Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning There are two main current theories on moral reasoning Kohlbergs cognitive developmental

l theory of moral development and Gilligans moral orientation theory. Gilligans theory of moral orientation asserts that females and males speak in different moral voices. The care-orientation of moral reasoning focuses on maintaining relationships, responsibility to not cause hurt and responds to the needs of others. This type of moral orientation is associated with females. For males, they are more likely to adopt the justice orientation which is concerned with principles of fairness and equality such as those assessed in conventional measures of moral reasoning (Gilligan, 1982). Gilligans theory of moral reasoning stemmed from Kohlbergs cognitive developmental stage theory of moral development. He based his theory upon research and interviews with groups of young children. A series of moral dilemmas were presented and children were interviewed to determine the reasoning behind their judgements of each scenario. One of the scenarios Kohlberg presented is the Heinz steals the drug. Kohlberg was not really interested in whether Heinz was right or wrong in stealing the drug under the circumstances mentioned in the scenario but in the reasoning that children used to arrive to a decision. Responses were then classified into various stages of reasoning in his theory of moral development. Kohlberg formed 6 stages grouped into three levels, where each level represented a qualitative advance into the individuals abilities to understand and integrate diverse points of view (Kohlberg, 1976) Level 1 pre-conventional morality Stage 1: obedience and punishment Stage 2: individualism and exchange Level 2 conventional morality Stage 3: interpersonal relationships (living up to social expectations and roles) Stage 4: maintaining social order (consider society as a whole when making judgements) Level 3 post-conventional morality Stage 5: social contract and individual rights Stage 6: universal principles Criticisms of Kohlbergs theory of Moral Development Does moral reasoning necessarily lead to moral behaviour? Kohlbergs theory used moral judgement interviews (MJI) which only reveals moral thinking, and there is a big difference in what we ought to do versus our actual actions. Is justice the only aspect of moral reasoning that should be considered? Gilligan (1977) pointed out that Kohlbergs theory of moral development focuses on the concept of justice when making moral choices and has neglected to recognise that there is a distinctively female mode of moral reasoning i.e. one that is characterised by compassion, desire to maintain relationships and interpersonal feelings. Lastly, there theory overemphasises Western philosophy in which individualistic cultures emphasises on personal rights while Eastern collectivist cultures emphasise on the community.

Unlike Kohlbergs moral stages, the care and justice orientations in Gilligans theory do not represent cognitive structures that develop in a stage-like sequence. Instead they provide a framework which can be modified by experiences and through which the individuals interpret and resolve moral problems. The origins of Gilligans theory Rooted in early childhood experiences of attachment and inequality fosters respectively a relational and individualistic self-concept. So the reason that males and females come to use one mode of moral reasoning over the other is that these experiences of attachment and inequality are differentially reinforced in a society dichotomised by gender. Based on Chodorows (1978) gender identity development theory, Gilligan proposed that because women are the primary care-takers in most cultures, their self-concept is based on being similar and connected to their mothers whereas boys self-concept is rooted in their differences and separation from their mothers. Moreover, boys tend to identify with their fathers who may be perceived as authoritative figures and who holds power over them. Thus the experience of attachment and connection is more salient to girls whereas the experiences of inequality and separation are more salient to boys.

Empirical Evidence for Moral Orientation Gilligans theory of moral orientation is largely untested compared to Kohlbergs theory of moral development (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). Because emotional closeness between fathers and their children was not studied it is impossible to determine whether the nature of childrens relationship with their fathers differs from their relationships with their mothers. Also, there is no evidence that girls receives more care-orientation interventions or that boys received more justice-orientated interventions from either parent. Thus it was concluded that boys and girls were not being socialised differently in this respect. This argument however cited a social learning explanation for the development of gender differences in moral reasoning, whereas Gilligan posited a neo-psychoanalytical account in which the origin of gender differences in moral reasoning lies in the childs sense of identification with each parent. Similar to Kohlberg, Gilligans theory of moral orientation was also measured by using an interview technique. For example, the Fable Interview (Johnston, 1988) had children respond to dilemmas embedded within two Aesop fables. Johnston (1988) had a sample of sixty 11and 15- year olds where they were to find a solution to each fable this was considered as the spontaneous solutions. They were then asked to consider an alternative solution to the dilemma. The advantage of the Fable Interview is that comparisons can be made between individuals because they all are responding to the same dilemmas. Results found that in the initial solution, 54 out of 60 either framed the fable-related dilemma as either problems of justice (i.e. rights) or response to needs (care-orientation). When considering an alternative solution, almost all of the children switched to the alternative orientation. So it seems children are well capable of using both moral orientations however in respect to the initial solutions, we can say they have a certain preference for a particular mode of moral orientation.

This is further supported by Gilligan and Attancucci (1988) who found that when reasoning arbour real life moral dilemmas, mens moral reasoning is justice orientated often involving abstract reasoning; womens moral reasoning is based on care-orientation where they focus on empathy and care in personal relationships. These preferences may occur on a subconscious level. Criticisms of the Moral Orientation Construct Validity: Firstly, a cross check to determine the accuracy and validity of assessing moral orientation by the fable method compared with the real-life dilemma method has not yet been carried out. Gilligan has been assumed of over-simplifying Kohlbergs moral reasoning in her description of the justice orientation (Pula, 1991) Critics have agreed that the justice orientation comes closest to the rigid law-andorder reasoning of Kohlbergs stage 4, therefore one might argue whether there is a need for a care-orientated mode of moral reasoning. For example, Colby et al (1983) showed that considerations of care, relationships and interpersonal trust are represented as norms and elements of each stage of the moral judgement interview scoring scheme, and various researchers have demonstrated that core-orientation reasoning can be elicited by MJI dilemmas (Walker et al, 1987; Wark & Kreb, 1996). Gilligan also ignores the contention that justice and rights exist in the context of social responsibilities and obligations. Thus at the higher stages of moral reasoning individuals follows rules only if those rules benefit the common good (Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 1983). Critics argued that too little work has been done to validate the existence of Gilligans justice orientations other than to demonstrate that these modes of moral reasoning are present in individual responses to moral dilemmas (Walker, 1989). Consequently it is not clear whether moral orientations are used consistently across situations and over time or how moral orientations relate to each other to moral behaviour.

Intra-individual consistency Gilligans assertion that most individuals prefer one mode of moral orientation over the other implies higher levels of intra-individuals consistency in their use. Indeed Gilligan and Attancucci (1988) reported two-thirds of participants focused only on one orientation in their discussion of a self-generated moral dilemma. Langdale (1986) demonstrated that within a single dilemma, 87% of participants used a single moral orientation and that the number of individuals with a predominant justice or care orientation was greater than chance. Also, the number of individuals that showed a predominant justice or care orientation across different moral dilemmas was significantly greater than chance Criticisms Critic researchers have been unable to replicate these findings (Krebs et al, 1994) For example, Wark and Krebs (1996) reported 9% of their college-age related sample obtained the same moral orientation score across 3 types of dilemmas and only 29% obtained the same or an adjacent score.

Consistency would only be achieved if individuals used the same orientation 75% of the time or more. Less than 20% of participants met this consistency criterion across self-generated and hypothesised dilemmas (Warks & Krebs, 1987). Also, individuals at the highest stage of moral reasoning are more likely to use both are and justice reasoning in their response to moral dilemmas.

There are mixed evidence regarding the extent to which moral orientation are used consistently. Walker (1989) followed children and adults over a two year interval and found that half the respondents showed a different moral orientation at the following compared to their initial interview before the follow up. In summary, there is little evidence to support the notion that individuals use a particular mode of moral orientation consistently over time and situations. Gender Differences in Kohlbergs Theory of Moral Development Gilligans claim that the MJI is gender biased has been convincingly debunked. Critical reviews of moral development literature have failed to find evidence that Kohlberg-based measured yield gender differences in moral reasoning scores. Instead, these reviews have found little to non-existent gender differences in moral reasoning (Rest, 1979; Thomas, 1986). Colby and Damon (1983) pointed out that Kohlbergs model has now been validated on a sample of males and females. They found that females passed through the same stages in the same order as males (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Lieberman, 1983). When occupation and education were controlled, gender difference in moral reasoning levels disappeared thus Gilligans allegations that Kohlbergs theory is gender biased is unwarranted. The research used above demonstrates that there are minimal gender differences in the justice reasoning stage, but does not answer whether there are gender differences in the use of justice orientation. Research on gender differences in moral orientation is less conclusive. Most researchers acknowledge that more than one mode of moral reasoning exists (Kohlberg et al, 1983). Many researchers have found evidence that gender differences in moral orientation are moderated by other variables e.g. dilemma content and social class. Jaffee and Hyde (2000) found support for a small gender difference in moral orientation, with more males marginally using justice moral orientation (d= .19) and females using careorientation (d= .28). Their limitation was that they were only able to determine relative gender differences in the use of care and justice moral orientations and not whether females predominantly used care reasoning or that males predominantly used justice reasoning. It is entirely possible that all with participants used a mixture of both types of orientation with females using relatively more care reasoning than makes and males using relatively more justice reasoning than females. It is also possible that gender differences in justice and care moral orientations are merely reflecting gender role identity although most studies fail to find significant differences in moral reasoning as a functioning of gender role identity (Hagar, 1990).

Their meta-analyses however, also revealed that a number of specific moderator variables were able to uniquely account for variation found in moral reasoning. Their analysis also established that differences in moral orientation was dependent on age, socio-economic status, the way in which moral orientation was operationalised, variations in coding schemes, the gender of the protagonist in the dilemma and the CONTENT of the dilemma. It suggests that moral reasoning is largely context-dependent. Ryan, Daniels and Reynolds (2004) suggested that gender differences in moral reasoning are due to differences in self-concept, with women feeling connected to others and using a care approach whereas men feel separate from others and so adopt justice-approach. Using selfcategorisation analysis, their research found evidence to show that the way people approach moral reasoning is dependent on the nature of the self-other relationship (i.e. social distance between the self and others in the given situation) and not gender. They argued that if the individual is interacting with a friend then they are more likely to foster a sense of connection and therefore use a moral reasoning based on care. If the individual interacts with a stranger then they are likely to feel socially distant towards them (i.e. separate) and therefore use a moral reasoning based on principles of justice. More importantly, in contrast to past findings, their results found that gender was not significant predictor of social distance and moral orientation. Although the data showed a trend where women used a greater level of familiarity in an unspecified situations and responded with more care, the differences however was not significant. They hypothesised that in the absence of information about the identity of the other, i.e. selfother relationship was ambiguous the individual may look to their own identity thereby making the situation gender salient, to determine behaviour however results showed that participants did not look clearly towards gender and norms and stereotypes. In their second study (in the same research, they varied the nature of the self-other relationship by manipulating the individuals own sense of identity while keeping the identity of the other constant (opposite to what they did in study one). They found that gender differences in moral orientation were apparent when gender was explicitly made salient. Thus it was the salience of gender and gender-related norms, NOT gender per se that lead to differences between men and women.