Right to Form Associations SSS vs CA Facts: the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded

the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS.The Public Sector Labor - Management Council ordered the strikers to return to work but the strikers refused to return to work. SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues SSS advances the view that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike. Issue:Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike? Held: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution

would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions: Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. The terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions and not those employed in proprietary functions of the Government including but not limited to governmental corporations. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the matter. To implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees ... enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their

right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes? The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. Sec. 12 Custodial Investigation GAMBOA VS. CRUZ Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged of robbery. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition. Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated. Held: No. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition

either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel. When petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer. Since petitioner in the course of his identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The right to counsel attaches at the start of investigation against a respondent and, therefore, even before adversary judicial proceedings against the accused have begun. While the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 11 The case at bar is far from this situation. PEOPLE vs. EDUARDO MACAM G.R. Nos. L-91011-12 November 24, 1994 QUIASON, J. Facts: Ernesto Macam, together with the other accused, went to his uncle, Benito Macam's house in QC.Benito invited them over for lunch and thereupon, Eduardo Macam suddenly grabbed the

clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled out Benito's gun and after they announced a hold-up, they started ransacking the place and looking for valuables. As a result, Leticia Macam was killed and Benito Macam, NiloAlcantara, and SalvacionEnrera were stabbed. Initially, all the accused pleaded not quilty. Later on, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., assisted by their respective counsels, changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty". The trial proceeded with respect to Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. and appellants. Of the latter, only DaniloRoque testified. RTC of QC found DaniloRoque and Ernesto Roque guilty beyond reasonable doubt of teh crime of Robbery w/ Homicide and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It appears that the security guards at the factory of the father of accused Eduardo Macam detained appellants. They were later brought to the Quezon City Police Headquarters for investigation. Since they refused to admit their participation in the commission of the crime, appellants were then brought to the Quezon City General Hospital and were made to line-up together with several policemen in civilian clothes. SalvacionEnrera, Benito Macam and NiloAlcantara, who were confined at the hospital for injuries sustained during the robbery, were asked to pinpoint the perpetrators. At that time, appellants were handcuffed and bore contusions on their faces caused by the blows inflicted on them by the police investigators. Appellants contend that their arrest without a warrant and their uncounseled identification by the prosecution witnesses during the police line-up at the hospital are violative of their constitutional rights under Section 12, Article 3 of the Constitution. Issue: Whether Art III Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution was violated Ruling: SC held that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information, confessions or admissions from the accused. It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before the trial.

The law enforcement machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the proceedings. After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench where the police officers first talked to the victims before the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification. Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces. However, prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identification at the police lineup. Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled accused cannot be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made the identification of appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again identified appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by the illegal line-up. The arrest of appellants was made without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. However, appellants are estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest because the issue was only raised for the first time before the SC. Decision was affirmed. People v Judge Ayson 175 SCRA 216 (1989) Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the

Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal. Issue: whether accused was under custodial investigation. Held:NO. Right Against Self-Incrimination The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself". It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty. That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It

follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. Rights in Custodial Interrogation Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against selfincrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative. Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include: 1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. 2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. 3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights." The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is

within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Question: whether the rights just discussed, apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime. Ans:NO. A defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court. But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor)possesses the right against selfincrimination. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. In other words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him." If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right. But if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters stated in his direct examination, or connected therewith. He may not on crossexamination refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the

evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged. It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against self-incrimination. In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 1)BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and 2)AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT 37 a)to refuse to be a witness; b)not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; c)to testify in his own behalf, subject to crossexamination by the prosecution; d)WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted. It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONILO PINLAC Y LIBAO G.R. Nos. 74123-24 September 26, 1988 PARAS, J. Facts: RoniloPinlac was charged with the crime of robbery for breaking into the house of Koji Sato (Japanese National) and the crime of robbery with homicide for breaking into the house of Sato's neighbor Saeki Osamu (Japanese National) and and killing the latter. Osamu's maid, Evelyn Salomea, was investigated. She revealed that she saw Pinlac enter the house of

Sato at seven o'clock in the evening, although she did not see him leave thereafter and that Jandayan (Sato's housemaid) has knowledge of the address of Marcelino (Sato's Cook and Pinlac's wife). Subsequently, the policemen went to Marcelino's residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and, finding Pinlac thereat, invited him to the police station. On the other hand, Pinlac stated that he never left the premises of his house and that three policemen came to his house in Taguig and arrested him without any warrant of arrest shown to him despite his demand. He was ordered to reenact according to what the police theorized how the crime was committed. During the investigation at the Police Headquarters in Makati, Metro Manila, he was tortured and forced to admit the crimes charged; and as a result of that unbearable physical torture and as a result, he was forced to succumbed to the wishes of the policemen and signed their prepared confession. The prosecution's evidence relied on circumstantial evidence and was thoroughly explained by the defense. The only evidence presented by the prosecution which could have been fatal, is the extra-judicial confession of the accused, which is now being assailed as violative of the Constitution. Issue: Whether Pinlacs Constitutional Rights were violated Ruling: The SC reiterated the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, .... He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid

down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence. When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. The Fiscal has the duty to adduce evidence that there was compliance with the duties of an interrogating officer. As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence. SC ruled that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove compliance with the constitution. Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. Petitioner was acquitted. People vs Bolanos Facts: The police boarded the two accused Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay in their jeep and proceeded to the police station of Balagtas, Bulacan to be investigated, on the way the accused told the police, after he was asked by the police if he killed the victim, that he killed the victim(Oscar Pagdalian) because the victim was abusive. During the trial, it was clearly established that the alleged oral admission of the appellant was given without the

assistance of counsel as it was made while on board the police vehicle on their way to the police station. Issue: was the extrajudicial confession valid? Held: No. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families. (Emphasis supplied). Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for the conviction, the accuse must be acquitted. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997 PER CURIAM Facts: Accused-appellant PablitoAndan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. The prosecution established that the victim MarrianeGuevarra, nursing student, was walking along the subdivision in Bulacan when Andan invited her inside his house under the pretext

that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken only to find out that there was no one in the house which resulted to commission of the crime. The body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin. Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to appellant. The police team led by Mayor Trinidad found the accused at his parent's house and he was taken aboard a patrol jeep and was brought to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. Upon physical examination, accused was found to sustain multiple scratches on the neck, chest and back. People and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarinmoako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son,

appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. On the arraignment however, accused pleaded not guilty. He also claims that the confession he made was coerced. RTC found Andan guilty and the case was escalated to the SC on automatic review. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in admitting the testimonies of the police investigators, reporters and the mayor on the alleged admission of the accused during the custodial investigation the accused not being assisted by counsel in violation of the constitution Ruling: Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired. The rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. This covers "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government."

It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Thus the SC held that the Andan's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court. Andan's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The confessions to the reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. The SC ruled that the appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. Andan was found guilty.

Navallo vs Sandiganbayan Facts: accused who is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, held in trust moneys and/or properties of the government and with intent to gain misappropriate said funds to his own private benefit. Meanwhile, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.The RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan convicted him of malversation of public funds. The Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Norte, Antonio Espino, made a preliminary audit examination of cash and other accounts of Ernesto Navallo (then Collecting and Disbursing Officer of Numancia National Vocational School). Espino found Navallo to be short of P16,483.62. He was asked to sign the cash count to document the shortage. Issue: was the audit examination equivalent to custodial investigation? Held: No. Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," which we have since defined as any "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENNY DY G.R. No. 74517 February 23, 1988 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. Facts: Christian Langel y Philippe, a Swiss tourist who was vacationing on Boracay with his sister and some friends incurred a gunshot would on the neck which caused his death. A police report was filed a day after the crime was committed and Benny Dy, with caliber .38 was made suspect to the shooting incident. And so Dy was charged with the crime of

murder with the use of unlicensed firearm and he was found guilty by the trial court. Prosecution presented evidence to the effect that in the early morning after the incident, the Accused confessed orally to Pat. Rodolfo Padilla, the operator of the radio station on the Island, and voluntarily surrendered the gun he had used in shooting the victim. The sequence of events presented by the prosecution then discloses that together with Pat, Manuel Casimiro, Pat. Padilla accompanied Benny Dy to the police headquarters at the Poblacion of Malay. At the police headquarters, Pat. Padilla gave the gun surrendered by Benny Dy to Chief of Police Ariston Tambong who in turn handed it over to police supply officer Pat. Romulo Sijano for safekeeping. The defense version, on the other hand, professes the innocence of the Accused, denies his presence inside the bar during the shooting, and attributes the offense to an unrecognized person. The accused stoutly denied having made any oral confession alleging that he went to Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that a boy helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning. The Accused argues that even if he did make such a confession, the same would be inadmissible in evidence. Issue: Whether Dy's oral confession is admissible Ruling: The fact of Appellant's surrender is further borne out by the Order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge, Judge Tonel dated 17 May 1984, categorically reciting that "no warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is already under police custody before the filing of the complaint." It would have been at variance with ordinary voluntarily placed himself human behavior for Appellant to have under police custody absent any culpability for any offense. Contrary to the defense contention, the oral confession made by the accused to Pat. Padilla that he had shot a tourist' and that the gun he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he wanted surrendered to the Chief of Police is competent evidence against him. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be given in evidence against him. It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res

gestae. The rule is that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given an ordinary manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. The Trial Court, therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case. Dy was convicted. People vsAlicando Facts: ArnelAlicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide for the death of Khazie Mae. Appellant pleaded guilty. Upon his arrest, he verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. Issue: was the arraignment and confession valid? Held: In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The arraignment of the appellant is a nullity. It violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant.

The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of conducting a "searching inquiry The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were framed in English yet there is no inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that the trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone. Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full comprehension of the consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned the appellant he would get the mandatory death penalty without explaining the meaning of "mandatory" It did not inform the appellant of the indemnity he has to pay for the death of the victim. We stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence uncounselled confession or admission. In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel despite the blatant violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his

uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death. It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant. We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is also inadmissible. The pillow and the t-shirt were not examined by any expert. To hold that they were human bloodstains is guesswork. For another, there was no testimony that the stains were caused by either the blood of the appellant or the victim. In addition, there was no testimony that the t-shirt was the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly committed the crime. It must also be noted that it is not unnatural for appellant to have bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by occupation. The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof that rested on the prosecution. Sec.13 Right to Bail PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PROCORO J. DONATO Facts: Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code. That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities as leaders of the NDF-NPA organizations, in conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the organizations aforementioned, engaged themselves in war against the forces of the government, destroying property or committing

serious violence, and other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful purpose. His petition for bail was denied. Prosecution contends that it would be dangerous to grant bail to private respondent considering his stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy and that his release would allow his return to his organization to direct its armed struggle to topple the government before whose courts he invokes his constitutional right to bail. Issue: should petitioner be granted bail? Was there a valid waiver for the right to bail? Held: (1) yes. As to petitioners grant of bail: True, there now appears a clash between the accused's constitutional right to bail in a non-capital offense, which right is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and the paramount interest of the state. Suffice to state that the Bill of Rights, one of which is the right to bail, is a "declaration of the rights of the individual, civil, political and social and economic, guaranteed by the Constitution against impairment or intrusion by any form of governmental action. To this Court, in case of such conflict as now pictured by the prosecution, the same should be resolved in favor of the individual who, in the eyes of the law, is alone in the assertion of his rights under the Bill of Rights as against the State. Anyway, the government is that powerful and strong, having the resources, manpower to fight those "who oppose, threaten and destroy a just and orderly society and its existing civil and political institutions." The prosecution's fear may or may not be founded that the accused may later on jump bail and rejoin his comrades in the field to sow further disorders and anarchy against the duly constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear cannot be a reason to deny him bail. For the law is very explicit that when it comes to bailable offenses an accused is entitled as a matter of light to bail. Dura lexsedlex. Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the application for bail were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which the private respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of the application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the petition for bail.

We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution . Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations which necessitate a grant of an opportunity to be heard for the purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not for the denial thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule 114 does not authorize any court to deny bail. It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer punishable by prision mayor. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990 amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalty for rebellion to reclusion perpetua. This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its effectivity. It is not favorable to him. " II. We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail. Private respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal custody even during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his right to bail." Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of the court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the

stipulation concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal custody and court having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in custody. Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail. But, is such waiver valid? Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides: Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it." As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: . . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word "waiver" covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with

and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large. . . . Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived. While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver. Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the state, as well as the accused, is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived; those of the second may be. It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action which would be invalid if taken against his will." We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private respondent. Commendadorvs De villa Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal they have taken before the court invoking that military officers are an

exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court. Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail. Held: We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows: The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system. National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and do not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians. RICARDO L. MANOTOC,Jr. vs. COURT OF APPEALS Issue: Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?

Facts: Petitioner as president of Manotoc Securities, Imc. was charged with estafa for accepting fake certificates of Torrens title. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Held:NO.A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the

person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state. If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will show that it is solely predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the United States where he will, allegedly attend to some business transactions and search for business opportunities. From the tenor and import of petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is absolute necessity for him to travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no indication that the alleged business transactions could not be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is there any hint that petitioner's absence from the United States would absolutely preclude him from taking advantage of business opportunities therein, nor is there any showing that petitioner's non-presence in the United States would cause him irreparable damage or prejudice. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. Facts: The Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Meanwhile, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by

petitioner. Muoz filed a petition for bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, Jr. holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high flight risk. After Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge. Issue: should the right to bail be granted to an extradite? Held: Yes. While this Court in Purganan case limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order. First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the

Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition.It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a

motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. The time-honored principle of pactasuntservanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Sec. 14 Criminal Due Process Galman vs Sandiganbayan Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military

investigators reported within a spanof three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknownand was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communisthired gunman, and thatthe military escorts gunned him down in turn.President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses ofpeople who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice andfreedom.The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version statingthat "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations.Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy'sassassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only differencebetween the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondentsabove-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman'sminority report would exclude nineteen of them.Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision inthe two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue therestraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply torespondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit acopy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution. But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-twovote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (whichapparently was not served on them).Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process. However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of

merit. Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process. Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. Was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to seethe President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moronalamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres.Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'. The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stagemanaged in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of theAquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also

predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondentsaccused of all criminal and civil liability.Pres.Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office. More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera," nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail.The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice. "Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaangconference(and revealed only

after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor. Sec. 14 Presumption of Innocence PEOPLE VS DRAMAYO

station themselves nearby. Only Dramayo and Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder. Hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or not the accuseds criminal liability was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Held: Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be,according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moral certainty. "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense." The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability. DUMLAO Vs . COMELEC

Facts: Dramayo brought up the idea of killing EstelitoNogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery ase where he is an accused. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to

Facts:PetitionerDumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas PambansaBlg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec.

4 provides that any retired elective provincial or municipal official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas PambansaBlg 52,which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact. Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should be declared null and void Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the need for new blood in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except

as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and oneagainst whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run forpublic office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have beenfiled against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crimewith the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code). And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, maybe rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of theelections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contraryproof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courtsrather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict offindings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, willthereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not beallowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionableportion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 ofBatasPambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansaBilang 52 is hereby declared validand that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas PambansaBilang 52 is herebydeclared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence

BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Facts: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position in the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition praying for the reversal of the resolution of the ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.

It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country. Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the COMELEC. COMELEC dismissed the petition. Issue: Was petitioner a fugitive from justice? Held: the phrase "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. Fugitive from justice does not only mean a person convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term fugitive from justice. FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE, PTE., LTD., by its agent, FEEDER INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.) INC., Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Court of Tax Appeals found the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" liable under Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 1464), as amended, and its cargo of 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil liable under Section 2530(a), (f), and (1-1) of the same Code and ordering the forfeiture of the said vessel and its cargo. The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore. The vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on said information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team to verify the report. The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping

documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboanga." In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. The petitioner then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the District Collector denied. Issue: Was petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law? Held:NO. It must be here emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such as those instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed. In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings, concerns the res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband or illegally imported goods. These merchandise violated the revenue law of the country, and as such, have been prevented from being assimilated in lawful commerce until corresponding duties are paid thereon and the penalties imposed and satisfied either in the form of fine or of forfeiture in favor of the government who will dispose of them in accordance with law. The importer or possessor is treated differently. The fact that the administrative penalty be falls on him is an inconsequential incidence to criminal liability. By the same token, the probable guilt cannot be negated simply because he was not held administratively liable. The Collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were transported in respondents' car and seized from their possession by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the information can only be determined in a separate criminal action. Respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases cannot deprive the State of its right to

prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In this case, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Government has sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been committed. Moreover, petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case. Sec. 14 right to be Heard by Himself and Counsel PEOPLE VS HOLGADO Facts:Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegalldetention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously andwithout justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one ArtemiaFabreag in the house of Antero Holgadofor about eight hours thereby depriving said ArtemiaFabreag of her personal liberty. He pleadedguilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter. Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.

criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard bycounsel. The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. Sec. 14 Right to be informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONNIE QUITLONG Facts: Accused was convicted of murder. That the several accused in the commission of the crime of murder against the victim, Jonathan Calpito, were in conspiracy. However, conspiracy was not alleged in the information filed. Notwithstanding this absence, the trial court ruled that conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of execution employed by the accused by means of abuse of superior strength as can be gleaned from the phrasing of the information. The information charging herein appellants for the death of Jonathan Calpito, as amended, has but simply stated: That on or about the 20th day of October 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO suddenly and

Held:Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. More so the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a

unexpectedly, without any warning whatsoever, inflicting upon him a stab wound, which directly caused his death. Issue: was the information properly charged accused of conspiracy? Held: No. Evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal consequences. It is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. Ratio: To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own

participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words conspired or confederated or the phrase acting in conspiracy, must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved as heretofore explained, an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and this criminal responsibility is individual and not collectiveAppellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by his own act of stabbing Calpito that caused the latter's death. The crime committed was qualified by abuse of superiority. SORIANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN Facts:Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned toinvestigate. In the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as pricefor dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an entrapment. Tan was given aPhp.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and aninformation was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decisionfinding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act(R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instantpetition. Issue: Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as contract ortransaction within the purview of .RA.3019. Held:R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of publicofficers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of anypublic officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting orreceiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for other person, inconnection with any contract or transaction between the Govt. and any other party wherein thepublic officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.The

petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPCand not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense chargedand is not included in the offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial or businesstransaction, but includes all kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative innature.The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by thepetitioner was neither a contract nor transaction. A transaction like a contract is one whichinvolves some consideration as in credit transactions. And this element is absent in theinvestigation conducted by the petitioner. Sec.14 Right to speedy, Impartial and Public Trial CONDE VS RIVERA Facts:Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond tono less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with herwitnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the causepostponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, afterthe passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems asfar away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.

theinformation, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.

Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions theaccused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has beendeprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition that, where aprosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendantagainst his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year,the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of