III YEAR VII TRIMESTER

TULSIRAM PATEL V. THE UNION OF INDIA A STUDY OF THE DOCTRINE FAIR HEARING VIS--VIS THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
A RESEARCH PAPER
SUBMITTED
BY

IN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

RISHAB BASU, 1666

TH

SUBMITTED ON 12 SEPTEMBER, 2010

National Law School of India University

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents....................................................................................................2 I. table of authorities...............................................................................................3 Ii. introduction.........................................................................................................5 Iii. research methodology........................................................................................7 iv. the doctrine of fair hearing scion of the principles of natural justice.................8 The Genesis of the Doctrine.................................................................................8 The Indian Experience..........................................................................................9 v. the journey from Challappan to Tulsiram answering an important question regarding fair hearing...........................................................................................12 Part XIV of the Constitution of India The Battlefield of Interpretation...............12 The Journey Begins The Challappan Case........................................................13 The Real Thing Tulsiram Patels Case..............................................................14 vi. is Tulsiram correct?..........................................................................................16 vii. conclusion....................................................................................................... 18 viii. bibliography....................................................................................................20

I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ENGLISH CASES
1. 2. 3. 4.

Board of Education v. Rice, [1911] A.C. 179. Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, (1863) 14 C.B. (N.S.) 180. R v. Sussex Industries, (1924) 1 KB 256. Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40.

INDIAN CASES
1. 2. 3.

Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364. Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1987) 2 SCC 537. Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway. v. T.R. Challappan, (1976) 3 SCC 1990.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Jt. Council of Bus Syndicate v Union of India, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 125. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545. S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379. Satyavir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 555. Tulsiram Patel v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1416. Union of India v. T.R. Verma, AIR 1957 SC 882.

INDIAN STATUTES
1. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. 2. Central Security Forces Rules, 1969.
3

3. Indian Penal Code, 1860. 4. Probation Offenders Act, 1958. 5. Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966. 6. Railway Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1958. 7. Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1968. 8. The Constitution of India, 1950.

II. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental basis of Governmental as well as administrative activities in liberal democratic nations, the researcher feels, usually stem from two major sources. These are, the basic ideas and principles of justice and fairness on one hand, and the codified laws, mostly the constitution, on the other. Taking the Indian experience into account, if we look into the entire jurisprudence that has arisen from cases that dealt with major constitutional matters, we shall perceive that the courts have decided issues with the help of two aspects. These being, the provisions of the Indian constitution itself, and the overarching Principles of Natural Justice. Considering the fact that the jurisprudence in the field of administrative law is really a subset of the broader umbrella of constitutional law, we will observe that the quandaries that have arisen from time to time in the former, have also been resolved with the help of the tools that service the latter namely, the principles of natural justice [hereinafter the PNJ] as well as the provisions of the constitution. One area within the ambit of administrative law where these twin-tools are especially important and decisive, is that of the jurisprudence regarding public servants and the affairs relating to their appointment, dismissal and tenure. Part XIV of the Constitution including Articles 309 to 312 deal with the matter and lay down how and why a public servant should be dismissed, as well as the role of the president and the state governor in the same. This however, as seen in cases as well as scholarly articles, is not enough, and the same need to be seen in light of the PNJ and ideally in the light of Article 14 of the constitution. Or do they? Another highly relevant question is whether the doctrine of pleasure as enshrined in Art. 310, is made an exception to in the form of Art. 311 (2) proviso. This is indeed the debate that took place in the case of Tulsiram Patel v. Union of India1 [hereinafter Tulsiram] where the Supreme Court discussed as to whether a chance to show cause by the government servants sought to be dismissed, better known as a chance of Fair Hearing should be given to them, in light of the constitutional provisions of Part XIV. Fair Hearing, as we shall see in the ensuing discussion in this paper, is a major component of the PNJ. The court in this case, essentially held that a public servant can be dismissed from service without holding an enquiry under Article 311(2) (b), as long as the same was in public interest. This judgment overruled the decision in the case

Tulsiram Patel v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1416.

of Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway. v. T.R. Challappan2 which held the opposite view in the matter. The central aim of this paper therefore, is to unearth, examine and analyse the doctrines of fair hearing and pleasure as a part of the PNJ in juxtaposition of the relevant constitutional provisions of Arts. 309, 310 and especially 311(2) (b), but within the purview of the case of Tulsiram, which forms the basis of the entire paper. In order to aid and ease the understanding of the topics under discussion in this paper, the researcher has divided this paper into three major portions. The first chapter will deal with a fundamental description and understanding of the PNJ as well the concept of fair hearing, which forms the entire theoretical base for the paper. The second chapter will deal with a discussion of the case of Tulsiram in relation to Challappan, i.e. the facts, arguments advanced and judgment made in the cases. The last and final chapter will deal with the researchers own analysis of the matters in discussion, and an attempt to decide whether the decision made in Tulsiram was indeed the correct course of action to adopt by the Honble Supreme Court, in relation to the understanding of the theoretical question in consideration in this paper. At the conclusion of the paper, the researcher hopes that the reader will be clear as to the concepts of fair hearing and its application by the Indian judiciary.

Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway. v. T.R. Challappan, (1976) 3 SCC 1990.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

AIMS
AND

OBJECTIVES

The primary aim of this paper to unearth, understand and analyze the principle of audi alterum partem or fair hearing as a part of the Principles of Natural Justice as well as the doctrine of pleasure through a study of the case Tulsiram Patel v. Union of India and thus understand the dynamics of Articles 309, 310 and 311 of the Indian Constitution.

SCOPE

AND

LIMITATIONS

This paper has only dealt with certain relevant English and Indian case law and only the principle of fair hearing within the principles of natural justice in order to discuss the issues at hand.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is the doctrine of fair hearing and how has it evolved in England and in India?
2. How was the case of Tulsiram decided, and what are its implications for the

development of the doctrine of fair hearing in India?

3. Was the Tulsiram case decided correctly?

CHAPTERISATION
The main body of this research paper has been divided into 3 chapters, which does not include introduction, research methodology and conclusion.

SOURCES
websites.

OF

DATA

The researcher has used secondary sources of data only. These include articles, treatises and

STYLE

OF

WRITING

The researcher has adopted an analytical as well as descriptive style of writing.

MODE

OF

CITATION

The researcher has employed a uniform mode of citation throughout the research paper.

IV. THE DOCTRINE OF FAIR HEARING SCION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE
The Genesis of the Doctrine
A very detailed description of the evolution of the entire PNJ, feels the researcher, would distract us from the primary aim of this paper, which is to look at the issue from the point of view of the case in discussion. Hence, let us only look at the growth of the doctrines of fair hearing and pleasure, as these are relevant to our discussion. The second arm of PNJ is called Audi Alterum Partem which essentially means the doctrine of fair hearing. The chief significance of this rule lies in the fact that it protects the common man from arbitrary administrative actions in cases where his right to person or property has been jeopardized.3 The meaning of this doctrine is that no one should be condemned unheard and hence its main purpose is to ensure fair play and justice to the affected persons. The use of this doctrine, however, does not cure all the problems and ills of the process, but depend upon the factual matrix, which help in improving administrative efficiency. Hence, as per this doctrine the accused person must be given the opportunity to defend himself. The rule that has been further derived from this parent-rule is that of qui alequid statuterit, parte inaudita aequum licetdixerit, haud aequum facerit which means that he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard although he may have said what is right will not have done what is right. Indeed, Lord Hewart rightly stated in R v. Sussex Industries4 that it is not merely of some importance but of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to have been done. The 19th century saw the growth and proliferation of this doctrine, when the doctrine of hearing was applied to proceedings in different bodies such as clubs, trade unions as well as a host of other associations. 5 The increasing regulation of the work of public authorities is an example of how deeply the PNJ were getting embedded in administrative matters, especially the doctrine of natural hearing, and

3 4

Dr. I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (Lukcnow: Eastern Book Company, 2003) at 177. R v. Sussex Industries, (1924) 1 KB 256. 5 P. Craig, Administrative Law (6th Edn., London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2008) at 371.

this was observed in the case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works6 where it was held that the powers of demolition that were vested in the defendant Board, were subject to notice and hearing requirements. In fact, if we briefly look at what was held in the major English cases regarding the rule of fair hearing, we shall see that the strength of this doctrine was augmented with the passage of time and that the judiciary has eventually made a rigid rule of this doctrine, which, of course, ahs to be applied on a case to case basis. Hence, in Board of Education v. Rice7 the judges stated that this rule should be applied to anyone, who decided anything.Various case laws in the West have over time expanded the meaning, scope and application of the principle of audi alterum partem or the doctrine of fair hearing. In Ridge v. Baldwin8 the court made a very important contribution to the jurisprudence of this doctrine. It said that after the expansion of this rule in the 19th century, its application had become rather confused. The reasons it gave or this were that the courts had applied the doctrine in areas which already observed the rule of natural justice; its application had been rather limited during the war; and the last was the unambiguity between the rights and remedies that were to be kept in mind.

The Indian Experience

This sentiment was further echoed in Indian courts and we can see that they have applied this principle rather liberally and enthusiastically. In the case of Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police9 where it was importantly held that administrative difficulty in issuing notice to the person concerned was no justification to withhold the right of hearing from the person. This becomes especially important, and we shall subsequently see why, in this paper. Interestingly, it has been held in the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation10 that the principle of Fair hearing has also been read into the interpretations of Article 14 and 21 and stated that no censure entry can be awarded without giving the accuse party a chance of hearing. It has also been held, however, that a refusal to participate in any enquiry without valid reason cannot be claimed at a later stage as a violation of natural justice. It must be noted at this stage that the administrative agencies in India are not really bound by any technical rules of procedure in the law courts, and therefore the principle of fair hearing assumes a role of special importance in this respect. However, Indian courts have indeed developed over time, various
6 7

Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, (1863) 14 C.B. (N.S.) 180. Board of Education v. Rice, [1911] A.C. 179. 8 Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40. 9 Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1987) 2 SCC 537. 10 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545.

rules for the application of the fair hearing doctrine to administrative decision-making albeit in a practical manner.11 In the case of Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma12 it has been held by the Supreme Court that when the rule of fair hearing has not been mandated by any statute and that the same can be applied only by the observance of the PNJ, and a distinction made between the violation of the entire rule of fair hearing and the violation only of certain facets of the rule. In the former case, the court will have to strictly apply the rules of the statute as far the provisions relating to the rule of fair hearing are concerned. However, if there is no such statute regarding the matter concerned, then the court will have to consider whether in the totality of the circumstances the party aggrieved has indeed been prejudiced. A further instance of the expansion of the doctrine under discussion that has been observed is the expansion of its application into matters of trade as well, thus exemplifying the extent of its universality. In Jt. Council of Bus Syndicate v. Union of India13 it was held that before the increase in insurance tariffs for buses, taxis, and trucks and so on, a fair chance of hearing should be given to the organizations representing the interests of these sectors. Importantly, it was held in the case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan14 that the doctrine of fair hearing should be applied only in the case where an administrative action has caused some prejudice to the person concerned, and has therefore led to the causing of adverse civil consequences for him. Finally, Dr. S.P. Sathe is of the opinion, that the major principle of English Common Law, regarding the PNJ should be observed in India, which lays down that not a single person should be deprived of his vested right of offering an explanation on his behalf,15 and the same was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. T.R. Verma.16 The three important aspects of audi alterum partem therefore, are that firstly, the party against whom action has been sought to be taken should have the notice of why such action should be taken, and what is precisely is; secondly, such a person should be provided with an adequate opportunity as to why such action should not be taken against him; and thirdly, the authority concerned should give reasons as to why such action is being taken. It is precisely the giving of reasons that will be the crux of the discussion in the ensuing parts.
11 12

Supra note 3 at 178. Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364. 13 Jt. Council of Bus Syndicate v Union of India, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 125. 14 S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379. 15 S.P. Sathe, Administrative Law (6th Edn., New Delhi: Butterworths, 1999) at 180. 16 Union of India v. T.R. Verma, AIR 1957 SC 882.

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V. THE JOURNEY FROM CHALLAPPAN TO TULSIRAM ANSWERING AN IMPORTANT QUESTION REGARDING FAIR HEARING
After the exhaustive discussion that we has in the previous chapter regarding the doctrine of fair hearing and the giving of reasons, the researcher now believes that we have a sound basis for the discussion and understanding of the matters in issue in the case of Tulsiram; the reason the judges arrived at the decision they did; followed by our own analysis of the same in the subsequent chapter. However, before embarking upon an understanding of Tulsiram, let us look at the decision in the Challappan case in order to understand the background to what was held in the former, since, it is the former which expressly overrules the decision in the latter, and it will only help us understand the matter better when comparing the decision and the reasons for the same, as given in the two celebrated cases.

Part XIV of the Constitution of India The Battlefield of Interpretation

In this section, we will briefly look at what is contained in Part XIV of the Indian Constitution, in order to understand the statutory context of our discussion. Art. 309 states that subject to the provisions of the constitution the appropriate legislature may lay down regulations for the recruitment and conditions of services of public servants and that in case of the Union the President and the States, the Governor can make such rules until the appropriate legislature ratifies or makes new rules. Art. 310 (1) states that except as being expressly provided by the constitution, every person who holds and carries out public service, does so under the pleasure of the President at the level of the Union, and the pleasure of the Governor at the level of the state. This, we see, brings in the doctrine of pleasure. Art. 311 (1) lays down the protection for civil servants where it says that no person who is a public servant, shall be dismissed from service by an authority lower than the one which has
12

appointed him. It is sub-clause 2 that is the most important and relevant for our paper, when it says that no such person will be discharged, without a reasonable opportunity of being heard regarding those charges being given to him. The second proviso to this clause says that when such an enquiry has been held, and a penalty is proposed to be placed upon such person, he shall not be heard regarding the penalty. Further it has been provided that the safeguards in this clause will not apply when a) when a person has been removed or dismissed due ti grounds that has led to a criminal conviction for him; b) where the authority that dismisses him is satisfied that it is not practicable to hold an enquiry, and reduce the same in writing; and c) where the President or the Governor is with satisfaction that the interest or security of the state will be adversely hampered by such inquiry, he may not hold it. Clause 3 finally states that the decision of the authority that is empowered to dismiss or reduce in rank a person, in respect of holding an inquiry under clause 2 shall be final. Keeping these constitutional provisions in mind, let us analyze the matter before us.

The Journey Begins The Challappan Case

In the case of Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T.R. Challappan17 was a case where the respondent in one of the three appeals that were dismissed together by this case, T.R. Challappan, was a railway post man. He was arrested at the railway station for indecent and disorderly drunken behavior, and was prosecuted and convicted under the Kerala Police Act. Of the other two railway employees, one had been convicted under s. 3 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 for having stolen property as well as u/s 420 of the Indian Penal Code for cheating. The magistrate, instead of sentencing them, released them on Probation Offenders Act, 1958, following which they were removed from service, without holding an inquiry upon their criminal conviction. Importantly, the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1968 provide the same thing as Art. 311(2)(a). Based upon this the Kerala High Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that the Magistrates orders releasing the railway employee on probation, did not amount to the imposition of a penalty under Rule 14 of the same Rules. This particular rule, incorporated the rule of fair hearing. The Supreme Court held that the word consider would refer to considering all the aspects of the matter concerning the person. However, it also added that the conviction of the delinquent
17

Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T.R. Challappan, (1976) 3 SCC 1990.

13

employee is taken as sufficient proof that he is criminally responsible. The court however held that before being dismissed, a public servant indeed possessed the right to be heard, and should be given the opportunity for the same.

The Real Thing Tulsiram Patels Case

After Challappan, the five-Judges Constitution Bench in the case of Tulsiram Patel v. Union of India18 created a high level of controversy. The facts in this case were such that all the public or government servants were either removed or dismissed from their posts without the holding of an inquiry, and the penalty of this removal had been placed upon them as per the second proviso to Art. 311(2) and other laws such as Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965; Rule 14 of the Railway Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1958 and Rule 37 of the Central Security Forces Rules, 1969. The importance of this case lies in the fact that It discussed and decided upon the scope of all the three clauses of the second proviso to Art. 311(2). Tulsiram Patel was a permanent auditor in the Regional Audit Office, M.E.S. Jabalpur, and as per the orders of the Headquarters at Meerut, his increment for one year was stopped. Following this and in rage, Tulsiram went to the Regional Audit Officer Mr. Jairath and asked him as to why his increment had been stopped, to which the latter answered that he did not know, and Tulsiram struck him on the head with an iron rod and Mr. Jairath fell down with his head bleeding heavily. He was convicted by the magistrate, but released on probation. Following that the as per similar law to Art. 311(2) (a) being contained in Rule 19 clause (i) of the Civil Service Rules, Tulsiram was removed from office. The respondents in the second category were dismissed members of the Central Industrial Security Force or CISF posted in Bokaro Steel Plant in Bihar, and were responsible for a large degree of violence following the creation of an all-India organization, and the persons of the unit involved and arrested were 800 in number. Keeping these circumstances in mind, the authorities arrived at the conclusion that holding an inquiry was impracticable, and hence the penalty of dismissal was places upon them, without carrying out of hearing under Rule 37 of the CISF Rules, 1969, as read with Art. 311(2)(b) of the Constitution. In this category were also involved employees of railways who participated in a strike on an All-India basis, and superior
18

Tulsiram Patel v. Union of India, AIR1985SC1416.

14

officers were assaulted, held to ransom while the economy of the country suffered. Since the situation was impracticable for a hearing, these employees were dismissed as per Rule 14 clause (ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, r/w the second proviso to Art. 311(2) of our constitution. In the third and final category were members of the District Police Force of Madhya Pradesh Special Armed Force, who were dismissed by the Governor by the application of clause (c) of the second proviso to Art. 311(2). This was because the accused were responsible for rioting in Gwalior and ransacking the Police Station. The Supreme Court addressed all these appeals by stating that when a case falls under the purview of clauses a, b and c of Art. 311(2), there is no need or requirement for a hearing when dismissing or reducing in rank of any government servant, and hence expressly and completely overturned what was held in the Challappans case, as discussed earlier. The court discussed that the judges had erred in deciding Challappans case, because it had considerer Rule 14 of the Railway Servants Rules by itself and not in conjunction with Art. 311(2). However, if we observe carefully, we shall see that in the first case, i.e. the one which fell under clause (a) of Art. 311 (2) a chance of hearing was not impracticable though the cases falling under clauses (b) and (c) were indeed so. Importantly, the Apex Court held that though the requirements of Art. 14 have been read into the PNJ and therefore Part XIV of the Constitution, yet when it has been expressly excluded in case of the entire Art. 311, Art. 14 cannot in that circumstance be forcefully read into the same, as it would clearly not be practicable to hold an inquiry in that manner. This was also upheld in the case of Satyavir Singh v. Union of India.19 However, as it appears in the case of Tulsiram, the decision in the same is rather contextual and can only be considered in cases where there has been mass violence, which has rendered the holding of inquiries as impracticable. After having examined and understood the facts and the reasons of the court in giving the decision that it did, let us, in the subsequent chapter, relate the same to the theoretical provisions of the doctrine of fair hearing as part of the PNJ, and come to a conclusion as to whether the court was correct in holding, as it did.
19

Satyavir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 555.

15

VI. IS TULSIRAM CORRECT?

In this chapter we shall essentially try to gather as to whether the decision made in Tulsiram is correct from the point of view of the entire theory and jurisprudence regarding the PNJ and the doctrine of fair hearing that we discussed in the beginning of the paper. An examination of the case of Tulsiram will show us that it was indeed a rather difficult case to judge, as far as the facts were concerned. In the first set of facts, as the court actually observed in the case, it was indeed a matter where the right to fair hearing could have been provided to the defendant. As we discussed in the first chapter of this paper, the every basic and essential principle of audi alterum partem is that every person who is being judged upon, must be heard. Juxtaposing this with sub-clause (a) of Art. 311 (2), we find that though the person was indeed dismissed due to a criminal charge, the facts of the situation as well as the PNJ should have been kept in mind and he should have been given a basic chance to represent himself. In the second matters governed by sub-clause (b) of Art. 311 (2), we find that the situation was truly one, in which there was no scope for having a practicable hearing since the number of people accused were of a very large number. However, the researcher urges that in such a situation, a representative should have been appointed either by the court or the counsels of the accused themselves, who had sufficient commonality of interest with his compatriots in order to make a fair and just representation before the court. It appears of course, that the researcher is urging a very extreme observation of the rule of audi alterum partem. This may indeed be true, but the researchers argument is that in all cases where a persons livelihood is being taken away from him, for whatever reason, he must be given an opportunity to represent himself, as it also involves the question of the standard and quality of public servants serving the nation. In the last and final appeal in the Tulsiram case we find that the rioting was indeed a situation where it would pose a threat to national security. However, even in this respect, the researchers aforementioned point stands. The final and important question is whether the second proviso to Art. 311 (2) is an exception Art. 310. In this regard, the researcher feels that the provision for the doctrine of pleasure that is laid down in Art. 310 is indeed made an exception to by the doctrine of fair hearing that is enshrined in the second proviso to Art. 311. If we look at the matter logically, we find that while Art. 310 states that public servants will be maintain their tenure in the pleasure of the
16

President or Governor, as their level may be, Art. 311 (2) limits this by laying the doctrine of fair hearing. However, it is the researchers understanding and contention that the doctrine of pleasure is to be exercised only symbolically and heavily subject to the facts and circumstances of the matter, as has also been observed in Tulsiram itself, as well as in the form of s. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, where the drafters expected the doctrine of pleasure to operate subject to PNJ. Hence, at any rate, it would rightly appear that the PNJ and it s celebrated subset, the doctrine of fair hearing should prevail over and above the doctrine of pleasure, and definitely so in a liberal democracy.

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VII. CONCLUSION
Let us now recapitulate what we have gathered in the course of this paper, form the commencement of the same. In the first chapter we learnt about the history, concept, theory and judicial interpretation of the doctrine of fair hearing or audi alterum partem as a subset of the Principles of Natural Justice, and found that the scope and ambit of application of the fair hearing doctrine has been gradually, albeit cautiously been expanded by the courts in England as well as India to a degree where it has become enshrined in the Constitution of India as well as judicial principles in Indian courts. The second chapter that formed the main portion of this paper saw us looking at the constitutional provisions that are important and relevant in this discussion. Secondly, we looked in good detail the facts, arguments advanced and finally the decisions in the Challappan and Tulsiram cases, and used the interpretation of the former in the latter to understand what the court did and why it did so in Tulsiram. In the last and final chapter of this paper we saw that the decision of Tulsiram though correct in law, was a bit too positivist in its approach, and unnecessarily so, since it had decent scope to incorporate the PNJ in the form of the doctrine of fair hearing, considering that this principle is really the bedrock of jurisprudence in modern liberal democracies. Finally, we observed that the Art. 311 (2) proviso does behave like an exception to the doctrine of pleasure that has been enshrined in Art. 310, and discussed the reasons for the same. Therefore, the researcher concludes this paper by stating the Principles of Natural Justice and particularly the doctrine of audi alterum partem or fair hearing have been rather painstakingly developed by the courts in different common law jurisdictions over a long period of time, and hence should be adhered to as much as possible, even if nominally so, in order to impart a basic opportunity to the other side to have itself heard, especially when it is a question of being dismissed from ones occupation. The Tulsiram case shows the court being aware of these aspects and their implications, but being a bit too hesitant, maybe drastically so in applying the principle of fair hearing, even in situations where it could have well been applied effectively.

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Let us hope the courts will be a little more willing to observe the rule of audi alterum partem in future, thus benefitting the people and the nation.

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VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARTICLES
1. D.

Chinni,

Is

the

Fairness

Doctrine

Game?,

available

at

http://www.journalism.org/node/6571.
2. L. Chenwi, Fair Trial Rights, 55(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly,

609 (2006).
3. M. Elliot, Kafkaesque Procedures are Unfair, 68(3) Cambridge Law Journal, 495

(2009).
4. M. Macaulay, Adjudication: Rough Justice?, 28 Scots Law Times, 217 (2000). 5. S. Rollo, A Comment on Mills v. HM Advocate, 27 Scots Law Times, 229 (2002).

TREATISES
1. D. Foulkes, Administrative Law (6th Edn., London: Buttherworths, 1986). 2. D.D. Basu, Administrative Law (3rd Edn., Calcutta: Kamal Law House, 1993). 3. Dr. I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (Lukcnow: Eastern Book Company, 2003). 4. M. Elliot et al, Administrative Law (3rd Edn., New Delhi: Oxford University Press,

2007).
5. P. Craig, Administrative Law (6th Edn., London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2008). 6. S. Cann, Administrative Law (4th Edn., New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006). 7. S.P. Sathe, Administrative Law (6th Edn., New Delhi: Butterworths, 1999). 8. S.P.Cane, Administrative Law (4th Edn., England, Oxford University Press, 2004).

WEB RESOURCES

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1. www.manupatra.com.

2. www.westlaw.com.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Constitutional Assembly Debates.

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