IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA No.

110765 ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice, on behalf of itself and its members; and Nova Health Systems, d/b/a Reproductive Services, on behalf of itself, its staff and its patients, Plaintiffs-Respondents, vs. Terry L. Cline, in his official capacity as Oklahoma Commissioner of Health; and Lyle Kelsey, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Oklahoma State Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision; and Catherine C. Taylor, in her official capacity as the President of the Oklahoma State Board of Osteopathic Examiners, Defendants-Petitioners. ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma Case No. CV-2011-1722, the Hon. Donald L. Worthington, Judge Presiding. Declaratory Judgment & Injunction ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF HON. REBECCA HAMILTON AND HON. PAM PETERSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS, FILED PURSUANT TO RULE 1.12(a)(1) WITH THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ALL OF THE PARTIES Cara S. Nicklas OBA No. 14180 McAlister & McAlister Law Firm, P.C. P.O. Box 1569 15 E. 15th Street Suite 200 Edmond, Oklahoma 73083-1569 (405) 359-0701 (tel) (405) 359-0806 (fax) cnicklas@mmmtlaw.com Paul Benjamin Linton Special Counsel Thomas More Society 921 Keystone Avenue Northbrook, Illinois 60062 (847) 291-3848 (tel) (847) 412-1594 (fax) PBLCONLAW@AOL.COM Pro Hac Vice Admission Pending

Attorneys for the Amici

Table of Contents Interest of the Amici. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ARGUMENT: I. THIS COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO RECOGNIZE A RIGHT TO ABORTION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION MERELY BECAUSE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS RECOGNIZED A RIGHT TO ABORTION UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Cases: Acuff v. State, 1955 OK CR 62, 283 P.2d 856. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Bailey v. City of Tulsa, 1971 OK CR 499, 491 P.2d 316. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Board of County Commrs of Muskogee County v. Lowery, 2006 OK 31, 136 P.3d 639.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Dean v. Crisp, 1975 OK CR 95, 536 P.2d 961. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Ex parte Thomas, 1908 OK CR 155, 97 P. 260. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1(Tex. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Grogan v. Kokh, LLC, 2011 OK CIV APP 34, 256 P.3d 1021. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Mahaffey v. Attorney General, 564 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Moe v. Secretary of Administration & Finance, 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Pierce v. State, 1929 OK CR 91, 42 Okla. Crim. 272, 275 P. 393. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 6 i

Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Pro-Choice Mississippi, v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1998).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Prock v. District Court of Pittsburg County, 1981 OK 41, 630 P.2d 772. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 12 Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117 (Del. 1990).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Serna v. Superior Court; 707 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1985).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Sitz v. Dept of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Taylor v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Thomas v. State, 1926 OK CR 140, 34 Okla. Crim. 63, 244 P. 1116. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Turner v. City of Lawton, 1986 OK 51, 733 P.2d 375.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6 Statutes: U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 U.S. Const. amend. I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 U.S. Const. amend. II.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 U.S. Const. amend. IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 U.S. Const. amend. V.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 U.S. Const. amend. VI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3 Okla. Const. art. I, 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9 Okla. Const. art. II, 7.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 7 Okla. Const. art. II, 20.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ii

Okla. Const. art. II, 21.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Okla. Const. art. II, 22.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Okla. Const. art. II, 23.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Okla. Const. art. II, 24.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Okla. Const. art. II, 26.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Okla. Const. art. II, 30.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 H.B. 1970. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Other Authorities: Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the Proposed State of Oklahoma Held at Guthrie, Oklahoma, November 20, 1906, to November 16, 1907. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State ConstitutionsAway From a Reactionary Approach, 9 Hastings Const. L. Q. 1 (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law[:] Litigating Individual Rights, Claims and Defenses (4th ed. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Earl M. Maltz, False ProphetJustice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 Hastings Const. L. Q. 429 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4 H.L. Stuart, Necrology, 12 Chron. of Okla. 236 (1934). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 II. THE DUE PROCESS GUARANTEE OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION (ART. II, 7) DOES NOT CONFER A RIGHT TO ABORTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Cases: A.E. v. State, 1987 OK 76, 743 P.2d 1041.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Alva State Bank & Trust Co. v. Dayton, 1998 OK 44, 755 P.2d 635. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Barnes v. Barnes, 2005 OK 1, 107 P.3d 560. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

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Black v. Ball Janitorial Service, Inc., 1986 OK 75, 730 P.2d 510. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Blocker v. Martin, 1994 OK 17, 868 P.2d 1316. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Boswell v. State, 1937 OK 727, 74 P.2d 940. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Bowlan v. Lunsford, 1936 OK 158, 54 P.2d 666. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Callaway v. City of Edmond, 1990 OK CR 25, 791 P.2d 104. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).. . . . . . . . . . 18 Copus v. State, 1924 OK CR 91, 224 P. 364. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Crump v. Geyer, 1916 OK 254, 157 P. 321.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Daffin v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept of Mines, 2011 OK 22, 251 P.3d 741. . . . . . . . . 10, 11 Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Davis v. Fieker, 1997 OK 156, 952 P.2d 505. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Delk v. Markel American Insurance Co., 2003 OK 88, 81 P.3d 629.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13 DuLaney v. Oklahoma State Dept of Health, 1993 OK 113, 868 P.2d 676. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Eastern Oklahoma Building & Construction Trades Council v. Pitts, 2003 OK 113, 82 P.3d 1008.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11 Edmondson v. Pearce, 2004 OK 23, 91 P.3d 605. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State of Oklahoma, 1987 OK 114, 746 P.2d 1135.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Gladstone v. Bartlesville Independent School District No. 30, 2003 OK 30, 66 P.3d 442.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Greenwood v. State, 1909 OK CR 156, 105 P. 371.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 1989 OK 8, 77 P.2d 766. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Henry v. Schmidt, 2004 OK 34, 91 P.3d 65.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Hope v. Perales, 634 N.E.2d 183 (N.Y. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Hughes v. State, 1994 OK CR 3, 868 P.2d 730. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 In re Baby Girl L., 2002 OK 9, 51 P.3d 544. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 In re Herbst, 1998 OK 100, 971 P.2d 395. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 1992 OK 122, 838 P.2d 1. . . . . . 12 In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 In re the Mental Health of K.K.B., 1980 OK 7, 609 P.2d 747.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Jack Lincoln Shops, Inc. v. State Dry Cleaners Board, 1943 OK 28, 135 P.2d 332. . . . . . . 11 Jobe v. State, 1973 OK CR 51, 509 P.2d 48. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Johnson v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists of the State of Oklahoma, 1996 OK 41, 913 P.2d 1339.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Lindsey v. State ex rel. Dept of Corrections, 1979 OK 35, 593 P.2d 1088. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Matter of Adoption of Darren Todd H., 1980 OK 119, 615 P.2d 287. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Matter of Rich, 1979 OK 173, 604 P.2d 1248. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 McClure v. Conocophillips Co., 2006 OK 42, 142 P.3d 390. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Messenger v. Messenger, 1992 OK 27, 827 P.2d 865. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11-12. 14 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Moe v. Secretary of Administration & Finance, 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . 18 Morris v. Sanchez, 1987 OK 110, 746 P.2d 184. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-17

Nelson v. Nelson, 1998 OK 10, 954 P.2d 1219. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11 Oklahoma Assn for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City, 1995 OK 62, 901 P.2d 800.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 18 Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000). . . . . . . 19 Presley v. Board of County Commrs of Oklahoma County, 1999 OK 45, 981 P.3d 309.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Raich v. Ashcroft, 500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 15, 18 Ross v. Peters, 1993 OK 8, 846 P.2d 1107. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10. 11 Spencer by and through Spencer v. Seikel, 1987 OK 75, 742 P.2d 1126. . . . . . . . . . . . . 15. 16 State of Alaska v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30 (Alaska 2001).. . . . . . . . . . . . 18 State of Alaska, Dept of Health & Human Services v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2001).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Troxel v. Glanville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Turner v. City of Lawton, 1986 OK 51, 733 P.2d 375.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Valley Hospital Assn v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). . . . . . . 18 Vogel v. Corp. Commn of Oklahoma, 1942 OK 14, 121 P.2d 586.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13, 14 Wilson v. State, 1936 OK 158, 252 P. 1106.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Wood v. Independent School District No. 141 of Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma, 1983 OK 30, 661 P.2d 892.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Women of the State of Minnesota v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995).. . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Statutes: U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Okla. Const. art. II, 2.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Okla. Const. art. II, 7.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Okla. Const. art. II, 30.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 H.B. 1970. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Okla. (Terr.) Stat. 2187 (1890), recodified at Okla. (Terr.) Stat 2177 (1893), recodified at Okla. (Terr.) Stat. 2268 (1903), recodified at Okla. Comp. Laws 2370 (1909), recodified at Okla. Rev. Laws 2436 (1910), recodified at Okla. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1859 (1921), recodified at Okla. Rev. Stat. 1834 (1931), recodified at 21 O.S. 861 (West 1937), carried forward as 21 O.S. 861 (West 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-15 Okla. (Terr.) Stat. 2188 (1890), recodified at Okla. (Terr.) Stat. 2178 (1893), recodified at Okla. (Terr.) Stat. 2269 (1903), recodified at Okla. Comp. Laws 2371 (1909), recodified at Okla. Rev. Laws 2437 (1910), recodified at Okla. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1860 (1921), recodified at Okla. Rev. Stat. 1835 (1931), recodified at 21 O.S. 862 (West 1937), carried forward as 21 O.S. 862 (West 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-15 12 O.S. 1053(F) (West Supp. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 12 O.S. 1147.1 (West 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 15 O.S. 15 (West 1996).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 21 O.S. 691(B) (West Supp. 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-16 22 O.S. 1010 (West 2003).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 22 O.S. 1011 (West 2003).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

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30 O.S. 3-119(3) (West 2009).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 63 O.S. 3101.4 (West Supp. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 63 O.S. 3101.8(C) (West Supp. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 84 O.S. 131 (West 1990).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 84 O.S. 228 (West 1990).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Certificate of Service

viii

Interest of the Amici Amici curiae are the Honorable Pam Peterson (Rep.), state representative for the 67th District, and the Honorable Rebecca Hamilton (Dem.), state representative for the 89th District. As legislators, amici have a vital interest in the constitutionality of the legislation which is the subject of this appeal, H.B. 1970. House Bill 1970 imposes reasonable restrictions on the use of medications that are prescribed for the purpose of inducing abortion. In striking down H.B. 1970, the district court determined that the due process guarantee of the Oklahoma Constitution, art. II, 7, confers a right to abortion that is parallel to and congruent with the right to abortion recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). That determination, amici respectfully submit, was erroneous. Nothing in the text, history or interpretation of the Oklahoma Constitution supports recognition of a state constitutional right to abortion. To assist this Court in addressing the issues presented by this appeal, amici submit this brief, which, pursuant to Rule 1.12(a)(1), is filed with the written consent of all of the parties to the litigation.

I. THIS COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO RECOGNIZE A RIGHT TO ABORTION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION MERELY BECAUSE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS RECOGNIZED A RIGHT TO ABORTION UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. As a threshold matter, amici submit that this Court is not required to recognize a right to abortion under the state constitution merely because the United States Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), recognized a right to abortion under the liberty language of 1 of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That a given right is protected by the federal constitution does not require a state court, as a matter of state law, to interpret the state constitution to extend protection to the same right, so long as the state constitution is not applied in a manner that would deny a valid federal constitutional claim. Plaintiffs, however, have presented no federal claims in their challenge to H.B. 1970. Accordingly, this Court need not determine whether H.B. 1970 satisfies the undue burden test set forth in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). There are two principled approaches in considering the relationship between similar state and federal constitutional guarantees. A state court may conclude, after a careful analysis of the relevant constitutional text, the history of its adoption and its judicial interpretation, that a given state constitutional guarantee should be construed consistently with the corresponding federal guarantee. Under this approach, often referred to as lockstep analysis, a state constitutional right would not be recognized unless there is a corresponding federal constitutional right; and, if there is such a right, the state right would be coextensive with the federal right, neither broader

nor narrower.1 Alternatively, a state court may conclude that, in light of its text, history and interpretation, the state guarantee should be construed independently of the federal guarantee. Under this approach, known as independent state constitutionalism, whether a state right would be recognized (and its scope) would not depend upon whether there is a corresponding federal right. The asserted right might not exist at all under the state constitution and, if it does, it could be broader or narrower than the federal right. What is not principled, however, is to combine the two approaches and to say, on the one hand, that federal constitutional law will be controlling in determining whether a given right is protected by the state constitution (thereby establishing, as a matter of state law, a federal floor of protection), but, on the other hand, that federal law will not be controlling in determining the scope of that same right (allowing for a higher state ceiling of protection). That hybrid approach is unprincipled in theory and unsound in practice, as Professor Earl Maltz has explained: The image of federal constitutional law as a floor in state court litigation pervades most commentary on state constitutional law. Commentators contend that in adjudicating cases, state judges must not adopt state constitutional rules which fall below this floor; courts may, however, appeal to the relevant state constitution to establish a higher ceiling of rights for individuals . . . . Certainly, as a matter of federal law, state courts are bound not to apply any rule which is inconsistent with decisions of the Supreme Court; the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution clearly embodies this mandate. It would be a mistake, however, to view federal law as a floor for state constitutional analysis; principles of federalism prohibit the Supreme Court from dictating the content of state law. In other words, state courts are not required to incorporate federally-created principles into their state constitutional analysis; the only requirement is that in the event of an irreconcilable conflict between federal law and state law principles, the federal principles must prevail.
1

Whether, properly understood, the protections accorded by the state due process guarantee (art. II, 7) are co-extensive with the federal Due Process Clause is discussed in the following argument. 3

* * * * * [S]uch courts [that do not employ lockstep analysis] must undertake an independent determination of the merits of each claim based solely on principles of state constitutional law. If the state court begins its analysis with the view that the federal practice establishes a floor, the state court is allowing a federal governmental bodythe United States Supreme Courtto define, at least in part, rights guaranteed by the state constitution. Thus, to avoid conflict with fundamental principles of state autonomy, a state court deciding whether to expand federally recognized rights as a matter of state law must employ a twostage process. The court first must determine whether the federally recognized rights themselves are incorporated into the state constitution and only then must determine whether those protections are more expansive under state law. Earl M. Maltz, False ProphetJustice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 Hastings Const. L. Q. 429, 443-44 (1988) (emphasis in original). Other commentators have recognized that [i]ndependent interpretation, as a matter of constitutional principle, must be a two-way street. Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9 Hastings Const. L. Q. 1, 10 (1981). [T]here is no constitutional impediment preventing state courts from granting a lesser degree of protection under state law, provided only that these courts then proceed to apply the command of the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. In other words, the logic of principled interpretation at the state level . . . demands that any given argument be tested on its own merits independently of what level of constitutional protection could result. In some instances, it may well be that the logical scope of a state constitutional premise does not extend so far as to afford an equivalent or greater measure of protection than that allotted under the Bill of Rights. . . . . Considerations of text, logic, history and consistency may prompt [state] judges to reject [certain] federally protected rights, but only as questions of state law. These federal rights would not suffer in that the same state judges would then have to yield to the dictates of federal law and acknowledge the claims presented. Accordingly, the constitutional premises upon which the state law is grounded would not be sacrificed merely because federal decisional law pointed in another direction. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis in original). The author of the leading text on state constitutional law 4

concurs: Using independent interpretation a court might reach the same or a different result than the federal one, using the same or different standards or theories. An independent opinion may even conclude that a state provision is less protective than the federal counterpart is presumed to be. The state court must then reach any federal fourteenth amendment challenges to the alleged deprivation. Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law[:] Litigating Individual Rights, Claims and Defenses (4th ed. 2008), Vol. I, at pp. 44-45. State reviewing courts have recognized that under an independent state constitutional analysis (as opposed to lockstep analysis), federal constitutional rights are not necessarily incorporated into state constitutions. In Sitz v. Dept of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993), the Michigan Supreme Court explained: Where a right is given to a citizen under federal law, it does not follow that the organic instrument of state government must be interpreted as conferring the identical right. Nor does it follow that where a right given by the federal constitution is not given by a state constitution, the state constitution offends the federal constitution. It is only where the organic instrument of government purports to deprive a citizen of a right granted by the federal constitution that the instrument can be said to violate the [federal] constitution. Id. at 216-17 (Mich. 1993). [A]ppropriate analysis of our constitution does not begin from the conclusive premise of a federal floor. . . . As a matter of simple logic, because the texts were written at different times by different people, the protections afforded may be greater, lesser, or the same. Id. at 217. Multiple state courts have agreed with this conclusion. See Serna v. Superior Court; 707 P.2d 793, 798-800 (Cal. 1985); Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 147 n. 25 (Del. 1990); Taylor v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1052, 1053 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Tex. 1993) (plurality); West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 n. 4

(Utah 1994). Several state courts applying independent state constitutional analysis to the issue of abortion have recognized that they are not required to employ federal constitutional analysis in determining whether, and to what extent, abortion is protected under their state constitutions. In a decision rejecting a state constitutional challenge to Ohios abortion informed consent statute, the Ohio Court of Appeals noted that although a state court is not free to find constitutional a statute that violates the United States Constitution, as interpreted by Planned Parenthood on the basis that the [state] [c]onstitution is not violated, it need not follow the undue burden test of Planned Parenthood [in construing] the [state] [c]onstitution. Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 577 n. 9 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). Instead, the state may use either a lesser or greater standard. Id. at 575 n. 5. In a similar vein, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in interpreting the Massachusetts Constitution, refused to employ the Supreme Courts (now abandoned) rigid formulation of balancing the interests at stake in the abortion debate, preferring instead a more flexible approach to the weighing of interests that must take place. Moe v. Secretary of Administration & Finance, 417 N.E.2d 387, 402-04 (Mass. 1981) (striking down restrictions on public funding of abortion). Finally, both the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Michigan Court of Appeals have conducted independent analyses of their state constitutions, the former concluding that the Mississippi Constitution confers a state right to abortion, Pro-Choice Mississippi, v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645, 650-54 (Miss. 1998), the latter concluding otherwise under the Michigan Constitution. Mahaffey v. Attorney General, 564 N.W.2d 104, 109-11 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that, depending upon text, history and 6

interpretation, a right secured by the Bill of Rights in the Oklahoma Constitution may be broader,2 narrower3 or the same4 as the corresponding right secured by the United States Constitution. Whether the due process guarantee of the Oklahoma Constitution (art. II, 7) incorporates the same right to abortion recognized under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is

See Turner v. City of Lawton, 1986 OK 51, 15, 733 P.2d 375, 380 (state search and seizure provision, art. II, 30, is broader in scope than the [Fourth Amendment]); Board of County Commrs of Muskogee County v. Lowery, 2006 OK 31, 9-20, 136 P.3d 639, 64752 (declining to follow Supreme Courts decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), in interpreting the eminent domain provisions of the state constitution, Okla. Const. art. II, 23, 24); Bailey v. City of Tulsa, 1971 OK CR 499, 6-10, 491 P.2d 316 (non-incrimination provision of state constitution, art. II, 21, is broader in scope than the non-incrimination guarantee of the Fifth Amendment and extends to physical, as well as testimonial, evidence). Compare Thomas v. State, 1926 OK CR 140, 34 Okla. Crim. 63, 66, 244 P. 1116, 1117 (under the second sentence of art. II, 22, of the state constitution, truth is not a complete defense to a criminal libel, but, in order for the truth to be a defense, it must be made to appear to the jury that the libelous matter was written or published with good motives and with justifiable ends, or was a privileged communication), with Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (under Free Speech Clause of First Amendment, truth is a complete defense to a charge of criminal libel, without regard to the reasons for which the allegedly libelous statements were made, with respect to statements made about the official conduct of public officials); Pierce v. State, 1929 OK CR 91, 42 Okla. Crim. 272, 279, 275 P. 393, 395 (under the right to keep and bear arms guarantee of the state constitution, Okla. Const. art. II, 26, the Legislature has power to not only prohibit the carrying of concealed or unconcealed weapons [including revolvers], but also has the power to even prohibit the ownership or possession of such arms), Ex parte Thomas, 1908 OK CR 155, 19, 97 P. 260, 264-65 (state right to keep and bear arms limited to those arms that would be appropriate for the militia), with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment secures right of individual to keep and bear arms), McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010) (applying Second Amendment to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment). See, e.g., Prock v. District Court of Pittsburg County, 1981 OK 41, 7, 630 P.2d 772, 775 (construing right to counsel guarantee of the state constitution, Okla. Const. art, II, 20, consistently with the right to counsel secured by the Sixth Amendment); Grogan v. Kokh, LLC, 2011 OK CIV APP 34, 9, 256 P.3d 1021, 1027 (construing first sentence of free speech guarantee of the state constitution, Okla. Const. art. II, 22, consistently with the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment). 7
4 3

discussed in the following argument. Here, amici emphasize that nothing in art. I, 1, of the Oklahoma Constitution requires this Court to incorporate the Supreme Courts abortion jurisprudence into its interpretation of the state constitution. Article I, 1, provides: The State of Oklahoma is an inseparable part of the Federal Union, and the Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land. In drafting the state constitution, the delegates rejected a resolution declaring that the people of Oklahoma adopt the Constitution of the United States as the highest and paramount law of the State of Oklahoma. Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the Proposed State of Oklahoma Held at Guthrie, Oklahoma, November 20, 1906, to November 16, 1907 (Proceedings) at 2930. Delegate Walter Ledbetter led the fight to defeat the resolution. Mr. Ledbetter argued that this clause should be stricken out because while the Constitution of the United States was the supreme law of the land in all matters pertaining to federal power and jurisdiction, yet as to state matters and matters affecting state sovereignty, the Constitution and laws of the state are supreme. He argued that the spheres of the state and federal government are separate and distinct and each within its sphere is supreme. H.L. Stuart, Necrology, 12 Chron. of Okla. 236, 238 (1934). Based on Ledbetters objection, the Convention delegates rejected the resolution. Proceedings at 30. Later that day, in order to comply with Congressional requirements for Statehood, the delegates approved a resolution merely stating that the people of Oklahoma adopt the United States Constitution. Proceedings at 35. This sequence of events makes clear that the drafters of the Oklahoma Constitution intended that the document be interpreted as an independent charter governing a sovereign people, and not as some appendix tacked on to the federal constitution. As the court of criminal appeals has explained, the provision of Art. I, 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution simply means

that nothing in the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma is intended to conflict with any provision of the Constitution of the United States, where such provision is applicable to an individual state, and if such should be the case, then any such provision would have to give way to the Federal provision. Acuff v. State, 1955 OK CR 62, 33, 283 P.2d 856, 865 (emphasis in original). In light of the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2), the principle set forth in art. I, 1, is [o]bviously true whether so stated or not. Id., 283 P.2d at 865. By its own terms, therefore, art. I, 1, does not incorporate any federal constitutional rights into the state constitution; it simply ensures that, in the event of a conflict between the two constitutions, the federal constitution prevails. But nothing in the federal constitution requires this Court to recognize a right to abortion on state constitutional grounds. As the court of criminal appeals has stated, It is the decisions of this Court and the Oklahoma Supreme Court that are supreme on state constitutional questions. Dean v. Crisp, 1975 OK CR 95, 4, 536 P.2d 961, 963. II. THE DUE PROCESS GUARANTEE OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION (ART. II, 7) DOES NOT CONFER A RIGHT TO ABORTION. The district court held that the due process guarantee of the Oklahoma Constitution, art. II, 7, confers a state right to abortion that is congruent with the federal right to abortion the Supreme Court derived in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), from the liberty language of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Article II, 7, provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The district courts holding, amici submit, was erroneous. Amici acknowledge that this Court has repeatedly stated that the similarly worded state

and federal due process clauses have a coextensive definitional range, Messenger v. Messenger, 1992 OK 27, 17, 827 P.2d 865, 872,5 and, therefore, are usually to be given a similar construction. Most of these (or equivalent) statements, however, have appeared in cases concerning procedural due process rights,6 preservation of evidence in criminal cases7 or the equal protection component of the state due process guarantee.8 And even when such statements have appeared in substantive due process cases, this Court has typically either rejected the

Occasionally, the Court has said that art. II, 7, may provide broader due process safeguards than are afforded by the Due Process Clause. See Daffin v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept of Mines, 2011 OK 22, 251 P.3d 741 (statute and rule precluding property owner who lived more than one mile from proposed mining site from participating in informal conference on proposed mine operations denied owners due process rights); Johnson v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists of the State of Oklahoma, 1996 OK 41, 25, 913 P.2d 1330, 1346-47 (requiring clear and convincing standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings against a person holding a professional license); Eastern Oklahoma Building & Construction Trades Council v. Pitts, 2003 OK 113, 8 n. 2, 82 P.3d 1008, 1012 n. 2 (dicta); Messenger, 1992 OK 27, 17 n. 42, 827 P.2d at 872 n. 42 (dicta). Henry v. Schmidt, 2004 OK 34, 20 n. 36, 91 P.3d 651, 656 n. 36 (right to jury trial in indirect criminal contempt proceedings); Johnson v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists, see n. 5, supra; DuLaney v. Oklahoma State Dept of Health, 1993 OK 113, 19 n. 33, 868 P.2d 676, 685 n. 33 (when a party applies for a permit to operate a solid waste disposal site, adjacent landowners and mineral interest owners are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard); Black v. Ball Janitorial Service, Inc., 1986 OK 75, 8 & n. 9, 730 P.2d 510, 513 & n. 9 (whether time intervals prescribed in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act for bringing an action against a public entity acting in a proprietary capacity when the harm occurred violate due process); Matter of Rich, 1979 OK 173, 4 n. 5, 604 P.2d 1248, 1250-51 n. 5 (procedural rights in proceedings to terminate parental rights).
7 6

McClure v. Conocophillips Co., 2006 OK 42, 27 n. 54, 142 P.3d 390, 399 n. 54.

Barnes v. Barnes, 2005 OK 1, 4, 107 P.3d 560, 563; Presley v. Board of County Commrs of Oklahoma County, 1999 OK 45, 8, 981 P.3d 309, 312; Nelson v. Nelson, 1998 OK 10, 11, 954 P.2d 1219, 1223; Oklahoma Assn for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City, 1995 OK 62, 12, 901 P.2d 800, 805; Callaway v. City of Edmond, 1990 OK CR 25, 8 n. 1, 791 P.2d 104, 106 n. 1; Ross v. Peters, 1993 OK 8, 16 n. 30, 846 P.2d 1107, 1114 n. 30; Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State of Oklahoma, 1987 OK 114, 54 & n. 48, 746 P.2d 1135, 1148 & n. 48. 10

claimed substantive right,9 or has applied rational basis review.10 Moreover, the very same opinions that have used the federal floor/state ceiling imagery have recognized that the Oklahoma Constitution may provide less rights than are guaranteed by the United States Constitution so long as it is understood that federal rights, if asserted, are protected. See, e.g., Daffin, 2011 OK 22, 16 & n. 20, 251 P.3d at 747 ([i]t is only when state law provides less protection that the question must be determined by federal law); Turner v. City of Lawton, 1986 OK 51, 10, 15, 733 P.2d 375, 378, 380 (same); Alva State Bank & Trust Co. v. Dayton, 1998 OK 44, 7, 755 P.2d 635, 638 (same) (Kauger, J., specially concurring); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 1989 OK 8, 6, 77 P.2d 766, 788 (same) (Kauger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In sum, as this Court has recognized, U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence

Edmondson v. Pearce, 2004 OK 23, 33-36, 91 P.3d 605, 623-24 (there is no substantive due process right to engage in cockfighting); Wood v. Independent School District No. 141 of Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma, 1983 OK 30, 8, 661 P.2d 892, 894 (a nontenured teachers interest in continued employment is . . . not a substantive right protected by the due process clause). Eastern Oklahoma Building & Construction Trades Council, 2003 OK 113, 8-9, 82 P.3d at 1012 (right to work amendment to state constitution did not violate any due process rights of unions); Gladstone v. Bartlesville Independent School District No. 30, 2003 OK 30, 3 n. 16, 19-21 & n. 55, 66 P.3d 442, 446, 451-52 & n. 55 (no substantive due process violation in statute barring tort claims against government entities on behalf of those covered by workers compensation); Nelson v. Nelson, 1998 OK 10, 16, 954 P.2d at 122425 (statutory and administrative requirements that divorcing couples with minor children attend classes intended to help their children to cope with their divorce did not violate substantive due process rights of parents); Ross v. Peters, 1993 OK 8, 23, 866 P.2d at 111718 (upholding decision of State Board of Examiners of Official Shorthand Reporters refusing enrollment of stenomask court reporters as certified shorthand reporters); Lindsey v. State ex rel. Dept of Corrections, 1979 OK 35, 17, 593 P.2d 1088, 1092-93 (Department of Corrections violated substantive due process rights of correctional officer by unreasonably, arbitrarily, capriciously and unlawfully depriving him of his property by reducing his grade and pay under the merit system); Jack Lincoln Shops, Inc. v. State Dry Cleaners Board, 1943 OK 28, 10, 135 P.2d 332, 335 (statute requiring licensing of dry cleaners did not violate the due process clause in its substantive aspect). 11
10

need not be dispositive of questions involving rights guaranteed by state constitutional provisions. Messenger, 1992 OK 27, 17 n. 42, 827 P.2d at 872 n. 42. The plaintiffs have argued and the district court held that federal due process rights are automatically incorporated into state due process analysis as minimum standards. But if this were correct, then there would have been no reason for this Court to state, as it did twenty years ago in striking an initiated abortion statute off of the ballot as violating the Supreme Courts decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), that it would not speculate concerning the scope of individual liberty [vis-a-vis] under the Okla. Const. art. 2, 2 or under the Okla. Const. due process clause, art. 2, 7. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 1992 OK 122, 35 n. 29, 838 P.2d 1, 12 n. 29. Nor would there have been any need for this Court to develop a methodology for evaluating state substantive due process claims; it simply would have adopted Supreme Court precedents for determining which such claims would be recognized under the state constitution. But that is not what the Court has done. In evaluating substantive due process claims under art. II, 7, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that it must consider our history, legal traditions and practices. In re Baby Girl L., 2002 OK 9, 15, 51 P.3d 544, 551 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997), and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n. 6 (1989)). Consistent with that approach, the Court has repeatedly recognized that the right of a parent to the care, custody, companion-ship and management of his or her child is a fundamental right protected by the federal and state constitutions. Matter of Adoption of Darren Todd H., 1980 OK 119, 18, 615 P.2d 287, 290 (citing cases). See also In re Herbst, 1998 OK 100, 10, 971 P.2d 395, 397-98 (same); Delk v. Markel American Insurance Co., 2003 OK 88, 17 n. 45, 81 P.3d 629, 639 n. 12

45 (same). This right, of course, is firmly rooted in the history and traditions of the American people and, ultimately, English common law. See Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1109 n. 33 (Okla. 1985) ([t]he parental interest in the custody of a child rests on the common law). As the United States Supreme Court has observed, The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). Indeed, The liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. Troxel v. Glanville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing, inter alia, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). Similarly, this Court has recognized a right to corporal [bodily] integrity, Blocker v. Martin, 1994 OK 17, 4, 868 P.2d 1316, 1316, which also has deep roots in English and American common law. See Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ([n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guaranteed by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestioned authority of law). Although the right to bodily integrity is closely connected to the common law and constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, which is a negative right based on the law of battery, see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 & n. 7 (1990), Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-26 & n. 17 (1997), neither the right to bodily integrity nor the corollary right to refuse unwanted medical treatment can be transformed by some strange legal alchemy into an affirmative right to insist upon a particular course of treatment or obtain access 13

to certain drugs.11 Thus, there is no common law or constitutional right to enlist the assistance of a physician in committing suicide, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-35, to obtain laetrile to treat cancer, Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980), Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980) (same), or to obtain marijuana to treat pain, Raich v. Ashcroft, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir. 2007). Finally, this Court has recognized that vested property rights may not be divested by an act of the legislature. Messenger, 1992 OK 27, 17-18, 827 P.2d at 872-73. The protection of such rights also has deep roots in the law of the State. See Crump v. Geyer, 1916 OK 254, 157 P. 321. The same cannot be said of an asserted state right to abortion. A right to abortion has no roots in the law of Oklahoma. The first territorial legislature enacted a prohibition of abortion in 1890, seventeen years before Oklahoma adopted a state constitution and was admitted to the Union. One statute prohibited the performance of an abortion upon a pregnant woman for any reason at any stage of pregnancy, unless the same [was] necessary to preserve her life. . . . Okla. (Terr.) Stat. 2187 (1890). Another statute prohibited a woman from soliciting an abortion or allowing an abortion to be performed upon her (subject to the same exception). Id. 2188 (no prosecutions were reported under this statute). These statutes have never been repealed.12

Plaintiffs argument that H.B. 1970 coerce[s] some women to have unwanted and unnecessary surgery, Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 23, simply ignores the fact that the decision to undergo an abortion remains with the pregnant woman herself. H.B. 1970 does not coerce any woman into having an abortionmedical or surgicalit merely regulates the circumstances under which a medical abortion may be performed. Okla. (Terr.) Stat. 2187, 2188 (1890), recodified at Okla. (Terr.) Stat. 2177, 2178 (1893), recodified at Okla. (Terr.) Stat. 2268, 2269 (1903), recodified at Okla. 14
12

11

Before Roe v. Wade was decided, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed convictions for abortion (and manslaughter convictions based upon the death of the woman resulting from an illegal abortion) without any hint that the prosecutions or convictions were barred by the state constitution. Greenwood v. State, 1909 OK CR 156, 105 P. 371; Copus v. State, 1924 OK CR 91, 224 P. 364; Wilson v. State, 1936 OK 158, 252 P. 1106. And in Bowlan v. Lunsford, 1936 OK 158, 54 P.2d 666, this Court explained that the state abortion statutes were enacted and designed for the protection of the unborn child and, through it, society. Id. at 11, 54 P.2d at 668. After Roe was decided, the court of criminal appeals declared the state abortion statutes unconstitutional on federal grounds only. Jobe v. State, 1973 OK CR 51, 4, 509 P.2d 481, 482. This Court has repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to Oklahomas post-Roe statutes regulating the practice of abortion. Spencer by and through Spencer v. Seikel, 1987 OK 75, 16-19, 742 P.2d 1126, 1130 (upholding prohibition of abortion after viability except to prevent the death of or impairment to the health of the pregnant woman); Davis v. Fieker, 1997 OK 156, 37-45, 952 P.2d 505, 51416 (upholding statute requiring all abortions after the end of the first trimester to be performed in general hospitals). The State of Oklahoma has recognized the rights of unborn children in a variety of contexts outside of abortion. In criminal law, Oklahoma has defined human being, as used to describe the subject of a homicide, to include an unborn child at every stage of gestation. 21 O.S.

Comp. Laws 2370, 2371 (1909), recodified at Okla. Rev. Laws 2436, 2437 (1910), recodified at Okla. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1859, 1860 (1921), recodified at Okla. Rev. Stat. 1834, 1835 (1931), recodified at 21 O.S. 861, 862 (West 1937), carried forward as 21 O.S. 861, 862 (West 2002). 15

 691(B) (West Supp. 2010).13 And a woman convicted of a capital offense may not be executed while she is pregnant. 22 O.S. 1010, 1011 (West 2003). In tort law, a statutory cause of action for wrongful death may be brought on behalf of an unborn child regardless of when the injuries causing death were inflicted. 12 O.S. 1053(F) (West Supp. 2011). In a medical malpractice case based upon a failure to disclose treatment alternatives, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that where a fetus was viable when a physician discovered that it was suffering from hydrocephalus, the physician had no duty to disclose to the mother information about abortion as an alternative treatment because abortion after viability is prohibited in Oklahoma unless the mothers life or health is endangered. Spencer by and through Spencer, 1987 OK 75, 19, 742 P.2d at 1130. And in Morris v. Sanchez, 1987 OK 110, 746 P.2d 184, this Court held that under the public policy of the State of Oklahoma, a parent cannot be said to be damaged by the birth of a normal, healthy child, and cannot recover damages by reason of the birth of such a child: As a matter of public policy, the birth of a normal and healthy child does not constitute a legal harm for which damages are recoverable. We recognize wrongful death actions because of the great value we place on human life. Conversely, we cannot recognize actions for wrongful birth or wrongful conception of a normal, health child. The birth of a normal, healthy child may be one of the consequences of a negligently performed sterilization, but we hold that it is not a legal wrong for which damages should or may be awarded. Id. at 19, 746 P.2d at 188 (citation omitted). Because of the sanctity which must be placed on human life, we cannot . . . . embrace the logical conclusion that the nonexistence of [an
13

Before the statutory definition of homicide was amended to include unborn children at any stage of gestation, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had rejected the common law born-alive rule and held that a viable unborn child is a human being who may be the victim of a homicide. Hughes v. State, 1994 OK CR 3, 24, 868 P.2d 730, 736, stating that [a] viable human fetus is nothing less than a human life. Id. at 15, 868 P.2d at 734. 16

unplanned] child would be a benefit. Id. at 10-11, 746 P.2d at187-88. Under Oklahomas health care laws, in the absence of specific authorization from the patient, life-sustaining treatment and/or artificially administered nutrition and/or hydration may not be withheld or withdrawn from a pregnant patient pursuant to an advance directive. 63 O.S. 3101.4 (Advance Directive for Health Care Form, V(a)); 3101.8(C) (West Supp. 2011). And a guardian may not consent to an abortion on behalf of a pregnant ward without specific court authorization, except in a medical emergency where the procedure is necessary to preserve the wards life. 30 O.S. 3-119(3) (West 2009). In property law, posthumous children (children conceived before but born after the death of a parent) are considered as living at the death of their parents for purposes of inheritance. 84 O.S. 228 (West 1990). And, subject to certain exceptions, afterborn children (children conceived before the death of a parent but born after the parent executes a will) receive the same share of the testates estate that they would have received if the testate had died intestate (without a will). 84 O.S. 131. A court may appoint a guardian or a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of persons not in being in proceedings to determine future interests in real estate. 12 O.S. 1147.1 (West 2000). Generally, [a] child conceived, but not born, is to be deemed an existing person so far as may be necessary for its interest in the event of it subsequent birth. 15 O.S. 15 (West 1996). In light of Oklahomas unbroken tradition, dating back to territorial days, of prohibiting abortion except to preserve the life of the pregnant woman, as well as the States solicitude for the rights of the unborn child in other areas of law, it cannot reasonably be said that the liberty protected by the due process guarantee of art. II, 7, encompasses a right to abortion17

fundamental or otherwise.14 [T]he meaning of a constitutional provision is the meaning as understood by those framing and adopting the constitution. A.E. v. State, 1987 OK 76, 16, 743 P.2d 1041, 1046, citing Boswell v. State, 1937 OK 727, 9, 74 P.2d 940, 942. See also Vogel v. Corp. Commn of Oklahoma, 1942 OK 14, 121 P.2d 586 (same with respect to right to jury trial).15 There is no evidence that the framers of the 1907 Constitution or the people who adopted it intended to incorporate a right to abortion into the organic instrument of government. Such an intent would have been remarkable in light of the contemporaneous prohibition of abortion except to save the life of the pregnant woman. Accordingly, this Court should conclude that the Oklahoma Constitution does not confer a state right to abortion.16

To the extent that this Court considers federal precedent in determining whether an asserted liberty interest (or right) is fundamental under the state due process guarantee, abortion would not qualify as a fundamental right. Although the Supreme Court characterized the right to choose abortion as fundamental in Roe, 410 U.S. at 15253, it tacitly abandoned that characterization in Casey, 505 U.S. at 86979 (Joint Op. of OConnor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ., replacing Roes strict scrutiny standard of review with the more relaxed undue burden standard, allowing for a broader measure of abortion regulation). Thus, the district courts characterization of the right to abortion as fundamental is mistaken. It is surprising, therefore, to read in Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (at 21-22) that arguments about the history of the Oklahoma Constitution are irrelevant. Without citing all of the cases to which they referred, plaintiffs stated below that [a]t least ten state supreme courts have recognized a state constitutional right to abortion. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 27-28. But each state supreme court that has done so based its decision upon an express or implied right of privacy. See State of Alaska v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30 (Alaska 2001); State of Alaska, Dept of Health & Human Services v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2001); Valley Hospital Assn v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981); In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1989); Moe v. Secretary of Administration & Finance, 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Women of the State of Minnesota v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995); Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1998); 18
16 15

14

Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae respectfully request that this Honorable Court reverse the order of the district court granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and enter summary judgment in favor of defendants. Respectfully submitted,

______________________________ Cara S. Nicklas OBA No. 14180 McAlister & McAlister, P.C. P.O. Box 1569 15 E. 15th Street Suite 200 Edmond, Oklahoma 73083-1569 (405) 359-0701 (tel) (405) 359-0806 (fax) cnicklas@mmmtlaw.com

_________________________________ Paul Benjamin Linton Special Counsel Thomas More Society 921 Keystone Avenue Northbrook, Illinois 60062 (847) 291-3848 (tel) (847) 412-1594 (fax) PBLCONLAW@AOL.COM Pro Hac Vice Admission Pending

Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982); Hope v. Perales, 634 N.E.2d 183 (N.Y. 1994) (by implication); Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000). Apart from the specific privacy interests secured by the state search and seizure provision, art. II, 30, which are not implicated here, the Oklahoma Bill of Rights does not contain an express right of privacy. Nor has this Court derived an implied right of privacy from the provisions of the state constitution. See In re the Mental Health of K.K.B., 1980 OK 7, 15 & n. 11, 21-22, 609 P.2d 747, 750 & n. 11, 751 (absent an emergency situation, legally competent adults involuntarily admitted to a state mental hospital have a federal constitutional right of privacy to refuse unwanted psychotropic medication). 19

Certificate of Service Paul Benjamin Linton certifies that on October 6, 2012, he caused a copy of the foregoing Brief of Amici Curiae, the Hon. Pam Peterson and the Hon. Rebecca Hamilton, to be served on each of the following counsel of record, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, Northbrook, Illinois 60062:

Anne E. Zachritz Andrews Davis 100 N. Broadway Suite 3300 Oklahoma City, OK 73102

Martha A Hardwick Hardwick Law Office P.O. Box 35975 Tulsa, OK 74153

Michele Movahed David Brown Center for Reproductive Rights 120 Wall Street 14th Floor N.Y., N.Y. 10005

Patrick R. Wyrick Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General State of Oklahoma 313 N.E.2d 21st St. Oklahoma City, OK 73105

______________________ Paul Benjamin Linton