ASSIGNMENT CRIMINAL LAW 1 Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.

the following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court. 2. A person under nine years of age. 3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code. When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80. 4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. 5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force. 6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. 7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable cause. Chapter Three CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MITIGATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY Article 13. Mitigating circumstances. - The following are mitigating circumstances; 1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant. 2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80. 3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. 4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act. 5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. 6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. 7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution; 8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings. 9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. 10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned. Chapter Four CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH AGGRAVATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY Article 14. Aggravating circumstances. - The following are aggravating circumstances: 1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position. 2. That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to the public authorities. 3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that is be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation. 4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness. 5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship. 6. That the crime be committed in the night time, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense. Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. 7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune. 8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. 9. That the accused is a recidivist.

A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code. 10. That the offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. 11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise. 12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or international damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin. 13. That the act be committed with evidence premeditation. 14. That the craft, fraud or disguise be employed. 15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense. 16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. 18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry. There is an unlawful entry when an entrance of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken. 20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen years of age or by means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means. (As amended by RA 5438). 21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commissions. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659 AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Section 4. There shall be incorporated after Article 211 of the same Code a new article to read as follows: "Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he

shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted. If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death." Section 23. Article 62 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows : "Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. - Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules: 1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. 1(a). When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances. The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any group who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group. An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. 2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof. 3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant. 4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein. 5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects : (a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; (b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and (c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he

be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years. For purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be a habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.

accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional, in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of such gift. If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of such gift. In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification. The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public duties. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985). Art. 211. Indirect bribery. The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and public censure shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).

Art. 210. Direct bribery. Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of this official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed. If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been MEMORIZE ARTICLES 12, 13 AND 14 CASES: 1.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE DOMINGO G.R. No. 131817. August 8, 2001

-October 12, 1994, At around 9:30 p.m., Michael Abad saw PO3 Pedro Delgado, accused-appellant Dante Domingo, Leonardo Guererro and Nanette Ricarse walking alongside each other across the boulevard. PO3 Delgado was nearest the cemented road pavement and on his right was Domingo, Guerrero and Ricarse. He noticed Guerrero step back and allow Ricarse to approach accused-appellant. From Abad's perspective, it appeared that Ricarse handed something to accused-appellant and immediately the latter shot Delgado at the back of his head. -Another witness, Rosauro Sauza, testified that he heard several gunshots and as he tried to look into the general direction of where he heard the gunshots, he saw accused-appellant, who was wearing a jacket, approaching and at the same time allegedly tucking something in his left waistline. -For his part, accused-appellant interposed self-defense. He claimed that on the evening of October 12, 1994, he and the victim were walking along Quimpo Boulevard going south. They had just come from a drinking session at the Ecoland Bus Terminal when the victim taunted accused-appellant that he is not the father of the unborn child being carried by his wife. At first, accused-appellant ignored the victim's taunting but when the latter pestered him and even laughed at him, he told the victim to stop. Resenting his admonition for him to stop, the victim pushed him and pulled out a knife. As the victim was about to stab him, he stepped back and shot the victim. -Guerrero and Ricarse simply raised lack of conspiracy between them and accused-appellant and did not controvert the latter's narration of the incident. -While the trial court acquitted Guerrero and Ricarse of the charges based on insufficiency of evidence, it convicted accused-appellant Dante Domingo of the crime charged and held thus: For the foregoing considerations, this Court finds DANTE DOMINGO, "GUILTY", of Murder aggravated by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and considering that the commission of the crime was not attended by any other aggravating circumstance is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA ISSUE : II. The court a quo erred in finding that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime charged; and III. The court a quo erred, in not considering the mitigating circumstances of intoxication, passion and obfuscation in favor of the accusedappellant. HELD -NO REASONABLE MEANS ON HIS PLEA OF SELF DEFENSE

-Treachery attended the commission of the crime. To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: [1] the employment of means methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender's safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and [2] the offender's deliberate or conscious choice of the means, method or manner of execution. -Accused-appellant pulled out his gun and fired at the victim four times. The attack was sudden and the wounds were fatal thereby effectively preventing the victim from mounting even a token defense. The necropsy report indicated that accused-appellant was at the 4 o'clock or 5 o'clock position in relation to his victim. Three of the four shots were fired from behind. Clearly, the assault was treacherous. -The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony. he failed to prove the approximate quantity of his intake as to sufficiently affect his mental faculties and consequently entitle him to a mitigation of his offense. Accused-appellant failed to prove he was in a state of intoxication at the time of the commission of the crime. he seemed to be fully aware and cognizant of everything that occurred. -Also, passion and obfuscation cannot be considered in favor of accused-appellant because it cannot be said that he acted under an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation. Interestingly, even after having been taunted with regard to the paternity of his child, accused-appellant still had a grip of the situation. He even pleaded with the victim to stop taunting him as they were both drunk. Plainly, passion and obfuscation did not provoke accused-appellant into killing Delgado. A person invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his 9 will. Besides, passion cannot co-exist with treachery because in passion, the offender loses his control and reason, while in treachery the means employed are consciously adopted and one who loses his reason and self-control could not deliberately employ a particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. -DECISION AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION ON DAMAGES 2. 3. 4. NIEL F. LLAVE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 166040. April 26, 2006. People of the Philippines vs. Eustaquio Loreno G.R. L-54414

Eustaquio Loreno GUILTY of Robbery with Double Rape, There being present aggravating circumstances in the commission of the offense, Eustaquio Loreno is hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the maximum penalty provided by law. Jimmy Marantal GUILTY of the crime of ROBBERY. Jimmy Marantal is sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, in view of the aggravating circumstances present. - At about 7:40 o'clock PM, Francisco Fable saw at first four men with flashlights approaching. When they came near, he heard one of them call Elias Monge saving that there was a letter from the chief hepe). Fable called Elias Monge who was in the sala, informing him that there was a letter from the chief. Two of the visitors, one wearing red clothes and the other in dark sweater. came up the house. When Elias Monge went out to the balcony the man in dark sweater handed to him the letter. Because it was dark to read it, Elias Monge invited the man in dark sweater to come inside the sala. -On reading the letter, Elias Monge and Monica read the following: "Kami mga NPA", which caused Monica to run to her mother, seized with fear, informing her what she came to know about camme visitorsed clothes posted himself near the post of the balcony. THEY TIED THE FAMILY. the man in dark sweater got hold of Monica Monge and dragged her up to a room located above the balcony He boxed and slapped her. Despite her struggle, he was able to remove her panty and then made her he on the floor near the bed. After undressing himself, he forcibly went on top of her. She kept on struggling and shouting for help, but he succeeded in inserting his organ into her vagina. She felt pain. He proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. -Not long thereafter, he turned his attention to Cristina Monge, and he dragged her to the room which was then rented by school teacher Miss Olitoquit (who was then in Naga City). Inside the room, the man in dark sweater forced his lewd designs on her but she resisted and struggled although her hands were still tied behind her back. He boxed her, hitting her on her right eye which caused her to lose consciousness. He then proceeded to satisfy his lust on her. When she regained consciousness, the man in dark sweater returned her shorts. She then realized that he had succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her -EUSTAQUIO Monge was able to untie himself, and then he also untied the others. Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they were robbed of their following personal properties: jewelry valued at Pl,000.00' two mosquito nets, P70.00; three bets, P200.00; one caldero of rice, P30.00; one reversible jacket, P40.00; three chickens, P30.00; one camera, P400.00; one beach towel, P35.00; cash in the amount of P6,500,00; and several others, all in the total of P10,305.00, more or less -He (Monge) was able to Identify two of the robbers, mentioning their names as Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal of Barrio Calabnigan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. After Sgt. del Socorro and his team made an ocular inspection of the place on that same day, they proceeded to barrio Calabnigan where they picked up Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal and brought them to the PC camp. -Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They admitted that they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7,

1978, but they were only forced by a man wearing black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be members of the New People's Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and their families would be killed. We, however, find the contention untenable. -A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of Appellee's Brief. death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of Such a character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in 5 equal combat. -A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint brief (pp. 3-10), showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery and rape against Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were facts inconsistent with appellant's claim of having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, to wit: 1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and the man in dark sweater went up the house of Elias Monge. While inside the house, Loreno pointed the gun to the victims which enabled the malefactors to ransack the house (p. 38, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 PM 2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater reached the balcony, Loreno positioned himself next to the post in the balcony, while the man in dark sweater delivered the letter to Elias Monge. Loreno admitted that, without prior instructions, he immediately positioned himself near the post of the balcony (p. 10, tsn, Id.), an act which showed his voluntary participation in the criminal acts. 3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan and thereafter, with ropes of the hammock. Loreno in fact admitted that he was the one who furnished the rattan which he got from inside the house (pp. 14-15, tsn, Id.). 4. When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for help from inside the room where she was earlier dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno's immediate reaction was to point his gun to the victims who were then lying on the floor, telling them not to rise if they wanted to live (p. 38, tsn., Id.). -The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to the master's room and the teacher's room where he made her open the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat and assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in dark sweater consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss and touch her private parts. -Upon seeing Fable, Jimmy Marantal kicked the former twice causing him (Fabie) to fall to the ground. Marantal's reaction towards Fable was due to the fact that Fable had recognized him and the blows which he gave to Fable who was still tied at the moment was to serve as a warning to Fable not to report his presence and participation in the robbery-rape incident to the authorities. -Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the shouts of Monica Monge for help and must have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by his two companions who earlier went up the house. As a "lookout" or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his companions effective means and encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There was no showing that Jimmy Marantal raised a voice of protest or did an act to prevent the commission of the crimes. -All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The foregoing acts, though separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their community of interest and concert of criminal design with their unidentified 6 companions which constituted conspiracy without the need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself. Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts of the accused themselves and when said acts point to joint purpose and concert of action and community of interest, which unity of 7 purpose and concert of action serve to establish the existence of conspiracy, and the degree of actual participation petition by each of the 8 conspirators is immaterial. Conspiracy having been establish, all the conspirators are liable as co-penpals regardless of the extent and 9 character of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. -The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was combat muted on January 7, 1978, by more than three persons, all armed, 10 in conspiracy with each other, attended by the aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime and dwelling and is, under P.D. 767, promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by death. But, for lack of the required number of votes, the accused should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, with the modification that the accused cused JIMMY MARANTAL is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. With costs against appellants. 5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO, G.R. No. 127755.

- AUTOMATIC REVIEW finding accused Joselito del Rosario y Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and 1 exemplary damages. -Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun," Virgilio Santos alias "Boy Santos" and John Doe alias"Dodong" were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her. -Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty, Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John Doe alias "Dodong" remained at large. Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario was tried. -eyewitness account of tricycle driver Paul Vincent Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about one and ahalf (1 1/2) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the incident - Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30 in the afternoon he was hired for P120.00 by a certain 6 7 "Boy" Santos, his co-accused. Their original agreement was that he would drive him to a cockpit at the Bias Edward Coliseum. However despite their earlier arrangement Boy Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. He (del 8 9 Rosario) acceded. Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market. Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help 10 "Dodong" Bisaya. Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but "Boy Santos" who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him. -Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but before boarding the tricycle "Jun" Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the ground. After the shooting, "Dodong" Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while "Jun" Marquez rode behind del Rosario and ordered him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del Rosario 11 overheard his passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there were cogon grasses. Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be 12 13 harmed. Del Rosario then went home. Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the 14 barangay captain and the police. -He now contends in this automatic review that the court a quo erred in: (1) Not finding the presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused Virgilio "Boy" Santos, Ernesto "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense that he was not part of the conspiracy among co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide; (3) Not considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not considering that there was no lawful 15 warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court. -The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was only forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime. -We disagree WITH the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those less powerful than a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an armed man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the 19 first time that day. we hold that the trial court erred when it said that it was "Boy" Santos who left the tricycle to chase the companion of the victim and then shot the victim on the head, instantly killing her. Del Rosario maintains that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter pointed his gun at him and threatened to shoot if he tried to escape. He also asserts that it was "Jun" Marquez who shot the victim and sat behind him in the tricycle. Taking the testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del Rosario, it can be deduced that "Jun" Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was referring to when he mentioned that a helper of the lady was chased "by the other man," and that this "other man" could
5 3

not be "Boy" Santos who stayed inside the tricycle and to whom the bag was handed over. This conclusion gives credence to the claim of del Rosario that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle, and to his allegation that "Boy" Santos stayed inside the tricycle precisely to threaten him with violence and to prevent him from fleeing; that there could have been no other plausible reason for "Boy" Santos to stay in the tricycle if the accused was indeed a conspirator; that "Boy" Santos could have just left the tricycle and helped in the commission of the crime, particularly when he saw the victim grappling with "Dodong" Bisaya and resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that "Boy" Santos opted to remain 27 inside the tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of threatening del Rosario and insuring that he would not escape and leave them behind. Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1-1/2) in front of the tricycle of witness Alonzo, the latter still could not have totally seen and was not privy to events that were transpiring inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of the gun by "Boy" Santos at del Rosario simultaneously with the robbing and shooting of the victim. From the exhibits submitted by the prosecution panel the back of the 28 sidecar of del Rosario tricycle was not transparent. On the issue of conspiracy. According to the trial court, del Rosario facilitated the escape of the other malefactors from the crime scene and conspiracy between accused and his passengers was evident because "while the grappling of the bag, the chasing of the helper of the victim and the shooting that led to the death of Virginia Bernas were happening, accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on his tricycle and the engine of the motor was running. We disagree with the trial court. The objective of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law. That must be their intent. There is need for "concurrence of wills" or "unity of action and purpose" or for "common and joint purpose and 31 design." Its manifestation could be shown by "united and concerted action." Since by its nature conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred 32 though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy. Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he was the driver of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt against him by asserting that he had no inkling of the malevolent design of his co-accused to rob and kill since he was not given any briefing thereof. He was merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime since he was ordered to help them escape. Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy. The only incriminating evidence against del Rosario is that he was at the scene of the crime but he has amply explained the reason for his presence and the same has not been successfully refuted by the prosecution. As stated earlier, he feared for his safety and security because of the threat made by his co-accused that he would be killed should he shout for help. No complicity can be deduced where there is absolutely no showing that the accused directly participated in the overt act of robbing and shooting 36 although he was with the persons who robbed and killed the victim. . Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent, right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and right to be informed of these rights as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. The driver was accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to name his passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police station, accused informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shootout transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening, accused del Rosario was at the back of the school, after which they went back to the police station. The investigator took the statement of the accused on May 14, 1996, and was only subscribed on May 22, 1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of 39 Ex-Judge Talavera. A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del Rosario was handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforces after a person has been taken into custody or 41 otherwise deprive of his freedom of action in any significant way. This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 42 7438 to include "the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides that . . . . Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known and understood by him, of his right to
35

remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer. From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the baranggay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights. Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant therefor. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of provides:
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Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 44 May 1996. In People vs. Sucro we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of the robbery with homicide. 6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NARCISO SALDAA et. al G.R. No. 148518. April 15, 2004

JEFFERSON TAN, was then on his way to Don Bosco Academy in Bacolor, Pampanga, on board their family L-300 van with plate no. With him were his brother, Jessie Anthony, his sister, Joanna, his cousin, Malou Ocampo, and their driver, Cesar Quiroz Jefferson narrated that along the highway in San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga, the vehicle slowed down to steer clear of a damaged portion of the road. Suddenly a man-later identified as appellant Arturo Malit-poked a gun at their driver.6 Simultaneously, three other men entered the van. These three were later identified as appellant Fernando Morales, Elmer Esguerra, and Narciso Saldaa While appellant Arturo Malit trained his gun at the driver, Elmer Esguerra took the driver's seat. The other two malefactors blindfolded the five victims The vehicle then sped off and later stopped for fuel at a gasoline station. At that point, one Romeo Bautista joined the group. After one hour and thirty minutes of driving, they arrived at their destination. The blindfolds of the victims were removed, and Narciso Saldaa ushered them into a small house located in a hilly area. Sensing that their kidnappers would talk to his father, Jefferson Tan decided to write a note to his father. Romeo Bautista and Narciso Saldaa then left to see his father. An hour later, three of their kidnappers-appellant Arturo Malit, appellant Fernando Morales, and Elmer Esguerra-ushered the five of them back into the vehicle.14 They proceeded to a beach littered with big rocks. Subsequently, two women came and fed them lunch.15 At 7:30 p.m., Saldaa and Bautista arrived at the beach and took the victims to a small house in Orani, Bataan, where they spent the night.16 They left Orani around 4:00 a.m. the following day and proceeded to an uninhabited place full of trees and grass.17 Jefferson further testified that he requested Bautista to allow him to speak with his father and so later that morning, Bautista and Saldaa escorted him to Balanga, Bataan, to a PLDT office. He told his father that their abductors planned to send him home to get the P2 million ransom. His father then negotiated with Romeo Bautista who agreed to reduce the ransom to P 1.5 million. Subsequently, Bautista and Saldaa took Jefferson to Guagua, Pampanga, aboard a minibus. Bautista alighted at Cleluz, Lubao, while Saldaa remained with him until they reached Sta. Cruz, Lubao. At Sta. Cruz, Saldaa transferred him onto a jeepney going to the town proper of Guagua. Before disembarking at San Pablo in Guagua, Saldaa instructed Jefferson to bring the ransom to the St. Peter and Paul Snack Center at 1:00 p.m. later that day. According to Jefferson, he arrived home about 10:30 a.m. and lost no time relaying to his father, Feliciano Tan, and the police the directives the kidnappers gave him. Upon the advice of the police, however, his father no longer allowed him leave to deliver the ransom money. Later, around 3:00 p.m., the kidnappers called and demanded an explanation from Feliciano Tan why the money was not delivered. He heard his father request for a lower ransom. The amount finally agreed upon was only P92,000 Later, their driver, Cesar Quiroz, arrived and relayed new instructions from the kidnappers that the meeting was no longer going to be at Cleluz 38 39 but at the bridge of Sta. Cruz, Lubao. According to Feliciano, they proceeded to Sta. Cruz as instructed, arriving thirty minutes early. He asked Cesar to look for the kidnappers. A few minutes later, Cesar returned to tell him to proceed to Gumi, Lubao, which was on the other side 40 41 of the bridge. There, appellant Malit boarded the vehicle followed by appellant Morales. The two told him that his children were in Gumi, about a kilometer away. When they reached Gumi, Malit asked for the money. Before showing the money, however, Feliciano asked about the 42 whereabouts of his children. Appellant Malit replied they were inside the L-300 van parked in front of them.

The exchange took place and Elmer Esguerra handed him the keys to the L-300 van. When Feliciano got home, he called Maj. Rey Aquino 44 of the PACC and told him that the children were already safe. After that, he reported the incident to the police authorities in Guagua who took 45 his sworn statement. During said investigation, Narciso Saldaa, one of the suspects in the case, admitted participation in the kidnapping and revealed the 47 identities of his cohorts. SPO4 Dizon averred that because there was no available lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office at the time, he 48 requested a certain Atty. Eligio Mallari, who was then following up on a case at the office, to assist Narciso Saldaa. Saldaa's sister-in-law 49 was also present. After Saldaa signed the sworn statement, it was sworn and subscribed to before Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Roman 50 Razon. Appellant FERNANDO MORALES testified for the defense. He denied under oath that he willingly participated in the kidnapping. He interposed the defense of having acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear. He averred that a day before the incident, his brother-in56 law, Elmer Esguerra, offered to help him secure a construction job at Floridablanca with a daily wage of P150.00. He and Elmer Esguerra planned to go together to ask permission from the contractor to start working. They agreed to meet at 6:00 a.m. on November 9, 1994, at 57 Plaza Guagua, Pampanga. At the appointed time and place, Elmer Esguerra arrived with another person, whom appellant Morales later came to know as Arturo Malit, now 58 his co-appellant. They waited some more until two (2) more persons arrived. Appellant Morales identified these two as Narciso Saldaa and 59 Romeo Bautista. Shortly afterwards, they all took a jeepney to San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga. When they got there, Saldaa ordered the 60 driver to stop. Esguerra then told appellants Morales and Malit to alight and wait at the corner of the street for the contractor. A few minutes later, Narciso Saldaa flagged an L-300 van and poked a gun at its driver. He and appellant Malit got scared so they tried to walk away but they didn't get very far because Elmer Esguerra, Romeo Bautista, and Narciso Saldaa, after taking over said vehicle, chased 62 63 them. Bautista threatened to shoot them both if they didn't board the vehicle, so they did. On the way to Mariveles, Bataan, according to Morales, they pleaded to be released because they did not want any involvement with the 64 crime. However, Narciso Saldaa and his companions responded with more threats. They stayed in Mariveles for an hour and a half before proceeding to Orani, Bataan, where they spent the night in a house belonging to 65 Saldaa's brother. According to appellant Morales, both he and appellant Malit were allowed to sleep in the same room as the children and 66 67 the driver. He added that he and Malit cooked food for and attended to the needs of the children. The next morning, they left for Lubao, Pampanga. In the afternoon of November 10, 1994, he and Malit alighted at Lubao because Narciso Saldaa and Romeo Bautista told them to 68 go home. Appellant Morales stated that prior to November 8, 1994, he did not know his co-accused Arturo Malit, Narciso Saldaa, and Romeo 69 70 Bautista. Neither did he know Feliciano Tan or any of his children before the incident. He testified to knowing Elmer Esguerra since the latter 71 is his brother-in-law. On cross-examination, appellant Morales declared that on November 22, 1994, he surrendered to the police after his parents came to inform 72 him that the police were looking for him. Later, he learned that Romeo Bautista was killed in an encounter with PACC agents. Appellant ARTURO MALIT testified also for the defense. He interposed the defense of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. He testified that on November 8, 1994, Romeo Bautista went to his house and invited him to work in a construction job the next day in Floridablanca, Pampanga. Having known Romeo Bautista for almost a month since they had occasion to work together on a construction job at his sister's house in Sta. Cruz, Lubao, Pampanga, he accepted the offer. At 5:00 a.m. the next day, both of them went to Guagua, 73 Pampanga, to fetch some more companions. At Guagua, they met three persons whom he came to know as Elmer Esguerra, Narciso Saldaa, and appellant Fernando Morales. They 75 proceeded to a waiting shed near Cabalantian supposedly to wait for their additional companions. Thirty (30) minutes had barely gone by 76 when Narciso Saldaa then flagged down a passing L-300 van and poked a gun at its driver. That caused him and Morales to get so scared that they started walking away. Hardly reaching a distance of twenty (20) meters, they were noticed by Saldaa, Esguerra and Bautista. The 77 three chased them by using the van. Bautista then forced both of them into the van at gunpoint. According to appellant Malit, when he saw that the children were scared, he talked to them and asked them to pray. He did not try to stop or tell his companions not to pursue their nefarious plan because he could not overcome his fear brought by the threats earlier made on him by 79 Esguerra, Saldaa, and Bautista. Appellant Malit also testified that in the afternoon of the following day, Saldaa and Bautista brought him and appellant Morales back to Lubao, 86 Pampanga, where they were allowed to alight at Sta. Cruz and go home. Then, Saldaa threatened to kill him if he reported the incident to 87 the police. Since then, he had seen neither appellant Morales nor Romeo Bautista. WHEREFORE, and in the light of all the foregoing discussions, the Court renders judgment finding the accused Narciso Saldaa, Elmer Esguerra, Arturo Malit and Fernando Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and imposes upon the aforenamed accused the penalty of DEATH. Malit filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, , the trial court denied the motion.
78 74 61

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(1) whether the trial court erred in not appreciating in appellants' favor the defense of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury; (2) whether conspiracy was adequately proven; and (3) whether appellants' guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Appellants' pleas are without sufficient merit. We find no reason to reverse the trial court's judgment of conviction. A thorough review of the evidence presented in this case leads to no other conclusion than that the crime of kidnapping for ransom we are not persuaded to overturn the sworn statement of accused Narciso Saldaa, who admitted his participation in the kidnapping of the victims. Extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that the declarant's consent in executing the same has been vitiated, the confession will be sustained In this case, the evidence on record shows that at the time the ransom money was to be delivered, appellants Arturo Malit and Fernando Morales, unaccompanied by any of the other accused, entered the van wherein Feliciano Tan was. At that time Narciso Saldaa, Elmer [105] Esguerra and Romeo Bautista were waiting for both appellants from a distance of about one (1) kilometer. By not availing of this chance to 106 escape, appellants' allegation of fear or duress becomes untenable. We have held that in order that the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal 107 combat. Moreover, the reason for their entry to the van, where the father of the victims was, could be taken as their way of keeping Feliciano Tan under further surveillance at a most critical time. Moreover, kidnap victim Jefferson Tan categorically testified that each of the kidnappers acted of his own accord and that nobody commanded anyone.109 According to Jefferson, while appellant Malit trained the gun on driver Cesar Quiroz, appellant Morales opened the right-side front door of the van at the same time that accused Elmer Esguerra took the wheel.110 The trial court found Jefferson's testimony worthy of credence. It disbelieved appellants' attempts, while on the witness stand, to put all the blame on co-accused Narciso Saldaa and Elmer Esguerra who, up to now, remain at large. The crime of kidnapping is not committed on impulse. It requires meticulous planning to determine who would be the prospective victim or victims. Its execution needs precise timing and coordination among the malefactors. The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the 128 commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code are present. The imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. In the instant case, appellants cannot escape the penalty of death, inasmuch as it was sufficiently alleged and indubitably proven that the kidnapping had been committed for the 129 purpose of extorting ransom. accused NARCISO SALDAA and ELMER ESGUERRA and appellants FERNANDO MORALES and ARTURO MALIT GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentencing each of them to death is hereby AFFIRMED. They are likewise ordered to pay, jointly and severally, actual damages in the amount of P92,000.00 representing the amount of ransom paid by the victims' father, as well as the sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages

7.

People of the Philippines vs. Ambal 100 SCRA 325

Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting his child to a neighbor, went to the house of the barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he (Honorato) had killed his wife Feling. After making that oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he had liquidated his wife. The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was bespattered with blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak. The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels and bickerings which were exacerbated by the fact that the wife sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and chose to spend the night in the poblacion of Mambajao. The couple had eight children. The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula's failure to buy medicine for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated alteration. Felicula told her husband that it would be better if he were dead ("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay"). That remark infuriated Ambal and impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1). On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the municipal court. After a preliminary examination, the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where on March 4, 1977 the fiscal filed against Ambal an information for parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's counsel de oficio manifested that the defense of Ambal was insanity. The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the municipal health officer, Doctor Maximino R. Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate who had undergone a six-month training in psychiatry in the National Mental Hospital, to examine Ambal and to submit within one month a report on the latter's mental condition (p. 65, Record).

Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a "passive-aggressive, emotionally unstable, explosive or inadequate personality" (Exh. 1). Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form February 1 (twelve days after the killing) to November 3, 1977, when he placed Ambal under observation, the latter did not show any mental defect and was normal (44-46 tsn November 3,1977).

Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or defect, Doctor Balbas replied: "Before the commission of the crime, he was normal. After the commission of the crime, normal, but during the commission of the crime, that is what we call "Psychosis" due to short frustration tolerance" (45 tsn). Doctor Cresogono Llacuna,a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-month observation of mental cases and who in the course of his long practice had treated around one hundred cases of mental disorders, attended to Ambal in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a psychoneurosis, a disturbance of the functional nervous system which is not insanity (65 November 15, 1977). The doctor concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal was normal but nervous (68 He had no mental disorder. Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or about ten months after the incident. He said that at the time of the killing he did not know what he was doing because he was allegedly not in full possession of his normal mental faculties. He pretended not to know that he was charged with the capital offense of having killed his wife. But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was informed of her death. During his confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked in the town plaza or was sent unescorted to buy food in the market. He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable. he admitted that he rode on a tricycle when he surrendered on the day of the killing. He remembered that a week before the incident he got wet while plowing. He feel asleep without changing his clothes. At midnight, when he woke up, he had chills. That was the commencement, his last illness In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease or defect. The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it. Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser penalty should be imposed because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and the absence of aggravating circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code) 8. 9. People of the Philippines vs. Formigones 87 Phil. 658 People vs. Dungo 199 SCRA 860

Nature: Automatic review of the decision of the RTC of Pampanga convicting the accused of murder. Facts: On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to Mrs. Siguas office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After which he departed from the office with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied bladed weapon. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained 14 wounds, 5 of which were fatal. Rodolfo Sigua, husband of the deceased, testified that sometime in February 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him why his wife was requiring so many documents from him. Rodolfo explained to him the procedure at the DAR. The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense: Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalinos wife noticed that he appears to be in deep thought always, maltreating their children when he was not used to it before. There were also times that her husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On that fateful day, Rosalino complained of stomachache but they didnt bother to buy medicine as the pain went away immediately. Thereafter, he went back to the store. But when Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. Worried, she looked for him. On her way home, she heard people saying that a stabbing occurred. She saw her husband in her parents-in-laws house with people milling around. She asked her husband why he did the act, to which Rosalino answered, Thats the only cure for my ailment. I have cancer of the heart. If I dont kill the deceased in a number of days, I would die. That same day, the accused went to Manila. Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated Aug. 17, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and classified his insanity as an organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-

vascular accident or stroke. But Dr. Balatbat who treated the accused for ailments secondary to stroke, and Dr. Lim who testified that the accused suffered dorm occlusive disease, concluded that Rosalino was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic. Issue: WON the accused was insane during the commission of the crime charged. Held: No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that he acts w/o the least discernment and that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. Under Philippine jurisdiction, theres no definite test or criterion for insanity. However, the definition of insanity under Sec 1039* of the Revised Administrative Code can be applied. In essence, it states that insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties, which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act. Evidence of insanity must refer to the mental condition at the very time of doing the act. However, it is also permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period before and after the time of the act in question. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts. It is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have wronged him. But in the case at hand, the accused was able to Mrs. Sigua. From this, it can be inferred that the accused was aware of his acts. This also established that the accused has lucid intervals. Moreover, Dr. Echavez testified to the effect that the appellant could have been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it when he shouted (during laboratory examination) that he killed Mrs. Sigua. This statement makes it highly doubtful that the accused was insane when he committed the act. The fact that the accused was carrying an envelope where he hid the fatal weapon, that he ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, that he fled to Manila to evade arrest, indicate that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim. (This was taken from the TCs decision). Judgment: questioned decision AFFIRMED.

People vs. Serafica 27 SCRA 123 That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1968, in the Central Sub-colony, Iwahig Penal Colony, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being then a prisoner convicted by final judgment and while serving his sentence at the said institution, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation and armed with a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife, assault, attack and wound therewith colonist Rolando Galeno, Pris. No. 56002-P in the different parts of his body, inflicting upon him mortal wounds on the left chest, right chest and penetrating the lungs and liver, and as a result thereof, said Rolando Galeno died instantly. Contrary to law and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia and the generic aggravating circumstances of known premeditation and recidivism, accused having been previously convicted for parricide by final judgment and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Criminal Case No. 3916 mentioned above was one of three cases filed in said court against the same defendant. The others were Criminal Case No. 3917, also for murder, and Criminal Case No. 3918, for frustrated murder. The three arose out of the same incident that took place on March 2, 1968 at the Iwahig Penal Colony. Upon arraignment on May 6, 1968, the defendant, with the assistance of Atty. Francisco Ponce de Leon as counsel de officio, pleaded guilty under the circumstances to be mentioned later, and thereafter the court sentenced him to death by electric chair, to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the sum of P3,000.00 and to pay the costs. The case was elevated to this Court in due time for a compulsory review in accordance with law. On May 6, 1968 the defendant pleaded guilty not only in Criminal Case No. 3916 but also in the other two cases. However, immediately after entering such plea in Criminal Cases Nos. 3916 and 3917, his counsel de officio made the following statement: ATTY. PONCE DE LEON: If Your Honor please, the accused is amending further the plea of guilty. He denies also the aggravating circumstance of treachery because according to him they had a fight with the victim and all of a sudden everything becomes black to him. He could no longer think well. Your Honor, I think this fellow here has a brain disease which may have brought about these crimes. He admitted the act of killing. I have advised him the consequences of his plea. I told him I could still fight this case in the Supreme Court. After the foregoing statement made by counsel de officio the court in Criminal Case No. 3918, for frustrated murder, called for the arraignment of the defendant. After the reading of the information, the latter entered a similar plea, but counsel de officio again made the following statement on behalf of his client ATTY. PONCE DE LEON: He admitted the act of stabbing but denies the presence of those aggravating circumstances. As a matter of fact, he wants to invoke the provisions of Article 180 of the Revised Penal Code. If Your Honor please, if we trace the history of these crimes it will date back to that unfortunate incident when he killed his wife. According to the accused he has been laboring under the belief that his mind is not functioning normally since that time and up to the time when he has killed a prisoner inside the colony. He was not aware of his acts. He did not know what he was doing. So that, Your Honor, I believe that in fairness to the accused, imploring the mercy and kindness of this Honorable Court, he should be examined by a specialist or an expert physician in Muntinglupa or anywhere for better facilities to determine the state of mind of the herein accused. That is our stand, Your Honor, for the defense. After the above statement the following appears in the transcript:1wph1.t COURT:

It seems that he has been examined before. FISCAL MAYO: There is a document showing the actual psychiatric examination conducted by a personnel of the Bureau of Prisons in Muntinglupa. And if, Your Honor please, for purposes of record, I may read the report: "FAMILY HISTORY: Both parents are still living. Youngest among six surviving siblings, he denies insanity and criminality among other members of the family. MENTAL STATUS: Subject appeared physically well. He was cooperative and spoke only in response to questions asked. He was neat in his attire. There were no oddities of behavior observed. His memory and orientation demonstrated no impairment. There were no delusions, hallucinations or illusions elicited. Grasp of general information was good. His judgment and insight were not impaired. REMARKS: Mentally clear. RECOMMENDATION: Mentally fit for work." There is here a psychological report that the I.Q. of the accused is 88 Dull-Normal. ATTY. PONCE DE LEON: May we know, Your Honor, when was that examination conducted? FISCAL MAYO: December 28, 1964 ATTY. PONCE DE LEON: Before the killing? FISCAL MAYO: When he was already sentenced and brought to prison. ATTY. PONCE DE LEON: Well, Your Honor, that was long before the commission of the grave crimes. Perhaps he was examined during the intervals when he was not feeling wrong. Because that kind of sickness is not continuous. The moment he could not think well, could not see well everything becomes dark to him he said. Mr. Fiscal, can we not temper the law with mercy by sending this accused to afford him the possibilities in Manila for examination in order to determine definitely the condition of his mentality? COURT: It seems Mr. Counsel that this accused was last time brought to the hospital for examination because of these charges.1wph1.t ATTY. PONCE DE LEON: That was in Iwahig, Your Honor. At pages 10-11 of the transcript the following material statements appear: ATTY. PONCE DE LEON: May it please the court. Your Honor, we don't question the harshness of the law as a matter of fact, in exceptional cases like this, we agree that the prisoners while serving their sentence shall be dealt with. Here is a situation where our contention is that when he committed the crimes his mind was not functioning normally. So that we believe that those strict provisions of the law nothwithstanding should be set aside; that the accused should be afforded the opportunity to be examined so that we will know whether in the commission of those acts he really acted in full consciousness. So, Your Honor, we reiterate that in fairness to the accused since that finding of the expert was done about four years ago these crimes were not yet committed. We reiterate our plea for mercy that he be given some more considerations to determine really the state of his mentality whether he was really sincere or not when these acts were committed. COURT: But the position of the court in our system of government is just against illegal administration of justice and that there is more ahead in the hands of the other branch of the government which is the executive. The President may exercise discretion relative to the disposition of prisoners like this. COURT: All right, sentence for Criminal Case No. 3917. Thereafter the lower court proceeded to pronounce its judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 3916 and 3917 which are now on appeal in this court as G.R. No. L-29092 and G.R. No. L-29093, respectively. In G.R. No. L-29092 (Criminal Case No. 3916 below) defendant's attorney de officio in this court, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas, submits the following propositions: (1) that it was error for the lower court to deny the motion to have the defendant subjected to examination by a specialist to determine his mental condition, and (2) that said court likewise erred in rendering judgment in spite of the fact that the plea of guilty entered by the defendant was a qualified plea. In G.R. No. L-29093 (Criminal Case No. 3917 below), however, defendant's counsel de oficio, Atty. J.R. Balonkita, submitted a brief expressing the view that the lower court committed no reversible error, and recommends that the decision rendered in the case be affirmed. The brief submitted by the office of the Solicitor General in both cases (G.R. No. L-29092 and G.R. No. L-29093) accepts Attorney Baizas' contention that the trial court erred in adjudging the defendant guilty and sentencing him accordingly, in spite of the fact that the plea of guilty centered by him was not unconditional but a qualified plea, as shown by the fact that before being sentenced, he amended it by denying the aggravating circumstance of treachery and by claiming that he had a fight with the deceased in the course of which everything became black and he could no longer think. The Office of the Solicitor General also agrees with the counsel de officio's contention that, in view of the nature of the plea entered and the gravity of the offense charged, the defendant, before being tried, should have been medically examined to ascertain whether he was in possession of his mental faculties when he committed the acts attributed to him. As a consequence, the Office of the Solicitor General recommends that the joint decision of the trial court be vacated and that both cages be remanded below for further proceedings. A plea of guilty, in order to justify the imposition of the penalty corresponding to the offense charged, must be an unconditional admission of guilt with respect thereof; it must be of such nature as to foreclose defendant's right to defend himself from said charge, thus leaving to the court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law (People vs. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563). The plea of guilty entered by the defendant in the two cases mentioned above is not of this nature. Moreover, the record discloses some circumstances pointing to the possibility that the defendant was not in full possession of his mental faculties when he attacked the deceased Rolando Galeno, apparently without rhyme nor reason at all. It is, therefore, our view that in the interest of the administration of justice, instead of pronouncing judgment after the entry of the plea mentioned heretofore, the lower court should have ordered that the defendant be subjected to the necessary mental examination to determine his decree of sanity at the time he committed the acts charged.

WHEREFORE, as prayed for by defendant's counsel de officio in G.R. No. L-29092 and the Office of the Solicitor General in both cases the joint decision rendered in the two cases above-mentioned is hereby vacated and both cases are remanded to the court a quo for proper proceedings. People of the Philippines vs. Faustino Tolentino G.R. No. L-48740 In the municipal court of Manila, where this action was commenced, as well as in the Court of First Instance, to which it was appealed, both of the above-named defendants pleaded guilty to the charge of theft of seven shirts valued at P14 belonging to one Cosme Famorca. Both being, recidivists, were sentenced in the Court of First Instance to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and to pay the corresponding civil indemnity to the offended party. Faustino Tolentino y de Dios was further sentenced to suffer an additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for habitual delinquency. He alone appealed to this Court. The only question raised by the appellant is the correctness of the additional penalty. The pertinent allegation of the information is that the accused Faustino Tolentino y de Dios is a habitual delinquent, he having been convicted of the crimes of theft and estafa by final judgments rendered by competent court, as follows: Date of commission Date of Crime sentence 10-13-25 Qualified theft, MCDE-16887 10-30-26 Theft, NCDE 42165 8-1-27 Qualified theft, NCDE-57895 9-30-35 Estafa, CFID50973 Sentence 6 months and P3 indemnity 3 months and 1 day 6 months 1 day and P15 indemnity 2 months 1 dayarresto mayor, to return the bicycle stolen or its value P40, and additional penalty of 2 years 4 months 21 days ofprision correccional, and costs. Date of release 3-18-26 1-20-27 8-10-30

10-29-26 8-1-27 9-14-35

The trial court sentenced the appellant under paragraph 5 (b) of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as if this were only his fourth and not his fifth conviction. The Solicitor General recommends the affirmance of that sentence, on the theory that appellant's fourth previous conviction alleged in the information should bee disregarded because the date of his release in connection therewith was not shown. On the other hand counsel for the appellant, on the basis of the trial court's implied finding that this is appellant's fourth conviction, contends that appellant should be sentenced under paragraph 5 (a) of article 62, as if the present were only his third conviction, on the ground that the first conviction should be taken circumstance and should be disregarded as an element of habitual, delinquency. We cannot uphold appellant's contention. Under his theory an accused cannot be sentenced for habitual delinquency unless he has had at least three previous convictions, because the first conviction has to be taken only as an aggravating circumstance and has to be disregarded for the purpose of determining habitual delinquency. That, we think, would be unwarranted interpretation of the Habitual Delinquency Law (paragraph 5 of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code), which reads as follows: 5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects: (a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods: (b) Upon a fourth conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium period; and (c) Upon fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty a guilty to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to the reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the penalties to be imposed upon the offender in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years. For the purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsificacion, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. A habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist, and in imposing the principal penalty upon him the aggravating circumstance of recidivism has to be taken into account. In fixing the penalty provided by law for the last crime " as required in paragraph 5 (a) (b), and (c) of article 62 of the

Revised Penal Code, the court cannot disregard articles 14 (9) and Revised Penal Code, which respectively define recidivism as an aggravating circumstance and lay down the rule for the application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We reaffirm the holding of this Court in People vs. Melendez, 59 Phil., 154; People vs. Espina, 62 Phil., 607; and the People vs. De Jesus, 63 Phil., 760, as a correct interpretation of the Habitual Delinquency Law. However, for the purpose of fixing the additional penalty, recidivism cannot be taken as an aggravating circumstance for the reason it is inherent in habitual delinquency (People vs. de Jesus, supra). Neither can we accept the recommendation for affirmance made by the Solicitor General on the theory that the present is appellant's fourth conviction. We cannot disregard his previous fourth conviction alleged in the information solely because the date of his release in connection therewith has not been shown. It appearing that he was sentenced for the fourth time on September 30, 1935, to suffer two months and done day of arresto mayorplus an additional penalty of two years, four months, and twenty-one days of prision correctional, we can readily see that he must have been released in connection therewith less than ten years previous to August 13, 1941, the date of the commission of the offense complained of in the present case. The stand taken by the trial court and the Solicitor General is untenable because if appellant's fourth previous conviction be disregarded, he could not be sentenced to any additional penalty as a habitual delinquent, his previous third conviction and release having taken place more than ten years prior to August 13, 1941. It results that this is appellant's fifth conviction, and accordingly, he must be sentenced under paragraph 5 (c) of article 62 to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. This penalty must be imposed in its minimum degree because of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. Wherefore, with the modification that the appellant Faustino Tolentino y de Dios shall suffer an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor, the sentence appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered. Yulo, C.J., Paras and Moran, JJ., concur. People of the Philippines vs. Guillermo Florendo; G.R. 136845 BELLOSILLO, J.: GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias Imong was found guilty of parricide with the aggravating circumstance of cruelty and sentenced to death. He was ordered to indemnify the heirs of his wife, Erlinda Ragudo Florendo, the amount of P500,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages and to 1 pay the costs of suit. His conviction is the subject of this automatic review. The records show that on 28 August 1996 at around 2:30 in the afternoon appellant and his wife Erlinda were inside their house engaged in an animated conversation. Living with them in the same house in Barangay Bulbulala, La Paz, Abra, was appellants father Agustin Florendo. After Erlinda was heard to have told Imong to go to sleep, the latter all of a sudden and without any provocation hacked Erlinda with a bolo in 2 the head and other parts of her body. The victim could only exclaim, "Patayennak met ni Imong ngen (Imong is going to kill me)!" Agustin, who was resting at that time, witnessed the incident. Instead of stopping appellant, Agustin left the house for fear that his son would also attack him. Agustin sought help from his immediate neighbor, Ernesto Anical, and told him, "Kasano Erning, patayen yen met ni Imong ni 3 baketnan (How is this Erning, Imong is killing his wife)!" Ernesto too became frightened and did not go out of his house; instead, he told Agustin to go to the barangay captain for assistance. Agustin went to the house of Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya to report the incident but the latter was not there. Thus, the wife of the barangay captain, upon being apprised of what happened, hurriedly went out to look for any available barangay tanod for assistance and was able to contact Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora. Agustin, on the other hand, restrained by fear and shock, stayed at the barangay captains house and when he finally returned at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon Erlinda was already dead. In the meantime, appellant ran to the house of the barangay captain after hacking his wife. When Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora arrived at the house of the barangay captain, he found appellant there holding a bloodied bolo, his hands and feet dripping with blood. Felipe advised appellant to yield his bolo but the latter did not respond. This prompted Felipe to grab his hand and take away his bolo. When Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya arrived, he asked appellant why his hand and feet were covered with blood but the latter did not answer. Appellant was later taken to the La Paz District Hospital for treatment of his wound and the police authorities of La Paz thereafter took him into custody pending investigation of the incident. Dr. Corazon Lalin Brioso, Municipal Health Officer of La Paz, autopsied the cadaver of the victim and found that she sustained sixteen (16) wounds on various parts of her body, four (4) of which were considered fatal and resulted in her instantaneous death due to hypovalemic 4 shock caused by massive hemorrhage. 1a\^/phi1.net On 2 September 1996 appellant was committed at the Abra Provincial Jail. During his confinement, he was observed to be having difficulty in sleeping. He could not eat during meal times. Most of the time he would stand in his cell without talking to anyone. Thus on 9 September 1996 he was treated as an outpatient at the Abra Provincial Hospital (APH). The Provincial Warden then requested a psychiatric examination of 5 appellant to determine whether he was fit to be arraigned. On 17 October 1996 appellant was supposed to be arraigned but he appeared without counsel and remained unresponsive to the questions propounded to him. On the same date, the trial court referred appellant to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC) for psychiatric evaluation since there was no psychiatrist at the APH. On 20 November 1996 he went to the BGHMC for consultation and was

admitted and managed as a case of schizophrenic psychosis, paranoid type (schizophreniform disorder). He was detained at the hospital and given medication for his illness. On 7 June 1997, after confinement for six (6) months and eighteen (18) days, he was discharged and 7 recommitted to the provincial jail as he was found fit to face the charges against him. When finally arraigned on 12 August 1997 appellant pleaded not guilty. At the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted killing his wife but put up the defense of insanity to claim exemption from criminal liability. At the initial hearing, the prosecution presented Agustin Florendo, Godofredo Apuya, Ernesto Anical, Felipe Adora and Dr. Corazon Lalin Brioso as witnesses. Agustin Florendo attested that his son was not in his proper senses on the day of the incident and repeated on cross-examination that 8 appellant was crazy and had been behaving strangely for one (1) year before the incident. Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya, on the other hand, stated that he already knew that appellant was mentally ill because in two (2) 9 instances, three. (3) months prior to the incident, he saw him singing, dancing and clapping his hands in their yard. Witness Ernesto Anical stated further that on the day of the incident appellant was not in his right senses as he saw him sharpening his bolo with his eyes red and looking very sharp. Yet, he likewise testified that appellant would join the people in their barangay in their drinking sprees and when already 10 drunk he would beat his wife. Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora also testified that appellant had been behaving oddly and was somewhat crazy as he saw him ten (10) days 11 before the incident singing and talking to himself. Both Godofredo Apuya and Felipe Adora stated that appellant suspected that his wife was having an affair with Godofredo for he once went to the house of Godofredo looking for her. But before the trial could prosper, the presiding judge received a letter from the provincial warden asking for the recommitment of appellant to the BGHMC because of his unstable mental condition. On 8 June 1998 the trial court directed the examination and treatment of appellant but not his admission in the hospital. Nonetheless, appellant was readmitted at the BGHMC on 11 June 1998 and discharged on 7 August 1998. On 10 August 1998, upon the assurance of Dr. Elsie I. Caducoy that appellant was fit to stand trial, appellant was called to testify. He stated that he did not remember anything that happened on 28 August 1996 but recalled seeing his children days before the incident; that he was brought to the provincial jail by the police authorities; that he thumbmarked a form given him in jail; that he came to know about the death of his wife only when his father told him about it while he was in jail; and, that he did not know Barangay Captain Apuya when asked about his 12 alleged affair with his wife. In the assailed Decision dated 19 August 1998 the trial court held that the crime committed was parricide. While no marriage certificate was presented to prove the relationship between appellant and the victim, such fact was evident from the testimonies of the witnesses and appellant himself who averred that the victim was his legitimate wife; that the aggravating circumstance of cruelty was present because the victim suffered sixteen (16) wounds; that while it was true that there was evidence that appellant was observed to be doing things out of the ordinary, like singing in English, dancing, laughing or talking alone, there was also evidence that he was socializing freely with the other young men in the barangay; that all these were indicative only of mental abnormality that did not excuse him from imputability for the offense; that no expert witness was presented to testify on the insanity of appellant; and, the motive of appellant in killing his wife was jealousy. Appellant Florendo now contends that the trial court erred in not acquitting him on the ground of insanity; for appreciating cruelty instead as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, and for upholding the legitimacy of his common-law relationship with the victim in order to bring the killing within the ambit of Art. 246 of The Revised Penal Code. The Court rejects the plea of insanity.1a\^/phi1.net Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least discernment because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes 13 insanity as an exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. The alleged insanity of Florendo was not substantiated by sufficient evidence. He was not completely bereft of reason or discernment and 14 freedom of will when he mortally hacked his wife. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably negate a complete absence of intelligence on his part when he committed the felony: (a) He was apparently well until about three (3) to four (4) months prior to his admission in the hospital when he was noted to have blank stares, claiming that he was in deep thought because he suspected his wife of having an extramarital affair, and at times would confront his wife about the matter but the latter would deny it; (b) That he became irritable at home and was easily angered by his childrens slightest mistakes; (c) That due to his jealousy he claimed that he only wanted to frighten his wife with his bolo in order to confront her but hacked her instead many times to death; (d) He denied having hallucinations at that time or being possessed by an evil spirit; (e) Immediately after the incident he went to the barangay captain, never thought of running away, and apparently felt guilty about what happened; (f) In jail, he said he started having auditory hallucinations where he would hear voices commanding him to do something but refused to elaborate on this; and, (g) He claimed that he frequently thought of his three (3) children whom he missed so much. These were hardly the acts of a person with a sick mind. A perusal of appellants testimony would show that he was aware of his emotions, bearing and temperament. Except for his testimony in open court that he had no recollection of what happened on 28 August 1996, he attested that he saw his children a few days before the incident; that he was brought to the provincial jail by the police authorities; and, that he thumbmarked a form given him in jail. Since he remembered the vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, he must have been in full control of his mental faculties. His recall of the events that transpired before, during and after the stabbing incident, as well as the nature and contents of his testimony, does not betray an aberrant mind. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his act.

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a persons mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with appellant, or who has rational basis to conclude that appellant was insane based on the witness own perception of appellant, or who is 15 qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. The first four (4) witnesses of the prosecution were one in alleging that appellant was crazy and had lost his mind as they noticed him to be behaving oddly, i.e., singing, dancing and talking to himself. The prosecution witnesses may have testified that appellant appeared to them to be insane prior to, during and subsequent to the commission of the crime, but there is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in his action. The fact that a person behaves crazily is not conclusive that he is insane. The prevalent meaning of the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." The popular conception of the word "crazy" is being used to describe a person or an act 16 unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so. The evidence adduced consisting of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellant was insane immediately before or on the day the crime was committed consisted merely of assumptions, and is too speculative, presumptive and conjectural to be convincing. Their observation that appellant manifested unusual behavior does not constitute sufficient proof of his insanity because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity hence exempting. In the case at bar, appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to the BGHMC a few months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by a persons inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and is often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality. During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. 17 Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied and dreamy and may appear "far away." Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment 18 the felony is committed. The medical findings of the BGHMC, which diagnosed appellants mental disorder as schizophrenic psychosis, paranoid type, refer to appellants treatment after the incident happened. It is bereft of any proof that appellant was completely deprived of intelligence or discernment at the time or at the very moment he killed his wife. It is inconclusive as to whether he was insane at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the killing. In compliance with this Courts Resolution of 15 August 2000, an evaluation of the psychological and psychiatric condition of appellant was conducted by the Supreme Court Clinic Services at the National Penitentiary on 22 August 2000. The neuro-psychiatric evaluation report disclosed that appellant was suffering from psychosis or insanity, classified as chronic schizophrenia, paranoid type. It divulged further that "prior to the onset of the overt psychotic symptoms, appellant manifested unusual behavior prior to the commission of the crime of parricide described as fearfulness, irritability, suspiciousness and jealousy or preoccupation with the fidelity of his wife. In retrospect, this group of 19 symptoms could have possibly been the prodromal phase heralding the onset of the psychotic illness." The report revealed that symptoms of appellants mental illness were conceivably manifested prior to the date of the crime and that substantial evidence was lacking to conclude that 20 his abnormal behavior was due to the use of drugs or any prohibited substance. As can be gleaned from the reports, appellant could only be undergoing the percursory stages of a disease prior to and at the time of the killing. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming that he had some form of mental illness by virtue of the premonitory symptoms of schizophrenia, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate certain matters such as his jealousy over the supposed infidelity of his wife, sufficiently discounts any intimation of insanity when he committed the dastardly crime. While appellant on many occasions before the commission of the crime did things that would indicate that he was not of sound mind, such acts only tended to show that he was in an abnormal mental state and not necessarily of unsound mind that would exempt him from criminal liability. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude 21 imputability. The odd or bizarre behavior of appellant prior to the commission of the crime as described by the prosecution witnesses, if anything else, did not completely deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. If the defense of insanity is sustained, the floodgates to abuse will be opened by the cunning and ingenious public. Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the commission of the crime does not prove insanity. The grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost care and circumspection as the State must keep its guard against murderers seeking to escape punishment through a general plea of insanity.1awphi1.nt We cannot sustain the ruling of the trial court that cruelty aggravated the killing simply because according to the autopsy report the victims body bore sixteen (16) wounds all in all, four (4) of which were severe, deep and fatal. The number of wounds is not a test for determining cruelty; it is whether appellant deliberately and sadistically augmented the victims suffering. Thus, there must be proof that the victim was 22 made to agonize before appellant rendered the blow which snuffed out her life. Although Erlinda received sixteen (16) wounds in all there is no showing that appellant deliberately and inhumanly increased her suffering. At any rate, even if cruelty is proved, it cannot be appreciated against appellant to raise the penalty to death as this was not alleged in the Information. Under Sec. 9, Rule 110, of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on 1 December 2000, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information or complaint, otherwise, they cannot be properly appreciated. Being favorable to appellant, this procedural rule must be given retroactive application. As to the marriage of the victim and appellant, the trial court properly upheld its legitimacy. In parricide, the best proof of relationship between appellant and the deceased is the marriage certificate, and in the absence thereof, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered. The testimony of appellant that he was married to the deceased is an admission against his penal interest. It is a confirmation of the sem per praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that "a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful

contract of marriage." Even if the marriage certificate was not presented, that the victim was the legitimate wife of appellant is evident from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In open court, appellant himself volunteered the information in his offer of evidence through counsel and on direct examination that the victim was his legitimate wife. Appellant was properly convicted of the crime of parricide. Parricide not being a capital crime per se, as it is not punishable by the mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death which are two (2) indivisible penalties, the application of the lesser or the greater penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. There being no aggravating or mitigating 25 circumstance appreciated for appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed. Nonetheless, clinical findings at the time of evaluation of the psychological and psychiatric condition of appellant show that despite maintenance of anti-psychotic medication he remains to be symptomatic. It is imperative that there should be continuous maintenance of his anti-psychotic medications and regular psychiatric follow-up to achieve and sustain remission of psychotic symptoms. As the trial court failed to award indemnity in favor of the heirs of the victim, the amount of P50,000.00 should be adjudged as civil indemnity 26 ex delicto, which award is mandatory and requires no proof other than the victims death. WHEREFORE, the conviction of accused-appellant GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias IMONG of parricide under Art. 246 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 5, of RA 7659, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of death. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of his wife, the deceased Erlinda Ragudo Florendo, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death, and to pay the costs. People of the Philippines vs. Froilan Padilla G.R. No. 122736 Accused-appellant Froilan Padilla was indicted for rape before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55, under the following information: That on or about the 13th day of June 1993, in the city of Lucena, province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit the crime of rape by means of force, 1 threats, and intimidation upon Leonisa P. Caballero, by then and there forcibly having carnal knowledge against the latter's will. When arraigned, accused-appellant originally pleaded not guilty. However, at the start of trial, he sought to change his plea into one of guilty 2 but to the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness. However, the victim was not amenable. Hence trial ensued. After the parties presented their respective evidence, the lower court rendered a judgment of conviction finding accused-appellant guilty of rape and sentenced him to 3 4 suffer reclusion perpetuaand to pay the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages. The facts as found by the trial court: At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of June 13, 1993, complainant Leonisa Caballero was sleeping inside her stall at the fishing port of Barangay Dalahican, Lucena City. She awakened when she felt a person on top of her, who had a knife poked at her neck. She could not see the man's face as it was dark. The man told her not to shout. As he spoke, she recognized his voice as that of appellant. Appellant removed her panty. Appellant pulled down his briefs which was his only clothing. He succeeded in raping her, able to penetrate her private parts with his organ. She was unable to do anything as she was afraid of the knife which was pushed against her neck As appellant left her stall and stepped out, a light shone on his face and complainant recognized him clearly. She was familiar with appellant because he was staying at the stall of his cousin, Coring (Puring) Padilla, which was just next to complainant's stall about one (1) meter away. Appellant was a laborer at the pier and sometimes eats at complainant's store. Complainant then shouted for help. One of those who came to complainant's help reported the incident at the PNP Port Maritime District. Three (3) officers responded: SPO1 Crispin Virtucio, SPO1 Pablo Marasigan and SPO3 Noel Fabella. As the three officers came to the site of the incident, they saw a scared woman crying in front of her stall. Complainant reported that she was raped and pointed to appellant, who was just in the next stall, as the culprit. The stalls were barely a meter apart and measure about 2 x 2 meters. Appellant was inside the adjacent store of Coring Padilla when the police officers went there. Appellant at first refused to accompany the police officers as he was apprehensive that he would be hurt. After it was explained to appellant that he will simply be questioned about the rape incident, he went with the respondent police officers to the maritime office. The police officers also took a knife tucked in the wall of the stall near appellant. Appellant was later turned over to the Lucena City Police Station. Complainant was examined by Dr. Bernardita V. De la Pea of the Quezon Memorial Hospital in Lucena City. Complainant, who was forty-two (42) years of age, was described to be fat and round and could not readily stand when seated or lying down. She had fresh laceration on her left forefinger, about 0.5 cm., which she must have sustained when she held the knife by the hand and appellant removed it from her hold. Her vagina bore multiple lacerations. She was found to have delivered four (4) babies already but was not pregnant. When she was examined, it was her second day of menstruation. No sperm cell was found on complainant which the doctor explained as possibly due to continuous urination. Accused-appellant is now before this Court seeking the reversal of his conviction. The appeal has no merit.
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23

From the records, there is no doubt that accused-appellant actually had sexual contact with the victim. The sexual congress was consummated while accused-appellant was armed with a long knife which he used in threatening the victim. The fear for her life or injury to her limb made her submit to the lecherous act done to her by accused-appellant. In an attempt to exculpate himself, accused-appellant asserts that he could not have engaged in sexual contact with complainant because she had her menstruation at that time. Such argument is clearly non-sequitur. The fact that the victim had her monthly menstruation does not mean that accused-appellant could not have had sexual intercourse with her. The presence or absence of menstruation does not negate the crime of 5 6 rape nor render its execution impossible. Lust, after all, manifests no reverence for occasion, location or the victim's condition, just as it is no 7 respecter of time and place. Accused-appellant also contends that no semen was found in the private parts of the victim, contrary to her claim that she felt accused-appellant ejaculate inside her. However, this was adequately explained during the trial by the examining physician, that 8 the traces of semen could have been washed away due to continuous urination. In any case, applicable herein is the ruling that the absence 9 10 of sperm samples in the vagina of the victim does not negate rape, because the absence of spermatozoa is not an element thereof. Accused-appellant denied the accusation and argued that he was never attracted to the victim. Accused-appellant's bare denial cannot stand against his positive identification by no less than the victim herself, who heard his voice threatening her and subsequently saw his face while he was escaping. Thus, during the victim's direct examination, she categorically stated: Q. A. How did you recognize him as the one who raped you? When he told me not to shout I recognized his voice, sir. xxx xxx xxx
11

And during her cross-examination: Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. You did not recognize that somebody when he was raping you because it was dark in your store, is it not? I recognized him when he went out of the door and his face was lighted, ma'm. What was the position of the accused when you saw him on the lighted part of that kitchen of yours? He happened to face me, ma'm. Is it not Mrs. witness that there were many persons where your store is situated? There were no persons because it was early morning, ma'm.
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Equally, accused-appellant's defense of alibi, aside from being inherently weak, cannot prosper, in the light of the evidence that the store where the victim was raped, on the one hand, and the store of accused-appellant's relative where he also stays, on the other hand, is just a matter apart. It was not, therefore, physically impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 14 Moreover, alibi cannot prevail over accused-appellant's positive identification as the rapist. The argument of the defense that the reason why accused-appellant was charged was because he was considered a "bad person" is too shallow an excuse. No ill motive can be attributed to the person who reported the rape to the police, just as no wrongful motive can be imputed on the victim in charging accused-appellant with a serious accusation. Ultimately, the issue boils down to credibility of witnesses. Assignment of credibility is a matter best left to the domain of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying an opportunity denied to appellate courts which simply relies on the silent pages of the cold evidence on record. No adequate and convincing reason was shown in order to justify setting aside the findings and conclusions arrived at by the court below, which if considered 15 would affect the result of the judgment. The trial court observed the victim's demeanor when she testified in court as "clear, straightforward 16 and credible" though "brief". However, the trial court erred in appreciating the three generic aggravating circumstances of armed with a deadly weapon, insult and dwelling. Although all the three aggravating circumstances were proven, none of them was specified, much less alleged, in the information either as a modifying or an aggravating circumstance. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, it is now required that the aggravating or modifying circumstances must be specified in the information. This new provision, being beneficial to accused-appellant, shall be given retroactive effect 17 as it applies to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In view of the constitutional proscription on the imposition of the death penalty at the time and since the retroactive application of the restored death penalty is unfavorable to accused-appellant, only reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on him. We, likewise, modify the monetary awards. Though a rape victim is automatically granted moral damages without need of proof, as it is 18 assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award, jurisprudence has settled that she is also automatically entitled 19 to a civil indemnity separate and distinct from the award of moral damages. Thus, accused-appellant is sentenced to pay moral damages of 20 P50,000.00 and civil indemnity of P50,000.00.

13

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55 in Criminal Case No. 93-451, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, in addition to the P50,000.00 as moral damages. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ ., concur. People of the Philippines vs. Sherjohn Arondain G.R. No. 131864 Robo con homicido is a special complex crime against property. Absent clear and convincing evidence that the crime of robbery was perpetrated, and that, on occasion or by reason thereof, a homecide was committed, an accused cannot be found guilty of robbery with homicide, but only homicide, or murder, as the case may be. Before us on automatic review is the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25, convicting and sentencing accused Sherjohn Arondain to death in Criminal Case No.47067 for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm; and convicting accused Sherjohn Arondain and Jose Precioso of Frustrated Robbery with Homicide and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 3, 1996, police officers Buenoji1do Loja, Fidel Mosquito, Marcelino Melendes and Roberto Catubuan responded to a report of a hold-up incident near the Florete Compound, along Q. Abeto Street, Mandurriao, Iloilo City. The police 3 officers found many people at the scene milling around a Chin-chin taxicab with its lights still on. Officer Melendes inspected the taxicab and found its driver, Teodorico Parreo, Jr., dead in the driver's seat. His foot was still on the accelerator, while his body was dangling on the open door of the cab, and his head was on the ground. Scattered on the floor of the cab and on the ground beneath the open door were money bills of different denominations totaling P1,040.00. The deceased's wallet containing a small amount of money was found beside him.4 Meanwhile, Officers Loja, Mosquito, and Catubuan were informed by John Gallo, a security guard of the Florete Compound, that after he heard a gunshot, he saw two male persons come out of the Chin-chin taxicab and run toward the field at the back of the Florete Compound. One of them came from the backseat of the taxicab while the other from the front seat, carrying a gun. They were later identified as Jose Precioso and 5 accused-appellant Sherjohn Arondain. Acting on the lead, the police officers requested the security guard of the compound to illuminate the field. As soon as the search light was turned on, the policemen saw accused-appellant holding a gun. Officer Mosquito fired a warning shot and approached accused-appellant. He asked him where his companion was, and he pointed to Jose Precioso who was lying on his belly about 8 to 10 meters away. Found in accused-appellant's possession was a .38 caliber revolver without serial number, with 2 live bullets and an empty shell, which the policemen 6 confiscated. The police officers asked why they shot the victim, and accused- appellant answered that he shot the victim because the latter resisted his demand for money. He added that after shooting the driver, he panicked and immediately scampered away, leaving the money bills scattered 7 on the floor of the taxicab. Dr. Tito Dormal, medico-legal officer of the PNP, Iloilo, conducted the autopsy on the deceased, Teodorico Parreo, Jr. He testified that the entrance wound was located above the right armpit. The bullet entered the chest cavity, perforated the right lung, and traveled thru the middle lobe of the left lung, where the slug was recovered. He inspected the slug and opined that the same must have been fired from a .38 caliber 8 revolver. SPO3 Ely Superio, of the Firearms and Explosive Unit of Region VI, testified that accused-appellant did not appear on the record as one of 9 those licensed to possess and carry firearms. The two accused, eighteen year-old Sherjohn Arondain and twenty- seven year-old Jose Precioso, interposed self-defense. Arondain testified that on the night of October 3, 1996, he and Jose Precioso were on board the Chin-chin taxicab driven by the deceased. He was seated in front; while Precioso was at the back seat. He claimed that the deceased overcharged them and asked for P80.00, when the usual fare was only P40.00. He insisted in paying only P40.00, which infuriated the deceased. When he extended his hand to tender the P40.00, the deceased slapped his hand, causing the money to fall on the floor of the cab. The deceased then immediately applied the brakes and blew his horn. Accused-appellant asked why he slapped his hand, and the deceased punched him on the left face. Accused-appellant tried to hit back, but the deceased allegedly drew a gun from his waist. Accused-appellant declared that he and his companion tried to wrestle the gun away from the deceased. In the ensuing affray, accused- appellant was able to take hold of the gun. He was so nervous that when the deceased tried to get back the gun, it went off and hit the latter. Frightened and shocked by the incident, accused-appellant and Precioso ran toward the 10 field at the back of the Florete Compound, where they waited for the police officers to arrive so they can turn themselves in. On June 17, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
2 1

Accordingly, the Court, finding the accused, Sherjohn Arondain and Jose Precioso, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Robbery with Homicide as defined and punished under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the following penalties: a) Reclusion Perpetua with such accessories as provided in Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code; b) To jointly reimburse the family of the victim the amount of P50,000.00; c) To jointly reimburse the family of the victim P67,677.00 as expenses for his wake and burial; d) To jointly pay the victim's family the amount of P312,000.00 representing the loss of support which the family was deprived as a result of his death; and e) To jointly pay the wife of the victim the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. The Court, likewise finding accused Sherjohn Arondain guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of death in accord with the first paragraph of Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended. SO ORDERED.
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Accused-appellant contends that: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF FRUSTRATED ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE AS DEFINED AND PUNISHED UNDER ARTICLE 297 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF NIGHTTIME AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF DEATH. IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT ONLY GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE. V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE MITIGATING 12 CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER. Accused-appelant does not deny authorship of the victim's death. He contends, however, that the killing of the victim was not on occasion or by reason of robbery, hence, he should not have been convicted for the complex crime of robbery with homecide, but only for homecide. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homecide, the prosecution has the onus probandi to establish the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homecide, which is 13 therein used in a generic sense, was committed. In People v. Suza, we ruled that in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homecide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be proven conclusively as any other essential element of a crime. In order for the crime of robbery with homecide to exist, it is necessary that it be clearly established that a robbery has actually taken place, and that, as a consequence or on the occasion of such robbery, a homecide be committed. Where the evidence does not conclusively prove the robbery, the killing of the victim would, therefore, be classified either as a simple homecide or a murder, depending upon the absence or presence of any qualifying circumstance, and not the complex offense of robbery with homecide."
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In the case at bar, the trial court's conclusion that the killing of deceased was done on occasion or by reason of robbery was based on the following circumstances: 1) that the victim's wallet containing a small amount of money was found beside his dead body and no longer in his pocket; 2) the presence of money in paper bills of different denominations amounting to a total of P1,040.00 scattered on the floor of the front seats, and on the ground beneath the doors of the taxicab; 3) the statement of accused-appellant immediately after his arrest that he shot the 15 victim because the latter refused his demand for money, which statement is allegedly admissible as part of theres gestae. Based on applicable jurisprudence, we find that the trial court erred in finding accused-appelant guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homecide. The confession made by the accused-appellant admitting the crime of frustrated robbery cannot be admitted as part of res gastae. It must be stressed that said statement, if it was at all made by accused-appellant, was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Said confession was given after he was arrested and without the assistance of counsel. He was not informed of his right to remain silent or right to counsel. From time he was arrested and deprived of his freedom, all the questions propounded on him by the police authorities for the purpose 16 of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information came within the ambit of a custodial investigation. As such, he was entitled to the rights enshrined under Article III, Section 12, of the Constitution. Failing to observe this constitutional mandate, the alleged confession of accused-appellant cannot be admitted as evidence against him. Absent accused-appellant's confession, only two pieces of circumstantial evidence remain to prove the crime of frustrated robbery, to with: 1) that the victim's wallet containing a small amount of money was found beside his dead body and no longer in his pocket; and 2) the scattered money in paper bills of different denominations amounting to a total of P1,040.00. A combination of these circumstances, however is not sufficient to establish intent to gain or animus lucrandi. That there was a struggle between the accused-appellant and the victim is not denied. Thus, the probability that the scattered money bills was caused by the scuffle between the two cannot be discounted. As to the cause thereof, the prosecution failed to substantiate their claim of an attemp tp unlawfully take the deceased's money. There was no proof that the victim's wallet which as found beside him was taken out from his pocket by accused-appellant. Prosecution witness John Ballo, who saw accusedappellant come out of the victim's taxi cab, never testified that the accused-appellant robbed the victim. His declaration was that accusedappellant went out of the cab carrying a gun. Nowhere in his testimony did he say that he saw accused-appellant attempting to rob, or walking away with the money of the victim. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that accused-appellant commited frustrated robbery, he should only be found guilty of the crime of homecide. In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, though the same was not alleged in the 17 18 information. In People v. Ramirez, citing the case of People v. Gano, the Court held that "pursuant to the amended provisions of Rule 110 Section 8 and 9, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances affecting the commission of the crime, must be alleged in the information, otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused even if proven at the trial." This rule may be applied retroactively, because it is favorable to the accused. Thus, nighttime should not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstances considering that the same was not alleged in the information. At any rate, even if nighttime was alleged in the information, the same will still not affect accused-appellant criminal liability as there was no 19 showing that he deliberately sought nocturnity to facilitate the commission of the crime, or that it insured his immunity from capture. For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, accused-appellant must prove that: (1) he had not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare them the 20 trouble and expense concomitant to his capture. In the case at bar, voluntary surrender cannot mitigate the liability of accused-appellant considering that his surrender was not in fact voluntary. The record show that he and his cohort immediately fled and hid behind the Florete Compound right after the shooting incident. It was only when accused-appellant realized that the presence of police officers in the field precluded his escape that he gave himself up. In the two informations filed against accused-appellant, he was charged for two separate crimes, namely, robbery with homecide, and illegal 21 possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866. After trial, a decision was rendered applying the then prevailing ruling in People v. Quijada, that the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm gave rise to two separate offenses, namely, (1) homecide or murder under the Revised Penal Code; and (2) illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form. Consequently, he was found guilty of frustrated robbery with homecide and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, and was accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. With the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294, however, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homecide or murder is no longer treated as a separate offense, but only as a special aggravating circumstance. Moreover, under said Act, only one crime is committed, i.e., homecide or murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of 22 firearm, and only one penalty shall be imposed on the accused. R.A. No. 8294 favors the accused-appellant in the instant case since it treats the two offenses for which he was charged only as a single offense. Hence, the amendatory provision should be retroactively applied to accused-appellant, who was not shown to be a habitual delinquent. Accordingly, he should be acquitted in Criminal Case No. 47067, for violation of P.D. No. 1866.

Notably, even in the absence of R.A. No. 8294, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form, much more be meted out the penalty of death for a reason that the information in Criminal Case No. 47067 charged him only with simple illegal possession of firearm. The information is bereft of any allegation that an unlicensed firearm was used in killing the victim. Without said allegation, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of aggravated illegal possession of firearm under Section 1 and 2 of P.D. No. 1866, without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Moreover, even assuming that there was an allegation that an unlicensed firearm was used in murder or homecide, still the imposition of the 23 death penalty on accused-appellant was erroneous. In People v. Nepumuceno, Jr. we pointed out that: As was emphasized in Quijada, under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 the commission of murder or homecide with the use of an unlicensed firearm serve to aggrevate the offense of illegal possession of firearm and, accordingly, increased the penalty prescribed in the first paragraph of the Section, i.e., from "reclusion temporal in its maximum penalty period to reclusion perpetua" to single indivisible penalty of death. It must be underscored that although R.A. No. 7659 had already taken effect at the time the violation of P.D. No. 1866 was allegedly committed by [accused-appellant], there is nothing in R.A. No. 7659 which specifically reimposed the death penalty in P.D. No. 1866. Without such reimposition, the death penalty imposed in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 for aggravated illegal possession of firearm shall remain suspended pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Article III of the Constitution. Conformably therewith, what the trial court could impose was reclusion perpetua. Applying Article 249, in relation to Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, reclusion temporal, which is the penalty for homicide, shall be imposed in its medium period, there being no modifying circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime. Since accused24 appellant is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he can thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty , the maximum of which shall be within the range ofreclusion temporal in its medium period; and the minimum, within the range of prision mayor, the penalty next lower to that prescribed. Anent accused-appellant's civil liability, the following guidelines regarding the award of actual damages representing burial, wake, and funeral 25 expenses, laid down in the case of People v. Degoma, are pertinent, thus: ...Of the expenses allegedly incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipt and which appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim. Thus, the Court cannot take account of receipts showing expenses incurred before the date of the slaying of the victim; those incurred after a considerable lapse of time from the burial of the victim and which do not have any relation to the death, wake or burial of the victim; those incurred for purely aesthetic or social purposes, such as the lining with marble of the tomb of the victim; those which appear to have been modified to show an increase in the amount of expenditure such as by adding a number to increase the purchase value from tens to hundreds; those expenditures which could not be reasonably itemized or determined to have been incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim; those which, would nonetheless, have been incurred despite the death, wake and burial of the victim, the death, wake and burial being merely incidental; and those which were not in fact shouldered by the immediate heirs of the victim, such as plane tickets by relatives or in-laws. Accordingly, the P67,677.00 funeral, wake, and burial expenses awarded by the trial court should be reduced to P17,818.40, being the total amount of expenses which were reasonably itemized, supported by receipts, and determined to have been incurred in connection with the funeral, wake or burial of the victim. The records reveal that at the time of his death, the victim was a 48-year old taxi driver, earning an average daily wage of P300.00 or 26 P9,000.00 a month. Hence, accused-appellant should indemnify the heirs of the deceased the amount of P1,151,820.00, for the deceased's 27 loss of earning capacity, computed pursuant to the following formula, to wit Net Earning Capacity (x) = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income -Living Expenses (50% of gross Annual Income) where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of deceased [ 48 years ]) x = 2/3 x (80- 48) x [(P108,000.00) - (P54,000.00)] x = [2/3 x 32] x P54,000.00 x = 21.33 x P54,000.00 x = P1,151,820.00 While the testimony of the victim's widow that the death of her husband caused her grief and sorrow justifies the award of moral damages, the 28 award of P300,000.00 must, however, be reduced to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Since there is no aggravating circumstance attendant in the present case, the award of P50,000.00 exemplary should therefore be deleted. The Court notes that accused Jose Precioso who was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for robbery with homicide, did not file an appellant's brief. Nevertheless, he shall benefit from the favorable decision of this Court with respect to accused-appellant Sherjohn Arondain. Section 11 (a), Rule 122, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides that: "An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter." Considering that the conclusions arrived at in the present case are similarly applicable to accused Jose Precioso, he should likewise be found guilty only for the crime of homicide. The same goes for the modifications of the civil liability. Thus, the reduction of the award of moral damages and funeral, burial, and wake expenses to P50,000.00 and P 17,818.40, respectively, as well as the deletion of exemplary damages, which are favorable to accused Jose Precioso, should also be applied to him. The additional monetary award imposed upon accused-appellant Sherjohn Arondain, which are clearly not favorable to accused Jose 29 Precioso, shall, however apply only to the former who pursued the present appeal. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25, in Criminal Case Nos. 47066 and 47067 is MODIFIED, as follows: 1) In Criminal Case No. 47066, accused-appellant Sherjohn Arondain and accused Jose Precioso, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Seven (7) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months, and One (1) day, ofreclusion temporal, as maximum. 2) Accused-appellant Sherjohn Arondain and accused Jose Precioso are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the following amounts to the heirs of the victim, to wit: a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (b ) PI7,818.40, as funeral, burial, and wake expenses; and c) P50,000.00 by way of moral damages. The award of P50,000.00 exemplary damages is deleted. Accused-appellant Sherjohn Arondain is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount ofP1,151,820.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased.1wphi1.nt 3) In Criminal Case No. 47067, for violation of P.D. No. 1866, accused-appellant Sherjohn Arondain is herebyACQUITTED. SO ORDERED. People of the Philippines vs. Angelito Bagsit G.R. 148877 The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City finding accused ANGELITO BAGSIT y BAGSIT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, sentencing him to death and ordering him to indenmify the heirs of the deceased P75,000.00 for moral damages, P96,950.00 for 1 funeral and similar expenses, and to pay costs, is on automatic review before the Court. On 12 September 1999 at around twenty (20) minutes past eight oclock in the evening, prosecution witness Richard Sison and his younger sister Heidi were watching television inside their house at Bgy. Soro-soro, Ilaya, Batangas City. When Richard looked out of the window, he saw a man whom he identified as Angelito Bagsit pointing a gun at his father Pepito Sison who was then closing the front door of their house. The barrel of the gun held by Angelito protruded thru their grilled window. Not for long, Richard heard a gunshot and almost simultaneously saw his father falling to the cement floor. With the help of his mother Teodora who came from his grandfathers house next door, Richard rushed his father to the hospital where he died shortly after. Richard Sison further testified that appellant Angelito Bagsit, a second cousin of his mother, used to frequent their house. He could not say what motivated Angelito to kill his father but as far as he knew, his father had no quarrel with the appellant before the shooting incident. Zenaida Bagsit Aguilar, daughter-in-law of the deceased, also testified that at around twenty past eight in the evening of the killing she was inside her house which was about ten (10) meters away from that of the deceased. As she was preparing coffee in the kitchen, appellant Angelito, who was toting a gun, passed by. Moments later, she heard Angelito cock his gun. Worried that something untoward would happen, she hurried towards her fathers house nearby. But before she could even talk to her father, a shot rang out. From her fathers house she looked out of the window and saw Pepito, awash in his own blood, being carried by his wife. Although she did not see the actual shooting, she was certain that it was the appellant who fatally shot her father-in-law because, under the circumstances, nobody else could have done it. When called to the witness stand, appellant Angelito Bagsit vehemently denied having anything to do with the death of Pepito Sison. He averred that in the evening of 12 September 1999 he became drunk after a drinking bout with Dante Bagsit and a certain Marcos Barte who hired him earlier that morning to take care of his piggery. He remembered having left the house of Marcos Barte at around eleven oclock in the evening. He recounted that he failed to reach his house, a mere ten (10)-minute walk, because it was already very dark. Instead, he spent the night leaning on a fence by the house of one Felix Agdon. When he finally arrived home at around five oclock the following morning his wife told him about the shooting of Pepito and that some police officers were looking for him.
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Relying on the positive assertions of the principal witnesses for the prosecution, the trial court discarded the denial and alibi of the appellant. Instead, it gave utmost significance to the positive identification by Richard Sison of the assailant before the investigating authorities 3 immediately after the killing. Thus the court a quo explained It is also to be noted that in denying the offense charged against him, the accused claimed to be having a drinking spree at the house of one Marcos Barte. If this is true, why was Marcos Barte and one Dante Bagsit, both of whom he claimed to be his drinking partners that fateful night, not come forward to corroborate his defense of alibi x x x x Besides, during his early direct testimony the accused claimed he was in the house of one Marcos Barte until 11:00 oclock in the evening of September 12, 1999 but later on declared that after failing to consume the fifth bottle of gin, he had gone home about 7:00 oclock in the evening. Finally, the Court observed that during the cross-examination of the accused, he was able to declare the length of the distance he had walked from the house of Marcos Barte as well as the length of time that had elapsed when he slumped on the fence of Felix Agdon where he allegedly passed the night because he was drunk. The Court finds this narration somewhat strange for him to do so because if really he was that drunk his apparent recollection defeats his very claim of drunkenness. Appellant now implores this Court for his exculpation, calling attention to the alleged errors of the trial court in finding him guilty of murder. He insists: (a) that in violation of his constitutional rights he was illegally arrested without a warrant; (b) that the trial court gravely erred in giving full faith to the unreliable, incredible and biased testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; and, (c) that he was wrongly meted the penalty of 4 death notwithstanding the presence of reasonable doubt calling for his exoneration. First, the appellant contends that his arrest on 13 September 1999 was illegal because the police authorities, despite reasonable time, effected his arrest without first securing a warrant of arrest in violation of his constitutional rights. We are not convinced. It is long settled that where the accused, by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, as shown by the counsel-assisted plea he entered during the arraignment and his active participation in the trial thereafter, voluntarily waives his constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches. We have consistently ruled that any objection concerning the issuance or service of a warrant of arrest or a procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, 5 otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Second, the appellant argues that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are tainted with suspicion and bias. Specifically, he points out that while witness Zenaida Aguilar claimed that she saw him pass by the side of her house carrying a gun and heard him cock it while she was at the kitchen, she nonetheless clarified that she did not see the actual shooting. Moreover, according to the appellant, it is surprising that a vital witness such as Zenaida Aguilar failed to execute any sworn statement before the police authorities and, worse, even took nine (9) months to give her testimony. Appellant also belittles the alleged eyewitness account of Richard Sison by explaining that under the circumstances described by Richard, it is improbable, if not outright impossible, for him to have had a clear view of the assailant. He explained that the light from within the house and the beam from the television caused a partial, if not a total impairment, of the witness vision; the natural consequence being that the suspects distinct features would not be recognizable from inside the well-lighted room. Appellants contentions are too insipid and hollow to deserve serious attention. While it is true that Zenaidas testimony is by itself insufficient to establish appellants authorship of the crime, the same being merely circumstantial in nature, we cannot discount its corroborative value because it establishes the fact that at the time Pepito was felled by an assassins bullet, the appellant was at or near the locus criminis. We have to mention that the house of Zenaida was but a stones throw away from the house of the victim. Thus, if her testimony is taken in conjunction with Richards eyewitness account, which also placed him at the scene of the crime, the appellants defense of alibi that he was nowhere near the crime scene would necessarily collapse. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Further, it must be supported by the most convincing evidence since it is an inherently weak defense which can be 6 easily fabricated. Neither can we accommodate the appellants specious assertion that Zenaidas delay in narrating her part of the gruesome story completely destroyed her credibility as a witness. It is axiomatic that delay in reporting a crime cannot always be construed as false accusation. This is founded on the truism that an ordinary person is naturally reluctant to be embroiled in a violent incident if only to avoid unwanted anxieties and exposure to possible reprisals on himself and his family. Appellant literally clutches at straws in insisting that the lighting inside the house made it entirely impossible for Richard to identify him as the culprit. First, we must bear in mind that appellant Angelito and Richard were no strangers to each other. They came from the same locality and were in 7 fact neighbors since childhood. Second, it has not been shown to our satisfaction that the supposed glare of the light inside the house was such that it virtually made the identification of the assailant impossible. On the contrary, what cannot be disputed is that: (a) when Richard looked out of the window, there was no obstruction which might have prevented him from seeing the appellant who was only several meters away from where he stood. In fact, the appellant was very close to the grilled window when he shot the victim that the light inside the house would have sufficiently illumined his face which all the more enabled Richard to recognize him; (b) the witness averred during his cross8 examination that the appellant shouted after he fired his gun. It is not strange then that Richard, being a neighbor of the appellant since childhood, was familiar with the latters voice. Surely, it is not fanciful to stress that even under less favorable circumstances a familiar face and a familiar voice would considerably reduce any error in identifying the assailant.

It is dogmatic that the positive identification of the accused, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are 9 negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. Richard Sison would not have imputed a crime as serious as murder if he were not truly convinced that in the hands of that person dripped the blood of his father. Treachery qualified the killing to murder. The appellant, who closely positioned himself surreptitiously behind the window of the house of his unsuspecting victim while the latter had his back turned, and fired his gun execution style, eliminated any risk from any defense that the victim might put up. As alleged in the amended Information, the killing was perpetrated with the use of an illegally possessed firearm. With the passage of RA 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is not a separate crime but merely a special aggravating 11 12 13 circumstance. After having been sufficiently proved by way of a certification dated 25 August 2000 that the appellant was not a licensed gun holder, an aggravating circumstance shall be appreciated against him pursuant to the above-mentioned law, which provides in part that "if homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance." Dwelling, also alleged in the amended Information, is likewise aggravating.1wphi1 The triggerman showed greater perversity when, although outside the house, he attacked his victim inside the latters own house when he could have very well committed the crime without necessarily transgressing the sanctity of the victims home. He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense - it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own abode, although the assailant might 14 have devised means to perpetrate the assault from the outside. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death pursuant to Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659. There being two (2) aggravating circumstances without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of death. A final word on the damages. In addition to the P75,000.00 as moral damages, the trial court awarded P96,950.00 as actual burial and incidental expenses. In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence, we grant the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity for his death. The 15 amount is awarded without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. We also reduce the amount of moral damages to 16 P50,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence for the pain and sorrow wrought by Pepitos untimely demise as testified to by his widow 17 Teodora Bagsit Sison. The actual damages granted by the trial court should however be deleted. The barren testimony of the widow in the absence of receipts to prove that the family of the deceased incurred funeral and incidental expenses is not sufficient to support this claim. However, temperate damages may be awarded in place of actual damages. The award of exemplary damages is warranted under Art. 2230 of the New Civil Code, in view of the presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling and the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm. Three (3) members of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; however, they submit to the ruling of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed accordingly. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding appellant Angelito Bagsit y Bagsit guilty of murder qualified by treachery, with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm and the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and imposing on him the supreme penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and, in lieu of actual damages, temperate damages of P25,000.00 shall be awarded to the heirs of the victim Pepito Sison. The award of actual damages is deleted for lack of sufficient evidence. In accordance with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of RA 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to Her Excellency, The President of the Philippines, for the possible exercise of her pardoning power. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED. People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Paraiso G.R. No. 12784 NOV 19 1999
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