Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey Author(s): Sencer Ayata Source: Middle East Journal,

Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter, 1996), pp. 40-56 Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328895 . Accessed: 08/10/2011 18:46
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PATRONAGE,PARTY, AND STATE: THE POLITICIZATION ISLAM IN TURKEY OF

Sencer Ayata

The recent rise of political Islam in Turkey is examined in terms of a complex interplay betweenfour major processes: the policies of the parties on the center right toward religion; state-sponsoredreligious activities and the consolidation of establishmentIslam; the impact of Sufi tarikatsand communities;and the growing organizational strength, ideological appeal, and electoral base of the Islamist WelfareParty (WP).

n the local elections held on 27 March 1994, the religious Welfare Party(WP) won 28 of the mayorshipsin Turkey's 75 provincialcenters. It raised its share of the votes to 19 percentfrom the previous9.9 percentin the generalelection held on 20 October1991, and in some regions emerged as the leading party in the highly politically fragmented landscape of the 1990s. What startledmany Turks, their Westernizedelite, and foreign observers was this party's success in the two largest metropolitanareas. Istanbul and Ankarawere known as the bastions of secularismand the democraticleft for the past two decades. Necmettin Erbakan,the leader of the WP, interpretedhis party's victory as reclaiming Istanbul,the ancient capital where the caliph of Islam had been based until 1924 when Kamal Ataturk abolished the Caliphate. He also saw it as winning over Ankara, the capital city of the Turkish Republic, which had been a symbol of modernizationfor many reformiststhroughoutthe Muslim world.

Sencer Ayata, Departmentof Sociology, Middle East Technical University,Ankara

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL* VOLUME 50, NO. 1, WINTER 1996

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This articleexamines the rise of political Islam in Turkeywithin the context of very recent developments and essentially political variables. The complex interplaybetween four major processes is identified as crucial in this respect. These processes are: the policies of the parties on the center right toward religion; state-sponsoredreligious activities;the impactof Sufi Islam;and Islamic partypolitics. The policies put forwardby political parties on the center right and the religious activities of various government institutionshave tended to heighten religious consciousness, increase levels of religious observance, and reinforce religious identity among the masses. On the other hand, Sufi Islam and Islamic party activity, though by no means militant in content, have strong radical and fundamentalist leanings. They are antitheticalto the compartmentalization of religion and state, insisting insteadon the Islamizationof the society and polity according to the principles of Islamic law. TURKISH SECULARIZATION In the early 1920s, the creatorsand leaders of the modernTurkishrepublic,Mustafa Kemal and his close associates, saw in Islam both positive and negative aspects. They clearly recognized that Islam was a significantpartof Turkishsociety, that religious faith was importantfor national unity and mobilization, and that it could contributeto social and moral welfare. On the other hand, they also saw Islam as a traditionalforce and a source of conservativeinfluence, superstition,false ideas, and dogmas that they felt were responsiblefor Turkey'sbackwardness, were obstacles to the achievementof national and ideals. The attitudeof the Republicanleaders was supportivewhen Islam was consistent with Republicanreforms, but extremely hostile when it was at cross-purposeswith the main objectives of modernization.1 Theiraim was to enforce a secularization programand make Islam compatible with the modernnation-state. The secularizationprograminvolved a set of major legal and institutionalchanges implemented by the government in the years following the declarationof the Turkish Republic in 1923. In 1924, the new regime introduceddrastic measures, abolishing the Caliphate,Islamic schools, seriat (Islamic law) courts, and the Ministries of Seriat and Evkaf (pious foundations).In 1925, sects and orders were banned and monasterieswere closed. In the same two years a unified educationalsystem under a secular Ministry of was established,as was a Directorateof Religious Affairs(DRA) (under Public Instruction the Premier's office), to replace the two previously mentioned ministries. In 1926, the Swiss civil code was put into effect. In 1928, the clause referringto Islam as the religion of the Turkish state was removed from the constitution. The new legal system was complemented by such ambitious reforms as voting rights for women (1926), the replacementof the Arabicwith the Latin alphabet(1928), the outlawingof traditionaland religious costumes, and the adoption of the metric system of measurement and the Gregoriancalendar.The aim of those changes was to diminish the influence of Muslim culture and weaken the power of tradition.2
(New York: GreenwoodPress, 1955), pp. 172, 173. 1. Henry Allen, The TurkishTransformation 2. Donald Webster, The Turkeyof Ataturk(New York: AMS Press, 1973), pp. 126-33.

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The secularizationprogramaimed at the complete separationof state and religion. The state wanted control over religious, educational,and culturalaffairsthat would affect the secularizationof public and social life. By placing legislation, education, and the judicial system under secular control, religion was kept out of governmentalprocesses. in Institutional Islam was "disestablished" its entiretyby the dismantlingof such powerful institutions as the Sultanate, the Caliphate, the 'ulama' (religious scholars), and Sufi religious orders. The attemptto controlreligion was manifestedboth by the establishmentof an office, the DRA, which was legally held responsible for the administrationof mosques, the trainingof new religious leaders, and the examination of the content of sermons in the mosques, and by the repressionof Islamic activity undertaken privateorganizations.In by fact, during this period, mosque activity stagnated, religious training in government schools almost disappeared, the main functionof the DRA was definedas the purging and of superstitiousbeliefs and "dogmas"from the Islamic faith. The governmentnot only tried to contain the role of Islam in society, but also took steps to reform Islam accordingto its own vision. The "purified" Islam was expected to promote the creation of a society composed of nationalist, scientifically minded, and anti-traditional individuals.3This requiredthat Islamic teaching be renderedcompatible with Western values and institutions to assist the government to develop intelligent, cooperative,patriotic,and moral citizens. The state's ideal was an Islam confined to the realm of individual conscience. In this conception, the interventionof government in religious affairswas a logical and necessary step to achieve the developmentof an Islam that would itself preach an effective separationof state and religion. Duringthe single-partyrule when the RepublicanPeople's Party(RPP) was in power (1946-50), the development of a centralized state, created mainly by means of the the bureaucracy, military,and the spreadof moderneducationalnetworks,made new and sometimes difficult demands on a wide sector of the population.The state increased its control over many aspects of public and private life, and exerted pressure on specific social groups and political actors. The chief opponents of centralization were the traditionallocal elites, the bourgeoisie-which the state wanted to promote but, at the same time, strictly regulate its activities-and a host of intermediate groups and communitiesinterposingthemselves between the citizens and the state.4The Westernizing reforms targeted the power of religious functionaries, leaders, and communities, and transferred theirpublic functions, such as law and education,to the new state institutions. The peasant population was also negatively affected by the demands of the state, especially during World War II, when additional taxation and rationing of basic consumption items occurred. Equally important was the introductionof new values, manners,and lifestyles by the state elite which tended to widen the culturalgap between the masses and the newly Westernizedurbanclasses.
3. Kemal Karpat,Turkey'sPolitics (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1959), p. 271. 4. Serif Mardin,"Center-Periphery Relations:A Key to TurkishPolitics,"in Engin Akarli,ed., Political Participation in Turkey(Istanbul:Bogazici University Publications, 1975).

TURKEY* 43

CENTER-RIGHT PARTIES AND RELIGION Competitiveelectoralpolitics in Turkeytodayhave a historyof almosthalf a century. Except for four years of direct military rule, and occasional spells during which the left-of-center RPP was in power, the governmenthas been in the hands of center-right parties.For almost four decades,these governmentssignificantlymodifiedthe relationship between religion, politics, and society from the way it had been during the single-party regime.5 The majorcenter-right partieshave included:the DemocratPartyI (DP) (1946-60), the Justice Party (JP) (1961-81), and the two parties founded in the early 1980s, in the aftermathof the militarycoup, which are still active, namely, the True Path Party (TPP) and the Motherland partiesclaim descent Party(MP). The DP, from which all center-right and to which they all turn for inspirationand legitimation, was founded by a group of prominent RPP members of parliament who opposed a government bill proposing comprehensiveland reform.The nascentbourgeoisieand the emergingliberalelements of the society supportedthis new political movement, which was to end single-partyrule in the 1950 generalelections.6From its inception,the DP identifieditself primarilywith the countryside,with agrarianinterests,and with the ruralpopulation. For a long time the centerright criticizedthe RPP regime for maintaininga coercive and state apparatus for insensitivityto the needs, customs, and traditionsof the people. Its political discoursecenteredon themes such as respect for indigenouscultureand freedom for business and religious activity.7 The DP, however, remained loyal to the basic principles of secularismas laid down by the previous regime. of The DP's approachto religion involved the incorporation Islam as a living cultural traditioninto the mainstreamof Turkishpolitics. Religion, in this view, was a necessary for social cement for the cohesion of society. It was also appropriate a political discourse of that opposed the "secularism" the Westernizedelite. Emphasiswas placed on the idea that religious commitmentand social developmentwere not incompatibleobjectives, and thatreligion did not negate the positivism of a section of the single-partyelite, who tended to present this relationshipas mutually antagonistic.8On the other hand, religion was increasingly invoked by the DP as a means of social and political control and a way to impede "communism,"a term that was used to describe any position left-of-center.9
5. ErgunOzbudun,"Islamand Politics in Modem Turkey:The Case of the National SalvationParty," ArabStudies, F. in Barbara Stowasser,ed., TheIslamic Impulse(Washington,DC: The Centerfor Contemporary Georgetown University, 1987), p. 143; Ilter Turan, "Religion and Political Culture in Turkey," in Richard Tapper,ed., Islam in Modern Turkey(London:I.B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 43-5. 6. Feroz Ahmad, The TurkishExperimentin Democracy, 1950-1975 (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1977), pp. 132-3. 7. Taha Akyol, "Sagin TabaniTavani Yenilesmeye Zorluyor"(The social bases of the right urges the Nation leadershipto change), in HidirGoktas and Ru?enCakir,eds., VatanMillet ye Pragmatizm(Motherland, and Pragmatism)(Istanbul:Metis Guncel, 1991); Nazli Ilicak, "SagdaVitrinlerleBirlikteFikirlerde Degisiyor" (In the right, ideas change as windows change) in Goktas and Cakir, ibid., pp. 77-9. Turkey:A Modern History (London:I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp. 243-4. 8. Erik J. Zuircher, 9. Feroz Ahmad, "Islamic Reassertion in Turkey," Third World Quarterly 10, no 2. (1988), pp. 750-69.

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Eventually, from the early 1950s onwards, center-rightgovernmentsrelaxed the state's control over religious activity and allowed the use of religious symbols, idioms, and practices as part of a new style of political communicationand propaganda. Two closely linked and lasting legacies of the center-righttraditionwere ideological and institutional.They included the reinterpretation secularismand the linking up to a of vast network of Islamic organizations.The liberals in the center-rightparties defended religious freedom as being part of individualrights, and argued for the liberalizationof governmentpolicy towardreligion. Essentially loyal to the principle of the separationof state and religion, they criticized the repressive measures taken by the RPP against religious groups. The liberals claimed that secularismwas so well entrenchedin Turkish society thatthe obsessive fear of reactionand obscurantism hauntedthe secularruling that elite was unjustified.The conservatives in the center-rightparties saw in secularisman ideology that underminedfamily and communityties, and led to the moral degeneration of youth, the weakening of spiritual values, and the spread of communism among alienated intellectuals-social ills that could only be cured by religion.10Unlike the liberals, the conservativesopenly arguedfor an enhancedrole for Islam, both in society and the state. The center-rightapproachtoward religion has emerged and evolved since the 1950s as a peculiar combination of these two viewpoints, involving both a general broadeningof political freedoms and an expandedrole for Islam in public life. The center right's relationswith organizedreligious groupshave included symbiotic relations, temporary alliances, and long-term affiliations. During DP rule (1950-60), forming alliances with Islamic groups was rare, at least at the national leadershiplevel, and as a matter of party policy. The general practice was to mobilize provincial local notables who had influence over local religious leaders. By contrast,the DP's successor, the JP (1961-81), establisheddirectand lasting relationshipswith variousIslamic groups, communities, and leaders. This involved a process of exchanging votes and political supportfor access to public resources and protection against threatsfrom the state and secularforces. In otherwords, the conservativeinfluencewas morepronouncedin the case of the JP. It was only in the case of the MP that Islamistelements became a majorwing of any party.Its founder,TurgutOzal, picked every MP candidatefor parliament before the 1983 general election, deliberately and almost alone, seeking a platform that would bring politicians of diverse ideological persuasions under the same roof. He also formed alliances with organized religious groups that enabled the MP to establish a virtual monopoly over the religious vote. When the MP came to power in 1983, the Naksibendis(a Sufi brotherhood) emerged as the single most importantlobbying group in politics. Ozal himself had Naksibendi affinities.The membersof this tarikat,or brotherhood, were given privileged positions in the MP. Some were old acquaintancesof Ozal who had collaboratedwith him on various privateand public projects.The Naksibendinetworkswere also useful to the partybeyond Turkey's borders.Initiationof an export-led growth strategy necessitated an aggressive
10. Karpat,Turkey'sPolitics, pp. 274-78.

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search for foreign customers who, in the 1980s, were found mainly in the Middle East. The Naksibendis,with links to the Gulf States, were expected to play a significantrole in promotingTurkish exports to the region and maintainingsteady oil supplies. The Ozal cabinets had at least three or four ministers of Naksibendipersuasion.The parliamentary groups had even more MPs affiliated with various religious organizations, and the ' Islamistsconstitutedthe single most powerful faction in the partyorganization.1 Control enabled the well-organizedIslamic over key positions in governmentand the bureaucracy networksto recruittheir own members into civil service jobs, divertingpublic resources to Islamic activities and business, and giving a boost to Islamic educationand the training of new members and cadres. In the 1980s, a multitudeof Islamist groups and networks, especially the Naksibendis, became firmly entrenchedin both the state and civil society, their growing power and influence in one sphere facilitating access to the other. Toward the end of the decade, the infiltrationof the state institutionsby the Islamic groups, and the Islamizationof society, both from below and above, along with the increasing sway of the "Holy Alliance," the Islamist conservative wing in the party, began to worry not only the opposition and leftist secularist intelligentsia, but also the country's leading power elite, such as the wealthy business groups, the military, and the liberals within the ruling party itself.12 The end of the 1980s was markedlydifferentfrom the beginning in termsof domestic and international prospects for Turkey. Reduced oil prices, increasedexports, and higher revenues from tourism had resulted in balance-of-paymentssurpluses, and diminishing significance of trade with the Middle East, as compared to that with the European Community (EC) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Turkey's application to the EC for full membership required downplayingthe Islamic element and enhancingthe alternativeimage of being "the only secular Muslim country."The end of the Cold-Warera promptedTurkey to turn to the ex-Soviet Republics for new friendships and alliances. This action was vigorously supportedby the West, which saw Muslim Turkey, with its combination of a market economy and secularpolitical system as a model for the new Islamic republicsof Central Asia. Religion as an antidoteto communismhad lost its importancein the post-Cold War era. Domestically, the liberal economy of the 1980s broughtnew political and economic values that reflected Turkey's expanding relations with the Western world. This whole arrayof factors made Islam less importantfor the power and business elite in Turkey.'3 When Ozal became presidentin 1989, the conflict between the liberals and the Holy Alliance within the MP sharpened.The increased Islamic influence on many aspects of social and public life pushed him to side with the liberals. To defeat the Holy Alliance, Ozal began to take a partisanstand, despite the fact that, as president,he was expected to
Yakseliki(The Rise of TarikatCapital) (Ankara:Oteki Yayinevi, 11. Faik Bulut, TarikatSer-mayesinin 1995), pp. 376-90. "The MotherlandParty, 1983-1989," in Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau,eds., 12. Ustun Erguider, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey(London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 160. 13. Birol Ye,ilada, "TurkishForeign Policy toward the Middle East," in Atila Eralp, et al., eds., The of Political and Socioeconomic Trcanisformation Turkey,pp. 169-92.

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be neutral toward all political parties, let alone factions within the same party. For instance,Ozal actively campaignedfor his wife when she ran as the candidatefor the MP leadershipin Istanbulprovince. In 1991, the Holy Alliance was defeated both in Istanbul and in the national congress of the MP, where the leader of the liberal group, Mesut Yilmaz, was elected partychairman.He subsequentlybecame primeministerand initiated a majorpurge of Islamist networks in the governmentand the bureaucracy. DP and JP politicians had always been patronizedby the Westernizedelite of the for metropolitanareas and the leading bureaucrats being provincialand having little taste for modern ways. In order to become part of the state establishment,these center-right politicians decided to develop more liberal and Western attitudes. The establishment technocrats,and the modernbusiness elite graduallyshifted their allegiance bureaucrats, towardthe center parties in power. This process gained momentumwhen a new stratum of businessmen, technocrats,journalists, academics, and professionals developed affinities, first, with the MP, and then with the TPP of SulaymanDemirel and Tansu 4,iller.'4 As a matterof fact, these groups, with the help of the mass media, supportedand, indeed, actively helped Ciller's election to the leadershipof the TPP at the 1993 party congress. They hoped that the previous rural, provincial, and conservative image of the party15 would be replaced by an urban,liberal, and Western one with the election of a modern, American-educated,female professor of economics to the leadership of the party in power. She then became Turkey's prime minister. Almost one year later, in March 1994, in municipalelections, the TPP's shareof the vote fell from 27 percentin 1991 to 21 percent.The votes were lost mainly to the religious WP and the nationalist, conservative National Action Party (NAP).'6 One possible explanationis that its conservativevoters shifted to religious and nationalistpartieson the right because of the liberal policies promoted by the leadership of the TPP. filler's immediate response to this situation was to switch back to the traditionalcenter-right approachof forging alliances with organized religious groups. She also arrangedfor a publicly announcedpersonal meeting between herself and FethullahGiilen, the spiritual head of Turkey's most influentialIslamic community,the Fethullah,i. The present situationis one in which the new business, cultural,and political liberal elites, with urbanand cosmopolitanvalues and connections, are challenging the power of the old-style, provincial-conservative, right-of-center politicians. The very core of center-rightpolitics is graduallybeing whittled away as supportersgatherat the opposite poles of the liberalto conservativeideological continuumof the parties.The conflict in the MP in the early 1990s indicates that, given the oppositionalnatureand the vigor of the debate between liberals and conservatives, any attempt to bring the two together and create "a wing politics of Islam" in a center-rightparty is unlikely to succeed.
14. OrhanTurkdogan,"Aydin Muhalefeti:Yeni Sol ve Yeni Sagin Olusumu"(The opposition of the intellectuals:The formationof the new right and the new left), TurkiyeGunlugu (Sayi 16, Guz, 1991), p. 29. 15. Feride Acar, "The True Path Party, 1983-1989," in Heper and Landau, Political Parties, pp. 188-201. 16. Devlet IstatistikEnstituisii (DIE) (The State Instituteof Statistics),Mahalli Idareler Se imi Sonu&lari (The Results of Local Elections [1994]) (Ankara,Turkey, 1994).

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THE STATEAND RELIGION In Turkey,the role of religion in the state began to expand graduallyfrom the 1950s onwards and got a boost in the late 1980s and 1990s. Islam in the Turkishstate, largely a product of the policies of center-rightgovemments, is visible in two areas: religious teaching and the activities of the Directorateof Religious Affairs.'7 Islamic educationunderthe surveillanceof the state falls into three basic categories: theology faculties, Quranicschools, and schools for chaplainsand preachers(SCP), all of which multiplied after 1950. Theology departmentshave been established in eighteen universities in Turkey, fifteen of which are in the recently founded provincial universities.'8 Their graduates teach specialized Islamic courses in the SCP as well as a compulsoryreligious course in secularmiddle and high schools. The majority,however, find jobs in the private sector and in government. There are 4,925 Quranicschools all over the country,which have 5,295 teachersand 176,892 regular and 52,028 evening-school students.The number of children attending summercourses reaches 1,326,443.19The QuranicSchools are providedwith teachersby the state and are expected to meet other expenses on their own. There are two important issues aboutthese schools: the first is the source of their money and whetherit is coming from abroad;the second is the impactof the policy promotedby variouslobbying groups in the Ministryof Educationto set up a new administrative system to awarddiplomas to graduatesfrom Quranicprimaryschools as an initial step in a broaderplan to universalize basic religious education to parallel secular primaryschools, or even to replace them. There are 466 SCP that are totally subsidizedand controlledby the government.The number of students, including secondary and evening students, is 446,429, with 14,995 is teachers.20 the secondarylevel, the curriculum basically secular,with an elementary At teaching of the Quran taking no more than five hours a week. Courses on the Quran, theology, Islamic jurisprudence, hadith (religious sayings), religious hermeneutics, preaching, and the history of world religions appear only at the high school level, mathematics, accompaniedby othercourses such as history,geography,Turkishliterature, religious physics, and chemistry.Thus, the curriculumis intendedto train "enlightened" functionaries educated in Islam as well as in the sciences. The schools have been importantfor the Islamic movement in terms of cadre-building: althougheducationalong fundamentalistlines is far from being part of the curriculum,factors such as classroom interaction,exchange of ideas among peers, and the collective religious identityconferred upon these schools make SCP students highly responsive to all kinds of Islamist movements. Only 10 percent of the graduatesare employed by the DRA, while others either continue their university education or find employmentin other fields.
17. The factual and statistical informationabout the religious schools and religious functionarieswas obtaineddirectly from personalconversationswith authoritiesin the Directorateof Religious Affairs(DRA) and from DRA archives, Ankara, 1994. 18. (OSYM, 1994). 19. DRA, 1994. 20. Ibid.

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Until 1950, the DRA had a very limited staff. Its functions were confined to the In publicationof the Quranand a few basic sources on Islam.21 the past four decades, the have expanded enormously: the size, activities, and responsibilities of the department number of personnel went up from only a few thousand in the 1950s to 88,533; its bureaucracy has become very complex, with more than a dozen departments and numeroussub-units;and its share of the governmentbudget was as high as 1.23 percent in in 1990.22 The DRA has a centralapparatus Ankara,with local branchesin all provinces and sub-provincesthroughoutTurkey, and 63,053 chaplains and preachersin the 68,675 More significant,however, has been the effortof the religious mosques underits control.23 functionariesto redefine the responsibilitiesof the departmentso as to extend its sphere of influence from "belief and worship"to having a say in ethics and the definitionof the content of religion. The DRA conveys to the public the officially approvedversion of Islam, and tries to reconcile the values of the nation-statewith those of Islam, while remaining silent on political matters.The DRA, however, has never yet been formally asked to make specific pronouncements, or to interpret or legitimize the decision of the parliament, the government,or the bureaucracy. Informally,and especially at the local communitylevel, DRA personneldo express their own political views. Given the considerablerespect and prestigethey enjoy among the common people in both ruraland urbanareas,because they respondto grass-rootsneeds, the chaplainsinfluencethe Muslim populationand help them identify more deeply with an Islamic world view. The SCP and the Islamic organizations thatprovide scholarshipsand dormitoriesfor high school studentsalso try to get as many of their graduatesinto universities.This has resultedin a proliferationof Islamist students and studyingengineering,law, medicine, public administration, the social sciences. With the help of Islamic networks, many of those college graduatesare then appointed as judges, prefects, constables, economists, and engineers in the state bureaucracy.The infiltrationof the bureaucracyis indeed part of a general strategy of differentIslamic organizationsto graduallyIslamicize the state. TARIKATS, ORDERS,AND COMMUNITIES The weakening of the 'ulama', the elimination of formal religious teaching in the schools, and the absence of alternativeorganizedreligious activity duringthe single-party period meant that Sufi Islam, particularly Naksibenditarikatplayed a distinctive role the in the rise of religious revivalism and fundamentalismin Turkey. From the 1970s onwards,the numerousbranchesand lodges of the Naksibenditarikatwere able to develop powerful and active networksin business, politics, the mass media, and social and welfare
21. Ismail Kara, "Cumhuriyet Turkiye'sinde Dini Yayinciligin Gelisimi Uzerine Birkac Not" (A few notes on the developmentof religious publicationsin Turkey),Toplumve Bilim (Society and Science), no. 29-30 (1985), pp. 77-9. 22. I,tar Tarhanli,Musluman Toplum Laik Devlet (Muslim Society, Secular State) (Istanbul: AFA, 1993), p. 138. 23. DRA, 1994.

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services. The religious orders and communities that originated from the mainstream Naksibendi lodges, such as the Nurcu, Siileymanci, Isikqi, and Fethullahci, have far the outstripped parentorganizationin both theirfollowing and the scope of theiractivities. For instance, the Fethullahci, a religious community founded by Fethullah Guilen, a disciple of Said Nursi, the founderof the Nur sect, now have branchesin almost every part of Turkey.They have set up dormitoriesfor tens of thousandsof poor students,and they own a majorTV channel,a widely circulatednewspaper,and publishingcompanies.They also have founded nearly two hundred prestigious high schools in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, where teaching is in the national language as well as in Turkishand English. Since such new Islamic organizationsare almost all of Naksibendi origin, the discussion of tarikatsfocuses more specially on this particulargroup. The core of Sufi teaching is the renewal of faith in Islam in order to overcome the spiritualand political conquest of the West and of Westem materialistculture,defined as self-indulgence, hedonism, consumerism, and greed for wealth and power. This selfaims at enhancingresistanceto excessive materialdesires and at strengthening purification the innerdrive of Muslim believers. The great struggle, the cihad-i ekber, is to be waged againstthe carnal,bestial, and predatoryelements of the individualego, and cannot take place in a state of isolation. Self-reform requires a leader and a devout Muslim community.An infallible mentorwho has a profoundknowledge of Islam and who is an ethical guide to interpretingIslamic rules in new contexts is essential.24In recent years, the concept of absolute authorityof the tarikatleader has waned, but the centralityof the idea of self-reformremains.Sufis assume that only individualsstrong in faith can combat the extemal enemies of Islam. The Naksibendis emphasize the role a righteous community plays in sustaining the self-reform process. The individual and his/her community are linked by means of extremelydetailedcodes of conductderivedfrom the Islamic seriat.Those are orthopraxy: introducedinto the everyday life of devout Muslims, and their observanceis enforced by a vigilant community.Such a powerful mechanismof social control leaves little scope for autonomousprivate action. Ordinarytarikatpeople mainly read pamphlets and listen to cassettes that give detailed instructionsabout religious worship and ethics. The Islamization of society is achieved through these dual processes of self-reform and orthopraxy, which strongly reinforce each other. The renewal of Islamic faith and lifestyle is, at the same time, an identity-formation process thatentails a strongrejectionof Westernvalues, culture, and institutions. Tarikatsand other Islamic organizationshave attemptedto preventthe alienationof individuals and the atomization of traditionalcommunities that occur in a fast-growing marketeconomy and a new urbancontext. The tarikatleaders try hardto give primacyto person-to-personrelations, however brief and temporary their encounters with their followers may be. At the same time, their networks are wide, diverse, and productive. Tarikatsand Islamic groupsdevelop networks,the boundariesof which extend far beyond
Sufi Orderson the Periphery:Kadiriand NaksibendiIslam in Konya and 24. Sencer Ayata, "Traditional Trabzon,"in Tapper,Islam in Mode-n Tur-key, pp. 236-9.

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links in the immediatelocal, and even national,community.They also have international the Middle East, the new CentralAsian republics, and with the Turkishmigrant-worker communities in Western Europe. Like freemasonry, these organizations facilitate the economic and social mobility of their members by creating parallel opportunitystructures.25

Tarikatactivities in the public sphere in the 1970s and 1980s focused primarilyon efforts to widen the basis of their organizations.Those activities included spreadingtheir ideas and increasing the number of their followers and cadres by using modern media techniques, such as sound and video cassettes, alongside a more traditionalpersonal approach.The channels of communicationvaried from discussion groups and panels, to house-to-house visits, video shows, preaching in mosques, and nearly all forms of the written word.26 The Sufi networks and organizationsoften describe the goal of their activities as educating Muslims. Educationis a ratherelastic term which may include anythingfrom the basic teachingof the Quranto the propagation fundamentalist of political views. Their "educational" activities include the publication of dozens of journals that address religious, political, scientific, and social issues, as well as thousandsof books on almost every major topic, the creation of visual and audio media programs oriented to the less-educated public, the setting up of formal institutions, such as schools, and the preaching in mosques, houses, and special gatheringplaces. As a consequence of these activities, a new Islamist elite of journalists,writers, and intellectualshas emerged.27 The Sufi communities are quite active in helping needy students. They play a significantrole in financingQuranicschools, to which the governmentalso contributes.In the case of the many high school and university students living away from home who cannot affordprivatelodgings or cannot find a place in studentdormitories,the religious organizationshave moved to meet this need. They run dormitoriesthat provide students with free accommodation and contribute to their food and other expenses. Two particularlyactive organizationsin this respect, the Siileymanci and the Fethullahci,are each said to accommodatewell over one hundredthousand students.The former has a reputation for isolating the dormitories from the wider society and enforcing total obedience to Islamic rules and norms.28 Public high school studentsoften are channeled into certain fields at the university based on the priorities of the religious communities interestedin infiltratingkey positions in organizations,businesses, and the government bureaucracy. Finally, university graduateswith Islamist leanings are provided with jobs, and some are sent abroadfor post-graduatestudy. Following the example of similar movements in other Islamic countries, the Sufi organizationshave, in the past few years, tended to concentratetheir efforts on welfare
25. Serif Mardin,"The NaksibendiOrderin TurkishHistory,"in Tapper,Islam in Modern Turkey,pp. 121-45. 26. Ay,e Saktanber,"Becoming the 'Other' as a Muslim in Turkey: Turkish Women vs. Islamist Women,"New Perspectives on Turkey11 (Fall, 1994), pp. 99-134. 27. Gencay Saylan, Islamiyet ve Siyaset (Islam and Politics) (Ankara:V Yayinlari, 1987), pp. 85-104. 28. Ru?en Cakir,Ayet ve Slogan (The Verse and the Slogan) (Istanbul:Metis, 1990), pp. 125-40.

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services, of which education is only one. The economic reformistpolicies of the 1980s limited governmentexpenditureon social services and on the welfare state in general.This stage and at a time when in a countryin which these services were only at a rudimentary exodus created widespreadpoverty in cities. The religious organithe rapid rural-urban zations have jumped in to organizerelief for the poor, medical centers, and hospitals that offer treatmentschemes and child-careprograms. As the success of religious activity has come to depend on increasing financial resources, the Sufi groups have become more involved in complicated economic to arrangements pool resourcesfrom extremelydiverse sources.These rangefrom modest individual contributionsto donations from local and internationalMuslim businesses, institutions,and states, includingTurkishmigrantworkersin Europe,and, of course, the efficienttappingof public resources.One of the majorreasons why many Sufi groups are so eager to have a foothold in various departmentsof government is that the more numerousthe loyal men of substance,the more these organizationscan benefit economically. Since the 1980s, the Islamist sector in the economy has expanded,with large-scale holding companies, chain stores, investment houses, banks, and insurance companies. Particularlynoteworthy are the joint businesses and investments that Islamist organizaThis entrepreneurial companiesbased in the Gulf countries.29 tions have with international involving activity is also backed up by a huge and complex institutionalinfrastructure Islamist employers' organizations, workers' and producers' cooperatives, consulting agencies, and tradeunions. Sufi Islam has therebyestablished strong links with both the of marketeconomy and the government,and a sizable proportion its membershas realized considerablesuccess, emergingas businessmenof variousranksand gradesand changing the class composition of the Sufi groups. The emerging political climate in Turkey presents Sufi groups with new dilemmas and conflicting demands. In order to expand their base, they must push forward with extent on their links with Islamization.Achieving this, however, dependsto an important state authorities,and business circles. The rise of the conservativecenter-right politicians, WP will force the Sufi groups to choose between cooperatingwith the WP or joining it, either of which will require considerable sacrifices. The present state of division and internalstrife within the center right itself-the shift from populist to liberal economic elite deeply concemed aboutthe threatof policies, and the emergence of a liberal-secular Islamic fundamentalism-are also challenges to Sufi Islam. Third, the expansion of the membershipof Sufi groups and the changing relationshipbetween members and leaders have loosened the bonds and weakenedthe loyalty of those at the bottomof the hierarchy. Hence, the extent of grass-rootssupportand the mobilizationalcapacityof the Sufi groups are likely to be problematicin the near future.

in 29. Birol Yesilada, "IslamicFundamentalism Turkeyand the Saudi Connection,"in UFSI Field Staff Reports,Africa/MiddleEast, No. 18, 1988; Ugur Mumcu,Rabita (Istanbul:Tekin Yayinevi, 1987), pp. 173-92.

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PARTY THE WELFARE The WP fits well within the category of organized Islamic popularmovements that operateas political parties.30 organizationis based on individuallypoliticized subjects; Its on ideological political appealto mobilize support;and its primaryobjective is to it relies establish an Islamic society and state. The WP is the successor of the National SalvationParty(NSP), founded in 1972 by The NSP was representedin parliamentbetween 1973 and 1980, and Necmettin Erbakan. also took partin threedifferentcoalition governments:one led by Biilent Ecevit, the leader Demirel of the JP, between 1975 and of the RPP, in 1974; and the othertwo by Suileyman 1977. The NSP was dissolved by the militaryleaders in 1981 and reappearedas the WP in 1983. There is a wide consensus in the mass media that the WP supersedesother political parties,not only in the size of its membership,but also in the elaboratenessand efficiency of its partyorganization.As a matterof fact, the partyowes its strengthto its responsive and well-organizedgrass-rootsmembership.The highly motivated, well-disciplined, and stronglycommittedactivists believe in theirpolitical cause as a mission ordainedby God. They function at the communitylevel, visiting every single quarter,street, and cluster of houses in the cities, gathering information about each voter and family separately, evaluating the data, and finding solutions for each problem.To penetratesmall communities, the young activists, including an army of women who can arrangehome visits at any time of the day, have emerged as the party's major assets. Reporterswrite that the party organization is on steam, as though an election is always imminent, carefully planning activities, minutely assigning responsibilities for each group and individual activist, and coordinatingtheir efforts.31 The grass-rootsorganizationof the WP offers people threemajorthings. The first is a clear and simple, but very comprehensive,ideology that explains what is fundamentally wrong with individuals,the society, and the country,and whathas to be done to put things in order. Second, the activists provide poor people with certainmaterialbenefits: health care and medical aid, help to children with their homework, assistance in finding jobs, food, fuel, and various commodities poor people need. Finally, and most important,they offer "sympathy,"an appreciationof the difficultiesof everyday life for ordinarypeople, respect for their work and their struggles. Thus, they create a personal atmosphereof closeness, affection, congeniality, and companionship.This combination of ideological appeal, material benefits, and sympathy works. Other political parties are not as convincing, and their political activities are more s'elf-centered,showing little care or interest for the moral and materialproblems of people at the grass-rootslevel. The distributionof WP votes throughoutthe countryis far from uniform.There are wide disparities, based on regional, class, and ethnic differences, and considerable
30. Sami Zubaida,Islam, the People and the State (London:I.B. Tauris, 1993), p. 50. 31. Ru,en Cakir,Ne Seriat ne Demokrasi (Neither Seriat nor Democracy) (Istanbul:Metis, 1994), pp. 51-9.

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differencesin ruraland urbanvoting patterns.An analysis of the 1973 general elections, the first in which the NSP took part, indicates that the party's performance was considerably above its national average in Eastern and CentralAnatolia, exceptionally and the Western Black Sea Coast, and poor in the Aegean, Thrace, the Mediterranean about equal with the national average in Istanbul and its periphery, as well as in the Twenty-one years later, in 1994, the regional distribution Eastem Black Sea provinces.32 patternhas persisted,despite the fact thatthe WP has increasedits votes from 11.8 percent to 19 percent of the total vote. The regional nature of the party's support should be evaluated against the background of religious and ethnic differences. In terms of the major Muslim sects, the situationis clear-cut:the Alevi minority,who define their cultureas secular,refrainfrom voting for the WP, which makes the WP almost exclusively Sunni. Ethnically, there is strong supportfor the WP in both the Southeasternand some Easternprovinces, where there are high concentrationsof Kurds, as well as in the Central and other Eastern provinces, which are bastionsof religious conservatismand Turkishnationalism.The two areas have poor, depressed, and land-locked economies, and populationsthat resent the prosperityof the coastal cities createdby tourismand the export-ledgrowth strategiesof the 1980s. Nevertheless, given their increased visibility in the mass media, WP leaders may find it more difficult to appeal to each of these different communities without offending the others. In the Turkishcontext, in general, some observers have rejected the association of Islamic movements with provincialism,illiteracy, poverty, and backwardness,choosing instead to portray them as an essentially modern, urban, and educated middle-class since the March 1994 local This view seems to be findingmore supporters phenomenon.33 elections, in which the WP won the mayorships of Turkey's two largest metropolitan centers, Istanbuland Ankara.I have majorreservations,however, concerningthis line of thinking.First, the election results show thatthe ten provinces, where earlierthe NSP and laterthe WP had theirhighest percentagesof votes in the seven elections since 1973, were the least developed socio-economically in the country.Second, in Easternand Southeastern Anatolia, where tribalism,semi-feudal landlordism,and traditionaltarikatnetworks are still very powerful, WP voting rates in ruralareas were as high as in the cities. On the dwellers was other hand, the WP's performancein urbanareas of middle-classapartment much lower comparedwith its performancein the gecekondu, or shanty towns.34What housing is no longer seems to puzzle many observersis the fact that suburbanapartment exclusively a Westernized,middle-class type of residence. Recently, small entrepreneurs, lower-rankcivil servants,working-classfamilies, and well-to-do migrantsof conservative

Asian and AfricanStudies 11, no. 8 (1976), 32. Jacob M. Landau,"NationalSalvationPartyin Turkey," pp. 64-72; TurkerAlkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey,"in Metin Heper and RaphaelIsraeli, eds., Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 102-10. 33. John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat:Mythor Reality? (New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1992). 34. DIE, Mahalli Idareler Se(imi Sonu&lari.

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backgroundshave moved to the high-rise apartmentblocs in the suburbs.35 Many of the educated WP activists, as well as the Islamist businessmen and professionals, are also based in such quarters.Finally, regardlessof social-class differences,the migrantKurdsin big cities tend to vote heavily for the WP. Thus, WP support in metropolitanareas is overwhelminglyperipheraland provincial, in the sense that it rests on a politically active "secondary elite," highly effective in mobilizing the urban, lower-middle- and lowerincome groups, and Kurds.
The WP ideology takes, as its point of departure, the Islamic fundamentalist contention that the weakness and backwardness of the Islamic society is not due to Islam,

but to Westerndominationof Muslims. The WP agrees with the Naksibenditeaching that Muslim renewal requiresmoral recovery, a struggle against Westernpowers, and support for the country's scientific, industrial,and militarydevelopment.In its political discourse, the WP makes a clear distinction between social systems based on "might,"and those
based on "right," identifying the true Islamic order with the latter. A system based on

might, they argue, is like a jungle with imminent threats from unknown assailants and intense struggles with others. The WP promises an orderly society based on mutual trust, which can be achieved by living in accordancewith the divine system of laws (right) that governs every aspect of life in a detailed,just, and perfect way. Ellis Goldbergarguesthat such an emphasis on a community governed by divine law is typical of Protestant as well as Islamic fundamentalism,and involves a paradigm for the rejection of arbitraryand absolute The authority.36 WP propaganda,in fact, criticizes the oppressive rule of the corruptand unjust society that exploits and humiliates the poor Muslim. It advocates Islam as the solution, and offers the individualan anchor,a source of strength,and also an all-powerful authorityto whom submission must be total. An unavoidableoutcome of the liberaleconomic policies of the 1980s and 1990s has been the increasing economic and social inequalities. Turkey now has one of the most skewed income distributionsin the world. Many observers point to problems such as unemployment, the absence of social security, poor social services, and widespread poverty, which are rampantin urbanas well as in ruralareas. This system of "slavery," as WP politicians call it, is a product of Western imperialistand Zionist exploitation. It must be replacedby the "justorder,"and include an alternativeeconomic system, respect for humanrights, and a political system that is just. The WP spends more time and energy discussing equality, social security, welfare, and social justice than any other political party,includingthe leftist parties,which tend to shun "populism"in their discourses. The Islamism of the WP indicates a shift away from the political traditionof Sufi Islam and the NSP itself, which had always remainedclose to the center right. Siding with the poor against the state is new for an Islamist party in Turkey.
35. (gaglarKeyder and Ay?e Oncu, Istanbula)1dthe Concept of Wor-ld Cities (Istanbul:FriederichEbert Vakfi, 1993), p. 30. 36. Ellis Goldberg, "Smashing Idols and the State: The ProtestantEthic and Egyptian Sunni Radicalism," in Juan R. I. Cole, ed., Comparing Muslim Societies. Knowledge and the State in a Wor-ldCiviliZation (Ann

Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 1992), p. 226.

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In summary, in the 1980s the WP built a huge organization with a powerful grass-roots base. It increased its autonomy vis-a-vis other religious groups, at times subordinatingtheir interests to its own, expanded its electoral base, and radicalized its ideology, which is disseminated through a vast propagandamachine. In the area of institutionbuilding,the partyhas been innovativeand adaptive,establishingreligious and welfare services, forging domestic and intemationalbusiness links, and even organizing sports events and wedding ceremonies. CONCLUSION Despite significant overlappingbetween its constituentelements, political Islam in Turkey is diverse and multi-centered. A distinction can be made between those movements that have an autonomouspower base and those that depend on center-right partiesand the secularinstitutionsof the state to maintainaccess to public resources.The WP and the splintered radical Islamist networks fall into the first category, while establishment Islam and the Sufi groups fall into the second. The latter often find it difficultto reconcile the opposing demandsof political Islam and those of secular forces with their own organizationalgoals. For instance, the rising religiosity of the masses has broughtmore power and prestige to the religious functionariesof the state, but they have the found their autonomysignificantlyreducedwhen Sufi groupspenetrated DRA and the the SCP. Furthermore, rise to power of the WP has challenged the virtual monopoly on religious life the DRA enjoyed as the only legally recognized religious institution.In the event of a major conflict between a secular government and the rising fundamentalist movements, establishmentIslam, which is completely under the patronageof the state, politicalIslamas heresy. may be compelledto side with the secularregimeandto denounce Similarly, the rise of a powerful political movement, the WP, has underminedthe uncontestedleadershiprole that Sufi Islam played duringthe Republicanera. The WP and the intellectualgroups with wide appeal to educatedIslamists have deliberatelyaimed at weakening tarikatbonds. The absence of such a threatfrom the center-rightparties, as well as the manifold benefits they derive from access to public authorities,makes some Sufi groups lend their supportto secularparties.Such collaboration,however, is likely to marginalize their position even furtherwithin an increasingly radical political Islamist movement. While both establishmentand Sufi Islam are ambivalentin their attitudestowardthe WP and the center-rightparties, the latter has a complex relationshipwith the Islamist movement. When in govemment, the center-rightparties have initiated policies geared towardincorporating peripheral culture,popularreligion, and variousreligious viewpoints into the mainstreamof Turkish politics. The support they have provided for religious activity, however, has helped the rise of political Islam and strengthenedfundamentalist movements, which are now challenging the social basis of power of the center-right parties. Within the center-right bloc, the liberals and the conservativeshave divergentviews and interests that are not easily reconcilable. The liberals emphasize individualism,

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entrepreneurship, innovation, and the global competitiveness of the Turkish economy. They also advocate "anti-populist"policies, such as removing government subsidies, cuttinggovernmentexpenditures,and privatization,which, in the shortrun, clash with the interestsof the poor. This, and the liberalcontemptfor "peasantculture,"makes liberalism highly unpopularamong the masses. In contrast,conservativegroupsand partiesare more sensitive to the egalitarian ethos of Turkish provincial culture. They insist on more conventionalpolicies to combat Islamic fundamentalism, such as strengthening establishment Islam, forging new alliances with Sufi networks, and appealing to popular and nationalist sentiments. The conservatives approachthe poor with "sympathy,"with an and of understanding appreciation the everydaystrugglesof ordinarypeople and a display of concernfor theirproblems.37 liberal appealis more pronouncedin the world of the The mass media, among the professionaland technocraticmiddle class, and the majorityof the business elite. The WP has made considerable progress in building the image of a genuine alternativeto the existing system. On the otherhand, a series of conjecturaland structural factors is likely to limit a furtherexpansion of the WP's electoral base. In the first place, the party does not yet have a strong hold on Islamic activity. Second, it could suffer seriously from growing ethnic tension and cleavages in the country. In the eyes of the Alevi, who make up one-fifthof the population,the WP is a reactionaryforce threatening progressive, democratic,and left-leaning Alevi culture. Although the party increasingly finds itself voicing the grievances of those Kurdish groups who vote for it in Eastern Anatolia and the metropolitan centers, nationalist propaganda accusing the WP of collaboratingwith Kurdish separatistsis mounting and weakening its nationalist base. Moreover, despite wide differences among political parties as to the meaning of secularism, all parties except the WP fiercely oppose the notion of an Islamic state. If necessary,these partiescould form electoraland parliamentary alliancesto defeat the WP, and coalition governmentsto exclude it from power. Secularizationhas, at least, three basic meanings:the separationof the public sphere from the religious sphere,the decline of religious beliefs and practices,and the relegation of religion to the privatesphere.38 the Turkishcontext, the differentiation In process is all but completed in the actual process of governance, despite the enormous expansion of establishmentIslam. Also, for the majorityof the urbanmiddle class, religion has indeed become a privateaffair.Today, despite their strongreligiosity, for the majorityof Sunnis, even those who vote for the WP, loyalty to religion and to the modernTurkishRepublic are compatible objectives.39

37. Bruce Mazlish, "The Breakdownof Connections and Modem Development,"WorldDevelopment 19, no. 1 (1991), p. 32. 38. Jos6 Casanova,Public Religions in the ModernWorld(Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1994), p. 211. 39. Besir Atalay, Sanayilesmeve Sosyal Degisme (Industrialization Social Change)(Ankara:Devlet and PlanlamaTeskilati [State PlanningOrganization],1983), p. 150; Ozbudun,"Islam and Politics," p. 144; James Brown, "IslamicFundamentalism and Turkey,"Journal of Political and Military Sociology 16 (Fall, 1988), p. 239.