WILLIAMSONS CHAIN REACTION ARGUMENT FOR E=K

Williamsons Chain Reaction Argument for E=K

E.J. COFFMAN In chapter 9 of Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson presents the following argument in support of the thesis that all and only knowledge is evidence (E=K): If evidence required only justified true belief, or some other good cognitive status short of knowledge, then a critical mass of evidence could set off a kind of chain reaction. Our known evidence justifies belief in various true hypotheses; they would count as evidence too, so this larger evidence set would justify belief in still more true hypotheses, which would in turn count as further evidence . The result would be very different from our present conception of evidence. (Williamson 2000: 201 [my emphasis]) Call this the Chain Reaction Argument (CRA). Before we can assess this argument, we have to answer this question: How should we understand that italicized sentence? Two readings present themselves: a reading that involves doxastic justificationa relation expressed by locutions like S has a justified belief that P, and a reading that involves propositional justificationa relation expressed by locutions like P is justified for S. Here are the two readings of the sentence in question: Doxastic Justification Reading (DJR): Your simply having some known evidence suffices for your justifiedly believing various true propositions that are supported by that evidence. Propositional Justification Reading (PJR): Your simply having some known evidence makes various true propositions justified for you. Charity demands that we attribute PJR to Williamson, not DJR. According to DJR, your simply having some known evidence suffices for your justifiedly believing various true propositions (truths) that your known evidence supports. But it seems possible that you have some known evidence such that you dont (yet) justifiedly believe any of the truths supported by that evidence.

WILLIAMSONS CHAIN REACTION ARGUMENT FOR E=K

Perhaps you havent yet come to believe any of the indicated truths. Or perhaps you believe some of those truths, but none of those beliefs is based on your evidence for itand so, none of the beliefs is justified. In light of these (and other) possibilities, DJR is implausible. On the other hand, PJR says that your simply having some known evidence suffices for your having justification to believe various truths supported by that evidence. Unlike DJR, PJR is quite plausible. Given PJRs plausibility and DJRs implausibility, charity demands that we interpret the italicized sentence as PJR. So, we can restate the CRA as follows: If justified true belief (JTB) suffices for evidence, then every truth Ss knowledge justifies for her is part of Ss evidence. But its possible that truths Ss knowledge justifies for her are not (yet) part of her evidence. So, JTB doesnt suffice for evidence. Further, for every other good cognitive status short of knowledge, theres a parallel argument to the conclusion that the status in question doesnt suffice for evidence. So, all evidence is knowledge. Couple that last claim with the thesis that all knowledge is evidence (which I grant), and E=K follows. This argument fails, and for a reason weve already noted. Weve noted that you might not believe every true proposition that your knowledge makes justified for you. (To illustrate: Sara knows that zebras dont wear anything in the wild; this bit of knowledge justifies Sara in believing Zebras dont wear armor in the wild; but it may well be that Sara hasnt [yet] formed a belief in the true armor propositionthough shes probably disposed to believe it [cf. Audi 1994].) So, given the CRAs first premiseviz., that JTBs sufficiency for evidence entails that every truth justified by your knowledge is part of your evidence, JTBs sufficiency for evidence entails that a true proposition you dont believe may nevertheless be part of your evidence. Notice, however, that JTBs sufficiency for evidence is clearly compatible with (say) the view that only justified true beliefs constitute evidenceand so, that evidence requires belief. So, pace CRAs first premise, JTBs sufficiency for evidence is clearly compatible with the view that evidence requires belief. Thus, the CRAs first premise is false. Upshot: E=K receives whatever support it may have from other arguments that have been offered for it.

WILLIAMSONS CHAIN REACTION ARGUMENT FOR E=K

801 McClung Tower Department of Philosophy University of Tennessee Knoxville, TN 37996 USA ecoffma1@utk.edu

References Audi, R. Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe. Nous 28: 419-434. Williamson, T. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.