The Positivism Dispute as a Turning Point in German Post-War Theory Author(s): Agnes Heller and Mark Ritter Source:

New German Critique, No. 15 (Autumn, 1978), pp. 49-56 Published by: New German Critique Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/487905 Accessed: 05/03/2010 06:36
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The Positivism Dispute as a Turning Point in German Post-War Theory

by Agnes Heller

The year 1960 is often deemed a turning point in German post-war literature. According to this interpretation, the period between the so-called "nadir" of 1945 and the year 1960 did not bring forth any authentic new beginning. Two types of exile literature dominated the literary scene: the literatures of internal and of external exile. This literature concerned itself with historical events - and to some extent, on a high artistic level - but the forms of life and the problems of the present were not included as themes and, more importantly, it did not result in the creation of new literary forms. The new literary public sphere, a new form of reception of art, was created only in the 1960s and by the works published then. I wish to point out in the present essay that this was not only the case in literature: the new strivings in art cannot be abstracted from the overall atmosphere of cultural life. The same date (1960) was also a turning point in theoretical reflection, especially in sociology and philosophy. Prior to this date, sociology and philosophy in the Federal Republic were marked by the same characteristics as literature. We can distinguish three currents here. The first was the continuation of the philosophy and sociology of the 1920s and 1930s as represented by theorists, some of whom retreated into inner exile after a flirtation with Nazism or who lived from the outset in an ambiguous inner exile: Heidegger in philosophy and Gehlen in sociological anthropology are the biggest names here. The second current was represented by theories that had returned home from exile: their representatives continued elaborating theories that in truth had long since been worked out, but in so doing they emphasized despair and skepticism; this can be seen as a natural reaction to their isolated position in German cultural life and to their loss of hope during the Cold War period. This tendency was represented primarily by the Frankfurt School, that is, by the protagonists of that school who had returned to Germany from America. The third tendency (appearing first in sociology) was characterized by its imitation of American sociology. While its representatives adopted to some extent Parsons' functionalism, they adhered mainly to the methods and "little" theories of American empirical sociology. This simple transplantation of the "great victor's" methods, which was also intentionally encouraged by 49

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fellowship policies, dominated the scene in the Cologne school, but not only there: Hofstatter in Hamburg also worked with the models of ingroupoutgroup relations, and Dahrendorf was experimenting at the time - but only in part - with the current American role theory. The great German sociological tradition seemed sunk in complete hibernation. Part of the problem was the lack of a general theoretical public sphere: the schools isolated themselves and there were no methodological confrontations which might have encouraged the taking of general positions. The turning point was the positivism dispute. Of course, we must discuss further what was meant by "point." The dispute was in fact a process of reflection and self-reflection. In this process a new theoretical public sphere was created. The positivism dispute, in the broad sense of the word, lasted nearly ten years. Adorno took the first step in 1957: he was a good seismograph. The Cold War still held sway, but with sharp eyes one could already make out the end of the tunnel. The relative end of the dispute came in 1967. Relative, we say, because it resumed in the 1970s (in the LuhmannHabermas dispute), but on an entirely new level. At that later date the theoretical public sphere was already present. This is not, of course, due only to the positivism dispute; the overall events of 1968 in Europe contributed much to it. But the positivism dispute created the basic categorical machinery: everyone knew already what was at stake and what the theoretical conflicts meant practically. If I said that the physiognomy of the German theoretical public sphere was created in the positivism dispute, I did not intend to deny that this was an occasion that also had parallels in other European countries. Frequent reference is made to the Polish discussions in the German positivism dispute. But in France, too, something similar occurred. The debate between existentialism and structuralism had the same function in terms of theory. The socio-political implications were at first (compare the LeviStrauss-Sartre debate) not so far removed from those in Germany, but in the latter part of the debate they were characterized by shifts which were never part of the German debates. Although these parallelisms were obvious from the outside point of view of another culture, those participating in the discussions did not react to one another. Whether the mutual suspicion between the two cultures contributed to this is a question we must leave open, although it was asked on the German side (I am thinking of Lepenies, who responded theoretically to this rift). Although the positivism dispute is also of great importance from the point of view of the theoretical solutions and suggested solutions, we must limit ourselves primarily to a presentation of its function. This is all the more important because I myself am not neutral on the substantive issues of the debate. The attitudes of the anti-positivists are much closer to my own thinking than those of the positivists, even if I do not consider all the arguments of the former relevant.

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The first article in the dispute - Adorno's "Sociology and Empirical Research" ("Soziologie und empirische Forschung") - is an attack on American sociology, and through this mediation it is an attack on the "American way of life" as well. The suggestion that German sociology be freed entirely from American sociology gives the analysis overtones of pathos. At the same time the total rejection of American sociology is formulated as a stand against the Americanization of Germany. Both main tendencies of American sociology at the time were attacked. According to Adorno, Talcott Parsons' systems theory takes place on such a high level of abstraction that it lacks all value in terms of providing social understanding. Empirical sociology, which works with questionnaires, gathers the opinions of mere subjects and assumes that the statistical average of these opinions is truth and reality. Thus it identifies the fetishized reality with "reality in general" and becomes fetishistic itself, like the market relations it obeys. Sociology, however, which is supposed to penetrate fetishism, ought to be critical and at the same time explain the opinions in relation to the totality. We would like to mention only in passing that in his Negative Dialectics (formulated at the same time), Adorno totally rejects this concept of totality, and that this concept appears in this article in two quite different interpretations: first, as the ontological totality of the totally alienated world, and secondly as a method of the dialectical discovery of an understanding of the world, that is, in a negative and in a positive (Hegelian and Marxian) formulation. Like Parsons' systems theory, empirical sociology is also described and criticized as "positivism." For Adorno, positivism is characterized here by two features which are not necessarily linked together: one is the application of the methods of the natural sciences to society, the other is the notion that one presupposes that which exists positively to be absolutely existent. The question of value, which plays such an important part in the later discussion, does not yet appear here. This critique of the American sociology of that time was certainly called for. The question of whether the concept of positivism can be applied to so many and such different variants of sociology is one that we can with good conscience omit. We cannot, however, ignore one essential feature of this stand, namely the fact that the examples for an adequate and essential understanding of society stem, with one exception, from German thought. The exception is Allport, the first who ventured to transplant the German tradition to American soil. This is all the more important because, at the time when Adorno was formulating his credo, the forms of American sociology he rejected were being attacked by the American school of cultural criticism. C. Wright Mills was one of the leading figures in this school. This internal American dialogue, however, was completely absent from Adorno's field of view. We can explain this in part with the previously mentioned tendency: the intended goal was the emancipation from America and the initiation of a

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sociology rooted in the German tradition. But there is another tendency and motivation in the article, without which the next step in the positivism dispute cannot be understood. Let us follow the arguments. Adorno says: "No matter how positivistic the methods may be, they are implicitly based on an idea derived and generalized from the rules of democratic elections. It is the idea that the quintessence of the contents of people's consciousness and unconsciousness, which form a statistical universe, is key to an understanding of the social process." And again: "Empirical social research itself becomes an ideology, as soon as it posits public opinion as absolute. It is misled to do this by a nominalistic conception of truth which foists off the volonte de tous as truth itself, because no other truth can be derived." Naturally, Adorno immediately adds that the volonte generale has wrought even more havoc than the acceptance of the volonte de tous. But the solution that he proposes, that is, to judge the agreement or disagreement of opinions with relation to the matter at hand, is more than dubious, it puts the sociologist-philosopher, who is to check the agreement or disagreement of opinions, above the world that is to be analyzed. In light of the concurrent rejection of scientistic considerations, this presumes a volonte generale after all, one which is equated with the point of view of a dialectic critical theory. Consequently, Adorno's theory is itself ambiguous: it is aimed at mass democracy, and attacks not only the fetishism in it, but also its very democracy. It is not political democracy that is being attacked, but the method of a possible democratic production of theories. For that reason, it is small wonder that at the 1961 Tiibingen Work Session of the German Society for Sociology, where the real positivism dispute began, Dahrendorf found more agreement than disagreement between the papers given by Adorno and Popper. Empirical sociology is rejected by Popper as much as by Adorno, even though the rationale is different. For Popper, the original sin is not the application of scientific methods as such, but of obsolete methods. The sociology of knowledge (and its conception of historicity) are also rejected by both men. And when Popper confirms the irrationality of that which is value free (Wertfreiheit)as a value, there is no real debate here either. The conception of values as "reifications" - where even the value free appears as a reification on the same level - only underscores Adorno's defensive argumentation. After what was discussed above, it is plausible that the mutual politeness, which did not reflect the essential conceptual differences, was based in a common attitude: as Adorno places the philosopher-sociologist above the society, so Popper places the scientist above the same society. And while Adorno's understanding of the category of "critique" was universal (conceived of as critique of society in general) whereas it had a limited meaning for Popper (as a critique of theories), one must admit that the limited conception of critique can be fit more homogeneously than the universal one into the aristocratic attitude.

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The post-war generation also took part in this discussion, but it was dissatisfied with the results. For this generation the emancipation from liberal-positivistic American sociology was already a fait accompli. Three prerequisites for a new beginning were already present: the end of the Cold War, the creation of a theoretical public sphere and the existence of the postwar generation itself. As we shall see, the older generation also reacted in a lively way to the new situation, but the theoretical new beginning was taken over by the younger generation. In the period of the positivism dispute the new philosophy and sociology were launched almost entirely by the young theorists who had received their training from the Frankfurt School. The protagonist of this discussion was Jirgen Habermas, who proved in later years to be the most important figure of the post-war generation. Positivism was being defended by Hans Albert, a member of the Popper school. As is well known, the Popper school was subject to a strict discipline that offered no chance to work out and represent new thoughts in reaction to the German situation. That is why Luhmann's appearance in the second positivism dispute (which was not called this, but was nothing else) was so important for the German public. Habermas welcomed the appearance of the new opponent, because he filled a place that had previously been occupied only symbolically. Luhmann succeeded where Albert had not: in bringing a variety of positivism (specifically, systems theory) together with a German philosophicaltradition,Heideggerian philosophy. Thus at this time the theoretical presuppositions of Habermas proved to be true: that positivism must be thought of as a variant of irrationalism; if not in all of its forms, then at least in the form in which irrationalism had most recently established itself in Germany. Lacking an adequate opponent the participants in the first positivism dispute spoke past rather than with each other. Albert made no effort even to understand the positions of the other school, and Habermas was always forced to strike at the original source, Popper, which was more fruitful for the working out of his positions than it would have been to react to a second hand version of the same line of thought. Habermas was the only one in this discussion who understood the positions of the other side and scrutinized them in a fundamental way. As we shall see, Adorno had also failed to do that. For Habermas, who had meanwhile published his book on theory and practice, this discussion was a process of enlightenment and self-enlightenment. Albert's charge that in many respects Habermas had changed his position over the course of the debate speaks for and not against him. His first essay, "The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics" ("Analytische Wissenschaftstheorie und Dialektik") was written as a postscript to the controversy between Popper and Adorno, and was meant as a defense of Adorno's position. In one sense this contribution is still an interpretation of Adorno's line of thought. Most of the categories with which it operates come from Frankfurt thought; categories such as totality and dialectics occupy a central position here. But a shift of theoretical interests and of attitudes is

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already visible. First, the philosophy announced here is not thought of as a negative dialectics. A new type of positive dialectics is formulated here against positivism. Critique retains its central place, but the point of view from which we criticize, and the history for which we criticize, are defined more clearly and less ambiguously than is the case with Adorno. Habermas does not equate totality with reification as a possible application of the concept. The utopian element becomes stronger and the attitude of despair disappears entirely. In short: this philosophy is tailored to a social situation which can and should have a future. And for that very reason, an appreciation of the opponent's arguments is much more important for Habermas than it was for Adorno. As far as the interpretation of the social function of positivism is concerned, they are in agreement. But Habermas feels obliged to take seriously and work through the relationships between science and technology within the overall concept of the relation between means and end. Here he shares one leading idea with the positivists: the idea of progress. For him, progress is not conceived of as a scientific-technical process common to all of society, rather science and technology are included within a conception of progress. In his second contribution to the discussion, "Against a Positivistically Truncated Rationalism" ("Gegen einen positivistisch halbierten Rationalismus"), Habermas takes a furtherstep. The concept of totalitydisappearsalmost completely; the category of rational enlightenment is put in the center, and in contrast to Adorno the concept of identity is applied in a positive sense. "Under the conditions of reproduction in an industrial society, individuals who have only technical knowledge at their disposal, and can expect no rational enlightenment about themselves or the goals of their actions, would lose their identity," he writes. And he adds: "Their demythologized world would be full of demons, because power cannot be broken positivistically." The problem of value is also taken up again. In his first contribution, Habermas' argumentation with respect to this problem was still quite conventional; he showed that the notion of value free is in itself a postulation of value, something, incidentally, that was never denied by Popper. But here he goes further in a direction that will prove fruitful: he attacks the separation of science and ethics. Put simply: he criticizes the Popperian concept of ethics, where it is equated with the ethics of the scientist. Habermas also points to human needs, sufferings and motivations, the theoretical formulation of which as a process of enlightenment and selfenlightenment has had no place in positivistic theorizing and the positivistic attitude. The problem is once again not understood by Albert. In his reply he argues with an indubitably true assertion: "Science becomes possible precisely when there are social areas in which the interest in knowledge emancipates itself from such elementary needs," which, however, says nothing about the question that has been posed. The postulate that the scientist should emancipate himself from his own sufferings, motivations and need in his interest in knowledge, says nothing about whether these

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sufferings and needs should or should not become thematic in the theory, nor about whether people can or cannot relate these theories back to their own needs, sufferings and motivations, and, if so, in what way. In the course of the discussion, Habermas began to tie up with a tradition and way of thought other than that of Adorno: with American pragmatism, especially with the theoretical suggestions of Peirce. The ideas of communication and community are brought together. The communicative community of scientists is accepted as the starting point, and the extension of the concept to the idea of a universal communicative community, which plays the central role in the second positivism dispute, is already hinted at here. As we have seen, the starting point of the positivism dispute was the attack on American sociology. We also recall that the emancipation from the American way of thinking was simultaneously a critique of mass democracy and that this attack aimed at democracy itself. Habermas' reference to Peirce therefore has a symbolic significance. He criticizes not only the methodology and scientism in positivism, but also its skepticalliberal, yet antidemocratic position. By hooking up with Peirce, Habermas established a link with the values and traditions of democracy. The thematization of the life world and the idea, never explicitly pronounced but nonetheless supported, of the primacy of practical reason point, of course, in the same direction. The aristocratic attitude which - despite all theoretical differences - brought about the astonishing initial agreement in Adorno's and Popper's theses, disappeared entirely. The theory of society of the younger generation of the Frankfurt School (besides Habermas, one should mention Krahl, Negt, Wellmer and Offe here) is democratic: Marxism is understood as a democratic tradition. This does not, of course, mean that democratic theorizing was the only important one at the time, although other theorists (like Apel), who did not come out of the Frankfurt School in the narrow sense of the term, have assumed an important place in the development of this theorizing. It should not be forgotten that, at the beginning of the development of a new theoretical public sphere, Gadamer's book Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode) was published, a book which represented a new - and conservative - variety of hermeneutics. And neither should it be forgotten that, at the end of the same period, non-democratic leftist theorizing (though not represented by important names) gained strength and influence. But the debates about hermeneutics and Marcuse's theories already occurred within that theoretical public sphere that had been elaborated and to some extent created by the positivism dispute. When the contributions to the positivism dispute appeared in book form, Adorno wrote a preface and Albert a (short) postscript to it. Albert's postscript is characterized by the blindness of scholastic dogmatism. He does not recognize the social function and meaning of the debate at all. He complains that the book was put together in a biased way. He considers this scientific misconduct, rather than seeing it as an expression of the essential shift in the

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social atmosphere and in the process of self-reflection. Adorno's preface is the diametric opposite of the postscript. Functioning as a good seismograph, the grand old man of the Frankfurt School translates the entire discussion into social terms. Although he refers again and again to Habermas' arguments and quotes them approvingly, we must see that he was unaware of what was substantially new in the debate. The reference to the first appearance of the student movement already points to Adorno's sensitivity. Although essentially he discusses his old thoughts, a slight shift towards optimism is discernible. "In extending itself by virtue of its immanent dynamism to the living work of people, the principle of exchange turns itself of necessity into an objective inequality, that of classes. Tersely put, the contradiction is: in exchange everything is all right and at the same time not all right. Logical critique and the emphatically practical demand that society must be changed, if only to prevent a reversion to barbarism, are impulses in the same movement of the concept," he writes. The basic idea of Negative Dialectics, that we have missed the moment for a change in society, is no longer to be found. To point to a parallel again: in France a group of theorists had formed who called themselves "Socialisme ou barbarie." The social function of positivism is formulated clearly and brilliantly in the preface: "If such a transfer (the transfer of the natural-scientific method to social science) were in any way possible, if it did not grossly misunderstand the power relations in whose actuality it constitutively maintains itself, then society, totally controlled by science, would remain an object, that of science, totally dependent as always." But just as he does understand the social function of positivism, he does not understand the criticized theses themselves. He attacks the thesis of logical consistency, he insists that things contradict one another, and this means that he did not want to understandin the theoretical sense - the suggestions of his opponents. I can no longer conceal the fact that here one can detect an astonishing similarity between Adorno and the later Lukacs. The chapter on positivism in Lukacs' Ontology expresses the same attitude and is characterized by the same arguments. No matter how energetically the two grand old men may have polemicized against one another, we must recognize that a shared tradition alone can point thoughts in the same direction. The positivism dispute shows what a great influence Adorno had on the forming of the new German theoretical public sphere. He himself, however, is not really a part of it. The man who personally initiated the turning point participated in that same turning point only emotionally, not theoretically. The "valley pasture,"1 after all, belonged to the generation of Thomas Mann. But through his personality, exile theory has had a greater influence on contemporary German theory than exile literature on contemporary German literature. Translatedby Mark Ritter
1. A play on Adorno's rather fanciful, Romantic middle name (Wiesengrund).