FILEDby

D.C.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MIAMI DIVISION

CASE No. 11-20657-CIV-JORDAN-

SEP 0 6 2011
STEVEN M. LARIMORE CLERK U.S. DIST. CT S. D. of FLA. - MIAMI

ENRIQUE VARONA,
Plaintiff,

VS

Florida State Trooper M.G. Rietmann, Haul 0 Way Towing, Inc, The State of Florida; Chief Administrative Officer of Dade County and Director of DMV, officially and personally;
Defendants,

1st AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR MONEY DAMAGES, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. 1983 AND 42 U.S.C. 1985 JURY TRIAL REQUESTED

Jurisdiction

This U.S. district court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 42 USC 1983^, 42 USC 1985, and 28 USC 1343(3) and directly from the constitution and Declaration of Independence - including the part about petitioning for redress of grievances. Authority: Bivens^. Pendant jurisdiction is asserted for claims asserted herein under the Florida constitution and Florida statutes. "The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice."- Davis v. Wechsler. 263 U.S. 22, 24.

Parties

1.

Defendant Florida State Trooper M.G. Rietmann (from hereon, "Rietmann") is a

Florida Highway Patrol officer, rank and badge number are unknown by Plaintiff. 2. The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicle a/k/a/ DMV is an agency

of the state of Florida, (from hereon, "DMV") 3. The state of Florida (from hereon, "Florida") as principal for the Florida Highway

Patrol and the DMV is liable under a title 42 USC 1983, and 42 USC 1985 see - "In cases arising under section 1983, judgment against a public servant in his official capacity imposes liability on the entity that he represents provided the public entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond". 42 U.S.C.A. section 1983. Held: 2.

In cases under section 1983, a judgment against a public servant in his official capacity imposes liability on the entity that he represents. This rule was plainly

implied in Monell, supra; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 LEd.2d 522; and Owen v. City of Independence, 455 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 LEd.2d
673.

4.

Haul 0 Way Towing, Inc (form hereon, "Haul 0 Way Towing") a subcontractor of

the State of Florida and co conspirator. 5. Plaintiff Enrique J Varona (from hereon, "Varona") is a U.S. citizen and a

resident of Miami Dade County, Florida. 6. Varona is entitled to the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship, Florida

citizenship and English common law which were won at the point of a sword in a field at Runnymede in 1215 and memorialized in the Magna Charta, Declaration of Varona uses the facilities of interstate

Independence, and Florida constitution.

commerce in the Southern Federal Judicial District of Florida. 7. All defendants are residents of the judicial district of the U.S. District Court for

the Southern District of Florida. 8. 9. Haul-0-Way Towing, Inc. is located in Miami Dade County, Florida. All defendants are persons within the meaning of 42 USC 1983.

Facts pertaining to all causes of action.

10.

To the extent permitted, Varona invokes the protection of the Florida

constitution. The words "constitution" and "constitutional" are used herein to denote rights under the Florida constitution as well as the U.S. constitution. To that end pendant jurisdiction is herein asserted. 11. On Tuesday 12 January 2010 Rietmann, of the Florida Highway Patrol

signaled Varona to stop for a traffic ticket. Varona drove to the nearby street at an entrance to Miami Dade Metro Zoo in the area of Kendall and stopped his car. 12. Varona immediately presented to Rietmann a valid unexpired standard Florida

new style photographic driver license scheduled to expire in August 2016. 13. Varona immediately presented to Rietmann a valid proof of automobile

insurance. 14. Rietmann cited Varona for speeding at 12 miles per hour over the posted Rietmann noticed the car did not have a valid

speed limit. Upon further investigation temporary tag and registration. 15.

Varona explained to Rietmann that he was the owner of the car - and Rietmann

so noted on the ticket. 16. Varona informed Rietmann that he had purchased the car in October 2008. 17. Varona explained that he had been unable to get a tag for the car because the dealer who sold him the car had gone out of business and could not be located to formalize the transfer of the title to Varona's name.. 18. Varona told Rietmann that he had gone to the DMV and filed a Complaint

Affidavit against the dealer who had sold him the automobile. That he should have gotten a temporary tag and registration at the DMV, but they had run out of them when Varona was there. Varona showed Rietmann the DMV paperwork to support his claim. 19. Rietmann then called by radio to inquire regarding Varona's tag and

registration.

20.

Rietmann then explained to Varona that Rietmann had no choice but to tow

Varona's automobile as mandated under Florida Impound law statute 322.34. 21. Varona asked Rietmann if he would entertain any arguments pertinent to

Rietmann's discretion to tow the vehicle. 22. Rietmann told Varona that Rietmann had no discretion under these

circumstances. 23. Florida's official policy regarding towing (by virtue of its non-discretionary

mandate to officers) is of such official nature as to trigger 1983 state liability. 24. Varona explained to Rietmann that he feared losing his car and that he was not authorizing Rietmann to tow his automobile. 25. Varona, observed a tow truck bearing the name "Miami Dade County Police

Impound" tow Varona's car away. 26. Varona explained to Rietmann that government or municipalities greatly

impede people's progress in life when they take their automobiles. 27. Varona explained to Rietmann that Varona was in a very bad financial situation

and would probably lose his car because he could not afford the towing costs. 28. Varona told Rietmann that it was not constitutionally possible because Varona

had not committed any act justifying the seizure of his car. 29. Varona explained to Rietmann that Florida statute 322.34 was

unconstitutional because it deprives a person of a substantial property interest as punishment for a crime before trying him for the crime. 30. 31. Florida Statutes 322.34 for impounding automobiles is unconstitutional. Florida statutes 322.34 is patently unconstitutional because it denies due

process by assessing a penalty prior to a judicial determination of guilt. A concealed fault is equal to a deceit. 32. Florida Statutes 322.34 is unconstitutional because it permits a judicial

determination to be made by a non-judicial officer who is a witness. 33. Florida Statutes 322.34 is unconstitutional because it permits a judicial

determination to be made by the officer without consideration of any evidence offered by the accused driver.

34.

Florida Statutes 322.34

is unconstitutional because it is used to effect

excessive punishment for speeding and for an expired tag and registration. 35. 36. Florida statutes 322.34 is void on its face and cannot be redeemed. The statute is defective in that there is no speedy and adequate remedy for

persons, like Varona, who were not driving with a suspended license, and had car insurance but who nonetheless suffer the loss of an automobile. 37. An automobile can not be taken from its owner The freedom to make use of

one's own property as a means of getting about from place to place, whether in pursuit of business or pleasure, is a liberty which under the 14th amendment cannot be curtailed by a state without due process of law" U.S. v Guest 383 US 745, 16 L Ed 2d 239; Wall v King 206 F2d 878; Passenger Cases, 7 How 283, 12 L Ed 702." Brief of prevailing party in Bell v Burson (May 1971) 402 US 535, 29 L Ed 2d 90, 91

S Ct 1586.
38. Varona explained to Rietmann that only a judge may determine the punishment for a crime - and punishment cannot be imposed prior to trial. 39. Varona was not arrested by Rietmann this proves that there was no adequate

reason to tow Varona's car - and therefore a tow could not be justified as incidental to arrest - nor was the tow predicated on safety considerations. 40. Rietmann should have refrained from towing Varona's car but in fact towed his car to punish Varona before trial. 41. Varona went on Friday 15 January, 2010 to Haul-O-Way towing to retrieve his

automobile. 42. Varona showed proof of insurance, a valid drivers license, and the tow

company receipt given to him by the tow truck driver when it impounded his automobile. 43. Varona showed Haul-O-Way towing proof of the DMV complaint affidavit and

proof of sale of the automobile. 44. Haul-O-Way Towing, Inc refused to release the automobile to Varona on

account that they wanted a registration or title as the only documents they would accept to release Varona's automobile. In violation of the law see; Scofield v. City of

Hillsborough C.A.9 (Cal.)1988, 862 F.2d 759. "Unregistered owners have right to contest seizure" 6,8 45. home. 46. 47. Haul-0-Way refused to release and tow Varona's car to his home. Varona came back a second time on Monday 18, January 2010 to retrieve his Varona suggested to Haul 0 Way Towing that the car be towed to Varona's

home and dropped at his parking space and that Varona would pay for the tow to his

automobile. 48. Haul-0-Way Towing Inc refused to release Varona's automobile citing the

same reasons as before. 49. Varona came back to Haul-0-Way Towing, Inc. a third time on or about

Thursday 21 January 2010 to retrieve his automobile and was told not to come back to their facility or else they would call the police and have him arrested. 50. Varona notified Haul 0 Way towing in person that it was unlawful for them to

not release his automobile upon proof of a valid drivers license, insurance and bill of sale and DMV records pertaining to the situation with the automobile. 51. Varona told Haul 0 Way Towing that an accruing storage fee was un-payable

by Varona and that he needed the vehicle released right away 52. 53. Haul 0 Way Towing told Varona that they did not care and to go away. Two weeks later Varona called Haul 0 Way Towing, Inc and was told the

vehicle was no longer there. They wouldn't provide Varona any further information about the were about of his automobile.. 54. By refusing to inform Varona of the were about of his automobile and by

depriving Varona of an opportunity to contest the taking of his car, defendants violated Varona's constitutional and statutory right to a pre-deprivation hearing or at least a post deprivation hearing - and they deprived him of his car before convicting
him.

1st cause of action: Unconstitutional Forfeiture without 5th amendment Due Process

55.

Plaintiffs incorporate every paragraph of this complaint in every cause of action

in this complaint as though fully set forth in that cause of action.

56.

No judicial process was utilized to affect forfeiture of Varona's automobile and

possessions therein. No process constitutes per se denial of 5th amendment due process. 57. All defendants are liable to Varona under 42 USC 1983.

2nd cause of action: 8th amendment violation Punishment prior to trial

58.

Plaintiffs incorporate every other paragraph of the complaint as though fully set

forth in this cause of action. 59. Varona's drivers license was valid on 12 January, 2010 and had automobile

insurance. 60. Punishment despite having all DMV required documents to remedy his situation

is a foreseeable result of punishing prior to trial. 61. The remedy of seeking subsequent recourse is inadequate. See "All that the

seizure left him ... was the right to bring a claim for the return of title at some unscheduled future hearing" - U.S. Supreme Court in condemning a similar prehearing seizure in U.S. v Good Real Property. 62. 63. All defendants are liable to Varona under 42 USC 1983. Injunctive relief is justified.

3rd cause of action: 1985(3)(c ) Conspiracy to deprive citizen of constitutional rights. 64. Plaintiffs incorporate every other paragraph as though fully set forth in this

cause of action. 65. Defendant The Florida Highway Patrol, are under the direction and

supervision of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles a/k/a the Florida DMV. 66. 67. The DMV is a department or agency of the state of Florida. Rietmann is a Florida Highway Patrol State Trooper, hence an employee of The

State of Florida via the DMV.

68. Rietmann has been hired by Defendant Florida Highway Patrol a/k/a the Florida
DMV.

69. Defendant the state of Florida is strapped for money. 70. Defendants The Florida Highway Patrol, The Department of Highway Safety and

Motor Vehicle (DMV) and the state of Florida are similar in, goals, and function - and they have mutual interests. 71. The dominant mutual interest is obtaining money to pay their employees and contractors. 72. A substantial source of revenue for defendants is traffic tickets and automobile seizures and impoundment. 73. A substantial source of revenue for the DMV is fees including towing fees and

automobile auctions due to police seizures. See 9(c) of 322.34

"322.34 9(c) Notwithstanding s. 932J03(l)(c) or s. 932.7055. when the seizing agency obtains a final judgment granting forfeiture of the motor vehicle under this section, 30 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the motor vehicle shall be retained by the seizing law enforcement agency and 70 percent shall be deposited in the General Revenue Fund." 74. 75. Defendants government entities communicate their needs to each other. An ombudsman is an officer who speaks for the consumer or user of an

organization's services. 76. 77. All defendants in traffic violation cases have no ombudsman. All governmental defendants herein cooperated to attempt to obtain maximum

revenue from the ticket and car seizure, auction through the impoundment system. 78. 79. In so doing they violated the rights of Varona. The violation was foreseeable, knowing, and reflects a trend of growing

institutional disregard for constitutional rights. 80. All defendants conspired to deprive Varona and others similarly situated of

their constitutional immunity and rights secured under the constitution.

81.

Haul 0 Way Towing, Inc should and could have known that Varona's drivers

license was valid, that he had proof of insurance and that a Florida statute 322.34 tow was not justified. 82. Haul 0 Way Towing, Inc refrained from knowing and thereby conspired with

other defendants against Varona. 83. All defendants so conspired willingly and knowingly with the intent to profit

financially by depriving Varona of his constitutional rights. 84. All violations of the constitution described herein were foreseeable results of the conspiracy of defendants. 85. All defendants are liable for all acts of all other defendants pursuant to the

conspiracy, namely, all acts in furtherance of the policy of recklessly seizing and impounding automobiles in contravention of the constitution. 86. Defendant Reitmann, was contemporaneously warned by Varona (as described herein, advice to Rietmann being presumed to be advice to the state of Florida and its pertinent agencies) that their actions violated the constitution and chose to violate Varona's rights after being advised. 87. By so conspiring, even if only by tacit compliance with official policy, all

defendants violated 42 USC 1985(3) ( c) - depriving persons of rights or privileges secured under the constitution under color of law and are liable to Varona. 88. The acts of all defendants violate 18 USC 241 - which makes it a federal crime

to conspire to deprive rights of citizens; and 18 USC 242 - which makes it a federal crime to deprive persons of rights under color of law. 89. Officer Rietmann violated his oath to uphold the constitution - which includes

the supremacy clause. 4th cause of action: Punishment before trial in violation of 6th amendment

90.

Plaintiffs incorporate every other paragraph as though fully set forth in this

cause of action.

91.

A statute that provides for punishment before trial is unconstitutional - in

violation of the 6th amendment. 92. Florida Statute 322.34 , reprinted herein, is such a statute and unconstitutional. 93. Punishment before trial for driving on a expired tag and no valid registration is

unconstitutional; all defendants contributed to this deprivation against Varona and he is entitled to redress. 5th cause of action: Unconstitutional failure to prove elements of crime in criminal case

94.

Plaintiffs incorporate every other paragraph as though fully set forth in this

cause of action. 95. Varona's car was taken to punish him for driving without a valid tag and

registration 96. Taking a person's car for driving without a valid tag and registration constitutes punishment fora crime,-Rietmann alleged specifically a crime under 322.34. 97. The seizure triggers the constitutional mandate that the prosecution must prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt - before punishment. 98. Varona was subjected to the unconstitutional provision of vehicle code section

322.34. Which is unconstitutional to the extent that they required Varona, then a criminal defendant, to pre-register* his car in order to receive notice of the right to a hearing on his car. 99. They require him to petition and prove ownership and innocence in order to avoid the punishment of loss of his car. 100. This stands the concept of "innocent until proven guilty in a court of law" on its head. 101. Varona herein lost his automobile and contents unconstitutionally and are

therefore entitled to redress including punitive damages pursuant to 42 USC 1983.

6th cause of action: Seizure of car that is exempt from levy

102.

Plaintiffs incorporate every other paragraph as though fully set forth in this

cause of action. 103. The procedure utilized by Haul 0 Way Towing, Inc under color of state law

deprived Varona of his statutory exemption right pursuant to Florida constitution were a motor vehicle under Section 222.25(1) of the Florida Statutes, a $1,000 personal property exemption under Article 10, Section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution, and a $4,000 personal property exemption under newly enacted Section 222.25(4) of the Florida Statutes, which exempt plaintiffs car and the proceeds from levy. 104. Plaintiff is entitled to redress under 1983 and 1985(3)(c ).

7th cause of action: Conversion after 30 day impound of auto and property inside it

105.

Plaintiffs incorporate every other paragraph as though fully set forth in this

cause of action. 106 Varona personally pleaded with defendants Haul 0 Way Towing, Inc. and the storage

was nonetheless presented no opportunity to challenge or mitigate charges. 107.

Defendants routinely and callously deprived citizens of their personal

property by seizing their automobiles and everything in them. 108. Varona was denied an opportunity to retrieve personal items from his

impounded car. 109. 110. These personal items were taken without due process of law. In the case of letters, files, legal files and other irreplaceable items the

harm is irreparable harm justifying the remedy of writ of prohibition and specific performance.

8th c/a: De facto Discrimination against Florida drivers. Feudal peonage.

111.

Varona had no traffic tickets, had proof of insurance and a receipt of was traveling on SW 152 st a state highway and an

purchase of the vehicle

instrument of interstate commerce. 112. The State of Florida through the DMV generates a substantial portion of its

revenue from enforcement of traffic laws including statute 322.34. 113. Florida economically challenged a/k/a indigent drivers suffer de facto

discrimination compared to residents of other states who use Florida roads. 114. 115. The penalty is a foreseeable result of the cooperation (conspiracy) of all All defendants use computers and radios to track debtor victims of parking

defendants.

and speed traps, suspend their license, tags and registration summarily (or charge prohibitively high registration fees to pay the parking tickets), and ultimately seize their cars and/or hold them in jail to force a guilty plea. 116. Out of state drivers, and drivers whose cars are registered out of state benefit

by lower registration fees and less oppressive enforcement of speeding laws by seizure and impoundment 117. A cause of the de facto discrimination alleged herein is that the foreign

state will often not suspend for failure to pay a Florida ticket - the result being that drivers in otherwise similar circumstances who commit the same offense, driving with an expired tag and registration escape the automatic impoundment. 118. Another cause is: the foreign state will not withhold registration for failure to

pay Florida traffic tickets. 119. Another case is: the foreign state will often issue tags for 2 years thereby

subjecting their patrons to fewer encounters with tag watchers. 120. 121. The traffic ticket system constitutes a de facto state of peonage for indigents Feudalism is antithetic to freedom.

and especially so for Florida residents.

122.

The constitution guarantees a republican form of government.

123. 124.

Peonage was outlawed in this country. Varona is entitled to redress under the constitution and 1983 and 1985(3).

9th c/a: Systematic Denial of constitutional rights by state of Florida and DMV

125.

Primacy of the individual is the hallmark of a free society.

126 .The history of the United States has been a history of increasing freedom and increasing respect for the rights of man. 127. 128. Decreasing freedom would be a reversal of this 220 year old trend. Equality under the law and mutuality are fundamental goals useful in analyzing

and perfecting human relationships and contracts. 129. Individuals are entitled to and must demand equality, respect, and mutuality

vis-a-vis governments just as individuals demand equality, respect, and mutuality from other humans. 130. In a free society, individual rights must be protected over the rights of groups

including government, municipalities, cities, etc. 131. The main difference between American law and that of other countries is the

primacy of the individual. 132. 133. We create government to help us - not to control and tax us. Observe the Government derives its power from the consent of the governed. Observe the

primacy.

primacy. 134. Governmental power is bounded by the terms of the constitution; individual

freedom is not so bounded. Primacy. 135. 136. 137. Therefore traffic fines for speeding must be placed in perspective. Therefore they must be considered minor - something like a civil debt. They should be recognized for the random taxation that they are.

138.

The culpability of a person who gets a speeding ticket should not be increased

because of arbitrary forfeiture of their property. The U.S. Supreme court in Pulliam v Allen (1984) 466 US 522, 80 L Ed 2d 565, 104 S Ct 1970 forbade prohibitive bail in otherwise non-jailable offenses and permitted assessment of costs and attorney fees against the magistrate who imposed the bail. 139. A debt owed to Varona does not escalate into a crime in a court of law is

simply a default which may be cured. 140. 141. Similarly a debt owed by Varona to a government should be treated similarly. Double standards are suspect. This double standard evinces a failure of the

principle of equality of the individual vis-a-vis the governmental unit at a fundamental level - in the drafting of statutes. 142. 143. If a debtor owes money to Varona the debtor can file a bankruptcy and the By comparison if Varona owes money to Florida or the DMV then he must

debt is cleared. litigate the issue because fines are generally not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 144. The Florida automobile registration is merely an attempt to collect an

alleged debt 145. 146. 147. Courts in enforcing speeding tickets don't talk much about the crime. Dialogue would reveal that many drivers are angry. This anger is similar to the anger expressed in the Declaration of

Independence as follows: "He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance." 148. Varona feels anger at the state of Florida and the DMV because they deny

equal protection. 149. To the extent that federal courts defer to the states DMV's at the expense of

individuals we diminish the primacy of the individual, the hallmark of free society and we reverse a 220 year old trend of increasing freedom. 150. Following natural bureaucratic instincts which mimic human instincts

defendant State of Florida has grown. It needs money to survive. It competes with individual humans for resources - (money).

151.

It has evolved into a system that values the collection of money but does not

value the rights of defendants. Individually the offending practices seem innocuous. Most don't arise if the driver simply pays the ticket. But these seemingly innocuous violations of constitutional rights form a pattern and constitute a system designed to raise money at the expense of constitutional rights. 152. Statute 322.34 contributes substantially to the Orwellian specter of this

systematic denial of constitutional rights. 153. The systemic effect is that law enforcement agencies such as the Florida uses disproportionate, scary, oppressive, and

Highway Patrol, DMV and others

depressing force to collect fines that are actually taxes imposed randomly. 154. The systematic effect is that the grand promise of the right to criminal due

process gives way to deference to the government as a bill collector - for speeding tickets. 155. Injunctive relief is appropriate to clear gridlock here where multiple courts and

agencies impose circuitous or onerous burdens.

10th cause of action: Impairment of the mobility necessary to gather food and survive 156. Plaintiffs incorporate every other paragraph as though fully set forth in this

cause of action. 157. Varona is an independent person, does sales on a commission basis and his job requires him to visit and prospect for new customers on a constant basis. 158. As a result of Varona's loss of his only automobile Varona's ability to buy

food, seek employment, work, move his property, put property in storage, socialize, visit with an attorney, obtain medicine, and do many of the basics of life is impaired. 159. 160. The village has disappeared. People need a car today. Compared to a bus, transportation by car is more reliable for poor people

because they can buy gasoline when they need it - or even receive it when they run on the side of the road. By comparison one must have $4 cash to make a round trip on the bus and routes have been cut as a result of budget woes.

161.

Varona lost his employment after his car was seized, would have sought other

employment if he had his car

162.

Plaintiff is entitled under 1983 to redress of this unlawful violation of his

constitutional rights from the people who took his car.

11th 163.

cause of action - Impairment of constitutional right to earn a livelihood Plaintiffs incorporate every other paragraph as though fully set forth in this

cause of action. 164. Taking a person's car for a technical trivial traffic offense is Draconian,

excessive and violative of the 8th amendment. 165. An automobile is necessary for Varona's livelihood - which consists in

prospecting for new customers throughout the Miami Dade and Broward areas -and other driving tasks. 166. The Magna Charta prohibits forfeitures and deprivations of livelihood even

for a felony. The Magna Charta is enforceable in the United States as part of the common law - Erie v Tompkins^ notwithstanding. 167. Florida Statute 322.34 as now enforced by Rietmann against Varona

contravenes statutes of exemption and ancient precepts designed to ensure that punishment does not deprive a person of the right to earn a livelihood. 168. As a matter of law the right to earn a living is fundamental and cannot be

taken without compelling state interest -and much more than collection of a traffic fine or fee. 169. Plaintiff is entitled under 1983 to redress of this unlawful violation of his constitutional rights from the people who took his car.

12th c/a: Denial of equal protection under the law

170.

Varona has a Constitutional right to have police services administered in a

non discriminatory manner. Varona's rights were violated when Rietmann as a state actor denied such protection to Varona. See Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 715-17 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a cause of action under 6 1983 based upon the discriminatory denial of police services); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); see also Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, (10th Cir. 1996) 1406 (stating that [a]n equal protection violation occurs when the

government treats someone differently [from] another who is similarly situated). 166. The alleged constitutional deprivation in this matter was the denial of equal police protection to Varona under Florida statute 322.34 which states that. 322.34 Driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked, except a "habitual traffic offender" as defined in s. 322.264. who drives a vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked is guilty of a moving violation, punishable as provided in chapter 318. (2) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s. 322.264. who, knowing of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation, drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon:

e) Except as provided in paragraph (d), the vehicle shall remain impounded or immobilized for any period imposed by the court until: 1. The owner presents proof of insurance to the arresting agency; or 2. The owner presents proof of sale of the vehicle to the arresting agency and the buyer presents proof of insurance to the arresting agency. 171. Varona had a valid drivers license and proof of insurance, Rietmann had no

legal basis to impound Varonas automobile under the statute he allegedly applied to Varona. This amounted to a constitutional deprivation of Varonas rights under the equal protection .clause of the 14th amendment. 172. Haul 0 Way Towing, Inc violated Varonas constitutional rights by not releasing the car to him upon proof of automobile insurance. Trial by jury Varona requests a Trial by jury for such is his right under title 42 USC 1983 and

cites, "If, however, there is a material dispute as to the facts regarding what the officer or the plaintiff actually did, the case must proceed to trial, before a jury if requested even when immunity from suit was an issue. Issues of credibility belong to the trier of fact" Lalonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2000): " The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution so requires See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317-318 (1995) (holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pre-trial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity) [0]nce "the plaintiff established that material issues of fact existed, the court was required to submit the factual dispute to a jury". Thomson v. Mahre, 110 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1997) ([Wjhere there is a genuine issue of fact on a substantive issue of qualified immunity, ordinarily the controlling principles of summary judgment and, if there is a jury demand and a material issue of fact, the Seventh Amendment, require submission to a jury.).

Conclusion

Wherefore, Plaintiff Enrique Varona moves this honorable court and demands the following relief: (1) Compensation of $100,000 for loss of his car and the (2) Compensation of possessions in it and resulting limitations on his activities.

$50,000 for the dignitary invasion and violation of constitutional rights; (3) Punitive damages in appropriate proportion to the wealth of defendants, but not less than $1.5 million from the State of Florida, $1 million from DMV, $1 million from The Florida Highway Patrol and $50,000 from Haul 0 way Towing, Inc. (4) Attorney fees under 42 DSC 1988 and private attorney general theories. (5) Declaratory relief: a declaration that Florida statute 322.34 the seizure is unconstitutional, violative of the violated and its All other supremacy clause and cannot be rehabilitated by interpretation; a declaration that of personal properties such as an automobile enforcement was as a matter of law a sad chapter in democracy (6) appropriate relief.

Respectfully submitted, -U^J /UjfcvVA^

[Enrifluff Varoha (pro-se)

"He who does not repel a wrong when he can, induces it.