PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INC v. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA.

(31 Jan 2007) - Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur: o Occurrence of injury o Thing which caused injury under the control and mgmt of defendant o Occurrence in ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control and mgmt had exercised proper care o The absence of explanation by defendant. - Doctrine of Corporate negligence - Agency by estoppel - Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City because of difficult bowel movement and anal discharge. Dr. Ampil operated on her an discovered cancer of the sigmoid, and that it had spread to her left ovary. Consequently he advised a hysterectomy to be performed on Natividad. Dr Fuentes performed the hysterectomy, them Dr. Ampil took over again. - At the end of the surgery, the nurses noted that 2 sponges were missing, but Dr. Ampil closed the incision anyway. - Natividad was released from the hospital, but continued to experience pain, but was assured that this was natural Natividad consulted doctor in the US. When she came back, her daughter discovered another piece of gauze in her vagina. Finally, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez again found another piece of gauze that was badly infected. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed and another surgical operation was needed. - Aganas file for damages against PSI, Dr. AMpil and Dr. Fuentes - RTC: PSI, Ampil & Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice. Pay damages, actual costs $20K, ~50K, MD 2M, ED 300K, AAF 250K - CA: Dr. Fuentes not liable. Dr. Ampil to reimburse whatever PSI pays out. - ISSUE: WON PSI liable? (YES) - ISSUE: WON Dr. Ampil negligent? (YES) - ISSUE: WON Dr, Fuentes negligent? (NO) - SC: Elements of medical negligence o Duty o Breach o Injury o Proximate Causation - SC: Dr. Ampil negligent. Negligence per se? He also did not inform Natividad about the 2 missing sponges. Natividad's injury can be traced to his act of closing the incision despite info that gauzes were missing. - SC: Res ipsa loquitor does not apply to Dr Fuentes because he was not the lead surgeon. He had no control and mgmt.

- SC: When a doctor practices medicine in a hospital setting, the hospital and its employees are deemed to subserve him in his ministrations to the patient and his actions are of his own responsibility BUT in the PH, there is an employeeemployer relationship b/w hospitals and doctors (Ramos v. CA) for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases. - SC: Moreover, the hospital's liability is anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by estoppel. Doctrine of corporate negligence - SC: Affirms CA Ruling. MANLICLIC v. CALAUNAN FACTS:Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and owner-type jeep owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision. By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. Counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)4of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case. ISSUE: WON the transcripts may be admitted in evidence. HELD: YES. Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.22 Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony

given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.23 Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.25 In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.26Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of DonatoGaniban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair. G.R No. 70766 November 9, 1988 AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL INC., petitioner, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND JOSE M. ALEJANDRINO, respondents, FACTS: The case is an appeal to reduce the amount of moral and exemplary damages in Civil Case No. 8882-P of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, to P240,000 and P100,000 respectively, and the latter, dated April 29, 1985, restoring the amount of the damages awarded by the trial court: P2,000,000 as moral damages and P400,000 as exemplary damages with interest thereon at 12% per annum from notice of judgment, plus costs of suit.

In November 1979, petitioner mailed to Alejandrino at his Philippine address a bill for US $70 (joining fee of US $35 and a December 1979 account of US $35). When it did not receive any payment, petitioner sent Alejandrino another statement of account in January 1980. As there was still no remittance made, petitioner cancelled Alejandrino's account in February 1980. Alejandrino knew of this cancellation. However, on May 2, 1980, Alejandrino received from the Manila office of petitioner, thru a private courier service, another statement of account. This happened because the Hongkong office did not inform the Manila office of the status of Alejandrino's account. Alejandrino sent to petitioner a check for US $70. Petitioner received the amount but it did not reinstate Alejandrino's account. Instead it merely entered the payment as a credit in said account. Alejandrino was not informed about this action taken by petitioner. In August 1980, Alejandrino received the July 1980 statement of account for US $70. Having previously paid a similar bill in May 1980, and not having ever used his credit card before, Alejandrino wrote petitioner inquiring what the bill was for. He did not receive any reply. ISSUE: (a) Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's motion, filed on May 15, 1985, for extension of time to file a petition for review of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated April 29, 1985, in view of Section 39 of B. P. Blg. 129, in relation to Section 5(2), Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (b) whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review filed in this case, without leave of court, -by waiving the requirement of Section 2, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, and without the petition containing an assignment of errors. RULING: On May 7, 1985, petitioner received a copy of the, Court of Appeals' resolution dated April 29, 1985 which am . the original decision of February 7, 1985 by restoring the damages granted by the trial court. Eight (8) days afterwards on May 15, 1985, within the reglementary period, petitioner filed with this Court a motion for extension of 30 days counted from May 16, 1985 within which to file its petition for review on June 10, 1985. This Court gave due course to the petition for review in its resolution dated October 28, 1985. The petition for review was seasonably filed. There is no infirmity in its filing. The appeal on questions of law to this Court thru a petition for review on certiorari is governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, and not by B.P. Blg. 129. In fact, the Supreme Court is outside the scope of B.P. Blg. 129. Besides, there is nothing sacred about the procedure of pleadings.This Court may go beyond the pleadings when the interest of justice so warrants. It has the prerogative to suspend its rule for the same purpose. In the language of Mr. Justice Moreland, "a litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered, ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, with six (6%) percent interest thereon computed from the finality of this decision until paid. No costs.