Auto Matic Flight Controll 4-2

Automatic Control
Flight Systems
An Interactive Video Teletraining and Self-Study Course
a5na
Weight
Developed and Presented by
Anthony A. Lambregts
National Resource Specialist for Advanced Controls
Federal Aviation Administration

January 27,1999
GETTING STARTED How Do I Use This Guide? I.
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SYSTEMS ENGINEERING CURRICULUM What Does the Curriculum Cover? ................................. Two-Week Job Function Course ............................. Overviews of Technical Subjects ............................ Core Technical Subjects Courses ............................ IVT COURSE ORIENTATION About This IVT Course .................................................. What Is IVT? .................................................................. Who Is the Target Audience? .......................................... Who Is the Instructor? .................................................. What Will You Learn? ................................................... How Will This Course Help You On the Job? .............. What Topics Does the Course Cover? ........................... What Are Some Good References? ................................ 7 8 9 9 10 11 11 12
II.
III. SELF-ASSESSMENT & EXERCISES Pre- & Post-Course Self-Assessment Questions ............ 14 Job-Related Exercises ..................................................... 16 APPENDICES A. Automatic Flight Control Systems Presentation Visuals Course Evaluation Forms B.
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Getting Started
How Do I Use This Guide? This document is to be used for both the initial IVT broadcast and the self-study course. The guide provides you with the position of this course in the Systems Curriculum, an orientation to the IVT course, support materials for use during the broadcast and self-study, self-assessment and practice exercises, and both an IVT and self-study course evaluation. Fo How these steps to complete your study. 1. Read Section I, Systems Curriculum, to familiarize yourself with the the overall scope and format of the curriculum. 3 -. Review Section II, IVT Course Orientation, before the broadcast, if possible, or before you watch the tape to get an overview of the purpose of the course, the target audience, the instructor, what you will learn, how this course will help you on the job, the topics covered in the course, and some good references on the topic. 3. Answer t,he pre-course self-assessment questions in Section III, Self-Assessment crnd Exercises. 4. Turn to Appendis A, Automatic Flight Control Systems . Presentdon Visuds, and refer to it during the broadcast OI while watching the videotape. Appendix A contains the visual support material used by the instructor during the broadcast. You can use these visuals to take notes and follow along with the broadcast presentation. Begin the videotape here if vou are completing this as a self-studv course. d 5. Complete the post-course self-assessment and exercises in Section III, Self Assessment crnd Exercises. 6. Complete the appropriate form (IVT or self-studv ) from Appendix B, Course Evnluntion Forms. For the IVT course, you will use the keypad you have been using during the course to complete the evaluation.
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Systems Engineering Curriculum I.
Systems Engineering Curriculum

The Systems Engineering Curriculum fits into the broader AIR Training Program that is summarized in the following figure.
What Does the Curriculum Cover?
The AIR Training
Program
An Overview
Within the context of the AIR Training Program, the Systems Engineering Curriculum is designed to effectivelvd meet the critical safety mission of the FAA by addressing the following Service goals: Stnnhrdizntion
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Promote standardization throughout the organization in task accomplishment and application of airworthiness regulations in order to achieve uniform compliance.
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SystemsEngineering Curriculum
Job Performance Proficiencv
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Reduce significantly the time required for newly-hired engineers to attain full job performance proficiency. Establish and maintain appropriate, effective, and responsive communication, collaboration, leadership, and teamwork with both internal and external customers.
Customer Service
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In addition to the Service goals, the Systems Engineering Curriculum is designed to provide ASEs with job function training in three domains:
0
Tasks and procedures governing the work of engineers in design approval, technical project management, certificate management, and designee management. FAR airworthiness requirements that are the purview of electrical and mechanical systems engineers. Generally they are Subpart F of FAR parts 23, 25, 27, and 39. Technical subjects essential for all new engineers to meet both introductor\v requirements and, later, minimum w technical proficiency level requirements.
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I t7eresulting Systems Engineering Curriculum structure consists of three main types of training opportunities 1. Two-Week Job Function Course 3. Overviews of Technical Subjects 3. Follow-on Core Technical Subjects Courses The Two-Week Job Function Course uses an instructor-led, classroom-based format with lecture, discussion, and individual and group activities. Supporting materials used in the course include print, overhead transparencies, videotapes, job aids, and documents and sample reports.
Two-Week Function Course
Job
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The course is divided into the following two major sections: Section I
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Certification Tasks - includes design approval, technical project management, certification management, and DER management. FAR Requirements and Key FAR Sections - includes training in the subparts of the FAR that apply to electrical and mechanical systems engineers (Subpart F) at two levels: an overview of those subparts across FARs 23, 25, 27, and 29; and in-depth discussion of significant sections of the FAR that are important to the Service. The importance of these sections may stem from problems in interpretation an-d application of requirements, technical complexity of a design, ihigh visibilitvd projects, or safety considerations that Lre paramount.
Section 2
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0l.e rliews of Technical Subjects
High-level overviews of 13 technical subjects are presented bv NRSs, Technical Specialists or other senior engineers. TIlesed overviews are available in two modes:
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An initial live four-hour IVT satellite broadcast with accompanying course material is received at each Directorate and other downlink sites. A Video/Self-Study Training Package adapted from the initial IVT presentation is available through the Directorate Training Manager.
Basic concepts and FAA-specific applications and examples are provided for each of the following 13 technical subjects: For electrical engineers
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Advanced Communications Advanced Display Systems/Heads-Up Displays

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Advanced Navigation Low Visibility
For mechanical engineers

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Crashworthiness and Interior Compliance Doors
0 Icing For both elecrical and mechanical engineers

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Automatic Flight Control Systems Complex Electronic Hardware Lightning and HIRF Protection Human Factors Software Svstem Safetv Analysis I d w
Each technical subject overview is designed to not only provide ASEs with the FAA perspective on the topic, but also serve as an indicator of what further training may be needed.
Core Technical Subjects

Courses
As a follow-on to the Overviews of Technical Subjects, the curriculum will provide more in-depth training in the following two subject areas:
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System Safety Assessment Reliability & Probability
These core technical subjects are essential to the technical work of the systems engineer in a regulatory environment regardless of product or technology. Training in each of the core subjects will be designed to bring systems engineers to a minimum level
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Systems Engineering Curriculum

of technical proficiency and to help promote proficiency in the application of the technical knowledge in an office work environment. Additional technical training for engineers beyond these core subjects will depend largely on AC0 organizational needs stemming from customer requirements, products certified, emerging technology, and the number of staff requiring more specialized training. In short, the more advanced the technical training required, the more individualized it becomes. Such training topics could be as follows: .
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HIRF Lightning Software Fundumentals Dynamic Seat Testing Icing Certification Accident Investigation Human Factors Flammability Interior Compliance & Crashworthiness
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,IVT Course Orientation
II.
IVT Course Orientation

Automatic Flight Control Systems is one of 13 Overviews of Technical Topics in the Systems Engineering Curriculum designed to prepare you to effectively meet the critical safety mission of the FAA. [For more information on the Curuiczrla, refer back to Section I of this guide. / Through a four-hour Interactive Video Teletraining (IVT) format, Anthony Lambregts, National Resource Specialist for Advanced Controls7 will introduce you to the fundamental concepts of automatic flight control. He will discuss some aspects of the applicable regulations and the equally important design aspects for which no regulations exist. His aim is not to make you a control theory expert, but rather to lead you stepby-step through the thicket of current and future automation designs. The emphasis is on functions more than on hardware and software implementation. The course will stay close to the physics of flight, introducing only those control theory elements necessary for you to communicate with the controls experts and to ask pertinent questions related to automation safety. The course will show how the historic, one-function-ata-time evolution of automation designs has led to very capable, albeit extremely complex, systems architectures in hardware and software, with much undesirable and unnecessary functional overlap. The vulnerabilities of the traditional automation designs to crew errors and confusion will be discussed and related to the underlying root cause design practices. Mr. Lambregts will give his vision on needed improvements in future automation design standards and needed updates in the regulations. Finally, recent advances in automation designs will be discussed, showing reduced complexity, improved performance, standardized / portable design and reduced vulnerability to crew errors are well within the current state of the art and technology.
About This IVT Course
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IVT Course Orient&ion
What Is IVT?
Interactive Video Teletraining, or IVT, is instruction delivered using some form of live, interactive television. For the overview courses, the instructor delivers the course from the television studio at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City. Through the IVT broadcast facility instructors are able to use a variety of visuals, objects, and media formats to support the instruction. Participants are located at various receive sites around the country and can see the instructor and his/her materials on television sets in their classrooms. The participants can communicate with the instructor either through a microphone and/or the simple-to-use Viewer Response System keypads. During the live presentation, when a participant has a question or thelnstructor asks for specific participant responses to questions. the participant(s) can signal to the instructor using their keypad. The collective participant responses or the name of a specific participant signalling a question are immediately visible to the instructor on the console at the broadcast site. The instructor can then respond as needed. When the instructor calls on a specific participant to speak from a site, participants at each of the other sites can simultaneously hear the participant who is speaking. This guide provides you with the framework for this course as well as the following appendices to be used for both the IVT and the self-study courses.
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Appendix A contains the actual visual support material used by the instructor during the broadcast. You can use these visuals to follow along with the videotape and record notes directly on the pages. Appendix B provides the Course Evaluation Forms for the IVT broadcast and the self-study video course.
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IVT Course Orientation

Who Is the Target Audience?
This course is designed for:

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Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs) who review and approve automatic flight control/flight management systems designs. FAA systems engineers with a limited background in airplane flight dynamics and automatic control systems who wish to gain a basic familiarity with automatic control systems design concepts and practices, control theory, certification requirements, and issues and trends in future automation.
Who Is the Instructor?
Anthmy A. Lnmbregts received his BS and MS in aeronautical engineering from the University of Delft, the Netherlands. From 1968 to 1995 he worked for the Boeing Commercial and Military Airplane Company in design, research, and engineering management related to automatic flight control systems for a wide variety of commercial, military, unmanned autonomous and research airplanes. In 1995, Mr. Lambregts joined the FAA as a National Resource Specialist. Mr. Lambregts is recognized internationally as an expert in advanced control systems. He holds 16 patents, 5 Boeing Invention Awards, and three NASA Recognition Awards. He was involved in variou aircraft certification efforts, including the B747 autopilot/Autothrottle and the B737/B767 Autoland designs. He managed advanced research programs, including the NASA TCV AFC Function Integration project, the Condor Autonomous Flight Control System development, the HSCT avionics/flight controls development, Enhanced Vision System, and the NASA/Boeing FBL program. Since joining the FAA, Anthony Lambregts has taken special interest in automation safety and getting needed design standards improvements adopted by the industry and in getting
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the applicable FARs and Acs updated. To this effect, he is participating in the FAAIJAA All Weather Operations and Flight Guidance Systems Harmonization working group meetins and in the Autopilot review team, as well as in the NASA/NASA Aviation Safety Program planning and proposal evaluations. He is also working with industry and academia on advanced flight control systems designs, such as the Bell 609, as well as controls and displays research. Mr. Lambregts is a member of the AIAA.
What Will You Learn?
After completing this course, you will have a basic understanding of automatic flight control systems (AFCS) in use today, including: How todays svstems have evolved over a period of more than 50 years. * FARs/ACs related to automatic flight control design certification (what is covered and what is not). Important concepts and approaches used in design for safety and protection against failures. The basics of aerodynamic flight controls and the consequences for automatic flight control design; concepts of stability; and trim and control augmentation functions.
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AFC system architecture evolution; functional elements; analog/digital function implementation; hardware components: actuation; and design assurance methodology. The various modes of AFCS and how full function/full flight envelope AFCS evolved, including automatic landing and FMS. An overview of control systems theory, concepts, design approaches, and analysis techniques. Fly-by-wire system concepts; fundamentals in design for handling qualities; and PI0 avoidance.
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A look at what is coming: future functionally integrated designs and systems architectures.
How Will This Course Help You On the Job?
At the end of this training session you will:

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Have a background on the historical evolution of automatic control systems and design practices. control systems: How they are put together, what the assumptions and groundrules are that can provide safe operation, and what the limitations are.
0 Understand the basic functional architectures of automatic
Know where to look for automation design safetv d vulnerabilities, using better insight in the control strategies and design approaches employed.
What Topics Does the Course Cover?
The following topic outline is intended to give you an overview of the course content. In addition to this outline, Appendix A contains the visual presentation material used by the instruct01 during the broadcast. I.
II.
Historic perspective on the evolution of automatic flight control systems FARs covering AFCS: What is and isnt covered Safety: Basic concepts and definitions and design approaches Manual airplane control, basic flight, and control dynamics of conventional airplanes Stability and control augmentation, control theory fundamentals Automatic control modes
III. IV. V. VI.
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VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. Control algorithms functional structure, design provisions Sensors, sensor information blending Automatic landing, function, performance, design implementation AFCS function hosting, system hardware architectures, analog/digital computers, actuators Design assurance strategies for hardware and software; failure prevention/tolerance strategies; failure detection, identification, and isolation Fly-by-wire design concepts and issues Automation safety: issues with current state-of-the-art AFCS design; design limitations; operational problems; root causes Needed design standards improvements Future functionallv d integrated designs and systems architectures
XII. XIII.
XIV. xv .
What Are Some Good References?
The instructor has compiled the following references foi automatic flight control systems. Flight Controls. Concepts. and Methods, Lambregts, A. A., 1996 Annual Report Netherlands Association of Aeronautical Engineers (KNVL). Available from the author. Vertical Flight Path and Speed Control Autopilot Design Using Total Energy Principles, Lambregts, A.A., AIAA paper 83- 2239 CP Automation Safety: Needed Design Standards Improvements, Lambregts, A.A., Presentation at the FAA LA DER Seminar, September, 1998. Available from the author.
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I VT Course Orien tution

Elements of Airplane Performance, Ruijgrok, G.J.J., Delft University Press, 1990. Airplane Stability and Control, Abzug, Malcolm J. and Larrabee, E. Eugene, Cambridge Aerospace Series, 1997. Aircraft Dynamics and Automatic Control, McRuer, D., Ashkenas, I. and Graham, D., Princeton University Press,
1973.
Trends in Advanced Avionics, Cur-ran, Jim, Iowa State University Press, 1992. Aircraft Flight Control Actuation System Design, Raymond, E.T., and Chenoweth, CC., SAE 15609 l-376-2. Aviation Safety and Pilot Control-Understanding and Preventing Unfavorable Pilot Vehicle Interactions, National Research Council, National Academic Press,
1997.
Accidents Direct Focus on Cockpit Automation, Aviation Week, January30, 1995 and Studies Highlight Automation Surprises, February 6, 1995. Integrating Human Factors and Automation with Progress in Aircraft Design and Flight Management, E. Tarnowski, Airbus Industry, reprinted in Aviation Safety, pp 169- 187,
1997.
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Self-Assessmentand Exercises
III.
Self-Assessment and Exercises

The instructor will ask you at the begining and end of the presentation to respond to the following five questions a.bout . automatic flightcontrol systems. Rate your confidence Levelfor each of the following statements before and after completing the course. 1. I know the basic AFCS certification regulations and understand design concepts and failure protection provisions needed for safety.
Very Confident BEFORE AFTER THE THE COURSE: COURSE: Moderately Confident Not Confident
Pre- & PostCourse SelfAssessment Questions
q q
q q
q q
9 A.
I understand the basic AFCS modes of operational and known safetv issues associated with the use of current AFCS designs.
Very Confident Moderately Confident Not Confident
BEFORE AFTER
THE THE
COURSE: COURSE:
q q
q q
q q
3.
I understand the basic AFCS design safety assurance process, what tvpes of design analyses documentation are needed for certifjcation, and where to find the guidance materials.
Very Confident Moderately Confident Not Confident
BEFORE AFTER
THE THE
COURSE: COURSE:
q q
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q q
Automatic Flight Control
q q
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4. I can review, understand, and assessa complete automatic flight control system description, performance, and safety analysis documents that arrive in the office for certification approval.
Very Confident BEFORE AFTER THE THE COURSE: COURSE: III 0 Moderately Confident 0 III Not Confident
q
0
5.
I understand the weaknesses in the current AFCS designs and know what operational safety aspects need to be addressed in the planned regulation updates.
Very Confident ModerateI! Confident Not Confident
BEFORE AFTER
THE THE
COURSE: COURSE:
q
cl
0
0
q
0
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Self-Assessment& Exercises
Job-Related Exercises
After viewing the IVT broadcast with the support visuals in Appendix A, complete the following questions to test your knowledge about automatic flight control systems. You can check your answers beginning on the page that follows the questions.
1.
What do the regulations say about automatic control a. Functions? b. Modes / mode interactions? c. Hosting of modes? d. Use of control surfaces? e. Performance?
How does a conventional airplane respond to an elevator
3 -.
control input?
3. How does a conventional airplane respond to a throttle
control input?
4.
How did the functional use of elevator, and throttle for certain automatic modes come about? What is the pre-requite condition for the autopilot to be able to control flight path ? What will happen when this requirement is not met? Can the autothrottle control speed unconditionally? What led to the development of the full flight regime autothrottle? Name some of the recurrent complaints about autothrottle designs. Why is the VNAV mode running into performance problems when controlling to a predicted idle descent path?
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5.
6.
7. 8. 9.
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10. What is speed stability and why is there such a requirement for manual airplane control? 11. What happens to speed stability when the autopilot path mode is engaged? Is there an equivalent substitute for speed stability? 12. What variable speed or altitude is the most critical to control? 13. Which variable can be controlled faster, speed or altitude? Why, how? 14. How is the autopilot stabilizer trim different than the pilot trimming the stabilizer manually? What are the consequences? 15. Which automatic control modes are considered flight critical? 16. What are the underlying assumptions for the operational safety of the non-critical automatic control modes? 17. Name key design provisions that are used to assure that no single automatic control system failure, or combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, can prevent continued safe flight and landing. 18. What is a transfer function? 19. What is the significance of the denominator of the transfer function? 20. What role does the numerator of the transfer function play in the system stability and command response? 2.1. What design strategy is often used to alter the command response without altering system stability?
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22. An overshooting response to a step command is caused by: a) Low system damping. b) Ill-conditioned numerator of the transfer functi,on. c) Possibly both. 23. What design strategies may be employed to quicken the response to a step command? 24. What design element is used to assure steady state command tracking under a variety of trim conditions? - . What possible design problems can be encountered when 35 using integral control of error feedback? 36. What non-linear control algorithm design elements are often used? Why? 37. Whv is a pitch attitude command limit often ineffective as e a safety devise? 28. What has led to the recent questioning of the safety of automation designs? I . Name five automation safety issues. ?9 30. What is envelope protection? 31. What are some of the limitations of single-input/single output control? ?3 3-. Name some of the consequences of a not fullv4 automated rudder? 33. What are possible advantages/disadvantages of a multiinput/multi-output control strategy? 34. What additional automatic control design elements are needed to reduce critical dependency on the pilot for operational safety?
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Answers
1. Nothing about functions; nothing about modes; inappropriate mode combinations should be locked out; nothing about control mode hosting; nothing about the use of control surfaces and performance; FAR 25.1309 states that a system should be shown to perform its intended function. A conventional airplane responds in all three degrees of freedom to an elevator control input: pitch angle, speed, and flight path.
A conventional airplane responds in all three degrees of
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freedom to a throttle control input: speed, flight path and pitch angle.
4.
Flight path control (Altitude Hold/Select) autopilot development using the elevator came first, next ILS glide slope control; speed control on elevator were also developed; tinallvI the approach speed control using the throttles completed the first round of SISO flight control automatic control modes in the vertical plane. The airplane must be on the positive slope part of the speed-drag curve in order to provide sustainable flight path control, without speed runaway. If, in the process of controlling flight path the speed drops below the minimum drag speed and the drag rises above the thrust, the autopilot path control will tend to induce airplane stall. No. The control authority of the autothrottle is limited at best to - .25 g (level flight), allowing active speed control only as long as the autopilot path control keeps the flight path angle within the steady state climb/descent performance boundary. However, it is generally possible to select autopilot vertical path commands (in principle 90 degrees vertical) that far exceed the needed thrust to sustain speed.
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5.
6.
Self-Assessment& Exercises 7. The desire to fly at minimum drag speed in cruise, for best
fuel economy. At minimum drag speed, the airplane becomes neutrally speed stable when the autopilot controls the flight path, any flight path correction will result in a corresponding speed deviation which tends not to self correct, requiring high pilot workload by the pilot manipulating throttles to control speed. The full-flight regime autothrottle development was the answer to the problem, but not the answer to the pilots prayer. 8. Recurring complaints by pilots about autothrottles include: a. Throttles are much too active, especially when there is turbulence b. Autothrottle does not maintain speed close enough, especially on approach in turbulence and windshear
C.
Autothrottle is pretty dumb: it does not take airplane energy situation into consideration
d. Autothrottle and autotpilot exhibit too much control coupling, causing undesirable flight path, speed and throttle gyrations after small disturbances 01 command inputs. 9. When thrust is .at the limit, the elevator can control either flight path or speed, not both. At idle thrust the steady state control of flight path by the elevator away from the idle thrust flight path angle will cause large and unacceptable deviations from the intended speed. However? the elevator can be used to control the speed without any restrictions, but the idle descent inertial flight path angle will be affected by airplane weight, configuration, and wind conditions.
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10. Speed stability is the desirable characteristic of an airplane to return to the trim speed when the control column is slowly returned to neutral, after the airplane is first maneuvered away from the trim speed by an initial column input. Speed stability is required for safety during manual control, to help keep the airplane within a safe flying speed envelope. 11. When the autopilot path control mode is engaged speed stability may be defeated, if the airplane is operated at or below the minimum drag speed. The only compensating safety strategy is to turn on the autothrottle speed control, but even the autothrottle cannot always prevent a speed run away if excessive flight path commands are selected. l3 It depends. Maintaining speed is essential for safe and A. controllable flight. At low altitude obstacle clearance and flight path control, to touchdown on the runway becomes an equally important objective. For up and away flight, maintaining the assigned altitude is an important safety concept for safe air traffic control, but when caught in an emergency (e.g., engine out), maintaining safe flying speed is more important than maintaining assigned altitude. In a life-threatening windshear close to the ground, it is preferable to allow speed to bleed off to just above stall in order to avoid or postpone hitting the ground, but not further, because a stall close to the ground virtually assures a crash.
13
Speed and altitude are both energy-related quantities that can be changed equally fast (in relative energy level) by the throttles. At constant thrust the use of the elevator changes altitude and speed in equal and opposite quantity, in terms of energy level change (no net energy change).
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14. The autopilot trims when the flight path control algorithm computes a continuous command that is greater than a certain threshold, therefore, it will continue to trim even if the power setting for the airplane is wrong to sustain the commanded flight path. As a result, the airplane can end up far out of trim relative to the intended speed. The pilot, on the other hand, trims the airplane to trim the control forces to zero for the intended speed he wants to fly. This means that when the airplane departs the trim speed, the pilot will need to hold a control force to keep the airplane at a speed away from the trim speed. This is a safety feature so the airplane will naturally return to the trim speed if the pilot relaxes his control force. 15. Only the Category III automatic landing function is considered flight critical, because in that case the pilot cannot be expected to provide adequate backup for a failure of the automatic flight path control function and assure continued safety of flight and landing. 16. The underlying assumption for the safety of the noncritical flight control functions is that the pilot can and will correct any failure or malfunction of the automatic flight control system, to assure continued safe flight and landing. This implies that at least one of the crew-members must monitor the operation of the AFCS continuously. Another assumption is that the crew will operate the AFCS correctly and within its intended flight and performance envelope. 17. Limited-control authority (e.g. 1 g); split control surfaces; parallel redundant functional paths; fail passive/fail operational design concepts; in-line performance monitoring/failure detection, identification and isolation.
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18. A transfer function is a mathematical function describing the dynamic time-dependent relationship between control input and a specific control state variable output. 19. The denominator of the transfer function describes the characteristics of the dynamic modes of the system in terms of natural frequency and damping. 20. The numerator of the transfer function does not affect the stability of the system dynamics, but plays a very important role in the dynamic response characteristics of the system to a command input. 21. The command response of a system can be changed without affecting system stability by certain rearrangements of the feed forward command paths and by adding feed forward command augmentation functions.
33 --. 33 .
C. Possiblv both. d Feedforward signal command paths, emanating from a suitable response model, fed into the corresponding state feedback loops.
34. Integral control of the outer loop error feedback is often used to assure steady state tracking of the command for a variety of trim conditions. 25. Integral control of outer loop error feedback will add a low frequencv control mode; it tends to destabilize the existing modes; if no special design implementation provisions are made, integral control can add a zero in the numerator of the transfer function of interest, causing a whiplash command overshoot characteristic.
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26. Non-linear design elements often used in control elements include: a. Signal amplitude limiters (e.g., pitch or bank angle command limit). b. Rate limiters -- to slow down or smooth out control responses. c. Mode switches with associated mode logic (e.g., to control the capture and tracking sub modes of a control algorithm). 37 - . A pitch attitude command signal limit is often ineffective and sometimes dangerous because: a. Such a limit is often placed on a proportional control innerloop, where there is no assurance the error signal between the command and the feedback will go to zero, because of steady state control surface trim requirements and other non-zero steady state feedback signals downstream of the command-limited control loop. b. It is verv difficult to dynamically compute a correct pitch attitude limit based angle of attack and flight path angle performance limits, because of turbulence and wind effects. c. An arbitrary static limit may not prevent stall or allow available performance extraction under all possible flight conditions.
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38. A string of catastrophic accidents and incidents involving automatic flight control systems and crew-systems interfaces: a. A320 accidents near Strasbourg and Habsheim b. A330 accident near Toulouse c. B747 incident of spiral dive over Pacific d. B737 shutdown of remaining good engine e. A300 accident neat Nagoya f. A310 accident near Bucharest g. Etc. 39. Significant automation safety issues include: a. Autopilot flight path control without consideration of available performance (thrust) and effect on speed. b. Loss of speed control due to lack of control priority strategy when thrust reaches limit.
C.
Autopilot flight path control causing speed bleed down to stalrwithout warning or timely disengage.
d. Lack of disengage logic for condition of imminent control authority limiting, causing function failure. e. Crew difficulty in judging adequacy of system performance due to control strategy that differs from the manual control strategy. f. Operational complexity making it difficult for the crew to maintain situation awareness. 30. Envelope protection 1sa aeslgn provtston to assure mat tne airplanes speed, bank angle and normal acceleration will remain within the safe operational envelope.
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3 1. Limitations of single-input/single output control strategy include: a. Undesirable control coupling b. Unnecessary high controller activity c. Loss of control when controller authority limit is reached d. Lower performance e. Possible violations of envelope limits not directly controlled by SISO mode (spill over) 32. The incomplete automation of the rudder means that the pilot must be vigilant to provide dynamic compensating for asymmetric thrust. The autopilot must be turned off in case of an engine failure and the pilot must manually retrim the rudder before he can re-engage the lateral autopilot. Difficulty of trimming sideslip to zero, especially in asymmetric trust or lateral imbalance conditions (no sideslip instrument). 33. Advantages of multi input-multi output control strategy: a. Precise control command coordination to achieve decoupled command responses b. Lower gains, higher/smoother performance, better design robustness (gain/phase margins) c. Better control/design strategies providing more functionality with simpler more generalized design, e.g. flight and performance envelope protection based on control priority and control authority allocation, inherent engine out dynamic compensation and automatic rudder re-trim.
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34. To reduce critical dependence on pilot to assure safety of automatic flight systems, future designs will need: a. More general mimo control strategies. b. A generalized reusable functional architecture that allows up-front integration of modes using standard building blocks. c. Built-in performance/flight envelope protection functions, covering all modes. d. Fully automated rudder, providing inherent functions of yaw damper/turn coordination, asymmetric thrust compensation, automatic rudder trim, etc. e. Better performance and failure monitoring with suitable system state annunciation and timely automatic disengage, if needed.
Flight Control
Systems 27
Appendix A
Appendix A
Automatic Flight Control Systems Presentation Visuals
IVT,Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Administration
Flight Control
Systems A
Appendix A
AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL

FUNDAMENTALS
Anthony A. Lambregts National Resource Specialist Advanced Controls
1. 23.. .$ b;:b . *l&; 2. * :;p G= h $@id 5 .v;. 3. .
Historic perspective on the evolution of automatic flight control systems (AFCS) FARs covering AFCS: What is/isnt & definitions covered and
Safety: Basic concepts design approaches
4. Manual airplane control, basic flight and control dynamics of conventional airplanes 5. Stability and control theory fundamentals augmentation, control
2
IVT,SeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Automatic Januaq. 1999
Flight Control
Systems Al
Course
6. Automatic
Outline,
control modes
cont.
7. Control algorithms design provisions
functional
structure,
8. Sensors, sensor information blending (c,~. b:,I <i;b 9. Automatic $+@ II landing, function, q-g-. performance, design implementation
:?> 10. AFCS function a, 51 ?h f,A. -,; architectures a:+;; 2 1-q *- Analog/digital Actuators
l l
hosting,
system
hardware
computers for hardware strategies

and isolation
11. Design assurance strategies and software Failure prevention/tolerance

l l
Failure detection,
identification
12. Fly-by-Wire
design
concepts
and issues
A
IVT;SeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Flight Control
Systems A2
Appendix A
13. Automation safety: Issues with current state of the art AFCS designs
l
Design
limitations;
operational
problems
Root causes
14. Needed design 52 a, . 1;9 b&. h .L... %.@<. 7 I
standards
improvements designs
15. Future functionally integrated and systems architectures
s Historic Piecemeal Evolution of Automated Functions

&
34,
+ 1909: Wright stabilizer :+ 1920: Sperry attitude
patent stabilization
y&a + 1930: Speed and heading angle modes ,I + 1930 - 1960: Continued automation
l
Elevator;
ailerons;
rudder;
throttles
% :p &.
+ 1960s: liil 1980s: ...
Fully automated Flight management system
flight control computer

6
IVTSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit>,
Automatic Januar>. I999
Flight Control
Systetns A3
Append.. A
&@p *4 t: .
Traditional Pitch Autopilot and Autothrottle
5, y* @CT., I, $C&. $3 , & .rI ;& +, I $&$

*cum;; ., :
Autothrottle I----------,,---, I---------e-----m, I Autopilot I I c+l+

I
I ; 1 I
j i : I
I I
Airplane
-j
Elevator I Control
Actuator
I
I I ---a-------_-----
;T.cl
I I
j?? $?. A:+& I 1/i> -I
Traditional
Roll Autopilot
i Outerloop
Modes
IVT Self-Stud\: Course Federal Aviation Authority
Flight Control
Systems A4
Appendix A
&$p 9& ,
FARs and ACs Affecting

Automatic Flight Control Systems
Pilot Approval
FAR 25.1329 and FAR 23.1329 - Automatic AC 25.1329-IA - Automatic (being revised) Pilot Systems
+ AC 23.1329-2 - Automatic Pilot Systems ,J+ Installations in Part 23 Airplanes + AC 20-57 - Automatic Landing Systems (ALS) +c+ AC 120-29 - Criteria for approval of Category I and Category II landing Minima for FAR 121 Operations f&J<, I kg&T. L, _ ;y. / (being revised) :a y-g+ i
9
FARs and ACs Affecting
+ S. 3 :;~~, ;>a ;$,&;:r g&: + ?-A + p+
AC 120-28C - Criteria for approval of Category Ill WeatherMinima (being revised) AC 90-45 - A - Flight Management Systems FAR 25.671 - Control Systems (basic mechanical system requirementsjam, etc) + FAR 25.777 and FAR 23.777 - Cockpit Controls + FAR 25.779 and FAR 23.777 - Motion and Effect of Cockpit Controls + FAR 25.673 and FAR 25.675- Static longitudinal stability; demonstration + FAR 25.177 - Static lateral stability
l( )
IVT.SeIf-Stud!, Course Federal Aviation Authority
Automatic Januar! . I999
Flight Control
Systems A5
Appelzdix A
FARs and ACs Affecting AFCS, cont.

+ FAR 25.181 - Dynamic Stability + FAR 25.629 - Aeroelastic stability + >I,. -$zps 2 .CSF, %W.., yf>r I; $>.&-f; + :: +%%:g: _, c.. $,$b &$,( ,* *rc* * h. g* ,;$.; Z*/ + Y,?. requirements
FAR 25.672 - Stability Augmentation and Automatic and Power-Operated Systems FAR 25.1309 and FAR 23.1309 - Equipment, Systems and Installations AC 25.1309-IA - Systems (being revised) Design and Analyses
+ AC 23.1309-18 - Equipment Systems and Installations in Part 23 Airplanes (being revised)

11
g;sp T6,
3%Selected
SAE and RTCA
x. + SAE ARP 4761 - Safety Assessment _ $0 +&:, + SAE ARP 4754 - Certification Considerations for , F$.r, Highly Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems a$. 3% + SAE ARP 4975 - Autoflight _ ry2 Guidance System $;s; &, I P&g-: ;,ci ._ ;-:, (Autoflight) Issues Discussion (draft)
+ SAE ARP 5366 - Autopilot, Flight Director, Autothrust Systems (draft)
and
+ RTCA I DO -1788 - Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification

12
IVTSelf-Stud>. Course Federal Aviation Authorit>
Automatic Januq.. I999
Flight Control
Systems A6
AppendiMvA
@p S-p?-,@,,;
FAR 25.1329 & 23.1329
Have quick disconnect Not produce hazardous flight path deviations

-During -As normal use a result of malfunction
- for both pilots loads or
13
FAR 25.1329 & 23.1329
Have positive interlocks improper operation
to prevent
lb 7$?. h ~~~;.lP I, I%. $39 g51 ;Q,h <@y:,&.,:. y&y
Have protection against adverse interaction due to malfunction Not produce multiple due to single failure axes hardover other than
1A
Provide mode indication, switch position
IVTSelf-Stud), Course Federal Aviatiorl Author-it>,
Flight Control
S>.stems A7
Appendix A
and autopilot and corrective

l
at all times action
Longitudinal
- Climb, cruise, descend: 3 seconds -Low approaches: 1 second
&
I_ j&p h-p-, @g+ h&c&.1* ;ry:,y *?
Lateral/directional
or maneuvering
flight
AC 2513294A q;,:,. -, + Malfunction yp2. !&>, I Evaluate i&g

l
& 23.1329-2
test must
:.k./ g+-. 2 I @&; -%Gi I :.-
cumulative effects on one axis due to any single signal Evaluate cumulative effects on all axes due to any single signal Not result in dangerous dynamic conditions of flight path deviations, speed and attitudes (23.1329):
i
Gi!*
IVTSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit>
Flight Control
Systems A8
Appendix A
-,c 9,.
AC 25.1329~IA
-.1 g?$. !Gh I
& 23.1329-2
+ Malfunction
l
test must
for
Evaluate oscillatory failures frequencies > .2 cps Evaluate hardovers feedback loop
due to open
Demonstrate recovery by over powering or quick disconnect
.a$7I, ;P 2&f; I &,;L %;$;
for pitch, roll, yaw respectively $3 -%Q 50, 30, 150 Ibs $If<- c h ::> k y; b$$. Loads during malfunction test and recovery
l
&@,$.~ -t/J. ; !I . :I+: Forces
must not exceed structural limits, or An, = +I unless analysis shows adequate structural margins Demonstrate adequate annunciation of automatic disconnect by aural warning (23.1329) Demonstrate intended function for
- All intended maneuvers - Environmental conditions, including turbulence
IVTSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit>.
Automatic Januar) , I999
Flight Control
Systems A9
Appendix A
+ For automatic
l
pilot instrument
Demonstrate lateral deviation due to engine failures less than 3 deglsec, with no hazardous attitudes Demonstrate
-Vertical -Altitude
satisfactory
deviation profile (coupled) loss (uncoupled)

19
+ AC 25.1329~IA & 23.1329-2

+ AC 25.1329~IA - Being rewritten :x; ,;P #j&, + AC 23.1329-2 I f@g; . % 0 _ i *%- Last rewritten in March 1991 $&>.Z.77 I i~jp~
l
--,. ^
More detail than AC 25.1329-IA Spells out alternate means for compliance with requirement to demonstrate/evaluate malfunctions designs using electronic monitors control authority limiting devices
for or
20
Automatic Januaqf, I999
Flight Control
Systems AI0
--
.-
Appemliv A
@p +.;
FAR 25.1309 & 23.1309
::+: Equipment, systems and installations must be designed so that failure conditions
l
kr c & pj$--sI -Q> I.I%- & +&; I p&$ * :J. ;;r 3% ;p 1 ; ,4,. I &:,
Preventing continued safe flight and landing will be extremely improbable
. Reducing crews ability to cope with adverse operating conditions will be improbable
21
FAR 25.1309 & 23.1309
;p && Ii g:$$ y!-*
+ Equipment, systems and installations must be designed to

l
Perform Provide
intended warning
function of unsafe operating conditions
Minimize crew errors due to controls, monitoring and warning means Minimize hazard on single engine airplanes due to probable malfunctions Prevent hazards on multiengine due to probable malfunctions airplane
22
IVTSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Automatic January,. I999
Flight Control
Systems Al I
Appendix A
&*
$9 ;+iCompliance
l
must
by analysis or test
Be shown
I-& ,A
Consider probability of failure modes, multiple failures, undetected failures Consider effects on airplane occupants and
Consider detectability of faults, crew warning cues, corrective actions 9-3
T., + ,.:.: c:!.., r3;F ,:, i?,. + :h. ,-I. u,y w: j;. g;:;; -*;(. ,*: 1 >. &;; -P .,,r I &y:>::i&dw$~+ Lb I * ~g.$ w>s&.. &l i2
4.9., .
Defines FAIL-SAFE
design concept
Provides definition of terms (catastrophic, major, minor failure conditions, associated probabilities) Provides compliance guidelines based on system complexity
4$::
IVT.SeIf-Stud\: Course Federal Aviation Authorit\.
Flight Control
Systems Al2
Appenclix A
Summary,
cont.
+I:Defines acceptable design analyses techniques, including

l
Functional
Hazard Analysis
Required qualitative and quantitative safety analysis for various failure categories and system complexity, considering environmental conditions, latent failures
25
it:+ 25-l 309-l B & 23.1309-l AC I., * 4,~. .A 0 Provides warning guidelines I<.. : *:;;:-, ,: h .:6 Y.-: -+f+: systems, controls, monitors, la. $. Unsafe operating conditions @ L ) h
@T;$; : I~
l
for for
IVTSelf-Stud\, Course Federal Aviation Authorit>
Automatic Januar?. I999
Flight Control
Systems Al3
Appendix A
Whats
NOT in FARs
flight control
l
system
or modes
Definition
of functions
Minimum required set of functions Partitioning of functions between automatic flight control sub-systems
Autopilot Autothrottle Flight management system Primary and secondary flight
.:<p
displays
27
Whats
NOT in FARs
(. + Performance requirements &. , + System integration requirements $5 ,:

l
::3> 2
l
Operations concept: how should mode and mode display function Regulations or guidelines about
-Mode overlap -Crew- machine interfaces Hardware architecture/redundancy
each
IVT Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Automatic Januar>. I999
Flight Control
Systems A14
Appemlix A
Whats
NOT in FARs
::+Specific
l
automation
safety
modes modes
Lock out of incompatible

- Pitch / roll control -Pitch / throttle control
Mixed manual and automatic
-;-.. :.y ifi;+: @~~;:~ I, Q&, .y.
- Roll I yaw control

l
Thrust limited climb/descent performance envelope protection
Whats NOT in FARs and ACs?, cont. .

Maneuver limits for normal operation and failure monitoring system
Performance
6% h p *$&, IIi: .;,f.X :, &ci;. L,,a,, &?Ati III + *.&J .> pii !$?a -:9: r/ $,h b .i;<
Mode reversion and automatic disengage criteria Automatic System disengage
I manual trim operation on pilot take over

30
Flight Control
S>rstetns Al5
Appendix A
-..
Design
Safety:
Definitions
impact on safety or ability of flight crew f:+Major Failure Condition: Significant reduction in safety margin and/or ability of flight crew to cope; higher workload or physical distress continued safe flight and landing
31
Design Safety: Definitions. cont.

(FHA): h,-.+Functional Hazard Assessment *L High level system examination; ,_, :+> classifies :A g$$ ;;:+: Q& ). t effects of functional failures, determines ?T 3 need and scope of additional analyses :4 $:;F);2.. h $+~$% *.,*I! $G Failure Modes and Effects Analysis: Structured inductive analysis; describes failure of function, component, mechanism, effects on system and safety of aircraft
32
IVTSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit\,
Automatic January,, I999
Flight Control
Systems Al6
Appendix A
Design Safety: Definitions. cont.

. i:+:Fault Tree or Reliability Block Diagram Analysis: Structured top-down analysis; identifies all contributing faults and probabilities to determine overall probability of defined failure condition
iq$$$$ ,:-, -2, +. .
+ Redundancy: Presence of more than one independent means for accomplishing given function or flight operation
33
Design Safety: Basic ConceMs
failures not shown to be extremely improbable, @ will prevent continued safe flight and landing &E;; h ifgrg?J; (AC 25 13294A paraphrased)
1 -
: Fail passive:
System will disconnect
for any
single failure that interferes with its intended function, without significantly reducing pilots ability to cope with the resulting situation and continue safe flight and landing
34
IVT:SeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit>.
Flight Control
Systems Al7
Appendix A
::+iFail operational: System will continue to perform its function, without pilot assistance or actions, after any single shown to be extremely improbable Critical function: Function whose failure would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of an airplane (AC 23.13094 B)
35
Design Safety:
::+Essential function: Function operating whose failure conditions of of
>I*10 E-5 36
IVT!Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority Automatic January. 1999 Flight Control Systems A18
fik;; 3 h g& &,v.+. Extremely improbable: Y Probability occurrence < I* 10 E-9 Improbable: occurrence Probable: I*10 E-5< probability c I*10 E-9 Probability of occurrence
cope with adverse (AC 23.1309-I B)
Appendix A
+ Flight Critical ::+iNon-flight functions
- CAT III autoland - All other automated
Critical
+ Limited control authority is used to assure that pilot can cope with any failure of the non-flight critical automation functions
Qyp:7!; -4,G: I... ,,
Flight Critical / Non-flight Critical Design, cont.

-+ Pilots have full burden of operational safety for non-flight critical automation functions + Operational
l
safety depends
on
Correct
use in normal operation
Correct pilot response if unsatisfactory operation is encountered

38
Flight Control
Systems A19
Appejz dik A
f:+.: Fail-safe
l l
provisions
Redundant load paths In-line monitoring and disconnect
+ Redundancy
l
of functional
elements
Dual with
- Equal force authority--fail - Comparison monitor identification, passive and alert pilot of faulty element
39
to disconnect elimination
Triple or dual-dual
- Detection,
8; p&q v.&y$ _*
R Basic Design Approaches
for
Sizing of individual actuator force and servo torque capability, e.g., lg single channel A/P Splitting of control surfaces pilot override capability of A/P & A/T * Control algorithm G-limit, e.g., Fly-by-wire airplanes
l l
+ Placarding (operating restrictions) + Flight envelope monitoring

l l
Stall, VmolMmo warning Envelope protection for automatic
modes
40
IVTSeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Flight Control
Systems A20
Appendix A
y = Flight Path Angle m = Aircraft Mass
w/g
* v 5=TCOS~ - D - WSiny
Weight
L - Wcosy + Tsina
Level Flight Thrust And Drag
peed
Neutral Stability
42
IVT:SeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
January, 1999
Automatic Flight Control Systems A21
Appendix A
Longitudinal
Control
IF: (T - D)/W = Constant
energy
distribution
between
altitude
& speed
L = C, l/Z - vz,,
(1 " M =F c; .a+v
*s 1/2-P,,- v2,
C,= c/ -+c -a ; 1/2-P- V&7

2
..&I
41 G P = Lift coefficient = Air density
0 1 / Vtrue= True airspeed S at Ve = Wing span = Equivalent airspeed 44
pr1 = Air density sea level
Flight Control
Systems A33 --
Appendk A
On Vertical Speed
Y max
hi mas
T max
Down
idle
py .,., xl.<, 1 -7&V i Ij.
Flight
Path Control
Using
+: At constant throttle, autopilot @ induces speed deviation

l
flight
path control
If speed stays above Vneutra,stability , speed tends to recover naturally If speed drops below Vneutra,stability , autopilot tends to drive airplane into stall, unless pilot manages power
; At idle power, controllability of a predicted idle S : descent path through elevator is very poor
l
Speed tends to diverge as result of flight path control, the fundamental reason for difficulties experienced in VNAV idle descents
46
*,,I-?-,
I VTSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
January, I999
Appemh A
peed Control:
7~~~ -R ;* 1., % q.p*< 4 @, T :
Observations
+j To maintain speed, Thrust controlled to compensate for changes in FIight Path Angle and Drag Drag smallest of terms; drag changes often
negligible, except due to flaps, gear, and spoilers ..+:i Elevator/stabilizer sized to provide pitch and trim control over entire flight envelope; & autopilot path control authority using elevator p$& %X@; far exceeds available thrust necessary to &7 maintain speed
Yq,, I
A7
@j;? d A- Therefore, ?F. &i,I, conditional &;> riv,:g, ,;*;,
:!S.. exceeding $$%?* .>T~$, I i$, ff: &+;Q: - autothrottle &*::I + Fixed elevator/stabilizer 1, speed control may be unstable due to positive thrust pitching moments
autothrottle speed control on pilot or autopilot not performance limit
is
48
IVT Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit>
Automatic Januar> . 1999
Flight Control
Systems A24
Appendix A
Flight Path and Speed ,< + . A!
Using elevator to control flight path at constant power setting does not always work defeats basic
:.+: Autopilot path control speed stability
;:+Using thrust to control speed will not work satisfactorily unless elevator control is active
Flight Path and Speed Control: Conclusions, cont.

@iip&j~:, 4. ii. Pilot must play a crucial safety p-& p . during mixed manual/automatic II g&$ TC Cf
operations role
+: Elimination of operational and safety limitations in future designs will require integrated flight path and speed control with control priority for limit thrust conditions and speed envelope protection
50
IVT/Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Automatic January, I999
Flight Control
Systems A25
Appemiix A
Lateral Directional Static Equations
cosp
. .I0
Sideslip
=P
=0
7 g;;*>,: G $@;
Lateral Directional Static Equations, cont.

Static Side Slip
Weight
$$s T,+T,
= Drag
FY,
LcOsq = Weight F yf = Lsinv

M,
Fyr=
= Mg sideslip
(I
47
Current
autopilots
do not control
IVT,Self-Stud) Course Federal Aviation Authorit)
Flight Control
Systems A26
Appendix A
g@g
ub ,99
Lateral Directional
Static
View from Rear
P
Weight 1 Drag = Lsinq = Weight do not trim the rudder 53
Fyt-xtT, -Ye =
Current autopilots
,::@. ; f% Airplane Dynamic Model & gp$, 4.; ,:l State Variables
,I_
g+-:q$$;y * ^j
:p State variables describe linear (u,v,w) and angular ( v, 0, p ) and @. % (p, q, r) velocities, orientation I p&f>> position (X, Y, Z) of airplane relative to specific -,>q,? reference coordinate systems ;3 $3. + Three coordinate systems are used: IA *+.J B:tI @&+z. %&?.I i> 1. Earth-fixed, arbitrary coordinate center
2. Airplane-fixed, coordinate center at cg (airplane body axes), used for u,v,w and p,q,r 3. Airplane cg-centered, axes aligned with initial airplane velocity components relative to airmass
~8:X, Y, Z (latitude, longitude, altitude): airplane position relative to earth reference system
IVT.SeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Automatic January.. I999
Flight Control
Systems A27
Appendix A
axes:
X, Y, Z
Final aircraft body axes: X, ,Y, , Z,

55
Kinematic
Relationshi
V = (r cosp +q sin p) lcos0 Q=qcosp-rsiny

Q =p+ y+sinQ
56
w-r Self-Stud!. Course Federal Aviation Authorit!
Flight Control
Systems A28
Appendix A
1.
- nl( -q
w + r v) - \\
sin 0. cos V,
-I,,)
r.p
+I,,
.(r
-p)
- ni( -p 1 --q .u) +-\\ ~0s U~cos V
-(I,,. +m(-r.u
-I,, ) .q .r I,, +p.w)
.(I+ p .q) q
+W .cosO.sin
6.
Izz t = ~J1z~,,,,-,,,,,, +(I,, -I,! ) I) c(+I,, O-cl .r)

57
Stability to Body Axes Transformation

;:+Aerodynamic :> Axes System forces defined defined in Stability in Airplane
+ Equations of motion % Axes System
$b :
!I+Stability to body axes transformation 5@ requires angle of attack (a) and side slip (p) a= angle between X, axis and plane formed by
airplane velocity vector and Y, axis by
58
p= angle between X, axis and plane formed airplane velocity vector and 2, axis
I VT,Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit>
Automatic Januar!,. I999
Flight Control
Systems A29
Appendix A
Stability to Body Axes cont. Transformation.

<+iAccelerations Therefore: velocitv irmass always Integrated referenced inertial (earth referenced) = inertial velocities acceleration and inertial
39.. &yr1. 1 .-; tjv:;: :

:* I
t@@$;;
I$J+..air U V c = +v
l
= air
+ tsind
wind
wind
wind
9 Wwind
in earth axes)
Wair
W,,,ind
Angle of Attack and
W air
IVTSelf-Stud>. Course Federal Aviation Authority
Automatic Januaq,. 1999
Flight Control
Systems A30
Appen dik A
Control
&q&VT
Force and Moment Dependencies
and propulsive forces and y + Aerodynamic w. 2x+. moments generally non-linear functions of , k. I;&:, basic state variables and control inputs $+ ,>-. *,1 If force and moment dependency functions defined and all airplane states and control inputs given, total sum of force and moments can be calculated In that case, these nonlinear equations solved by numerical integration techniques using digital computers, assuming initial aircraft states also given
For analysis, often necessary to linearize equations of motions In many cases, particularly for commercial aircraft with relatively low maneuver rates, terms involving products of perturbation states are small relative to other terms; may be neglected without appreciably affecting resulting dynamics characterization
For example:
l l l
eq. 1: vr and qw eq. 2: rp and r2, p2 eq. 3: pv
l l l
eq. 4: qr and pq eq. 5: pw eq. 6: pq and qr
IVT.Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Autotnatic Januaq : I999
Flight Control
Systems A3 I
Appendix A
::::Linearization
Change specific
l
of Equations,
cont.
in force or moment/unit change of state variable called stability derivative

of forces dependencies
Derivatives X,,, X,,, X(,, X0 denote changes along the X axis due to u, n, q,Q. Derivatives defined for all state variable of force and moments equations Assume Divide eq. 3 & 5 through Divide each equation by rt,; neglect
vfI, wI!, po, qn, r, are zero and u = 1~ + by leading
Au
Au.r
A 1r.q and
mass or inertia
factor
Result: linearized y$j&+ eq. 5 in p, p

l
equations
with eq. 3 in LZ,LZ and
r P
b,, ... ... bZ2
Form:
-i- = [A]--;+ [B]. u
IVT Self-Stud>, Course Federal Aviation Authorit)
Flight Control
Systems A32
Appendix A
yielding + Controls executed
aircraft
motion
time history
&AT = j&l (t) and 6,& = f;r,.,.,(t) may be manually or automatically
unaugmented airplane to understand how to improve responses by feedback and sometimes feedforward control augmentation and how
65
Unaugmented
State equations
l
Airplane
l
i = /A/
x + /B/
ti
$J$. @&v, ,s$w i @.; Ph>y.:jq-
A (state transition) matrix elements reveal many of the dynamic system properties matrix determines effectiveness of each controller to influence each degree of freedom Larger off-diagonal SD is relative to on diagonal SD, more modes are cross coupled
66
B (control)
IVT/SeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
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Flight Control
Systems A33
Appemk A
Longitudinally - determined by cr,,(Cm,) Lateral-dir. - determined by ~(Cnp)
*+ Dynamic Stability: See FAR23125181 Means that modes describing dynamic system behavior have positive damping
l
67
Linear Control Analvses

+ To conduct linear analyses on aircraft responses for given control input requires formation of specific transfer function of ,j& interest v i jgj&. !I ,p .
&% y% &$I .
j$g+ Transfer function defines output relationship
control
input to
& + Specific input to output transfer function may be formed applying Cramers rule to equations of motion, or by matrix algebra
Flight Control
Systems A34
App enclix A
:T Linear Control Analyses,

l
cont.
in S
Example:
-
AU
= 6,
(polynomial characteristic
in s)/h, polynomial
e&-ff$Yr ct[e.
f$& s@ h t$@.. %.%,t hp. :I ;c+ ~gbg& $r&; h ! 1; r&.*<

Tzw v. ; *c;
S is LaPlace operator, signifying differentiation (numerator) or integration (denominator) of state variable with respect to time. Powers of S signify successive differentiations or integrations Numerator and denominator polynomials may be factored into lSf and 2nd order elements, yielding real and complex conjugate roots of
69
$$ j:Ev;;,< 1p*, -&.: (4 F.I&;<

I
Denominator roots called poles; poles also referred to as eigenvalues of system Denominator polynomial (characteristic polynomial) is same for any transfer function and determines natural frequency (03~) and stability (damping, < ) of system dynamic modes Numerator roots called zeros; zeros only affect time response shape, not stability
70
IVTSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit)
Flight Control
Systems A35
Appendix A
dynamic
l
behavior
of an aircraft:
Eigenvalues / poles and zero location in complex plane; each real or complex pole pair characterizes a dynamic mode of airplane Time response simulation response plots charts
71
. Root locus
l
. Bode or frequency
l
Bode plots gain and phase margins/Nichols
+ Computer control analyses programs available to quickly $9 perform any desired analysis !Pt& h g$t?, - MATLAB I? G.
- MATRIX X, etc.
72
IVT%elf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Automatic January,. 1999
Flight Control
Systems AX
Appendix A
Unagmented
Airplane
Characteristic
polynomial
qfh order in S
Factoring and rooting CP yield two 2nd order rigid body dynamic modes
- Short period: cc)0 = h .5 - 1 seconds, <= .3 - .7 - Phugoid q=o-.I or long period: m 0 = -30 - 60 seconds,
hp Y :r; hc ay :t+> q,~
L +fP ?
Order of TF numerator specific TF
depends
on
73
Unagmented
General Dynamic
Airplane
cont.
Characteristics,
.22++Lateral directional
l
Characteristic yielding
polynomial
z = I/U
qfh order,
= -I set
- Is order Roll mode
- lst order Spiral mode z = I/w = -10 -03 set 1) Mode sometimes - Dutch Roll mode unstable
T, = 10 -m set
,wO= - S-10 set, c = 0 - .3
IV-I- Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit:,
Flight Control
Systems A37
Appendix A
Location of pole in complex plane indicates natural frequency cc)0 and damping < of mode a =I Short Period i Imaginary ..... .. . ...__..... ijw I 4
IVT.SeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit:
Flight Control
Systems A38
Appendix A
Imaginary
Characteristics
of
Flight Control
Systems A39
Appendix A
Transter
inteqrator: (low pass) 1.0 t +*O\
gain 0 (d b-*() z t phase (degr.) +
Function
1 S
Elements
response)
s
,p-. Bode Plots (frequency
differentiator: (high pass)
t +*O /
-20 t phase +go degr. 0 gain (W 0 + f3 radkec
w radlsec I
y?@ Transfer
T.7,
Function
Elements
response),
cont.
Bode Plots (frequency
washout: (high pass)

4 0 = I
- r, S : s+l
gLin NW t
-20
+
\
CI) radlsec
phase0 Wegr.) 1. -90 --------.L

+ w radkec
Flight Control
Systems A40
Appendix A
iggg;; 2
Transfer - . Plots . rr. troae

lead-lag.
.
Function
(frequency
Elements
response),
cont.
-&!cond order 2 S+4ead-lag:

t
s2 + 2<,w, s + 0: s2 + 2<202s + 0;
+2
o z +mr
gain w phise +g() _--___.__ --------_ degr. 0-1 -1 II) tcu radlsec t
phase degr.
lad/set
rl rz
n egative
/, .,/
@I w,l
sign of num. phase
01
z, or c, changes
01
&Sk. &y+ +-&.:z P*; + Given transfer function for unaugmented or .&G I. e. bygain 9;~ :* for augmented airplane, approximate L.. c k ~>A and phase plots may be sketched using break Q&
%B&frequencies
i!&,<y. q$&. v
I is :., I .k* Transfer :A ,_ ,,.
Function
Analyses
and asymptote
method
t!, + Computer programs quicker and more necessary 9 accurate, but basic understanding I%& I J, for good control law design work G&y @c I Negative z:or 6 in numerator - non-minimum phase response (initial response opposite
-I -, I (IL
IVT!Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Flight Control
Systems A41
Appendix A
Unaugmented
Airplane
Observations
Basic airplane Weight, Speed, altitude,
design math
configuration moments of inertia number
center of gravity,
ne has unacceptable HQ, may be possible to improve characteristics by stability/ command augmentation
83
Y~,$ ::+. - way to externally I&, Stability augmentation ,,%?i, alter certain natural internal feedback s h ac* I t$::,:
% (stability derivative) of airplane dynamic T& model %&, I @+k tr$y+ 9;. :.FPure feedback of existing aircraft states will not change order of dynamic airplane model Addition of dynamic elements in feedback loops will change order of airplane dynamic model
84
IVTSeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Flight Control
Systems
A42
*.)* 1, . *;a,,. hL2 .<a,,, +&f Ii! W -+-tqq , * &I;,*+@ h i&&g + Issue: Control authority and priority *.*_ L. between SAS and pilot control
Stability augmentation sometimes used to restore stability to desired level after design configuration and/or operations decisions result in poor stability of unaugmented airplane
$9 of+% &z,,. Relationship
Open/Closed
Function
Loop
closed algebra
Transfer
Given TF G(S) of interest of basic airplane, $+ loop TF may be derived using blockdiagram ssa, x,, = fxi - H(s)X,))G(S)
X0 (I + H(S)G(S)) ;s+ ;v p x,, Xi = Xi G(S)
G(S) = 1 + H(S)G(S)
Example: g.
G(S) =-$
H(S) = K,
G(S)
1 + K, G(S)
I VTISelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit)
Flight Control
Systems A43
Appendix A
I &$$.. phase o
f: -900 -1 800
**i. $&
.06 5 w,, 5 F.E.M: GM2 6db +goo ...................................................... ........ ..........
. :
i :
PM 2 45
co,, 5.06 : GM 2 4db
PM 130
87
qg& :-: Pitch -. :-. ,v;;$;; I Short I?; &$! -%c. ;>
+. !)?ig+ ; h I,y*?y, : L& L.9,
damper- improves damping of Period mode, feeds back pitch rate and sometimes pitch attitude or angle of attack to elevator on airplanes with relaxed static stabilitv
+: Yaw damper- improves damping of Dutch Roll mode on swept wing airplanes, feeds back body axis yaw rate to rudder
IVl Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit>.
Flight Control
Systems A44
Appendi- A
++ Pitch Damper or Pitch Innerloop
Complex
conjugate
root
89
input
rl,rK, I-
1 I
l l
Filter may be washout or bandpass filter At frequencies 2 short period frequency a= 8 Reliability and cost of sensors may affect choice Possible to use lagged 4 in lieu of 8 Feedback - different response to turbulence 8 than Q feedback
January,. 1999
Automatic Flight Control S>xtems A45
Appendix A
Typical Yaw Damper
,_
3% Yaw damper
command
added in series with pilots
input
91
I +: Simplest modes used in early autopilots $+ k.. Pitch attitude hold (structure - see slide 89) ,g; :
l
$w&. *::<;$ L
Roll attitude
hold
Vertical Vertical speed/fpa . Go around Altitude hold/select ILS glideslopelflare Vertical navigation
l l l
l l
Lateral Heading/track VORllLS localizer Lateral navigation (LNAV)

92
(VNAV)
IVT Self-Stud), Course Federal Aviation Authorit)
Automatic Januarq. I999
Flight Control
Systems A46
Appendix A
fb :+.: Command or outerloop modes cannot function without innerloop feedbacks (simplest form: y / 8 and r / q ) + In general, for any particular mode, feedbacks are required, besides the characteristic mode feedback, of each higher frequency state variable to achieve satisfactory damping and performance
& ? *p*. Feedback gains may be determined by analyses, using transfer function I root !:a$ locus, time response; or modem optimal g;,:. y con&o/ analyses techniques k q$;,. 3 +p Control surface effectiveness change generally compensated by 1 I qc gain schedule I f$& ,, ,
94
IVT:Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Flight Control
Systems A47
Appendix A
Control
Performance
specify
+ Performance requirements generally & desired bandwidth for control mode $
ii.! Bandwidth indicates swiftness of response follow up to a command; bandwidth (in radlsec) is product of all steady state throughput gains, 9 going around main control loop
integrations
in loop
96
Flight Control
Systems A48
Appendix A
5S change of innerloop feedbacks prevent droop of h/h, TFfrequency
and
+ Integral control also compensates for innerloop sensor errors and needed trim control surface position
+: Traditional designs use proportional + integral control on modes most outerloop
IC
+ Approach
can lead to trouble

98
IVT,SeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit)
Flight Control
Systems A49
Appendix A q&F 6
*: Nonlinear
Control Algorithm
+ Integral signal path reduces damping, necessitating low K,, resulting in new low freq. mode integrators need proper initialization and HOLD submode to prevent windup when control surface limits
99
+ Large step commands cannot tolerate integrator, need u,-limit: $$ designers often revert to non-linear h && design elements 4: I. *+.
l
CAPTURE and TRACK submodes Switching Limiters, logic rate limiters, etc. 10(
IVT.SeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Flight Control
Systems AS0
Appendk A
+sz k +g
Altitude
Hold/Select
Mode
Appropriate
&limit
difficult
to determine
@$&;..*\ r
Control
Vertical
Mode Algorithms
Speed & Glide Slope Modes
Automatic Januar4. 1999
Flight Control
Systems AS1
Appendix A
i&g ? ,, A.
Automatic
Stabilizer
Trim
::+ Automatic stabilizer trim ensures longterm the elevator returns to faired position to maintain control authority and minimize drag + Trim activated when elevator position exceeds a threshold value for longer than + *aA Trim stops when elevator returns within a &gF,;j threshold band around neutral for a certain I @+; c i.r ~ C,< ueriod of time ,:
Automatic stabilizer trim with autopilot path mode engaged defeats

speed trim/ stability concept, possibly
leaving airplane disengage

l
out of trim upon A/P (e.g., run-away
Design integrity failure)
Flight Control
Systems A52
Appendix A
Command overshoot Control activity Acceleration limiting
Tracking perf. Loss of control Poor energy management

105
Lateral
Issue: 0.1. gain schedule

106
Flight Control
Systems A53
Appendix A
Rate gyros, Vertical gyros, IRU Euler angles Accelerometers True airspeed/ Mach Number Angle of attack Sideslip Temperature
volume,
weight
+ Air data sensors

l
::+In most cases, sensor dynamics are negligible
,. $ eg,~.< ,ir..7 h -a;-; ,f 1*@ . .i i.. a, y hl
107
Air Data Sensors

contamination, icing, flow field effects, maintenance abuse Not favored in flight critical integrity issue + Static PreSSure side slip +I. Long pressure sensor designs handling/
- reliability/ error/ iags
sensitive
to position
tubes add significant
response
@%. Remedies: Probe heaters; L/R cross plumbing; pressure transducers close to probe; complementary filters
lot
IVT,SeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit\.
January. I999
Appelzdix A
Disturbance Rejection Performance

f ii: Control * include
l
tracking
(process)
disturbance
sources
Sensor
noise (high frequency)
Atmospheric
disturbances
Dominant sources - Windshear - Temperature

l
Configuration
changes
Trim changes in pitch and power due to fuel burn, speed, and altitude changes
.y ) gg, -2..
$*q. Effects of Turbulence ,p and Windshear

Turbulence and wind shear are distinguishable only by frequency Airspeed is affected directly by horizontal gusts, indirectly by vertical gust, due to energy transfer through elevator control
R. + $?a,:!@ &q;;>. &&i ( XiI. b .I, pi+,< + h ,+ 7%&+?,; i &,u G+ $g;;: Tr &
I
*q>;,c; : 1-:, ~
1 II
IVTSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit)
Flight Control
Systems A55
Appendix A
Effects of Turbulence
horizontal
and vertical
gusts bandwidth; for
path and speed control
$3 Control Effectiveness f.@&; dk-. Turbulence

k
in
; open
gain-db 0 thrust control
Ah CI R
~C~~~~~~~ closes l. ac%pen ..CA............. ....... :................... <. ...... .;..... ..+. ........
-20
loopi
,lelevator - u Pnntrnl I ....+.................................-.... ...i.............. . ...i....................... .&II -20 :/: .Ol .; i.0 Y i + cu rad/sec
x.&./-y,
. +3n
10
11;
Flight Control
Systems A56
Appeizdix A
Control Activity in Turbulence Versus Speed Tracking in Windshear

Throttle + Pos LO --/L
\
~sgllst
2O/o/ft/s -
-\
Increasing gust filtering b J0 L, 7
4h/(kn/sec)
+ ma verror Udofwindshe3r
113
W~,~i 7 T;q~; Qi iy+ *
Effect of Horizontal
& Vertical
Winds
on Trim Thrust at Constant7J,

t+or descent causes change gravity component along
in
Conclusion
weight
amplify speed deviation

114
IVTiSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
January. 1999
Appendk A
&;y k y;,
Balancing
Flight Pat
control
and increase
throttle
activity
* + Traditional autopilots and autothrottle systems designed independently, without regard to undesirable control coupling .+ Proper balancing of altitude/speed tracking and control activity in turbulence requires integrated design and correct turbulence $p modeling and analyses
alancing Flight Path and Speed Control in Turbulence and Windshear, cont.
+ Options tracking
l
for balancing performance
altitude and speed in turbulence: by of states
Synthesis of feedback signals frequency-dependent blending inertial and airmass referenced
Pitch controller: Choice of innerloop feedbacks -- discussed for flare algor Choice of altitude and speed control bandwidths (not good option)
llf
IVTiSeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Flight Control
Systems A58
Appendix A
Inertial Inertial Baro altitude Baro altitude rate Geodesic Geodesic Vertical Inertial Inertial Inertial Inertial Vert. airmass fl pth angle
speed acceleration altitude altitude acceleration angle of attack angle of attack sideslip sideslip rate 117 = rate rate
= drift angle
Vert. Inertial
fl pth angle
K$-K25f
K&K2$-+Kfi+l
K&l
+ K$+Kz$+K,S
+I
ill
IVTYjelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit>
January. 1999
App endix A
:::j 3 1%
Second t+ Order
Third Order
measure 2, .. b + Accelerometers ;.. due to contact ~@yQ& accelerations *= :>

c h
-%qy:
forces
jp.
Using Euler equations
of motion:
g-
P I=-=
v
U
a,. + g.cos -
e-sin u
q -r
Automatic Januar>*. I999
Flight Control
Systems A60
Appendix A
Classic Landing Algorithm
Flare
GS control 4 a o-, innerloop 1 command Flare control

0
Performance issues Flare initiation . Terrain sensitivity Initialization 0 Flare gains 0 Innerloop design
l l
Note: Flare trajectory variation due to Vqround may be eliminated by making K, (:) to Viround
Flight Control
Systems A61
Appendk A
+ Classic flare algorithm can meet performance requirement of AC20-57A (&&KS 1500 ft ) + Variable flare initiation not desirable height is
with significantly better +;g:& performance and constant flare initiation .&$,Y &h *& height developed and flight tested by F- NASA TCV program: + Variable Tau alg. with K, (:)Vgrou@q,. = 500 ft)
l
~~,, rl.:,%+ Algorithms
2400ft) x Algorithms use high gains and advanced inner loop design for turbulence rejection
Explicit
Flare Trajectory
alg. @
124
IV? Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Automatic Januar>,. I999
Flight Control
Systems A62
Appendix A
Performance Improvement Gust and Windshear
for1
1o-2
10-l
I 10
FAEQUENCY
w - RADt8EC l3EWONSE OF h/u* 132
Trajectory:
k! kI + /&) = 2~ -k2.v 4k2 c -?k+ k,.y+ k, command ? 1 computation: - h:.v =Y 0

= I -1 II A-,, = 0 v<; . clt AT,, + v,; * at s = -\-;I- I =
/-:? I:P
-*
--
yn-, = y,,(l-
k,V,
. at)
IVT Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authorit)
Flight Control
Systems A63
Appendix A
y,t*q ww,.y k +$& .,
Evolution Toward Full Function Automatic Flight Control
requiring
airplanes exhibit poor speed stability, cruise autothrottle to reduce workload
+ Introduction of Inertial Navigation System and other function automation reduced workload + Introduction of EFIS and FMC in 1980s new set of
127
+ lnadverfent result; F/WC introduced guidance and control algorithms
Current Architectures
Flight Control
Systems A64
Appendix A
Traditional Control Algorithm Design Process: Observations

(2: In traditional design process, functional and performance requirements often dealt with by separate design features ::+.i This approach quickly leads to undesirable mode
ince each mode/flight condition approached as separate design problem, overall complexity can be overwhelming and mode integration difficult algorithms etter way to structure . .. control
Process and Tools vg& , F& h ;;g;

%
i:++
conceptual design and function integration critically depends on human ingenuity
Correct conceptual design is paramount
c s ::+Classic and modern design tools give little insight in concept design G and function integration
130
Flight Control
Systems A65
Appendix A
;I+: Classical and modern are both useful ;:+: Optimal control
control
methods does not
is misnomer;
:+:Linear design and gain determination is trivial - nonlinear design, mode integration and design validation/verification far
Avionics
Architecture:
Typical
...- m . .
132
January, 1999
Appendix A
AFCS Digital Computer
Architecture
January, 1999
Appendix A
lVT/SeIf-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
January, 1999
Appendix A
System Failure Probability

SYSTEM COMPARISON WtTH AHRS IN LIEU OF STRAPiX3WN
to-2
DultExCAK PAmmE 8rnLW

WADWPLEX DWLSUAL
. Hardware components separate function

l
for every
Parallel processing Less opportunity functions
of parallel functions for undefined inversely
Reliability/availability related to complexity
January, 1999
9 Same hardware . Parallel functions many solutions! . Need correct . Software

l
for many functions must be serialized software -
/ detailed
design is crucial
design
expertise
/ discipline and
Overall effort shifts to validation verification
Control Actuation
positioning
actuators an artificial feel
+ Because of irreversibility, system is used +zActuator redundancy flight critical function
needed to meet reliability/availability
+I:As a result, manual/AFCS control actuation interfaces can become complex
January, 1999
Appendix A
Smart Actuator
Command
Voting (B-2)
Typical Actuator
Loop Closure (B-2)
I-
I*
I
KNICE I :UlW -TION I-# /
i
,
K~RCEECUUIZER
c-l
I uz s -.
I -
142
January, 1999
Appendix A
Actuator
Force & Rate Capability

(Typical)
VELOCITY ACTUATOR
---v--- EXCESS FORCE
STALL
! ! I I ! I 143
+- Must provide safety assurance commensurate with criticality of loss of function

l
Flight critical function: Pilot not expected to provide sole safety backup - safety must be built in
. Non-flight critical funcfion: Pilot assumed to be able to provide adequate backup for safety
IVT,?SeI!-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
January, 1999
Appendix A
Design Safety, cont.

Hardware component failure error error (hardware
Design (specification) Design implementation or software) error
. Operator
l
Unacceptable/unsafe
performance
145
@, g
..+ Suitability of conceptual design + Validity of design requirements (3 Correctness + Correctness

l
of design and specification of implementation requirements within
Function as specified; no unintended function Intended envelope Specified environmental
$@ ,r i, I
+ Performance
l l
conditions
:+.iFailure characteristics/management !.+ Design error tolerance :* Human operator error resistance/recovery ..4f
I VT/Se1 f-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
Automatic January, 1999
Flight Control
Systems A73
Appendix A
. Airplane-system safety assessment, i.e., per SAE 4761 - Functional System hazard assessment (FHA) safety assessment
)) Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) )) Fault tree analysis (FTA) )) Common mode analysis 1) Specific risk analysis
Random
hardware
failures
Similar redundancy - Environmental stress testing

l
Generic
errors
redundancy
- Dissimilar
January, I999
Appendix A
Strategies,
Generic errors
- Requirements validation - Multiple version software
l
cont.
(parallel
/ series)
Software verification, i.e., RTCA DO 1786
i:++ Hardware / software design integration / acceptance testing

14s
Hardovers, Common
Transients, and Mode Failures

if not extremely force/g-limit authority
. Must be safe I manageable - Single channel

-wJq$ E:.: <: L
- control
w Engage/disengage
- Issue: Autopilot
monitor
transients
disengage
trip
9 Must be safe I manageable logic

1) Failure
)) Departure of design envelope (speed; angle of
January, I999
Appendix A
Hardovers,
Transients,
and
critical
l
design safety
Examples: Design error in microprocessor or in redundancy management software Need exhaustive design sneak circuit analysis review/
. Reasonableness
l
checks monitors: sometimes
on sensor
values
In-line/red-line Performance;
Check function uses function model
. Parity check; memory data wrap around

l
check sum; check fail passive
Watchdog Miscompare design)
timer or heartbeat
(e.g., dual channel
152
January, I999
Appendix A
and Isolation,
cont.
. Majority voting: Need minimum of three independent sources (can include analytically redundant sources) . Parity equations (e.g., skewed axes inertial reference sensors: Deselection of sensor with highest residue)
+I: Definition: Airplane control concept whereby surfaces commanded through electrical wires
l
Weight reduction Lower maintenance -. Design freedom to optimize aerodynamic performance by RSS and achieve standardized handling qualities through SAS and CAS Cost reductions
l l
January, 1999
Appendix A
FBW Genesis
+; Mid-1980s, Airbus developed FBW control featuring

l
A-320 with
C* control Sidestick Autothrottle
algorithm protection feel throttle drive servo

155
. Speed and n,envelope

l
controller without
with passive
+ Boeing followed
l
suit with B777 featuring

servo
C*U control
algorithm column/wheel/throttle
. Conventional . Hydraulic
feel; autopilotxolumnlwheel
January, 1999
Appendix A
characteristics, ::K: Speed stability
HQ or equivalent safety
+:;Mode changes for up and away and takeoff / landing
+ Manual and automatic
mode
electronics electronics
bay versus remote loop closure at actuator
January, 1999
Appendii A
fl stick
throttle
..Boeing...?Vi ................... ......
C* Criterion
in aircraft
l c* = (n,),,
response
+ W,,kh
(C*-variable)
of
V,, speed at which contributions ( n z) PS and q are equal
. Assume airplane has good handling qualities when response of C*-variable falls within
Appendix A
Feedback
of
I(
C*)dt = h + 8
provides path stability, but not path tracking; there is no speed

l
Certification based on equivalent safety obtained by speed / angle of attack envelope protection
161
Speed feedback causes n, /stick response to be overridden long-term by speed response, resulting in conventional delta V/stick command Handling qualities deteriorate on backside of drag curve due to reversal of nz response
lVT/Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
January, I999
Appendix A
TYPICAL COMMAND RESPONSE n,U algorithm HSCT .25 g pull-up W=400k, &=I55 kn, gamma=3O .
162
:+ Boon to airline economics +I.Most automated airplanes best safety record
I safety have
;:+Recent publicity about accidents and incidents involving automation criticize automation, calling human centered design for
January, 1999
Appendix A
;:+Most automation design deficiencies rooted in historic systems evolution, using incremental function design
;.+Poor control
l
strategies
Elevator flight path control without regard to thrust Loss of AIT speed control when at
. Automatic stabilizer trim - defeating speed stability . Inadequate control coordination, high
January, 1999
Appendix A
Deficiencies,
cont.
can overpower! . Throttle wake up (automatic
engagement)
Unsafe disconnects + Failure

l
close to stall & out of trim or annunciate

fail due to
to disconnect
when
Vertical speed mode improper thrust
Automation
Design
No rudder control and trim for asymmetric thrust
+ Inappropriate control authority limits - on pitch attitude ::+Unclear control references (e.g, speed in A/T, A/P, FMS)
January, 1999
Appendix A
Automation Design Deficiencies, cont.
;.+I! Inadequate mode status annunciation i:+Inconsistent operation between modes + Operational complexity leading to pilot confusion / errors
use of control f:+Over-reliance automation
authority on pilot as integrator
limitations
/ deficiencies
. Mixed manual I automatic modes with altered safety . Handling performance limits and failure conditions
January, I999
Appendk A
Deficiencies:
Root Causes
Too many/overlapping together by intractable Poor / incomplete and integration
modes, cobbled mode logic automation and design
function design
. Flawed conceptual processes
loss of control
l
will require
and mode of mode overlap mode logic
Better control strategy integration concept
Fewer modes, elimination Elimination
of sub modes, simpler mode concepts
. Better integrated
- No open ended climbs/descents
January, 1999
Appendix A
$9, gT$, * fg.i;
Needed Design Standards
- Autopilot mode control panel - No mixed mode operation
. Better thought
out first & second
tier protection
- First tier: Performance envelope protection - Second tier: Speed envelope protection
l
Fully automated More effective reconfiguration
rudder to handle thrust failure monitoring/ management
function
. Mission;
strategy
operations; functions; systems
. Process management Synthesis / analysis
January, 1999
Appendix A
for commonality
- Up-front function integration
. Decoupled
l
command control
responses
Pilot-like
strategy
- Energy efficiency - Control authority allocation
. Envelope
safeguards
- Priority control on elevator when thrust limited - VminNmax protection, covering alI modes
January, 1999
Appendix A
Future Flight Control
Systems
Reduced system maintenance
complexity,
less risk
Design portability: Faster/lower system development Reduced customization
Less flight testing,
less pilot training
+ All-encompassing control strategy for all modes, including FBW manual :+ Integrated pitch I thrust and roll I yaw control + Consistency of operation and performance between modes and flight conditions
January, 1999
Appendix A
Functionally Integrated Architecture

Path definition
Airline operations Oriented functions
Rational function partitioning No function Simplified
. Altitude/vertical Heading/track
l
spd
safety functions
reusable design
179
+ Outerloop control is a trajectory kinematics problem; should be designed independently of airplane characteristics
l
Conventional design methods do not cater to this approach Output is a trajectory acceleration command
January, 1999
Appendix A
Outerloophnerloop
Design Observations,
Design
cont.
;:+Innerloop generates forces and moments to satisfy commanded accelerations

l
Feedback gains may need to be compensated for changes in the airplane dynamics
;:+I; Examples: autothrottle
Altitude
control;
Concatenation of Control LOOPS: Altitude Control

outerloop;e innerloOp
Control
authority
(8
max
) depends
on max
January, 1999
Appendix A
Loops,
cont.
:I+!Simple rule for bandwidth separation requirement between adjacent loops can be derived; example: K, (h, - h) - K, h = h, assume h, = - h, then
B: K, and K;, represent
bandwidth
of h and h modes
::+ VP 154 shows
disjoint
between
/ii and OC
+ Most designers ignore problem and adjust feedback gains for each flight condition to obtain satisfactory bandwidth and damping + Physical insight allows more accurate solution:
January, 1999
Appendix A
Control Mode Functional Architecture
consist of proportional and integral terms with scheduled gains to assure consistent 6 By placing integrator at innerlouterloop boundary and following preceding rules for concatenation of control loops, a dramatically simplified provided that accommodates modes by reusable building all possible blocks control
18:
Integral
control
now
Issue:
Performance
Requires V referenced to V -0uterloop in turbulence windshear

l
186
January, 1999
Appendix A
New Generalized
Targets I I I w
1 ---w I I I -- t *
Design Process
0 Airplane tailored design
* Innerloop Force & moment * control +
Airplane independent 0 design

Guidance error Normalization (any mode) * Control Commands Coordinatior *
Airplane
--) I
1 Feedback L Designed to provide: Decoupled control + Standard trajectory dynamics

l l
187
in speed and altitude + Pilots intuitively speed control decouple flight path and
;:+ Current automatic control modes fail to account for control coupling; operation like giving throttle to one pilot to control speed and elevator to other pilot to control flight path + Both front side and back side control technique exhibit same type of difficulties
January, 1999
Appendix A
Longitudinal
Revisited.
Consider elevator and thrust
l
Control
cont.
control responses:
Elevator Control
b
Decompose speed and flight path errors into into energy (throttle control) and energy distribution (elevator control) components Gather up terms to form total control commands
In detail the process
works as follows.....
189
Total Energy Control
+ For any path mode, feedbacks are normalized into flight path angle command using loop concatenation + Likewise, for speed mode feedbacks are normalized into dimensionless acceleration command
Flight Control
Systems A95
Appendix A
use same normalization gain constants (first order mode control time constant) components: +I!Elevator y + ii/g difference: y - irlg
controls
191
Total Energy Control System

Architecture
energy control-
and Mode Hierarchy

i energy rate control
lizcd and r mds nation
19
January, 1999
Appendix A
Total Energy Control System Core Algorithm - Energy Rate Control

fq Airplane independent design 0 10 Airplane tailored design
Specific Net Thrust
Pitch Attitude Command
TECS Algorithm
Features
+I.Energy Strategy achieves pilot-like control qualify in automatic control
l
No inefficient Decoupled responses Priority
throttle overshoot
activity free command limits
control
when thrust
Simultaneous maneuvering
flight path/speed at limit T maneuver limit
. Normal acceleration
January. I999
Appendix A
TECS Algorithm
Features, cont.
outerloop boundary, structured to avoid cmd overshoot, satisfies VF 155 :+ Transient free mode switching; no re-initialization + Complete consistency between modes and predictability
195
ALTlCAS
ALTCMD 10 000
Modes, Combined
Descend/Acceleration - _-_ .--270
CASCMD
fl/sec* THROTTLE
-4 55.0
Negligible
Throltle
Response1
196
January. 1999
Appendix A
::+I! When throttle

. SPEED control,
limits, elevator
if in
dedicated
to
- ALTITUDE HOLDISEL - FLIGHT PATH ANGLE TO I GO AROUND
. PATH control,
- MANUAL FPA - GLIDE SLOPE
if in
)) Except when VMIN or VMAX becomes )) Controlling speed mode
Go-Around Mode - Engage at 100 ft; Weight, 560,000 lb; Flaps 30; Altitude Loss 31 ft
ALT 2000 1000 n VERT ACCEL 0 5 -5 fthed HDOT -15 50 10 Weec -30 kn 15 THETA 5 -5 deg -CAS
15 GAMMA 5 -5 deg
THROl-lLE 60
40
5 ELEV -5 10.00 20.06 30.00 40.06 50.00 Tlme,sec 60.'0& 70.00 60.00 60.00 -15 deg 100.00
deg
0 0.00
196
January, 1999
Appendix A
- High-Speed-Gl-ide-Slope-Capture-with Flap Extension and V,,,Control

GSE 0.70 0.00 deg eo.70 ALT 2000
-____---_-__-. _-.. _,- --_.--__ .._
.- ---__-_ - .---------
-.--.--I
.__ 0 GAMMA -2 -4 dog 200 CAS 150 100 kn
FLAPP
40 20
Down GEAR UP 6 ELEV 2 o -2 deg
deg THROTTLE
0 55.0 30.0
deg
5.0
Time, set
*..*
+ In speed priority mode, when thrust is at limit, speed commands are executed with limited longitudinal acceleration, so as to maintain preferred part of energy rate for vertical path control
January, I999
Automatic Flight Control Systems Al00
Appendix A
An Example
+ Y ) allowing execution by reducing temporarily by half
speed command climb gradient
by temporary
level off
ALTICAS Modes, Descent with Su bsequeit--Deceleration 1 I

(100% Deceleration Priority) -13 I13 000 1t 10 ooo* CASCMD -i i * - .a.= I; ---~~...~z.x ! : ;.Y.~z,~,T,----------\ \-Descent 1 310 . . . . .,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2ao---C--;--i E.,-_ --2. 1 j I 250 4 0 ftls2 THROTTLE -4 55.0 --_. -C;t...., a**.. . ..* Rate Reduced -------4. u25C to Decelerate 310 CAS IT**0 -kn 50 HDOT 0 -50 It/s 16 000 ALT 000 ~10 000 it
kn VERT ACCEL
6 ELEV 2
deg
5.0
b2
deg
202
1VT/Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
January, 1999
Appendix A
FBW Manual Control Implementation
FPA-Based
Augmented
Manual Mode
&,, Input
Desired y Response
for Constant
Good HQ requires
l
Low response Good damping Coordinated response
lag Ty
y /z
No x. overshoot Good pitch attitude
Time
January, 1999
Appendix A
TECS - FPA Augmented

Effect on 8, E
Manual Mode
a Response
basic TECS
FF command
time
augmentation
gains for desired
Velocity CWS Res-pans-es -to- GM b Column Pull/Push: B747-TECS-. ____ . -. ^._

Flaps 30 Gear Down
I1
:MD
0.10 0.00
1 GAMMA 0 -1 I ---,* 1 p .* I ,,.. ,. . . .. .. *... deg
leg .UMN ICE
-0.10 20 0 i--g.. lb .*,I7 174 170
-I I\,
_-* L-
-----_ ---
T 8 VERT ACCEL 0 -8 6000 5000 4000 II

11/S
CAS
ALT
kn lTTLE
166 80 40
4 ELEV 0 0 -4 12 18 ~~ 24 30 . 36 1, 42 -. 48 .-. -. 54 -----. 60 de3 .---.---
deg
0 6
.-
__-_-
206
January, 1999
Appendix A
Total Heading Control System 12 Architecture and Mode Hierarchv
LRoll Attitude 1-Command

Command Cross Track Velocity Cmd Cross Track Deviation
Generalized Roll Attitud and Yaw Rate Commands Coordinatio I
207
6 Typical AFCS Mode Control Panel Y V. :: Current Generation: 747-400
+I!No apparent grouping and hierarchical ordering of related mode functions :I+: indication of command execution No status
January, 1999
Appendix A
Mode Control
Panel with
:.+ Related functions (.+:Mode & command
grouped together and ordered execution status indicated
Integrated
strategy
Design - Payoff
for manual and automatic guidance cues
++Primary flight display enhancements

l
Thrust / elevator
cmd cues
/VT/Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Authority
January, I999
Appendix A
. Continuity
l
manual - automatic
control
Easier pilot monitoring
of automatic
+ Large cost reductions,

l
lower risk
Faster design cycle, less HW/SW, less
January, I999
Appendix B
Appendix B
Course Evaluation Forms

There are two course evaluation forms in this appendix. Please select the one appropriate for your course of study.
l l
IVT broadcast Self-study video course
If you are taking this course via IVT, then you will probably complete the course questionnaire by using the Viewer Response System keypad that youve been using during the course. Your IVT instructor will provide directions on how to complete the course evaluation.
IVT!Self-Study Video Course Federal Aviation Administration
January, I999
Automatic Flight Control Systems B
Appendix B
IVT COURSE EVALUATION

AIR - Automatic Flight Control Systems
l/27/99
Please give us your candid opinions concerning the training youve just completed. Your evaluation of the IVT course is important to us, and will help us provide the best possible products and services to you. Use your Viewer Response keypad to answer the following questions.
Good 1. Length of course 2. Depth of information 3. Pace of training 4. Clarity of objectives 5. Sequence of content 6. Quality of course materials 7. Quality of graphics/visual aids 8. Readability of text on monitor A A A A A A A A
very
Good B B B B B B B B
Average C C C C C C C C
Poor D D D D D D D D
Very Poor E E E E E E E E
Press the Flag
key to indicate when you are ready to go to the next page.
IVT Course Federal Aviation
Automatic Administration January, 1999
Flight Control
Systems B-l
Appendix B
Good 9. Effectiveness of instructor(s) 10. Communication between student and instructor 11. Applicability to your job of material A A
A
very
Good B
Average C
Poor D
Veq Poor E
B B
C C
D D
E E
12. Overall quality of the course 13. Overall effectiveness of the I VT format
14. Would you like to take other IVT courses? A. YES
B. NO
C. UNDECIDED
15. On the keypad: enter your number of years of FAA experience. (n irmeric answer )
Wlrenjinislretl,
press the Next Quest key on your keypad and answer YES, then Enter.
Additional Comments may be faxed to the IVT Studio:

405-954-0317 / 9507
IVT Course Federal Aviation Administration
January, 1999
Automatic Flight Control Systems B-2
Appendix B
Self-Study Video Course Evaluation AIR - Automatic Flight Control Systems

Original Broadcast Date: l/27/99
Please give us your candid opinions concerning the training youve just completed. Your evaluation of the self-study video course is important to us, and will help us provide the best possible products and services to you. Date(s) You Used the Self-Study Video Course Package: Number of years of FAA experience: (Optional) Name:
For
Office phone: (
the following. please completely darken the circle appropriate to your response. Very Good Good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Average 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Poor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Very PO01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1. Length of course -. ? Depth of information
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3. Pace of training 4. Clarity of objectives 5. Sequence of content 6. Amount of activities/practice 7. Quality of course materials 8. Effectiveness of instructor(s) 9. Overall quality of the course 10. Overall effectiveness of the self-study video format
Self-Study Video Course Federal Aviation Administration
Flight Control
Systems B-3
Appendix B
11. Rate your level of knowledge of the topic before and after taking this self-study course. Very Low BEFORE THE COURSE: 0 AFTER THE C.OURSE: 0 Low 0 0 Moderate 0 0 High 0 0 Very High 0 0
12. What did you like best about the course?
13. What would you improve in the course?
1-t. What pre\,ious experience. if any. have you had with self-study courses? 0 None 0 Moderate 0 Considerable
15. Were you comfortable with the self-study video format? If not. why not?
0 Yes 0 No 0 Undecided
16. Would you like to take other self-study video courses? If not. why not?
0 Yes 0 No 0 Undecided
17. Additional comments:
PLEASE SEND THIS COMPLETED FORM TO YOUR DIRECTORATE/DIVISION TRAINING MANAGER (ATM). THANK YOU.
Self-Study Video Course Federal Aviation Administration Automatic January. I999 Flight Control B-4

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Automatic Control

An Interactive Video Teletraining and Self-Study Course

Federal Aviation Administration

GETTING STARTED How Do I Use This Guide? I.

IVTSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic January. I999

I VT Self-Stud> Course Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic January. I999

Systems Engineering Curriculum I.

Systems Engineering Curriculum

What Does the Curriculum Cover?

The AIR Training

IVT Self-Stud> Course Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic January. 1999

Two-Week Function Course

IVTSelf-Stud!; Course Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic January. 1999

0l.e rliews of Technical Subjects

Advanced Communications Advanced Display Systems/Heads-Up Displays

IVTSelf-Stud! Course Federal Aviation Administration

Advanced Navigation Low Visibility

For mechanical engineers

Crashworthiness and Interior Compliance Doors

0 Icing For both elecrical and mechanical engineers

Core Technical Subjects

System Safety Assessment Reliability & Probability

Systems Engineering Curriculum

IVTSelf-Stud!, Course Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic January. I999

,IVT Course Orientation

IVT Course Orientation

About This IVT Course

IVTSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic January. 1999

IVT Course Orient&ion

IVT Self-Stud>, Course Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic Januar!. I999

IVT Course Orientation

This course is designed for:

Who Is the Instructor?

IVTSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic January. 1999

IVT Course Orient&ion

What Will You Learn?

IVT!Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic January. 1999

IVT Course Orient&ion

How Will This Course Help You On the Job?

At the end of this training session you will:

0 Understand the basic functional architectures of automatic

What Topics Does the Course Cover?

III. IV. V. VI.

IVl Self-Stud> Course Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic January. I999

IVT Course Orient&ion

What Are Some Good References?

IVTSelf-Study Course Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic Januap. I999

I VT Course Orien tution

IVT?Self-Study Course Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic January. I999

Self-Assessment and Exercises

Pre- & PostCourse SelfAssessment Questions

1. 23.. .$ b;:b . l&; 2. :;p G= h $@id 5 .v;. 3. .