The Middle East and Political Islam: A Monster of Our Own Making

Is Islamism still a relevant ideology in Middle Eastern politics? Islam, a monotheistic faith with similar roots to Judeo-Christianity, is the primary religion throughout the Middle East and some African and Asian nations, with two major, distinct forms: Shia and Sunni. Shia Muslims are the minority constituting roughly 15% of the Muslim world. Islamophobic language and rhetoric is one of the last 'acceptable' forms of discrimination in the West and it goes without saying that the current distribution of power in the international system is heavily tilted against the Muslim countries (Ayoob, 2005, p. 958). Despite much rhetoric regarding Muslim Arab's hatred of US/Western freedom, Arab anti-American sentiment is not based on opposition to 'American values' of democracy and freedom. It is fundamentally grounded in particular aspects of American foreign policy (Ayoob, 2005, p. 960). Appreciation of Islamism is fundamental to understanding Middle Eastern politics, and Western policy responses. Islamism is a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition (Denoeux, 2002, p. 61). Most Western discussion of Islamism is inspired by three demonstrably false assumptions: that political Islam is monolithic; that political Islam is inherently violent; and that the intermingling of religion and politics is unique to Islam (Ayoob, 2004, p. 1) and, given this portrayal, is viewed as threatening. Islamism is not a unified movement despite being often presented as highly homogenous (Bayat, 2005, p. 891). There are in fact almost as many varieties of political Islam as there are states that are predominantly Muslim (Ayoob, 2005, p. 955). Although all variants of political Islam draw on the rich intellectual and theological history of Islamic civilisation (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 72) and a common theme of a mythologised 'golden age' of Islam (Ayoob, 2005, p. 952), different groups employ significantly diverse interpretations, aims and methods (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 73). Islamism is highly reactive and responsive to external stimuli and is influenced and informed by various socio-political experiences (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 72). Islamist groups are, as a rule, discrete because political Islam is context-specific and is the result of the interpretation of religious precepts and local culture, including political culture (Ayoob, 2005, p. 953). While Islams's 'golden age' is mythologised only a small minority of activists advocate a 'return' to the early years of Islamic history (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 73) and only a tiny minority of organisations... advocate a return to a supra-national entity (Baxter and Akbarzadeh,

2008, p. 75). These are basically nationalist movements, albeit in Islamic garb, and their primary objective is the creation of independent states (Ayoob, 2005, p. 955). Perhaps most threatening to the West is the concept of jihad which refers to a personal, internal struggle against unbelief, or to a public or communal striving to implement Islamic norms, which could culminate in an armed struggle (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 71). Throughout Islamic history a militarized understanding of the concept of jihad has competed with other, non-militant interpretations (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 71). The physical interpretation of jihad is confronting but modern Islamic scholars largely perceive the spiritual form of jihad as the 'greater' and physical, militant jihad as 'lesser' (Sadiki, 1995) and it is understood, outside of the Western media at least, that mainstream Islamist movements are reformist rather than radical in nature (Ayoob, 2005, p. 954). It is also that in it's revolutionary stages...liberalism was no less violent than other ideologies (Adamson, 2005, p. 551), including Islamism, and, according to some, what is most notable about Islamists is their prominent role in civil society organizations which mark them as examples of, or agents for, liberalization (Berman, 2003, p. 257). Alongside such claims lies the argument of academics such as Chomsky who claims that the only real difference between the terrorism of groups such as Islamist extremists and the counterterrorism undertaken by the US and other governments is the nature of Western hegemony, simply put: by standard Western rhetoric only the powerful can be victims of 'terrorism' and identical actions by the powerful are invariably called something else (Chomsky, 2004). The Islamist movement emerged around the mid-twentieth century as a response to the trauma of colonialism and Western intervention and a sense of disenfranchisement in the face of repressive authoritarian regimes and the failure of secular, nationalist movements. The Muslim Brotherhood, pivotal in the development of Islamism, was an organisation founded in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna, in 1928. The organisation was not initially established as a force for radical change but was an apolitical organisation for evolutionary change, primarily through preaching and education (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 73). As the organisation grew its doctrine was often interpreted, or utilized, as a challenge to the ruling elite and splinter factions... increasingly understood the role of the organization as a political one (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 73). A trend which grew in strength after the state assassination of al-Banna in 1949. Modern Islamist thought, pioneered by thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb, of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini during the 'revival' period between the 1950's and 1970's, drew on pre-existing traditions of Islamic political thought and adapted the doctrines of their faith to form the

basis of revolutionary socio-political movements (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 73). Qutb emphasised the universality of Islam (Khatab, 2004) and produced several important texts, including Milestones (2001). Why Islamism has become such a powerful political force, particularly in the Middle East, can be explained only through an understanding of the region's history. Bayat claims that Islamism can be viewed as a search for certainty in this uncertain world (2005, p. 894) and according to some scholars it has become the primary vehicle and vocabulary of most political discourse throughout the Muslim world (Fuller, 2002, p. 50). While this may not be entirely accurate, it has certainly become the primary 'vehicle and vocabulary' of political dissent in the Muslim world. The influence of the traumatic history of Western colonialism, and continued Western intervention, cannot be overplayed as it has created a serious rupture in the political development of the region (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 72). At the core of the Islamist movement is a sense of reactive pride (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 72). It is perhaps more important to understand what Islamism seeks to confront, than what it aims to achieve: at it's heart is a rejection of foreign interference in Arab/Muslim affairs (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 76). Alongside the rejection of foreign intervention sits the failings and corruption of secular nationalist Arab governments and the authoritarian regional regimes, many of which enjoyed US support (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 70). Throughout the Middle East, regimes failed to modernise and absorb the growing ranks of the new middle-class and a generation of university graduates, attempting to climb the socio-economic ladder, discovered that the ruling elite had no interest in sharing the spoils of power (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 76). For these disillusioned, educated middleclass, political Islam represented a safe form of political rebellion because not even the most repressive state can fully suppress opposition expressed through religious idiom (Ayoob, 2005, p. 956). In the mid and late twentieth century, the growth in Islamism was more about poverty and the absence of opportunity for growth and societal change (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 76) than anything else. In this way, concepts such as secularisation, and capitalism came to be seen as failed ideologies, inappropriate for the Middle East, or as part and parcel of Western interventionism. The major powers and their policies are perceived by most Muslims as being... deliberately anti-Muslim (Ayoob, 2005, p. 959). Western powers, and specifically the US, have used high-minded language of secularisation and democracy whilst propping up US-friendly dictators against popular revolution. This practise, with its roots in the bipolar logic of the Cold War (when the US saw combating the rise

of socialism as the ultimate goal) has persisted for fear of political Islam, although economic concerns over access to oil cannot be ignored. The result has been increasing anti-American sentiment and the repeated failure of Arab attempts at self-determination which has further entrenched Islamism and opened the door to increasingly extremist Islamist groups. It is claimed that in nations harbouring terrorists groups the nature of the political regime, as well as the social and economic situation... may generate conditions favourable to the genesis of radicalism, thus stimulating terrorism (Bravo, 2006, p. 331). The Arab-Israel war of 1967, and Israel's overwhelming victory, also proved a catalyst for widespread disillusionment with the secular-nationalist promises of prosperity as simultaneously the embrace of secular norms by ruling elites was seen as evidence of a Western conspiracy against Islam (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 75). In this light the rise of Islamism was viewed as the panacea to the decline of the region in the face of Western intervention (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 75). Some Islamist groups' success can be partially attributed to the fact that, during political upheaval, organisations with pre-existing power structures and rules provide the easiest and stablest power base. In the chaos and horror of revolution/civil war it is the 'simple' and established ideology of Islam which has the best chance of forming a stable new power arrangement. Islamist groups often capitalise on this position by establishing charitable networks affiliated to, or set up as front organizations for the political group (Ayoob, 2005, p. 957). This simultaneously bolsters their religious credentials, provides great staying power in the face of repressive regimes, and significantly increases their popularity in the eyes of the populace (Ayoob, 2005, p. 957-958). In the wake of the Arab-Israel war, seeds of the first modern Islamic state were already germinating in unexpected quarters. The Iranian people were en route to embracing democracy and, in 1951, a popular government under the power of Mossedeq was elected. Mossedeq, an ardent nationalist, moved to nationalise Iran's oil industry and remove Western economic influence. This move was unacceptable to the US and UK as a lucrative supply of oil was jeopardised and, under Cold War logic, Mossedeq's government was threateningly 'socialist'. In response, the US and UK backed a military coup, harnessed local Nazis and Muslim terrorists and employed assassinations to destabilise and overthrow the elected government and reinstall the pro-US Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty as King of Iran (Abrahamian, 2001). The 1953 coup quickly became a symbol of the sort of direct foreign intervention which had oppressed the Arab world for so long. It was a blatant violation of Iranian national sovereignty, carried out to protect the economic and political interests of the United States

and United Kingdom (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 77). Subsequent decades saw Washington supporting the authoritarian Pahlavi regime while rationalizing or ignoring the tremendous popular disaffection (Makdisi, 2002, p. 548). The Shah introduced a series of repressive measures, including the 'White Revolution' a top-down policy of aggressive secularization (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 79) and crushed dissent through the slaughter of thousands involved in public protests. Despite attempts to crush dissent the Shah's hold on power was crumbling as he was viewed as a US puppet and, in the fiercely nationalist Iranian populace discontent was seething (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 79). The Shah had unintentionally, through ruthless suppression of all opposition, opened up a political vacuum in which Islamist groups could thrive (Ayoob, 2005, p. 957). Ayatollah Khomeini, an exiled cleric, was able to harness the popular discontent against the Pahlavi regime and it's US backers and emerged as an embodiment of a new future (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 80). With a charismatic figurehead, popular discontent soon became revolution and in February 1979 the regime was replaced. The heady mix of religious fervour and nationalism that led to the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran remains the most famous and enduring product of the movement known as political Islam (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 70). The emergence of this first modern Islamic state spread hope to the region's young Muslims and severely damaged international perceptions of US power, their financially and militarily backed, and much lauded, 'puppet' regime had been crushed by a local Islamic uprising, an uprising which was viewed as an indigenous response to external involvement (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 80). The US was caught with it's pants down, having believed the Pahlavi regime's assurances that it had the population under control and, as Khomeini swept into power, a large and sophisticated stockpile of US-supplied technology and weaponry came under the control of a government headed by a virulently anti-American, Islamic cleric. America is the number-one enemy of the deprived and oppressed people of the world... It exploits the oppressed people of the world... as if it alone... had the right to live in the world (Khomeini, 1985, pp. 304-305). Despite Western, and particularly US, fears to the contrary, the Islamic revolution in Iran never represented the beginning of a wave of Islamic uprisings. This was primarily because the revolution was specifically Shia in nature and this meant that it was not easily exportable to the wider Middle East where the Shia population represents a minority group. Although the hope engendered by the realisation of self-determination through Islamism certainly was exportable (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 82).

Khomeini's Islamicisation of society gained momentum and Iranian women who had taken the veil as a rebellious statement against an authoritarian ruler and forced secularisation found themselves legally bound to wear it (Afary and Anderson, 2005, p. 113). As Khomeini pushed to maintain societal and cultural control the idealism of the revolution appeared to give way (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 83) and vigilance against Western influence became aggressive purging of all non-Islamic elements. Despite these issues the Islamic Republic of Iran has proved it has staying power and has maintained relative stability in a region where stability is almost impossible. This makes the nation all the more threatening to Western powers: an Islamic state, formed by the indigenous revolutionary overthrow of a US backed regime cannot be seen to be succeeding in providing stability in a region where US policy has repeatedly failed. Iran was named by the US as part of the 'axis of evil' in the anti-Muslim, anti-Arab rhetoric which followed the 9/11 bombing of the World Trade Centre. The US seemed to unquestionably subscribe to the idea that we are entering a time when The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics (Huntington, 1992, p. 22). The 2003 US invasion of Iraq only served to worsen the socio-political situation of the region as the horror of the 'shock and awe' invasion and the resulting civil war and bloodshed meant that Arab autocrats could point to it as a cautionary tale of the folly of unseating even the worst despots (Ajami, 2012, p. 2/8) and it soon became clear that clerics were filling the power vacuum created by the war (Rosen, 2006, p. 7). Chomsky claims that according to Iraqis, there is hope for national reconciliation if the invaders, who are responsible for the internal violence, withdraw and leave Iraq to Iraqis (Chomsky, 2010, p. 130). Despite the disaster that was the Iraqi war, the US followed quickly with an invasion of Afghanistan, the true base of those responsible for 9/11: the Al-Qaeda and their charismatic leader Osama binLaden. Like much of the region's troubles, Afghanistan's socio-political mess was a direct result of previous US involvement. An American-backed a 'jihad' against Soviet Afghanistan, during the Cold War, resulted in the collapse of the Afghan state and descent into bloody civil war which left a political vacuum into which the Taliban stepped,. This new political environment provided fertile ground for... Islamist radicals... and subsequently for the emergence of Al-Qaeda, whose leaders, including Osama bin Laden, were once favourites of the CIA (Ayoob, 2005, p. 954). 2011's 'Arab Spring' fundamentally changed the face of the Middle East and will forever be remembered as the year a rhythmic chant echoed across Arab lands: 'The people want to topple the regime' (Ajami, 2012, p. 56). A series of revolutions seemed to spontaneously sweep the Middle East

and invariably Islamism played a role, whether quietly through charitable work and political rhetoric or through direct, violent action. What the end result of the Arab Spring will be, and who will be in power once the region begins to settle is still very much an open question but, should regimes decisively be toppled, Islamist groups will surely hold at least some share of the power. The important question is: will the appeal of Islam continue in the Middle East or will it recede if Arab nationalism and democracy were to begin to flourish? As long as authoritarian and repressive regimes continue to rule Muslim countries, Islamism as an ideology and a political movement will continue to thrive within those countries (Ayoob, 2005, p. 958). The Western powers seem to believe that they are faced with a dichotomous and mutually exclusive choice in the Middle East, either they support neoauthoritarian regimes... or face anti-Western Islamic regimes (Jourde, 2007, p. 483). It is clear that Islamophobia and Western intervention only put fuel on the fire and further empower the tiny minority of violent, extremist Islamist groups because when and where the sense of impotence becomes very acute, it provides extremist elements with the opportunity to exploit the prevailing climate of despair (Ayoob, 2005, p. 960). The West's choice is either to live up to their own rhetoric and truly encourage democracy in the Middle East, in full knowledge that it could conceivably result in power residing with radical Islamist groups, or, the Middle East will have to be contained, with continually increasing difficulty, forever. Our hope must be that, like in all cultures and societies before, democracy naturally leads to secularisation and that power tends to be held by centrists. The only chance of radical Islamism's power being broken is an end to actions which fuel anti-Westernism. When Islamism is understood as primarily a reaction to Western intervention then, in light of the US invasion of Iraq and ongoing military involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan, political Islam can be seen to be as relevant today as ever before. The Islamic political cat is well and truly out of the bag and, far from placating it, continued Western intervention will only enrage it further.

Bibliography ABRAHAMIAN, E. 2001. The 1953 coup in Iran. Science & Society, 65, 182. ADAMSON, F. B. 2005. Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics1. International studies review, 7, 547. AFARY, J. & ANDERSON, K. B. 2005. Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism, University of Chicago Press. AJAMI, F. 2012. Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously, The. Foreign Affairs, 91, 56. AYOOB, M. 2004. Political Islam: image and reality. World policy journal, 21, 1. AYOOB, M. 2005. The future of political Islam: the importance of external variables. International affairs, 81, 951. BAXTER, K. & AKBARZADEH, S. 2008. US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roots of AntiAmericanism, Oxon, Routledge. BAYAT, A. 2005. Islamism and social movement theory. Third world quarterly, 26, 891. BERMAN, S. 2003. Islamism, revolution, and civil society. Perspectives on politics, 1, 257. BRAVO, A. B. S. 2006. An empirical analysis of terrorism: Deprivation, Islamism and geopolitical factors. Defence and peace economics, 17, 329. CHOMSKY, N. 2004. Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance, Penguin Adult. CHOMSKY, N. 2010. Hopes and Prospects, Penguin Adult. DENOEUX, G. 2002. The forgotten swamp: navigating political Islam. Middle East policy, 9, 56. FULLER, G. E. 2002. Future of Political Islam, The. Foreign Affairs, 81, 48. HUNTINGTON, S. P. 1992. Clash of Civilizations, The. Foreign Affairs, 72, 22. JOURDE, C. 2007. The international relations of small neoauthoritarian states: Islamism, warlordism, and the framing of stability. International studies quarterly, 51, 481. KHOMEINI, R. 1985. Islam & Revolution: Writings and Declarations, London, Mizan Press. MAKDISI, U. 2002. Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: An Interpretation of a Brief History. The Journal of American history, 89, 538. ROSEN, N. 2006. Anatomy of a Civil War. Boston review, 31, 7. SADIKI, L. 1995. Al-La Nidam: An Arab View of New world (Dis) order. Arab studies quarterly, 17, 1.