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, ' ' . , , . - , , , . " .

, , . - , , , . " . " ' One of these times the Meshech Chochmah says (Shemos 32,19) was the . His argument runs as follows.

Only God is a necessary existent .

According to Zohar so also Torah is a necessary existent and does not depend on anything or anyone.

The kedushah of places such as Eretz Yisroel then, and of people like Moshe, is derivative as opposed to essential. God and Torah have essential holiness; Eretz Yisroel and Moshe have derivative holiness (amongst their other qualities) holiness that derives from the Torah.

Holiness then is contingent upon the Torah whereas the Torah does not depend upon holiness, either of a land such as Eretz Yisroel, or of a person like Moshe who was just an agent to transmit the Torah.

Therefore the Torah applies equally in Israel and elsewhere in chutz laoretz (aside from certain mitzvos), and to Moshe Rabbeinu and everyone else.

Holiness is thus contingent and temporary it left Har Sinai after the giving of the Torah, and the Temple after its destruction and therefore Titus was not harmed when he went into the Holy of Holies.

Only God who has essential holiness is to be worshipped. Since God is so transcendent and intangible however, Bnei Yisroel wanted quasidivine intermediaries to bridge the gap between God and ourselves. They ascribed divinity to Moshe, and when he did not come down to a golden calf claiming they took them out of Egypt and considered them appropriate to worship.

Moshe was worried that the people would also deify the luchos, so he smashed them to demonstrate to them that there is no intrinsic holiness aside from Hashem, and that the Torah does not depend on anything or anyone.

The Meshech Chochmah has only discussed the source of holiness - intrinsic versus derivative. Holiness can also be explored vis--vis its nature: is it ontological changing the objects/persons/places essential being; or is it institutional - a matter of halachic definition, and teleological - deriving from the uses to which they are put - carrying out the dictates of the Torah which does not change the objects essence making it ontologically superior, but rather changes the way we relate to it.

The Mesech Chochah does not discuss this. He just says the holiness is contingent upon the Torah and not the Torah upon holiness, the Torah applies equally in Israel and elsewhere. Similarly the Torah is not dependent upon a persons holiness and therefore Moshe Rabbeinu and everyone else are equally obligated to keep the Torah.

That is what he means in Parshas Yisro when he says . He is not speaking ontologically about the nature of holiness, but rather about the source of holiness.

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