Religious Freedom Jurisprudence

I. Local Jurisprudence

Register of Deeds vs. Ung Si Su Temple

Facts: The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed of donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2, block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in favor of the unregistered religious organization UngSiu Si Temple, operating through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the latter and its trustees. The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consulta to the IVth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court upheld the action of the Rizal Register of Deeds, stating that this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of the provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said

Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should not be admitted for registration." (Printed Rec. App. pp. 17-18).

Counsel for the done UySiu Si Temple appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows: "SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or denomination, whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name of other country, or not incorporated at all, to hold land in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitable institutions. "SECTION. 2.Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the name of three Trustees for the use of such associations; . . ." (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.)

and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates Article III, Section 1 (7) or the freedom of religion clause of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission Whether or not the refusal of the Register of Deeds to accept the Deed of Donation violates Article III, Section 1 (7) of the Constitution Held: In view of the absolute terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution, the provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith. In providing that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines", The Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. Neither is there any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII, restricting the acquisition of public agricultural lands and other natural resources to "corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens" (of the Philippines).

The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos, and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens. As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are by no means convinced (nor has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or worship; or that one may not worship the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in fee simple. The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc., herein represented by Prof. Abdulrafih H. Sayedy, petitioner, vs. Office of the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President of the Philippines, herein represented by Hon. Alberto G. Romulo, Executive Secretary, and the Office on Muslim Affairs, herein represented by its Executive Director, Habib Mujahab Hashim, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development License No. SB-01-085, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. Petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection

thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office under Patent No. 4-2000-03664. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109. As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it. A petition for prohibition was filed by petitioner praying for the declaration of nullity of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001 and the prohibition of herein respondents Office of the Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) from implementing the subject EO. Issue:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 46 violates Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution on the separation of Church and State Whether or not subject EO violates Sections 15 and 16 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution Whether or not respondents violated Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

Held: OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions." OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to

believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. To justify EO 46's intrusion into the subject religious activity, the Solicitor General argues that the freedom of religion is subservient to the police power of the State. By delegating to OMA the authority to issue halal certifications, the government allegedly seeks to protect and promote the muslim Filipinos' right to health, and to instill health consciousness in them. In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market

are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of muslims. Section 48(4) of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives to the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) of the Department of Agriculture (DOA) the power to inspect slaughtered animals intended for human consumption to ensure the safety of the meat released in the market. Another law, RA 7394, otherwise known as "The Consumer Act of 1992," gives to certain government departments the duty to protect the interests of the consumer, promote his general welfare and to establish standards of conduct for business and industry. To this end, a food product, before its distribution to the market, is required to secure the Philippine Standard Certification Mark after the concerned department inspects and certifies its compliance with quality and safety standards. One such government agency designated by RA 7394 is the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFD) of the Department of Health (DOH). Under Article 22 of said law, BFD has the duty to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations fixing and establishing a reasonable definition and standard of identity, a standard of quality and a standard of fill of containers for food. The BFD also ensures that food products released in the market are not adulterated. Furthermore, under Article 48 of RA 7394, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is tasked to protect the consumer against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales acts or practices as defined in Article 50. DTI also enforces compulsory labeling and fair

packaging to enable the consumer to obtain accurate information as to the nature, quality and quantity of the contents of consumer products and to facilitate his comparison of the value of such products. With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health of muslim and non-muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. Of great help are the provisions on labeling of food products (Articles 74 to 85) of RA 7394. In fact, through these labeling provisions, the State ably informs the consuming public of the contents of food products released in the market. Stiff sanctions are imposed on violators of said labeling requirements. Through the laws on food safety and quality, therefore, the State indirectly aids muslim consumers in differentiating food from non-food products. The NMIC guarantees that the meat sold in the market has been thoroughly inspected and fit for consumption. Meanwhile, BFD ensures that food products are properly categorized and have passed safety and quality standards. Then, through the labeling provisions enforced by the DTI, Muslim consumers are adequately apprised of the products that contain substances or ingredients that, according to their Islamic beliefs, are not fit for human intake. These are the non-secular steps put in place by the State to ensure that the muslim consumers' right to health is protected. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit for muslim consumption.

We do not share respondents' apprehension that the absence of a central administrative body to regulate halal certifications might give rise to schemers who, for profit, will issue certifications for products that are not actually halal. Aside from the fact that muslim consumers can actually verify through the labels whether a product contains non-food substances, we believe that they are discerning enough to know who the reliable and competent certifying organizations in their community are. Before purchasing a product, they can easily avert this perceived evil by a diligent inquiry on the reliability of the concerned certifying organization. Wherefore, the petition is granted. Executive Order 46, s.2011 is hereby declared null and void. Consequently, respondents are prohibited from enforcing the same.

Gil Balbuna, et al., petitioners and appellants, vs. The Honorable Secretary of Education, et al., respondents and appellees

Facts: The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act No. 1265. Petitioners appellants assail the validity of the above Department Order, for it allegedly denies them freedom of worship and of speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights; that it denies them due process of law and equal protection of the laws; and that it unduly restricts their rights in the upbringing of their children. Since the brief for the petitioners-appellants assails Republic Act No. 1265 only as construed and applied, the issue ultimately boils down to the validity of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, which promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of the law.

Issue: Whether or not Department Order No. 8 has no binding force and effect, not having been published in the Official Gazette as allegedly required by Commonwealth Act 638, Article 2 of the New Civil Code, and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code Whether or not Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void for being an undue delegation of police power

Held: In relation to Article 2 of the New Civil Code and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code, statutes or laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. It is likewise true that administrative rules and regulations, issued to implement a law, have the force of law. Nevertheless, the cases cited above involved circulars of the Central Bank which provided for penalties for violations thereof and that was the primary factor that influenced the rationale of those decisions. In the case at bar, Department Order No. 8 does not provide any penalty against those pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag ceremony or otherwise violating the provisions of said order. Their expulsion was merely the consequence of their failure to observe school discipline which the school authorities are bound to maintain. As observed in Gerona vs .Secretary of Education, supra, ". . . for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute, they were not being prosecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. . . . Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

Finally, appellants contend that Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void for being an undue delegation of legislative power, "for its failure to lay down any specific and definite standard by which the Secretary of Education may be guided in the preparation of those rules and regulations which he has been authorized to promulgate." With this view we again disagree. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act read as follows: "Section 1.All educational institutions shall henceforth, observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include and playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem. "Section 2.The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provided." In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem specially when contrasted with other standards heretofore upheld by the Courts: "public interest" (People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328): "public welfare" (Municipality of Cardona vs. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547); "interest of law and order" (Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil., 669; justice and equity and the substantial merits of the case" (Int. Hardwood vs. Pagil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602); or "adequate and efficient instruction" (P.A.C.U. vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil., 806; 51 Off. Gaz., 6230). That the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of

standards and policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency. To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.

Iglesia ni Cristo, complainant vs. Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella, Court of First Instance of Abra, respondent.

Facts: Respondent judge was charged with ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench for including in a decision penned by him, statements offensive to the members of the Iglesiani Cristo sect to wit: ". . . It cannot, therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge was retorted to as a gimmick of showing to the community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in general that the Iglesia ni Cristo inhesitatingly helps its members of his/her problem."

In his comment, respondent judge alleged that such statements complained of are his honest appraisal and evaluation of the evidence presented. Issue: Whether or not respondent judges remarks about the Iglesia ni Cristo were offensive Held: Under the freedom of religion guarantee, no one, much less a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of edherents of a religious sect in a derogatory sense.

Respondent judge was admonished to be much more careful in the use of language likely to offend an individual or religious sect.

Gregorio Aglipay, petitioner, vs. Juan Ruiz, respondent.

Facts: In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty- third International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. Said stamps were issued and sold, but a great part remained unsold. Petitioner seeks the issuance from the Supreme Court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

Issue: Whether or not the action of respondent in issuing and selling said stamps is a violation of the provisions of Article VI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution

Held: Respondent issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view. Instead, it gave the Director of Posts

discretionary power to determine if issuance would be advantageous to the government. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Church. What was emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress, but the City of Manila, the capital of the Philippines. Main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not completed.

Martin Centeno, petitioner, vs. Hon. Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and the People of The Philippines, respondents.

Facts: Sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ngTikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This was denied by the trial court, and petitioner's motion for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued.

Issue: Whether or not the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest sense so as to include religious solicitation Held: Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in this case, considering that solicitations intended for religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree no. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable.

American Bible Society, plaintiff-appellant, vs. City of Manila, defendant-appellee. Facts: American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898, with its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral in said City. The defendant-appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A). Issue:

Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid

Held: It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

Fernando Ignacio and Simeon De La Cruz, petitioners-appellants, vs. The Honorable Norbeto Ela, Mayor of Sta. Zambales, respondent-appellee. Facts: Petitioners are members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, commonly known as Jehovah's Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to those professed by the Catholic organization. In its publication "FACE THE FACTS", that society branded the latter as a religious organization which is "a part of the monstrosity now appearing in and claiming the right to rule the earth." Desiring to hold a meeting in furtherance of its objectives, petitioners asked respondent to give them permission to use the public plaza together with the kiosk, but, instead of granting the permission, respondent allowed them to hold their meeting on the northwestern part corner of the plaza. He adopted as a policy not to allow the use of the kiosk for any meeting by any religious denomination as it is his belief that said Kiosk should only be used "for legal purposes." And when their request for reconsideration was denied, petitioners instituted the present action for mandamus. Issue: Whether or not the action taken by respondent is unconstitutional being an abdrigement of the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by the Constitution

Held: The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be "injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society", and this power may be exercised under the "police power" of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. It is true that there is no law nor ordinance which expressly confers upon respondents the power to regulate the use of the public plaza, together with its kiosk, for the purposes for which it was established, but such power may be exercised under his broad powers as chief executive in connection with his specific duty "to issue orders relating to the police or to public safety" within the municipality (section 2194, paragraph c, Revised Administrative Code). And it may even be said that the above regulation has been adopted as an implementation of the constitutional provision which prohibits any public property to be used, directly or indirectly, by any religious denomination (paragraph 3, section 23, Article VI of the Constitution). The power exercised by respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of

untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious denomination as a place of meeting of its members. This was the policy adopted by respondent for sometime previous to the request made by petitioners. Respondent never denied such request but merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning them the northwestern part of the public plaza. It cannot therefore be said that petitioners were denied their constitutional right to assemble for, as was said, such right is subject to regulation to maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so considering that the tenets of petitioners' congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which respondent must have considered in denying their request. Verily, the pretense of petitioners cannot be attributed to the unsuitability of that portion as a meeting place but rather to their obstinate desire to use the kiosk knowing it to be contrary to the policy of the municipality.

The Province of Abra, represented by Ladislao Ancheta, Provincial Assessor,

petitioner, vs. Honorable Harold M. Hernando, in his capacity as Presiding

Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance Abra; The Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc., represented by Bishop Odilo Etspueler and Reverend Felipe Flores, respondents.

Facts: The Provincial Assessor of Abra levied a tax assessment on the properties of respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The latter filed a petition for declaratory relief on the ground that it is exempted from payment of real estate taxes, its properties being actually, directly and exclusively used for religious or charitable purposes as sources of support for the bishop, the parish priest and his helpers. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but the same was denied. After conducting a summary hearing, respondent Judge granted the exemption without hearing the side of petitioner. Hence, this present petition for certiorari and mandamus alleging denial of procedural due process.

Issue: Whether or not the properties of The Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc., are exempted from taxation

Held: The petitioner was right in seeking necessary proof as the law frowns on exemptions from taxation; hence respondent judges failure to accord a hearing therefore was in violation of the constitutional command of procedural due process.

ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners, vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZAR, respondents.

Facts: A wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash donations pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of said council, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. The image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day as per Resolution No. 6 which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest refused to return custody of the image to the council until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond. The parish priest and his co-petitioners thereafter filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay

was not allowed to participate; and that they contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and state. Freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church. The lower court dismissed the complaint and upheld the validity of the resolution.

Issue:

Whether or not the barangay council was not duly constituted because Isidoro M. Maago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not allowed to participate in its sessions

Whether or not the resolutions contravene no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium" (Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution).

Held: On petition for review, the Supreme Court held, that the absence of the Kabataang Barangay chairman, despite due notice from the sessions of the barangay council, did not render the resolutions then adopted void since there was a quorum; and that the questioned resolutions did not contravene any constitutional provision since the image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money, and in connection with a socio- religious affair, the celebration of which is an ingrained tradition in rural communities.

Epicharis T. Garcia, petitioner, vs. The Faculty Administration Committee, Loyola School of Theology, herein represented by Fr. Antonio B. Lambino,

respondent.

Facts: Petitioner alleged that she was admitted by respondent in the Summer of 1975 to pursue graduate studies leading to a Master of Arts in Theology but was denied readmission in the following semester. She contended that the reason given by respondent for such denial, namely: that "her frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class," is not a valid ground for her expulsion. Respondent, on the other hand, contended that petitioner was admitted in the Summer of 1975 not to a degree program but merely to take some courses for credit, since admission to a degree program requires acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School and no such acceptance was given; that respondent has discretion to admit or continue admitting in said school any particular student, considering not only academic or intellectual standards but also other factors such as personality traits, character orientation in relation with other students, space limitations, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size; and that there was no clear duty to admit petitioner since the school of theology is a seminary for the priesthood and petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has the right to compel the Faculty Administration Committee to allow her to continue studying in the said educational institution

Held: The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus and held that the academic freedom expressly granted by the Constitution to "institutions of higher learning" involves two kinds of freedom: that which is enjoyed by the university as a corporate body to determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admittedly to study, and that which is accorded to a university professor to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as he sees it in the field of his competence. Universities and colleges, should not be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject.

MVRS Publications, Inc., Mars C. Laconsay, Myla C. Aguja and Agustino G. Binegas, Jr., petitioners, vs. Islamic Da'Wah Council Of The Philippines, Inc., Abdul-Rahman R.T. Linzag, Ibrahim F.P. Arcilla, Abdul Rashid De Guzman, AlFared Da Silva and Ibrahim B.A. Junio, respondents

Facts: Respondents, the ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious organizations and individual Muslims, filed a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit, against MVRS Publications, Inc. (MVRS) arising from an article published in Bulgar, a daily tabloid, which allegedly contained libelous statement that alluded to the pig as the God of the Muslims, and this was published with intent to disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. The Court of Appeals, however, ordered the petitioners to pay damages to private respondents Muslims to whom it was clear the defamation was directed. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners had the legal standing to institute a class suit against respondents

Held: In granting the petition, thereby reversing the decision of the CA, the Supreme Court held that the statements published by the petitioners did not specifically identify nor refer to any particular individual who was purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication; and that absent circumstances specifically pointing to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression as well as of the press under the Bill of Rights.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands,

petitioner-appellant, vs. JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court

of First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole, represented by ERAO G. MANALO, as Executive Minister, respondents-appellees.

Facts:

In 1933, private respondent, a corporation sole duly existing under Philippine laws, acquired two lots with a total area of 313 square meters from Andres Perez, who had possessed the property since 1933 and had declared the same for tax purposes. On September 13, 1977, private respondent filed an application for registration of the two lots pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law alleging that it and its predecessor-in-interest had possessed the land for more than 30 years. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the ground that the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, is disqualified under the Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain and that the land applied for is a public land. After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots in the name of private respondent. Hence, this appeal by the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, is disqualified under the Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain

Held: The Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibits a corporation sole or a juridical person like the Iglesia Ni Cristo from acquiring or holding lands of the public domain; that said church is not entitled to avail of the benefits of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law which applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons; and that the subject lots are not private lands because possession by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest has not been since time immemorial and because land registration proceeding under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law presupposes that the land is public.

United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries Philippines (UEUGIP),

petitioner, vs. Hon. Carmelo Noriel, Director, Bureau of Labor Relations;

George A. Eduvala, Representation Officer, Bureau of Labor Relations; and National Union of Garments, Textile, Cordage and Allied Workers of the Philippines (GATCORD), respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Union seeks to declare null and void the certificate election conducted and supervised by the Bureau of Labor Relations in Gelmart Industries Philippines, Inc. on the ground of irregularity, lack of fairness, and violation of procedural due process. Its objection thereto was predicated on the wilful deletion and replacement of its name in the notice of certification election and sample ballot by a non-contending party which caused confusion in the minds of independent workers and demoralization in the ranks of those inclined to favor it, and the electioneering of nuns and priest as observers or inspectors on behalf of private respondent union which garnered the highest number of votes in said election. This last point was raised as a ground in a protest filed by petitioner. Private respondent union stoutly denied the imputation of irregularity and clarified matters by a factual presentation of what transpired.

Issue: Whether or not there was a willful deletion and replacement of its name in the notice of certification election and sample ballots

Held: The Supreme Court ruled for the respondents, it being obvious that the grievance spoken of by the petitioner was more fancied than real, the assertion of confusion and demoralization based on conjecture rather than on reality and that petitioner did not choose to press the point of alleged participation by nuns and priest.

Lim Che Boon, Tan Hon Koc, Joseph Lim and Yiu Yek See, petitioners, vs. Lydia Basa, Anthony Sayheeliam and Yao Chek, respondents.

Facts: Petitioners Joseph Lim, Liu Yek See, Alfredo Long and Felix Almeria were members of a religious group known as "The Church In Quezon City (Church Assembly Hall), Incorporated" which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1973. The members of the said Church vested upon their Board of Directors the absolute power to admit and expel a member of the Church. As early as 1988, the Board of Directors observed that certain members of the church including petitioners herein exhibited conduct which was dishonorable, improper and injurious to the character and interest of the Church. They warned petitioners that if they persist in their highly improper conduct, they will be dropped from the membership of the Church. However, petitioners ignored their repeated admonitions. Alarmed that petitioners' conduct will continue to undermine the integrity of the principles of faith of the Church, the Board of Directors, during its August 30, 1993 regular meeting, removed from the membership list certain names of members, including the names of herein petitioners. On September 29, 1993, petitioners and others questioned their expulsion by filing with the SEC Securities Investigation and Clearing Department a petition seeking mainly the annulment of the August 30, 1993 membership list and the reinstatement of the original list, on the ground that it was made without prior notice and hearing. Subsequently, SEC Hearing Officer Manuel Perea ruled, among others, that the expulsion was in accordance with the Church

By-laws. In a petition for certiorari, the SEC en banc affirmed the Perea ruling. Petitioners did not appeal the said decision. Since the said SEC en banc decision pertained only to the preliminary injunction incident, the SEC, through a hearing panel, conducted further proceedings. Petitioners filed motions to dismiss/strike out the counterclaim and thirdparty complaint, but those motions were denied. Upon denial of the separate motions for reconsideration of both parties, the respondents filed with the SEC en banc a petition for review questioning the validity of the expulsion. The SEC en banc issued an order setting aside the expulsion of certain members of the Church. The private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the SEC en banc.

Issue: Whether or not the expulsion made by the SEC en banc in its July 11, 1994 decision is valid

Held: The Court emphasized that the issue of the validity of the expulsion had long been resolved and declared valid by the SEC en banc in its decision dated July 11, 1994 in SEC EB Case No. 389. The petitioners themselves admitted in their present petition that they did not appeal anymore from the July 11, 1994 decision of the SEC en

banc, thereby rendering the same final and conclusive. As such, the expulsion order is now inextricably binding on the parties concerned and can no longer be modified, much less reversed. Further, the provision on expulsion under the CHURCH By-Laws, as phrased, may sound unusual and objectionable to petitioners as there is no requirement of prior notice to be given to an erring member before he can be expelled. It must be stressed that the basis of the relationship between a religious corporation and its members is the latter's absolute adherence to a common religious or spiritual belief. Once this basis ceases, membership in the religious corporation must also cease. Thus, generally, there is no room for dissension in a religious corporation. And where, as here, any member of a religious corporation is expelled from the membership for espousing doctrines and teachings contrary to that of his church, the established doctrine in this jurisdiction is that such action from the church authorities is conclusive upon the civil courts.

Alejandro Estrada, complainant, vs. Soledad S. Escritor, respondent.

Facts: Soledad S. Escritor, a court interpreter, who admittedly, while still married to another, cohabited since 1980 to Luciano Quilapio, Jr., who was himself married to another. Escritor and Quilapio had a nineteen-year old son. The private complainant herein was not personally related to Escritor nor did he personally know her. However, he wanted the Court to declare as immoral the relationship of Escritor with Quilapio in consonance with the pertinent provision of the Administrative Code. In her defense, Escritor contended that under the rules of the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious sect of which she is a member, the act of signing a Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, is sufficient to legitimize a union which would otherwise be classified as adulterous and bigamous. Escritor alleged that in compliance with the foregoing rules, she and her partner signed the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness in 1991, and by virtue of such act, they are for all purposes, regarded as husband and wife by the religious denomination of which they are devout adherents.

Issue: Whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom should be carved out as an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively liable

Held: The Supreme Court resolved to remand this case to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General was ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claim of religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice: and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The Court also ordered the setting of the rehearing of the case.

Reli German, Ramon Pedrosa, Tirso Santillan, Jr., Ma. Luisa Andal, Nieva Malinis, Ricardo Lavina, Cesar Cortes, Danilo Reyes, Jose Reyes, Josefina Mate, Lourdes Calma, Mildred Juan, Olive Guanzon, Fernando Cochico, Sherman Cid, Nazareno Bentulan, Roslina Donaire, Mario Martinez, Beatriz Teylan, Angelina Lapid, Rosemarie Flores, Daniel Van Soto, Edgardo Mercader, Nelly Agustin, Marily Magcalas, David Chan, Arsenio Salansang, Nelson De Guzman, Marciano Araneta, Cesar Meneses, Dionisio Rellosa, Mario Santiago, Severino Santos, Leonora Santos, Nimfa Doronilla, Florence Guinto, Rosalina Manansala, Percival Ostonal, Tommy Macaranas, Roger Nicandro, petitioners, vs. Gen. Santiago Barangan and Major Isabela Lariosa,

respondents.

Facts: At about 5:00 in the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacaang grounds locate in the same street. Wearing the now familiar inscribed yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. Along the way, however, they were barred by respondent Major Isabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and corespondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacaang security area. When petitioners'

protestations and pleas to allow them to get inside the church proved unavailing, they decided to leave. However, because of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse. Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the President of the Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive with a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the yellow Tshirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of antigovernment slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents allegation. Issue: Whether or not petitioners claim to the free exercise of religion is valid Held: Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This

curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education, thus: "The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it." (Emphasis supplied)

Ang Mga Kaaniib Sa Iglesia Ng Dios Kay Kristo Hesus, H.S.K. Sa Bansang Pilipinas, INC., petitioner, vs. Iglesia Ng Dios Kay Cristo Jesus, Haligi At Suhay Ng Katotohanan, respondent.

Facts: When Soriano, et al. registered the corporate name of petitioner corporation, respondent corporation filed a petition before the SEC for the change of petitioner's corporate name on the ground that the same causes confusion among their members and the public. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition but the motion was denied. Thereafter, for failure to file an answer, petitioner was declared in default and later, the SEC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to change its corporate name. Petitioner alleged that it was deprived of its day in court because its counsel neglected to file an answer to the petition after their motion to dismiss was denied in the SEC.

Issue: Whether or not the change of name will cause confusion to the members of the group and the public

Held: The Court ruled that when petitioner was declared in default, their counsel moved for reconsideration. And after judgment by default was rendered against petitioner, their counsel filed a motion for extension of time to appeal/file a motion for reconsideration. Thereafter,

petitioner's counsel also filed a motion to set aside the decision. Hence, petitioner's counsel is guilty only of simple negligence that binds the client. At any rate, the SEC can de-register at all times and under all circumstances corporate names which in its estimation are likely to spawn confusion.

Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts of Iligan City (Office Hours)

Facts: In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts in the said city request that they be allowed to enjoy the following privileges: 1.to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks during the month of Ramadan; 2.to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year. Judge Salazar forwarded the said letter-request to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Judge Salazar expressed his conformity with the first request, i.e., allowing them to hold office from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan. However, he expressed some misgivings about the second request, i.e., excusing them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year. Issue: Whether or not Muslim employees in the different courts in the said city can be excused from work on the periods aforementioned

Held: The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to the Islamic faith. However, while the observance of Ramadan and allowing the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan finds support in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is no such basis to excuse them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar year. On the other hand, the need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well as to enforce them uniformly to all civil servants, Christians and Muslims alike, cannot be disregarded. Underlying Section 5, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 is the interest of the general public to be assured of continuous government service during office hours every Monday through Friday. The said rule enjoins all civil servants, of whatever religious denomination, to render public service of no less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week. To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution of the prescribed government working hours. For then, they would be rendering service twelve (12) hours less than that required by the civil service rules for each

month. Further, this would encourage other religious denominations to request for similar treatment. The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service laws. In fine, the remedy of the Muslim employees, with respect to their request to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year, is legislative, which is to ask Congress to enact a legislation expressly exempting them from compliance with the prescribed government working hours.

Dominador L. Taruc, Wilberto Dacera, Nicanor Galanida, Renerio Canta, Jerry Canrta, Cordencio Consigna, Susano Alacala, Leonardo Dizon, Salvador Gelsano and Benito Laugo, petitioners, vs. Bishop Porfirio B. De La Cruz, Rev. Fr. Rustom Florano and Delfin Bordas, respondents. Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Florano's wife belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Tarucs, thus the animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife's political camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish. Bishop de la Cruz, however, failed to stop Taruc from carrying out his plans. On June 19, 1993, at around 3:00 p.m., Taruc and his sympathizers proceeded to hold the open mass with Fr. Ambong as the celebrant. cdtai2005 On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church for reasons of: (1)disobedience to duly constituted authority in the Church;

(2)inciting dissension, resulting in division in the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help, Iglesia Filipina Independiente, Socorro, Surigao del Norte when they celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on June 19, 1996; and (3)for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety and fear among the general membership. Petitioners appealed to the Obispo Maximo and sought reconsideration of the above decision In the meantime, Bishop de la Cruz was reassigned to the diocese of Odmoczan and was replaced by Bishop Rhee M. Timbang. Like his predecessor, Bishop Timbang did not find a valid reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish. He issued a circular denying petitioners' persistent clamor for the transfer/re-assignment of Fr. Florano. Petitioners were informed of such denial but they continued to celebrate mass and hold other religious activities through Fr. Ambong who had been restrained from performing any priestly functions in the PIC parish of Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on the theory that they conspired with the Bishop to have petitioners expelled and

excommunicated from the PIC. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case before the lower court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but it was denied. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied so they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the court a quo and ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice to its being refiled before the proper forum. Issue: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution

Held: Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically provides that: Sec. 5.No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. cdlaws06

The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

II. Foreign Jurisprudence

COX v. NEW HAMPSHIRE, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)

312 U.S. 569

COX et al. v. STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE. No. 502.

Argued March 7, 1941. Decided March 31, 1941.

Facts:

Appellants are five 'Jehovah's Witnesses' who, with sixty-three others of the same persuasion, were convicted in the municipal court of Manchester, New Hampshire, for violation of a state statute prohibiting a 'parade orprocession' upon a public street without a special license. After their arrest, the group sued the state for violating their Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of speech, press, worship, and assembly. Upon appeal, there was a trial de novo of these appellants before a jury in the Superior Court, the other defendants having agreed to abide by the final decision in that

proceeding. Appellants were found guilty and the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State.
Issue:

Whether or not the statute was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in that it deprived appellants of their rights of freedom of worship, freedom of speech and press, and freedom of assembly, vested unreasonable and unlimited arbitrary and discriminatory powers in the licensing authority, and was vague and indefinite.

Held: The Court unanimously upheld the convictions of the Jehovas Witnesses for engaging in a public parade without a license.

The state acted within its power in trying to regulate the use of public space. "The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need." The state also has an interest in knowing about parades ahead of time so that it can arrange proper policing. The Court also rejects the claim that the licensing fee encroached on their right to assemble. Provided this fee is reasonable, it not unconstitutional. In

summary, "No interference with religious worship or the practice of religion in any proper sense is shown, but only the exercise of local control over the use of streets for parades and processions." This decision allows states to impose licensing fees for people who want to have parades or processions. The State faces increased costs in policing and overseeing parades so they are permitted to pass some of these expenses on to the groups conducting these events. The requiring of licenses is consistent with allowing time and place restrictions to prevent a public inconvenience.

In the instant case, we are aided by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State which construed the statute and defined the limitations of the authority conferred for the granting of licenses for parades and processions. The court observed that if the clause of the Act requiring a license 'for all open-air public meetings upon land contiguous to a highway' was invalid, that invalidity did not nullify the Act in its application to the other situations described. Recognizing the importance of the civil liberties invoked by appellants, the court thought it significant that the statute prescribed 'no measures for controlling or suppressing the publication on the highways of facts and opinions, either by speech or by writing'; that communication 'by the distribution of literature or by the display of placards and signs' was in no respect regulated by the statute; that the regulation with respect to parades and processions was applicable only 'to organized formations of persons using the highways'; and that 'the defendants separately or collectively in groups not constituting a parade or procession', were 'under no contemplation of the act'. In this light, the court thought that interference with liberty of speech and writing seemed slight; that the distribution of pamphlets and folders by the groups 'traveling in unorganized fashion' would have

had as large a circulation, and that 'signs carried by members of the groups not in marching formation would have been as conspicuous, as published by them while in parade or procession'.

There is no evidence that the statute has been administered otherwise than in the fair and non-discriminatory manner which the state court has construed it to require.

FLAST v. COHEN, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) 392 U.S. 83 FLAST ET AL. v. COHEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. No. 416. Argued March 12, 1968. Decided June 10, 1968. Facts: Appellant taxpayers allege that federal funds have been disbursed by appellee federal officials under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to finance instruction and the purchase of educational materials for use in religious and sectarian schools, in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Appellants sought a declaration that the expenditures were not authorized by the Act or, in the alternative, that the Act is to that extent unconstitutional, and requested the convening of a three-judge court Appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to enjoin the allegedly unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds under Titles

I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27, 20 U.S.C. 241a et seq., 821 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. II). The complaint alleged that the seven appellants had as a common attribute that "each pay[s] income taxes of the United States," and it is clear from the complaint that the appellants were resting their standing to maintain the action solely on their status as federal taxpayers. The appellees, who are charged by Congress with administering the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, were sued in their official capacities. The gravamen of the appellants' complaint was that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools, and to purchase textbooks and other instructional materials for use in such schools. Such expenditures were alleged to be in contravention of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Appellants' constitutional attack focused on the statutory criteria which state and local authorities must meet to be eligible for federal grants under the Act. Title I of the Act establishes a program for financial assistance to local educational agencies for the education of low-income families. Federal payments are made to state educational agencies, which pass the payments on in the form of grants to local educational agencies. Under 205 of the Act, 20 U.S.C. 241e, a local educational agency wishing to have a plan or program funded by a grant must submit the plan or program to the appropriate state educational agency for approval. The plan or program must be "consistent with such basic criteria as the [appellee United States Commissioner of Education] may establish." The specific criterion of that section attacked by the appellants is the requirement

Issue: Whether or not a taxpayer has standing to sue the government to prevent an unconstitutional use of taxpayer funds. Held: Surely it is plain that the rights and interests of taxpayers who contest the constitutionality of public expenditures are markedly different from those of "Hohfeldian" plaintiffs,including those taxpayer-plaintiffs who challenge the validity of their own tax liabilities. We must recognize that these non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs complain, just as the petitioner in Frothingham sought to complain, not as taxpayers, but as "private attorneysgeneral."The interests they represent, and the rights they espouse, are bereft of any personal or proprietary coloration. They are, as litigants, indistinguishable from any group selected at random from among the general population, taxpayers and nontaxpayers alike. Although various efforts have been made in Congress to authorize public actions to contest the validity of federal expenditures in aid of religiously affiliated schools and other institutions, no such authorization has yet been given.

The Court ruled that the taxpayers could sue the federal government if its spending violated a specific limitation on its power.

Two criteria must be met by people who want to use their status as taxpayers to gain standing to sue an act of the federal government. First, the type of legislation in question must directly involve the expenditure of funds. A regulatory law cannot be challenged. Also, the taxpayers must show that the congressional spending exceeded a specific limitation on their power. Both of these stipulations are met by the petitioners in this case. This decision weakened an earlier ruling in Frothingham v. Mellon that many believed prevented people from claiming taxpayer status to gain standing to sue the federal government. Following this decision, people could challenge expenditures by Congress provided the two conditions laid out in this case were met.

GILLETTE v. UNITED STATES, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) 401 U.S. 437 GILLETTE v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 85. Argued December 9, 1970 Decided March 8, 1971 Facts: Petitioner in No. 85, who was convicted for failure to report for induction, and petitioner in No. 325, who sought discharge from the armed forces upon receipt of orders for Vietnam duty, claim exemption from military service because of their conscientious objection to participation in the Vietnam conflict, as an "unjust" war, pursuant to 6 (j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967. That section provides that no person shall be subject to "service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Petitioners also challenge the constitutionality of 6 (j) as construed to cover only objectors to all war, as violative of the Free Exercise and Establishment of Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.

Issue: Whether or not a person could be exempted from military service because of his objecting to a particular war rather than war in general Held: The Court decided 8-1 that Congress did not act unconstitutionally by limiting conscientious objector status to those people who objected to all wars.

There is no evidence that Congress intended to allow people to conscientiously object to a particular war. The legislation in question people to be exempted from service if they are opposed "to participation in war in any form." The establishment claims of the petitioners are weak because there is no discrimination against any particular religious affiliation or belief. There are numerous valid reasons behind the construction of the conscientious objector law, but hindering or aiding particular religious beliefs was not one of them. "We conclude not only that the affirmative purposes underlying [the law] are neutral and secular, but also that valid neutral reasons exist for limiting the exemption to objectors to all war, and that the section therefore cannot be said to reflect a religious preference." To allow objection to a particular war would make it too difficult for the country to ensure a ready military.

This decision limited itself to assessing the constitutionality of the Congressional limitations on conscientious objection. Marshall stated "Of course we do not suggest that Congress would have acted irrationally or unreasonably had it decided to exempt those who object to particular wars." People are now required to become religious pacifists if they wish to be exempt from military service.

HAMILTON v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIF., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) 293 U.S. 245 HAMILTON et al. v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.* No. 55.

Argued Oct. 17-18, 1934. Decided Dec. 3, 1934. [293 U.S. 245, 246] Messrs. John Beardsley, of Los Angeles, Cal., and Gregory Hankin, of Washington, D.C., for appellants. [293 U.S. 245, 249] Mr. John U. Calkins, Jr., of San Francisco, Cal., for appellees. [293 U.S. 245, 250] Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court. Facts: Each of these minors registered, became a student in the University, and fully conformed to all its requirements other than that compelling him to take the course in

military science and tactics in the Reserve Officers Training Corps which they assert to be an integral part of the military establishment of the United States and not connected in any way with the militia or military establishment of the state. The courses in military. The regents require enrollment and participation of ablebodied male students who are citizens of the United States. These courses include instruction in rifle marksmanship, scouting and patrolling, drill and command, musketry, combat principles, and use of automatic rifles. Arms, equipment, and uniforms for use of students in such courses are furnished by the War Department of the United States government. These minors are members of the Methodist Episcopal Church and of the Epworth League and connected religious societies and organizations. For many years their fathers have been ordained ministers of that church. Because the Methodist Episcopal Church in her General Conference of 1928 has declared: 'We renounce war as an instrument of national policy.' Because our nation led the nations of the world in signing the Paris Peace Pact, and the Constitution of the United States, Article 6, Section 2, provides that: 'This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof and all treaties made under authority of the United States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land'. The regents refused to make military training optional or to exempt these students. Then, because of their religious and conscientious objections, they declined to take the prescribed course, and solely upon that ground the regents by formal notification suspended them from the University, but with leave to apply for readmission at any time conditioned upon their

ability and willingness to comply with all applicable regulations of the University governing the matriculation and attendance of students. Other allegations of the petition need not be stated, as they merely go to show the grounds upon which appellants under the state practice sought the writ of mandate. Issue: Whether or not the challenged provisions of the state Constitution, organic act, and regents' order, in so far as they impose compulsory military training, are repugnant to the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Held: Viewed in the light of our decisions, that proposition must at once be put aside as untenable. Government, federal and state, each in its own sphere owes a duty to the people within its jurisdiction to preserve itself in adequate strength to maintain peace and order and to assure the just enforcement of law. And every citizen owes the reciprocal duty, according to his capacity to protect and defend the government against all enemies.

The Court unanimously upheld the right of California to force its university students to take classes in military training.

States are permitted to, and have an interest in, creating a citizenry capable of serving in the country's military. Attendance in the University of California is a privilege in which the students want to partake. "Taken on the basis of the facts alleged in the petition, appellants' contentions amount to no more than an assertion that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a safeguard of 'liberty' confers the right to be students in the State University free from obligation to take military training as one of the conditions of attendance." Such a position is not constitutionally supportable. Just as states have a duty to protect their citizens, citizens have a reciprocal duty to aid in defending their states.

JONES v. CITY OF OPELIKA, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) 316 U.S. 584 JONES v. CITY OF OPELIKA. BOWDEN et al. v. CITY OF FORT SMITH, ARK. JOBIN v. STATE OF ARIZONA. Nos. 280, 314, and 966. Argued Feb. 5, April 30, 1942. Decided June 8, 1942. Facts: The City of Opelika, Alabama, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Lee County charging petitioner Jones with violation of its licensing ordinance by selling books without a license, by operating as a Book Agent without a license, and by operating as a transient

agent, dealer or distributor of books without a license. Petitioner demurred, alleging that the ordinance because of unlimited discretion in revocation and requirement of a license was an unconstitutional encroachment upon freedom of the press. During the trial without a jury these contentions, with the added claim of interference with freedom of religion, were renewed at the end of the city's case, and at the close of all the evidence. The court overruled these motions, and found petitioner guilty on evidence that without a license he had been displaying pamphlets in his upraised hand and walking on a city street selling them two for five cents. Issue: Whether or not there is a violation both of rights to freedoms of the press and religion. Held: Freedom of press and religion, explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, must at least be entitled to the same freedom from burdensome taxation which it has been thought that the more general phraseology of the commerce clause has extended to interstate commerce. Whatever doubts may be entertained as to this Court's function to relieve, unaided by Congressional legislation, from burdensome taxation under the commerce clause, it cannot be thought that that function is wanting under the explicit guaranties of freedom of speech, press and religion. In any case the flat license tax can hardly become any the less burdensome or more permissible, when levied on activities within the protection extended

by the First and Fourteenth Amendments both to the orderly communication of ideas, educational and religious, to persons willing to receive them, and to the practice of religion and the solicitation of funds in its support. The Court upheld the statute because it only covered individuals engaged in a commercial activity rather than a religious ritual. Individual rights must be balanced against competing rights of the state. The fact that a person is engaged in disseminating religious materials does not place his action above regulation by the state. [W]hen, as in these cases, the practitioners of these noble callings choose to utilize the vending of their religious books and tracts as a source of funds, the financial aspects of their transactions need not be wholly disregarded. To subject any religious or didactic group to a reasonable fee for their money-making activities does not require a finding that the licensed acts are purely commercial. It is enough that money is earned by the sale of articles.When traditional means of distribution are used by religious groups, they can be held to the same standards as non-religious groups. Because Jones did not have a license revoked arbitrarily by the state he has no standing to challenge that part of the statute. This decision forces religious groups to meet the same requirements as non-religious groups engaged in a similar activity. The fact that they are selling religious materials does not exempt them from statutes regulating commercial acts.

JONES v. WOLF, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) 443 U.S. 595 JONES ET AL. v. WOLF ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA. Argued January 16, 1979. Decided July 2, 1979. Facts: This case involves a dispute over the ownership of church property following a schism in a local church affiliated with a hierarchical church organization. the property of the Vineville Presbyterian Church of Macon, Ga. (local church), is held in the names of the local church or of trustees for the local church. That church, however, was established as a member of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS), which has a generally hierarchical form of government. Under the polity of the PCUS, the government of the local church is committed to its Session in the first instance, but the actions of this "court" are subject to the review and control of the higher church courts (the Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly). At a congregational meeting attended by a quorum of the local church's members, 164 of them voted to separate from the PCUS, while 94 opposed the resolution. The majority then united with another denomination and has retained possession of the local church property. The Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate the dispute, and the commission eventually issued a

ruling declaring that the minority faction constituted the "true congregation" of the local church, and withdrawing from the majority faction "all authority to exercise office derived from the [PCUS]." Representatives of the minority faction brought this class action in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive orders establishing their right to exclusive possession and use of the local church's property as a member of the PCUS. The trial court, purporting to apply Georgia's "neutral principles of law" approach to church property disputes, granted judgment for the majority. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court had correctly stated and applied Georgia law and rejecting the minority's challenge based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Issue: Whether or not the "true congregation" or the 'neutral principles of law' will be used. Held: A careful examination of the constitutions of the general and local church, as well as other relevant documents, may be necessary to ascertain the form of governance adopted by the members of the religious association. But there is no reason to restrict the courts to statements of polity related directly to church property. For the constitutionally necessary limitations are imposed not on the evidence to be considered but instead on the object of the inquiry, which is both limited and clear: the civil court must determine whether the local church remains autonomous, so that its members have unreviewable authority to withdraw it

(and its property) from the general church, or whether the local church is inseparably integrated into and subordinate to the general church.

The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision by a 5-4 vote. The case was ordered for re-argument before these lower courts. The general principle of "Neutral Principles of Law" can be used to resolve ownership disputes within a church. "The state has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively." In this case, the state court did not properly articulate the grounds for its decision because this dispute was not between the church hierarchy and a local church but was between two factions of a local church. If the laws and regulations of the general church matter, deference to the local church's identity may be made by representatives of the church hierarchy. The NPoL can be used as long as the courts do not consider any religious doctrines. The lower courts can independently decide which criteria to use. The Court asserted the interest in the state's settling of disputes regarding religious property. However, it failed to explicate which criteria should be used. Rather, it stated that one of these criterion cannot be religious doctrine.

KEDROFF v. ST. NICHOLAS CATHEDRAL, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) 344 U.S. 94 KEDROFF ET AL. v. SAINT NICHOLAS CATHEDRAL OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN NORTH AMERICA. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 3. Argued February 1, 1952.Reargued October 14, 1952. Decided November 24, 1952. Facts: In a suit brought in a New York state court by a corporation, holder of the legal title, to determine which prelate was entitled to the use and occupancy of a Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in New York City, the Court of Appeals of New York held for plaintiff, on the ground that Article 5-C of the Religious Corporations Law of New York had the purpose and effect of transferring the administrative control of the Russian Orthodox churches in North America from the Supreme Church Authority in Moscow to the authorities selected by a convention of the North American churches. Held: As thus construed and applied, the New York statute interferes with the free exercise of religion, contrary to the First Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue: Whether or not the State can exercise its reserved power to control this property without invading religious freedom, because it is a Cathedral and devoted to religious uses. Held: The State cannot exercise its reserved power to control this property without invading religious freedom, because it is a Cathedral and devoted to religious uses. I forbear discussion of the extent to which restraints imposed upon Congress by the First Amendment are transferred against the State by the Fourteenth Amendment beyond saying that I consider that the same differences which apply to freedom of speech and . The fact that property is dedicated to a religious use cannot, in my opinion, justify the Court in sublimating an issue over property rights into one of deprivation of religious liberty which alone would bring in the religious guaranties of the First Amendment. I assume no one would pretend that the State cannot decide a claim of trespass, larceny, conversion, bailment or contract, where the property involved is that of a religious corporation or is put to religious use, without invading the principle of religious liberty. The Supreme Court ruled that the New York statute improperly involved the state with an internal church dispute. The New York law violates the Fourteenth Amendment by limiting the parishioners' rights to freely exercise their religion. In the statute transferring church control to American

leadership, the state ruled that the church must "in all other respects conform to, maintain and follow the faith, doctrine, ritual, communion, discipline, canon law, trends, and usages of the Eastern Confession." This imposed certain beliefs on the members of the St. Nicholas Cathedral.

The Court was unwilling to allow New York to make decisions affecting the internal operations of a church within its territory. Attempting to do so has an effect on the free exercising of the religious convictions of the church community.

LEE v. WEISMAN, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) 505 U.S. 577 ROBERT E. LEE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PRINCIPAL OF NATHAN BISHOP MIDDLE SCHOOL, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. DANIEL WEISMAN ETC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT No. 90-1014

Argued November 6, 1991 Decided June 24, 1992 Facts: Principals of public middle and high schools in Providence, Rhode Island, are permitted to invite members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions at their schools' graduation ceremonies. Petitioner Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to offer such prayers at the graduation ceremony for Deborah Weisman's class, gave the rabbi a pamphlet containing guidelines for the composition of public prayers at civic ceremonies, and advised him that the prayers should be nonsectarian. Shortly before the ceremony, the District Court denied the motion of respondent Weisman, Deborah's father, for a temporary restraining order to prohibit school officials from including the prayers in the ceremony. Deborah and her family attended the ceremony, and the prayers were recited. Subsequently,

Weisman sought a permanent injunction barring Lee and other petitioners, various Providence public school officials, from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at future graduations. It appears likely that such prayers will be conducted at Deborah's high school graduation. The District Court enjoined petitioners from continuing the practice at issue on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Issue: Whether or notthe graduation prayer violated the Establishment Clause. Held: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the graduation prayer violated the Establishment Clause. The government's involvement in the religious exercise at graduation is 'pervasive'. The prayers violate the earlier rulings preventing school sponsored prayer. The state places both public and peer pressure on students to take rise for and remain silent during the prayer. Although a person might stand for the prayer merely as a sign of respect for others, such an action could properly be construed as accepting the message. The control held by teachers and principals over the students' actions forces those graduating to submit to the standards of behavior.

This decision goes against years of history. The Lemon Test should not be used as the defining test of what is permissible under the Establishment Clause because, "if applied with consistency it would invalidate longstanding traditions." Non-sectarian prayer at public gatherings and celebrations is a tradition that ought to be protected within the confines of the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court rejected the opportunity to reverse the standard it established in Lemon. This ruling extended the prohibition of school prayer to graduation ceremonies. It failed to accept that a student would not be harmed by standing during the prayer without sharing the message contained in the prayer.

MINERSVILLE SCHOOL DIST. v. GOBITIS, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) 310 U.S. 586 MINERSVILLE SCHOOL DIST. et al. v. GOBITIS et al. No. 690.

Argued April 25, 1940. Decided June 3, 1940. Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. Facts: Lillian Gobitis, aged twelve, and her brother William, aged ten, were expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as part of a daily school exercise. The local Board of Education required both teachers and pupils to participate in this ceremony. The ceremony is a familiar one. The right hand is placed on the breast and the following pledge recited in unison: 'I pledge allegiance to my flag, and to the Republic for which it stands; one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.' While the words are spoken, teachers and pupils extend their right hands in salute to the flag. The Gobitis family are affiliated with 'Jehovah's Witnesses', for whom the Bible as the Word of

God is the supreme authority. The children had been brought up conscientiously to believe that such a gesture of respect for the flag was forbidden by command of scripture. Issue: Whether or not the Constitutional challenge to the law was under Article I, Section 8, to spend for the general welfare as the expenditure is of a large sum of funds is valid. Held: The very fact that we have constitutional guaranties of civil liberties and the specificity of their command where freedom of speech and of religion are concerned require some accommodation of the powers which government normally exercises, when no question of civil liberty is involved, to the constitutional demand that those liberties be protected against the action of government itself. The state concededly has power to require and control the education of its citizens, but it cannot by a general law compelling attendance at public schools preclude attendance at a private school adequate in its instruction, where the parent seeks to secure for the child the benefits of religious instruction not provided by the public school. And only recently we have held that the state's authority to control its public streets by generally applicable regulations is not an absolute to which free speech must yield, and cannot be made the medium of its suppression. any more than can its authority to penalize littering of the streets by a general law be used to suppress the distribution of handbills as a means of communicating ideas to their recipients.

The guaranties of civil liberty are but guaranties of freedom of the human mind and spirit and of reasonable freedom and opportunity to express them. They presuppose the right of the individual to hold such opinions as he will and to give them reasonably free expression, and his freedom, and that of the state as well, to teach and persuade others by the communication of ideas. The very essence of the liberty which they guaranty is the freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall say, at least where the compulsion is to bear false witness to his religion. If these guaranties are to have any meaning they must, I think, be deemed to withhold from the state any authority to compel belief or the expression of it where that expression violates religious convictions, whatever may be the legislative view of the desirability of such compulsion. In an 8-1 decision, the Court ruled that the school district's interest in creating national unity was sufficient to allow them to require students to salute the flag. This case requires the Court to balance the religious interests of the Jehovah's Witness children with the secular interests of the school district. "Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities." Requiring the saluting of the flag builds national unity which is at the core of national security. Even though the members of the Court might disagree that a compulsory flag salute is the best way to create national unity, the school district's err in

judgment is not sufficient to declare their practice unconstitutional. Finally, the students will not be pulled away from their faith by partaking in the pledge because their parents have a much greater influence than the school in their religious faiths. The Court portrayed the case as balancing conflicting claims of liberty and authority. The school's interest in creating national unity was more important than the rights of the students to refuse to salute the flag.

319 U.S. 105 (1943) MURDOCK v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA and seven other cases, including JONES v. CITY OF OPELIKA, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) Nos. 480-487. Argued March 10, 11, 1943. Decided May 3, 1943. Facts: Petitioners are 'Jehovah's Witnesses'. They went about from door to door in the City of Jeannette distributing literature and soliciting people to 'purchase' certain religious books and pamphlets, all published by the Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society. The 'price' of the books was twenty-five cents each, the 'price' of the pamphlets five cents each. In connection with these activities petitioners used a phonograph on which they played a record expounding certain of their views on religion. None of them obtained a license under the ordinance. Before they were arrested each had made 'sales' of books. There was evidence that it was their practice in making these solicitations to request a 'contribution' of twentyfive cents each for the books and five cents each for the pamphlets but to accept lesser sums or even to donate the volumes in case an interested person was without funds. In the present

case some donations of pamphlets were made when books were purchased. Petitioners were convicted and fined for violation of the ordinance. Their judgments of conviction were sustained by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, against their contention that the ordinance deprived them of the freedom of speech, press, and religion guaranteed by the First Amendment. Petitions for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania were denied. The First Amendment, which the Fourteenth makes applicable to the states, declares that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....' It could hardly be denied that a tax laid specifically on the exercise of those freedoms would be unconstitutional. Yet the license tax imposed by this ordinance is in substance just that. Issue: Whether or not the licensing requirement constituted a tax on Murdocks religious exercise. Held: Jehovah's Witnesses are not 'above the law'. But the present ordinance is not directed to the problems with which the police power of the state is free to deal. It does not cover, and petitioners are not charged with, breaches of the peace. They are pursuing their solicitations peacefully and quietly. Petitioners, moreover, are not charged with or prosecuted for the use of language which is obscene, abusive, or which incites retaliation. As we have said, it is not merely a registration ordinance calling for an identification of the

solicitors so as to give the authorities some basis for investigating strangers coming into the community. And the fee is not a nominal one, imposed as a regulatory measure and calculated to defray the expense of protecting those on the streets and at home against the abuses of solicitors. The Court in a 6-3 decision determined that the ordinance was an unconstitutional tax on the Jehovahs Witnesses right to freely exercise their religion. The petitioners used the distribution of pamphlets and brochures as a form of missionary activity with an evangelical purpose. Not all behavior could be allowed by claiming that it was a religious activity. We only hold that spreading one's religious beliefs or preaching the Gospel through distribution of religious literature and through personal visitations is an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more orthodox types. If the activity were done in order to raise money, it would be commercial and could be taxed. However, in this case, although donations were sought, the activity served a religious function. Religions are not entirely free from facing financial burdens from the government. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. If the exercise can be taxed then the government is capable of making it prohibitively expensive and could only be done by the wealthy. The state claimed that this argument was unimportant because the tax was not expensive in practice. It is a license tax-a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution. The fact

that the ordinance was imposed indiscriminately does not save it from being unconstitutional. The neutral imposition of the tax on solicitation performed by a religious group did not make it constitutionally acceptable. Also, the Court distinguished between commercial activity and religious activity that involves the selling of religious literature.

PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH v. HULL CHURCH, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) 393 U.S. 440 PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES ET AL. v. MARY ELIZABETH BLUE HULL MEMORIAL PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA. No. 71. Argued December 9-10, 1968. Decided January 27, 1969. Facts: Respondents, two local churches, voted to withdraw from petitioner general church with which they had had a doctrinal dispute and to reconstitute themselves as an autonomous religious organization. A church tribunal proceeded to take over respondents' property on behalf of the general church. Respondents, without appealing to higher church tribunals, sued in the Georgia state court to enjoin the general church from trespassing on the disputed property. The general church moved to dismiss and cross-claimed for injunctive relief on the ground that civil courts had no power to determine whether the general church had departed from its tenets of faith and practice. The motion to dismiss was denied and the case was submitted to the jury on the theory that Georgia law implies a trust of local church property for the benefit of the general church on condition that the general church adhere to doctrinal tenets existing at the time of affiliation by the local churches. The jury, having been

instructed to determine whether the general church's actions were a substantial abandonment of its original doctrines, returned a verdict for respondents; the trial judge issued an injunction against the general church; and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. Held: Civil courts cannot, consistently with First Amendment principles, determine ecclesiastical questions in resolving property disputes; and since the departure-from-doctrine element of Georgia's implied trust theory requires civil courts to weigh the significance and meaning of religious doctrines, it can play no role in judicial proceedings. Issue: Whether or not the state had authority to determine whether the general church had departed from its tenets of faith and practice. Held: The Georgia courts have violated the command of the First Amendment. The departure-from-doctrine element of the implied trust theory which they applied requires the civil judiciary to determine whether actions of the general church constitute such a "substantial departure" from the tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of the local churches' affiliation that the trust in favor of the general church must be declared to have terminated. This determination has two parts. The civil court must first decide whether the challenged actions of the general church depart substantially from prior doctrine. In reaching such a decision, the court must of necessity make its own interpretation of the meaning of church doctrines. If the court should decide that a substantial departure has occurred, it

must then go on to determine whether the issue on which the general church has departed holds a place of such importance in the traditional theology as to require that the trust be terminated. A civil court can make this determination only after assessing the relative significance to the religion of the tenets from which departure was found. Thus, the departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion - the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a role. Since the Georgia courts on remand may undertake to determine whether petitioner is entitled to relief on its cross-claims, we find it appropriate to remark that the departurefrom-doctrine element of Georgia's implied trust theory can play no role in any future judicial proceedings. The departure-from-doctrine approach is not susceptible of the marginal judicial involvement contemplated in Gonzalez. Gonzalez' rights under a will turned on a church decision, the Archbishop's, as to church law, the qualifications for the chaplaincy. It was the archbishopric, not the civil courts, which had the task of analyzing and interpreting church law in order to determine the validity of Gonzalez' claim to a chaplaincy. Thus, the civil courts could adjudicate the rights under the will without interpreting or weighing church doctrine but simply by engaging in the narrowest kind of review of a specific church decision - i. e., whether that decision resulted from fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The Court unanimously (9-0) decided that the Superior Court overstepped its constitutional powers by involving itself in this dispute. In an earlier decision (Watson v. Jones) the Supreme Court ruled that the courts may not interpret ecclesiastical questions. By determining that the U.S. Presbyterian Church had strayed from its original tenants, the Superior Court decided which beliefs were essential to the faith. It should be left to the people involved to decide which of these tenants were central to their religious beliefs. While civil courts can make decisions involving church property, "First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice." If the courts involve themselves with analyzing a faith's tenants, there is a danger of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine. The Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional for courts to make decisions regarding which beliefs were essential to a religious group. While making this decision, the Court reaffirmed its right to involve itself in making decisions relating to church property.

Prince v. Massachusetts APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS PLYMOUTH COUNTY

No. 98 Argued: December 14, 1943 --- Decided: January 31, 1944

MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE delivered the opinion of the Court. Facts: The case brings for review another episode in the conflict between Jehovah's Witnesses and state authority. This time Sarah Prince appeals from convictions for violating Massachusetts' child labor laws, by acts said to be a rightful exercise of her religious convictions. When the offenses were committed, she was the aunt and custodian of Betty M. Simmons, a girl nine years of age. Originally, there were three separate complaints. They were, shortly, for (1) refusal to disclose Betty's identity and age to a public officer whose duty was to enforce the statutes; (2) furnishing her with magazines, knowing she was to sell them unlawfully, that is, on the street, and (3) as Betty's custodian, permitting her to work contrary to law. The complaints were made, respectively, pursuant to 79, 80 and 81 of Chapter 149, Gen.Laws of Mass. (Ter. Ed.). The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction under the first complaint on state grounds, but sustained the judgments founded on the other two.

They present the only questions for our decision. These are whether 80 and 81, as applied, contravene the Fourteenth Amendment by denying or abridging appellant's freedom of religion and by denying to her the equal protection of the laws. Issue: Whether or not state's child labor laws violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to exercise her religion and her equal protection rights. Held: It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in such use, streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other things, this difference may be magnified. This is so not only when children are unaccompanied, but certainly to some extent when they are with their parents. What may be wholly permissible for adults therefore may not be so for children, either with or without their parents' presence. We think that, with reference to the public proclaiming of religion, upon the streets and in other similar public places, the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults, as is true in the case of other freedoms, and the rightful boundary of its power has not been crossed in this case. In so ruling, we dispose also of appellant's argument founded upon denial of equal protection. It falls with that based on denial of religious freedom, since, in this instance, the

one is but another phrasing of the other. Shortly, the contention is that the street, for Jehovah's Witnesses and their children, is their church, since their conviction makes it so, and to deny them access to it for religious purposes, as was done here, has the same effect as excluding altar boys, youthful choristers, and other children from the edifices in which they practice their religious beliefs and worship. The argument hardly needs more than statement, after what has been said, to refute it. However Jehovah's Witnesses may conceive them, the public highways have not become their religious property merely by their assertion. And there is no denial of equal protection in excluding their children from doing there what no other children may do. Our ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case presents. We neither lay the foundation "for any [that is, every] state intervention in the indoctrination and participation of children in religion" which may be done "in the name of their health and welfare" nor give warrant for "every limitation on their religious training and activities." The religious training and indoctrination of children may be accomplished in many ways, some of which, as we have noted, have received constitutional protection through decisions of this Court. These and all others except the public proclaiming of religion on the streets, if this may be taken as either training or indoctrination of the proclaimer, remain unaffected by the decision. In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld Massachusetts restriction on the abilities of children to sell religious literature.

The State has a broad power to oversee the acts of children. Parental authority may be restricted when doing so is in the interests of a childs welfare. While children share many of the rights of adults, they face different potential harms from similar activities. The main issue the Court must resolve is whether the parents presence makes it permissible for the child to perform an activity that would otherwise be prohibited. In finding that the dangers would still exist, the state is free to legislate against this activity in which it would be appropriate for adults to engage. This law does not constitute a restriction of religious freedom because the streets are not part of the Jehovahs Witnesses property. Of particular interest is the conclusion of Rutledges opinion in which he states that the state law does not restrict the Jehovahs Witnesses religious freedom because the activity being outlawed occurs on public property. The religious significance of the act is minimized because of the venue in which it occurred rather than basing the evaluation on the nature of the act itself.

SHERBERT v. VERNER, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) 374 U.S. 398 SHERBERT v. VERNER ET AL., MEMBERS OF SOUTH CAROLINA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA. No. 526. Argued April 24, 1963. Decided June 17, 1963. Facts: Appellant, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. She was unable to obtain other employment because she would not work on Saturday, and she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, which provides that a claimant is ineligible for benefits if he has failed, without good cause, to accept available suitable work when offered him. The State Commission denied appellant's application on the ground that she would not accept suitable work when offered, and its action was sustained by the State Supreme Court. Held: As so applied, the South Carolina statute abridged appellant's right to the free exercise of her religion, in violation of the First Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. When she was unable to obtain other employment because from conscientious scruples she would not take Saturday work, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act. That law provides that, to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be "able to work and . . . available for work" and, further that a claimant is ineligible for benefits "[i]f. . . he has failed, without good cause . . . to accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment office or the employer . . . ." The appellee Employment Security Commission, in administrative proceedings under the statute, found that appellant's restriction upon her availability for Saturday work brought her within the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers who fail, without good cause, to accept "suitable work when offered. . . by the employment office or the employer . . ." The Commission's finding was sustained by the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County. That court's judgment was in turn affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which rejected appellant's contention that, as applied to her, the disqualifying provisions of the South Carolina statute abridged her right to the free exercise of her religion secured under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. The State Supreme Court held specifically that appellant's ineligibility infringed no constitutional liberties because such a construction of the statute "places no restriction upon the appellant's freedom of religion nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her conscience." We noted probable

[jurisdiction of appellant's appeal. We reverse the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Issues: Whether or not the States decision to deny her benefits placed an infringement on her constitutional right to practice her religion Whether or not the States decision protect a compelling state interest Held: There are two questions that need to be considered. First, The Court finds that there is clearly an infringement on the womans right to free exercise because she was placed in the position of having to choose between the benefits and her religious tenants. Receipt of the unemployment benefits should not be conditional on certain religious decisions. The State has no compelling reason for denying the woman benefits. The chance of fraudulent filings is not a serious enough concern to limit the free exercise rights of citizens. By allowing Seventh Day Adventists the same rights as people of other faiths, the Court is merely imposing neutrality rather than giving them special rights. The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such, Government may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities, nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the

dissemination of particular religious views,. On the other handthe Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for "even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions." The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. Plainly enough, appellant's conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation. If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate . . . ." The Supreme Court ruling 7-2 in favor of the womans right to refuse to work on her Sabbath without relinquishing her right to unemployment benefits. This decision forced states to recognize the unique requirements of various faith traditions. Recognizing these special needs does not constitute an endorsement of any of these religions. The Court limited the scope of its opinion by stating, Nor do we, by our

decision today, declare the existence of a constitutional right to unemployment benefits on the part of all persons whose religious convictions are the cause of their unemployment.

UNITED STATES v. BALLARD, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) 322 U.S. 78 UNITED STATES v. BALLARD et al. No. 472.

Argued March 3 and 6, 1944. Decided April 24, 1944. Facts: Respondents were indicted and convicted for using, and conspiring to use, the mails to defraud. The indictment was in twelve counts. It charged a scheme to defraud by organizing and promoting the I Am movement through the use of the mails. The charge was that certain designated corporations were formed, literature distributed and sold, funds solicited, and memberships in the I Am movement sought 'by means of false and fraudulent representations, pretenses and promises'. The false representations charged were eighteen in number. It is sufficient at this point to say that they covered respondents' alleged religious doctrines or beliefs. They were all set forth in the first count.

Guy W. Ballard, now deceased, alias Saint Germain, Jesus, George Washington, and Godfre Ray King, had been selected and thereby designated by the alleged 'ascertained masters,' Saint Germain, as a divine messenger; and that the words of 'ascended masters' and the words of the alleged divine entity, Saint Germain, would be transmitted to mankind through the medium of the said Guy W. Ballard; that Guy W. Ballard, during his lifetime, and Edna W. Ballard, and Donald Ballard, by reason of their alleged high spiritual attainments and righteous conduct, had been selected as divine messengers through which the words of the alleged 'ascended masters,' including the alleged Saint Germain, would be communicated to mankind under the teachings commonly known as the 'I Am' movement; that Guy W. Ballard, during his lifetime, and Edna W. Ballard and Donald Ballard had, by reason of supernatural attainments, the power to heal persons of ailments and diseases and to make well persons afflicted with any diseases, injuries, or ailments, and did falsely represent to persons intended to be defrauded that the three designated persons had the ability and power to cure persons of those diseases normally classified as curable and also of diseases which are ordinarily classified by the medical profession as being incurable diseases; and did further represent that the three designated persons had in fact cured either by the activity of one, either, or all of said persons, hundreds of persons afflicted with diseases and ailments;'

Issue:

Whether or not the defendants honestly and in good faith believe those things

Held: Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law. Obviously if the question whether the religious experiences in fact occurred could not constitutionally have been submitted to the jury the court rightly withdrew it. If it could have been submitted I know of no reason why the parties could not, with the advice of counsel, assent to its withdrawal from the jury. And where, as here, the indictment charges two sets of false statements, each independently sufficient to sustain the conviction, I cannot accept respondents' contention that the withdrawal of one set and the submission of the other to the jury amounted to an amendment of the indictment.

The Court ruled that it was proper for the jury to base its decision on the sincerity of Ballard's beliefs. The content of the teachings of the 'I Am' movement were immaterial. These beliefs could not be an issue in any case because the content of religious convictions could not be judged as either correct or incorrect. Because of the First Amendment, heresy is an unknown offense in the United States. All that mattered was whether Ballard believed in good faith that he possessed the powers he claimed to have. If this was so, then he must be acquitted. This decision prevented juries from considering whether a person's religious beliefs were true. So long as the person accepted them in good faith, it is improper for the state to attempt to determine they are logical.

U.S. v. MACINTOSH, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) 283 U.S. 605 UNITED STATES v. MACINTOSH. No. 504.

Argued April 27, 1931. Decided May 25, 1931. Facts: The respondent was born in the Dominion of Canada. He came to the United States in 1916, and in 1925 declared his intention to become a citizen. His petition for naturalization was presented to the federal District Court for Connecticut, and that court, after hearing and consideration, denied the application upon the ground that, since petitioner would not promise in advance to bear arms in defense of the United States unless he believed the war to be morally justified, he was not attached to the principles of the Constitution. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree and directed the District Court to admit respondent to citizenship. 42 F.(2d) 845.

The Naturalization Act, 4, provides that an alien may be admitted to citizenship in the manner therein provided and not otherwise. By section 3 of the same act, jurisdiction to naturalize aliens is conferred upon the District Courts of the United States and other enumerated courts of record. The applicant is required to make and file a preliminary declaration in writing setting forth, among other things, his intention to become a citizen of the United States and to renounce all allegiance to any foreign prince, etc. Section 4 of the act. Issue: Whether or not the terms of the oath are to be taken as necessarily implying an assurance of willingness to bear arms, so that one whose conscientious convictions or belief of supreme allegiance to the will of God will not permit him to make such an absolute promise cannot take the oath and hence is disqualified for admission to citizenship. Held: In examining the requirements for naturalization, we find that the Congress has expressly laid down certain rules which concern the opinions and conduct of the applicant. Thus it is provided that no person shall be naturalized 'who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the

Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of his or their official character, or who is a polygamist.' The respondent, Douglas Clyde Macintosh, entertained none of these disqualifying opinions and had none of the associations or relations disapproved. Among the specific requirements as to beliefs, we find none to the effect that one shall not be naturalized if thereason of his religious convictions he is opposed to war or is unwilling to promise to bear arms. In view of the questions which have repeatedly been brought to the attention of the Congress in relation to such beliefs, and having regard to the action of the Congress when its decision was of immediate importance in the raising of armies, the omission of such an express requirement from the naturalization statute is highly significant. Much has been said of the paramount duty to the state, a duty to be recognized, it is urged, even though it conflicts with convictions of duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the state exists within the domain of power, for government may enforce obedience to laws regardless of scruples. When one's belief collides with the power of the state, the latter is supreme within its sphere and submission or punishment follows. But, in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has always been maintained. The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, would unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and law-abiding citizens. The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation. In a 5-4 decision, the Court refused to allow a candidate for naturalization to qualify his oath by pledging only to fight in wars he deemed moral.

Naturalization is a privilege, to be given, qualified, or withheld as Congress may determine, and which the alien may claim as of right only upon compliance with the terms which Congress imposes. The oath is used to gauge whether the person is fitted for citizenship and all that it entails. While peace is a noble goal, Congress must have the power to decide when war is necessary and select who will fight in it. This right must not be qualified or limited. Congress, not the Courts, may decide who can claim to be a conscientious objector. Naturalized citizens must leave this to Congress just as native born Americans do already. [W]e are a nation with the duty to survive; a nation whose Constitution contemplates war as well as peace; whose government must go forward upon the assumption, and safely can proceed upon no other, that unqualified allegiance to the nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the land, as well those made for war as those made for peace, are not inconsistent with the will of God. The applicant should not be able to select the terms of his citizenship or it will become impossible to determine which sections of the citizenship oath are non-negotiable. This decision reasserted the importance of Congressional authority to dictate the terms of war. The slippery slope argument is used to prevent any qualifications being made to the terms of citizenship.

UNITED STATES v. SCHWIMMER, 279 U.S. 644 (1929) 279 U.S. 644 UNITED STATES v. SCHWIMMER. No. 484.

Argued April 12, 1929. Decided May 27, 1929. Facts: Respondent filed a petition for naturalization in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The court found her unable, without mental reservation, to take the prescribed oath of allegiance, and not attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and not well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same; and it denied her application. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree, and directed the District Court to grant respondent's petition. Respondent was born in Hungary in 1877 and is a citizen of the country. She came to the United States in August, 1921, to visit and lecture, has resided in Illinois since the latter part of that month, declared her intention to become a citizen the following November, and

filed petition for naturalization in September, 1926. On a preliminary form, she stated that she understood the principles of and fully believed in our form of government, and that she had read, and in becoming a citizen was willing to take, the oath of allegiance. Question 22 was this: 'If necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?' She answered: 'I would not take up arms personally.' She testified that she did not want to remain subject to Hungary, found the United States nearest her ideals of a democratic republic, and that she could whole-heartedly take the oath of allegiance. She said: 'I cannot see that a woman's refusal to take up arms is a contradiction to the oath of allegiance.' For the fulfillment of the duty to support and defend the Constitution and laws, she had in mind other ways and means. Issue: Whether or notnot the requirement could be construed in favour of the religious belief of the accused Held: In an 8-1 decision, the Court ruled that it was proper for Schwimmers application for citizenship be denied. The government has established statutes regulating who can become naturalized citizens because of the benefits it brings. Because of the great value of the privileges conferred by naturalization, the statutes prescribing qualifications and governing procedure

for admission are to be construed with definite purpose to favor and support the government. And, in order to safeguard against admission of those who are unworthy, or who for any reason fail to measure up to required standards, the law puts the burden upon every applicant to show by satisfactory evidence that he has the specified qualifications. The Court accepts the importance the government has assigned to being able to compel military service of its citizens if necessary. And their opinions and beliefs as well as their behavior indicating a disposition to hinder in the performance of that duty are subjects of inquiry under the statutory provisions governing naturalization and are of vital importance, for if all or a large number of citizens oppose such defense the 'good order and happiness' of the United States cannot long endure. The pacifism that Schwimmer professes may hinder her ability to develop the nationalism that the country attempts to foster. The reason for her pacifism is immaterial because she is not yet a citizen who possesses the rights of citizenship that allow for conscientious objection. The Court places great emphasis on the interest of the state to foster feelings of nationalism. It is proper for the country to prevent people who espouse feelings contrary to the nations interests from the privilege of naturalization.

UNITED STATES v. SEEGER, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) 380 U.S. 163 UNITED STATES v. SEEGER. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 50. Argued November 16-17, 1964. Decided March 8, 1965.* Facts: Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of New York of having refused to submit to induction in the armed forces. He was originally classified 1-A in 1953 by his local board, but this classification was changed in 1955 to 2-S (student) and he remained in this status until 1958 when he was reclassified 1-A. He first claimed exemption as a conscientious objector in 1957 after successive annual renewals of his student classification. Although he did not adopt verbatim the printed Selective Service System form, he declared that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his "religious" belief; that he preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open, "rather than answer `yes' or `no'"; that his "skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God" did "not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever"; that his was a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious

faith in a purely ethical creed." R. 69-70, 73. He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral integrity "without belief in God, except in the remotest sense." R. 73. His belief was found to be sincere, honest, and made in good faith; and his conscientious objection to be based upon individual training and belief, both of which included research in religious and cultural fields. Seeger's claim, however, was denied solely because it was not based upon a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being" as required by 6 (j) of the Act. At trial Seeger's counsel admitted that Seeger's belief was not in relation to a Supreme Being as commonly understood, but contended that he was entitled to the exemption because "under the present law Mr. Seeger's position would also include definitions of religion which have been stated more recently," R. 49, and could be "accommodated" under the definition of religious training and belief in the Act, R. 53. He was convicted and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the section distinguished "between internally derived and externally compelled beliefs" and was, therefore, an "impermissible classification" under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Issue: Whether or notthe law unfairly did not exempt non-religious conscientious objectors and that it discriminated between different forms of religious beliefs.

Held: In summary, Seeger professed "religious belief" and "religious faith." He did not disavow any belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being"; indeed he stated that "the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence." He decried the tremendous "spiritual" price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life. In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity with which he held them, we think the Board, had it applied the test we propose today, would have granted him the exemption. We think it clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers. The decision must be based on the definition of Supreme Being and determine whether it includes the theism that the parties involved espouse. Specifically, the intent of Congress in the wording of the language must be determined. The use of the term Supreme Being appears to have been used to distinguish religious beliefs from social, political, or philosophical beliefs which are not allowed to be used for conscientious objections. The statements of a variety of theologians support the notion that religious belief encompasses a variety of interpretations of reality. The question to be asked to assess which beliefs are considered religious is, It is essentially an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?Weight must be given to the claims of individuals when determining whether their beliefs are religious.

This decision establishes an expansive definition of what constitutes religious-type beliefs. Provided that the belief is not strictly personal and the person claims that the beliefs serve the same function as a traditional religious belief, the state should recognize its validity. As a result, when applying for status as a conscientious objector, believers in nontraditional variances of monotheism are offered the same rights as people of traditional faiths.

WELSH v. UNITED STATES, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) 398 U.S. 333 WELSH v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 76. Argued January 20, 1970 Decided June 15, 1970 Facts: Petitioner was convicted of refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces despite his claim for conscientious objector status under 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. That provision exempts from military service persons who by reason of "religious training and belief" are conscientiously opposed to war in any form, that term being defined in the Act as "belief in a relation to a supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation" but not including "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal code." In his exemption application petitioner stated that he could not affirm or deny belief in a "Supreme Being" and struck the words "my religious training and" from the form. He affirmed that he held deep conscientious scruples against participating in wars where people were killed. The Court of Appeals, while noting that petitioner's "beliefs are held with the strength of more traditional

religious convictions," concluded that those beliefs were not sufficiently "religious" to meet the terms of 6 (j), and affirmed the conviction. Petitioner contends that the Act violates the First Amendment prohibition of establishment of religion and that his conviction should be set aside on the basis of United States v. Seeger, which held that the test of religious belief under 6 (j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption. Held: The judgment is reversed. Issue: Whether or not the sincerity of belief should qualify him for exemption from military duty under the Universal Military Training and Service Act. Held: In a 5-3 decision, the Court allowed Welsh to be declared a conscientious objector even though he declared that his opposition to war was not based on religious convictions. This case has many similarities to the Seeger decision in which a person was exempted from military service because his views were based on a his views of an ultimate reality. The Selective Service identifies two differences between the cases. First, Welsh insisted that his views were not religious. He crossed out the word religious on the application form and said his views were formed by reading in the fields of history and sociology. The Court rejects this claim because it places too much emphasis on the interpretation by the individual of his

beliefs. Although an individuals assertion that his views are religious is to be regarded highly, the opposite proclamation is not to be similarly viewed. The other distinction the Selective Service identified was that Welshs views were political in nature. This ignore the depth of Welshs beliefs. Under this interpretation, the Universal Military and Service Act, exempts from military service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war. This decision greatly expands the types of beliefs that can be used to obtain conscientious objector status. The depth and fervency of the beliefs are critical to determining which views exempt an individual from military service.

WEST VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BARNETTE, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 319 U.S. 624 WEST VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. v. BARNETTE et al. No. 591.

Argued March 11, 1943. Decided June 14, 1943. Facts: The Board of Education on January 9, 1942, adopted a resolution containing recitals taken largely from the Court's Gobitis opinion and ordering that the salute to the flag become 'a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools,' that all teachers and pupils 'shall be required to participate in the salute honoring the Nation represented by the Flag; provided, however, that refusal to salute the Flag be regarded as an Act of insubordination, and shall be dealt with accordingly.' The resolution originally required the 'commonly accepted salute to the Flag' which it defined. Objections to the salute as 'being too much like Hitler's' were raised by the Parent and Teachers Association, the Boy and Girl Scouts, the Red Cross, and the Federation of Women's Clubs. Some modification appears to

have been made in deference to these objections, but no concession was made to Jehovah's Witnesses. What is now required is the 'stiff-arm' salute, the saluter to keep the right hand raised with palm turned up while the following is repeated: 'I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.' Appellees, citizens of the United States and of West Virginia, brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated asking its injunction to restrain enforcement of these laws and regulations against Jehovah's Witnesses. The Witnesses are an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5. They consider that the flag is an 'image' within this command. For this reason they refuse to salute it. Children of this faith have been expelled from school and are threatened with exclusion for no other cause. Officials threaten to send them to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles. Parents of such children have been prosecuted and are threatened with prosecutions for causing delinquency. Issue: Whether or not the decision in Gobitis should apply in the case at bar Held:

In an 8-1 decision, the Court ruled that the school district violated the rights of students by forcing them to salute the American flag. The refusal of the students to say the pledge did not infringe on the rights of other students. The flag salute required students to declare a belief that was contrary to their faiths. The state did not claim that a clear and present danger would be created if the students remained passive during the pledge. Unlike the decision in Gobitis, this Court does not believe that allowing an individual's rights to be supported over government authority is a sign of a weak government. "Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities." Finally, compulsion is not a legitimate means for creating national unity. This decision directly reversed the Court's earlier decision in Gobitis. In this case, the Court saw the forced salute as compelling the students to assert a belief contrary to their faiths. The minimal harm created by lack of compliance is not great enough to dismiss the rights of the students to exercise their religions.

CANTWELL v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)

310 U.S. 296

CANTWELL et al. v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT. No. 632.

Argued March 29, 1940. Decided May 20, 1940.

Mr. Hayden C. Covington, of New York City, for appellants and petitioners.

Messrs. Edwin S. Pickett, of New Haven, Conn., and Francis A. Pallotti, of Hartford, Conn, for appellee and respondent.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS, delivered the opinion of the Court.

Facts:

Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell, members of a group known as Jehovah's witnesses, and claiming to be ordained ministers, were arrested in New Haven, Connecticut, and each was charged by information in five counts, with statutory and common law offenses. After trial in the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County each of them was convicted on the third count, which charged

a violation of 6294 of the General Statutes of Connecticut,1 and on the fifth count, which charged commission of the common law offense of inciting a breach of the peace. On appeal to the Supreme Court the conviction of all three on the third count was affirmed. The conviction of Jesse Cantwell, on the fifth count, was also affirmed, but the conviction of Newton and Russell on that count was reversed and a new trial ordered as to them.

The appellants claimed that their activities were not within the statute but consisted only of distribution of books, pamphlets, and periodicals. The State Supreme Court construed the finding of the trial court to be that 'in addition to the sale of the books and the distribution of the pamphlets the defendants were also soliciting contributions or donations of money for an alleged religious cause, and thereby came within the purview of the statute. It overruled the contention that the Act, as applied to the appellants, offends the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it abridges or denies religious freedom and liberty of speech and press. The court stated that it was the solicitation that brought the appellants within the sweep of the Act and not their other activities in the dissemination of literature. It declared the legislation constitutional as an effort by the State to protect the public against fraud and imposition in the solicitation of funds for what purported to be religious, charitable, or philanthropic causes.

Issue:

Whether or not the state's action in convicting the Cantwells with inciting a breach

of the peace and violating the solicitation statute violated their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.

Held: The Court ruled that the statute requiring a license to solicit for religious purposes was a prior restraint that vested the state with excessive power in determining which groups must obtain a license. Also, the Cantwells did not pose a threat to public order by spreading their message.

The statute denies these individuals their due process rights. The state is not permitted to place this prior restraint on those who seek to solicit contributions. The activity is not restricted because of its potential for harm, as is evidenced by the fact that the act could be performed after obtaining a permit. The statute gives the secretary of public welfare the power to determine which groups are religious and therefore, who must obtain a permit before soliciting contributions. "Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and included in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth." Even if an error by the secretary can be corrected by the courts, the process still serves as an unconstitutional prior restraint. "[T]o condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon

the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution." The Cantwells should not be convicted of posing a threat to public order because they were merely sharing their ideas. When several Catholics became upset at the message one of the sons immediately left the scene in order to avoid a physical confrontation.

This decision made it impermissible for states to place special requirements on people engaged in spreading a religious message. Also, sharing one's message in an unfriendly environment does not necessarily pose a threat to public order.