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Count: 1,488 Pages:6 Group Members: Sr.No. Name 1 Saksham Mendiratta 2 Shafique Gajdhar 3 Sugandh Jindal Group No:1
Introduction:
A cartel is a formal agreement among competing firms. It is formal organizations where there are a small number of sellers and usually involve homogeneous products. Cartel members may agree on such matters as price fixing, total industry output, market shares, allocation of customers, allocation of territories, bid rigging, establishment of common sales agencies, and the division of profits or combination of these. The aim of such collusion (also called the cartel agreement) is to increase individual members' profits by reducing competition. One can distinguish private cartels from public cartels. In the public cartel a government is involved to enforce the cartel agreement, and the government's sovereignty shields such cartels from legal actions. Inversely, private cartels are subject to legal liability under the antitrust laws now found in nearly every nation of the world. Furthermore, the purpose of private cartels is to benefit only those individuals who constitute it, public cartels, in theory, work to pass on benefits to the populace as a whole. Competition laws often forbid private cartels. Identifying and breaking up cartels is an important part of the competition policy in most countries, although proving the existence of a cartel is rarely easy, as firms are usually not so careless as to put collusion agreements on paper.
To explain the concept cartel let us assume that there are two centralized cartel. In the above given diagram D is the total market demand curve and MR is the corresponding MR curve for the cement produced by the two firms forming the cartel. The total MC for the centralized cartel is obtained by summing horizontally the MC curves of the two member firms. The cement cartel authority cartel will set price= P and sell quantity and sell quantity which is given by intersection of MR curve and total MC curve. To maximize profit manager of cartel must allocate production to the member firms based on the rule of marginal cost. Incremental output should always be allocated to the firm that has lower marginal cost.
THE CEMENT INDUSTRY IN INDIA: India is second largest producer of cement in the world only after China. 183 large cement plants and more than 360 mini cement plants. 330 million tones a year installed capacity 97% of the installed capacity is accounted for by large producers, around 40 in number 21 top companies control 90% of the market 40% of the market is controlled by two groups, Holcim and Aditya Birla Group
Source: http://forbesindia.com/article/briefing/cci-the-cement-cartel-of-india/33354/1
other 33%
Source: NINETY FIFTH REPORT ON PERFORMANCE OF CEMENT INDUSTRY (PRESENTED TO THE RAJYA SABHA ON 24TH FEBRUARY, 2011) 4
Analysis:
View of CCI: The CCI had carried investigations into allegations that cement companies had decreased production to inflate cement prices.CCI believes that cement makers have controlled the supply through underutilization of capacity. According to CCI the act of cement firms(of limiting and controlling supplies in the market and determining prices through an anticompetitive agreement is not only detrimental to the cause of the customer but also to the whole economy since cement is crucial input in construction and infrastructure industry vital for economic development of the company. View of Cement Companies: The cement companies have denied any cartelSisation saying prices are controlled by demand & supply. Companies have maintained that the prices reflect the rise in the input cost such as transportation and coal. CMA has argued that for a cartel to exist there should be a mechanism in place for: 1. Coordinating the cartel agreement and to ensure its functioning. 2. Monitoring the behavior and conduct of the members of the cartel 3. Punishing the members of the cartel who do not fall in line with decision of cartel.
Our View In Support Of Cement Companies: The document proof, that there was a cartelization and arising out of the cartelization companies really entered into profiteering and they made profit, is still pending. Also we do not have the privilege of having the order in front of us. So it will be a comment without having read the order, but having said this, yes if 8% is true, it is too harsh. The analyst talked about EBITDA margins, but ideally the penalty has to be paid out of the post-tax profits. It has got nothing to do with EBITDA. Actually 8% is not even the profits for most of the companies. The PAT level is 8% for very few companies. So if there are 8 or 10 companies who are involved in this case and if the penalties are there of the nature of 8% of the turnover, it is extremely harsh. Third thing is that a cartelization acquisition particularly in a cement kind of an industry which has about 45 to 50 players is very hard to believe that there can be a very effective cartelization for a very long period.
Conclusion:
We would like to make certain recommendations that: Competition Commission of India which was constituted to check restrictive trade practices across the country should be strengthened legally to enable it to take suomotu34action in all such cases. Proper infrastructure may be developed for the Commission, so that it can obtain requisite information and can take suo motuaction and exert its powers effectively. Already installed capacity for cement production should optimally be used to prevent artificial scarcity. Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion should take strong action against nonperforming cement industries. REFERENCES http://forbesindia.com/article/briefing/cci-the-cement-cartel-of-india/33354/1 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-0619/news/32317692_1_cement-manufacturers-cement-firms-cartelisation http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-industry/indlgoods/svs/cement/builders-association-of-india-urges-cci-to-review-finequantum-on-cement-companies/articleshow/14370338.cms
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