Rodrigueza, Armel L.

1. AISAs contention is devoid of merit. In interpreting a statute, a careful review of the whole law, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone.

Therefore, Section 6 of RA No. 6727 must be interpreted in harmony with the other sections of said law, specifically, Articles 106, 107, and 109. Thus: "ART. 106. Contractor or Sub-Contractor. Whenever an employer enters

into a contract with another person for the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's sub-contractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this code. In the event that the contractor or sub-contractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or sub-contractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him. xxx ART. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person, partnership association or corporation which, nor being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project. ART. 109. Solidary Liability. The provisions of existing laws to the

contrary notwithstanding, every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or sub-contractor for any violation of any

provision of this Code. For purposes of determining the extent of their civil liability under the Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers."

AISA has a joint and solidary liability with its principal (DMMSU) to pay for the wages of the security guards. This is because the law made the contractor liable, by virtue of his status as direct employer, while the principal becomes the indirect employer of the former's employees for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the contractor to pay them.

The Court now holds petitioner jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of the wage increases to private respondents. Accordingly, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the NLRC in arriving at the impugned decision, and the instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

So ordered.

2.

This Court finds that the ad interim appointments by former President Carlos P. Garcia were validly revoked by Administrative Order No. 2, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal.

Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution states that (t)wo (2) months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, President or acting President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

A basic tenet of statutory construction is that if the law is clear, construction is not necessary and the Courts duty is merely to apply the law. Here, the Constitution made clear as to what the outgoing President may or may not do as regards appointments in executive positions. Ad interim appointees, therefore, cannot challenge the revocation of their appointments by the new President, considering that said appointments were, by their very nature, merely temporary.

This Court also will not hesitate to state its observation as to the glaring irregularity in the act of the former President in making these rushed or midnight appointments. Where the acts of the Chief Executive tramples upon the Constitution, this Court will take the necessary steps to correct such acts of indiscretion to protect the people from its possible pernicious effects.

Wherefore, Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal is hereby declared VALID and shall be given force and effect. So ordered.

(Note: Reaction Paper is on the next page.)

Reaction Paper

The paper, entitled: Judicial Tendencies In Statutory Construction: Differing Views on the Role of the Judge, presented two views on how judges should decide cases in relation to the laws applicable, as enacted by the legislature. The first view is the conservative, wherein the law is considered as complete, and the judge merely has to apply the law, making him an agent of the legislator; and the other is the modern approach, wherein the law is not complete until the judge has articulated and applied it, making him part of the legislative process.

I am inclined to agree with the author of the article in that a judge should not be limited to only one view, but rather, consider the two views and apply it according to the circumstances of the case. In short, a judge must use any view on an as needed basis. A judge must use his sound discretion according to the practical considerations of the case.

This is so because legislators, much like judges, are also mere human beings subject to limitations and weaknesses. Therefore, inasmuch as we presume that the legislature enacts a statute for a benevolent cause, we must also be cognizant of the fact that legislators, true to their nature as human beings, are bound by limitations, and they cannot possibly foresee every event, instance, or situation and include them in enacting laws.

A judge must always be mindful of his role in the judicial system and must carefully utilize any of the two approaches to statutory construction that he thinks is best suited to the case. His objective must be to apply the law while avoiding an application that lacks rationality and does harm.

In the end, a judge need not choose whether to do justice or to play the game according to the rules. Rather, he should strive to do justice but do so according to the rules of the game.