POLITICALLAWREVIEW

VOLUMEI
BasedontheoutlineofJusticeVicenteV.Mendoza
April1996RevisedEdition _______________

CompiledbyJoseSalvadorY.Mirasol

UpdatedbyUPLawBatch1995

UpdatedandEnlargedbyRodellA.Molina UPLawBatch1996
This revised edition is intended to further improve a previous edition of this work. ImportantpointstakenfromJusticeIsaganiCruz'sbookinPoliticalLawhavebeensummarizedin thiswork. SpecialthankstoLianneTanforlendingmeherdisketteinPoliticalLawReviewasupdated byUPLawBatch1995,Ma.RosarioBernardofordigestingsomeofthecasesinvolumeI,Shirley Alinea for lending me her notes in Political Law, Non Lerrer, Buddy Carale and TJ Matta for patientlyprintingthiswork. ThisworkisdedicatedtoUPLawBatch1996,towhichIbelong,mostspeciallytoSection A.MaythisworkhelpusinpassingPoliticalLawthiscomingbarexamsinSeptember1996. Letusallprayforaonehundredpercentpassingrate.

"ToHimbethegloryandhonorforever." _______________

RAM

GENERALINTRODUCTION

I.DEFINITIONSANDCONCEPTSINPUBLICLAW A.PoliticalLawdefined

Thatbranchofpubliclawwhichdealswiththeorganizationandoperationofthegovernmentorgansof thestateanddefinestherelationsofthestatewiththeinhabitantsofitsterritory.(Sinco,PhilippinePolitical Law1,11thed.,1962) ScopeofPoliticalLaw.Theentirefieldofpoliticallawmaybesubdividedinto(a)thelawofpublic administration,(b)constitutionallaw,(c)administrativelaw,and(d)thelawofpubliccorporations.These foursubdivisionsmaybebrieflydescribedforthetimebeing,asfollows:Thefirstdealswiththeorganization andmanagementofthedifferentbranchesofthegovernment;thesecond,withtheguarantiesoftheconstitution toindividualrightsandthelimitationsongovernmentalaction;thethird,withtheexerciseofexecutivepowerin the making of rules and the decision of questions affecting private rights; and the last, with governmental agenciesforlocalgovernmentorforotherspecialpurposes.(Sinco1)

MacariolavAsuncion,114SCRA77(1982) SpanishCodeofCommerceProvisionDisqualifyingJudgesfromEngaginginCommerceisPartofSpanish PoliticalLawAbrogatedbyChangeofSovereignty F:

ThecomplainantallegedthatrespondentjudgeoftheCFIviolatedparagraphs1and5,Art.14oftheCodeof Commerce(w/cprohibitedjudges,amongothers,fromengagingincommerce,eitherin person orin proxyorinthe financialinterventionincommercialorindustrialcompaniesw/inthelimitsofthedistricts)whenheassociatedhimselfw/ theTradersMftg.&FishingIndustries,Inc.asastockholderandpres.,saidcorp.havingbeenorganizedtoengagein business.

HELD:AlthoughthisprovisionisincorporatedintheCodeofCommercew/cispartofthecommercial laws of the Phils, it partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the governmentandcertainpublicofficersandemployees,likejusticesandjudges.Politicallawhasbeendefined asthatbranchofpubliclaww/cdealsw/theorganizationandoperationofthegovernmentalorgansoftheState anddefinestherelationsofthestatew/theinhabitantsofitsterritory. Specifically,Art.14oftheCodeof Commercepartakesmoreofthenatureofanadministrativelawbec.itregulatestheconductofcertainpublic officersandemployeesw/respecttoengaginginbusiness;hence,politicalinessence. xxxUponthetransferofsovereigntyfromSpaintoUS,andlateronfromUStotheRepublicofthe Phils., Art. 14 of the said Code must be deemed to have been abrogated bec. where there is change of sovereignty,thepoliticallawsoftheformersovereign,whethercompatibleornotw/thoseofthenewsovereign, areautomaticallyabrogated,unlesstheyareexpresslyreenactedbyaffirmativeactofthenewsovereign.There appearstobenoenablingoraffirmativeact.Consequently,Art.14oftheCodeofCommercehasnolegaland bindingeffectandcannotapplytorespondentJudge.VV.

B.ConstitutionalLawDefined Aconstitutionisbothalegaldocumentandapoliticalplan.It,therefore,embodieslegalrulesaswellas politicalprinciples.Andsowhenwespeakofconstitutionallawinthestrictsenseofthetern,werefertothe

legalrulesoftheconstitution.xxx xxx Inthesenseinw/ctheconceptisunderstoodinAmericanandPhilippineJurisprudence,constitutional lawisatermusedtodesignatethelawembodiedintheconstitutionandthelegalprinciplesgrowingoutofthe interpretationandapplicationmadebycourtsoftheprovisionsoftheconstitutioninspecificcases.xxx Constitutionallawformsadistinctbranchofjurisprudencedealingw/thelegalprinciplesaffectingthe nature,adoption,amendment,andoperationoftheconstitution.(Sinco67.)

TypesofConstitutionalLaw.Ingeneral,therearethree(3)differenttypesofconstitutionallaw,namely, (1)theEnglishtype,characterizedbytheabsenceofawrittenconstitution(Sinco67) Anunwrittenconstitution,andthepowerofjudicialreviewbythecourts. Thus,thecourtscannot invalidatetheactsoftheparliamentasbeingunconstitutionalbecauseof"parliamentarysupremacy."(Mirasol notes.) (2)theEuropeancontinentaltype,wherethereisawrittenconstitutionw/cgivesthecourtsnopowerto declareineffectivestatutescontrarytoit(Sinco67.) A written constitution but nopower of judicial reviewby the courts. The socalled Constitutional Courts of France do not exercise real judicial review but only render advisory opinions on constitutional questionsupontherequestofthegovernment,notofpartiesinactuallitigation.(Mirasolnotes.) (3)theAmericantypewherethelegalprovisionsofthewrittenconstitutionaregiveneffectthroughthe powerofthecourtstodeclareineffectiveorvoidordinarystatutesrepugnanttoit.(Sinco67.) Awrittenconstitutionandtheexerciseofjudicialreviewbythecourts,whichisthepowerofthecourts todeterminetheconstitutionalvalidityoftheactsoflegislatureandotherbranchesofgovernment. (Mirasol notes.)

C.ConstitutionDefined Itis"alawforthegovernment,safeguardingindividualrights,setdowninwriting."(Hamilton.) SuchaviewfoundacceptanceintheworkofTanadaandFernando: "Itmaybemorespecificallydefinedasawritteninstrumentorganizingthegovernment,distributingits powersandsafeguardingtherightsofthePeople." FromMalcolmandLaurel: "Itisthewritteninstrumentbywhichthefundamentalpowersofgovernmentareestablished,limited anddefined,andbywhichthosepowersaredistributedamongtheseveraldepartmentsfortheirsafeanduseful exerciseforthebenefitofthebodypolitic." AccordingtoSchwartz,"aconstitution isseenasanorganicinstrument,underwhichgovernmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed. Such stress upon both grant and limitation of authority is

fundamentalinAmericantheory.'Theofficeandpurposeoftheconstitutionistoshapeandfixthelimitsof governmentalactivity.'"(Fernando,TheConstitutionofthePhilippines,2021,2nded.,1977.)

TypesofConstitutions ClassificationofConstitutions: Constitutionsareclassifiedasfollows:(1)writtenandunwritten,and(2)rigidandflexible. WrittenandUnwritten(Classificationastowhenitisadopted.) (a)Awrittenconstitutionisonetheprovisionsofw/chavebeenreducedtowritingandembodiedin one or more instruments at a particular time. The US Constitution is a classical example of a written constitution. Writtenconstitutionshavebeenalsocalledconventionalorenacted,bec.theyaregivendefiniteformby asteadilyconstitutedbody,theconstitutionalconvention,ataparticulartime. Writtenconstitutionsareeitherdemocraticormonarchical.Democraticconstitutionsessentiallyspring fromtheauthorityofthepeople.Monarchicalconstitutionsarethosegrantedbyamonarchasanactofgraceto hissubjects.Thisclassofconstitutionsarealsocalledoctroyedconstitutions.Theybelongtothepastage. (b)Anunwrittenconstitutionisonew/chasnotbeencommittedtowritingatanyspecifictimebutis theaccumulatedproductofgradualpoliticalandlegaldevelopment. TheEnglishConstitutionisthemodern exampleofthisclass. Unwrittenconstitutionshavebeenknownalsoascumulativeorevolved,bec.theyarenotformulatedat anydefinitetimebutarerathertheoutcomeofapoliticalevolutionaryprocess.

FlexibleandRigidConstitutions.(Classificationaccordingtoamendmentprocess.) The classification of constitutions into written and unwritten has been considered unscientific and inaccurate bec. no written constitution, after having been applied for a considerable period, can remain substantiallyunchangedinitsoriginalconditionotherthanbyformalamendments.xxx. Toclassifyconstitutionsintorigidandflexibleistouseabasisthathastodomorew/theirnaturerather thantheirmereform. Rigid. Aconstitutionisclassifiedasrigidwhenitmaynotbeamendedexceptthroughaspecial processdistinctfromandmoreinvolvedthanthemethodofchangingordinarylaws.Itissupposedthatbysuch aspecialprocedure,theconstitutionisrendereddifficulttochangeandtherebyacquiresagreaterdegreeof stability. Flexible. Aconstitutionisclassifiedasflexiblewhenitmaybechangedinthesamemannerand throughthesamebodythatenactsordinarylegislation.TheBritishConstitutionisflexible. Aconstitution'sstabilitydependsuponotherfactorsthanthemererigidityorflexibilityoftheamending process,suchas(1)thegeneraltemperamentofthepeopleandtheirleadersand(2)thedegreeofanation's

politicalmaturityandsocialhomogenity.(Sinco6870.) ThePhilippineConstitutionisbothwrittenandrigid(SeeArt.XVIIontheAmendmentprocess).

II.THEBACKGROUNDOFTHEPRESENTCONSTITUTION HistoricalBackgroundofthe1987Constitution Thehistoryofthe1987Constitutionbeganon11April1899,thedatewhentheTreatyofParisbetween theUnitedandSpainof10December1898becameeffectiveupontheexchangeofinstrumentsofratificationof bothcountries.Butthesourcesofthe1987Constitutionare(i)McKinley'sInstructionstotheSecondPhilippine Commission;(ii)SpoonerAmendment;(iii)PhilippineBillof1902;(iv)JonesLawof1916,otherwiseknownas thePhilippineAutonomyAct;(v)1935Constitution;(vi)1973Constitutionand(vi)FreedomConstitutionof 1986anditsimplementingorders. TreatyofParis UndertheTreatyofParis,thePhilippineswascededbySpaintotheUnitedStates.Spainrelinquished its sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, and with this, all laws of a political nature were automatically abrogated. The Treaty provided that the civil and political status of all inhabitants of the islands was to be determinedbytheUSCongress. ThePhilippinesinturn,wasnotgiventhestatusofan"incorporatedterritory"(astomakeitacandidate forstatehood)andso expropriovigore,theUSConstitutiondidnotapplytothePhilippinesunlesstheUS Congressexpresslyenacteditsprovisions. McKinley'sInstructions President McKinley, legislating as CommanderinChief, issued on 7 April 1900 his "Letter of InstructiontotheSecondPhilippineCommission"underTaft. Itsetupa"dividedcivilandmilitarygovernment"withtheexistingMilitarygovernorastheExecutive, and a Philippine Commission, created on 1 September 1900, as the Legislative, both representing the US PresidentasCommanderinChief. ItalsoextendedtothePhilippinesalltherightsintheBillofRightsoftheUSFederalConstitution, excepttherighttobeararms(becausethecountrywasinrebellion)andtherighttoatrialbyjury(becausethe Americans distrusted the Filipinos capacity to be a just judge of his peers). The right to jury trial of an AmericanchargedwithacrimeinthePhilippineswasdeniedbythecourtsinUSvDorr,2Phil332(1903)by virtueoftheLetterofInstruction. ThiswasthefirstOrganicAct(alawwhichestablishesthestructureandlimitationsofthegovernment)

of the Philippines. What it lacked, as a constitution, were the ratification by the people, and the right of amendment(whichwasreservedsolelytotheUSPresident). Thejudiciarywassubsequentlyestablishedon11June1901,withaSupremeCourt,CourtsofFirst Instance,andJusticeofPeaceCourts. SpoonerAmendment On 4 July 1901, the Spooner Amendment, which was actually a rider to the "Army and Navy AppropriationsAct,"changedthethen"divided,militaryandcivilgovernment"intoafullycivilgovernment, under the US Congress. All acts of the Philippine Commission would now begin: "Be it enacted by the authorityoftheUSgovernment,"andnolongerbyauthorityoftheUSPresident. PhilippineBillof1902 TheUSCongressnowincontrolofthePhilippines,ratifiedalltheorganicactsofthePresident,inorder topreventdisruptionofgovernment,andon1July1900,passedthePhilippineBillof1902,whichwastobe organic act of the Philippines from 1902 to 1906. The organic act introduced significant provisions to constitutionalhistory. ThePhilippineCommissionwastheupperhouse.ItwasundertheGovernorGeneralwhoretainedall theexecutivepower,includingthepowertosuspendthewritof habeascorpus uponrecommendationofthe PhilippineCommission. ItestablishedanelectivelowerhousecalledthePhilippineAssembly,composedentirelyofFilipinos.It calledforthefirstelectioninthePhilippinestofillup,themembershipinthelowerhouse,assoonasthe Philippine insurrection stopped and there was a condition of general peace, except in the Moro and Non Christianprovinces. Acensuswastakenandcompletedon28March1903andwithacertificationofpeaceandofFilipino acceptanceoftheUSgovernmentmadebythePhilippineCommissionon29March1907,theelectionforthe PhilippineAssemblywasconductedon10July1907,withOsmenaasspeaker. TheBillalsodefinedforthefirsttimewhothecitizensofthePhilippines were. Theywereallthe inhabitantsofthePhilippineislandswhoweresubjectsofSpainasof11April1899,whocontinuedtoreside therein,andallthechildrenbornsubsequentthereto.Thisdefinitionisstillgoodlawtoday. JonesLaw On 29 August 1916, the US Congress passed the Jones Law, otherwise known as the Philippine AutonomyAct. It established a tripartite government with real separation of powers; this was the prototype of our presentsetup.TheexecutivepowerwasinthehandsofanAmericanGovernorGeneral,whowasindependent

oftheLegislature,andwhowasgiventhepowertosuspendthewritofhabeascorpusandimposemartiallaw withouttherecommendationoftheLegislature.TheLegislaturewascomposedoftheSenateandtheHouseof Representatives,allcomposedofFilipinos.ThejudiciarycontinuedtobemadeupoftheSupremeCourt,the CFIsandJusticeofPeaceCourts. Underthissetup,whiletheFilipinoshasallthelegislativepower,theAmericanshadalltheexecutive powerandthus,alsothecontrolofthegovernment.Thus,intheBoardofControl(NationalCoalCorporation) cases,theUSSupremeCourtruled,despitethedissentofHolmesandBrandeis,thatthePresidentoftheSenate andtheSpeakeroftheHousecouldnotvotethestocksoftheNCCandelectitsdirectorsbecausethiswasa politicalfunction.OnlytheGovernorGeneralcouldvotethegovernmentshares,saidthecourt. ThedefinitionofwhowerecitizensofthePhilippinesfirstenunciatedinthePhilippineBillof1902, wascarriedoverbytheJonesLaw. TydingsMcDuffieLaw Althoughthiswasnotanorganicact,itisimportantintheconstitutionalhistoryofthePhilippines becauseitwastobetheenablingstatute,providingthemechanismwherebytheconstitutionofanindependent Philippinescouldbeadopted.Thelaw,uponitsacceptancebytheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesofthe Philippines,providedfor(i)thecallingofaConstitutionalConventiontodraftaConstitutionforthePhilippines, (ii) the adoption of a Constitution that established a republican government, with a Bill of Rights, and a separationofchurchandstate,(iii)thesubmissionofthedrafttotheUSPresidentforcertificationthatthe ConstitutionwasinconformitywiththeconditionssetbytheTydingsMcDuffieLaw,and(iv)itsratificationby thepeopleinaplebiscite.Completeindependencewastotakeplaceten(10)yearsafteritseffectivity.

1935Constitution Accordingly, on 30 July 1934, an election was held to choose the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Claro M. Recto was elected President of the Convention. On 8 February 1935, the Concon approvedthedraft.On23March1935,thedraftwascertifiedbythePresident,FranklinDelanoRooseveltas conformingtotheTydingsMcDuffieLaw.On14May1935,itwasratifiedbythepeopleinaplebiscite,with theprovisionsonthequalificationsofthePresident,VicePresidentandmembersofCongresstakingeffectupon ratification.InSeptember1935,thefirstelectionunderthe1935ConstitutionwasconductedwithManuelLuis QuezonasPresidentandSergioOsmenaasVicePresident. On15November1935,upontheinaugurationoftheCommonwealth,the1935Constitutiontookeffect. ThisConstitutionwastoserveasthecharteroftheCommonwealth,anduponwithdrawalofUSsovereignty,of theRepublic. TheConstitutionprovidesforatripartitegovernment,withtheexecutivelodgedinthePresidentwho hadasixyearterm,thelegislativeinaunicameralNationalAssembly,andthejudiciaryinaSupremeCourt, CFIsandJusticeofPeaceCourtsasbefore.

In 1940, it was amended to provide for (a) a bicameral Congress with a Senate and a House of Representatives;(b)atermoffouryearsforthePresident,butwithreelectionand(c)theestablishmentofan independentconstitutionalbodyknownastheCommissiononElections. Warensued,andthePhilippines wassodevastatedthatthedeclarationofitsindependence,due15 November1945hadtobepostponed. Atanyrate,on23April1946,theelectionofthefirstofficialsofthe PhilippineRepublicwasheld,andon4July1946,theRepublicwasinauguratedandthePhilippinesbecame "politically"independentoftheUS. Theoretically,toanextentthatsovereigntyisnevergrantedtoapeoplebutisearnedbythemasthey asserttheirpoliticalwill,thenitisamisnomertosaythat4July1946wasthedayUSgrantedindependenceto thePhilippines.Moreappropriately,itwasthedaywhentheUSwithdrewitssovereigntyoverthePhilippines, thusgivingtheFilipinopeopleanoccasiontoasserttheirownindependence. Butnot"economically". On30April1946,oneweekaftertheelection,theUSCongresspassedthe BellTradeActwhichwouldgrantPhilippineprimeexportsentrytotheUSfreeofcustomsdutiesfrom1946to 1954, and a gradual increase in duties from 1954 to 1974 (LaurelLangley agreement), provided that the PhilippineswouldgrantUScitizensandcorporationsthesameprivileges,andinaddition,therighttoexplore naturalresourcesofthePhilippinesinparitywiththeFilipinos,andtooperatepublicutilities. Thismustbe acceptedbyCongress,embodiedinanExecutiveAgreement,andreflectedasanamendmentintheConstitution. TheSenateapprovalofthisbillgaverisetothecaseofVeravAvelino,77Phil192(1946).TheSenate then had 11Nacionalistasand 13Liberals. ThreeNacionalistaSenatorselect (Vera, Diokno and Romero), knowntobeagainsttheBellTradeAct,werepreventedbytherestoftheSenate,inwhatisknownas"exclusion proceedings,"ongroundsthattheirelectionsweremarredwithfraud.Thepoliticalmotivationwasclearbutthe SC was conned into lifting the injunction it issued for the withholding of the suspension, because of the unfulfilledpromisethattheSenatewouldnotcarryoutthesuspension.Withthebalanceofpoweroffset,the BellTradeActwaspassed.Subsequently,theSChadtodismissthepetitiononthegroundthattheprincipleof separationofpowers,itcouldnotorderacoequalbranchtoreinstateamember. TheSenateauthorizedPresidentRoxastoenterintoanExecutiveAgreement,whichhedidon3July 1946,theeveofthedeclarationofPhilippineIndependence. ThencametheamendmentoftheConstitutioninordertoincludetheParityRightsAgreement,which gaverisetothecaseofMabanagvLopezVito,78Phil1(1947).UndertheAmendatoryProvisionsofthe1935 Constitution,Congress,actingasconstituentbody,needed3/4votetoproposeanamendmenttotheConstitu tion.ButwiththethreeSenatorsstillsuspended,onlythe21remainingwereusedasthebasisforcomputingthe 3/4requirement.Whenthiswasraisedincourt,itbeggedofffromrulingonthegroundthatitwasapolitical question.ItalsousedtheEnrolledBillTheory. Sowiththeamendmentproposed,itwassubsequentlyratifiedon5March1947. ThethirdtimetheConstitutionwasamended(1940,1947)wasin1967.AResolutionofbothhouses providedfor(a)theamendmentoftheConstitutionbyaConvention,(b)theincreaseofseatsintheHouseof

RepresentativestomaketheConconsufficientlyrepresentative,and(c)allowingmembersoftheHouseasdele gateswithoutforfeitingtheirseats.Thefirstwasapproved,thesecondandthirdwererejected.Thisbecamethe subjectmatterofGonzalesvCOMELEC. ElectionofdelegatestotheConcontookplaceon10November1970.ThentheConConmeton1June 1971.Beforeitfinisheditswork,itcameupwitharesolutioncallingforanamendmenttothe1935Constitution reducingthevotingagefrom21to18,sothatawiderbasecouldvoteintheratificationoftheConstitutionthen beingdrafted.AplebiscitewassetbytheCOMELECfor8November1971butthiswasenjoinedbytheSCin thecaseofTolentinovCOMELEC,thecourtrulingthatapiecemealamendmentwasnotallowedbythe1935 Constitutionsinceitprovidedthattheamendmentsweretoberatifiedat"anelection"whichmeantonlyone election.TheCourtuphelditsjurisdictionovertheConConbyarguingthatsincetheConconderiveditspower fromtheConstitution,itwasthuslimitedbytheConstitution. ButitwassubsequentlyovertakenbyMartialLaw.On30November1972,theConventionsubmittedits "draft"tothePresident,whocalledonaplebiscitetoratifytheConstitution.Thiswasquestionedinthecaseof PlanasvCOMELEC,49SCRA105(1973)onthegroundthattherecanbenofreedomofexpressionunder MartialLaw. ButthecasewasrenderedmootandacademicwhenthePresidentcancelledtheplebisciteand insteadheldacitizens'assemblyon10to15January,1973.On17January1973,thePresidentcameupwitha proclamationthattheConstitutionhadcometofullforceandeffectafteritsoverwhelmingratificationbythe peopleinavivavocevote.

1973Constitution ThevalidityoftheratificationprocesswasquestionedinthecaseofJavellanavExecutiveSecretary,50 SCRA 30 (1973) but the failure of the SC to come up with the necessary votes to declare the act as unconstitutionalforceditintotheconclusionthat"therearenofurtherobstaclestoconsideringtheconstitution inforceandeffect." The1973Constitutionwasamendedfourtimes. Thefirst,in1976,gavethePresident,legislativepowerseveniftheInterimBatasangPambansawas alreadyoperating. Thesecond,in1980wasnotsignificant.ItmerelyraisedtheretirementofjusticesoftheSCfrom65to 70astokeepFernandoforfivemoreyears. Thethird,in1980changedtheformofgovernmentfromParliamentarytoPresidential. Thefourth,in1984,respondedtothesuccessionproblembyprovidingforaVicePresident. ThestartoftheendoftheMarcosyears,ofcourse,couldbetreatedasearlyas21August1983.Butits immediateprecursorwastheSnapElectionwhichthePresidentwasforcedtocallandseton7February1986to

respondtotheclamorforpopularmandate. Thevalidityofthe"SnapElectionLaw"calledbytheBatasangPambansawasraisedinthecaseof Philippine Bar Associa v COMELEC 140 SCRA 455 (1985). The issue was raised because of the tion , conditionalletterofresignationsentbyMr.MarcostotheBatasan,makinghisresignationeffectiveonlyupon (i)theholdingofaPresidentialelection,(ii)theproclamationofawinner,(iii)theassumptionintoofficebythe winning candidate. It was contended that a conditional resignation was not allowed under the 1973 Constitution,foritdidnotcreateavacancy,andwithoutavacancy,therewasnoreasontocallforanelection. ButtheSCfailedtoissueapreliminaryinjunctiontoenjointheCOMELECfrompreparingfortheelection,thus making"theinitiallylegalquestion intoapoliticalone." Inthemeantime,thepoliticalpartieshavestarted campaigningandthepeopleweresoinvolvedintheelectionthattostopitonlegalgroundswouldfrustratetheir verywill.Andso,failingtocomeupwiththemajoritytoholdtheSnapElectionLawunconstitutional,theSC couldnotissuetheinjunctionprayedfor.Theelectionwentahead. Therestishistory. Theresults oftheelectionwereproclaimedbytheBatasan,namingMarcosand Tolentinoasthewinners.ButtheFebruary2to25,1986,EDSArevolutiontookplace.On25February,Marcos wasproclaimed inMalacanang byMakasiar,while Aquino wasproclaimed inClubFilipinobyTeehankee. Laterthatevening,MarcosfledtoHawaii.

A.TheFebruary1986RevolutionandtheProclamationofProvisionalConstitution. FreedomConstitution WhatwasthebasisoftheAquinogovernment?Diditassumepowerpursuanttothe1973Constitution, orwasitarevolutionarygovernment? Proclamation No. 1, 25 February 1986 (Provisional government). But Proclamation No. 3 which announcedtheProvisionalConstitution,seemedtosuggestthatitwasarevolutionarygovernment,sinceinone ofitswhereasesitannouncedthatthe"newgovernmentwasinstalled,throughadirectexerciseofthepowerof theFilipinopeopleassistedbyunitsoftheNewArmedForces,"referringtotheEDSArevolution. Thebetterviewisthelatterview.TheAquinogovernmentwasnotanoffshootofthe1973Constitution forunderthatConstitution,aprocedurewasgivenfortheelectionofthePresidentproclamationbythe BatasanandthecandidateBatasanproclaimedwasMarcos. LawyersLeaguevAquino(GRNos.73748,73972&73990,May22,1986).Thisviewwasaffirmed inLawyersLeaguevAquinowherethelegitimacyoftheAquinogovernmentisquestionedonthegroundthatit wasnotestablishedpursuanttothe1973Constitution.TheSCruledthatpetitionershadnopersonalitytosue andtheirpetitionstatesnocauseofaction."ForthelegitimacyoftheAquinogovernmentisnotajusticiable matter. ItbelongstotherealmofpoliticswhereonlythepeopleofthePhilippinesarethejudge. Andthe peoplehavemadethejudgment;theyhaveacceptedthegovernmentofPresidentAquinowhichisineffective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and lawa de jure

government.Moreover,thecommunityofnationshasrecognizedthelegitimacyofthepresentgovernment.All theelevenmembersofthisCourtasreorganized,havesworntoupholdthefundamentallawoftheRepublic underhergovernment." TheAquinogovernmentwasaresultofa"directstateaction."Itwasnotasifasmallgrouprevolted andsucceededinwrestingpowerintheend.Rather,theentirestaterevoltedandoverthrewthegovernment,so thatrightfromthebeginning,theinstallationwasalreadylawfulandthegovernmentwasatalltimesdejure. Inthisregard,itmustbenotedthatthereisnosuchthingasaconstitutionalrightofrevolution. A revolution,fromthepointofviewofaState,isalwayslawfulsinceaStatecannevergowrong;itcanchangeits governmentinwhateverwaythesovereignseesfit.Butthisrightofrevolution,inherentinsovereignty,cannot berecognizedinaConstitution,forthiswouldbeselfdestructive.ThenatureofaConstitutionistosetupa governmentandprovideforanorderlywaytochangethisgovernment.Arevolutioncontradictsthisnature. Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986 (Provisional Constitution). At any rate, the Provisional ConstitutionorFreedomConstitutionwasadoptedon25March1986throughProclamationNo.3.Itabrogated thelegislativeprovisionsofthe1973Constitution,modifiedtheprovisionsregardingtheexecutivedepartment, andtotallyreorganizedthegovernment.(Itsuseofthe1973Constitution,however,isnotbetoconstruedthatit wasacontinuationthereof.)ThenitprovidedforthecallingofaConstitutionalCommission,composedof30to 50membersappointedbythePresidentwithin60days. (Inourhistory,allmajorconstitutionsMalolos, 1935,1971weredraftedbyelecteddelegates.) ThePresidentappointed48Commissioners,whoworkedontheConstitutionfrom1Juneto15October 1986.Thedraftwassubmittedtothepeopleinareferendumon2February1987.On11February1987,the President, through Proclamation No. 58, announced its overwhelming ratification by the people and that, therefore,ithadcomeintoforceandeffect. InRe:SaturninoBermudez(145SCRA160)(1960).InthecaseofInRe:SaturninoBermudez,theSC held,quotingthepreviouscaseofLawyersLeaguevAquino,that:
[T]helegitimacyoftheAquinogovernmentisnotajusticiablematter.Itbelongstotherealmof politicswhereonlythepeopleofthePhilippinesarethejudge.Andthepeoplehavemadethejudgment; theyhaveacceptedthegovernmentofPresidentAquinowhichisineffectivecontroloftheentirecountry sothatitisnotmerelyadefactogovernmentbutinfactandlawadejuregovernment.Moreover,the communityofnationshasrecognizedthelegitimacyofthepresentgovernment.Alltheelevenmembers of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.

B.AdoptionandEffectivityofthepresentConstitution ProvisionalConstitution,Art.V.
ARTICLEV

ADOPTIONOFANEWCONSTITUTION Section1.WithinsixtydaysfromthedateofthisProclamation,aCommissionshallbeappointedbythe PresidenttodraftaNewConstitution.TheCommissionshallbecomposedofnotlessthanthirtynormorethan fiftynaturalborncitizensofthePhilippines,ofrecognizedprobity,knownfortheirindependence,nationalismand patriotism.TheyshallbechosenbythePresidentafterconsultationwithvarioussectorsofsociety. Section2.TheCommissionshallcompleteitsworkwithinasshortaperiodasmaybeconsistentwiththe needbothtohastenthereturnofnormalconstitutionalgovernmentandtodratadocumenttrulyreflectiveofthe idealsandaspirationsoftheFilipinopeople. Section3. TheCommissionshallconductpublic hearingstoinsurethatthepeoplewillhaveadequate participationintheformulationoftheNewConstitution. Section4.TheplenarysessionsoftheCommissionshallbepublicandrecorded. Section5.TheNewConstitutionshallbepresentedbytheCommissiontothePresidentwhoshallfixthe datefortheholdingofaplebiscite.Itshallbecomevalidandeffectiveuponratificationbyamajorityofthevotes castinsuchplebiscitewhichshallbeheldwithinaperiodof60daysfollowingitssubmissiontothePresident.

1987Constitution,Art.XVIII,sec.27. Art.XVIII,Sec.27. ThisConstitution shalltakeeffectimmediatelyuponitsratificationbya majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede the all previous Constitutions. The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was approved by the ConstitutionalCommissionof1986onthetwelfthdayofOctober 1986,andaccordinglysignedonthe fifteenth dayofOctober1986atthePlenaryHall,NationalGovernmentCenter,QuezonCity,bythe Commissionerswhosesignaturesarehereunderaffixed. ProclamationNo.58(ProclaimingtheRatificationofthe1987Constitution),February11,1987 DeLeonvEsguerra,153SCRA602(1987.) The1987Constitutiontookeffecton2February1987. F:
ThecasearoseduetoArt.III,Sec.2ofProclamationNo.3,whichprovidedthat:"Allelectiveandappointive officialsandemployeesunderthe1973Constitutionshallcontinueinofficeuntilotherwiseprovidedbyproclamationor executiveorderoruponthedesignationorappointmentandqualificationoftheirsuccessors,ifsuchappointmentismade withinaperiodofoneyearfrom25February1986." DeLeonwasabarriocaptaininTaytay,Rizal.On9February1987,hewasreplacedbytheMLG(DLG).Sothe questionaroseastowhenthe1987Constitutiontookeffect.Ifittookeffecton2February,thereplacementwasnolonger

valid, since Proclamation No. 3 would have been superseded. But if it took effect on 11 February (the date of proclamation),thereplacementwouldhavebeenvalid.

The SC, consulting the proceedings of the Concom, ruled that the intent of the framers of the Constitutionwastomakeiteffectiveonthedateofitsratification. Art.XVIII,Sec.27clearlyprovidedthat "thisConstitution shall takeeffect imme diately upon itsratification byamajorityofthevotescastinthe plebiscite." The1987ConstitutionwasratifiedinaplebisciteonFeb.2,1987,superseding theProvisional Constitution. Consequently,afterthatdate,respondentOICGovernorcouldnotdesignaterespondentstothe electivepositionsoccupiedbypetitioners.Petitionersmustnowbeheldtohaveacquiredsecurityoftenure. Thedissentingopinionpointedoutthatbycontemporaneousconstruction,the1973Constitutionhada similarprovisionasthepresentoneinissue(Art.XVII,Sec.16,ThisConstitutionshalltakeeffectimmediately uponitsratificationbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscite),andyetittookeffectonthedayofthe proclamation.The1981and1984amendmentscontainedsimilarprovisions(validwhenapproved),andyetthe practicehasalwaysbeentomakethedateofproclamation,thedateofeffectivity. Furthermore,iftheeffectivitywas2February,thentheappointmentsmadebythePresidenttoCAposts afterthatdatewouldbeinvalidfortheywerenotsubmittedtotheJudicial andBarCouncil.Onthispoint,however,TeehankeenotedthatthePresidentissuedtheappointmentsintheend ofJanuary. A concurringopinion notedthedebatebetweenDavide(date ofproclamation) andBernas(dateof ratification),andDavide'scommentthathewasgivingupduetotyrannyofnumbers. VV: TheSCwascorrectforthatwastheclearintentoftheframers.Theonestobeblamedarethe framersthemselves.Effectivityshouldreallybethedateofproclamation. One,howcanonecanbeexpectedtocomplywiththeprovisionsoftheConstitutionwhen,priortoits proclamation,thereisnowaytodetermineifithasbeenratifiedornot?ShouldtheDirectorofPrisoncontinue thescheduledelectrocutionofadeathrowconvicton3Februaryinviewoftheabolitionofcapitalpunishment inthe1987Constitution;ifhedoes,hewouldtechnicallybeviolatingtheconstitutionundertheaboveholding. Ifhedoesnot,hewouldbeinderelictionofduty,incasetheconstitutionisnotratified. Two,noanalogycanbemadebetweentheelectiontoofficeofapublicofficerwhoisdeemedelected onthedayofelection),andtheeffectivityoftheconstitution,becauseapublicofficer,thoughdeemedelected, doesnotassumeofficeonthedayofhiselection,notevenonthedayofhisproclamation.

III.THESUPREMACYOFTHECONSTITUTIONANDTHEROLEOFTHECOURTS

A.TheoryofJudicialReview AngaravElectoralCommission,63Phil139(1936).In1935,theNationalAssembly

adoptedaresolutionthat"allmemberselect,withnoelectionprotestfiledonorbefore3December1935are deemedelected."TheElectoralCommission,aconstitutionalbody,ontheotherhandsetthe9December1935 asthedeadlineforthefilingofelectionprotest. Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a motion of protest (complaint) on 8 December 1935. This was entertainedbytheElectoralCommission.AngaracontendedthatthedeadlinesetbytheNationalAssemblywas controlling.Whoprevailed? The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral Commission,inviewoftheconstitutionalprovisiongrantingtheElectoralCommissionjurisdictionoverelection protests. In justifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed out that when the court allocated constitutionalboundaries,itneitherassertssupremacy,norannulstheactsofthelegislature.Itsimplycarries outtheobligationsimposeduponitbytheconstitutiontodetermineconflictingclaimsandtoestablishforthe partiestherightswhichtheconstitutiongrantstothem.

ConditionsfortheExerciseofJudicialReview InPeoplevVera,66Phil56(1937),J.Laurellaiddownthedoctrinethatjudicialreviewcanonlybe exercisedinanactualcaseandcontroversy. This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3) a constitutionalquestionraisedattheearliestpossibletime,and(4)aconstitutionalquestionthatistheverylis motaofthecase,i.e.anunavoidablequestion. Seven(7)rulesofavoidanceofconstitutionalquestions(J.Brandeis): Inthefollowingcases,thecourtmustrefrainfrompassingontheissueofconstitutionalityorfrom exercisingjudicialreview: 1.Friendly,nonadversaryproceedings.(novitalconflict) 2.Anticipationofaquestionofconstitutionallawinadvanceofthenecessityofdecidingit.(premature case) 3.Formulationofarulebroaderthanisrequiredbytheprecisefactstowhichitisapplied. 4.Existenceofothergroundsuponwhichthecasemaybedisposedof(nottheverylismota) 5.Acomplaintmadebyonewhofailstoshowinjuryastoitsoperation.(nostanding) 6.Instanceofonewhohasavailedhimselfofitsbenefit. 7. Possibility of a construction of the statute which can avoid the resolution of the constitutional question.

Policyofstrictnecessity(RescueArmycase)

Thecourtmust,asmuchpossible,refrainfromexercisingjudicialreviewunlessalltherequirementsfor itsexercisearefulfilledbecauseof: 1.Thedangerofexercisingthefunction,inviewofpossibleconsequencesforothersstemmingalso fromconstitutionalroots. 2.Comparativefinalityofthoseconsequences. 3.Considerationduetothejudgmentoftheotherrepositoriesofconstitutionalpowerconcerningthe scopeoftheirauthorities. 4.Necessityforeachtokeepwithinitsownpower. 5.Inherentlimitationsofthejudicialprocessitslargelynegativecharacter,anditslimitedresourcesfor enforcement. 6.Withalinparamountimportanceofconstitutionaladjudication. Thus, the following must be avoided: (i) political questions, (ii) advisory opinions, (iii) moot and academicissues,and(iv)nostanding.

PoliticalQuestion Anissueisapoliticalquestionwhenitdoesnotdealwiththeinterpretationofalawanditsapplication toacase,butwiththeverywisdomofthelawitself.Whenajudgeattemptstoresolveapoliticalquestion,heis notexercisingajudicialfunction,butisrathersupplantinghisconsciencetothatofthepoliticalbranchofthe government. Bakerv.Carr,369US186(1962)hasattemptedtoformulatesomeguidelinesfordeterminingwhethera questionispoliticalornot.

Prominentonthesurfaceofanycaseheldtoinvolveapoliticalquestionisfoundatextually demonstrableconstitutionalcommitmentoftheissuetoapoliticaldepartment;oralackofjudicially discoverableandmanageablestandardsforresolvingit;ortheimpossibilityofdecidingwithoutaninitial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertakingindependentresolutionwithoutexpressinglackoftherespectduecoordinatebranchesof government;oranunusualneedforunequestioningadherencetoapoliticaldecisionalreadymade,orthe potentiality of embarrassment from multafarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

AdvisoryOpinion A case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no actual case and controversy that demands constitutionalconstructionforitsresolution.Thismaytaketheformofdeclaratoryrelief.Itisnotwiseforthe courttoengageinanadvisoryopinionbecause: a)Thisonlyleads todialectics, toabstract legal arguments and sterile conclusions (Laurel quoting

Frankfurter) b)Thejudicialfunctionisimpoverishedsinceitthrivesonfactsthatdrawoutthemeaningofthelaw. Mootness Acasebecomesmootwhentherearefacts,injuriesandheatedargumentsbutforsomereasonthelegal problemhasbecomestale. Whenacaseismootandacademic,itceasestobeacaseandcontroversy. Any decisionreachedbythecourtwouldnotbeconclusiveontheparties. Exceptionstomootness: 1)Ifthequestioniscapableofrepetitionandevasiveofreview. 2)Ifthereexitsamerepossibilityofcollaterallegalconsequencesifthecourtdoesnotact. 3)Voluntarycessationfromthewrongfulactbythedefendant,ifheisfreetoreturntohisoldways. Ripeness Aconstitutionalquestionmaycometothecourteithertooearlyorprematurely,sothatitisstillabstract (advisoryopinion),ortoolate,sothatthecourt'sdecisionwouldnolongeraffecttheparties(mootness).The courtmustresolveconstitutionalissuesonlywhentheycometoitattherighttime(ripeness). NoStanding Apartyhasastandinginacaseifhisinterestissuchthathestandstobebenefitedifthecaseisresolved inhisfavor,andhestandtobereallyinjuredifitisdecidedagainsthim. Standing is established by two nexuses: the party's status and the type of legislative act being questioned,orhisstatusandtheprecisenatureoftheconstitutionalinfringement. The test of standing is whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversyastoassuresuchconcreteadversenesswhichsharpensthepresentationofissuesuponwhichthe courtsolargelydependsforilluminationofdifficultconstitutionalquestions(BakervCarr,supra.) Apersonhasstandingtochallengethegovernmentalactonlyifhehasapersonalandsubstantialinterest inthecasesuchthathehassustained,orwillsustain,directinjuryasaresultotitsenforcement.(Peoplev.Vera, infra.) PhilippinePractice InreSaturninaBermudez(145SCRA160,1986) TheactionwasfordeclaratoryrelieftointerpretSection5ofArt.XVIII,whichprovidesthat:Thesix yeartermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresidentelectedinthe7February1986election,isforpurposes ofsynchronizationofelection,herebyextendedtonoonof30June1991.Thequestionwaswhothe"incumbent

President" referred to in said provision was whether Aquino (the one in office) or Marcos (the one proclaimedbytheBatasan).TheconfusionarosebecauseinProclamationNo.3,Pres.Aquinoreferredtothe "directexerciseofthepoweroftheFilipinopeopleassistedbytheunitsofthenewAFP"asthecauseforthe installationofthenewgovernment.IfPresidentAquinowasnotelectedbutcameintoofficeasaresultofthe EDSARevolution,theshewouldnotbethe"incumbent"whowaselectedintheFebruary7election,referredto intheprovision. TheSCruledthat(a)thepetitionerhadnostanding,(b)theSChadnojurisdictionoverpetitionsfor declaratoryrelief,c)thesuitwasagainstthePresidentwhocannotbesued,d)thepetitionerhadnocauseof actionbecause,reiteratingthedecisioninLawyer'sLeagueforaBetterPhilippinesvAquino,thelegitimacyof theAquinogovernmentisnotajusticiablematterbutisapoliticalquestion. Andyet,theSCruledthatthe"incumbent" referredtowasPresidentAquinowhowasineffective controlofthecountryandhadbeenrecognizedbytherestoftheworld. (The Court, disregarding the limits of judicial review, felt compelled to render a decision on the legitimacyoftheAquinogovernmentsoastoavoidanydoubtastoitsveryownlegitimacy.Itmustbenoted, thoughthathiscaseistheentitlementofanactualcaseandcontroversy.) DumlaovCOMELEC(95SCRA392) Section4ofBP52providedthatanyretiredelectivelocalofficialwhohadreceivedretirementpayto whichhewasentitledunderthelawandwhohavebeen65yearsoldatthecommencementofthetermofoffice towhichhesoughttobeelected,wasnotqualifiedtorunforthesameelectivelocalofficefromwhichhehad retired. Dumlaofiledforprohibitiontoenjointheenforcementofthelaw,claimingthatthiswasdirectedathim asformergovernorofNuevaVizcaya. TheSCheldthat(a)hehadnostanding,sincehehadnotbeeninjuredbytheoperationofthelaw,no petitionforhisdisqualificationhavingbeenfiledand(b)theactionwasarequestforadvisoryopinion.Andyet, theSCupheldthevalidity"becauseofparamountpublicinterest",declaringthatthelegislativepurposeof infusingyoungerbloodinlocalgovernmentwasvalid.Adapted. IgotvCOMELEC(95SCRA392) Sec.4ofBP52alsoprovidedinpartthatanypersonconvictedofsubversion,insurrectionorrebellion, orsimilaroffenseswasdisqualifiedfromrunningforanylocalposition,andthefilingofchargesforsuchcrimes beforeacivilormilitarycourtafterpreliminaryinvestigationwasprimafacieevidenceofsuchfact.Igotsought toquestionthevalidityofthisprovision. TheSCheldthathehadnostandingbecause(a)hehadneverbeenconvictednorchargedofanythese crimes,(b)hehadnotbeendisqualifiedfrombeingacandidate,(c)hehadnopersonalnorsubstantialinterestat stake,and(d)hecouldnotsueastaxpayersincethestatutedidnotdirectlyinvolvethedisbursementofpublic funds.

Andyet,althoughabstainingfromrulingonthefirstpartoftheprovision,theSCheldthatthesecond partregardingthepresumptionofguiltwasunconstitutionalforviolatingthepresumptionofinnocence.

PoliticalQuestions In PBAvCOMELEC,140SCRA455,weseeareversalofjudicialreview. Thecasewasclearlya justiciable controversy. Is the resignation submitted by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election, proclamationandassumptionintoofficebytheelectedPresident,avalidresignationastoauthorizetheBatasan topassaSnapElectionLaw?TheCourtcouldhavevalidlyissuedaninjunctiontostoptheCOMELECfrom proceedingwiththepreparationsfortheelection.Butitdidnot,citingitsdelayindecidingthecaseandthe sentimentsofthepeoplethatdevelopedinthemeantimeasreasonforitsinaction.Accordingtothecourt,what atfirstwasalegalquestionbecameapoliticalquestionbecauseitwasovertakenbyevents. VV:ACourtwhichdoesnotissueaninjunctiontoenjoinanofficialactwhenitcouldhaveissuedone isactuallydecidingthecaseinfavorofthevalidityoftheact. Failuretoissueaninjunctionisasmuchan exerciseofjudicialreview. InRomulovYniguez,infra,weseeanothertrendofjudicialreview.Whatseemslikealegalquestion when viewed in isolation (namely, whether the rules of the Batasan enabling it to shelf a complaint for impeachmentagainstthePresidentisconstitutional.)isreallyapoliticalquestionwhenviewedinabroader context(i.e.,thatthecasewasfiledagainsttheSpeakerofacoequalbranchtocompelhimbymandamusto recallthecomplaintfromthearchive,andthattheultimateresultofthecasewastoquestionthedecisionofthe Batasantoshelvethecase,amatter,thatissolelycommittedtothatdepartment.) Yet,despitethereallypoliticalnatureofthequestion,theSCpassedonthevalidityoftherulestoerase doubtsthatmaystillbeentertained.

C.FunctionsofJudicialReview 1.CheckinginvalidatingalaworanexecutiveactthatisfoundtobecontrarytotheConstitution. 2.Legitimating(legitimizing)upholdingthevalidityofthelawwhichresultsfromameredismissalofacase challengingthevalidityofthatlaw. WhentheCourtexercisesthisfunction,itusesthedoublenegativebydeclaringthatthelawis"not unconstitutional".Thisisnomeresemantics.TheCourtcannotdeclarethelawconstitutionalforitenjoysthe presumption of constitutionality, so that a declaration to that effect by the court would not make it more constitutional.Ontheotherhand,anyonewhochallengesthevalidityofalawhastheburdenofprooftoshow

itsinvalidity.Declaringthatthelawisnotunconstitutionalistantamounttosayingthatthechallengerhasnot mettheburdenrequired.

LegitimatingandCheckingAspectsofJudicialReview.DismissalofChallengetoaLaw'sValidityLegitimizes it. InOccenavCOMELEC,104SCRA1(1981),whichsoughtaninjunctiontoprohibittheCOMELEC fromproceedingwiththeplebiscitefortheproposed1981amendments,andinMitravCOMELEC,104SCRA 59 (1981), which sought a mandamus to compel the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to ratify the 1973 Constitution,bothprayersbasedonthepremisethatthe1973Constitutionhadnotbeenratified,theSCheldthat thefailureoftheCourtintheJavellanavExecutiveSecretarycasetomusterthevotesrequiredtodeclarethe 1973Constitutionasbeinginvalidlyratified,whichresultedinthedismissalofthesuitquestioningthevalidity oftheratificationoftheConstitution,ineffectlegitimatedtheratification.InOccena,theCourtruledthat:
"TheSupremeCourtcancheckaswellaslegitimate.Inthelattercase,thereisanaffirmation thatwhatwasdonecannotbestigmatizedasconstitutionallydeficient.Themeredismissalofasuitof thischaractersuffices. ThatisthemeaningoftheconcludingstatementintheJavellanaresolution. Sincethen,theCourthasinvariablyappliedthepresentConstitution."

3. Symbolic toeducatethebenchandbarastothecontrollingprinciplesandconceptsonmattersofgreat publicimportance. Symbolic Function of Supreme Court toGive Guidelines to Bench and Bar in Cases which are Moot and Academic. In SalongavCruzPano,134SCRA438(1985),thecaseagainstpetitionerforsubversionwhichwas filed bythe fiscal onthe basis of flimsy testimonygiven by VictorLovely wasalready dismissed without prejudicebythefiscal(uponanticipationofadverseruling).Andyet,theSCnotingthatasthefiscalsaidthe dismissalofthechargeswaswithoutprejudicetothefilingofnewonesforthesameactsbecausethepetitioner hasnotbeenarraignedanddoublejeopardydoesnotapply,thecaseisnotentirelymoot,decidedtoperformits dutyto"formulateguidingandcontrollingconstitutionalprinciples,preceptsanddoctrines orrules"forthe guidanceofthebarandbench.Itthus,wentontolectureaboutitsantiquatedunderstandingoftheincitingtest, andhowitcouldnotbeprovedbyamerephotograph. InJaviervCOMELEC,144SCRA194(1986),thecasewasalreadymootednotonlybythedeathof EvelioJavier,butalsobytheabolitionofBatasan,theAntiqueseatwhichheandPacificadorwerecontesting for.AndyettheSC,claimingtobe"notonlythehighestarbiteroflegalquestionsbutalsotheconscienceofthe government,"decidedthecaseanyway"fortheguidanceofandasarestraintuponthefuture.Thecitizencomes tousinquestoflawbutwemustalsogivehimjustice.The2arenotalwaysthesame.Therearetimeswhenwe cannotgrantthelatterbec.theissuehasbeensettledandthedecisionisnolongerpossibleaccordingtothelaw. Buttherearealsotimeswhenalthoughthedisputehasdisappeared,asinthiscase,itneverthelesscriesouttobe resolved.Justicedemandsthatweactthen,notonlyforthevindicationoftheoutragedright,thoughgone,but

alsofortheguidanceofandasarestraintuponthefuture." InDemeteriavAlba,148SCRA208,theSCstruckdownSec.44ofPD1177,authorizingthePresident totransferfundsfromonedepartmenttoanother,onthegroundthatitoverextendedtheprivilegegrantedunder Art.VIII,sec.16(5)ofthe1973Constitution,evenifsuchprovisionwasalreadyabrogatedbytheFreedom Constitution.Then,citingtheJaviercaseontheneed"notonlyforthevindicationofanoutragedright,though gone,butalsofortheguidanceofandasarestraintuponthefuture,"itlecturedonhowthislawwouldopenthe floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffusion of accountabilityforbudgetaryperformance,andentrenchmentoftheporkbarrelsystem,andonhowthiswould createtemptationsformisappropriationandembezzlement.

Allcourtscanexercisejudicialreview Art.VIII,Sec.5(2).TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers: xxx (2)Review,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmonappealorcertiorariasthelawortheRulesof Courtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin: (a)Allcasesinwhichtheconstitutionality orvalidity ofany treaty,internationalor executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (b)Allcasesinvolvingthelegalityofanytax,impost,assessment,ortoll,oranypenaltyimposed inrelationthereto. (c)Allcasesinwhichthejurisdictionofanylowercourtisinissue. (d)Allcriminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaorhigher. (e)Allcasesinwhichonlyanerrororquestionoflawisinvolved.

ThereviewpoweroftheSCimpliesthatithasappellatejurisdiction overfinaljudgments oflower courtsoncaseswithconstitutionalissues. Ifso,inferiorcourtshaveoriginaljurisdictionoverconstitutional casesalthoughtheydecidethecaseonlyatfirstinstance,theirdecisionbeingalwaysreviewablebytheSC. Thus,forinstanceanRTCcanruleontheconstitutionalityoftheAntiSubversionLaw. InJ.M.Tuason&Co.vCA,3SCRA696(1961),RA2616,whichprovidedfortheexpropriationofthe TatalonEstate,wasclaimedtobeunconstitutional.ThisissuesaidtheSC,couldberesolvedbytheCFIinthe ejectmentcasefiledbeforeitbytheevicteesoftheestate,sincethe1935Constitutioncontemplatedthatinferior courtsshouldhavejurisdictionincasesinvolvingconstitutionalityissues,thatitspokeofappellatereviewof "finaljudgmentofinferiorcourts"incaseswheresuchconstitutionalityhappenstobeinissue.The2/3voteof theSCrequiredbySec.10ofArt.VIIrestrictedthedecisionsofthatCourtonlyintheexerciseofitsappellate jurisdiction. InYnotvIAC,148SCRA659,theSCreversedtheRTC'sholdingthatithadnoauthoritytoruleonthe validityofEO626A,banningthetransportingofcarabaosfromoneprovincetoanother. TheCourtpointed out,thatsinceithasjurisdictiontoreview,revise,reverse,modifyoraffirmfinaljudgmentsoflowercourtsin

constitutionalcases,thenthelowercourtscanpassuponthevalidityofastatuteinthefirstinstance. TheSCthenstruckdownthelawforbeingarbitraryandforundulydelegatinglegislativepower.

C.EffectofaDeclarationofUnconstitutionality CivilCode,Art.7. Article7.xxx WhenthecourtsdeclarealawtobeinconsistentwiththeConstitution,theformershallbevoid andthelattershallgovern. xxx Theeffectofadeclarationthatalawisunconstitutionalistomakethelaweithervoidorvoidable. Itisvoidifonitsface,itdoesnotenjoyanypresumptionofvalidity. Assuch,itproducesnoeffect whatsoever,createsnorightoroffice,itimposesnoduty.Whateverpenaltywaspaidduringtheperiodofits operationmustberemitted. AnexampleisBP52inIgotvCOMELECcase,supra,providingthatanyonewhohasbeenchargedof rebellion,etc.isprimafaciepresumedtobedisqualifiedfromrunningforalocalpost.Onitsface,itblatantly goesagainsttheconstitutionalpresumptionofinnocence. Anotherexampleisalawimposingpriorrestraintwhichis,accordingtoSullivanvBantamBooks,and USvNewYorkTimes,presumptivelyunconstitutional. Butalawdeclaredunconstitutionalisonlyvoidableif,onitsface,itenjoysthepresumptionofvalidity. In this case, it becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. And even so, the invalidationproducesnoretroactiveeffect,sinceitwouldbeunjusttoholdthatthelawdidnotproduceany effectatallpriortoitsnullification.Fromthetimethelawwaspromulgatedtothetimeitwasdeclaredinvalid, peoplewouldhaveenteredintovarioustransactionsandrelations,expectingandinfactcompelledtopresume thatthelawisvalid.Thus,tonowholdthatthelawneverproducedanyeffectwouldpenalizethosewhoinfaith believed the laws passed by their representatives to be in accordance with their solemn duty under the Constitution. AsthecourtputitinChicotCountyDistrictvBaxterStateBank,thepastcannotalwaysbeerased,so thatstatementsofprincipleofabsoluteretroactivityisnotacceptableinallcases.Saidthecourt,
"[T]heactualexistenceofastatute,priortosuchdetermination,isanoperativefact,andmay haveconsequenceswhichcannotjustlybeignored.Thepastcannotalwaysbeerasedbyanewjudicial declaration. Theeffectofthesubsequentrulingastoinvaliditymayhavetobeconsideredinvarious aspectswithrespecttoparticularrelations,individualandcorporate,andparticularconduct,privateand official.xxx"

ThecaseofSerranodeAgbayanivPNB,38SCRA429(1971)isinpoint. In1939,AgbayaniborrowedP450fromPNBsecuredbyarealtymortgage.In1944,theloanmatured butPNBcouldnotcollectbecauseitwasatthistimeofthewar.In1945,Pres.OsmenaissuedtheDebtMorato riumLaw(EO#32),suspendingthepaymentofloansforfouryearsduetotheravagesofwar.In1948,RA342 extendedtheDebtMoratoriumLawforanothereightyears(upto1956).In1953,however,theSCdeclaredRA 342asunconstitutionalinthecaseofRuttervEsteban.In1959,PNBfiledasuitforpaymentoftheloan.Has theactionprescribed? Ifwetaketheorthodoxview,theactionhasprescribed,sincethedeclarationof RA342asuncon stitutionalretroactedto1945whenEO32wasfirstissued.Between1944whentheloanmaturedand1959,when PNBcollectedtheloan,15yearshadelapsed. [TheorthodoxviewwasannouncedbyMr.J.Field,inthecaseofNortonvs.ShelbyCountywherethe courtheldthat:
"xxx.Anunconstitutionalactisnotalaw;itconfersnorights;itimposesnoduties;itaffordsno protection;itcreatesnooffice;itis,inlegalcontemplation,inoperative,asifithadnotbeenpassed.]

Butifwetaketheunorthodoxview,astheSCdid,theactioncouldstillprosper.Theperiodfrom1945 whenthelawwaspromulgated,to1953whenitwasdeclaredunconstitutionalshouldnotbecountedforthe purposeofprescriptionsincetheDebtMoratoriumLawwasoperativeduringthistime.Ineffect,only7years hadelapsed(194445,195359). Indeed,itwouldbeunjusttopunishthecreditorwhocouldnotcollectpriorto1953becausetheDebt MoratoriumLawwaseffective,onlytobetoldlaterthathisrespectforanapparentlyvalidlawmadehimlose hisrighttocollect. Art.7oftheCivilCodewhichprovidesthat,"Whenthecourtsdeclarealawtobeinconsistentwiththe Constitution,theformershallbevoidandthelattershallgovern."seemstobetheorthodoxviewonthematter.

CONSTITUTIONALLAW ________________ PARTONE

THEPHILIPPINESASASTATE

I.Statedefined. CIRvCamposRueda,42SCRA23(1971). A State isapoliticallyorganizedsovereigncommunity, independentofoutsidecontrol,boundbytiesofnationhood,legallysupremewithinitsterritory,andacting throughgovernmentfunctioningunderaregimeoflaw. Astateisacommunityofpersons,moreorlessnumerous,permanentlyoccupyingafixedterritoryand possessedofanindependentgovernmentorganizedforpoliticalendstowhichthegreatbodyofinhabitants renderhabitualobedience.(Prof.SamiloBarlongayquotingGarner,IntroductiontoPoliticalLaw,41.) Theelementsofastateare:territory,people,sovereignty,government. PeoplereferssimplytotheinhabitantsoftheState. TerritoryisthefixedportionofthesurfaceoftheearthinhabitedbythepeopleoftheState. GovernmentistheagencyorinstrumentalitythroughwhichthewilloftheStateisformulated,expressed andrealized. SovereigntyisthesupremeanduncontrollablepowerinherentinaStatebywhichthatStateisgoverned.

II.ComponentsofthePhilippineState A.TerritoryTheArchipelagoConcept Art.I.ThenationalterritorycomprisesthePhilippinearchipelago,withalltheislandsandwaters embracedtherein,andallotherterritories overwhichthePhilippines hassovereigntyorjurisdiction, consistingofitsterrestrial,fluvial,andaerialdomains,includingitsterritorialsea,theseabed,thesubsoil, theinsularshelves,andothersubmarineareas.Thewatersaround,between,andconnectingtheislands ofthearchipelago,regardlessoftheirbreadthanddimensions,formpartoftheinternalwatersofthe Philippines. Inshort,thePhilippineterritoryconsistsof:(1)thePhilippinearchipelago,and(2)allterritoriesover whichthePhilippineshassovereigntyorjurisdiction. Ofalltheconstitutionsintheworld,probablyonlythePhilippineshasadefinitionofitsterritory.At firstglance,thisisuselesssinceone'sterritoryunderInternationalLawisdefinednotbyone'sselfserving claimsastowhatitcovers,butbyinternationaltreatiesandcustoms.Historically,however,thisdefinitionhada

validpurpose. The1935ConstitutionneededtodefinePhilippineterritoryinordertopreventitsdismembermentby theUS.Since,pursuanttotheTydingsMcDuffieAct,thedraftoftheConstitutionwastobesubmittedtotheUS Presidentforapproval,definingthenationalterritorywasawayofmakingtheUSacknowledgeitsextentand (to)respectitsintegrity. The1973Constitutionneededadefinitionofnationalterritoryinordertolayclaimto Sabah.TheclaimwasoriginallymadebyPresidentMacapagal.Sabahwasoneoftheterritoriesbelongingto thePhilippines byhistoricrightandlegaltitle. President Marcos,in1977on theoccasion ofan ASEAN MinisterialMeetinginSingaporeannouncedthatthePhilippineswaswillingtodropitsclaimsoverSabah; nothingwasdone,howevertoamendtheConstitution. The1987Constitutionchangedthephraseologyinto:"allotherterritoriesoverwhichthePhilippineshas sovereigntyorjurisdiction."Insochanging,therationalewastoremoveanyirritanttoourrelationswiththe Malaysiabroughtaboutbythe1973formulationbutwithoutrenouncingtheclaimatthesametime.Anyway,if the Philippines has theright over Sabah under International Law,itpossesses thatright with orwithout a Constitution,theConstitutionbeingmerelyamunicipallawwhichdoesnotbindotherstates. The 1987 Constitution, therefore, contains a definition of national territory so as not to give an impressionthatthePhilippinesisabandoningitsclaimoverSabah.Removingsuchadefinitionwouldamount todroppingtheclaimaltogether,afactnotfortheCommissionerstodecide.

1.ThePhilippineArchipelago a.Treatylimits 1.TreatyofParisof10December1898. Article 3 defines the metes and bounds of the archipelago by longitude and latitude, degrees and seconds.Technicaldescriptionsaremadeofthescopeofthearchipelagoasthismaybefoundonthesurfaceof theearth.

2.TreatyofWashingtonof7November1900betweentheUnitedStatesandSpain. CedingCagayan,SibutoandSulu.

3.Treatyof2January1930betweentheUnitedStatesandGreatBritain.

CedingtheTurtleandMangseeIslands.

b.Methodofdeterminingthebaselines 1.RA3046(17June1961) DetermineappropriatepointsoftheoutermostIslandsofthearchipelago,thenconnectthembymeans ofastraightlineuntilallislandsaresurroundedorenclosedbytheimaginarystraightlines. "ThebaselinesfromwhichtheterritorialseaofthePhilippinesisdeterminedconsistofstraight linesjoiningappropriatepointsoftheoutermostislandsofthearchipelago."(fifthwhereasclause.)

2. RA 5446 (8 September 1968). Sec. 2 of the Act provides that the definition of the territorialseaofthePhilippineArchipelagoasprovidedinthisActiswithoutprejudicetothedelineationofthe baselinesoftheterritorialseaaroundtheterritoryofSabah,situatedinNorthBorneo,overwhichtheRepublic ofthePhilippineshasacquireddominionandsovereignty. Usesofthebaseline: a.Determinewhatisinternalwater(allwatersinsidethebaseline,whetherornotmorethan12miles fromtheshore). b.Determinethe200mileEEZ. c.ArchipelagicDoctrine Thebasicconceptofanarchipelagoisthatbodyofwaterstuddedwithislands,ortheislandssurrounded withwater,isviewedasaunityofislands and waters togetherformingone unit. Thisisincontrasttoa continentwhichisasinglemassofland. Themainpurposeofthearchipelagicdoctrineistoprotecttheterritorialinterestsofanarchipelago.If wefollowtheoldruleofinternationallaw,itispossiblethatbetweenislands,e.g.BoholandSiquijor,duetothe morethan24miledistancebetweenthe2islands,theremaybehighseas.Thus,foreignvesselsmayjustenter anytimeatwill,posingdangertothesecurityoftheState.Accordingtothedoctrine,eventhesebodiesofwater withinthebaseline, regardlessofbreadth,formpartofthearchipelago andarethusconsidered asinternal waters. The archipelagic doctine has a twofold purpose: (1) economic reasons; (2) national security. (Barlongay.) Thearchipelagicdoctrineistheprinciplethatitisanintegratedunit;everythingwithinitcomprisesthe archipelago.(ibid.)

TheConstitutionalprovisionsembodyingthisdoctrineare: 1."archipelago,withalltheislandandwatersembracedtherein" Anarchipelagoisabodyofwater,studdedwithislands. 2."thewatersaround,between,andconnectingtheislandsofthearchipelago,regardlessofthebreadth anddimensions,formpartofinternalwater" Thefollowingprovisionsarereallysuperfluous: 1."terrestrial,fluvialandaerialdomains" (becauseland,waterandairspacealreadyformpartofanarchipelago) 2."territorialsea,seabed,subsoil,insularshelves,othersubmarineareas" "Territorialsea"meanswateroutsidethebaselineextendingupto12miles. "Internalwater"referstowaterwithinthebaseline. "Insularshelf"meansthelandwhichissubmergedunderwaterwhichmayextendbeyond12milesas longasitisnotmorethan300ft.deep.Itisalsoknownasintercontinentalshelf.(Barlongay.)

2.OtherterritoriesoverwhichthePhilippineshassovereigntyorjurisdiction PD1596(11June1978) ClaimstheKalayaanGroupofIslandsaspartofPhilippineterritoryonthebasisofhistoricrightsand legaltitle. Theclaimwasmade"byreasonofhistory,indispensableneed,andeffectiveoccupationandcontrol establishedinaccordancewithinternationallaw.xxx"

3.Theterritorialsea,theseabed,thesubsoil,theinsularshelvesandothersubmarineareas

4.ExclusiveEconomicZone PD1599(11June1978). Thereisestablishedanexclusiveeconomiczoneextending"toadistanceof twohundrednauticalmilesbeyondandfromthebaselinesfromwhichtheterritorialseaismeasured.Provided,

That,wheretheouterlimitsofthezoneasthusdeterminedoverlaptheexclusiveeconomiczoneofanadjacent orneighboringstate,thecommonboundariesshallbedeterminedbyagreementwiththestateconcernedorin accordancewithpertinentgenerallyrecognizedprinciplesorinternationallawondelimitation."(Sec.1thereof.) Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to navigations and overflight,thelayingofsubmarinecablesandpipelines,andotherinternationallylawfulusesofthesearelating tonavigationandcommunications.(Sec.4thereof.)

Purposes: 1.Sovereignrightstoexplore,exploit,conserveandmanagethenaturalresources,livingornonliving, renewableornonrenewableoftheseabed,subsoil,andsuperadjacentwaters. Economicexploitationandexplorationoftheresourcesofthezonesuchastheproductionofenergy fromthewater,currentsandwinds. 2.Exclusiverightsandjurisdictionwithrepecttotheestablishmentandutilizationofartificialislands, offshore terminals, installations and structures; the preservation of the marine environment, including the preventionandcontrolofpollutionandscientificresearch. 3.Suchotherrightsasarerecognizedbyinternationallaw. Otherstatesareprohibitedfromusingthezoneto: 1.Exploreorexploitanyresources; 2.Carryoutanysearch,excavationordrillingoperations; 3.Conductanyresearch; 4.Constructoroperateanyartificialisland,offshoreterminal,installation,orotherstructure; 5.Performanyactivitywhichiscontraryto,orinderogationof,thesovereignrightsandjurisdiction hereinprovided. Otherstatesareallowedtousethezonefor: 1.Navigationandoverflight; 2.Layingofsubmarinecableandpipelines; 3.Otherlawfulusesrelatedtonavigationandcommunication.

IncaseofoverlappingofEEZs,thecommonboundariesaretobedeteminedby(i)agreementand(ii) internationalrulesondelimitations.

UNConventionontheLawoftheSea(30April1982.) Theexclusiveeconomiczonewhichshallnotextendbeyond200nauticalmilesfrombaselinesfrom whichthebreadthoftheterritorialseaismeasured,isrecognizedintheUNCLOS,ofwhichthePhilippinesisa signatory.Itsconceptisthatalthoughitisnotpartoftheterritory,exclusiveeconomicbenefitisreservedfor thecountry.

B.People 1.Threemeaningsoftheword"People" Theword"people"isusedinatleastthreesensesintheConstitution: a."People"asInhabitants Art.XIII,Section1.TheCongressshallgivehighestprioritytotheenactmentofmeasuresthat protectandenhancetherightofallthe people tohumandignity,reducesocial,economic,andpolitical inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the commongood. Art.II,Section15.TheStateshallprotectandpromotetherighttohealthofthepeopleandinstill healthconsciousnessamongthem. Section16.TheStateshallprotectandadvancetherightofthepeopletoabalancedandhealthful ecologyinaccordwiththerhythmandharmonyofnature. Art.III,Section2.Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papers,andeffects againstunreasonablesearchesandseizuresofwhatevernatureandforanypurposeshallbeinviolable, xxx QuaCheeGanvDeportationBoard,9SCRA27(1963), infra. Therightoftheanindividualtobe secureinhispersonisguaranteedbytheConstitution.UnderourConstitution,thesameisdeclaredapopular rightofthepeopleand,ofcourse,indisputablyappliestobothcitizensandforeignersinthiscountry.

b.PeopleasCitizens

Preamble.We,thesovereignFilipinopeopleimploringtheaidofAlmightyGod,inordertobuilda just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posteritythe blessings of independence anddemocracy under therule of lawanda regime of truth, justice,freedom,love,equalityandpeace,doordainandpromulgatethisConstitution. Art.II,Sec.1.ThePhilippinesisademocraticandrepublicanState.Sovereigntyresidesinthe peopleandallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem. Art. II, Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The GovernmentmaycalluponthepeopletodefendtheStateand,inthefulfillmentthereof,all"citizens"may berequiredtorenderpersonalmilitaryorcivilservice. Art.III,Sec.7.Therightofthepeopletoinformationonmattersofpublicconcernshallberecog nized.Accesstoofficialrecords,andtodocuments,andpaperspertinenttoofficialacts,transactions,or decisions,aswellastogovernmentresearchdatausedasbasisforpolicydevelopment,shallbeafforded thecitizenssubjecttolimitationsprovidedbylaw.

c.PeopleasElectors Art.VII,Sec.4. ThePresidentandVicePresidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthe people xxx. Art.XVI,Sec.2.TheCongressmay,bylaw,adoptanewnameforthecountry,anationalanthem, oranationalseal,whichshallallbetrulyreflectiveandsymbolicoftheideals,history,andtraditionsof thepeople.Suchlawshalltakeeffectonlyuponitsratificationbythepeopleinanationalreferendum. Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between Republic of the PhilippinesandUnitedStatesofAmericaconcerningMilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,or facilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippinesexceptunderatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenateand, whenCongressrequires,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythe people inanationalreferendum heldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingparty. 2.Citizenship a.Whoarecitizens Art.IV,Sec.1.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines: 1)ThosewhoarecitizenofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionoftheConstitution; 2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines; 3)ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973,ofFilipinomothers,whoelectPhilippinecitizenshipupon

reachingtheageofmajority;and 4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.

Thesecitizensareclassifiableinto(i)naturalborncitizens(covering#'s1,2,and3)and(ii)naturalized citizens(covering#4).

b.ElectionofPhilippinecitizenship
Com.ActNo.625 (June7,1941.) ANACTPROVIDINGTHEMANNERINWHICHTHEOPTIONTO ELECT PHILIPPINECITIZENSHIPSHALLBEDECLAREDBYAPERSONWHOSEMOTHERISAFILIPINOCITIZEN

Section1.TheoptiontoelectPhilippinecitizenshipinaccordancewithsubsection(4),section1,ArticleIV [1935Constitution:ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesand,uponreachingtheageofmajority, electPhilippinecitizenship]shallbeexpressedinastatementtobesignedandsworntobythepartyconcerned beforeanyofficerauthorizedtoadministeroaths,andshallbefiledwiththenearestcivilregistry.Thesaidparty shallaccompanytheaforesaidstatementwiththeoathofallegiancetotheConstitutionandtheGovernmentofthe Philippines. Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the statement herein authorized before any officer of the Government of the United States (now officials of Philippine Embassy or Consulate)authorizedtoadministeroaths,andheshallforwardsuchstatementtogetherwithhisoathofallegiance, totheCivilRegistryofManila.

Note:Therightofelectionpermittedunderthe1987ConstitutionisavailableonlytothoseborntoFilipino mothersunderthe1935Constitutionwho,hadthatcharternotbeenchanged,wouldhavebeenabletoelect Philippinecitizenshipuponattainingmajorityage.ThatrightisretainedforthemunderArticleIV,Section1 (3). Obviously, election is not necessary in the case of the child to a Filipino mother under the present constitutionasshewouldbeconsideredaFilipinocitizenatbirth.

Cov.ElectoralTribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives,199SCRA692(1991) F: PetitionersBalingitandCoandprivaterespondentOngwereamongthecandidateswhoviedforthepositionof
representativeinthe2ndlegislativedistrictofNorthernSamarintheMay1987election.Ongwasproclaimedthewinner. PetitionersfiledelectionprotestwiththeHouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunalagainstOngontheground thatOngisnotanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippinesandnotaresidentofthe2nddistrictofSamar.HRETruledinfavor ofOng.

ISSUE:W/NOngisanaturalborncitizenastoentitlehimtorunascongressman. RULING:YES,Ongisanaturalborncitizen. Underthe1987Constitution: "Sec.1.Theff.arecitizensofthePhil.: xxx 3)Thosebornbefore17January1973,ofFilipinomothers,whoelectPhilippinecitizenshipupon reachingtheageofmajority;and 4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw. Sec. 2. Natural borncitizens arethose who arecitizens of thePhil. from birth without having to performanyacttoacquireorperfecttheircitizenship.ThosewhoelectPhil.citizenshipinaccordancewithpar. 3,Sec.1hereofshallbedeemednaturalborncitizens." TheCourtinterpretsSec.1par.3asapplyingnotonlytothosewhoelectPhil.citizenship after2 February1987butalsothosewho,havingbeenbornofFilipinomothers,electedcitizenshipbeforethatdate,as in the case of Ong. This ruling finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The provisionwasframedtocorrecttheanomaloussituationwhereonebornofaFilipinofatherandanalienmother wasautomaticallygrantedthestatusofanaturalborncitizenwhileonebornofaFilipinomotherandanalien fatherwouldstillhavetoelectPhil.citizenship.Ifonesoelected,underearlierlaws,hewasnotconferredthe statusofanaturalborncitizen. ThereisnoquestionthatOng'smotherwasanaturalbornFilipinaatthetimeofhermarriagewithJose OngChuan,aChinesewhofiledanapplicationfornaturalizationandwasgrantedone.Crucialtothiscaseis whetherornotOngelectedorchosetobeaFilipinocitizeninordertocomewithinthepurviewoftheabove quotedconstitutionalprovision. ToexpectOngtohaveformallyorinwritingelectedcitizenshipwhenhecameofageistoaskforthe unnaturalandunnecessaryforthecourtisoftheopinionthatOngwasalreadyacitizen.Notonlywashis motheranaturalborncitizenbuthisfatherhadbeennaturalizedwhentherespondentwasonlynineyearsold. Hecouldnothavedivinedwhenhecameofagethatin1973and1987,theConstitutionwouldbeamendedto requirehimtohavefiledaswornstatementin1969electingcitizenshipinspiteofhisalreadyhavingbeena citizensince1957.AnelectionofPhilippinecitizenshippresupposesthatthepersonelectingisanalienorhis statusisdoubtfulbecauseheisanationaloftwocountries.ThereisnodoubtinthiscaseaboutOng'sFilipino nationalitywhenheturned21. Therearecaseswhichdefine"election"asbothaformalandaninformalprocess.InthecaseofInRe Mallare,theCourtheldthattheexerciseoftherightofsuffrageandtheparticipation inelectionexercises constituteapositiveactofelectionofPhil.citizenship.Inthiscase,Ongdidnotmerelyexercisehisrightof suffrage.HehasestablishedhislifehereinthePhil. OngwasbornintheruraltownofSamarwheretherearenoalienenclavesandnoracialdistinctions.

Theresp.haslivedthelifeofaFilipinosincebirth.Hisfatherappliedfornaturalizationwhenthechildwasstill asmallboy.Onghasworkedinasensitivepositioninagovernmentagency. Hisprofession(CPA)requires citizenship fortakingtheexaminations andgettingalicense.Hehasparticipated inpolitical exercises asa FilipinoandhasalwaysconsideredhimselfaFilipino.Thereisnothingtoindicateanytingeofalienness.The massofvotersofN.SamararefullyawareofOng'sparentage.Theyvotedbyoverwhelmingnumberstohave himrepresenttheminCongress.Becauseofhisactssincechildhood,theyhaveconsideredhimaFilipino. TheHREThadaninterestingviewastohowOngelectedcitizenship.Itobservedthat"whenOngwas onlynineyearsold,hisfatherbecameanaturalizedFilipino.Sec.15oftheRevisedNaturalizationActsquarely appliesitsbenefittohimforhewasthenaminorresidinginthecountry.Concededly,itwasthelawitselfthat hadalreadyelectedPhil.citizenshipforOngbydeclaringhimassuch. ThepetitionerscontendthatOng'sfatherwasnotvalidlynaturalizedbecauseofhisprematuretakingof theoathofcitizenship.ThepetitionersquestionthecitizenshipofOng'sfatherthroughacollateralapproach. Thiscannotbedone.Inourjurisdiction,anattackonaperson'scitizenshipmayonlybedonethroughadirect actionforitsnullity.MRM. xxxThefilingofaswornstatementorformaldeclarationisarequirementforthosewhostillhaveto elect citizenship. FOR THOSE ALREADY FILIPINOS when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberatechoicewhichcannotbelessbinding.AnyelectionofPhilippinecitizenshiponthepartofprivatere spondentOngwouldnotonlyhavebeensuperfluousbutwouldalsohaveresultedinabsurdityconsideringthatit wasthelawitselfthathadalreadyelectedPhilippinecitizenshipforhim. Dissenting: Ong is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen, he having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinesecitizenshipofhisfatheratthetimeofhisbirth.Underthe1935Constitutionwhichwasinforceatthe timeofOng'sbirth,onlythosewhosefatherswerecitizensofthePhilippineswereconsideredFilipinocitizens. ThosewhosemotherswerecitizensofthePhilippineshadtoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheage ofmajority,inordertobeconsideredFilipinocitizens. c.Naturalborncitizens Art.IV,Section2.NaturalborncitizensarethosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirth withouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship. Thosewhoelect Philippinecitizenshipinaccordancewithparagraph(3),Section1hereofshallbedeemednaturalborn citizens.

TheprovisiongrantingnaturalbornstatuseventothosewhowerebornofFilipinomothersbefore17 January1973butelectedPhilippinecitizenshipafterthatdateismeanttocorrecttheanomaloussituationwhere onebornundersimilarcircumstancesbutmadetheelectionbefore17January1973isgrantedthestatusof naturalborncitizenbythe1973Constitution.Simplybecausetherewasnodefinitionofanaturalborncitizen underthe1935Constitution,thatonewhomadetheelectionaftertheeffectivityofthe1973Constitutionwas

notconferredsuchstatus.Thedefinitionofanaturalborncitizenunderthe1973Constitution,thereforemadea childofFilipinomotherandalienfather'srightdependsonthefleetingaccidentoftime,andresultedintwo kindsofcitizensmadeupofessentiallythesamemembers. Atthesametime,however,thosewhoelectedpriorto17January1973couldnotbeplacedinthesame footingasthosewhomadetheelectionafterthatdate,becausetheformeralreadyhada"vestedright"totheir citizenshipwhichcouldnotbediminishedbythe1973Constitution. Theremedyistoplacethelatterinthesamefootingastheformer.Thus,underthe1987Constitution, thisaccidentalanomalynolongerexists. Toillustrate: IfXwasbornandelectedbefore17January1973,hisstatusunderthe1973and1987 Constitutionsisthatofanaturalborncitizen,becausealthoughhehadtoperformanacttoperfecthisciti zenship,hecouldnototherwisebeclassifiedsincetherewasnodefinitionofnaturalborncitizensinthe1935 Constitution. IfXwasbornbeforeandelectedafter17January1973,whetherbeforeorafter2February1987,hewas notanaturalborncitizenunderthe1973Constitution.Ifnotfortheprovisointhe1987Constitution,hewould nothavebeendeemednaturalborncitizeneither. Inturnthedefinitionof"naturalborncitizen"asonewhoissuchfrom(notat)birth(continuouslyupto the time his citizenship is questioned), was raised about the citizenship of Quezon, et.al., under the 1935 Constitution. Havingthestatusofanaturalborncitizenisimportantforthepurposeofcertainpoliticalandeconomic rightsopenonlytosuchcitizens. a)Political:Qualificationtorunforthefollowingposts:

Whomustbenaturalborncitizens: (1)President Art.VII,Sec.2 (2)VicePresident Art.VII,Sec.3 (3)MembersofCongress Art.VI,Secs.3and6 (4)JusticesoftheSCandlowercollegiatecourts Art.VIII,Sec.7(1) (5)Ombudsmanandhisdeputies Art.XI,Sec.8 (6)ConstitutionalCommissions Art.IX,B,Sec.1(1) Art.IX,C,Sec.1(1) Art.IX,D,Sec.1(1) (7)MembersoftheCentralMonetaryAuthority Art,XII,Sec.20 (8)MembersoftheCHR Art.XIII,Sec.17(2) (CommissiononHumanRights)

Formernaturalborncitizensastransfereesofprivatelands. b)Economic Art. XII, Sec. 8 xxx [A]naturalborn citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenshipmaystillbeatransfereeofprivatelands,subjecttolimitationsprovidedbylaw.

Thefollowingarenaturalborncitizens: 1)Thosewhoarecitizens ofthePhilippines atthetime oftheadoption ofthisConstitution (asof2 February1987). a)ThosewhoarecitizensundertheTreatyofParis UnderArt.9oftheTreatyofParis,thecivilandpoliticalstatusoftheinhabitantsofthePhilippineswas tobedeterminedbytheUSCongress. Pursuanttothisprovisioninthetreaty,theUSCongresspassedthe PhilippineBillof1July1902, Section4ofwhichdefinedwhothecitizensofthePhilippineswere: "TheinhabitantsofthePhilippinesresidingthereinwhoweresubjectsofSpainon11April1899,and continuingtoresidetherein,aswellastheirchildrenbornsubsequentthereto." Thecutoffdateof11April1899wasthedateof"exchangeofinstrumentsofratification"betweenthe USSenateandSpain,orthedateofratificationoftheTreatyofParis. Thepeninsularesweregivenaperiodof18monthstoindicateiftheychooseFilipinoorSpanishcitizen ship,byfilingtheirelectionwiththeCFI. ThissameprovisionwasreembodiedintheJonesLawof29August1916.

b)Thosedeclaredcitizensbyjudicialdeclarationapplyingthejussoliprinciple,beforethe1957 caseofTioTiamvRepublic. InRoavCommissionerofCustoms(1912),duringtheregimeofthePhilippineBillof1902,Roa,who wasborninthePhilippinesin1889byaChinesefatherandFilipinomother,wasdeclaredbythecourttobea citizenbyjussoli. InPazChuavSecretaryofLabor(1939),duringtheregimeofthe1935Constitution,PazChuawhowas borninTarlacin1914ofChinesefatherandFilipinomother,wasnotdeclaredacitizen.TheSCheld,without alludingtotheRoacase,thatthejussoliwasneveradoptedinthePhilippines.

In TorresvTanChim(1940),Tan,whowasinthePhilippinesin1893ofChinesefatherandFilipino mother,wasdeclaredacitizen.AccordingtoJ.Laurel,theprincipleofjussolistillapplied.The1934Concon wasawareoftheRoarulinganddidnotintendtooverruleit. InTanChongvSecretaryofLaborandLamSweeSangvSecretaryofLabor(1947),acasedecided duringtheregimeoftheRepublicuponamotionforreconsiderationofaprewardecision,Tan,whowasborn in1915,andLam,whowasbornin1900,bothinthePhilippines,ofChinesefatherandFilipinomother,were notdeclaredcitizens. AccordingtoJ.Padilla,the1935Constitutionneveradoptedthe jussoli principle;the merefactofbirthinthePhilippinesdoesnotconfercitizenshiponaperson. In TalarocvUy (1950),consideringhisserviceduringthewarandhishavingbeenelectedmayorin Misamis,wasdeclaredbytheSCacitizen"simplyduetobirth",withoutmentionofjussoliorjussanguinis. Finally,in TioTamvRepublic (1957),theSCtriedtoresolvetheflipfloprulingsbystatingthatwe followonlyjussanguinisbutthatthosewhowerejudiciallydeclaredcitizensonthebasisofjussolipriortothis casewouldbeconsideredcitizens.Thisisthefinalwordonthematter. Itwouldbeworthytonotethattheflipflopindecisioncanbeexplainedbythedateofbirthofthe applicantineachcase.Thosebornbefore11April1899weretheonestowhomjussoliwasapplied,forthey verywellwerecitizensundertheTreatyofParis.

c) Those who were naturalized in accordance with law. (Act. No. 2927 of the Philippine Commission).

d)Thosewhowerecitizensunderthe1935Constitution. 1)ThosewhowerecitizensatthetimeofadoptionoftheConstitution(15November1935,thedateof theinaugurationoftheCommonwealthgovernment). 2)ThoseborninthePhilippinesofforeignparent,whobeforetheadoptionoftheConstitutionhadbeen electedtopublicofficeinthePhilippines. This is the socalled "Caram rule in honor of Caram, a Syrian, elected to the 1934 Constitutional Convention.Therulewasadoptedtoavoidtheabsurdityofthesituation. Theruleonlyappliestoelectivepositions,notappointiveones. In ChiongbianvdeLeon,theSCheldthatifoneisconsideredacitizenundertheCaramrule,his childrenwouldalsobeconsideredcitizens,butunderthethirdcategory(thosewhosefathersarecitizens) 3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.

4)ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesand,upon,reachingtheageofmajority,elected Philippinecitizenship. Itwasonlybeginning17January1973whenchildrenofFilipinomothersbecamecitizenswithoutneed ofelection. ChildrenbornbeforethisdateofFilipinomotherandalienfathershadan"inchoatecitizenship" untiltheyelecteduponreaching21years. 5)Thosenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw. e)Thosewhoarecitizensunderthe1973Constitution. 1)Thosewhoarecitizensasof17January1973,thedateofeffectivityofthe1973Constitution. 2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines. Thatis,thosebornonorafter17January1973ofFilipinofatherorFilipinomother. 3)ThosewhoelectedPhilippinecitizenshippursuanttothe1935Constitution Thatis,thosebornbefore17January1973ofFilipinomothersbutreachedtheageofmajorityand electedPhilippinecitizenshiponorafter17January1973. Notethatifonewasborn,reachedtheageofmajorityandelectedPhilippinecitizenship before17 January 1973, then he would be a citizen under e1 (those who are citizens at the adoption of the 1973 Constitution). Ontheotherhand,ifonewasborn,reached21years,butdidnotorfailedtoelectbefore17January 1973,thenhelosthiscitizenshipthen. 4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.

2.)ThosebornofFilipinofathersorFilipinomothers(after17January1973).

3.)Thosebornbefore17January1973ofFilipinomotherswhoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreaching theageofmajority. Thiscasearoseunderthe1935Constitution,childrenofFilipinomothersdidnotautomaticallybecome citizens.Theyhadan"inchoatecitizenship"duringtheirminority,andbecamefullpledgedcitizensonlyupon electionattheageofmajority.

Beginning with the 1973 Constitution, however, children of Filipino mothers automatically became citizens.Thisprovisionthencoversthosechildrenborn,beforetheeffectivityofthe1973Constitution. ByJanuary17,1994,thisprovisionwouldhavenoapplicationanymore,sincethelastofthoseborn before17January1973wouldhavereachedtheageofmajoritybythen.

CaseA:AFilipinowomanmarriedB,anAmericanin1961.ThemarriagemadeAanAmericancitizen (whichunderCA63,strippedherofherPhilippinecitizenship,themarriagehavingbeencelebratedbefore17 January1973).AandBlivedintheUSsincethenandin1962,begotC,whowasautomaticallyanAmerican citizenbyjussoliandjussanguinis. In 1983, when C turns 21, can he elect Philippine citizenship? Yes, according to obiters in Cu v Republic and VillahermosavCID,inordertoelectPhilippinecitizenship,atleastforelectionpurposes,itis enoughthat(1)theperson'smotherwasaFilipinoatthetimeofhermarriagetothealienfather,evenifshe subsequentlylosehercitizenshipbyvirtueofthemarriageand(2)thepersonbeachildofthatmarriage,forhim toelectPhilippinecitizenship. IfCwantstorunforCongress,isheconsideredanaturalbornFilipino?Underthe1973Constitution, no.Butunderthe1987Constitution,yes. Notethatifhewerebornafter17January1973,thechildwouldnotevenbeaFilipino.

d. NaturalizedCitizens,RevisedNaturalizationLaw(Com.ActNo.473,effective June17,1939.) 4.)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.(namelyCA473,RevisedNaturalizationLaw)(Art. IV,Sec.1(4)) Whoarequalifiedtobenaturalized Qualifications(Sec.2,CA473) A.Age 1)Hemustnotbelessthan21yearsoldatthedateofhearing. Barlongay:Whenthelawusesthephase"ageofmajority,"use18yearsold,butnotwhenitusesthe phrase"notlessthan21yearsold. B.Residence

2)HemusthaveresidedinthePhilippinesforacontinuousperiodofnotlessthantenyears.

C.Character 3.) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution,andmusthaveconductedhimselfinanirreproachableconductduringtheentireperiodofhis residenceinthePhilippinesinhisrelationwiththeconstitutedgovernmentaswellaswiththecommunityin whichheisliving. D.Property 4.) HemustownrealestateinthePhilippinesworthnotlessthanP5,000ormusthavesomeknown lucrativetrade,professionorlawfuloccupation. (Test:Canhesupporthimselfandhisfamily?) E.Education 5.)Mustbeabletospeakandwrite(notreadandwrite)FilipinoorEnglish,andaprincipaldialect(as protantomodifiedbythe1987Constitution,sincethelawitselfspokeofEnglishorSpanish,andaprincipal dialect).Thus,adeafandmuteisdisqualified,Orest offvRepublic .

Art.XIV,Sec.7. Forpurposesofcommunicationandinstruction,theofficiallanguagesofthe PhilippinesareFilipinoand,untilotherwiseprovidedbylaw,English. Theregionallanguagesarethe auxiliaryofficiallanguagesintheregionsandshallserveasauxiliarymediaofinstructiontherein.xxx 6.)Hemusthaveenrolledhisminorchildrenofschoolageinanyofthepublicschoolsorprivate schoolsrecognizedbytheBureauofPrivateSchoolsofthePhilippines,wherePhilippinehistory,government andcivicsaretaughtorprescribedaspartoftheschoolcurriculum,duringtheentireperiodoftheresidencein thePhilippinesrequiredofhimpriortothehearingofhispetitionfornaturalizationasPhilippinecitizen.

Whenisthetenyearresidencerequirementreducedtofive(5)years? Com.ActNo.473,sec.3.
Sec.3.Specialqualifications.TheTenyearsofcontinuousresidencerequiredunderthesecondconditionof thelastprecedingsectionshallbeunderstoodasreducedtofiveyearsforanypetitionerhavinganyofthefollowing qualifications: (1) HavinghonorablyheldofficeundertheGovernmentofthePhilippinesorunderthatofanyofthe provinces,cities,municipalities,orpoliticalsubdivisions.(whichwasallowedbeforebythe1935Constitution,no distinctionwhetherappointiveorelectiveposts.) (2)HavingestablishedanewindustryorintroducedausefulinventioninthePhilippines.. (3)BeingmarriedtoaFilipinowoman

If it were an alien woman who married a Filipino man, she would only need an administrative proceedingforthecancellationofherAlienCertificateofRegistration,uponproofofmarriageandaccordingto theholdinginMoyYamLim,proofofnondisqualification.Thesearetheonlyrequirementsbecauseipsofacto, shebecameaFilipinoherselfbymarriage.
(4) Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not establishedfortheexclusiveinstructionofchildrenofpersonsofaparticularnationalityorrace,inanyofthe branchesofeducationorindustryforaperiodofnotlessthantwoyears. (5)HavingbeenborninthePhilippines.

Whoaredisqualifiedtobenaturalized? CA473,Sec.4 Theapplicantmustnotonlypossessthequalifications,hemustnothaveanyofthedisqualificationsset bylaw.

Section4.Whoaredisqualified.ThefollowingcannotbenaturalizedasPhilippinecitizens: (a)Personsopposedtoorganizedgovernmentoraffiliatedwithanyassociationorgroupofpersonswho upholdandteachdoctrinesopposingallorganizedgovernments; (b)Personsdefendingorteachingthenecessityorproprietyofviolence,personalassault,orassassination forthesuccessandpredominanceoftheirideas; (c)Polygamists,orbelieversinthepracticeofpolygamy; (d)Personsconvictedofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude.

(Moralturpitudeinvolvesdishonesty,depravity. Apropensitytobreakthelaw,evenjusttrafficlaws, constitutemoraldepravity.Whilemurderbeingacrimeofpassiondoesnotinvolvemoralturpitude,theftand estafado.)

(e)Personssufferingfrommentalalienationorincurablecontagiousdisease; (f) Personswho,duringtheperiodoftheirresidenceinthePhilippines,havenotmingledsociallywith Filipinos,orwhohavenotevincedasinceredesiretolearnandembracethecustoms,traditions,andidealsofthe Filipinos; (g)CitizensorsubjectsofnationswithwhomthePhilippinesisatwar,duringtheperiodofsuchwar; (h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalizedcitizensorsubjectsthereof.

DeclarationofIntention Com.ActNo.473,sec.5.
Sec.5. Declarationofintention. OneyearpriortothefilingofhispetitionforadmissiontoPhilippine citizenship,theapplicantforPhilippinecitizenshipshallfilewiththeOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral,adeclaration underoaththatitisbonafidehisintentiontobecomeacitizenofthePhilippines.Suchdeclarationshallsetforth

thename,age,occupation,personaldescription,placeofbirth,lastforeignresidenceandallegiance,thedateof arrival,thenameofthevesseloraircraft,ifany,inwhichhecametothePhilippines,andtheplaceofresidencein thePhilippinesatthetimeofmakingthedeclaration.Nodeclarationshallbevaliduntillawfulentryforpermanent residencehasbeenestablishedandacertificateshowingthedate,place,andmannerofhisarrivalhasbeenissued. Thedeclarantmustalsostatethathehasenrolledhisminorchildren,ifany,inanyofthepublicschoolsorprivate schoolsrecognizedbytheBureauofPrivateSchoolsofthePhilippines,wherePhilippinehistory,governmentand civicsaretaughtorprescribedaspartoftheschoolcurriculum,duringtheentireperiodoftheresidenceinthe Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarantmustfurnishtwophotographsforhimself. Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. Persons born in the Philippinesandhavereceivedtheirprimaryandsecondaryeducationinpublicschoolsorthoserecognizedbythe Governmentandnotlimitedtoanyraceornationality,andthosewhohaveresidedcontinuouslyinthePhilippines foraperiodofthirtyyearsormorebeforefilingtheirapplication,maybenaturalizedwithouthavingtomakea declarationofintentionuponcomplyingwiththeotherrequirementsofthisAct. Tosuchrequirementsshallbe addedthatwhichestablishesthattheapplicanthasgivenprimaryandsecondaryeducationtoallhischildreninthe publicschoolsorinprivateschoolsrecognizedbytheGovernmentandnotlimitedtoanyraceornationality.The sameshallbeunderstoodapplicablewithrespecttothewidowandminorchildrenofanalienwhohasdeclaredhis intentiontobecomeacitizenofthePhilippines,anddiesbeforeheisactuallynaturalized.

If one who is not exempted, fails to file, or files an invalid declaration of intention, he can be denaturalizedanytimethroughdenaturalizationproceedings.

Procedure Com.Act.No.473,Secs.712
Section7.Petitionforcitizenship.AnypersondesiringtoacquirePhilippinecitizenshipshallfilewiththe competentcourt,apetitionintriplicate,accompaniedbytwophotographsofthepetitioner,settingforthhisname andsurname;hispresentandformerplacesofresidence;hisoccupation;theplaceanddateofhisbirth;whether singleormarriedandthefatherofchildren,thename,age,birthplaceandresidenceofthewifeandofeachofthe children;theapproximatedateofhisorherarrivalinthePhilippines,thenameoftheportofdebarkation,and,if heremembersit,thenameoftheshiponwhichhecame;adeclarationthathehasthequalificationsrequiredby thisAct,specifyingthesame,andthatheisnotdisqualifiedfornaturalizationundertheprovisionsofthisAct;that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the PhilippinesfromthedateofthefilingofthepetitionuptothetimeofhisadmissiontoPhilippinecitizenship.The petitionmustbesignedbytheapplicantinhisownhandwritingandbesupportedbytheaffidavitofatleasttwo crediblepersons,statingthattheyarecitizensofthePhilippinesandpersonallyknowthepetitionertobearesident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable,andthatsaidpetitionerhasintheiropinionallthequalificationsnecessarytobecomecitizenofthe PhilippinesandisnotinanywaydisqualifiedundertheprovisionsofthisAct.Thepetitionshallalsosetforththe namesandpostofficeaddressesofsuchwitnessesasthepetitionermaydesiretointroduceatthehearingofthe case.Thecertificateofarrival,andthedeclarationofintentionmustbemadepartofthepetition.

Section.8. Competentcourt. TheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovinceinwhichthepetitionerhas residedatleastoneyearimmediatelyprecedingthefilingofthepetitionshallhaveexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionto hearthepetition. Section9. Notificationandappearance.Immediatelyuponthefilingofapetition,itshallbethedutyof theclerkofthecourttopublishthesameatpetitioner'sexpense,onceaweekforthreeconsecutiveweeks,inthe OfficialGazette,andinoneofthenewspapersofgeneralcirculationintheprovincewherethepetitionerresides, andtohavecopiesofsaidpetitionandageneralnoticeofthehearingpostedinapublicandconspicuousplaceinhis officeorinthebuildingwheresaidofficeislocated,settingforthinsuchnoticethename,birthplaceandresidence ofthepetitioner,thedateandplaceofhisarrivalinthePhilippines,thenamesofthewitnesseswhomthepetitioner proposestointroduceinsupportofhispetition,andthedateofthehearingofthepetition,whichhearingshallnot beheldwithinninetydaysfromthedateofthelastpublicationofthenotice.Theclerkshall,assoonaspossible, forwardcopiesofthepetition,thesentence,thenaturalizationcertificate,andotherpertinentdatatotheOfficeof thePresident,theOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral,theProvincialCommanderofthePhilippineNationalPoliceofthe provinceandthemunicipaljudgeofthemunicipalitywhereinthepetitionerresides. Section.10.Hearingofthepetition.Nopetitionshallbeheardwithinthethirty(30)daysprecedingany election. The hearing shall bepublic,and theSolicitorGeneral,either himselforthrough his delegateorthe provincialfiscalconcerned,shallappearonbehalfoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesatalltheproceedingsandat thehearing. If,afterthehearing,thecourtbelieves,inviewoftheevidencetaken,thatthepetitionerhasallthe qualificationsrequiredby,andnoneofthedisqualificationsspecifiedinthisActandhascompliedwithallrequisites hereinestablished,itshallorderthepropernaturalizationcertificatetobeissuedandtheregistrationofthesaid naturalizationcertificateinthepropercivilregistryasrequiredinsectiontenofActNumberedThereethousand sevenhundredfiftythree. Section11. Appeal.Thefinalsentencemay,attheinstanceofeitheroftheparties,beappealedtothe SupremeCourt. Section12. IssuanceoftheCertificateofNaturalization.If,afterthelapseofthirtydaysfromandafter thedateonwhichthepartieswerenotifiedofthedecisionoftheCourt,noappealhasbeenfiled,orif,uponappeal, thedecisionofthecourthasbeenconfirmedbytheSupremeCourt,andthesaiddecisionhasbecomefinal,the clerkofthecourtwhichheardthepetitionshallissuetothepetitioneranaturalizationcertificatewhichshall, among other things, state the following: The file number of the petition, the number of the naturalization certificate,thesignatureofthepersonnaturalizedaffixedinthepresenceoftheclerkofthecourt,thepersonal circumstancesofthepersonnaturalized,thedatesonwhichhisdeclarationofintentionandpetitionwerefiled,the dateofthedecisiongrantingthepetition,andthenameofthejudgewhorenderedthedecision.Aphotographof thepetitionerwiththedrysealaffixedtheretoofthecourtwhich grantedthepetition, must beaffixedtothe certificate. Beforethenaturalizationcertificateisissued,thepetitionershall,inopencourt,takethefollowingoath: "I_________________________________, solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty and particularly to the ___________________________ofwhichatthistimeIamasubjectorcitizen;thatIwillsupportanddefendthe ConstitutionofthePhilippinesandthatIwillobeythelaws,legalordersanddecreespromulgatedbytheduly

constitutedauthoritiesoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesandthatIimposethisobligationuponmyselfvoluntarily withoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasion. SohelpmeGod."

a.DeclarationofintentionfiledwiththeOSGoneyearbeforeactualapplication. b.FilingofpetitionfornaturalizationwiththeRTCoftheprovinceinwhichtheapplicantisaresidentforat leastoneyear. c.Hearing,exceptwithin30daysbeforeanelection.TheStateisrepresentedbytheSolicitorGeneralorbythe fiscalinhisbehalf.Twowitnessestotestifyonthecharacteroftheapplicantarepresented. d.Decision.AppealofthedecisionoftheRTCmaybemadetoSC,pursuanttoRA530,amendingSec.17of theJudiciaryActof1948.(UnderBP129,appealistotheCA). e.Decisionbecomesfinalbutnotexecutory,thirty(30)daysafternoticeofthedecisionisreceivedbythe parties.ThenoticeofthedecisionmustbereceivedbytheOSG;copyfurnishedtothefiscalisnotsufficientto starttherunningofthe30dayperiod. Afavorabledecisionbecomesexecutoryonlyafter2yearsfromthefinalityofthedecision.Itshallbecome executoryonlyaftertheperiodof2yearsduringwhichthepetitionershallcontinuetobeunderprobation,asit were,sothegovernmentcanbedoublysureheisentitledtobenaturalizedasacitizenofthePhilippines. (RepublicAct530,Section1) f.Summaryhearingaftertwoyears,whichisreallyacontinuationofthepreviousproceedings,toprovethat: i)HedidnotleaveRPduringthe2yearperiodofprobation; ii)Hedevotedhimselftolawfulcalling; iii)Hewasnotconvictedofanyoffenseofviolationofgovernmentrules. iv)Hedidnotcommitanactprejudicialtonationalinterestorinimicaltoagovernmentannounced policy. g.OathbeforetheRTC. h.IssuanceofaCertificateofNaturalizationissuedbytheCourt. (Onlyacertificationisgivenbecausethe decisiontwoyearsbeforehasgrantedhimhiscitizenship.) i.CancellationofACRbeforetheCommissionerofImmigrationandDeportation.

"DerivativeNaturalization"(Sec.15)
"xxxAnywomanwhoisnowormayhereafterbemarriedtoacitizenofthePhilippines,andwhomight

herselfbelawfullynaturalized,shallbedeemedacitizenofthePhilippines."

Note:Initslatestpronouncementonthisquestion,theSCheldthattheclause"whomightherselfbelawfully naturalized"shouldbeinterpretedtomeanonlythatthealienwomanmustnotbelaboringunderanyofthe disqualifications prescribed by law. Moreover, she can establish her claim to Philippine citizenship in administrativeproceedingsbeforetheimmigrationauthoritiesonlyandwillnothavetofileajudicialactionfor thispurpose.Sheisnolongerrequiredtoprovethatshepossessesthequalificationsfornaturalization. Whendecisionexecutory RepublicActNo.530,sec.1
Sec.1.Theprovisionsofexistinglawsnotwithstanding,nopetitionforPhilippinecitizenshipshallbeheard bythecourtsuntilaftersixmonthsfromthepublicationoftheapplicationrequiredbylaw,norshallanydecision grantingtheapplication become executoryuntil aftertwoyearsfrom itspromulgation and after thecourt,on properhearing,withtheattendanceoftheSolicitorGeneralorhisrepresentative,issatisfied,andsofinds,that duringtheinterveningtimetheapplicanthas(1)notleftthePhilippines,(2)hasdedicatedhimselfcontinuouslytoa lawfulcallingorprofession,(3) hasnotbeenconvictedofanyoffenseorviolationofGovernmentpromulgated rules,(4)orcommittedanyactprejudicialtotheinterestofthenationorcontrarytoanyGovernmentannounced policies.

Effectonwifeandminorchildren Com.ActNo.473,sec.15.
Section15.AnywomanwhoisnowormayhereafterbemarriedtoacitizenofthePhilippines,andwho mightherselfbelawfullynaturalizedshallbedeemedacitizenofthePhilippines. Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be consideredcitizensthereof. Aforeignbornminorchild,ifdwellinginthePhilippinesatthetimeofthenaturalizationoftheparent, shallautomaticallybecomeaPhilippinecitizenandaforeignbornminorchild,whoisnotinthePhilippinesatthe timetheparentisnaturalized,shallbedeemedaPhilippinecitizenonlyduringhisminority,unlesshebeginsto residepermanentlyinthePhilippineswhenstillaminor,inwhichcase,hewillcontinuetobeaPhilippinecitizen evenafterbecomingofage. A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parents, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a PhilippinecitizenatthePhilippineConsulateofthecountrywhereheresides,andtotakethenecessaryoathof allegiance.

EffectofNaturalizationontheWife Ifthewifeis(i)legallymarriedtothenaturalizedhusband,and(ii)shedoesnotsufferfromanyofthe disqualifications in Sec. 4, she is entitled to be declared a citizen as well. What is required is only an administrativeproceedingbeforetheCIDforthecancellationofherACRonthegroundthatherhusbandhas

beenrecentlynaturalized. AccordingtoMoyaLimYao(41SCRA292)ruling,sheneednotprovethequalifications,butonlythat sheisnotdisqualified.TheproceedingsmayevenbewiththeDepartmentofNaturalResourcesinrelationtoa grantofconcessionrequiringcitizenship,wherethewifeprovesthatherhusbandhasbecomeaFilipino.

EffectofNaturalizationontheChildren I.Ifthechildisofage,noeffect. II.Ifthechildisaminor: A.IfborninRPautomaticallybecomesacitizenuponthenaturalizationofthefather. B.Ifbornabroad 1.Ifbeforethenaturalizationofthefather. a.IfresidinginRPatthetimeofnaturalizationautomaticallybecomesacitizen. b. If not residing in RP at the time of naturalization considered citizen only during his minority,unlesshetakespermanentresidenceinRPbeforereachingmajorityage.Inotherwords,hecontinues tobeaFilipinoafterreaching18yearsoldonlyifhedecidestoresideherepermanentlybeforereachingthatage. 2.IfafterthenaturalizationofthefatherConsideredcitizenontheconditionthatuponreachingthe ageofmajority,hetakesanoathofallegianceinthePhilippineconsulateoftheplacewherehemaybe.Ifhe failstoregisterhisintenttocontinueasFilipinowithinone(1)yearuponreaching21years,heceasestobea Filipinocitizen. Denaturalization Com.ActNo.473,Sec.18
Section18.Cancellationofnaturalizationcertificateissued.Uponmotionmadeintheproperproceedings bytheSolicitorGeneralorhisrepresentative,orbytheproperprovincialfiscal,thecompetentjudgemaycancelthe naturalizationcertificateissuedanditsregistrationintheCivilRegistry: (a)Ifitisshownthatsaidnaturalizationcertificatewasobtainedfraudulentlyorillegally; (b)Ifthepersonnaturalizedshall,withinthefiveyearsnextfollowingtheissuanceofsaidnaturalization certificate,returntohisnativecountryortosomeforeigncountryandestablishhispermanentresidencethere: Provided,thatthefactofthepersonnaturalizedremainingformorethanoneyearinhisnativecountryorthe countryofhisformernationality,ortwoyearsinanyotherforeigncountry,shallbeconsideredas primafacie evidenceofhisintentionoftakinguppermanentresidenceinthesame; (c)Ifthepetitionwasmadeonaninvaliddeclarationofintention; (d) Ifitisshownthattheminorchildrenofthepersonnaturalizedfailedtograduatefromapublicor private high schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines, where Philippine history,

governmentandcivicsaretaughtaspartoftheschoolcurriculum throughthefaultoftheirparentseitherby neglectingtosupportthemorbytransferringthemtoanotherschoolorschools. Acertifiedcopyofthedecree cancellingthenaturalizationcertificateshallbeforwardedbytheclerkoftheCourttotheOfficeofthePresident andtheSolicitorGeneral;

Notwhentheydroppedoutbecauseofscholasticperformance
(e)Ifitisshownthatthenaturalizedcitizenhasallowedhimselftobeusedasadummyinviolationofthe ConstitutionalorlegalprovisionrequiringPhilippinecitizenship,asarequisitefortheexercise,useorenjoymentof aright,franchiseorprivilege.

Procedure: FiledbytheSolicitorGeneralbeforethesameRTCthatgrantedhisnaturalization,regardlessofwhere hemayberesidingatthattime.

BARLONGAYCASE: Republicvs.LiYao(214SCRA748) F:
Fifteen(15)yearsafterLiYaowasconferredwithFilipinocitizenshipbynaturalization,theRepublicsoughtthe cancellationthereofonthegroundsof:1)notbeingofgoodmoralcharacterbyhavingamorousrelationswithwomen;2) nothavingconductedhimselfinanirreproachablemannerindealingwiththedulyconstitutedauthoritiesbyusingnames otherthanthatauthorized,byresortingtotaxevasionandviolatingtheAntiDummyLaw.Thetrialcourtrelyingsolelyon thegroundofevasionofthepaymentoflawfultaxesbyunderdeclarationofincomeasreflectedinhisincometaxreturn for194651,cancelledhisnaturalization.Hencethisappeal.

ISSUE:W/nthecancellationofLiYao'snaturalizationwasvalid. RULING:Yes.Acertificateofnaturalizationmaybecancelledifitissubsequentlydiscoveredthattheapplicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellationofacertificateofnaturalizationupongroundsorconditionswhicharisesubsequenttothegranting ofthecertificateofnaturalization.Moreover,anaturalizationproceedingisnotajudicialadversaryproceeding, thedecisionrenderedthereinnotconstituting resjudicata astoanymatterthatwouldsupportajudgement cancellingacertificateofnaturalizationonthegroundofillegalorfraudulentprocurementthereof. Theconcealmentofapplicant'sincometoevadepaymentoflawfultaxesshowsthathismoralcharacter isnotirreproachable,thusdisqualifyinghimfornaturalization. Ataxamnestyonlyrelieveshimfromanycivil,criminaloradministrativeliabilityinsofarashistax caseisconcerned.Itdoesnothavetheeffectofobliteratinghislackofgoodmoralcharacterandirreproachable conductwhicharegroundsfordenaturalization.MRM.

3.LossandReacquisitionofCitizenship ArticleIV,Sec.3.Philippinecitizenshipmaybelostorreacquiredinthemannerprovidedbylaw. (referringtoCA63.) ArticleIV,Sec.4.CitizensofthePhilippineswhomarryaliensshallretaintheircitizenship,unless bytheiractoromissiontheyaredeemed,underthelaw(CA63)tohaverenouncedit.

CommmonwealthAct63 Section1.Howcitizenshipmaybelost.AFilipinocitizenmaylosehiscitizenshipinanyofthefollowingways and/orevents: (1)Bynaturalizationinaforeigncountry; (2)Byexpressrenunciationofcitizenshiporexpatriation; (3)BysubscribingtoanoathofallegiancetosupporttheConstitutionorlawsofaforeigncountryupon reachingtheageofmajority;Provided,however,ThataFilipinomaynotdivesthimselfofPhilippinecitizenshipin anymannerwhilethePhilippinesisatwarwithanycountry; (4)Byrenderingservicetooracceptingcommissioninthearmedforcesofaforeigncountry:Provided, Thattherenderingofserviceto,ortheacceptanceofsuchcommissionin,thearmedforcesofaforeigncountry,and thetakingofanoathofallegianceincidentthereto,withtheconsentofthePhilippines,shallnotdivestaFilipinoof hisPhilippinecitizenshipifeitheroftheff.circumstancesispresent: (a)ThePhilippineshasadefensiveand/oroffensivepactofalliancewiththesaidforeign country;or (b)ThesaidforeigncountrymaintainsarmedforcesinthePhilippineterritorywiththe consentofthePhilippines;ProvidedthattheFilipinocitizenconcerned,atthetimeofrendering saidserviceoracceptanceofsaidcommission,andtakingtheoathofallegianceincidentthereto, statesthathedoessoonlyinconnectionwithhisservicetosaidforeigncountry: Andprovided finally,ThatanyFilipinocitizenwhoisrenderingserviceto,oriscommissionedin,thearmed forcesofaforeigncountryunderanyofthecircumstancesmentionedinparagraph(a)or(b)shall notbepermittedtoparticipatenorvoteinanyelectionofthePhilippinesduringtheperiodofhis serviceto,orcommissionin,thearmedforcesofsaidforeigncountry.Uponhisdischargefromthe serviceofthesaidforeigncountry,heshallbeautomaticallyentitledtothefullenjoymentofhis civilandpoliticalrightsasaFilipinocitizen; (5)Bycancellationofthecertificateofnaturalization; (6)Byhavingbeendeclaredbycompetentauthority,adeserterofthePhilippinearmedforcesintimeof war,unlesssubsequently,aplenarypardonoramnestyhasbeengranted; (7)Incaseofawoman,uponhermarriage,toaforeignerif,byvirtueofthelawsinforceinherhusband's country,sheacquireshisnationality.[ThisisnowqualifiedbyArt.IV,Sec.4.CitizensofthePhilippineswhomarry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renouncedit.] Theprovisions ofthissectionnotwithstanding, theacquisitionofcitizenship byanaturalbornFilipino citizenfromoneoftheIberianandanyfriendlydemocraticIberoAmericancountriesorfromtheUnitedKingdom

shallnotproducelossorforfeitureofhisPhilippinecitizenshipifthelawofthatcountrygrantsthesameprivilegeto itscitizensandsuchhadbeenagreeduponbytreatybetweenthePhilippinesandtheforeigncountryfromwhich citizenshipisacquired.

a.LossofCitizenship Grounds: (1)Naturalizationinaforeigncountry[CA63,Sec.1(1)]

FrivaldovCOMELEC(174SCRA245)(1989) F:
FrivaldowaselectedasgovernorofSorsogon.TheLeagueofMunicipalitiesfiledapetitionfortheannulmentof Frivaldo'selectionandproclamationonthegroundthathewasnotaFilipinocitizen,havingbeennaturalizedintheUSin 1983.HeadmittedsuchbutraisedasadefensethathedidsotoprotecthimselffromMarcosandthathisnaturalizationas anAmericancitizenwasnotimpressedwithvoluntarinessbutwasobtainedonlyforreasonsofconvenience.TheLeague arguedthatsinceFrivaldowasanaturalizedAmericancitizenandhadnotreacquiredPhilippinecitizenshiponthedayof theelection,hewasnotqualifiedtorunforgovernor.Frivaldocounteredthathisoathinhiscertificateofcandidacythathe wasanaturalborncitizenshouldbeasufficientactofrepatriation. Additionally,hisactiveparticipationinthe1987 electionshaddivestedhimofhisUScitizenshipunderthelawsoftheUS.

HELD:FrivaldoclaimshehasreacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipbyvirtueofavalidrepatriation.Heclaimsthat byactivelyparticipatingintheelections,heautomaticallyforfeitedAmericancitizenshipunderUSlaws.Such lawsdonotconcernus.SuchforfeitureisbetweenhimandtheUSashisadoptedcountry.Itshouldbeobvious thatevenifhedidlosehisnaturalizedAmer icancitizenship,suchforfeituredidnotandcouldnothavetheeffect ofautomaticallyrestoringhiscitizenshipinthePhilippinesthathehadearlierrenounced.Atbest,whatmight havehappenedasaresultofthelossofhisnaturalizedcitizenshipwasthathebecameastatelessindividual. Merefilingofcertificateofcandidacyisnotasufficientactofrepatriation.Repatriationrequiresan expressandequivocalact.Frivaldo'sclaimthathecouldnothaverepatriatedhimselfunderLOI270bec.the SpecialCommitteeprovidedforthereinhadnotyetbeenconstitutedseemstosuggestthatthelackofthatbody renderedhisrepatriationunnecessary. Thatisfarfetchedifnotspecious. Suchaconclusionwouldopenthe floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandonedcitizenshipw/oformallyrejectingtheiradoptedstateandreaffirmingtheirallegiancetothePhils.It doesnotappearthatFrivaldohastakenthesecategoricalacts.Hecontendsthatbysimplyfilinghiscertificate ofcandidacyhehad,w/omore,alreadyeffectivelyrecoveredPhil.citizenship. Butthatishardlytheformal declarationthelawenvisionssurely,Phil.citizenshippreviouslydisownedisnotthatcheaplyrecovered.Ifthe SpecialCommitteehadnotyetbeenconvened,whatitmeantsimplywasthatthepetitionerhadtowaituntilthis wasdone,orseeknaturalizationbylegislativeorjudicialproceedings.Adapted.

LabovsCOMELEC(176SCRA1)

F:

RamonLabo,Jr.marriedanAustraliancitizeninthePhils.HewasgrantedAustraliancitizenship.Hetookan oathofallegiancerenouncingallotherallegiance,etc.Thoughthemarriagewasdeclaredvoidforbeingbigamous,Labo was,accordingtotherecordsstillanAustraliancitizen.Inthe1988localelections,LaboranformayorofBaguio.His FilipinocitizenshipwasquestionedonthegroundthathehadacquiredAustraliancitizenshipthroughhismarriagetoan Australian citizen andhis takingan oath of allegiance toAustralia where he renounced all other allegiance toother countries.Laboclaimedthat(1)hismarriagedidnotautomaticallydivesthimofhisFilipinocitizenshipandthat(2)his naturalizationinAustraliamadehimatworstonlyadualnationalanddidnotdivesthimofhisPhilippinecitizenship.

HELD:Labo'sfirstcontentionisirrelevant.HebecameanAustraliancitizenbyvirtueofnaturalizationandnot bymarriage. Thesecond argumentis specious w/c cannotstand againstthe clear provisions ofCANo. 63,w/c enumeratesthemodesbyw/cPhil.citizenshipmaybelost,andamongthemare(1)naturalizationinaforeign country;(2) expressrenunciationofcitizenship;and(3) subscribingtoanoathofallegiancetosupportthe Consti.orlawsofaforeigncountry,allofw/careapplicabletopetitioner.UnderArticleIV,Section5,"dual allegianceofcitizenisinimicaltothenationalinterestandshallbedealtwithbylaw." xxxEvenifitbeassumedthat,aspetitionerasserts,hisnaturalizationwasannulledafteritwasfound thathismarriagewasbigamous,thatcircumstancealonedidnotautomaticallyrestorehisPhil.citizenship.His divestitureofAustraliancitizenshipdoesnotconcernushere. Thatisamatterbetweenhimandhisadopted country.WhatwemustconsideristhefactthathevoluntarilyandfreelyrejectedPhil.citizenshipandwillingly andknowinglyembracedthecitizenshipofanothercountry.Thepossibilitythathemayhavebeensubsequently rejectedbyAustraliadoesnotmeanthathehasbeenautomaticallyreinstatedasaPhil.citizen Phil.citizenshipmaybereacquiredbydirectactofcongress,bynaturalizationorbyrepatriation.Itdoes notappearthatpetitionerhasreacquiredPhil.citizenshipbyanyofthesemethods.Adapted.

Labov.COMELEC(211SCRA297,July1992) F:
LaboranformayorofBaguiointheMay11,1992elections.Hisopponent,Ortega,questionedhiscitizenship beforetheComelec,relyingonLabov.Comelec(179SCRA1,1989)whichdeclaredLabonotacitizenofthePhilippines.

HELD: 1. Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippinecitizenshipisanindispensablerequirementforholdinganelectiveoffice.Thefactthathewaselected bythemajorityoftheelectorateisofnomoment. AsheldinFivaldovs.COMELEC,
"xxxThewillofthepeopleasexpressedthroughtheballotcannotcuretheviceofineligibility, especiallyiftheymistakenlybelieved,asinthiscase,thatthecandidatewasqualified.xxx"

xxx Petitioner claims that he has reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his application for reacquisitionofPhil.citizenshipfiledbeforetheOfficeoftheSolGen.pursuanttoPD725andLOI270.To date,however,theSpecialCommitteeonNaturalizationhadnotyetacteduponsaidapplication.Intheabsence ofanyofficialactionorapprovalbyproperauthorities,amereapplicationforrepatriationdoesnot,andcannot,

amounttoanautomaticreacquistionoftheapplicant'sPhil.citizenship.
2.ThedisqualificationofLabodoesnotnecessarilyentitleOrtegaasthecandidatewiththenexthighestnumber ofvotestoproclamationasmayor.Theineligibilityofacandidate receivingmajorityvotedoesnotentitletheeligible candidatereceivingthenexthighestnumberofvotestobedeclaredelected. 3.Therulewouldhavebeendifferentiftheelectoratefullyawareinfact&inlawofacandidate'sdisqualification soastobringsuchawarenesswithintherealmofnotorietywouldnonethelesscasttheirvotesinfavoroftheineligiblecan didate.Insuchcase,theelectoratemaybesaidtohavewaivedthevalidityandefficacyoftheirvotesbynotoriously misapplyingtheirfranchiseorthrowingawaytheirvotes,inwhichcase,theeligiblecandidateobtainingthenexthigher numberofvotesmaybedeemedelected.Adapted.

(2)ExpressrenunciationorExpatriation[CA63,Sec1(2)] ThisoverrulesHawvGovernment,wheretheSCheldthatrenunciationcouldbeimplied. Expatriationisaconstitutionalright(GoGullianvGovernment).Noonecanbecompelledtoremaina Filipinoifhedoesnotwantto.

YuvDefensorSantiago(169SCRA364) F:
Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for five years and renewed for the same period upon presentmentbeforetheproperPortugueseconsularofficer.DespitehisnaturalizationasaPhilippinecitizenin1978,he appliedforandwasissuedaPortuguesepassportin1981.WhilestillacitizenofthePhilippineswhohadrenounced,upon hisnaturalization,"absolutelyandforeverallallegianceandfidelitytoanyforeignprince,potentate,stateorsovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercialdocumentshesigned.

HELD: The foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquiredthroughnaturalization. In BoardofImmigrationCommissioner vsGoGallano,express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Yu, with full knowledge and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenshipuponnaturalizationasaPhilippinecitizenresumedorreacquiredhispriorstatusasaPortuguese citizen,appliedforarenewalofhisPortuguesepassportandrepresentedhimselfassuchinofficialdocuments evenafterhehadbecomeanaturalized Philippine citizen. SuchresumptionorreacquisitionofPortuguese citizenshipisgrosslyinconsistentwithhismaintenanceofPhilippinecitizenship. Dissenting: ThemereuseofaforeignpassportisnotipsofactoexpressrenunciationofFilipinocitizenship. Whatevermaybethereasonsfordoingso,itmustbeascertainedinacourtoflawwhereafulltrialisconducted insteadofanadministrativedeterminationofamostsummarynature(asinthiscase).Adapted.

AznarvOsmena,COMELEC,185SCRA703(May1990) F:
EmelitoOsmenaranforGovernorofCebuintheJan.18,1988elections.AznarasCebuChairmanofLDPLaban filedwithCOMELECapetitionforthedisqualificationofOsmenaonthegroundthatheisallegedlynotaFilipinocitizen, beingaUScitizen,asevidencedbyOsmena'sapplicationforalien,hisaliencertificateofregistration,permittoreenter thePhils,immigrationcertificateofclearanceetc.OsmenaontheotherhandmaintainedthatheisaFilcitizen,alleging that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio Osmena, that he is a holder of a valid Phil passport, that he has been continuouslyresidinginthePhilssincebirth&hasnotgoneoutofthecountryformorethan6monthsandthathehas beenaregisteredvoterinthePhilssince1965.TheComelecdecidedforOsmena.

HELD:1.IntheproceedingsbeforetheCOMELEC,thepetfailedtopresentdirectproofthatprivateresphad losthisFilipinocitizenshipbyanyofthemodesprovidedforunderCA#63.Amongothers,theseare:(1)by naturalizationinaforeigncountry;(2)byexpressrenunciationofcitizenship;(3)bysubscribingtoanoathof allegiancetosupporttheConstitutionorlawsofaforeigncountry.Fromtheevidence,itisclearthatprivate respondentOsmenadidnotlosehisPhilcitizenshipbyanyofthe3mentionedhereinaboveorbyanyothermode oflosingPhilcitizenship. 2.ByvirtueofhisbeingthesonofaFilipinofather,thepresumptionthatprivaterespisaFilipino remains.ItwasincumbentuponthepetitionertoprovethatprivresphadlosthisPhilcitizenship.PetAznar failedtopositivelyestablishthisfact.OsmenaremainsaFilipino&thelossofhisPhilcitizenshipcannotbe presumed. 3.ConsideringthefactthatadmittedlyOsmenawasbothaFilipino&anAmerican,themerefactthathe hasaCertificatestatingheisanAmericandoesnotmeanthatheisnotstillaFilipino.InthecaseofOsmena, theCertificationthatheisanAmericandoesnotmeanthatheisnotSTILLaFilipino,possessedasheis,of bothnationalitiesorcitizenship.ThereisnoexpressrenunciationhereofPhilcitizenship.Thereisevenno impliedrenunciationofsaidcitizenship.WhenweconsiderthattherenunciationneededtolosePhilcitizenship mustbeEXPRESS,itstandstoreasonthattherecanbenosuchlossofPhilcitizenshipWHENTHEREISNO RENUNCIATION,EITHEREXPRESSORIMPLIED. 4.Thestatementinthe1987constitutionthat"dualallegianceofcitizensisinimicaltothenational interest&shallbedealtwithbylaw"hasnoretroactiveeffect.Adapted.

(3)Takinganoathofallegiancetoanothercountryuponreachingtheageofmajority. (4)Acceptingacommissionandservinginthearmedforcesofanothercountry,unless thereisan offensiveordefensivepactwiththecountry,oritsmaintainsarmedforcesinRPwithRP'sconsent. (5)Denaturalization. (6)BeingfoundbyfinaljudgmenttobeadeserteroftheAFP. (7)MarriagebyaFilipinowomantoanalien,ifbythelawsofherhusband'scountry,shebecomesa

citizenthereof. Thisisdeemedrepealedbythe1973and1987Constitutions,whichmandatethatFilipinocitizenswho marryaliensshallretaintheircitizenship,unlessbytheir"act"or"omission",theyaredeemedunderthelawto haverenouncedit.Atpresent,thelaw(CA63,Sec.1par.7)onlyprovidesforexpressrenunciation(i.e.,act), andsothereisnolawatthemomenton"renunciationbyomission."ButCongressmayprovideforsuchlater. But Sec.2ofthe1973Consti.(carried overasSec.4of the1987Consti.)onlyhasaprospective application.Thus,CA63continuesformarriagescelebratedbefore17January1973.IfaFilipinomarrieda Greekin1972andbecameaGreekcitizenherselfthereby,thenshelostherFilipinocitizenship. Astoher children,however,itisenoughthatshewasaFilipinaatthetimeofmarriagetoqualifythemtoelectPhilippine citizenshipwhentheyreachedtheageofmajority(Villahermosaruling). Butifthechildrenwerebornafter 1973,thenunderthe1987Constitution,thosechildrenarenowevennaturalborn. Butif,in1961,aFilipinowomanmarriedanalienwhosecountrydidnotmakeheranautomaticcitizen, andsoinordertoacquirehiscitizenship,sheappliedfornaturalization,andafterhernaturalizationshebegotC, CcouldnolongerelectPhilippinecitizenship.TherulinginCuandVillahermosaappliesonlytomotherswho losttheircitizenshipbyoperationoflawandnotbytheirownvoluntaryacts. IfCwasbornaftertheapplicationbutbeforetheapprovalofthenaturalizationofhismother,hecould stillelectPhilippinecitizenship. Butforsimilarmarriagescelebratedafter17January1973,themerefactofmarriagealonedoesnotstrip theFilipinowomanofherPhilippinecitizenship.Thus,ifaFilipinamarriesanalienin1974,evenifshegains herhusband'scitizenship,livesabroad,doesnotpayhertaxes,neverreturnstoRP,sheisstillaFilipinaunder the1973and1987Constitutions,solongasshedoesnotcategoricallyrenouncehercitizenship.Itfollowsthat herchildrenarenaturalborncitizens,beingthechildrenofFilipinomothers,andthistimewithouttheneedof election.

Expatriationisaconstitutionalright(GoGullianvGovernment).NoonecanbecompelledtoremainaFilipino ifhedoesnotwantto. Exception: Com.Act.No.63,Sec.1(3).

xxx[A]FilipinomaynotdivesthimselfofPhilippinecitizenshipinanymannerwhiletheRepublicofthe Philippinesisatwarwithanycountry.

Peoplevs.Manayao,74Phil.721(1947) F:
ManayaowasoneoftheMakapiliswhotookpartinthekillingoftheresidentsinbarrioBanaban,municipalityof Angat,Bulacan. Aftertheliberation,he,amongothers,waschargedw/treasonandw/multiplemurderinthePeople's

court.Inhisdefense,heargues,amongothers,hehaslosthisPhilippinecitizenshipandwasthereforenotamenabletothe Phil.lawontreason.

HELD:Appellant'scontentionisrepugnanttothemostfundamentalandelementaryprinciplesgoverningthe dutiesofacitizentowardhiscountryundertheConsti.ThedefenseoftheStateisaprimedutyofgovernment andinthefulfillmentofthisdutyallcitizensmayberequiredbylawtorenderpersonal,militaryorcivilservice. Duringaperiodofstress,underaConstienshriningsuchtenets,thecitizencannotbeconsideredfreetocastoff hisloyaltyandobligationstowardhisFatherland. Itwouldshocktheconscienceofanyenlightenedcitizenrytosaythatthisappellant,bytheveryfactof committingthetreasonousactschargedagainsthim,divestedhimselfofhisPhil.citizenshipandtherebyplaced himselfbeyondthearmofourtreasonlaw.Forifthiswereso,hisverycrimewouldbetheshieldthatwould protecthimfrompunishment.VV.

Art.XI,Sec.18.PublicofficersandemployeesowetheStateandthisConstitutionallegianceatall times,andanypublicofficeroremployeewhoseekstochangehiscitizenshiporacquirethestatusofan immigrantofanothercountryduringhistenureshallbedealtwithbylaw.

BARLONGAYCASE: Caasivs.CourtofAppeals(191SCRA229) F:
These2caseswereconsolidatedbec.theyhavethesameobjective: thedisqualificationunderSec.68ofthe OmnibusElectionCodeoftheprivateresp.,MeritoMiguel,forthepositionofmunicipalmayorofBolinao,Pangasinan,to w/chewaselectedinthelocalelectionsof1/18/88,onthegroundthatheisagreencardholder,hence,apermanent residentoftheUS,notofBolinao.

HELD:Despitehisvigorousdisclaimer,Miguel'simmigrationtotheUSin1984constitutedanabandonmentof hisdomicileandresidenceinthePhils.ForhedidnotgototheUSmerelytovisithischildrenorhisdoctor there;he entered the USw/the intention tolive there permanently asevidenced by hisapplication for an immigrant's(notavisitor'sortourist's)visa. Basedonhisapplication, hewasissued bytheUSGovtthe requisitegreencardorauthoritytoresidetherepermanently. xxxTobe"qualifiedtorunforelectiveoffice"inthePhils.,thelaw(Sec.68oftheOmnibusElection Code)requiresthatthecandidatewhoisagreencardholdermusthave"waivedhisstatus asapermanent residentorimmigrantofaforeigncountry."Therefore,hisactoffilingacertificateofcandidacyforelective officeinthePhils.,didnotofitselfconstituteawaiverofhisstatusasapermanentresidentorimmigrantofthe US.Thewaiverofhisgreencardshouldbemanifestedbysomeactofactsindependentofanddonepriorto filinghiscandidacyforelectiveofficeinthiscountry.Withoutsuchpriorwaiver,hewas"disqualifiedtorunfor anyelectiveoffice." Residenceinthemunicipalitywhereheintendstorunforelectiveofficeforatleast1yearatthetimeof thefilingofhiscert.ofcandidacy,isoneofthequalificationsthatacandidateforelectivepublicofficemust possess.Migueldidnopossessthatqualificationbec.hewasapermanentresidentoftheUSandheresidedin Bolinaoforaperiodofonly3mos.afterhisreturntothePhils.inNov.1987.RAM.

b.ReacquisitionofCitizenship

Secs.25,CommonwealthAct63
Sec.2.Howcitizenshipmaybereacquired.Citizenshipmaybereacquired: (1) Bynaturalization: Provided,Thattheapplicantpossessnoneofthedisqualificationsprescribedin sectiontwoofActNumberedTwentyninehundredtwentyseven(nowSec.4ofCA473.) (2) ByrepatriationofdesertersoftheArmy,NavyorAirCorp: Provided,Thatawomanwholosther citizenshipbyreasonofhermarriagetoanalienmayberepatriatedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthisAct aftertheterminationofthemaritalstatus;and (3)BydirectactoftheNationalAssembly(nowCongress.) Sec. 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. The procedure prescribed for naturalization under Act Numbered Twentynine hundred twentyseven (now CA 473) shall apply to the reacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipbynaturalizationprovidedforinthenextprecedingsection:Provided,That thequalificationsandspecialqualificationsprescribedinsections3and4ofsaidActshallnotberequired: And Provided,further, (1)ThattheapplicantbeatleasttwentyoneyearsofageandshallhaveresidedinthePhilippinesatleast sixmonthsbeforeheappliesfornaturalization; (2)Thatheshallhaveconductedhimselfinaproperandirreproachablemannerduringtheentireperiod ofhisresidenceinthePhilippines,inhisrelationswiththeconstitutedgovernmentaswellaswiththecommunityin whichheisliving;and (3)Thathesubscribestoanoathdeclaringhisintentiontorenounceabsolutelyandperpetuallyallfaith andallegiancetotheforeignauthority,stateorsovereigntyofwhichhewasacitizenorsubject. Sec.4.RepatriationshallbeeffectedbymerelytakingthenecessaryoathofallegiancetotheRepublicof thePhilippinesandregistrationinthepropercivilregistry. Sec.5.TheSecretaryofJusticeshallissuethenecessaryregulationsfortheproperenforcementofthisAct. NaturalizationblanksandotherblanksrequiredforcarryingouttheprovisionsofthisActshallbepreparedand furnishedbytheSolicitorGeneral,subjecttoapprovaloftheSecretaryofJustice. xxx

(1)Naturalization(CA63andCA473) Butthisisnowanabbreviatedprocess,withnoneedtowaitforthreeyears(oneyearfordeclarationofintent, andtwoyearsforthejudgmenttobecomeexecutory).Anapplicantmustonlypossessthefollowing: a.21yearsofage; b.Residentfor6months;

c.Goodmoralcharacter; d.Nodisqualification. (2)Repatriation (i)Womanwhobyhermarriagelosthercitizenship. (Thisisnolongertrueunderthe1973and1987Constitutions,ifthelosswasdueonlytomarriage.) In PeoplevAvengoza,119SCRA119(1982),itwasheldthatawomanwholosthercitizenshipby reasonofhermarriagetoaChinesehusbandandhergaininghiscitizenship,mustfirstjudicially,provethatshe wasFilipinocitizenpriortothemarriage,beforeshecanberepatriatedbyvirtueofthedeathofherhusband. InJaovRepublic,121SCRA358(1983),itwasheldthatalthoughhercitizenshippriortohermarriage toaChinesehusbandneededjudicialconfirmation,theprocessofrepatriationitself(i.e.,ofreacquiringthat citizenship)involvesapurelyadministrativeproceeding. Thus:Filipinocitizenshippriortoitslossbyvirtueofmarriagetoanalienandgaininghiscitizenship needsjudicialdeclaration. Butreacquisitionofsuchcitizenship byrepatriation isapurelyadministrative procedure.

Peoplev.Avengoza,119SCRA119(1982) F:
GoCham,aChinese,hiswifeAnselmaAvengoza,andthelatter'smother,GavinaA.,wereaccusedofviolationof CA108.ItwaschargedthatGoGamandAnselmaA.usedGavinaA.asdummyinordertoacquirelandsinCamarines Surw/cthecouplewerenotqualifiedtoacquireunderthe1935Consti.Pendingtrial,GavinaA.andGoChamdied.On hermotionthetrialcourtallowedAnselmaA.towithdrawherpreviouspleaofnotguiltyandtofileamotiontoquashw/c thecourtlatergranted.ThetrialcourtruledthatAnselmahadreacquiredherFilipinocitizenshipuponthedeathofher husband,GoCham,anduponcomplyingw/CA63,sec.4bytakinganoathofallegiancetotheRepublicandfilingthe oathw/theCivilRegistrar.Theprosecutionappealed.

HELD: Def.Avengoza'ssoleevidenceonrecordtosupportherrepatriationisheroathofallegiancetothe Republic.Def.AvengozabecameanalienbyreasonofherlawfulmarriagetoaChinesecitizen;howeverthis doesnotnecessarilymeanthatshewasaFilipinocitizenprevioustosuchmarriage.Thus,sheshouldfirstprove her citizenship previous toher marriage and as there is no conclusive proof of this matter on record, this questionmustbejudiciallydeterminedbeforeshecanbelegallyrepatriated.VV.

Jaov.Republic,121SCRA358(1983) F:
PetitionerfiledintheCFIDavaoapetitionforrepatriation.SheclaimedthatwhileherfatherwasaChineseand hermotheraFilipinio,herparentswerenotlegallymarried,andthatalthoughshelostherPhil.citizenshipwhenshe marriedaChinesenational,herhusbanddiedon9/6/62.Aftertrial,thecourtdeclaredthepetitionerjudiciallyrepatriated. Thegovtappealed.

HELD:Theproceedingstakeninthetrialcourtareacompletenullity.Thereisnolawrequiringorauthorizing thatrepatriationshouldbeeffectedbyajudicialproceeding.AllthatisrequiredforafemalecitizenofthePhils. wholosthercitizenshiptoanalientoreacquireherPhil.citizenshipupontheterminationofhermaritalstatus "isforhertotakethenecessaryoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhils.andtoregisterthesaidoathinthe proper civil registry." Moreover, the petitioner's claim of Phil. citizenship prior to her marriage for being allegedlyanillegitimatechildofaChinesefatherandaFilipinomothermaynotbeestablishedinanaction wheretheotherorherheirsarenotparties.ItisconsistentrulethatPhil.citizenshipmaynotbedeclaredina nonadversarysuitwherethepersonswhoserightsareaffectedbysuchdeclarationarenotparties,suchasan actionfordeclaratoryrelieforapetitionforjudicialrepatriationasanalien.VV. (ii)ThosedeclaredbyauthoritiestobedesertersoftheArmedForces.(Onlythisisapplicabletothe present.) (3)LegislativeAct Whichisbothamodeofacquiringandreacquiringcitizenship.

BARLONGAYCASE: Republicvs.DelaRosa,232SCRA785 F:
Three(3)petitionsinvolvingthesameissuesandpartieswereconsolidated.Saidcasesquestionedthereadmission ofJuanFrivaldoasaFilipinocitizenunderCA63ortheRevisedNaturalizationLawasamendedbyCA473.Frivaldo becameaUScitizenallegedlyduetothepressurefromtheMarcosregime.Hecamebackhere, ranforGovernorof Sorsogonandwon.

RULING:DISQUALIFIED.FrivaldomustvacatehisofficeandsurrenderthesametotheViceGovernor. AformercitizenwhooptstoreacquirePhil.citizenshipthroughnaturalizationunderCA63is duty boundtofollowtheprocedureprescribedbysaidlaw,anditisnotforhimtodecideandselecttherequirements whichhebelievesareinconvenient.The lawdoesnotdistinguishbetweenanapplicantwhowasformerlya Filipinocitizenandonewhowasneveracitizen. (Barlongay:Thisstatementisinaccuratebecausethereareindeeddifferences.) Failuretocomplywiththepublicationandpostingrequirementsunderthelawrenderednullandvoid theproceedings conducted, thedecision rendered andtheoath ofallegiance taken.TheTCnever acquired jurisdictiontohearthepetitionfornaturalizationofFrivaldo.Underthelaw,boththepetitionfornaturalization andtheordersettingitforhearingmustbepublishedonceaweekforthreeconsecutiveweeksintheOGorina newspaperofgeneralcirculation.Moreover,thepublicationandthepostingmustbeinitsfulltextfortheCourt toacquirejurisdiction. ThepetitionfornaturalizationlacksseveralallegationsunderSecs.2and6ofthelaw:(1)thatpetitioner isofgoodmoralcharacter;(2)heresidedcontinuouslyinthePhil.foratleasttenyears;(3)thatheisableto speakandwriteEnglishandanyoneoftheprincipaldialects;(4)hewillresidecontinuouslyinthePhil.from

dateoffilingofpetitionuntilhisadmissiontoPhilcitizenship;(5)thathehasfiledadeclarationofintentionor ifheisexcusedfromsaidfiling,thejustificationtherefor.Theabsenceofsuchallegationsisfataltothepetition. Adecisioninapetitionfornaturalizationbecomesfinalonlyafter30daysfrompromulgation,counted fromthedateofreceiptbytheSol.Gen.ofhiscopyofthedecision.Sec.1ofRA530providesthatnodecision grantingcitizenshipinnaturalizationproceedingsshallbeexecutoryuntilafter2yearsfromitspromulgationin ordertobeabletoobserveiftheapplicanthas:(1)notleftthecountry;(2)dedicatedhimselfcontinuouslyto lawfulcalling;(3)notbeenconvictedofanyoffenseorforviolationofgovernmentpromulgatedrules;(4)not committedanyactprejudicialtotheinterestofthecountryorcontrarytogovernmentannouncedpolicies. TheproceedingsintheTCweremarredbyirregularities.Thehearingwassetaheadofthescheduled dateuponrequestofFrivaldosohecouldcatchupwiththelastdayforfilinghiscertificateofcandidacy, withoutpublication;thepetitionwasheardwithin6monthsfromlastpublication;Frivaldowasallowedtotake hisoathofallegianceevenbeforethefinalityofjudgmentandwithoutwaitingforthe2yearwaitingperiod. MRM.

4.DualAllegiance Art.IV,Sec.5Dualallegianceofcitizensisinimicaltothenationalinterestandshallbedealtwith bylaw. Art.XI,Sec.18.PublicofficersandemployeesowetheStateandthisConstitutionallegianceatall times,andanypublicofficeroremployeewhoseekstochangehiscitizenshiporacquirethestatusofan immigrantofanothercountryduringhistenureshallbedealtwithbylaw.

DualallegianceisnotcontradictorytothedoublenationalityofaFilipinawhomarriedanalien.Itis notthebusinessofPhilippinelawtodetermineifitscitizenisalsoacitizenofanothercountrybyvirtueof marriage. WhatSec.5contemplatesisthecaseofalienswhoarenaturalizedasFilipinosbutremainloyaltotheir countryoforigin(specificallyformerChinesenationalswhoevenraninthelegislativeYuanofChina),aswella publicofficerswho,whileservingthegovernment,seekcitizenshipinanothercountry. Note:UnderSec40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode,thosewithdualcitizenshiparedisqualifiedfromrunning foranyelectivelocalposition.

5.MixedMarriages Cruz,ConstitutionalLaw,1991ed.(hereinafterCruz):

1. ItwasprovidedundertheoldrulethataFilipinowomanwhomarriedanalienforfeitedherPhil. citizenshipifunderthelawsofherhusband'sStateshewasrequiredtofollowhiscitizenship.Thisrulehasbeen reversedbyArt.IV,Sec.4oftheConsti.w/cprovidesthat:

"CitizensofthePhilippineswhomarryaliensshallretaintheircitizenship,unlessbytheiractoromissiontheyare deemed,underthelaw,tohaverenouncedit."

2.Butwhatofthereverseofthesituation?SupposeitisthealienwomanwhomarriesaFilipino? Sec.15ofCA473providesthat"anywomanwhoisnowormayhereafterbemarriedtoacitizenofthe Phils.,andwhomightherselfbenaturalized,shallbedeemedacitizenofthePhils." Initslatestpronouncementonthisquestion,theclause"whomightherselfbelawfullynaturalized"was interpretedtomeanonlythatthealienwomanmustnotbelaboringunderanyofthedisqualificationsprescribed bylawfornaturalizationinherownrightasaFilipinocitizen.Moreover,shecanestablishherclaimtoPhil. citizenshipinadministrativeproceedings beforetheimmigrationauthoritiesonlyandwillnothavetofilea judicialactionforthispurpose. Recapitulating,J.BarredodeclaredinMoyaLimYaov.Comm.ofImmigration,41SCRA292:
xxxWenowholdxxxthatunderSec.15ofCA473,analienwomanmarryingaFilipino,native bornornaturalized,becomesipsofactoaFilipinaprovidedsheisnotdisqualifiedtobeacitizenofthe Phils.underSec.4ofthesamelaw.Likewise,analienwomanmarriedtoanalienwhoissubsequently naturalizedherefollowsthePhil.citizenshipofherhusbandthemomenthetakeshisoathasFilipino citizen,providedthatshedoesnotsufferfromanyofthedisqualificationsundersaidSec.4.

UPDATED11/24/95 RAM

C.Sovereignty Sovereignty

"SovereigntyisthesupremeanduncontrollablepowerinherentinaStatebywhichtheStateisgoverned. Therearetwokindsofsovereignty,towit, legal and political.Legalsovereigntyistheauthorityw/chasthe powertoissuefinalcommandswhereaspoliticalsovereigntyisthepowerbehindthelegalsovereign,orthesum totaloftheinfluencesthatoperateuponit. Sovereigntymayalsobe internal or external. InternalsovereigntyreferstothepoweroftheStateto controlitsdomesticaffairs.Externalsovereignty,w/cisthepoweroftheStatetodirectitsrelationsw/other States,isalsoknownasindependence.xxx"(Cruz.) "ThesupremepoweroftheStatetogovernpersonsandthingswithinitsterritory.

'TheoryofAutoLimitation'isthepropertyoftheStateforceduetowhichaStatehasexclusivelegal competenceofselflimitationandselfrestriction(Jellinek). InReaganvCIR,itwasheldthattheprovisioninthemilitarybasesagreementgivingtheUScriminal jurisdiction over crimes committed even by Filipinos inside the bases is not a derogation of Philippine sovereignty. ThePhilippineshasthepowertolimittheexerciseofitssovereignty. Whenitallowsaforeign Statetousepartofitsterritoryandwaivesjurisdictionovercrimescommittedtherein,itdoesnotgiveuppartof itssovereigntybutonlylimitstheexerciseofitssovereignty."(Mirasolnotes.)

1.DominiumandImperium "ImperiumreferstotheState'sauthoritytogovern.Itcoverssuchactivitiesaspassinglawsgoverninga territory,maintainingpeaceandorderoverit,anddefendingitagainstforeigninvasion.WhentheStateactin thiscapacityjureimperii,itgenerallyenjoyssovereignimmunity. Dominium referstothecapacityoftheStatetoownproperty. Itcoverssuchrightsastitletoland, exploitationanduseofit,anddispositionorsaleofthesame.TheRegaliandoctrinewherebyalllandsofthe publicdomainbelongtotheState,andanyoneclaimingtitlehastheburdentoshowownership,comeswithin thisconcept.Inthiscapacityjuregestium,theStatedescendstothestatusofordinarypersonsandthusbecomes liableassuch."(Mirasolnotes.) Astateasajuridicalpersonmayactinthecapacityofsovereignaswellasowner.xxx"Asthereare overtonesindicativeofskepticism,ifnotofoutrightrejection,ofthewellknowndistinctioninpubliclawbet. thegovernmentalauthoritypossessedbythestatew/cisappropriatelyembracedintheconceptofsovereignty, anditscapacitytoownoracquireprop.,itisnotinappropriatetopursuethematterfurther.Theformercomes undertheheadingofimperiumandthelatterofdominium.Theuseofthistermisappropriatew/referenceto landsheldbythestateinitsproprietarycharacter.Insuchcapacity,itmayprovidefortheexploitationanduse oflandsandothernaturalresources,includingtheirdisposition,exceptaslimitedbytheConsti.DeanPounddid speakoftheconfusionthatexistedduringthemedievalerabet.twosuchconcepts,butdidnotetheexistenceof respublicaeasacorallarytodominium.xxx[T]herewasarecognitionbyJ.HomesinCarinov.InsularGov't, that'SpaininitsearlierdecreesembodiedtheuniversaltheorythatalllandswereheldfromtheCrown***.' Thatwasaconceptofjusregalia,w/cwasadoptedbythe1973Consti.,ownershiphoweverbeingvestedinthe stateassuchratherthantheheadthereof.(Fernando56.)

2.Territorial,Personal,andExtraterritoralJurisdiction Jurisdictionisthemanifestationofsovereignty.(Mirasolnotes.) Thejurisdictionofthestateisunderstoodasbothitsauthorityandthesphereoftheexerciseofthat authority.(Sinco26.) a.TerritorialjurisdictionistheauthorityoftheStatetohaveallpersonsandthingswithinitsterritorial limitstobecompletelysubjecttoitscontrolandprotection.(Mirasolnotes.)

Whenexercisedinreferencetopersonsorthingsfoundw/intheterritoryofthestate,itisknownas territorial jurisdiction. All persons w/in that area, regardless of nationality, are subject to the territorial jurisdictionofthestate. Theterritorialjurisdictionofastateissovereigntyoperatingorappliedw/initsterritory.Itsscopeand effectareexpressedinthisclassicstatementofChiefJusticeMarshallonthesubject:
"Thejurisdictionofthenationw/initsownterritoryisnecessarilyexclusiveandabsolute.Itis susceptibleofnolimitationnotimposedbyitself. Anyrestrictionuponit,derivingvalidityfroman external source,would implyadiminution ofits sovereignty to the extent ofthe restriction,andan investmentofthatsovereigntytothesameextentinthatpowerw/cwouldimposesuchrestriction.All exceptions,therefore,tothefullandcompletepowerofanationw/initsownterritories,mustbetraced uptotheconsentofthenationitself.Theycanflowfromnootherlegitimatesource.Thisconsentmay beeitherexpressorimplied."(Sinco2627.)

b.Personaljurisdictionistheauthorityofthestateoveritsnationals,theirpersons,property,andacts, whetherwithinoroutsideitsterritory.TheCivilCodeprovisionthatprohibitoryandmandatorylawsfollow citizenswherevertheygoisanexample.(Mirasolnotes.) Whenjurisdictionisexercisedonthebasisofthestatusofthepersonsaffected,independentoftheir presenceorabsenceintheterritoryofthestate,itisknownaspersonaljurisdiction.(Sinco26.) Thepersonaljurisdictionofthestateisexercisedoverallitscitizensw/inorw/oitsterritory.Itaffects theirperson,prop.,andevensomeoftheiractsperformedabroad.Theauthorityofthestatetow/ctheyowe permanentallegiancefollowsthematalltimeswherevertheymightresideandaslongastheirmembershipof thestatesubsists.(Sinco28.) c. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State over persons, things or acts, outside its territoriallimitsbyreasonoftheireffectstoitsterritory. Art.2oftheRPC isaclassicexampleofthis. (Mirasolnotes.) Byagreementw/otherstates,astatemayestablishitslegalinstitutionsoutsideitsterritoriallimits. Thus if a state does not have sufficient confidence in the administration of justice and the system of law obtaininginaparticularcountry,itmayenterintoatreatyfortheestablishmentofitsowncourtsinthelatter countrywhereitscitizensornationalsmaybetried. xxx Regardlessoftreatyoragreement,however,astatehasfullauthoritytoadoptrulesintendedtoapplyto persons,whethercitizensoraliens,andthingsfoundintheterritoryofotherstatesoronthehighseasunder certainconditions. Ofcourse,theactualenforcementofrulesintendedtohaveextraterritorialeffectmaybe accomplishedonlywhenthepersonsconcernedarefoundw/intheterritorialjurisdictionofthestate.Toenforce themintheterritoriallimitsofanotherstatewouldbetoviolatethesovereigntyofthelatter,unlessthisstate givesitsconsentthereto.Thus,wehaveArt.2oftheRevisedPenalCode:
"Art. 2. Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisionsofthisCodeshallbeenforcednotonlywithinthePhilippineArchipelago,includingits

atmosphere,itsinteriorwatersandmaritimezone,butalsooutsideofitsjurisdiction,againstthose who: 1.ShouldcommitanoffensewhileonaPhilippineshiporairship. 2. Should forge or counterfeit anycoin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligationsandsecuritiesissuedbytheGovernmentofthePhilippines. 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligationsandsecuritiesmentionedintheprecedingnumber. 4.Whilebeingpublicofficersoremployees,shouldcommitanoffenseintheexerciseof theirfunctions;or 5. Should commit anyof the crimes against national security and thelaw of nations, definedinTitleOneofBookTwoofthisCode."

xxx.(Sinco2829.)

3.SovereignImmunity (a)Basis i.Constitutional Art.XVI,Sec.3.TheStatemaynotbesuedwithoutitsconsent. ii.Jurisprudence Positivisttheory:Therecanbenolegalrightasagainsttheauthoritythatmakesthelawsonwhichthe rightdepends.(HolmesinKawananakoavPolyblank) Sociologicaltheory:IftheStateisamenabletosuits,allitstimewouldbespentdefendingitselffrom suitsandthiswouldpreventitfromperformingitsotherfunctions.(RepublicvVillasor,54SCRA83)(Mirasol notes.) ThedoctrineisalsoavailabletoforeignStatesinsofarastheyaresoughttobesuedinthecourtsofthe localState.TheaddedbasisinthiscaseistheprincipleofthesovereignequalityofStates,underw/coneState cannotassertjurisdictionoveranotherinviolationofthemaximparinparemnonhabetimperium.Todoso would"undulyvexthepeaceofnations."(Cruz.)

Republicv.Villasor,54SCRA83(1973.) F:
On7/3/61,adecisionwasrenderedinSPinfavorofresps.P.J.KienerCo.,Ltd,et.al.andagainstpetitionerherein, confirmingthearbitrationawardintheamountof1.7M,subjectofSP.On6/24/69,resp.JudgeissuedanOrderdeclaring theaforestateddecisionfinalandexecutory,directingtheSheriffsofRizalProvince,QCaswellasManilatoexecutethe saiddecision.Acorrespondingaliaswritofexecutionwasthenissued.Onthestrengthofsaidwrit,thesheriffserved

noticesofgarnishmentw/severalbanks,speciallyonthe'moniesduetheAFPintheformofdeposits,sufficienttocover theamountmentionedinthewrit;'thePhil.VeteransBankreceivedthesamenoticeofgarnishment.Hence,thisoriginal actionforcertiorariandprohibitionw/theSC.

HELD:Itisafundamentalpostulateofconstitutionalismflowingfromthejuristicconceptofsovereigntythat thestateaswellasitsgovtisimmunefromsuitunlessitgivesitsconsent.Itisreadilyunderstandablewhyit mustbeso.Asovereignisexemptfromsuit,notbec.ofanyformalconceptionorobsoletetheory,butonthe logicalandpracticalgroundthattherecanbenolegalrightasagainsttheauthoritythatmakesthelawonw/c therightdepends.(J.Holmes,Kawananakoav.Polyblank,205US349.)Sociologicaljurisprudencesuppliesan answernotdissimilar. [A]continuedadherencetothedoctrineofnonsuabilityisnottobedeploredforas against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacletotheperformanceofitsmultifariousfunctionsarefargreaterifsuchafundamentalprinciplewere abandonedandtheavailabilityofjudicialremedywerenotthusrestricted. TheStatemaynotbesuedwithoutitsconsent.Acorollary,bothdictatedbylogicandsoundsensefrom suchabasicconceptisthatpublicfundscannotbetheobjectofagarnishmentproceedingeveniftheconsentto besuedhadbeenpreviouslygrantedandthestateliabilityadjudged.Thisisbasedonconsiderationsofpublic policy.Disbursementsofpublicfundsmustbecoveredbythecorrespondingappropriationasrequiredbylaw. ThefunctionsandpublicservicesrenderedbytheStatecannotbeallowedtobeparalyzedordisruptedbythe diversionofpublicfundsfromtheirlegitimateandspecificobjects,asappropriatedbylaw.RAM.

(b)WhenasuitisagainsttheStateandwhenitisnot. A suit is against the State, regardless of who is named as the defendant, if it produces adverse consequencestothepublictreasuryintermsofdisbursementofpublicfundsandlossofgovernmentproperty. WhenasuitisagainsttheState,itcannotprosperunlesstheStatehasgivenitsconsent. Inthefollowingcases,however,thesuitisnotreallyagainsttheState. 1.Whenthepurposeofthesuitistocompelanofficerchargedwiththedutyofmakingpayments pursuanttoanappropriationmadebylawinfavoroftheplaintifftomakesuchpayment.Forinthiscase,the suit is not really against the State, the State having acknowledged its liability to the plaintiff through the enactmentofanappropriationlaw.Rather,thesuitisintendedtocompelperformanceofaministerialduty. (BegosovPVA,32SCRA466andDelMarvPVA,51SCRA340bothinvolvingtheWarWidowBenefitsLaw duetheveterans.) 2.Whenfromtheallegationsinthecomplaint,itisclearthattherespondentisapublicofficersuedina privatecapacity. 3.Whentheactionisnotinpersonamwiththegovernmentasthenameddefendant,butanaction in remthatdoesnotnamethegovernmentinparticular. InRepublicvFeliciano(148SCRA424),asuitagainstthegovernmentfortherecoveryofpossession andownershipoflandbasedonapossessoryinformationwasdisallowedbytheSConthegroundthatasuitfor

therecoveryofpropertyisanaction"inpersonam"whichseekstobringtheStatetocourtjustlikeanyprivate personwhoisclaimedtousurpapieceofproperty. Whattheplaintiffshouldhavedone,theCourtcontinued,wastoapplyforajudicialconfirmationof imperfecttitleunderSec.48(b)ofCA141,whichisan"action inrem",i.e.,onedirectedagainstthewhole world,andnotthegovernmentinparticular.

Republicv.Feliciano,148SCRA424 F:
RespondentPabloFelicianofiledacomplaintintheCFIofCamarinesSuragainsttheRepublicofthePhilippines, representedbythelandauthority,fortherecoveryofownershipandpossessionofaparceloflandinTinambac,Camarines Sur. He alleged that the lot in questionshouldbe excluded from the NARRA settlement reservationprogram ofthe governmentunderProc.No.90,sinceit'shisprivatepropertybeingcoveredbyapossessoryinformationtitleinthename ofhispredecessorininterest.(Proc.No.90reservesforsettlementpurposes,undertheadministrationoftheNARRA,now theLandAuthority,atractoflandsituatedintheMunicipalitiesofTinambacandSiruma,CamarinesSur.) Feliciano prayedthathebedeclaredtherightfulownerofthepropertyinquestion. Amotiontodismiss,principallyonthegroundthattheRPcannotbesuedwithoutitsconsentandhencetheaction cannotprosper,wasfiledby86settlers(asintervenors)ofthelandinquestion. TheCFIgrantedthemotiontodismiss,whichwasthenreversedbytheIAConappeal.Hencethispetitionbythe RP.

ISSUES:1.WONthedoctrineofnonsuabilityofthestatecanbeinvokedinthiscase.(YES) ThedoctrineofnonsuabilityoftheStatehasproperapplicationinthiscase.Theplaintiffhasimpleaded theRPasdefendantinanactionforrecoveryofownershipandpossessionofaparcelofland,bringingtheState tocourtjustlikeanyprivatepersonwhoisclaimedtobeusurpingapieceofproperty.Asuitfortherecoveryof propertyisnotanactioninrem,butanactioninpersonam. Byitscaptionanditsallegationandprayer,thecomplaintisclearlyasuitagainsttheState,whichunder settledjurisprudenceisnotpermitted,exceptuponashowingthattheStatehasconsentedtobesued,either expresslyorbyimplicationthroughtheuseofstatutorylanguagetooplaintobemisinterpreted.Thereisnosuch showingofconsentintheinstantcase.Worse,thecomplaintitselffailstoallegetheexistenceofsuchconsent. Thisisafataldefect,andonthisbasisalone,thecomplaintshouldhavebeendismissed. Thefailureofthepetitionertoassertthedefenseofimmunityfromsuitwhenthecasewastriedbefore thecourtaquo,asallegedbyprivaterespondent,isnotfatal.Itisnowsettledthatsuchdefense"maybeinvoked bythecourtssuasponteatanystageoftheproceedings." 2.WONtheconsentoftheRPmaybereadfromProc.No.90itself.(NO) Theexclusion of existing privaterights from the reservation established by Proc. no. 90 cannot be construed asawaiver of theimmunity oftheState fromsuit.Waiverof immunity,being inderogation of sovereignty,willnotbeinferredlightly,butmustbeconstruedinstrictissimijuris.Moreover,theProclamationis notalegislativeact.TheconsentoftheStatetobesuedmustemanatefromstatutoryauthority.WaiverofState Immunitycanonlybemadebyanactofthelegislativebody.Adapted.

Begosav.Chairman,PhilippineVeteransAdm.,32SCRA466(1970) F:GaudencioBegosa,plaintiffappellee,wasan"enlistedmenofthePhil.CommonwealthArmy,inductedintheservice
oftheUSAFFE"havingtaken"activeparticipationinthebattleofBataan"aswellasthe"liberationdriveagainstthe enemy"thereafterbecame"permanentlyincapacitatedfromworkduetoinjurieshesustainedinlineofdutyxxx." Pltff.filedhisclaimfordisabilitypensionasfarbackas3/4/55;butitwaserroneouslydisapprovedon6/21/55, bec.hisdishonorabledischargefromtheArmywasnotagoodorpropergroundforthesaiddisapproval,andthaton reconsiderationaskedforbyhimon11/1/57,w/checontinuedtofollowup,theBoardofAdministrators,Phil.Veterans Admin.,finallyapprovedhisclaimon9/2/64,attherateofP30/mo.JudgeSorianonotedthat:"haditnotbeenforthesaid error,itappearsthattherewasnogoodgroundtodenythesaidclaim,sothelatterwasvalidandmeritoriousevenasofthe dateofitsfilingon3/4/55,hencetomakethesameeffectiveonlyasofthedateofitsapprovalon9/2/64accordingto def'sstandwouldbegreatlyunfairandprejudicialtopltff. TheappealassignsasoneerrorwhatitconsiderstobethefailingoftheLCinnotholdingthatthecomplaintin thiscaseisineffectasuitagainsttheStatew/chasnotgivenitsconsentthereto.

HELD:ItdoesnotadmitofdoubtthatifthesuitwereinfactagainsttheState,theLCshouldhavedismissed thecomplaint.Norisittobedoubtedthatwhileostensiblyanactionmaybeagainstapublicofficial,thedef. mayinreality bethe govt. Asaresult,itisequallywellsettledthatwherealitigationmay haveadverse consequencesonthepublictreasury,whetherinthedisbursementoffundsorlossofprop.,thepublicofficial proceededagainstnotbeingliableinhispersonalcapacity,thenthedoctrineofnonsuabilitymayappropriately beinvoked.Ithasnoapplication,however,wherethesuitagainstsuchafunctionaryhadtobeinstitutedbec.of hisfailuretocomplyw/thedutyimposedbystatute appropriating public fundsforthebenefitofpltff.or petitioner.Suchisthepresentcase. xxxHowever,wherethejudgementinsuchacasewouldresultnotonlyintherecoveryofpossessionof theprop.infavorofsaidcitizenbutalsoinachargeagainstorfinancialliab.oftheGovt,thenthesuitshouldbe regardedasoneagainstthegovtitself,andconsequently,itcannotprosperorbevalidlyentertainedbythecourts exceptw/theconsentofsaidGovt.RAM.

DelMarv.PhilippineVeteransAdm(PVA),51SCRA340(1973) F:
DelMaraverredthatheservedduringWWIIaschiefjudgeadvocateoftheCebuAreaCommand(aduly recognizedguerrillaorg.)w/therankofmajor;thathesubsequentlyobtainedanhonorabledischargefromtheserviceon 10/20/46 on a cert. of permanent total physical disability; that upon proper claim presented and after hearing and adjudication,thePhil.VeteransBdgrantedhimamonthlylifepensionofP50effective1/28/47;thatin3/50,thesaidBd. discontinuedpaymentofmonthlylifepensiononthegroundthathisreceiptofsimilarpensionfromtheUSGovt,thruthe USVeteransAdmin.byreasonofmilitaryservicerenderedintheUSintheFarEastduringthewar,precludedhimfrom receivinganyfurthermonthlylifepensionfromthePhil.Govt;thathewrotethesaidBd.twice,demandingthecontinued paymentofhismonthlypensionbuthisdemandswentunheeded.Andpetitionformandamuswasfiledw/CFICebuw/c renderedjudgmentupholdingDelMar'sclaim. ThePVAarguesthatthecourtaquowasw/ojurisdictiontotrythecivilcasebec.itinvolvesamoneyclaim againstPVAamereagencyoftheGovtperforminggovernmentalfunctionsw/nojuridicalpersonalityofitsownand,in reality,partakesofanactionagainstthePhil.Govtw/cisimmunefromsuitw/oitsconsent.

HELD:Asageneralproposition,theruleontheimmunityoftheGovtfromsuitw/oitsconsentholdstrueinall

actionsresultingin"adverseconsequencesonthepublictreasury,whetherinthedisbursementsoffundsorloss ofprop.Needlesstosay,insuchactions,w/c,ineffect,constitutesuitsagainsttheGovt,thecourthasnooption buttodismissthem. Nonetheless,theruleadmitsofanexception. Itfindsnoapplicationwhereaclaimant institutesanactionagainstafunctionarywhofailstocomplyw/hisstatutorydutytoreleasetheamountclaimed fromthepublicfundsalreadyappropriatedbystatuteforthebenefitofthesaidclaimant.Asclearlydiscernible fromthecircumstances,thecaseatbarfallsundertheexception.RAM.

ShaufvCA,191SCRA713(1990) Doctrineofimmunityfromsuitwillnotapplyandmaynotbeinvokedwherethepublicofficialisbeingsuedin hisprivateandpersonalcapacityasanordinarycitizen. F:

ByreasonofhernonselectiontoapositionatClarkAirBase,Shauffiledanequalopportunitycomplaintagainst officersofClarkAirBase,forallegeddiscriminationagainsttheformerbyreasonofhernationalityandsex.Shethenfiled acomplaintfordamageswiththeRTC.RespondentsfiledaMTDonthegroundthatasofficersoftheUSArmedForces performingofficialfunctionsinaccordancewiththepowersvestedinthem,theyareimmunefromsuit. Shaufcontendsthattheofficersarebeingsuedintheirprivatecapacityfordiscriminatoryactsperformedbeyond theirauthority,hencetheinstantactionisnotasuitagainsttheUSGovt.whichwouldrequireitsconsent.Accordingto respondents,thecomplaintisbarredbytheimmunityoftheUSsincetheactssueduponaregovernmentalactivitiesofthe US.

HELD:1.Thegeneralruleisthatastatemaynotbesuedwithoutitsconsent.Whilethedoctrineappearsto prohibitonlysuitsagainstthestatewithoutitsconsent,itisalsoapplicabletocomplaintsfiledagainstofficials ofthestateforactsallegedlyperformedbytheminthedischargeoftheirduties.Theruleisthatifthejudgment againstsuchofficialswillrequirethestateitselftoperformanaffirmativeacttosatisfythesame,suchasthe appropriationoftheamountneededtopaythedamagesawardedagainstthem,thesuitmustberegardedas againstthestateitself,althoughithasnotbeenformallyimpleaded. 2.Itisadifferentmatterwherethepublicofficialismadetoaccountinhiscapacityassuchforacts contrarytolawandinjurioustotherightsofplaintiff.InasmuchastheStateauthorizesonlylegalactsbyits officers,unauthorizedactsofgovt.officialsorofficers arenotactsoftheState, and an action againstthe officialsorofficersbyonewhoserightshavebeeninvadedorviolatedbysuchacts,fortheprotectionofhis rights,isnotasuitagainsttheStatewithintheruleofimmunityoftheStatefromsuit.Thedoctrineofstate immunitycannotbeusedasaninstrumentforperpetratinganinjustice. 3.Thecloakofimmunityisremovedfromthemomentthepublicofficialissuedinhisindividual capacitysuchaswhereheactswithoutauthorityorinexcessofthepowersvestedinhim.Apublicofficialmay beliableinhispersonalcapacityforwhateverdamagehemayhavecausedbyhisactdonewithmaliceandin badfaith,orbeyondthescopeofhisauthorityorjurisdiction.Inthiscase,theofficersareliablefordamages. Adapted. RepublicvSandoval,220SCRA124(1993)

Hereinpublicofficials,havingbeenfoundtohaveactedbeyondthescopeoftheirauthority,maybeheldliable fordamages. F:
Theheirsofthe12rallyistswhoperishedduringtheMendiolamassacrefiledanactionfordamages.Suchaction wasfiledagainstthegovernment.ThiswasbyvirtueofarecommendationmadebytheCitizen'sMendiolaCommission (createdforthepurposeofconductinganinvestigationofthedisorder,deathsandcasualtiesthattookplaceduringthe Mendiolaincident.)thattheheirsandwoundedvictimsoftheincidentbecompensatedbytheGovt.Notwithstandingsuch recommendation,noconcreteformofcompensationwasreceivedbythevictims.TheCayloGroup(thegroupofmarchers inthesaidincident)filedaformalletterofdemandfromthegovt. Stillunheededforalmostayear,thegroupfiledan actionagainstthegovt,togetherw/themilitaryofficersandpersonnelinvolvedintheincidentbeforethetrialcourt.Resp. JudgedismissedthecomplaintasagainsttheRPonthegroundthattherewasnowaiverbytheSate.

HELD:1.Theprincipleofimmunityfromsuitisbasedontheveryessenceofsovereignty,andonthepractical groundthattherecanbenolegalrightasagainsttheauthoritythatmakesthelawonwhichtherightdepends.It alsorestsonreasonsofpublicpolicythatpublicservicewouldbehindered,andthepublicendangered,ifthe sovereignauthoritycouldbesubjectedtolawsuitsattheinstanceofeverycitizenandconsequentlycontrolledin theusesanddispositionsofthemeansrequiredfortheproperadministrationofthegovernment. 2.ThisisnotasuitagainsttheStatewithitsconsent.Firstly,therecommendationmadebytheMendiola Commissionregardingindemnificationoftheheirsandthevictimsoftheincidentbythegovernmentdoesnot inanywaymeanthatliabilityautomaticallyattachestotheState.TheCommissionwasmerelyafactfinding bodyanditsrecommendationwasnotfinalandexecutory.Secondly,whateveractsorutterancesthatPresident Aquinomayhavedoneorsaid,thesamearenottantamounttotheStatehavingwaiveditsimmunityfromsuit. Althoughconsenttobesuedmaybegivenimpliedly,suchconsentwasnotgiveninthiscase. 3.SomeinstanceswhenasuitagainsttheStateisproperare: (1)whentheRepublicissuedbyname; (2)whenthesuitisagainstanunincorporatedgovt.agency; (3)whenthesuitisonitsfaceagainstagovt.officerbutthecaseissuchthattheultimateliabilitywill belongnottotheofficerbuttothegovt. Inthiscase,whiletheRepublicissuedbyname,theultimateliabilitydoesnotpertaintothegovt. Although the military officers were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalizeirresponsibilityandnonaccountabilitynorgrantaprivilegedstatusnotclaimedbyanyother officialoftheRepublic. Theprincipleofstateimmunityfromsuitdoesnotapply,asinthiscase,whenthereliefdemandedby thesuitrequiresnoaffirmativeofficialactiononthepartoftheStatenortheaffirmativedischargeofany obligationw/cbelongstotheStateinitspoliticalcapacity, eventhoughtheofficersoragentswhoaremade defendantsclaimtoholdoractonlybyvirtueofatitleofthestateandasitsagentsandservants. Theyarethereforeliablefordamages.Adapted.

(c)Consenttobesued Howconsentisgiven Theconsenttobesued,inordertobeeffective,mustcomefromtheState,actingthroughadulyenacted statute.Waiverofstateimmunitycanonlybemadebyanactoflegislativebody. InRepublicvPurissima,78SCRA470(1977),theSCheldthatacontractenteredintobytheRiceand CornAdministrationstipulatingthatintheeventofbreach,actionmaybefiledbytheparties,cannotbethe basisofamoneyclaimagainsttheRCA,agovernmententityundertheOfficeofthePresident,sincetheRCA hadnoauthoritytobindthegovernmenttobesued.Onlyastatutecould.

Republicv.Purissima,78SCRA470(1977) SuabilityoftheState.TheNeedforaStatuteGivingConsent F:
TheRice&CornAdministration(RCA)enteredintoacontractw/theYellowBallFreightLinesinw/cthey agreedthatintheeventofbreach,actionmaybefiledw/thecourtsofMla.In1972,Yellowfiledamoneyclaimagainst RCA.Thecasewasassignedtoresp.Judge.,whodeniedamotiontodismissfiledbyRCArelyingonthestipulationinthe contractoftheparties.

HELD:TheRCAispartofthegovt,beinginfactanofficeundertheOfficeofthePres.andthereforecannotbe suedw/otheconsentoftheState.Theconsenttobeeffective....mustcomefromtheState,actingthruaduly enactedstatute. Thus,whatevercounselfordef.RCAagreedtohadnobindingforceinthegovt. Thatwas clearlybeyondthescopeofhisauthority. InRepublicvFeliciano,148SCRa424,theSCheldthattheProclamationofthePresidentofthePhil ippines(recognizingprivaterightstotheland)cannotbethesourceofconsent,sincetheProclamationisnota legislativeact.VV.

RepublicvFeliciano,supra.

Expressconsent: (1)Moneyclaimsarisingfromcontracts,expressorimplied. ActNo.3083. AnActDefiningtheConditionsunderwhichtheGovernmentofthePhilippines maybeSued.

Sec.1.SubjecttotheprovisionsofthisAct,theGovernmentofthePhilippinesherebyconsentsandsubmits

tobesueduponanymoneyedclaiminvolvingliabilityarisingfromcontract,expressorimplied,whichcouldserve asabasisofcivilactionbetweenprivateparties. Sec.2.Apersondesiringtoavailhimselfoftheprivilegehereinconferredmustshowthathehaspresented hisclaimtotheCommissiononAuditandthatthelatterdidnotdecidethesamewithintwomonthsfromthedateof itspresentation. Sec.3.OriginalactionsbroughtpursuanttotheauthorityconferredinthisActshallbeinstitutedinthe RegionalTrialCourtoftheCityofManilaoroftheprovincewheretheclaimantresides,attheoptionofthelatter, uponwhichcourtexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionisherebyconferredtohearanddeterminesuchactions. Sec.4.Actionsinstitutedasaforesaidshallbegovernedbythesamerulesofprocedure,bothoriginaland appellate,asifthelitigantswereprivateparties. Sec.5.WhentheGovernmentofthePhilippinesisplaintiffinanactioninstitutedinanycourtoforiginal jurisdiction,thedefendantshallhavetherighttoasserttherein,bywayofsetofforcounterclaiminasimilaraction betweenprivateparties. Sec.6. ProcessinactionsbroughtagainsttheGovernmentofthePhilippinespursuanttotheauthority grantedinthisActshallbeservedupontheSolicitorGeneralwhosedutyitshallbetoappearandmakedefense, eitherhimselforthroughdelegates. Sec.7.NoexecutionshallissueuponanyjudgmentrenderedbyanycourtagainsttheGovernmentofthe PhilippinesundertheprovisionsofthisAct;butacopythereofdulycertifiedbytheclerkoftheCourtinwhich judgmentisrenderedshallbetransmittedbysuchclerktothePresidentofthePhilippines,withinfivedaysafterthe samebecomesfinal. Sec.8.ThePresidentofthePhilippines,atthecommencementofeachregularsessionoftheLegislature, shalltransmittothatbodyforappropriateactionalldecisionssoreceivedbyhim,andifsaidbodydeterminethat paymentshouldbemade,itshallappropriatethesumwhichtheGovernmenthasbeensentencedtopay,including thesameintheappropriationsfortheensuingyear. Sec.9.ThisActshalltakeeffectonitsapproval. Approved,March16,1923.

Com.Act327. AnActFixingtheTimewithinwhichtheAuditorGeneralshallRenderHisDecisionsand PrescribingtheMannerofAppealTherefrom.

Sec.1.Inallcasesinvolvingthesettlementofaccountsorclaims,otherthanthoseofaccountableofficers, theAuditorGeneralshallactanddecidethesamewithinsixtydays,exclusiveofSundaysandholidays,aftertheir presentation.Ifsaidaccountsorclaimsneedreferencetootherpersons,officeoroffices,ortoapartyinterested, theperiodaforesaidshallbecountedfromthetimethelastcommentnecessarytoaproperdecisionisreceivedby him. Withrespecttotheaccountsofaccountableofficers,theAuditorGeneralshallactonthesamewithinone

hundreddaysaftertheirsubmission,Sundaysandholidaysexcepted. IncaseofaccountsorclaimsalreadysubmittedtobutstillpendingdecisionbytheAuditorGeneralonor beforetheapprovalofthisAct,theperiodsprovidedinthissectionshallcommencefromthedateofsuchapproval. Sec.2.ThepartyaggrievedbythefinaldecisionoftheAuditorGeneralinthesettlementofanaccountor claimmay,withinthirtydaysfromreceiptofthedecision,takeanappealinwriting: (a)xxx (b)TothePresidentofthePhilippines,or (c)TotheSupremeCourtofthePhilippines,iftheappellantisaprivatepersonorentity. Iftherearemorethanoneappellant,allappealsshallbetakentothesameauthorityresortedtobythefirst appellant. FromadecisionadverselyaffectingtheinterestsoftheGovernment,theappealmaybetakenbytheproper headofthedepartmentorincaseoflocalgovernmentsbytheheadoftheofficeorbranchoftheGovernment immediatelyconcerned. TheappealshallspecificallysetforththeparticularactionoftheAuditorGeneraltowhichexceptionis takenwiththereasonsandauthoritiesreliedonforreversingsuchdecision. Sec.3.ThisActshalltakeeffectuponitsapproval. Approved,June18,1938.

Sec.2ofCA327hasbeenamendedbySec.50ofPD1445andbySec.35,Chapter5,SubtitleB,Title I,BookV,AdministrativeCodeofthePhilippines,asfollows:
Sec.50.AppealfromdecisionsoftheCommission.Thepartyaggrievedbyanydecision,order,orrulingof theCommissionmaywithinthirtydaysfromhisreceiptofacopythereofappealoncertioraritotheSupremeCourt inthemannerprovidedbylawandtheRulesofCourt.Whenthedecision,order,orrulingadverselyaffectsthe interestsofanygovernmentagency,theappealmaybetakenbytheproperheadofthatagency.(PD1445.) Sec.35. AppealfromDecisionoftheCommission.Anydecision,orderorrulingoftheCommissionmay bebroughttotheSupremeCourtoncertioraribytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromhisreceiptofacopy thereofinthemannerprovidedbylawandtheRulesofCourt.Whenthedecision,orderorrulingadverselyaffects theinterestofanygovernmentagency,theappealmaybetakenbytheproperheadofthatagency.(SubtitleB,Title I,BookV,AdministrativeCodeofthePhilippines.)

Beforethe1987Constitution,thelawinforcewasAct3038andCA327which,accordingtoSaysonv Singson(asuittocompelpaymentofelectricalsuppliesdeliveredtoCAA),allowedsuitonlyformoneyclaims arisingfromcontract,andprovidingaspecialprocedure. Underthisprocedure,theclaimmustbefiledwiththeAuditorGeneral(now,COA).IftheAuditordid notactwithin60days,thentheclaimantcouldfilehisclaimwiththeRTC. ButiftheAuditorrendereda decision,thentheappealcouldbemadetotheSC,unlesstheclaimantwasapublicofficialinwhichcaseappeal wastothePresident.

Art.IXofthe1987Constitutionnowgivesadifferentprocedure.Allmoneyclaimsaretobefiledwith COA,whichhas60dayswithinwhichtoact. Ifitfailstosoact,theclaimantmustwaitanyway. Oncea decisionhasbeenmade,hehas,within30daystoappealbycertioraritotheSC.

Saysonv.Singson,54SCRA282(1973) F:
In1/67,theOfficeoftheDistrictEngr.requisitionedvarioussparepartsfortherepairofaD8Bulldozer. A publicbiddingforthesaiditemswasconductedwhereintheawardscommitteeacceptedthewinningbidofP43,530given bySingkierMotorServiceownedbyresp.Singson.SaidawardwasapprovedbytheSec.ofPublicWorksandComm.who thendirectedtheimmediatedeliveryoftheparts.Induecourse,thevoucherw/ccoveredthetransactionreachedthehands ofpetitionerHighwayAuditorSaysonwhothenmadeinquiriesaboutthereasonablenessoftheprice.Afterfindingthe pricereasonable(aswasevidencedbytheindorsementsoftheDiv.Engr.andtheComm.ofPublicHighways,theapproval of the Sec.of PW & C, andtheverificationofthe representativeofthe Bureau ofSupplyCoordination), petitioner approvedandeffectedpaymentofthevoucherandwithheldthe20%equivalentofP8,706inordertosubmitthedocuments coveringthetransactiontotheSupervisingAuditorforreview. Aftermakingacanvass,theGeneralAuditingOffice determinedthetransactiontobeoverpricedbyatleastP40,000.Malversationchargeswerefailedagainstthedistrictengr. andcivilengr.involved.Amandamussuitwasfiledbytheresp.w/csoughttocompelpetitionergovernmentauditorsto approvethepaymentofthevouchercoveringthebalance.TheLCdecidedinfavorofresp.Singson.Hencethisappealby certiorari.

HELD:Itisapparentthatresp.Singson'scauseofactionisamoneyclaimagainsttheGovt,forthepaymentof theallegedbalanceofthecostofsparepartssuppliedbyhimtotheBureauofPublicHighways. Assuming momentarilythevalidityofsuchclaim,mandamusisnottheremedytoenforcethecollectionofsuchclaim againsttheState***,butanordinaryactionforspecificperformance***.Actually,thesuitdisguisedasonefor mandamustocompeltheAuditorstoapprovethevouchersforpayment,isasuitagainsttheState,w/ccannot prosperorbeentertainedbytheCourtexceptw/theconsentoftheState***.Inotherwords,theresp.should havefiledhisclaimw/theGeneralAuditingOffice,undertheprovisionsofCA327***w/cprescribethe conditionsunderw/cmoneyclaimagainstthegovernmentmaybefiled. xxxItistruethatonceconsentissecured,anactionmaybefiled.ThereisnothingtopreventtheState, however,insuchstatutorygrant,torequirethatcertainadministrativeproceedingsbehadandbeexhausted. Also,intheproperforuminthejudicialhierarchycanbespecifiedifthereafteranappealwouldbetakenbythe partyaggrieved.Here,therewasnorulingoftheAuditorGen.Evenhadtherebeensuch,thecourttow/cthe mattershouldhavebeenelevatedisthisTribunal;theLCcouldnotlegallyactonthematter.Adapted.

(2)Quasidelictscommittedbyspecialagents
Art.2180.Theobligationimposedbyarticle2176isdemandablenotonlyforone'sownactsoromissions, butalsoforthoseofpersonsforwhomoneisresponsible. xxx TheStateisresponsibleinlikemannerwhenitactsthroughaspecialagent,butnotwhenthedamagehas beencausedbytheofficialtowhomthetaskdoneproperlypertains,inwhichcasewhatisprovidedinArt.2176 shallbeapplicable.

xxx(CivilCode.) Art.2176.Whoeverbyactoromissioncausesdamagetoanother,therebeingfaultornegligence,isobliged topayforthedamagedone.Suchfaultornegligence,ifthereisnopreexistingcontractualrelationbetweenthe parties,iscalledaquasidelictandisgovernedbytheprovisionsofthisChapter.(ibid.)

Art.2180oftheCivilCodeallowsasuitagainstthegovernmentforquasidelictscommittedbythe governmentwhenactingthroughspecialagents(thoseperformingnonregularfunctions) Butifthetortiousactwascommittedbyaregularemployee,theinjuredpartycouldonlybringasuitfor damagesagainsttheemployeeinhispersonalcapacity. Itshouldbenotedinthisconnection,thatinMerrittvsGovt.ofthePhilippineIslands,34Phil311,the SCsaidthatitisthereforeevidentthattheStateisonlyliableforactsofitsagents,officersandEEswhenthey actasspecialagentswithinthemeaningofArt.1903(nowArt.2180)andthatthechauffeuroftheambulanceof theGeneralHospitalwasnotsuchagent. Inthiscase,thePhilippine GeneralHospital(PGH),theagency involved,didnotyethaveseparatelegalpersonalityfromthePhilippineGovt.Itshouldfurtherbenotedthatthe plaintiffwasallowedtosuebyvirtueofaspeciallawbutwasunabletoholdthedefendantgovt.liablesincethe injurieswerecausedbyaregulardriverofthegovt.andnotaspecialagent.

MerrittvGovernmentofthePhilippineIslands,34Phil311 F:
Merritt,whileridinghismotorcyclewashitbyanambulanceownedbythePhilippineGeneralHospital.Itwas drivenbyadriveremployedbythehospital. InorderforMerritttosuethePhilippinegovernment,ActNo.2457was enactedbythePhilippineLegislatureauthorizingE.MerritttobringsuitagainsttheGovernmentofthePhilippineIslands andauthorizingtheAttorneyGeneralofsaidIslandstoappearinsaidsuit.AsuitwasthenfiledbeforetheCFIofManila whichfixedtheresponsibilityforthecollisionsolelyontheambulancedriveranddeterminedtheamountofdamagestobe awardedtoMerritt.Bothpartiesappealedfromthedecision,plaintiffMerrittastotheamountofdamagesanddefendant inrenderingtheamountagainstthegovernment.

ISSUE:DidthedefendantinenactingActNo.2457simplywaiveitsimmunityfromsuitordiditalsoconcede itsliabilitytotheplaintiff? HELD:Byconsentingtobesued,astatesimplywaivesitsimmunityfromsuit.Itdoesnottherebyconcedeits liability totheplaintiff,orcreateanycauseofaction inhisfavor,orextend its liability toanycausenot previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submit itself to the jurisdictionofthecourt,subjecttoitsrighttointerposeanylawfuldefense. ActNo.2457authorizesE.Merritttobringsuitforthepurposeoffixingtheresponsibilityforthe collisionanddeterminingtheamountofdamages,ifany,towhichE.Merrittisentitledonaccountofsaid collision.ThegovernmentdidnotassumeanyliabilityundertheAct.

TheGovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsisonlyliable,fortheactsofitsagents,officersandemployees whentheyactasspecialagentswithinthemeaningofparagraph5ofA1903,OCC(par.6,Art.2180,NCC).A specialagentisonewhoreceivesadefiniteandfixedorderorcommission,foreigntotheexerciseoftheduties ofhisofficeifheisaspecialofficial.Thespecialagentactsinrepresentationofthestateandexecutesthetrust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who onhis own responsibility performs the functions w/c are inherent in and naturally pertaintohisofficeandw/careregulatedbylawandtheregulations.TheresponsibilityoftheStateislimited tothatw/citcontractsthroughaspecialagent,dulyempoweredbyadefiniteorderorcommissiontoperform someactorchargedw/somedefinitepurposew/cgivesrisetotheclaim,andnotweretheclaimisbasedonacts oromissionsimputabletoapublicofficialchargedw/someadministrativeortechnicalofficewhocanbeheld totheproperresponsibilityinthemannerlaiddownbythelawofcivilresponsibility. Thechauffeurofthe ambulanceoftheGeneralHospitalwasnotsuchanagent.Adapted.

USv.Ceballos,182SCRA644 F:
Resp. was employed as barracks boy in Camp O'Donnel, and was arrested following a buybust operation conductedbypetitioners,whoareofficersoftheUSAirForceandspecialagentsoftheAirForceOfficeofSpecial Investigators.Petitionersfiledchargesagainstresp.forviolationofRA6425andtestifiedagainsthimatthetrial.Resp wasdismissedfromemploymentasaresultofthefilingofthecharge. Resp.filedacomplaintfordamagesagainst petitionersforhisremoval.Defendants(petitionersherein)filedtheaffirmativedefensethattheyhadonlydonetheirduty intheenforcementofPhil.lawsinsidetheAmericanbasespursuanttotheRPUSMBA. Later,theircounselfileda motiontowithdrawanswerandmovedforthedismissalofthecomplaintonthegroundthatdefendantswereactingintheir officialcapacityandthatthecomplaintagainstthemwasineffectasuitagainsttheUSw/oitsconsent.

HELD: Petitionerscannotbedirectlyimpleadedforactsimputabletotheirprincipalw/chasnotgivenits consenttobesued.Petitionerswereactingintheexerciseoftheirofficialfunctionswhentheyconductedthe buybustoperation. Pvt resp. invoke Art. 2180, NCCw/c holds the govt liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument,itwouldseem,ispremisedonthegroundthatsincetheofficersaredesignatedas"specialagents,"the USgovtshouldbeliablefortheirtorts. Suabilityv.Liability. Thereseemstobeafailuretodistinguishbet.suabilityandliability. Suability dependsontheconsentofthestatetobesued,liabilityontheapplicablelawandtheestablishedfacts. The circumstancethatastateissuabledoesnotnecessarilymeanthatitisliable;ontheotherhand,itcanneverbe heldliableifitdoesnotfirstconsenttobesued.Liabilityisnotconcededbythemerefactthatthestatehas alloweditselftobesued.Whenthestatedoeswaiveitssovereignimmunity,itisonlygivingthepltffthechance toprove,itcan,thatthedef.isliable. Thesaidart.establishesaruleofliability,notsuability.Thegovtmaybeheldliableunderthisart.only ifitfirstallowsitselftobesuedthroughanyoftheacceptedformsofconsent. Moreover,theagentperforminghisregularfunctionsisnotaspecialagentevenifheissodenominated, asinthecaseatbar.Nolessimportant,thesaidprovisionappearstoregulateonlytherelationsofthelocalstate w/itsinhabitantsand,hence,appliesonlytothePhil.govtandnottoforeigngovtsimpleadedinourcourts. WerejecttheconclusionofthetrialcourtthattheanswerfiledbythespecialcounseloftheOfficeof theSheriffJudgeAdvocateofClarkAirBasewasasubmissionbytheUSgovttoitsjurisdiction. Express

waiverofimmunitycannotbemadebyamerecounselofthegovtbutmustbeeffectedthroughadulyenacted statute.Neitherdoessuchanswercomeundertheimpliedformsofconsent. NOTESontheconsolidatedcasesUSv.Guinto,etal.: 1.Thedoctrineofstateimmunityissometimesderisivelycalledthe"royalprerogativeofdishonesty" becauseoftheprivilegeitgrantsthestatetodefeatanylegitimateclaimagainstitbysimplyinvokingitsnon suability.ThisimplieshoweverthattheStatemaybesuedwithitsconsent. 2.Theconsentofthestatetobesuedmaybemanifestedexpresslyorimpliedly.Expressconsentmaybe embodiedinagenerallaworaspeciallaw. Expressconsentiseffectedonlybythewill ofthelegislature throughthemediumofadulyenactedstatute.Consentisimpliedwhenthestateentersintoacontractorititself commenceslitigation.Whenthegovt.entersintoacontract,itisdeemedtohavedescendedtothelevelofthe othercontractingpartyanddivestedofitssovereignimmunityfromsuitwithitsimpliedconsent.However,dis tinctionsmustbemadebetweensovereignandproprietaryacts.Thestatemayonlybeliableforproprietaryacts. Asforthefilingofacomplaintbythegovt.,suabilitywillresultonlywherethegovt.isclaimingafffirmative relieffromthedefendant. 3.ThereisnoquestionthattheUSwillbedeemedtohaveimpliedlywaiveditsnonsuabilityifithas enteredintoacontractinitsproprietaryorprivatecapacity.Itisonlywhenthecontractinvolvesitssovereignor governmentalcapacitythatnosuchwaivermaybeimplied. 4.Inthiscase,byenteringintoanemploymentcontract[aproprietaryfunction]withtherespondents, the US impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity. The state could therefore be sued since such contractsarecommercialinnature.Adapted.

(3)Incorporationofgovernmentownedorcontrolledcorps. Whenthegovernmentcreatesacorporation,itinvariablyprovidesthiscorporationaseparateentityand with the capacity to sue and be sued. If the government entity is given the capacity to be sued, the suit encompassesanykindofaction,includingonefromtort. In SSSvCA,120SCRA707(1983),thepropertyofoneSocorroCruzwasforeclosed duetothe negligenceoftheregularemployeesofSSSinmistakingheraccount,whichwasupdated,withthatofanother SocorroCruz,whichwasinarrears.TheSC,ingrantingnominaldamagestotheclaimant,seemedtobesaying thatSSScouldhaveinvokedthedefenseofArt.2180,whichitdidnot. TheseparateopinionofMakasiar enunciatedthis.[Note:Consenttobesuedincludesactionsbasedonquasidelicteventhoughcommittedby regularagentsandnotbyspecialagents.] Sotherule,itseems,isthatagovernmententitycanbesuedfortort,butifitis,itcaninvokethedefense thatitactedthroughitsregularemployees,notspecialagents.

PNBvsCIR,81SCRA314(1978) SincethePHHChadthecapacitytobesued,anyjudgmentagainstitcouldbeenforcedbyawritofexecution,

anditsfundscouldevenbegarnished. F:
TheUnitedHomesiteEmployeesandLaborersAssociationofthePeople'sHomesiteandHousingCorporation (PHHC)inacasefiledbeforetheCourtofIndustrialRelationsprevailedoverPHHC.Thefinalandexecutoryjudgment wassoughttobeenforcedviaawritofgarnishmentagainstPHHC'sfundsdepositedwithPNB.PNBsoughttoquashthe writallegingthatthefundswere"publicincharacter."Themotionwasdenied,hencethispetitionforcertiorarialleging graveabuseofdiscretionindenyingthemotion.

HELD:PHHCwasagovernmentownedentity.Ithaspersonalitydistinctandseparatefromthegovernment.It hasallthepowersofacorporationundertheCorporationLaw,accordinglyitmaysueandbesuedandmaybe subjectedtocourtprocessesjustlikeanyothercorporation.Byengaginginbusinessthroughtheinstrumentality ofacorp.,thegovtdivestsitselfofitssovereigncharacter,soastorenderthecorp.subjecttotherulesgoverning privatecorporations.Garnishmentisaproperremedyforaprevailingpartytoproceedagainstthefundsofa corporateentityevenifownedorcontrolledbythegovernment. Itiswellsettledthatwhenthegovernment enters into commercial business, it abandons itssovereign capacity and istobe treated just like anyother corporation.(ThecasewasbasedprimarilyonNASSCOvCIR,118Phil782.)VV.

RayovsCFIofBulacan,110SCRA456 F:
Petitioners are among the many victims of the flooding caused by the simultaneous opening of the three floodgatesofAngatDamduringtheheightoftyphoon"Kading".ThecomplaintstheyfiledbeforetheCFIofBulacan weredismissedforthereasonthattheNPCintheoperationoftheAngatDamis`performingapurelygovernmental function,'thusit`cannotbesuedwithouttheexpressconsentoftheState.'RespondentCFIdeniedMRecon,hence,this petition.

HELD:Thegovernmenthasorganizedaprivatecorporation,putmoneyinitandhasallowedittosueandbe suedinanycourtunderitscharter[RA6395,Sec.3(d)].Asagovernmentownedandcontrolledcorporation,it hasapersonalityofitsown,distinctandseparatefromthatoftheGovernment(NASSCOvCIR).Moreover,the charterprovisionthattheNPCcan"sueandbesuedinanycourt"iswithoutqualificationonthecauseofaction andaccordinglyitcanincludeatortclaimsuchastheoneinstitutedbypetitioners.Adapted.

SSSV.CA,120SCRA707(1983) F:
TheSpousesDavidandSocorroCruzobtainedaloanfromSSSonthesecurityofalotlocatedinSto.Rosario, Pateros,Rizal.Claimingthatthecouplehaddefaultedinthepaymentofthemonthlyamortizations,theSSSappliedfor theforeclosureofthemortgage.Asaresultthesheriffscheduledthesaleoftheprop.mortgagedandnoticeofthesalewas published.Itturnedoutthatwhilethecouplefailedtopaysomeoftheamortizationsontime,atthetimeoftheapplication forforeclosure,theiraccountwasuptodate.TheSSSmistookthecouple'saccountforthatofanotheronebearingthe samenameSocorroCruz,althoughw/differentmiddlename.ThespousessuedSSSfordamages.

HELD:(1)Havingacceptedthelatepaymentsofthemonthlyinstallments,theSSScouldnotsuddenlyandw/o priornoticetothecoupleapplyfortheextrajudicialforeclosureoftheirmortgage.Therewasnegligenceonthe partoftheSSSwhenitmistooktheloanaccountofSocorroJ.CruzforthatofSocorroC.Cruz.Itsattention

wascalledtotheerrorbutitrefusedtoacknowledgeitsmistake.SSSshould,thus,beheldliablefornominal damages. (2)Underitscharter[RA1161,sec.4(k)]theSSScansueandbesued.So,evenassumingthattheSSS enjoysimmunityfromsuitasanentityperforminggovernmentalfunctionsbyvirtueoftheexplicitprovisionof theenablinglaw,itcanbesued.Thegovernmentmustbedeemedtohavewaivedimmunityinrespectofthe SSS,althoughitdoesnottherebyconcedeitsliability. Makasiar,dissenting: xxx. Theprovisionthatitcanbesuedandbesuedmerelyallowsaprivatecitizenaremedyforthe enforcementofhisrightsbutalwayssubjecttothedefenseofthegovt.SinceunderArt.2180,NCCtheStateis liablefortortonlywhenitactsthroughspecialagentsbutnotwhenitactsthroughofficialstowhomthetask doneproperlypertainsandwhoaloneareliablefortheirtorts,theSSScannotbeheldliablefordamagesinthis case.VV.

Impliedconsent: (1)Whenthegovernmententersintobusinesscontracts Whenthegovernmentisintheperformanceofgovernmentalfunction(jureimperii),evenifitenters intoacontractwithprivatepersons,itcannotbesuedwithoutitsconsent. ThusinUnitedStatesvRuiz,136SCRA487(1985).acontractfortherepairofwharvesandpiersatthe navalbaseinSubicwasheldtobeinlinewiththegovernmentalfunctionoftheUSGovernmentandsothe immunityexisted. But when the government enters into commercial contracts and descends to the status of ordinary persons(juregestioni),itcanbesuedlikeanyotherperson. In Malong vPNR,138SCRA63(1985),itwasheld thatwhen the stateorganized thePhilippine NationalRailway,itdivesteditselfofitssovereigncapacity,andsobecameliablefordamagesthatarosefrom thedeathofonewhofellfromanoverloadedtrain.

UnitedStatesofAmericav.Ruiz,136SCRA487(1985) StateImmunityfromSuitsExtendstocontractsRelatingtoSovereignFunctions. F:
In5/72,theUSadvertisedforbidprojectsinvolvingtherepairofwharvesandcertainworksontheshorelinesat itsnavalbaseinSubic,Zambales.EligiodeGuzman&Co.,Inc.(EG&Co.)submittedproposalsinconnectionw/w/cit received2telegramsfromtheUSgovtaskingittoconfirmitspriceproposalsandthenameofitsbondingco.However,in 6/82,EG&Co.wasinformedthatitsproposalshadbeenrejectedandtheprojectshadbeenawardedto3rdparties.EG& Co.broughtsuitintheCFItocompeltheUSgovttoallowittoperformtheworkontheprojects.Italsoaskedforawritof prel.inj.torestraintheUSgovtfromenteringintocontractw/3rdpartiesforworkontheprojects.TheUSgovtmovedto dismissthecomplaint,butitsmotionwasdenied.Hencethepetitionforreview.

HELD: Ithasbeennecessarytodistinguishbet.sovereignandgovernmentalacts(jureimperii)andprivate, commercialandproprietaryacts(juregestionis.)TheresultisthatStateimmunitynowextendsonlytoactsjure imperii.However,theresp.Judgeheldthatbyenteringintoacontractfortherepairofwharvesorshorelinesthe Statedidnotactinitsgovernmentalcapacity. Astatemaybesaidtohavedescendedtothelevelofanindividualandcanthusbedeemedtohave tacitlygivenitsconsenttobesuedonlywhenitentersintobusinesscontracts.Theruledoesnotapplywhere thecontractrelatestotheexerciseofitssovereignfunctions. Inthiscasetheprojectsareanintegralpartofthenavalbasew/cisdevotedtothedefenseofboththe USandthePhils.,indisputablyafunctionofthegovtofthehighestorder;theyarenotutilizedfor,nordedicated to,commercialorbusinesspurpose.VV.

MalongvPNR,138SCRA63(1985) PNRnotImmunefromSuit F:
ThepetitionerssuedthePhilippineNationalRailway(PNR)fordamagesforthedeathoftheirsonwhofellfrom anoverloadedPNRtrainon10/30/77.However,thetrialcourtdismissedthesuitonthegroundthat,underitscharteras amendedbyPD741,thePNRhadbeenmadeagovernmentinstrumentality,andthatassuchitisimmunefromsuit.

HELD: Thecorrectruleisthat"notallgovernmententities,whethercorporateornoncorporate,areimmune fromsuits.Immunityfromsuitisdeterminedbythecharacteroftheobjectsforw/ctheentityisorganized." Whenthegovtentersintoacommercialtransactionitabandonsitssovereigncapacityandistobetreatedlike anyothercorp.Inthiscase,thestatedivesteditselfofitssovereigncapacitywhenitorganizedthePNR,w/cis nodifferentfromitspredecessor,theManilaRailroadCo.VV.

(2)Whenitwouldbeinequitableforthestatetoinvokeitsimmunity,orwhenittakesprivateproperty forpublicuseorpurpose. InAmigablevCuenca,(43SCRA360),AlfonsovPasayandMinisteriovCFI,40SCRA464,theSC allowedsuitfortherecoveryofpossessionoftitledlandspreviously(decades)takenoverbythegovernmentfor expansionofroadswithoutjustcompensationandtheproperexpropriationproceedings.Insoholding,itsaid thatitwouldbeunjustforthegovernmenttoinvokeimmunityafterithasitselfviolatedtherightsoftheparties claimantbytakingoverthepossessionofthelands. InSantiagovRepublic,87SCRA294(1978),theSCallowedtherevocationofadeedofdonationmade totheBureauofPlantIndustryforitsfailuretocomplywiththeconditionthatitshouldinstallalightningand watersystemonthepropertyandbuildanofficebuildingwithparkinglotbeforeacertaindate.Itwouldbe

unfair,saidthecourt,forthegovernmenttoinvokeitsimmunityaftergratuitouslyreceivingpropertyandnot fulfillingitsconditions. ThecaseofCommissionerofPublicHighwaysvsBurgos,96SCRA831,simplyimplementedtheruling inAmigablevsCuenca,43SCRA360.Intheearliercase,thequestionraisedwastherightoftheplaintifftosue thegovt.forrecoveryofthevalueofherpropertywhichhadbeenconvertedintopublicstreetswithoutpayment toherofjustcompensation.AlthoughitwasshownthatshehadnotpreviouslyfiledherclaimwiththeAuditor Generalasnormallyrequired,theSCdecidedinherfavor.TheSCheldthatthedoctrineofgovernmental immunityfromsuitcannotserveasaninstrumentforperpetratinganinjusticeonacitizen.Inthisinstantcase, theSCfixedjustcompensationbasedonthemarketvalueofthelandatthetimeofthetaking.

Santiagov.Republic,87SCRA284(1978) ConsenttobeSuedPresumedwhereAllowanceofImmunityWouldbeInequitable F:
PetitionerfiledanactionintheCFIofZamboangaCityfortherevocationofadeedofdonationw/cheandhis wifehadmadetotheBureauofPlantIndustry.Heclaimedthatthedoneefailedtocomplyw/theconditionofthedonation thatthedoneeshouldinstallalightingandwatersystemontheprop.andbuildanofficebuildingw/parkinglotthereon notlaterthan12/7/74.Thetrialcourtdismissedtheactiononthegroundofsovereignimmunity.

HELD:Ordinarily,asuitofthisnaturecannotprosper.Itwould,however,bemanifestlyunfairforthegovt,as donee,w/cisallegedtohaveviolatedtheconditionunderw/citreceivedgratuitouslycertainprop.,toinvokeits immunity.Sinceitwouldbeagainstequityandjusticetoallowsuchadefenseinthiscase,consenttobesued couldbepresumed.VV. CommissionerofPublicHighwaysvBurgos,96SCRA831(1980) F:

Priv. respondent Victoria Amigable was the owner of a parcel of land in Cebu City; sometime in 1924 the Governmenttookthislandforroadrightofwaypurpose.In1959,shefiledintheCFIofCebuacomplaintforrecoveryof ownershipandpossessionplusdamages. Thiscomplaintwasdismissedonthegroundsofestoppelandthestatuteof limitationsandalsoonthegroundofnonsuabilityoftheGovernment.TheSConappealreversedtheCFIandremanded the case for the purpose of determining the compensation to be paid Amigable, directing that to determine just compensationfortheland,thebasisshouldbethepriceorvaluethereofatthetimeofthetaking.Respondentjudge, howeverdidnotheedthedirectivebutinsteadtookintoaccountsuperveninginflationofthecurrencyandadjustedthe valueinaccordancewiththeprevailingpesodollarexchangerate.HisbasiswasArticle1250oftheCivilCode.TheSol Genappealedthedecision.

HELD:Art.1250appliesonlytocaseswhereacontractoragreementisinvolved.Itdoesnotapplywherethe obligationtopayarisesfromlaw,independentofcontract.ThetakingofprivatepropertybytheGovernmentin theexerciseofitspowerofeminentdomaindoesnotgiverisetoacontractualobligation. Thevalueofthe propertyatthetimethegovttookpossessionofthelandinquestion,nottheincreasedvalueresultingfromthe

passageoftime,w/cinvariablybringsunearnedincrementtorealestate,representsthevaluetobepaidasjust compensationfortheprop.taken.Adapted.

(3)IftheGovt.filesacomplaint,defendantmayfileacounterclaimagainstit InFroilanvsOrientalPanShipping,GRL6060(Sept.30,1950),theSCheldthatwhentheStateitself filesacomplaint,thedefendantisentitledtofileacounterclaimagainstit.Thisisbasedonequitablegrounds. TheSCruledthatthegovt.impliedlyalloweditselftobesuedwhenitfiledacomplaintininterventionforthe purposeofassertingaclaimforaffirmativereliefagainsttheplaintiff,towit,recoveryofavessel.

FroilanvsOrientalPanShipping,12SCRA276,GRL6060(Sept.30,1950) F:FroilanpurchasedfromShippingCommissionavesselforP200,000payingP50Tdownpayment.ACMwasexecuted
tosecurethepaymentofthebalance.Forvariousreasonsincludingnonpaymentofinstallments,theCommissiontook possessionofthevesselandconsideredthecontractofsalecancelled.TheCommissioncharteredanddeliveredsaidvessel toPanOriental. FroilanappealedfromtheactionoftheCommissionandhewasrestoredtoalltherightsunderthe originalcontract. However, PanOriental retained thepossessionofthevessel. Froilanfileda complaint torecover possessionofthevessel.Awritofreplevinwasissued.TheGovtintervenedallegingthatFroilanfailedtopaythebalance totheCommission;thattheintervenorwasentitledtothepossessionofsaidvesselunderthetermsoftheoriginalcontract orinorderforittoeffecttheextrajudicialforeclosureofthemortgage.PanOrientalansweredthecomplaintinintervention prayingthatifRPsucceededinobtainingthepossessionofthevessel,tocomplyw/itsobligationofdeliveringittoPan Orientalpursuanttotheircontractofbareboatcharterw/optiontopurchase. Complaintininterventionwasdismissed uponFroilan'spaymentofhisaccounttotheRP.RPfiledamotiontodismissthecounterclaimw/cPanOrientalhadfiled againstitinviewofthecourt'sorderdismissingthecomplaintinintervention.CounterclaimofPanO.againstRPwas dismissed.Hence,thisappeal.RPraised,amongothers,asgroundforthedismissalofPanO'scounterclaim,theState's immunityfromsuit.

HELD: Byfilingitscomplaintinintervention, thegovtineffectwaiveditsrightofnonsuability. Stated otherwise, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the State surrendered its privileged positionandcamedowntothelevelofthedef.Thelatterautomaticallyacquires,w/incertainlimits,therightto setupwhateverclaimsandotherdefenseshemighthaveagainsttheState.Adapted.

(d)Scopeofconsent (1)UnderActNo.3083
Sec.1.SubjecttotheprovisionsofthisAct,theGovernmentofthePhilippinesherebyconsentsandsubmits tobesueduponanymoneyedclaiminvolvingliabilityarisingfromcontract,expressorimplied,whichcouldserve asabasisofcivilactionbetweenprivateparties. xxx

Whenamoneyjudgmentisgivenagainstthegovernment,theordinaryruleforexecutionwouldnot apply,fortheconsentofthegovernmenttobesuedisonlyuptothepointofjudgment.Ifitdoesnotpay,it cannotbecompelledtopaybyattachmentorotherwise(howdoesoneattachtheQuezonbridge?) TheprocedureisforonetofurnishtheOfficeofthePresidentwiththedecisionsoitcouldincludethe amountinthebudgetforthenextyearasthebasisforappropriation(sincetherecanbenodisbursementof publicfundsexceptinpursuanceoflaw). Ifthejudgenonethelessissuesawritofexecutionagainstgovernmentfundsorproperty,noordinary civilactioncanbefiledagainstthejudge,unlessthereisashowingofmalice.But,areinstatementofthefunds togovernmentaccountsandrefundbytheprivatepartycanbeordered.(CommissionerofPublicHighwaysv SanDiego,31SCRA616(1970),reiteratingthecaseofAlsuavJohnson.)

CommissionerofPublicHighwaysvSanDiego,31SCRA616(1970) F:
On 11/20/40, the Govt filed a complaint for eminent domain (ED) in the CFI for the expropriation of land belongingtoN.T.HashimneededtoconstructEDSA.On11/25/40,theGovttookpossessionoftheprop.upondepositw/ thecitytreasurerofthesumfixedbythecourtastheprovisionalvalueofallthelotsneededtoconstructtheroad.In1958, theestateofHashim,throughitsJudicialAdministrator,TomasHashim,filedamoneyclaimw/theQCEngr'sOffice,w/c wasallegedtobetheFMVoftheprop.inquestion.Nothinghavingcomeoutoftheclaim,theestatefiledacomplaintfor therecoveryoftheFMVagainsttheBureauofPublicHighways(BPH.)Thepartiesenteredintoacompromiseagreement w/cwasapprovedbytheCFI.Theestatefiledamotionfortheissuanceofawritofexecution,w/cthecourtgranted.A noticeofgarnishment,togetherw/awritofexecutionwasservedonPNB,notifyingitthatlevywastherebymadeuponthe fundsofpetitionerBureauandtheAuditorGeneralondeposit. Resp.Coruna,inhiscapacityasChief,Documentation StaffofPNB'sLegalDept.,authorizedtheissuanceofacashier'scheckofthebankintheamountofthejudgment/ compromiseagreement. PetitionerscontendthatPNBactedprecipitatelyinhavingdeliveredtheamountw/oaffording petitioner Bureau a reasonable time to contest the validity of the garnishment. It demands that the bank credit the petitioner'saccountw/theamountgarnished.

HELD:Althoughthegovt,aspltff.inexpropriationproceedings,submitsitselftothejurisdictionoftheCourt andtherebywaivesitsimmunityfromsuit,thejudgementthatisthusrenderedrequiringitspaymentofthe awarddeterminedasjustcompensationforthecondemnedprop.asaconditionprecedenttothetransfertothe titletheretoinitsfavor,cannotberealized upon execution. xxx [It] isincumbent uponthelegislatureto appropriateanyadditionalamount,overandabovetheprovisionaldeposit,thatmaybenecessarytopaythe awarddeterminedinthejudgment,sincetheGovtcannotkeepthelandanddishonorthejudgment. xxx TheuniversalrulethatwheretheStategivesitsconsenttobesuedbyprivatepartieseitherby generalorspeciallaw,itmaylimitclaimant'sclaim"onlyuptothecompletionofproceedingsanteriortothe stageofexecution"andthatthepoweroftheCourtsendwhenthejudgmentisrendered,sincegovtfundsand propertiesmaynotbeseizedunderwritsofexecutionorgarnishmenttosatisfysuchjudgments,isbasedon obviousconsiderationsofpublicpolicy.Disbursementsofpublicfundsmustbecoveredbythecorresponding appropriationsasrequiredbylaw.ThefunctionsandpublicservicesrenderedbytheStatecannotbeallowedto be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriatedbylaw.RAM.

(2)Underacharter Whenconsenttobesuedisprovidedbythecharter,theconsentdoesnotstopwiththerendition,but goesuptothesatisfactionofthejudgment. InPNBvCIR,81SCRA314(1978),theSCheldthatsincethePHHChadthecapacitytobesued,any judgmentagainstitcouldbeenforcedbyawritofexecution,anditsfundscouldevenbegarnished. PNBvCIR,81SCRA314(1978),supra. (notinV.V.Mendoza'srevisedoutline). (e)Measureofrecovery When property has been unlawfully taken by the government so that it is nowcompelled to make payment,themeasureofrecoveryisthefairmarketvalueofthepropertyatthetimeoftaking(MinisteriovCFI, 40SCRA464). Thevalueofthepesoinrelationtothedollaratthetimeoftakingcannotbeconsidered.ForArt1250 of the Civil Code concerning supervening inflation has no application in eminent domain cases, being applicableonlytocontractualobligations[CommissionerofPublicHighwaysvBurgos,96SCRA831(1980)]. Ultimately,thefacevalueofthepesothenistheamounttobepaidnow.

D.Government 1.Governmentisthatinstitutionoraggregateofinstitutionsbywhichanindependentsocietymakesand carriesoutthoserulesofactionwhicharenecessarytoenablementoliveinasocialstateorwhichareimposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Governmentistheaggregateofauthoritieswhichruleasociety.(USvDorr,2Phil332,339).

U.S.vs.Dorr(2Phil332) F:
Thedefendants wereconvicteduponacomplaint chargingthem withtheoffenseofwriting,publishing,and circulatingascurrilouslibelagainsttheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesandtheInsularGovernmentofthePhilippine Islands.ThecomplaintisbaseduponSec.8ofActNo.292oftheCommissionwhichpunishesanypersonwhoshall "utterseditiouswordsorspeeches,write,publish,orcirculatescurrilouslibelsagainsttheU.S.GovernmentortheInsular GovermentofthePhil.Islands,orwhichtendtodisturborobstructanylawfulofficerinexecutinghisoffice,orwhichtend toinstigateotherstocabalormeettogetherforunlawfulpurposes,orwhichsuggestorinciterebelliousconspiraciesor riots,orwhichtendtostirupthepeopleagainsttheunlawfulauthoritiesxxx". Theallegedlibelwaspublishedasaneditorialintheissueofthe"ManilaFreedom".Thearticlementionedabout the"foolishworkthattheCivilCommissionisdoingallovertheIslands"referringtotheappointmentbythelatterof nativeswhichwerereferredtoas"insurgents"and"rogues"toimportantGovernmentpositions.

ISSUE:WhetherthepublicationconstitutesanoffenseunderSec.8ofACT.No.292 HELD:NO.Theterm"government"asemployedinACTNo.292oftheU.S.PhilippineCommissionisused in the abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished from the concrete organism of the Government.ThearticleinquestioncontainsnoattackuponthegovernmentalsystemoftheU.S.,anditisquite apparentthat,thoughgrosslyabusiveasrespectsboththeCommissionasabodyandsomeofitsindividual members,itcontainsnoattackuponthegovernmentalsystembywhichtheauthorityoftheU.S.isenforcedin theseislands.TheformofGovermentbyaCivilCommissionandaCivilGovernorisnotassailed.Itisthe characterofthemenwhoareinstructedwiththeadministrationofthegovernmentthatthewriterisseekingto bringintodisrepute.Adapted. Noteonthecase: Administration meanstheaggregateofthosepersonsinwhosehandsthereinsofthegovtareforthe timebeing(entrusted.) (notinVV'soutline) a.Functions Cruz: Thegovtperformstwokindsoffunctions,towit,theconstituentandtheministrant. Constituentfunctionsconstitutetheverybondsofsocietyandarethereforecompulsory.xxxMinistrant functionsarethoseundertakentoadvancethegeneralinterestsofsociety,suchaspublicworks,publiccharity, andregulationoftradeandindustry.Thesefunctionsaremerelyoptional.xxx To our SC, however, the distinction bet. constituent and ministrant functions is not relevant in our jurisdiction.InPVTAv.CIR,65SCRA416,itreiteratedtherulinginACCFAv.FederationofLaborUnions, 30SCRA649,thatsuchdistinctionhasbeenblurredbec.oftherepudiationofthe laissezfaire policyinthe Consti.xxx

b.DoctrineofParensPatriae Cruz: OneoftheimportanttasksofthegovtistoactfortheStateasparenspatriae,orguardianoftherights ofthepeople.xxx ThisprerogativeofparenspatriaeisinherentinthesupremepowereveryState,whetherthatpoweris lodgedinaroyalpersonorinthelegislature,andhasnoaffinitytothosearbitrarypowerswhicharesometimes exertedbyirresponsiblemonarchstothegreatdetrimentofthepeopleandthedestructionoftheirliberties.

c.DeJureandDeFactoGovernments Cruz: Adejuregovthasrightfultitlebutnopowerorcontrol,eitherbec.thishasbeenwithdrawnfromitor bec.ithasnotyetactuallyenteredintotheexercisethereof.Adefactogovt,ontheotherhand,isagovtoffact, thatis,itactuallyexercisespowerorcontrolbutw/olegaltitle. Thethreekindsofdefactogovtareasfollows: (1)Thegovtthatgetspossessionandcontrolof,orusurps,byforceorbythevoiceofthemajority,the rightfullegalgovtandmaintansitselfagainstthewillofthelatter. (2) Thatestablishedasanindependentgovtbytheinhabitantsofacountrywhoriseininsurrection againsttheparentstate. (3)Thatwhichisestablishedandmaintainedbymilitaryforceswhoinvadeandoccupyaterritoryof theenemeyinthecourseofwar,andw/cisdenominatedasagovtofparamountforce,liketheSecondRepublic ofthePhils.establishedbytheJapanesebelligerent. Thecharacteristicsofthiskindofdefactogovtare: (a) Itsexistenceismaintainedbyactivemilitarypowerw/intheterritories,andagainsttherightful authorityofanestablishedandlawfulgovt. (b)Duringitsexistence,itmustnecessarilybeobeyedincivilmattersbyprivatecitizenswho,byacts ofobediencerenderedinsubmissiontosuchforce,donotbecomeresponsible,aswrongdoers,forthoseacts, thoughnotwarrantedbythelawsoftherightfulgovt.

2."GovernmentofthePhilippines"defined GovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesisdefinedas"thecorporategovernmentalentitythrough whichthefunctionsofgovernmentareexercisedthroughoutthePhilippines,including,saveasthecontrary appearsfromthecontext,thevariousarmsthroughwhichpoliticalauthorityismadeeffectiveinthePhilippines, whetherpertainingtotheautonomousregions,theprovincial,city,municipalorbarangaysubdivisionsorother formoflocalgovernment."[AdinistrativeCodeof1987,Sec.2(1).]

Case: NACOCOisagovernmententityorganizedtopromotethecoconutindustry. Inalitigation concerningNACOCO,thegovernmentcounselappearedforitandobtainedatranscriptofstenographicnotes. UndertheRulesofCourt,thegovernmentisexemptedfrompaymentofthetranscript.IsNACOCOpartofthe government? TheSCheldthatitisnotbecauseNACOCOwasorganizedtoperformministrantfunctions. ButaccordingtoConfederationofGovernmentEmployeesvAgrarianReform,thedistinctionbetween thetwofunctionsofthegovernmentconstituentandministrantnolongerholdsunderthe1935Constitution, whichimposedagreaterroleonthegovernment. III.PRINCIPLESANDPOLICIESOFTHEPHILIPPINEGOVERNMENT

(notinV.V.Mendoza'srevisedoutline) Preamble We,thesovereignFilipinopeople,imploringtheaidofAlmightyGod,inordertobuildajustand humanesocietyandestablishagovernmentthatshallembodyouridealsandaspirations,promotethe commongood,conserveanddevelopourpatrimony,andsecuretoourselvesandourposteritythebless ingsofindependenceanddemocracyundertheruleoflawandaregimeoftruth,justice,freedom,love, equality,andpeace,doordainandpromulgatethisConstitution.

Whilethe1935Constitutionstartedwith"TheFilipinopeople...",the1973and1987Constitutions beginthepreamblewith"We,thesovereignFilipinopeople..."Thechangefromthirdpersonpointofviewtoa firstpersonpointofviewemphasizesthattheFilipinosthemselvesaretheonesestablishingtheConstitution. ThethirdpersonpresupposessomeonetalkingabouttheFilipinopeople,andyetthatsomeoneishimselfa Filipino. Whilethe1935and1973ConstitutionsreferredtotheDivineProvidence,the1987Constitutionrefers AlmightyGod,whichismorepersonal. Apreamblehastwofunctions:(1)identifytheauthorsoftheConstitution,and(2)statethegeneral principlesuponwhichtheConstitutionisfounded.(Setsthetoneforthesucceedingprovisions.) Principles A. It isa standard tobeobservedbecause itisrequiredbyjustice orfairnessorotherdimensions of morality 1.SovereigntyofitsPeopleandRepublicanism Art.II,Sec.1.ThePhilippinesisademocraticandrepublicanState.Sovereigntyresidesinthe peopleandallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem. Art.V.SUFFRAGE. Sec.1.SuffragemaybeexercisedbyallcitizensofthePhilippinesnototherwisedisqualifiedby law,whoareatleasteighteenyearsofage,andwhoshallhaveresidedinthePhilippinesforatleastone yearandintheplacewhereintheyproposetovoteforatleastsixmonthsimmediatelyprecedingthe election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed onthe exercise of suffrage. Sec.2.TheCongressshallprovideasystemforsecuringthesecrecyandsanctityoftheballotas wellasasystemforabsenteevotingbyqualifiedFilipinosabroad.

TheCongressshallalsodesignaprocedureforthedisabledandtheilliteratestovotewithoutthe

assistanceofotherpersons.Untilthen,theyshallbeallowedtovoteunderexistinglawsandsuchrulesas theCommissiononElectionsmaypromulgatetoprotectthesecrecyoftheballot. (notinVV'soutline) Art.VI,Sec.1.ThelegislativepowershallbevestedintheCongressofthePhilippineswhichshall consistofaSenateandaHouseofRepresentatives,excepttotheextentreservedtothepeoplebyprovision oninitiativeandreferendum. Underthisprinciple, thePhilippines isademocratic state thatis,agovernment for,of,and bythe people.Butitisnotapuredemocracy.Thus,whileitistruethatthepeoplearethepossessorsofsovereign power,itisequallythecasethattheycannotexercisethepowersofgovernmentdirectly,butonlythroughthe mediumoftheirdulyelectedrepresentatives. Theirparticipationingovernmentconsistsof: 1)Suffrageelectingtheofficialstowhomtheydelegatetherightofgovernment. 2)Plebiscite a)ratifyingtheConstitution b)approvinganyamendmentthereto c)withrespecttolocalmatters,approvinganychangesinboundaries,mergers,divisions,and evenabolitionoflocaloffices d)creatingmetropolitanauthorities,and e)creatingautonomousregions

3)Initiativeandreferendumenactingorproposinglaws,localornational,inareferendum. 4)Recall(UndertheLocalGovernmentCode.)[asaddedbyProf.Barlongay.] Barlongay: FeaturesofRepublicanism: 1.Itisagovtoflawsandnotofmen; 2.Thereisperiodicholdingofelections; 3.Thereisobservanceofprincipleofseparationofpowersandofchecksandbalances; 4.Thereisobservanceoftherolethatthelegislaturecannotpassorenactirrepealablelaws.

2.AdherencetoInternationalLaw

Preamble We,thesovereignFilipinopeople,imploringtheaidofAlmightyGod,inordertobuildajustand humanesocietyandestablishagovernmentthatshallembodyouridealsandaspirations,promotethe commongood,conserveanddevelopourpatrimony,andsecuretoourselvesandourposteritythebless ingsofindependenceanddemocracyundertheruleoflawandaregimeoftruth,justice,freedom,love, equality,andpeace,doordainandpromulgatethisConstitution. Art.II,Sec.2. ThePhilippines renounceswarasaninstrumentofnationalpolicy,adoptthe generallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawaspartofthelawoftheland,andadherestothepolicy ofpeace,equality,justice,freedom,cooperation,andamitywithallnations.

"Adopts the generally accepted principles of international law" means the Philippines uses the incorporation theory. Without need of statute, these principles of international law become part of the Philippinebodyoflawsfromthemunicipalpointofview. "Adherencetotheprinciplesofinternationallaw"wasadoptedfromtheKelloggBrianPact.

Art.II,Sec.7.TheStateshallpursueanindependentforeignpolicy.Initsrelationswithother states,theparamountconsiderationshallbenationalsovereignty,territorialintegrity,nationalinterest, andtherighttoselfdetermination. Art.II,Sec.8.ThePhilippines,consistentwiththenationalinterest,adoptsandpursuesapolicy offreedomfromnuclearweaponsinitsterritory.

"Consistentwithnationalinterest"admitsoftwointerpretations.OneviewholdsthattheConstitution itselfhasdecidedtohavenonuclearinterestasthepolicyoftheState.Theotherviewholdsthat,asshownby thedeliberationsoftheConstitutionalCommission,thephraseshouldbereadas"subjecttonationalinterest" whichmeansthattheissueofwhethertoallowthestockpilingofnuclearweaponsdependsonCongressional policy. ItistheintentandsenseoftheConstitutionalCommissionthatthephrase"consistentwithnational interest"xxxalsomeans"subjecttothenationalinterest."(JoaquinBernas,THECONSTITUTIONOFTHE REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINESACommentary,vol.II,1988ed.)

Art.XVIII,Sec.4.Allexistingtreatiesorinternationalagreementswhichhavenotbeenratified shallnotberenewedorextendedwithouttheconcurrenceofatleast2/3ofallthemembersoftheSenate. Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between Republic of the PhilippinesandUnitedStatesofAmericaconcerningMilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,or facilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippinesexceptunderatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenateand, whentheCongressrequires,ratifiedbyamajorityofvotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendum heldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingparties.

Thereasonwhytheagreementmustberecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingstateissoitis approvedbyitsownSenate,andnotjustbyitsPresident(executiveagreement),thus,committingitslegislature tohonortheagreementandpreventingitfromrefusingappropriationstherefore. 3.SupremacyofCivilianAuthority Art.II,Sec.3.Civilianauthorityisatalltimes,supremeoverthemilitary.TheArmedForcesof thePhilippinesistheprotectorofthepeopleandtheState. Itsgoalistosecurethesovereigntyofthe Stateandtheintegrityofthatnationalterritory. Art.VII,Sec.18. ThePresidentshallbetheCommanderinChiefofallarmedforcesofthe Philippines,andwheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppress lawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Incaseofinvasionorrebellion,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit, hemay,foraperiodnotexceedingsixtydays,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusorplace thePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.Withinfortyeighthoursfromtheproclamationof martiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,thePresidentshallsubmita reportinpersonor inwriting totheCongress. TheCongress, votingjointly,byavoteofatleasta majorityofallitsMembersinregularorspecialsession,mayrevokesuchproclamationorsuspension, whichrevocationshallnotbesetasidebythePresident.UpontheinitiativeofthePresident,theCongress may,inthesamemanner,extendsuchproclamationorsuspensionforaperiodtobedeterminedbythe Congress,iftheinvasionorrebellionshallpersistandpublicsafetyrequiresit. TheCongress,ifnotinsession,shallwithintwentyfourhoursfollowingsuchproclamationor suspension,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacall. TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiency ofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritorthe extensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioningofthecivilcourtsorlegislativeassemblies,norauthorisetheconfermentofjurisdictionon military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspendtheprivilegeofthewrit. Thesuspension of theprivilegeshallapplyonlytopersons judicially chargedforrebellion or

offensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion. Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbe judiciallychargedwithinthreedays,otherwiseheshallbereleased. Art.XVI,Sec.4.TheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshallbecomposedofacitizenarmedforce whichshallundergomilitarytrainingandservice,asmaybeprovidedbylaw.Itshallkeeparegularforce necessaryforthesecurityoftheState. Art.XVI,Sec.5. (1)AllmembersoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshalltakeanoathor affirmationtoupholdanddefendtheConstitution. (2)TheStateshallstrengthenthepatrioticspiritandnationalistconsciousnessofthemilitary,and respectforpeople'srightsintheperformanceoftheirduty. (3) Professionalism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and adequate remuneration and benefitsofitsmembersshallbeaprimeconcernoftheState.TheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshall beinsulatedfrompartisanpolitics. Nomemberofthemilitaryshallengagedirectlyorindirectlyinanypartisanpoliticalactivity. (4) NomembersoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesintheactiveserviceshall,atanytime,be appointedordesignatedinanycapacitytoacivilianpositionintheGovernment,includinggovernment ownedorcontrolledcorporationsoranyoftheirsubsidiaries. (5)Lawsonretirementofmilitaryofficersshallnotallowextensionoftheirservice. (6)TheofficersandmenoftheregularforceoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshallbe recruitedproportionatelyfromallprovincesandcitiesasfaraspracticable. (7)ThetourofdutyoftheChiefofStaffoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshallnotexceed three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the Presidentmayextendsuchtourofduty. (notinVV'soutline) Sec.6.TheStateshallestablishandmaintainonepoliceforce,whichshallbenationalinscopeand civilianincharacter,tobeadministeredandcontrolledbyanationalpolicecommission.Theauthorityof localexecutivesoverthepoliceunitsintheirjurisdictionshallbeprovidedbylaw.

Thesupremacyofcivilianruleoverthemilitaryisensuredby,(i)theinstallationofthePresident,the highestcivilianauthority,asthecommanderinchiefofthemilitary,(ii)therequirementthatmembersofthe AFPsweartoupholdanddefendtheConstitution,whichisthefundamentallawofthecivilgovernment,(iii)the professionalizationoftheserviceandthestrengtheningofthepatriotismandnationalism,andrespectforhuman rights,ofthemilitary,(iv)insulationoftheAFPfrompartisanpolitics,(v)prohibitionagainsttheappointment to a civil position, (vi) compulsory retirement of officers (no over staying of officers), so as to avoid propagation ofpower), (vii) a3year limitation on thetourofdutyoftheChiefofStaff,whichalthough extendibleincaseofemergencybythePresident,dependsonCongressionaldeclarationofemergency,(viii)re quirementofprofessionalrecruitment,soastoavoidanyregionalcliquefromformingwithintheAFP,aswellas

(ix)theestablishmentofapoliceforcethatisnotonlyciviliancharacterbutalsounderthelocalexecutives.

4.GovernmentasProtectorofthePeopleandPeopleasDefendersoftheState Art. II Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The GovernmentmaycalluponthepeopletodefendtheStateand,inthefulfillmentthereof,allcitizensmay berequiredunderconditionsprovidedbylaw,torenderpersonal,militaryorcivilservice. Art.II,Sec.5.Themaintenanceofpeaceandorder,theprotectionoflife,liberty,andproperty, andthepromotionofthegeneralwelfare,areessentialfortheenjoymentbyallthepeopleoftheblessing ofdemocracy.

Notetheemphasisonthegovernmentasservantofthepeople,ratherthanviceversa. Notealsothatthepeoplemaybylawarerequiredtorender"personal"(notproxy)militaryorcivil service.

5.SeparationofChurchandState Art.II,Sec.6.TheseparationoftheChurchandStateshallbeinviolable. Art.III,Sec.5.Nolawshallbemaderespectinganestablishmentofreligion,orprohibitingthe free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discriminationorpreference,shallforeverbeallowed.Noreligioustestshallberequiredfortheexercise ofcivilorpoliticalrights. Art.IX,C,Sec.2(5)xxxReligiousdenominationsandsectsshallnotberegistered(asapolitical party,organization,orcoalitionbytheCOMELEC). Art.VI,Sec.5(2) Thepartylistrepresentativesshallconstitutetwenty percentum ofthetotal numberofrepresentativesincludingthoseunderthepartylist. Forthreeconsecutivetermsafterthe ratificationofthisConstitution,onehalfoftheseatsallocatedtothepartylistrepresentativesshallbe filled,asprovidedbylaw,byselectionorelectionfromthelabor,peasant,urbanpoor,indigenouscultural communities,women,youth,andsuchothersectorsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthereligioussector.

Exceptions: Art.VI,Sec.28(3).Charitableinstitutions,churches,parsonagesorconventsappurtenantthereto,

mosques, nonprofit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusivelyusedforreligious,charitable,oreducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtaxation. Sec. 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employed directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitaryassuch,exceptwhensuchpriest,preacher,minister,ordignitary isassignedtotheArmed ForcesofthePhilippines,oranypenalinstitution,orgovernmentorphanageorleprosarium. Art.XIV,Sec.3(3).Attheoptionexpressedinwritingbytheparentsorguardians,religionshall beallowedtobe taught totheirchildren orwardsin public elementary andhigh schools within the regularclasshoursbyinstructorsdesignatedorapprovedbythereligiousauthoritiesofthereligionto whichthechildrenorwardsbelong,withoutadditionalcosttotheGovernment. Sec.4(2).Educationalinstitutions,otherthanthoseestablishedbyreligiousgroupsandmission boards,shallbeownedsolelybycitizensofthePhilippinesorcorporationsorassociationsatleast60%of thecapitalofwhichisownedbysuchcitizens. TheCongressmay,however,requireincreasedFilipino equityparticipationinalleducationalinstitutions. The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines. Noeducationalinstitutionsshallbeestablishedexclusivelyforaliensandnogroupofaliensshall comprisemorethan1/3oftheenrollmentinanyschool.Theprovisionsofthissubsectionshallnotapply to schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise providedbylaw,forotherforeigntemporaryresidents.

TheclassiccaseinseparationofchurchandstateisPamilvTeleron,whichinvalidatedtheselectiontoa localpostofFr.Gonzaga,(notehowever,thatecclesiasticsarenotprohibitedfromrunningforCongress). ItisdifficulttodrawthelinebetweenseparationofChurchandState. In Elizalde v Victoriano,for instance,alawexemptingmembersofIglesianiKristofromtherequirementthatallemployeesmustjoina unionasconditionforcontinuedemployment,pursuanttoaclosedshopagreementintheCBA,ontheground thatitisprohibitedbytheirreligion,washeldvalid.Foralthoughthelawamountedtoanestablishmentof religion,itwaslikewisepromotingthefreeexercisethereof. Thenonestablishment clauseisnotviolated,however,ifthebenefitderivedbyareligionfromthe expenditureofpublicfundsismerelyincidentaltopublicpurpose.Thus,inAglipayvRuiz,theSCheldthat thestampsprintedbythegovernmenttocommemoratethe33rdInternationalEucharisticCongressinManila didnotviolatetheseparationofchurchandstate,becauseitsmainpurposewastopromoteManilaasseatofthe congressandthustoattracttouriststoits(thestampshowedthemapofthePhilippines,notachalice). Not havingbeeninspiredbyanysectarianfeelingtofavoradenominationnortobenefittheRomanCatholicChurch, whateverreligiouscharacterthestamphadwasonlyincidentalanduncontemplated.

WhiletheConstitutionmandatesseparationofChurchandStatethrough(1)NonEstablishment,Free ExerciseandNoReligiousTestclausesintheBillofRights,(ii)thedisallowanceofthereligioussectorfrom beingregisteredasapoliticalpartyandfrombeingappointedassectoralrepresentativesofCongress,yetit allowsexceptionstotherule. (1)Theexemptionofreligious institutionsfromtaxationisarecognitionthattheChurchisnotall separatefromState,foriftheywerereallyso,theChurchshouldbetaxedbyStatelikeanyotherentity. (2)Publicfunds,whilegenerallyprohibitedfrombeingspentforreligiouspurposesasanaspectofthe NonEstablishmentclause,maybeappliedtopriestrenderingreligiousservicetotheAFP,apenalinstitution, oragovernmentorphanageorleprosarium.Thereasonistheexigencyoftheservice.IfmembersoftheAFP hadtogooutofthebarrackstoattendtotheirspiritualneeds,nationalsecuritymightbeendangered;ifinmates wereallowedtogooutofjailtohearmass,theymightneverreturn;andifleperswereallowedoutofthe leprosarium,theymightcontaminateothers. Thegeneralprohibition,however,doesnotapplytoapriestwho,forinstance,teachesMathematicsat UP,forpaymentinthiscaseisnotforreligiousactivitiesbutforteachingofasecularsubject. (3)Thepermissiontohaveoptimalreligiousinstructionduringregularclasshoursuponwrittenrequest oftheparentorguardian,tobetaughtbyateacherapprovedbytheauthoritiesofthereligionofwhichthechild isamember,provideditiswithoutcosttothegovernmentisanewprovisionintheConstitution.Undertheold AdministrativeCode,theinstructioncouldnotbewithinregularclasshours.UnderA359oftheCivilCode, religiousinstructionwouldevenbemadepartofthecurriculum(withgradesandfailingmarks),solongasthe parentsaskforit. (4)Withtheexceptionofsectarianschools,allschoolsmustbeownedbycitizensor60%Filipino corporations.Thecontrolandadministrationofallschools,includingsectarianschools,mustbeinthehandsof Filipinos.Furthermore,theycannotbeestablishedexclusivelyforaliens,andthealienpopulationintheschool shouldnotexceed1/3.

B.Policies A policy isastandardwhichsetsoutagoaltobereached,generallyanimprovementineconomic, politicalorsocialfeatureofthecommunity

1.IndependentforeignpolicyandanuclearfreePhilippines Art.II,Sec.7.TheStateshallpursueanindependentforeignpolicy.Initsrelationswithother states,theparamountconsiderationshallbenationalsovereignty,territorialintegrity,nationalinterest,

andtherighttoselfdetermination. Art.II,Sec.8.ThePhilippines,consistentwiththenationalinterest,adoptsandpursuesapolicy offreedomfromnuclearweaponsinitsterritory. Art.XVIII,Sec.4.Allexistingtreatiesorinternationalagreementswhichhavenotbeenratified shallnotberenewedorextendedwithouttheconcurrenceofatleast2/3ofallthemembersoftheSenate. Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between Republic of the PhilippinesandUnitedStatesofAmericaconcerningMilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,or facilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippinesexceptunderatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenateand, whentheCongressrequires,ratifiedbyamajorityofvotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendum heldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingparties.

2.AJustandDynamicSocialOrder Preamble ...inordertobuildajustandhumanesocietyandestablishaGovernmentthatshallembodyour idealsandaspirations,promotethecommongood,preserveanddevelopourpatrimony,andsecureto ourselvesandourposteritytheblessingsofindependenceanddemocracy... Art. II, Sec. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperityandindependenceofthenationandfreethepeoplefrompovertythroughpoliciesthatprovide adequatesocialservices,promotefullemployment,arisingstandardofliving,andanimprovedqualityof lifeforall. Art. XII, Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities,income,wealth;asustainedincreaseintheamountofgoodsandservicesproducedbythe nationforthebenefitofthepeople;andanexpandingproductivityasthekeytoraisingthequalityoflife forall,especiallytheunderprivileged. a.Promotionofsocialjustice Barlongay:The1987Constitution,comparedtothe1935andthe1973Constitution,containsthemostexpanded conceptofSocialJustice. TheclassicdefinitionofSocialJusticeisfoundinCalalangvs.Williams,70P726,whereJusticeLaurel declaredasfollows:
"Social Justice is 'neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,' but the

humanizationoflawsandtheequalizationofsocialandeconomicforcesbytheStatesothatjusticeinits rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotionofthewelfareofallthepeople,theadoptionbytheGovernmentofmeasurescalculatedto insureeconomicstabilityofallthecomponentelementsofsociety,throughthemaintenanceofaproper economicandsocialequilibriumintheinterrelationsofthemembersofthecommunity,constitutionally, throughtheadoptionofmeasureslegallyjustifiable,orextraconstitutionally, theexerciseofpowers underlyingtheexistenceofallgovernmentsonthetimehonoredprincipleof saluspopuliestsuprema lex."

Art.II,Sec.10.TheStateshallpromotesocialjusticeinallphasesofnationaldevelopment. Art.XIII,Sec.1. TheCongressshallgivehighestprioritytotheenactment ofmeasuresthat protectandenhancetherightofallthepeopletohumandignity,reducesocial,economicandpolitical inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the commongood. Tothisend,theStateshallregulatetheacquisition,ownership,use,anddispositionofproperty anditsincrements. Art.XIII,Sec.2.Thepromotionofsocialjusticeshallincludethecommitmenttocreateeconomic opportunitiesbasedonfreedomofinitiativeandselfreliance. Art.II,Sec.26. TheStateshallguaranteeequalaccesstoopportunitiesforpublicservice,and prohibitpoliticaldynastiesasmaybedefinedbylaw. Art.VII,Sec.13,par.2.Thespouseandrelativesbyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthe4thcivil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Member of the Constitutional Commissions,ortheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsof bureausoroffices,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations. (notinVV'soutline) Art.IX,B,Sec.7. Noelectiveofficial shallbeeligibleforappointment ordesignation inany capacitytoanypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure. Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficialshall holdanyotheremploymentintheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,including governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsorsubsidiaries. ThePresidentcannotholdanyotherpostexceptthoseallowedbytheConstitution,viz.,(1)Chairmanof NEDA,and(2)DepartmentSecretary(VV). TheVicePresidentcanholdacabinetseatwithoutneedofconfirmation.

Members ofthecabinet(SecretariesandUndersecretaries): Some areoftheview thattheclause "unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw"impliesthatwhenthereisalawallowingso,hemaybeappointedtoany othergovernmentpost,evenifnotaffiliatedtohiscabinetposition.EO284limitsthenumberofgovernment postsofcabinetmemberstonotmorethan2.However,EO284hasbeendeclaredunconstitutionalbytheSCin thecaseofCivilLibertiesUnionvsExecutiveSecretary(194S317).Theprohibitionhoweverdoesnotinclude positionsheldwithoutadditionalcompensationinexofficiocapacitiesasprovidedbylawandasrequiredbythe primaryfunctionsoftheconcernedofficial'soffice.[Forfurtherdiscussion,seeExecutiveDept.:Prohibitions.]

b.Respectforhumandignityandhumanrights Art.II,Sec.11.TheStatevaluesthedignityofeveryhumanpersonandguaranteesfullrespect forhumanrights. (notinVV'srevisedoutline) Art.XVI,Sec.5(2).TheStateshallstrengthenthepatrioticspiritandnationalistconsciousnessof themilitary,andrespectforpeople'srightsintheperformanceoftheirduty. Art.XIII,Sec.17 (1)ThereisherebycreatedanindependentofficecalledtheCommissiononHumanRights. (2)TheCommissionshallbecomposedofaChairmanandfourMemberswhomustbenatural borncitizensofthePhilippines,andamajorityofwhomshallbemembersoftheBar.Thetermofoffice andotherqualificationsanddisabilitiesoftheMembersshallbeprovidedbylaw. (3)UntilthisCommissionisconstituted,theexistingPresidentialCommissiononHumanRights shallcontinuetoexerciseitspresentfunctionsandpowers. (4)TheapprovedannualappropriationsoftheCommissionshallbeautomaticallyandregularly released. Sec.18.TheCommissiononHumanRightsshallhavethefollowingpowersandfunctions: (1) Investigate on its own or on complaint by any party all forms of human rights violations involvingcivilorpoliticalrights; (2)Adoptitsoperationalguidelinesandrulesofprocedureandciteforcontemptforviolations thereofinaccordancewiththeRulesofCourt; (3)Provideappropriatelegalmeasuresfortheprotectionofhumanrightsofallpersonwithinthe Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid servicestotheunderprivilegedwhosehumanrightshavebeenviolatedorneedprotection; (4)Exercisevisitorialpowersoverjails,prisons,ordetentionfacilities; (5)Establishacontinuingprogramofresearch,education,andinformationtoenhancerespectfor theprimacyofhumanrights; (6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and provide for, compensationtovictimsofviolationsofhumanrights,ortheirfamilies;

(7)MonitortheGovernment'scompliancewithinternationaltreatyobligationsonhumanrights; (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of document or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conductedbyitorunderitsauthority; (9)Requesttheassistanceofanydepartment,bureau,office,oragencyintheperformanceofits functions; (10)Appointitsofficersandemployeesinaccordancewithlaw;and (11)Performsuchotherdutiesandfunctionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw. Sec.19.TheCongressmayprovideforothercasesofviolationsofhumanrightsthatshouldfall withintheauthorityoftheCommissiontakingintoaccountitsrecommendation.

c.Fundamentalequalityofwomenandmen Art.II,Sec.14.TheStaterecognizestheroleofwomeninnationbuilding,andshallensurethe fundamentalequalityofmenandwomenbeforethelaw. (thefollowing2provisionsarenotinVV'srevisedoutline) Art.IV,Sec.1(2)inrelationwithSec.4.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines: xxx (2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines. Sec.4.CitizensofthePhilippineswhomarryaliensshallretaintheircitizenship,unlessbytheir actoromissiontheyaredeemedunderthelaw,tohaverenouncedit. Art.XIII,Sec.14.TheStateshallprotectworkingwomenbyprovidingsafeandhealthfulworking conditions,takingintoaccounttheirmaternalfunctions,andsuchfacilitiesandopportunitiesthatwill enhancetheirwelfareandenablethemtorealizetheirfullpotentialintheserviceofthenation. (notinVV'srevisedoutline) Art.XIII,Sec.11. TheStateshalladoptanintegratedandcomprehensiveapproachtohealth developmentwhichshallendeavortomakeessentialgoods,healthandothersocialservicesavailabletoall thepeopleataffordablecost. Thereshallbepriorityfortheneedsoftheunderprivilegedsick,elderly, disabled,women,andchildren.TheStateshallendeavortoprovidefreemedicalcaretopaupers. (SeealsoCANo.1,theNationalDefenseAct) One significant move to equalize men and women is in the area of citizenship. Under the 1935 Constitution,achildbornofaFilipinomotherbecameaFilipinoonlyuponelectionwhenhereachedtheageof majority.The1973Constitutionremovedthisstigmaandmadesuchbornafter17January1973aFilipinowith outtheneedofelection.The1987Constitutionimprovedthesituationevenmorebygrantingtothosechildren

bornbefore17January1973whoelectedcitizenship,whetherbornbeforeorafter17January1973,thestatusof naturalborncitizens. Atthesametime,Filipinowomenwhobyvirtueofmarriagetoanalienhusband,becamecitizensof theirhusband'scountrynolongerlostherPhilippinecitizenshipbythatfactalone,beginning17January1973. Intheareaoflaborithasbeenconsistentlyheld,beginningintheUSwithSandyvOregon(thecourt requiringthecompanytoprovidestoolsforwomenworkersinthefactories),thatstatutes(Book3,TitleIII, ChapterIoftheLaborCode)grantingwomenbettertreatmentbyvirtueoftheirmaternalfunctionwerevalid.

d.Promotionofhealth Art.II,Sec.15.TheStateshallprotectandpromotetherighttohealthofthepeopleandinstill healthconsciousnessamongthem. Sec.16.TheStateshallprotectandadvancetherightofthepeopletoabalancedandhealthful ecologyinaccordwiththerhythmandharmonyofnature. Art.XIII,Sec.11. TheStateshalladoptanintegratedandcomprehensiveapproachtohealth developmentwhichshallendeavortomakeessentialgoods,healthandothersocialservicesavailabletoall thepeopleataffordablecost.Thereshallbepriorityfortheneedsoftheunderprivileged,sick,elderly, disabled,womenandchildren.TheStateshallendeavortoprovidefreemedicalcaretopaupers. Sec.12.TheStateshallestablishandmaintainaneffectivefoodanddrugregulatorysystemand undertakeappropriatehealthmanpowerdevelopmentandresearch,responsivetothecountry'shealth needsandproblems. Sec.13.TheStateshallestablishaspecialagencyfordisabledpersonsfortheirrehabilitation,self developmentandselfreliance,andtheirintegrationtothemainstreamofsociety.

e.Priorityofeducation,science,technology,arts,cultureandsports(ESTACS) Art.II,Sec.17.TheStateshallgiveprioritytoeducation,science,etechnology,arts,cultureand sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social programs, and promote total human liberationanddevelopment.

Art.XIV,Sec.1.TheStateshallprotectandpromotetherightofallcitizenstoqualityeducation atalllevelsandshalltakeappropriatestepstomakesucheducationaccessibletoall.

Students have the constitutional right not only to education but to a quality education, up to the secondarylevel,forfree.Butthisissubjecttotherightoftheschooltoimposereasonableacademicstandards, andtomakeeducationavailableonlyonthebasisofmerit. InVillarvTechnologicalInstituteofthePhilippines,135SCRA706(1985),acaseinvolvingthedenial ofenrollmentofstudentactivistswhotookpartindemonstrationsandmassactions,andwho,atthesametime incurredscholasticdeficiencies.TheCourtheldthatparticipationinmassactionsperseisnotavalidground fordismissal,butthatfailureinacademicsubjectspursuanttoschoolregulationswasavalidground.Forwhile therighttoeducationisasocial,economicandculturalright,itisavailableonly"onthebasisofmerit." In Tagonan v Cruz Pano, 137 SCRA 245 (1985), a case of a nursing student who was denied readmissionaftershefailedasubjectduringherpreviousprovisionaladmission(andherinabilitytotakethis subjectinanotherschoolaftershetriedtobribetheDeanofthatschool),theSCagainupheldtherightof schoolsofhigherlearningtochoosethestudentswhichitthinkscouldbestachievetheirgoalofexcellenceand truth,whileaffirmingtherightofstudentstoqualityeducation.

BARLONGAYCASE: DepartmentofEducation,CultureandSportsv.SanDiego,180SCRA533(1989) F:Theprivateresp.isagraduateofUEw/adegreeofBSZoology.ThepetitionerclaimsthathetooktheNMAT3times

andflunkeditasmanytimes.Whenheappliedtotakeitagain,thepetitionerrejectedhisapplicationonthebasisofthe ruleallowingonly3chancesforastudenttotaketheNMAT.HethenwenttotheRTCValenzuelatocompelhisadmission tothetest. xxxByagreementoftheparties,pvt.resp.wasallowedtotaketheNMATon4/16/89subjecttotheoutcomeof hispetition.xxx Afterthehearing,theresp.judgerenderedadecisiondeclaringthechallengedorderinvalidandgrantingthe petitiononthegroundthatthepetitionerhadbeendeprivedofherrighttopursueamedicaleducationthroughanarbitrary exerciseofthepolicepower.

HELD:Wecannotsustaintheresp.judge.Herdecisionmustbereversed. In Tablarinv.Gutierrez,152SCRA730,thisCourtupheldtheconstitutionality oftheNMATasa measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competenceandpreparationforamedicaleducation. xxx WeseenoreasonwhytherationaleintheTablarincasecannotapplytothecaseatbar.Theissueraised inbothcasesistheacademicpreparationoftheapplicant.Thismaybegaugedatleastinitiallybytheadmission testand,indeedw/morereliability,bythe3flunkrule. ExerciseofPolicePower.Thepowerisvalidlyexercisedif(a)theinterestsofthepublicgenerally,as distinguishedfromthoseofaparticularclass,requiretheinterferenceoftheState,and(b)themeansemployed

arereasonablynecessarytotheattainmentoftheobjectsoughttobeaccomplishedandnotundulyoppressive uponindividuals.Inotherwords,theproperexerciseofthepolicepowerrequirestheconcurrenceofalawful subjectandalawfulmethod. Thesubjectofthechallengedregulationisw/intheambitofthepolicepower.Itistherightandindeed theresponsibilityoftheStatetoinsurethatthemedicalprofessionisnotinfiltratedbyincompetents.xxx Themethodemployedbytheregulationisnotirrelevanttothepurposeofthelawnorisitarbitraryor oppressive.The3flunkruleisintendedtoinsulatethemedicalschoolsandultimatelythemedicalprofession fromtheintrusionofthosenotqualifiedtobedoctors. Therighttoqualityeducationisnotabsolute.TheConstitutionalsoprovidesthat"everycitizenhasthe righttochooseaprofessionorcourseofstudy,subjecttofair,reasonableandequitableadmissionandacademic requirements. Thechallengedregulationdoesnotviolatetheequalprotectionclause.Alawdoesnothavetooperate w/equalforceonallpersonsorthingstobeconformabletotheequalprotectionclause. Therecanbenoquestionthatasubstantialdistinctionexistsbet.medicalstudentsandotherstudents whoarenotsubjectedtotheNMATandthe3flunkrule.Themedicalprofessiondirectlyaffectstheverylives ofthepeople,unlikeothercareersw/c,forthisreason,donotrequiremorevigilantregulation. Therewouldbeunequalprotectionifsomeapplicantswhohavepassedthetestsareadmittedandothers whohavealsoqualifiedaredeniedentrance. Inotherwords,whattheequalprotectionrequiresisequality amongequals.RAM. f.Urbanlandreformandhousing Art.XIII,Sec.9.TheStateshallbylaw,andforthecommongood,undertakeincooperationwith theprivatesector,acontinuingprogramofurbanlandreformandhousingwhichwillmakeavailableat affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centersandresettlementareas.Itshallalsopromoteadequateemploymentopportunitiestosuchcitizens. Intheimplementationofsuchprogram,theStateshallrespecttherightsofsmallpropertyowners. Sec.10.Urbanorruralpoordwellersshallnotbeevictednortheirdwellingsdemolished,except inaccordancewithlawandinajustandhumanemanner. Noresettlement ofurbanorruraldwellersshallbeundertakenwithoutadequateconsultation withthemandthecommunitieswheretheyaretoberelocated. ThelimitationstothepoweroftheStateinthisregard: 1.Respectfortherightsofpropertyowners. 2.Inthecaseofresettlement,saidprogrammustbewiththepermissionofthepersonstoberesettled,andthe communitytowhichtheywouldberesettled.

g.Reforminagricultureandothernaturalresources Art.II,Sec.21.TheStateshallpromotecomprehensiveruraldevelopmentandagrarianreform. Art.XIII,Sec.4.TheStateshall,bylaw,undertakeanagrarianreformprogramfoundedonthe rightoffarmersandregularfarmworkers,whoarelandless,toowndirectlyorcollectivelythelandsthey tillor,incaseofotherfarmworkers,toreceiveajustshareofthefruitsthereof. Tothisend,theState shallencourageandundertakethejustdistributionofagriculturallands,subjecttosuchprioritiesand reasonableretentionlimitsasCongressmaypresecribe,takingintoaccountecological,developmental,or equityconsiderations,andsubjecttothepaymentofjustcompensation.Indeterminingretentionlimits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntarylandsharing. Sec.5. TheStateshallrecognizetherightoffarmers,farmworkers,andlandowners,aswellas cooperatives,andotherindependentfarmers'organizationstoparticipateintheplanning,organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculuture thourgh approrpriate technologyandresearch,andadequatefinancial,production,marketing,andothersupportservices. Sec.6.TheStateshallapplytheprinciplesofagragianreformorstewarship,wheneverapplicable inaccordancewithlaw,inthedispositionorutilizationofothernaturalresources,includinglandsofthep ublicdomainunderleaseorconcessionsuitabletoagriculture,subjecttopriorrights,homesteadrightsof smallsettlers,andtherightsofindigenouscommunitiestotheirancestrallands. TheStatemayresettlelandlessfarmersandfarmworkersinitsownagriculturalestateswhich shallbedistributedtotheminthemannerprovidedbylaw. Sec.7.TheStateshallprotecttherightsofsubsistencefishermen,expeciallyoflocalcommunities, tothepreferentialuseofthecommunalmarineandfishingresources,bothinlandandoffshore.Itshall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conservesuchresources.Theprotectionshallextendtooffshorefishinggroundsofsubsistencefishermen againstforeignintrusion. Fishworkersshallreceiveajustsharefromtheirlaborintheutilizationof marineandfishingresources. Sec.8. TheStateshallprovdeincentivestolandownerstoinvesttheproceedsoftheagrarian reformprogramtopromoteindustrialization,employmentcreation,andprivatization ofpublicsector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprisesoftheirchoice.

Thebasicphilosophybehindagrarianreformis"landtothetiller"ifoneisaregularfarmworkerand

"profitsharing"inothercases.But"justcompensation"anda"reasonableretentionlimit"areguaranteedthe landowner. Commonlimitationstolandreform(urbanoragrarian): Itmustnotimpairtherightsofsmallagriculturallandowners,smallhomesteadsettlers,andsmall propertyowners; Theideaofreformistobenefitthepoorandotherpeasantsandthelandless.Itwouldtherefore,beself defeatingfortheConstitutiontomakenoreservationinfavorofsmallpropertyownersandhomesteadsettlers. Thebasicphilosophybehindothernaturalresourcesistheprincipleof"stewardship"anyonewhois giventhechancetocultivatepubliclandmustuseintrustforthesucceedinggenerations,andsomustexercise prudenceinitsuse.

h.Protectionoflabor Art.II.Sec.18.TheStateaffirmslaborasaprimarysocialeconomicforce.Itshallprotectthe rightsofworkersandpromotetheirwelfare. Art.XIII,Sec.3.TheStateshallaffordfullprotectiontolabor,localandoverseas,organizedand unorganized,andpromotefullemploymentandequalityofemploymentopportunitiesforall. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,andpeacefulconcertedactivities,includingtherighttostrikeinaccordancewithlaw.They shall be entitle to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and living wage. They shall also participateinpolicyanddecisionmakingprocessaffectingtherightsandbenefitsasmaybeprovidedby law. TheStateshallpromotetheprincipleofsharedresponsibilitybetweenworkersandemployersand thepreferentialuseofvoluntarymodesinsettlingdisputesincludingconciliation,andshallenforcetheir mutualcompliancetherewithtofosterindustrialpeace. TheStateshallregulatetherelationsbetweenworkersandemployers,recognizingtherightof labortoitsjustshareinthefruitsofproductionandtherightofenterprisestoreasonablereturnson investments,andtoexpansionandgrowth.

Thebasicphilosophybehindlaborissharedresponsibilityandthepreferentialuseofvoluntaryand peacefulforthesettlementofdisputes.

Therightofgovernmentworkerstoformunions Art.III,Sec.8.Therightofpeople,includingthoseemployedinthepublicandprivatesectors,to formunions,associationsorsocietiesforpurposesnotcontrarytolawshallnotbeabridged.

Art.IX,B,Sec.2(5).Therightofselforganizationshallnotbedeniedtogovernmentemployees. (notinVV'srevisedoutline) Sec.2(1).Thecivilserviceembracesallbranches,subdivisions,instrumentalities,andagenciesof theGovernment,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationswithoriginalcharters. TherightofgovernmentworkerstoformunionsisundisputedunderArtIII(8)oftheConstitution.(This provisionisevenmisplacedsincetheBillofRightsonlycoverscivilandpoliticalrights.) Theproblemis whethertheyhavetherighttostrike. ThosewhoholdthenegativeviewsaythattherighttoselforganizationismentionedinArtIII(8) separatelyfromtherighttostrikeinArtXIII(3).Ifitisincluded,therewouldbenoneedtoexplicatethetwo anymore. ButthosewhoholdtheaffirmativeviewsaythatalthoughtheConstitutiondoesnotexplicitlygrantit, Congresscanalwaysgranttherighttogovernmentworkers.TheConstitutiondoesnotprohibititinArtIII(8)in the phrase "for purposes not contrary to law". Besides the right to selforganization is rendered nugatory withoutthecoercivetoolofstrike(whichistruebecausethestrikeatissueisonlytheeconomicstrike,notthe ULPstrike). ItmustbenotedthattheSCruledinAllianceofGovernmentWorkersvMinisterofLabor,124SCRA 1, under the 1973 Constitution, that government workers cannot negotiate for terms and condition of employment, fortheseareamatteroflaw. Theirremedyistoreporttotheirown headsand toconvince Congresstoenactthedesiredlaw. SaidtheCourt: Civilservantsareentitledtoformsocietiesforpurposesnotcontrarytolaw. Butto formanassociationisonething,andtousesuchassociationforthecoercivemeasureofgoingonstrikeand bargainingwiththegovernmentsoastopressureitintocomplyingwiththeirdemands,isanother. In NHA v Juco (134SCRA172),theSCheldthatthoseinthegovernmentservicecannotbargain collectivelyasprivateworkersbecausetheyaregovernedbytheCivilServiceLaw.Italsoheldthatallgovt ownedorcontrolledcorporationsregardlessoftheirmannerofcreation,werecoveredbytheCivilService. Ininterpretingtherulingintheabovecases,wehavetodistinguishbetweentwokindsofgovernment corporationsinaccordancewithArt.IX,B,Sec.2(1):a)thosewhichwereorganizedwithspecialcharters,in casetheemployeesaregovernedbytheCivilServiceLawandarguablybytheSCrulinginAlliance,andb) thosewhichwereorganizedpursuanttothegenerallaw(CorporationCode),inwhichcasetheiremployeescan withoutdoubtbargaincollectivelyandgoonstrike. The grant of the right to form unions is a social economic right included for the first time in the Constitution.Previously,onlypoliticalandcivilrightswereguaranteedgovernmentemployees. Question:Doestherighttoselforganizationgiventogovt.employeesincludetherighttostrike?

SSSEmployeesAssnvsCA,175SCRA686(1989) F:SSSfiledw/theRTCQCacomplaintfordamagesw/aprayerforawritofprelinj.againstpetitionersSSSEA,alleging
thatthe officers and members of the latter staged anillegal strike andbarricaded the entrances to the SSS building preventingnonstrikingemployeesfromreportingtoworkandSSSmembersfromtransactingbusinessw/SSS.ThePublic SectorLaborManagementCouncilorderedthestrikerstoreturntoworkbutthestrikersrefusedtodoso. TheSSSEA wentonstrikebec.SSSfailedtoactontheunion'sdemands. Petitionersfiledamotiontodismissthecomplaintforlackofjurisdiction,w/cmotionwasdenied.Therestraining orderw/cwaspreviouslyissuedwasconvertedintoaninjunctionafterfindingthestrikeillegal.Petitionersappealedthe casetotheCA.ThelatterheldthatsincetheemployeesofSSSaregovtemployees,theyarenotallowedtostrike.

HELD:EmployeesintheCivilServicemaynotresorttostrikes,walkoutsandothertemporaryworkstoppages, likeworkersintheprivatesector,inordertopressuretheGovt.toaccedetotheirdemands.Asnowprovided underSec.4,RuleIIIoftheRulesandRegulationstoGoverntheExerciseoftheRightofGovt.EEstoSelf Organizationwhichtookeffectaftertheinitialdisputearose,thetermsandconditionsofemploymentinthe Govt,includinganypoliticalsubdivisionorinstrumentalitythereofandgovt.ownedandcontrolledcorporations withoriginalcharters,aregovernedbylawandemployeesthereinshallnotstrikeforthepurposeofsecuring changesthereof. ThestatementofthecourtinAllianceofGovtWorkersv.MinisterofLaborandEmployment(124 SCRA1)isrelevantasitfurnishestherationalefordistinguishingbet.workersintheprivatesectorandgovt employeesw/regardtotherighttostrike?
Sincethetermsandconditionsofgovt.employmentarefixedbylaw,govt.workerscannotuse thesameweaponsemployedbyworkersintheprivatesectortosecureconcessionsfromtheiremployers. Theprinciplebehindlaborunionisminprivateindustryisthatindustrialpeacecannotbesecuredthrough compulsionoflaw.Relationsbet.privateemployersandtheiremployeesrestonanessentiallyvoluntary basis. Subjecttotheminimumrequirementsofwagelawsandotherlaborandwelfarelegislation,the termsandconditionsofemploymentintheunionizedprivatesectoraresettledthroughtheprocessof collective bargaining. In govt employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegatedpower,theadministrativeheadsofgovtw/cfixthetermsandconditionsofemployment.And thisiseffectedthroughstatutesoradministrativecirculars,rules,andregulations,notthroughCBA's

EO180,w/c providesguidelines fortheexerciseoftherighttoorganizeofgovt employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditionsofemploymentinvolvedarenotamongthosefixedbylaw. Govtemployeesmay,therefore,throughtheirunionsorassociations,eitherpetitiontheCongressforthe bettermentofthetermsandconditionsofemploymentwhicharew/intheambitoflegislationornegotiatew/the appropriategovtagenciesfortheimprovementofthosew/arenotfixedbylaw. Iftherebeanyunresolved grievances,thedisputemaybereferredtothePublicSectorLaborManagementCouncilforappropriateaction. RAM.

BARLONGAYCASE: ManilaPublicSchoolTeachersAssociationv.Laguio,200SCRA323 F:
OnSeptember17,1990,Monday,atleast800publicschoolteachersproceededtothenationalofficeoftheDECS andairedtheirgrievances.ThemassactioncontinuedintotheweekdespitetheDECSSecretary'sRETURNTOWORK order.TheSecretaryfiledadministrativechargesagainsttheprotestingteachers.TheSecretaryrenderedthequestioned decisions in the administrative proceeding. He dismissed some teachers and placed others in under suspension. Two separate petitions werefiledtoassailthevalidity ofthe returntoworkorder andhis decisions in the administrative proceeding.

ISSUE:WHETHERORNOTTHEMASSACTIONSARECONSIDEREDASSTRIKES? HELD: Yes.Themassactionsconstitutedaconcertedandunauthorizedstoppageof,orabsencefromwork, whichitwastheteachers'dutytoperform,undertakenforessentiallyeconomicreasons. ISSUE:WHETHERORNOTPUBLICSCHOOLTEACHERSCANSTRIKE? HELD:No.Employeesofthepublicservicedonothavetherighttostrikealthoughtheyhavetherighttoself organizationandnegotiatewithappropriategovernmentagenciesfortheimprovementofworkingconditions. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS? HELD:Thiscourtisacourtoflastresort.Itresolvesquestionsoflawwherethereisnodisputeofthefactsor thatthefactshavebeenalreadydeterminedbythelowertribunals.Itisnotatrieroffacts.Itcannotresolvethe issuewhichrequirestheestablishmentofsomefacts.Theremedyisforthepetitionerstoparticipateinthe administrativeproceedings. Iftheylost, they mayappealto theCivilServiceCommission. Ifpending said administrativeproceedings,immediaterecoursetojudicialauthoritywasbelievednecessary,recourseiswiththe RTCwheretherewouldbeopportunitytoproverelevantfacts.Adapted.

i.IndependentPeople'sOrganizations Art. II, Sec. 23. The State shall encourage non governmental, communitybased, or sectoral organizationsthatpromotethewelfareofthenation. Art.XIII,Sec.15.TheStateshallrespecttheroleofindependentpeople'sorganizationstoenable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interestsandaspirationsthroughpeacefulandlawfulmeans. People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promotethepublicinterestandwithidentifiableleadership,membershipandstructure. Sec.16.Therightofthepeopleandtheirorganizationstoeffectiveandreasonableparticipation

atalllevelsofsocial,political,andeconomicdecisionmakingshallnotbeabridged.TheState,shallby law,facilitatetheestablishmentofadequateconsultationmechanisms. Thisisinrecognitionofpeople'spower,asidefromtheprovisiononinitiativeandreferendum.

3.FamilyasaBasicAutonomousSocialInstitution Art.II,Sec.12.TheStaterecognizesthesanctityoffamilylifeandshallprotectandstrengthen thefamilyasabasicautonomoussocialinstitution.Itshallequallyprotectthelifeofthemotherandthe lifeoftheunbornfromconception.Thenaturalandprimaryrightanddutyofparentsintherearingof theyouthforcivicefficiencyand thedevelopmentofmoralcharactershallreceivethesupportofthe Government. ThisprovisionseemstobethebasisofanargumentthatabortionisprohibitedbytheConstitution.It might also be the basis of a stand against family planning. The root of the problem, of course, is the determinationofwhenlifebegins. TherightofparentstoreartheirchildrenistheonlynaturalrightrecognizedbytheConstitution.Thisis adeclarationthattheStatedoesnotespousefascismwhichholdsthattheStateownsthelifeofeveryone. Art. XV, Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly,itshallstrengthenitssolidarityandactivelypromoteitsdevelopment. Sec.2.Marriage,asaninviolablesocialinstitution,isthefoundationofthefamilyandshallbe protectedbytheState. Somecitethisprovisionasthebasisofastandagainstdivorce. Andyetnotreally. Thephrase" inviolablesocialinstitution,"wasliftedfromArt.52oftheCivilcode,andunderthatCode,divorcewaspartof theproposeddraftsubmittedtoCongressbytheCodeCommissionandwasalmostapprovedifnotforreasons otherthancompatibilitywithArt.52. Sec.3.TheStateshalldefend: (1)Therightofspousestofoundafamilyaccordingtotheirreligiousconvictionsandthedemands ofresponsibleparenthood; (2)Therightofchildrentoassistance,includingpropercareandnutrition,andspecialprotection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (3)Therightofthefamilytoafamilylivingwageandincome;and (4)Therightoffamiliesorfamilyassociationstoparticipateintheplanningandimplementation ofpoliciesandprogramsthataffectthem. Sec.4. ThefamilyhasthedutytocareforitselderlymembersbuttheStatemayalsodoso

throughjustprogramsofsocialsecurity. Art.II,Sec.13.TheStaterecognizesthevitalroleofyouthinnationbuildingandshallpromote andprotecttheirphysical,moral,spiritual,intellectualandsocialwellbeing. Itshallinculcateinthe youthpatriotismandnationalism,andencouragetheirinvolvementinpublicandcivilaffairs. Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequenceandincidentsaregovernedbylawandnotsubjecttostipulation,exceptthatthemarriage settlementsmaybetoacertainextentfixthepropertyrelationsduringthemarriage.(CivilCode.) Art.1.Marriageisaspecialcontractofpermanentunionbetweenamanandawomanentered intoinaccordancewithlawfortheestablishmentofconjugalandfamilylife.Itisthefoundationofthe familyandaninviolablesocialinstitutionwhosenature,consequences,andincidentsaregovernedbylaw andnotsubjecttostipulation,exceptthatmarriagesettlementsmayfixthepropertyrelationsduringthe marriagewithinthelimitsprovidedbythisCode.(FamilyCode.)

4.SelfReliantandIndependentEconomicOrder Art. II, Sec. 19. The State shall develop a selfreliant and independent national economy effectivelycontrolledbyFilipinos. Sec. 20. TheStaterecognizes theindispensable role of the private sector,encouragesprivate enterprise,andprovidesincentivestoneededinvestments. Art. XII, Sec. 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contributetothecommongood.Individualsandprivategroups,includingcorporations,cooperativesand similarcollectiveorganizations,shallhavetherighttoown,establishandoperateeconomicenterprises, subjecttothedutyoftheStatetopromotedistributivejusticeandtointervenewhenthecommongoodso demands. These provisions revealthattheeconomic policy ofthePhilippines isone closer tosocialism than capitalism.TheStateadoptsapolicyofbalancingtheprivatesector'spursuitforprofitandtheconcernofthe Statetopromotedistributivejustice. Theuseof"distributivejustice"isbasedontheAristoteliannotionofgivingeachonewhatisduehim onthebasisofpersonalworthandvalue,andnotmerelywhathehascontractedfor.

GarciavsBOI(191SCRA288) FACTS: TheBOIapprovedthetransferofthesiteofthepetrochemicalplantfromBataantoBatangasandshiftof

feedstockforthatplantfromnaphthaonlytonaphthaand/orLPG. Thepetrochemicalplantwastobeajointventure betweenthePNOCandtheBPCwhichisaTaiwanesegroup.AccordingtotheBOI,itistheinvestorwhichhasthefinal sayastothesiteandthefeedstocktobeused.

HELD:EveryprovisionoftheConstitutiononthenationaleconomyandpatrimonyisinfusedwiththespiritof nationalinterest.Thenonalienationofnaturalresources,theState'sfullcontroloverthedevt.andutilizationof scarceresources,agreementswithforeignersbeingbasedonrealcontributionstotheeconomic growthand generalwelfareofthecountryandtheregulationofforeigninvestmentsinaccordancewithnationalgoalsand prioritiesaretooexplicitnottobenoticedandunderstood. Apetrochemical industryisnotan ordinaryinvestment opportunity. Thepetrochemical industry is essentialtothenationalinterst.TheBOIcommittedagraveabuseofdiscretionwhenitapprovedthetransferof thepetrochemicalplantfromBataantoBatangasandauthorizedthechangeoffeedstockfromnaphthaonlyto naphthaand/orLPG.Nocogentadvantagetothegovt.hasbeenshownbythistransfer.Thisisarepudiationof theindependentpolicyofthegovt.expressedinnumerouslawsandtheConstitutiontorunitsownaffairsthe wayitdeemsbestforthenationalinterest.

5.CommunicationandInformationinNationBuilding Art.II,Sec.24.TheStaterecognizesthevitalroleofcommunicationandinformationinnation building. Art.XVI,Sec.10.TheStateshalltheprovidethepolicyenvironmentforthefulldevelopmentof Filipinocapabilityandtheemergenceofcommunicationstructuressuitabletotheneedsandaspirations ofthenationandthebalancedflowofinformationinto,outof,andacrossthecountry,inaccordancewith apolicythatrespectthefreedomofspeechandofthepress. Sec.11(1). Theownership andmanagementofmassmediashallbelimited tocitizens ofthe Philippines,ortocorporations,cooperativesorassociations,whollyownedandmanagedbysuchcitizens. TheCongressshallregulateorprohibitmonopoliesincommercialmassmediawhenthepublic interestsorequires.Nocombinationsinrestraintoftradeorunfaircompetitionthereinshallbeallowed. (2)Theadvertisingindustryisimpressedwithpublicinterest,andshallberegulatedbylawforthe protectionofconsumersandthepromotionofgeneralwelfare. OnlyFilipinocitizensorcorporationsorassociationsatleastseventypercentofthecapitalof whichisownedbysuchcitizensshallbeallowedtoengageintheadvertisingindustry. Theparticipationofforeigninvestorsinthegoverningbodyofentitiesinsuchindustryshallbe limitedtotheirproportionateshareinthecapitalthereof,andalltheexecutiveandmanagingofficersof suchentitiesmustbecitizensofthePhilippines.

Art.XVIII,Sec.23.Advertisingentitiesaffectedbyparagraph2,Section11ofArticleXVIofthis Constitutionshallhavefiveyearsfromitsratificationtocomplyonagraduatedandproportionatebasis withtheminimumFilipinoownershiprequirementtherein.

BothownershipandmanagementofmassmediamustbeinthehandsofFilipinos,100%. Whilemonopoliesinmassmediamayberegulatedorprohibited,combinationsinrestraintofandunfair competitionininformationmattersareabsolutelyprohibited. Commercialadvertisingisnowdefinedasbeingvestedwithpublicinterest,andcanthusbeownedand managedonlyby70%Filipinocorporations.

6.AutonomyofLocalGovernments Art.II,Sec.25.TheStateshallensuretheautonomyoflocalgovernments. Art.X.LocalGovernment. GENERALPROVISIONS Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,cities,municipalities,andbarangays.ThereshallbeautonomousregionsinMuslimMindanao andtheCordillerasashereinafterprovided. Sec.2.Theterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsshallenjoylocalautonomy. Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsiveandaccountablelocalgovernmentstructureinstitutedthroughasystemofdecentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, elections,appointmentandremoval,term,salaries,powersandfunctionsanddutiesoflocalofficials,and allothermattersrelatingtotheorganizationandoperationofthelocalunits. Sec.4.ThePresidentofthePhilippinesshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverlocalgovernments. Provinceswithrespecttocomponentcitiesandmunicipalities,andcitiesandmunicipalitieswithrespect tocomponentbarangaysshallensurethattheactsoftheircomponentunitsarewithinthescopeoftheir prescribedpowersandfunctions. Sec.5.Eachlocalgovernmentunitshallhavethepowertocreateitsownsourcesofrevenuesand to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as Congress may provide,

consistentwiththebasicpolicyoflocalautonomy.Suchtaxes,fees,andchargesshallaccrueexclusivelyto thelocalgovernments. Sec.6.Localgovernmentunitsshallhaveajustshare,asdeterminedbylaw,inthenationaltaxes whichshallbeautomaticallyreleasedtothem. Sec.7.Localgovernmentsshallbeentitledtoanequitableshareintheproceedsoftheutilization and developmentofthenationalwealthwithintheirrespectiveareas,inthemannerprovidedbylaw, includingsharingthesamewiththeinhabitantsbywayofdirectbenefits. Sec. 8. Theterm of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, whichshall be determinedbylaw,shallbethreeyearsandnosuchofficialshallserveformorethanthreeconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthefulltermofwhichhewaselected. Sec. 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be prescribedbylaw. Sec.10.Noprovince,city,municipality,orbarangaymaybecreated,divided,merged,abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local governmentcodeandsubjecttoapprovalbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebisciteinthepolitical unitsdirectlyaffected. Sec.11.TheCongressmay,bylaw,createspecialmetropolitanpoliticalsubdivisions,subjecttoa plebisciteassetforthinSection10hereof. Thecomponentcitiesandmunicipalitiesshallretaintheir basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdictionofthemetropolitanauthoritythatwilltherebybecreatedshallbelimitedtobasicservices requiringcoordination. Sec. 12. Cities thatare highlyurbanized, asdetermined by law,andcomponent cities whose chartersprohibit theirvotersfromvotingforprovincial electiveofficials,shallbe independent ofthe province.Thevotersofcomponentcitieswithinaprovince,whosecharterscontainnosuchprohibition, shallnotbedeprivedoftheirrighttovoteforelectiveprovincialofficials. Sec.13. Localgovernmentunitsmaygroupthemselves,consolidateorcoordinatetheirefforts, services,andresourcesforpurposescommonlybeneficialtotheminaccordancewithlaw. Sec.14. ThePresidentshallprovideforregionaldevelopmentcouncilsorothersimilarbodies composedoflocalgovernmentofficials,regionalheadsofdepartmentsandothergovernmentoffices,and representatives from nongovernmental organizations with the regions for purposes of administrative decentralizationtostrengthentheautonomyoftheunitsthereinandtoacceleratetheeconomicandsocial

growthanddevelopmentoftheunitsintheregion.

AUTONOMOUSREGIONS Sec.15.ThereshallbecreatedautonomousregionsinMuslimMindanaoandintheCordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historicalandculturalheritage,economicandsocialstructures,andotherrelevantcharacteristicswhich theframework ofthis Constitution andthe national sovereignty as well as territorialintegrity of the RepublicofthePhilippines. Sec.16.ThePresidentshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverautonomousregionstoensurethat lawsarefaithfullyexecuted. Sec.17.Allpowers,functions,andresponsibilitiesnotgrantedbythisConstitutionorbylawto theautonomousregionsshallbevestedintheNationalGovernment. Sec.18.TheCongressshallenactanorganicactforeachautonomousregionwiththeassistance andparticipationoftheregionalconsultativecommissioncomposedofrepresentativesappointedbythe President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structureofgovernmentfortheregionconsistingoftheexecutivedepartmentandlegislativeassembly, bothofwhichshallbeelectiveandrepresentativeoftheconstituentpoliticalunits.Theorganicactsshall likewiseprovideforspecialcourtswithpersonal,family,andpropertylawjurisdictionconsistentwiththe provisionsofthisConstitutionandnationallaws. Thecreationoftheautonomousregionshallbeeffectivewhenapprovedbymajorityofthevotes castbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose,providedthatonlyprovinces,cities,and geographicareasvotingfavorablyinsuchplebisciteshallbeincludedintheautonomousregion. Sec.19.ThefirstCongresselectedunderthisConstitutionshall,withineighteenmonthsfromthe time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim MindanaoandtheCordilleras. Sec.20. WithinitsterritorialjurisdictionandsubjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitutionand nationallaws,theorganicactofautonomousregionsshallprovideforlegislativepowersover: (1)Administrativeorganizations; (2)Creationofsourcesofrevenues; (3)Ancestraldomainandnaturalresources; (4)Personal,family,andpropertyrelations; (5)Regionalurbanandruralplanningdevelopment; (6)Economic,social,andtourismdevelopment; (7)Educationalpolicies;

(8)Preservationanddevelopmentoftheculturalheritage;and (9)Suchothermattersasmaybeauthorizedbylawforthepromotionofthegeneralwelfareof thepeopleoftheregion. Sec.21.Thepreservationofpeaceandorderwithintheregionshallbetheresponsibilityofthe localpoliceagencieswhichshallbeorganized,maintained,supervised,andutilizedinaccordancewith applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government.

7.RecognitionoftheRightsofIndigenousCulturalCommunities

Art.II,Sec.22.TheStaterecognizesandpromotestherightsofindigenousculturalcommunities withintheframeworkofnationalunityanddevelopment. Art.VI,Sec.5(2) Thepartylistrepresentativesshallconstitutetwenty percentum ofthetotal numberofrepresentativesincludingthoseunderthepartylist. Forthreeconsecutivetermsafterthe ratificationoftheConstitution,onehalfoftheseatsallocatedtothepartylistrepresentativesshallbe filled,asprovidedbylaw,byselectionorelectionfromthelabor,peasant,urbanpoor,indigenouscultural communities,women,youth,andsuchothersectorsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthereligioussector. Art.XII,Sec.5.TheState,subjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationaldevelopment policiesandprograms,shallprotecttherightsofindigenousculturalcommunitiestotheirancestrallands toensuretheireconomic,social,andculturalwellbeing. TheCongressmayprovidefortheapplicabilityofcustomarylawsgoverningpropertyrightsor relationsindeterminingtheownershipandextentofancestraldomain. Art.XIII,Sec.6.TheStateshallapplytheprinciplesofagrarianreformorstewardshipwhenever applicableinaccordancewithlaw,inthedispositionorutilizationofothernaturalresources,including lands of the public domainunder lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homesteadrightsofsmallsettlers,andtherightsofindigenouscommunitiestotheirancestrallands. Art.XIV,Sec.17.TheStateshallrecognize,respectandprotecttherightsofindigenouscultural communities topreserveanddeveloptheircultures,traditionsandinstitutions. Itshallconsiderthese rightsintheformulationofnationalplansandpolicies. Art.XVI,Sec.12.TheCongressmaycreateaconsultativebodytoadvisethePresidentonpolicies affecting indigenousculturalcommunities,themajorityofthemembersofwhichshallcomefromsuch communities.

8.HonestPublicServiceandFullPublicDisclosure

Art.II,Sec.27. TheStateshallmaintainhonestyandintegrityinthepublicserviceandtake positiveandeffectivemeasuresagainstgraftandcorruption. Sec.28. Subjecttoreasonableconditionsprescribedbylaw,theStateadoptsandimplementsa policyoffullpublicdisclosureofallitstransactionsinvolvingpublicinterest. Art.III,Sec.7. Therightofthepeopletoinformation onmattersofpublicconcernshallbe recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,ordecisions,aswellastogovernmentresearchdatausedasbasisforpolicydevelopment, shallbeaffordedthecitizen,subjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

HonestyofPublicOfficials Art. XI, Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafterasmayberequiredbylaw,submitadeclarationunderoathofhisassets,liabilities,andnet worth. In thecaseofthePresident,Vice President,theMembers oftheCabinet,theCongress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armedforceswithgeneralorflagrank,thedeclarationshallbedisclosedtothepublicinthemanner providedbylaw. Art. VI, Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumptionofoffice,makeafulldisclosureoftheirfinancialandbusinessinterests.Theyshallnotifythe Houseconcernedofpotentialconflictofinterestthatmayarisefromthefilingofproposedlegislationof whichtheyareauthors. Sec.20.TherecordsandbooksofaccountsoftheCongressshallbepreservedandbeopentothe publicinaccordancewithlaw,andsuchbooksshallbeauditedbytheCommissiononAuditwhichshall publishannuallyanitemizedlistofamountspaidtoandexpensesincurredforeachMember. Art.IX,D,Sec.4. TheCommission(onAudit)shallsubmittothePresidentandtheCongress, withinthe timefixedbylaw,anannualreportcoveringthefinancial conditionandoperationofthe Government,itssubdivisions,agencies,andinstrumentalities,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolled corporations,andnongovernmentalentitiessubjecttoitsauditandrecommendmeasuresnecessaryto improvetheireffectivenessandefficiency. Art. XI, Sec. 4. The present antigraft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to functionandexerciseitsjurisdictionasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw.

Sec. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the

OmbudsmantobeknownastheTanodbayan,oneoverallDeputyandatleastoneDeputyeachforLuzon, VisayasandMindanao.AseparateDeputyforthemilitaryestablishmentmaylikewisebeappointed. Sec.6.TheofficialsandemployeesoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,otherthantheDeputies,shall beappointedbytheOmbudsmanaccordingtotheCivilServiceLaw. Sec.7.TheexistingTanodbayanshallhereafterbeknownastheOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutor. Itshallcontinuetofunctionandexerciseitspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw,except thoseconferredontheOfficeoftheOmbudsmancreatedunderthisConstitution. Sec.8.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbenaturalborncitizensofthePhilippines,andat the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediatelypreceding election. TheOmbudsman must have for ten years or more been a judge or engagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines. During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as providedforinSection2ofArticleIXAofthisConstitution. Sec.9. TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofat leastsixnomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil,andfromalistofthreenomineesforevery vacancythereafter.Suchappointmentshallrequirenoconfirmation.Allvacanciesshallbefilledwithin threemonthsaftertheyoccur. Sec. 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively,oftheConstitutionalCommissions,andtheyshallreceivethesamesalary,whichshallnotbe decreasedduringtheirtermofoffice. Sec. 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment.Theyshallnotbequalifiedtorunforanyofficeintheelectionimmediatelysucceeding theircessationfromoffice. Sec.12.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputies,asprotectorsofthepeople,shallactpromptlyon complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the govt., or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including govt. owned or controlled corporations and shall,inappropriatecases,notifythecomplainantsoftheactiontakenandtheresultthereof. Art.XI,Sec.13.TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallhavethefollowingpowers,functions,duties: (1) Investigateonitsownoroncomplaintanyactoromissionofanypublicofficial,employee, officeoragency,whensuchactoromissionappearstobeillegal,unjust,improper,orinefficient (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government,oranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,aswellasofanygovernmentowned

orcontrolledcorporationwithoriginalcharter;toperformandexpediteanyactordutyrequiredbylaw, ortostop,prevent,andcorrectanyabuseorimproprietyintheperformanceofduties. (3)Directtheofficerconcernedtotakeappropriateactionagainstapublicofficialoremployeeat fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliancetherewith. (4)Directtheofficerconcernedinanyappropriatecase,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybe providedbylaw,tofurnishitwithcopiesofdocumentsrelatingtocontractsortransactionsenteredinto byhisofficeinvolvingdisbursementoruseofpublicfundsorproperties,andreportanyirregularityto theCommissiononAuditforappropriateaction. (5)Requestanygovernmentagencyforassistanceandinformationnecessaryinthedischargeof itsresponsibilities,andtoexamine,ifnecessary,pertinentrecordsanddocuments. (6) Publicizematterscoveredbyitsinvestigationwhencircumstancessowarrantandwithdue prudence. (7)Determinethecausesofinefficiency,redtape,mismanagement,fraudandcorruptioninthe Governmentandmakerecommendationsfortheireliminationandtheobservanceofhighstandardsof ethicsandefficiency. (8)Promulgateitsrulesofprocedureandexercisesuchotherpowersorperformsuchfunctionsor dutiesasmaybeprovidedbylaw. Sec. 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyrelease. Sec.15. TherightoftheStatetorecoverpropertiesunlawfullyacquiredbypublicofficialsor employees,fromthemortheirnominees,ortransferees,shallnotbebarredbyprescription,laches,or estoppel. Sec.16.Noloan,guaranty,orotherformoffinancialaccommodationforanybusinesspurpose maybegranted,directlyorindirectlybyanygovt.ownedorcontrolledbankorfinancialinstitutiontothe President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the ConstitutionalCommissions,theOmbudsman,ortoanyfirmorentityinwhichtheyhavecontrolling interest,duringtheirtenure.

ForeignLoans Art.VII,Sec.20.ThePresidentmaycontractorguaranteeforeignloansonbehalfoftheRepublic withthepriorconcurrenceoftheMonetaryBoard,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedby law. TheMonetaryBoardshall,withinthirtydaysformtheendofeveryquarterofthecalendaryear, submit to Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteedbythegovernmentorgovernmentownedandcontrolledcorporationswhichwouldhavethe effectofincreasingtheforeigndebt,andcontainingothermattersasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

Art.XII,Sec.21.Foreignloansmayonlybeincurredinaccordancewithlawandtheregulationof themonetaryauthority.InformationonforeignloansobtainedorguaranteedbytheGovernmentshallbe madeavailabletothepublic.

ExecutiveAgreementsonNaturalResources Art.XII,Sec.2. xxx The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,andothermineraloilsaccordingtothegeneraltermsandconditionsprovidedbylaw,based onrealcontributionstotheeconomicgrowthandgeneralwelfareofthecountry.Insuchagreements,the Stateshallpromotethedevelopmentanduseoflocalscientificandtechnicalresources. ThePresidentshallnotifytheCongressofeverycontractenteredintoinaccordancewiththis provision,withinthirtydaysfromitsexecution.(pars.4and5thereof.) Art. VI, Sec. 12. All members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall upon assumptionofoffice,makeafulldisclosureoftheirfinancialandbusinessinterests.Theyshallnotifythe Houseconcernedofpotentialconflictofinterestthatmayariseformthefilingofproposedlegislationof whichtheyareauthors.

HealthofthePresident Art.VII,Sec.12. IncaseofseriousillnessofthePresident,thepublicshallbeinformedofthe stateofhishealth.TheMembersoftheCabinetinchargeofnationalsecurityandforeignrelationsand theChiefoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,shallnotbedeniedaccesstothePresidentduringsuch illness.

Valmontev.Belmonte,170SCRA256(1989) F:
Petitionersweremediapractitioners.TheyrequestedinformationfromrespondentGeneralManageroftheGSIS regardingcleanloansgrantedbytheGSIScertainmembersofthedefunctBPontheguarantyofMrs.ImeldaMarcos shortlybeforetheFeb.7,1986election.Theirrequestwasrefusedonthegroundofconfidentiality.Theybroughtthissuit formandamus.

HELD:(1)Thecornerstoneoftherepublicansystemofgovtisthedelegationofpowerbythepeople.Inthis system,governmentalagenciesandinstitutionsoperatew/inthelimitsoftheauthorityconferredbythepeople. Deniedaccesstoinformationontheinnerworkingsofgovt,thecitizenrycanbecomepreytothewhimsand

capricesofthosetowhomthepowerhadbeendelegated. Thepostulateofpublicofficeasapublictrust, institutionalizedintheConstitutiontoprotectthepeoplefromabuseofgovernmentalpower,wouldcertainlybe merely empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribedbyimplementinglegislationadoptedpursuanttotheConstitution. Therighttoinformationisnot merelyanadjunctofandthereforerestrictedinapplicationbytheexerciseofthefreedomofspeechandofthe press. Farfromit. Therighttoinformationgoeshandinhandw/theconstitutionalpoliciesoffull public disclosure andhonestyinthepublicservice. Itismeant toenhance thewidening roleofthecitizenry in governmentaldecisionmakingaswellasincheckingabuseingovt. (2)Therighttoinformationisnotabsolute.Itislimitedto"mattersofpublicconcern,"andisfurther "subjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw." (Legaspiv.CSC,150SCRA530.) Similarly,the State'spolicyoffulldisclosureislimitedto"transactionsinvolvingpublicinterest,"andis"subjecttoreasonable conditionsprescribedbylaw."TheGSISisatrusteeofcontributionsfromthegovtanditsemployeesandthe administratorofvariousinsuranceprogramsforthebenefitofthelatter.Undeniably,itsfundsassumeapublic character. xxx. Consideringthenatureofitsfunds,theGSISisexpectedtomanageitsresourcesw/utmost prudenceandinstrictcompliancew/thepertinentlawsorrulesandregulations.Insum,thepublicnatureofthe loanablefundsoftheGSISandthepublicofficeheldbytheallegedborrowersmaketheinformationsought clearlyamatterofpublicinterestandconcern. (3)TherighttoprivacycannotbeinvokedbyajuridicalentitylikeGSISbec.acorp.hasnorightor privacyinitsnamesincetheentirebasisoftherighttoprivacyisaninjurytothefeelingsandsensibilitiesofthe partyandacorp.wouldhavenosuchgroundforrelief.NeithercantheGSISinvoketherighttoprivacyofits borrowers.Therightispurelypersonalinnature.Theconcernedborrowersthemselvesmaynotsucceedifthey choosetoinvoketheirrighttoprivacy,consideringthepublicofficestheywereholdingatthetimetheloans wereallegedtohavebeengranted. (4)ThatGSIS,ingrantingloans,wasexercisingaproprietaryfunctionwouldnotjustifytheexclusion ofthetransactionsfromthecoverageandscopeoftherighttoinformation. (5) But,althoughcitizensareaffordedtherighttoinformation,and,pursuantthereto,areentitledto "access toofficialrecords,"theConstitution doesnotaccordthemarighttocompel custodians ofofficial recordstopreparelists,abstracts,summariesandthelikeintheirdesiretoacquireinformationonmattersof publicconcern.VV.

UPDATED12/1/95 RAM

PARTTWO STRUCTUREANDPOWERSOFTHENATIONALGOVERNMENT

I.THESEPARATIONOFPOWERS Cruz: Purpose. Thedoctrineofseparationofpowersisintendedtopreventaconcentrationofauthorityin onepersonorgroupofpersonsthatmightleadtoanirreversibleerrororabuseinitsexercisetothedetrimentof ourrepublicaninstitutions.Morespecifically,accordingtoJ.Laurel,thedoctrineisintendedtosecureaction, toforestalloveraction,topreventdepotismandtoobtainefficiency.xxx BlendingofPowers.ThereareinstancesundertheConsti.whenpowersarenotconfinedexclusivelyw/inone deptbutareinfactassignedtoorsharedbyseveraldepartments.Asaresultofthisblendingofpowers,thereis somedifficultynowinclassifyingsomeofthemasdefinitelylegislative,executiveorjudicial.AsJ.Homesput itvividlywhenheremarkedthat"thegreatordinancesoftheConstitutiondonotestablishanddividefieldsof blackandwhite.Eventhemorespecificofthemarefoundtoterminateinapenumbrashadinggraduallyfrom oneextremetoanother." Thepowersofgovtmaynotatalltimesbecontainedw/mathematicalprecisionin

watertightcompartmentsbec.oftheirambiguousnature,e.g.,thepowerofappointment,w/ccanrightfullybe exercisedbyeachdeptoveritsownadministrativepersonnel.xxx

A.Congress 1.Composition,Qualifications,andTermofOffice a.Senate Art.VI,Secs.24 Art.VI. Sec.2.TheSenateshallbecomposedoftwentyfourSenatorswhoshallbeelectedatlargebythe qualifiedvotersofthePhilippines,asmaybeprovidedbylaw. Sec.3.NopersonshallbeaSenatorunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,and,on thedayoftheelection,isatleastthirtyfiveyearsofage,abletoreadandwrite,aregisteredvoter,anda residentofthePhilippinesfornotlessthantwoyearsimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection. Sec.4.ThetermofofficeoftheSenatorsshallbesixyearsandshallcommence,unlessotherwise providedbylaw,atnoononthethirtiethdayofJunenextfollowingtheirelection. NoSenatorshallserveformorethantwoconsecutiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationoftheoffice foranylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthefull termofwhichhewaselected. COMPOSITION 24Senatorselectedatlargebyqualifiedvoters QUALIFICATIONS Citizenship: Ageonthedayofelection: Education: Registeredvoter: Residence: Naturalborncitizen 35 Abletoreadandwrite InthePhilippines 2years(immediatelyprecedingthe election)

TERMOFOFFICE

Six(6)years Tocommenceunlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,atnoononJune30nextfollowingtheelection.(Art. VI,Sec.4) ButunderSec.2oftheTransitoryprovisions,thesenatorselectedonthe2ndMondayofMay,1987 shallserveuntilnoonofJune30,1992.(Art.XVIII,Sec.2) Ofthesenatorselectedintheelectionof1992,thefirst12obtainingthehighestnumberofvotesshall servefor6yearsandtheremaining12for3years.Thereafter,12senatorswillbeelectedevery3years,toserve atermof6years.(Art.XVIII,Sec.2) No Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms, and for this purpose, no voluntary renunciationoftheofficeforanylengthoftimeshallbeconsideredforthepurposeofinterruptingthecontinuity ofhisserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected.(Art.VI,Sec.4) A)Regularcase:IfXrunsin1992,getsthe#12slot,andisreelectedin1998,hecannolongerrunin thesenatorialelectionof2004,evenifintheyear2000heresignsfromoffice.Ingeneral,thelimitforregular senators(thoseelectedafterthetransition,orafter1992)is12consecutiveyears. ButifXrunsin1992,getsthe#13slot,doesnotrerunin1995,butrerunsin1998,hecanstillrerunin 2004. B)Transition:IfMacedarerunsin1992andendsupin#15,whenhistermexpiresatnoonof30June 1995,hecannolongerrunforreelectionassenator,evenifhewillhaveservedforonly8years,sincethe Constitutiontalksof2consecutiveterms. IfXrunsin1992,endsup#13,thenrerunsin1995,hecannolongerrunforsenatorintheyear2001, evenifhewillhaveservedforonly9years. IfMacedadoesnotrerunin1992,thenrunsagainin1995,hecanstillrerunin2001.

b.HouseofRepresentatives Art.VI,Secs.58 Art.VI. Sec.5(1) TheHouseofRepresentativesshallbecomposedofnotmorethantwohundredand fiftymembers,unlessotherwisefixedbylaw,whoshallbeelectedfromlegislativedistrictsapportioned amongtheprovinces,cities,andtheMetropolitanManilaareainaccordancewiththenumberoftheir respectiveinhabitants,andonthebasisofauniformandprogressiveratio,andthosewho,asprovidedby law,shallbeelectedthroughapartylistsystemofregisterednational,regional,andsectoralpartiesor organizations.

(2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number or representativesincludingthoseunderthepartylist.Forthreeconsecutivetermsaftertheratificationof thisConstitution,onehalfoftheseatsallocatedtopartylistrepresentativesshallbefilled,asprovidedby law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,youth,andsuchothersectorsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthereligioussector. (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacentterritory.Eachcitywithapopulationofatleasttwohundredfiftythousand,oreachprovince, shallhaveatleastonerepresentative. (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionmentoflegislativedistrictsbasedonthestandardprovidedinthisSection. Sec.6.NopersonshallbeaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesunlessheisanaturalborn citizenofthePhilippinesand,onthedayoftheelection,isatleasttwentyfiveyearsofage,abletoread andwrite,and,exceptthepartylistrepresentatives,aregisteredvoterinthedistrictinwhichheshallbe elected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnotlessthenoneyearimmediatelyprecedingthedayofthe election. Sec.7. TheMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallbeelectedforatermofthreeyears whichshallbegin,unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,atnoononthethirtiethdayofJunenextfollowing theirelection. NoMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallserveformorethanthreeconsecutiveterms. Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptionin thecontinuityofhisserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected. Sec.8.Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionoftheSenatorsandtheMembersof theHouseofRepresentativesshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay.

Art.IXC,Secs.68 ArtIXC. Sec.6.Afreeandopenpartysystemshallbeallowedtoevolveaccordingtothefreechoiceofthe people,subjecttotheprovisionsofthisArticle. Sec.7.Novotescastinfavorofapoliticalparty,organization,orcoalitionshallbevalid,except forthoseregisteredunderthepartylistsystemasprovidedinthisConstitution. Sec.8.Politicalparties,ororganizationsorcoalitionsregisteredunderthepartylistsystem,shall notberepresentedinthevoters'registrationboards,boardsofelectioninspectors,boardofcanvassers,or othersimilarbodies.However,theyshallbeentitledtoappointpollwatchersinaccordancewithlaw.

Art.XVIII,Sec.7. Untilalawispassed,thePresidentmayfillbyappointmentfromalistof nomineesbytherespectivesectorstheseatsreservedforsectoralrepresentativesinparagraph(2),Section 5ofArticleVIofthisConstitution.

RepublicAct7941
ANACTPROVIDINGFORTHEELECTIONOFPARTYLISTREPRESENTATIVESTHROUGHTHEPARTYLIST SYSTEM,ANDAPPROPRIATINGFUNDSTHEREFOR. BeitenactedbytheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesofthePhilippinesincongressassembled. Sec.1.Title.ThisActshallbeknownasthe"PartyListSystemAct." Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representativestotheHouseofRepresentativesthroughapartylistsystemofregisterednational,regionalandsectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresentedsectors,organizations andparties, andwho lackwelldefined political constituenciesbut whocould contributetotheformulationandenactmentofappropriatelegislationthatwillbenefitthenationasawhole,tobecome membersoftheHouseofRepresentatives.Towardsthisend,theStateshalldevelopandguaranteeafull,freeandopen partysysteminordertoattainthebroadestpossiblerepresentationofparty,sectoralorgroupinterestintheHouseof Representativesbyenhancingtheirchancestocompeteforandwinseatsinthelegislature,andshallprovidethesimplest schemepossible. Sec.3. DefinitionofTerms. (a) The partylistsystem isamechanismofproportionalrepresentationinthe electionofrepresentativestotheHouseofRepresentativesfromnational,regionalandsectoralpartiesororganizationsor coalitions thereof registered withtheCommissiononElections (COMELEC). component partiesororganizations of coalitionmayparticipateindependentlyprovidedthecoalitionofwhichtheyformpartdoesnotparticipateinthepartylist system. (b)Apartymeanseitherapoliticalpartyorasectoralpartyoracoalitionofparties. (c)Apoliticalpartyreferstoanorganizedgroupofcitizensadvocatinganideologyorplatform,principlesand policies for the general conduct of government and which,as the most immediate means ofsecuringtheir adoption, regularlynominatesandsupportscertainofitsleadersandmembersascandidatesforpublicoffice. Itisanationalpartywhenitsconstituencyisspreadoverthegeographicalterritoryofatleastamajorityofthe regions.Itisaregionalpartywhenitsconstituencyisspreadoverthegeographicalterritoryofatleastamajorityofthe citiesandprovincescomprisingtheregion. (d)AsectoralpartyreferstoanorganizedgroupofcitizensbelongingtoanyofthesectorsenumeratedinSection 5hereofwhoseprincipaladvocacypertainstothespecialinterestandconcernsoftheirsector. (e) A sectoralorganization referstoagroupofcitizensoracoalitionofgroupofcitizenswhosharesimilar physicalattributesorcharacteristics,employment,interestsorconcerns. (f)Acoalitionreferstoanaggrupationofdulyregisterednational,regional,sectoralpartiesororganizationsfor politicaland/orelectionpurposes. Sec.4. ManifestationtoParticipateinthePartyListSystem. Anyparty,organization,orcoalitionalready registeredwiththeCommissionneednotregisteranew.However,suchparty,organization,orcoalitionshallfilewiththe Commission,notlaterthanninety(90)daysbeforetheelection,amanifestationofitsdesiretoparticipateinthepartylist system.

Sec.5. Registration. Anyorganizedgroupofpersonsmayregisterasaparty,organizationorcoalitionfor purposesofthepartylistsystembyfilingwiththeCOMELECnotlaterthanninety(90)daysbeforetheelectionapetition verifiedbyitspresidentorsecretarystatingitsdesiretoparticipateinthepartylistsystemasanational,regionalorsectoral partyororganizationoracoalitionofsuchpartiesororganizations,attachingtheretoitsconstitution,bylaws,platformor programofgovernment,listofofficers,coalitionagreementandotherrelevantinformationastheCOMELECmayrequire: Provided,Thatthesectorshallincludelabor,peasant,fisherfolk,urbanpoor,indigenousculturalcommunities,elderly, handicapped,women,youth,veterans,overseasworkers,andprofessionals. TheCOMELECshallpublishthepetitioninatleasttwo(2)nationalnewspapersofgeneralcirculation. TheCOMELECshall,afterduenoticeandhearing,resolvethepetitionwithinfifteen(15)daysfromthedateit wassubmittedfordecisionbutinnocasenotlaterthansixty(60)daysbeforetheelection. Sec.6. Refusaland/orCancellationofRegistration. TheCOMELECmay, motuproprio, oruponverified complaintofanyinterestedparty,refuseorcancel,afterduenoticeandhearing,theregistrationofanynational,regionalor sectoralparty,organizationorcoalitiononanyofthefollowinggrounds: (1)Itisareligioussectordenomination,organizationorassociationorganizedforreligiouspurposes; (2)Itadvocatesviolenceorunlawfulmeanstoseekitsgoal; (3)Itisaforeignpartyororganization; (4)Itisreceivingsupportfromanyforeigngovernment,foreignpoliticalparty,foundation,organization,whether directlyorthoughanyofitsofficersormemberorindirectlythoughthirdpartiesforpartisanelectionpurposes. (5)Itviolatesorfailstocomplywithlaws,rulesorregulationsrelatingtoelections; (6)Itdeclaresuntruthfulstatementsinitspetition; (7)Ithasceasedtoexistforatleastone(1)year;or (8)Itfailstoparticipateinthelasttwo(2)precedingelectionsorfailstoobtainatleasttwopercentum(2%)ofthe votescastunderthepartylistsysteminthetwo(2)precedingelectionsfortheconstituencyinwhichithasregistered. Sec.7.CertifiedListofRegisteredParties.TheCOMELECshall,notlaterthansixty(60)daysbeforeelection, prepareacertifiedlistofnational,regional,orsectoralparties,organizationsorcoalitionswhichhaveappliedorwhohave manifestedtheirdesiretoparticipateunderthepartylistsystemanddistributecopiesthereoftoallprecintsforpostingin thepollingplacesonelectionday.Thenamesofthepartylistnomineesshallnotbeshownonthecertifiedlist. Sec.8.NominationofPartyListRepresentatives.Eachregisteredparty,organization,orcoalitionshallsubmit totheCOMELECnotlaterthanfortyfive(45)daysbeforetheelectionalistofnames,notlessthanfive(5),fromwhich partylistrepresentativesshallbechosenincaseitobtainstherequirednumberofvotes. Apersonmaybenominatedinone(1)listonly.Onlypersonswhohavegiventheirconsentinwritingmaybe namedinthelist.Thelistshallnotincludeanycandidateforanyelectiveofficeorapersonwhohaslosthisbidforan electiveofficeintheimmediatelyprecedingelection.Nochangeofnamesoralterationoftheorderofnomineesshallbe allowedafterthesameshallhavebeensubmittedtotheCOMELECexceptincaseswherethenomineedies,orwithdraws inwritinghisnomination,becomesincapacitatedinwhichcasethenameofthesubstitutenomineeshallbeplacedinthe list.IncumbentsectoralrepresentativesintheHouseofRepresentativeswhoarenominatedinthepartylistsystemshall notbeconsideredresigned. Sec.9.QualificationsofPartyListNominees.Nopersonshallbenominatedaspartylistrepresentativeunless heisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,aresidentofthePhilippinesforaperiodofnotlessthan one(1)yearimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection,abletoreadandwrite,a bonafide memberofthepartyor organizationwhichheseekstorepresentforatleastninety(90)daysprecedingthedayoftheelection,andisatleast twentyfive(25)yearsofageonthedayoftheelection. Incaseofanomineeoftheyouthsector,hemustbeatleastbetwentyfive(25)butnotmorethanthirty(30)years ofageonthedayoftheelection.Anyyouthsectoralrepresentativewhoattainstheageofthirty(30)duringhistermshall

beallowedtocontinueinofficeuntiltheexpirationofhisterm. Sec.10. MannerofVoting.Everyvotershallbeentitledtotwo(2)votes:thefirstisavoteforcandidatefor memberoftheHouseofRepresentativesinhislegislativedistrict;andthesecond,avotefortheparty,organization,or coalition he wants represented in the House of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization,orcoalitionnotentitledtobevotedforshallnotbecounted:Providedfinally,Thatthefirstelectionunderthe partylistsystemshallbeheldinMay1998. TheCOMELECshallundertakethenecessaryinformationcampaignforpurposesofeducatingtheelectorateon thematterofthepartylistsystem. Sec.11.NumberofPartyListRepresentatives.Thepartylistrepresentativesshallconstitutetwentypercentum (20%)ofthetotalnumberofthemembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesincludingthoseunderthepartylist. For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representationintheHouseofRepresentativesatthestartoftheTenthCongressofthePhilippinesshallnotbeentitledto participateinthepartylistsystem. Indeterminingtheallocationofseatsforthesecondvote,thefollowingprocedureshallbeobserved: (a)Theparties,organizations,andcoalitionsshallberankedfromthehighesttothelowestbasedonthenumber ofvotestheygarneredduringtheelections. (b) Theparties,organizations,andcoalitionsreceivingatleasttwopercent(2%)ofthetotalvotescastforthe partylistsystemshallbeentitledtooneseateach:Provided,Thatthosegarneringmorethantwopercent(2%)ofthevotes shallbeentitledtoadditionalseatsinproportiontotheirtotalnumberofvotes: Provided,finally,Thateachparty, organization,orcoalitionshallbeentitledtonotmorethanthree(3)seats. Sec.12.ProcedureinAllocatingSeatsforPartyListRepresentatives.TheCOMELECshalltallyallthevotes fortheparties,organizations,orcoalitionsonanationwidebasis,rankthemaccordingtothenumberofvotesreceivedand allocatepartylistrepresentativesproportionatelyaccordingtothepercentageofvotesobtainedbyeachparty,organization, orcoalitionasagainstthetotalnationwidevotescastforthepartylistsystem. Sec.13. How PartyListRepresentativesAreChosen. Partylistrepresentativesshallbeproclaimedbythe COMELECbasedonthelistofnamessubmittedbytherespectiveparties,organizations,orcoalitionstotheCOMELEC accordingtotheirrankinginsaidlist. Sec.14.TermofOffice.Partylistrepresentativesshallbeelectedforatermofthree(3)yearswhichshallbegin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No partylist representativesshallserveformorethanthree(3)consecutiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforanylengthof timeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected. Sec.15.ChangeofAffiliation;Effect.Anyelectedpartylistrepresentativewhochangeshispoliticalpartyor sectoralaffiliationduringhistermofofficeshallforfeithisseat:Provided,Thatifhechangeshispoliticalpartyorsectoral affiliationwithinsix(6)monthsbeforeanelection,heshallnotbeeligiblefornominationaspartylistrepresentativeunder hisnewpartyororganization. Sec.16. Vacancy.Incaseofvacancyintheseatsreservedforpartylistrepresentatives,thevacancyshallbe automaticallyfilledbythenextrepresentativefromthelistofnomineesintheordersubmittedtotheCOMELECbythe same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization,orcoalitionconcernedshallsubmitadditionalnominees. Sec.17.RightsofPartyListRepresentatives.Partylistrepresentativesshallbeentitledtothesamesalariesand

emolumentsasregularmembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives. Sec.18. RulesandRegulations.TheCOMELECshallpromulgatethenecessaryrulesandregulationsasmay benecessarytocarryoutthepurposesofthisAct. Sec.19. Appropriations. TheamountnecessaryfortheimplementationofthisActshallbeprovidedinthe regularappropriationsfortheCommissiononElectionsstartingfiscalyear1996undertheGeneralAppropriationsAct. Starting1995,theCOMELECisherebyauthorizedtoutilizesavingsandotheravailablefundsforpurposesofits informationcampaignonthepartylistsystem. Sec.20. SeparabilityClause. IfanypartofthisActisheldinvalidorunconstitutional,theotherpartsor provisionsthereofshallremainvalidandeffective. Sec. 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthisActareherebyrepealed. Sec.22. Effectivity.ThisActshalltakeeffectfifteen(15)daysafteritspublicationinanewspaperofgeneral circulation. Approved,March3,1995.

COMPOSITION Notmorethan250Members(*unlessotherwisefixedbylaw)electedfrom: a)Legislativedistricts(80%oftheseatsshallbeallottedtodistrictrepresentatives.) Thedistrictsaretobedeterminedaccordingtothefollowingrules:[200districtsor80%] 1.Thedistrictsaretobeapportionedamongtheprovinces,cities,andMetroManila.[Sec.5(1)] 2. The apportionment must be based on the number of inhabitants, using a uniform and progressive ratio. Within3yearsfollowingthereturnofeverycensus,Congressshall makeareapportionmentoflegislative districts,basedonthestandardshereinprovided(tomakeitrepresentativeandmoreresponsivetothepeople). [Sec.5(4)] 3.Eachlegislativedistrictmustcompriseasfaraspracticable,contiguous,compact,andadjacentterritory(to avoidgerrymandering,orputtingtogetherofareaswhereacandidateisstrong,evenifthesearenotcontiguous). [Sec.5(3)] 4.Eachcitywithapopulationofatleast250,000musthaveatleastonerepresentative.[Sec.5(3)] 5.Eachprovince,regardlessofpopulationmusthaveatleastonerepresentative.[Sec.5(3)] b)Partylistsystemofregisterednational,regional,andsectoralpartiesororganizations.[Sec.5(2)]

Thepartylistrepresentativesshallconstitute20%ofthelowerhouse. For3consecutivetermsaftertheratificationoftheConstitution(1987,1992,1995),1/2oftheseats allocatedtothepartylistrepresentativesshallbefilledbyselectionorelection,asprovidedbylaw,formthe(i) labor,(ii)peasant,(iii)urbanpoor,(iv)indigenousculturalcommunities,(v)women,(vi)youth,and(vii)such othersectorsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthereligioussector. Untilalawispassed,thePresidentmaysetuppostsbyappointmentfromalistofnomineesbythe respectivesectors,theseatsreservedforsectoralrepresentatives(Art.XVIII,Sec.7).

QUALIFICATIONS Citizenship: Ageonthedayofelection: Education: Registeredvoter: Residence: Naturalborncitizen 25 Abletoreadandwrite Inthedistrict,ifdistrict representative 1yearinthedistrict (immediatelyprecedingtheelection)

TERMOFOFFICE 3years Tocommence(unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw)atnoonofJune30nextfollowingtheelection.(Art. VI,Sec.7) ButunderSec.2oftheTransitoryProvisions,themembersoftheHouseelectedonthesecondMonday ofMay,1987shallserveuntilnoonofJune30,1992. NoMemberoftheHouseshallserveformorethan3consecutiveterms.Novoluntaryrenunciationof theofficeforanylengthoftimeshallbeconsideredaninterruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthefull termforwhichhewaselectedforthepurposeofcircumventingthis3termlimitation.(Art.VI,Sec.7) Thus,Perezcanstillrerunin1992,and1995,butnolongerin1998. Ifheisreelectedin1992and 1995,andheresignsin1997,hecanstillnolongerrunin1998.Butifhedoesnotrunin1992orin1995,hecan run for another 3 straight terms, because the continuity would be broken. Thus, one can be a lifetime Congressmansolongashedoesnotrunonthethirdterm.

Dimaporovs.Mitra202SCRA779(Oct.15,1991) F:
PetitionerMohammadAliDimaporowaselectedRepresentativeforthe2ndLegislativeDistrictofLanaodelSur duringthe1987congressionalelections. In Jan., 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional GovernoroftheAutonomousRegioninMuslimMindanao.UponbeinginformedofsuchdevelopmentbytheCOMELEC,

respondentsSpeakerandSecretaryoftheHouseofReps.excludedpetitioner'snamefromtheRollofMembersofthe HouseofReps.pursuanttoSec.67,ArticleIXoftheOmnibusElectionCode(B.P.Blg.881) Havinglostintheelections,petitionerthentriedbutfailedinhisbidtoregainhisseatinCongress.Hence,this petition. HemaintainsthathedidnotlosehisseatascongressmanbecauseSec.67,Art.IXofB.P.Blg.881isnot operativeunderthepresentConstitution,beingcontrarythereto,andthereforenotapplicabletothepresentmembersof Congress.

ISSUE:WhetherSec.67,Art.IXofB.P.Blg.881isoperativeunderthepresentConstitution HELD:YES.Sec.67,Art.IXofB.P.Blg.881reads:"Anyelectiveofficialwhethernationalorlocalrunning foranyofficeotherthantheonewhichheisholdinginapermanentcapacityexceptforPresidentandVice Presidentshallbeconsideredipsofactoresignedfromhisofficeuponthefilingofhiscertificateofcandidacy." Petitionerfailedtodiscernthatratherthancutshortthetermofofficeofelectivepublicofficials,this statutoryprovisionseekstoensurethatsuchofficialsserveouttheirentiretermofofficeandtherebycutting shorttheirtenurebymakingitclearthatshouldtheyfailintheircandidacy,theycannotgobacktotheirformer position. Thisisconsonant withtheconstitutionaledictthatallpublicofficialsmustservethepeoplewith utmostloyaltyandnottriflewiththemandatewhichtheyhavereceivedfromtheirconstituents. In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress,petitionerseemstoconfuse"term"with"tenure"ofoffice.
"ThetermofofficeprescribedbytheConstitutionmaynotbeextendedorshortenedbythelegislature,butthe periodduringwhichanofficeractuallyholdstheoffice(tenure),maybeaffectedbycircumstanceswithinorbeyondthe powerofsaidofficer.Thesesituationswillnotchangethedurationofthetermofoffice."

Underthequestionedprovision,whenanelectiveofficialcoveredtherebyfilesacert.ofcandidacyfor anotheroffice,heisdeemedtohavevoluntarilycutshorthistenure,nothisterm.Thetermremainsandhis successor,ifany,isallowedtoserveitsunexpiredportion. ThefactthatthegroundcitedinSec.67,Art.IXofB.P.Blg.881isnotmentionedintheConstitution itselfasamodeofshorteningthetenureofofficeofthemembersofCongressdoesnotprecludeitsapplication topresentmembersofCongress.Sec.2,Art.IXoftheConstitutionprovidesthat"xxxAllotherpublicofficers andemployeesmayberemovedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment."Suchconstitutional expressionclearlyrecognizesthatthe4groundsfoundinArt.VIoftheConstitutionbywhichthetenureofa CongressmanmaybeshortenedareNOTexclusive. Moreover, as the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automaticallythepermanentforfeitureoftheelectivepositionbeingpresentlyheld,itisnotnecessarythatthe otherpositionbeactuallyheld.ThegroundforforfeitureinSec.13,Art.VIoftheConstitutionisdifferentfrom theforfeituredecreedinSec.67,Art.IXofB.P.Blg.881,whichisactuallyamodeofvoluntaryrenunciationof officeunderSec.7,par.2ofArt.VIoftheConstitution.RAM. Gutierrez,Jr.,J.:Dissentingopinion Congresscannotaddbystatuteoradministrativeacttothecausesfordisqualificationorremovalof constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining constitutional officersotherthanthoseprovidedintheConstitution.

c.Synchronizedtermsofoffice Art.XVIII,Secs.12 Art.XVIII,Sec.1.ThefirstelectionsofMembersoftheCongressunderthisConstitutionshallbe heldonthesecondMondayofMay,1987. ThefirstlocalelectionsshallbeheldonadatetobedeterminedbythePresident,whichmaybe simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all MembersofthecityormunicipalcouncilsintheMetropolitanManilaarea. Sec.2.TheSenators,MembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,andthelocalofficialsfirstelected underthisConstitutionshallserveuntilnoonofJune30,1992. OftheSenatorselectedintheelectionin1992,thefirsttwelveobtainingthehighestnumberof votesshallserveforsixyearsandtheremainingtwelveforthreeyears.

2.Election a.Regularelection ArtVI,Sec.8 Art.VI,Sec.8. Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionoftheSenatorsandthe MembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay. Regular(Art.VI,Sec.8) 2ndMondayofmay,every3years,starting1992(unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw).Thetermofoffice beginsonthefollowingJune30. Forthetransitoryperiod,thefirstelectionwasheldonthe2ndMondayofMay,1987(Art.XVIII,Sec. 1.) b.Specialelection Art.VI,Sec.9 Art.VI,Sec.9. IncaseofvacancyintheSenateorintheHouseorRepresentatives,aspecial electionmaybecalledtofillsuchvacancyinthemannerprescribedbylaw,buttheSenatororMemberof

theHouseofRepresentativesthuselectedshallserveonlyfortheunexpiredterm. RepublicActNo.6645,Dec.28,1987

REPUBLICACTNO.6645 ANACTPRESCRIBINGTHEMANNEROFFILLINGAVACANCY INTHECONGRESSOFTHEPHILIPPINES. Sec. 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representativesatleastone(1)yearbeforethenextregularelectionforMembersofCongress,theCommissionon Elections,uponreceiptofaresolutionoftheSenateortheHouseofRepresentatives,asthecasemaybe,certifying totheexistenceofsuchvacancyandcallingforaspecialelection,shallholdaspecialelectiontofillsuchvacancy.If Congressisinrecess,anofficialcommunicationontheexistenceofthevacancyandcallforaspecialelectionbythe PresidentoftheSenateorbytheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,asthecasemaybe,shallbesufficientfor such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpiredterm. Sec.2.TheCommissiononElectionsshallfixthedateofthespecialelection,whichshallnotbeearlierthan fortyfive(45)daysnorlaterthanninety (90)daysfromthedateofsuchresolution orcommunication,stating amongotherthingstheofficeorofficestobevotedfor:Provided,however,Thatifwithinthesaidperiodageneral electionisscheduledtobeheld,thespecialelectionshallbeheldsimultaneouslywithsuchgeneralelection. Sec.3. The Commissionon Electionsshall sendcopiesoftheresolution,innumbersufficient fordue distributionandpublication,totheProvincialorCityTreasurerofeachprovinceorcityconcerned,whointurn shallpublishitintheirrespectivelocalitiesbypostingatleastthreecopiesthereofinasmanyconspicuousplacesin eachoftheirelectionprecints,andacopyineachofthepollingplacesandpublicmarkets,andinthemunicipal buildings. Sec.4.ThisActshalltakeeffectuponitspublicationintheOfficialGazetteorinatleasttwonewspapersof generalcirculation. Approved,December28,1987.

Art.IXC,Sec.11 Art.IXC,Sec.11. FundscertifiedbytheCommissionasnecessarytodefraytheexpensesfor holdingregularandspecialelections,plebiscites,initiatives,referenda,andrecalls,shallbeprovidedin the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be released automatically upon certificationbytheChairmanoftheCommission.

IncaseofvacancyintheSenateortheHouse,aspecialelectionmaybecalledtofillupsuchvacancy "inthemannerprescribedbylaw." ThelawthatgovernsandlaysdownthedetailsconcerningthespecialcongressionalelectionsisRep. ActNo.6645(December28,1987).Underthelaw,nospecialelectionwillbecalledifthevacancyoccurs(i) lessthan18monthsbeforethenextregularelectioninthecaseoftheSenate,or(ii)lessthan1yearbeforethe nextregularelectioninthecaseoftheHouse;inthesecases,wewilljusthavetowaitforthenextregular election,forpracticalreasons. Whenthevacancyoccursduringtheperiodwhenspecialelectionsareallowedtobeconducted(18or12 monthsormorebeforethenextregularelection),theparticularHouseofCongressmustpasseitheraresolution bytheHouseconcerned,ifCongressisinsession,oracertificationbytheSenatePresidentortheSpeakerofthe House,ifCongressisnotinsession,(a)declaringtheexistenceofthevacancyand(b)callingforaspecial electiontobeheldwithin45to90daysfromthedateofcallingofthespecialelection(thatis,fromthedateof theresolutionorcertification). ButtheSenatororMemberoftheHousethuselectedshallserveonlyfortheunexpiredportionofthe term.(Art.VI,Sec.9) FundscertifiedbytheCOMELECasnecessarytodefraytheexpensesforholdingregularandspecial elections,plebiscites,initiatives,referenda,andrecalls,shallbeprovidedintheregularorspecialappropriations and,onceapproved,shallbereleasedautomaticallyuponcertificationbytheChairmanoftheCOMELEC.(Art. IXC,Sec.11) InLozadavsCOMELEC,120SCRA337,apetitiontocompeltheCOMELECtocallspecialelections tofilltwelvevacancies intheinterim Batasang Pambansa wasdismissed ontheground interalia thatthe petitionerswerenotproperpartiesastheyhadonlywhattheSupremeCourtcalleda"generalizedinterest" sharedwiththerestofthepeople.

LozadavsCOMELEC,120SCRA337(1983) F:
Thisisapet.formandamusfiledbyLozadaandIgotasrepresentativesuitforandinbehalfofthosewhowishto participateintheelectionirrespectiveofpartyaffiliation,tocompeltheresp.COMELECtocallaspecialelectiontofillup existingvacanciesnumbering12intheInterimBP.Thepet.isbasedonSec.5(2),Art.VIIIofthe1973Consti.w/creads: "IncaseavacancyarisesintheBP18monthsormorebeforearegularelection,theCOMELECshallcalla specialelectiontobeheldw/in60daysafterthevacancyoccurstoelecttheMembertoservetheunexpiredterm." PetitionerLozadaclaimsthatheisaTPandabonafideelectorofCebuCityandatransientvoterofQC,MM, whodesirestorunforthepositionintheBP;whilepetitionerIgotallegesthat,asTP,hehasstandingtopetitionby mandamusthecallingofaspecialelectionasmandatedbythe1973Consti.

HELD:I.

a. Astaxypayers,petitionersmaynotfiletheinstantpetition,fornowherethereinisitalleged

thattaxmoneyisbeingillegallyspent.xxx b. Asvoters,neitherhavepetitioners therequisiteinterestorpersonalitytoqualifythemto maintainandprosecutethepresentpetition.Petitioners'standingtosuemaynotbepredicateduponaninterest ofthekindallegedhere,w/cisheldincommonbyallmembersofthepublicbec.ofthenecessarilyabstract natureoftheinjurysupposedlysharedbyallcitizens. II. a.TheSC'sjurisdictionovertheCOMELECisonlytoreviewbycertiorarithelatter'sdecision, ordersorrulings.xxxThereisinthiscasenodecision,orderorrulingoftheCOMELECw/cissoughttobe reviewedbythisCourtunderitscertiorarijurisdictionxxx. b.Mandamusdoesnotlie.ThereistotalabsencethatCOMELEChasunlawfullyneglectedthe performanceofaministerialdutyorhasrefusedonbeingdemanded, todischargesuchaduty. xxx[T]he holdingofspecialelectionsinseveralregionaldistrictswherevacanciesexist,wouldentailhugeexpenditureof money. OnlytheBPcanmakethenecessaryappropriationforthepurpose,andthispoweroftheBPmay neitherbesubjecttomandamusbythecourtsmuchlessmayCOMELECcompelBPtoexerciseitspowerof appropriation. III. Perhapsthe strongestreason whythesaidprovision isnotintended to applytotheInterim National AssemblyisthefactthataspassedbytheConCon,theInterimNAwastobecomposedbythe delegatestotheConCon,aswellasthethenincumbentPres.andVP,andthemembersoftheSenateandHouse ofRep.ofCongressunderthe1935Consti.W/suchnumberofrepresentativesrepresentingeachcongressional district,oraprovince,nottomentiontheSenators,therewasfeltabsolutelynoneedforfillingupvacancies occurringintheInterimNA,consideringtheuncertaintyofthedurationofitsexistence.RAM. Barlongay: Q:Canappropriationofmoneythroughalawbecompelledbymandamus? A:No. Q:Istheruleabsolute? A:No.Thereareexceptions(seePasaycase).LGUsmaybecompelledbymandamustoappropriatemoneyfor obligationsalreadyincurredor(whenthereisalready)arighttow/caprivatepartyisentitled.

3.Salaries,PrivilegesandDisqualifications a.Salaries Art.VI,Sec.10.ThesalariesofSenatorsandMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallbe determinedbylaw.Noincreaseinsaidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthefull termofalltheMembersoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesapprovingsuchincrease.

Art.XVIII,Sec.17.UntiltheCongressprovidesotherwise,thexxxPresidentoftheSenate,the Speaker of the House of Representatives xxx (shall receive an annual salary of) two hundred forty thousandpesoseach;theSenators,theMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,xxxtwohundredfour thousandpesoseach;xxx

ThesalariesofSenatorsandMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallbedeterminedbylaw. UnlesstheCongressprovidesotherwise,thePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseshallreceive anannualsalaryofP240,000;whiletheSenatorsandthemembersoftheHouseshallreceiveP204,000each. (Art.XVIII,Sec.17.) WhileitisCongress,throughasalarylaw,thatdeterminesthesalarytobereceivedbyitsmembers,the Constitutionmandatesthatnoincreaseinsaidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthefull termofallthemembersofthetwohousesapprovingsuchincrease.

PhilconsavMathay,18SCRA300(1966) F:
PHILCONSAhasfiledinthisCourtasuitagainsttheAuditorGeneralofthePhils.,andtheAuditorofthe Congress,seekingtopermanentlyenjointheaforesaidofficialsfromauthorizingorpassinginauditthepaymentofthe increasedsalariesauthorizedbyRA4134(approved6/10/64)totheSpeakerandmembersoftheHRepbefore12/30/69. Sec.1,par.1ofRA4134provided,interalia,thattheannualsalaryoftheSenatePres.andoftheSpeakerofthe HRepshallbeP40,000each;thatoftheSenatorsandmembersoftheHRep,P32,000each(therebyincreasingtheirpresent compensationofP16TandP7,200paforthePresidingofficersandmembersrespectively.) The19651966BudgetimplementedtheincreaseinsalaryoftheSpeakerandmembersoftheHRepsetbyRA 4134. ThepetitionerscontendthatsuchimplementationisviolativeofArtVI,Sec.14ofthe1935Consti,w/cprovided that:"xxxNoincreaseinsaidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthefulltermofalltheMembers oftheSenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesapprovingsuchincrease.xxx" Thereasongivenbeingthatthetermofthe8senatorselectedin1963,andwhotookpartintheapprovalofRA 4134,willexpireonlyon12/30/69;whilethetermofthemembersoftheHousewhoparticipatedintheapprovalofthesaid Actexpiredon12/30/65.

HELD: The Court agrees w/ petitioners that the increased compensation provided is not operative until 12/30/69,whenthefulltermofallmembersoftheSenateandHousethatapproveditwillhaveexpired. Purposeoftheprovision.Thereasonforthethisrule,theCourtsaid,istoplacea"legalbartothe legislatorsyieldingtothenaturaltemptationtoincreasetheirsalaries.Notthatthepowertoprovideforhigher compensationislacking,butwiththelengthoftimethathastoelapsebeforeanincreasebecomeseffective, thereisadeterrentfactortoanysuchmeasureunlesstheneedforitisclearlyfelt." Significantly,inestablishingwhatmightbetermedawaitingperiod,theconstitutionalprovisionrefers to"allmembersoftheSenateandoftheHouseorRep."inthesamesentence,asasingleunit,w/odistinctionor separation bet. them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expirationofthefullterm"xxxusingthesingularform,andnottheplural,despitethedifferenceinthetermsof office,xxxtherebyrenderingmoreevidenttheintenttoconsiderbothhousesforthepurposeasindivisible componentsofonesingleLegislature. Theuseoftheword"term"inthesingular,whencombined w/the

followingphrase"allthemembersoftheSenateandoftheHouse,"underscoresthatintheapplicationofsaid provision, the fundamental consideration isthat thetermsof officeof all members ofthe Legislature that enactedthemeasuremusthaveexpiredbeforetheincreaseincompensationcanbecomeoperative. TermofallthemembersoftheCongress,insteadofallthemembersoftheSenateandoftheHouse." Thisisadistinctionw/oadifference,sincetheSenateandtheHousetogetherconstitutetheCongress. The use of the phrase "of the Senate and of the House" when it could have employed the shorter expression"oftheSenateandtheHouse"isgrammaticallycorrect.Tospeakof"membersoftheSenateandthe House"wouldimplythatthemembersoftheSenatealsoheldmembershipintheHouse.RAM.

Illustration:Ifasalarylawispassedin1983increasingthesalaryofmembersofCongress,thesame lawcanonlytakeeffectforthetermthatbeginsatnoonof30June1992;butifasalaryispassedin1988 decreasing the salary of members of Congress, the law can take effect right away, since the Constitution prohibitsonlytheincrease. Ifanothersalarylawispassedin1993toincreasethesalary,thesamecantake effectnotinthetermbeginningatnoonof30June1995;thetoptwelvesenatorselectedonthe2ndMondayof May,1992wouldstillbeholdingofficethen.Itcanonlytakeeffectin1998.Effectively,therefore,suchlawcan takeeffectonlyaftertheexpirationofthelongesttermofaSenator,whichissixyears,evenifthetermofthe Representativewhovotedforthelawisonly3years.

LigotvMathay,56SCRA823(1974) F:
PetitionerservedasamemberoftheHRepofCongressfor3consecutive4yrtermscoveringa12yrspanfrom 12/30/57to12/30/69.Duringhis2ndterminoffice,RA4134wasenactedintolaw. Petitionerwasreelectedtoa3rdterm(12/30/65to12/30/69)butwasheldnotentitledtothesalaryincreaseof P32,000duringsuchthirdtermbyvirtueofthisCourt'sunanimousdecisioninPhilconsav.Mathay.Petitionerlosthisbid foraconsecutive4thterminthe1969electionsandhistermhavingexpiredon12/31/69,filedaclaimforretirementunder CA186,Sec.12(c),asamended. TheHRepthusissuedatreasurywarrantinpetitioner'sfavorashisretirementgratuity,usingtheincreasedsalary ofP32,000p.a.Resp.CongressAuditordidnotsignthewarrantpendingresolutionbytheAuditorGen.ofasimilarclaim filedbyCongSingson.WhentheAuditorGen.'sadversedecisiononSingson'sclaimcameout,respAuditorrequested petitionertoreturnthewarrantforrecomputation.Petitioner'srequestforreconhavingbeendeniedbytheAuditorGen.he filedthepresentpetitionforreview.

HELD: 1. [T]he"rateofpayasprovidedbylaw"formembersofCongressretiring on 12/30/69,suchas petitioner,mustnecessarilybeP7,200p.a.,thecompensationtheyreceived"asprovidedbylaw"andtheConsti duringtheirtermofoffice. 2.TograntretirementgratuitytomembersofCongresswhosetermsexpiredon12/30/69computedon thebasisofanincreasedsalaryofP32,000p.a.wouldbetopaythemprohibitedemolumentsw/cineffect increasethesalarybeyondthatw/ctheywerepermittedbytheConsti.toreceiveduringtheirincumbency.This wouldbeasubtlewayofgoingaroundtheconstitutionalprohibitionandincreasingineffecttheircompensation duringtheirtermofofficeandofdoingindirectlywhatcouldnotbedonedirectly.

3. Petitioners'contentionthatsincetheincreasedsalaryofP32Tp.a.wasalreadyoperativewhenhis retirementtookeffecton12/30/69,hisretirementgratuityshouldbebasedonsuchincreasedsalarycannotbe sustainedasfarasheandothermembersofCongresssimilarlysituatedareconcernedforthesimplereasonthat aretirementorbenefitisaformofcompensationw/inthepurviewoftheConstitutionalprovisionlimitingtheir compensationand"otheremoluments"totheirsalaryasprovidedbylaw.RAM. b.Freedomfromarrest Art.VI,Sec.11.ASenatororMemberoftheHouseshall,inalloffensespunishablebynotmore than six (6) years imprisonment (prision correcional), be privileged from arrest while Congress is in session.xxx Elementsoftheprivilege: i.Congressmustbeinsession,whetherregular(sec.15)orspecial(supra).Itdoesnotmatterwherethe memberofCongressmaybefound(attendingthesession,socializinginaprivateparty,orsleepingathome);so longasCongressisinsession,freedomfromarrestholds; ii.Thecrimeforwhichthememberistobearrestedispunishableby6yearsofimprisonmentorless. "Punishable"referstothemaximumpossiblepenaltywhichapenalstatuteattachestotheoffense.Itfollowstoo thatifthecrimeispunishableby6yearsand1dayofprisionmayorormore,themembercanbearrested,even ifheissessioninthehallsofCongress.

Historyoftheprivilege TheRevisedPenalCode(ActNO.3815),enactedin1932,indirectlygrantedparliamentaryimmunity, wheninArt.145,itpunishedwithapenaltyofprisioncorrecional"anypublicofficeroremployeewhoshall, whiletheAssemblyisinregularorspecialsession,arrestorsearchanymemberthereof,exceptincasesuch memberhascommittedacrimepunishableunderthisCodebyapenaltyhigherthanprisionmayor." Whenthe1935Constitutiontookeffect,itwasthoughtthatadirectgrantofparliamentaryimmunity was given, since in Art. VI, Sec. 15, it was provided that: "The Senators and Members of the House of Representativesshallinallcasesexcepttreason,felonyandbreachofthepeace,beprivilegedfromarrestduring theirattendanceatthesessionoftheCongress,andingoingtoandreturningfromthesame."

MartinezvMorfe,44SCRA22(1972) F:
Bothpetitionersarefacingcriminalprosecution,theinformationfiledagainstpetitionerMartinezforfalsification ofapublicdocument(punishablebyprisionmayor)and2informationsagainstpetitionerBautista,Sr.forviolationofthe RevisedElectionCode(penaltyimposableforeachoffensechargedisnothigherthan prisionmayor). Petitioners,as

delegatesoftheConCon(1973Consti.)wouldinvokewhattheyconsidertobetheprotectionoftheconstitution(granting immunityfromarresttosenatorsandrepresentativesduringtheirattendanceatthesessionsofCongress)ifconsideredin connectionw/Art145,RPCpenalizingapublicofficerwhoshall,duringthesessionsofCongress,"arrestorsearchany memberthereof,exceptincasesuchmemberhascommittedacrimepunishableunder(such)codebyapenaltyhigherthan prisionmayor."ForundertheConstitutionalConventionAct,delegatesareentitledtotheparliamentaryimmunitiesofa senatororarepresentative. Whatissoughtbypetitionersisthattherespectivewarrantsofarrestissuedagainstthembequashedontheclaim thatbyvirtueoftheparliamentaryimmunitytheyenjoyasdelegates,xxxtheyareimmunefromarrest.

HELD: Certiorari does not lie to quash the warrants issued against petitioners. Their reliance on the constitutionalprovisionw/cforthemshouldbesupplementedbywhatwasprovidedforintheRPCisfutile. Thereisnojustificationforgrantingtheirrespectivepleas. UnderArt.IV,Sec.15ofthe1935Consti.,theimmunityfromarrestdoesnotcoveranyprosecutionfor treason,felonyandbreachofthepeace. Treason existswhentheaccusedlevieswaragainsttheRepublicor adherestoitsenemiesgivingthemaidandcomfort.Afelonyisanactoromissionpunishablebylaw.Breachof the peace covers anyoffense whether defined by the RPC or any special statute. xxx [F]rom the explicit languageoftheConsti.,xxxpetitionerscannotjustifytheirclaimtoimmunity.NordoesArt.145,RPCcometo theirrescue.Suchaprovisionthattookeffectin1932couldnotsurviveaftertheConsti.becameoperativeon 10/15/35. xxx InthelanguageoftheConsti.thenthatportionofArt.145,RPCpenalizingapublicofficialor employeewhoshallwhiletheCongressisinregularorspecialsessionarrestorsearchanymemberthereof exceptincasehehascommittedacrimepunishableundertheRPCbyapenaltyhigherthanprisionmayoris declaredinoperative. TheaboveconclusionreachedbythisCourtisbolsteredandfortifiedbypolicyconsiderations.Thereis, tobesure, a fullrecognition of thenecessity tohavemembers of Congress, and likewise delegates tothe ConCon,entitledtotheutmostfreedomtoenablethemtodischargetheirvitalresponsibilities,bowingtono otherforceexceptthedictatesoftheirconscience.xxxTheutmostlatitudeinfreespeechshouldbeaccorded them.Whenitcomestofreedomfromarrest,however,itwouldamounttothecreationofaprivilegedclass,w/o justificationinreason,ifnotwithstandingtheirliabilityforacriminaloffense,theywouldbeconsideredimmune duringtheirattendanceinCongressandingoingtoandreturningfromthesame.Thereislikelynodissentfrom thepropositionthatalegislatororadelegatecanperformhisfunctionsefficientlyandwell,w/otheneedforany transgressionofthecriminallaw.RAM. The exceptions under the 1935 Constitution (treason, felony and breach of the peace) were so comprehensiveastoexcludefromtheoperationoftheprivilegeallcriminaloffensesandtolimittheimmunity fromarrestorcivilprocessonlyduringthesessionofthatbody.Ultimately,Art.145oftheRPC,totheextent thatitpenalizedpublicofficersfromarrestingmembersofCongressforcrimespunishablewithprisionmayor orless,wasrendered"inoperative"uponthepassageofthe1935Constitution. Art.145,thenwasdeemed strickenoutofthestatutebooksuponthisdeclarationbytheCourt;itwasdeclared"inoperative."Withoutthis felony,therewasnowaytospeakofimmunityfromarrest. The 1971 Concon, aware of this ruling (Martinez and Bautista were delegates), provided for real immunityinthe1973Constitution,byincludingArt,VIII,Sec.9:"AMemberoftheNationalAssemblyshall, inalloffensespunishablebynotmorethan6yearsimprisonment,beprivilegedfromarrestduringhisattend

anceatitssessions,andingoingtoandreturningfromthesame;buttheNationalAssemblyshallsurrenderthe Memberinvolvedtothecustodyofthelawwithin24hoursafteritsadjournmentforarecessofitsnextsession, otherwisesuchprivilegeshallceaseuponitsfailuretodoso." The1987Constitutionseemstohavewidenedtheprivilegebysimplystatingthatsuchamember"shall, inalloffensespunishablebynotmorethan6yearsimprisonment,beprivilegedformarrestwhiletheCongress isinsession." Unlikethe1973rule,now,arrestcanonlybemadewhenCongressisnotinsession. Ifthe arrestingofficercannotacquirejurisdictionoverthepersonofthememberduringsuchperiod,hewillhaveto waituntiltheendofhisterm. Itwouldalsoseemthatupontheeffectivityofthe1973Constitution,Art.145,RPCwhichwasdeclared inoperativebytheSC,wasdeemedrevived,butwithmodification(fromprisionmayortoprisioncorrecional).

c.SpeechandDebateClause ArtVI,Sec.11.xxxNomembershallbequestionednorbeheldliableinanyotherplaceforany speechordebateintheCongressorinanycommitteethereof.

Thisprivilegeprotectsthememberconcernedfromanylibelsuitthatmaybefiledagainsthimfora speechmade"in"thehallsofCongressorinanyofitscommittees.Speechisnotconfinedtotraditionalspeech buteventothecastingofvotes,themakingofreports,adebateordiscussion,evencommunicativeactions,and anyotherformofexpression. Thespeech,however,mustbemade"in"Congressinthedischargeoflegislativeduty.Thus,

JimenezvCabangbang,17SCRA876(1966) F: ThisisanordinarycivilactionfortherecoverybyplaintiffsJimenez,etal.,ofseveralsumsofmoney, bywayofdamagesforthepublicationofanallegedlylibelousletterofdefendantBartolomeCabangbang.An openletterofthePresident,publishedinseveralnewspapersofgeneralcirculationsayingthatcertainmembers oftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines hadbeenpreparingforacoupandworkingforthecandidacyofthe SecretaryofDefenseforthePresidency. Uponbeingsummoned,theCabangbangmovedtodismissthecomplaintuponthegroundthattheletter inquestionisnotlibelous,andthat,evenifitwere,saidletterisaprivilegedcommunication. ISSUES: Whetherthepublicationinquestionisaprivilegedcommunication;and,ifnot,(2) whetheritis libelousornot. (1) Thedeterminationofthefirstissuedependsonw/nthepublicationfallsw/inthepurviewofthe phrase"speechordebatetherein"thatistosay,inCongressusedinthisprovision. ScopeofParliamentaryFreedomofSpeechandDebate."Saidexpressionreferstoutterancesmadeby

Congressmenintheperformanceoftheirofficialfunctions,suchasspeechesdelivered,statementsmade,or votescastinthehallsofCongress,whilethesameisinsession,aswellasbillsintroducedinCongress,whether thesameisinsessionornot,andotheractsperformedbyCongressmen,eitherinCongressoroutsidethe premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of CongressionalCommitteesdulyauthorizedtoperformitsfunctionsassuch,atthetimeoftheperformanceof theactsinquestion." Thepublicationinvolvedinthiscasedoes not belongtothiscategory. Accordingtothecomplaint herein,itwasanopenlettertothePres.dated11/14/58,whenCongresspresumablywasnotinsession,anddef. causedsaidlettertobepublishedinseveralnewspapersofgen.circ.inthePhils.,onoraboutsaiddate.Itis obviousthat,inthuscausingthecommunicationtobesopublished,hewasnotperforminghisofficialduty, eitherasamemberofCongressofasofficeroranyCommitteethereof. (2) Letterwasnotlibelous. Theletterwasnotlibelousbec.itmentionsthathereinappellantsas possibly"unwittingtoolsofaplanofwhichtheyhaveabsolutelynoknowledge." Inotherwords,thevery document uponw/cpltffs'action isbasedexplicitlyindicatesthattheymightbe absolutelyunaware ofthe allegedoperationplans,andthattheymaybeunwittingtoolsoftheplanners.Thestatementisnotderogatoryto pltffs.tothepointofentitlingthemtorecoverdamages.RAM. TheprovisionprotectstheMemberofCongressonlyfrombeingheldliableoutsideofCongress("inany otherplace");itdoesnotprotecthimfromliability"inside"Congress,i.e.,frompossibledisciplinarymeasures thathispeersmayimposeuponhim.Forasmentionedabove,hisspeechmayconstitutedisorderlybehavioras in Osmena v Pendatun (109Phil863),andthismaybepenalized withcensure,suspensionfor60days,or expulsion,thelattertwouponconcurrenceof2/3ofthemembership. Itisimportanttonotethatthisprivilegeisnotabsolute.Theruleprovidesthatthelegislatormaynotbe questioned"inanyotherplace,"whichmeansthathemaybecalledtoaccountforhisremarksbyhisown colleagues inCongressitself, and when warranted, punished for disorderly behavior. Thus, in the caseof Osmena v Pendatun,thePresidenthimselfwhohadbeenvilifiedbythepetitionercouldnotfileanycivilor criminalactionagainsthimbecauseofthisimmunity.Nonetheless,themajorityofthemembersoftheHouseof Representativesinwhichthequestioned speechwasdeliveredwerenotprecluded fromdemonstrating their loyaltytothechiefexecutivebydeclaringOsmenaguiltyofdisorderlybehaviorandsuspendinghiminthe exerciseoftheirdisciplinarypower[nowArt.VI,Sec.16(3)].

OsmenavPendatun(109Phil863) F:
In1960,Cong.OsmenadeliveredaprivilegespeechinCongressentitled"AMessagetoGarcia,"maliciously denouncingandchargingtheadministrationofPres.Garcia.Asaresultofthis,theHRepthroughHouseResolutionNo. 59createdaspecialcommitteetoinvestigatetheveracityofthechargesandforhimtoshowcausewhyheshouldnotbe punishedbytheHouseifhefailedtosubstantiatehischarges. Onhisside,Osmenacontendedinhispetitionthat: (1) theConsti.gavehimcompleteparliamentaryimmunity,andso,forwordsspokenintheHouse,heoughtnottobe questioned;(2)thathisspeechconstitutednodisorderlybehaviorforw/checouldbepunished;(3)supposinghecouldbe

questionedanddisciplinedtherefor,theHousehadlostthepowertodosobec.ithadtakenupotherbusinessbefore approvingHouseResolutionNo.59;(4)thattheHousehasnopower,undertheConsti.,tosuspendoneofitsmembers. ResolutionNo.175foundOsmenaguiltyofseriousdisorderlybehavior.Hewassuspendedfor15months.

HELD: 1. Sec.15,Art.VIofthe1935Consti.providesthat"foranyspeechordebate"inCongress,the SenatorsorMembersoftheHRep"shallnotbequestionedinanyotherplace."Observethat"theyshallnotbe questionedinanyotherplace"thanCongress.Buttheymay,nevertheless,bequestionedinCongressitself. Furthermore,theRulesoftheHousew/cpetitionerhimselfhasinvokedrecognizetheHouse'spowerto holdamemberresponsible"forwordsspokenindebate." The provision guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression w/o fear of being made responsibleincriminalorcivilactionsbeforethecourtsoranyotherforumoutsideoftheCongressionalHall. Butitdoesnotprotecthimfromresponsibilitybeforethelegislativebodyitselfwheneverhiswordsandconduct areconsideredbythelatterdisorderlyorunbecomingamemberthereof. Forunparliamentaryconduct,membersxxxofCongresshavebeen,orcouldbecensured,committedto prison,suspended,evenexpelledbythevotesoftheircolleagues. 2.OnthethirdpointofpetitionerthattheHousemaynolongertakeactionagainsthim,bec.afterhis speechandbeforeapprovingtheResolutionNo.59,ithadtakenupotherbusiness. xxx [C]ourtshavedeclaredthat"therulesadoptedbydeliberativebodiesaresubjecttorevocation, modificationorwaiveratthepleasureofthebodyappointingthem."Andithasbeensaidthat"Parliamentary rulesaremerelyproceduralandw/theirobservance,thecourtshavenoconcern. Theymaybewaivedor disregardedbythelegislativebody." 3.Onthequestionw/ndeliveryofspeechesattackingthePres.constitutesdisorderlyconductforw/c Osmenamaybedisciplined,webelievethattheHouseisthejudgeofwhatconstitutesdisorderlybehavior,not onlybec.theConsti.hasconferredjurisdiction uponit,butalsobec.thematterdependsmainlyonfactual circumstancesofw/ctheHouseknowsbestbutw/ccannotbedepictedinblackandwhiteforpresentationto, andadjudicationbytheCourts.RAM. Illustration:IfCongressmanXmakesanoralabuseagainstCongressmanYinthehallsofCongress,he cannotbearrestednorprosecutedforslanderbecauseofthespeechclause.Buthecanbepunishedbyhispeers fordisorderlybehavior. ButifCong.X,inthecourseofheateddebate,assaultsCong.Yandinflictsphysicalinjuries,hecanbe criminallyprosecuted(fordirectassaultwithgraveorlessgravephysicalinjuries)becausealthoughaverbal assaultisimmune,aphysicalisnotimmune.Butalthoughhecanbeprosecuted,hecannotbearrestedwhile Congressisinsession,becausewhileheisnotimmunefromprosecution,heisimmunefromarrest,assuming thepenaltydoesnotexceedprisioncorrectional.ThecourtmustthuswaitfortherecessofCongressbeforeit canorderhisarrest.

d.Disqualifications (1)IncompatibleOfficesandForbiddenOffices

Art.VI,Sec.13. NoSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayholdanyother office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries, duringhistermwithout forfeitinghisseat.xxx Anincompatibleofficeisapostwhichamembercannotacceptunlesshewaivesorforfeitshisseatin Congress. A sensu contrario, if he waives or forfeits his seat, he may accept the other post, since the incompatibilityarisesonlybecauseofhissimultaneousmembershipinboth.

BARLONGAYCASE: Adazav.Pacana,Jr.,135SCRA431(1985) F:
PetitionerHomobonoAdazawaselectedgovernorofMisamisOrientalinthe1/30/80elections.Electedvicegov. forsaidprovinceinthesameelectionswasresp.FernandoPacana,Jr.Bothqualifiedandassumedtheirrespectiveoffices. BothAdazaandPacanafiledtheircertificatesofcandidacyforthe5/14/84BPelections.Inthesaidelections, petitionerwonwhilerespondentslost. On7/23/84,resp.took his oathofofficeas gov.ofMis. Or. andstartedtoperform the dutiesofgovernor. Claimingtobethelawfuloccupantofthegovernor'soffice,petitionerhasbroughtthispetitiontoexcluderesp.therefrom. Hearguesthathewaselectedtosaidofficeforatermof6yrs.,thatheremainstobethegovernoroftheprovinceuntilhis termexpireson3/23/86asprovidedbylaw,andthatw/inthecontextoftheparliamentarysystem,alocalelectiveofficial canholdthepositiontow/chehadbeenelectedandsimultaneouslybeanelectedmemberofParliament.

HELD: 1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the BP from holding any other office of employmentinthegovtduringhistenureisclearandunambiguous. Sec.10,Art.VIIIofthe1973Consti. providesthat:
"Sec.10.AmemberoftheNationalAssemblyshallnotholdanyotherofficeoremploymentinthegovernment xxxexceptthatofprimeministerormemberofthecabinet.xxx

xxxItisofnoavailtopetitionerthatthesystemofgovtinotherstatesallowsalocalelectiveofficialto act as an elected member of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of the people in whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. xxx [T]he incompatibility herein present is one created by no less than the constitutionitself. 2.Thesecondpropositionadvancedbypetitioneristhatresp.Pacana,asamereprivatecitizen,hadno righttoassumethegovernorshipleftvacantbypetitioner'selectiontotheBP.Hemaintainsthatresp.shouldbe consideredashavingabandonedorresignedfromthevicegovernorshipwhenhefiledhiscert.ofcandidacy. ThepointpressedrunsafoulofBP697,Sec.13(2)ofw/cprovidesthatgovernors,mayors,membersofthe varioussangguniangorbarangayofficialsshall,uponfilingacert.ofcandidacy,beconsideredonforcedleave ofabsencefromoffice."Respfallsw/inthecoverageofthisprovisionconsideringthathewasamemberofthe SangguniangPanlalawigan.RAM.

Art.VI,Sec.13.xxxNeithershallhebeappointedtoanyofficewhichmayhavebeencreatedor theemolumentsthereofincreasedduringthetermforwhichhewaselected.

ForbiddenOffice(VI,Sec.13) Aforbiddenofficeisonetowhichamembercannotbeappointedevenifheiswillingtogiveuphisseat in Congress. The effect of his resignation from the Congress is the loss of his seat therein but his disqualificationfortheforbiddenofficeneverthelessremains.Theprohibitionliesinthe"fiduciary"natureof therelationshipinvolved. Suchamembercannotresigninanticipationofthepassageofthelawcreatingsuchofficeorincreasing itsemolumentasawayofcircumventingtheprohibition. However,theprohibitionisnotforever (asinthe JonesLaw);itisforthetermforwhichhewaselected.

(2)Otherprohibitions Art.VI,Sec.14.NoSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmaypersonallyappearas counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasijudicial and other administrativebodies. Neithershallhe,directlyorindirectly,beinterestedfinanciallyinanycontract with,orinanyfranchiseorspecialprivilegegrantedbytheGovernment,oranysubdivision,agency,or instrumentality thereof, including any governmentownedor controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, duringhistermofoffice.HeshallnotinterveneinanymatterbeforeanyofficeoftheGovernmentforhis pecuniarybenefitorwherehemaybecalledupontoactonaccountofhisoffice. (i)Personallyappearingascounselbeforeanycourtofjustice,theElectoralTribunal,quasijudicial bodies,andotheradministrativebodies. WhattheConstitutionprohibitsinthecaseofmembersofCongresswhoarealsomembersofthebaris theirpersonalappearancebeforeanyofthesebodies.Thisisnotaprohibitionagainst,thepracticeoflawinany court.Thus,amembermaystillsignandfilehispleadings,givelegaladvice,continueaspartner,andhavea partnerorassociateappearforhimincourt. Underthe1973Constitution,theprohibitionagainstpersonalappearancecoveredonlycourtsinferiorto acourtofappellatejurisdiction(RTCdown),courtsinacivilcasewhereinthegovernmentistheadverseparty, andadministrativebodies. Now,theprohibitionisagainst"any"court,thusincluding theSCandtheCA, regardlessoftheaction.

BARLONGAYCASE: Puyatv.DeGuzman,Jr.,113SCRA32(1982)

F:

On5/14/79,anelectionforthe11DirectorsoftheInternationalPipeIndustriesCorp.(IPI)washeld.Therewere twogroups, the PuyatGroupand the AceroGroup. The Puyat Groupwould bein control oftheBoardand ofthe managementofIPI. On5/25/79,theAceroGroupinstitutedattheSECquowarrantoproc.questioningthe5/14/79election.Thesaid groupclaimedthatthevoteswerenotproperlycounted. May2531,1979,thePuyatGroupclaimsthatattheconferencesofthepartiesw/resp.SECCommissioner, JusticeEstanislaoA.Fernandez,thenamemberoftheInterimBP,orallyenteredhisappearanceascounselforresp.Acero tow/cthePuyatGroupobjectedonConstitutionalgrounds. Sec.11,Art.VIIIofthe1973Consti. providedthatno Assemblymancould"appearascounselbeforexxxanyadministrativebody,"andSECwasanadministrativebody. xxx On7/17/79,theSECgrantedleavetointerveneonthebasisofAtty.Fernandez'ownershipoftenshares.Itisthis OrderallowinginterventionthatprecipitatedtheinstantpetitionforCertiorariandProhibitionw/Prel.Inj. xxx On9/4/79,theCourtenbancissuedaTROenjoiningrespSECCommissionerfromallowingtheparticipationas anintervenor,ofresp.FernandezattheproceedingsintheSECcase.

HELD: TheinterventionofAssemblymanFernandezintheSECcasefallsw/intheambitoftheprohibition containedintheConsti.Therehasbeenanindirect"appearanceascounselbeforexxxanadministrativebody." Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion of Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearingascounsel.Ostensibly,heisnotappearingonbehalfofanother,althoughheisjoiningthecauseof thepvtresps.Hisappearancecouldtheoreticallybefortheprotectionofhisownershipof10sharesofIPIin respectofthematterinlitigation. However,certainsalientcircumstancesmilitateagainsttheinterventionofAssemblymanF.intheSEC case.HehadacquiredamereP200worthofstocksinIPI.Heacquiredthem"afterthefact,"thatis,on5/30/79, afterthecontestedelectionofDirectorson5/14/79,afterthequowarrantosuithadbeenfiledon5/25/79before SECandonedaybeforethescheduledhearingofthecasebeforetheSECon5/31/79.Andwhatismore,before hemovedtointervene,hehadsignifiedhisintentiontoappearascounselforresp.Acero,butw/cwasobjected tobypetitioners. Realizing,perhaps,thevalidityoftheobjection,hedecided,insteadto"intervene"onthe groundoflegalinterestinthematterunderlitigation.RAM.

(ii)Beinginterestedfinanciallyinany(a)contractwith,or(b)franchiseorspecialprivilegegrantedby, theGovernment,itssubdivision,agencyorinstrumentality,agovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporation,orits subsidiary.Theprohibitionisforthedurationofhistermofoffice. (iii)Interveninginanymatterbeforeanyofficeofthegovernmentforhispecuniarybenefit. (iv)Interveninginanymatterwherehemaybecalledupontoactonaccountofhisoffice. Itmaybenotedthatthelast3prohibitionsarethemselvespunishableactsundertheAntiGraftand CorruptPracticesAct.

e.DutytoDisclose

Art.XI,17.Apublicofficeroremployeeshall,uponassumptionofofficeandasoftenthereafter asmayberequiredbylaw,submitadeclarationunderoathofhisassets,liabilities,andnetworth.Inthe caseofthePresident,theVicePresident,theMembersoftheCabinet,theCongress,theSupremeCourt, theConstitutionalCommissionsandotherconstitutionaloffices,andofficersofthearmedforceswith generalorflagrank,thedeclarationshallbedisclosedtothepublicinthemannerprovidedbylaw. Art. VI, Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumptionofoffice,makeafulldisclosureoftheirfinancialandbusinessinterests.Theyshallnotifythe Houseconcernedofapotentialconflictofinterestthatmayarisefromthefilingofaproposedlegislation ofwhichtheyareauthors. Sec.20.TherecordsandbooksofaccountsoftheCongressshallbepreservedandbeopentothe publicinaccordancewithlaw,andsuchbooksshallbeauditedbytheCommissiononAuditwhichshall publishannuallyanitemizedlistofamountspaidtoandexpensesincurredforeachMember. Ingeneral,apublicofficeroremployeeshall,uponassumingofficeandasoftenthereafterasmaybe, requiredbylaw,submitadeclarationunderoathofhisassets,liabilitiesandnetworth. Butinthecaseof membersofCongressandotherhighgovernmentofficials(asenumerated),thedisclosuremustbemadepublic (Art. XI, Sec. 17). Furthermore, all members of Congress shall, upon assumption of office make a full disclosureoftheirfinancialandbusinessinterests(Art.VI,Sec.12). ThelawgoverningthisfinancialdisclosurebypublicofficersandemployeesisRA3019,otherwise knownastheAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct.Everypublicofficershallsubmitto(a)theOfficeofthe DepartmentHead,or(b)theOfficeofthePresidentincaseofaheadofdepartmentorchiefofanindependent office,thefollowing: 1.Atrue,detailed,andswornstatementofassetsandliability; 2.Astatementoftheamountsandsourcesofhisincome; 3.Theamountofpersonalandfamilyexpenses,and 4.Theamountofincometaxespaidthepreviousyear,onthefollowingoccasions: (a)within30yearsafterassumingoffice (b)onorbeforeApril15afterthecloseofthecalendar year,and (c)upontheexpirationoftheirtermofoffice,orupon resignationorseparationfromoffice WhenamemberofCongressauthorsaproposedlegislation,hemustnotifytheHouseconcernedofany

"potentialconflictofinterest"thatmayarisefromhisfilingofsuchbill(Art.VI,Sec.12.) Furthermore,therecordsandbooksofaccountsoftheCongressshallbepreservedandbeopentothe publicinaccordancewithlaw,andsuchbooksshallbeauditedbytheCommissiononAudit,whichshallpublish annuallyanitemizedlistofamountspaidtoandexpensesincurredforeachMember(Art.VI,Sec.20.) Thepurposeofpublicdisclosureofamember'sfinancialstatusandofficialexpensesistomakehim visibletotherest,andthusgivehimadeterrentfromcommittinggraftandcorruption.Thepublichasarightto knowhowmuchitisspendingforitsgovernment,

4.InternalGovernmentofCongress a.Electionofofficers Art.VI,Sec.16(1) TheSenateshallelectitsPresident andtheHouseofRepresentativesits Speaker,byamajorityvoteofallitsrespectiveMembers. EachHouseshallchoosesuchotherofficersasitmaydeemnecessary.

FirstorderofbusinesselectionbyeachhouseofthePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakerofthe House,andsuchotherofficersthattherulesofeachhousemayprovide. Amajorityvoteofalltherespectivemembersisrequiredtoelectthesetwoofficers. UpontheelectionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker,theConstitutiondeemstheHouses"organized."(VI, 19) b.Quorum Id.,Sec.16(2)AmajorityofeachHouseshallconstituteaquoromtodobusiness,butasmaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner,andundersuchpenalties,assuchHousemayprovide. Thequorumrequiredtoconductbusinessisamajority(1/2+1)ofallthemembers. Buttopassalaw,onlythevotesofthemajorityofthosepresentinthesession,therebeingaquorum, arerequired.Thisisknownasthe"shiftingmajority". Toillustrate:13membersoftheSenatearesufficienttoconstituteaquorum.Ifonly13membersare present,avoteby7infavorofabillissufficienttopassit.Butasthenumberofthosepresentincreases,the numberofvotesneededtopassabillwouldcorrespondinglyincrease,i.e.,shift.

When a quorum cannot be had, a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendanceoftheabsent(recalcitrant)membersbythemeansofarrestorsuchothermeasuresandpenaltiesas theHousemayprovideinitsrules.

AvelinovCuenco,83Phil17(1949) F:
Jose Avelino was Senate President in 1949. On 2/21/49, Senators Tanada and Sanidad filed a resolution (Resolution68)againstAvelinocallingforaninvestigation.Duringthesession,Avelinoand6otherswalkedoutleaving12 senatorsbehind.The12senatorscontinuedthesessionandpassedresolutionno.67declaringtheSenatePres.seatvacate. Sen.CuencowaseventuallyelectedastheactingPres.oftheSenate. ByhispetitioninthisquowarrantoproceedingpetitioneraskstheCourttodeclarehimtherightfulPresidentof thePhil.Senateandoustresp.,Sen.Cuenco.

ISSUES: a.DoestheCourthavejurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter? b.Itifhas,wereresolutionsNos.68and67validlyapproved? c.Shouldthepetitionbegranted? HELD:a.Tothefirstquestion,theanswerisinthenegative,inviewoftheseparationofpowers,thepolitical natureofthecontroversyandtheconstitutionalgranttotheSenateofthepowertoelectitsownpres.,w/cpower shouldnotbeinterferedw/,nortakenover,bythejudiciary.xxx b.Thesecondquestiondependsuponthesesubquestions:(1)Wasthesessionofthesocalledrump Senateacontinuationofthesessionvalidlyassembledw/22Senators(2wereabsent onewasabroad;the otherwasconfinedinaManilahospital)inthemorningof2/21/49?(2)Wasthereaquorominthatsession? (1)SupposingthattheCourthasjurisdiction,thereisunanimityintheviewthatthesessionunderSen. Arranzwasacontinuationofthemorningsessionandthataminorityof10senatorsmaynot,byleavingthe Hall,preventtheother12senatorsfrompassingaresolutionthatmetw/theirunanimousresolution. (2) Iftherumpsession wasnotacontinuation ofthemorning session, wasitvalidlyconstituted? JusticesParas,Feria,PabloandBengzonsaytherewasforthefollowingreasons:(i)theminutessayso,(ii)at thebeginningofsuchsessiontherewereatleast14senatorsincludingSenatorsPendatunandLopez,and(iii)in viewoftheabsencefromthecountryofSenatorConfessor,12senatorsconstituteamajorityoftheSenateof23 senators. WhentheConstitution declaresthatamajorityof"eachHouse"shallconstitute aquorom,"the House"doesnotmean"all"themembers.Evenamajorityofallthemembersconstitutethe"House."Thereis adifferencebet.amajorityof"allthemembersoftheHouse"andamajorityof"theHouse,"thelatterrequiring lessnumberthanthefirst.Therefore,anabsolutemajority(12)ofallthemembersoftheSenatelessone(23) constitutesconstitutionalmajorityoftheSenateforthepurposeofthequorom. J.Pablobelievesfurtherthat evenifthe12didnotconstituteaquorom,theycouldhaveorderedthearrestofone,atleast,oftheabsent membersxxx.RAM. InAvelinovCuenco,supra.,therulingthenwas:ThequorumwascomputedonthenumberofSenators overwhomtheSenatehasjurisdictionatthetimeofsession.

c.Rulesofproceedings Id., Secs.16(3)EachHousemaydeterminetherulesofitsproceedings,punishitsMembersfor disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of twothirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member.Apenaltyofsuspension,whenimposed,shallnotexceedsixtydays. Sec.21. TheSenateortheHouseofRepresentativesoranyofitsrespectivecommittees may conductinquiriesinaidoflegislationinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesofprocedure.Therights ofpersonsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected. EachHouseoritscommitteesmaydeterminetherulesofitsproceedings. Theserulesincludethe proceduretobefollowedin"inquiriesinaidoflegislation." TheHousemaysetasidetherulesitadoptedasitseesfit,becausetheserulesareonlyofatemporary nature. PacetevSecretaryoftheCommissiononAppointments,40SCRA58(1971) TherulesoftheCommissiononAppointmentsconcerningitsinternalbusinesscouldbereviewedbytheCourts, thatis,itisajusticiablematter,whenacertainconstructionofsuchruleswoulddefeattherightoftheindivid ualtoapublicoffice. F:
Inhissuitformandamusandprohibitionfiledw/thisCourt,petitionerF.Paceteallegedthathewasappointedby thethenPres.ofthePhils.on8/31/64asMun.JudgeofPigcawan,Cotabato.Hethenassumedofficeanddischargedhis duties.AshisappointmentwasmadeduringtherecessofCongress,itwassubmittedtotheCommissiononAppointments (CA)atitsnextsessionin'65.On5/20/65,hewasunanimouslyconfirmed.Morethan9mos.aftersuchconfirmation,the thenSec.ofJustice,throughtheJudicialSupt.,advisedpetitionertovacatehispositionasmun.judge,thegroundbeing thathisappointmenthadbeenbypassed.Petitionerwastakenbysurpriseandsoughtclarificationfromtheprin.resp.He wasinformedthatadayafterhisconfirmation,oneofthemembersoftheCA,Sen.Ganzon,wrotetoitsChairman,stating thathewasfilingamotionfortherecon.oftheconfirmationoftheappointmentofpetitionerxxxinviewofderogatory info.w/chehadreceived.Resp.Sec.ofCAthuswasledtonotifythethenSec.ofJusticeaccordingly,followingwhathe consideredtobetheprevailingpracticeofsuchbodythatthemerepresentationofsuchletter"automaticallyvacatedthe confirmationoftheappointmentinquestion***."Resp.thenadvisedpetitionerthatheshouldvacatehispositionashe hadnotbeendulyconfirmed.

HELD:Petitionermustprevail. 1.R21oftheRevisedRulesoftheCAreads:
"ResolutionoftheCommissiononanyappointmentmaybeconsideredonmotionbyamemberpresentednot morethanonedayaftertheirapproval.Ifamajorityofthememberspresentconcurtograntarecon.,theappointmentshall bereopenedandsubmittedanewtotheCommission.Anymotiontoreconsiderthevoteonanyappointmentmaybelaid onthetable,andthisshallbeafinaldispositionofsuchamotion."

"Respondent'stheorywouldgivetothemerefilingofmotionforrecon.theeffectw/citwouldhaveif themotionwereapproved,and,hence,woulddispensew/thenecessityofsuchapproval,forw/theconcurrence ofamajorityofthememberspresentisnecessary."(Altarejosv.Molo,25SCRA550.)xxxThatwouldbe tantamounttoimpartingtoamoveofsinglememberofacollectivebodyadecisiveweight.Itisbadenoughif theminorityweretoprevail.Aonemanruleisinfinitelyworse.

2.Adinterimappointmentstakeeffectatonce.Thetitleoftheappointeetotheofficeiscomplete.In the language of the Consti., the appointment is effective "until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournmentoftheCongress." Theconstitutionalrequirementisclear.TheremusteitherbearejectionbytheCAornonactiononits part.Nosuchthinghappenedinthiscase.Petitionerhadinsteadinhisfavoraunanimousvoteofconfirmation. Hecouldthusinvokeconstitutionalprotection.Forresps.toarguethatthemerefilingofaMFRdidsufficeto setitaside,evenintheabsenceofanyfurtheractionistolosesightofwhatisprovidedintheConsti. 3.Thecourtsarecalledupontoseetoitthatprivaterightsarenotinvaded.Thusevenlegislativeacts andexecutiveordersarenotbeyondthepaleofjudicialscrutiny.xxx[T]hereisnothingsacrosanctaboutarule oftheCA,especiallyso,whenasinthiscase,aconstructionsoughttobefastenedonitwoulddefeattherightof anindividualtoapublicoffice.RAM. d.Disciplineofmembers Art.VI,Sec.16(3)EachHousemaydeterminetherulesofitsproceedings,punishitsMembers fordisorderlybehavior,andwiththeconcurrenceoftwothirdsofallitsMembers,suspendorexpela Member.Apenaltyofsuspension,whenimposed,shallnotexceedsixtydays.

Eachhousemaypunishitmembersfor"disorderlybehavior."Whatconstitutes"disorderlybehavior"is solelywithinthediscretionofthehouseconcerned. Althoughamemberofeitherhousecannotbeheldaccountableinanyotherplaceforanyspeechhe makeintheCongressorinanycommitteethereof,hecanbefoundguiltyofdisorderlybehaviorbyhisown peers,soruledtheCourtinOsmenavPendatun.109Phil.863(1960). The penalty may consist of (i) censure; or upon a 2/3 vote of all the members of the house, (ii) suspension,notexceeding60days,or(iii)expulsion. Thehistorybehindthe60daylimitationontheperiodofsuspensioncouldbetracedtotheearlycaseof Alejandrino v Quezon, infra. Inadictum,theSCsaidthatitwasnotwithinthepowerofthelegislatureto suspenditsmember,sincesuspensiondeprivedtheconstituentsofthemembersuspendedoftherighttobe representedbyarepresentativethattheyreallyhad.Ineffect,suspensionpunishedtheconstituents.Inthecase ofexpulsion,theconstituentscouldatleastelectsomeoneelsetosubstitutethememberrepresented. Iftheonlydisciplinarymeasureswerelimitedtoexpulsionandcensure,however,theremightnotbea penaltyappropriateenoughforadisorderlybehaviorthatmeritedsomethingmorethancensurebutlessthan expulsion.Itwasthisdilemma,thattheCourtpreciselyfacedinOsmenavPendatun,whichmadeitupheldthe suspensionof15monthsdespitetheAlejandrinoruling. Thus,the1973Constitutiondevisedasystemofallowingsuspensionasapenaltybutlimiteditsperiod to60days[Art.VII,Sec.7(3)].Thiswascarriedoverinthe1987Constitution.[Art.VI,Sec.16(3)]

Alejandrinov.Quezon,46P83(1924) F:
Thepetitionerinthisorig.pet.formandamusandinjunctionisJoseAlejandrino,aSenatorappointedbytheGov Gen.torepresentthe12thSenatorialDistrict.ThecasusbelliisaresolutionadoptedbythePhil.Senatecomposedofthe resp.Senators,on2/5/24,deprivingAlejandrinoofalltheprerogatives,privileges,andemolumentsofhisofficeforthe periodof1yrfrom1/24havingbeendeclaredguiltyofdisorderlyconductandflagrantviol.oftheprivilegesoftheSenate forhavingtreacherouslyassaultedSen.deVeraontheoccasionofcertainphrasesbeingutteredbythelatterinthecourse ofthedebateregardingthecredentialsofMr.Alejandrino.Theburdenofpetitioner'scomplaintisthattheresolutionis unconstitutionalandentirelyofnoeffect.

HELD:1.Mandamus(M).Thegen.ruleisthatthewritwillnotliefromonebranchofthegovttoacoordinate branch,fortheveryobviousreasonthatneitherisinferiortotheother. Mwillnotlieagainstthelegislative body,itsmembers,oritsofficers,tocompeltheperformanceofdutiespurelylegislativeintheircharacterw/c thereforepertainstotheirlegislativefunctionsandoverw/ctheyhaveexclusivecontrol. 2.Onthemeritsofthecontroversy,theOrganicActauthorizestheGovGen.toappoint2senatorsand 9representativestorepresentthenonChristianregionsintheLegislature.Thesesenatorsandrepresentatives "holdofficeuntilremovedbytheGov.Gen."TheymaynotberemovedbytheLeg.However,totheSenateand the HRep., respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, w/ the concurrenceof2/3,expelanelectivemember."xxx.TheConsti.haspurposelywithheldfromthe2Housesof the Leg. and the GovGen. alike the power to suspend an appointive member. The reason is obvious. Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House w/o depriving the constituency ofrepresentation;expulsion,whenpermissible,likewisevindicatesthehonorofthelegislative bodywhilegivingtotheconstituencyanopportunitytoelectanew;butsuspensiondeprivestheelectoraldistrict ofrepresentationw/othatdistrictbeingaffordedanymeansbyw/ctofillthevacancy.Bysuspension,theseat remainsfilledbuttheoccupantissilenced.Suspensionfor1yr.isequivalenttoqualifiedexpulsionorremoval. However,thewritprayedforcannotissue,forthereasonthattheSCdoesnotpossessthepowerof coerciontomakethePhil.Senatetakeanyparticularaction.RAM.

Osmenav.Pendatun,109P863(1960)supra.(SpeechandDebateClause) Comparedw/Alejandrinov.Quezon:ItistruethatinAlejandrinoanobiterdictumthat"suspensiondeprives theelectoraldistrictofrepresentationw/othatdistrictbeingaffordedanymeansbyw/ctofillthatvacancy." Buttheremarkshouldbeunderstoodtoreferparticularlytothe appointive senatorwhowasthentheaffected partyandwhowasthentheaffectedpartyandwhowasbythesameJonesLawchargedw/thedutytorepresent the12thDistrictxxx. Itmustbeobserved,however,thatatthattimetheLegislaturehadonlythosepowersw/weregrantedto itbytheJonesLaw;whereasnowtheCongresshasthefulllegislativepowersandprerogativesofasovereign nation,exceptasrestrictedbytheConsti. xxx Now,theCongresshasthe inherentlegislativeprerogativeof suspensionw/ctheConsti.didnotimpair. "TheLegislativepowerofCongressisplenary,subject onlytosuchlimitations asarefoundinthe Consti. Sothat any power deemed tobe legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the

Congress,unlesstheConsti.providesotherwise."(Verav.Avelino,77P192.)RAM.

ExpulsioncomparedwithexclusionunderArt.VI,Sec.17

ExpulsionunderArt.VI,Sec.16(3)shouldbedistinguishedfromexclusionunderArt.VI,Sec.17, Art. VI, Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunalwhichshallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsof theirrespectiveMembers.xxx Underthelatter,ElectoralTribunalsoftheSenateandtheHouse,determineelectioncontests.They shallbethesolejudgesoftheelections,returns,andqualificationsoftheirelectivemembers.EachElectoral Tribunalisindependentoftheother;thisemphasizestheexclusivecharacterofthejurisdictionconferredupon each House. However, each Tribunal cannot add to the qualifications or disqualifications found in the Constitution. Thus,theElectoralTribunaliswithoutpowertoexcludeanymemberelectwhomeetsallthe Constitution'srequirementsformembership.

e.JournalandCongressionalRecords Art.VI,16(4)EachHouseshallkeepaJournalofitsproceedingsandfromtimetotimepublish thesame,exceptingsuchpartsasmay,initsjudgment,affectnationalsecurity;andtheyeasandnayson anyquestionshall,attherequestofonefifthoftheMemberspresent,beenteredintheJournal. EachHouseshallalsokeepaRecordofitsproceedings.

ItisthefirsttimethattheConstitutionrequiresa"record"inadditiontoa"journal".Uptothe1973 Constitution,onlyajournalwasrequiredtobekept,althoughinpractice,thelegislaturehasalwayskepta record. Cruz:Thejournalisonlyaresumeofminutesofwhattranspiredduringalegislativesession.Therecordisthe wordforwordtranscriptoftheproceedingstakenduringthesession.

(1)TheEnrolledBillTheory

Once a bill has been approved by both houses (the procedure will be discussed later), the bill is engrossedorenrolled,andthis"EnrolledCopyoftheBill"bearsthecertificationofthePresidingOfficerofthe house(eitherSenatePresidentorSpeakeroftheHouse)thatthisbillasenrolledistheversionpassedbyeach house.Thepurposeofthecertificationistopreventattemptsatsmugglingin"riders".Theenrolledcopyis thensenttothePresidentforhisaction.

Whathappensifthereisadiscrepancybetweentheenrolledcopyofthebill,andanyothercopyofthe bill?Theenrolledbillprevails,saystheSCinthefollowingcases.

MabanagvLopezVito,78Phil.1(1947) F:
Threeofthepltff.senatorsand8ofthepltff.representativeshadbeenproclaimedbyamajorityvoteofthe COMELECashavingbeenelectedsenatorsandrepresentativesintheelectionsheldon4/23/46. The3senatorswere suspended bythe Senate shortlyafter the openingof the first session following the elections, on account of alleged irregularitiesintheirelection.The8representativessincetheirelectionhadnotbeenallowedtositinthelowerHouse, excepttotakepartintheelectionofSpeaker,forthesamereason,althoughtheyhadnotbeenformallysuspended.xxx Asaconsequence,these3senatorsand8reprs.didnottakepartinthepassageofthequestionedresolution,nor wastheirmembershipreckonedinthecomputationofthenecessary3/4votew/cisrequiredinproposinganamendmentto theConsti.(theParityRightsAmendment.) Ifthesemembershadbeencounted,theaffirmativevotesinfavorofthe proposedamendmentwouldhavebeenshortofthenecessary3/4voteineitherbranchofCongress.

HELD: 1. Jurisdiction. Both notions of jurisdiction and conclusiveness of legislative enactment are synonymousinthatbotharefoundedupontheregardw/cthejudiciaryaccordsacoequal,coordinate,and independentbranchofGovt.Ifapoliticalquestionconclusivelybindsthejudgesoutofrespecttothepolitical departments,adulycertifiedlaworresolutionalsobindsthejudgesunderthe"enrolledbillrule"bornofthat respect.xxx 2. Enrolled Bill Theory. The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticatedbillorresolutionimportsabsoluteverityandisbindingonthecourts.xxx Sec.313oftheoldCodeofCiv.Proc.,asamended,provides:
"Officialdocumentsmaybeprovedasfollows:***(2)theproceedingsofthexxxCongress,bythejournalsof thosebodiesorofeitherhousethereof,orbypublishedstatutesorresolutions,orbycopiescertifiedbytheclerkor secretary,orprintedbytheirorder;Provided,thatinthecaseofActsofxxxthePhil.Leg.,whenthereisanexistenceofa copysignedbythepresidingofficersandsecretariesofsaidbodies,itshallbeconclusiveproofoftheprovisionsofsuch Actsandofthedueenactmentthereof."

Reasonsinsupportofenrollment:
Sec.150.ReasonsforConclusiveness.xxx[T]heruleagainstgoingbehindtheenrolledbillisrequiredbythe respectduetoacoequalandindependentdeptofgovt,anditwouldbeaninquisitionintotheconductofthemembersof thelegislature,averydelicatepower,thefrequentexerciseofw/cmustleadtoendlessconfusionintheadmin.ofthelaw. Theruleisalsooneofconvenience,bec.courtscouldnotrelyonthepublishedsessionlaws,butwouldberequiredtolook beyondthesetothejournalsofthelegislatureandoftentoanyprintedbillsandamendmentsw/cmightbefoundafterthe adjournmentofthelegislature.(Am.Jur.)

3.Comparedw/USv.Pons.TheCourtlookedintothejournalsinUSv.Ponsbec.,inallprobability, thosewerethedocumentsofferedinevidence.ItdoesnotappearthatadulyauthenticatedcopyoftheActwas

inexistenceorwasplacedbef.theCourt;andithasnotbeenshownthatifthathadbeendone,thisCourtwould nothaveheldthecopyconclusiveproofofthedueenactmentofthelaw.RAM.

CascoChemicalCo.vGimenez,7SCRA347(1963) F:
PursuanttotheprovisionsofRA2609(ForExMarginFeeLaw),theCBissuedCircularNo.95,fixingauniform marginfeeof25%onforextransactions.xxxSeveraltimesinNov.andDec.1959,petitionerCasco,w/cisengagedinthe manufactureofsyntheticresingluesxxx,boughtforexfortheimportationofureaandformaldehydew/carethemain RMintheproductionofsaidgluesandpaidthecorrespondingmarginfee.Petitionerhadsoughttherefundclaimingthat theseparateimportationofureaandformaldehydeisexemptfromsaidfee.AlthoughtheCBissuedthevouchersforthe refund,theAuditoroftheBankrefusedtopassinauditandapprovesaidvouchersuponthegroundthattheexemption grantedbytheMBforpetitioner'sseparateimportationsofureaandformaldehydeisnotinaccordw/theprovisionsofsec. 2,par.XVIIIofRA2609. Petitionermaintainsthattheterm"ureaformaldehyde"appearingintheprovisionshouldbeconstruedas"urea and formaldehyde"andthattherespshereinhaveerredinholdingotherwise. xxx "Ureaformaldehyde"isafinished product,w/cispatentlydistinctanddifferentfrom"urea"and"formaldehyde,"asseparatearticlesusedinthemanufacture ofthesyntheticresinknownas"ureaformaldehyde."PetitionercontendsthatthebillapprovedinCongresscontainedthe copulativeconjunction"and"bet.theterms"urea"and"formaldehyde"andthatthemembersofCongressintendedto exempt"urea"and"formaldehyde"separatelyasessentialelementsinthemanufactureofthesyntheticresingluexxxciting thestatementsmadeontheflooroftheSenate,duringtheconsiderationofthebillbef.theHousexxx.

HELD:SaidindividualstatementsdonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewoftheSenate.Muchlessdotheyindicate theintentoftheHRep.Further,theenrolledbillw/cusestheterm"ureaformaldehyde"insteadof"ureaand formaldehyde," isconclusiveuponthecourtsasregardsthetenorofthemeasurepassedbyCongressand adoptedbythePres.Iftherehasbeenanymistakeintheprintingofthebillbef.itwascertifiedbytheofficers ofCongressandapprovedbythePres.,theremedyisbyamendmentorcurativelegislation.RAM.

In Morales v Subido, infra., the SC, in upholding the enrolled bill, explained that its basis is the separation of powers, so that the remedy of an aggrieved party is not a judicial decree but a legislative amendmentorcurativelegislation.Inthiscase,thephrase,"whohasservedthepolicedepartmentofcityor" wasomittedfromtheengrossedcopyofthePoliceActof1966,therebychangingthequalificationsrequiredby thelawofachiefofacitypoliceagency.Itwasclearfromtherecordsandjournalthattheomissiontookplace notanystageofthelegislativeproceedings,butonlyduringitsenrollment.Itwasfurtherclearthatthechange wasmadenotbyCongress,butonlybyanemployee.AndyettheSCrefusedtogobehindtheenrolledActto discoverwhatreallyhappened,becauseoftherespectduetheotherdepartments. ThecasewasdifferentinAstorgavVillegas,infra.,becausehere,uponbeinginformedthattheenrolled billdidnotcontaintheamendmentproposedbySenatorTolentino(regardingthepowersoftheViceMayorof Manila)whenthehousebillwasraisedtotheSenate,theSenatePresident,withdrewhissignatureandnotified thePresidentofthemistake,whothenlikewisewithdrewhissignature.Therewasnooccasion,then,toapply theenrolledbilltheory.

(2)ProbativeValueoftheJournal Thejournalisconclusiveonthecourtsastoitscontents,sotheSCruledinUSVPons,34Phil.729 (1916).Pons,inthiscasewasprosecutedunderacriminalstatute.Hecontended,however,thatthestatutewas passedpastthemidnightafterFebruary28,1914,thelastdayofsessionofthelegislativebody,butthatthe membersstoppedtheclockatmidnight,topassthelaw.TheSCrejectedthisclaim,rulingthattheprobative valueofthejournalcouldnotbequestioned,otherwiseproofoflegislativeactionwouldbeuncertainandwould nowhavetodependontheimperfectmemoryofmen.

USVPons,34Phil.729(1916) F:
JuanPonswasaccusedofviolatingAct2381w/cprohibitstheillegalimportationofopium.Inhismotionforthe reversalofhisconviction,counselcontentedthatthelastdayofthespecialsessionsoftheLeg.for1914was2/28;thatAct 2381,underw/cPonsmustbepunishediffoundguilty,wasnotpassedorapprovedon2/28buton3/1ofthatyr;andthat, therefore,thesameisnullandvoid.ThevalidityoftheActisnototherwisedisputed.Asitisadmittedthatthelastdayof thespecialsessionwas,undertheGovGen'sproclamation,2/28andthattheappellantischargedw/havingviolatedAct 2381,thevitalquestionisthedateoftheadjournmentoftheLeg.,andthisreducesitselfto2others,namely,(1)howthat istobeproved,whetherbythelegislativejournalsorextraneousevidence,and(2) whetherthecourtcantakejudicial noticeofthejournals.

HELD:A.Whiletherearenoadjudicatedcasesinthisjurisdictionupontheexactquestionw/nthecourtsmay takejudicialnoticeofthelegislativejournals,itiswellsettledintheUSthatsuchjournalsmaybenoticedby courtsindeterminingthequestionw/naparticularbillbecamealawornot. Andthesejournalsshow,w/ absolutecertainty,thattheLeg.adjournedsinedieat12o'clockon2/28/14. B.Wewillinquirew/nthecourtsmaygobehindthelegislativejournalsforthepurposeofdetermining thedateofadjournmentwhensuchjournalsareclearandexplicit. Counselforappellant,inordertoestablishhiscontention,mustnecessarilydependuponthememoryor recollectionofwitnesses,whilethelegislativejournalsaretheactsoftheGovtorthesovereignitself. From theirverynatureandobjecttherecordsoftheLegareasimportantasthoseofthejudiciary,andtoinquireinto theveracityofthejournalsoftheLeg.,whentheyareclearandexplicit,wouldbetoviolateboththeletterand spirit of the organic laws by w/c the Phil. Govt was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independentdeptoftheGovt,andtointerferew/thelegitimatepowersandfunctionsoftheLeg.xxxIfthe clock,was,infactstopped,asheresuggested,"theresultantevilmightbeslightascomparedw/thatofaltering theprobativeforceandcharacteroflegislativerecords,andmakingtheproofoflegislativeactiondependupon uncertainoralevidence,liabletolossbydeathorabsence,andsoimperfectonaccountofthetreacheryof memoryxxx.RAM.

(3)MattersRequiredtobeEnteredintheJournal TheConstitutionrequiresthatthefollowingmattersbecontainedinthe journal: (a)Theyeasandnaysonthirdandfinalreadingofabill[Art.VI,Sec. 26(2)]; (b)VetomessageofthePresident(i.e.,hisobjectiontoabillwhenhe vetoesit)[Art.VI,Sec.27(1)]; (c)TheyeasandnaysontherepassingofabillvetoedbythePresident (Art.VI,Sec.27(1)]; (d) The yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of the memberspresent[Art.VI,Sec.16(4)] Inaddition,thejournalcontainsthesummaryoftheproceedings. Arecord,ontheotherhand,containstheverbatimtranscriptofallproceedings ofthehouseorits committees.TheConstitutionissilentastowhattherecordmustcontain. However,inArt.XI,Sec.3(3),theConstitutionspeaksofthevoteofeachmemberoftheHouseeither affirmingafavorableoroverridingitscontraryresolutionoftheimpeachmentcomplainttobe"recorded."

(4)JournalEntryRulevEnrolledBillTheory IntheAstorgavVillegascase,theSC,bywayofobiter,indicatedthatthejournalmightreallyprevail overtheenrolledbill,sinceajournalisrequired bytheConstitutionwhiletheenrollmentofabillisjusta legislativepracticethatisnotevenmentionedintheConstitution. Further,enrollment doesnotaddtothe validityofthebill,forwhatmakesitvalidarethevotesofthemembers. Butthisviewismeredictum. ItcontradictstherulinginMoralesvSubidothattheenrolledcopy prevailsoverthejournal.ItalsocontradictstheratioinMarshallField&Co.vClark,143US649(1891)that thepartieswerenotcompetenttoshowfromthejournalthatthebillinthecustodyoftheSecretaryofStatewas againstthecontentsofthejournal,becausejournalsarejustkeptbyclerkswhocouldbemistaken,whilethe certifiedbillismadebythehighestofficerofthechamber. Toreconcilethesetwoviews,itmaybesaidthat,astomattersrequiredbytheConstitutiontobeplaced inthejournal,thejournalisconclusive.Butasidefromthese4matters,anyothermatterdoesnotenjoysuch conclusiveness. AstorgavVillegas,56SCRA714(1974)

F:

HouseBillNo.9266,w/cwasfiledintheHRep.,passedon3rdreadingw/oamendments. Itwassenttothe Senateforconcurrence. ItwasreferredtotheappropriateSenateCommittee,w/crecommendedapprovalw/aminor amendmentrecommendedbySen.Roxas.WhenthebillwasdiscussedontheSenatefloor,substantialamendmentstoSec. 1wereintroducedbySen.Tolentino,w/camendmentswereapprovedintotobytheSenate.xxxOn5/21/54,theSec.of theSenatesentalettertoHRepthattheHousebillhadbeenpassedbytheSenatew/amendments. Attachedwasa certificationoftheamendment,w/cwastheonerecommendedbySen.Roxas,andnottheTolentinoamendmentsw/cwere theonesactuallyapprovedbytheSenate.TheHRepsignifiedapprovalassentbacktoit.Theprintedcopieswerethen certifiedandattestedtobytheSecretariesoftheSenateandoftheHRep,theSpeakeroftheHRep,andtheSenatePres. ItwaslatermadepublicbySen.TolentinothattheenrolledcopyofHousebillno.9266signedintolawbythe Pres.wasawrongversionofthebillactuallypassedbytheSenateandapprovedontheSenatefloor.TheSenatePres. admittedthismistakeinalettertothePres.Asaresult,thePres.sentamessagetothepresidingofficersofbothHouses informingthemthatinviewofthecircumstanceshewasofficiallywithdrawinghissignatureonHouseBillno.9266. Upontheforegoingfacts,theMayorofMla.issuedcircularsorderingthedisregardoftheprovisionsofRA4605. Healsoissuedanorderrecalling5membersofthecitypoliceforcewhohadbeenassignedtotheViceMayorpresumably underauthorityofRA4065. Reactingtothesesteps,thethenVMayorAstorga,filedapet.w/thisCourtfor"Mandamus,Injunctionand/or Prohibitionw/PrelMandatoryandProhibitoryInjunction"tocompelcompliancew/theprovisionsofRA4065. Respondents'positionisthatRA4065neverbecamelawsinceitwasnotthebillactuallypassedbytheSenate, andthattheentriesinthejournalofthatbodyandnottheenrolledbillitselfshouldbedecisiveintheresolutionofthe issue.

HELD:1.Petitioner'sargumentthattheattestationofthepresidingofficersofCongressisconclusiveproofof abill'sdueenactment,required,itissaid,bytherespectduetoacoequaldeptofthegovt,isneutralizedinthis casebythefactthattheSenatePres.declaredhissignatureonthebilltobeinvalidandissuedasubsequent clarificationthattheinvalidationofhissignaturemeantthatthebillhehadsignedhadneverbeenapprovedby theSenate.Obviouslythisdeclarationshouldbeaccordedevengreaterrespectthantheattestationitinvalidated, w/citdidforareasonthatisundisputedinfactandindisputableinlogic. AsfarasCongressitselfisconcerned, thereisnothingsacrosanctinthecertification madebythe presidingofficers.Itismerelyamodeofauthentification.ItistheapprovalbyCongressandnotthesignatures ofthepresidingofficersthatisessential. 2.Petitioneragreesthattheattestationinthebillisnotmandatorybutarguesthatthedisclaimerthereof bytheSenatePres.,grantingittohavebeenvalidlymade,wouldonlymeanthattherewasnoattestationatall, butwouldnotaffectthevalidityofthestatute.xxxThisargumentsbegsthequestion.Itwouldlimitthecourt's inquirytothepresenceorabsenceoftheattestationandtotheeffectofitsabsenceuponthevalidityofthe statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequentlytherebeingnoenrolledbilltospeakof,whatevidenceistheretodeterminew/nthebillhadbeen dulyenacted?Insuchacase,theentryinthejournalshouldbeconsulted.RAM.

MarshallField&Co.vClark,143US649(1891) ItisnotcompetentfortheappellanttoshowfromtheJournalsthattheenrolledbillcontainedasectionthat doesnotappearintheenrolledActinthecustodyoftheStateDepartment.

F:

Inaccordancew/theTariffActofOct.1,1890,dutieswereassessedandcollectedonwoollendressgoods, woollenwearingapparel,andsilkembroideriesimportedbyField&Co.;onsilkandcottonlacesimportedbySutton& Co.;andoncoloredcottonclothsimportedbySternbach&Co.Theimportersseverallyprotestedagainsttheassessment uponthegroundthattheActwasnotalawoftheUS.Itwascontended,amongothers,thattheTariffActwasanullity bec."itisshownbycongressionalrecordsofproceedings,reportsofcommitteesofconference,andotherpapersprintedby authorityofCongress,andhavingreferencetoHouseBill9416,thatasectionofthebillasitfinallypassed,wasnotinthe billauthenticatedbythesignaturesofthepresidingofficersoftherespectivehousesofCongress,andapprovedbythe Pres."

HELD:ThesigningbytheHouseSpeakerandbytheSenatePres.ofanenrolledbillisanofficialattestationby thetwoHousesthatsuchbillistheonethathaspassedCongress.Itisadeclarationbythe2houses,through theirpresidingofficers,tothePres.thatabill,thusattested,hasreceived,indueform,thesanctionofthe legislativebranchofthegovt,andthatitisdeliveredtohiminobediencetotheconstitutionalrequirementthat allbillsw/cpassCongressshallbepresentedtohim.AndwhenthebillthusattestedissignedbythePres.and depositedinthearchives,itsauthenticationasabillthathaspassedCongressshouldbedeemedcompleteand unimpeachable.RAM.

Moralesv.Subido,27SCRA131(1969.) F:
Thepresentinsistenceofthepetitioneristhattheversionoftheprovision(Sec.10ofthePoliceActof1966),as amendedatthebehestofSen.Rodrigo,wastheversionapprovedbytheSenateon3rdreading,andthatwhenthebill emergedfromtheconferencecommittee,theonlychangemadeintheprovisionwastheinsertionofthephrase"orhas servedaschiefofpolicew/exemplaryrecord."Insupportofthisassertion,thepetitionersubmittedcertifiedphotostatic copiesofthedifferentdraftsofHouseBill6951showingthevariouschangesmade. Itisunmistakablethatthephrase "whohasservedthepolicedeptofacityor,"wasstillpartoftheprovision,butaccordingtothepetitionertheHousebill divisiondeletedtheentireprovisionandsubstitutedwhatisnowSec.10oftheActw/cdidnotcarrysuchphrase. Itwouldthusappearthattheomissionofthephrase"whohasservedthepolicedeptofacityof",wasmadenotat any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreadingthereof;thatthechangewasnotmadebyCongressbutonlybyanemployeethereofxxx.

HELD: Thepetitionerwhollymisconceivesthefunctionofthejudiciaryunderoursystemofgovt. [T]he enrolledActintheofficeofthelegislativesecretaryofthePres.ofthePhils.showsthatsec.10isexactlyasitis inthestatuteasofficiallypublishedinslipformbytheBureauofPrinting.Wecannotgobehindtheenrolled Acttodiscoverwhatreallyhappened.TherespectduetotheotherbranchesofGovtdemandsthatweactupon thefaithandcreditofwhattheofficersofthesaidbranchesattesttoastheofficialactsoftheirrespective departments.Otherwise,wewouldbecastintheunenviableandunwantedroleofasleuthtryingtodetermine what actually didhappeninthelabyrinthoflawmaking,w/consequentimpairmentoftheintegrityofthe legislativeprocess. Theinvestigationw/cthepetitionerwouldlikethisCourttomakecanbebetterdonein Congress. [W]earenottobeunderstoodasholdingthatinallcasesthejournalsmustyieldtotheenrolledbill.To besure,therearecertainmattersw/ctheConst.expresslyrequiresmustbeenteredonthejournalofeachhouse. xxx[W]ithrespecttomattersnotexpresslyrequiredtobeenteredonthejournal,theenrolledbillprevailsinthe

eventofanydiscrepancy.RAM.

(5)CongressionalRecord Art.VI,Sec.16(4)xxx EachHouseshallalsokeepaRecordofitsproceedings.

UPDATED1/6/96 RAM

f.Sessions (1)Regularsessions Art.VI,Sec.15.TheCongressshallconveneonceeveryyearonthefourthMondayofJulyforits regularsession,unlessadifferentdateisfixedbylaw,andshallcontinuetobeinsessionforsuchnumber ofdaysasitmaydetermine,untilthirtydaysbeforetheopeningofitsnextregularsession,exclusiveof Saturdays,Sundaysandlegalholidays.xxx Sec.16(5)NeitherhouseduringthesessionoftheCongressshall,withouttheconsentoftheother house,adjournformorethanthreedays,nortoanyotherplacethanthatinwhichthetwohousesshallbe sitting. Cruz:"[P]lace"ashereusedrefersnottothebuildingbuttothepoliticalunitwherethetwoHousesmaybe sitting. (2)Specialsessions Art.VI,Sec.15.xxxThePresidentmaycallaspecialsessionatanytime. Specialsessionsareheldinthefollowinginstances: a)WhenthePresidentcallsforaspecialsessionatanytime(Art.VI,Sec.15) b)TocallaspecialelectionduetoavacancyintheofficesofPresidentandVicePresident(Art.VII, Sec.10)inw/cCongressshallconveneat10a.m.ofthethirddayafterthevacancy,withoutneedofacall. c) To decide on the disability of the President because the Cabinet (majority) has "disputed" his assertionthatheisabletodisposehisdutiesandpowers.(ThistakesplacenotwhentheCabinetfirstsendsa written declaration about the inability of the President, but after the President has disputed this initial declaration.)(Art.VII,Sec.11.) Congressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,within48hours,withoutneedofcall. d)TorevokeorextendthePresidentialProclamationofMartialLaworsuspensionofthewritofhabeas

corpus(Art.VII,Sec.18). Congress,ifnotinsession,shall,within24hoursfollowingsuchproclamationorsuspension,convene, withoutneedofacall. Inthelastthreecases,Congressconveneswithoutneedofacall.Theseareexceptionstothegeneral ruleinthe1stcasethatwhenCongressisnotinsession,itcanonlymeetinspecialsessioncallbythePresident. (3)Jointsession Whenbothhousesmeetjointly,theygenerallyvoteseparately.Thereasonisobvious:thereareonly24 senators,whilethereare250representatives. ItwouldbebadpolicytogiveonevotetoaSenator,whowas elected"atlarge",andthesameweightofvotetoarepresentative,whoiseitherelectedonlybyonelegislative districtorapartylist. Jointsessionandseparatevotingtakeplaceinthefollowinginstances: (a)VotingSeparately a)WhenCongress,whileactingasthecanvasserofvotesforthePresidentandVicePresident,hasto breakthetiebetweentwoormorecandidatesforeitherpositionhavinganequalandthehighestnumberofvotes (Art.VII,Sec.4,par.5). b)Whenitdecides(by2/3vote)onthequestionofthePresident'sinabilitytodischargethepowersand dutiesofhisoffice(Art.VII,Sec.11,par.4). c)WheneverthereisavacancyintheOfficeoftheVP,whenitconfirmsthenominationofaVPbythe President from among the members of Congress; such person shall assume office upon confirmation by a majorityvoteofallthemembersofbothHouses,votingseparately(Art.VII,Sec.9). d)Whenitdeclares(by2/3vote)theexistenceofastateofwar[Art.VI,Sec,23(1)]. e)WhenitproposestoamendtheConstitution(3/4voteofthemembers)[Art.XVII,Sec.1(1)].

(b)VotingJointly Butthereisoneexceptionalinstancewhenthetwohousesmeetandvotejointly:When,therehasbeena proclamationofMartiallaworasuspensionofthewritbythePresident,andCongresshastodecidewhetherto revokeortoextendsuchproclamationorsuspension(majorityvoteofallmembers,votingjointly)(VII,Sec. 18). VV:Thereisanillogicalinconsistencyhere.Todeclareastateofwar,thevoteistakenseparately.But

todecideonaninternaldisorder(whichisshortofwar)whichspurredtheproclamationofMartialLawor suspensionofthewrit,thevoteistakenjointly.Ifthevotingismade"joint"duetotheemergencycharacterof thesituationbroughtaboutbytheinvasionorrebellion,thereisnoreasonwhyitshouldnotbesotodeclarethe existenceofwar(whichamongothers,empowersthePresidenttoextendthetourofdutyoftheChiefofStaff), thedangertonationalsecurityandtheemergencynaturebeingthesame,ifnotgraver.

5.ElectoralTribunals Art.VI,Secs.17and19 Art. VI, Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunalwhichshallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsof theirrespectiveMembers.EachElectoralTribunalshallbecomposedofnineMembers,threeofwhom shallbeJusticesoftheSupremeCourttobedesignatedbytheChiefJustice,andtheremainingsixshall beMembersoftheSenateortheHouseofRepresentatives,asthecasemaybe,whoshallbechosenonthe basisofproportionalrepresentationfromthepoliticalpartiesandthepartiesororganizationsregistered under the partylist represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. Id.,Sec.19.TheElectoralTribunalsandtheCommissiononAppointmentsshallbeconstituted withinthirtydaysaftertheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavebeenorganizedwiththe electionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker.TheCommissiononAppointmentsshallmeetonlywhilethe Congressisinsession,atthecallofitsChairmanoramajorityofallitsMembers,todischargesuch powersandfunctionsashereinconferreduponit.

a.Composition TheSenateandtheHouseshalleachhaveanElectoralTribunal,tobecomposedof9members,3shall bejustices oftheSCtobe designated bytheChiefJustice, and theremaining 6shall bemembers ofthe respectivehouseschoseonthebasisof"proportionalrepresentation"fromthepoliticalparties,andtheparties ororganizationsregisteredunderthepartylistsystem.TheseniorjusticeshallbetheChairman. Theuseofproportionalrepresentationtofillupthe6slotsreservedformembersoftheparticularhouse isdifferentfromtheruleunderthe1935Constitution,whichreserved3seatsforthemajoritypartyandanother 3seatsfortheminorityparty.InTanadavCuenco,103Phil.1051(1957),theSCruledthattheslotreservedfor theminoritypartyshouldnotbefilledupbythemajorityparty,eveniftherewasonlyonememberfromthe minorityparty(inthepersonofTanada). Fortofillitupwouldoffset thebalanceofthetribunal,andthis woulddefeatitsneutralitywhenactingasthesolejudgeofallelectioncontests.Thiscouldnotbedoneunder the presentsetupofthelowerhousebecauseofthepartylistsystem,whichmakesafixedrepresentation impossible.Ontheotherhand,bymakingthecompositionproportional,theverynatureoftheElectoralTribu nalasaneutraljudgeofelectioncontestshasbeendestroyed.IntheSenate,forinstance,ifonlyonesenator

comesfromtheminorityparty,thereisnowaythathewouldberepresentedinthetribunal.Atleast,2senators arerequiredofthe24membersoftheSenateinordertohaveonerepresentativeinthetribunal.Andevenif thissinglerepresentativevotetogetherwiththe3justices,thereisnowayforthemoutvotethe5fromthe majorityparty. Thecasethenisoneofamajoritypreservingitsadvantage. Underthesysteminthe1935 Constitution,solongasthereisoneminoritysenator,thereisalwaysaclausethathecouldoutvotethemajority, andthatiswhenthe3justicesvotewithhim. InAbbasvsSenateElectoralTribunal,166SCRA651,thepetitionerswhowereprotestantsinacontest beforetherespondentbody,soughtthedisqualificationofallthelegislativemembersthereofonthegroundthat theywereamongtheprotesteesinthesaidcontest,alongwiththeothermajoritymembersoftheSenate.(The originaloppositionmember,SenatorEstrada,laterjoinedthemajorityandwasreplacedbySenatorEnrile,who voluntarilyinhibitedhimself.)Indismissingthepetition,theSCsaid: ItseemsclearthatinprovidingforaTribunaltobestaffedbybothJusticesoftheSupremeCourtand membersoftheSenate,theConstitutionintendedthatboththosejudicialandlegislativecomponentscommonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators.SaidintentismoreclearlysignalledbythefactthattheproportionofSenatorstoJusticesis2to1 an unmistakable indication that the legislative and judicial components cannot be totally excluded from participationintheresolutionofsenatorialelectioncontests. WhereasituationiscreatedwhichprecludesthesubstitutionofanySenatorsittingintheTribunalby anyofhisothercolleaguesintheSenatewithoutinvitingthesameobjectionstothesubstitute'scompetence,the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandonadutythatnoothercourtorbodycanperform,butwhichitcannotlawfullydischargeisshornofthe participationofitsentiremembershipofSenators. Theoverriding consideration should be thatthe Tribunal be notprevented from discharging a duty whichitalonehasthepowertoperform,theperformanceofwhichisinthehighestinterestofthepeople. ItshouldbenotedthattheframersoftheConstitutioncouldnothavebeenunawareofthepossibilityof anelectioncontestthatwouldinvolveall24Senatorselect,someofwhomwouldinevitablyhavetositin judgmentthereon.

b.NatureofFunction The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performanceandexecutionofthelimitedandspecificfunctionassignedtoitbytheConstitution.Thoughits composition is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature, it is a body separate from and independentofthelegislature. ThegrantofpowertotheElectoralCommissiontojudgeallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsand qualificationsofmembersofthelegislature,isintendedtobecompleteandunimpaired.(Angara vs Electoral Commission,63Phil134)

RequestofJusticesMelencioHerrera,CruzandFelicianotoberelievedasmembersoftheHRET(Res.March 19,1991) This resolution should be read in connection with Bondoc vs Pineda, which is discussed under IndependenceoftheElectoralTribunals. Insaidrequest,thethreejusticesaskedtoberelievedfrommembershipintheHRET. Accordingto them,politicalfactorswhichhavenothingtodowiththemeritsofthecase,wereblockingtheaccomplishment of their constitutionally mandated task. They therefore suggested that there should be a provision in the ConstitutionthatupondesignationtomembershipintheElectoralTribunal,thosesodesignatedshoulddivest themselvesofaffiliationwiththeirrespectivepoliticalparties,toinsuretheirindependenceandobjectivityas theysitinTribunaldeliberations. TheSCresolvedtodirectthemtoreturntotheirdutiesintheTribunal.Accordingtothecourt,inview ofthesensitiveconstitutionalfunctionsoftheElectoralTribunalsasthe"solejudge"ofallcontestsrelatingto theelection,returnsandqualificationsofthemembersofCongress,allmembersofthesebodiesshouldbe guidedonlybepurelylegalconsiderationsinthedecisionofthecasesbeforethemandthatinthecontemplation oftheConstitution,thememberslegislators,thereof,uponassumptionoftheirdutiestherein,sitintheTribunal nolongerasrepresentativesoftheirrespectivepoliticalpartiesbutasimpartialjudges.Tofurtherbolsterthe independenceoftheTribunals,thetermofofficeofeverymemberthereofshouldbeconsideredcoextensive withthecorrespondinglegislativetermandmaynotbelegallyterminatedexceptonlybydeath,resignation, permanentdisability,orremovalforvalidcause,notincludingpoliticaldisloyalty.

(notinVV'srevisedoutline) Status In Angara v Electoral Commission, supra,theSC held that thethenElectoral Commission wasan independentbody,althoughattachedtoCongress, InSuaresvChiefAccountant,theCommissiononAudit,(thenunderthe1935Constitution)asadjunct ofCongress,wasruledtobeanindependentbody,althoughattachedtoCongress,andsothesalaryofitsstaffers neednotbethesameasthoseoftheSenate. Organization(Art.VI,Sec.19) TheElectoralTribunalshallbeconstitutedwithin30daysafterthe2housesshallhavebeenorganized withtheelectionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker. Functions(id.,Sec.17)

TheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshalleachhaveanElectoralTribunalwhichshallbethe sole judge of all contests relating to the (i) election, (ii) returns, and (iii) qualifications of their respective members. Under Vera v Avelino,supra,thehousemayconduct"exclusionproceedings," andbyavoteofthe majoritydenyadmissiontoamemberelectpendingtheresolutionofcomplaintsconcerninghiselection. EveniftheConstitutionvestsintheElectoralTribunalthepowertodecidetheelection,returnsand qualificationsofmemberelect,theremaybenoelectoralcontest,andsonooccasionfortheElectoralTribunal toexerciseitsjurisdiction.If,forinstance,Sistheonlycandidateandhesuffersfromadisqualification,e.g., citizenship,therewouldbenoelectioncontestsincetherewouldbenoprotestant,andsothejurisdictionofthe tribunalcouldnotbeinvoked.Inthiscase,thehousecouldnotbedeniedthepowertopassonthismember elect'squalifications. Theoppositeisan"expulsionproceeding"whereasittingmemberisoustedfordisorderlybehaviorbya voteof2/3pfallthemembersoftheparticularhouse.

c.IndependenceoftheElectoralTribunals AlthoughtheElectoralTribunalsarepredominantlylegislativeinmembershipandtheprovisioncreating themisfoundinArticleVIontheLegislativeDepartment,itisnotcorrecttosaythattheyaremereadjunctsof theCongressofthePhilippines.Infact,inthedischargeoftheirconstitutionalduties,theyareindependentof thelegislature,andalsooftheotherdepartmentsforthatmatter. In the case Bondoc vs Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, the question raised was whether the House of Representativescould,attherequestofthedominantpoliticalpartytherein,changeitsrepresentativeinthe HRET,presumablytothwartthepromulgationofadecisionfreelyreachedbytheTribunal.Whileacknowledg ingtheindependenceoftheTribunalasthe"solejudge"ofelectioncontestsinvolvingthemembersoftheHouse ofRepresentatives,theSCassumedjurisdiction,preciselytoprotectthatindependence.TheSCheldthatthe independenceoftheHRETwouldbecomeamythanditsproceedingsafarceiftheHouseofRepresentativesof the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) componentoftheHRET,toservetheinterestsofthepartyinpower. TheresolutionoftheHouseofRepresentativesremovingCongressmanCamasurafromtheHRETfor disloyaltytotheLDP,becausehecasthisvoteinfavoroftheNP'scandidate,Bondoc,isaclearimpairmentof theconstitutionalprerogativeoftheHRETtobethesolejudgeoftheelectioncontestbetweenBondocand Pineda.TosanctionsuchinterferencebytheHouseofRepresentativeintheworkoftheHRETwouldreduce theTribunaltoameretoolfortheaggrandizementofthepartyinpowerwhichthethreeSCjusticesandthelone minoritymemberwouldbepowerlesstostop.Aminoritypartycandidatemayaswellabandonallhopeatthe thresholdoftheTribunal. Asjudges,themembersoftheHRETmustbenonpartisan.Theymustdischargetheirfunctionswith

completedetachment,impartialityandindependenceevenindependencefromthepoliticalpartytowhichthey belong.

Bondocv.Pineda(201SCRA792,Sept.1991) F:
Pineda(LDP)andBondoc(NP)bothranascongressionalrepsforthe4thdistrictofPampanga.Pinedawonbut BondocfiledaprotestintheHouseofRepsElectoralTribunal(HRET),whichiscomposedof9members,3ofwhomare SCjustices,andtheremaining6aremembersoftheHousechosenonthebasisofproportionalrepresentationfromthe political parties & theparties ororganizations registeredunder thepartylistsystem representedtherein.The HRET decidedinfavorofBondoc.Cong.Camasura,anLDP,votedinfavorofBondoc.BeforeBondoccouldbeproclaimed,the LDPexpelledCamasuraasmemberoftheparty.The3justiceswhoalsovotedforBondocaskedtoberelievedfromtheir assignmentintheHRETbecausethewithdrawalofCamasuraasHRETrepofLDPineffectwasawayofabortingthe proclamationofBondoc(NP).[RequestofJusticesMelencioHerrera,CruzandFelicianotoberelievedasmembersofthe HRET(Res.March19,1991)]

ISSUES: 1.MaytheHouseofRepsattherequestofthedominantpoliticalpartytherein,changethe party'srepresentationintheHRETtothwartthepromulgationofadecisionfreelyreachedbythetribunalinan electioncontestpendingtherein? 2.MaytheSupremeCourtreviewandannulthatactionoftheHouse? HELD:(astoIssue#1): 1.No.Theuseoftheword"SOLE"inbothSec.17ofArt.VIofthe1987Consti&Sec.11ofArt.VIof the1935ConstiunderscorestheEXCLUSIVEjurisdictionoftheHRETasjudgeofcontestsrelatingtothe ELECTION, RETURNS & QUALIFICATIONS of the members of the House (Robles v. HRET, GR 88647,1990).ThetribunalwascreatedtofunctionasaNONPARTISANcourtalthough2/3ofitsmembersare politicians.ItisaNONPOLITICALbodyinaseaofpoliticiansxxx.Tobeabletoexerciseexclusivejurisdic tion,theHRETmustbeINDEPENDENT.Itsjurisdictiontohearanddecidecongressionalelectioncontestsis notsharedbyitwiththeLegislaturenorwiththecourts. 2. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be NONPARTISAN. They must discharge their functionswithcompletedetachment,impartiality,&independenceevenindependencefromthepoliticalparty towhichtheybelong. Hence,DISLOYALTYTOPARTY&BREACHOFPARTYDISCIPLINEareNOT VALIDgroundsfortheexpulsionofamemberofthetribunal.InexpellingCong.CamasurafromtheHRETfor having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination & appreciationoftheballots&therecountofthevotesbythetribunal,thehousecommittedagraveabuseof discretion,aninjustice,andaviolationoftheConstitution.ItsresolutionofexpulsionagainstCamasuraisnull &void. Astoissue#2:Yes.Thepower&dutyofthecourtstonullify,inappropriatecases,theactionsofthe executive&legislativebranchesoftheGovt.,doesnotmeanthatthecourtsaresuperiortothePresident&the legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk the "irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality&legalityoflegislativeorexecutiveactionwhenajusticiablecontroversyisbroughtbeforethe

courtsbysomeonewhohasbeenaggrievedorprejudicedbysuchaction,asinthiscase.Itis"aplainexerciseof thejudicialpower,thatpowertohearanddisposeofacaseorcontroversuproperlybroguebeforethecourt,to thedeterminationofwhichmustbebroughtthetest&measureofthelaw(Verav.Avelino, 77Phil192). Adapted.

d.Powers Intheearliercaseof Angara vs Electoral Commission (63Phil139),itwasheldthattherespondent bodyhadtheexclusiverighttoprescribeitsownrulesofprocedure,asagainstthoseearlieradoptedbythe legislature itself, in connection with the election contests under its jurisdiction. This ruling was recently affirmedbytheSCinLazatinvsHouseElectoralTribunal,168SCRA391.TheSCheldthat: The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualificationsoftheMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,topromulgaterulesandregulationsrelativeto matterswithinitsjurisdiction,includingtheperiodforfilingelectionprotestsbeforeit,isbeyonddispute.Its rulemakingpowernecessarilyflowsfromthegeneralpowergrantedtoitbytheConstitution.Thisistheimport ofthecase Angara vs Electoral Commission. Insuch case, theSCheldthatthecreation oftheElectoral Commissioncarriedwithit exnecesitaterei thepowerregulativeincharactertolimitthetimewithinwhich protestsintrustedtoitscognizanceshouldbefiled.Whereageneralpowerisconferred,everyparticularpower necessaryfortheexerciseoftheoneortheperformanceoftheotherisalsoconferred.Intheabsenceofany furtherconstitutionalprovisionrelatingtotheproceduretobefollowedinfilingprotestsbeforetheElectoral Commission,therefore,theincidentalpowertopromulgatesuchrulesnecessaryfortheproperexerciseofits exclusivepowertojudgeallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualificationsofthemembersofthe legislature,mustbedeemedbynecessaryimplicationtohavebeenlodgedalsointheElectoralCommission.

e.JudicialReviewofdecisionsofElectoralTribunals Cov.ElectoralTribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives(199SCRA692,July,1991) F:
Co,Balinquit&Ongranforrepresentativeofthe2ndlegislativedistrictofNorthernSamarintheMay11,1987 elections.Ongwonbutpets(Co&Balanquit)protestedOng'selectiononthegroundofnoncitizenship.TheHRETfound forOng.

HELD:1.JudgmentsofelectoraltribunalarebeyondjudicialinterferencesaveonlyintheexerciseoftheCourt's socalledextraordinaryjurisdiction,xxxuponadeterminationthatthetribunal'sdecisionorresolutionwas renderedwithoutorinexcessofitsjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionoruponaclearshowingof sucharbitraryandimprovidentusebytheTribunalofitspowerasconstitutesadenialofdueprocessoflaw,or uponademonstrationofaveryclearunmitigatedERROR,manifestlyconstitutingsuchgraveabuseofdiscretion thattherehastobearemedyforsuchabuse. 2.IntheabsenceofashowingthattheHREThascommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingto lackofjurisdiction,theCourtcannotexerciseitscorrectivepower.Adapted.

6.CommissiononAppointments Art.VI,Sec.1819 Art.VI,Sec.18.ThereshallbeaCommissiononAppointmentsconsistingofthePresidentofthe Senate,as exofficio Chairman,twelvesenators,andtwelveMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives, electedbyeachHouseonthebasisofproportionalrepresentationfromthepoliticalpartiesandpartiesor organizations registered under the partylist system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submittedtoitwithinthirtysessiondaysoftheCongressfromtheirsubmission.TheCommissionshall rulebyamajorityvotesofalltheMembers. Id.,Sec.19.TheElectoralTribunalsandtheCommissiononAppointmentsshallbeconstituted withinthirtydaysaftertheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavebeenorganizedwiththe electionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker.TheCommissiononAppointmentsshallmeetonlywhilethe Congressisinsession,atthecallofitsChairmanoramajorityofallitsMembers,todischargesuch powersandfunctionsashereinconferreduponit. Compositionbyproportionalrepresentationhasalwaysbeentheruleevenunderthe1935Constitution. And rightly so. For unlike the Electoral Tribunal which performs the essentially neutral function of adjudication,theCommissiononAppointmentsperformstheessentiallypoliticalfunctionofappointment.The distributionofpoliticalpartiesinthetwoHousesmustthusbereflectedproportionatelyintheCommission. SincemembershipintheCommissiononAppointmentsisbasedonpartyaffiliation,thenadefection fromonepartytoanotherchangestheproportionintherespectivehouses(which)isavalidgroundforthe reorganizationofthecommission. However,ameretemporaryalliance,anagreementbetweenandamongmemberscomingfromdifferent partiestoactinaconcertedmanneronlyonsomeissues,butwithoutachangeinpartyaffiliation,doesnot justifyacalltoreorganizethecommissiononthegroundthatthereisnolongerproportionalrepresentation.So theSCruledinCunananvTan,115Phil7(1962). In Daza vs Singson,180SCRA496,thepetitionerquestionedhisreplacementintheCommissionon Appointments,insistingthathisdesignationtheretoasarepresentativeoftheLiberalPartywaspermanentand couldnotbewithdrawn. Forhispart,therespondentcontendedthathecouldbevalidlybenamedinthe petitioner'splaceinviewofthepoliticalrealignmentintheHousefollowingthereorganizationoftheLDPto whichhebelonged. Bothinvokedtheearlier CunananvsTan case,wheretheSChadheldthatthepolitical affiliations in the two Houses of Congress should be reflected in their respective representations in the CommissionofAppointments.ThepetitionerclaimedthattheformationoftheLDPwasmerelyatemporary developmentwhereastherespondentclaimedthatithadpermanentlyalteredthepoliticalcompositionofthe House. Rulinginfavoroftherespondent,theSCdeclaredthatpetitioner's argumentisbasedonthenon registrationoftheLDP,whichheclaimshasnotprovidedthepermanentpoliticalrealignmenttojustifythe

questionedreorganization.However,theCOMELECthengrantedthepetitionoftheLDPforregistrationasa politicalparty.Petitionerthenclaimsthatregistrationisnotsufficientandthatthepoliticalpartymustpassthe testoftime. Underthistheory,aregisteredpartyobtainingthemajorityoftheseatswillnotbeentitledto representationintheCommissiononAppointmentsaslongasitwasorganizedonlyrecentlyandhasnotyet aged.Ifsuchargumentistobefollowed,onlytheLiberalPartyshallpasssuchtest. TheHouseofRepresentativesthereforehastheauthoritytochangeitsrepresentationintheCommission of Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership.Itisunderstoodthatsuchchangesmustbepermanentanddonotincludethetemporaryalliances orfactionaldivisionsnotinvolvingseveranceofpoliticalloyaltiesorformaldisaffiliationandpermanentshifts ofallegiancefromonepoliticalpartytoanother.

CosetengvsMitra(187SCRA377) F:
Duringthe1987Congressionalelections,CosetengwastheonlycandidateelectedundertheKAIBAparty.Ofthe 12electedtotheCommissiononAppointments,RoqueAblanoftheKBL,representedtheCoalescedMinority.Whenthe LDP was organized a year later, the House Committees including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments had to be reorganized. Coseteng requested Mitra that she be appointed a member of the CA as a representativeofKAIBA.Ablanwashoweverretainedasthe12thmemberrepresentingtheHouseminority. CosetengfiledapetitiontodeclarenullandvoidtheappointmentofthemembersoftheCAonthetheorythat theirelectiontotheCAviolatedtheconstitutionalmandateofproportionalrepresentation.

HELD:Thepetition should bedismissed notbecause itraises a political question,which itdoes not,but because the revision of the House representation in the CA is based on proportional representation of the politicalpartiestherein. Theissueisjusticiable.Thelegality,andnotthewisdom,ofthemanneroffillingtheCA,isjusticiable. Evenifitwereapoliticalquestion,suchwouldstillcomewithinjudicialreviewontheissueofwhetherthere wasgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtoexcessorlackofjurisdiction. Thecompositionwasbasedonproportionalrepresentationofthepoliticalpartiestherein. Theother minoritypartiesareboundbythemajority'schoices.EvenifKAIBAwereanoppositionparty,itslonemember representsonly.4%oftheHouse,thussheisnotentitledtooneofthe12seats.Theotherrepresentativestothe CAweredulyelectedbytheHouse(notbytheirparty)asprovidedinArt.VI,Sec.18.Thevalidityoftheir electiontotheCAelevenfromtheCoalescedMajorityandonefromtheCoalescedMinorityisunassailable. Adapted.

GuingonavsGonzales(214SCRA789)

F:

Asaresultofthe1992Senatorialelections,theLDPwasentitledto7.5seatsintheCA,theNPCto2.5,the LAKASNUCDto1.5andtheLPPDPLABANto.5.Theproblemaroseastowhattowiththe1/2towhicheachofthe partiesisentitled.TheLDPmajorityconvertedafractionalhalfmembershiptoawholemembership(7.5+.5)tobeable toelectSenatorRomulo.Insodoing,oneotherparty'sfractionalrepresentationintheCAwasreduced.Thisisclearlya violationofSec.18,Art.VIbecauseitisnolongerbasedonproportionalrepresentationofthepoliticalparties. Senator Tanada claimed that he has a right to be elected as member of the CA because of the physical impossibilityofdividingaperson(needtoroundoff.5toonesenator)andbecauseasthesolerepresentativeofhisparty, hispartyisentitledtorepresentation.

HELD:TheprovisionofSection18onproportionalrepresentationismandatoryincharacteranddoesnotleave anydiscretiontothemajoritypartyintheSenatetodisobeyordisregardtheruleonproportionalrepresentation. Nopartycanclaimmorethanwhatitisentitledtoundersuchrule.Section18alsoassuresrepresentationinthe CAofanypoliticalpartywhosucceedsinelectingmemberstotheSenate,providedthatthenumberofsenators soelectedenablesittoputarepresentativeintheCA.Therefore,intheSenate,apoliticalpartymustatleast have2dulyelectedsenatorsforeveryseatintheCA. TheSCdoesnotagreethatitismandatorytoelect12SenatorstotheCA. WhattheConstitution requiresisthattherebeatleastamajorityoftheentiremembership. TheConstitutiondoesnotrequirethe electionandpresenceof12senatorsand12membersoftheHouseinorderthattheCommissionmayfunction. TheelectionofSenatorRomuloandTanadaasmembersoftheCAwasclearlyaviolationofArt.VI, Sec.18.Adapted.

(notinVV'srevisedoutline) Function(Art.VII,Sec.16) TheCommissionshallconfirmorapprovenominationsmadebythePresidentofcertainpublicofficers namedbytheConstitutionorbylaw: 1.headsoftheexecutivedepartments 2.ambassadors,otherpublicministers,andconsuls 3.officersoftheArmedForcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain 4.otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution a.Chairmanandmembersof3ConstitutionalCommissions b.regularmembersoftheJudicialandBarCouncil c.membersoftheRegionalConsultativecouncil SessionsandProcedure(Secs.18&19) TheCommission onAppointments shall meettodischargeitspowersandfunctions onlywhilethe Congressisinsession.Themeetingmaybecalledby(a)theChairman,or(b)amajorityofallitsmembers. TheChairmanoftheCommissiondoesnotvote,excepttobreakatie.TheCommissionshallactonall appointmentssubmittedtoitwithin30sessiondaysoftheCongressfromtheirsubmission.TheCommission rulesbyamajorityvoteofallitsmembers.

Regularappointment RegularappointmenttakesplacewhenthePresidentappointsanofficerwhoseappoinmentrequires confirmationbytheCommission,whileCongressisinsession.Theofficersoappointedcannotassumeoffice atonce. ThePresidentmustfirstnominatehimtotheCommission. Then,theCommissionshallactonall appointmentssubmittedtoitwithin30sessiondaysoftheCongressfromtheirsubmission(VI,18).Failureto actwithintheperiodistantamounttodisapprovalofthenomination,sincetheConstitutionrequirespositive actionbytheCommission(VV).IftheCongressortheCommissionitselfadjournswithouttakinganyaction onthenomination,againitisdeemeddisapproved(orbypassed).IftheCommissionapprovesthenomination, theOfficeofthePresidentmakesan"issuanceofcommission."Onlythencantheappointeeassumeoffice. Recessappointment Ontheotherhand,recessappointmenttakeswhenCongressisnotinsession.(Thisisalsoknownas adinterim appointment, but the latter term is equivocal because it can be used in 2 senses: (i) midnight appointment,whichhappenswhenthePresidentmakesanappointmentbeforehistermexpires,whetherornot thisisconfirmedbytheCommissiononAppointments,and(ii)recessappointment,whichhappenswhenthe PresidentmakesappointmentwhileCongressisinrecess,whetherornothistermisabouttoexpire.)Unlike regularappointment,theadinterimappointmentmadebythePresidentiscompleteinitself,andthuseffective atonce,evenwithoutconfirmation.Butthisappointmenthasonlytemporaryeffect.WhenCongressconvenes, the Commission would have to act on the ad interim appointment by confirming it (in which case the appointmentbecomespermanent)ordisapprovingitbymeansofapositivefailuretoactontheappointment(in whichcasetheappointmentisimmediatelyterminated). AccordingtotheConstitution,thePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentduringtherecess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointments(whichcanonlybedonewhenCongressisinsession(Art.VI, Sec.19)oruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress(iftheCommissionfailstoactearlier).(Art.VII,Sec.16, par.2).

7.LegislativePowerandProcessofCongress a.Generalplenarypowers Art.VI,Sec.1. ThelegislativepowershallbevestedintheCongressofthePhilippines,which shallconsistofaSenateandaHouseofRepresentatives,excepttotheextentreservedtothepeoplebythe provisiononinitiativeandreferendum.

b.LimitationsontheLegislativePower

(1)Substantivelimitations (a)Expresssubstantivelimitations 1)TheBillofRights Art.III.BillofRights. ThefreedomofindividualsareaddressedaslimitationstothepowerofCongresstolegislate.Thus,the provisionsoftheBillofRightsbeginwiththephrase"Nolawshallbepassed".

2)AppropriationLaws Art.VI,Sec.29. (1) NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuanceofan appropriationmadebylaw. xxx Art.VI,Sec.25. (1) TheCongressmaynotincreasetheappropriationrecommendedbythe PresidentfortheoperationoftheGovernmentasspecifiedinthebudget.Theform,content,andmanner ofpreparationofthebudgetshallbeprescribedbylaw. (2) Noprovision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relatesspecificallytosomeparticularappropriationstherein.Anysuchprovisionorenactmentshallbe limitedinitsoperationtotheappropriationtowhichitrelates. (3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedureforapprovingappropriationsforotherdepartmentsandagencies. (4) Aspecialappropriationsbillshallspecifythepurposeforwhichitisintended,andshallbe supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a correspondingrevenueproposaltherein. (5)Nolawshallbepassedauthorizinganytransferofappropriations;however,thePresident,the PresidentoftheSenate,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,theChiefJusticeoftheSupreme Court,andtheheadsofConstitutionalCommissionsmay,bylaw,beauthorizedtoaugmentanyitemin thegeneralappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveofficesfromsavingsinotheritemsoftheirrespective appropriations. (6) Discretionaryfundsappropriatedforparticularofficialsshallbedisbursedonlyforpublic purposestobesupportedbyappropriatevouchersandsubjecttosuchguidelinesasmaybeprescribedby law. (7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriationsbillfortheensuingfiscalyear,thegeneralappropriationslawfortheprecedingfiscalyear shallbedeemedreenactedandshallremaininforceandeffectuntilthegeneralappropriationsbillis passedbytheCongress.

GeneralPrinciple NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuanceofanappropriationmadebylaw.[Art. VI,Sec.29(1)]. Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,bills oflocal application,andprivatebills,shalloriginateexclusivelyintheHouse,buttheSenatemayproposeorconcur withamendments(Sec.24).(ThereasonisthattheHouseisthemorepopularchamberofCongress.) GeneralAppropriation ThePresidentshallsubmittoCongress,within30daysfromtheopeningofitsregularsession,asthe basisofthegeneralappropriationsbill,abudgetof(a)expenditures,and(b)sourcesoffinancing,including receiptsfromexistingandproposedrevenuemeasures.(Art.VII,Sec.22). Theform,content,andmannerofpreparationofthebudgetshallbeprescribedbylaw.[Art.VI,Sec. 25(1),2ndsentence]. TheCongressmaynotincreasetheappropriationsrecommendedbythePresidentfortheoperationof theGovernmentasspecifiedinthebudget. No provision or enactment shall be embrace in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specificallytosomeparticularappropriationtherein.Anysuchprovisionorenactmentshallbelimitedinits operationtotheappropriationtowhichitrelates.[Art.VI,Sec.25(2)] The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approvingappropriationsforotherdepartmentsandagencies. If,bytheendofthefiscalyear,theCongressshallhavefailedtopassthegeneralappropriationsbillfor theensuingfiscalyear,thegeneralappropriationslawfortheprecedingfiscalyearshallbedeemedreenacted, andshallremaininforceandeffectuntilthegeneralappropriationsbillispassedbytheCongress.[Art.VI,Sec. 25(7)] SpecialAppropriation Aspecialappropriationsbillshall(a)specifythepurposeforwhichitisintended,and(b)supportedby funds, actuallyavailable ascertified bytheNational Treasurer,or toberaised by acorresponding revenue proposaltherein.[Art.VI,Sec.25(4)] (Aspecialappropriationsbillmaybeproposedtosupplyalackormeetanewneed,likeaspecial election.InthecaseofaspeciallawtoelectthePresidentandVicePresident,however,therequirementsofthe sectionsarespecificallyexemptedbytheConstitutioninArt.VII,Sec.10.)

Transferoffundsalreadyappropriated Nolawshallbepassedauthorizinganytransferofappropriations. However,thePresident,PresidentoftheSenate,SpeakeroftheHouse,theChiefJusticeoftheSupreme Court,andtheheadsoftheConstitutionalCommissionmay,bylaw,beauthorizedto"augment"anyiteminthe general appropriations law for their respective offices, from "savings" in other items of their respective appropriations.[Art.VI,Sec.25(5)] Discretionaryfundsappropriatedforparticularofficialsshallbedisbursedonlyforpublicpurposes,to besupportedbyappropriatevouchers,andsubjecttosuchguidelinesasmaybeprescribedbylaw.[Art.VI,Sec. 25(6)] InDemetria vAlba,supra,itwasheldthatSec.44oftheBudgetActof1977(BP1177)grantingthe Presidenttheblanketauthoritytotransferfundsfromonedepartmenttoanother,withorwithoutsavings,is unconstitutional.

ProhibitedappropriationtoenforcetheSeparationofChurchandState Nopublicmoneyorpropertyshallbeappropriated(applied,paid,oremployed),directlyorindirectly, fortheuse,benefit,orsupportofanyreligion(sect,church,denomination,sectarianinstitution,oranysystemof religion)orofanypriest(preacher,minister,otherreligiousteacher,orreligiousdignitary). Exception: When suchpriest,et.al.,isassigned to(a)theAFP; (b)anypenalinstitution; (c)any governmentorphanage;or(d)anyleprosarium.[Art.VI,Sec.29(2)] Appropriationslaws(thespendingpowersofCongress(id.,Sec.25))aretiedupwithTaxlaws(the powertoraiserevenues(id.,Sec.28)). Theyaretwoindispensablesidesofacoin. Theyaretiedupbythe principlethatnomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuanceofanappropriationmadebylaw (id.,Sec.29(1)).

3)Taxlaws

Id.,Sec.28.(1)Theruleoftaxationshallbeuniformandequitable.TheCongressshallevolvea progressivesystemoftaxation. Cruz:Uniformityintaxationmeansthatpersonsorthingsbelongingtothesameclassshallbetaxedatthesame rate.Itisdistinguishedfromequalityintaxationinthatthelatterrequiresthetaximposedtobedeterminedon thebasisofthevalueoftheproperty.ThepresentConsti.addsthattheruleoftaxationshallalsobeequitable,

w/cmeansthatthetaxburdenmustbeimposedaccordingtothetaxpayer'scapacitytopay. Id.,Sec.28(2)TheCongressmay,bylaw,authorizethePresidenttofix,withinspecifiedlimits, andsubjecttosuchlimitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,tariffrates,importandexportquotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national developmentprogramoftheGovernment. (3)Charitableinstitutions,churchesandparsonagesorconventsappurtenantthereto,mosques, nonprofitcemeteries,andalllands,buildings,andimprovements,actually,directly,andexclusivelyused forreligious,charitable,oreducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtaxation. (4)Nolawgrantinganytaxexemptionshallbepassedwithouttheconcurrenceofamajorityofall theMembersoftheCongress.

Art.XIV,Sec.4(3)Allrevenuesandassetsofnonstock,nonprofiteducationalinstitutionsused actually,directly,andexclusivelyforeducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtaxesandduties.Upon thedissolutionorcessationofthecorporateexistenceofsuchinstitutions,theirassetsshallbedisposedof inthemannerprovidedbylaw. Proprietaryeducationalinstitutions,includingthosecooperativelyowned,maylikewisebeentitled tosuchexemptionssubjecttothelimitationsprovidedbylawincludingrestrictionsondividendsand provisionsforreinvestment.

Art.VI,Sec.29. (1) NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuanceofan appropriationmadebylaw. (2) Nopublicmoneyorpropertyshallbeappropriated,applied,paid,oremployed,directlyor indirectly,forthe use,benefit,orsupportofanysect,church,denomination,sectarianinstitution,or systemofreligion,orofanypriest,preacher,minister,orotherreligiousteacher,ordignitaryassuch, exceptwhensuchpriest,preacher,minister,ordignitaryisassignedtothearmedforces,ortoanypenal institution,orgovernmentorphanageorleprosarium. (3)Allmoneycollectedonanytaxleviedforaspecialpurposeshallbetreatedasaspecialfund andpaidoutforsuchpurposeonly.Ifthepurposeforwhichaspecialfundwascreatedhasbeenfulfilled orabandoned,thebalance,ifany,shallbetransferredtothegeneralfundsoftheGovernment.

4)JurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt Art.VI,Sec.30. Nolawshallbepassedincreasingtheappellatejurisdiction oftheSupreme CourtasprovidedinthisConstitutionwithoutitsadviceandconcurrence. Cruz:ThepurposeistopreventfurtheradditionstothepresenttremendouscaseloadoftheSCw/cincludesthe baclogofthepast2decades.

5)Titleofroyalty Art.VI,Sec.31.Nolawgrantingatitleofroyaltyornobilityshallbeenacted. Cruz: Thepurposeofthisprohibitionistopreservetherepublicananddemocraticnatureofoursocietyby prohibitingthecreationofprivilegedclassesw/specialperquisitesnotavailabletotherestofthecitizenry.

(b)Impliedsubstantivelimitations

(i)Nondelegationoflegislativepowers Asageneralrule,legislativepowerscannotbedelegated,whatcanbedelegatedistheexecutionofthe laws under acceptable standards limiting discretion of the executive. The Constitution, however, provides certainspecificexemptions.

A.DelegationtothePresident 1)Emergencypowers: Art.VI,Sec.23.xxx (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,foralimitedperiod,andsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowers necessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.Unlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionof theCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof.. 2)Certaintaxingpowers[Art.VI,Sec.28(2)](seeDelegationofTaxPowers) Art.VI,Sec.28.xxx (2)TheCongressmay,bylaw,authorizethePresidenttofix,withinspecifiedlimits,andsubject tosuchlimitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,tariffrates,importandexportquotas,tonnageand wharfagedues,andotherdutiesorimpostswithintheframeworkofthenationaldevelopmentprogramof theGovernment.

B.DelegationtoLocalGovernments Taxpowers:

Art.X,Sec.5. Eachlocalgovernment unitshallhavethepowertocreateitsownsourcesof revenuesandtolevytaxes,feesandchargessubjecttosuchguidelinesandlimitationsastheCongressmay provide,consistentwiththebasicpolicyoflocalautonomy. Suchtaxes,fees,andchargesshallaccrue exclusivelytothelocalgovernments.

PelaezvsAuditorGeneral15SCRA569 AtissueherewasthevalidityofSec.68oftheRevisedAdministrativeCodeempoweringthePresident ofthePhilippinestocreate,merge,divide,abolishorotherwisealtertheboundariesofmunicipalcorporations. Pelaez contended that it was an invalid delegation of legislative power. The govt. argued that it was not, invokingtheearliercaseof CardonavsBinangonan,36Phil547,wherethepowerofthegovernorgeneralto transferterritoryfromonemunicipalitytoanotherwassustained. TheSCupheldPelaez. Itruledthatthe completenesstestandthesufficientstandardtestmustbeappliedtogetherorconcurrently.TheSCdeclaredthat theCardonacaseinvolvednotthecreationofanewmunicipalitybutmerelythetransferofterritoryfromone municipalitytoanother.Thepowertofixsuchboundariesofexistingmunicipalitiesmaypartakeofanadminis trativenaturebutthecreationofmunicipalcorporationsisstrictlylegislativeinnature. AlthoughCongressmaydelegatetoanotherbranchoftheGovt.thepowertofilldetailsintheexecution, enforcementoradministrationofalaw,itisessential,toforestallaviolationoftheprincipleofseparationof powers,thatsaidlaw:(a)becompleteinitselfitmustsetforththereinthepolicytobeexecuted,carriedoutor implementedbythedelegateand(b)tofixastandardthelimitsofwhicharesufficientlydeterminateor determinabletowhichthedelegatemustconformintheperformanceofhisfunctions. Indeed,withouta statutorydeclarationofpolicy,whichistheessenceofeverylaw,andwithouttheaforementionedstandard,there wouldbenomeanstodetermine,withreasonablecertainty,whetherthedelegatehasactedwithinorbeyondthe scopeofhisauthority. Sec.68oftheRACdoesnotmeetthesewellsettledrequirementsforavaliddelegationofthepowerto fixthedetailsintheenforcementofalaw.Itdoesnotenunciateanypolicytobecarriedoutorimplementedby thePresident.Neitherdoesitgiveastandardsufficientlyprecisetoavoidtheevileffectsofunduedelegation. Adapted.

C.DelegationtothePeople Initiativeandreferendumpowers: Art.VI,Sec.32.TheCongress,shall,asearlyaspossible,provideforasystemofinitiativeand referendum,andtheexceptionstherefrom,wherebythepeoplecandirectlyproposeandenactlaws,or approveorrejectanyactorlaworpartthereof,passedbytheCongressorlocallegislativebody,afterthe registrationofapetitiontherefore,signedbyatleastten percentum ofthetotalnumberofregistered voters with every legislative district represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

(ii)Prohibitionagainstpassageofirrepealablelaws Itisaxiomaticthatalllaws,eventheConstitutionitself,mayberepealedoramended.Noonecanbind futuregenerationstoalaw.

(2)ProceduralLimits Art.VI,Sec.26(1)EverybillpassedbyCongressshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshallbe expressedinthetitlethereof. (2)Nobill passed byeither House shall become a law unlessit has passed threereadings on separatedays,andprintedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributedtoitsMembersthreedays beforeitspassage,exceptwhenthePresidentcertifiestothenecessityofitsimmediateenactmenttomeet apubliccalamityoremergency.Uponthelastreadingofabill,noamendmenttheretoshallbeallowed, andthevotethereonshallbetakenimmediatelythereafter,andtheyeasandnaysenteredintheJournal. Sec.27(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresentedtothe President.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit;otherwise,heshallvetoitandreturnthesamewithhis objectionstotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallentertheobjectionsatlargeinitsJournaland proceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,twothirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouseshall agreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichitshall likewisebeconsidered,andifapprovedbytwothirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshallbecomea law.Inallsuchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenamesofthe MembersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicatehisveto ofanybilltotheHousewhereitoriginatedwithinthirtydaysafterthedateofreceiptthereof;otherwise, itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit. (2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation, revenue,ortariffbill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject.

c.QuestionHour Art.VI,Sec.22.Theheadsofdepartmentsmayupontheirowninitiativewiththeconsentofthe President,orupontherequestofeitherHouse,astherulesofeachHouseshallprovide,appearbeforeand be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submittedtothePresidentoftheSenateortheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativesatleastthreedays beforetheirscheduledappearance. Interpellations shallnotbelimited towrittenquestions,butmay covermattersrelatedthereto.WhenthesecurityoftheStateorthepublicinterestsorequiresandthe Presidentsostatesinwriting,theappearanceshallbeconductedinexecutivesession.

The heads of department shall provide, appear before, and be heard, by any house, on any matter pertainingtotheirdepartments: (i)upontheirowninitiative,withtheconsentofthePresident;or (ii)uponrequestofeitherhouse,astherulesofthathouseshallprovide. (Thisisacarryoverofthe1973Constitution,afeatureofaparliamentarysystem.) Writtenquestionsshallbesubmittedtothepresidingofficerofthehouseatleast3daysbeforethe scheduledappearance.Thepurposeistoenablethecabinetmembertoprepare. Interpellationsshallnotbelimitedtowrittenquestions,butmaycovermattersrelatedthereto. ItissubmittedthatamemberoftheCabinetmaynotrefusetoappearbeforethehouse.Ifherefusesa summons,hecanbecitedforcontempt.IfthePresidentforbidshisappearance,stillhemustappearifaskedby Congress.Under1935,itwasanexcuseforthePresidenttocertifythattheinterestofpublicsecurityjustifies therefusal;under1987,theremedyisanexecutivesessionnotrefusaltoappear. WhenthesecurityoftheStateorthepublicinterestsorequires,andthePresidentsostatesinwriting, theappearanceshallbeconductedinexecutivesession.(ItmustbenotedthenthatthePresidentcannotdisallow theappearancebutcanonlyaskforacloseddoorsession).

d.LegislativeInvestigations Art.VI,Sec.21.TheSenateortheHouseofRepresentativesoranyofitsrespectivecommittees mayconductinquiriesinaidorlegislationinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesorprocedure.The rightsofpersonsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected. Eachhouseoranyofitscommitteesmayconduct"inquiriesinaidoflegislation"accordingtoitsduly publishedrulesofprocedures. Toenforcethisright,theSCupheldthepowerofCongresstoholdincontemptapersonrequiredto appearbeforeCongressoritscommitteeandanswerquestionsrelevanttoamatteroflegislativeinterestinthe Arnaultcases. InArnaultvNazareno.87Phil29(1950).Arnaultwascitedforcontemptforpersistentlyrefusing,after takingthestand,torevealthenameofthepersontowhomgavetheP440,000.Inconnectionwiththelegislative investigationoftheBuenavistaandTambobongRealEstateswherebyacertainBertwasabletosellthelandto thegovernmentandrealizedP1.5million. Thesecondcaseof Arnault v Balagtas,97Phil350(1955)arose whenhepersistedinnotgivinginformation,thistimeaboutanaffidavitwhichpurportedlygavethedetailssur roundingtheacquisitionsoftheestatesbyBertandthesupposedcircumstancesunderwhichhegavetheamount toaJessSantos.TheCourtinbothcases,upheldtheauthorityoftheSenatetocitehimincontempt,andthus dismissedthehabeascorpuspetitions.

Whensoheldincontempt,sincetheSenateisacontinuingbody,thecontemptseemstobeeffective evenbeyondthesessionduringwhichthecontemptwasmade,heldtheSCinArnault,overrulingthecaseof LopezvdelosReyes,55Phil170(1930),wheretheCourtheldthatthecontemptlastedonlyforthesessionand couldnotberevivedinthenextsessionbyamerereapprovalofthepreviouscontempt. However,therightsofthepersons(a)appearingin,or(b)affectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected. Notableamongtheserightsistherightagainst"selfincrimination".Usually,immunityisgrantedto thosewhoarecompelledtoappear.

BengzonvsSenateBlueRibbonCommittee203SCRA767 Inthiscase,thepetitionerssoughttorestraintherespondentfrominvestigatingtheirparticipationinthe alleged misuse of govt. funds and the illicit acquisition of properties being claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The SC granted the petition, holding that the petitioners are impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondent Committee, and that no legislation was apparently being contemplatedinconnectionwiththesaidinvestigation. However,thedecisionfailedtoconsiderthattheproceedingbeforetheSandiganbayanwascriminalin nature and that the purpose of the legislative investigation was to ascertain the disposition of funds and propertiesclaimedtobepublicinnature.Itsfindingsonthismattercouldbethesubjectoflegislationalthough itmaynothavebeenexpresslystatedthatsuchwasthepurposeoftheinquiry.Asobservedintheearliercaseof ArnaultvsNazareno,87Phil29,theSCisboundtopresumethattheactionofthelegislativebodywaswitha legitimateobjectifitwascapableofbeingsoconstrued,andithasnorighttoassumethatthecontrarywas intended.

Mendoza,TheUseofLegislativePurposeasaLimitationontheCongressionalPowerofInvestigation,46PHIL L.J.707(1971) Adeterminationthattheinquiryisfora"legislativepurpose"isnottheend,butonlythebeginning,of thecomplexity. xxx TheideathatCongresshasarighttobefullyinformedinorderthatitmaylegislatewiselyunderliesthe exerciseofthepowertoinvestigate,w/coercivepowertocompeldisclosure.Atthesametimeconcernforthe factthatunlesslimitedtoa"legislativepurpose"thepowertoinvestigatemaybeusedtoharassindividualsand invadefundamentalrightsveryearlyledtheUSSCtoinsistonashowingthatinvestigationsbe"inaidof legislation." xxx THEALTERNATIVEUSEOFTHEDOCTRINE

Throughtheyears,thedoctrineoflegislativepurpose,firstannouncedinKilbournvs.Thomposon,103 US168(1880),hassteadilydeclinedinvalueasalimitationonthecongressionalpowerofinvestigation,until todayitisusedonlyasacounterweighttoindividualrights.xxx Theuseofthedoctrineoflegislativepurposeissubjecttothefollowingobservations: First.Tosaythatcongressionalinquiriesmayonlybejustifiedintermsoftheneedforlegislationisto assumetwothings:(a)thatthepowersofgovtcanbeneatlydividedintolegislative,judicialandexecutive,and (b)thatthefunctionofCongressisconfinedtostrictlylawmaking.Onlyadoctrinaireviewoftheprincipleof separationofpowerscansupportthefirst.The2ndassumptionisbasedonanunreality.xxx Second. [T]he doctrine of legislative purpose is difficult of enforcement. xxx It is said that investigationscanonlybeundertakeninaidoflegislation.ButhowistheCourttoproveotherwiseifCongress declaresthatitspurposeislegislation?TheCourtcannotprobeintothemotivesofthemembersofCongress. Andlegislativeinvestigationneednotresultinlegislation.xxx [W]hiletheCourtmaytrytoenforcethelegislativepurposedoctrinebyrequiringCongresstostatethe aimsandpurposesofauthorizedinvestigations,thereisnothingitcandoifCongressrefusestocomplyw/its demand. On what ground can the Court strike down vague authorizing resolutions? On the principle of separationofpowers? Fourth.Evengiventhefactthataninvestigationisforalegislativepurpose,thetaskoftheCourtisnot atanend.xxxThelegislativepurposeservedbytheinquirywillstillhavetobeweighedagainsttherightofthe witness. Legislative purpose serves not as a limitation on the power of investigation but rather as a counterweighttotheinterestincivilliberties. Fifth. xxx Topresumethatthepurposeislawmakingwherethepurposeisdifferentistoplacean undueweightononesideofthescale.Againstthepresumptionoflegislativepurpose,individualrightswould indeedappeartobemerepaperweights.xxx xxxByrecognizingexposureasanormalpurposeofinvestigations,whileatthesametimestressingits potentialdangertoindividualrights,theCourtcanbegintoactasarealbalancerofinterests,strikingdown thoseinquirieswhichneedlesslydestroyconstitutional rights andupholdingthoseinw/cexposureofsome dangerormisdeedsisessentialtosociety. xxx [T]heuseof"legislativepurposeasashorthandtermforwhatCongressmightundertaketendstolenda conclusorymeaningwhenwhatisinvolvedisaprocessofreachingjudgment.xxx

NotesonLegislativeInquiriesbyRAM: The power of Congress to conduct investigations exists for the primary purpose of enabling it to dischargeitslegislativefunctionswiselyandeffectivelytoguideandaidCongressintheenactmentoflaws,

theiramendmentsandaswellastheirrepeal.1IntheseminalcaseofArnaultvs.Nazareno 2,theSupremeCourt said: Thepowerofinquirywithpowertoenforceitisanessentialandappropriateauxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absenceofinformationrespectingtheconditionswhichthelegislationisintendedtoaffector change;andwherethelegislativebodydoesnotitselfpossessrequisiteinformationwhichis notinfrequentlytruerecoursemustbehadtootherswhodopossesit.xxx. Legislativeinvestigationsarecarriedoutinordertoascertain(a)whatnewlegislationis needed (b) the existing law to be repealed and (c) whether a new legislation is effectively accomplishingitspurposewithaviewofamendingit.3 Butinadditiontoobtainingfactsthat maybeusefulinenactinglaws,thepowerofinquirymaybeutilizedbyCongressforthescrutiny ofexecutiveactionaswellastheformationofpublicopinion. 4Congressionalinvestigationshave thesalutaryeffectofkeepingthepublicinformedofwhatishappeningintheirgovernmentsince congressionalinvestigationsaregivenwidepublicitybymedia.5 Congressional investigative function may be justified under certain provisions of the Constitutionwhicharejudicialandexecutiveinnature.6Intheexerciseofthepowertoconfirm appointments7,informationconcerningthequalificationsoftheappointeemaybeinvestigated. TheSenatemayconductaninvestigationintoallmatterspertinenttothepossibleratificationofa treaty.8Thepowertoinquireisalsoimpliedintheauthoritytoimpeachofficials. 9Investigatory power is also available when Congress is considering constitutional amendments 10, or the declarationoftheexistenceofastateofwar.11 ThegeneralpowerofCongressinconductinginvestigationsmayberoughlydividedinto twoparts,onebeingitsinquisitorialpowerandtheotheritspunitivepower.12 Theinquisitorial powersofCongress,ontheonehand,consistsofitsauthoritytosummonwitnesses,toextract testimonyfromthem,andcompeltheproductionofpapers,documentsandotherinformation.13 ThepunitivepoweroftheLegislature,ontheotherhand,consistsofitsauthoritytodeal directly,bywayofcontemptproceedings, with actswhichinherentlyobstructorpreventthe

1JoaquinR.Roces,ThePowerofCongressionalInvestigations,UELawJournal,vol.I,nos.14,19581959atpage262 263. 287Phil29,45(1950). 3JuanF.Rivera,TheCongressofthePhilippines,pp.5758. 4TanadaandFernando,TheConstitutionofthePhilippines,pp.771771. 5opcit.,loccit. 6JuanF.Rivera,TheCongressofthePhilippines,p.57. 7Art.VII,Sec.16,1987Constitution 8Art.VII,Sec.21,ibid. 9Art.XI,Sec.3,ibid. 10Art.XII,ibid 11Art.VI,Sec.23,ibid. 12supranoteno.2atp.264265. 13ibid,citingWilloughby,OntheConsitutionoftheUnitedStates,Vol.I,sec.344.

dischargeofitslegislativeduties.1 AsearlyasthecaseofLopezv.delosReyes,2theSupreme CourthasruledthatthepowertopunishforcontemptisessentialtopermittheLegislatureto performitsdutieswithoutimpediment. Thispronouncementhasbeenreaffirmedinthe1950 caseofArnaultv.Nazareno.3 Inthatcase,theSupremeCourthastakennoteofthefactthat experience has shownthat mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and that volunteeredinformationareoftenunreliable. Thecourts,thus,concludedthatsomemeansof compulsionisessentialtoobtainwhatisneeded. Thecorrelativepowertopunishaprevaricatingwitnessforcontemptrestsontherightof thelegislaturetoselfpreservationandisfoundedon"therighttopreventactswhich,inandof themselves,inherentlyobstructorpreventthedischargeoflegislativeduties,orrefusaltodothat whichthereisaninherentlegislativepowertocompelinorderthatlegislativefunctionsmaybe performed."4Thispunitivepower,however,terminateswhenthelegislativebodyceasestoexist uponitsfinaladjournment.5 Thus,unliketheSenatewhichisacontinuingbody,thetermof whosemembersexpireatdifferenttimes,6 thelifeof theHouseofRepresentativesterminates uponitsfinaladjournment.7 TRACINGTHEROOTS Thepracticeoflegislativeinquiriesdatesbacktothe1620swhenPilgrimslandedin America.Beforethatevent,BritishParliamenthadexperimentedwithafactfindingcommittee armedwiththepowertocompelattendanceofpersonsandtheproductionofdocumentswiththe power to punish contumacious witnesses. This experiment on legislative inquest eventually developedasanecessarypartofthelegislativeprocesswiththeestablishmentofthesupremacy ofParliamentin1688.By1689,anumberofparliamentarycommitteesofinvestigationwerein operation.8 TheUSCongressfirstexercisedthispowerinMarchof1792.TheformerCongresshad approvedaresolutioncreatingacommitteetoinvestigatethecausesoffailureoftheexpedition underMajorGeneralSt.ClairagainsttheIndiansatFortWayne,givingthiscommitteethepower tocall forpapers andrecordsneed intheinvestigation. When thecommitteewascalled to submitthenecessarypapersrelativetothecampaign,PresidentGeorgeWashingtonorderedhis cabinettodeliveronlythosepapers,theexaminationofwhichwouldpromotepublicinterest,and torefusethedeliveryofsuchpaperswhendisclosurewouldinjurepublicinterest.Nonetheless, thedeterminationofwhatwouldenhancepublicinterestwasstillaPresidentialprerogative.In 1796,PresidentWashingtonagainrefusedtherequestoftheHouseforthedeliveryofcopyof
1ibid,atp.267 255Phil170. 3supranote6. 4supranote2atp.267citingMarshallv.Gordon,243US521. 5Bernas,TheConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesACommentary,vol.II,p.134. 6Art.XVII,Sec.2,1987Constitution. 7supranote18. 8supranote7atp.56citingKeele,HaroldM.NotesonCongressionalInvestigations,AmericanBarAssociationJournal, vol.40no.2,p.154,February1954.

instructionoftheUSMinisterwhonegotiatedatreatywithGreatBritaininvokingthedoctrineof separation of powers. Subsequently, United States Presidents from Jefferson to Truman effectivelywieldedthisdoctrineasashieldagainstinquiriesinitiatedbyCongress.1 ThefirstPhilippinecaseonthematteroflegislativeinvestigationsisthecaseofArnault v.Nazareno.Inthatcase,SenateResolutionno.8createdaspecialcommitteetoinvestigatethe Buenavista and Tambobong Estates purchase. The Committee called and examined various witnesses, and among them was Jean Arnault. It sought to inquire into the necessity and regularityofthepaymentofacertainBurtofonemillionfivehundredthousandpesos(P1,500, 000). Burt,forthedownpaymentoftwentythousandpesos(P20,000)hadsometimein1946 purchased from San Juan de Dios Hospital and from the Philippine Trust Company the BuenavistaandTambobongEstates.TheCommitteesoughttodeterminewhowereresponsible forandwhobenefitedfromthetransaction attheexpenseofthegovernment. JeanArnault refusedtorevealthenameofthepersontowhomhegavetheamountofonehundredforty thousandpesos(P140,000.00)aswellastoanyotherrelatedpertinentquestions.TheCommittee thenorderedhiscommitmenttothecustodyoftheSergeantatarmsandimprisonmentinthe NewBilibidPrison,MuntinglupauntildischargedbyfurtherorderoftheSenateorbytheSpecial CommitteecreatedbySenateResolutionno.8.Apetitionforthereleaseofthepetitionerfrom hisconfinementatMuntignlupawasdeniedbytheSupremeCourt,therebyupholdingtheright ofCongresstoconductinvestigationsinaidoflegislation. Philippinecourtshaveheldthatthecongressionalpowertoinvestigateiscoextensive withlegislativepower.2ThisrulingfollowsthelaterdecisionshandeddownbytheUSSupreme Court.NotethatearlierUSjurisprudencehasmaintainedthatcongressionalinvestigativepower istobeusedtoimplementa"clearandpreciselegislativepurpose."3Later,USrulings,however, haveexpandedthepowerto"atleastasgreatasthepowertolegislate."4

LIMITATIONS ArticleVI,Sec.21ofthe1987Constitutionprovides: TheSenateortheHouseofRepresentativesoranyofitsrespectivecommitteesmay conductinquiriesinaidoflegislationinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesofprocedure. Therightsofpersonsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected. Inanattempttoprotecttherightsofwitnesses,theConstitutionimposesseverallimitationstothe investigatorypowerofCongress.First.,theinvestigationmustbeinaidoflegislation.Congresscannot conductaninvestigationmerelyforthepurposeofinvestigation.Noinquiryisanendinitself;itmustbe relatedtoandinfurtheranceofalegitimatetaskofCongress.5 Investigationofpurelyprivateaffairsof peoplecannotbemade,asCongresscannotlegislateonthem.HoweverCongresscaninquireintoprivate
1supranote2,atp.265266citingHistoryof(US)CongressionalInvestigations. 2Arnaultv.Nazareno,supra 3Kilbournv.Thompson,103US168(1881). 4supranoteno.2atp.60citingUSv.Johnson,333US837. 5Watkinsv.US,supra

affairsiftheyaffectmattersonwhichCongresscanlegislate. 1 Moreover,Congresscannotconductan investigationtofindoutifsomeoneshouldbeprosecutedcriminally,ortodetermineifsomeoneisguilty orinnocentofacrime,ortodecidewhataretherightsofpartiestoacontroversy.Congressisnotalaw enforcementagencyoracourt.2 Unfortunately,however,thedeterminationofwhatis"inaidoflegislation"isnottheendbutonly thebeginning ofthecomplexity.3 IfaclaimismadebyCongressthataninvestigation isinaidof legislation,howwillthecourtproveotherwise?Moreoftenthannot,courtsarecompelledtotakethe statementof"inaidoflegislation"atfacevalueandrenderitconclusiveuponthemselves.4 Itisdifficulttodefineanylimitsbywhichthesubjectmatterofitsinquirycanbecircumscribed.5 Itisnotnecessarythateveryquestionpropoundedtoawitnessmustbematerialtoaproposedlegislation. Materialityofthequestionmustbedeterminedbyitsdirectrelationtothesubjectofinquiryandnotby itsindirectrelationtoanyproposedorpossiblelegislation. 6Indeterminingtheproprietyofthequestion propounded toawitness, thus, thefollowing matters aretobe considered7:(1)thedefinition ofthe inquiryfoundintheauthorizingresolutionorstatute;(2)theopeningremarksofthecommitteechair;(3) the nature of the proceedings; (4) the question itself; and (5) the response of the committee to a pertinencyobjection.InthecaseofBengzonv.SenateBlueRibbonCommittee,8theSupremeCourthas heldthatthecontemplatedinquirybytherespondent Committee isnotreally"inaidoflegislation" becauseitisnotrelatedtoapurposewithinthejurisdictionofCongress.Inthatcase,thepetitionersseek toenjointheSenateBlueRibbonCommitteefromrequiringthemtotestifyandproduceevidenceatits inquiryintotheallegedsaleoftheequityofBenjamin Romualdez toLopaGroupinthirtysix(36) corporations.9TheCourtnotesthefactthatsincetheaimoftheinvestigationistofindoutwhetherornot therelativesofthePresidentorMr.RicardoLopahasviolatedSection5ofRepublicAct3019,theAnti GraftandCorruptPracticesAct,thematterappearsmorewithintheprovinceofcourtsratherthanthe legislature.10 Inaddition,thecourtnotesthatforrespondentcommitteetoprobeandinquireintothe samejusticiablecontroversy,whichisalreadybeforetheSandiganbayan,wouldbeanencroachmentinto theexclusivedomainofjudicialjurisdictionthathasmuchearliersetin.11 Secondly, theinvestigationmust beinaccordancewith dulypublished rulesofprocedure of Congress.TheserulesofprocedurearesubjecttochangeorevensuspensionbyCongressatanytime exceptifitwillaffectthesubstantiverightsofthewitnessandotherpersonsinvolved.12 And thirdly, the Constitution further mandates that the rights of witnesses appearing in or affectedbysuchinquiriesmustberespected.Likeallotherformsofgovernmentalactions,theBillof Rightsisapplicabletocongressionalinvestigations.Witnessesatsuchinvestigations,hence,cannotbe
1JacintoJimenez,TheModernDaySpanishInquisition,AteneoLawJournal,volXXXIVp.71,citingNelsonv.Symaqn, 105A2d756,764. 2Ibid. 3VicenteV.Mendoza,TheUseofLegislativePurposeasaLimitaitononCongressionalPowertoInvestigate,46PLJ707. 4supra,note29atp.719. 5Arnaultv.Nazareno,supra. 6ibid. 7supranote23citingWatkinsv.US,354Us178,209214. 8203SCRA767. 9MiriamDefensorSantiago,CONSTITUTIONALLAW,p.141. 10Ibid,p.783. 11ibid,p.784. 12supranote19atp.133citingOsmenav.Pendatun,109Phil.863(1960)

compelled togiveevidenceagainstthemselves,theycannotbesubjected tounreasonablesearchand seizure, and their freedoms of speech, press, religion and political belief and association cannot be abridged.1 The right against selfincrimination applies to any witness in any proceeding, whether civil, criminal,orinvestigative,whoisbeingcompelledtogivetestimonythatmaybeusedagainstthemina subsequentcriminalcase.2Theprivilegeagainstselfincriminationnotonlyextendstoanswersthatwill, inthemselvessupportaconvictionbutlikewise,embrace"thosewhichwouldfurnishalinkinthechain of evidence to prosecute the claimant for a (crime)."3 The privilege, nevertheless, is operative and availableonlywherethecompelledtestimonyorcommunicationpossessesapotentialforincrimination. Forpotentialincriminationtoexist,theremustbeashowingthat(1)thereisathreatofcriminalliability; (2)thatsuchthreatofcriminalliabilityconcernsthewitnesshimself;and(3)thatsuchthreatisrealand appreciableandnotimaginaryandunsubstantial.4 Inalegislativeinvestigation,awitnesscannotclaim hisrightagainstselfincriminationinrefusingtoanswerbeforeanyquestionispropoundedonhim.He mustwaituntilheisaskedanincriminatoryquestion.5 Awitnesscanattempttoavoidansweringparticularquestionsbyclaiminganinfringementofhis freedomofspeech,orfreedomofassociation,belief,orreligion.Tobemeaningful,freedomofspeech and freedom of association must allow citizens to express ideas, even unpopular ones, and to join associations, eveninfamousones,withoutfearofultimate sanctionfordoingso. Totheextentthat testifying before a legislative committee forces one to publicly reveal beliefs and associations when disclosure can lead to being blacklisted, socially ostracized, or losing one's job, compelling such testimonyinfringesuponone'sconstitutionalrights.Alegislativeinvestigationmaycreatewhatiscalled a"chillingeffect"ontheexerciseoftheserights.6 Awitnesscanremainsilentandultimatelyavoidpossiblesanctionforacontemptcitationifheor she(1)makesaproperclaimtotheconstitutionalprotectionagainstselfincrimination,(2)validlyalleges aninfringementoffreedomofreligion,speech,orofthepressandassociationand(3)validlyclaims questionsaskedarenotpertinent.7However,itisapparentthatbutforalimitedandproperclaim,noneof these options is freeof a substantial riskthat thewitness maybe wrongand have tosufferforthe miscalculations.Indeed,thelegislativepowerofinquiryandtheauxiliarypowertocompeltestimonyare limitedintheoryonly,butinvariablyunrestrictedinpractice.8 The1987,aswellasinthe1973Constitutiondirectlyconferredthepowerofinvestigationupon congressional committees.9 This is a significant development since under the 1935 Constitution, the investigatorypowersofthecommitteeswereconferredbythelegislature.Thereisaneedfordefining
1supranote2atp.66. 2ManualonGuarantyagainstSelfincrimination,PerfectoV.Fernandez,UPLawComplexInstituteofHumanRightsLaw Center,p.11citingCounselmanv.Hitchcock,142US547,12SCt195,35LEd1110. 3Ibid,p.63citingHoffmanv.US,341US479,71SCt816,95LEd1118. 4Ibid,p.139citingHoffmanv.US,supra.. 5JacintoJimenez,supranote27atp.90citingInrePetitionofGraham,104So2d16,18. 6PowertoInvestigate,theSupremeCourtandtheAllocationofConsitutionalPower,IntroductoryEssaysandSelected Cases,OtisH.StephensandGregoryJ.Rathjen,p.146citingBarenblattv.US,360US109,79SCt1081,27USLaw Week4366(1959). 7supranote33atp.148. 8Ibid. 9Bernas,supranote18atp.132.

with"sufficientparticularity"thejurisdictionandpurposeofinvestigatingcommittees(1)asawayof insuringtheresponsibleexerciseofdelegatedpowerand(2)asabasisfordeterminingtherelevanceof thequestionsasked.1Thescopeofthepowersofthecommitteemust,therefore,bedelimitedinorderto enablethewitnesstoknowwhetherthesubjectofinvestigationisproper,and,ultimatelywhetherthe questions asked are pertinent to the subject of inquiry.2 In delineating this powers, the following propositions3havebeenmade:(1)theauthorityofaninvestigatingcommitteetoactmustbedetermined fromtheruleorresolutioncreatingit;(2)avalidlegislativepurposeasdistinctfromapurposemerelyof exposure,mustbeshown; and(3)thewitnessmustbeinformedastothepertinencyoftheparticular questioninrelationtothelegislativepurpose.

AVAILABILITYOFJUDICIALREVIEW Art.VIIISection1ofthe1987Constitutionprovides: Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactual controversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceableand todeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamounting tolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityof theGovernment. Thecourtscanreviewwhetherornotthequestionspropoundedtoawitnessisrelevantto the subject matter of legislative investigation. Whether the alleged immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction,thecourtisindutyboundtopassuponthecontention.4 Whenaclaimtotheconstitutionalrightagainstselfincrimination,freedomofspeech, press,religionandassociationisassertedtobargovernmentalinterrogation,theresolutionofthe issuealwaysinvolvesabalancingbythecourtsofthecompetingprivateandpublicinterestsat stakeintheparticularcircumstancesshown.5 Itcannotbesimplyassumed,however,thateverycongressionalinvestigationisjustified byapublic need that overbalances anyprivaterights affected. Todoso istoabdicate the responsibilityplacedbytheConstitution uponthejudiciarytoinsurethatCongressdoesnot unjustifiablyencroachuponanindividual'srighttoprivacynorabridgehislibertyofspeech, press,religionorassembly.6Thelegislativepurposeservedbytheinquirywillstillhavetobe weighedagainsttherightofthewitness.Legislativepurposeservesbest,notasalimitationon thepowerofinvestigationbutrather,asacounterweighttotheinterestincivilliberties.7 To presumethatthepurposeislawmakingwhen,infact,itisnotistoplaceanundueweightonone
1supranote29atp.711citingWatkinsv.US,354US178. 2Ibid. 3supranote2atp.66citingBarenblattv.US,79Sct1081,27USLawWeek4366(1959). 4supranote6. 5supranote44. 6Bengzonv.SenateBlueRibbonCommitte,203SCRA767,785. 7supranote30atp.719.

sideofthescale.8RAM.

QuestionHour(Art.VI,Sec.22)andLegislativeInvestigation(id.,Sec.21) a.Astopersonswhomayappear: 22:Onlyadepartmenthead 21:Anyperson b.Astowhoconductstheinvestigation 22:Entirebody 21:Committees c.Astosubjectmatter 22:Mattersrelatedtothedepartmentonly 21:Anymatterforthepurposeoflegislation.

e.ActasBoardofCanvassersforpresidentialandVicePresidentialelections Art.VII,Sec.4,pars.4, etseq . Art.VII,Sec.4.xxx ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresident,dulycertifiedbytheboardof canvassersofeachprovincesorcity,shallbetransmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentofthe Senate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenateshall,notlaterthanthirty daysafterthedayofelection(w/cisthe2ndTuesdayofJune),openallthecertificatesinthepresenceof theSenateandHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upondeterminationof the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass (i.e., tally the certificatesofcanvass)thevotes. Thepersonshavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoor moreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes(tie),oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythe voteofamajorityofallthemembersofCongress,votingseparately. TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates.

RA7166:AnActProvidingforSynchronizedNationalandLocalElectionsandforElectoralReforms
8Ibid,p.720.

Sec.30. CongressastheNationalBoardofCanvassersfortheElectionofPresidentandVicePresident: Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. Congress shall determine the authenticityanddueexecutionofthecertificatesofcanvassforPresidentandVicePresidentasaccomplishedand transmittedtoitbythelocalboardsofcanvassers,onashowingthat:(1)eachcertificateofcanvasswasexecuted, signedandthumbmarkedbythechairmanandmembersoftheboardofcanvassersandtransmittedorcausedtobe transmittedtoCongressbythem;(2)eachcertificateofcanvasscontainsthenamesofallofthecandidatesfor President and VicePresident and their corresponding votes in words and in figures; and (3) there exists no discrepancyinotherauthenticcopiesofthecertificateofcanvassordiscrepancyinthevotesofanycandidatein wordsandfiguresinthesamecertificate. Whenthecertificateofcanvass,dulycertifiedbytheboardofcanvassersofeachprovince,cityordistrict, appearstobeincomplete,theSenatePresidentshall requiretheboardofcanvassersconcernedtotransmitby personaldelivery,theelectionreturnsfrompollingplacesthatwerenotincludedinthecertificateofcanvassand supportingstatements. Saidelection returnsshallbesubmittedbypersonal deliverywithin two(2)daysfrom receiptofnotice. Whenitappearsthatanycertificateofcanvassorsupportingstatementofvotesbyprecinctbearserasures oralterationswhichmaycastdoubtastotheveracityofthenumberofvotesstatedthereinandmayaffecttheresult oftheelection,uponrequestofthePresidentialorVicePresidentialcandidateconcernedorhisparty,Congress shall,forthesolepurposeofverifyingtheactualnumberofvotescastforPresidentandVicePresident,countthe votesastheyappearinthecopiesoftheelectionreturnssubmittedtoit.

f. Call a special election in case of vacancy in the offices of President and Vice President Art.VII,Sec.10. TheCongressshall,atteno'clockinthemorningofthethirddayafterthe vacancyintheofficesofthePresidentandVicePresidentoccurs,conveneinaccordancewithitsrules withoutneedofacallandwithinsevendaysenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresident andaVicePresidenttobeheldnotearlierthanfortyfivedaysnorlaterthansixtydaysfromthetimeof suchcall.Thebillcallingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderparagraph2,Section26, ArticleVIofthisConstitutionandshallbecomelawuponitsapprovalonthirdreadingbytheCongress. Appropriationsforthespecialelectionshallbechargedagainstanycurrentappropriationsandshallbe exemptfromtherequirementsofparagraph4,Section25,ArticleVIofthisConstitution.Theconvening oftheCongresscannotbesuspendednorthespecialelectionpostponed. Nospecialelectionshallbe calledifthevacancyoccurswithineighteenmonthsbeforethedateofthenextpresidentialelection.

WhenavacancyoccursintheofficesofthePresidentandVicePresident,morethan18monthsbefore thedateofthenextregularpresidentialelection,theCongressshallconveneat10AMofthe3rddayafterthe vacancy,inaccordancewithitsrules,withoutneedofcall.TheconveningofCongresscannotbesuspended.

Within7daysafteritconvenes,itshallenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresidentand VicePresident,tobeheldbetween45to60daysfromthedayofsuchcall.Theholdingofthespecialelection cannotbepostponed. Notlaterthan30daysaftertheelection,CongressshallagainactasBoardofCanvassers(seeinfra), sinceArt.VII,Sec.4par.atalksofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresident. Thus,thetimetableis: Day0vacancyoccurs Day3Congressconveneswithoutneedofcall Day10Congresspassesthespecialelectionlaw,ifithasnotpassedbeforethisdate Day55to70electionisheld Day85to100asthecasemaybecanvassingbyCongress,ifithasnotdonesoearlier. UndertheConstitutionthenavacancyisfilledbythe100thdayfromthevacancyatthelatest. Thelawsopassedisexemptedfromthefollowing: a)CertificationunderVI,26,par.2.Thus,thethreereadingscanbedoneallonthesameday. b)ApprovalbythePresident(forobviousreasons).Thebillautomaticallybecomesalaw,then,uponits approvalon3rdandfinalreading. c)CertificationbytheNationalTreasureroftheavailabilityoffunds,orrevenueraisingmeasureunder Art.VI,Sec.25(4).Appropriationsforthespecialelectionshallbechargedagainstanycurrentappropriations.

g.Revokeorextendsuspensionofprivilegeof habeascorpus ordeclarationofmartial law Art.VII,Sec. 18. ThePresident shallbetheCommanderinChief ofallarmed forcesofthe Philippines,andwheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppress lawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Incaseofinvasionorrebellion,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit, hemay,foraperiodnotexceedingsixtydays,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusorplace thePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.Withinfortyeighthoursfromtheproclamationof martiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,thePresidentshallsubmita reportinpersonor inwriting totheCongress. TheCongress, votingjointly,byavoteofatleasta majorityofallitsMembersinregularorspecialsession,mayrevokesuchproclamationorsuspension, whichrevocationshallnotbesetasidebythePresident.UpontheinitiativeofthePresident,theCongress may,inthesamemanner,extendsuchproclamationorsuspensionforaperiodtobedeterminedbythe Congress,iftheinvasionorrebellionshallpersistandpublicsafetyrequiresit. TheCongress,ifnotinsession,shallwithintwentyfourhoursfollowingsuchproclamationor

suspension,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacall. TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiency ofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritorthe extensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioningofthecivilcourtsorlegislativeassemblies,norauthorizetheconfermentofjurisdictionon military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspendtheprivilegeofthewrit. Thesuspension of theprivilegeshallapplyonlytopersons judicially chargedforrebellion or offensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion. Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbe judiciallychargedwithinthreedays,otherwiseheshallbereleased.

WhenthePresidentsuspendstheprivilegeofthewritorproclaimsmartiallaw(seediscussion,infra), thenCongressshallconvenewithin24hoursformtheproclamationorsuspensioninaccordancewithitsrules, withoutneedofacall,ifitisnotinsession.ThePresidentshallthensubmitareportinpersonorinwritingto Congress,within48hoursfromtheproclamationorsuspension. Byajointmajorityvoteofallthemembersofbothhousesinajointmeeting,theCongresshas2 possiblecoursesofaction: 1) To revoke (or disapprove) the proclamation or suspension, which revocation cannot be set aside (vetoed)bythePresident,or 2)Toextendtheproclamationafter60days,foraperiodtobedeterminedbyCongress,ifthecauses persist. It must be noted that the Congress does not approve the proclamation or suspension, but either disapprovesitorextendsit,becausetheproclamationorsuspensionisvalidinitselffor60daysalready,andso doesnotrequiretheapprovalofCongressforitseffectivity.Whatitneedsistheextensionthatmaybegranted byCongressbeyondthe60dayperiodwhenitexpires,whichextensionneednotbeforanother60daysonly.

h.ApprovePresidentialAmnesties Art.VII,Sec.19.Exceptincasesofimpeachment,orasotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution, thePresident maygrantreprieves,commutations,andpardons,andremitfinesandforfeitures,after convictionbyfinaljudgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the MembersoftheCongress. ThePresidenthasthepowertograntamnestywiththeconcurrenceofamajorityofallthemembersof Congress.

i.Confirmcertainappointments (1)Art.VII,Sec.9(ByCongress) Art.VII,Sec.9.WheneverthereisavacancyintheOfficeoftheVicePresidentduringtheterm forwhichhewaselected,thePresidentshallnominateaVicePresidentfromamongtheMembersofthe SenateandtheHouseofRepresentativeswhoshallassumeofficeuponconfirmationbyamajorityvoteof alltheMembersofbothHousesofCongress,votingseparately. (2)Id.,Sec.16(BytheCommissiononAppointments) Art.VII,Sec. 16. ThePresident shallnominateand, with the consentoftheCommission on Appointments,appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersand consuls,orofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Governmentwhoseappointments arenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhom,hemaybe authorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerin rankin thePresident alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards. ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.

ThefollowingofficersappointedbythePresidentrequireconfirmationbytheCA: a.Headsofdepartments(VII,16) b.Ambassadors,publicministers,andconsuls(VII,16) c.OfficersoftheAFPfromtherankofcolonelandnavalcaptain(VII,16) d.ChairmanandmembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions(IX,B,C,&D,1[2]) e.MembersoftheJudicialandBarCouncil(VIII,8[2]) In Sarmiento vs Mison,156SCRA549,theCommissionerofCustomswasheldnottobesubjectto confirmation,beingoftherankofthebureaudirector,whowaspurposelydeletedfromthelistingofthose whoseappointmentshadtobeapprovedbytheCommissiononAppointments. Itwastheclearandexpress intentoftheframersoftheConstitutiontoexcludepresidentialappointmentsfromconfirmationbytheCA, exceptappointmentstoofficesexpresslymentionedinArt.VII,Sec.16.Thepowertoappointisalreadyvested

inthePresident,withoutneedofconfirmationbytheCA. SarmientovsMison,156SCRA549 F:
Petitionersbroughtthissuitforprohibitionintheircapacityastaxpayers,membersoftheBarandlawprofessors, toenjoinrespondentCommissionerofCustomsfromperforminghisfunctionsonthegroundthathisappointment,w/o confirmationbytheCA,isunconstitutional.

HELD: Art.VII,Sec.16,asorginallyproposedbytheCommitteonExecutivePowerofthe1986ConCom read:

Sec.16.ThePresidentshallnominateand,withtheconsentofaCommissiononAppointment,shallappointthe headsofexecutivedepartmentsandbureaus,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,orofficersofthearmed forcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptainandallotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenot otherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmaybylawvestthe appointmentofinferiorofficersinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orintheheadsofdepartments.

However,onmotionofComm.Foz,2changeswereapprovedinthetextoftheprovision.Thefirstwas to delete the phrase "and bureaus," and the second was to place a period (.) after the word "captain" and substitutethephrase"andall"w/thephrase"HESHALLALSOAPPOINTANY."Thefirstamendmentwas intendedtoexempttheappointmentofbureaudirectorsfromtherequirementofconfirmationonthegroundthat thispositionislowandtorequireconfirmationwouldsubjectbureaudirectorstopoliticalinfluence. Onthe other hand, the 2nd amendment was intended to subject to confirmation only those mentioned in the frist sentence,namely: Theheadsoftheexec.depts,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,officersofthearmed forcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhiminthe Consti,i.e., (1)RegularmembersoftheJudicialandBarCouncil[Art.VIII,Sec.8(2)] (2)ChairmanandCommissionersoftheCivilServiceCommission[Art.IXB,Sec.1(2)]; (3)ChairmanandCommissionersoftheCOMELEC[Art.IXC,Sec.1(2)]; (4)ChairmanandCommissionersoftheCOA[Art.IXD,Sec.1(2)]; (5)Membersoftheregionalconsultativecommission(Art.X,Sec.18.) Therestoftheappointmentsmentionedinsec.16arenotsubjecttoconfirmation.Theseare:(1)all otherofficersoftheGovtwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw;(2)thosewhomthePres. maybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint;and(3)officerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentsCongressmaybylaw vestinthePres.alone. xxx.VV.

j.ConcurinTreaties Art. VII, Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurredinbyatleasttwothirdsofallthemembersoftheSenate.

Thisistrue,althoughitisthePresidentwhoisthechiefspokesmaninforeignrelations. Executive agreementsdonotneedconcurrence.

k.Declarationofwaranddelegationofemergencypowers Art. VI, Sec.23. (1) TheCongress, by a vote oftwothirds ofboth Houses in joint sessions assembled,votingseparately,shallhavethesolepowertodeclaretheexistenceofastateofwar. (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,foralimitedperiodandsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowers necessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.Unlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionof theCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof.

TheCongress,byavoteof2/3ofbothhousesinjointsessionassembledbutvotingseparatelyshallhave thesolepowertodeclaretheexistenceofastateofwar.[Art.VI,Sec.23(1)] Intimesofwarorothernationalemergency,theCongressmayauthorizethePresident,foralimited periodandsubjectsuchrestrictionsasthelawmayprescribe,toexercisepowersnecessaryandpropertocarry outadeclarednationalpolicy.SuchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentofCongress,unlesssooner withdrawnbyitsresolution.[Art.VI,Sec.23(2).] AlthoughthetourofdutyoftheChiefofStaffoftheAFPshouldnotexceed3years,thePresidentmay extendsuchtourofdutyintimesofwarorothernationalemergencydeclaredbyCongress.[Art.XVI,Sec. 5(7).]

l.BejudgeofthePresident'sphysicalfitness Art. VII, Sec. 11, par. 4. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration,orifnotinsession,withintwelvedaysafteritisrequiredtoassemble,determinesbyatwo thirdsvoteofbothHouses,votingseparately,thatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersand duties of his office, the VicePresident shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercisingthepowersanddutiesofhisoffice. Thereare3waysinwhichthePresidentmaybedeclaredunabletodischargehisfunctionsunderthis article: (1)Uponhisownwrittendeclaration (2)UponthefirstwrittendeclarationbymajorityofhisCabinet (3)UpondeterminationbyCongressby2/3voteofallitsmembersvotingseparately,actingonthe2nd writtendeclarationbytheCabinet WhenthePresidenthimselftransmitstotheSenatePresidentandSpeakeroftheHousehiswritten

declarationthatheisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,thereisnoproblem.TheVice PresidentshalldischargesuchpowersanddutiesasActingPresident,untilthePresidenttransmittotheSenate PresidentandSpeakerawrittendeclarationthatheisnolongerunabletodischargehispowersandduties. TheproblemariseswhenamajorityofallmembersofCabinettransmittotheSenatePresidentand SpeakertheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargehisoffice.Uponsuchtransmittal,the VicePresidentshall"immediately"assumetheofficeasActingPresident. The President can contest this by transmitting to the Senate President and Speaker his written declarationthatnoinabilityexists.Uponsuchtransmittal,heshallreassumehisoffice. ButifthemajorityofallthemembersoftheCabinetreallybelieveotherwise,theycancontestthis "declaration of non inability" by again sending a second written declaration to the Senate President and Speaker,within5daysfromthetimethePresidenttransmittedhiswrittendeclarationofnoninability. Itisthissecondcabinetwritten"declarationofinability"thatbringsintheCongressasjudgeofthe President'sabilitytodischargehisoffice. (TheVicePresidentinthissecondinstancedoesnotactasPresident:thePresidenthavingspokenas againsthisCabinet,hisdeclarationentitleshimtostayuntilCongresssaysotherwise.ButiftheCabinetsubmits thedeclarationmorethan5daysafterthePresidentreassumesoffice,thismaybeviewedasanewdeclaration, andsotheVicePresidentcanimmediatelyactasPresident.) Congressmustconvene(a)within10daysafterreceiptofthe2ndwrittendeclarationbytheCabinet,if itisinsession,or(b)within12daysafteritisrequiredtoassemblebyitsrespectivepresidingofficer,ifitisnot insession. Inajointsession,theCongressshalldecidethePresident'sability. Twothirdsvotebyeachhouse, votingseparately,isrequiredtodeclarethePresident'sinability.Inotherwords,if2/3ofeachhousevotethat thePresidentmuststepdown,theVicePresidentshallactasPresident.Butiflessthan2/3ofeachHousevote thatthePresidentisunable,thePresidentshallcontinueinoffice.

m.PowerofImpeachment (1)WhoaresubjecttoimpeachmentArt.XI,Sec.2 Art. XI, Sec. 2. The President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftand corruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalorpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmaybe removedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.

a.President b.VicePresident c.JusticesoftheSupremeCourt d.MembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions e.Ombudsman (2)Groundsforimpeachment Art.XI,Sec.2,supra. a)CulpableviolationoftheConstitution b)Treason(RPC) c)Bribery(RA3019) d)Graftandcorruption(RA3019) e)Otherhighcrimes f)Betrayalofpublictrust Limitation:Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithina periodofoneyear.[Art.XI,Sec.3(5)] Forum:TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateallcasesofimpeachment.[Art. XI,Sec.3(1)] (3)Procedureforimpeachment Art.XI,Sec.3(1)(6) Art.XI,Sec.3. (1) TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateall casesofimpeachment. (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of RepresentativesorbyanycitizenuponresolutionofendorsementbyanyMemberthereof,whichshallbe includedintheOrderofBusinesswithintensessiondays,andreferredtotheproperCommitteewithin threesessiondaysthereafter.TheCommittee,afterhearing,andbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,

shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the correspondingresolution.TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithinten sessiondaysfromreceiptthereof. (3)AvoteofatleastonethirdofalltheMembersoftheHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded. (4)Incasetheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleastonethirdofall theMembersoftheHouse,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenate shallforthwithproceed. (5)Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithin aperiodofoneyear. (6)TheSenateshallhavethesolepowertotryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment.Whensitting forthatpurpose,theSenatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation.WhenthePresidentofthePhilippinesison trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwothirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate.

A)Initiationstage 1)Ifinitiatedbylessthan1/3[Secs.3(2)(4)] (a)AverifiedcomplaintforimpeachmentisfiledwiththeHouseofRepresentativeby:(i)amemberof theHouseofRepresentatives,or(ii)anycitizenuponaresolutionofendorsementbyanymemberoftheHouse. (b) The complaint must be included in the Order of Business within 10 session days upon receipt thereof.(thepurposeistoprohibitanydelay) (c)Notlaterthan3sessiondaysafter,includingthecomplaintintheOrderofBusiness,itmustbe referred(bytheSpeaker)tothepropercommittee(usually,theCommitteeonJusticeandOrder). (d)TheCommitteehas60sessiondaysfromreceiptofthereferraltoconducthearings(toseeifthereis probablecause),tovotebyanabsolutemajority,andtosubmitreportanditsresolutiontotheHouse. (e)TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationandgeneraldiscussionbytheHousewithin10 sessiondaysfromreceiptthereof. (f)Afterthediscussion,avoteistaken,withthevoteofeachmemberrecorded.Avoteofatleast1/3of allthemembersoftheHouseisneededto"affirmafavorableresolutionwiththeArticlesofImpeachmentofthe Committee,ortooverrideitscontraryresolution." IftheCommitteemadeafavorablerecommendation(i.e.,itrecommendedthatthecomplaintbesent overtotheSenate),1/3ofallthemembersareneededtoapprovesuchrecommendation.

If the Committee made a contrary recommendation (i.e., it recommended the dismissal of the complaint),1/3ofallthemembersareneededtodisapproveoroverridethisreport. Inotherwords,solongas1/3ofthelowerhousevotestoproceedwiththetrial,thenthecasewouldbe senttotheSenate,regardlessofthecommitteerecommendation,andregardlessofthenumberwhovote(which, couldevenbeashighas66%oftheentireHouse),thatitshouldnotbesenttotheSenatefortrial. Thereasonisthattheinitiationstagedoesnotdeterminetheguiltorinnocenceoftheofficerbeing impeached.Itmerelydetermineswhetherthereisaprimafaciecaseagainsttheofficerthatmeritsafullblown trialintheSenate. Itissimilartoapreliminaryinvestigation.ItsanalogyinUSConstitutionalLawisthevoteof4justices oftheUSSupremeCourtonwhethertogiveduecoursetoapetitionforcertiorari.Oncethe4justicesbelieve thatthepetitionisonitsfacemeritorious,theCourtmustgiveduecoursetoit,evenif5believethatitshould nothearthecase.Anyway,thegrantofduecoursedoesnotmeanafavorablejudgmentintheend. ThecaseofRomulovYniguez,supra,servedastheprecursorofthepresentprovisiononimpeachment. Underthe1973Constitution,theonlyprovisionontheinitiationstageofimpeachmentwas:"uponthefilingofa verifiedcomplaint,theNationalAssemblymayinitiateimpeachmentbyavoteofatleast1/3ofallitsmembers." ThesilenceoftheConstitutionontheproceduretobefollowedenabledtheBatasantoadoptarulethatwould allowamerecommitteeoftheBatasantokillthecomplaintforimpeachmentbymerelyshelvingitintothe archives.AndthedilemmainRomulovYniguezwasthepoliticalnatureofthedecisiontoshelvethecase.For althoughthelegalityoftherulesofprocedureonimpeachmentisajusticiableorlegalquestion,andthussubject tojudicialreview,toquestionthisincourt,andsatisfytherequirementsofjudicialreview(likeaninjury),one mustresorttomandamustoretrievethecasefromthearchives.ButhowcanonemandamustheSpeaker?Thus, evenifRomulowasraisingalegalquestion,thecourthadtoconsiderthequestionasapoliticalonebecauseit couldnotordertheSpeaker,acoequal,toretrievethecasetheyshelved,adecisionmadebythelegislatureina matterwithinitscompetence. ThefactualsituationcouldnolongerariseunderthepresentConstitutionsincetheCommitteemust reportthecasetothefloor,regardlessofitsrecommendation.Itcannotnow"kill"thebillonitsownvolition. Andsincethereisaclearruleofprocedure,anyotherproceduresimilartothatadoptedbytheBatasanwould nowbereviewablebytheCourtsagainstaconstitutionalstandard,inthesamewaylawspassedbyCongresscan bemeasuredagainsttheconstitutionalnorm. 2)Ifinitiatedby1/3[Art.XI,Sec.3(4)] Iftheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleast1/3ofallthemembersofthe House,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenateshallforthwithproceed. Thismeansthattheentireprocessiscutshort.ThereisnoneedforaCommitteereportanddiscussion anymore,sincetheendresultisthat1/3ofthemembersoftheHousehavedecidedtosendthecasefortrial. B)TrialStage

a)TheArticlesofImpeachmentoftheCommitteeisforwardedtotheSenate,whichhasthesolepower totryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment,fortrial. b) When sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment case, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. c)Asageneralrule,thePresidentoftheSenatepresidesoveranimpeachmenttrial.Butwhenitisthe PresidentofthePhilippineswhoisontrial, theChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourtshallbethepresiding officer,butheshallnotvote. d)Tocarryoutaconviction,thevoteof2/3ofallthemembersoftheSenate(16Senators)isrequired. Iflessthan2/3votethattheofficerisguilty,theeffectisacquittal. e)ThejudgmentoftheSenate(likethejudgmentoftheHouseonwhethertoinitiate)isapolitical questionthatcannotbereviewedbythecourt(RomulovYniguez).(Unlikealawthatcanbereviewedbythe courts because of the existence of constitutional standards, this judgment cannot be reviewed, for the Constitutionitselfhasgrantedthediscretiontothiscoequalbranchtoappreciatethecaseaspresented.)

(4)ConsequencesofImpeachment Art.XI,Sec.3(7)Judgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallnotextendfurtherthanremovalfrom office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convictedshallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishmentaccordingtolaw.

Incaseofacquittal ThePresidentcontinuesinoffice,becausependingtheimpeachmenttrial,heremainsinoffice. Acquittaldoesnotonlymeanthedismissaloftheimpeachmentcase,butalsoabarfromanycriminal actiononthesameoffensethatmaybefiledlateron.(VV) Incaseofconviction[Art.XI,Sec.3(7)] Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than (i) removal from office and (ii) disqualificationtoholdanyofficeunderRP. Butapersonconvictedshallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishment accordingtolaw(RPC,AntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct,andotherpenallaws). (Thecourtscannotreviewthejudgmentontheimpeachmentcase,andultimatelytheremovalfrom officeandthedisqualification,becausethesearepoliticalquestions. Butitcanreviewthejudgmentinthe criminalcase.)

(5)Mustimpeachmentprecedefilingofcriminalcase? InLecarozvsSandiganbayan,128SCRA324,theSCsaidthatthebroadpoweroftheConstitutionvests therespondentcourtwithjurisdictionoverpublicofficersandemployees,includingthoseinGOOCs.Thereare exceptions,however,liketheconstitutionalofficers,particularlythosedeclaredtoberemovablebyimpeach ment.Intheircase,theConstitutionproscribesremovalfromofficebyanyothermethod;otherwise,toallowa publicofficerwhomayberemovedsolelybyimpeachmenttobechargedcriminallywhileholdinghisoffice withanoffensethatcarriesthepenaltyofremovalfromoffice,wouldbeviolativeoftheclearmandateofthe fundamental law. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualificationtoholdanyofficeofhonor,trustorprofitundertheRepublicofthePhilippines,buttheparty convictedshallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecutiontrial,andpunishment,inaccordancewithlaw. Theeffectofimpeachmentislimitedtothelossofpositionanddisqualificationtoholdanyofficeofhonor,trust orprofitundertheRepublicofthePhilippines.Thepartythusconvictedmaybeproceededagainst,triedand thereafterpunishedinaccordancewithlaw.Theclearimplicationis,the partyconvictedintheimpeachment proceedingshallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trialandpunishmentaccordingtolaw;and thatifthesamedoesnotresultinconvictionandtheofficialisnottherebyremoved,thefilingofacriminal actioninaccordancewithlawmaynotprosper. Constitutionalofficersarenotentitledtoimmunityfromliabilityforpossiblecriminalacts.Butthereis a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced.Theymustfirstberemovedfromofficeviatheconstitutionalrouteofimpeachment(Art.XI,Secs.2 and3).Shouldtheybeimpeached,theymaythenbeheldtoanswereithercriminallyoradministrativelyforany wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against them in appropriate proceedings. Therefore a fiscal or prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against constitutional officers.Theremedyofapersonwithalegitimategrievanceistofileimpeachmentproceedings.

n.Powerwithregardtotheutilizationofnaturalresources Art.XII,Sec.2. Alllandsofthepublicdomain,waters,minerals,coal,petroleum,andother mineraloils,allforcesofpotentialenergy,fisheries,forestsortimber,wildlife,floraandfauna,andother naturalresourcesareownedbytheState. Withtheexceptionofagriculturallands,allothernatural resourcesshallnotbealienated.Theexploration,development,andutilizationofnaturalresourcesshall beunderthefullcontrolandsupervisionoftheState.TheStatemaydirectlyundertakesuchactivities,or itmayenterintocoproduction,jointventure,orproductionsharingagreementswithFilipinocitizensor corporationsorassociationsatleastsixty percentum ofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchcitizens. Such agreementmaybeforaperiodnotexceedingtwentyfiveyears,renewablefornotmorethantwentyfive years,andundersuchtermsandconditionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw. Incasesofwaterrights for irrigation,watersupply,fisheries,orindustrialusesotherthanthedevelopmentofwaterpower,beneficial

usemaybethemeasureandlimitofthegrant. TheStateshallprotectthenation'smarinewealthinitsarchipelagicwaters,territorialsea,and exclusiveeconomiczone,andreserveitsuseandenjoymentexclusivelytoFilipinocitizens. TheCongressmay,bylaw,allowsmallscaleutilizationofnaturalresourcesbyFilipinocitizens,as wellascooperativefishfarming,withprioritytosubsistencefishermenandfishworkersinrivers,lakes, bays,andlagoons. The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,andothermineraloilsaccordingtothegeneraltermsandconditionsprovidedbylaw,based onrealcontributionstotheeconomicgrowthandgeneralwelfareofthecountry.Insuchagreements,the Stateshallpromotethedevelopmentanduseoflocalscientificandtechnicalresources. ThePresidentshallnotifytheCongressofeverycontractenteredintoinaccordancewiththis provision,withinthirtydaysfromitsexecution.

ThePresidentmayenterintoagreementswithforeignownedcorporationsinvolvingeithertechnicalor financialassistanceforlargescaleexploration,development,andutilizationofminerals,petroleum,andother mineraloilsaccordingtothegeneraltermsandconditionsprovidedbylaw...ThePresidentshallnotifythe Congressofeverycontractenteredintoinaccordancewiththisprovision,within30daysfromitsexecution. (Art.XII,Sec.2,pars.4&5).

o.AmendmentoftheConstitution Art.XVII,Sec.1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby: (1)TheCongress,uponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsMembers;or (2)Aconstitutionalconvention. Sec.2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethrough initiativeuponapetitionofatleasttwelve percentum ofthetotalnumberofregisteredvotersofwhich everylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvotestherein. Noamendmentunderthissectionshallbeauthorisedwithinfiveyearsfollowingtheratificationofthis Constitutionnoroftenerthanonceeveryfiveyearsthereafter. TheCongressshallprovidefortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthisright. Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of twothirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convetion,orbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,submittotheelectoratethequestionofcallingsucha convention. Sec.4.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionofthisConstitutionunderSection1hereofshallbevalid

whenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscitewhichshallbeheldnotearlierthansixtydays norlaterthanninetydaysaftertheapprovalofsuchamendmentorrevision. AnyamendmentunderSection2hereofshallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certificationbytheCommissiononElectionsofthesufficiencyofthepetition. ConstituentPower(Art.XVII,Secs.1and2) Theconstituentpower,orthepowertoamendorrevisetheConstitution,isdifferentfromthelaw makingpowerofCongress,saidtheSCinGonzalesvComelec,infra. AmendmentorrevisionoftheConstitutionmaybeproposedin3ways: 1.ByCongressactingasaconstituentbody(XVII,1) Avoteof3/4ofallitsmembersisrequired. 2.Byaconstitutionalconvention(XVII,1) a)CongresscallsaConConbyavoteof2/3ofallitsmembers,or b)Congresssubmitstotheelectoratethequestionofcallingsuchconvention,byanabsolute majorityvote. 3.Bythepeople(Art.XVII,Sec.2) Through initiative upon petition by 12% of all registered voters, of whichever legislative district is represented by at least3% of itsregistered voters. But thiscannot be resorted to (i)within 5 years from February2,1987,nor(ii)moreoftenthanonceeveryfiveyears. Anyamendmentorrevisionshallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebisciteto beheldbetween6oto90daysfrom,theapprovaloftheamendmentorrevisioninthecaseofCongressorthe ConCon,orthecertificationbyCOMELECofthesufficiencyofthepetitioninthecaseofthepeople.

Comparedwiththe1935Constitution: 1935Constitution,Art.XV Art.XV,Sec.1. TheCongressinjointsessionassembled,byavoteofthreefourthsofallthe MembersoftheSenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesvotingseparately,mayproposeamendments tothisConstitutionorcallaconventionforthepurpose.Suchamendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthis Constitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastatanelectionatwhichtheamendmentsare

submittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.

8.LegislativeProcess a.Requirementsastobills (1)Astotitlesofbills Art.VI,Sec.26.(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshall beexpressedinthetitlethereof.

Titleofbills Thepurposeistoprevent"logrolling"orthesmugglinginof"riders",thatis,itemsthatareunrelatedto thebillitselfandwouldnothavebeenpassedhadtheynotbeensneakedintothebill. Cruz: Thepurposesofthisruleare: (1) Topreventhodgepodgeorlogrollinglegislation. Thisisdefinedas"anyactcontainingseveral subjectsdealingwithunrelatedmattersrepresentingdiverseinterests,themainobjectofsuchcombinationbeing tounitethemembersofthelegislaturewhofavoranyoneofthesubjectsinsupportofthewholeact." (2)Topreventsurpriseorfrauduponthelegislature. (3)Tofairlyapprisethepeople,throughsuchpublicationsofitsproceedingsasareusuallymade,ofthe subjectsoflegislationthatarebeingconsideredinorderthattheymayhaveopportunityofbeingheardthereon, bypetitionorotherwise,iftheyshouldsodesire. xxx Butthetitleneednotbeacompletecatalogueofabill.xxx Inanycase,atitlemustnotbe"souncertainthattheaveragepersonreadingitwouldnotbeinformedof thepurposeoftheenactmentorputoninquiryastoitscontents,orw/cismisleading,eitherinreferringtoor indicatingonesubjectwhereanotherordifferentoneisreallyembracedintheact,orinomittinganyexpression orindicationoftherealsubjectorscopeoftheact." Thetitlecouldbespecific(AbilltocreatethemunicipalityofBagoda)orasbroad(CivilCode). Whichshouldcontrol,thetitleorthetextofthestatute? In Cruz v Paras, infra.theSCreferredtothetitleofthebilltofixthemeaningofthetextorthe substantive portion of the bill. The title provided for the "regulation" of nightclubs and other places for entertainment,whilethetext,asamended,gavelocalgovernmentstheauthorityto"prohibit"theseplacesalto gether.TheCourtruledthatBocaue,couldnot,underthislaw,prohibittheseplacesbutonlyregulatethem,first becausethe titlewascontrollingoverthetext (VV: theCourtstoodtheprincipleonitshead),andsecond, becausethenightclubswerenotnuisancespersethatcouldbesummarilyevicted.Toconstruetheamendatory

actasgrantingmunicipalcorporationsthepowertoprohibittheoperationofnightclubswouldbetoconstrueit inawaythatitviolatestheconstitutionalprovisionthat"everybillshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshallbe expressedinthetitlethereof."

Cruzv.Paras,123SCRA569(1983) F:
ThepetitionersareoperatorsornightclubsinBocaue,Bulacan.theyfiledprohibitionsuitstostoptheMun.of Bocauefromenforcinganordinanceprohibitingtheoperationofnightclubs,cabarets,anddancehallsinthatmun.orthe renewaloflicensestooperatethem.TheCFIupheldthevalidityoftheordinanceanddismissedthepetition.Hence,this petitionforcertiorari.

HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not preventedfromcarryingontheirbusiness.RA938,asorginallyenacted,grantedmunicipalitiesthepowerto regulatetheestablishment,maintenance andoperationofnightclubs andthelike. WhileitistruethatOn 5/21/54,thelawwasamededbyRA979w/cpurportedtogivemunicipalitiesthepowernotonlytoregulatebut likewisetoprohibittheoperationofnightclubs,thefactisthatthetitleofthelawremainedthesamesothatthe powergrantedtomunicipalitiesremainsthatofregulation,notprohibition.Toconstruetheamendatoryactas grantingmun.corporationsthepowertoprohibittheoperationofnightclubswouldbetoconstrueitinaway that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressedinthetitlethereof."Moreover,therecentylyenactedLGC(BP337)speakssimplyofthepowerto regulatetheestablishment,andoperationofbilliardpools,theatricalperformances,circusesandotherformsof entertainment.Certiorarigranted.VV.

(2)Requirementsastocertainlaws (a)Appropriationlaws Art.VII,Sec.22.ThePresidentshallsubmittotheCongresswithinthirtydaysfromtheopening ofeveryregularsession,asthebasisofthegeneralappropriationsbill,abudgetofexpendituresand sourcesoffinancing,includingreceiptsfromexistingandproposedrevenuemeasures.

Art.VI,Secs.2425 Art.VI,Sec.24.Allappropriations,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublic debt,billsoflocalapplication,andprivatebillsshalloriginateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives, buttheSenatemayproposeorconcurwithamendments. Cruz:TheabovementionedbillsaresupposedtobeinitiatedbytheHouseorRepresentativesbec.itismore numerousinmembership andthereforealsomorerepresentativeofthepeople. Moreover,itsmembersare

presumedtobemorefamiliarw/theneedsofthecountryinregardtotheenactmentofthelegislationinvolved. xxx Anappropriationbillisonetheprimaryandspecificpurposeofw/cistoauthorizethereleaseoffunds fromthepublictreasury. Arevenuebillisonethatleviestaxesandraisesfundsforthegovt,whileatariffbillspecifiestherates ordutiestobeimposedonimportedarticles. Abillincreasingthepublicdebtisillustratedbyonefloatingbondsforpublicsubscriptionredeemable afteracertainperiod. Abilloflocalapplicationisoneinvolvingpurelylocalormunicipalmatters,likeacharterofacity. Privatebillsareillustratedbyabillgrantinghonorarycitizenshiptoadistinguishedforeigner. Art.VI,Sec.25. (1) TheCongressmaynotincreasetheappropriationrecommendedbythe PresidentfortheoperationoftheGovernmentasspecifiedinthebudget.Theform,content,andmanner ofpreparationofthebudgetshallbeprescribedbylaw. (2) Noprovision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relatesspecificallytosomeparticularappropriationstherein.Anysuchprovisionorenactmentshallbe limitedinitsoperationtotheappropriationtowhichitrelates. (3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedureforapprovingappropriationsforotherdepartmentsandagencies. (4) Aspecialappropriationsbillshallspecifythepurposeforwhichitisintended,andshallbe supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a correspondingrevenueproposaltherein. (5)Nolawshallbepassedauthorizinganytransferofappropriations;however,thePresident,the PresidentoftheSenate,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,theChiefJusticeoftheSupreme Court,andtheheadsofConstitutionalCommissionsmay,bylaw,beauthorizedtoaugmentanyitemin thegeneralappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveofficesfromsavingsinotheritemsoftheirrespective appropriations. (6) Discretionaryfundsappropriatedforparticularofficialsshallbedisbursedonlyforpublic purposestobesupportedbyappropriatevouchersandsubjecttosuchguidelinesasmaybeprescribedby law. (7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriationsbillfortheensuingfiscalyear,thegeneralappropriationslawfortheprecedingfiscalyear shallbedeemedreenactedandshallremaininforceandeffectuntilthegeneralappropriationsbillis passedbytheCongress.

Demetriav.Alba,148SCRA208(1987) Budget Law, Authorizing the Transfer of Items Appropriated for One Government Office to Another is Unconstitutional. F:Petitioners,asconcernedcitizens,andmembersoftheBP,filedapetitionforprohibition,contestingthevalidityofPD

1177,Sec.44,authorizingthePresidentofthePhils."totransferanyfund,appropriatedforthedifferentdepartments, bureaus,officesandagenciesoftheExecutiveDepartment...toanyprogram,projectoractivityofanydepartment,bureau oroffice...."

HELD:Par.1ofSec.44ofPD1177undulyextendstheprivilegegrantedunderArt.VIII,Sec.16(5)ofthe 1973Constitution. ItempowersthePres.toindiscriminatelytransferfundsfromonedept.bureau,officeor agencyoftheExecutiveDept.toanyprogram,projectoractivityofanydept.bureauorofficeincludedinthe GeneralAppropriationsActorapprovedafteritsenactment,w/oregardastow/nthefundstobetransferredare actually savings in the item from w/c the same are to be taken, or w/n the transfer is for the purpose of augmentingtheitemtow/csaidtransferistobemade.Itdoesnotcompletelydisregardthestandardssetinthe fundamentallaw,therebyamountingtoanunduedelegationoflegislativepowers,butlikewisegoesbeyondthe tenorthereof.Indeed,suchconstitutionalinfirmitiesrendertheprovisioninquestionnullandvoid.VV.

Art.VI,Sec.29. (1) NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuanceofan appropriationmadebylaw. (2) Nopublicmoneyorpropertyshallbeappropriated,applied,paid,oremployed,directlyor indirectly,forthe use,benefit,orsupportofanysect,church,denomination,sectarianinstitution,or systemofreligion,orofanypriest,preacher,minister,orotherreligiousteacher,ordignitaryassuch, exceptwhensuchpriest,preacher,minister,ordignitaryisassignedtothearmedforces,ortoanypenal institution,orgovernmentorphanageorleprosarium. (3)Allmoneycollectedonanytaxleviedforaspecialpurposeshallbetreatedasaspecialfund andpaidoutforsuchpurposeonly.Ifthepurposeforwhichaspecialfundwascreatedhasbeenfulfilled orabandoned,thebalance,ifany,shallbetransferredtothegeneralfundsoftheGovernment.

Guingonav.Garague,196SCRA221(1991) F:
Petitionersquestiontheconstitutionalityoftheautomaticappropriationfordebtserviceinthe1990budget.

HELD:WhileitistruethatunderSec.5(5),ArticleXIVoftheConstitution,Congressismandatedtoassignthe highestbudgetaryprioritytoeducation,itdoesnottherebyfollowthatthehandsofCongressaresohamstrung astodepriveitthepowertorespondtotheimperativesofthenationalinterestandfortheattainmentofother statepoliciesorobjectives.Inthiscase,thebudgetforeducationhastripledandthecompensationforteachers hasdoubled.Thisisaclearcompliancewiththeconstitutionalmandategivinghighestprioritytoeducation. Havingfaithfullycompliedtherewith,Congressiscertainlynotwithoutanypower,guidedonlybyits goodjudgment,toprovideanappropriation,thatcanreasonablyserviceourenormousdebt. Itisnotonlya matterofhonorandtoprotectthecreditstandingofourcountry. Moreespecially,theverysurvivalofour economyisatstake.IfintheprocessCongressappropriatedanamountfordebtservicebiggerthantheshare allocatedtoeducation,theSCfindsthatsuchappropriationisconstitutional. ItwasalsoarguedthatthePresidentialDecreesauthorizingautomaticappropriationisviolativeofSec.

29(1):NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuanceofanappropriationmadebylaw.They assertthattheremustbedefiniteness,certainty,andexactnessinanappropriation,otherwiseitisanundue delegationoflegislativepowertothePresidentwhodeterminesinadvancetheamountappropriatedforthedebt service.TheSCwasnotpersuadedbysucharguments.Thetransitoryprovisionsprovidethatallexistinglaws notinconsistentwiththeConstitutionshallremainoperativeuntilamended,repealedorrevoked.Inthiscase, theautomaticappropriationprovidestheflexibilityfortheeffectiveexecutionofdebtmanagementpolicies. ItwasarguedthatthePDsdidnotmeettherequirementthatallappropriationsauthorizingincreaseof debt must be passed by Congress and approved by the President (VI, 24 and 27). This refers only to appropriationmeasuresstilltobepassedbyCongress.Inthiscase,thePDshavebeenconsideredaspassed. Astowhethertherewasunduedelegationoflegislativepower,theCourtfinds thatinthiscase,the questionedlawsarecompleteinalltheiressentialtermsandconditionsandsufficientstandardsareindicated therein.Inthiscase,thelegislativeintentionisclearandthatistheamountneededshouldbeautomaticallyset asideinordertoenablethecountrytopaytheprincipal, interest,taxesandotherchargeswhen theyshall becomeduewithouttheneedtoenactaseparatelawappropriatingfundsthereforastheneedarises.Although the amounts are not stated specifically,such amounts are limited to the principal, interest, taxes and other charges. (b)Taxlaws Art.VI,Sec.28. (1) Theruleoftaxationshallbeuniformandequitable. TheCongressshall evolveaprogressivesystemoftaxation. (2)TheCongressmay,bylaw,authorizethePresidenttofix,withinspecifiedlimits,andsubject tosuchlimitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,tariffrates,importandexportquotas,tonnageand wharfagedues,andotherdutiesorimpostswithintheframeworkofthenationaldevelopmentprogramof theGovernment. (3)Charitableinstitutions,churchesandparsonagesorconventsappurtenantthereto,mosques, nonprofitcemeteries,andalllands,buildings,andimprovements,actually,directly,andexclusivelyused forreligious,charitable,oreducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtaxation. (4)Nolawgrantinganytaxexemptionshallbepassedwithouttheconcurrenceofamajorityofall theMembersoftheCongress.

Art.XIV,Sec.4(3)Allrevenuesandassetsofnonstock,nonprofiteducationalinstitutionsused actually,directly,andexclusivelyforeducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtaxesandduties.Upon thedissolutionorcessationofthecorporateexistenceofsuchinstitutions,theirassetsshallbedisposedof inthemannerprovidedbylaw. Proprietaryeducationalinstitutions,includingthosecooperativelyowned,maylikewisebeentitled tosuchexemptionssubjecttothelimitationsprovidedbylawincludingrestrictionsondividendsand provisionsforreinvestment. (4)Subjecttoconditionsprescribedbylaw,allgrants,endowments,donations,orcontributions

usedactually,directly,andexclusivelyforeducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtax.

NormsofTaxation Theruleoftaxationshallbeuniformandequitable.TheCongressshallevolveaprogressivesystemof taxation.[Art.VI.Sec.28(1)] DelegationofTaxPowers Asageneralrule,thepowertotax,beinganessentialaspectofsovereignty,isinherentlylegislativeand thereforeisnondelegable,unlesstheConstitutionitselfallowsthedelegation. There are 2 sets of specific exceptions: 1.TheCongress,may,bylaw,authorizethePresidenttofix,withinspecifiedlimits,andsubjecttosuch limitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,(i)tariffrates,(ii)importandexportquotas,(iii)tonnageand wharfagedues,and(iv)otherdutiesandimposts,withintheframeworkofthenationaldevelopmentprogramof theGovernment.[id.,Sec.28(2)] 2.Eachlocalgovernmentunitshallhavethepowertocreateitsownsourcesofrevenues,andtolevy taxes,fees,andchargessubjecttosuchguidelinesandlimitationsastheCongressmayprovide,consistentwith the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.(Art.X,Sec.5) ThetaxingpowermayalsobeexercisedbythePresidentasanincidentoftheemergencypowersthat Congressmaygranttohim,underArt.VI,Sec.23(2). BurdenofTaxation Taxationbeingthesourceofrevenueofgovernmentanditsverylifeblood,"nolawgrantinganytax exemptionshallbepassedwithouttheconcurrenceofamajorityofallthemembersofCongress." [id.,Sec. 28(4)] According to jurisprudence, any question regarding the constitutionality of a tax measure must be resolvedinfavorofitsvalidity.Butanydoubtregardingthetaxabilityofanypersonunderavalidtaxlawmust beresolvedinfavorofthatpersonandagainstthetaxingpower.However,anydoubtastotheapplicabilityofa taxexemptiongrantedtoapersonmustberesolvedagainsttheexemption. Proceedsoftaxes Allmoneycollectedonanytaxleviedforaspecialpurposeshallbetreatedasaspecialfundandpaid outforsuchpurposeonly.Ifthepurposeforwhichaspecialfundwascreatedhasbeenfulfilledorabandoned, thebalanceifany,shallbetransferredtothegeneralfundsoftheGovernment.[id.,Sec.29(3))

Localgovernmentunitsshallhaveajustshare,asdeterminedbylaw,inthenationaltaxeswhichshallbe automaticallyreleasedtothem.(Art.X,Sec.6).

Taxationofreligiousandcharitableinstitutions Charitableinstitutions,churchesandparsonagesorconventsappurtenantthereto,mosques,nonprofit cemeteries,and"alllands,buildingsandimprovements,actually,directly,andexclusivelyusedforreligious, charitable,oreducationalpurposes,shallbeexemptfromtaxation."(Art.VI,Sec.28(3)] InAbravsHernando,107SCRA104(1981),theSCheldthatonewhoclaimsexemptionfromtaxeson thegroundthatthepropertysoughttobetaxedbythegovernmentis"actually,directly,andexclusivelyusedfor religiouspurposes"(mustproveit.)Thiscannotsimplybepresumedonthebasisofadeclarationtothateffect. InYMCAvCollector,33Phil217(1916),thebuildingsandgroundsoftheYMCAdevotedtoreligious, charitableandeducationalends,andnotfoundedandconductedforprofit,wereheldtobetaxexempt.(Asnow, theexemptionisnotlimitedtoreligiousinstitutions.) InBishopofNuevaSegoviavProvincialBoard,67Phil352(1927),theSCexemptedfromtaxation(1) apieceoflandthatusedtobeacemeterybutwasnolongerusedforburialwherethefaithfulwouldcongregate beforeandaftermass,and(2)atractgardenneartheconventwherevegetableswereplantedfortheuseofthe priest. It is submitted that under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, this case would be overruled, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Malcolm followed. For the former cemetery and the vegetable tract are not "actuallyanddirectly"usedforreligiouspurposes. Under the 1935Constitution, the provision read"exclusivelyfor religious, charitable or educational purposes";in1973actually,directly,andexclusivelyforreligiousorcharitablepurposes";and,in1987,"actually, directly,andexclusivelyusedforreligious,charitableoreducationalpurposes." Atanyrate,theexemptionappliesonlytotaxes. Thus,a"specialassessment"(theamountassessed resulting from the appreciation of value of realty due to public works constructed nearby) under the Real PropertyTaxCode(ortherecentlyenactedLocalGovernmentCode),notbeingatax,doesnotfallunderthe exemption. As in Apostolic Prefect v City Treasurer, 71 Phil 347 (1941), property owned by a religious institutionandusedforreligiousandeducationalpurposesisliableforspecialassessments.

TaxationofEducationalInstitutions All lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for ... educational purposesshallbeexemptfromtaxation.[Art.VI,Sec.28(3)] All revenues and assets of nonstock, nonprofit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties... Proprietary educational

institutions,includingthosecooperativelyowned,maylikewisebeentitledtosuchexemptions,subjecttothe limitationsprovidedbylaw,includingrestrictionsondividendsandprovisionsforreinvestment.[Art.XIV,Sec. 4(3)]. Subjecttotheconditionsprescribedbylaw,allgrants,endowments,donationsorcontributionsactually, directly,andexclusivelyforeducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtax.[Art.XIV,Sec.4(4)]. Undertheseprovisions,itisclearthat(1)sectarianschools[Art.VI,Sec.28(3)andArt.XIV,Sec.4(3)] construedtogetheraswellas(2)nonstock,nonprofitsecularschools[Art.XIV,Sec.4(3)]areexemptfromthe followingtaxes:a}allrealpropertytax("assets"andHodgesvMunicipalBoardofIloiloCity,19SCRA28 (1967), b} income tax [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3)] for #2 and a fortiori for #1 for income actually,directly,and exclusivelyusedforeducationalpurposesandevenc}estateandgifttax[Art.XIV,Sec.4(4)]. Proprietaryschoolsontheotherhand,aregrantedonlylimitedexemption. b.Procedureforthepassageofbills Art.VI,Sec.26.(2)NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthree readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendmenttheretoshallbeallowed,andthevotethereonshallbetakenimmediatelythereafter,andthe yeasandnaysenteredintheJournal.

ThreeReadings: NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthreereadings...[Art.VI,Sec. 26(2).] On"firstreading,"thetitleofthebill,withouttheprovisions,isreadbeforethebody.Thepresiding officerthenrefersthebilltothepropercommitteee.g.,"TotheCommitteeonLocalGovernments".(Congress generallyworksthroughitscommittees,notasonebody.) Afterconsiderationofthebillorresolution,theCommitteereturnsthesametothebodytogetherwith itsamendments,objectionsorrecommendations.Wherethereportisfavorable,thebillisplacedontheproper calendar.Ifthereportisunfavorable,themattershallbelaidonthetable,unlessthebodyonthewholedecides otherwise. On"secondreading",thebillorresolutionisreadinfullbeforethefloor,withsuchamendmentsasthe committeemayhaveproposed. Then,itissubjectedtodebate,discussion andamendments. Whenthisis through,amotiontoclosethegeneraldebateismade,thenavoteistakenbythemembershiponwhethertopass thebillornotonthebasisoftheamendmentsordiscussions.

Thebillasamendedandapprovedisthe"printedinfinalform"anditscopiesare,asageneralrule, distributedtothemembersatleast3daysbeforeitspassage.[Sec.26(2)][Thepurposeofthe3dayrequirement istoenablethememberstocheckifthebillreflectsthetextandamendmentsapprovedonsecondreading,and toseeifridershavebeenintroduced.] As an exception, however, the Constitution allows the 3day and printed copy requirement to be dispensedwithwhenthePresidentcertifiestothenecessityoftheimmediateenactmentofthebilltomeeta publiccalamityoremergency.[Sec.26(2).]Inthiscase,therefore,thethreereadingsmaybemadeinlessthan3 dayswithoutthebillbeingprinted. Onthe"thirdandfinalreading",thebilliscalledbyitsnameortitle,thenavoteistakenrightaway, withthe"yeas"and"nays"enteredintheJournal.Nomoreamendmentisallowed. [Sec.26(2).] Asageneralrule,thethreereadingsmustbeconductedonseparatedays,[Sec.26(2).]Theexceptionis foundinArt.VII,Sec.10:WhenCongressconvenestocallaspecialelectiontoelectthePresidentandVice President,"thebillcallingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderpar.2,Sec.26,Art.VI",mean ing,thethreereadingscanbedoneonthesameday.

ConferenceCommittee Abillcanbepassedjointly(whenitisajointsession,supra),orseparately.Inthelattercase,itcanbe passedsimultaneously(whenabillistakenupbybothhousesseparatelybutatthesametime,orsequentially (whenabilloriginatesformonehouseandgoestotheotherhouse).Thereisnoproblemifthebillispassed jointly.Butifitispassedseparately,thebillapprovedbyonehousegoestotheotherhouse,whichcanamend suchbill.Oncetheotherhouseapprovesthebill,thisiscalledtheotherhouse'sversionofthebill. AConferenceCommitteeisthenorganized,composedofequalnumberofmembersfromtheSenate andtheHouse,tomakerecommendationstotherespectivechambersonhowtoreconcilethetwoversionsofthe bill.Therespectivemembersareusuallygrantedblanketauthoritytonegotiateandreconcilethebills.Atthe endoftheprocess,thecommitteecomesupwitha"ConferenceCommitteeReport",whichisthensubmittedto therespectivechambersforapproval.

EngrossmentorEnrollmentoftheBill Oncethebillisapprovedbybothhouses,thebillisengrossedorenrolled(seesupra).TheEnrolled copyoftheBillbearsthecertificationbythepresidingofficers(SenatePresidentandSpeakeroftheHouse)that thisenrolledcopyistheversionpassedbyeachhouse.(Theeffectsofthisenrolledbillarediscussedabove.)

ApprovalbythePresident

Art.VI,Sec.27(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresented tothePresident.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit;otherwise,heshallvetoitandreturnthesame withhisobjectiontotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallentertheobjectionsatlargeinitsJournal andproceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,twothirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouse shallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichit shalllikewisebereconsidered,andifapprovedbytwothirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshall becomealaw.Insuchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenames oftheMembersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicatehis vetoof anybill totheHouse where it originatedwithin thirtydaysafter thedate of receipt thereof, otherwise,itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit. (2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation, revenue,ortariffbill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject. The bill as approved by Congress and certified by its presiding officers is then presented to the President. Generally,thereare3waysforthebilltobecomealaw: 1)WhenitisapprovedbythePresident; 2)WhenthevoteofthePresidentisoverriddenby2/3voteofallthemembersofbothhouses; 3)UponfailureofthePresidenttovetothebillandtoreturnitwithhisobjections,totheHousewhereit originated,within30daysafterthedateofreceipt.[Sec.27(1).] Butthereare2caseswhenabillbecomesalawwithoutthesignatureofthePresident: 1)WhenthevetoofthePresidentisoverriddenby2/3voteofallthemembersofbothhouses;and 2)WhenthebillisonecallingaspecialelectionforPresidentandVicePresidentunderArt.VII,Sec. 10.Herethebillbecomeslawupon3rdandfinalreading.TheActingPresidentisnotrequiredtosign,forhe mayhaveaninterestinthequestion.

c.ThePresident'svetopower QualifiedversusAbsoluteVeto

VetoPowerofthePresident

Message Veto versus Pocket Veto. There is only one way for the President to veto a bill: By disapproving it, and returning it to the house where the bill originated, together with his "veto message"

(explaininghisobjectionstothebill,whichmessageshallbeenteredintheJournalwithin30daysafterreceipt [Sec.27(1)] No"pocketveto"inthePhilippines.Inthisregard,thereisno"pocketveto"inthePhilippines. Whatisapocketveto? ComparewithArt.I,Sec.7ofUSConstitution: Art.I,Sec.7.IfanybillshallnotbereturnedbythePresidentwithintendays(Sundaysexcepted) afteritshallhavebeenpresentedtohim,thesameshallbealaw,inlikemannerasifhehadsignedit, unlesstheCongressbytheiradjournmentpreventitsreturninwhichcaseitshallnotbealaw. (The UnitedStatesConstitution.)

Apocketveto,asintheUSrequirestwoconcurringelements,(1)failuretoactonthebilland (2)thereasonhedoesnotreturnthebilltoCongressisthatCongressisnotinsession.Thus,iftheUS Congressisinsession,failurebythePresidenttoactwillnotresultinthevetoofthebill. InthePhilippines,thereisnosuchprovision.InactionbythePresidentfor30daysneverproduceda veto. IfCongressisnotinsession,thePresidentmuststillactinordertovetothebill. Onlyheneedsto communicatethevetotoCongresswithoutneedofreturningthevetoedbillwithhisvetomessage.

Art.VI,Sec.27(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresented tothePresident.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit;otherwise,heshallvetoitandreturnthesame withhisobjectiontotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallentertheobjectionsatlargeinitsJournal andproceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,twothirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouse shallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichit shalllikewisebereconsidered,andifapprovedbytwothirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshall becomealaw.Insuchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenames oftheMembersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicatehis vetoof anybill totheHouse where it originatedwithin thirtydaysafter thedate of receipt thereof, otherwise,itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit. (2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation, revenue,ortariffbill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject. Comparewith1935Constitution,Art.VI,Sec.20 Sec.20(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresentedtothe President.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit;butifnot,heshallreturnitwithhisobjectionstothe House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to

reconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,twothirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouseshallagreeto passthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichitshalllikewisebe considered,andifapprovedbytwothirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshallbecomealaw.Inall suchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenamesoftheMembers votingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.IfanybillshallnotbereturnedbythePresidentas hereinprovidedwithintwentydays(Sundayexcepted),afteritshallhavebeenpresentedtohim,thesame shallbecomealawinlikemannerasifhehadsignedit,unlesstheCongressbyadjournmentpreventsits return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after adjournment. (2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsofanyappropriation bill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject.Whenaprovisionofan appropriationbillaffectsoneormoreitemsofthesame,thePresidentcannotvetotheprovisionwithout atthesametimevetoingtheparticularitemoritemstowhichitrelates.Theitemoritemsobjectedto shallnottakeeffectexceptinthemannerheretoforeprovidedastobillsreturnedtotheCongresswithout theapprovalofthePresident. Ifthevetoreferstoabilloranyitemofanappropriation billwhich appropriatesasuminexcessoftenpercentumofthetotalamountvotedintheappropriationbillforthe generalexpensesoftheGovt.fortheprecedingyear,orifitshouldrefertoabillauthorizinganincrease ofthepublicdebt,thesameshallnotbecomealawunlessapprovedbythreefourthsofalltheMembersof eachHouse.(The1935Constitution.)

VetoMessage:WhenthePresidentvetoesameasure,heshouldreturnthemeasuretotheHouseof origin,indicatinghisobjectionstheretoinwhatiscommonlyknownasa"vetomessage"sothatthesamecanbe studiedbythemembersforpossibleoverridingofhisveto. Is partial veto allowed under the Constitution? The general rule is that the President must approve entirelyordisapproveintoto. Theexceptionappliestoappropriation,revenueandtariffbills,anyparticular itemoritemsofwhichmaybedisapprovedwithoutaffectingtheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject. Cruz: In Bolinao Electronics Corp. v Valencia, 11 SCRA 486, a public works bill contained an item appropriatingacertainsumforassistancetotelevisionstations,subjecttotheconditionthattheamountwould notbe available inplacees wherethere werecommercial television stations inoperation. Pres. Macapagal approvedtheappropriationbutvetoedthecondition. WhenhisactwassubsequentlychallengedintheSC,it washeldthatthevetowasineffectualandthattheapprovaloftheitemcarriedw/ittheapprovalofthecondition attachedtoit.xxx Inthiscase,theSCfurtherheldthatthevetopoweris"destructive"innature,notcreative,andsothe Presidentislimitedtoapprovingordisapprovingthebill,intoto.Hecannotchooseonlythepartsthathelikes andvetoestherest.Thus,inthiscase,thePresidentwasprohibitedfromvetoingonlythepartprohibitingthe Philippine Broadcasting System from operating outside a certain radius, while approving the rest of the appropriationforthisgovernmentradiostation.

Thus,whenthePresidentapprovesonepartandvetoesanother,thevetoisineffective:itisasthough thereisnoveto. Butinthecaseofappropriations,revenueortariffbills,thePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoany particularitemoritems,withoutvetoingtheotheritemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject. Thereasonis,theseitemsarereallyindependentofeachother,andsoeveryitemisdeemedabillin itself.Butastoeachitem,hecannotapprovepartanddisapprovetheotherpart.

InGonzalesvsMacaraig,191SCRA452,thePresidentofthePhilippinesvetoedaprovisioninthe1989 GeneralAppropriationsBillandlaterasimilarprovisioninthe1990GeneralAppropriationsBill[providingfor aprohibitionagainsttherestorationorincreaseofrecommendedappropriationsdisapprovedand/orreducedby Congress]. Inhervetomessage,Pres.AquinosaidthatsuchprovisionviolatesArt.VISec.25(5)andthatit nullifies her power and that of the Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice and Heads of Constitutional Commissions,toaugmentanyiteminthegeneralappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveofficesfromsavingsin other items of their respective appropriations, even in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation of essential public services. In rejecting the challenge to the veto, the SC declaredthattherestrictiveinterpretationurgedbythepetitionersthatthePresidentmaynotvetoaprovision withoutvetoingtheentirebillnotonlydisregardsthebasicprinciplethatadistinctandseverablepartofabill maybesubjectofaseparatevetobutalsooverlookstheConstitutionalmandatethatanyprovisioninthegeneral appropriationsbillshallrelatespecificallytosomeparticularappropriationthereinandthatanysuchprovision shallbelimitedinitsoperatetotheappropriationtowhichitrelates[Art.VI,Sec.25(5).]Inotherwords,a provisioninanappropriationbillislimitedinitsoperationtosomeparticularappropriationtowhichitrelates, anddoesnotrelatetotheentirebill. Inthiscase,thechallengedprovisionsdonotrelatetoanyparticularordistinctiveappropriation.They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Also, such provisions aremoreofanexpressionofCongressional policy ratherthanabudgetary appropriation. They shouldbetreatedasitemsforthepurposeofthePresident'svetopower.

BengzonvsDrilon208SCRA133(1992) F:
Theissuehereistheconstitutionality ofthevetobythePresidentofcertainprovisionsin the1992General AppropriationsActrelatingtothepaymentofadjustedpensionstoretiredjusticesoftheSCandtheCA.Accordingto Pres.Aquino,thepaymentofsuchadjustedpensions(adjustedwithrespecttothepesopurchasingpower)woulderodethe govt'scollectiveefforttoenforcethepolicyofstandardizationofcompensationandthatgovt.shouldnotgrantdistinct privilegestoselectgroupsofofficialsoverthoseofthevastmajorityofcivilserviceservants.Theretiredjusticesasserted thatsuchsubjectvetoisnotanitemveto.

HELD:ThevetopowerofthePresidentisnotabsolute.TheExecutivemustvetoabillinitsentiretyornotat all.Howeverwhenitcomestoappropriation,revenueortariffbills,theAdministrationneedsthemoneytorun themachineryofgovt.anditcannotvetotheentirebillevenifitmaycontainobjectionablefeatures.Thisisthe

reasonfortheitemvetopower. TheConstitutionprovidesthatonlyaparticularitemoritemsmaybevetoed.Thepowertodisapprove anyitemoritemsinanappropriatebilldoesnotgranttheauthoritytovetoapartofanitemandtoapprovethe remainingportionofthesameitem. Theterms"item"and"provision"aredifferent.Anitemreferstotheparticulars,thedetails,thedistinct andseverablepartsofthebill. Itisanindivisiblesumofmoneydedicatedtoastatedpurpose. Anitem obviouslymeansanitemwhichinitselfisaspecificappropriationofmoney,andnotsomegeneralprovisionof law. Inthiscase,thePresidentdidnotvetoanitem.ShevetoedthemethodsorsystemsplacedbyCongress toinsurethatpermanentandcontinuingobligationstocertainofficialswillbepaidwhentheyfalldue.Inthis case,thevetoedportionsarenotitemsbutareprovisions.Theaugmentationofspecificappropriationsfound inadequatetopayretirementpayments,bytransferringsavingsfromotheritemsofappropriationsisaprovision andnotanitem.ItgivestheSCChiefJusticethepowertotransferfundsfromoneitemtoanother.Thereisno specificappropriationofmoneyinvolved. Neithermaythevetopowerbeexercisedasameansofrepealingexistinglaws.Thisisarrogatingunto thePresidencylegislativepowerswhicharebeyonditsauthority.Adapted.

OverridingtheVeto UponconsiderationoftheobjectionsraisedbythePresidentinhisvetomessage,theHousefromwhich thebilloriginatedshallreconsiderthebill.Ifaftersuchreconsideration,2/3ofallthemembersofsuchhouse shallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesenttogetherwiththeobjectionsofthePresident,totheotherhouseby whichitshalllikewisebereconsidered.Ifapprovedby2/3ofallthemembersofthathouse,itshallbecomea law.Inallsuchcases,thevotesofeachhouseshallbedeterminedby"yeas"or"nays",andthenamesofthe membersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredintheJournal.[VI,27(1)]

d.Legislativevetoes

TheCongresscannotdeemadraftsubmittedbyanexecutiveagencypassedaslawbyitmereinaction withinacertainperiod. Itmustgothroughthe3readingsandthesubmissionofthebilltothePresident,as requiredbytheConstitution.InMillervMardo,2SCRA298(1961),theSCstruckdownasunconstitutional Sec.6ofRA997,whichprovidedthatthereorganizationplandraftedbytheDepartmentofLaborandsubmitted to President for approval shall be deemed as approved by Congress after its adjournment, unless in the meantime,Congressbyresolutiondisapprovedtheplan.ItstruckdownaswelltheReorganizationPlandrafted pursuanttothislaw. Insoholding,theCourtruledthattheapprovalofabillcannotbemadebyCongressbymeresilence, adjournmentorconcurrentresolution. TheConstitutionrequiresthetwohousestoholdseparatesessionfor

deliberation,andtosubmitthedeterminationofonetotheseparatedeterminationoftheother,unlessajoint sessionisprovidedfor.ThismethodofpassingalawamountstoanabdicationbyCongressofitslegislative prerogativestotheExecutive.

e.EffectivityofLaws Art.2.Lawsshalltakeeffectafterfifteendaysfollowingthecompletionoftheirpublicationinthe Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. The Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

Whenabillbecomesalawthroughanyofthe3meansmentionedabove,thelawdoesnotbecome effectiveatonce.Accordingtotherulinguponreconsiderationin Tanada v Tuvera, 136SCRA27(1985),in additiontothedatefixedeitherbytheeffectivityclauseofthestatute,or,initsabsence,byArt.2oftheCivil (15daysafteritspublication),theremustfirstbeapublicationofthelaweitherintheOfficialGazetteorina newspaperofgeneralcirculation[EO200].Otherwise,thereisaviolationofdueprocess. This requirement for publication applies to any kind of law, even laws which are not of general application,privatelaws(e.g.lawgrantingcitizenshiptoX),lawsoflocalapplication,andrulesandregulations ofsubstantivecharacter. In People v Que Po Lay, 94Phil640(1956),aCBcirculargoverningtheremittanceofdollarswith correspondingforfeitureincaseofviolation,washeldtorequirepublication,sinceithadthenatureofapenal rule.

Tanadav.Tuvera,136S27(1985) F:
Invokingthepeople'srighttobeinformedonmattersofpublicconcern,arightrecognizedintheConstitution,as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated,petitioners seekawrit ofmandamus tocompel respondent public officials topublish,and/orcause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrativeorders.Respondentscontend,amongothersthatpublicationintheOGisnotasinequanonrequirementfor theeffectivityoflawswherethelawsthemselvesprovidefortheirowneffectivitydates.Itisthussubmittedthatsincethe presidentialissuancesinquestioncontainspecialprovisionsastothedatetheyaretotakeeffect,publicationintheOGis indispensablefortheireffectivity.ThepointstressedisanchoredonArt.2ofNCC.

HELD:Theinterpretationgivenbyrespondentisinaccordw/thisCourt'sconstructionofsaidarticle.Inalong lineofdecisions,thisCourthasruledthatpublicationintheOGisnecessaryinthosecaseswherethelegislation itselfdoesnotprovideforitseffectivitydateforthenthedateofpublicationismaterialfordeterminingits dateofeffectivity,w/cisthe15thdayfollowingitspublicationbutnotwhenthelawitselfprovidesforthe datewhenitgoesintoeffect. Respondent'sargument,however,islogicallycorrectonlyinsofarasitequatestheeffectivityoflawsw/

thefactofpublication.Consideredinthelightofotherstatutesapplicabletotheissueathand,theconclusionis easilyreachedthatsaidArt.2doesnotprecludetherequirementofpublicationintheOG,evenifthelawitself providesforthedateofitseffectivity. xxx Thepublicationofallpresidentialissuances"ofapublicnature"or"ofgeneralapplicability"is mandatedbylaw.Theclearobjectofthelawistogivethegeneralpublicadequatenoticeofthevariouslaws w/caretoregulatetheiractionsandconductascitizens.W/osuchnoticeandpublication,therewouldbeno basisfortheapplicationofthemaximignorantialegisnonexcusat.Itwouldbetheheightofinjusticetopunish orotherwiseburdenacitizenforthetransgressionofalawofw/chehadnonoticewhatsoever,notevena constructiveone.Itisneedlesstosaythatthepublicationofpresidentialissuances"ofapublicnature"or"of generalapplicability"isarequirementofdueprocess.Itisaruleoflawthatbeforeapersonmaybeboundby law,hemustfirstbeofficiallyandspecificallyinformedofitscontents.RAM.

Tanadav.Tuvera, 146S446(1986). Motionforreconsideration. xxx[T]heclause"unlessitisotherwise provided"referstothedateofeffectivityandnottotherequirementofpublicationitself,w/ccannotinanyevent be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval,oronanyotherdate,w/oitspreviouspublication. Publicationisindispensableineverycase,butthelegislaturemayinitsdiscretionprovidethattheusual 15dayperiodshallbeshortenedorextended. Itisnotcorrecttosaythatunderthedisputedclausepublicationmaybedispensedw/altogether.The reasonisthatsuchomissionwouldoffenddueprocessinsofarasitwoulddenythepublicknowledgeofthelaws thataresupposedtogovernit. Conclusivepresumptionofknowledgeofthelaw.Theconclusivepresumptionthateverypersonknows thelawpresupposesthatthelawhasbeenpublishedifthepresumptionistohaveanylegaljustificationatall. Thetermlawsshouldrefertoalllawsandnotonlytothoseofgeneralapplication,forstrictlyspeaking alllawsrelatetothepeopleingeneralalbeittherearesomethatdonotapplytothemdirectly. RULE: All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a conditionfortheireffectivity,w/cshallbegin15daysafterpublicationunlessadifferenteffectivitydateisfixed bythelegislature. Coverage.CoveredbythisrulearePDsandEOspromulgatedbythePres.intheexerciseoflegislative powers.Administrativerulesandregulationsmustalsobepublishediftheirpurposeistoenforceorimplement existinglawpursuanttoavaliddelegation. Interpretativeregulationsandthosemerelyinternalinnature,i.e.,regulatingonlythepersonnelofthe administrativeagencyandnotthepublic,neednotbepublished.Neitherispublicationrequiredofthesocalled lettersofinstructionsissuedbyadministrativesuperiorsconcerningtherulesorguidelinestobefollowedby theirsubordinatesintheperformanceoftheirduties. Publicationmustbeinfulloritisnopublicationatallsinceitspurposeistoinformthepublicofthe contentsofthelaws.ThemerementionofthenumberofthePD,thetitleofsuchdecree,itswhereabouts,the supposeddateofeffectivity,andinameresupplementoftheOGcannotsatisfythepublicationrequirement. Thisisnotevensubstantialcompliance.RAM.

ExecutiveOrderNo.200,June18,1987

Art.2.Lawsshalltakeeffectafterfifteendaysfollowingthecompletionoftheirpublicationeither intheOfficialGazetteorinanewspaperofgeneralcirculationinthePhilippines,unlessitisotherwise provided.(asamendedbyEO200.)

9.InitiativeandReferendum, Initiativeisthepowerofthepeopletoproposebillsandlaws,andtoenactorrejectthematthepolls, independentofthelegislativeassembly.Itistherightofagroupofcitizenstointroduceamatterforlegislation eithertothelegislatureordirectlytothevoters. Referendum istherightreservedtothepeopletoadoptorrejectanyactormeasurewhichhasbeen passedbyalegislativebodyandwhichinmostcaseswouldwithoutactiononthepartoftheelectorsbecomea law. It is a method of submitting an impt. legislative measure to a direct vote of the whole people, the submissionofalawpassedbythelegislaturefortheirapprovalorrejection.

Rep.ActNo.6735,Aug.4,1989

UPDATED1/22/96 /RAM

B.ExecutiveDepartment 1.ThePresident

a.Qualifications,election,termandoath Art.VII,Secs.2,4and5 Art.VII,Sec.2. NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthe Philippines,aregisteredvoter,abletoreadandwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection, andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection. QualificationsofPresident 1)NaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines 2)Registeredvoter 3)Abletoreadandwrite 4)40yearsofageonthedayofelection 5)ResidentofthePhilippinesforatleast10yearsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection

Art.VII,Sec.4.ThePresidentandtheVicePresidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeople foratermofsixyearswhichshallbeginatnoononthethirtiethdayofJunenextfollowingthedayofthe electionandshallendatnoonofthesamedatesixyearsthereafter.ThePresidentshallnotbeeligiblefor anyreelection. NopersonwhohassucceededasPresidentandhasservedassuchformorethanfour yearsshallbequalifiedforelectiontothesameofficeatanytime. NoVicePresidentshallserveformorethantwosuccessiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationofthe officeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheservicefor thefulltermforwhichhewaselected. Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionforPresidentandVicePresidentshallbe heldonthesecondMondayofMay. ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresident,dulycertifiedbytheboardof canvassersofeachprovincesorcity,shallbetransmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentofthe Senate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenateshall,notlaterthanthirty daysafterthedayofelection(w/cisthe2ndTuesdayofJune),openallthecertificatesinthepresenceof theSenateandHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upondeterminationof the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass (i.e., tally the certificatesofcanvass)thevotes. Thepersonshavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoor moreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes(tie),oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythe voteofamajorityofallthemembersofCongress,votingseparately. TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates. TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection, returns, and qualifications of the President, or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

ElectionandTermofPresident RegularElectionandTerm ThePresidentandVicePresident(whoshallbeelectedwithandinthesamemannerasthePresident) shallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeopleforatermof6years,whichshallbeginonthenoonofJune30next followingthedayofelection.TheregularelectionforPresidentandVicePresidentshallbeheldonthe2nd MondayofMay.(Art.VII,Sec.4pars.1&3). Thesixyeartermfortheincumbent President andVice President elected intheFebruary 7,1986 electionis,forpurposesofsynchronizationofelections,herebyextendedtonoonofJune30,1992.Thefirst regularelectionsforthePresidentandVicePresidentunderthisConstitutionshallbeheldonthe2ndMondayof May,1992.(Art.XVIII,Sec.5.) In In re Saturnino Bermudez,145SCRA160,theSCheldthatthe"incumbentPresidentandVice President"referredtoabovearePres.CorazonAquinoandVicePresidentSalvadorLaurel(eveniftheywerenot theonesdeclaredbytheBatasangPambansaasthewinnersoftheFebruary7,1986SnapElection). SpecialElectionandTerm IfavacancyoccursintheofficesofPresidentandVicePresidentmorethan18monthsbeforethedate ofthenextregularpresidentialelection,aspecialelectiontoelectthePresidentandVicePresidentshallbe calledbyCongress,pursuanttoVII,10.(SeediscussionunderOtherPowersofCongress,supraandSuccession, infra.) AconditionalresignationbytheincumbentPresidentisnotarealresignationthatcreatesavacancyfor thepurposeofcallingaspecialelection.ButinthePhilippineBarAssociation,Inc.vCOMELEC,140SCRA 455,thefailureoftheSCtoissueaninjunctionontimeisalreadyadecisioninitselfinfavorofthevalidityof thelawcallingforSnapElectionsdespitetheabsenceofvacancy;only,itisadecisionthatisnotsupportedbya ratiodecidendi. Indeed, amidtermelectioninapresidential systemofgovernment inresponsetopopular clamorforit,isalegalanomaly. PBAV.COMELEC,140SCRA455(1985).Validityof"Snap"ElectionforPresidentandVicePresident. SuitsquestioningthevalidityofBP883,callingaspecialelectionforPres.andVicePres.onFeb.7, 1986.ThelawwasenactedfollowingtheletterofPres.MarcostotheBPthathewas"irrevocablyvacatingthe positionofPres.effectiveonlywhentheelectionisheldandafterthewinnerisproclaimedandqualifiedas Pres.bytakinghisoathofofficetendaysafterhisproclamation."Theprincipalgroundforthechallengetothe validityofthestatutewasthattheconditionalresignationofthePres.didnotcreateavacancyrequiredbyArt. VII,Sec.9(nowArt.VII,Sec.8)w/cauthorizedthecallingofaspecialelection. Afterdeliberating,7JusticesvotedtoDISMISS.Ontheotherhand,5JusticesvotedtoDECLAREthe statuteunconstitutional.Inaccordancew/Javellanav.ExecutiveSec.,50SCRA141(1973),J.Teehankeewasof theviewthatastherewerelessthantenvotesfordeclaringBP883unconstitutional,thepetitionsshouldbe dismissed.

Noopinionwasdelivered.VV.

TheConstitutionissilentastowhetherthepersonselectedinthespecialelectionshallserveonlyfor theunexpiredportionoftheterm,andwhetherthenewPresidentcanrunforreelectionifhehasnotserved morethan4years,whichdependsontheconstructionofthephrase"hassucceededasthePresident,"discussed inthenextsection.VV:Onlyunexpiredportion. Reelection ThePresidentshallnotbeeligibleforanyreelection.Furthermore,nopersonwhohas"succeeded"as Presidentandhasservedassuchformorethan4years,shallbequalifiedforanyelectiontothesameoffice(the Presidency)atanytime.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.1) ThepersonwhosucceedsasPresidentandnotjustinanactingcapacity,couldeitherbe(i)theVice President,or(ii)onewhowaselectedPresidentinaspecialelection.Inbothcases,ifhehasservedformore than4years,heisineligibleforreelectionasPresident. Ifheservedfor4yearsorless,hecanrunforreelection,itissubmitted,since(a)theterm"succeeded" encompasses election and (b) the general rule prohibiting the President to run for reelection refers to the Presidentelectedduringtheregularelection.Furthermore,itissubmittedthatthispersonmayresignonthe4th yearsoastobequalifiedtorunforPresident,sincethereisnothingintheConstitutionthatprohibitsthis. InviewofthewordingofArt.XVII,Sec.5,however,PresidentAquinocanrunforthe1992electionas PresidentwithoutviolatingtheruleagainstreelectionsincetheFebruary7,1987electionwasnotconducted underthepresentConstitution,the1992Presidentialelectionbeingthe"firstregularelections"tobeheldunder thisConstitution.Furthermore,althoughshemayhaveservedformorethan4yearsasPresidentbythen,she willhavedonesonotassuccessortothePresidency.IfVicePresidentLaurelistheonewhoservesasPresident formorethan4years,thenhecannotrunforthePresidencyin1992. TheVicePresidentontheotherhand,shallnotserveformorethan2successiveterms.Andforthis purpose,avoluntary(butnotinvoluntary)renunciationofofficeforanylengthoftime,shallnotbeconsidered aninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheserviceforthefulltermsforwhichhewaselected.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par. 2). Thisisapplicable,however,beginning1992,becauseoftheTransitoryProvisions. (Thisprohibitionis similartothatapplicabletoSenators.) CanvassingofElectionReturns AsalreadynotedintheOtherPowersoftheLegislature,supra,itistheCongressthatactsasBoardof CanvassersofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresident.Theprovisionreads: "ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresidentdulycertifiedbythe BoardofCanvassersofeachprovinceorcity,shallbesubmittedtotheCongress,directedtothe PresidentoftheSenate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenate shall,notlaterthan30daysafterthedateoftheelection,openallthecertificatesinthepresence oftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesinajointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upon

determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof, in the manner provided by law, canvassthevotes. Thepersonhavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincase 2ormoreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes,oneofthemshallforthwithbechosen bythevoteofamajorityofallthemembersoftheCongress,votingseparately. TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates."(Art. VII,Sec.4,pars.46). ElectoralTribunalfortheElectionofthePresidentandVicePresident TheSupreme Court,sitting enbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelating totheelection, returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVicePresident,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthatpurpose. (Art.VII,Sec.4,par.7.) Note that while election controversies in the Congress are under the exclusive jurisdiction of their respectiveElectoralTribunals,thoseintheExecutiveareundertheSupremeCourtitself.

OathofOffice Art. VII, Sec. 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice PresidentortheActingPresidentshalltakethefollowingoathoraffirmation: "Idosolemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatIwillfaithfullyandconscientiouslyfulfillmy dutiesasPresident(orVicePresidentorActingPresident)ofthePhilippines,preserveand defenditsConstitution,executeitslaws,dojusticetoeveryman,andconsecratetomyself totheserviceoftheNation.SohelpmeGod."(Incaseofaffirmation,lastsentencewill beomitted.)

b.Privilegeandsalary Art.VII,Sec.6.ThePresidentshallhaveanofficialresidence.ThesalariesofthePresidentand VicePresidentshallbedeterminedbylawandshallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.Noincreasein saidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentduringwhich suchincreasewasapproved.Theyshallnotreceivedduringtheirtenureanyotheremolumentfromthe Governmentoranyothersource.

Thesalariesof thePresident and VicePresident shall be determined by law. Unless theCongress

providesotherwise,thePresidentshallreceiveanannualsalaryofP300,000andtheVicePresident,thesalary ofP240,000.

c.Prohibitions

Art.VII,Sec.13.ThePresident,VicePresident,theMembersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputies orassistantsshallnot,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,holdanyotherofficeoremployment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,orspecialprivilegegrantedbytheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentality thereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Theyshallstrictly avoidconflictofinterestintheconductoftheiroffice. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices, includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

ProhibitionagainstthePresident,VicePresident,membersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputiesorassistants (a)Theyshallnotholdanyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheirtenure,unlessotherwiseprovided bythisConstitution InCivilLibertiesUnionvsExecutiveSecretary,194SCRA317,thepetitionerchallengedEx.OrderNo. 284whichineffectallowedCabinetmembers,theirundersecretariesandasst.secretariesandotherappointive officialsoftheExecutiveDepartmenttoholdotherpositionsinthegovt.,albeit, subjectofthelimitations imposedtherein.Therespondents,inrefutingthepetitioners'argumentthatthemeasurewasviolativeofArt. VIII,Sec.13,invokedArt.IXB,Sec.7,allowingtheholdingofmultiplepositionsbytheappointiveofficialif allowedbylaworbythepressingfunctionsofhispositions. IndeclaringtheEOunconstitutional,theSCheldthatbyostensiblyrestrictingtheno.ofpositionsthat Cabinetmembers,undersecretariesorasst.secretariesmayholdinadditiontotheirprimarypositiontonotmore than2positionsinthegovt.andGOOCs,EO284actuallyallowsthemtoholdmultipleofficesoremployment indirectcontraventionoftheexpressmandateofArt.VIII,Sec.13prohibitingthemfromdoingso,unlessother wiseprovidedinthe1987Constitutionitself. Ifmaximumbenefitsaretobederivedfromadept.head'sabilityandexpertise,heshouldbeallowedto attendtohisdutiesandresponsibilitieswithoutthedistractionofothergovt.officesoremployment.

CivilLibertiesUnion(CLU)vExecutiveSecretary,194SCRA317(1991)

F:

thepetitionerchallengedEx.OrderNo.284whichineffectallowedCabinetmembers,theirundersecretariesand asst.secretariesandotherappointiveofficialsoftheExecutiveDepartmenttoholdotherpositionsinthegovt.,albeit, subjectofthelimitationsimposedtherein. Therespondents,inrefutingthepetitioners'argumentthatthemeasurewas violativeofArt.VIII,Sec.13,invokedArt.IXB,Sec.7,allowingtheholdingofmultiplepositionsbytheappointive officialifallowedbylaworbythepressingfunctionsofhispositions.

HELD:Byostensiblyrestrictingtheno.ofpositionsthatCabinetmembers,undersecretariesorasst.secretaries mayholdinadditiontotheirprimarypositiontonotmorethan2positionsinthegovt.andGOOCs,EO284 actuallyallowsthemtoholdmultipleofficesoremploymentindirectcontraventionoftheexpressmandateof Art.VIII,Sec.13prohibitingthemfromdoingso,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthe1987Constitutionitself.If maximumbenefitsaretobederivedfromadept.head'sabilityandexpertise,heshouldbeallowedtoattendto hisdutiesandresponsibilitieswithoutthedistractionofothergovt.officesoremployment. xxx ThestricterprohibitionappliedtothePres.andhisofficialfamilyunderSec.13,Art.VIIascompared totheprohibitionapplicabletoappointiveofficialsingeneralunderArt.IX,B,Sec.7,par.2areproofofthe intentofthe1987Consti.totreatthemasaclassbyitselfandtoimposeuponsaidclassstricterprohibions. Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employmentinthegovtduringtheirtenurewhensuchisallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsoftheir positions,membersoftheCabinet,theirdeputiesandassistantsmaydosoonlywhenexpresslyauthorizedby theConsti.itself.xxx However,theprohibitionagainstholdingdualormultipleofficesoremploymentunderArt.VII,Sec.13 mustnotbeconstruedasapplyingtopostsoccupiedbytheExecutiveofficialsspecifiedthereinw/oaddition compensationinan exofficio capacityasprovidedbylawandasrequiredbytheprimaryfunctionsofsaid official'soffice.Thereasonisthatthesepostsdonotcomprise"anyotheroffice"w/inthecontemplationofthe constitutional prohibition butareproperlyan imposition ofadditional duties andfunction on saidofficials. Adapted.

(b)Theyshallnotpracticeanyotherprofession. (c)Theyshallnotparticipateinanybusiness. (d)Theyshallnotbefinanciallyinterestedinanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseorspecialprivilege granted.

CompareProhibitionsagainstotherofficials

Art.VI,Sec.13.NoSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayholdanyotheroffice or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries,duringhistermwithoutforfeitinghis seat.Neithershallhebeappointedtoanyofficewhichmayhavebeencreatedortheemolumentsthereof

increasedduringthetermforwhichhewaselected. Art.IX,A,Sec.2.NoMemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhistenure,holdany otherofficeoremployment. Neithershallheengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorintheactive managementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice, norshallhebefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseor privilegegrantedbytheGovernment, anyofits subdivisions,agencies, orinstrumentalities, including governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

Art.IX,B,Sec.7. Noelectiveofficialshallbeeligibleforappointmentordesignationinany capacitytoanypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure. Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficial shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

Art.VIII,Sec.12.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandofothercourtsestablishedbylaw shallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasijudicialoradministrativefunctions.

Exceptionstoruleprohibitingexecutiveofficialsfromholdingadditionalpositions: a.President (1)The President can assume a Cabinetpost, (because thedepartments are mere extensions of his personality,accordingtotheDoctrineofQualifiedPoliticalAgency,sonoobjectioncanbevalidlyraisedbased onArt.VII,Sec.13.) (2)ThePresidentistheChairmanofNEDA.(Art.XII,Sec.9) b.VicePresident Art.VII,Sec.3.xxx TheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasmemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresno confirmation. c.Cabinet (1)TheSecretaryofJusticeshallbeanexofficiomemberoftheJudicialandBarCouncil.(Art.VIII, Sec.8[1])

2)Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,appointiveofficialsshall not hold anyother office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.(Art.IX,B,7,par.2) Art.VII,Sec.13talksof"unless otherwiseprovidedbytheConstitution." In thecaseofCabinet members,thisreferstoArt.IX,B,7,par.2.Thus,theConstitutionallowsaCabinetmembertoholdanother officeprovidedeither(1)suchisnecessitatedbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition(e.g.SecretaryofTrade andIndustryasChairmanofNDC,SecretaryofAgrarianReformasChairmanoftheLandBank),or(ii)is allowedbylaw.ThevalidityofEO284allowingmembersoftheCabinetandtheirUnderSecretariestohold2 additionalofficeswasdecidedinthecaseofCLUvsExec.Secretary.

d.Succession (1)Atthebeginningofterm

Art. VII, Sec. 7. The Presidentelect and the VicePresident elect shall assume office at the beginningoftheirterms. xxx

ThisprovisionreferstothePresidentandVicePresidentelectedintheregularelection,andsotheterm referred to begins on June 30 next following the election on the 2nd Monday of 1992, and every 6 years thereafter.

VacancyinthePresidency Therearetwosetsofrulesonsuccession,dependingonwhetherthevacancytookplacebeforethe beginningofthetermonJune30,orduringthependencyofthetermsthatcommencesonJune30.(Thecutoff pointisunsettled.OneviewisthatthecutoffisnoonofJune30,asexpressedinArt.VII,Sec.4,par.1.The otherviewisthatthecutoffismidnightofJune29whenJune30begins.) A.TemporaryorpermanentvacancyinthePresidencybeforetheterm

1.IfthePresidentelect cannotassume hispostatthebeginning ofhistermbecause i)he hasnot qualifiedasyet(e.g.hehadanoperationandsohecouldnottakehisoathofofficeonJune30),ii)ora Presidenthasnotbeen"chosen"andqualifiedasyet(e.g.thereisatieandCongresshasnotyetbrokenthetie), thentheVicePresidentshallactasPresidentuntilthePresidentelectshallhavequalified,orshallhavebeen "chosen:andqualified,asthecasemaybe.(Art.VII,Sec.7,pars.2&3).

Art.VII,Sec.7.xxx If the Presidentelect fails to qualify, the VicePresidentelect shall act as President until a Presidentshallhavebeenchosenandqualified. IfaPresidentshallnothavebeenchosen,theVicePresidentelectshallactasPresidentuntila Presidentshallhavebeenchosenandqualified. xxx

2.IfthePresidentelecti)dies,orii)becomespermanentlydisabled"atthebeginningofthetermofthe President"(i.e.,beforetheterm),thentheVicePresidentelectshallbecomethePresident.(Id.,par.4) Art.VII,Sec.7.xxx xxx xxx IfatthebeginningofthetermofthePresident,thePresidentelectshallhavediedorshallhave becomepermanentlydisabled,theVicePresidentelectshallbecomePresident. 3.IfbothPresidentandVicePresident(i)havenotbeen"chosen"or(ii)havenotqualified,or(iii)die, or(iv)becomepermanentlydisabled,thenthePresidentoftheSenate,orincaseofhisinability,theSpeakerof theHouse,shallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentoraVicePresidentshallhavebeen"chosen"andqualified. (par.5) Art.VII,Sec.7.xxx WherenoPresidentandVicePresidentshallhavebeenchosenorshallhavequalified,orwhere both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativesshallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentoraVice Presidentshallhavebeenchosenandqualified.(par.5thereof.) IncaseboththePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseareunabletoactasPresident,then Congressshallbylaw,provideforthe"mannerofselecting"theonewhowillactasPresidentuntilaPresident ofVicePresidentshallhave(beeneither"chosen"or"elected"pursuanttothespecialelectionreferredtoinVII, 10,andqualified. Art.VII,Sec.7.xxx TheCongressshall,bylaw,provideforthemannerinwhichonewhoistoactasPresidentshallbe selecteduntilaPresidentoraVicePresidentshallhavequalified,incaseofdeath,permanentdisability, orinabilityoftheofficialsmentionedinthenextprecedingparagraph.(par.6thereof.)

Art.VII,Sec.10. TheCongressshall,atteno'clockinthemorningofthethirddayafterthe

vacancyintheofficesofthePresidentandVicePresidentoccurs,conveneinaccordancewithitsrules withoutneedofacallandwithinsevendaysenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresident andaVicePresidenttobeheldnotearlierthanfortyfivedaysnorlaterthansixtydaysfromthetimeof suchcall.Thebillcallingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderparagraph2,Section26, ArticleVIofthisConstitutionandshallbecomelawuponitsapprovalonthirdreadingbytheCongress. Appropriationsforthespecialelectionshallbechargedagainstanycurrentappropriationsandshallbe exemptfromtherequirementsofparagraph4,Section25,ArticleVIofthisConstitution.Theconvening oftheCongresscannotbesuspendednorthespecialelectionpostponed. Nospecialelectionshallbe calledifthevacancyoccurswithineighteenmonthsbeforethedateofthenextpresidentialelection.

(2)Duringterm Art.VII,Sec.8.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofthe President,theVicePresidentshallbecomethePresidenttoservetheunexpiredterm.Incaseofdeath, permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofboththePresidentandVicePresident,the PresidentoftheSenateor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,shallthen actasPresidentuntilthePresidentorVicePresidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified. TheCongressshall,bylaw,provide whoshallserveasPresidentincaseofdeath,permanent disability,orresignationoftheActingPresident.HeshallserveuntilthePresidentortheVicePresident shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualificationsastheActingPresident.

B.PermanentVacancyinthePresidencyduringtheterm 1.IncaseofthePresident's(i)death(ii)permanentdisability,(iii)removalfromoffice(theonlywayis byimpeachment),or(iv)resignation,theVicePresidentshallbecomePresidentfortheunexpiredportionofthe term.(par.1) 2.IncaseofboththePresident'sandVicePresident'sdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice (byimpeachment),orresignation,thentheSenatePresidentor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouse, shallactasPresidentuntilthePresidentorVicePresidentshallhavebeen"elected"(pursuanttothespecial electioninArt.VII,Sec.10)andqualified.(par.1.) When the Acting President (i.e., the Senate President, or Speaker of the House) dies, becomes permanentlydisabled,orresigns(butisnotremoved,becausethereisnoneedtoimpeachhim,hisstaybeing temporary),thentheCongressshallbylaw,provide"who"shallbeActingPresidentuntilthePresidentorVice Presidentshallhavebeen"elected"(pursuanttothespecialelectioninArt.VII,Sec.10)andqualified. This

ActingPresidentshallbesubjecttothesamerestrictionsofpowersanddisqualifications.(par.2)

Comparisonsanddistinctionsbetweenthetwovacancies: a)TheincumbentPresidentneverholdsoverthePresidencyinanycase. b)ThevacancymustoccurintheofficesofboththePresidentandVicePresidentinorderfortheSenate President,ortheSpeaker,or,intheirinability,theoneprovidedtosucceedaccordingtotheLawofSuccession passedbytheCongress,tosucceedasActingPresidentuntilthequalificationofthePresident. c)TheLawonSuccessionmustbepassedbytheCongressinbothcasesintheeventthatthePresident, VicePresident,SenatePresidentandtheSpeakerareallunabletoactasPresident.Butinthecaseofavacancy occurringbeforetheterm,thelawprovidesonlyforthe"mannerofselecting"theActingPresident,whileinthe caseofavacancyoccurringduringtheterm,itprovidesfor"theperson"whoshallactasPresident. Inboth cases,thestintoftheActingPresidentistemporary. d)Whenthevacancycomesbeforetheterm,theConstitutiontalksofthesuccessoractingasPresident untilaPresidenthasbeen"chosen"and"qualified";whenitcomesduring,ittalksof"elected"andqualified. Thereasonisthatbeforetheterm,thevacancyinthePresidencyneednotbefilledupbyelection,sinceitmay befilledupbyavoteofCongressincaseofatie(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.5);butduringtheterm,theonlywayto fillupthevacancyisbyspecialelection. e)Aspecialelectioninbothcasesisheld,pursuanttoArt.VII,Sec.10,onlywhenbothofficesof President and VicePresident arevacant. However, if thevacancy occurs beforethe term, thegrounds are limitedto2(deathandpermanentdisabilityorboth),whileifthevacancyoccursduringtheterm,thegrounds are4(death,permanentdisability,removal,andresignation). f)Thevacancythatoccursbeforethetermofofficemaybetemporaryorpermanent;thevacancythat occursduringthetermofofficecanonlybeapermanentone. Thus,adifferentsetofrulesapplies,tobe discussednextfollowing,incaseofthetemporaryinabilityofthePresidentduringthetermofoffice.

Art.VII,Sec.10. TheCongressshall,atteno'clockinthemorningofthethirddayafterthe vacancyintheofficesofthePresidentandVicePresidentoccurs,conveneinaccordancewithitsrules withoutneedofacallandwithinsevendaysenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresident andaVicePresidenttobeheldnotearlierthanfortyfivedaysnorlaterthansixtydaysfromthetimeof suchcall.Thebillcallingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderparagraph2,Section26, ArticleVIofthisConstitutionandshallbecomelawuponitsapprovalonthirdreadingbytheCongress. Appropriationsforthespecialelectionshallbechargedagainstanycurrentappropriationsandshallbe exemptfromtherequirementsofparagraph4,Section25,ArticleVIofthisConstitution.Theconvening oftheCongresscannotbesuspendednorthespecialelectionpostponed. Nospecialelectionshallbe calledifthevacancyoccurswithineighteenmonthsbeforethedateofthenextpresidentialelection.

(3)Incaseoftemporarydisability Art.VII,Secs.1112 Art. VII, Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the SpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatheisunabletodischargethepowers anddutiesofhisoffice,anduntilhetransmitstothemawrittendeclarationtothecontrary,suchpowers anddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVicePresidentasActingPresident. WheneveramajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmittothePresidentoftheSenate andtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunable todischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVicePresidentshallimmediatelyassumethepowers anddutiesoftheofficeasActingPresident. Thereafter,whenthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakerofthe HouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatnoinabilityexists,heshallreassumethepowersand dutiesofhisoffice.Meanwhile,shouldamajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmitwithinfive daystothePresident oftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwritten declarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theCongressshall decidetheissue. Forthatpurpose,theCongressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,withinfortyeight hours,inaccordancewithitsrulesandwithoutneedofcall. IftheCongress,withintendaysafterreceiptofthelastwrittendeclaration,orifnotinsession, withintwelvedaysafteritisrequiredtoassemble,determinesbyatwothirdsvoteofbothHouses,voting separately,thatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVicePresident shallactasPresident;otherwise,thePresident shallcontinueexercising thepowersanddutiesofhis office.

C.TemporaryVacancyinthePresidencyduringtheterm(Art.VI,Sec.11,supra) AvacancyinthePresidencyarisingfromhisdisabilitycanoccurinanyofthefollowingways: 1.AwrittendeclarationbythePresident 2.WrittendeclarationbytheCabinet 3.FindingbyCongressby2/3votethatthePresidentisdisabled. Inallthesecases,theVicePresidenttemporarilyactsasthePresident. VoluntarydeclarationofinabilitybyPresident

a.WhenthePresidenttransmitstotheSenatePresidentandtheSpeakerhiswrittendeclarationthatheis unabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,suchpowersanddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVice PresidentasActingPresident. b.TheVicePresidentshallsoactuntilthePresidenttransmitstotheSenatePresidentandtheSpeakera writtendeclarationthatheisnolongerunabletodischargehisoffice. ContestedinabilityofthePresident a.WhenmajorityofallthemembersoftheCabinettransmittotheSenatePresidentandSpeakertheir writtendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargehisoffice,thentheVicePresidentshallimmediately assumethePresidencyinanactingcapacity. b.ThePresidentcancontestthisbysendinghisownwrittendeclarationtotheSenatePresidentand Speaker,thatnoinabilityexists.Uponsuchtransmittal,thePresidentshallautomaticallyassumehisoffice. c.ShouldthemajorityoftheCabinetinsistontheiroriginalstandbytransmittingasecondwritten declarationofthePresident'sinabilitywithin5daysfromresumptionofofficeofthePresident,thenCongress shallstepin. d.UponreceiptofthisseconddeclarationbytheCabinet,Congressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession, within48hours,withoutneedofcall,inaccordancewithitsrules.(Ifitisalreadyinsession,itmustmeetright away,asglimpsedfromthefactthattheyonlyhave10daystodecide,whereasifitisnotinsession,itmust convenein2daysanddecidebeforethe12thday.) e.CongressshalldeterminethePresident'sinabilitywithin10daysafterreceiptofthesecondwritten declarationbytheCabinetifitisinsession,orwithin12daysafteritisrequiredtoassemblebyitsrespective presidingofficerifitisnotinsession. f.IfthePresident,bya2/3voteofbothhousesvotingseparately,determinedtobe"unable"todischarge hisoffice,thentheVicePresidentshallactasPresident. Iflessthan2/3findhimunable,thenthePresident shallcontinueexercisingthepowersanddutiesofhisoffice.

SeriousIllnessofthePresident Art.VII,Sec.12. IncaseofseriousillnessofthePresident,thepublicshallbeinformedofthe stateofhishealth.ThemembersoftheCabinetinchargeofnationalsecurityandforeignrelationsand theChiefofStaffoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,shallnotbedeniedaccesstothePresident duringsuchillness.

e.Removal

Art.XI,Secs.23 Art. XI, Sec. 2. The President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftand corruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalorpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmaybe removedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.

Art.XI,Sec.3. (1) TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateall casesofimpeachment. (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of RepresentativesorbyanycitizenuponresolutionofendorsementbyanyMemberthereof,whichshallbe includedintheOrderofBusinesswithintensessiondays,andreferredtotheproperCommitteewithin threesessiondaysthereafter.TheCommittee,afterhearing,andbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the correspondingresolution.TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithinten sessiondaysfromreceiptthereof. (3)AvoteofatleastonethirdofalltheMembersoftheHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded. (4)Incasetheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleastonethirdofall theMembersoftheHouse,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenate shallforthwithproceed. (5)Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithin aperiodofoneyear. (6)TheSenateshallhavethesolepowertotryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment.Whensitting forthatpurpose,theSenatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation.WhenthePresidentofthePhilippinesison trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwothirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate. (7) Judgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallnotextendfurtherthanremovalfromofficeand disqualificationtoholdanyofficeundertheRepublicofthePhilippines,butthepartyconvictedshall neverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishmentaccordingtolaw.

[A more detailed discussion on this topic can be found above under Other Powers of Congress: Impeachment.] InitiationStageattheHouseofRepresentatives

a.FilingofverifiedcomplaintforimpeachmentofthePresidentorVicePresident,onthegroundof culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftandcorruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalof publictrust. b.InclusionofthecomplaintintheOrderofBusinesswithin10sessiondays. c.ReferralofcomplainttotheCommitteeonJusticewithin3sessiondaysfromitsinclusion. d.Hearing,voting,andsubmissionofreportbytheCommitteewithin60daysfromreferral. e.PlacingoncalendaroftheCommitteeresolutionwithin10daysfromsubmission. f.Discussiononthefloorofthereport,thenavotebythemembershipoftheHouseofRepresentatives. g.If1/3votetoaffirmafavorableresolutionoroverrideacontraryresolution,thecaseisforwardedto theSenatefortrial. TrialStageattheSenate a.TheSenatorstakeanoathoraffirmation.TheChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourtpresidesoverthe trial,butdoesnotvote. b.Aftertrial,theSenatorsvotetoconvictoracquit.Avoteof16(2/3ofallthemembers)isrequiredto convictthePresidentorVicePresident. Posttrial a.IfthePresidentisacquittedbytheSenate,heshallcontinueinoffice.Noimpeachmentproceeding canagainbeinitiatedagainsthimwithinaperiodofoneyear. b.IfthePresidentisimpeached,heshallberemovedfromofficeatonce,andshallbedisqualifiedto holdanyofficeintheRepublic.HiscriminalliabilityunderArt.XI,Sec.3(7)maybesubjecttohimimmunity fromsuit.

f.PowersandFunctionsofthePresident (1)ExecutivePower Art.VII,Secs.1and17 Art.VII,Sec.1.TheexecutivepowershallbevestedinthePresidentofthePhilippines.

Id., Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.Heshallensurethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.

Theexecutivefunctionisessentiallythedutytoimplementthelawswithinthestandardsimposedbythe legislature.UndertheConstitution,thispowerisexercisedbythePresident.Thus,whentheCabinetandother branchesoftheExecutiveDepartmentimplementthelaw,theyareactingunderthecontrolofthePresident.

MarcosvsManglapus177SCRA668,178SCRA760 F:
ThisisapetitionformandamusaskingtheCourttoordertherespondentstoissuetraveldocumentstoMr.Marcos andhisimmediatefamilyandtoenjointheimplementationofthePresident'sdecisiontobartheirreturntothePhilippines. Theissueiswhetherornot,intheexerciseofexecutivepower,thePresidentmayprohibittheMarcosesfromreturningto thePhilippines. TheConstitutionprovidesthattheexecutivepowershallbevestedinthePresident(Art.VII,Sec.1).However,it doesnotdefinewhatismeantby"executivepower"althoughinthesamearticleittouchesontheexerciseofcertainpowers bythePresident,i.e.thepowerofcontroloverallexecutivedepts.,bureausandoffices,thepowertoexecutethelaws,the appointingpower,thepowersunderthecommanderinchiefclause,thepowertograntreprieves,commutations,pardons, thepowertograntamnestywiththeconcurrenceofCongress,thepowertocontractorguaranteeforeignloans,thepower toenterintotreatiesorinternationalagreements,thepowertosubmitthebudgettocongressandthepowertoaddress Congress.(VII,Sec.1423)

TheinevitablequestioniswhetherbyenumeratingcertainpowersofthePresident,didtheframersof theConstitutionintendthatthePresidentshallexercisethosespecificpowersandnoother? AccordingtotheSC,thatalthoughthe1987Constitutionimposeslimitationsontheexerciseofspecific powersofthePresident,itmaintainsintactwhatistraditionallyconsideredaswithinthescopeofexecutive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific power enumeratedintheConstitution. Inotherwords,executivepowerismorethanthesumofspecificpowersso enumerated. Inthiscase,thePresidenthasthepowertobartheMarcosesfromreturningtothePhilippines.Shehas theobligationtoprotectthepeople,promotetheirwelfareandadvancethenationalinterest.Shehastobalance thegeneralwelfareandthecommon goodagainsttheexerciseofrights ofcertainindividuals. Thepower involvedisthePresident'sresidualpowertoprotectthegeneralwelfareofthepeople.Itisfoundedontheduty ofthePresident,asstewardofthepeople. ResolutiononMotionforReconsideration: ItcannotbedeniedthatthePresident,uponwhomexecutivepowerisvested,has unstatedresidual powerswhichareimpliedfromthegrantofexecutivepowerandwhicharenecessaryforhertocomplywithher dutiesundertheConstitution.ThepowersofthePresidentarenotlimitedtowhatareexpresslyenumeratedin thearticleontheExecutiveDepartmentandinscatteredprovisionsoftheConstitution.Adapted.

(2)Controlofexecutivedepartments Art.VII,Sec.17.ThePresidentshallhavecontrolofalltheexecutivedepartments,bureaus,and offices.Heshallensurethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.

"Control"isthepowertosubstituteone'sownjudgmentinthatofasubordinate. Underthequalifiedpoliticalagencydoctrine,thedifferentexecutivedepartmentsaremereadjunctsof the President. The secretaries are the alter ego of the President, men of his bosom confidence whom he designated toassist him in his otherwise physically impossible multifarious functions, the extension of the Presidentintheparticularfieldinwhichtheyact. Theiractsarepresumptivelyactsofthe"President,until countermandedorreprobatedbyhim".ThePresidentcansubstitutehiswilloverthoseofthesecretaries,and theycannotcomplain. Furthermore,theyholdtheirofficesubjecttothediscretionofthePresident,whocan replacethemanytimeonceheloseshisconfidenceinthem. Thus,inPlanasvGil,sincetheCivilServiceCommissioner,thennotanindependentbody,wasthealter ego of the President, and the President could investigate local officials, the Commissioner could likewise investigatethem. InVillenavSecretaryoftheInterior,theinvestigationoftheMayorofMakatibytheSecretaryofthe InteriorwasdeemedaninvestigationconductedbythePresidenthimself. The doctrine on the power of control remained unchanged in the jurisprudence under the 1973 Constitution. Free Telephone Workers Union vs Minister of Labor (108 SCRA 757) had occasion to reemphasizeitscontinuingvalidity.Here,thepowergiventotheMinisterofLabortoassumejurisdictionovera labordisputeaffectingthenationalinterestortocertifyitforcompulsoryarbitrationwaschallengedasanundue delegationofapowerwhichproperlybelongedtothePresident.Allthatwasneededtosettlethecasewasto hark back to the Villena doctrine that the heads of ministries are alter egos of the President. Under the presidentialsystem,allexecutiveandadministrativeorganizationsareadjunctsoftheExecutiveDepartment,the headsofthevariousexecutivedepartmentsareassistantsandagentsoftheChiefExecutiveand,exceptincases wheretheChiefExecutiveisrequiredbytheConstitutionorthelawtoactinpersonortheexigenciesofthe situationdemandthatheactpersonally,themultifariousexecutiveandadministrativefunctionsoftheChief Executive are performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobatedbytheChiefExecutive,presumptivelytheactsoftheChiefExecutive.Eachheadofadepartmentis, andmustbe,thePresident'salteregointhemattersofthatdepartmentwherethePresidentisrequiredbylawto exerciseauthority.ThePresidenthastheconstitutionalpowerofcontrolanddirectionoversuchdept.headsand cabinetsecretaries.

(3)Generalsupervisionoflocalgovernmentsandautonomousregions

Art.X,Sec.4.ThePresidentshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverlocalgovernments.xxx

Art. X, Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensurethatlawsarefaithfullyexecuted.

"Generalsupervision"meansthemereoverseeingofasubordinatetomakesurethattheydotheirduties underthelaw.Butthisdoesnotincludethepowertooverruletheiracts,iftheseactsarewithintheirdiscretion. Thegrantofmeresupervisorypoweroverlocalgovernmentsandautonomousregionsisinlinewiththe policyoftheStatetopromotetheautonomyoflocalgovernmentsandautonomousregions.Therecanbenoreal localautonomywhiletheNationalGovernmentcontrolsthelocalgovernments. GanzonvsCA200SCRA271 ThepetitionersquestionthepowerofthePresident,actingthroughtheSecretaryofLocalGovernment, tosuspendand/orremovelocalofficials. ItistheconsideredopinionoftheCourtthatnotwithstandingthechangeintheconstitution,thecharter didnotintendtodivestthelegislatureofitsrightorthePresidentofherprerogativeasconferredbyexisting legislationtoprovideadministrativesanctionsagainstlocalofficials.Theomissionof"asmaybeprovidedby law"(Sec.4,Art.X)signifiesnothingmorethantounderscorelocalgovernments'autonomyfromCongressand tobreakCongress'"control"overlocalgovt.affairs.TheConstitutiondidnot,however,intendforthesakeof localautonomy,todeprivethelegislatureofallauthorityovermunicipalcorporations,inparticular,concerning discipline. Petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers,whichsupposedlyexcludesthepowerofinvestigation,anddeniedhercontrol,whichallegedlyembraces disciplinaryauthority. Thisisamistakenimpressionbecauselegally"supervision"isnotincompatiblewith disciplinaryauthority. "Control"hasbeendefinedasthepowerofanofficertoalter,modifyornullifyorset asidewhatasubordinateofficerhaddoneintheperformanceofhisdutiesandtosubstitutethejudgmentofthe formerforthatofthelatter."Supervision"ontheotherhandmeansoverseeingorthepowerorauthorityofan officertoseethatsubordinateofficersperformtheirduties.Adapted.

(4)Powerofappointment Cruz:Appointmentmaybedefinedastheselection,bytheauthorityvestedw/thepower,ofanindividualwho istoexercisethefunctionsofagivenoffice. The power of appointment is, according to the SC in Concepcion v Paredes, the most eminently executivepower,becauseitisthroughhisappointeesthatthePresidentcanexecutelaws.

ThepowerofappointmentbythePresidentunderthe1987Constitutionhasbeensignificantlycurbed.It canbeclassifiedasfollows:

WiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments MembersoftheRegionalConsultativeCouncilinArt.X,Sec.18areaccordingtoSarmientovMison, 156 SCRA 547, supra.also subject toconfirmation by the CA, because their appointment is vested in the President by the Constitution. But J. Mendoza disagrees. For unlike the Chairman and members of the ConstitutionalCommissionsandtheregularmembersoftheJBC,theConstitutioninArt.X,Sec.18doesnot saythattheappointmentissubjecttoconfirmation.Also,thepatternintheConstitutionshowsthatwherethe nomineesarealreadyscreenedeitherbyJBC(forjusticesandjudges)orthemultisectoralbodies(Regional ConsultativeCouncil),thenthereisnoneedforCAconfirmationtopreventanoverkill.Itisenoughthatthe Presidentmadetheappointmentonthebasisofnominations.Otherwise,itwouldbetoorigid,consideringthat thedutyoftheRCCisonlytoadviseCongressontheautonomousacttobeenacted. Dobureaudirectorsneedconfirmation?InSarmientovMison(Dec.1987),theSCheldthatno theydidnotneedtobeconfirmed.ThedeliberationsoftheConConshowedthatadraftsimilarto VII,10ofthe1935Constitution,whichincludedbureauheadsinthelistofappointeesrequiring confirmation,wasintroduced,butuponmotion,bureaudirectorswereomittedexpresslyfromthe draftbecausetheywereconsideredoflowrank,andsowerethoughttobebettershieldedfrom partisanpolitics. ButtheSCaddedthatofthe4categoriesofpublicofficersrequiringconfirmation,the4thmustbe givenarestrictiveconstructionbecauseconfirmationderogatestheappointingpowerofthePresident.Indeed,it said,onlyasmallclassofofficersneededconfirmation. Insayingso,however,itdidnottrytoexplaincertainanomaliesthatmayarisefromsuchrestrictive interpretation:(a)Ifacolonelneededconfirmation,whynottheUndersecretaryofNationalDefensewhohasa higherrankaslineofficer?(b)Ifanambassadorneededconfirmation,whynottheUndersecretaryofForeign Affairswhohasahigherrank?(c)WhynottheCBgovernorwhoissopowerfulastoplungethecountryinto bankruptcy?

BautistavsSalonga172SCRA160 F:
PetitionerwasappointedChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRightson12/17/88.Shetookheroathofoffice on12/22andthereafterenteredintothedischargeofherfunctionsandduties.However,on1/9/89,shewasaskedbythe Commission on Appointments to submit certain information and documents needed in the confirmation of her appointment.Sherefusedtodosoonthegroundthatherappointmentwasnotsubjecttoconfirmation.On1/14/89,the Pres. submitted petitioner's ad interim appointment to the CA, but, considering petitioner's refusal to submit to the jurisdictionoftheCA,theCAdisapprovedherappointmenton1/25.Petitioner,anticipatingtheactionoftheCA,fileda petitionforcertiorariw/theSC.

ISSUE:WhetherornottheappointmentbythePresidentoftheChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRights (CHR)istobemadewithorwithoutCAconfirmation. HELD:(1)OnlythoseappointmentsexpresslymentionedinthefirstsentenceofSec.16,Art.VIIaretobe reviewedbytheCA,namely,"theheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersand consuls,otherofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhose appointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution."AllotherappointmentsbythePres.aretobemadew/othe participationoftheCA." SincethepositionofChairmanoftheCHR,anindependentofficecreatedbythe Constitution,isnotamongthepositionsmentionedinthefirstsentenceofSec.16,Art.VII,appointmentsto whicharetobemadewiththeconfirmationoftheCA,itfollowsthattheappointmentbythePresidentofthe ChairmanoftheCHRistobemadewithouttherevieworparticipationoftheCA.Theyareamongtheofficers ofthegovt"whomhe(thePres.)maybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint."AndSec.2(c)ofEO163,May5,1987, authorizesthePres.toappointtheChairmanandMembersoftheCHR. xxx.VV.

QuintosDelesvs.CommissiononAppointments177SCRA259 F:
Petitionerand3otherswereappointedSectoralRepresentativesbythePresidentpursuanttoArticleVII,Section 16,par.2andArticleXVIII,Section7oftheConstitution.However,petitionerandthe3othersectoralrepresentatives appointeeswerenotabletotaketheiroathsanddischargetheirdutiesasmembersofCongressduetotheoppositionof somecongressmenmembersoftheCommissiononAppointments(CA),whoinsistedthatsectoralrepresentativesmust first be confirmed by the CA before they can take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires confirmation by the CA in the appointment of sectoral representativestotheHouseofRepresentatives. HELD:YES.Section16,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionprovidesthat:"Thepresidentshallnominateand,with theconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments,appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors, otherpublicministersandconsuls,orofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,and otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitutionxxx". InSARMIENTOVS.MISON(1987),theSCconstruedSec.16,Art.VIIoftheConstitutiontomean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16, Art. VII require confirmationbytheCA. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in par. 2, Sec. 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointmentbythePresidentbyexpressprovisionofSec.7,Art.XVIIIoftheConstitution,itisindubitablethat sectoralrepresentativestotheHouseofRepresentativesareamongthe"otherofficerswhoseappointmentsare vested in the President in this Constitution", referred to in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII whose appointmentsaresubjecttoconfirmationbytheCA.(SARMIENTOVS.MISON) Implicitintheinvocationofpar.2,Section16,Art.VIIasauthorityfortheappointmentofpetitioneris, therecognitionbythePresidentasappointingauthoritythatpetitioner'sappointmentrequiresconfirmationby theCA.UnderPar.2,Sec.16,ArtVII,appointmentsmadebythePresidentpursuantthereto"shallbeeffective

onlyuntildisapprovalbytheCAoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress."Ifindeedappointmentsof sectoralrepresentativesneednoconfirmation,thePresidentneednotmakeanyreferencetotheconstitutional provisionsabovequotedinappointingthepetitioner.Asamatteroffact,thePresidenthadexpresslysubmitted petitioner'sappointmentforconfirmationbytheCA. ConsideringthatCongresshadadjournedwithoutresp. CAhavingactedonpetitioner's appointment, saidappointment/nominationhadbecomemootandacademic pursuanttoSec.23oftheRulesofresp.CAand"unless resubmitted shallnotagainbeconsideredbythe Commission."Adapted.

Calderonv.Carale(208SCRA254) F:
InMarch1989,RA6715(HerreraVelosoLaw),amendingtheLaborCode,wasapproved.ItprovidesinSec.13 thereofasfollows: "xxx TheChairman,theDivisionPresidingCommissionersandotherCommissionersshallbeappointedbythePresident, subjecttoconfirmationbytheCA.xxx" Pursuanttosaidlaw,PresidentAquinoappointedtheChairman(B.CARALE)andCommissionersoftheNLRC. Theappointmentsstatedthattheappointeesmayqualifyandenterupontheperformancesofthedutiesoftheoffice. Thepresentpetitionforprohibitionquestionstheconstitutionalityandlegalityofthepermanentappointments extendedbythePresidenttotherespondentsChairmanandMembersoftheNLRC,withoutsubmittingthesametothe CommissiononAppointmentsforconfirmationpursuanttoArt.215oftheLaborCodeasamendedbyRA6715. Petitionersinsistsonamandatorycompliancew/RA6715whichhasinitsfavorthepresumptionofvalidity.RA 6715isnot,accordingtothepetitioner,anencroachmentontheappointingpoweroftheexecutivecontainedinSec.16of Art.VIIoftheConstitution. TheSolicitorGeneralcontends,ontheotherhand,thatRA6715transgressesSec.16,Art.VIIbyexpandingthe confirmationpowersoftheCommissiononAppointmentswithoutconstitutionalbasis.

ISSUES: (1) W/N Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointmentsextendedbythePresidenttogovernmentofficersadditionaltothoseexpresslymentionedinthe firstsentenceofSec.16,Art.VIIoftheConstitution.(NO) HELD:ThecontroversyinthecaseisfocusedonSec.16,Art.VIIofthe1987Constitutionw/cprovides: "Sec.16.ThePresidentshallnominateand,withtheconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments, appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,orofficers ofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevested inhiminthisConstitution.HeshallalsoappointallotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsare nototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmay, bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orintheheads ofdepartments,agencies,commissions,orboards."xxx TherearefourgroupsofofficerswhomthePresidentshallappoint.Thesefourgroupsare: First,theheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,officers ofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevested

inhiminthisConstitution; Second,allotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforlaw; Third,thosewhomthePresidentmaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint; Fourth,officerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentstheCongressmaybylawvestinthePresidentalone. The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose appointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylawandthosewhomthePresidentmaybeauthorizedbylawto appoint. Indubitably,theNLRCChairmanandCommissionersfallwithinthesecondsentenceofSec.16,Art.VII, morespecificallyunder"thosewhomhe(thePresident)maybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint."Undeniably,the ChairmanandMembersoftheNLRCarenotamongtheofficersmentionedinthefirstsentenceofSec.16 whoseappointmentsrequiresconfirmationbytheCA. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the CA of the appointments of respondents ChairmanandMembersoftheNLRC,itisunconstitutionalbecause: 1.itamendsbylegislation,thefirstsentenceofSec.16,Art.VIIoftheConstitutionbyaddingthereto appointmentsrequiringconfirmationbytheCA;and 2.itamendsbylegislation,thesecondsentenceofSec.16,Art.VII,byimposingtheconfirmationoftheCA onappointmentsw/careotherwiseentrustedonlywiththePresident. Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicialfunction. SupremeCourtdecisionsapplyingorinterpretingtheConstitutionshallformpartofthelegalsystemof thePhilippines.NodoctrineorprincipleoflawlaiddownbytheCourtinadecisionrendered enbanc orin divisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbytheCourtsittingenbanc.Adapted.

Notes: Fromtherulingsin SarmientoIIIv.Mison,156S549), Bautistav.Salonga,172S160,and Delesv. ConstitutionalCommission,177S259,thesedoctrinesarededucible: 1.ConfirmationbytheCAisrequiredonlyforpresidentialappointeesasmentionedinthefirstsentence ofSec.16,Art.VII,including,thoseofficerswhoseappointmentsareexpresslyvestedbytheConstitutionitself inthepresident(likesectoralrepresentativestoCongressandmembersoftheconstitutionalcommissionsof Audit,CivilServiceandElection). 2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaworthoseofficerswhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawto appoint(liketheChairmanandMembersoftheCom.onHumanRights).Also,asobservedin Sarmientov. Mison,whenCongresscreatesinferiorofficesbutomitstoprovideforappointmentthereto,orprovidesinan unconstitutionalmannerforsuchappointments,theofficersareconsideredasamongthosewhoseappointments

arenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw.

(2)W/NlegislationcanexpandaconstitutionalprovisionaftertheSupremeCourthasinterpretedit. InEndenciaandJugov.David,93Phil.699,theCourtheld: "WehavealreadysaidthattheLegislatureunderourformofgovernmentisassignedthetaskandthe powertomakeandenactlaws,butnottointerpretthem.Thisismoretruewithregardtotheinterpretationofthe Constitution,whichisnotwithinthesphereoftheLegislativeDepartment.IftheLegislaturemaydeclarewhata lawmeans,orwhataspecificportionoftheConstitutionmeans,especiallyafterthecourtshaveinactualcase ascertaineditsmeaningbyinterpretationandapplieditinadecision,thiswouldsurelycauseconfusionand instabilityinjudicialprocessesandcourtdecisions.Undersuchasystem,afinalcourtdeterminationofacase basedonjudicialinterpretationofthelaworoftheConstitutionmaybeunderminedorevenannulledbya subsequentanddifferentinterpretationofthelaworoftheConstitutionbytheLegislativeDepartment.That would neither be wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our constitutionalsystemofgovernment,particularlythosegoverningtheseparationofpowers." ThefunctionoftheCourtinpassinguponanactofCongressisto"laythearticleoftheConstitution whichisinvokedbesidethestatutewhichischallengedandtodecidewhetherthelattersquareswiththeformer" andtoannounceitsconsideredjudgmentuponthequestion." ItcannotbeoverlookedthatSec.16,Art.VIIofthe1987Constitutionwasdeliberatelyintendedbythe framerstobeadeparturefromthesystemembodiedinthe1935ConstitutionwheretheCAexercisedthepower ofconfirmationoveralmostallpresidentialappointments,leadingtomanycasesofabuseofsuchpowerof confirmation.Adapted.

Ramosv.Alvarez(97PHIL.844)[ComparewithCalderoncase] F:
BeforeservinghisfulltermaselectedmemberoftheProvincialBoardofNegrosOcc.,JesusAritao(LP)resigned hisofficewhenhefiledhiscertificateofcandidacyforcongressman. Tofillsuchvacancy,thenPresidentQuirino,actingontheauthorityofSec.21(b)oftheRevisedElectioncode (REC)appointed Agustin Ramos (LP), whoassumed office thereafter.Induetime,Ramos' interim appointment was submittedtotheCommissiononAppointments(CA)forconfirmation.Butbeforeitcouldbeconfirmed,thenewPresident of the Phil., Hon. R. Magsaysay, nominated Rafael Alvarez for the same office. The nomination was unanimously confirmedbytheCAafterithasrejectedRamos'appointment. AlvarezassumedofficeasmemberoftheProv'lBoardofNegrosOcc.despitevigorousoppositionfromRamos, whothereafterfiledthepresentpetitiontohavehimselfdeclaredlegallyentitledtotheofficeandtohaveAlvarezousted therefrom. Petitionercontends,amongothers,thatheisstilllegallyentitledtotheofficebecausehisappointmentwasnot subjecttotheconsentordisapprovaloftheCA.Respondentonhispartcontendsotherwise.

ISSUE:W/NanappointmentmadebythePresidentunderSec.21(b)oftheRECissubjecttotheconsentofthe CA.(YES)

Sec.21(b)oftheREC,underw/cthepetitionerwasappointed,provides: Whenever in any elective local office a vacancy occurs as a result of the death, resignation,removalorcessationoftheincumbent,thePresidentshallappointtheretoasuitable person belonging to the political party of the officer whom he is to replace, upon the recommendation ofsaidparty,saveinthecaseofmayor,whichshallbefilledbythevice mayor." UnderPar.3,ofSec.10,Art.VIIofthe1935Constitution,therearefourgroups ofofficersthatthePresidentshallappoint,namely: First,theheadsofexecutivedepartmentsandbureaus,officersoftheArmyfromtherankofcolonel,of theNavyandairforcesfromtherankofcaptainorcommander; Second,allotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforinthe Constitution; Third,thosewhomthePresidentmaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint;and Fourth,inferiorofficerswhoseappointmentstheCongresshasbylawvestedinthePresidentalone. TheConstitutionisexplicitthatforofficersofthefirst,secondandthirdgroups,theappointmentmade bythePresidentshallbewiththeconsentoftheCA.Itisonlyinthecaseofthefourthgroup,thatis,ofinferior officerswhoseappointmentisbylawvested"inthePresidentalone"thatsuchconsentisnotrequired. Ontheotherhand,examiningtheprovisionofSec.21(b)oftheREC,wefindthatwhileitsaysthatthe Presidentshallmaketheappointment,itdoesnotsaythattheappointmentisnottobesubjecttotheconsentof theCAthatis,thatitistobemadebythePresidentalone.Suchbeingthecase,thePresident'sappointmentmust bedeemedsubjecttothegeneralrequirementthatthesameistobewiththeconsentoftheCA.Itwouldfallthen underthethirdgroupofofficersmentionedinpar.3ofSec.10,Art.VIIofthe1935Constitution.Thus,inthe UnitedStates,underaconstitutionalprovisionsimilartoours,thegeneralruleisthat"whenastatutedoesnot specifyhowanofficeristobeappointed,itmustbebythePresidentandwiththeconsentoftheSenate." Inviewoftheforegoing,petitioner'sappointmentasmemberoftheProvincialBoardwassubjecttothe consentoftheCA,sothathisrighttotheofficeceasedwhenhisappointmentwasrejectedbytheCommission. Adapted. (TakenoteofthecaseofCalderonv.Carale,208SCRA254)

(a)Headsoftheexecutivedepartments Art.VII,Sec. 16. ThePresident shallnominateand, with the consentoftheCommission on

Appointments,appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersand consuls,orofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Governmentwhoseappointments arenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhom,hemaybe authorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerin rankin thePresident alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards. ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.

(b)Ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls(Id.)

(c)OfficersoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippineswiththerankofcolonelor navalcaptain(becausetheseareofficersofasizeablecommandenoughtostageacoup) (Id.) (d) Other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in the Constitution: (i)ChairmanandCommissionersoftheConstitutionalCommissions Art. IX, B, Sec. 1. (2) The Chairman and the Commissioners(oftheCivilServiceCommission)shallbe appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointment for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairmanshallholdofficeforsevenyears,aCommissioner forfiveyears,andanotherCommissionerforthreeyears, withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshall beonlyforunexpiredtermofthepredecessor. Innocase shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporaryoractingcapacity. Id.,C,Sec.1.(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissioners(oftheCommissiononElections)shall beappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointmentforatermofseven yearswithoutreappointment.Ofthosefirstappointed,threeMembersshallholdofficeforsevenyears, twoMembersforfiveyears,andthelastMembersforthreeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointment toanyvacancyshallbeonlyforunexpiredtermofthepredecessor. InnocaseshallanyMemberbe

appointedordesignatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity. Id.,D,Sec.1(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissioners(oftheCommissiononAudit)shallbe appointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointmentforatermofsevenyears without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyforunexpiredtermofthepredecessor. Innocaseshallany Memberbeappointedordesignatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity.

(ii)Regularmembers oftheJudicialandBarCouncil(composedoftheIBP representative,professoroflaw,retiredSCjustice,andrepresentativeoftheprivatesector.Notetheexofficio members:ChiefJustice,SecretaryofJustice,andrepresentativeofCongress)Art. VII,Sec.8.(2)Theregularmembersofthe(JudicialandBar)Councilshallappointedbythe PresidentforatermoffouryearswiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments.OftheMembers firstappointed,therepresentativeoftheIntegratedBarshallserveforfouryears,theprofessoroflawfor threeyears,theretiredJusticefortwoyears,andtherepresentativeoftheprivatesectorforoneyear.

(iii)Sectoralrepresentatives Art.XVIII,Sec.7. Untilalawispassed,thePresidentmayfillbyappointmentfromalistof nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2) of Section5ofArticleVIofthisConstitution.

(iv)RegionalConsultativeCommission

Art.X,Sec.18. TheCongressshallenactanorganicactforeachautonomousregionwiththe assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointedbythePresidentfromalistofnomineesfrommultisectoralbodies.Theorganicactshalldefine thebasicstructureofgovernmentfortheregionconsistingoftheexecutivedepartmentandlegislative assembly,bothofwhichshallbeelectiveandrepresentativeoftheconstituentpoliticalunits.Theorganic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistentwiththeprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationallaws. Thecreationoftheautonomousregionshallbeeffectivewhenapprovedbymajorityofthevotes castbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose,providedthatonlyprovinces,cities,and geographicareasvotingfavorablyinsuchplebisciteshallbeincludedintheautonomousregion.

UponrecommendationoftheJudicialandBarCouncil

(a)MembersoftheSupremeCourtandallothercourts Art. VIII, Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointedbythePresidentfromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil foreveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submissionofthelist. (b)Ombudsmanandhis5deputies(forLuzon,Visayas,Mindanao,generaland military)

Art.XI,Sec.9.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalist ofatleastsixnomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil,andfromalistofthreenomineesfor everyvacancythereafter.Suchappointmentsshallrequirenoconfirmation.Allvacanciesshallbefilled withinthreemonthsaftertheyoccur.

AppointmentofVicePresidentasMemberoftheCabinet Art.VII,Sec.3.xxx TheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasaMemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresno confirmation AppointmentssolelybythePresident Art.VII,Sec.16.ThePresidentshallxxxalsoappointallotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhose appointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhom,hemaybeauthorizedbylawto appoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresident alone,inthecourts,orintheheadsofdepartments,agencies,commissionsorboards. ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress. 1.ThosevestedbytheConstitutiononthePresidentalone(e.g.appointmentofVicePresidenttothe Cabinet)[Art.VII,Sec.3(2)] 2.Thosewhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedbylaw.

3.Thosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint. 4.ThoseotherofficerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentisvestedbylawinthePresident(alone). Thephraseologyismuddled. Themeaningof#4wastoucheduponinSarmientovMison.Inarguingthatevenbureauchiefsneeded confirmationeveniftheyareofinferiorrank,theargumentwasthephrase,"TheCongressmay,bylaw,vestin theappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone"meantthatuntilalawispassedgiving suchappointingpowertothePresidentalone,thensuchappointmenthastobeconfirmed.Onlyaftersuchlawis passeddoesthenecessityforconfirmationnolongerhold.TheSCdismissedthisviewhowever,sayingthatthe inclusionoftheword"alone"wasanoversight.Thus,theConstitutionshouldread"TheCongressmay,bylaw, vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresident."

(5)LimitationsonappointingpowerofthePresident Art.VII,Secs.13and15 `Art.VII,Sec.13.xxx The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices, includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

Id.,Sec.15.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelectionsanduptotheendof histerm,aPresidentorActingPresidentshallnotmakeappointments,excepttemporaryappointmentsto executivepositionswhencontinuedvacanciesthereinwillprejudicepublicserviceorendangerpublic safety.

a.Thespouseandrelativesbyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthe4thcivildegreeofthePresidentshall not,duringhis"tenure".beappointedas(i)membersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,(ii)memberofthe OfficeofOmbudsman,(iii)Secretaries,(iv)Undersecretaries,(v)Chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices, includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries. b.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelections(2ndMondayofMarch),anduptothe endofhis"term"(June30),aPresident(orActingPresident)shallnotmakeappointments. Exception:Temporaryappointments,toexecutivepositions,whencontinuedvacanciesthereinwill(1) prejudicepublicservice(e.g.Postmaster)or(ii)endangerpublicsafety(e.g.ChiefofStaff).

This provision seems to have overruled previous pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the validity of "midnightappointments". (Adinterimappointmentscouldeitherbe"midnight",ifmadebythePresidentbeforehestepsdownfromoffice orrecess,ifmadebythePresidentwhenCongressisnotinsession.) InAytonavCastillo,4SCRA1(1962),theSCruledthatwhile"midnightappointments"arenotillegal, theyshouldbemadeinthecapacityofa"caretaker"doublycarefulandprudentinmakingtheselection,soas nottodefeatthepoliciesoftheincomingadministration.Saidthecourt: AftertheproclamationofanincomingPresident,theoutgoingPresidentisnomorethana"caretaker" administratordutyboundtopreparefortheorderlytransitiontothenewPresident,andheshouldnotdoactsthat wouldobstructthepoliciesofhissuccessor. Thefillingupofvacanciesinimportantposts,iffew,andsospacedastoaffordsomeassuranceofdelib erateactionandcarefulconsiderationoftheneedfortheappointmentandtheappointeesqualifications,maybe undoubtedlypermitted. Buttheissuanceof350appointmentsinonenight,andtheplannedinductionofalmostallofthemafew hoursbeforetheinaugurationofthenewPresidentmayberegardedasabuseofpresidentialprerogatives. Where the President makes adinterim (i.e., midnight) appointments, he is bound to be "prudent"toinsureapprovalofhisselection,eitherbypreviousconsultationwiththeCAorby explaininghisreasonthereafter.WheretheCAthatwillconsidertheappointeesisdifferentfrom thatexistingatthetimeofappointment,andwherethenamesaretobesubmittedbyhissuccessor who may not wholly approve of his selections, the President should be "doubly careful in extendingsuchappointment.

InJorgevMayer,10SCRA331(1964),theCourtemphasizedtheruleinAytonathataprudentlymade midnightappointmentsospacedastoaffordsomeassuranceofdeliberateactionandcarefulconsiderationofthe needfortheappointmentandtheappointees'qualifications isnotprohibitedbylaw. Thecircumstancesof Jorge'sappointmentasDirectorofLandsinthiscase,basedonhis38yearsoffaithfulserviceandconfirmedby theCAbeforeitsadjournment,werefoundtobejudicious.

InQuisumbingvTajanglangit,10SCRA446(1964),theSCemphasizedthattheAytonarulingdoesnot declareallmidnightappointmentsasinvalid,andthattheadinterimappointmentofthepetitionerchiefofpolice here,whosequalificationandregularitywerenotdisputed,exceptforthefactthatitwasmadeduringthelast fewdaysoftheoldadministration,isthusnotinvalid.

Interimorrecessappointments

Art VI, Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constitutedwithinthirtydaysaftertheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavebeenorganized withtheelectionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker. TheCommissiononAppointmentsshallmeetonly whiletheCongressisinsession,atthecallofitsChairmanoramajorityofallitsMembers,todischarge suchpowersandfunctionsashereinconferreduponit.

Art.VII,Sec.16.xxx ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.

Regularandrecess(adinterim)appointments The procedure for confirmation has been discussed above under Constitutional Congressional Committees.Tosketch: Appointmentsrequiringconfirmationareoftwokinds,(i)regular,iftheCA,thatis,Congress,isin session,or(ii)duringtherecessofCongress(becausetheCommissionshallmeetonlywhileCongressisin session[Art.VI,Sec.19]). Regular appointments require confirmation before the appointee can take his post. The President nominates,CongressreceivesthenominationandforwardsthistotheCAforconfirmation,thentheOfficeof thePresidentissuesaCommission,atwhichpointtheappointeecanassumehisoffice. Recessappointments,ontheotherhand,neednoconfirmationtobeeffective,albeittemporarily.The appointment is effective until it is disapproved by the Commission on Appointments, or until the next adjournmentofCongress(unlessmeantime,itisconfirmedbytheCommission)(Art.VII,Sec.16,par.2) TemporaryDesignations: AdministrativeCodeof1987,BookIIISec.17 ThePresidentmaydesignateanofficeralreadyinthegovt.serviceoranyothercompetentpersonto performthefunctionsofanyofficeintheexecutivebranch,appointmenttowhichisvestedinhimbylaw,when: (a)Theofficerregularlyappointedtotheofficeisunabletoperformhisdutiesbyreasonofillness, absenceoranyothercause;or (b)Thereexistsavacancy; Innocaseshallatemporarydesignationexceedone(1)year.

(6)LimitationsontheappointingpoweroftheActingPresident

Art.VII,Secs.1416 Art.VII,Sec.14. AppointmentsextendedbyanActingPresidentshallremaineffectiveunless revokedbytheelectedPresidentwithinninetydaysfromhisassumptionorreassumptionofoffice. Art.VII,Sec.15.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelectionsanduptotheend ofhisterm,aPresidentorActingPresidentshallnotmakeappointments,excepttemporaryappointments toexecutivepositionswhencontinuedvacanciesthereinwillprejudicepublicserviceorendangerpublic safety.

Art.VII,Sec.16.xxx ThePresident shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whethervoluntaryorcompulsory,butsuchappointmentsshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbythe CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.

UPDATED1/23/96 /RAM

(7)Executiveclemencies Art.VII,Sec.19.Exceptincasesofimpeachment,orasotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution, thePresident maygrantreprieves,commutations,andpardons,andremitfinesandforfeitures,after convictionbyfinaljudgment. It shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the MembersoftheCongress.

ThePresident maygrant (i)reprieves,(ii) commutations, and (iii) pardons, and (iv) remit fines and forfeitures,afterconvictionbyfinaljudgment,except: (a)Incasesofimpeachment,and (b)AsotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,viz.

Art.IX,C,Sec.5.Nopardon,amnesty,paroleorsuspensionofsentenceforviolationofelection laws,rules,andregulationsshallbegrantedbythePresidentwithoutthefavorablerecommendationby theCommission(onElections.)

Definitions Reprieveisatemporaryrelieffromorpostponementofexecutionofcriminalpenaltyorsentenceora stayofexecution.Itdoesnotmorethanstaytheexecutionofasentenceextendedtoaprisonertoaffordhiman opportunitytoprocuresomeameliorationofthesentenceimposed.(Black.)Itisthewithholdingofasentence foranintervaloftime,apostponementofexecution,atemporarysuspensionofexecution. (Peoplevs.Vera, infra.) Commutation isareduction ofsentence. (Black.) Itisaremission ofapartof thepunishment;a substitutionofalesspenaltyfortheoneoriginallyimposed.(Peoplevs.Vera,infra.) Pardonisapermanentcancellationofsentence.(Black)Itisanactofgraceproceedingfromthepower entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment thelawinflictsforthecrimehehascommitted.Itisaremissionofguilt,aforgivenessofthe offense.(PeoplevVera,infra.)

Cruz: KindsofPardon. Pardonmaybeclassifiedintoabsoluteorconditionalandplenaryorpartial.An absolutepardonisoneextendedw/oanystringsattached,sotospeak,whereasaconditionalpardonisoneunder w/ctheconvictisrequiredtocomplyw/certainrequirements.Aplenarypardonextinguishesallthepenalties imposedupontheoffender,includingaccessorydisabilities,whereaspartialpardondoesnot. Wherethepardonisconditional,theoffenderhastherighttorejectthesamesincehemayfeelthatthe conditionimposedismoreonerousthanthepenaltysoughttoberemitted. Butinthecaseofanabsolute pardon,thepardoneehasnooptionatallandmustacceptitwhetherhelikesitornot.Inthissense,anabsolute pardonissimilartocommutation,w/cisalsonotsubjecttoacceptancebytheoffender. Amnesty isasovereignactofoblivionforpastacts,grantedbygovernmentgenerallytoaclassof personswhohavebeenguiltyusuallyofpoliticaloffenses(treason,sedition,rebellion),andwhoaresubjectto trialbuthavenotyetbeenconvicted,andoftenconditionedupontheirreturntoobedienceanddutywithina prescribedtime.(Black;BrownvWalker,161US602). Probationisadispositionunderwhichadefendantafterconvictionandsentenceisreleasedsubjectto conditionsimposedbythecourtandtothesupervisionofaprobationofficer.[Sec.3(a),PD968.] Parole is the suspension of the sentence of a convict granted by a Parole Board after serving the minimumtermoftheindeterminatesentencepenalty,withoutgrantingapardon,prescribingthetermsupon whichthesentenceshallbesuspended.

(a)Pardondistinguishedfromprobation Peoplevs.Vera,65P56(1937) Probation and Pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually distinct and differentfromeachother,bothinoriginandnature. Inprobation,theprobationerisinnotruesense,asin pardon,afreeman.Heisnotfinallyandcompletelyexonerated.Heisnotexemptfromtheentirepunishment w/cthelawinflicts.UndertheProbationAct,theprobationer'scaseisnotterminatedbythemerefactthatheis placedonprobation.Theprobationer,duringtheperiodofprobation,remainsinlegalcustodysubjecttothe controloftheprobationofficerandofthecourt,hemayberearresteduponthenonfulfillmentoftheconditions ofprobationand,whenrearrested,maybecommittedtoprisontoservethesentenceoriginallyimposedupon him.

Notes: Inbothcases,theremustbeafinaljudgmentofconviction,andtheconvictmustbeexemptedfrom serviceofsentence.ButpardonisgrantedbytheChiefExecutiveforanycrime,whileprobationisgrantedby thecourtafterinvestigationbyaprobationofficeronlyforcaseswherethepenaltyimposeddoesnotexceed6 yearsand1day(prisionmayor),wherethecrimeisnotagainstthesecurityoftheState,wheretherewasno previousconvictionforanoffensepunishedby arrestomayor,andwheretherewasnopreviousavailmentof probation. Inabsolutepardon,thesentenceanditseffects,includingtheaccessorypenalties,areabolisheduponthe grantofpardon.Inprobation,therestorationoftheprobationertohiscivilrightstakesplacesonlyafterhisfinal dischargeaftertheperiodofhisprobation.(Secs.14&16)

(b)PardondistinguishedfromParole PardonmaybegrantedbytheChiefExecutiveundertheConstitutionandformerlytheAdministrative Code,atanytimeafterfinaljudgmentofconviction,evenbeforeservice;whileparoleisgrantedbytheBoardof PardonsandParoleundertheIndeterminateSentenceLawonlyaftertheconvicthasservedtheminimumterm ofhissentence. Inpardon,theconvictbecomesafreeman;inparole,heisnotreallyfreebecausealthoughhehis releasedfromthecustodyofthelaw,hemustsubmittoperiodicexaminationbytheBoardofParole. InTesorovDirectorofPrisons,68Phil154(1939),theSCdismissedthecontentionthatbecauseparole isnotmentionedintheConstitution,thenthepowertograntparoleisalsodeemedrepealed.TheCourtsaidthat paroleispartofthepardoningpowerofthePresident. JusticeFernandopointsout,however,thatthisisnot accurate.IfeverthePresidenthasthepowertograntparole,itisbecausethelawgrantshimthatpower,andnot becauseparoleispartofpardon.

Tesorovs.DirectorofPrisons,68Phil154 F: OnOct.10,1934,petitionerTesorowasconvictedintheCFIManilaofthecrimeoffalsificationofapublic
documentandwassentenced.HispenaltywastoexpireonOct.28,1937. OnNov.14,1935,theGov.Gen.grantedthepetitioneraparole,whichthelatteraccepted,subjecttocertain conditions.Oneoftheconditionswasthathewillnotcommitanyothercrimeandwillconducthimselfinanorderly manner. Dec.3,1937,thepetrwaschargedwiththecrimeofadultery.However,thecasewasdismissedfornonappearance ofthecomplainant,JoseNagar. Feb. 1938, Nagar lodged a complaint with the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts supportingthecrim.action,chargedpetitionerwithviolationoftheconditionsofhisparole. Later,byvirtueofanorderfromthePresident,thepetrwasarrestedandrecommittedtothecustodyoftheDir.of Prisons. Petr.contendsthatsec.64(i)oftheRev.Adm.Code,insofarasitconfersupontheChiefExecutivethepowerto grantandrevokeparoles,hasbeenimpliedlyrepealedbyPar.6,sec.11,Art.VIIoftheConstitution,asthelatteromittedto specifysuchpowerinconnectionwiththepowersgrantedthereintothePresidentofthePhilippines. Sec.64(1)givestheGov.Gentheff.powersandduties: "Togranttoconvictedpersonsreprievesorpardons,eitherplenaryorpartial,conditionalor unconditional;tosuspendsentenceswithoutpardon,remitfines,andorderthedischargeofanyconvicted personuponparole,subjecttosuchconditionsashemayimpose;andtoauthorizethearrestandre incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions,ofhispardon,parole,orsuspensionofsentence." TheaforementionedConstitutionalprovisionprovides: "ThePresidentshallhavethepowertograntreprieves,commutations,andpardons,and remitfinesandforfeitures,afterconviction,foralloffenses,exceptincasesofimpeachment,uponsuch conditionsandwithsuchrestrictionsandlimitationsashemaydeempropertoimpose.Heshallhavethe powertograntamnestywiththeconcurrenceoftheNationalAssembly."

ISSUENO.1:W/Ntherehasbeenarepeal. HELD:NONE.ThepowertopardongiventhePresidentbytheConstitution,"uponsuchconditionsandwith suchrestrictionsandlimitationsashemaydeempropertoimpose,"includesthepowertograntandrevoke paroles.IftheomissionofthepowerofparoleintheConstitutionistobeconstruedasadenialthereoftothe President, the effect would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption of the Constitution,havebeenreleasedconditionallybytheChiefExecutive. ISSUENO.2:W/NtheBoardhaslegalauthoritytoinvestigatetheconductofthepetitioner. HELD:YES.Bythetermsofhisparole,petitioneragreedtoreporttotheexecutivesecretaryoftheBoardonce amonthduringthefirstyearofhisparole,andthereafter,onceevery3months.Byhisconsenttothiscondition, petitionerhasplacedhimselfunderthesupervisionoftheBoard.Thedutytoreportonthepartofthepetitioner

implies acorrespondingpoweronthepartoftheBoardtoinquireintohisconductand afortiori tomake recommendationstothePresidentbywhoseauthorityitwasacting.Thepowertorevokeparolesnecessarily carries with it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of revocationistoberationalandintelligent.Intheexerciseofthisincidentalpower,thePresidentisnotprecluded bylaworbytheConstitutionfrommakinguseofanyagencyofthegovt,orevenofanyindividual,tosecurethe necessaryassistance. ISSUENO.3:W/Njudicialpronouncementtotheeffectthathehascommittedacrimeisnecessarybeforehe canbeproperlyadjudgedashavingviolatedhisconditionalparole. HELD:NO.Asoneoftheconditionsofhisparole,petitioneragreedthathewillnotcommitanyothercrimeand willconducthimselfinanorderlymanner.Thus,themerecommission,nothisconvictionbycourt,ofanyother crime,thatwasnecessaryinorderthatpetitionermaybedeemedtohaveviolatedhisparole.AndunderSec.64 (i),theChiefExecutiveisauthorizedtoorder"thearrestandreincarcerationofanysuchpersonwho,in his judgment,shallfailtocomplywiththecondition/sofhispardon,parole,orsuspensionofsentence. ISSUENO.4:W/NthecourtscanreviewthefindingsofthePres.regardingtheviolationoftheconditional parole. HELD:NO.Wherethedeterminationoftheviolationoftheconditionalparolerestsexclusivelyinthesound judgmentoftheChiefExecutive,thecourtswillnotinterfere,bywayofreview,withanyofhisfindings. ISSUENO.5:W/Nupontheexpirationofhismaximumtermofimprisonment,hisconditionalparolealso expires. HELD:NO.Whenaconditionalpardonisviolated,theprisonerisplacedinthesamestateinw/chewasatthe timethepardonwasgranted.Hemayberearrestedandrecommittedtoprison.xxxTheruleiswellsettledthat, inrequiringtheconvicttoundergosomuchofthepunishmentimposedbyhisoriginalsentenceashehadnot sufferedatthetimeofhisrelease,thecourtshouldnotconsiderthetimeduringwhichtheconvictwasatlarge byvirtueofthepardonastimeservedontheoriginalsentence.(Pp.v.Tapel)Thisruleappliesbyanalogyto conditionalparole.Adapted.

Torresv.Gonzales152SCRA272 F:
Before1979,Torreswasconvictedofthecrimeofestafa(2counts)andwassentencedtoimprisonmentandtopay anindemnity.ThemaximumsentencewouldexpireonNov.2,2000. OnApril18,1979,aconditionalpardonwasgrantedthepetitionerbythePresidentonconditionthatpetitioner would"notagainviolateanyofthepenallawsofthePhil.Shouldthisconditionbeviolated,hewillbeproceededagainst inthemannerprescribedbylaw.Petitioneracceptedtheconditionalpardonandwasreleased. OnSept.8,1986,thePresidentcancelledtheconditionalpardonofthepetitioneruponrecommendationofthe BoardofPardons.TherecordbeforetheBoardshowedthatpetitionerhadbeenchargedwith20countsofestafa,convicted

ofseditionw/cisthesubjectofanappeal,andaletterreportfromtheNBIshowingalonglistofchargesbroughtagainst thepetitioner.ThepetitionerwassubsequentlyarrestedandconfinedinMuntinlupatoservetheunexpiredportionofhis sentence. Petitionerclaimshedidnotviolatehisconditionalpardonsincehehasnotbeenconvictedbyfinaljudgmentofthe 20countsofestafanorofthecrimeofsedition.Healsocontendsthathewasnotgivenanopportunitytobeheardbefore hewasarrestedandrecommittedtoprisonandthusdeprivedofdueprocess.

ISSUE:W/Nconvictionofacrimebyfinaljudgmentofacourtisnecessarybeforethepetitionercanbevalidly rearrestedandrecommittedforviolationofthetermsofhisconditionalpardonandaccordinglytoservethe balanceofhisoriginalsentence. HELD:NO.TheCourtcited3cases:Espuelasv.Prov'lWardenofBohol;Tesorov.Dir.ofPrisonsandSalesv. Dir.ofPrisons. Thegrantofpardonandthedetermination ofthetermsandconditions ofaconditional pardonare purelyexecutiveactswhicharenotsubjecttojudicialscrutiny. Thedeterminationoftheoccurrenceofabreachofaconditionofapardon,andtheproperconsequences ofsuchbreach,maybeeitherapurelyexecutiveact,notsubjecttojudicialscrutinyunderSec.64(i)oftheRev. Adm.Code;oritmaybeajudicialactconsistingoftrialforandconvictionofviolationofaconditionalpardon under Art. 159 of the RPC. Where the President opts to proceed under Sec. 64 (i), RAC, no judicial pronouncementofguiltofasubsequentcrimeisnecessary,muchlessconvictionthereforbyfinaljudgmentofa court,inorderthataconvictmayberecommendedfortheviolationofhisconditionalpardon. Becausedueprocessisnotsemperetubiquejudicialprocess,andbecausetheconditionallypardoned convicthadalreadybeenaccordedjudicialdueprocessinhistrialandconvictionfortheoffenseforw/chewas conditionallypardoned,sec.64(i),RAC,isnotafflictedwithaconstitutionalvice. Inshort,inproceedingagainstaconvictwhohasbeenconditionallypardonedandwhoisallegedto havebreachedtheconditionsofhispardon,theExecutiveDept.has2options:(i)toproceedagainsthimunder Sec.64(i),RAC;or(ii)toproceedagainsthimunderArt.159,RPCwhichimposesthepenaltyof prision correccional minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive,shallviolateanyoftheconditionsofsuchpardon.Here,thePresidenthaschosentoproceedagainst thepetitionerundertheRAC.Thatchoiceisanexerciseoftheexecutiveprerogativeandnotsubjecttojudicial scrutiny.Adapted.

(c)PardondistinguishedfromAmnesty 1.Pardonisusuallygrantedforcommoncrimes;amnesty,forpoliticalcrimes. 2.Pardonisgrantedtoindividuals;amnesty,toagroup,class,orcommunitygenerally.

3.Pardoncanonlybegrantedafterconviction;amnestymaybegrantedevenbeforetrial. 4.Pardonlooksforwardandrelievestheoffenderfromtheconsequencesofanoffenseofwhichhehas beenconvicted,thatis,itabolishesorforgivesthepunishment;amnestylooksbackwardandabolishesandputs intoobliviontheoffenseitself,thatis,itoverlooksandobliteratestheoffensewithwhichtheconvictischarged thatthepersonreleasedstandspreciselyasthoughhehadcommittednooffense.(Barrioquinto vFernandez, infra.) 5.PardonisaprivateactofthePresidentw/cmustbepleadedandprovedbythepersonbec.thecourts donottakejudicialnoticeofit;amnestyisapublicactofw/cthecourtstakejudicialnotice.(Cruz,Philippine PoliticalLaw,1991ed.) 6.PardondoesnotrequiretheconcurrenceoftheCongress;amnestyrequiressuchconcurrence.(id.)

Barrioquintoetalv.Fernandez82Phil642 F:
PetitionersJimenezandBarrioquintowerechargedwithmurder.Jimenezwassentencedtolifeimprisonment. Beforetheperiodforperfectinganappealhadexpired,JimenezbecameawareofProcl.No.8whichgrantsamnestyin favorofallpersonswhomaybechargedwithanactpenalizedundertheRPCinfurtheranceofresistancetotheenemyor againstpersonsaidinginthewareffortsoftheenemy,andcommittedduringtheperiodDec.8,1941tothedatewheneach particularareaofthePhil.wheretheoffensewasactuallycommittedwasliberatedfromenemycontrolandoccupation. ThepetitionerssubmittedtheircasestotheGuerrillaAmnestyCommission(GAC). TheGACreturnedtheircasestotheCFIZamboangaw/odecidingwhetherornottheyareentitledtothebenefits oftheAmnestyProclamation,onthegroundthatinasmuchasneitherofthepetitionershaveadmittedtocommittingthe offense,theycannotinvokethebenefitsoftheamnesty.

HELD: Pardon isgrantedbytheChiefExecutiveandassuchitisaprivateactwhichmustbepleadedand provedbythepersonpardoned,becausethecourtstakenonoticethereof;whileAmnestyisbyProclamationof theChiefExecutivewiththeconcurrenceofCongress,anditisapublicactofwhichthecourtsshouldtake judicialnotice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while Amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communitieswhomaybeguiltyofpoliticaloffenses,generallybeforeoraftertheinstitutionofthecriminal prosecutionandsometimesafterconviction. Pardonlooksforwardandrelievestheoffenderfromtheconsequencesofanoffenseofwhichhehas been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "not work the restorationoftherightstoholdpublicoffice,ortherightofsuffrage,unlesssuchrightsbeexpresslyrestoredby thetermsofthepardon,"andit"innocaseexemptstheculpritfromthepaymentofthecivilindemnityimposed uponhimbythesentence"(Art36RPC).WhileAmnestylooksbackwardandabolishesandputsintooblivion theoffenseitself,itsooverlooksandobliteratestheoffensewithwhichheischargedthatthepersonreleasedby amnestystandsbeforethelawpreciselyasthoughhehadcommittednooffense.

ISSUE:W/NinordertoentitleapersontothebenefitsoftheAmnestyProcl.ofSept.7,1946,itisnecessaryas aconditionprecedentthatheshouldadmithavingcommittedthecriminalactwithw/cheischargedandallege theamnestyasadefense. HELD:NO.Itissufficientthattheevidence,eitherofthecomplainantoroftheaccused,showsthattheoffense committedcomesw/nthetermsofsaidAmnestyProcl. Itisnotcorrecttosaythat"invocationofthebenefitsoftheamnesty isinthenatureofapleaof confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declaredbythecourtsortheAmnestyCommissionsentitledtothebenefitsoftheamnesty.For,w/nheadmits or confesseshaving committed the offense w/ w/c he ischarged, theCommissions should, if necessary or requestedbytheinterestedparty,conductsummaryhearingofthewitnessesbothforthecomplainantsandthe accused,onwhetherhehascommittedtheoffenseinfurtheranceoftheresistancetotheenemy,oragainst personsaidinginthewareffortsoftheenemy,anddecidewhetherheisentitledtothebenefitsofamnestyand tobe"regardedasapatriotorherowhohasrenderedinvaluableservicestothenation,"ornot,inaccordance withthetermsoftheAmnestyProclamation. ISSUE:W/Nthebenefitsofamnestymaybewaived. HELD: The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented, either by the prosecutionorthedefense,cannotbewaived,becauseitisofpublicinterestthatapersonwhoisregardedbythe AmnestyProclamation,whichhastheforceoflaw,notonlyasinnocent,forhestandsintheeyesofthelawasif hehadnevercommittedanypunishableoffensebecauseoftheamnesty,butasapatriotorhero,cannotbe punishedasacriminal.

DissentingOpinion: Amnestypresupposesthecommissionofacrime.Whenanaccusedsaysthathehasnotcommitteda crime,hecannothaveanyuseforamnesty.ItisalsoselfevidentthatwheretheAmnestyProclamationimposes certainconditions,asinthiscase,itisincumbentupontheaccusedtoprovetheexistenceofthoseconditions.A petitionforamnestyisinthenatureofapleaofconfessionandavoidance.Thepleaderhastoconfessthe allegationsagainsthimbeforeheisallowedtosetoutsuchfactsas,iftrue,woulddefeattheaction. o The4thdistinction(pardonisforwardlookingwhileamnestyisbackwardlooking)isnotaccurateon thebasisofdecidedcases. Itcanbeseenfromseveralcases,thereforethattheeffectofpardonretroactstothedayofthecrime.It isnotsimplyforwardlooking. Pardonisstilluseful,then,eveniftheconvicthasalreadyservedhisfullsentence,becausetheremaybe

accessorypenaltiesthatareperpetualinextent.Adapted.

Notes: Thefifthdistinctionbet.pardonandamnestyisthatpardonisaprivateactofthePresident,andsomust beimpleadedincourt;amnestyisapublicactbythePresidentandCongress,andsothecourtisenjoinedtotake judicialnoticeofit.(supra) The5thdistinction(pardonisaprivateactwhileamnestyisapublicact)isnottrueinPhilippinelaw. Thecaseholdsthatpardonmustberaisedasadefense,otherwisethecourtcannottakejudicialnoticeofsuch pardon. But under Art. 89 of the RPC, absolute pardon extinguishes criminal liability. And under the Constitution,pardoncanonlybegrantedafterfinalconviction.Ifso,once,aconvicthasbeengrantedpardon, thisimpliesthathehasalreadybeenconvicted,andthatpreciselyhehasbeenexemptedfromthepenaltyarising fromconviction.Whywouldhestillhavetoinvokeit?Thisseemstocontemplateasituationwhereheisbeing chargedagainofthesamecrime,andthatheneedstoinvokethepardonasadefense,whichisimpossible becauseofdoublejeopardy. TheerrorintheBarrioquintorulingisthatitborrowedthisdistinctionfromAmericanlaw,whichallows thePresidentthepowertograntpardonevenbeforeconviction(thus,FordwasabletopardonNixoneven withoutatrial.) SuchwasourlawundertheJonesLawof1916.Butunderthe1935Constitution,thisrulewaschanged: pardoncouldonlybegrantedafterconviction,In1973,itwasmadestricter:pardoncouldbegrantedonlyafter "final"conviction.Then,in1981,thephrase"afterfinalconviction"wasdropped,thusgoingbacktotherule undertheJonesLawandthePresidentcouldgrantpardonanytime.In1987,thephrasereads:"afterconviction byfinaljudgment." Asidefromextinguishingcriminalliability,pardonalsoworkstoremitfinesandforfeiturespaidinfavor oftheGovernment. Butitdoesnotautomaticallyrestorethepublicofficeforfeited,norrelievethepardoneeofcivilliability andotherclaimspertainingtotheprivateoffendedparty.

(d)EffectsofPardon InCristobalvLabrador,71Phil34(1940),thevoterwhoserighttovotewaschallengedinanexclusion proceedingbecausehehadbeenconvictedofestafawhichcarriedtheaccessorypenaltyofdisqualificationfrom therightofsuffrage,andinPellobellovPalatino,72Phil441(1941),themayorelectwhowasnotallowedto takehisoathbecauseofapreviousconviction,forfalsificationofaprivatedocumentwhichlikewisecarriedthe accessorypenaltyofdisqualification,werebothallowedtoexercisetheirpoliticalrightinviewofthesubsequent pardongrantedthem.[Therewouldbenoproblemiftheywerepardonedbeforehand,forthentheywouldbe restoredtotheirpoliticalright(s)rightaway.]

CristobalvLabrador,71Phil34(1940) F:
On3/15/30,TeofiloSantoswasfoundguiltyofestafaandsentencedto6monthsofarrestomayor.Uponappeal, hisconvictionwasaffirmed.Hewasconfinedinjailfrom3/14/9/32to8/18/32.Notwithstandinghisconviction,Santos continuedtobearegisteredelectorinMalabon,Rizalandwasmunicipalpres.from 1934to1937. Subsequently,The ElectionCodewasapproved.Sec.94,par.(b)ofsaidlawdisqualifiestheresp.fromvotingforhavingbeendeclaredby finaljudgmentguiltyofanycrimeagainstprop."Bec.ofthisprovision,SantospetitionedtheChiefExecutiveforabsolute pardon.ThePres.grantedhispetitionrestoringhimtohis"fullcivilandpoliticalrights,exceptthatwithrespecttothe righttoholdpublicofficeoremployment,hewillbeappointedforappointmentsonlytopositionsw/careclericalor manualinnatureandinvolvingnomoneyorprop.responsibility.On11/40,Cristobalfiledapetitionfortheexclusionof Santos'nameinfromthelistofvotersinMalabononthegroundthatthelatterisdisqualifiedunderpar.(b),Sec.94ofCA 357.LCdeniedCristobal'spetitionholdingthatSantos'pardonhadtheeffectofexcludinghimfromthedisqualification createdbypar.(b)ofSec.94.Hence,thispetitionforceritorari.

HELD:Thereare2limitationsupontheexerciseoftheconstitutionalprerogativeofthePres.tograntpardon: (1)thatthepowerbeexercisedafterconviction;(2)thatsuchpowerdoesnotextendtocasesofimpeachment. xxxAnabsolutepardonnotonlyblotsoutthecrimecommittedbutitalsoremovesalldisabilitiesresultingfrom conviction.Inthepresentcase,thedisabilityistheresultofconvictionw/ow/ctherewouldbenobasisforthe disqualificationfromvoting. xxx Inthepresentcase,whilethepardonextendedisconditionalinthesensethat"hewillbeeligiblefor appointmentonlytopositionsw/careclericalormanualinnatureinvolvingnomoneyorprop.resp.,"itis absoluteinsofarasit"restorestheresp.tofullcivilandpoliticalrights."Adapted. Pelobellov.Palatino72Phil441 F:
PelobelloallegesthatPalatinoisdisqualifiedfromvotingandbeingvotedupon.ItappearsthatPalatinowascon victedbyfinaljudgmentin1912ofatentadocontralaautoridadysusagentesandsentencedtoimprisonment.Hewaslater electedmayorofTorrijos,Marinduquein1940.ItisadmittedthatPalatinowasgrantedbytheGov.Gen.aconditional pardonin1915.ItisalsoproventhatonDec.25,1940,thePresidentgrantedhimabsolutepardonandrestoredhimtothe enjoymentoffullcivilandpoliticalrights.

ISSUE:W/Ntheabsolutepardonhadtheeffectofremovingthedisqualificationincidenttocriminalconviction underthethenElectionCode,thepardonhavingbeengrantedaftertheelectionbutbeforethedatefixedbylaw forassumingoffice. HELD:YES.TheSCadoptsthebroadviewinCristobalv.Labradorthatsubjecttothelimitationsimposedby theConstitution,thepardoningpowercannotberestrictedorcontrolledbylegislation;anabsolutepardonnot onlyblotsoutthecrimecommittedbutremovesalldisabilitiesresultingfromtheconviction;andthatwhen grantedafterthetermofimprisonmenthasexpired,absolutepardonremovesallthatisleftoftheconsequences ofconviction.ThusthebetterviewisnottounnecessarilyrestrictorimpairthepoweroftheChiefExecutive who,afterinquiryintotheenvironmentalfacts,shouldbeatlibertytoatonetherigidityoflawtotheextentof relievingcompletelythepartyorpartiesconcernedfromtheaccessory andresultantdisabilitiesofcriminal

conviction. Underthecircumstancesofthecase,itisevidentthatthepurposeingrantinghimabsolutepardonwas toenablehimtoassumethepositionindeferencetothepopularwill;andthepardonwasthusextendedafterthe electionbutbeforethedatefixedbytheElectionCodeforassumingoffice.Adapted.

InLacunavAbes,24SCRA780,thepetitionerwasconvictedofcounterfeiting,andsowasdisqualified fromtherightofsuffrage.Asaresult,hewasnotallowedtofilehiscandidacy,evenifhewasalreadygranted pardon,becauseoneoftherequirementsfortheofficewasthatthecandidatebeaqualifiedvoter.TheSC,after pointingoutthatthelawdidnotrequirethathebearegisteredvoterbutonlyaqualifiedvoteratthedayof election,pointedoutthat,grantingarguendo,pardonretroactedtothedayofthecrime.Thus,onthedayofthe election,"itisasthoughhewasaregisteredvoterevenifonthatday,hewasnotyetpardoned."

Lacunav.Abes24SCRA780 F:
MayorelectAbeshadbeenconvictedofthecrimeofcounterfeitingtreasurywarrantsandsentencedto prision mayorandafine.Afterhehadpartiallyservedhissentence,hewasreleasedonApril7,1959byvirtueofaconditional pardongrantedbythePresident,remittingonlytheunexpiredportionoftheprisontermandfine.Withoutthepardon,his maximumsentencewouldhavebeenservedonOct.13,1961. Withtheapproachofthe1967elections,Abesappliedforregistrationasavoterbutsaidapplicationwasdenied. Despitethis,Abesfiledhiscertificateofcandidacyfortheofficeofmayorandlaterwon.OnNov.16,1967,hewas proclaimedthefullyelectedmayor.Lacunaplacedsecond. Lacunafiledhispetitionforquowarrantowithprelim.injunctioninCFINuevaEcija.Onthesamedaythatthe hearingwasheldontheapplicationforprelim.injunction,thePresidentgrantedAbesanabsoluteandunconditionalpardon andrestoredtohimfullcivilandpoliticalrights. CFIdismissedthepetition,declaringAbes'eligibilitytothepositionofmayor. LacunacontendsthattherestorationofAbes'civilandpol.rightsdidnotretroacttoremovethedisqualification existinganteriortothegrantofthepardon.

ISSUE:W/Naplenarypardon,grantedafterelectionbutbeforethedatefixedbylawforassumingoffice,had theeffectofremovingthedisqualificationsprescribedbyboththecriminalandelectoralcodes. HELD: YES. The view consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's effects should not be unnecessarilylimitedasitwouldleadtotheimpairmentofthepardoningpower,whichwasnotcontemplatedin theConstitution(Cristobalv.Labrador;Pelobellov.Palatino;Mijaresv.Custorio). Aslaiddowninthe Pelobello case,"xxxsubjecttothelimitationsimposedbytheConstitution,the pardoningpowercannotberestrictedorcontrolledbylegislativeaction;thatanabsolutepardonnotonlyblots outthecrimecommittedbutremovesalldisabilitiesresultingfromconviction;andthatwhengrantedafterthe termofimprisonmenthasexpired,absolutepardon removesallthatisleftoftheconsequencesofconviction. ThusthebetterviewisnottounnecessarilyrestrictorimpairthepoweroftheChiefExecutivewho,afterinquiry intotheenvironmentalfacts,shouldbeatlibertytoatonetherigidityoflawtotheextentofrelievingcompletely thepartyorpartiesconcernedfromtheaccessoryandresultantdisabilitiesofcriminalconviction.Adapted.

In Monsanto vs Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, where a woman who was convicted of estafa through falsificationofpublicdocumentswasgrantedanabsolutepardon,andthereafterclaimedshewasentitledasa consequencetoreinstatementasassistantcitytreasurer,theSCheldthatapardoncannotmasktheactsconsti tutingthecrime.Theseare"historicalfacts"which,despitethepublicmanifestationofmercyandforgiveness implicitinpardon,"ordinary,prudentmenwilltakeintoaccountintheirsubsequentdealingswiththeactor." Pardongrantedafterconvictionfreestheindividualfromallpenaltiesandlegaldisabilitiesandrestoreshimto allhiscivilrights.Butunlessexpresslygroundedontheperson'sinnocence,itcannotbringbacklostreputation forhonesty,integrityandfairdealing. Thismustbeconstantlykeptinmind,lestwelosetrackofthetrue characterandpurposeoftheprivilege. Thus,pardondoesnot ipsofacto restoreaconvictedfelontopublic office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction, although such pardon undoubtedly restoreshiseligibilityforappointmenttothatoffice.

MonsantovsFactoran,170SCRA190 APardonedConvictisnotEntitledtoReinstatementtoaPublicOffice. F:
Petitioner Salvacion Monsanto was Asst. Treasurer of Calbayog City. She was convicted of estafa thru falsificationofpublicdocumentsandsentencedto4yrs.,2mos.and1dayofprisioncorrecional,asminimum,to10yrs. and1dayofprisionmayor,asmaximum;topayfine(P3,500)andtoindemnifythegovt(P4,892.50)inadecisionofthe SB.WhilehercasewaspendingappealintheSC,shewasgrantedabsolutepardonand"restoredtofullcivilandpolitical rights"bythenPres.Marcos.TheMinistryofFinanceagreedtoreinstateherw/onecessityofanewappointmentprovided thiswasdonenotearlierthanthedateofherpardon.However,on4/15/86,thenewadministrationheldthatshewasnot entitledtoautomaticreinstatementonthebasisofthepardongrantedher.AsherMFRwasdenied,petitionerbroughtthis actiontotheSC.Petitioner'stheoryisthatthegen.ruleonpardondoesnotapplytoherbec.shewasextendedclemency whilehercasewasstillpendingintheSC.Shecontendedthatw/ofinaljudgmentonconviction,theaccessorypenaltyof forfeitureofofficedidnotattach.

HELD:(1)Petitionerwasgrantedpardonunderthe1973Consti.,asamended,w/c,bydeletingtherequirement that pardon could be granted only after final conviction, impliedly authorized it to be granted even before conviction.The1987Consti.revertedtotheformerrule,requiringfinalconvictionasaconditionforthegrant bythePres.ofpardon.However,itisimmaterialwhenthepardonwasgranted,fortheresultwouldbethesame. Byacceptingthepardon,thepetitionerisdeemedtohaveabondonedherappeal,w/theresultthatthejudgment of conviction of the SB (w/c entailed her temporary absolute disqualification from holding public office) becamefinal. (2)ThemoderntrendofauthoritiesrejecttheundulybroadlanguageofExParteGarland,4Wall.333 (1867)totheeffectthatintheeyesofthelaw,theoffenderwhoispardonedisasinnocentasifhehadnever committedtheoffense.Whilewearepreparedtoconcedethatpardonmayremitallthepenalconsequencesofa criminalindictmentifonlytogivemeaningtothefiatthatapardon,beingapresidentialprerogative,shouldnot becircumscribedbylegislativeaction,wedonotsubscribetotheviewthatpardonblotsouttheguiltofan

individualandthatonceheisabsolved,heshouldbetreatedasifhewereinnocent.Forwhatevermayhavebeen thejudicialdictainthepast,wecannotperceivehowpardoncanproducesuch"moralchanges"astoequatea pardonedconvictincharacterandconductw/onewhohasconstantlymaintainedthemarkofagood,law abidingcitizen.Accordingly,pardondoesnotipsofactorestorehimtopublicofficemayhavebeenforfeitedby reasonoftheconviction,althoughsuchpardonundoubtedlyrestoreshiseligibilityforappointmenttothatoffice. Petitioner may apply for reappointment but, in considering her qualifications, the facts constituting her convictionshouldbetakenintoaccounttodeterminewhethershecanagainbeentrustedw/publicfunds. (3)Norcanpetitionerbeexemptedfromthepaymentofthecivilindemnity.Itsubsistsnotwithstanding serviceofsentence,ifforanyreasonthesentenceisnotservedbypardon,amnestyorcommutationofsentence. VV. Notes on the case: "Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilitiesandrestoreshimtoallhiscivilrights.Butunlessexpresslygroundedontheperson'sinnocence(w/c israre),itcannotbringbacklostreputationforhonesty,integrityandfairdealing.Thismustbeconstantlykept inmindlestwelosetrackofthetruecharacterandpurposeoftheprivilege.xxx"

(e)Sanctionsforviolationsofconditionalpardon TorresvsGonzales152SCRA272 In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breachedtheconditionsofhispardon,theExecutiveDept.has2options:(i)toproceedagainsthimunderSec. 64(i),RAC;or(ii)toproceedagainsthimunderArt.159,RPCwhichimposesthepenaltyof prisioncorrec cional minimumperiod,uponaconvictwhohavingbeengrantedconditionalpardonbytheChiefExecutive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitionerundertheRAC.Thatchoiceisanexerciseoftheexecutiveprerogativeandnotsubjecttojudicial scrutiny.

(f)Doespardoningpowerapplytoadministrativecases?

LlamasvsExecutiveSecretary,202SCRA844(1991) "Conviction"maybeusedineitheracriminalcaseorinanadministrativecase. F: Pet.LlamaswasViceGov.ofTarlacwhoassumedthepositionofgov.whenGov.Ocampowasfound guiltybyDILGofaviol.ofRA3019andmetedapenaltyof90dayssuspension.Administrativeconvictionwas basedoncomplaintfiledbypetitionersandotherschargingOcampow/executingloanagreementw/Lingkod Tarlac Foundation for the amount of P20M, w/c is a nonstock and nonprofit org. headed by the gov. as chairman and his brotherinlaw as executive director, trustee and secretary. Loan was claimed to be disadvantageoustothegovt. MFRbyOcampowasdeniedbyDILG. On3/19/91,Ocampoissued"admin.

order"whereinhesignifiedintentiontocontinueinofficeathisresidenceinthebeliefthatpendencyofappeal totheExec.Sec.precludedfinalityasexecutoryoftheDILGorder. W/orulingontheMFR,theExec.Sec. issued a resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo. Llamas filed petition claiming that executive clemencycouldonlybegrantedbythePres.incrim.cases,notinadmin.cases. HELD: Accordingtopetitioner,"afterconvictionbyfinaljudgment"appliessolelytocrim.cases." But,he himselfdescribesthegovernorasone"convictedinanadmin.case"andthusactuallyconcedesthat"conviction" maybeusedeitherinacrim.oradmin.case.TheConst.doesnotdistinguishbet.w/ccasesexecutiveclemency maybeexercisedbythePres.,w/thesoleexclusionofimpeachmentcases. If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminalcases,withmuchmorereasoncanshegrantexecutiveclemencyinadministrativecases,whichare clearlylessseriousthancriminaloffenses.However,thepowerofthePresidenttograntexecutiveclemencyin administrative casesrefersonly toadministrative casesin theExecutive branchand not intheJudicial or Legislativebranchesofthegovt. UnderthedoctrineofQualifiedPoliticalAgency,thedifferentExecutivedepartmentsaremereadjuncts ofthePresident.TheiractsarepresumptivelytheactsofthePresidentuntilcountermandedorreprobatedby her. In this case, the President in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may substitute herdecision forthatof hersubordinate. Itis clearly within thepowerof the Presidentnotonlytogrant"executiveclemency"butalsotoreverseormodifyarulingissuedbyasubordinate againstanerringpublicofficial,whereareconsiderationofthefactsallegedwouldsupportthesame.Itisin thissensethattheallegedexecutiveclemencywasgranted.Adapted.

Sec.53,Chapter7,SubtitleA,TitleI,BookV,AdministrativeCodeof1987 Sec. 53. Removal of Administrative Penalties or Disabilities. In meritorious cases and upon recommendationofthe(CivilService)Commission,thePresidentmaycommuteorremoveadministrative penaltiesordisabilitiesimposeduponofficersoremployeesindisciplinarycases,subjecttosuchterms andconditionsashemayimposeintheinterestoftheservice

(g)Whomayavailofamnesty? TolentinovsCatoy82Phil300(1948) F:
PetitionerwasaHukbalahapwhowasfoundguiltyofillegalassemblyinfurtheranceoftheHukbalahapdesigns. Afterthejudgmentwaspromulgated,thePresidentissuedProc.No.76grantingamnestytoleadersandmembersofthe Hukbalahap.Petitionerwhowasalreadyservinghissentence,sentapetitiontothePresidentforhisreleaseunderthe provisionsoftheproclamation.Noactionwastakenonhispetition.Hethenwenttocourtandfiledanapplicationfora writofhabeascorpus.

HELD:ThoughsomemembersoftheCourtquestiontheapplicabilityofAmnestyProclamationNo.76to Hukbalahapsalreadyundergoingsentenceuponthedateofitspromulgation,themajorityoftheCourtbelieve

thatbyitscontextandpervadingspirittheproclamationextendstoallmembersoftheHukbalahap.Itmakesno exception when it announces that the amnesty is proclaimed in favor of the leaders and members of the associations knownastheHukbalahap and Pambansang Kaisahan ngMagbubukid (PKM). Nocompelling reasonisapparentforexcludingHukbalahapsofanyclassorconditionfromitsobjectwhichis"toforgiveand foregotheprosecutionofthecrimes ofrebellion,sedition,etc."Iftotalpunishment isforegoneinfavorof Hukbalahapswhosucceededinevadingarrest,itstandstoreasonthatthosewhofellintotheclutchesofthelaw haveabetterclaimtoclemencyfortheremainingportionofapunishmentfixedforthesameoffense. The avowed practical objective of the amnesty is to secure pledge of loyalty and obedience to the constitutedauthoritiesandencourageresumptionoflawfulpursuitsandoccupation.Thisobjectivecannotbe expectedtomeetwithfullsuccesswithoutthegoodwillandcooperationoftheHukbalahapswhohavebecome moreembitteredbytheircapture,prosecutionandincarceration. Fundamentally and in their utmost effect, pardon and amnesty are synonymous. Pardon includes amnesty.Pardonandamnestyarebothconstruedmoststrictlyagainstthestate.Adapted.

MacagaanvsPeople152SCRA430 Petitioners were charged and convicted of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documentsbytheSandiganbayan.TheyclaimedthattheyhadbeengrantedamnestybyPresidentMarcos.The SandiganbayanclaimedthatthebenefitsofamnestywereneveravailabletopetitionersunderPD1182.TheSC agreedwiththeSandiganbayanthatinfactthepetitionerswereexpresslydisqualifiedfromamnesty.Theactsfor which they were convicted were ordinary crimes without any political complexion and consisting only of diversionofpublicfundstoprivateprofit.Theamnestyproclamationcoveredonlyactsinthefurtheranceof resistancetodulyconstitutedauthoritiesoftheRepublic.

BARLONGAYCASE: Veravs.People,7SCRA152(1963) Amnestycannotbeinvoked,wheretheaccusedactuallydeniesthecommissionoftheoffensecharged. F:

IntheCFIQuezon,petitionersVera,amongothers,werechargedw/thecomplexcrimeofkidnappingw/murder ofAmadeoLozanes.Uponpetitioners'motion,invokingthebenefitsofAmnestyProcl.ofthePres,s.of1946,thecase wasreferredtotheEightGuerrillaAmnestyCommission,w/cactuallytriedit.Duringthehearing,noneofthepetitioners admittedhavingcommittedthecrimecharged.Infact,Vera,theonlydef.whotookthewitnessstand,insteadofadmitting thekillingofthedeceasedLozanes,categoricallydeniedit.Hence,theCommission,initsdecisionheldthatitcouldnot takecognizanceofthecase,onthegroundthatthebenefitsoftheAmnestyProcl.,couldbeinvokedonlybydefs.ina criminalcasewho,admittingthecommissionofthecrime,pleadthatsaidcommissionwasinpursuanceoftheresistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commissionorderedthatthecaseberemandedtothecourtoforiginfortrial.AMFRwasfiledbypetitionersbutwas denied.FromthisorderoftheCommission,petitionersappealedtotheCAw/ccertifiedtheappealtous,inviewofthe legalissueinvolved.

ISSUE:W/npersonsinvokingthebenefitofamnestyshouldfirstadmithavingcommittedthecrimeofw/cthey

areaccused. PetitionerscontendthattobeentitledtothebenefitsofAmnestyProcl.No.8,itisnotnecessaryfor themtoadmitthecommissionofthecrimecharged,citinginsupportoftheirsubmission,amongothers,the caseofBarrioquinto,et.alvs.Fernandez,et,al.(82P642.)totheeffectthat"inordertoentitleapersontothe benefitsofAmnestyProcl.,itisnotnecessarythatheshould,asaconditionprecedent,admithavingcommitted thecriminalactoroffensew/w/cheischarged,andallegetheamnestyasadefense;itissufficientthatthe evidence,eitherofthecomplainantortheaccused,showsthattheoffensecommittedcomesw/inthetermsof saidAmnestyProcl. HELD: ButsaidcaseshavebeensupersededanddeemedoverruledbythesubsequentcasesofPeo.vs.Llanita, et.al.(86P219),etc.whereinweheldthat
"Itisrankinconsistencyforappellanttojustifyanactorseekforgivenessforanact,accordingto him,hehasnotcommitted. Amnestypresupposesthecommissionofacrime,andwhenanaccused maintainsthathehasnotcommittedacrime,hecannothaveanyuseforamnesty. Whereanamnesty procl.imposescertainconditions,asinthiscase,itisincumbentupontheaccusedtoprovetheexistence ofsuchconditions. Theinvocationofamnestyisinthenatureofapleaofconfessionandavoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on accountofinterveningfactswhich,ifproved,wouldbringthecrimechargedwithinthescopeofthe amnestyproclamation."(italicssupplied.)

Atanyrate,thefactsestablished bef.theCommissiondonotbringthecasew/inthetermsofthe AmnestyProcl.xxxAsfoundbytheCommission,thekillingofthedeceased(Lozanes)wasnotinfurtherance oftheresistancemovement,butduetotherivalrybet.theHunter'sGuerrilla,tow/chebelonged,andtheVera's Guerrillaofpetitioners.RAM.

(8)Powersascommanderinchief Art.VII,Sec.18. ThePresidentshallbetheCommanderinChiefofallarmedforcesofthe Philippines,andwheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppress lawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Incaseofinvasionorrebellion,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit, hemay,foraperiodnotexceedingsixtydays,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusorplace thePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.Withinfortyeighthoursfromtheproclamationof martiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,thePresidentshallsubmita reportinpersonor inwriting totheCongress. TheCongress, votingjointly,byavoteofatleasta majorityofallitsMembersinregularorspecialsession,mayrevokesuchproclamationorsuspension, whichrevocationshallnotbesetasidebythePresident.UpontheinitiativeofthePresident,theCongress may,inthesamemanner,extendsuchproclamationorsuspensionforaperiodtobedeterminedbythe Congress,iftheinvasionorrebellionshallpersistandpublicsafetyrequiresit. TheCongress,ifnotinsession,shallwithintwentyfourhoursfollowingsuchproclamationor suspension,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacall.

TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiency ofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritorthe extensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioningofthecivilcourtsorlegislativeassemblies,norauthorizetheconfermentofjurisdictionon military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspendtheprivilegeofthewrit. Thesuspension of theprivilegeshallapplyonlytopersons judicially chargedforrebellion or offensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion. Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbe judiciallychargedwithinthreedays,otherwiseheshallbereleased. Art.III,Sec.13.Allpersons,exceptthosechargedwithoffensespunishablebyreclusionperpetua whentheevidence ofguildisstrong,shall,beforeconviction, be bailable bysufficient sureties, orbe releasedonrecognizanceasmaybeprovidedbylaw.Therighttobailshallnotbeimpairedevenwhen theprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusissuspended.Excessivebailshallnotberequired. Art.VIII,Sec.1.xxx Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolving rightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeena grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentalityoftheGovernment.

AsCommanderinChiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippines,thePresidenthasthefollowingpowers: a.Hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion. b.Hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,or c.HemayproclaimmartiallawovertheentirePhilippinesoranypartthereof. Subjectto:Art.VIII,Sec.1par.2.Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactual controversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornot therehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranch orinstrumentalityoftheGovt. CallouttheAFPtopreventlawlessviolence Thisismerelyapolicemeasuremeanttoquelldisorder.Assuch,theConstitutiondoesnotregulateits

exerciseradically

Suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus A"writofhabeascorpus"isanorderfromthecourtcommandingadetainingofficertoinformthecourt (i)ifhehasthepersonincustody,and(ii)whathisbasisindetainingthatperson. The"privilegeofthewrit"isthatportionofthewritrequiringthedetainingofficertoshowcausewhy heshouldnotbetested.Notethatitistheprivilegethatissuspended,notthewrititself. Requisites: 1.Theremustbeaninvasionorrebellion,and 2.Thepublicsafetyrequiresthesuspension. Effectsofthesuspensionoftheprivilege 1.Thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritappliesonlytopersons"judiciallycharged"forrebellionor offensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.5).Suchpersonssuspectedofthe abovecrimescanbearrestedanddetainedwithoutawarrantofarrest. "Judiciallycharged"asusedintheConstitutionisimprecise.Forifonewerealreadyjudiciallycharged, hisdetentionwouldbelegalandsohecouldnolongerpetitionfor habeascorpus. Habeascorpus precisely contemplatesasituationinwhichapersonisbeingdetainedwithoutbeingchargedincourt.Thus,theprovision shouldread"onewhoissuspectedofcomplicityin"thetwocrimesabove. Asageneralrule,nopersoncouldbearrestedwithoutawarrantofarrest(validlyissuedupon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmationofthecomplainantandthewitnesses,(cf.Art.III,Sec.2),unless(i)thearrestwas madeinconnectionwithacrimecommittedinthepresenceofthedetainingofficer,or(ii)the privilegeofthewritwassuspended. Ifthepublicofficerarrestshimwithoutawarrant,the officerbecomesliablefor"arbitrarydetention"underArt.124oftheRPC,andapetitionfor habeascorpuscanbefiledtoseekhisrelease. Thesuspensionoftheprivilegedoesnotmakethearrestwithoutwarrantlegal.Butthemilitaryis,in effect, enabled to make the arrest, anyway since, with the suspension of the privilege, there is no remedy available against suchunlawful arrest(arbitrary detention). The arrestwithout warrant is justified by the emergencysituationandthedifficultyinapplyingforawarrantconsideringthetimeandthenumberofpersons tobearrested. Butthecrimeforwhichheisarrestedmustbeonerelatedtorebellionortheinvasion. Astoother

crimes,thesuspensionoftheprivilegedoesnotapply. 2. Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbe judiciallychargedwithin3days,orotherwiseheshallbereleased.(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.6). Inotherwords,thepublicofficercandetainapersonwithoutwarrantofarrest,buthecanonlydosofor 72hours.Beforethelapseof72hours,aninformationmusthavebeenfiledinthepropercourtcharginghimof the offense for which he was arrested. Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the detainee wants a preliminaryinvestigationtobefirstconductedbythefiscal,hemustsignawaiveroftheeffectsofArt.125. (delayinthedeliveryofdetainedpersons) Theeffectofthesuspensionoftheprivilege,therefore,isonlytoextendtheperiodsduringwhichhecan bedetainedwithoutawarrant.UnderArt.125,asamendedbyEO272,thepublicofficercanonlydetainhim for12,18or36hoursdependingonthegravityoftheoffenseofwhichheischarged;withinthistime,hemust bejudiciallycharged,otherwise,hemustbereleased.Whentheprivilegeissuspended,theperiodisextendedto 72hours. Whathappensifheisnotjudiciallychargednorreleasedafter72hours?Thepublicofficerbecomes liableunderArt.125for"delayinthedeliveryofdetainedpersons."Astothedetainee,itissubmittedthatheor someoneelseinhisbehalfcanfileapetitionforhabeascorpus.Forevenifthesuspensionhasalifetimeof60 daysingeneral,astothatperson,thesuspensiononlyhasaneffectivityof72hours,sothatafterthistime,the suspensionisliftedastohim. 3. Therighttobailshallnotbeimpairedevenwhentheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusis suspended.(Art.III,Sec.13) Art.III,Sec.13.xxxTherighttobailshallnotbeimpairedevenwhentheprivilegeofthewritofHCis suspended.Excessivebailshallnotberequired. ThisnewprovisionabrogatestherulinginMoralesvPonceEnrilewhichheldthecontrary. ProclaimMartialLaw Requisites: 1.Theremustbeaninvasionorrebellion,and 2.PublicsafetyrequirestheproclamationofmartiallawalloverthePhilippinesoranypartthereof.

Effectsoftheproclamationofmartiallaw ThePresidentcan: 1.Legislate

2.Orderthearrestofpeoplewhoobstructthewareffort. Butthefollowingcannotbedone(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.4) 1.SuspendtheoperationoftheConstitution. 2.Supplantthefunctioningofthecivilcourtsandthelegislativeassemblies. Theprincipleisthatmartiallawisproclaimedonlybecausethecourtsandothercivilinstitutionslike Congresshavebeenshutdown.Itshouldnothappenthatmartiallawisdeclaredinordertoshutdownthecivil institutions. 3.Conferjurisdictionuponmilitarycourtsandagenciesovercivilians,wherecivilcourtsareunableto function. Thisisthe"opencourt"doctrinewhichholdsthatcivilianscannotbetriedbymilitarycourtsifthecivil courtsareopenandfunctioning.Butifthecivilcourtsarenotfunctioning,thencivilianscanbetriedbythe militarycourts. Martiallawsusuallycontemplatesacasewherethecourtsarealreadyclosedandthecivil institutionshavealreadycrumbled,thatisa"theaterofwar."Ifthecourtsarestillopen,thePresidentcanjust suspendtheprivilegeandachievethesameeffect. 4.Automaticallysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus. Thisoverrulestheholdingin Aquino v PonceEnrile,59SCRA183(1974),thatwhenthePresident proclaimsmartiallaw,healsoimpliedlysuspendstheprivilegeofthewrit. Underthepresentrule,thePresidentcanstillsuspendtheprivilegeevenasheproclaimmartiallaw,but hemustsosuspendexpressly. TheRoleofCongress a.WhenthePresidentproclaimsmartiallaworsuspendstheprivilegeofthewrit,suchproclamationor suspensionshallbeeffectiveforaperiodof60days,unlesssoonerrevokedbytheCongress. b.Uponsuchproclamationorsuspension,Congressshallconveneatonce.Ifitisnotinsession,itshall convene inaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacall within24hoursfollowingtheproclamation or suspension. c.Within48hoursfromtheproclamationorthesuspension,thePresidentshallsubmitareport,in personorinwriting,totheCongress(meetinginjointsessionoftheactionhehastaken). d.TheCongressshallthenvotejointly,byanabsolutemajority.Ithastwooptions: (i)Torevokesuchproclamationorsuspension.

Whenitsorevokes,thePresidentcannotsetaside(orveto)therevocationashenormallywoulddoin thecaseofbills.IfCongressdoesnotdoanything,themeasurewillexpireanywayin60days.Sotherevoca tionmustbemadebeforethelapseof60daysfromthedatethemeasurewastaken. (ii)Toextenditbeyondthe60dayperiodofitsvalidity. CongresscanonlysoextendtheproclamationorsuspensionupontheinitiativeofthePresident. Theperiodneednotbe60days;itcouldbemore,asCongresswoulddetermine,basedonthe persistenceoftheemergency.IfCongressfailstoactbeforethemeasureexpires,itcannolonger extendituntilthePresidentagainredeclaresthemeasure,forhowdooneextendsomethingthat hasalreadylapsed? NotethatCongresscannot"validate"theproclamationorsuspension,becauseitisalreadyvalid. Itisthusrestrictedtothe2measuresabove. IfCongressextendsthemeasure,butbeforetheperiodofextensionlapses,therequirementsforthe proclamationorsuspensionnolongerexist,Congresscanlifttheextension,sincethepowertoconferimpliesthe powertotakeback.IfCongressdoesnotrevieworlifttheorder,thiscanbereviewedbytheSupremeCourt pursuanttothenextsection.

TheRoleoftheSupremeCourt TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfilledbyanycitizen,thesufficiencyofthe factualbasisof(a)theproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,or(b)the extensionthereof.Itmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithin30daysfromitsfiling.(Art.VII,Sec.18par. 3) Thisisbecausejudicialpowerincludesthedutytodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagrave abuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityofthe Government.(Art.VIII,Sec.1,par.2) ThejurisdictionoftheSCmaybeinvokedinapropercase.Apetitionforhabeascorpusisonesuch case.Whenapersonisarrestedwithoutawarrantforcomplicityintherebellionorinvasion,heorsomeoneelse inhisbehalfhasthestandingtoquestionthevalidityoftheproclamationorsuspension.ButbeforetheSCcan decideonthelegalityofhisdetention,itmustfirstpassuponthevalidityoftheproclamationorsuspension. ThetesttobeusedbytheSupremeCourtinsoreviewingtheactofthePresidentinproclaimingor suspending, or the act of Congress in extending, is the test of arbitrariness which seeks to determine the sufficiencyofthefactualbasisofthemeasure. ThequestionisnotwhetherthePresidentorCongressacted correctly,butwhetherheactedarbitrarilyinthattheactionhadnobasisinfact. Decidingonwhethertheactwasarbitraryamountstoadeterminationofwhetherornottherewasgrave abuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction,whichisnowmadepartofjudicialpowerbyArt.

VIII,Sec.1,par.2.Thiscurbsradicallytheapplicationofthepoliticalquestiondoctrine. ThistestwastakenfromthecaseofLansangvGarcia,42SCRA446(1971).Theissuethereraisedwas whetherinsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritin1971,Marcoshadabasisfordoingso.TheSC,inconsidering thefactthatthePresidentbasedhisdecisionon(a)theSenatereportontheconditioninCentralLuzonand(b)a closeddoorbriefingbythemilitaryshowingtheextentofsubversion,concludedthatthePresidentdidnotact arbitrarily.Onemaydisagreewithhisappreciationofthefacts,butonecannotsaythatitiswithoutbasis. [InthiscaseofLansangvs.Garcia,theSCheldunanimouslythatithastheauthoritytoinquireintothe existenceofthefactualbasisinordertodeterminetheconstitutionalsufficiencythereof.ThisholdingoftheSC isnowfoundinArt.VII,Sec.18,par.3.] Withthistestandthenewprovisionsinthe1987Constitution,thecaseofGarciaPadillavPonceEnrile, 121SCRA 472(1983), is, at last, overruled, and may it be so always. In that case, the SC held that the President'sproclamationofmartiallawisbeyondjudicialreview,andthatthecitizencanonlytrustthatthe Presidentactsingoodfaith.ThecasesofBarcelonvBakerandMontenegrovCastaneda,whichruledthatthe validityofthesuspensionoftheprivilegewasapoliticalquestion,arelikewiseburiedinthegraveofjudicial history.

Thereare4ways,then,fortheproclamationorsuspensiontobelifted: 1)LiftingbythePresidenthimself 2)RevocationbyCongress 3)NullificationbytheSupremeCourt 4)Operationoflawafter60days MilitaryTrialofCiviliansVoidEvenUnderMartialLaw,IfCivilCourtsAreOpen.(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.5.). InAquinovsMilitaryCommission No.2,63SCRA546,theSCupheldthepowerofthePresidentto createmilitarytribunalsauthorizedtotrynotonlymilitarypersonnelbutalsociviliansevenifatthattimecivil courtswereopenandfunctioning,thusrejectingthe"opencourt"theory. TheSCthereheld: "Martiallaw createsanexceptiontothegeneralruleofexclusivesubjectiontotheciviljurisdiction,andrendersoffenses againstthelawsofwar,aswellasthoseofacivilcharacter,triablebymilitarytribunals.Publicdangerwarrants thesubstitutionofexecutiveprocessforjudicialprocess.Theimmunityofciviliansfrommilitaryjurisdiction, must,however,givewayinareasgovernedbymartiallaw.xxx In the case of Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, the Aquino vs. Military Commission No.2decision wasreversed. AccordingtotheSC,civilians whoareplacedontrialforcivil offensesundergenerallawareentitledtotrialbyjudicialprocess.Sincewearenotenemyoccupiedterritory norareweunderamilitarygovt.andevenonthepremisethatmartiallawcontinuesinforce,themilitary tribunals cannottryandexercisejurisdictionovercivilians forciviloffensescommitted bythemwhichare properlycognizable bythecivilcourtsthathaveremained openandhavebeenregularlyfunctioning. The assertionofmilitaryauthorityovercivilianscannotrestonthePresident'spowerasCommanderinChieforon anytheoryofmartiallaw.Aslongascivilcourtsremainopenandareregularlyfunctioning,militarytribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly

cognizablebycivilcourts.Toholdotherwiseisaviolationoftherighttodueprocess. "Thepresidingofficeratacourtmartialisnotajudgewhoseobjectivityandindependenceareprotected bytenureandundiminshedsalaryandnurturedbythejudicialtradition,butisamilitaryofficer.Substantially differentrulesofevidenceandprocedureapplyinmilitarytrials.Apartfromthesedifferences,thesuggestionof the possibility of influence on the actions of the courtmartial by the officer who convenes it, selects its membersandthecounselonbothsides,andwhousuallyhasdirectcommandandauthorityoveritsmembersis apervasiveoneinmilitarylaws,despitestrenuouseffortstoeliminatethedanger.

(9)Emergencypowers Art.VI,Sec.23.xxx (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress, may, by law, authorize the President,foralimitedperiod,andsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowers necessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.Unlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionof theCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof.

ThisgrantofemergencypowertothePresidentisdifferentfromtheCommanderinChiefclause.When thePresidentactsundertheCommanderinChiefclause,heactsunderaconstitutionalgrantofmilitarypower, whichmayincludethelawmakingpower. ButwhenthePresidentactsundertheemergencypower,heacts underaCongressionaldelegationoflawmakingpower. Thescopeofthegrantissuch"powersnecessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy." Under the 1935 Constitution, this was construed the power to issue rules and regulations to carry out the declaredpolicy. The1987Constitution,itissubmitted,doesnotchangethescope. "Powernecessaryand proper"shouldmeanlegislativepower,becauseCongressisonlyallowedtodelegatelegislativepower,beingits onlyinherentpower.ItsotherpowersareonlygrantedtoitbytheConstitution,andsoitcannotdelegatewhat hasonlybeendelegatedtoit. Thispoweris(1)foralimitedperiod,and(2)subjecttosuchrestrictionsasCongressmayprovide.The power ceases (a) upon being withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, or, if Congress fails to adopt such resolution,(b)uponthenext(voluntary)adjournmentofCongress.ForthefactthatCongressisabletomeetin sessionuninterruptedlyandadjournofitsownwillprovesthattheemergencynolongerexistsistojustifythe delegation. Thisruleortheterminationofthegrantofemergencypowersisbasedondecidedcases,whichinturn becameArt.VII,Sec.15ofthe1973Constitution.

InAranetavDinglasan,84Phil368(1949),theCongressgrantedthePresidentemergencypowersto fixrentalsofhouses.Afterthewar,Congressheldaspecialsession.TheSCheldthattheemergencypower lastedonlyuntilCongresshelditsregularsession.ThefactthatCongresscouldnowmeetmeantthattherewas

noemergencyanymorethatwouldjustifythedelegation. InthecasesofRodriguezvTreasurero,involvingthelawmadebyPres.Quirinoappropriatingthesum ofmoneyfortheoperationofthegovernment; Barredo v COMELEC,involvinganotherlawmadebyPres. Quirinoappropriatinganamounttodefraytheexpensesforanelection,andGuevarravCollectorofCustoms, involvingaregulationofexport,theSCheldthattheemergencypowerthatenabledthePresidenttolegislate ceasedthemomentCongresscouldmeetinregularsession. Attheveryleast,saidtheSCin Rodriguez v Gella,92Phil603(1953),itshouldceaseuponthe approvalofaresolutionbyCongressterminatingsuchgrant.Inthiscase,theCongressenactedabillprecisely terminatingthegrantofemergencypower,butthiswasvetoedbythePresident.TheSCruledthatthevetoed billshouldbedeemedaresolutionthatterminatesthegrant.

AranetavDinglasan,84Phil368(1949) F:
ThepetitionschallengethevalidityofEOsofthePres.avowedlyissuedinvirtueofCA671.Theyresttheircase chieflyonthepropositionthattheEmergencyPowersAct(CA671)hasceasedtohaveanyforceandeffect.

HELD:CA671becameinoperativewhenCongressmetinregularsessionon5/25/46,andtheEOswereissued w/oauthorityoflaw. CA671doesnotintermfixthedurationofitseffectiveness.TheintentionoftheActhastobesought forinitsnature,theobjecttobeaccomplished,thepurposetobesubserved,anditsrelationtotheConsti. Art.VIofthe1935Consti.providesthatanylawpassedbyvirtuethereofshouldbe"foralimited period."Thewords"limitedperiod"arebeyondquestionintendedtomeanrestrictiveinduration.Emergency, inordertojustify thedelegationofemergencypowers, "mustbe temporaryoritcan notbesaid tobean emergency." ItistobepresumedthatCA671wasapprovedw/thislimitationinview.Theoppositetheorywould makethelawrepugnanttotheConsti.,andiscontrarytotheprinciplethatthelegislatureisdeemedtohavefull knowledgeoftheconstitutionalscopeofitspowers.Theassertionthatnewlegislationisneededtorepealthe actwouldnotbeinharmonyw/theConsti.either.Ifanewanddifferentlawwerenecessarytoterminatethe delegation,theperiodforthedelegationwouldbeunlimited,indefinite,negativeanduncertain;"thatw/cwas intendedtomeetatemporaryemergencymaybecomepermanentlaw,"forCongressmightnotenacttherepeal, andevenifitwould,therepealmightnotmeetw/theapprovalofthePres.,andtheCongressmightnotbeable tooverridetheveto.Further,thiswouldcreatetheanomalythat,whileCongressmightdelegateitspowersby simplemajority,itmightnotbeabletorecallthemexceptbya2/3vote.xxx.RAM.

RodriguezvGella,92Phil603(1953) F:
On12/16/41,CA671wasapproveddeclaringastateoftotalemergencyasaresultofwarinvolvingthePhils.and authorizingthePres.topromulgaterulesandregulationstomeetsuchemergency." In1949,theSCdecidedthatsaid emergencypowersceasedasearlyas1945.Here,theissueagainisw/nCA671isstilleffective.Itappearsthatin1952,

thePres.issuedEOs545and546(forappropriationoffundsforpublicworksandforreliefintheprovincesandcities visitedbytyphoons,floods,etc.) TheCongresspassedHouseBill727declaringthat"washaslongended"andthatthe"needforthegrantofsuch unusualpowerstothePres.hasdisappeared,"andforthatreason,CongressrepealedalltheEmergencyPowersActsofthe Pres.However,thiswasvetoedbythePres. PetitionersseektoinvalidatesaidEOs.

HELD:AlthoughHouseBill727,hasbeenvetoedbythePres.anddidnottherebybecomearegularstatute,it mayatleastbeconsideredasaconcurrentresolutionoftheCongressformallydeclaringtheterminationofthe emergencypowers.TocontendthattheBillneededpresidentialacquiescencetoproduceeffect,wouldleadto theanomalous,ifnotabsurdsituationthat,"whileCongresswhiledelegateitspowersbyasimplemajority,it mightnotbeabletorecallthemexceptby2/3vote.xxxAdapted. Barlongay:Noticetheapparentinconsistencybet.theConstitutionandthecases.TheConsti.[Art.VI,Sec.23 (2)] states that the emergency powers shall cease upon the next adjournment of Congress unless sooner withdrawnbyresolutionofCongresswhereasthecasestellusthattheemergencypowersshallcease upon resumptionofsession.Toreconcilethetwo,IbelievethatitwouldnotbeenoughforCongresstojustresume sessioninorderthattheemergencypowersshallcease.Ithastopassaresolutionwithdrawingsuchemergency powers,otherwisesuchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentofCongress.

(10)Contractingandguaranteeingforeignloans Art.VII,Sec.20.ThePresidentmaycontractorguaranteeforeignloansonbehalfoftheRepublic ofthePhilippineswiththepriorconcurrenceoftheMonetaryBoard,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsas maybeprovidedbylaw.TheMonetaryBoardshall,withinthirtydaysfromtheendofeveryquarterof thecalendaryear,submittoCongressacompletereportofitsdecisionsonapplicationsforloanstobe contractedorguaranteedbytheGovernment,orgovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations,which wouldhavetheeffectofincreasingtheforeigndebt,andcontainingothermattersprovidedbylaw.

Art.XII,Sec.21.Foreignloansmayonlybeincurredinaccordancewithlawandtheregulationof themonetaryauthority.InformationonforeignloansobtainedorguaranteedbytheGovernmentshallbe madeavailabletothepublic.

RepublicAct4860

ANACTAUTHORIZINGTHEPRESIDENTOFTHEPHILIPPINESTOOBTAINSUCHFOREIGNLOANS ANDCREDITS,ORTOINCURSUCHFOREIGNINDEBTEDNESS,ASMAYBENECESSARYTOFINANCE APPROVEDECONOMICDEVELOPMENTPURPOSESORPROJECTS,ANDTOGUARANTEE,INBEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN LOANS OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY

CORPORATIONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR PURPOSES OF RE LENDINGTOTHEPRIVATESECTOR,APPROPRIATINGTHENECESSARYFUNDSTHEREFORE,AND FOROTHERPURPOSES. BeitenactedbytheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesofthePhilippinesinCongressassembled: Sec.1.ThePresidentofthePhilippinesisherebyauthorizedinbehalfoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesto contract such loans, credits and indebtedness with foreign governments, agencies or instrumentalities of such foreigngovernments,foreignfinancialinstitutions,orotherinternationalorganizations,withwhom,orbelongingto countries with which, the Philippines has diplomatic relations, as maybe necessary and upon such terms and conditionsasmaybeagreedupon,toenabletheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinestofinance,either directly or through any government office, agency or instrumentality or any governmentowned or controlled corporation, industrial, agricultural or other economic development purposes or projects authorized by law: Provided,Thatatleastseventyfivepercentshallbespentforpurposesofprojectswhicharerevenueproducing and selfliquidating, such as electrification, irrigation, river control and drainage, telecommunication, housing, constructionandimprovementofhighwaysandbridges,airports,portsandharbors,schoolbuildings,waterworks andartesianwells,airnavigationfacilities,developmentoffishingindustry,andother:Provided,Thatsuchforeign loans shall be used to meet the foreign exchange requirements or liabilities incurred in connection with said developmentprojectstocoverthecostofequipment,relatedtechnicalservicesandsupplies,wherethesamearenot obtainablewithinthePhilippinesatcompetitivepricesaswellaspartofthepesocosts,otherthanworkingcapital andoperationalexpensesnotexceedingtwentypercentoftheloan:Provided,further,Thatinthecaseofroads, bridges,irrigation,portworks,rivercontrols,airportsandpower,theamountshallnotexceedseventypercentof theloan. TheauthorityofthePresidentofthePhilippinesashereinprovidedshallincludethepowertoissue,forthe purposeshereinbeforestated,bondsforsaleintheinternationalmarketstheincomefromwhichshallbefullytax exemptinthePhilippines. Sec.2.Thetotalamountofloans,creditsandindebtedness,excludinginterests,whichthePresidentofthe PhilippinesisauthorizedtoincurunderthisActshallnotexceedonebillionUnitedStatesdollarsoritsequivalentin otherforeigncurrenciesattheexchangerateprevailingatthetimetheloans,creditsandindebtednessareincurred: Provided,however,That thetotal loans, creditsand indebtednessincurredunderthisActshall notexceedtwo hundredfiftymillioninthefiscalyearoftheapprovalofthisAct,andtwohundredfiftymillioneveryfiscalyear thereafter,allinUnitedStatesdollarsoritsequivalentinothercurrencies. All loans, credits and indebtedness under the preceding section shall be incurred only for particular projects in accordance with the approved economic program of the Government and after the plans for such projectsshallhavebeenpreparedbytheofficesoragenciesconcerned,recommendedbytheNationalEconomic CouncilandtheMonetaryBoardoftheCentralBankofthePhilippines,andapprovedbythePresidentofthe Philippines. Sec.3. ThePresidentofthePhilippinesis,likewise,herebyauthorized,inbehalfoftheRepublicofthe Philippines,toguarantee,uponsuchtermsandconditionsasmaybeagreedupon,foreignloansextendeddirectly to,orbondsforsaleininternationalmarketsissuedby,corporationsownedorcontrolledbytheGovernmentofthe Philippinesforindustrial,agriculturalorothereconomicdevelopmentpurposesorprojectsauthorizedbylaw,such

asthosementionedinSectiononeofthisAct,includingtherehabilitationandmodernizationofthePhilippine NationalRailways,thecashcapitalrequirementsoftheLandBank,electrification,irrigation,rivercontroland drainage,telecommunication,housing,constructionand/orimprovementofhighways,housing,constructionand/or improvement of highways, airports, ports and harbors, school buildings, waterworks and artesian wells, air navigation, development of the fishing industry, iron and nickel exploitation and development, and others: Provided,Thatatleastseventyfivepercentshallbespentforpurposesorprojectswhicharerevenueproducing andselfliquidating. Theloans/orbondedindebtednessofgovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationswhich maybeguaranteedbythePresidentunderthisActshallincludethoseincurredbygovernmentownedorcontrolled financialinstitutionsforthepurposeofrelendingtotheprivatesectorandthetotalamountthereofshallnotbe morethanfivehundredmillionUnitedStatesdollarsoritsequivalentinotherforeigncurrenciesattheexchange rateprevailingatthetimetheguaranteeismade: Provided,Thatthegovernmentownedorcontrolledfinancial institutionsshallrelendtheproceedsofsuchloansand/orbondedindebtednesstoFilipinosortoFilipinoownedor controlledcorporationsandpartnerships,atleastsixtysixandtwothirdspercentumoftheoutstandingandpaid upcapitalofwhichisheldbyFilipinosatthetimetheloanisincurred,suchproportiontobemaintaineduntilsuch time as the loan is fully paid: Provided, however, That during anytime that any amount of the loan remains outstanding,failuretomeetwiththecapitalownershiprequirementshallmaketheentireloanimmediatelydueand demandable,togetherwithallpenaltiesandinterests,plusanadditionalspecialpenaltyoftwo percentum onthe totalamountdue. Sec.4. TheimplementationofthisActshallbesubjectto,andgovernedby,theprovisionsofExecutive Order236,datedFebruary13,1957,prescribingproceduresfortheplanningofdevelopmentfinances,theissuance ofgovernmentsecurities,andthedisbursementofproceedsandcreatingtheFiscalPolicyCouncilandtheTechnical CommitteeonDevelopmentFinance,asamendedbyExecutiveOrderNo.236,datedMay26,1966,notinconsistent withthisAct,whichareherebyadoptedbyreferenceandmadeanintegralpartofthisAct. Sec.5.ItshallbethedutyofthePresident,withinthirtydaysaftertheopeningofeveryregularsession,to reporttotheCongresstheamountofloans,creditsandindebtednesscontracted,aswellastheguaranteesextended, andthepurposesandprojectsforwhichtheloans,creditsandindebtednesswereincurred,andtheguarantees extended,aswellassuchloanswhichmaybereloanedtoFilipinoownedorcontrolledcorporationsandsimilar purposes. Sec.6. TheCongressshallappropriatethenecessaryamountofanyfundsintheNationalTreasurynot otherwiseappropriated,tocoverthepaymentoftheprincipalandinterestonsuchloans,creditsorindebtednessas andwhentheyshallbecomedue. Sec.7.ThisActshalltakeeffectuponitsapproval. Approved,September8,1966.

DoesCongresshavetobeconsultedbythePresidentwhenhecontractsorguaranteesforeignloansthat increasetheforeigndebtofthecountry? TheaffirmativeviewcitesArt.VI,Sec.24whichholdsthatallbillsauthorizingincreaseofthepublic debtmustoriginateexclusivelyfromtheHouseofRepresentatives,althoughtheSenatemayproposeorconcur

withamendments. Thenegative,andstrongerview,isthatthePresidentdoesnotneedpriorapprovalbyCongressbecause theConstitutionplacesthepowertocheckthePresident'spowerontheMonetaryBoardandnotonCongress. Congressmay,ofcourse,provideguidelinesforcontractingorguaranteeingforeignloans,andhavetheserules enforcedthroughtheMonetaryBoard.ButthatCongresshaspriorapprovalisatotallydifferentissue. Atanyrate,thepresentpower,whichwasfirstintroducedinthe1973Constitution,wasbasedonRA 4860ortheForeignLoanAct.Whatusedtobeastatutorygrantofpowerisnowaconstitutionalgrantwhich Congresscannottakeaway,butonlyregulate.

(11)Powersoverforeignaffairs (a)Treatymakingpower Art. VII, Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurredinbyatleasttwothirdsofallthemembersoftheSenate.

ByreasonofthePresident'suniquepositionasheadofstate,heisthelogicalchoiceasthenation's spokesmaninforeignrelations.TheSenate,ontheotherhand,isgrantedtherighttoshareinthetreatymaking powerofthePresidentbyconcurringwithhimwiththerighttoamend.

Treatydistinguishedfromexecutiveagreements ExecutiveagreementsenteredintobythePresidentneednoconcurrence.Thereasonisthatalthough executiveagreementsareakindofinternationalagreements,whentheConstitutionintendstoincludeexecutive agreements,itsayssospecifically,asinArt.VIII,Sec.5,par.2,whenitspeaksofthepoweroftheSCtoreview finaljudgmentsoflowercourtsincasesinwhichtheconstitutionalityorvalidityofanytreaty,internationalor executiveagreement,isinquestion. InholdingthattreatiesareformaldocumentswhichrequireratificationwithapprovaloftheSenate, whileexecutiveagreementsbecomebindingthroughexecutiveactionwithoutneedofavotebytheSenate,the SCinCommissionerofCustomsvEasternSeaTrading,3SCRA351(1961),saidthatthedifferencebetweena treatyandanexecutiveagreementisthata treaty isaninternationalagreementinvolvingpoliticalissuesor changesofnationalpolicyandthoseinvolvinginternationalarrangementsofapermanentcharacter,whilean executiveagreementisaninternationalagreementembodyingadjustmentsofdetailcarryingoutwellestablished nationalpoliciesandtraditions,andthoseinvolvingarrangementsofamoreorlesstemporarynature. Examplesoftreatiesareanagreementontax,extradition,alliance.Examplesofexecutiveagreements areagreementsrelatingtopostalconventions,tariffrates,copyright,mostfavorednationclause.

CommissionerofCustomsvs.EasternSeaTrading,3SCRA351 F: Resp.Easternwastheconsigneeofseveralshipmentofonionandgarlicw/carrivedattheportofMla.from8/5to
9/7/54.SomeshipmentscamefromJapanandothersfromHK.Inasmuchasnoneoftheshipmentshadthecertificate requiredbyCBCircularsNos.44and45forthereleasethereof,thegoodsthusimportedwereseizedandsubjectedto forfeitureproceedingsforallegedviolationsofSec.1363(f)oftheRev.Adm.Code,inrelationtothesaidcirculars.Said goodswerethendeclaredforfeitedinfavorofthegovtbytheCommissionerofCustomsthegoodshavingbeen,inthe meantime,releasedtotheconsigneesonsuretybonds.Onreview,theCourtofTaxAppealsreversedtheCommissionerof Customsandorderedtheaforementionedbondstobecancelledandwithdrawn.AccordingtotheCTA,theseizureand forfeitureofthegoodsimportedfromJapancannotbejustifiedunderEO238,notonlybec.thesameseekstoimplement anExecutiveAgreementextendingtheeffectivityofourTradeandFinancialAgreementsw/Japanw/cagreement,is ofdubiousvalidityxxxowingtothefactthatourSenatehadnotconcurredinthemakingofsaidExecutiveAgreement.

HELD:TheconcurrenceofsaidHouseofCongressisrequiredbytheConsti.inthemakingof"treaties",w/c are,however,distinctanddifferentfrom"executiveagreements,"whichmaybevalidlyenteredintow/osuch concurrence. [Thecourtwentontodistinguishatreatyfromanexecutiveagreement.] The agreement in question, being merely an executive agreement, there is no requirement of concurrence.RAM.

USAFFEVeteransAssn.vsTreasurer105Phil1030 F:
ThecentralissueinthiscaseconcernsthevalidityoftheRomuloSnyderAgreement(1950)wherebythePhil. Govt.undertooktoreturntotheUSGovt.intenannualinstallments,atotalof$35MdollarsadvancedbytheUSto,but unexpendedby,theNationalDefenseForcesofthePhilippines.TheUSAFFEVeteranscontendedthatthemoneydelivered bytheUSwerestraightpaymentsformilitaryservicesandthatthereforetherewasnothingtoreturntotheUSandnothing toconsiderasaloan. TheyalsocontendedthattheRomuloSynderAgreementwasvoidforlackofauthorityofthe officerswhoconcludedthesame.

HELD:Thefundsinvolvedhavebeenconsistentlyregardedasfundsadvancedandtobesubsequentlyaccounted for.Sucharrangementthereforeincludestheobligationtoreturntheunexpendedamounts. Inthiscase,Pres.Quirinoapprovedthenegotiations. HehadpowertocontractloansunderRA213 amendingRA16.AstothecontentionthattheagreementlacksratificationbytheSenate,itwasheldthatthe yearlyappropriationsbyCongressoffundsascompliancewiththeagreementconstitutedratification.Buteven iftherewasnoratification,theagreementwouldstillbevalid.Theagreementisnota"treaty"asthetermis usedintheConstitution.TheagreementwasneversubmittedtotheSenateforconcurrence.Itmustbenoted thatatreatyisnottheonlyformthataninternationalagreementmayassume.Forthegrantoftreatymaking powertotheExecutiveandtheSenatedoesnotexhaustthepowerofthegovt.overinternationalrelations. Consequently,executiveagreementsmaybeenteredintowithotherstatesandareeffectiveevenwithoutthe concurrenceoftheSenate.Fromthepointofviewofinternationallaw,thereisnodifferencebetweentreaties andexecutiveagreementsintheirbindingeffectuponstatesconcernedaslongasthenegotiatingfunctionaries

haveremainedwithintheirpowers. Thedistinctionbetweenanexecutiveagreementandatreatyispurelya constitutionaloneandhasnointernationallegalsignificance. In the case of Altman vs US, it was held that an international compact negotiated between the representativesoftwosovereignnationsandmadeinthenameandorbehalfofthecontractingpartiesand dealingwithimportantcommercialrelationsbetweenthetwocountries,isatreatyinternationallyalthoughasan executiveagreement,itisnottechnicallyatreatyrequiringtheadviceandconsentoftheSenate. NatureofExecutiveAgreements:Thereare2classes:(1)agreementsmadepurelyasexecutiveacts affectingexternalrelationsandindependentoforwithoutlegislativeauthorization,whichmaybetermedas presidentialagreements,and(2)agreementsenteredintoinpursuanceofactsofCongress,orCongressional ExecutiveAgreements.TheRomuloSnyderAgreementmayfallunderanyofthesetwoclasses,forpreciselyon Sept.18,1946,CongressspecificallyauthorizedthePresidenttoobtainsuchindebtednessw/theGovtofthe US,itsagenciesorinstrumentalities.Evenassuming,arguendo,thattherewasnolegislativeauthorization,itis herebymaintainedthattheRomuloSnyderAgreementwaslegallyandvalidlyenteredintotoconformtothe secondcategory.This2ndcategoryusuallyincludesmoneyagreementsrelatingtothesettlementofpecuniary claimsofcitizens.Adapted.

CIRvsGotamco148SCRA36 F:
TheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)isaninternationalorganizationwhichhasaregionalofficeinManila.It enjoysprivilegesandimmunitieswhicharedefinedintheHostAgreemententeredintobetweenthePhilippinesandthe saidorganization.OneoftheprovisionsisthatWHOshallbeexemptfromalldirectandindirecttaxes.Whenitdecidedto constructabuildingtohouseitsownoffices,itenteredintoafurtheragreementwiththegovt.exemptingitfrompaying dutiesonanyimportationofmaterialsandfixturesrequiredfortheconstruction.WHOinformedthebiddersthatitwas exemptfromthepaymentofallfees,licensesandtaxesandthattheirbidsshouldnotincludesuchitems.However,the CIRdemandedfromitscontractor,Gotamco,thepaymentof3%contractor'stax.TheCIRquestionstheentitlementofthe WHOtotaxexemption,contendingthattheHostAgreementisnullandvoid,nothavingbeenratifiedbythePhilippine Senate.

HELD:WhiletreatiesarerequiredtoberatifiedbytheSenate,lessformaltypesofinternationalagreements maybeenteredintobytheChiefExecutiveandbecomebindingwithouttheconcurrenceofthelegislativebody. TheHostAgreementcomeswithinthelattercategory. Itisavalidandbindinginternationalagreementeven withouttheconcurrenceofthePhilippineSenate.Adapted.

(b)Deportationofundesirablealiens InQuaCheeGanvDeportationBoard,9SCRA27(1959),theSCdeclaredthatwhiletheDeportation Boardhasnopowertoissueawarrantofarrestissueduponthefilingofformalchargesagainstcertainalienfor thepurposeoftakinghimincustodytoanswerthosecharges,ithasthepowerdelegatedbythePresident,to issueawarranttocarryoutafinalorderbasedonafindingofguilt.

InGoTekvDeportationBoard,79SCRA17(1976),theSCupheldthePresident'spowertoorderthe deportationofanalienunderSec.69oftheRevisedAdministrativeCode.Heneednotwaitforthependingcase toendinconviction. Hemay,evenduringthependencyofthecase,orderthedeportationifhethinksheis undesirabletonationalinterest.Thisdecisiontodeport,saidtheCourt,isanactofState.

QuaCheeGanvs.DeportationBoard,9SCRA27(1963) F:
On5/12/52,SpPros.Galangchargedpetitionersbef.theDeportationBoardw/havingpurchaseddollarsinthe totalsumof$130,000,w/ohavingthenecessarylicensefromtheCB,andofhavingclandestinelyremittedthesametoHK; andpetitionersw/havingattemptedtobribeofficersofthePhil.andUSGovernmentsinordertoevadeprosecutionfor saidunauthorizedpurchaseofUSdollars.Followingthefilingofsaiddeportationcharges,awarrantforthearrestofsaid alienswasissuedbythepresidingofficersoftheDeportationBd.xxx PetitionerscontestthepowerofthePres.todeportaliensand,consequently,thedelegationtotheDeportationBd. oftheancillarypowertoinvestigate,onthegroundthatsuchpowerisvestedintheLegislature.Itisclaimedthatforthe powertodeportaliensbeexercised,theremustbealegislationauthorizingthesame.

HELD:UnderCA613,theCommissionerofImmigrationwasempoweredtoeffectthearrestandexpulsionof an alien, after previous determination by the Bd. of the existence of ground or grounds therefor. W/ the enactmentofthislaw,however,thelegislaturedidnotintendtodelimitorconcentratetheexerciseofthepower todeportontheImmigrationCommissioneralone.WhileitmayreallybecontendedthatSec.52ofCA613did not expressly confer on the Pres. the authority todeport undesirable aliens, xxx but merely lays downthe proceduretobeobservedshouldtherebedeportationproceedings,thefactthatsuchaprocedurewasprovided forbef.thePres.candeportanalienw/cprovisionwasexpresslydeclaredexemptedfromtherepealingeffect ofImmigrationActof1940 isaclearindicationoftherecognition,andinferentiallyaratification,bythe legislatureoftheexistenceofsuchpowerintheExecutive. Underthepresentandexistinglaws,therefore,deportationofanundesirablealienmaybeeffectedin2 ways: (1) by order of the Pres., after due investigation, pursuant to Sec. 69 of RAC, and (2) by the CommissionerofImmigration,uponrecommendationoftheBd.ofCommissioners,underSec.37ofCA613. President'spowerofinvestigationmaybedelegatedtotheDeportationBoard.ThePresident'spower ofinvestigationmaybedelegated.ThisisclearfromareadingofSec.69oftheRACw/cprovidesfor"aprior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent xxx the Deportation Board has been conductingtheinvestigationastheauthorizedagentofthePres.xxx Powertoarrestaliens. Sec.69oftheRACdoesnotprovidefortheexerciseofthepowertoarrest. Thecontentionxxxthatthearrestofaforeignerisnecessarytocarryintoeffectthepowerofdeportationisvalid onlywhenthereisalreadyanorderofdeportation.Tocarryouttheorderofdeportation,thePres.obviouslyhas thepowertoorderthearrestofthedeportee.But,certainly,duringtheinvestigation,itisnotindispensablethat thealienbearrested. PowertoorderarrestofalienmaynotbedelegatedtoDeportationBoardbyPresident. Conceding w/odecidingthatthePres.canpersonallyorderthearrestofalien,yetsuchpowercannotbedelegatedbyhimto theDeportationBoard.Theexerciseofthepowertoorderthearrestofanindividualdemandstheexerciseof

discretionbytheoneissuingthesame,todeterminewhetherunderspecificcircumstances,thecurtailmentofthe libertyofsuchpersoniswarranted.xxxAndauthoritiesaretotheeffectthatwhileministerialdutiesmaybe delegated, official functions requiring the exercised of discretion and judgement may not be so delegated. RAM.

GoTekvs.DeportationBoard,79SCRA17(1977) F:
PetitionerwasarrestedforpossessionoffakedollarsandprosecutedunderArt.168RPC. Atthesametime, deportationproceedingswerebroughtagainsthim. HefiledapetitionforprohibitionagainsttheDeportationBoard, contending that he could only be deported on grounds enumerated in Sec. 37 (3) of the Immigration Law (of w/c possessionoffakedollarsisnot)andonlyafterconviction.TheCFIMlasustainedhiscontention.

HELD:ThePresident'spowertodeportaliensderivesfromSec.69oftheRev.Adm.Codew/cdoesnotspecify thegroundsfordeportationofaliensbutonlyprovidesthatitbeorderedafterdueinvestigation.Theintentionis to give the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirableastoaffectorinurethesecurity,welfare,orinterestoftheState.TheChiefExecutiveisthesoleand exclusivejudgeoftheexistenceoffactsw/cwarrantthedeportationofaliensasdisclosedinaninvestigation. VV.

(12)Poweroverlegislation (a)MessagetoCongress Art.VII,Sec.23.ThePresidentshalladdresstheCongressattheopeningofitsregularsession. Hemayalsoappearbeforeitatanyothertime.

Every4thMondayofJuly,thePresidentdeliverstheStateoftheNationAddress,whichcontainshis proposalsforlegislation.Throughthisspeech,hecaninfluencethecourseoflegislationthatCongresscantake duringtheregularsession.

(b)Prepareandsubmitthebudget Art.VII,Sec.22.ThePresidentshallsubmittoCongresswithinthirtydaysfromtheopeningof everyregularsession,asthebasisofthegeneralappropriationsbill,abudgetofexpendituresandsources offinancing,includingreceiptsfromexistingandproposedrevenuemeasures.

The budget is the plan indicating the (a) expenditures of the government, (b) sources of financing, and (c) receipts from revenueraising measures. This budget is the upper limit of the

appropriationsbilltobepassedbyCongress.Throughthebudget,therefore,thePresidentrevealsthe prioritiesofthegovernment.

(c)Vetopower Art.VI,Sec.27(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresented tothePresident.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit;otherwise,heshallvetoitandreturnthesame withhisobjectiontotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallentertheobjectionsatlargeinitsJournal andproceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,twothirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouse shallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichit shalllikewisebereconsidered,andifapprovedbytwothirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshall becomealaw.Insuchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenames oftheMembersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicatehis vetoof anybill totheHouse where it originatedwithin thirtydaysafter thedate of receipt thereof, otherwise,itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit. (2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation, revenue,ortariffbill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject. Asageneralrule,allbillsmustbeapprovedbythePresidentbeforetheybecomelaw,exceptwhen(i) thevetoofthePresidentisoverriddenby2/3vote,and(ii)thebillpassedisthespeciallawtoelectthePresident andVicePresident.ThisgivesthePresidentanactualhandinlegislation.However,hiscourseofactionisonly toapproveitorvetoitasawhole.(SeeLegislativePowerofCongress)

(d)EmergencyPower Art.VI,Sec.23.xxx (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress, may, by law, authorize the President,foralimitedperiod,andsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowers necessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.Unlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionof theCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof. (SeePreviousNotes)

(e)Fixingoftariffrates Art.VI,Sec.28.xxx TheCongressmay,bylaw,authorizethePresidenttofixwithinspecifiedlimits,andsubjectto suchlimitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,tariffrates,importandexportquotas,tonnageand wharfagedues,andotherdutiesorimpostswithintheframeworkofthenationaldevelopmentprogramof

theGovernment.

Thereasonforthedelegationisthehighlytechnicalnatureofinternationalcommerce,andtheneedto constantlyandwithrelativeeaseadapttheratestoprevailingcommercialstandards.

(13)Immunityfromsuit

TheSChasaffirmedtimeandagainthedoctrineofthePresident'simmunityfromsuit.Inaresolution inCarillovMarcos,(April1981)andinthelatestcaseofInreBermudez(October1986),theCourtsaidthatit is"elementarythatincumbentPresidentsareimmunefromsuitorfrombeingbroughttocourtduringtheperiod oftheirincumbencyandtenure."

ArelateddoctrineisthePresident's"immunityfromliability".IntheUScaseofNixonvFitzgerald,an employeeoftheAirForcewaslaidoffduetoanadversedecision ofaSenateCommitteemadeuponthe insistenceofPres.Nixon,butwhichdecisionwaslaterfoundtobebaseless,theSCruledthatthePresident, whetherinofficeornot,isabsolutelyimmunefromliabilityforhisofficialacts.TheCourtgavethreereasons forsuchimmunity: 1.ThesingularimportanceofthePresidencyandhishighvisibility. 2. The distraction that suits would bring to such an important official laden with enormous responsibility. 3.TheconsequencethatthePresidentmighthesitateatthemomentofgreatestperiltothenationifhe knowsthathewouldbeheldliablelateron. InHarlowvFitzgerald,however,theSCruledthatCabinetmembersandsenioraidessuedforthesame actasinNixonvFitzgeraldonlyenjoy"qualifiedimmunity." Thisimmunityislessthanabsolute,andyetit wouldenablethemtodefeatunsubstantiatedclaimswithoutresortingtotrial.Theyareallowedtoshowina preliminarymannerthattheclaimisunsubstantial.

Barlongay: Q:DoesthePresident'simmunityfromsuitextendtohisalteregos? A:No.

Carillovs.Marcos,Res.ofApril4,1981

ThePresidentassuchcannotbesued,enjoyingashedoesimmunityfromsuit,butthevalidityofhis actscanbetestedbyanactionagainsttheotherexecutiveofficialsorsuchindependentconstitutionalagenciesas theCommissiononElectionsandtheCommissiononAudit.VV.

Inre:SaturninoV.Bermudez,145SCRA160 F:
Inapetitionfordeclaratoryreliefimpleadingnorespondents,petitioner,asalawyer,quotesthefirstpar.ofSec.5 ofArt.VIIIoftheproposed1986Consti.,w/cprovides: "Sec.5.ThesixyeartermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresidentelectedintheFebruary7,1986election, isforpurposesofsynchronizationofelections,herebyextendedtonoonofJune30,1992. xxx" Claimingthatthesaidprovisionisnotclearastowhomitrefers,hethenaskstheCourt"todeclareandanswerthe questionoftheconstructionanddefinitenessastowho,amongthepresentincumbentPres.AquinoandVicePres.Laurel andelectedPres.MarcosandVicePres.Tolentinobeingreferredtounderthesaidprovision.

HELD:Thispetitionisdismissedoutrightforlackofjurisdictionandlackofcauseofaction. Prescindingfromthepetitioner'slackofcapacitytosue,itiselementarythatthisCourtassumesno jurisdictionoverpetitionsfordeclaratoryrelief.Moreimportantly,thepetitionamountsineffecttoasuitagainst theincumbentPres.AquinoanditisequallyelementarythatincumbentPresidentsareimmunefromsuitor frombeingbroughttocourtduringtheperiodoftheirincumbencyandtenure.RAM.

SolivenvsMakasiar;BeltranvsMakasiar167SCRA393 F:
ThisisthelibelcaseinvolvingBeltran'sallegationsthatPresidentAquinowashidingunderherbed.Oneofthe issueswaswhetherthePresidentmayinitiatecriminalproceedingsagainstthepetitionersthroughthefilingofacomplaint affidavit. According to Beltran, the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disabilitytofilesuit.HecontendedthatifcriminalproceedingsensuebyvirtueofthePresident'sfilingofhercomplaint affidavit,shemaysubsequentlyhavetobeawitnessfortheprosecution,bringingherundertheTC'sjurisdiction. This wouldbeanindirectwayofdefeatingherprivilegeofimmunityfromsuit,sincebytestifyingonthewitnessstand,she wouldbeexposingherselftopossiblecontemptofcourtorperjury.

HELD: Therationale forthegranttothePresident oftheprivilegeofimmunity fromsuitistoassurethe exerciseofPresidentialdutiesandfunctionsfreefromanyhindranceordistraction,consideringthatbeingthe Chief Executive is a job that, aside from requiring all of the officeholder's time, also demands undivided attention. Butthisprivilegeofimmunityfromsuit,pertainstothePresidentbyvirtueoftheofficeandmaybe invokedonlybytheholderoftheoffice;notbyanyotherpersoninthePresident'sbehalf.Thus,anaccusedina criminalcasewherethePresidentisacomplainantcannotraisethepresidentialprivilegeasadefensetoprevent thecasefromproceedingagainsttheaccused. Moreover,thereisnothinginourlawsthatwouldpreventthePresidentfromwaivingtheprivilege.The Presidentmayshedtheprotectionaffordedbytheprivilegeandsubmittothecourt'sjurisdiction.Thechoiceof

whethertoexercisetheprivilegeortowaiveitissolelythePresident'sprerogative.Itisadecisionthatcannotbe assumedandimposedbyanotherperson.RAM.

Barlongay: Q:DoesthePresident'simmunityfromsuitextendevenbeyondhisterm? A:Yes.Solongastheactwasdoneduringhisterm.

(14)ExecutivePrivilege Inthecaseof US vs Nixon,PresidentNixonrefusedtoreleaseinformationconcerningtheWatergate scandal,claimingwhathecalled"executiveprivilege."TheUSSCheldhisrefusalinvalid,declaringthatneither thedoctrineofseparationofpowers,northeneedforconfidentiality ofhighlevelcommunications,without more,cansustainanabsolute,unqualifiedPresidentialprivilegeofimmunityfromjudicialprocessunderall circumstances.ThePresident'sneedforcompletecandorandobjectivityfromadviserscallsforgreatdeference fromthecourts. However,whentheprivilegedependssolelyonthebroad,undifferentiatedclaimofpublic interestintheconfidentialityofsuchconversations,aconfrontationwithothervaluesarise.Absentaclaimof needtoprotectmilitary,diplomaticorsensitivenationalsecuritysecrets,itisdifficulttoaccepttheargument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminishedbyproductionofsuchmaterialforinspectionwithalltheprotectionthatthecourtwillbeobligedto provide.

2.VicePresident a.Qualifications,election,termandoath Art.VII,Sec.3.ThereshallbeaVicePresidentwhoshallhavethesamequalificationsandterm ofofficeandbeelectedwithandinthesamemannerasthePresident.Hemayberemovedfromofficein thesamemannerasthePresident. TheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasaMemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresno confirmation.

Id.,Sec.4.ThePresidentandtheVicePresidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeoplefora termofsixyearswhichshallbeginatnoononthethirtiethdayofJunenextfollowingthedayofthe electionandshallendatnoonofthesamedatesixyearsthereafter.ThePresidentshallnotbeeligiblefor anyreelection. NopersonwhohassucceededasPresidentandhasservedassuchformorethanfour yearsshallbequalifiedforelectiontothesameofficeatanytime. NoVicePresidentshallserveformorethantwosuccessiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationofthe officeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheservicefor

thefulltermforwhichhewaselected. Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionforPresidentandVicePresidentshallbe heldonthesecondMondayofMay. ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVicePresident,dulycertifiedbytheboardof canvassersofeachprovincesorcity,shallbetransmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentofthe Senate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenateshall,notlaterthanthirty daysafterthedayofelection(w/cisthe2ndTuesdayofJune),openallthecertificatesinthepresenceof theSenateandHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upondeterminationof the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass (i.e., tally the certificatesofcanvass)thevotes. Thepersonshavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoor moreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes(tie),oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythe voteofamajorityofallthemembersofCongress,votingseparately. TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates. TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection, returns, and qualifications of the President, or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Id.,Sec.5.Beforetheyenterontheexecutionoftheiroffice,thePresident,theVicePresidentor theActingPresidentshalltakethefollowingoathoraffirmation: "Idosolemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatIwillfaithfullyandconscientiouslyfulfillmy dutiesasPresident(orVicePresidentorActingPresident)ofthePhilippines,preserveand defenditsConstitution,executeitslaws,dojusticetoeveryman,andconsecratetomyself totheserviceoftheNation.SohelpmeGod."(Incaseofaffirmation,lastsentencewill beomitted.)

b.Privilegeandsalary Art.VII,Sec.6.ThePresidentshallhaveanofficialresidence.ThesalariesofthePresidentand VicePresidentshallbedeterminedbylawandshallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.Noincreasein saidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentduringwhich suchincreasedwasapproved.Theyshallnotreceivedduringtheirtenureanyotheremolumentfromthe Governmentoranyothersource.

c.Prohibitions

Art.VII,Sec.13.ThePresident,VicePresident,theMembersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputies orassistantsshallnot,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,holdanyotherofficeoremployment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,orspecialprivilegegrantedbytheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentality thereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Theyshallstrictly avoidconflictofinterestintheconductoftheiroffice. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices, includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

Art.VII,Sec.3.xxx TheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasmemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresno confirmation.

d.Succession

Art.VI,Sec.9.WheneverthereisavacancyintheOfficeoftheVicePresidentduringtheterm forwhichhewaselected,thePresidentshallnominateaVicePresidentfromamongthemembersofthe SenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives,whoshallassumeofficeuponconfirmationbyamajorityvoteof allthemembersofbothhouses,votingseparately.

NotethatincasethevacancyoccursinboththeofficesofPresidentandVicePresident,thereisno ActingVicePresidentspokenof.ThereasonisthattheVicePresidentdoesnothaverealfunctionswhenthe Presidentisaround. When a vacancy occurs in both offices, the VicePresident is elected in a special election. If the vacancyoccursonlyintheVicePresidency,thesuccessorisnotelectedanymore,butmerelychosenfromthe Congress.

e.Removal Art.XI,Secs.23 Art. XI, Sec. 2. The President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the

Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftand corruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalorpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmaybe removedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.

Art.XI,Sec.3. (1) TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateall casesofimpeachment. (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of RepresentativesorbyanycitizenuponresolutionofendorsementbyanyMemberthereof,whichshallbe includedintheOrderofBusinesswithintensessiondays,andreferredtotheproperCommitteewithin threesessiondaysthereafter.TheCommittee,afterhearing,andbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the correspondingresolution.TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithinten sessiondaysfromreceiptthereof. (3)AvoteofatleastonethirdofalltheMembersoftheHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded. (4)Incasetheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleastonethirdofall theMembersoftheHouse,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenate shallforthwithproceed. (5)Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithin aperiodofoneyear. (6)TheSenateshallhavethesolepowertotryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment.Whensitting forthatpurpose,theSenatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation.WhenthePresidentofthePhilippinesison trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwothirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate. (7) Judgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallnotextendfurtherthanremovalfromofficeand disqualificationtoholdanyofficeundertheRepublicofthePhilippines,butthepartyconvictedshall neverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishmentaccordingtolaw.

f.Functions (1)Rightofsuccession

Art.VII,Secs.8and11 Art.VII,Sec.8.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofthe President,theVicePresidentshallbecomethePresidenttoservetheunexpiredterm.Incaseofdeath,

permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofboththePresidentandVicePresident,the PresidentoftheSenateor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,shallthen actasPresidentuntilthePresidentorVicePresidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified. TheCongressshall,bylaw,provide whoshallserveasPresidentincaseofdeath,permanent disability,orresignationoftheActingPresident.HeshallserveuntilthePresidentortheVicePresident shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualificationsastheActingPresident.

Art. VII, Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the SpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatheisunabletodischargethepowers anddutiesofhisoffice,anduntilhetransmitstothemawrittendeclarationtothecontrary,suchpowers anddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVicePresidentasActingPresident. WheneveramajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmittothePresidentoftheSenate andtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunable todischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVicePresidentshallimmediatelyassumethepowers anddutiesoftheofficeasActingPresident. Thereafter,whenthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakerofthe HouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatnoinabilityexists,heshallreassumethepowersand dutiesofhisoffice.Meanwhile,shouldamajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmitwithinfive daystothePresident oftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwritten declarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theCongressshall decidetheissue. Forthatpurpose,theCongressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,withinfortyeight hours,inaccordancewithitsrulesandwithoutneedofcall. IftheCongress,withintendaysafterreceiptofthelastwrittendeclaration,orifnotinsession, withintwelvedaysafteritisrequiredtoassemble,determinesbyatwothirdsvoteofbothHouses,voting separately,thatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVicePresident shallactasPresident;otherwise,thePresident shallcontinueexercising thepowersanddutiesofhis office.

(2)MembershipinCabinet Art.VII,Sec.3.xxx TheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasmemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresno confirmation.

UPDATED1/24/96 RAM

C.TheJudicialDepartment

Barlongay: Of the three departments of government, two departments (Executive and Legislative) are consideredasactive.Ontheotherhand,theJudiciaryisconsideredaspassive.Itispassiveinthesensethatit hastowaitforacasetobefiledbeforeitcanact. Cruz: Tomaintaintheindependence oftheJudiciary,thefollowingsafeguardshavebeenembodied inthe Consti: (1)TheSCisaconstitutionalbody.Itcannotbeabolishednormayitsmembershiporthemannerofits meetingsbechangedbymerelegislation.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(1)] (2)ThemembersofthejudiciaryarenotsubjecttoconfirmationbytheCA. (3)ThemembersoftheSCmaynotberemovedexceptbyimpeachment.(Art.IX,Sec.2.) (4)TheSCmaynotbedeprivedofitsminimumoriginalandappellatejurisdictionasprescribedinArt. X,Sec.5oftheConsti.(Art.VIII,Sec.2.) (5)TheappellatejurisdictionoftheSCmaynotbeincreasedbylaww/oitsadviceandconcurrence. (Art.VI,Sec.30.) (6)TheSCnowhasadministrativesupervisionoveralllowercourtsandtheirpersonnel.(Art.VIII, Sec.6.) (7)TheSChasexclusivepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts.(Art.VIII,Sec.11.) (8)ThemembersoftheSCandalllowercourtshavesecurityoftenure,w/ccannotbeunderminedbya lawreorganizingthejudiciary.(Id.) (9) Theyshallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasijudicialoradministrativefunctions. (Art.VIII,Sec.12.) (10)Thesalariesofjudgesmaynotbereducedduringtheircontinuanceinoffice.(Art.VIII,Sec.10.) (11)Thejudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy.(Art.VIII,Sec.3.)

(12)TheSCalonemayinitiaterulesofcourt.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(5).] (13)OnlytheSCmayorderthetemporarydetailofjudges.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(3)] (14)TheSCcanappointallofficialsandemployeesofthejudiciary.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(6)] 1.TheSupremeCourt a.Composition Art.VIII,Sec.4. (1) TheSupremeCourtshallbecomposedof aChiefJusticeandfourteen AssociateJustices.Itmaysitenbancoritsdiscretion,indivisionsofthree,five,orsevenMembers.Any vacancyshallbefilledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof. (2) Allcasesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreement,or law,whichshallbeheardbytheSupremeCourt,enbanc,includingthoseinvolvingtheconstitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and otherregulations,shallbedecidedwiththeconcurrenceofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytook partinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon. (3)Casesormattersheardbyadivisionshallbedecidedorresolvedwiththeconcurrenceofa majorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvoted thereon,andinnocase,withouttheconcurrenceofatleastthreeofsuchMembers.Whentherequired numberisnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecided enbanc: Provided,thatnodoctrineorprincipleor principleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedor reversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.

Creation ThejudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablished bylaw.(Art.VIII,Sec.1,par.1.) TheSupremeCourtisaconstitutionalbody. AssuchitcannotbeabolishedbytheCongressforthe powertodestroyonlyresidesintheonewhohasthepowertocreate. Thelowercourts(CourtofAppeals,RegionalTrialCourts,MunicipalTrialCourts,MetropolitanTrial Courts,MunicipalCircuitTrialCourts),ontheotherhand,areestablishedbylaw,andsocouldbeabolishedby law,providedthesecurityoftenureisnotundermined. Composition

TheSupremeCourtshallbecomposedofaChiefJusticeand14AssociateJustices.[Art.VIII,Sec. 4(1)] Underthe1935Constitution,theSupremeCourtwascomposedofeleven(11)justicesinall;in1973,

fifteen(15)Justices.

ModeofSitting Itmaysitenbanc,orinitsdiscretion,indivisionsof3,5or7members(or5,3or2divisions).[Art. VIII,Sec.4(1)] In1935,therulewasthattheSCmaysitenbancorin2divisions,"unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw." CongressdecidedagainstallowingtheSCtositin2divisionsonthetheorythatthereisonlyoneSupreme Court.Andso,itprovidedintheJudiciaryActof1948therulethattheSCmayonlysitenbanc.Butthereality wasthat thedockets were crowded. This prompted the framers toeliminate one phrase "unless otherwise providedbylaw"in1956,andineffectleavethedecisiontotheSConwhethertositenbancorin2divisions,if itsatondivisions. In1987,notonlywasthediscretionretained,butalsothedivisionswereincreased.Theremaybe5,3or 2divisionsmadeupof3,5or7members,respectively.Atpresent,theSCsitseitherenbancorin3divisions.

OneSupremeCourt When the SC sits in divisions, it does not violate the concept of a "one Supreme Court" because, according the United States v Limsiongco, 41 Phil 94 (1920), the divisions of the SC do not diminish its authority,becausealthoughitsitsindivisions,itremainsandcofunctionsasonebody. This"oneSupremeCourt"doctrineisstrengthenedbytheprovisionthat"whentherequirednumber(in adivision)isnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecidedenbanc:provided,thatnodoctrineorprincipleoflawlaid downbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourt sittingenbanc.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(3)]

StrictComposition InVargasvRilloraza,80Phil297(1948),theSCheldthatthetemporarydesignationofjudgesofthe CFIandtheCourtofAppealsintheSupremeCourttoconstituteaquorumduetodisqualificationofsomeofthe justices,isunconstitutional.ThereisbutoneSupremeCourtwhosemembershipappointmentsarepermanent.

VargasvRilloraza,80Phil297(1948) F:Pet.VargasfiledamotionassailingtheconstitutionalityofPeople'sCourtActw/cprovidesthatanyjusticeoftheSC
whoheldanyofficeorpositionunderthePhilExec.CommissionorunderthegovtcalledPhil.Republic,maynotsitand voteinanycasebroughttothatcourtundersec.13hereofinw/ctheaccusedisapersonwhoheldanyofficeorposition undereitherboththePhil.Exec.CommissionandthePhil.Republicoranybranch,instrumentalityoragencythereof.If

onaccountofsuchdisqualification,orbec.ofanyofthegroundsofdisqualificationofjudges,inR126,sec.1oftheROC, oronaccountofillness,absenceoftemporarydisability,therequisitenumberofjusticesnecessarytoconstituteaquorom inanycaseisnotpresent,thePres.maydesignatesuchno.ofjudgesoftheCFI,judgesatlargeofCFI,cadastraljudges, havingnoneofthedisqualificationsetforthintheabovelaw,asmaybenecessarytosittemporarilyasjusticeoftheSCin ordertoformaquorom.

HELD:(1)Congressdoesnothavethepowertoaddtotheexistinggroundsfordisqualificationofajusticeof theSC.Todisqualifyanyoftheseconstitutionalcomponentmemberofthecourtespeciallyasinthiscase,a majorityoftheminatreasoncase,isnothingshortofdeprivingthecourtitselfofitsjurisdictionasestablished bythefundamentallaw.Disqualificationofajudgeisadeprivationofhisjudicialpower.Itwouldseemevident thatifCongresscoulddisqualifymembersofSCintakingpartinthehearinganddeterminationofcertain "collaboration"cases,itcouldextendthedisqualificationtoothercases. (2)Thedesignationprovided(aCFIjudgetositasaSCjusticeiftheSCdoesnothavetherequired quorum)isrepugnanttotheconstitutionalrequirementthatmembersbeappointedbythePres.w/theconsentof the CA. (This was under the 1935 Constitution w/c required confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.)Itwillresultinasituationwherein6memberssittingwillnotbeappointedandconfirmedin accordancew/theConsti. (3) Howeverbriefortemporarymaybetheactionorparticipationofajudgedesignated,thereisno escapingthefactthathewouldbeparticipatinginthedeliberationsandactsoftheSCandifallowedtodoso, hisvotewouldcountasmuchasanyregularjustice.xxxAdapted.

b.Appointmentandqualifications Art.VIII,Sec.7.(1)NopersonshallbeappointedMemberoftheSupremeCourtoranylower collegiatecourtunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.AmemberoftheSupremeCourt mustbeatleastfortyyearsofage,andmusthavebeenforfifteenyearsormoreajudgeofalowercourt orengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.

JudicialandBarCouncil Id.,Sec.8.(5)The(JudicialandBar)Councilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommending appointeestotheJudiciary.ItmayexercisesuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmay assigntoit.

Id.,Sec.9.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointedby thePresidentfromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforevery vacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submissionofthelist.

Qualifications

(1)Naturalborncitizen[Art.VIII,Sec.7(1)] (2)Atleast40yearsofage(id.) (3)Atleast15yearsofexperienceasajudgeoflowercourt,orpracticeoflawinthePhilippines(id.) (4)Ofprovencompetence,integrity,probityandindependence[Art.VIII,Sec.7(3)] c.Salary Art.VIII,Sec.10.ThesalaryoftheChiefJusticeandoftheAssociateJusticesoftheSupreme courtandofjudgesoflowercourtsshallbefixedbylaw.Duringtheircontinuanceinoffice,theirsalary shallnotbedecreased. UnlesstheCongressprovidesotherwise,theCJshallreceiveanannualsalaryofP240,000andthe AssociateJusticesshallreceiveP204,000each.(Art.XVIII,Sec.17.) ThesalaryoflowercourtjudgesisnotinitiallyfixedbytheConstitutionbutbythelaw. Duringtheircontinuanceinoffice,theirsalaryshallnotbedecreased.(Art.VIII,Sec.10.) Butitmaybeincreasedbylaw,totakeeffectatonce. Reasonsare:[one]theConstitutiondoesnot prohibitit;[two]theJudiciaryplaysnopartinthepassageofthelawincreasingtheirsalaryunliketheCongress andtheExecutive,andsotherecanbenoconflictofinterest;and[three]thiswillpromotetheindependenceof theJudiciary. IstheimpositionofincometaxonthesalaryoftheJusticesandJudgesadiminutionoftheirsalaryas prohibitedbytheConstitution? Underthe1935Constitution(Art.VIII,Sec.9),itwasprovidedthatthemembersoftheJudiciary"shall receivesuchcompensationasmaybefixedbylaw,whichshallnotbediminishedduringtheircontinuancein office." InPerfectovMeer,85Phil552(1950),theSCruledthatsalariesofjudgeswerenotsubjecttoincome tax,forsuchwouldbeadiminutionoftheirsalary,incontraventionoftheConstitution. Thishappenedafter JusticePerfectorefusedtopaytheassessmentofincometaxmadeuponhimbytheCollector.

Responding to this, Congress passed a law providing that the constitutional provision against the diminutionofsalariesofmembersofthejudiciaryshouldnotbeinterpretedtomeananexemptionfromincome tax.(Sec.13,RA590.) ButtheCourtstruckthisstatutedownasunconstitutionalwhenasinthepreviouscase,JudgeEndencia refusedtopayhistaxes;therebygivingtheSCanopportunity tomakethepronouncement inthecaseof EndenciavDavid,93Phil696(1953).TheSCrulinginvalidatingthestatutewasbasedonthereasonthatthe legislaturehadnopowertointerprettheConstitution,suchpowerbeinglodgedinthejudicialbranch,andso whenitdid,itviolatedtheseparationofpowersundertheConstitution.

Comparethe1973Constitution,Art.XV,Sec.6 Awareofthisruling,theframersofthe1973ConstitutionclearlyprovidedinArt.XV,Sec.6that: Art.,Sec.6. Nosalary oranyformofemolumentofanypublicofficeroremployee,including constitutionalofficers,shallbeexemptfromthepaymentofincometax. therebyavoidingaSCcontrary,selfdefensiveruling. Thisprovisioninthe1973Constitution,however,isnotfoundinthe1987Constitution,promptingsome judgesincludingNitafan,tocontendthattheoldrulinginPerfectoandEndenciaistherebydeemedrevived.But theSCthistimedidnotupholdtheoldruling. Notexemptfromincometax In Nitafan v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (July 1987), the Court ruled that under the 1987 Constitution,thesalariesofmembersoftheJudiciaryarenotexemptfromtaxes.Itanchoreditsdecisiononthe deliberationoftheConstitutionalCommission,thatis,onthelegislativehistoryofthepresentArt.VIII,Sec.10. AdraftofthepresentArt.VIII,Sec.10whenoriginallypresentedtothebody,expresslyexemptedthe salaryofjudgesfromtaxation.Butwhenthisdraftwasdiscussedonsecondreading,thesentimentwasagainst theexemption,thereasonbeingthatlikeanyothercitizen,judgesandjusticesmustpaytheirshareintheburden ofmaintainingthegovernment. SothisexpressexemptionwasdeletedfromArt.VIII,Sec.10andsoitwas whenthedraftwasadoptedbythebody. TherewasaplantoinsertasimilarprovisionasthatfoundinArt.XV,Sec.6of1973,butthrough oversight,theconstitutionalcommissionfailedtoinsertone.Yet,theintentwascleartohaveone,andsoitmust bereadintotheConstitution,theSCconcluded.

d.Securityof Tenure Art.VIII,Sec.11. ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallhold

office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to dischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudges oflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartin thedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.

Id.,Sec.2.xxx NolawshallbepassedreorganizingtheJudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofits Members. Reorganization ItishighlydoubtfulifthisprovisionappliestotheSC.Thepowertoreorganizeinvolvesthepowerto createanddestroy.SincetheSCisacreationoftheConstitutionandnotofCongress,itmaynotbecreatednor destroyed,andultimatelyreorganizedbyCongress.

DelaLallanavs.Alba,112SCRA294(1982) F:
Sec.144ofBP129replacedtheexistingcourtsystem,w/theexceptionoftheSCandtheSB,w/anewoneand providedthatuponthecompletionofthereorganizationbythePres.,thecourtsaffected"shallbedeemedautomatically abolishedandtheincumbentsthereofshallceasetoholdoffice." Petitioner,judgeofthecitycourtofOlangapo,and7 membersoftheBarquestionedthevalidityoftheActinanactionforprohibition,onthegroundthatitcontravenedthe securityoftenureofjudges.TheysoughttobolstertheirclaimbyimputinglackofGFintheenactmentoftheActandby characterizing it as an undue delegation of legislative power bec. of Sec. 41, w/c authorizes the Pres. to fix the compensationofthosewhowouldbeappointedunderit"alongtheguidelinessetforthinLOINo.93,pursuanttoPD985, asamendedbyPD1597."

HELD: TheimputationoflackofGFdisregardsthefactthattheActwastheproductofcarefulstudyand deliberationnotonlybytheBPbutalsobyaPresidentialstudycommittee(composedoftheChiefJusticeand MinisterofJusticeascochairmen,w/membersdrawnfromtheSCandMinistryofJustice.)Thestudygroup calledattentiontothecloggeddocketsofthecourtsandthepossibleworseningofthesituationasaresultof populationgrowthandrisingexpectations,andtheadverseeffectofthisonthedevelopmentalprogramsofthe govt.Itwasthisproblemw/ctheActseekstosolve.xxx[T]heabolitionofanofficeisw/inthecompetenceof alegislativebodyifdoneinGF.ThetestiswhethertheabolitionisinGF.Asthatelementispresentinthe enactmentofBP129,thelackofmeritofthepetitionbecomesapparent. (2)However,whiletherecanbenoclaimtosecurityoftenurewheretheofficenolongerexists,intheir effectthereisnodifferencebet.removalandtheabolitionofoffice.Ineithercase,theeffectontheincumbent isoneofseparation.Accordingly,intheimplementationofthelawitwouldbeinkeepingw/thespiritofthe Consti.that,asfarasincumbentjusticesandjudgesareconcerned,theSCbeconsultedandthatitsviewbe accordedfullestconsideration.Thisisnotrenderingadvisoryopinionbec.thereisnoquestionoflawinvolved. Neitheristhereintrusionintotheappointingprocessbec.onlyincumbentsareinvolved. (3) As to the charge of undue delegation, the provisions of Sec. 41 that the Pres. should fix the compensationofthosewhowillbeappointedtothenewcourts"alongtheguidelinessetforthinLOINo.93,

pursuanttoPD985,asamendedbyPD1597"constitutesasufficientground.VV.

e.Removal Art.VIII,Sec.11. ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallhold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to dischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudges oflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartin thedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.

Art.XI,Sec.2. ThexxxMembersoftheSupremeCourtxxxmayberemovedfromoffice,on impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftand corruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalofpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmaybe removedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.

SeeprocedureforimpeachmentunderOtherPowersofCongress. MembersoftheSCcannotberemovedexceptbyimpeachment.Thus,aSCjusticecannotbechargedin acriminalcaseoradisbarmentproceeding,becausetheultimateeffectofeitheristoremovehimfromoffice, andthuscircumventtheprovisiononimpeachment.

f.FiscalAutonomy Art.VIII,Sec.3. TheJudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy. AppropriationsfortheJudiciary maynotbereducedbythelegislaturebelowtheamountappropriatedforthepreviousyearand,after approval,shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

g.Jurisdiction (1)ThePowerofJudicialReview Art.VIII,Sec.5.xxx (2) Review,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmonappealor certiorari asthelawortheRulesof Courtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin: (a) Allcases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or

regulationisinquestion.

ThejudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablished bylaw.(Art.VIII,Sec.1,par.1.) ScopeoftheJudicialPower Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticeto:(Art.VIII,Sec.1,par.2) 1.Settleactualcontroversies,involvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable;and Thisistheclassicaldefinitionofjudicialpowerthatcontemplatesacasewherethepartyplaintiffhasa causeofactionagainstthepartydefendant,thatis,theplaintiffhasarightcorrespondingtothedefendant's obligation,whichrightwasviolatedbythedefendant,therebyresultingininjury. 2.Determinewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackor excessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.

AsearlyasAngaravElectoralTribunal,theSCheldthatwhenitperformshischeckingfunctionofthe coequalbranches,itismerelyperformingadutyimposeduponitbytheConstitution;thatitactsasthemecha nism that implements the "supremacy of theConstitution." Theextent towhich it exercises this function, however,hasbeenlimitedbythepoliticalquestiondoctrine. (1)PowerofJudicialReview

AngaravElectoralCommission,63Phil139(1936). F:
In1935,theNationalAssemblyadoptedaresolutionthat"allmemberselect,withnoelectionprotestfiledonor before3December1935aredeemedelected."TheElectoralCommission,aconstitutionalbody,ontheotherhandsetthe9 December1935asthedeadlineforthefilingofelectionprotest. Ynsua,wholosttoAngara,filedamotionofprotest(complaint)on8December1935.Thiswasentertainedby theElectoralCommission. AngaracontendedthatthedeadlinesetbytheNationalAssemblywascontrolling. Who prevailed?

HELD: The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral Commission,inviewoftheconstitutionalprovisiongrantingtheelectoralCommissionjurisdictionoverelection protests. In justifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed out that when the court allocated constitutionalboundaries,itneitherassertssupremacy,norannulstheactsofthelegislature.Itsimplycarries outthesolemnandsacredobligationsimposeduponitbytheconstitutiontodetermineconflictingclaimsandto establishforthepartiestherightswhichtheconstitutiongrantstothem.Thisisintruthallthatisinvolvedin

whatistermed"judicialsupremacy"whichproperlyisthepowerofjudicialreviewundertheConstitution. Eventhen,thispowerofjudicialreviewislimitedtoactualcasesandcontroversiestobeexercisedafter fullopportunityofargumentbytheparties,andlimitedfurthertotheconstitutionalquestionraisedorthevery lismota presented.Anyattemptatabstractioncouldonlyleadtodialecticsandbarrenlegalquestionsandto sterileconclusionsunrelatedtoactualities. Narrowedasitsfunctionisinthismanner,thejudiciarydoesnot passuponquestionsofwisdom,justiceorexpediencyoflegislation.xxxAdapted. a.ConditionsfortheExerciseofJudicialReview

InPeople vVera,66Phil56(1937),J.Laurellaiddownthedoctrinethatjudicialreviewcanonlybe exercisedinanactualcaseandcontroversy. This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3) a constitutionalquestionraisedattheearliestpossibletime,and(4)aconstitutionalquestionthatistheverylis motaofthecase,i.e.anunavoidablequestion.

PoliticalQuestions In PBA v COMELEC,140SCRA455,weseeareversalofjudicialreview. Thecasewasclearlya justiciable controversy. Is the resignation submitted by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election, proclamation and assumption into office by the elected President, a valid resignation as to authorized the BatasantopassaSnapElectionLaw?TheCourtcouldhavevalidlyissuedaninjunctiontostoptheCOMELEC fromproceedingwiththepreparationsfortheelection.Butitdidnot,citingitsdelayindecidingthecaseand thesentimentsofthepeoplethatdevelopedinthemeantimeasreasonforitsinaction.Accordingtothecourt, whatatfirstwasalegalquestionbecameapoliticalquestionbecauseitwasovertakenbyevents.[Inthiscase, no7Justicesvotedtodismissthepetitions,and5Justicesvotedtodeclarethestatuteunconstitutional. In accordancew/Javellanavs.Exec.Sec.,J.Teehankeewasoftheviewthatastherewerelessthantenvotesfor declaringBP883unconstitutional,thepetitionsshouldbedismissed.) VV:ACourtwhichdoesnotissueaninjunctiontoenjoinanofficialactwhenitcouldhaveissuedone isactuallydecidingthecaseinfavorofthevalidityoftheact. Failuretoissueaninjunctionisasmuchan exerciseofjudicialreview. InRomulovYniguez,infra,weseeanothertrendofjudicialreview.Whatseemslikealegalquestion when viewed in isolation (namely, whether the rules of the Batasan enabling it to shelve a complaint for impeachmentagainstthePresidentisconstitutional.)isreallyapoliticalquestionwhenviewedinabroader context(i.e.,thatthecasewasfiledagainsttheSpeakerofacoequalbranchtocompelhimbymandamusto recallthecomplaintfromthearchive,andthattheultimateresultofthecasewastoquestionthedecisionofthe Batasantoshelvethecase,amatter,thatissolelycommittedtothatdepartment.) SaidtheSC: BydenyingMitra'smotiontorecalltheresolutionofimpeachment,theBPineffect confirmedtheactionofitscommitteedismissingtheresolution.Thisplacesthematterbeyondreviewbythis Court.WhilethepetitionisdirectedattheCommitteeonJustice,HumanRightsandGoodGovt.,itisactually directedattheBPbec.thecommittee'saction,dismissingtheresolutionofimpeachment,wasapprovedbythe

BP.Indeed,aninterferencebythejudicialdept.w/theworkofalegislativecommitteewouldbetantamountto anintereferencew/theworkofthelegislatureitself. Yet,despitethereallypoliticalnatureofthequestion,theSCpassedonthevalidityoftherulestoerase doubtsthatmaystillbeentertained.

DumlaovCOMELEC(95SCRA392) F:
Section4ofBP52providedthatanyretiredelectivelocalofficialwhohadreceivedretirementpaytowhichhe wasentitledunderthelawandwhohavebeen65yearsoldatthecommencementofthetermofofficetowhichhesought tobeelected,wasnotqualifiedtorunforthesameelectivelocalofficefromwhichhehadretired. Dumlaofiledforprohibitiontoenjointheenforcementofthelaw,claimingthatthiswasdirectedathimasformer governorofNuevaVizcaya.

HELD:TheSCheldthat(a)hehadnostanding,sincehehadnotbeeninjuredbytheoperationofthelaw,no petitionforhisdisqualificationhavingbeenfiledand(b)theactionwasarequestforadvisoryopinion.Andyet, theSCupheldthevalidity"becauseofparamountpublicinterest",declaringthatthelegislativepurposeof infusingyoungerbloodinlocalgovernmentwasvalid.Adapted.

Barlongay: Q:Whatarethetwoaspectsofpoliticalquestions? A:(1)thosequestionsthatarelefttothepeopleintheirsovereigncapacity (2)mattersw/carelodgedintheotherbranchesofgovt. Q:Whatistheeffectoftheexpandedjurisdictiononthepoliticalquestiondoctrine? A:Thedoctrinestillexistsbuthasbeenreducedinscope.

b.Allcourtscanexercisejudicialreview ThereviewpoweroftheSCimpliesthatithasappellatejurisdiction overfinaljudgments oflower courtsoncaseswithconstitutionalissues. Ifso,inferiorcourtshaveoriginaljurisdictionoverconstitutional casesalthoughtheydecidethecaseonlyatfirstinstance,theirdecisionbeingalwaysreviewablebytheSC. Thus,forinstanceanRTCcanruleontheconstitutionalityoftheAntiSubversionLaw. InJ.M.Tuason&Co.vCA,3SCRA696(1961),RA2616,whichprovidedfortheexpropriationofthe TatalonEstate,wasclaimedtobeunconstitutional.ThisissuesaidtheSC,couldberesolvedbytheCFIinthe ejectmentcasefiledbeforeitbytheevicteesoftheestate,sincethe1935Constitutioncontemplatedthatinferior courtsshouldhavejurisdictionincasesinvolvingconstitutionalityissues,thatitspokeofappellatereviewof "finaljudgmentofinferiorcourts"incaseswheresuchconstitutionalityhappenstobeinissue.The2/3voteof theSCrequiredbySec.10ofArt.VIIrestrictedthedecisionsofthatCourtonlyintheexerciseofitsappellate

jurisdiction. Said the court: The Consti. contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involvingtheconstitutionalityofanytreatyorlaw,foritspeaksofappellatereviewofthefinaljudgmentof inferiorcourts,incaseswheresuchconstitutionalityhappenstobeinissue.The2/3voteoftheSC,requiredby Sec.10,Art.VIII,ofthe1935Consti.,conditionsonlydecisionsofthatcourtintheexerciseofitsappellate jurisdiction. InYnotvIAC148SCRA659,theSCreversedtheRTC'sholdingthatithadnoauthoritytoruleonthe validityofEO626A,banningthetransportingofcarabaosfromoneprovincetoanother. TheCourtpointed out,thatsinceithasjurisdictiontoreview,revise,reverse,modifyoraffirmfinaljudgmentsoflowercourtsin constitutionalcases,thenthelowercourtscanpassuponthevalidityofastatuteinthefirstinstance. TheSCthenstruckdownthelawforbeingarbitraryandforundulydelegatinglegislativepower.

Ynotvs.IAC,148SCRA659(1987) F:
Petitioners'6carabaos wereconfiscatedbythepolice forhavingbeen transported from Masbate toIloilo in violationofEO626A. Hebroughtanactionforreplevin,challengingtheconsitutionalityoftheEO. Thetrialcourt sustainedtheconfiscationoftheanimalsanddeclinedtoruleonthevalidityofthelawonthegroundthatitlacked authoritytodoso.ItsdecisionwasaffirmedbytheIAC.Hencethispetitionforreview.

HELD:(1) UndertheprovisiongrantingtheSCjurisdictionto"review,revise,reverse,modifyoraffirmon appealor certiorari,asthelaworrulesofcourtmayprovidefinaljudgmentsoflowercourts"inallcases involvingtheconstitutionalityofcertainmeasures,lowercourtscanpassuponthevalidityofastatuteinthefirst instance. (2)Thereisnodoubtthatbybanningtheslaughteroftheseanimals(exceptwherethereatleast7yrs. oldifmaleand11yrsoldiffemaleupontheissuanceofthenecessarypermit)theEOwillbeconservingthose stillfitforfarmworkorbreedingandpreventingtheirimprovidentdepletion.Wedonotsee,however,howthe prohibitionoftheinterprovincialtransportofcarabaoscanpreventtheirindiscriminateslaughter,considering thattheycanbekilledanywhere,w/nolessdifficultyinonprovincethaninanother.Obviously,retainingthe carabaoinoneprovincewillnotpreventtheirslaughterthere,anymorethanmovingthemtoanotherprovince willmakeiteasiertokillthemthere.Asforthecarabeef,theprohibitionismadetoapplytoitasotherwise,so saystheEO,itcouldbeeasilycircumsbcribedbysimplykilling theanimal. Perhapsso. However,ifthe movementoftheliveanimalsforthepurposeofpreventingtheirslaughtercannotbeprohibited,itshouldfollow thatthereisnoreasoneithertoprohibittheirtransferas,nottobeflippant,deadmeat. (3)Intheinstantcase,thecarabaoswerearbitrarilyconfiscatedbythepolicestationcommander,were returnedtothepetitioneronlyafterhehadfiledacomplaintforrecoveryandgivenasupersedeasbondw/cwas orderedconfiscateduponhisfailuretoproducethecarabaoswhenorderedbythetrialcourt.TheEOdefined theprohibition,convictedthepetitionerandimmediatelyimposedpunishment,w/cwascarriedoutforthright. Themeasuresstruckhimatonceandpounceduponthepetitionerw/ogivinghimachancetobeheard,thus denyinghimelementaryfairplay.xxxVV. (2)JudicialReviewandpoliticalquestions. Art.VIII,Sec.1.JudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsas

maybeestablishedbylaw. Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolving rightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeena grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentalityoftheGovernment.

The second aspect of the definition of judicial power modifies the political question doctrine. As enunciated in Tanada v Cuenco, a political question is one tobe decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,oneinrespecttowhichfulldiscretionarycapacityisgiventotheotherbranchesofthegovernment. Itdoesnotmean,however,thatthepoliticalquestiondoctrinehasbeencompletelyabrogatedbythe Constitution,suchthatifthosecaseswheretheSCinvokedthedoctrineweredecidednowitwouldhaveto decidethecaseonitsmerits.ItissubmittedthatwhattheConstitutionoverrulesisonlytherulinginGarcia PadillavPonceEnrile,supra,wheretheSCheldthatthequestiononthevalidityoftheproclamationofmartial lawisbeyondjudicialreview,sothatwhenthePresidentsaysthatthereisaneedforsuchproclamation,his wordsarebindingontheCourts,andallthatthecitizencandoistrustinthegoodfaithofthePresident. Indeed,asalreadynotedintheCommanderinChiefpowerofthePresidentabove,Art.VII,Sec.18 authorizestheSCtoreview,inanappropriateproceeding(likeahabeascorpuspetition),filedbyacitizen(who, undertheRulesofCourt,couldbethedetaineehimself,oranyoneelseinhisbehalf),thesufficiencyofthe factualbasisoftheproclamationorsuspension. Beyondthis,thepoliticalquestiondoctrineisnotadeadissue.Infact,theSupremeCourtcontinuesto invokeitasinLawyers'LeagueforaBetterPhilippinesvAquino,InreBermudezandMarcosvsManglapus.

GarciavsBOI,191SCRA288 Inthiscase,thecourtruledthatithasaconstitutionaldutytostepintothecontroversyanddetermine theparamountissue.Saidthecourt,"[t]hereisbeforeusanactualcontroversywhetherthepetrochemicalplant shouldremaininBataanorshouldbetransferredtoBatangas,andwhetheritsfeedstockoriginallyofnaphtha onlyshouldbechangedtonaphthaand/orliquifiedpetroleumgasastheapprovedamendedapplicationofthe BPC,nowLuzonPetrochemicalCorp.(LPC),shows.AndinthelightofthecategoricaladmissionoftheBOI thatitistheinvestorwhohasthefinalchoiceofthesiteandthedecisiononthefeedstock,whetherornotit constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding. TheSupremeCourtheldthattheBOIcommittedagraveabuseofdiscretioninapprovingthetransferof thepetrochemicalplantfromBataantoBatangasandauthorizingthechangeoffeedstockfromnaphthaonlyto naphthaand/orLPGforthemain reasonthatthefinalsayisintheinvestorallothercircumstancestothe contrarynotwithstanding.Nocogentadvantagetothegovernmenthasbeenshownbythistransfer.Thisisa repudiationoftheindependentpolicyofthegovernmentexpressedinnumerouslawsandtheConstitutiontorun

itsownaffairsandthewayitdeemsbestforthenationalinterest. Dissenting:ThedecisionoftheBOImaybeextremelyunwiseandinadvisable,buttheSCmaynot,forthat reasonannultheBOI'sactionorprohibititfromactingonthemannerthatlieswithinitsparticularsphereof competence,fortheCourtisnotajudgeofthewisdomandsoundnessoftheactionsofthetwoothercoequal branchesoftheGovernment,butonlyoftheirlegalityandconstitutionality.Adapted.

(3)Jurisdictionovercriminalcaseswherepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetua Art.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers: xxx (2)Review,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmonappealor certiorari asthelawortheRulesof Courtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin: (d)Allcriminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaorhigher.

InPeoplevDaniel,86SCRA511(1978)andasaffirmedinPeoplevRamos,88SCRA466(1979),both beingrapecaseswherethetrialcourtimposedlesserpenaltiesbecauseofmisappreciationoftheaggravating andqualifyingcircumstancesandonappealthepenaltywasincreased.Themajorityopinionheldthat"hence forth,shouldtheCAbeoftheopinionthatthepenaltyofdeathorreclusionperpetuashouldbeimposedinany criminalcaseappealedtoitwherethepenaltyimposedbythetrialcourtislessthanreclusionperpetua,thesaid Court,withcomprehensivewrittenanalysisoftheevidenceanddiscussionofthelawinvolved(should)render judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstanceswarrant,refrainfromenteringjudgment,andforthwithcertifythecaseandelevatetheentire recordtheretotothisCourtforreview."ChiefJusticeCastro,forthemajority,explained:Art.X,Sec.5(2)(d) [nowArt.VIII,Sec.5(2)(d)]providesthattheSCshallhaveappellatejurisdictionover"finaljudgementsand decreesofinferiorcourts"incriminalinw/cthe"penaltyimposedisdeathorlifeimprisonment."Unlessthe CArendersjudgmentandimposesthepenaltyofdeathorreclusionperpetua,therewouldbenojudgmentfor SCtoreview.Indeed,Section34oftheJudiciaryActof1948andthepresentRule124,Sec.13providethat, whenevertheCAshouldbeoftheopinionthatthepenaltyofdeathorlifeimprisonmentshouldbeimposed, "thesaidcourtshallrefrainfromenteringjudgmentthereon,andshallforthwithcertifythecasebroughtbefore itonappeal,"whichthatitisnotprohibitedfromrenderingjudgment.Inotherwords,theCAisnotprohibited fromrenderingjudgmentbutfrom"enteringjudgment."Thedistinctionbet.thetwoiswellestablished. The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated w/ an "entry of judgment" as the latter is understoodinR36inrelationtoSec.8,R121andSec.16,R124,ROC."Entryofjudgment"presupposesa finaljudgment finalinthesensethatnoappealwastakenfromthedecisionofthetrialcourtorappellate courtw/inthereglamentaryperiod.Ajudgmentinacrim.casebecomesfinalafterthelapseoftheperiodfor perfecting anappeal, orwhenthesentence hasbeenpartiallyortotallysatisfiedorserved,orthedef.has expresslywaivedinwritinghisrighttoappeal.Itisonlythenthatthereisajudgmentw/cistobeenteredor recordedinthebookofentriesofjudgments.

Rule124,Sec.13.xxx WhenevertheCourtofAppealsshouldbeoftheopinionthatthepenaltyofreclusionperpetuaor highershouldbeimposedinacase,theCourtafterdiscussionoftheevidenceandthelawinvolved,shall render judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher as the circumstances warrant, refrainfromenteringjudgmentandforthwithcertifythecaseandelevatetheentirerecordthereoftothe SupremeCourtforreview.

(4)ArticleVII,Sec.18,par.3 Art.VII,Sec.18.xxx xxx TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiency ofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritorthe extensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling.

(5)ArticleVII,Sec.4,par.7 Art.VII,Sec.4.xxx xxx TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection, returns,andqualificationsofthePresident,VicePresident,andmaypromulgateitsruleforthepurpose.

Lopezvs.Roxas,17SCRA756(1966) F:
In1965,the2HousesofCongressinjointsessionproclaimedpetitionerFernandoLopezelectedtotheOfficeof theVicePresidentofthePhilippines.Hisclosestopponent,resp.GerardoRoxas,thenfiledwiththePresidentialElectoral Tribunal(PET)anelectionprotestcontestingtheelectionofpetitionerhereinasVPuponthegroundthatitwasnothe,but saidresp.,whohadobtainedthelargestnumberofvotesforsaidoffice. PetitionerLopeztheninstitutedthisOriginal ActiontopreventthePETfromhearinganddecidingtheaforementionedelectioncontest,uponthegroundthatR.A.No. 1793,creatingsaidTribunal,is"unconstitutional"andthat,"allproceedingstakenbyitareanullity".

ISSUE:WhetherR.A.1793isunconstitutional HELD:NO.Section1,Art.VIIIoftheConstitutionvestsinthejudicialbranchofthegovernment,notmerely somespecifiedorlimitedjudicialpower,buttheentiretyor"all"ofsaidpower,except,only,somuchasthe Constitutionconfersuponsomeotheragency,suchasthepowerto"judgeallcontestsrelatingtotheelection, returnsandqualifications'ofmembersoftheSenateandthoseoftheHouseofRepresentatives,whichisvested bytheConstitutionsolelyintheSenateElectoralTribunalandtheHouseElectoralTribunal,respectively. R.A1793,creatingthePET,hastheeffectofgivingadefeatedcandidate thelegalrighttocontest

judiciallytheelectionofthePresidentelectortheVPelect.ByprovidingthatthePET"shallbecomposedof theChiefJusticeandtheother10MembersoftheSC",R.A.1793hasconferreduponsuchcourtanadditional exclusiveoriginaljurisdiction.Ithasnotcreatedanewandseparatecourt.IthasmerelyconferredupontheSC thefunctionsofaPET. ThePETisnotinferiortotheSCsinceitisthesamecourt,althoughthefunctions peculiartosaidTribunalaremorelimitedinscopethanthoseoftheSCintheexerciseofitsordinaryfunctions. TheauthorityofthePETtodeclarewhohasthebetterrighttoofficedoesnotabridgeconstitutionaltenure. Iftheevidenceintroducedintheelectionprotestshowsthatthepersonreallyelectedistheprotestant,notthe persondeclaredelectedbyCongress,thenthelatterhadlegallynoconstitutionaltenurewhatsoever,and,hence, hecanclaimnoabridgmentthereof.Moreover,intheimpositionofnewdutiesupontheSC,theCongresshas not,throughR.A.1793,encroachedupontheappointing poweroftheExecutive. Itconstitutesneitherthe creationofanoffice,northeappointmentofanofficer.Saidlawisconstitutional.Adapted.

(6)ArticleIX,A,Sec.7 Art.IX,A,Sec.7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseor matterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.A caseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,or memorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself. Unlessotherwise providedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,orderorrulingofeachCommissionmaybebrought totheSupremeCourton certiorari bytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromreceiptofthecopy thereof.

h.CongressionalPoweroverJurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt Art.VIII,Sec.2. TheCongressshallhavethepowerthedefine,prescribeandapportionthe jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumeratedinSection5hereof. xxx Butwhilethejurisdictionofcourtsisamatteroflegislativeapportionment,theConstitutionsetscertain limitationsonthisprerogative: 1.ItcannotdecreasetheconstitutionallysetjurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt. (ItmaynotdeprivetheSupremeCourtofitsjurisdictionovercasesenumeratedinSection5hereof.) 2.ItcannotincreasetheconstitutionallysetappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt.

Art.VI,Sec.30. Nolawshallbepassedincreasingtheappellatejurisdiction oftheSupreme CourtasprovidedinthisConstitutionwithoutitsadviceandconcurrence.

3.ItcanincreasetheoriginaljurisdictionoftheSC(pursuanttoitsgeneralpower). 4.ItcanmakethejurisdictionoftheSCconcurrentwithlowercourts(pursuanttoitsgeneralpower). Thus,undertheRulesofCourt,theoriginaljurisdictionoftheSCisconcurrentwiththeRTCandinthe caseofthespecialcivilactions,withtheCA. 5. Itcannotpassalawreorganizingthejudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofits members.(Art.VI,Sec.2,par.2)

MantrusteSystems,Inc.vsCA F:
Mantruste(MSI)enteredintoaninterimleaseagreementw/DBP,ownerofBayviewPlazaHotelwhereinthe formerwouldoperatethehotelforaminimumof3mos.oruntilsuchtimethatthesaidpropertiesaresoldtoMSIorother thirdpartiesbyDBP.Subsequently,thePres.issuedProcl.50w/csoughttotheexpeditiousprivatizationofgovernment assets. TheBayviewHotelproperties wereamongthegovt assets identifiedforprivatization andwereconsequently transferredfromDBPtotheAssetPrivatizationTrust(APT)fordisposition. xxx. Thepropertiesweresubsequently awardedtotheMakatiAgroTradingandLaFilipinaCorp.MSIfiledacomplaintfortheissuanceofarestrainingorder enjoiningAPTfromapprovingthewinningbidandawardingtheBayviewpropertytoprivatepetitionersandfromejecting MSIfromthepropertyorfromterminatingthecontractoflease. TheCAnullifiedthelowercourt'sdecisionforbeing violativeofSec.31ofProcl.50A.

HELD: Section31ofProclamationNo.5Aprohibitedcourtsandadministrativeagencies fromissuing any restrainingorderorinjunctionagainsttheAssetPrivatizationTrustinconnectionwiththeacquisition,saleor dispositionofassetstransferredtoit,noragainstanypurchaserofassetssoldbytheTrusttopreventsuch purchaserfromtakingpossessionofanyassetspurchasedbyhim.SaidSectiondoesnotinfringeanyprovision oftheConstitution.Itdoesnotimpairtheinherentpowerofthecourts"tosettleactualcontroversieswhichare legallydemandableandenforceableandtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretion amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityofthegovt." The President,intheexerciseofherlegislativepowerundertheFreedomConstitution,issuedsaidProclamationto preventcourtsfrominterferinginthedischargeoftheExecutiveDepartmentofitstaskofcarryingoutthe expeditiousdispositionandprivatizationofcertaingovt.corporationsand/ortheassetsthereof,absentanygrave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistentwiththeConstitutionandnothavingbeenrepealedorrevokedbyCongress,hasremainedoperative. Whilethejudicialpowermayappeartobepervasive,thetruthisthatunderthesystemofseparationor powers,thepowersofthecourtsovertheotherbranchesandinstrumentalitiesofgovernmentislimitedtothe determination ofwhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessof jurisdictionintheexerciseoftheirauthorityandintheperformanceoftheirassignedtasks. Courtsmaynot substitutetheirjudgmentforthatoftheAPT,norblock,byaninjunction,thedischargeofitsfunctionsandthe implementationofitsdecisionsinconnectionwiththeacquisition,sale,ordispositionofassetstransferredtoit. Adapted.

TheSupremeCourt'sJurisdiction A)Originaljurisdiction[Art.VIII,Sec.5(1)] (1)Casesaffectingambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls. (2)Petitionsforcertiorari,prohibition,mandamus,quowarrantoandhabeascorpus. (3)SufficiencyoffactualbasisofproclamationofmartiallawandsuspensionofprivilegeofwritofHC NotethattheSCdoesnothavejurisdictionoverdeclaratoryreliefcases,whichmustbefiledwiththe RTC(InReBermudezsaidsotoo,andyetgaveduecoursetothepetition.) Thefirstcase(ambassadors,etc.)ismadeconcurrentwithRTCsbylaw(JudiciaryActof1948).The secondcase(specialcivilactions)isconcurrentwiththeCAandtheRTC,withrespecttoinferiorbodies. B)AppellateJurisdiction TheSupremeCourtshallhavethepowertoreview,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmon(i)ordinary appeal,or(ii)petitionforreviewoncertiorari,asthelawortheRulesofCourtmayprovide,finaljudgmentand ordersoflowercourtsinthefollowingcases: (1)Casesquestioningtheconstitutionalityorvalidityofany(a)treaty,(b)internationalandexecutive agreement,(c)laworstatute,(d)presidentialdecree,(e)proclamation,(f)order,(g)instruction,(h)ordinance,or (i)regulation. (2)Casesquestioningthelegalityofan(a)tax,(b)impost,(c)assessment,or(d)toll,or(e)anypenalty imposedinrelationthereto. (3)Casesinwhichthejurisdictionoflowercourtsisinissue. (4)Criminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaorhigher. (5)Casesinw/conlyanerrororquestionoflawisinvolved. (6)OrdersoftheConstitutionalCommissions.

Appellatejurisdictionmaybeexercisedintwoways: 1.Ordinaryappeal Thisisobligatoryonthecourts,sotheappellantpossessesthis"asamatterofright".Underthismode, theSCcanpassonbothquestionsoffactandlaw.

OrdinaryappealtotheSCisallowedbylawincriminalcaseswherethepenaltyimposedisreclusion perpetuaorhigher,includingthoseinvolvingotheroffenseswhich,althoughnotsopunished,aroseoutofthe sameoccurrenceorwhichmayhavebeencommittedbytheaccusedonthesameoccasion(toensureuniformity ofdecision).(Sec.17,JudiciaryActof1948). TheothercaseistheautomaticreviewbytheSCofcriminalcaseswherethedeathpenaltyisimposed. Thisisunliketheordinaryappealtakenwherethepenaltyisreclusionperpetuaorhigher,forinthiscase,the reviewisautomatic.Thereasonwhyitisnotautomaticinthefirstcase(reclusionperpetua)isthatonappeal, theappellatecourtmayincreasethepenaltyimposedbythetrialcourt(todeath)sothattheconvictmustfirst waivehisrightagainstdoublejeopardy,preciselybyvoluntarilymakingtheappeal,beforetheSCcanreopenthe case on appeal. But the case is different when death is imposed because the worst that could happen on automaticappealisthatthejudgmentisaffirmed. NaturalizationanddenaturalizationcasesundertheJudiciaryActof1948(Sec.17)usedtobedirectly appealabletotheSC.ButthisisdeemedtohavebeenamendedbytheJudiciaryReorganizationActof1980 (BP129)which,inSec.5(3),makesallcasesdecidedbytheRTC,appealabletotheCA,exceptthosemade directlyappealabletotheSCby(i)theConstitution,(ii)BP129and(iii)Sec.17[3(i)]andSec.17[4(4)]ofthe JudiciaryActof1948.Naturalizationanddenaturalizationcasesdonotfallunderanyoftheexceptions. 2.Petitionforreviewoncertiorari ThisisnotdiscretionaryontheSC. Ithastheauthoritynottogiveduecoursetothepetition,ifthe petitionshowsnomeritonitsface.Thus,modeprovidedforinRule45,islimitedtopurequestionsoflaw.All othercasescanbeappealedtotheSCusingthismode. TheConstitutionnowprovidesthat"nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionof thecourtshallberefusedduecourseordeniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor."(Art.VIII,Sec.14,par. 2) The four other cases falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the SC (viz, constitutionality, tax, jurisdictionandpurequestionsoflaw),areappealabletotheSCbypetitionforreviewoncertiorari.However, incasesinvolvingconstitutionality,tax,orjurisdiction,whentheresolutionofthemainissuedependsona controvertedquestionoffact,thecasemustbeappealedtotheCAonboth,questionsoffactandlaw,andthe decisionoftheCAisthenraisedtotheSCbypetitionforreviewoncertiorarionpurequestionsoflaw.(Sec.17 oftheJudiciaryActof1948) Certiorari Thecertiorarireferredtoin5(1)(whentheSCexercisesoriginaljurisdiction)isthespecialcivilaction of certiorari under Rule 65, where the question raised is a "jurisdictional question," that is, (a) lack of jurisdiction,(b)excessofjurisdiction,or(c)graveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdiction. The certiorari referred to in 5(2) (when the SC exercises appellate jurisdiction) is certiorari as an ordinarymodeofappeal,wheretheissueraisedis"errorofjudgment"orerroroflaw.

i.Administrativepowers

(1)Supervisionoflowercourts Art.VIII,Sec.6.TheSupremeCourtshallhaveadministrativesupervisionoverallcourtsandthe personnelthereof.

InNoblejasvTeehankee,theSCheldthatalthoughtheCommissionerofLandRegistrationisgiventhe rankofjudgeoftheCFI,heisstillanadministrativeofficial,henceoutsidethejurisdictionoftheSCandcannot beinvestigatedbyitasifhewerealowercourtjudge.Otherwise,theSCwouldbeperforminganonjudicial work. (2)Temporarilyassignjudgestootherstationsinthepublicinterest Art.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethexxxpower(to) xxx (3) Assigntemporarilyjudgesoflowercourtstootherstationsaspublicinterestmayrequire. Suchtemporaryassignmentshallnotexceedsixmonthswithouttheconsentofthejudgeconcerned. (3)Orderachangeofvenueorplaceoftrialtoavoidmiscarriageofjustice[Art. VIII,Sec.5(4)]

(4)Disciplineoflowercourtjudges Art.VIII,Sec.11.xxx TheSupremeCourt enbanc shallhavethepowertodisciplinejudgesof lowercourts,orordertheirdismissal,byavoteofamajorityofthememberswhoactuallytookpartinthe deliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.

(5)Appointmentofofficialsandemployeesofentirejudiciary Art.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethexxxpower(to) xxx (6)AppointallofficialsandemployeesoftheJudiciaryinaccordancewiththeCivilServiceLaw.

j.Rulemaking Art.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers:

xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,practice,andprocedureinallcourts,theadmissiontothepracticeoflaw,theIntegratedBar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedureforthespeedydispositionofcases,shallbeuniformforallcourtsofthesamegrade,andshall notdiminish,increase,ormodifysubstantiverights. Rightsofprocedureofspecialcourtsandquasi judicialbodiesshallremaineffectiveunlessdisapprovedbytheSupremeCourt.

PowerofCongresstorepealRulesofCourt ArticleXVIII,Sec.10.AllcourtsexistingatthetimeoftheratificationofthisConstitutionshall continuetoexercisetheirjurisdiction,untilotherwiseprovidedbylaw. Theprovisionsoftheexisting RulesofCourt,judiciaryacts,andprocedurallawsnotinconsistentwiththisConstitutionshallremain operativeunlessamendedorrepealedbytheSupremeCourtortheCongress.

(notinVV'srevisedoutline) CoJudicialpowers AsidefromthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtmentionedabovethefollowingareitsotherpowers relatedto,thoughnotexactlyconstituting,itsjudicialfunction: 1.Orderachangeofvenueorplaceoftrial,inordertoavoidamiscarriageofjustice.Art.VIII,Sec. 5(4)] 2. Rule making Promulgate rules concerning (a) the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,(b)pleading,practiceandprocedureinallcourts,(c)theadministrationtothepracticeoflaw,(d)the IntegratedBar,and(e)legalassistancetotheunderprivileged. Limitationstothispower: Suchrulesshall(i)providesimplifiedandinexpensiveprocedure,forthe speedydispositionofcases,(ii)beuniformforallcourtsofthesamegrade,and(iii)notdiminish,increaseor modifysubstantiverights. Rulesofprocedureofspecialcourtsandquasijudicialbodiesshallremaineffectiveunlessdisapproved bytheSC.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(5)] Itisonthebasisofthispower,thattheRulesofCourt,theBar,IBP,LegalAidOfficewereadopted.

In1935,asaffirmedinthecaseofInreCunanan,theCongresswasgiventhepowertoalter,supplement ormodifytheRulesofCourt.Thus,iftheSCsetthepassinggradeinthebarat75%,Congresscouldloweritto 70%,providedthishasnoretroactiveeffect. Thisisnolongertruein1987.Rulemakingpowerandthecorollarypowerofamendingtherulesare nowlodgedexclusivelyontheSC.

PracticeofProfessions Art.XII,Sec.14.xxx ThepracticeofallprofessionsinthePhilippinesshallbelimitedtoFilipinocitizens,saveincases prescribedbylaw. MartialLaw Art.VII,Sec.18. TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyany citizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofMartialLaworthesuspensionofthe privilegeofthewritortheextensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydays formitsfiling.(par.3thereof.)

k.Noquasijudicialandadministrativeworkofjudges Generally:Nononjudicialworkforjudges;Noquasijudicialandadministrativeworkforjudges. Asageneralrule,membersofthejudiciaryshallonlyhavejudicialfunctions,inlinewiththeseparation ofpowersprincipleoftheConstitution.Thus: Art.VIII,Sec.12. ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandofothercourtsestablishedbylaw shallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasijudicialoradministrativefunction.

Thus,inMeralcovPasayTransportationCo.,57Phil600(1932),theSCheldthatjusticesoftheSC couldnotbeconstitutedintoaBoardofArbitrationtodeterminereasonablecompensationfortheuseofa bridge,forthisisanonjudicialwork.

MeralcovPasayTransportationCo.,57Phil600(1932) Theissue concerns the legal rightof the members ofthe SC,sitting as aboard of arbitrators, the decisionofamajorityofwhomshallbefinal,toactinthatcapacity.

HELD:TheSCanditsmembersshouldnotandcannotberequiredtoexerciseanypowerortoperformanytrust ortoassumeanydutynotpertainingtoorconnectedw/theadministeringofjudicialfunctions.RAM.

InGarciavMacaraig,39SCRA106(1971),theSCsaidthatitdidnotlookwithfavoratthepracticeof longstandingofjudgesbeingdetailedwiththeDepartmentofJusticetoassisttheSecretary,evenifitwereonly inconnectionwithhisworkofexercisingadministrativeauthorityovercourts. Thebasisofthisruleisthe separationofpowers.Inthiscase,resp.MacaraigwasappointedtooneofthenewlycreatedCFIbranchesw/ stationatCalambaLaguna.Atthetimeofhisappointment,resp.wasthechiefofTechnicalStaffoftheDOJ andconcurrentlymemberoftheBoardofPardonsandParole.xxx

InRe:RodolfoManzano166SCRA246 F:
EO No. 856 created the Provincial/City Committees on Justice to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,particularlythoseinvolvingthepoorandindigentones,thusalleviatingjailcongestionandimprovinglocaljail conditions. Among the functions of said committee are to receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden,fiscalorjudgewhomaybefoundtohavecommittedabusesinthedischargeofhisdutiesandreferthesameto properauthorityforproperaction,torecommendrevisionofanylaworregulationwhichisbelievedprejudicialtothe properadministrationofcriminaljustice. JudgeManzano,ExecutiveJudgeOfIlocosNortewasappointedasmemberofsaidCommittee.Beforeaccepting theappointment,itsoughttheopinionoftheSCastotheproprietyofsuchappointment.

HELD: Suchcommitteeperformsadministrativefunctions. Administrativefunctionsarethosewhichinvolve theregulationandcontrolovertheconductandaffairsofindividualsfortheirownwelfareandthepromulgation ofrules and regulations tobettercarryoutthepolicy ofthelegislatureorsuchasaredevolvedupon the administrativeagencybytheorganiclawofitsexistence. UndertheConstitution,themembersofthecourtsshallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperforming quasijudicialoradministrativefunctions.ConsideringthatmembershipofJudgeManzanoinsuchcommittee, willviolatetheConstitution,theSupremeCourtisconstrainedtodenyhisrequestthathebeallowedtoserve therein. He can only render assistance to such committee to help promote the laudable purposes of said committee,butonlywhensuchassistancemaybereasonablyincidentaltothefulfillmentofhisjudicialduties. Adapted. Exceptions:ConstitutionallyappointednonjudicialfunctionsoftheSupremeCourt a.ActasPresidentialElectoralTribunal WhileCongressactsastheNationalBoardofCanvassersforthePresidentialelection,theSupreme CourtactsastheElectoralTribunalforsuchelection.TheConstitutionprovides:"TheSupremeCourt,sitting enbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtoelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentor VicePresident,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose."(Art.Art.VII,Sec.4,lastpar.)

ThismeansthatbeforetheproclamationbytheCongressofthewinner,Congressisthejudgeofany electoralissue,buttheproclamation,whenthereisanelectoralcontestalready,thentheSCbecomesthesole judge. The1935Constitutiondidnotprovidethispower. AndsoRA1793gavetheSCthepowertoactas judgeinpresidentialelectoralcontests.ItwaschallengedinthecaseofLopezvRoxas,17SCRA756(1966), buttheSCupheldthelaw,reasoningthatitdidnotconstitutetheSCasaseparatebodybutonlyaddedtoits powersthepowertobethejudgeofelectioncontests. WiththeexpressprovisioninArt.VII,Sec.4,par.7,thisisnolongeraproblem. b.ChiefJusticeaspresidingofficerinimpeachmenttrialofthePresident.[Art.XI,Sec.3(6)] c.ChiefJusticeasChairmanoftheJudicialandBarCouncil.

l.Reportonthejudiciary Art.VIII,Sec.16.TheSupremeCourtshall,withinthirtydaysfromtheopeningofeachregular sessionoftheCongress,submittothePresidentandtheCongressanannualreportontheoperationsand activitiesoftheJudiciary.

m.Mannerofsittingandvotesrequired Art.VIII,Sec.4. (1) TheSupremeCourtshallbecomposedof aChiefJusticeandfourteen AssociateJustices.Itmaysitenbancoritsdiscretion,indivisionsofthree,five,orsevenMembers.Any vacancyshallbefilledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof. (2) Allcasesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreement,or law,whichshallbeheardbytheSupremeCourt,enbanc,includingthoseinvolvingtheconstitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and otherregulations,shallbedecidedwiththeconcurrenceofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytook partinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon. (3)Casesormattersheardbyadivisionshallbedecidedorresolvedwiththeconcurrenceofa majorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvoted thereon,andinnocase,withouttheconcurrenceofatleastthreeofsuchMembers.Whentherequired numberisnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecided enbanc: Provided,thatnodoctrineorprincipleor principleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedor reversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.

TheSupremeCourtmaysitenbancorinitsdiscretion,indivisionsof3,5,or7members.[Art.VIII,

Sec.4(1)] ThefollowingcasesshallbeheardbytheSCenbanc: 1.Casesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreementorlaw.[Id.,Sec. 4(2)] 2.Cases involving the(a) constitutionality, (b) application, or(c)operation ofpresidential decrees, proclamations,orders,instructions,ordinancesandotherregulations.[Id.,Sec.4(2)] 3.AllothercaseswhichundertheRulesofCourtarerequiredtobeheardbytheSCenbanc.[Id.,Sec. 4(2)] 4. Casesormattersheardbyadivisionwheretherequirednumberofvotestodecideorresolve(the majorityofthosewhotookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon,andinnocase lessthan3members)isnotmet.[Id.,Sec.4(3)] 5.Tomodifyorreverseadoctrineorprincipleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrendereden bancorindivision.[Id.,Sec.4(3)] 6.Administrativedisciplinarycasesinvolvingjudgesoflowercourts.(Id.,Sec.11.) 7.Actionsinstitutedbycitizentotestthevalidityofaproclamationofmartiallaworsuspensionofthe privilegeofthewrit.(Art.VII,Sec.18.) 8.ThecourtsittingasPresidentialElectoralTribunal.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.7.)

Rule56,Sec.11 Sec.11. Procedureifopinionisequallydivided.Wherethecourt enbancisequallydividedin opinion,orthenecessarymajoritycannotbehad,thecaseshallbereheard,andifonrehearingno decisionisreached,theactionshallbedismissediforiginallycommencedinthecourt;inappealedcases, thejudgementororderappealedfromshallstandaffirmed;andonallincidentalmatters,thepetitionor motionshallbedenied. Rule125,Sec.3 Sec.3.Decisionifopinionisequallydivided. When the court en banc is equally divided in opinion,orthenecessarymajoritycannotbehad,thecaseshallbereheard,andifonrehearingno decision is reached, the judgment of conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted.

n.Requirementastodecisions Art.VIII,Secs.1314 Deliberations Art.VIII,Sec.13.TheconclusionsoftheSupremeCourtinanycasesubmittedtoitfordecision enbanc orindivisionshallbereachedinconsultationbeforethecaseisassignedtoamemberforthe writingoftheopinionoftheCourt.AcertificationtothiseffectsignedbytheChiefJusticeshallbeissued andacopythereofattachedtotherecordofthecaseandservedupontheparties.AnyMemberwhotook nopart,ordissented,orabstainedfromadecisionorresolutionmuststatethereasontherefor.Thesame requirementsshallbeobservedbyalllowercollegiatecourts.

Thereasonfortherequirementthatthedecisionmustbereached"inconsulta"(i.e.,afterdeliberations bythegroup)istoemphasizethattheSCisonebody,albeitcollegiate,sothatthedecisionofthecaseisbythe courtitselfandnottheponente.Thewriteroftheopinionismerelythespokesmanofthebody.

ConsingVCA177SCRA14(1989) ISSUE:W/NabsenceofcertificationbytheCourtofAppealsrendersthatdecisioninvalid. HELD: NO. The certification requirement imposed by the 1987 constitution was meant to ensure the implementation of the constitutional requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts,suchastheCA,SandiganbayanandCTA,arereachedafterconsultationwiththemembersofthecourt sittingenbancorinadivisionbeforethecaseisassignedtoamemberthereoffordecisionwriting. Theabsencewouldnotnecessarilymeanthatthecasesubmittedfordecisionhadnotbeenreachedin consultationbeforebeingassignedtoonememberforthewritingoftheopinionofthecourtsincetheregular performanceofofficialdutyispresumed.Thelackofcertificationservesasanevidenceoffailuretoobserve thecertificationrequirementbutitwouldnothavetheeffectofinvalidatingthedecision.

Art.VIII,Sec.14.Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearly anddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased. Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefuseddue courseordeniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.

Voting

Votesrequiredto"renderadecisionorresolution" A)Enbanc Concurrenceofa majorityofthemembers who(i) actually tookpartinthedeliberations (i.e., the consultation)ontheissuesinthecase,and(ii)votedthereon.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(2)andSec.11.] a.Thelowestpossiblevotesneededtorenderadecisionis5,sincequorumof15is8,andmajorityof8 is5.Thisnumbermayincreaseasthenumberofjusticespresentincrease; b.Onewhoabstainedisdeemedtohavevotedforthepurposeofcomputingthemajorityvoteneeded. Foranabstentionisreallyaformofcastingavotewithitsownrepercussionsontheoutcomeofthecase. c.Onewhowaspresentbutkeptsilentduringthedeliberationsanddidnotvoteisstillincludedinthe countingforthepurposeofdeterminingthemajority.Foritmayhappenthathehasalreadymadeuphismind onhowtodecideandinfluencetheoutcomeofthecase. d.Butonewhoexpresslyinhibitedorisdisqualifiedfromtakingpart(forinstancebecauseofconflictof interest)isnotincluded. e.Theremustbeaquorumbeforeavaliddecisioncanbemade. Withoutaquorum,therecanbeno validbusinesstobeginwith. f.Incase,thenecessarymajoritycannotbemustered,thenthereisnodecisionrendered.(Seeeffectof failuretoreachamajoritybelow.) Thisprovisionthus,overrulestherequirementof(a)10votes(2/3)todeclarealawunconstitutional under1973(aconstitutionalrequirement),and(b)10votestoimposeoraffirmthedeathpenalty(byinternal rulesoftheSC,althoughconstitutionally8voteswereenough).Thepresumptionofconstitutionalityoflaws undertheJudiciaryActof1948,however,remainsvalid. B)Indivisions Casesormattersheardbyadivisionshallbedecidedorresolved(a)withtheconcurrenceofamajority ofthememberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon,and(b)in nocasewithouttheconcurrenceofatleast3ofsuchmembers.Whentherequirednumberisnotobtained,the caseshallbedecidedenbanc.Nodoctrineorprincipleoflawlaidbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbanc orindivisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(3)] a.Inadivisionof7members,themajorityifallarepresentis4.Ifonly6arepresent,4.Ifonly5or4, 3.Ifonly3,noquorum. b.Inadivisionof5members,3votesareneededregardlessofwhether5,4,or3arepresent.

c.Indivisionof3members,3votesareneeded. d.Inanyofthesecases,whenthevotescannotbemustered,thecasemustberaisedtothecourtenbanc.

Effectoffailuretomusterthenecessarymajority: Ifthenecessarymajoritycannotbehad,thecaseisagainreheard.Ifuponrehearing,nomajorityisstill had,thefollowingaretheeffects: a.Ifacaseisonappeal,thejudgmentappealedfromisdeemedaffirmedexcept: (i)Criminalcaseswherethejudgmentisthatofconviction:theconvictionisreversed,andthe accusedisacquitted. (ii)Caseswherethelowercourtdeclaredalaw,etc.unconstitutional:thejudgmentisreversed, andthevalidityofthelawisdeemedsustained,pursuanttothepresumptionofconstitutionalityunderSec.9of theJudiciaryActof1948.(Ifthelowercourtdeclaredthelawasnotunconstitutional,thisjudgmentisdeemed affirmedpursuanttothegeneralruleabove.) (Thus, if 12 are present, 5 voted the law unconstitutional, 4 voted for its validity, and 3 abstained,thereisnodecisionandsothelawremainsvalid.) b.Ifthecaseisanoriginalpetition,thenthecaseisdeemeddismissed. Writingofthedecision Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearlyanddistinctlythefactsand thelawonwhichitisbased.(Art.VIII,Sec.14.) InthecaseoftheSCandlowercollegiatecourt,thisruleisaddressedtotheonetowhomthewritingof the opinion was assigned after consultation, that is, the ponente. In the case by other courts, this rule is addressedtothejudge. Decisionsonthemerit. Therulerequiringstatementoftherelevantfacts,theissues,theruling,andthereasonedopinionin supportoftheruling,appliesonlytodecisionsonthemeritbyacourtofrecord,basedonthefollowingrulings oftheSC: a.InValladolidvInciong,121SCRA205(1983),itwasheldthattheOrderoftheDeputyMinisterof Labor did not contain a statement of facts and conclusions of law is not covered by the constitutional requirementbecauseitisnotadecisionofacourtofrecord,theMinistryofLaborbeinganadministrative

agencywithquasijudicialfunctions,withrulesofproceduremandatedtobenonlitigious,summaryandnon technical. Section14,Chapter3,BookVII,AdministrativeCodeof1987 Section14. Decision. Everydecision renderedbytheagencyinacontestedcaseshallbein writingandshallstateclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.xxx

AirManilavs.Balatbat,38SCRA489(1971) Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental procedureprinciples,suchasthedue process requirements ininvestigations andtrials. Administrative due processincludes: (a)Therighttonotice,beitactualorconstructive,oftheinstitutionoftheproceedingsthatmayaffecta person'slegalrights; (b)Reasonableopportunitytoappearanddefendhisrights,introducewitnessesandrelevantevidence inhisfavor; (c)Atribunalsoconstitutedastogivehimreasonableassuranceofhonestyandimpartiality,andoneof competentjurisdiction;and (d)Afindingordecisionbythattribunalsupportedbysubstantialevidencepresentedatthehearing,or atleastcontainedintherecordsordisclosedtothepartiesaffected.

b.InBacolodMurciaMillingCo.vHenares,107Phil.560(1960),theSCruledthatordersofacourton anincidentalmatter(inthiscase,theorderimposingthepaymentofattorney'sfees)neednotstatethelegalbasis oftheruling.

MinuteResolution Cruz: Injustifyingthesocalledminuteresolution,theSCsaidinBorromeov.CA,186SCRA1:

"TheSCdisposesofthebulkofitscasesbyminuteresolutionsanddecreesthemasfinalandexecutory,aswhere acaseispatentlyw/omerit,wheretheissuesraisedarefactualinnature,wherethedecisionappealedfromissupportedby substantialevidenceandisinaccordw/thefactsofthecaseandtheapplicablelaws,whereitisclearfromtherecordsthat thepetitionswerefiledmerelytoforsetalltheearlyexecutionofjudgmentandfornoncompliancew/therules. The resolutiondenyingduecourseordismissingapetitionalwaysgivesthelegalbasis. xxxx TheCourtisnotdutyboundtorendersigneddecisionsallthetime.Ithasamplediscretiontoformulatedecisions and/orminuteresolutions,providedalegalbasisisgiven,dependingonitsevaluationofacase."

AndneitherdoestheruleapplytoadministrativecasesdecidedbytheSCitself,asitheldinPrudential Bankv.Castro,158SCRA646,thus: "No constitutional provision is disregarded in the SC's Minute Resolution denying a motion for reconsideration'forlackofmerit,theissuesraisedthereinhavingbeenpreviouslydulyconsideredandpassed upon.Inanadministrativecase,theconstitutionalmandatethat'no***motionforreconsiderationofadecision ofthecourtshallbe***deniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasisthereforisinapplicable.Andevenifitwere,said resolutionstatedthelegalbasisforthedenial,and,therefore,adheredfaithfullytotheconstitutionalrequirement. 'Lackofmerit,'asagroundfordenialislegalbasis.

Petitionsforreviewandmotionsforreconsideration Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefuseddue courseordenied,withoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.(Art.VIII,Sec.14,par.2.) Thisruleappliestoadismissalofamotionforreconsiderationofa"decisiononthemerits",saidtheSC in Mendoza v CFI,51SCRA369(1973). Itdoesnotapply,asinthiscase,toadismissalofamotionfor reconsiderationofapreviousdismissalofapetitionforhabeascorpus.(Thedismissalofthepetitionforhabeas corpusisnotadecisiononthemerits,butissimilartoadismissalofapetitionforreview,whichisadecision nottogiveduecoursetothepetition.) Thepastpracticeusedtobethatwhentheappellatecourtdeniedapetitionforreview,ordeniedaMFR, itsimplydidsoinaMinuteResolution,statingthatthecasewasdismissedforlackofbasis.Thisaggrieved manyalawyer,speciallythosewhowouldspenddayspreparingpagesofbriefs,onlytofindoutthatalltheir effortwasansweredbyaoneliner"Dismissedforlackofbasis". Thispromptedtheframersofthe1987ConstitutiontoforcetheCourttoatleastwritedownthelegal basisforthedenial.Thismeansthatwhileafullydetaileddecisionisnotrequired,neitherisaskimpyoneliner isallowed.Thelegalreasonforthedismissalmustbewritten. DissentersandAbstainers Inthecaseofadecisiononthemerits,ifamember(a)tooknopart,or(b)dissented,or(c)abstained fromadecisionorresolution,hemuststatehisreasontherefor.(Art.VIII,Sec.13.) Before,onlythosewhodissentedwererequiredtowriteanopinion.Now,eventhosewhotooknopart inthedeliberationsbutwerepresent,andthosewhoabstainedarerequiredtowritetheirreasonsfortheseare reallyformsofcastingtheirvote.Thosewhoinhibitedthemselvesare,ofcourse,notrequiredtovote,sincethey didnotreallyparticipate. Procedurally,thepurposeistoenablethepartytofindoutthereasonfortheactiontaken.Forcourts lowerthantheSC,andeventheSCitself,thisisimportantforappealormotionforreconsiderationpurposes,as

thebasisfortheassignmentoferror. Theoretically,sincetheSCisnotanelectivebranchitmustexplainthereasonbeingitsultimatesource ofauthority.Congressneednotexplainitsactionsinceithasbeendelegatedthelegislativepowerbythepeople. o.Mandatoryperiodfordecidingcases Art.VIII,Sec.15.(1)AllcasesormattersfiledaftertheeffectivityofthisConstitutionmustbe decidedorresolvedwithintwentyfourmonthsfromthedateofsubmissionfortheSupremeCourt,and, unlessreducedbytheSupremeCourt,twelvemonthsforalllowercollegiatecourts,andthreemonthsfor allotherlowercourts. (2)Acaseormattershallbedeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthe lastpleading,brieformemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself. (3) Upontheexpirationofthecorrespondingperiod,acertificationtothiseffectsignedbythe ChiefJusticeorthepresidingjudgeshallforthwithbeissuedandacopythereofattachedtotherecordof thecaseormatter,andservedupontheparties.Thecertificationshallstatewhyadecisionorresolution hasnotbeenrenderedorissuedwithinsaidperiod. (4) Despitetheexpirationoftheapplicablemandatoryperiod,thecourt,withoutprejudiceto suchresponsibilityasmayhavebeenincurredinconsequencethereof,shalldecideorresolvethecaseor mattersubmittedtheretofordetermination,withoutfurtherdelay.

Art.VII,Sec.18.xxx xxx TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiency ofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritorthe extensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling. xxx(par.3thereof.)

Art.XVIII,Secs.1214 Art. XVIII, Sec. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this Constitution,adoptasystematicplantoexpeditethedecisionorresolutionofcasesormatterspendingin theSupremeCourtorthelowercourtspriortotheeffectivityofthisConstitution.Asimilarplanshallbe adoptedforallspecialcourtsandquasijudicialbodies. Id., Sec. 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the applicableperiodforthedecisionorresolutionofthecasesormatterssubmittedforadjudicationbythe courts,shallbedeterminedbytheSupremeCourtassoonaspracticable.

Id., Sec. 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this ConstitutionshallapplytocasesormattersfiledbeforetheratificationofthisConstitution,whenthe applicableperiodlapsesaftersuchratification. A)CasesfiledafterFebruary2,1987 AllcasesormattersfiledaftertheeffectivityofthisConstitutionmustbedecidedwithintwentyfour monthscountedfromthedateofsubmission."[Art.VIII,Sec.15(1)] Acaseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief ormemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself.[Art.VIII,Sec.15(2)] MandatoryperiodintheSupremeCourt:24months[Art.VIII,Sec.15(1)] Except:Apropercasequestioningthesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaw orsuspensionoftheprivilegewhichmustbedecided30daysfromfiling.(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.1.)

Butwhathappensifthejudgeorcourtfailstomeetthedeadlineanyway?TheConstitutionprovides: Upontheexpirationofthecorrespondingperiod,acertificationtothiseffectsignedbytheChiefJustice orthepresidingJudgeshallforthwithbeissued,andacopythereofattachedtotherecordofthecaseormatter, andservedupontheparties. Thecertificationshallstatewhyadecisionorresolutionhasbeenrenderedor issuedwithinsaidperiod.[Art.VIII,Sec.15(3)] Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility(administrativedisciplinaryactionagainstthejudgeorjustices)shalldecideorresolvethecaseor mattersubmittedtheretofordeterminationwithoutfurtherdelay.[Art.VIII,Sec.15(4)] Inotherwords,failuretodecidethecase[forreasonsotherthantheinabilitytoreachthenecessary majority]hasnoconsequenceonthecase.Thus,acertificationisrequiredthattheperiodhaslapsedwithoutany decisionbeingmade,statingthereasonforsuchinaction.Thenthecourtmustdecidewithoutanyfurtherdelay. Theconsequencesareonthejudge:(a)hecouldnotdrawouthissalary,sincehewouldnotbeabletocertify thathehasresolvedallcasessubmittedtohimin90daysand(b)heissubjecttoadministrativesanctions. B)CasesfiledbeforeFebruary2,1987butexpireafterthisdate TheprovisionsofArt.VIII,Sec,15(3)(4)shallapplytocasesormattersfiledbeforetheratificationof thisConstitution,whentheapplicableperiodlapsesaftersuchratification.(Art.XVIII,Sec.14) Inotherwords,itisasifthesecaseswerefiledafterFebruary2,1987. C)CasesthatexpiredbeforeFebruary2,1987

Thelegaleffectofthelapse,beforetheratificationofthisConstitution,oftheapplicableperiodforthe decisionorresolutionofthecasesormatterssubmittedforadjudicationbythecourts,shallbedeterminedbythe SCassoonaspracticable.(Art.XVIII,Sec.13.) TheSupremeCourtshall,within1yearfromFebruary2,1987adoptasystematicplantoexpeditethe decisionorresolutionofcasesormatterspendingintheSCorlowercourtspriortotheeffectivityofthis Constitution.Asimilarplanshallbeadoptedforallspecialcourtsandquasijudicialbodies.(Art.XVIII,Sec. 12.)

2.Lowercourts a.Qualificationsandappointment Art.VIII,Sec.7(1)(2) Art.VIII,Sec.7.(1)NopersonshallbeappointedMemberoftheSupremeCourtoranylower collegiatecourtunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.AmemberoftheSupremeCourt mustbeatleastfortyyearsofage,andmusthavebeenforfifteenyearsormoreajudgeofalowercourt orengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines. (2)theCongressshallprescribethequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts,butnopersonmaybe appointedjudgethereofunlessheisacitizenofthePhilippinesandamemberofthePhilippineBar. Id.,Sec.8.(5)The(JudicialandBar)Councilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommending appointeestotheJudiciary.ItmayexercisesuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmay assigntoit. Id.,Sec.9.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointedby thePresidentfromalistofatlistthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforevery vacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety days from the submissionofthelist.

Composition Thecompositionoflowercourtsshallbeprovidedbylaw.ThelawsaretheJudiciaryActof1948and BP129. Qualifications

LowerCollegiateCourt(CourtofAppeals) (1)Nopersonshallbeappointedmemberofanylowercollegiatecourtunlessheisanaturalborncitizen.[Art. VIII,Sec.7(1)]andamemberofPhilippineBar. (2)TheCongressshallprescribequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(2)] (3)Amemberofthejudiciarymustbeapersonofprovencompetence,integrity,probity,andindependence. [Art.VIII,Sec.7(3)] LowerCourts (1)TheCongressshallprescribequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts,butnopersonmaybeappointedjudge thereofunlessheisacitizenofthePhilippinesandamemberofthePhilippinebar.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(2)] (2)Hemustbeapersonofprovencompetence,integrity,probityandindependence.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(3)]

b.Salary Art.VIII,Sec.10.ThesalaryoftheChiefJusticeandoftheAssociateJusticesoftheSupreme courtandofjudgesoflowercourtsshallbefixedbylaw.Duringtheircontinuanceinoffice,theirsalary shallnotbedecreased. . c.Congressionalpowertoreorganizeandsecurityoftenure Art.VIII,Sec.11. ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallhold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to dischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudges oflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartin thedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.

Id.,Sec.2.xxx NolawshallbepassedreorganizingtheJudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofits Members. ThepowerofCongresstoreorganizelowercourtshasbeenupheldbytheSCpriorto1987. InOcampovSecretaryofJustice,51OG147(1955),theSCbyfailingtomusterthe2/3vote

requiredthentodeclarealawunconstitutionalineffectsustainedthevalidityofthelawpassedbyCongress abolishingtheofficesof"judgesatlarge"and"cadastraljudges"andtheconsequentremovalofjudgesoccu pyingtheseposts. Notingthatthepurposeofthelawwastopromotetheindependenceofthejudiciary(by avoidingforumshopping),itheldthatanabolitionofanofficemadeingoodfaithdoesnotviolatesecurityof tenure.Securityoftenurepresupposesthecontinuedexistenceoftheofficefromwhichonewasremovednot removalfromanofficethathasbeenabolishedingoodfaithandnotmerelypartisanpoliticalreasons. InDeLaLlanavAlba,112SCRA294(1982),theSCagainupheldtheReorganizationActof 1980(BP129),onthegroundthattheabolitionofanoffice,iswithinthecompetenceofthelegislatureifdone ingoodfaith.ThattherewasgoodfaithwasshownbythefactthattheActwastheproductofcarefulstudyand deliberationbytheBatasanandthePresidentialstudycommittee,themembershipofwhichincludesSCjustices, andwasthemeanstoupgradetheadministrationofjusticeinthePhilippines.TheSCreiteratedthattherecan benoclaimforsecurityoftenurewheretheofficenolongerexists,andthattheabolitionofofficeisnot removal,althoughtheireffectsmaybethesame. Itisdoubtfulwhethertheserulingsremainvalidintotoinviewofthenewexpressprovisionprohibiting areorganizationlawthatunderminesthesecurityoftenureoftheJudiciary. OnecompromiseviewisthatCongresshasthepowertopassareorganizationlawconcerningthelower courts,butitcanonlytakeeffectuntiltheposthasbeenvacatedbytheincumbentjudge.

d.Removal Art.VIII,Sec.11. ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallhold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to dischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudges oflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartin thedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon. Cruz:"Judgesoflowercourt,"ashereused,includesjusticesoftheSandiganbayan.Thisrulecastsmuchdoubt onthelegalityofthepresidentialdecreemakingthemremovableonlybythelegislaturethroughtheprocessof impeachment.

e.Jurisdiction Art.VIII,Sec.1.JudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsas maybeestablishedbylaw. Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolving rightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeena grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentalityoftheGovernment.

Asruledin J.M. Tuason & Co. v CA andin Ynot v IAC, supra,thereisineffecta"constitutional confermentoforiginaljurisdiction onthelowercourtsinthosefivecasesforwhichtheSupreme Courtis grantedappellatejurisdictionin5(2)." UndertheprovisiongrantingtheSCjurisdiction"toreview,revise,reverse,modifyoraffirmonappeal orcertiorariasthelaworRulesofCourtmayprovide,judgmentsoflowercourts,"lowercourtscanpassupon thevalidityofastatuteinthefirstinstance.

f.Requirementsastopreparationofdecisions Art.VIII,Sec.14.Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearly anddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased. Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefuseddue courseordeniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.

Mannerofsitting TheCourtofAppealssitsindivisionswhenithearscases;theonlytimeitconvenesasonebodyisto takeupmattersofadministration. Thetrialandinferiorcourts,ofcourse,donothavethisproblemsincethereisonlyonejudge.

Deliberations Thesamerequirements(forconsulta)shallbeobservedbyalllowercollegiatecourts.(Art.VIII,Sec. 13) Forobviousreasons,thisrequirementdoesnotapplytothetrialandinferiorcourts.

Voting Forcollegiatecourts,liketheCourtofAppeals,thelawprovidesthatitsitsonlyindivisionswhen decidingcases. Fortrialandinferiorcourts,noproblemarisessinceonlyonejudgeisinvolved.

Effectoffailuretomusterthenecessarymajority

CourtofAppeals.Thesamerulesapply,exceptthatthedecisioncannowbeappealedtotheSC. InferiorCourts.Failuretodecidehasnoconsequenceonthedecisionofthecourt.TheCourtisnot oustedofitsjurisdiction,butthejudgesuffersadministrativeconsequences.

g.Mandatoryperiodfordeciding

Art.VIII,Sec.15.(1)AllcasesormattersfiledaftertheeffectivityofthisConstitutionmustbe decidedorresolvedwithintwentyfourmonthsfromthedateofsubmissionfortheSupremeCourt,and, unlessreducedbytheSupremeCourt,twelvemonthsforalllowercollegiatecourts,andthreemonthsfor allotherlowercourts. (2)Acaseormattershallbedeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthe lastpleading,brieformemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself. (3) Upontheexpirationofthecorrespondingperiod,acertificationtothiseffectsignedbythe ChiefJusticeorthepresidingjudgeshallforthwithbeissuedandacopythereofattachedtotherecordof thecaseormatter,andservedupontheparties.Thecertificationshallstatewhyadecisionorresolution hasnotbeenrenderedorissuedwithinsaidperiod. (4) Despitetheexpirationoftheapplicablemandatoryperiod,thecourt,withoutprejudiceto suchresponsibilityasmayhavebeenincurredinconsequencethereof,shalldecideorresolvethecaseor mattersubmittedtheretofordetermination,withoutfurtherdelay. Art.XVIII,Secs.1214

Art. XVIII, Sec. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this Constitution,adoptasystematicplantoexpeditethedecisionorresolutionofcasesormatterspendingin theSupremeCourtorthelowercourtspriortotheeffectivityofthisConstitution.Asimilarplanshallbe adoptedforallspecialcourtsandquasijudicialbodies. Id., Sec. 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the applicableperiodforthedecisionorresolutionofthecasesormatterssubmittedforadjudicationbythe courts,shallbedeterminedbytheSupremeCourtassoonaspracticable. Id., Sec. 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this ConstitutionshallapplytocasesormattersfiledbeforetheratificationofthisConstitution,whenthe applicableperiodlapsesaftersuchratification.

MandatoryPeriod

Lowercollegiatecourts:12months,unlessreducedbytheSC Otherlowercourts:3months,unlessreducedbytheSC

Overruled: TheConstitutionnowexplicitlyprovidesinSec.15(1)thattheperiodsaremandatory,asidefromusing theword"must"(not"shall"asin1973)inSec.15(1).ThecaseofMarcelinovCruz,121SCRA51(1983), whichheldthattheperiodsinthe1973Constitutionwereonlydirectory,isthusnow,overruled. Cruz:Itshouldbenotedthat,althoughdecisionwithinthemaximumperiodisnowmandatory,failuretoarrive atthesamewillnotdivestthecourtofjurisdiction,withoutprejudicetoanyresponsibilitythatmayattachtothe judge.Thecourtmuststillresolvethecasew/ofurtherdelay,unliketheoldrulewhenthedecisionappealed wasdeemedautomaticallyaffirmedandthepetitionwasdeemedautomaticallydismissedasaresultofthe inactionofthecourt. xxx

Marcelinovs.Cruz,121SCRA51 F:
Judgementinacriminalcasewasrenderedbeforetheclerkofcourtwithin85daysafterthecasewasconcluded. Butjudgementwaspromulgatedafterlapseof90daysfromthedaythecasewassubmittedfordecision.

ISSUE: W/Ntrialcourtlostjurisdiction overthecaseforfailuretodecidethesamewithin90daysfrom submissionthereof. W/Nconstitutionalprovisionismandatory. HELD:Notoboth.Theconstitutionalprovisionreferstorenditionofjudgementwhichreferstothefilingof thesigneddecisionwiththeclerkofcourt. Bythephrase"unlessreducedbytheSupremeCourt,"itisevidentthattheperiodprescribedissubject tomodificationbytheSCunderitsprerogativepowertopromulgaterulesconcerningprocedureinallcourts. Constitutionalprovisionsaredirectory,wheretheyrefertomattersmerelyprocedural.Butfailuretodecidea casewithin90daysconstituteagroundforadministrativesanctionagainstthedefaultingjudge.Adapted.

DeRomavsCA152SCRA205 The CA decided the case beyond the 12 month period prescribed by the 1973 Constitution. Said provision in the Constitution was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the correspondingcourtsofjurisdictionorrendertheirdecisionsinvalid.

3.TheJudicialandBarCouncil Art.VIII,Sec.8. AJudicialandBarCouncilisherebycreatedunderthesupervisionofthe SupremeCourtcomposedoftheChiefJusticeas exofficio Chairman,theSecretaryofJustice,anda representativeoftheCongressasexofficioMembers,arepresentativeoftheIntegratedBar,aprofessor oflaw,aretiredMemberoftheSupremeCourt,andarepresentativeoftheprivatesector. (2) TheregularmembersoftheCouncilshallbeappointedbythePresidentforatermoffour years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representativeoftheIntegratedBarshallserveforfouryears,theprofessoroflawforthreeyears,the retiredJusticefortwoyears,andtherepresentativeoftheprivatesectorforoneyear. (3)TheClerkoftheSupremeCourtshallbetheSecretaryexofficiooftheCouncilandshallkeep arecordofitsproceedings. (4)TheregularMembersoftheCouncilshallreceivesuchemolumentsasmaybedeterminedby theSupremeCourt. TheSupremeCourtshallprovideinitsannualbudgettheappropriationsforthe Council. (5)TheCouncilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommendingappointeestotheJudiciary.It mayexercisesuchotherfunctionanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmayassigntoit.

Exofficiomembers[Art.VIII,Sec.8(1)] (1)ChiefJusticeasexofficioChairman (2)SecretaryofJustice (3)RepresentativeofCongress Regularmembers[Art.VIII,Sec.8(1)] (4)RepresentativeoftheIntegratedBar (5)ProfessorofLaw (6)RetiredmemberoftheSC (7)Representativeofprivatesector Secretaryexofficio[Art.VIII,Sec.8(3)] ClerkoftheSC,whoshallkeeparecordofitsproceedings

Appointment,Tenure,Salary Exofficiomembers

ForobviousreasonsthisdoesnotapplysincethepositionintheCouncilisgoodonlywhilethepersonis theoccupantoftheoffice. Regularmembers[Art.VIII,Sec.8(2)] The regular members shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Thetermoftheregularmembersis4years. But the term of those initially appointed shall be staggered in the following way so as to create continuityinthecouncil: IBPrepresentative4years Lawprofessor3years Retiredjustice2years Privatesector1year RegularmembersshallreceivesuchemolumentsasmaybedeterminedbytheSC.TheSCshallprovide initsannualbudgettheappropriationsfortheCouncil.[Art.VIII,Sec.8(4)]

Functions 1.RecommendappointeestotheJudiciary[Art.VIII,Sec.8(5)] 2.RecommendappointeestotheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanandhis5deputies.(Art.XI,Sec.9) 3.SuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSCmayassign[Art.VIII,Sec.8(5)]

4.Automaticreleaseofappropriationforthejudiciary Art.VIII,Sec.3. TheJudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy. AppropriationsfortheJudiciary maynotbereducedbythelegislaturebelowtheamountappropriatedforthepreviousyearand,after approval,shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

UPDATED1/27/96 REVISED4/13/96 RAM