were filed, both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. 3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they are valid. 4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps. WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional.

Ratification Section 4 Any amendment to, or revision of, this constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. Any amendment under section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition. Proposals to amend the Constitution must be ratified within a reasonable time after they are made because they are intended to answer present needs or correct current problems. If they are accepted only after a long delay, they may no longer serve the purposes for which they were made in the first place. Moreover, proposals should be voted upon at a time when interest in them is still rife and the electorate is still knowledgeable on the pros and cons of the issues submitted to them. The Doctrine of Fair and Proper Submission: Justice Sanchez and Justice B:B:L: Reys, dissents in Gonzalez vs. Commission on Elections. In order that the proposed amendments could be considered to have been properly submitted, the people must be

afforded opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influence. There must be a fiar submission, intelligent consent or rejection. Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections One of the issues raised was the validity of the submission of certain proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the election. The Supreme Court, however, declared, in interpreting Article XV of the 1935 Constitution: There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

Almario vs. Alba The petitioners sought a postponement of the plebiscite on the 1984 constitutional amendments, to give the people more time to study the proposed changes, particularly those relating to urban reform and the inclusion of grant as an additional mode of acquiring public lands. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding there was enough time (67 days for the amendment of Section 11 and 42 days for the amendment of Section 12, both in Article XIV). Occea vs. Commission on Elections Petition for prohibition seeking to restrain respondents from implementing: Batas Pambansa Big. 51 (providing for the elective and/or appointive positions in various local governments) 52 (governing the election of local government officials scheduled on January 30, 1980) 53 (defining the rights and privileges of accredited parties) 54 (providing for a plebiscite, simultaneously with the election of local officials on January 30, 1980, regarding the proposed amendment of Article X, Section 7, of the 1973 Constitution)

The constitutional issues raised are: (1) whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to authorize the holding of local elections (2) assuming it has such power, whether it can authorize said elections without enacting a local government code (3) assuming it may validly perform the foregoing, whether it can schedule such elections less than ninety, (90) days from the passage of the enabling law; (4), assuming further that the proposed amendment to Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution is valid, whether the plebiscite con be legally held together with the local elections. The thrust of Petitioner's arguments is that these issues should be resolved in the negative. The Court finds no merit in the petition. 3. Section 6 of Article XII of the Constitution does not fix an unalterable period of ninety (90) days for an election campaign. This provision must be construed in relation to Section 5 of Article XII thereof which grants to the Commission on Elections the power to supervise or regulate the operation of transportation public utilities, media of communication, etc. during the "election period". Section 6 fixes the "election period" by stating that unless fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety (90) days before the day of election and shall end thirty (30) days thereafter. In Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra, We resolved, in effect, this issue by holding that the forty-five day period of campaign prescribed in Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code was not violative of Section 6 of Article XII of the Constitution. 4. Considering that the proposed amendment to Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite on the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18, before the rest of the draft of the Constitution then under revision had been approved. The petition to prohibit this plebiscite was granted by the Supreme Court, which strictly interpreted the requirement of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution that the proposed amendments shall be approved

by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. The use of the word election in the singular, according to the Supreme Court, meant that the entire Constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only.

Judicial Review of Amendments and Revisions The present doctrine allows the courts to inquire into whether or not the prescribed procedure for amendment has been observed. Thus, the judiciary may declare invalid a proposal adopted by less than three-fourths of the members of the Congress, or a call for a constitutional convention by less than twothirds of the legislature, or a ratification made by less than a majority of the votes cast, or a plebiscite irregularly held.

Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,16 the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections Supra

Planas vs. Commission on Elections Proposals may not be in violation with jus cogens. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

Javellana vs. Executive Secretary Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents

from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void." The five questions thus agreed upon as reflecting the basic issues herein involved are the following: 1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore nonjusticiable, question? Judicial question. 2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions? No 3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? 4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? and 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

Does the issue on the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 partake of the nature of a political, and, hence, non-justiciable question?

Within its own sphere but only within such sphere each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority, not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but, also, to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution. and, in an attempt to describe the nature of a political question in terms, it was hoped, understandable to the laymen, We added that "... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy" in matters concerning the government of a State, as a body politic. "In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." POLITICAL QUESTION

The president issued a decree submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973 In the light of the foregoing, and considering that Art. XV of our 1935 Constitution prescribes the method or procedure for its amendment, it is clear to my mind that the question whether or not the revised Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified in accordance with said Art. XV is a justiciable one and non-political in nature, and that it is not only subject to judicial inquiry, but, also, that it is the Court's bounden duty to decide such question.

I cannot honestly say, therefore, that the people impliedly or expressly indicated their conformity to the proposed Constitution.

Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections The amending process, both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. Section 2(2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc, and no

treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten members The supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. The Supreme Court held that the period from September 21 to October 16, or a total of twenty five days, would give the people sufficient time within which to study the proposed amendments and vote intelligently thereon.

Theories on the Position of Constitutional Convention in relation to the regular departments of the government: Theory of Conventional Sovereignty: The constitutional convention is supreme over the other departments of the government because the powers it exercises are in the nature of sovereign powers.[Loomis vs. Jackson] Inferiority of Constitutional Convention: Considers the constitutional convention inferior to the other departments of the government since it is merely a creation of the legislature. *Woods Appeal+ Independence and Co-equality: as long as it exists and confines itself within the sphere of its jurisdiction, the constitutional convention must be considered independent of and co-equal with the other departments of the government. This theory, which is the most popular, has been observed in this jurisdiction since the case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito.

Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto." Three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of

Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the present petition was filed. As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Basically the two notions are synonymous in that both are founded on the regard which the judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent departments of the Government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective.

NOTES How to classify laws: Who is the subject of the regulation? Two persons private law (e.g. civil or commercial law). Person and the State (political, criminal, public international law).

Always three branches of the government: Legislative Executive Judicial

Judicial review

a) Ordinary legality/constitutionality. Validity of acts (validity is broader than legality). Legality applies to acts of the president only. Congress acts are only investigated whether they are constitutional. b) Extraordinary concept (expanded certiorari jurisdiction) grave abuse of discretion. The higher court can nullify acts of lower courts but also of co- equal branches of the government. Normal certiorari jurisdiction only involves the lower courts acts.

Peoples proposal for change in constitution 1. must be an implementing act in place 2. Change must only be an amendment. 3. Proposal must be made directly by the people People must be petitioners. The exact wording of the proposal must be found in the proposal. 4. 12% / 3% 5. once every five years only

Political question 1. question that the people can decide in their sovereign capacity -> policy/wisdom 2. question in regard to which full discretionary authority is given to the legislative or executive branch > policy

Earlier the Philippines strictly applied the political question doctrine. Judicial review is now expanded in the 1987 Constitution.