Essays in Radical Empiricism, by William James

Title: Essays in Radical Empiricism Author: William James

By William James
THE VARIETIES O RE!I"IO#S E$%ERIE&'E: A ST#() I& H#*A& &AT#RE+ "i,,ord !ectures deli-ered at Edinbur.h in /01/2/013+ 4-o+ &e5 )or67 !ondon7 Bombay7 and 'alcutta: !on.mans7 "reen 8 'o+ /013+ %RA"*ATIS*: A &EW &A*E OR SO*E O!( WA)S O THI&9I&": %O%#!AR !E'T#RES O& %HI!OSO%H)+ 4-o+ &e5 )or67 !ondon7 Bombay7 and 'alcutta: !on.mans7 "reen 8 'o+ /01:+ THE *EA&I&" O TR#TH: A SE;#E! TO <%RA"*ATIS*+= 4-o+ &e5 )or67 !ondon7 Bombay7 and 'alcutta: !on.mans7 "reen 8 'o+ /010+ A %!#RA!ISTI' #&IVERSE: HIBBERT !E'T#RES O& THE %RESE&T SIT#ATIO& I& %HI!OSO%H)+ 4-o+ &e5 )or67 !ondon7 Bombay7 and 'alcutta: !on.mans7 "reen 8 'o+ /010+ SO*E %ROB!E*S O %HI!OSO%H): A BE"I&&I&" O A& I&TRO(#'TIO& TO %HI!OSO%H)+ 4-o+ &e5 )or67 !ondon7 Bombay7 and 'alcutta: !on.mans7 "reen 8 'o+ /0//+ ESSA)S I& RA(I'A! E*%IRI'IS*+ 4-o+ &e5 )or67 !ondon7 Bombay7 and 'alcutta: !on.mans7 "reen 8 'o+ /0/3+ THE WI!! TO BE!IEVE7 A&( OTHER ESSA)S I& %O%#!AR %HI!OSO%H)+ /3mo+ &e5 )or67 !ondon7 Bombay7 and 'alcutta: !on.mans7 "reen 8 'o+ /40:+ *E*ORIES A&( ST#(IES+ 4-o+ &e5 )or67 !ondon7 Bombay7 and 'alcutta: !on.mans7 "reen 8 'o+ /0//+ THE %RI&'I%!ES O %S)'HO!O")+ 3 -ols+7 4-o+ &e5 )or6: Henry Holt 8 'o+ !ondon: *acmillan 8 'o+ /401+ %S)'HO!O"): BRIE ER 'O#RSE+ /3mo+ &e5 )or6: Henry Holt 8 'o+ !ondon: *acmillan 8 'o+ /403+ TA!9S TO TEA'HERS O& %S)'HO!O"): A&( TO ST#(E&TS O& SO*E O !I E>S I(EA!S+ /3mo+ &e5 )or6: Henry Holt 8 'o+ !ondon7 Bombay7 and 'alcutta: !on.mans7 "reen 8 'o+ /400+ H#*A& I**ORTA!IT): TWO S#%%OSE( OBJE'TIO&S TO THE (O'TRI&E+ /?mo+ Boston: Hou.hton *i,,lin 'o+ !ondon: Archibald 'onstable 8 'o+ /404+ THE !ITERAR) RE*AI&S O HE&R) JA*ES+ Edited7 5ith an Introduction7 by William James+ With %ortrait+ 'ro5n 4-o+ Boston: Hou.hton *i,,lin 'o+ /44@+

ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM

B)

WILLIAM JAMES

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'O%)RI"HT7 /0/37 B) HE&R) JA*ES JR+ A!! RI"HTS RESERVE( B%. iiiC

EDITORS PREFACE
The present -olume is an attempt to carry out a plan 5hich William James is 6no5n to ha-e ,ormed se-eral years be,ore his death+ In /01: he collected reprints in an en-elope 5hich he inscribed 5ith the title DEssays in Radical Empiricism>E and he also had duplicate sets o, these reprints bound7 under the same title7 and deposited ,or the use o, students in the .eneral Har-ard !ibrary7 and in the %hilosophical !ibrary in Emerson Hall+ T5o years later %ro,essor James published The Meaning of Truth and A Pluralistic Universe7 and inserted in these -olumes se-eral o, the articles 5hich he had intended to use in the DEssays in Radical Empiricism+> Whether he 5ould ne-ertheless ha-e carried out his ori.inal plan7 had he li-ed7 cannot be certainly 6no5n+ Se-eral ,acts7 ho5e-er7 stand out -ery clearly+ In the ,irst place7 the articles included in the ori.inal plan but omitted ,rom his later -olumes are indispensable to the understandin.B%. i-C o, his other 5ritin.s+ To these articles he repeatedly alludes+ Thus7 in The Meaning of Truth Fp+ /3:G7 he says: <This statement is probably eHcessi-ely obscure to any one 5ho has not read my t5o articles D(oes 'onsciousness EHistI> and DA World o, %ure EHperience+>= Other allusions ha-e been indicated in the present teHt+ In the second place7 the articles ori.inally brou.ht to.ether as DEssays in Radical Empiricism> ,orm a connected 5hole+ &ot only 5ere most o, them 5ritten consecuti-ely 5ithin a period o, t5o years7 but they contain numerous cross2re,erences+ In the third place7 %ro,essor James re.arded

Dradical empiricism> as an independent doctrine+ This he asserted eHpressly: <!et me say that there is no lo.ical conneHion bet5een pra.matism7 as I understand it7 and a doctrine 5hich I ha-e recently set ,orth as Dradical empiricism+> The latter stands on its o5n ,eet+ One may entirely reJect it and still be a pra.matist+= FPragmatism7 /01:7 %re,ace7 p+ iH+G inally7 %ro,essor James came to5ard the end o, his li,e to re.ard Dradical empiricism> as more B%. -C,undamental and more important than Dpra.matism+> In the %re,ace to The Meaning of Truth F/010G7 the author .i-es the ,ollo5in. eHplanation o, his desire to continue7 and i, possible conclude7 the contro-ersy o-er pra.matism: <I am interested in another doctrine in philosophy to 5hich I .i-e the name o, radical empiricism7 and it seems to me that the establishment o, the pra.matist theory o, truth is a step o, ,irst2rate importance in ma6in. radical empiricism pre-ail= Fp+ HiiG+ In preparin. the present -olume7 the editor has there,ore been .o-erned by t5o moti-es+ On the one hand7 he has sou.ht to preser-e and ma6e accessible certain important articles not to be ,ound in %ro,essor James>s other boo6s+ This is true o, Essays i7 ii7 i-7 -7 -iii7 iH7 H7 Hi7 and Hii+ On the other hand7 he has sou.ht to brin. to.ether in one -olume a set o, essays treatin. systematically o, one independent7 coherent7 and ,undamental doctrine+ To this end it has seemed best to include three essays Fiii7 -i7 and -iiG7 5hich7 althou.h included in the ori.inal plan7 5ere a,ter5ards reprinted else5hereE B%. -iCand one essay7 Hii7 not included in the ori.inal plan+ Essays iii7 -i7 and -ii are indispensable to the consecuti-eness o, the series7 and are so inter5o-en 5ith the rest that it is necessary that the student should ha-e them at hand ,or ready consultation+ Essay Hii thro5s an important li.ht on the author>s .eneral Dempiricism7> and ,orms an important lin6 bet5een Dradical empiricism> and the author>s other doctrines+ In short7 the present -olume is desi.ned not as a collection but rather as a treatise+ It is intended that another -olume shall be issued 5hich shall contain papers ha-in. bio.raphical or historical importance 5hich ha-e not yet been reprinted in boo6 ,orm+ The present -olume is intended not only ,or students o, %ro,essor James>s philosophy7 but ,or students o, metaphysics and the theory o, 6no5led.e+ It sets ,orth systematically and 5ithin brie, compass the doctrine o, Dradical empiricism+> A 5ord more may be in order concernin. the .eneral meanin. o, this doctrine+ In the %re,ace to the Will to Believe F/404G7 %ro,essor B%. -iiCJames .i-es the name <radical empiricism= to his <philosophic attitude7= and adds the ,ollo5in. eHplanation: <I say Dempiricism7> because it is contented to re.ard its most assured conclusions concernin. matters o, ,act as hypotheses liable to modi,ication in the course o, ,uture eHperienceE and I say Dradical7> because it treats the doctrine o, monism itsel, as an hypothesis7 and7 unli6e so much o, the hal,5ay empiricism that is current under the name o, positi-ism or a.nosticism or scienti,ic naturalism7 it does not do.matically a,,irm monism as somethin. 5ith 5hich all eHperience has .ot to sKuare= Fpp+ -ii2 -iiiG+ An Dempiricism> o, this description is a <philosophic attitude= or temper o, mind rather than a doctrine7 and characteriLes all o, %ro,essor James>s 5ritin.s+ It is set ,orth in Essay Hii o, the present -olume+ In a narro5er sense7 Dempiricism> is the method o, resortin. to particular experiences ,or the solution o, philosophical problems+ Rationalists are the men o, principles7 empiricists the men o, ,acts+ FSome Problems of Philosophy7 B%. -iiiCp+ A@E c,+ also7 ibid.7 p+ MME and Pragmatism7 pp+ 07 @/+G Or7 <since principles are uni-ersals7 and ,acts are particulars7 perhaps the best 5ay o,

characteriLin. the t5o tendencies is to say that rationalist thin6in. proceeds most 5illin.ly by .oin. ,rom 5holes to parts7 5hile empiricist thin6in. proceeds by .oin. ,rom parts to 5holes+= FSome Problems of Philosophy7 p+ A@E c,+ also ibid.7 p+ 04E and A Pluralistic Universe7 p+ :+G A.ain7 empiricism <remands us to sensation+= F p. cit.7 p+ 3?M+G The <empiricist -ie5= insists that7 <as reality is created temporally day by day7 concepts +++ can ne-er ,itly supersede perception++++ The deeper ,eatures o, reality are ,ound only in perceptual eHperience+= FSome Problems of Philosophy7 pp+ /117 0:+G Empiricism in this sense is as yet characteristic o, %ro,essor James>s philosophy as a !hole+ It is not the distincti-e and independent doctrine set ,orth in the present boo6+ The only summary o, Dradical empiricism> in this last and narro5est sense appears in the %re,ace to The Meaning of Truth Fpp+ Hii2HiiiGE B%. iHCand it must be reprinted here as the 6ey to the teHt that ,ollo5s+B/C <Radical empiricism consists F/G ,irst o, a postulate7 F3G neHt o, a statement o, ,act7 FAG and ,inally o, a .eneraliLed conclusion+= F/G <The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms dra!n from experience+ FThin.s o, an uneHperienceable nature may eHist ad libitum7 but they ,orm no part o, the material ,or philosophic debate+G= This is <the principle o, pure eHperience= as <a methodical postulate+= F',+ belo57 pp+ /@07 3M/+G This postulate corresponds to the notion 5hich the author repeatedly attributes to Shad5orth Hod.son7 the notion <that realities are only 5hat they are D6no5n as+>= FPragmatism7 p+ @1E "arieties of #eligious $xperience7 p+ MMAE The Meaning of Truth7 pp+ MA7 //4+G In this sense Dradical empiricism> and pra.matism are closely allied+ Indeed7 i, pra.matism be de,ined as the assertion that <the meanin. o, any proposition can al5ays be brou.ht do5n to some B%. HCparticular conseKuence in our ,uture practical eHperience7 +++ the point lyin. in the ,act that the eHperience must be particular rather than in the ,act that it must be acti-e= FMeaning of Truth7 p+ 3/1GE then pra.matism and the abo-e postulate come to the same thin.+ The present boo67 ho5e-er7 consists not so much in the assertion o, this postulate as in the use o, it+ And the method is success,ul in special applications by -irtue o, a certain <statement o, ,act= concernin. relations+ F3G <The statement o, ,act is that the relations bet!een things% con&unctive as !ell as dis&unctive% are &ust as much matters of direct particular experience% neither more so nor less so% than the things themselves+= F',+ also A Pluralistic Universe7 p+ 341E The Will to Believe7 p+ 3:4+G This is the central doctrine o, the present boo6+ It distin.uishes Dradical empiricism> ,rom the <ordinary empiricism= o, Hume7 J+ S+ *ill7 etc+7 5ith 5hich it is other5ise allied+ F',+ belo57 pp+ M32MM+G It pro-ides an empirical and relational -ersion o, Dacti-ity7> B%. HiCand so distin.uishes the author>s -oluntarism ,rom a -ie5 5ith 5hich it is easily con,usedNthe -ie5 5hich upholds a pure or transcendent acti-ity+ F',+ belo57 Essay -i+G It ma6es it possible to escape the -icious disJunctions that ha-e thus ,ar ba,,led philosophy: such disJunctions as those bet5een consciousness and physical nature7 bet5een thou.ht and its obJect7 bet5een one mind and another7 and bet5een one Dthin.> and another+ These disJunctions need not be Do-ercome> by callin. in any <eHtraneous trans2empirical connecti-e support= FMeaning of Truth7 %re,ace7 p+ HiiiGE they may no5 be avoided by re.ardin. the dualities in Kuestion as only differences of

empirical relationship among common empirical terms+ The pra.matistic account o, Dmeanin.> and Dtruth7> sho5s only ho5 a -icious disJunction bet5een Didea> and DobJect> may thus be a-oided+ The present -olume not only presents pra.matism in this li.htE but adds similar accounts o, the other dualities mentioned abo-e+ Thus 5hile pra.matism and radical empiricism B%. HiiCdo not di,,er essentially 5hen re.arded as methods7 they are independent 5hen re.arded as doctrines+ or it 5ould be possible to hold the pra.matistic theory o, Dmeanin.> and Dtruth7> 5ithout basin. it on any ,undamental theory o, relations7 and 5ithout eHtendin. such a theory o, relations to residual philosophical problemsE 5ithout7 in short7 holdin. either to the abo-e Dstatement o, ,act7> or to the ,ollo5in. D.eneraliLed conclusion+> FAG <The .eneraliLed conclusion is that there,ore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs% in short% no extraneous trans'empirical connective support% but possesses in its o!n right a concatenated or continuous structure+= When thus .eneraliLed7 Dradical empiricism> is not only a theory o, 6no5led.e comprisin. pra.matism as a special chapter7 but a metaphysic as 5ell+ It eHcludes <the hypothesis o, trans2empirical reality= F',+ belo57 p+ /0@G+ It is the author>s most ri.orous statement o, his theory that reality is an <eHperience2continuum+= B%. HiiiCFMeaning of Truth7 p+ /@3E A Pluralistic Universe7 !ect+ -7 -ii+G It is that positi-e and constructi-e Dempiricism> o, 5hich %ro,essor James said: <!et empiricism once become associated 5ith reli.ion7 as hitherto7 throu.h some stran.e misunderstandin.7 it has been associated 5ith irreli.ion7 and I belie-e that a ne5 era o, reli.ion as 5ell as o, philosophy 5ill be ready to be.in+= F p. cit.7 p+ A/ME c,+ ibid.7 !ect+ -iii7 passimE and The "arieties of #eligious $xperience7 pp+ @/@2@3:+G The editor desires to ac6no5led.e his obli.ations to the periodicals ,rom 5hich these essays ha-e been reprinted7 and to the many ,riends o, %ro,essor James 5ho ha-e rendered -aluable ad-ice and assistance in the preparation o, the present -olume+ Ralph Barton %erry+ 'ambrid.e7 *assachusetts+ January 47 /0/3+

FOOTNOTES
B/C The use o, numerals and italics is introduced by the editor+ B%. Hi-C

CONTENTS
I+ (oes D'onsciousness> EHistI /

II+ A World o, %ure EHperience III+ The Thin. and its Relations IV+ Ho5 T5o *inds 'an 9no5 One Thin. V+ The %lace o, A,,ectional acts in a World o, %ure EHperience VI+ The EHperience o, Acti-ity VII+ The Essence o, Humanism VIII+ !a &otion de 'onscience I$+ Is Radical Empiricism SolipsisticI $+ *r+ %it6in>s Re,utation o, DRadical Empiricism> $I+ Humanism and Truth Once *ore $II+ Absolutism and Empiricism IndeH B%. /C

A0 03 /3 A /A : /@ @ /0 1 31 ? 3A M 3M / 3M M 3? ? 34 /

I
DOES !CONSCIO"SNESS E#IST$%&'
DThou.hts> and Dthin.s> are names ,or t5o sorts o, obJect7 5hich common sense 5ill al5ays ,ind contrasted and 5ill al5ays practically oppose to each other+ %hilosophy7 re,lectin. on the contrast7 has -aried in the past in her eHplanations o, it7 and may be eHpected to -ary in the ,uture+ At ,irst7 Dspirit and matter7> Dsoul and body7> stood ,or a pair o, eKuipollent substances Kuite on a par in 5ei.ht and interest+ But one day 9ant undermined the soul and brou.ht in the transcendental e.o7 and e-er since then the bipolar relation has been -ery much o,, its balance+ The transcendental e.o seems no5adays in rationalist Kuarters to stand ,or e-erythin.7 in empiricist Kuarters ,or almost nothin.+ In the hands o, such 5riters as Schuppe7 Rehm6e7 &atorp7 *Onsterber.Nat any rate in his earlier 5ritin.s7 Schubert2Soldern and others7 the spiritual principle attenuates itsel, to a thorou.hly .hostly condition7 bein. only a name ,or the ,act that

the Dcontent> o, eHperience is (no!n+ It loses personal ,orm and acti-ityNthese passin. o-er to the contentNand becomes a bare Be!usstheit or Be!usstsein )berhaupt7 o, 5hich in its o5n ri.ht absolutely nothin. can be said+B%. 3C I belie-e that Dconsciousness7> 5hen once it has e-aporated to this estate o, pure diaphaneity7 is on the point o, disappearin. alto.ether+ It is the name o, a nonentity7 and has no ri.ht to a place amon. ,irst principles+ Those 5ho still clin. to it are clin.in. to a mere echo7 the ,aint rumor le,t behind by the disappearin. Dsoul> upon the air o, philosophy+ (urin. the past year7 I ha-e read a number o, articles 5hose authors seemed Just on the point o, abandonin. the notion o, consciousness7BAC and substitutin. ,or it that o, an absolute eHperience not due to t5o ,actors+ But they 5ere not Kuite radical enou.h7 not Kuite darin. enou.h in their ne.ations+ or t5enty years past I ha-e mistrusted Dconsciousness> as an entityE ,or se-en or ei.ht years past I ha-e su..ested its non2eHistence to my students7 and tried to .i-e them its pra.matic eKui-alent in realities o, eHperience+ It seems to me that the hour is ripe ,or it to be openly and uni-ersally discarded+B%. AC To deny plumply that Dconsciousness> eHists seems so absurd on the ,ace o, itN,or undeniably Dthou.hts> do eHistNthat I ,ear some readers 5ill ,ollo5 me no ,arther+ !et me then immediately eHplain that I mean only to deny that the 5ord stands ,or an entity7 but to insist most emphatically that it does stand ,or a ,unction+ There is7 I mean7 no abori.inal stu,, or Kuality o, bein.7BMC contrasted 5ith that o, 5hich material obJects are made7 out o, 5hich our thou.hts o, them are madeE but there is a ,unction in eHperience 5hich thou.hts per,orm7 and ,or the per,ormance o, 5hich thisB%. MC Kuality o, bein. is in-o6ed+ That ,unction is (no!ing+ D'onsciousness> is supposed necessary to eHplain the ,act that thin.s not only are7 but .et reported7 are 6no5n+ Whoe-er blots out the notion o, consciousness ,rom his list o, ,irst principles must still pro-ide in some 5ay ,or that ,unction>s bein. carried on+ I *y thesis is that i, 5e start 5ith the supposition that there is only one primal stu,, or material in the 5orld7 a stu,, o, 5hich e-erythin. is composed7 and i, 5e call that stu,, Dpure eHperience7> then 6no5in. can easily be eHplained as a particular sort o, relation to5ards one another into 5hich portions o, pure eHperience may enter+ The relation itsel, is a part o, pure eHperienceE one o, its Dterms> becomes the subJect or bearer o, the 6no5led.e7 the 6no5er7B@C the other becomes the obJect 6no5n+ This 5ill need much eHplanation be,ore it can be understood+ The best 5ay to .et it understood is to contrast it 5ith the alternati-e -ie5E and ,or that 5e may ta6e the recentest alternati-e7 that in 5hich the e-aporation o, the de,inite soul2substance has proceeded as ,ar as it can .o 5ithout bein. yet complete+ I, neo29antism has eHpelled earlier ,orms o, dualism7 5e shall ha-e eHpelled all ,orms i, 5e are able to eHpel neo29antism in its turn+B%. @C or the thin6ers I call neo29antian7 the 5ord consciousness to2day does no more than si.naliLe the ,act that eHperience is inde,easibly dualistic in structure+ It means that not subJect7 not obJect7 but obJect2plus2subJect is the minimum that can actually be+ The subJect2obJect distinction mean5hile is entirely di,,erent ,rom that bet5een mind and matter7 ,rom that bet5een body and soul+ Souls 5ere detachable7 had separate destiniesE thin.s could happen to them+ To consciousness as such nothin. can happen7 ,or7 timeless itsel,7 it is only a 5itness o, happenin.s

in time7 in 5hich it plays no part+ It is7 in a 5ord7 but the lo.ical correlati-e o, Dcontent> in an EHperience o, 5hich theB%. ?C peculiarity is that fact comes to light in it7 that a!areness of content ta6es place+ 'onsciousness as such is entirely impersonalNDsel,> and its acti-ities belon. to the content+ To say that I am sel,2conscious7 or conscious o, puttin. ,orth -olition7 means only that certain contents7 ,or 5hich Dsel,> and De,,ort o, 5ill> are the names7 are not 5ithout 5itness as they occur+ Thus7 ,or these belated drin6ers at the 9antian sprin.7 5e should ha-e to admit consciousness as an Depistemolo.ical> necessity7 e-en i, 5e had no direct e-idence o, its bein. there+ But in addition to this7 5e are supposed by almost e-ery one to ha-e an immediate consciousness o, consciousness itsel,+ When the 5orld o, outer ,act ceases to be materially present7 and 5e merely recall it in memory7 or ,ancy it7 the consciousness is belie-ed to stand out and to be ,elt as a 6ind o, impalpable inner ,lo5in.7 5hich7 once 6no5n in this sort o, eHperience7 may eKually be detected in presentations o, the outer 5orld+ <The moment 5e try to ,iH our attention upon consciousness and to see !hat7 distinctly7 it is7= says a recent 5riter7B%. :C <it seems to -anish+ It seems as i, 5e had be,ore us a mere emptiness+ When 5e try to introspect the sensation o, blue7 all 5e can see is the blueE the other element is as i, it 5ere diaphanous+ )et it can be distin.uished7 i, 5e loo6 attenti-ely enou.h7 and 6no5 that there is somethin. to loo6 ,or+=B?C <'onsciousness= FBe5usstheitG7 says another philosopher7 <is ineHplicable and hardly describable7 yet all conscious eHperiences ha-e this in common that 5hat 5e call their content has this peculiar re,erence to a centre ,or 5hich Dsel,> is the name7 in -irtue o, 5hich re,erence alone the content is subJecti-ely .i-en7 or appears +++ While in this 5ay consciousness7 or re,erence to a sel,7 is the only thin. 5hich distin.uishes a conscious content ,rom any sort o, bein. that mi.ht be there 5ith no one conscious o, it7 yet this only .round o, the distinction de,ies all closer eHplanations+ The eHistence o, consciousness7 althou.h it is the ,undamental ,act o, psycholo.y7 can indeed be laid do5n as certain7 can be brou.ht out by analysis7 but can neither be de,ined nor deduced ,rom anythin. but itsel,+=B:C B%. 4C D'an be brou.ht out by analysis7> this author says+ This supposes that the consciousness is one element7 moment7 ,actorNcall it 5hat you li6eNo, an eHperience o, essentially dualistic inner constitution7 ,rom 5hich7 i, you abstract the content7 the consciousness 5ill remain re-ealed to its o5n eye+ EHperience7 at this rate7 5ould be much li6e a paint o, 5hich the 5orld pictures 5ere made+ %aint has a dual constitution7 in-ol-in.7 as it does7 a menstruumB4C Foil7 siLe or 5hat notG and a mass o, content in the ,orm o, pi.ment suspended therein+ We can .et the pure menstruum by lettin. the pi.ment settle7 and the pure pi.ment by pourin. o,, the siLe or oil+ We operate here by physical subtractionE and the usual -ie5 is7 that by mental subtraction 5e can separate the t5o ,actors o, eHperience in an analo.ous 5ayNnot isolatin. them entirely7 but distin.uishin. them enou.h to 6no5 that they are t5o+B%. 0C II &o5 my contention is eHactly the re-erse o, this+ $xperience% * believe% has no such inner duplicity+ and the separation of it into consciousness and content comes% not by !ay of

subtraction% but by !ay of additionNthe addition7 to a .i-en concrete piece o, it7 o, other sets o, eHperiences7 in connection 5ith 5hich se-erally its use or ,unction may be o, t5o di,,erent 6inds+ The paint 5ill also ser-e here as an illustration+ In a pot in a paint2shop7 alon. 5ith other paints7 it ser-es in its entirety as so much saleable matter+ Spread on a can-as7 5ith other paints around it7 it represents7 on the contrary7 a ,eature in a picture and per,orms a spiritual ,unction+ Just so7 I maintain7 does a .i-en undi-ided portion o, eHperience7 ta6en in one conteHt o, associates7 play the part o, a 6no5er7 o, a state o, mind7 o, Dconsciousness>E 5hile in a di,,erent conteHt the same undi-ided bit o, eHperience plays the part o, a thin. 6no5n7 o,B%. /1C an obJecti-e Dcontent+> In a 5ord7 in one .roup it ,i.ures as a thou.ht7 in another .roup as a thin.+ And7 since it can ,i.ure in both .roups simultaneously 5e ha-e e-ery ri.ht to spea6 o, it as subJecti-e and obJecti-e both at once+ The dualism connoted by such double2barrelled terms as DeHperience7> Dphenomenon7> Ddatum7> D"orfindung>Nterms 5hich7 in philosophy at any rate7 tend more and more to replace the sin.le2barrelled terms o, Dthou.ht> and Dthin.>Nthat dualism7 I say7 is still preser-ed in this account7 but reinterpreted7 so that7 instead o, bein. mysterious and elusi-e7 it becomes -eri,iable and concrete+ It is an a,,air o, relations7 it ,alls outside7 not inside7 the sin.le eHperience considered7 and can al5ays be particulariLed and de,ined+ The enterin. 5ed.e ,or this more concrete 5ay o, understandin. the dualism 5as ,ashioned by !oc6e 5hen he made the 5ord Didea> stand indi,,erently ,or thin. and thou.ht7 and by Ber6eley 5hen he said that 5hat common sense means by realities is eHactly 5hat the philosopher means by ideas+ &either !oc6eB%. //C nor Ber6eley thou.ht his truth out into per,ect clearness7 but it seems to me that the conception I am de,endin. does little more than consistently carry out the Dpra.matic> method 5hich they 5ere the ,irst to use+ I, the reader 5ill ta6e his o5n eHperiences7 he 5ill see 5hat I mean+ !et him be.in 5ith a perceptual eHperience7 the Dpresentation7> so called7 o, a physical obJect7 his actual ,ield o, -ision7 the room he sits in7 5ith the boo6 he is readin. as its centreE and let him ,or the present treat this compleH obJect in the common2sense 5ay as bein. Dreally> 5hat it seems to be7 namely7 a collection o, physical thin.s cut out ,rom an en-ironin. 5orld o, other physical thin.s 5ith 5hich these physical thin.s ha-e actual or potential relations+ &o5 at the same time it is Just those self'same things 5hich his mind7 as 5e say7 percei-esE and the 5hole philosophy o, perception ,rom (emocritus>s time do5n5ards has been Just one lon. 5ran.le o-er the paradoH that 5hat is e-idently one reality should be in t5o places at once7 both in outer space and in a person>s mind+ DRepresentati-e>B%. /3C theories o, perception a-oid the lo.ical paradoH7 but on the other hand they -iolate the reader>s sense o, li,e7 5hich 6no5s no inter-enin. mental ima.e but seems to see the room and the boo6 immediately Just as they physically eHist+ The puLLle o, ho5 the one identical room can be in t5o places is at bottom Just the puLLle o, ho5 one identical point can be on t5o lines+ It can7 i, it be situated at their intersectionE and similarly7 i, the Dpure eHperience> o, the room 5ere a place o, intersection o, t5o processes7 5hich connected it 5ith di,,erent .roups o, associates respecti-ely7 it could be counted t5ice o-er7 as belon.in. to either .roup7 and spo6en o, loosely as eHistin. in t5o places7 althou.h it 5ould remain all the time a numerically sin.le thin.+ Well7 the eHperience is a member o, di-erse processes that can be ,ollo5ed a5ay ,rom it alon. entirely di,,erent lines+ The one sel,2identical thin. has so many relations to the rest o,

eHperience that you can ta6e it in disparate systems o, association7 and treat it asB%. /AC belon.in. 5ith opposite conteHts+B0C In one o, these conteHts it is your D,ield o, consciousness>E in another it is Dthe room in 5hich you sit7> and it enters both conteHts in its 5holeness7 .i-in. no preteHt ,or bein. said to attach itsel, to consciousness by one o, its parts or aspects7 and to outer reality by another+ What are the t5o processes7 no57 into 5hich the room2eHperience simultaneously enters in this 5ayIB%. /MC One o, them is the reader>s personal bio.raphy7 the other is the history o, the house o, 5hich the room is part+ The presentation7 the eHperience7 the that in short F,or until 5e ha-e decided !hat it is it must be a mere thatG is the last term o, a train o, sensations7 emotions7 decisions7 mo-ements7 classi,ications7 eHpectations7 etc+7 endin. in the present7 and the ,irst term o, a series o, similar Dinner> operations eHtendin. into the ,uture7 on the reader>s part+ On the other hand7 the -ery same that is the terminus ad ,uem o, a lot o, pre-ious physical operations7 carpenterin.7 paperin.7 ,urnishin.7 5armin.7 etc+7 and the terminus a ,uo o, a lot o, ,uture ones7 in 5hich it 5ill be concerned 5hen under.oin. the destiny o, a physical room+ The physical and the mental operations ,orm curiously incompatible .roups+ As a room7 the eHperience has occupied that spot and had that en-ironment ,or thirty years+ As your ,ield o, consciousness it may ne-er ha-e eHisted until no5+ As a room7 attention 5ill .o on to disco-er endless ne5 details in it+ As your mental state merely7 ,e5 ne5 ones 5ill emer.e under attention>s eye+ As a room7 it 5ill ta6e an earthKua6e7 or a .an. o, men7 and in any case a certain amount o, time7 to destroy it+ As your subJecti-e state7 the closin. o, your eyes7 or any instantaneous play o, your ,ancy 5ill su,,ice+ In the real 5orld7 ,ire 5ill consume it+ In your mind7 you can let ,ire play o-er it 5ithout e,,ect+ As an outer obJect7 you must pay so much a month to inhabit it+ As an inner content7 you may occupy it ,or any len.th o, time rent2,ree+ I,7 in short7 you ,ollo5 it in the mentalB%. /@C direction7 ta6in. it alon. 5ith e-ents o, personal bio.raphy solely7 all sorts o, thin.s are true o, it 5hich are ,alse7 and ,alse o, it 5hich are true i, you treat it as a real thin. eHperienced7 ,ollo5 it in the physical direction7 and relate it to associates in the outer 5orld+ III So ,ar7 all seems plain sailin.7 but my thesis 5ill probably .ro5 less plausible to the reader 5hen I pass ,rom percepts to concepts7 or ,rom the case o, thin.s presented to that o, thin.s remote+ I belie-e7 ne-ertheless7 that here also the same la5 holds .ood+ I, 5e ta6e conceptual mani,olds7 or memories7 or ,ancies7 they also are in their ,irst intention mere bits o, pure eHperience7 and7 as such7 are sin.le thats 5hich act in one conteHt as obJects7 and in another conteHt ,i.ure as mental states+ By ta6in. them in their ,irst intention7 I mean i.norin. their relation to possible perceptual eHperiences 5ith 5hich they may be connected7 5hich they may lead to and terminate in7 and 5hich then they may be supposed toB%. /?C Drepresent+> Ta6in. them in this 5ay ,irst7 5e con,ine the problem to a 5orld merely Dthou.ht2o,> and not directly ,elt or seen+B/1C This 5orld7 Just li6e the 5orld o, percepts7 comes to us at ,irst as a chaos o, eHperiences7 but lines o, order soon .et traced+ We ,ind that any bit o, it 5hich 5e may cut out as an eHample is connected 5ith distinct .roups o, associates7 Just as our perceptual eHperiences are7 that these associates lin6 themsel-es 5ith it by di,,erent relations7B//C and that one ,orms the inner history o, a person7 5hile the other acts as an impersonal DobJecti-e> 5orld7 either spatial and temporal7 or else merely lo.ical or mathematical7 or other5ise Dideal+>

B%. /:C The ,irst obstacle on the part o, the reader to seein. that these non2perceptual eHperiences ha-e obJecti-ity as 5ell as subJecti-ity 5ill probably be due to the intrusion into his mind o, percepts7 that third .roup o, associates 5ith 5hich the non2perceptual eHperiences ha-e relations7 and 5hich7 as a 5hole7 they Drepresent7> standin. to them as thou.hts to thin.s+ This important ,unction o, the non2perceptual eHperiences complicates the Kuestion and con,uses itE ,or7 so used are 5e to treat percepts as the sole .enuine realities that7 unless 5e 6eep them out o, the discussion7 5e tend alto.ether to o-erloo6 the obJecti-ity that lies in non2perceptual eHperiences by themsel-es+ We treat them7 D6no5in.> percepts as they do7 as throu.h and throu.h subJecti-e7 and say that they are 5holly constituted o, the stu,, called consciousness7 usin. this term no5 ,or a 6ind o, entity7 a,ter the ,ashion 5hich I am see6in. to re,ute+B/3C B%. /4C Abstractin.7 then7 ,rom percepts alto.ether7 5hat I maintain is7 that any sin.le non2perceptual eHperience tends to .et counted t5ice o-er7 Just as a perceptual eHperience does7 ,i.urin. in one conteHt as an obJect or ,ield o, obJects7 in another as a state o, mind: and all this 5ithout the least internal sel,2diremption on its o5n part into consciousness and content+ It is all consciousness in one ta6in.E and7 in the other7 all content+ I ,ind this obJecti-ity o, non2perceptual eHperiences7 this complete parallelism in point o, reality bet5een the presently ,elt and the remotely thou.ht7 so 5ell set ,orth in a pa.e o, *Onsterber.>s -rund.)ge7 that I 5ill Kuote it as it stands+ <I may only thin6 o, my obJects7= says %ro,essor *Onsterber.E <yet7 in my li-in. thou.ht they stand be,ore me eHactly as percei-ed obJects 5ould do7 no matter ho5 di,,erent the t5o 5ays o, apprehendin. them may be in their .enesis+ The boo6 here lyin. on the table be,ore me7 and the boo6 in the neHt room o, 5hich I thin6 and 5hich I mean to .et7 are both in the same sense .i-en realities ,or me7 realities 5hich I ac6no5led.e and o, 5hich I ta6eB%. /0C account+ I, you a.ree that the perceptual obJect is not an idea 5ithin me7 but that percept and thin.7 as indistin.uishably one7 are really eHperienced there% outside7 you ou.ht not to belie-e that the merely thou.ht2o, obJect is hid a5ay inside o, the thin6in. subJect+ The obJect o, 5hich I thin67 and o, 5hose eHistence I ta6e co.niLance 5ithout lettin. it no5 5or6 upon my senses7 occupies its de,inite place in the outer 5orld as much as does the obJect 5hich I directly see+= <What is true o, the here and the there7 is also true o, the no5 and the then+ I 6no5 o, the thin. 5hich is present and percei-ed7 but I 6no5 also o, the thin. 5hich yesterday 5as but is no more7 and 5hich I only remember+ Both can determine my present conduct7 both are parts o, the reality o, 5hich I 6eep account+ It is true that o, much o, the past I am uncertain7 Just as I am uncertain o, much o, 5hat is present i, it be but dimly percei-ed+ But the inter-al o, time does not in principle alter my relation to the obJect7 does not trans,orm it ,rom an obJect 6no5n into a mental state++++B%. 31C The thin.s in the room here 5hich I sur-ey7 and those in my distant home o, 5hich I thin67 the thin.s o, this minute and those o, my lon.2-anished boyhood7 in,luence and decide me ali6e7 5ith a reality 5hich my eHperience o, them directly ,eels+ They both ma6e up my real 5orld7 they ma6e it directly7 they do not ha-e ,irst to be introduced to me and mediated

by ideas 5hich no5 and here arise 5ithin me++++ This not2me character o, my recollections and eHpectations does not imply that the eHternal obJects o, 5hich I am a5are in those eHperiences should necessarily be there also ,or others+ The obJects o, dreamers and hallucinated persons are 5holly 5ithout .eneral -alidity+ But e-en 5ere they centaurs and .olden mountains7 they still 5ould be Do,, there7> in ,airy land7 and not Dinside> o, oursel-es+=B/ACB%. 3/C This certainly is the immediate7 primary7 naP,7 or practical 5ay o, ta6in. our thou.ht2o, 5orld+ Were there no perceptual 5orld to ser-e as its Dreducti-e7> in Taine>s sense7 by bein. Dstron.er> and more .enuinely Douter> Fso that the 5hole merely thou.ht2o, 5orld seems 5ea6 and inner in comparisonG7 our 5orld o, thou.ht 5ould be the only 5orld7 and 5ould enJoy complete reality in our belie,+ This actually happens in our dreams7 and in our day2dreams so lon. as percepts do not interrupt them+ And yet7 Just as the seen room Fto .o bac6 to our late eHampleG is also a ,ield o, consciousness7 so the concei-ed or recollected room is also a state o, mindE and the doublin.2up o, the eHperience has in both cases similar .rounds+ The room thou.ht2o,7 namely7 has many thou.ht2o, couplin.s 5ith many thou.ht2o, thin.s+ Some o, these couplin.s are inconstant7 others are stable+ In the reader>s personal history the room occupies a sin.le dateNhe sa5 it only once perhaps7 a year a.o+ O, the house>s history7 on the other hand7 it ,orms a permanent in.redient+ Some couplin.s ha-e the curious stubbornness7 to borro5 Royce>s term7 o, ,actE others sho5 the ,luidity o, ,ancyN5e let them come and .o as 5e please+ "rouped 5ithB%. 33C the rest o, its house7 5ith the name o, its to5n7 o, its o5ner7 builder7 -alue7 decorati-e plan7 the room maintains a de,inite ,oothold7 to 5hich7 i, 5e try to loosen it7 it tends to return7 and to reassert itsel, 5ith ,orce+B/MC With these associates7 in a 5ord7 it coheres7 5hile to other houses7 other to5ns7 other o5ners7 etc+7 it sho5s no tendency to cohere at all+ The t5o collections7 ,irst o, its cohesi-e7 and7 second7 o, its loose associates7 ine-itably come to be contrasted+ We call the ,irst collection the system o, eHternal realities7 in the midst o, 5hich the room7 as Dreal7> eHistsE the other 5e call the stream o, our internal thin6in.7 in 5hich7 as a Dmental ima.e7> it ,or a moment ,loats+B/@C The room thus a.ain .ets counted t5ice o-er+ It plays t5o di,,erent rQles7 bein. -edan(e and -edachtes7 the thou.ht2o,2an2obJect7 and the obJect2thou.ht2o,7 both in oneE and all this 5ithout paradoH or mystery7 Just as the same material thin. may be both lo5 and hi.h7 or small and .reat7 or bad and .ood7 because o, its relations to opposite parts o, an en-ironin. 5orld+ B%. 3AC As DsubJecti-e> 5e say that the eHperience representsE as DobJecti-e> it is represented+ What represents and 5hat is represented is here numerically the sameE but 5e must remember that no dualism o, bein. represented and representin. resides in the eHperience per se+ In its pure state7 or 5hen isolated7 there is no sel,2splittin. o, it into consciousness and 5hat the consciousness is Do,+> Its subJecti-ity and obJecti-ity are ,unctional attributes solely7 realiLed only 5hen the eHperience is Dta6en7> i.e.7 tal6ed2o,7 t5ice7 considered alon. 5ith its t5o di,,erin. conteHts respecti-ely7 by a ne5 retrospecti-e eHperience7 o, 5hich that 5hole past complication no5 ,orms the ,resh content+

The instant ,ield o, the present is at all times 5hat I call the Dpure> eHperience+ It is only -irtually or potentially either obJect or subJect as yet+ or the time bein.7 it is plain7 unKuali,ied actuality7 or eHistence7 a simple that+ In thisB%. 3MC na/f immediacy it is o, course validE it is there7 5e act upon itE and the doublin. o, it in retrospection into a state o, mind and a reality intended thereby7 is Just one o, the acts+ The Dstate o, mind7> ,irst treated eHplicitly as such in retrospection7 5ill stand corrected or con,irmed7 and the retrospecti-e eHperience in its turn 5ill .et a similar treatmentE but the immediate eHperience in its passin. is al5ays Dtruth7>B/?C practical truth7 something to act on7 at its o5n mo-ement+ I, the 5orld 5ere then and there to .o out li6e a candle7 it 5ould remain truth absolute and obJecti-e7 ,or it 5ould be Dthe last 5ord7> 5ould ha-e no critic7 and no one 5ould e-er oppose the thou.ht in it to the reality intended+B/:C B%. 3@C I thin6 I may no5 claim to ha-e made my thesis clear+ 'onsciousness connotes a 6ind o, eHternal relation7 and does not denote a special stu,, or 5ay o, bein.+ The peculiarity of our experiences% that they not only are% but are (no!n% !hich their 0conscious1 ,uality is invo(ed to explain% is better explained by their relations2these relations themselves being experiences2to one another. I( Were I no5 to .o on to treat o, the 6no5in. o, perceptual by conceptual eHperiences7 it 5ould a.ain pro-e to be an a,,air o, eHternal relations+ One eHperience 5ould be the 6no5er7 the other the reality 6no5nE and I could per,ectly 5ell de,ine7 5ithout the notion o, Dconsciousness7> 5hat the 6no5in. actually and practically amounts toNleadin.2to5ards7 namely7 and terminatin.2in percepts7 throu.h a series o, transitional eHperiences 5hich the 5orld supplies+ But I 5ill not treat o, this7 space bein. insu,,icient+B/4C I 5ill rather consider a ,e5 obJections that are sure to be ur.ed a.ainst the entire theory as it stands+B%. 3?C ( irst o, all7 this 5ill be as6ed: <I, eHperience has not Dconscious> eHistence7 i, it be not partly made o, Dconsciousness7> o, 5hat then is it madeI *atter 5e 6no57 and thou.ht 5e 6no57 and conscious content 5e 6no57 but neutral and simple Dpure eHperience> is somethin. 5e 6no5 not at all+ Say !hat it consists o,N,or it must consist o, somethin.Nor be 5illin. to .i-e it upR= To this challen.e the reply is easy+ Althou.h ,or ,luency>s sa6e I mysel, spo6e early in this article o, a stu,, o, pure eHperience7 I ha-e no5 to say that there is no general stu,, o, 5hich eHperience at lar.e is made+ There are as many stu,,s as there are Dnatures> in the thin.s eHperienced+ I, you as6 5hat any one bit o, pure eHperience is made o,7 the ans5er is al5ays theB%. 3:C same: <It is made o, that7 o, Just 5hat appears7 o, space7 o, intensity7 o, ,latness7 bro5nness7 hea-iness7 or 5hat not+= Shad5orth Hod.son>s analysis here lea-es nothin. to be desired+B/0C EHperience is only a collecti-e name ,or all these sensible natures7 and sa-e ,or time and space Fand7 i, you li6e7 ,or Dbein.>G there appears no uni-ersal element o, 5hich all thin.s are made+

(I The neHt obJection is more ,ormidable7 in ,act it sounds Kuite crushin. 5hen one hears it ,irst+B%. 34C <I, it be the sel,2same piece o, pure eHperience7 ta6en t5ice o-er7 that ser-es no5 as thou.ht and no5 as thin.=Nso the obJection runsN<ho5 comes it that its attributes should di,,er so ,undamentally in the t5o ta6in.s+ As thin.7 the eHperience is eHtendedE as thou.ht7 it occupies no space or place+ As thin.7 it is red7 hard7 hea-yE but 5ho e-er heard o, a red7 hard or hea-y thou.htI )et e-en no5 you said that an eHperience is made o, Just 5hat appears7 and 5hat appears is Just such adJecti-es+ Ho5 can the one eHperience in its thin.2,unction be made o, them7 consist o, them7 carry them as its o5n attributes7 5hile in its thou.ht2,unction it diso5ns them and attributes them else5here+ There is a sel,2contradiction here ,rom 5hich the radical dualism o, thou.ht and thin. is the only truth that can sa-e us+ Only i, the thou.ht is one 6ind o, bein. can the adJecti-es eHist in it Dintentionally> Fto use the scholastic termGE only i, the thin. is another 6ind7 can they eHist in it constituti-ely and ener.etically+ &o simple subJect can ta6e the same adJecti-es and at one time be Kuali,ied by it7 and at another time be merely Do,> it7 as o, somethin. only meant or 6no5n+= The solution insisted on by this obJector7 li6e many other common2sense solutions7 .ro5s the less satis,actory the more one turns it in one>s mind+ To be.in 5ith7 are thou.ht and thin. as hetero.eneous as is commonly saidIB%. 30C &o one denies that they ha-e some cate.ories in common+ Their relations to time are identical+ Both7 moreo-er7 may ha-e parts F,or psycholo.ists in .eneral treat thou.hts as ha-in. themGE and both may be compleH or simple+ Both are o, 6inds7 can be compared7 added and subtracted and arran.ed in serial orders+ All sorts o, adJecti-es Kuali,y our thou.hts 5hich appear incompatible 5ith consciousness7 bein. as such a bare diaphaneity+ or instance7 they are natural and easy7 or laborious+ They are beauti,ul7 happy7 intense7 interestin.7 5ise7 idiotic7 ,ocal7 mar.inal7 insipid7 con,used7 -a.ue7 precise7 rational7 casual7 .eneral7 particular7 and many thin.s besides+ *oreo-er7 the chapters on D%erception> in the psycholo.y2boo6s are ,ull o, ,acts that ma6e ,or the essential homo.eneity o, thou.ht 5ith thin.+ Ho57 i, DsubJect> and DobJect> 5ere separated Dby the 5hole diameter o, bein.7> and had no attributes in common7 could it be so hard to tell7 in a presented and reco.niLed material obJect7 5hat part comes in throu.h the sense2or.ans and 5hat part comes Dout o, one>s o5nB%. A1C head>I Sensations and appercepti-e ideas ,use here so intimately that you can no more tell 5here one be.ins and the other ends7 than you can tell7 in those cunnin. circular panoramas that ha-e lately been eHhibited7 5here the real ,ore.round and the painted can-as Join to.ether+B31C (escartes ,or the ,irst time de,ined thou.ht as the absolutely uneHtended7 and later philosophers ha-e accepted the description as correct+ But 5hat possible meanin. has it to say that7 5hen 5e thin6 o, a ,oot2rule or a sKuare yard7 eHtension is not attributable to our thou.htI O, e-ery eHtended obJect the ade,uate mental picture must ha-e all the eHtension o, the obJect itsel,+ The di,,erence bet5een obJecti-e and subJecti-e eHtension is one o, relation to a conteHt solely+ In the mind the -arious eHtents maintain no necessarily stubborn order relati-ely to each other7 5hile B%. A/Cin the physical 5orld they bound each other stably7 and7 added to.ether7 ma6e the .reat

en-elopin. #nit 5hich 5e belie-e in and call real Space+ As Douter7> they carry themsel-es ad-ersely7 so to spea67 to one another7 eHclude one another and maintain their distancesE 5hile7 as Dinner7> their order is loose7 and they ,orm a durcheinander in 5hich unity is lost+B3/C But to ar.ue ,rom this that inner eHperience is absolutely ineHtensi-e seems to me little short o, absurd+ The t5o 5orlds di,,er7 not by the presence or absence o, eHtension7 but by the relations o, the eHtensions 5hich in both 5orlds eHist+ (oes not this case o, eHtension no5 put us on the trac6 o, truth in the case o, other KualitiesI It doesE and I am surprised that the ,acts should not ha-e been noticed lon. a.o+ Why7 ,or eHample7 do 5e call a ,ire hot7 and 5ater 5et7 and yet re,use to say that our mental state7 5hen it is Do,> these obJects7 is either 5et or hotI DIntentionally7> at any rate7 and B%. A3C5hen the mental state is a -i-id ima.e7 hotness and 5etness are in it Just as much as they are in the physical eHperience+ The reason is this7 that7 as the .eneral chaos o, all our eHperiences .ets si,ted7 5e ,ind that there are some ,ires that 5ill al5ays burn stic6s and al5ays 5arm our bodies7 and that there are some 5aters that 5ill al5ays put out ,iresE 5hile there are other ,ires and 5aters that 5ill not act at all+ The .eneral .roup o, eHperiences that act7 that do not only possess their natures intrinsically7 but 5ear them adJecti-ely and ener.etically7 turnin. them a.ainst one another7 comes ine-itably to be contrasted 5ith the .roup 5hose members7 ha-in. identically the same natures7 ,ail to mani,est them in the Dener.etic> 5ay+B33C I ma6e ,or mysel, no5 an eHperience o, blaLin. ,ireE I place it near my bodyE but it does not 5arm me in the least+ I lay a stic6 upon it7 and the stic6 either burns or remains .reen7 as I please+ I call up 5ater7 and pour it on the ,ire7 and absolutely no di,,erence ensues+ I accountB%. AAC ,or all such ,acts by callin. this 5hole train o, eHperiences unreal7 a mental train+ *ental ,ire is 5hat 5on>t burn real stic6sE mental 5ater is 5hat 5on>t necessarily Fthou.h o, course it mayG put out e-en a mental ,ire+ *ental 6ni-es may be sharp7 but they 5on>t cut real 5ood+ *ental trian.les are pointed7 but their points 5on>t 5ound+ With Dreal> obJects7 on the contrary7 conseKuences al5ays accrueE and thus the real eHperiences .et si,ted ,rom the mental ones7 the thin.s ,rom our thou.hts o, them7 ,anci,ul or true7 and precipitated to.ether as the stable part o, the 5hole eHperience2chaos7 under the name o, the physical 5orld+ O, this our perceptual eHperiences are the nucleus7 they bein. the ori.inally stron. eHperiences+ We add a lot o, conceptual eHperiences to them7 ma6in. these stron. also in ima.ination7 and buildin. out the remoter parts o, the physical 5orld by their meansE and around this core o, reality the 5orld o, laHly connected ,ancies and mere rhapsodical obJects ,loats li6e a ban6 o, clouds+ In the clouds7 all sorts o, rules are -iolatedB%. AMC 5hich in the core are 6ept+ EHtensions there can be inde,initely locatedE motion there obeys no &e5ton>s la5s+ (II There is a peculiar class o, eHperiences to 5hich7 5hether 5e ta6e them as subJecti-e or as obJecti-e7 5e assign their se-eral natures as attributes7 because in both conteHts they a,,ect their associates acti-ely7 thou.h in neither Kuite as Dstron.ly> or as sharply as thin.s a,,ect one another by their physical ener.ies+ I re,er here to appreciations7 5hich ,orm an ambi.uous sphere o, bein.7 belon.in. 5ith emotion on the one hand7 and ha-in. obJecti-e D-alue> on the other7 yet seemin. not Kuite inner nor Kuite outer7 as i, a diremption had be.un but had not made itsel, complete+B3ACB%. A@C

EHperiences o, pain,ul obJects7 ,or eHample7 are usually also pain,ul eHperiencesE perceptions o, lo-eliness7 o, u.liness7 tend to pass muster as lo-ely or as u.ly perceptionsE intuitions o, the morally lo,ty are lo,ty intuitions+ Sometimes the adJecti-e 5anders as i, uncertain 5here to ,iH itsel,+ Shall 5e spea6 o, seducti-e -isions or o, -isions o, seducti-e thin.sI O, 5ic6ed desires or o, desires ,or 5ic6ednessI O, healthy thou.hts or o, thou.hts o, healthy obJectsI O, .ood impulses7 or o, impulses to5ards the .oodI O, ,eelin.s o, an.er7 or o, an.ry ,eelin.sI Both in the mind and in the thin.7 these natures modi,y their conteHt7 eHclude certain associates and determine others7 ha-e their mates and incompatibles+ )et not as stubbornly as in the case o, physical Kualities7 ,or beauty and u.liness7 lo-e and hatred7 pleasant and pain,ul can7 in certain compleH eHperiences7 coeHist+ I, one 5ere to ma6e an e-olutionary construction o, ho5 a lot o, ori.inally chaotic pure eHperiences became .radually di,,erentiated into an orderly inner and outer 5orld7 the 5hole theory 5ould turn upon one>s success in eHplainin. ho5 or 5hy the Kuality o, an eHperience7 once acti-e7 could become less so7 and7 ,rom bein. an ener.etic attribute in some cases7 else5here lapse into the status o, anB%. A?C inert or merely internal Dnature+> This 5ould be the De-olution> o, the psychical ,rom the bosom o, the physical7 in 5hich the esthetic7 moral and other5ise emotional eHperiences 5ould represent a hal,5ay sta.e+ (III But a last cry o, non possumus 5ill probably .o up ,rom many readers+ <All -ery pretty as a piece o, in.enuity7= they 5ill say7 <but our consciousness itsel, intuiti-ely contradicts you+ We7 ,or our part7 (no! that 5e are conscious+ We feel our thou.ht7 ,lo5in. as a li,e 5ithin us7 in absolute contrast 5ith the obJects 5hich it so unremittin.ly escorts+ We can not be ,aithless to this immediate intuition+ The dualism is a ,undamental datum: !et no man Join 5hat "od has put asunder+= *y reply to this is my last 5ord7 and I .reatly .rie-e that to many it 5ill sound materialistic+ I can not help that7 ho5e-er7 ,or I7 too7 ha-e my intuitions and I must obey them+ !et the case be 5hat it may in others7 I am as con,ident as I am o, anythin. that7 inB%. A:C mysel,7 the stream o, thin6in. F5hich I reco.niLe emphatically as a phenomenonG is only a careless name ,or 5hat7 5hen scrutiniLed7 re-eals itsel, to consist chie,ly o, the stream o, my breathin.+ The DI thin6> 5hich 9ant said must be able to accompany all my obJects7 is the DI breathe> 5hich actually does accompany them+ There are other internal ,acts besides breathin. Fintracephalic muscular adJustments7 etc+7 o, 5hich I ha-e said a 5ord in my lar.er %sycholo.yG7 and these increase the assets o, Dconsciousness7> so ,ar as the latter is subJect to immediate perceptionEB3MC but breath7 5hich 5as e-er the ori.inal o, Dspirit7> breath mo-in. out5ards7 bet5een the .lottis and the nostrils7 is7 I am persuaded7 the essence out o, 5hich philosophers ha-e constructed the entity 6no5n to them as consciousness+ That entity is fictitious% !hile thoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are.B%. A4C I 5ish I mi.ht belie-e mysel, to ha-e made that plausible in this article+ In another article I shall try to ma6e the .eneral notion o, a 5orld composed o, pure eHperiences still more clear+

FOOTNOTES

B3C BReprinted ,rom the 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ i7 &o+ /47 September /7 /01M+ or the relation bet5een this essay and those 5hich ,ollo57 c,+ belo57 pp+ @A2@M+ Ed+C BAC Articles by Bald5in7 Ward7 Ba5den7 9in.7 AleHander and others+ (r+ %erry is ,ran6ly o-er the border+ BMC BSimilarly7 there is no <acti-ity o, Dconsciousness> as such+= See belo57 pp+ /:1 ,,+7 note+ Ed+C B@C In my Psychology I ha-e tried to sho5 that 5e need no 6no5er other than the Dpassin. thou.ht+> BPrinciples of Psychology7 -ol+ i7 pp+ AA4 ,,+C B?C "+ E+ *oore: Mind7 -ol+ Hii7 &+ S+7 B/01AC7 p+ M@1+ B:C %aul &atorp: $inleitung in die Psychologie7 /4447 pp+ /M7 //3+ B4C < i.urati-ely spea6in.7 consciousness may be said to be the one uni-ersal sol-ent7 or menstruum7 in 5hich the di,,erent concrete 6inds o, psychic acts and ,acts are contained7 5hether in concealed or in ob-ious ,orm+= "+ T+ !add: Psychology% 4escriptive and $xplanatory7 /40M7 p+ A1+ B0C B or a parallel statement o, this -ie57 c,+ the author>s Meaning of Truth7 p+ M07 note+ ',+ also belo57 pp+ /0?2/0:+ Ed+C B/1C B or the author>s reco.nition o, <concepts as a co2ordinate realm= o, reality7 c,+ his Meaning of Truth7 pp+ M37 /0@7 noteE A Pluralistic Universe7 pp+ AA02AM1E Some Problems of Philosophy7 pp+ @12@:7 ?:2:1E and belo57 p+ /?7 note+ "i-in. this -ie5 the name Dlo.ical realism7> he remar6s else5here that his philosophy <may be re.arded as some5hat eccentric in its attempt to combine lo.ical realism 5ith an other5ise empiricist mode o, thou.ht= FSome Problems of Philosophy7 p+ /1?G+ Ed+C B//C Here as else5here the relations are o, course experienced relations7 members o, the same ori.inally chaotic mani,old o, non2perceptual eHperience o, 5hich the related terms themsel-es are parts+ B',+ belo57 p+ M3+C B/3C O, the representati-e ,unction o, non2perceptual eHperience as a 5hole7 I 5ill say a 5ord in a subseKuent article: it leads too ,ar into the .eneral theory o, 6no5led.e ,or much to be said about it in a short paper li6e this+ B',+ belo57 pp+ @3 ,,+C B/AC *Onsterber.: -rund.)ge der Psychologie7 -ol+ i7 p+ M4+ B/MC ',+ A+ !+ Hodder: The Adversaries of the Sceptic7 pp+ 0M200+ B/@C or simplicity>s sa6e I con,ine my eHposition to DeHternal> reality+ But there is also the system o, ideal reality in 5hich the room plays its part+ Relations o, comparison7 o,

classi,ication7 serial order7 -alue7 also are stubborn7 assi.n a de,inite place to the room7 unli 6e the incoherence o, its places in the mere rhapsody o, our successi-e thou.hts+ B',+ abo-e7 p+ /?+C B/?C &ote the ambi.uity o, this term7 5hich is ta6en sometimes obJecti-ely and sometimes subJecti-ely+ B/:C In the Psychological #evie! ,or July B/01MC7 (r+ R+ B+ %erry has published a -ie5 o, 'onsciousness 5hich comes nearer to mine than any other 5ith 5hich I am acKuainted+ At present7 (r+ %erry thin6s7 e-ery ,ield o, eHperience is so much D,act+> It becomes Dopinion> or Dthou.ht> only in retrospection7 5hen a ,resh eHperience7 thin6in. the same obJect7 alters and corrects it+ But the correcti-e eHperience becomes itsel, in turn corrected7 and thus eHperience as a 5hole is a process in 5hich 5hat is obJecti-e ori.inally ,ore-er turns subJecti-e7 turns into our apprehension o, the obJect+ I stron.ly recommend (r+ %erry>s admirable article to my readers+ B/4C I ha-e .i-en a partial account o, the matter in Mind7 -ol+ H7 p+ 3:7 /44@ Breprinted in The Meaning of Truth7 pp+ /2M3C7 and in the Psychological #evie!7 -ol+ ii7 p+ /1@7 /40@ Bpartly reprinted in The Meaning of Truth7 pp+ MA2@1C+ See also '+ A+ Stron.>s article in the 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ i7 p+ 3@A7 *ay /37 /01M+ I hope mysel, -ery soon to recur to the matter+ BSee belo57 pp+ @3 ,,+C B/0C B',+ Shad5orth Hod.son: The Metaphysic of $xperience7 -ol+ i+ passim+ The Philosophy of #eflection7 b6+ ii7 ch+ i-7 S A+ Ed+C B31C Spencer>s proo, o, his DTrans,i.ured Realism> Fhis doctrine that there is an absolutely non2 mental realityG comes to mind as a splendid instance o, the impossibility o, establishin. radical hetero.eneity bet5een thou.ht and thin.+ All his pain,ully accumulated points o, di,,erence run .radually into their opposites7 and are ,ull o, eHceptions+ B',+ Spencer: Principles of Psychology7 part -ii7 ch+ HiH+C B3/C I spea6 here o, the complete inner li,e in 5hich the mind plays ,reely 5ith its materials+ O, course the mind>s ,ree play is restricted 5hen it see6s to copy real thin.s in real space+ B33C BBut there are also <mental acti-ity trains7= in 5hich thou.hts do <5or6 on each other+= ',+ belo57 p+ /4M7 note+ Ed+C B3AC BThis topic is resumed belo57 pp+ /A: ,,+ Ed+C B3MC BPrinciples of Psychology7 -ol+ i7 pp+ 3002A1@+ ',+ belo57 pp+ /?02/:/ FnoteG+C B%. A0C

II
A WORLD OF P"RE E#PERIENCE%&)'

It is di,,icult not to notice a curious unrest in the philosophic atmosphere o, the time7 a loosenin. o, old landmar6s7 a so,tenin. o, oppositions7 a mutual borro5in. ,rom one another on the part o, systems anciently closed7 and an interest in ne5 su..estions7 ho5e-er -a.ue7 as i, the one thin. sure 5ere the inadeKuacy o, the eHtant school2solutions+ The dissatis,action 5ith these seems due ,or the most part to a ,eelin. that they are too abstract and academic+ !i,e is con,used and superabundant7 and 5hat the youn.er .eneration appears to cra-e is more o, the temperament o, li,e in its philosophy7 e-en thou.h it 5ere at some cost o, lo.ical ri.or and o, ,ormal purity+ Transcendental idealism is inclinin. to let the 5orld 5a. incomprehensibly7 in spite o, its Absolute SubJect and his unity o, purpose+ Ber6eleyan idealism is abandonin. the principle o, parsimony and dabblin. in panpsychic speculations+ Empiricism ,lirts 5ith teleolo.yE and7 stran.est o, all7 natural realism7 so lon. decently buried7 raises its head abo-e the tur,7 and ,inds .lad hands outstretched ,rom the most unli6ely Kuarters to help it to its ,eet a.ain+ We are all biased by our personal ,eelin.s7 I 6no57 and I am personally discontented 5ith eHtant solutionsE so I seem to read the si.ns o, a .reat unsettlement7 as i, the uphea-al o, more real conceptions and more ,ruit,ul methods 5ere imminent7 as i, a true landscape mi.ht result7 less clipped7 strai.ht2ed.ed and arti,icial+B%. M1C I, philosophy be really on the e-e o, any considerable rearran.ement7 the time should be propitious ,or any one 5ho has su..estions o, his o5n to brin. ,or5ard+ or many years past my mind has been .ro5in. into a certain type o, Weltanschauung+ Ri.htly or 5ron.ly7 I ha-eB%. M/C .ot to the point 5here I can hardly see thin.s in any other pattern+ I propose7 there,ore7 to describe the pattern as clearly as I can consistently 5ith .reat bre-ity7 and to thro5 my description into the bubblin. -at o, publicity 5here7 Jostled by ri-als and torn by critics7 it 5ill e-entually either disappear ,rom notice7 or else7 i, better luc6 be,all it7 Kuietly subside to the pro,undities7 and ser-e as a possible ,erment o, ne5 .ro5ths or a nucleus o, ne5 crystalliLation+ I* Radical Empiricism I .i-e the name o, Dradical empiricism> to my Weltanschauung+ Empiricism is 6no5n as the opposite o, rationalism+ Rationalism tends to emphasiLe uni-ersals and to ma6e 5holes prior to parts in the order o, lo.ic as 5ell as in that o, bein.+ Empiricism7 on the contrary7 lays the eHplanatory stress upon the part7 the element7 the indi-idual7 and treats the 5hole as a collection and the uni-ersal as an abstraction+ *y description o, thin.s7 accordin.ly7 starts 5ith the parts and ma6es o, the 5holeB%. M3C a bein. o, the second order+ It is essentially a mosaic philosophy7 a philosophy o, plural ,acts7 li6e that o, Hume and his descendants7 5ho re,er these ,acts neither to Substances in 5hich they inhere nor to an Absolute *ind that creates them as its obJects+ But it di,,ers ,rom the Humian type o, empiricism in one particular 5hich ma6es me add the epithet radical+ To be radical7 an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly eHperienced7 nor eHclude ,rom them any element that is directly eHperienced+ or such a philosophy7 the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations% and any (ind of relation experienced must be accounted as 0real1 as anything else in the system+ Elements may indeed be redistributed7 the ori.inal placin. o, thin.s .ettin. corrected7 but a real place must be ,ound ,or e-ery 6ind o, thin. eHperienced7 5hether term or relation7 in the ,inal philosophic arran.ement+

&o57 ordinary empiricism7 in spite o, the ,act that conJuncti-e and disJuncti-e relationsB%. MAC present themsel-es as bein. ,ully co2ordinate parts o, eHperience7 has al5ays sho5n a tendency to do a5ay 5ith the connections o, thin.s7 and to insist most on the disJunctions+ Ber6eley>s nominalism7 Hume>s statement that 5hate-er thin.s 5e distin.uish are as Dloose and separate> as i, they had Dno manner o, connection7> James *ill>s denial that similars ha-e anythin. Dreally> in common7 the resolution o, the causal tie into habitual seKuence7 John *ill>s account o, both physical thin.s and sel-es as composed o, discontinuous possibilities7 and the .eneral pul-eriLation o, all EHperience by association and the mind2dust theory7 are eHamples o, 5hat I mean+B3?CB%. MMC The natural result o, such a 5orld2picture has been the e,,orts o, rationalism to correct its incoherencies by the addition o, trans2eHperiential a.ents o, uni,ication7 substances7 intellectual cate.ories and po5ers7 or Sel-esE 5hereas7 i, empiricism had only been radical and ta6en e-erythin. that comes 5ithout dis,a-or7 conJunction as 5ell as separation7 each at its ,ace -alue7 the results 5ould ha-e called ,or no such arti,icial correction+ #adical empiricism7 as I understand it7 does full &ustice to con&unctive relations7 5ithout7 ho5e-er7 treatin. them as rationalism al5ays tends to treat them7 as bein. true in some supernal 5ay7 as i, the unity o, thin.s and their -ariety belon.ed to di,,erent orders o, truth and -itality alto.ether+ II* C+n,-nc.i/0 R0la.i+ns Relations are o, di,,erent de.rees o, intimacy+ *erely to be D5ith> one another in a uni-erse o, discourse is the most eHternal relation that terms can ha-e7 and seems to in-ol-e nothin. 5hate-er as to ,arther conseKuences+ Simultaneity and time2inter-al come neHt7 and then space2 adJacency and distance+ A,ter them7 similarity and di,,erence7 carryin. the possibility o, many in,erences+ Then relations o, acti-ity7 tyin. terms into series in-ol-in.B%. M@C chan.e7 tendency7 resistance7 and the causal order .enerally+ inally7 the relation eHperienced bet5een terms that ,orm states o, mind7 and are immediately conscious o, continuin. each other+ The or.aniLation o, the Sel, as a system o, memories7 purposes7 stri-in.s7 ,ul,ilments or disappointments7 is incidental to this most intimate o, all relations7 the terms o, 5hich seem in many cases actually to compenetrate and su,,use each other>s bein.+B3:C %hilosophy has al5ays turned on .rammatical particles+ With7 near7 neHt7 li6e7 ,rom7 to5ards7 a.ainst7 because7 ,or7 throu.h7 myNthese 5ords desi.nate types o, conJuncti-e relation arran.ed in a rou.hly ascendin. order o, intimacy and inclusi-eness+ A priori7 5e can ima.ine a uni-erse o, 5ithness but no neHtnessE or one o, neHtness but no li6eness7 or o, li6eness 5ith no acti-ity7 or o, acti-ity 5ith no purpose7 or o, purpose 5ith no e.o+ These 5ould be uni-erses7 each 5ith its o5n .rade o, unity+ The uni-erse o, human eHperience is7 by one or another o, its parts7 o, each and all these .rades+ Whether or not it possibly enJoys some still more absolute .rade o, union does not appear upon the sur,ace+B%. M?C Ta6en as it does appear7 our uni-erse is to a lar.e eHtent chaotic+ &o one sin.le type o, connection runs throu.h all the eHperiences that compose it+ I, 5e ta6e space2relations7 they ,ail to connect minds into any re.ular system+ 'auses and purposes obtain only amon. special series o, ,acts+ The sel,2relation seems eHtremely limited and does not lin6 t5o di,,erent sel-es to.ether+ Prima facie7 i, you should li6en the uni-erse o, absolute idealism to an aKuarium7 a

crystal .lobe in 5hich .old,ish are s5immin.7 you 5ould ha-e to compare the empiricist uni-erse to somethin. more li6e one o, those dried human heads 5ith 5hich the (ya6s o, Borneo dec6 their lod.es+ The s6ull ,orms a solid nucleusE but innumerable ,eathers7 lea-es7 strin.s7 beads7 and loose appendices o, e-ery description ,loat and dan.le ,rom it7 and7 sa-e that they terminate in it7 seem to ha-e nothin. to do 5ith one another+ E-en so my eHperiences and yours ,loat and dan.le7B%. M:C terminatin.7 it is true7 in a nucleus o, common perception7 but ,or the most part out o, si.ht and irrele-ant and unima.inable to one another+ This imper,ect intimacy7 this bare relation o, !ithness bet5een some parts o, the sum total o, eHperience and other parts7 is the ,act that ordinary empiricism o-er2emphasiLes a.ainst rationalism7 the latter al5ays tendin. to i.nore it unduly+ Radical empiricism7 on the contrary7 is ,air to both the unity and the disconnection+ It ,inds no reason ,or treatin. either as illusory+ It allots to each its de,inite sphere o, description7 and a.rees that there appear to be actual ,orces at 5or6 5hich tend7 as time .oes on7 to ma6e the unity .reater+ The conJuncti-e relation that has .i-en most trouble to philosophy is the co'conscious transition7 so to call it7 by 5hich one eHperience passes into another 5hen both belon. to the same sel,+ About the ,acts there is no Kuestion+ *y eHperiences and your eHperiences are D5ith> each other in -arious eHternal 5ays7 but mine pass into mine7 and yours pass into yours in a 5ay in 5hich yours and mine ne-er passB%. M4C into one another+ Within each o, our personal histories7 subJect7 obJect7 interest and purpose are continuous or may be continuous+B34C %ersonal histories are processes o, chan.e in time7 and the change itself is one of the things immediately experienced+ D'han.e> in this case means continuous as opposed to discontinuous transition+ But continuous transition is one sort o, a conJuncti-e relationE and to be a radical empiricist means to hold ,ast to this conJuncti-e relation o, all others7 ,or this is the strate.ic point7 the position throu.h 5hich7 i, a hole be made7 all the corruptions o, dialectics and all the metaphysical ,ictions pour into our philosophy+ The holdin. ,ast to this relation means ta6in. it at its ,ace -alue7 neither less nor moreE and to ta6e it at its ,ace -alue means ,irst o, all to ta6e it Just as 5e ,eel it7 and not to con,use oursel-es 5ith abstract tal6 about it7 in-ol-in. 5ords that dri-e us to in-ent secondary conceptions in order to neutraliLe their su..estions and to ma6e our actual eHperience a.ain seem rationally possible+B%. M0C What I do ,eel simply 5hen a later moment o, my eHperience succeeds an earlier one is that thou.h they are t5o moments7 the transition ,rom the one to the other is continuous+ 'ontinuity here is a de,inite sort o, eHperienceE Just as de,inite as is the discontinuity'experience 5hich I ,ind it impossible to a-oid 5hen I see6 to ma6e the transition ,rom an eHperience o, my o5n to one o, yours+ In this latter case I ha-e to .et on and o,, a.ain7 to pass ,rom a thin. li-ed to another thin. only concei-ed7 and the brea6 is positi-ely eHperienced and noted+ Thou.h the ,unctions eHerted by my eHperience and by yours may be the same Fe.g.7 the same obJects 6no5n and the same purposes ,ollo5edG7 yet the sameness has in this case to be ascertained eHpressly Fand o,ten 5ith di,,iculty and uncertaintyG a,ter the brea6 has been ,eltE 5hereas in passin. ,rom one o, my o5n moments to another the sameness o, obJect and interest is unbro6en7 and both the earlier and the later eHperience are o, thin.s directly li-ed+B%. @1C There is no other nature7 no other 5hatness than this absence o, brea6 and this sense o, continuity in that most intimate o, all conJuncti-e relations7 the passin. o, one eHperience into another 5hen they belon. to the same sel,+ And this 5hatness is real empirical Dcontent7> Just as

the 5hatness o, separation and discontinuity is real content in the contrasted case+ %ractically to eHperience one>s personal continuum in this li-in. 5ay is to 6no5 the ori.inals o, the ideas o, continuity and o, sameness7 to 6no5 5hat the 5ords stand ,or concretely7 to o5n all that they can e-er mean+ But all eHperiences ha-e their conditionsE and o-er2subtle intellects7 thin6in. about the ,acts here7 and as6in. ho5 they are possible7 ha-e ended by substitutin. a lot o, static obJects o, conception ,or the direct perceptual eHperiences+ <Sameness7= they ha-e said7 <must be a star6 numerical identityE it can>t run on ,rom neHt to neHt+ 'ontinuity can>t mean mere absence o, .apE ,or i, you say t5o thin.s are in immediate contact7 at the contact ho5 can they be t5oI I,7 on the other hand7 you put a relation o,B%. @/C transition bet5een them7 that itsel, is a third thin.7 and needs to be related or hitched to its terms+ An in,inite series is in-ol-ed7= and so on+ The result is that ,rom di,,iculty to di,,iculty7 the plain conJuncti-e eHperience has been discredited by both schools7 the empiricists lea-in. thin.s permanently disJoined7 and the rationalist remedyin. the looseness by their Absolutes or Substances7 or 5hate-er other ,ictitious a.encies o, union they may ha-e employed+B30C rom all 5hich arti,iciality 5e can be sa-ed by a couple o, simple re,lections: ,irst7 that conJunctions and separations are7 at all e-ents7 co2ordinate phenomena 5hich7 i, 5e ta6e eHperiences at their ,ace -alue7 must be accounted eKually realE and second7 that i, 5e insist on treatin. thin.s as really separate 5hen they are .i-en as continuously Joined7 in-o6in.7 5hen union is reKuired7 transcendental principles to o-ercome the separateness 5e ha-e assumed7 then 5e ou.ht to stand ready to per,orm the con-erse act+ We ou.ht to in-o6e hi.her principles o, disunion7 also7 to ma6e our merely eHperienced disJunctions more truly real+ ailin. thus7 5e ou.ht to let the ori.inally .i-en continuities stand on their o5n bottom+ We ha-e no ri.ht to be lopsided or to blo5 capriciously hot and cold+B%. @3C III* T10 C+2ni.i/0 R0la.i+n The ,irst .reat pit,all ,rom 5hich such a radical standin. by eHperience 5ill sa-e us is an arti,icial conception o, the relations bet!een (no!er and (no!n+ Throu.hout the history o, philosophy the subJect and its obJect ha-e been treated as absolutely discontinuous entitiesE and thereupon the presence o, the latter to the ,ormer7 or the Dapprehension> by the ,ormer o, the latter7 has assumed a paradoHical character 5hich all sorts o, theories had to be in-ented to o-ercome+ Representati-e theories put a mental Drepresentation7> Dima.e7> or Dcontent> into the .ap7 as a sort o, intermediary+ 'ommon2sense theories le,t the .ap untouched7 declarin. our mind able to clear it by a sel,2transcendin. leap+ Transcendentalist theories le,t it impossible to tra-erse byB%. @AC ,inite 6no5ers7 and brou.ht an Absolute in to per,orm the saltatory act+ All the 5hile7 in the -ery bosom o, the ,inite eHperience7 e-ery conJunction reKuired to ma6e the relation intelli.ible is .i-en in ,ull+ Either the 6no5er and the 6no5n are: F/G the sel,2same piece o, eHperience ta6en t5ice o-er in di,,erent conteHtsE or they are F3G t5o pieces o, actual eHperience belon.in. to the same subJect7 5ith de,inite tracts o, conJuncti-e transitional eHperience bet5een themE or FAG the 6no5n is a possible eHperience either o, that subJect or another7 to 5hich the said conJuncti-e transitions !ould lead7 i, su,,iciently prolon.ed+

To discuss all the 5ays in 5hich one eHperience may ,unction as the 6no5er o, another7 5ould be incompatible 5ith the limits o, this essay+BA1C I ha-e Just treated o, type /7 the 6ind o, 6no5led.e called perception+BA/C This is the type o, case in 5hich the mind enJoys direct DacKuaintance> 5ith a present obJect+ In the other types the mind has D6no5led.e2about> an obJect not immediately there+ O, type 37 the simplest sort o, conceptual 6no5led.e7 I ha-e .i-en some account in t5o BearlierC articles+BA3C Type A can al5ays ,ormally and hypothetically be reduced to type 37 so that a brie, description o, that type 5ill put the present reader su,,iciently at my point o, -ie57 and ma6e him see 5hat the actual meanin.s o, the mysterious co.niti-e relation may be+B%. @MC Suppose me to be sittin. here in my library at 'ambrid.e7 at ten minutes> 5al6 ,rom D*emorial Hall7> and to be thin6in. truly o, the latter obJect+ *y mind may ha-e be,ore it only the name7 or it may ha-e a clear ima.e7 or it may ha-e a -ery dim ima.e o, the hall7 but such intrinsic di,,erences in the ima.e ma6e no di,,erence in its co.niti-e ,unction+ 'ertain extrinsic phenomena7 special eHperiences o, conJunction7 are 5hat impart to the ima.e7 be it 5hat it may7 its 6no5in. o,,ice+ B%. @@C or instance7 i, you as6 me 5hat hall I mean by my ima.e7 and I can tell you nothin.E or i, I ,ail to point or lead you to5ards the Har-ard (eltaE or i,7 bein. led by you7 I am uncertain 5hether the Hall I see be 5hat I had in mind or notE you 5ould ri.htly deny that I had Dmeant> that particular hall at all7 e-en thou.h my mental ima.e mi.ht to some de.ree ha-e resembled it+ The resemblance 5ould count in that case as coincidental merely7 ,or all sorts o, thin.s o, a 6ind resemble one another in this 5orld 5ithout bein. held ,or that reason to ta6e co.niLance o, one another+ On the other hand7 i, I can lead you to theB%. @?C hall7 and tell you o, its history and present usesE i, in its presence I ,eel my idea7 ho5e-er imper,ect it may ha-e been7 to ha-e led hither and to be no5 terminated+ i, the associates o, the ima.e and o, the ,elt hall run parallel7 so that each term o, the one conteHt corresponds serially7 as I 5al67 5ith an ans5erin. term o, the othersE 5hy then my soul 5as prophetic7 and my idea must be7 and by common consent 5ould be7 called co.niLant o, reality+ That percept 5as 5hat I meant7 ,or into it my idea has passed by conJuncti-e eHperiences o, sameness and ,ul,illed intention+ &o5here is there Jar7 but e-ery later moment continues and corroborates an earlier one+ In this continuin. and corroboratin.7 ta6en in no transcendental sense7 but denotin. de,initely ,elt transitions7 lies all that the (no!ing of a percept by an idea can possibly contain or signify+ Where-er such transitions are ,elt7 the ,irst eHperience (no!s the last one+ Where they do not7 or 5here e-en as possibles they can not7 inter-ene7 there can be no pretence o, 6no5in.+ In this latter case the eHtremes 5ill be B%. @:Cconnected7 i, connected at all7 by in,erior relationsNbare li6eness or succession7 or by D5ithness> alone+ 9no5led.e o, sensible realities thus comes to li,e inside the tissue o, eHperience+ It is madeE and made by relations that unroll themsel-es in time+ Whene-er certain intermediaries are .i-en7 such that7 as they de-elop to5ards their terminus7 there is eHperience ,rom point to point o, one direction ,ollo5ed7 and ,inally o, one process ,ul,illed7 the result is that their starting'point thereby becomes a (no!er and their terminus an

ob&ect meant or (no!n+ That is all that 6no5in. Fin the simple case consideredG can be 6no5n2as7 that is the 5hole o, its nature7 put into eHperiential terms+ Whene-er such is the seKuence o, our eHperiences 5e may ,reely say that 5e had the terminal obJect Din mind> ,rom the outset7 e-en althou.h at the outset nothin. 5as there in us but a ,lat piece o, substanti-e eHperience li6e any other7 5ith no sel,2transcendency about it7 and no mystery sa-e the mystery o, comin. into eHistence and o, bein. .radually ,ollo5ed by other pieces o, substanti-e eHperience7 5ithB%. @4C conJuncti-ely transitional eHperiences bet5een+ That is 5hat 5e mean here by the obJect>s bein. Din mind+> O, any deeper more real 5ay o, bein. in mind 5e ha-e no positi-e conception7 and 5e ha-e no ri.ht to discredit our actual eHperience by tal6in. o, such a 5ay at all+ I 6no5 that many a reader 5ill rebel at this+ <*ere intermediaries7= he 5ill say7 <e-en thou.h they be ,eelin.s o, continuously .ro5in. ,ul,ilment7 only separate the 6no5er ,rom the 6no5n7 5hereas 5hat 5e ha-e in 6no5led.e is a 6ind o, immediate touch o, the one by the other7 an Dapprehension> in the etymolo.ical sense o, the 5ord7 a leapin. o, the chasm as by li.htnin.7 an act by 5hich t5o terms are smitten into one7 o-er the head o, their distinctness+ All these dead intermediaries o, yours are out o, each other7 and outside o, their termini still+= But do not such dialectic di,,iculties remind us o, the do. droppin. his bone and snappin. at its ima.e in the 5aterI I, 5e 6ne5 any more real 6ind o, union aliunde7 5e mi.ht be entitledB%. @0C to brand all our empirical unions as a sham+ But unions by continuous transition are the only ones 5e 6no5 o,7 5hether in this matter o, a 6no5led.e2about that terminates in an acKuaintance7 5hether in personal identity7 in lo.ical predication throu.h the copula Dis7> or else5here+ I, any5here there 5ere more absolute unions realiLed7 they could only re-eal themsel-es to us by Just such conJuncti-e results+ These are 5hat the unions are !orth7 these are all that !e can ever practically mean by union7 by continuity+ Is it not time to repeat 5hat !otLe said o, substances7 that to act li(e one is to be oneIBAAC Should 5e not say here that to be eHperienced as continuous is to be really continuous7 in a 5orld 5here eHperience and reality come to the same thin.I In a picture .allery a painted hoo6 5ill ser-e to han. a painted chain by7 a painted cable 5ill hold a painted ship+ In a 5orld 5here both the terms and their distinctions are a,,airs o, eHperience7 conJunctions that are eHperienced must be at least as real as anythin. else+ They 5ill be Dabsolutely> real conJunctions7 i, 5e ha-e no transphenomenal Absolute ready7 to derealiLe the 5hole eHperienced 5orld by7 at a stro6e+ I,7 on the other hand7 5e had such an Absolute7 not one o, our opponents> theories o, 6no5led.e could remain standin. any better than ours couldE ,or the distinctions as 5ell as the conJunctions o, eHperience 5ould impartially ,all its prey+ The 5hole Kuestion o, ho5 Done> thin. can 6no5 Danother> 5ould cease to be a real one at all in a 5orld 5here otherness itsel, 5as an illusion+BAMCB%. ?1C So much ,or the essentials o, the co.niti-e relation7 5here the 6no5led.e is conceptual in type7 or ,orms 6no5led.e Dabout> an obJect+ It consists in intermediary eHperiences Fpossible7 i, not actualG o, continuously de-elopin. pro.ress7 and7 ,inally7 o, ,ul,ilment7 5hen the sensible percept7 5hich is the obJect7 is reached+ The percept here not only verifies the concept7 pro-es its ,unction o, 6no5in. that percept to be true7 but the percept>s eHistence as the terminus o, the chain o, intermediaries creates the ,unction+ Whate-er terminates that chain 5as7 because it no5 pro-es itsel, to be7 5hat the concept Dhad in mind+> B%. ?/C

The to5erin. importance ,or human li,e o, this 6ind o, 6no5in. lies in the ,act that an eHperience that 6no5s another can ,i.ure as its representative7 not in any Kuasi2miraculous Depistemolo.ical> sense7 but in the de,inite practical sense o, bein. its substitute in -arious operations7 sometimes physical and sometimes mental7 5hich lead us to its associates and results+ By eHperimentin. on our ideas o, reality7 5e may sa-e oursel-es the trouble o, eHperimentin. on the real eHperiences 5hich they se-erally mean+ The ideas ,orm related systems7 correspondin. point ,or point to the systems 5hich the realities ,ormE and by lettin. an ideal term call up its associates systematically7 5e may be led to a terminus 5hich the correspondin. real term 5ould ha-e led to in case 5e had operated on the real 5orld+ And this brin.s us to the .eneral Kuestion o, substitution+B%. ?3C I(* S-3s.i.-.i+n In Taine>s brilliant boo6 on DIntelli.ence7> substitution 5as ,or the ,irst time named as a cardinal lo.ical ,unction7 thou.h o, course the ,acts had al5ays been ,amiliar enou.h+ What7 eHactly7 in a system o, eHperiences7 does the Dsubstitution> o, one o, them ,or another meanI Accordin. to my -ie57 eHperience as a 5hole is a process in time7 5hereby innumerable particular terms lapse and are superseded by others that ,ollo5 upon them by transitions 5hich7 5hether disJuncti-e or conJuncti-e in content7 are themsel-es eHperiences7 and must in .eneral be accounted at least as real as the terms 5hich they relate+ What the nature o, the e-ent called Dsupersedin.> si.ni,ies7 depends alto.ether on the 6ind o, transition that obtains+ Some eHperiences simply abolish their predecessors 5ithout continuin. them in any 5ay+ Others are ,elt to increase or to enlar.e their meanin.7 to carry out their purpose7 or to brin. us nearer to their .oal+ TheyB%. ?AC Drepresent> them7 and may ,ul,il their ,unction better than they ,ul,illed it themsel-es+ But to D,ul,il a ,unction> in a 5orld o, pure eHperience can be concei-ed and de,ined in only one possible 5ay+ In such a 5orld transitions and arri-als For terminationsG are the only e-ents that happen7 thou.h they happen by so many sorts o, path+ The only ,unction that one eHperience can per,orm is to lead into another eHperienceE and the only ,ul,ilment 5e can spea6 o, is the reachin. o, a certain eHperienced end+ When one eHperience leads to For can lead toG the same end as another7 they a.ree in ,unction+ But the 5hole system o, eHperiences as they are immediately .i-en presents itsel, as a Kuasi2chaos throu.h 5hich one can pass out o, an initial term in many directions and yet end in the same terminus7 mo-in. ,rom neHt to neHt by a .reat many possible paths+ Either one o, these paths mi.ht be a ,unctional substitute ,or another7 and to ,ollo5 one rather than another mi.ht on occasion be an ad-anta.eous thin. to do+ As a matter o,B%. ?MC ,act7 and in a .eneral 5ay7 the paths that run throu.h conceptual eHperiences7 that is7 throu.h Dthou.hts> or Dideas> that D6no5> the thin.s in 5hich they terminate7 are hi.hly ad-anta.eous paths to ,ollo5+ &ot only do they yield inconcei-ably rapid transitionsE but7 o5in. to the Duni-ersal> characterBA@C 5hich they ,reKuently possess7 and to their capacity ,or association 5ith one another in .reat systems7 they outstrip the tardy consecutions o, the thin.s themsel-es7 and s5eep us on to5ards our ultimate termini in a ,ar more labor2sa-in. 5ay than the ,ollo5in. o, trains o, sensible perception e-er could+ Wonder,ul are the ne5 cuts and the short2circuits 5hich the thou.ht2paths ma6e+ *ost thou.ht2paths7 it is true7 are substitutes ,or nothin. actualE they end outside the real 5orld alto.ether7 in 5ay5ard ,ancies7 utopias7 ,ictions or mista6es+ But 5here

they do re2enter reality and terminate therein7 5e substitute them al5aysE and 5ith these substitutes 5e pass the .reater number o, our hours+B%. ?@C This is 5hy I called our eHperiences7 ta6en all to.ether7 a Kuasi2chaos+ There is -astly more discontinuity in the sum total o, eHperiences than 5e commonly suppose+ The obJecti-e nucleus o, e-ery man>s eHperience7 his o5n body7 is7 it is true7 a continuous perceptE and eKually continuous as a percept Fthou.h 5e may be inattenti-e to itG is the material en-ironment o, that body7 chan.in. by .radual transition 5hen the body mo-es+ But the distant parts o, the physical 5orld are at all times absent ,rom us7 and ,orm conceptual obJects merely7 into the perceptual reality o, 5hich our li,e inserts itsel, at points discrete and relati-ely rare+ Round their se-eral obJecti-e nuclei7 partly shared and common and partly discrete7 o, the real physical 5orld7 innumerable thin6ers7 pursuin. their se-eral lines o, physically true co.itation7 trace paths that intersect one another only at discontinuous perceptual points7 and the rest o, the time are Kuite incon.ruentE and around all the nucleiB%. ??C o, shared Dreality7> as around the (ya6>s head o, my late metaphor7 ,loats the -ast cloud o, eHperiences that are 5holly subJecti-e7 that are non2 substitutional7 that ,ind not e-en an e-entual endin. ,or themsel-es in the perceptual 5orldNthe mere day2dreams and Joys and su,,erin.s and 5ishes o, the indi-idual minds+ These eHist !ith one another7 indeed7 and 5ith the obJecti-e nuclei7 but out o, them it is probable that to all eternity no interrelated system o, any 6ind 5ill e-er be made+ This notion o, the purely substitutional or conceptual physical 5orld brin.s us to the most critical o, all the steps in the de-elopment o, a philosophy o, pure eHperience+ The paradoH o, sel,2transcendency in 6no5led.e comes bac6 upon us here7 but I thin6 that our notions o, pure eHperience and o, substitution7 and our radically empirical -ie5 o, conJuncti-e transitions7 are 4en(mittel that 5ill carry us sa,ely throu.h the pass+B%. ?:C (* W1a. O3,0c.i/0 R040r0nc0 Is* Whosoe-er ,eels his eHperience to be somethin. substitutional e-en 5hile he has it7 may be said to ha-e an eHperience that reaches beyond itsel,+ rom inside o, its o5n entity it says Dmore7> and postulates reality eHistin. else5here+ or the transcendentalist7 5ho holds 6no5in. to consist in a salto mortale across an Depistemolo.ical chasm7> such an idea presents no di,,icultyE but it seems at ,irst si.ht as i, it mi.ht be inconsistent 5ith an empiricism li6e our o5n+ Ha-e 5e not eHplained that conceptual 6no5led.e is made such 5holly by the eHistence o, thin.s that ,all outside o, the 6no5in. eHperience itsel,Nby intermediary eHperiences and by a terminus that ,ul,ilsI 'an the 6no5led.e be there be,ore these elements that constitute its bein. ha-e comeI And7 i, 6no5led.e be not there7 ho5 can obJecti-e re,erence occurI The 6ey to this di,,iculty lies in the distinction bet5een 6no5in. as -eri,ied and completed7 and the same 6no5in. as in transitB%. ?4C and on its 5ay+ To recur to the *emorial Hall eHample lately used7 it is only 5hen our idea o, the Hall has actually terminated in the percept that 5e 6no5 D,or certain> that ,rom the be.innin. it 5as truly co.niti-e o, that+ #ntil established by the end o, the process7 its Kuality o, 6no5in. that7 or indeed o, 6no5in. anythin.7 could still be doubtedE and yet the 6no5in. really 5as there7 as the result no5 sho5s+ We 5ere virtual 6no5ers o, the Hall lon. be,ore 5e 5ere certi,ied to ha-e been its actual 6no5ers7 by the

percept>s retroacti-e -alidatin. po5er+ Just so 5e are Dmortal> all the time7 by reason o, the -irtuality o, the ine-itable e-ent 5hich 5ill ma6e us so 5hen it shall ha-e come+ &o5 the immensely .reater part o, all our 6no5in. ne-er .ets beyond this -irtual sta.e+ It ne-er is completed or nailed do5n+ I spea6 not merely o, our ideas o, imperceptibles li6e ether25a-es or dissociated Dions7> or o, DeJects> li6e the contents o, our nei.hbors> mindsE I spea6 also o, ideas 5hich 5e mi.ht -eri,y i, 5e 5ould ta6e the trouble7 but 5hich 5e hold ,orB%. ?0C true althou.h unterminated perceptually7 because nothin. says Dno> to us7 and there is no contradictin. truth in si.ht+ To continue thin(ing unchallenged is% ninety'nine times out of a hundred% our practical substitute for (no!ing in the completed sense. As each eHperience runs by co.niti-e transition into the neHt one7 and 5e no5here ,eel a collision 5ith 5hat 5e else5here count as truth or ,act7 5e commit oursel-es to the current as i, the port 5ere sure+ We li-e7 as it 5ere7 upon the ,ront ed.e o, an ad-ancin. 5a-e2crest7 and our sense o, a determinate direction in ,allin. ,or5ard is all 5e co-er o, the ,uture o, our path+ It is as i, a di,,erential Kuotient should be conscious and treat itsel, as an adeKuate substitute ,or a traced2out cur-e+ Our eHperience7 inter alia7 is o, -ariations o, rate and o, direction7 and li-es in these transitions more than in the Journey>s end+ The eHperiences o, tendency are su,,icient to act uponN5hat more could 5e ha-e done at those moments e-en i, the later -eri,ication comes completeI This is 5hat7 as a radical empiricist7 I say toB%. :1C the char.e that the obJecti-e re,erence 5hich is so ,la.rant a character o, our eHperiences in-ol-es a chasm and a mortal leap+ A positi-ely conJuncti-e transition in-ol-es neither chasm nor leap+ Bein. the -ery ori.inal o, 5hat 5e mean by continuity7 it ma6es a continuum 5here-er it appears+ I 6no5 ,ull 5ell that such brie, 5ords as these 5ill lea-e the hardened transcendentalist unsha6en+ 'onJuncti-e eHperiences separate their terms7 he 5ill still say: they are third thin.s interposed7 that ha-e themsel-es to be conJoined by ne5 lin6s7 and to in-o6e them ma6es our trouble in,initely 5orse+ To D,eel> our motion ,or5ard is impossible+ *otion implies terminusE and ho5 can terminus be ,elt be,ore 5e ha-e arri-edI The barest start and sally ,or5ards7 the barest tendency to lea-e the instant7 in-ol-es the chasm and the leap+ 'onJuncti-e transitions are the most super,icial o, appearances7 illusions o, our sensibility 5hich philosophical re,lection pul-eriLes at a touch+ 'onception is our only trust5orthy instrument7 conception and the Absolute 5or6in. hand in hand+ 'onceptionB%. :/C disinte.rates eHperience utterly7 but its disJunctions are easily o-ercome a.ain 5hen the Absolute ta6es up the tas6+ Such transcendentalists I must lea-e7 pro-isionally at least7 in ,ull possession o, their creed+BA?C I ha-e no space ,or polemics in this article7 so I shall simply ,ormulate the empiricist doctrine as my hypothesis7 lea-in. it to 5or6 or not 5or6 as it may+ ObJecti-e re,erence7 I say then7 is an incident o, the ,act that so much o, our eHperience comes as an insu,,icient and consists o, process and transition+ Our ,ields o, eHperience ha-e no more de,inite boundaries than ha-e our ,ields o, -ie5+ Both are ,rin.ed ,ore-er by a more that continuously de-elops7 and that continuously supersedes them as li,e proceeds+ The relations7 .enerally spea6in.7 are as real here as the terms are7 and the only complaint o, the transcendentalist>s 5ith 5hich I could at all sympathiLe 5ould be his char.e that7 by ,irst ma6in. 6no5led.e to consist in eHternal relations as I ha-e done7 and by then con,essin. that nine2tenths o, the time these are not actually but only -irtually there7 I ha-e 6noc6ed the solid bottom out o,

the 5hole business7 and palmed o,, a substitute o, 6no5led.e ,or the .enuine thin.+ Only the admission7 such a critic mi.ht say7 that our ideas are sel,2transcendent and Dtrue> already7 in ad-ance o, the eHperiences that are to terminate them7 can brin. solidity bac6 to 6no5led.e in a 5orld li6e this7 in 5hich transitions and terminations are only by eHception ,ul,illed+B%. :3C This seems to me an eHcellent place ,or applyin. the pra.matic method+ When a dispute arises7 that method consists in au.urin. 5hat practical conseKuences 5ould be di,,erent i, one side rather than the other 5ere true+ I, no di,,erence can be thou.ht o,7 the dispute is a Kuarrel o-er 5ords+ What then 5ould the sel,2transcendency a,,irmed to eHist in ad-ance o, all eHperiential mediation or termination7 be (no!n'asI What 5ould it practically result in ,or us7 5ere it trueI It could only result in our orientation7 in the turnin. o, our eHpectations and practicalB%. :AC tendencies into the ri.ht pathE and the ri.ht path here7 so lon. as 5e and the obJect are not yet ,ace to ,ace For can ne-er .et ,ace to ,ace7 as in the case o, eJectsG7 5ould be the path that led us into the obJect>s nearest nei.hborhood+ Where direct acKuaintance is lac6in.7 D6no5led.e about> is the neHt best thin.7 and an acKuaintance 5ith 5hat actually lies about the obJect7 and is most closely related to it7 puts such 6no5led.e 5ithin our .rasp+ Ether25a-es and your an.er7 ,or eHample7 are thin.s in 5hich my thou.hts 5ill ne-er perceptually terminate7 but my concepts o, them lead me to their -ery brin67 to the chromatic ,rin.es and to the hurt,ul 5ords and deeds 5hich are their really neHt e,,ects+ E-en i, our ideas did in themsel-es carry the postulated sel,2transcendency7 it 5ould still remain true that their puttin. us into possession o, such e,,ects !ould be the sole cash'value of the self' transcendency for us+ And this cash2-alue7 it is needless to say7 is verbatim et literatim 5hat our empiricist account pays in+ On pra.matist principles there,ore7 a disputeB%. :MC o-er sel,2 transcendency is a pure lo.omachy+ 'all our concepts o, eJecti-e thin.s sel,2transcendent or the re-erse7 it ma6es no di,,erence7 so lon. as 5e don>t di,,er about the nature o, that eHalted -irtue>s ,ruitsN,ruits ,or us7 o, course7 humanistic ,ruits+ I, an Absolute 5ere pro-ed to eHist ,or other reasons7 it mi.ht 5ell appear that his 6no5led.e is terminated in innumerable cases 5here ours is still incomplete+ That7 ho5e-er7 5ould be a ,act indi,,erent to our 6no5led.e+ The latter 5ould .ro5 neither 5orse nor better7 5hether 5e ac6no5led.ed such an Absolute or le,t him out+ So the notion o, a 6no5led.e still in transitu and on its 5ay Joins hands here 5ith that notion o, a Dpure eHperience> 5hich I tried to eHplain in my BessayC entitled D(oes 'onsciousness EHistI> The instant ,ield o, the present is al5ays eHperience in its Dpure> state7 plain unKuali,ied actuality7 a simple that7 as yet undi,,erentiated into thin. and thou.ht7 and only -irtually classi,iable as obJecti-e ,act or as some one>s opinion about ,act+ This is as trueB%. :@C 5hen the ,ield is conceptual as 5hen it is perceptual+ D*emorial Hall> is Dthere> in my idea as much as 5hen I stand be,ore it+ I proceed to act on its account in either case+ Only in the later eHperience that supersedes the present one is this na/f immediacy retrospecti-ely split into t5o parts7 a Dconsciousness> and its Dcontent7> and the content corrected or con,irmed+ While still pure7 or present7 any eHperienceNmine7 ,or eHample7 o, 5hat I 5rite about in these -ery linesNpasses ,or Dtruth+> The morro5 may reduce it to Dopinion+> The transcendentalist in all his particular 6no5led.es is as liable to this reduction as I am: his Absolute does not sa-e him+ Why7 then7 need he Kuarrel 5ith an account o, 6no5in. that merely lea-es it liable to this ine-itable

conditionI Why insist that 6no5in. is a static relation out o, time 5hen it practically seems so much a ,unction o, our acti-e li,eI or a thin. to be -alid7 says !otLe7 is the same as to ma6e itsel, -alid+ When the 5hole uni-erse seems only to be ma6in. itsel, -alid and to be still incomplete Felse 5hy its ceaseless chan.in.IG 5hy7 o,B%. :?C all thin.s7 should 6no5in. be eHemptI Why should it not be ma6in. itsel, -alid li6e e-erythin. elseI That some parts o, it may be already -alid or -eri,ied beyond dispute7 the empirical philosopher7 o, course7 li6e any one else7 may al5ays hope+ (I* T10 C+n.0rmin+-sn0ss +4 Di440r0n. Minds%56' With transition and prospect thus enthroned in pure eHperience7 it is impossible to subscribe to the idealism o, the En.lish school+ Radical empiricism has7 in ,act7 more a,,inities 5ith natural realism than 5ith the -ie5s o, Ber6eley or o, *ill7 and this can be easily sho5n+ or the Ber6eleyan school7 ideas Fthe -erbal eKui-alent o, 5hat I term eHperiencesG are discontinuous+ The content o, each is 5holly immanent7 and there are no transitions 5ith 5hich they are consubstantial and throu.h 5hich their bein.s may unite+ )our *emorial Hall and mine7 e-en 5hen both are percepts7 are 5holly out o, connection 5ith each other+ Our li-es are a con.eries o, solipsisms7 out o, 5hich in strict lo.ic only a "od could compose a uni-erse e-en o, discourse+ &o dynamic currents run bet5een my obJects and your obJects+ &e-er can our minds meet in the same+B%. ::C The incredibility o, such a philosophy is ,la.rant+ It is Dcold7 strained7 and unnatural> in a supreme de.reeE and it may be doubted 5hether e-en Ber6eley himsel,7 5ho too6 it so reli.iously7 really belie-ed7 5hen 5al6in. throu.h the streets o, !ondon7 that his spirit and the spirits o, his ,ello5 5ay,arers had absolutely di,,erent to5ns in -ie5+ To me the decisi-e reason in ,a-or o, our minds meetin. in some common obJects at least is that7 unless I ma6e that supposition7 I ha-e no moti-e ,or assumin. that your mind eHists at all+ Why do I postulate your mindI Because I see your body actin. in a certain 5ay+ Its .estures7 ,acial mo-ements7 5ords and conduct .enerally7 are DeHpressi-e7> so I deem it actuated as my o5n is7 by an inner li,e li6e mine+ This ar.ument ,rom analo.y is myB%. :4C reason7 5hether an instincti-e belie, runs be,ore it or not+ But 5hat is Dyour body> here but a percept in my ,ieldI It is only as animatin. that obJect7 my obJect7 that I ha-e any occasion to thin6 o, you at all+ I, the body that you actuate be not the -ery body that I see there7 but some duplicate body o, your o5n 5ith 5hich that has nothin. to do7 5e belon. to di,,erent uni-erses7 you and I7 and ,or me to spea6 o, you is ,olly+ *yriads o, such uni-erses e-en no5 may coeHist7 irrele-ant to one anotherE my concern is solely 5ith the uni-erse 5ith 5hich my o5n li,e is connected+ In that perceptual part o, my uni-erse 5hich I call your body7 your mind and my mind meet and may be called conterminous+ )our mind actuates that body and mine sees itE my thou.hts pass into it as into their harmonious co.niti-e ,ul,ilmentE your emotions and -olitions pass into it as causes into their e,,ects+ But that percept han.s to.ether 5ith all our other physical percepts+ They are o, one stu,, 5ith itE and i, it be our common possession7 they must be so li6e5ise+ or instance7 yourB%. :0C hand

lays hold o, one end o, a rope and my hand lays hold o, the other end+ We pull a.ainst each other+ 'an our t5o hands be mutual obJects in this eHperience7 and the rope not be mutual alsoI What is true o, the rope is true o, any other percept+ )our obJects are o-er and o-er a.ain the same as mine+ I, I as6 you !here some obJect o, yours is7 our old *emorial Hall7 ,or eHample7 you point to my *emorial Hall 5ith your hand 5hich * see+ I, you alter an obJect in your 5orld7 put out a candle7 ,or eHample7 5hen I am present7 my candle ipso facto .oes out+ It is only as alterin. my obJects that I .uess you to eHist+ I, your obJects do not coalesce 5ith my obJects7 i, they be not identically 5here mine are7 they must be pro-ed to be positi-ely some5here else+ But no other location can be assi.ned ,or them7 so their place must be 5hat it seems to be7 the same+ BA4C B%. 41C %ractically7 then7 our minds meet in a 5orld o, obJects 5hich they share in common7 5hich 5ould still be there7 i, one or se-eral o, the minds 5ere destroyed+ I can see no ,ormal obJection to this supposition>s bein. literally true+ On the principles 5hich I am de,endin.7 a Dmind> or Dpersonal consciousness> is the name ,or a series o, eHperiences run to.ether by certain de,inite transitions7 and an obJecti-e reality is a series o, similar eHperiences 6nit by di,,erent transitions+ I, one and the same eHperience can ,i.ure t5ice7 once in a mental and once in a physical conteHt Fas I ha-e tried7 in my article on D'onsciousness7> to sho5 that it canG7 one does not see 5hy it mi.ht not ,i.ure thrice7 or ,our times7 or any number o, times7 by runnin. into as many di,,erent mental conteHts7 Just as the same point7 lyin. at their intersection7 can be continued into many di,,erent lines+ Abolishin. any number o, conteHts 5ould not destroy the eHperience itsel, or its other conteHts7 any more than abolishin. some o, the point>s linear continuations 5ould destroy the others7 or destroy the point itsel,+ I 5ell 6no5 the subtle dialectic 5hich insistsB%. 4/C that a term ta6en in another relation must needs be an intrinsically di,,erent term+ The cruH is al5ays the old "ree6 one7 that the same man can>t be tall in relation to one nei.hbor7 and short in relation to another7 ,or that 5ould ma6e him tall and short at once+ In this essay I can not stop to re,ute this dialectic7 so I pass on7 lea-in. my ,lan6 ,or the time eHposed+BA0C But i, my reader 5ill only allo5 that the same Dno!> both ends his past and be.ins his ,utureE or that7 5hen he buys an acre o, land ,rom his nei.hbor7 it is the same acre that successi-ely ,i.ures in the t5o estatesE or that 5hen I pay him a dollar7 the same dollar .oes into his poc6et that came out o, mineE he 5ill also in consistency ha-e to allo5 that the same obJect may concei-ably play a part in7 as bein. related to the rest o,7 any number o, other5ise entirely di,,erent minds+ This is enou.h ,or my present point: the common2sense notion o, minds sharin. the same obJect o,,ers no special lo.ical or epistemolo.ical di,,iculties o, its o5nE it stands or ,alls 5ith the .eneral possibility o, thin.s bein. in conJuncti-e relation 5ith other thin.s at all+B%. 43C In principle7 then7 let natural realism pass ,or possible+ )our mind and mine may terminate in the same percept7 not merely a.ainst it7 as i, it 5ere a third eHternal thin.7 but by insertin. themsel-es into it and coalescin. 5ith it7 ,or such is the sort o, conJuncti-e union that appears to be eHperienced 5hen a perceptual terminus D,ul,ils+> E-en so7 t5o ha5sers may embrace the same pile7 and yet neither one o, them touch any other part eHcept that pile7 o, 5hat the other ha5ser is attached to+

It is there,ore not a ,ormal Kuestion7 but a Kuestion o, empirical ,act solely7 5hether7 5hen you and I are said to 6no5 the Dsame> *emorial Hall7 our minds do terminate at or in a numerically identical percept+ Ob-iously7 as a plain matter o, ,act7 they do not+ Apart ,rom color2blindness and such possibilities7 5e see the Hall in di,,erent perspecti-es+ )ou may be on one side o, it and I on another+ The percept o, each o, us7 as he sees the sur,ace o, the Hall7 is moreo-er only his pro-isional terminus+ TheB%. 4AC neHt thin. beyond my percept is not your mind7 but more percepts o, my o5n into 5hich my ,irst percept de-elops7 the interior o, the Hall7 ,or instance7 or the inner structure o, its bric6s and mortar+ I, our minds 5ere in a literal sense conterminous7 neither could .et beyond the percept 5hich they had in common7 it 5ould be an ultimate barrier bet5een themNunless indeed they ,lo5ed o-er it and became Dco2conscious> o-er a still lar.er part o, their content7 5hich Fthou.ht2trans,erence apartG is not supposed to be the case+ In point o, ,act the ultimate common barrier can al5ays be pushed7 by both minds7 ,arther than any actual percept o, either7 until at last it resol-es itsel, into the mere notion o, imperceptibles li6e atoms or ether7 so that7 5here 5e do terminate in percepts7 our 6no5led.e is only speciously completed7 bein.7 in theoretic strictness7 only a -irtual 6no5led.e o, those remoter obJects 5hich conception carries out+ Is natural realism7 permissible in lo.ic7 re,uted then by empirical ,actI (o our minds ha-e no obJect in common a,ter allIB%. 4MC )es7 they certainly ha-e Space in common+ On pra.matic principles 5e are obli.ed to predicate sameness 5here-er 5e can predicate no assi.nable point o, di,,erence+ I, t5o named thin.s ha-e e-ery Kuality and ,unction indiscernible7 and are at the same time in the same place7 they must be 5ritten do5n as numerically one thin. under t5o di,,erent names+ But there is no test disco-erable7 so ,ar as I 6no57 by 5hich it can be sho5n that the place occupied by your percept o, *emorial Hall di,,ers ,rom the place occupied by mine+ The percepts themsel-es may be sho5n to di,,erE but i, each o, us be as6ed to point out 5here his percept is7 5e point to an identical spot+ All the relations7 5hether .eometrical or causal7 o, the Hall ori.inate or terminate in that spot 5herein our hands meet7 and 5here each o, us be.ins to 5or6 i, he 5ishes to ma6e the Hall chan.e be,ore the other>s eyes+ Just so it is 5ith our bodies+ That body o, yours 5hich you actuate and ,eel ,rom 5ithin must be in the same spot as the body o, yours 5hich I see or touch ,rom 5ithout+ DThere> ,or me meansB%. 4@C 5here I place my ,in.er+ I, you do not ,eel my ,in.er>s contact to be Dthere> in my sense7 5hen I place it on your body7 5here then do you ,eel itI )our inner actuations o, your body meet my ,in.er there: it is there that you resist its push7 or shrin6 bac67 or s5eep the ,in.er aside 5ith your hand+ Whate-er ,arther 6no5led.e either o, us may acKuire o, the real constitution o, the body 5hich 5e thus ,eel7 you ,rom 5ithin and I ,rom 5ithout7 it is in that same place that the ne5ly concei-ed or percei-ed constituents ha-e to be located7 and it is through that space that your and my mental intercourse 5ith each other has al5ays to be carried on7 by the mediation o, impressions 5hich I con-ey thither7 and o, the reactions thence 5hich those impressions may pro-o6e ,rom you+ In .eneral terms7 then7 5hate-er di,,erin. contents our minds may e-entually ,ill a place 5ith7 the place itsel, is a numerically identical content o, the t5o minds7 a piece o, common property in 5hich7 throu.h 5hich7 and o-er 5hich they Join+ The receptacle o, certain o,B%. 4?C our eHperiences bein. thus common7 the eHperiences themsel-es mi.ht some day become common also+ I, that day e-er did come7 our thou.hts 5ould terminate in a complete empirical identity7

there 5ould be an end7 so ,ar as those eHperiences 5ent7 to our discussions about truth+ &o points o, di,,erence appearin.7 they 5ould ha-e to count as the same+ (II* C+ncl-si+n With this 5e ha-e the outlines o, a philosophy o, pure eHperience be,ore us+ At the outset o, my essay7 I called it a mosaic philosophy+ In actual mosaics the pieces are held to.ether by their beddin.7 ,or 5hich beddin. the Substances7 transcendental E.os7 or Absolutes o, other philosophies may be ta6en to stand+ In radical empiricism there is no beddin.E it is as i, the pieces clun. to.ether by their ed.es7 the transitions eHperienced bet5een them ,ormin. their cement+ O, course such a metaphor is misleadin.7 ,or in actual eHperience the more substanti-e and the more transiti-e parts run into each other continuously7 there is in .eneralB%. 4:C no separateness needin. to be o-ercome by an eHternal cementE and 5hate-er separateness is actually eHperienced is not o-ercome7 it stays and counts as separateness to the end+ But the metaphor ser-es to symboliLe the ,act that EHperience itsel,7 ta6en at lar.e7 can .ro5 by its ed.es+ That one moment o, it proli,erates into the neHt by transitions 5hich7 5hether conJuncti-e or disJuncti-e7 continue the eHperiential tissue7 can not7 I contend7 be denied+ !i,e is in the transitions as much as in the terms connectedE o,ten7 indeed7 it seems to be there more emphatically7 as i, our spurts and sallies ,or5ard 5ere the real ,irin.2line o, the battle7 5ere li6e the thin line o, ,lame ad-ancin. across the dry autumnal ,ield 5hich the ,armer proceeds to burn+ In this line 5e li-e prospecti-ely as 5ell as retrospecti-ely+ It is Do,> the past7 inasmuch as it comes eHpressly as the past>s continuationE it is Do,> the ,uture in so ,ar as the ,uture7 5hen it comes7 5ill ha-e continued it+ These relations o, continuous transition eHperienced are 5hat ma6e our eHperiencesB%. 44C co.niti-e+ In the simplest and completest cases the eHperiences are co.niti-e o, one another+ When one o, them terminates a pre-ious series o, them 5ith a sense o, ,ul,ilment7 it7 5e say7 is 5hat those other eHperiences Dhad in -ie5+> The 6no5led.e7 in such a case7 is -eri,iedE the truth is Dsalted do5n+> *ainly7 ho5e-er7 5e li-e on speculati-e in-estments7 or on our prospects only+ But li-in. on thin.s in posse is as .ood as li-in. in the actual7 so lon. as our credit remains .ood+ It is e-ident that ,or the most part it is .ood7 and that the uni-erse seldom protests our dra,ts+ In this sense 5e at e-ery moment can continue to belie-e in an eHistin. beyond+ It is only in special cases that our con,ident rush ,or5ard .ets rebu6ed+ The beyond must7 o, course7 al5ays in our philosophy be itsel, o, an eHperiential nature+ I, not a ,uture eHperience o, our o5n or a present one o, our nei.hbor7 it must be a thin. in itsel, in (r+ %rince>s and %ro,essor Stron.>s sense o, the termNthat is7 it must be an eHperience for itsel, 5hose relation to other thin.s 5e translate into the actionB%. 40C o, molecules7 ether25a-es7 or 5hate-er else the physical symbols may be+BM1C This opens the chapter o, the relations o, radical empiricism to panpsychism7 into 5hich I can not enter no5+BM/C The beyond can in any case eHist simultaneouslyN,or it can be eHperienced to have existed simultaneouslyN5ith the eHperience that practically postulates it by loo6in. in its direction7 or by turnin. or chan.in. in the direction o, 5hich it is the .oal+ %endin. that actuality o, union7 in the -irtuality o, 5hich the Dtruth7> e-en no57 o, the postulation consists7 the beyond and its

6no5er are entities split o,, ,rom each other+ The 5orld is in so ,ar ,orth a pluralism o, 5hich the unity is not ,ully eHperienced as yet+ But7 as ,ast as -eri,ications come7 trains o, eHperience7 once separate7 run into one anotherE and that is 5hy I said7 earlier in my article7 that the unity o, the 5orld is on the 5hole under.oin. increase+ The uni-erse continually .ro5s in Kuantity by ne5 eHperiences that .ra,t themsel-es upon the older massE but these -ery ne5 eHperiences o,ten help the mass to a more consolidated ,orm+ B%. 01C These are the main ,eatures o, a philosophy o, pure eHperience+ It has innumerable other aspects and arouses innumerable Kuestions7 but the points I ha-e touched on seem enou.h to ma6e an enterin. 5ed.e+ In my o5n mind such a philosophy harmoniLes best 5ith a radical pluralism7 5ith no-elty and indeterminism7 moralism and theism7 and 5ith the Dhumanism> lately sprun. upon us by the OH,ord and the 'hica.o schools+BM3C I can not7 ho5e-er7 be sure that all these doctrines are its necessary and indispensable allies+ It presents so many points o, di,,erence7 both ,rom the common sense and ,rom the idealism that ha-e made our philosophic lan.ua.e7 that it is almost asB%. 0/C di,,icult to state it as it is to thin6 it out clearly7 and i, it is e-er to .ro5 into a respectable system7 it 5ill ha-e to be built up by the contributions o, many co2operatin. minds+ It seems to me7 as I said at the outset o, this essay7 that many minds are7 in point o, ,act7 no5 turnin. in a direction that points to5ards radical empiricism+ I, they are carried ,arther by my 5ords7 and i, then they add their stron.er -oices to my ,eebler one7 the publication o, this essay 5ill ha-e been 5orth 5hile+

FOOTNOTES
B3@C BReprinted ,rom the 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ I7 /01M7 &o+ 317 September 307 and &o+ 3/7 October /A+ %p+ @32:? ha-e also been reprinted7 5ith some omissions7 alterations and additions7 in The Meaning of Truth7 pp+ /132/31+ The alterations ha-e been adopted in the present teHt+ This essay is re,erred to in A Pluralistic Universe7 p+ 3417 note @+ Ed+C B3?C B',+ Ber6eley: Principles of 5uman 6no!ledge7 IntroductionE Hume: An $n,uiry 7oncerning 5uman Understanding7 sect+ -ii7 part ii FSelby2Bi..e>s edition7 p+ :MGE James *ill: Analysis of the Phenomena of the 5uman Mind7 ch+ -iiiE J+ S+ *ill: An $xamination of Sir William 5amilton1s Philosophy7 ch+ Hi7 HiiE W+ 9+ 'li,,ord: 8ectures and $ssays7 pp+ 3:M ,,+C B3:C BSee <The EHperience o, Acti-ity7= belo57 pp+ /@@2/40+C B34C The psycholo.y boo6s ha-e o, late described the ,acts here 5ith approHimate adeKuacy+ I may re,er to the chapters on DThe Stream o, Thou.ht> and on the Sel, in my o5n Principles of Psychology7 as 5ell as to S+ H+ Hod.son>s Metaphysic of $xperience7 -ol+ i7 ch+ -ii and -iii+ B30C BSee <The Thin. and its Relations7= belo57 pp+ 032/33+C BA1C or bre-ity>s sa6e I alto.ether omit mention o, the type constituted by 6no5led.e o, the truth o, .eneral propositions+ This type has been thorou.hly and7 so ,ar as I can see7

satis,actorily7 elucidated in (e5ey>s Studies in 8ogical Theory+ Such propositions are reducible to the S2is2P ,ormE and the Dterminus> that -eri,ies and ,ul,ils is the SP in combination+ O, course percepts may be in-ol-ed in the mediatin. eHperiences7 or in the Dsatis,actoriness> o, the P in its ne5 position+ BA/C BSee abo-e7 pp+ 02/@+C BA3C B<On the unction o, 'o.nition7= Mind7 -ol+ H7 /44@7 and <The 9no5in. o, Thin.s To.ether7= Psychological #evie!7 -ol+ ii7 /40@+ These articles are reprinted7 the ,ormer in ,ull7 the latter in part7 in The Meaning of Truth7 pp+ /2@1+ Ed+C These articles and their doctrine7 unnoticed apparently by any one else7 ha-e lately .ained ,a-orable comment ,rom %ro,essor Stron.+ B<A &aturalistic Theory o, the Re,erence o, Thou.ht to Reality7= 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ i7 /01M+C (r+ (ic6inson S+ *iller has independently thou.ht out the same results B<The *eanin. o, Truth and Error7= Philosophical #evie!7 -ol+ ii7 /40AE <The 'on,usion o, unction and 'ontent in *ental Analysis7= Psychological #evie!7 -ol+ ii7 /40@C7 5hich Stron. accordin.ly dubs the James2*iller theory o, co.nition+ BAAC B',+ H+ !otLe: Metaphysi(7 SS A:2A07 0:7 047 3MA+C BAMC *r+ Bradley7 not pro,essin. to 6no5 his absolute aliunde7 ne-ertheless derealiLes EHperience by alle.in. it to be e-ery5here in,ected 5ith sel,2contradiction+ His ar.uments seem almost purely -erbal7 but this is no place ,or ar.uin. that point out+ B',+ + H+ BradleyE Appearance and #eality% passim+ and belo57 pp+ /1?2/33+C BA@C O, 5hich all that need be said in this essay is that it also can be concei-ed as ,unctional7 and de,ined in terms o, transitions7 or o, the possibility o, such+ B',+ Principles of Psychology7 -ol+ i7 pp+ M:A2M417 -ol+ ii7 pp+ AA:2AM1E Pragmatism7 p+ 3?@E Some Problems of Philosophy7 pp+ ?A2:ME Meaning of Truth7 pp+ 3M?23M:7 etc+ Ed+C BA?C B',+ belo57 pp+ 0A ,,+C BA:C B',+ <Ho5 T5o *inds 'an 9no5 One Thin.7= belo57 pp+ /3A2/A?+C BA4C The notion that our obJects are inside o, our respecti-e heads is not seriously de,ensible7 so I pass it by+ BA0C BThe ar.ument is resumed belo57 pp+ /1/ sK+ Ed+C BM1C Our minds and these eJecti-e realities 5ould still ha-e space For pseudo2space7 as I belie-e %ro,essor Stron. calls the medium o, interaction bet5een Dthin.s2in2themsel-es>G in common+ These 5ould eHist !here7 and be.in to act !here7 5e locate the molecules7 etc+7 and !here 5e percei-e the sensible phenomena eHplained thereby+ B',+ *orton %rince: The 9ature of Mind% and 5uman Automatism7 part i7 ch+ iii7 i-E '+ A+ Stron.: Why the Mind 5as a Body7 ch+ Hii+C BM/C B',+ belo57 p+ /44E A Pluralistic Universe7 !ect+ i-2-ii+C

BM3C I ha-e said somethin. o, this latter alliance in an article entitled DHumanism and Truth7> in Mind7 October7 /01M+ BReprinted in The Meaning of Truth7 pp+ @/2/1/+ ',+ also <Humanism and Truth Once *ore7= belo57 pp+ 3MM23?@+C B%. 03C

III
T7E T7IN8 AND ITS RELATIONS%95'
EHperience in its immediacy seems per,ectly ,luent+ The acti-e sense o, li-in. 5hich 5e all enJoy7 be,ore re,lection shatters our instincti-e 5orld ,or us7 is sel,2luminous and su..ests no paradoHes+ Its di,,iculties are disappointments and uncertainties+ They are not intellectual contradictions+ When the re,lecti-e intellect .ets at 5or67 ho5e-er7 it disco-ers incomprehensibilities in the ,lo5in. process+ (istin.uishin. its elements and parts7 it .i-es them separate names7 and 5hat it thus disJoins it can not easily put to.ether+ %yrrhonism accepts the irrationality and re-els in its dialectic elaboration+ Other philosophies try7 some by i.norin.7 some by resistin.7 and some by turnin. the dialectic procedure a.ainst itsel,7 ne.atin. its ,irst ne.ations7 to restore the ,luent sense o, li,e a.ain7 and let redemption ta6e the place o, innocence+ The per,ection 5ith 5hich any philosophy may do this is the measure o, its human success and o, its importance in philosophic history+ In Bthe last essayC7 DA World o, %ure EHperience7> I tried my o5n hand s6etchily at the problem7 resistin. certain ,irst steps o, dialectics by insistin. in a .eneral 5ay that the immediately eHperienced conJuncti-e relations are as real as anythin. else+ I, my s6etch is not to appear too na/f7 I must come closer to details7 and in the present essay I propose to do so+B%. 0AC I D%ure eHperience> is the name 5hich I .a-e to the immediate ,luH o, li,e 5hich ,urnishes the material to our later re,lection 5ith its conceptual cate.ories+ Only ne52born babes7 or men in semi2coma ,rom sleep7 dru.s7 illnesses7 or blo5s7 may be assumed to ha-e an eHperience pure in the literal sense o, a that 5hich is not yet any de,inite !hat7 tho> ready to be all sorts o, 5hatsE ,ull both o, onenessB%. 0MC and o, manyness7 but in respects that don>t appearE chan.in. throu.hout7 yet so con,usedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points7 either o, distinction or o, identity7 can be cau.ht+ %ure eHperience in this state is but another name ,or ,eelin. or sensation+ But the ,luH o, it no sooner comes than it tends to ,ill itsel, 5ith emphases7 and these salient parts become identi,ied and ,iHed and abstractedE so that eHperience no5 ,lo5s as i, shot throu.h 5ith adJecti-es and nouns and prepositions and conJunctions+ Its purity is only a relati-e term7 meanin. the proportional amount o, un-erbaliLed sensation 5hich it still embodies+ ar bac6 as 5e .o7 the ,luH7 both as a 5hole and in its parts7 is that o, thin.s conJunct and separated+ The .reat continua o, time7 space7 and the sel, en-elope e-erythin.7 bet5iHt them7 and ,lo5 to.ether 5ithout inter,erin.+ The thin.s that they en-elope come as separate in some 5ays

and as continuous in others+ Some sensations coalesce 5ith some ideas7 and others are irreconcilable+ ;ualitiesB%. 0@C compenetrate one space7 or eHclude each other ,rom it+ They clin. to.ether persistently in .roups that mo-e as units7 or else they separate+ Their chan.es are abrupt or discontinuousE and their 6inds resemble or di,,erE and7 as they do so7 they ,all into either e-en or irre.ular series+ In all this the continuities and the discontinuities are absolutely co2ordinate matters o, immediate ,eelin.+ The conJunctions are as primordial elements o, D,act> as are the distinctions and disJunctions+ In the same act by 5hich I ,eel that this passin. minute is a ne5 pulse o, my li,e7 I ,eel that the old li,e continues into it7 and the ,eelin. o, continuance in no 5ise Jars upon the simultaneous ,eelin. o, a no-elty+ They7 too7 compenetrate harmoniously+ %repositions7 copulas7 and conJunctions7 Dis7> Disn>t7> Dthen7> Dbe,ore7> Din7> Don7> Dbeside7> Dbet5een7> DneHt7> Dli6e7> Dunli6e7> Das7> Dbut7> ,lo5er out o, the stream o, pure eHperience7 the stream o, concretes or the sensational stream7 as naturally as nouns and adJecti-es do7 and they melt into it a.ain as ,luidly 5hen 5e apply them to a ne5 portion o, the stream+B%. 0?C II I, no5 5e as6 5hy 5e must thus translate eHperience ,rom a more concrete or pure into a more intellectualiLed ,orm7 ,illin. it 5ith e-er more aboundin. conceptual distinctions7 rationalism and naturalism .i-e di,,erent replies+ The rationalistic ans5er is that the theoretic li,e is absolute and its interests imperati-eE that to understand is simply the duty o, manE and that 5ho Kuestions this need not be ar.ued 5ith7 ,or by the ,act o, ar.uin. he .i-es a5ay his case+ The naturalist ans5er is that the en-ironment 6ills as 5ell as sustains us7 and that the tendency o, ra5 eHperience to eHtin.uish the eHperient himsel, is lessened Just in the de.ree in 5hich the elements in it that ha-e a practical bearin. upon li,e are analyLed out o, the continuum and -erbally ,iHed and coupled to.ether7 so that 5e may 6no5 5hat is in the 5ind ,or us and .et ready to react in time+ Had pure eHperience7 the naturalist says7 been al5ays per,ectly healthy7 there 5ould ne-erB%. 0:C ha-e arisen the necessity o, isolatin. or -erbaliLin. any o, its terms+ We should Just ha-e eHperienced inarticulately and unintellectually enJoyed+ This leanin. on Dreaction> in the naturalist account implies that7 5hene-er 5e intellectualiLe a relati-ely pure eHperience7 5e ou.ht to do so ,or the sa6e o, redescendin. to the purer or more concrete le-el a.ainE and that i, an intellect stays alo,t amon. its abstract terms and .eneraliLed relations7 and does not reinsert itsel, 5ith its conclusions into some particular point o, the immediate stream o, li,e7 it ,ails to ,inish out its ,unction and lea-es its normal race unrun+ *ost rationalists no5adays 5ill a.ree that naturalism .i-es a true enou.h account o, the 5ay in 5hich our intellect arose at ,irst7 but they 5ill deny these latter implications+ The case7 they 5ill say7 resembles that o, seHual lo-e+ Ori.inatin. in the animal need o, .ettin. another .eneration born7 this passion has de-eloped secondarily such imperious spiritual needs that7 i, you as6 5hy another .eneration ou.ht to be born at all7 the ans5er is: D'hie,lyB%. 04C that lo-e may .o on+> Just so 5ith our intellect: it ori.inated as a practical means o, ser-in. li,eE but it has de-eloped incidentally the ,unction o, understandin. absolute truthE and li,e itsel, no5 seems to be .i-en

chie,ly as a means by 5hich that ,unction may be prosecuted+ But truth and the understandin. o, it lie amon. the abstracts and uni-ersals7 so the intellect no5 carries on its hi.her business 5holly in this re.ion7 5ithout any need o, redescendin. into pure eHperience a.ain+ I, the contrasted tendencies 5hich I thus desi.nate as naturalistic and rationalistic are not reco.niLed by the reader7 perhaps an eHample 5ill ma6e them more concrete+ *r+ Bradley7 ,or instance7 is an ultra2rationalist+ He admits that our intellect is primarily practical7 but says that7 ,or philosophers7 the practical need is simply Truth+ Truth7 moreo-er7 must be assumed Dconsistent+> Immediate eHperience has to be bro6en into subJects and Kualities7 terms and relations7 to be understood as truth at all+ )et 5hen so bro6en it is less consistent than e-er+ Ta6en ra57 it is allB%. 00C un2distin.uished+ IntellectualiLed7 it is all distinction 5ithout oneness+ DSuch an arran.ement may !or(7 but the theoretic problem is not sol-ed+> The Kuestion is Dho! the di-ersity can eHist in harmony 5ith the oneness+> To .o bac6 to pure eHperience is una-ailin.+ D*ere ,eelin. .i-es no ans5er to our riddle+> E-en i, your intuition is a ,act7 it is not an understanding+ DIt is a mere eHperience7 and ,urnishes no consistent -ie5+> The eHperience o,,ered as ,acts or truths DI ,ind that my intellect reJects because they contradict themsel-es+ They o,,er a compleH o, di-ersities conJoined in a 5ay 5hich it ,eels is not its 5ay and 5hich it can not repeat as its o5n++++ or to be satis,ied7 my intellect must understand7 and it can not understand by ta6in. a con.eries in the lump+>BMMC So *r+ Bradley7 in the sole interests o, Dunderstandin.> Fas he concei-es that ,unctionG7 turns his bac6 on ,inite eHperience ,ore-er+ Truth must lie in the opposite direction7 the direction o, the AbsoluteE and this 6ind o, rationalism and naturalism7 or Fas I 5ill no5 call itG pra.matism7 5al6 thence,or5ard upon opposite paths+ or the one7 those intellectual products are most true 5hich7 turnin. their ,ace to5ards the Absolute7 come nearest to symboliLin. its 5ays o, unitin. the many and the one+ or the other7 those are most true 5hich most success,ully dip bac6 into the ,inite stream o, ,eelin. and .ro5 most easily con,luent 5ith some particular 5a-e or 5a-elet+ Such con,luence not only pro-es the intellectual operation to ha-e been true Fas an addition may Dpro-e> that a subtraction is already ri.htly per,ormedG7 but it constitutes7 accordin. to pra.matism7 all that 5e mean by callin. it true+ Only in so ,ar as they lead us7 success,ully or unsuccess,ully7 bac6 into sensible eHperience a.ain7 are our abstracts and uni-ersals true or ,alse at all+BM@CB%. /11C III In Section VI o, Bthe last essayC7 I adopted in a .eneral 5ay the common2sense belie, that one and the same 5orld is co.niLed by our di,,erent mindsE but I le,t undiscussed the dialectical ar.uments 5hich maintain that this is lo.ically absurd+ The usual reason .i-en ,or its bein. absurd is that it assumes one obJect Fto 5it7 the 5orldG to stand in t5o relations at onceE to my mind7 namely7 and a.ain to yoursE 5hereas a term ta6en in a second relation can not lo.ically be the same term 5hich it 5as at ,irst+B%. /1/C I ha-e heard this reason ur.ed so o,ten in discussin. 5ith absolutists7 and it 5ould destroy my radical empiricism so utterly7 i, it 5ere -alid7 that I am bound to .i-e it an attenti-e ear7 and seriously to search its stren.th+ or instance7 let the matter in dispute be term M7 asserted to be on the one hand related to 87 and on the other to 9E and let the t5o cases o, relation be symboliLed by 82M and M29

respecti-ely+ When7 no57 I assume that the eHperience may immediately come and be .i-en in the shape 82M297 5ith no trace o, doublin. or internal ,ission in theB%. /13C M7 I am told that this is all a popular delusionE that 82M29 lo.ically means t5o di,,erent eHperiences7 82M and M297 namelyE and that althou.h the Absolute may7 and indeed must7 ,rom its superior point o, -ie57 read its o5n 6ind o, unity into M>s t5o editions7 yet as elements in ,inite eHperience the t5o M>s lie irretrie-ably asunder7 and the 5orld bet5een them is bro6en and unbrid.ed+ In ar.uin. this dialectic thesis7 one must a-oid slippin. ,rom the lo.ical into the physical point o, -ie5+ It 5ould be easy7 in ta6in. a concrete eHample to ,iH one>s ideas by7 to choose one in 5hich the letter M should stand ,or a collecti-e noun o, some sort7 5hich noun7 bein. related to 8 by one o, its parts and to 9 by another7 5ould in5ardly be t5o thin.s 5hen it stood out5ardly in both relations+ Thus7 one mi.ht say: D(a-id Hume7 5ho 5ei.hed so many stone by his body7 in,luences posterity by his doctrine+> The body and the doctrine are t5o thin.s7 bet5een 5hich our ,inite minds can disco-er no real sameness7 thou.h the same name co-ers both o, them+B%. /1AC And then7 one mi.ht continue: DOnly an Absolute is capable o, unitin. such a non2identity+> We must7 I say7 a-oid this sort o, eHample7 ,or the dialectic insi.ht7 i, true at all7 must apply to terms and relations uni-ersally+ It must be true o, abstract units as 5ell as o, nouns collecti-eE and i, 5e pro-e it by concrete eHamples 5e must ta6e the simplest7 so as to a-oid irrele-ant material su..estions+ Ta6en thus in all its .enerality7 the absolutist contention seems to use as its maJor premise Hume>s notion Dthat all our distinct perceptions are distinct eHistences7 and that the mind ne-er percei-es any real conneHion amon. distinct eHistences+>BM?C #ndoubtedly7 since 5e use t5o phrases in tal6in. ,irst about DM>s relation to 8> and then about DM>s relation to 97> 5e must be ha-in.7 or must ha-e had7 t5o distinct perceptionsENand the rest 5ould then seem to ,ollo5 duly+ But the startin.2point o, the reasonin. here seems to be the ,act o, the t5o phrasesE and this su..ests that the ar.ument may be merely -erbal+ 'an it be that the 5hole dialectic consists in attributin. to the eHperience tal6ed2about a constitution similar to that o, the lan.ua.e in 5hich 5e describe itI *ust 5e assert the obJecti-e double2ness o, the M merely because 5e ha-e to name it t5ice o-er 5hen 5e name its t5o relationsIB%. /1MC 'andidly7 I can thin6 o, no other reason than this ,or the dialectic conclusionEBM:C ,or7 i, 5e thin67 not o, our 5ords7 but o, any simple concrete matter 5hich they may be held to si.ni,y7 the eHperience itsel, belies the paradoH asserted+ We use indeed t5o separate concepts in analyLin. our obJect7 but 5e 6no5 them all the 5hile to be but substitutional7 and that the M in 82M and the M in M29 mean Fi.e.7 are capable o, leadin. to and terminatin. inG one sel,2same piece7 M7 o, sensible eHperience+ This persistent identity o, certain units For emphases7 or points7 or obJects7 or membersNcall them 5hat you 5illG o, the eHperience2continuum7 is Just one o, those conJuncti-eB%. /1@C ,eatures o, it7 on 5hich I am obli.ed to insist so emphatically+BM4C or samenesses are parts o, eHperience>s inde,easible structure+ When I hear a bell2stro6e and7 as li,e ,lo5s on7 its a,ter ima.e dies a5ay7 I still har6 bac6 to it as Dthat same bell2stro6e+> When I see a thin. M7 5ith 8 to the le,t o, it and 9 to the ri.ht o, it7 I see it as one ME and i, you tell me I ha-e had to Dta6e> it t5ice7 I reply that i, I Dtoo6> it a thousand times I should still see it as a unit+BM0C Its unity is abori.inal7 Just as the multiplicity o, my successi-e ta6in.s is abori.inal+ It comes unbro6en as that M7 as a sin.ular 5hich I encounterE they come bro6en7 as those ta6in.s7 as my plurality o, operations+ The unity and the separateness are strictly co2ordinate+ I do not easily

,athom 5hy my opponents should ,ind the separateness so much more easily understandable that they must needs in,ect the 5hole o, ,inite eHperience 5ith it7 and rele.ate the unity Fno5 ta6en as a bare postulate and no lon.er as a thin. positi-ely percei-ableG to the re.ion o, the Absolute>s mysteries+ I do not easily ,athom this7 I say7 ,or the said opponents are abo-e mere -erbal Kuibblin.E yet all that I can catch in their tal6 is the substitution o, 5hat is true o, certain 5ords ,or 5hat is true o, 5hat they si.ni,y+ They stay 5ith the 5ords7Nnot returnin. to the stream o, li,e 5hence all the meanin. o, them came7 and 5hich is al5ays ready to reabsorb them+ B%. /1?C I( or au.ht this ar.ument pro-es7 then7 5e may continue to belie-e that one thin. can be 6no5n by many 6no5ers+ But the denial o, one thin. in many relations is but one application o, a still pro,ounder dialectic di,,iculty+ *an can>t be .ood7 said the sophists7 ,or man is man and good is .oodE and He.elB@1C and Herbart in their day7 more recently A+ Spir7B@/C and most recently and elaborately o, all7 *r+ Bradley7 in,orms us that a term can lo.ically only be a puncti,orm unit7 and that not one o, the conJuncti-e relations bet5een thin.s7 5hich eHperience seems to yield7 is rationally possible+ B%. /1:C O, course7 i, true7 this cuts o,, radical empiricism 5ithout e-en a shillin.+ Radical empiricism ta6es conJuncti-e relations at their ,ace -alue7 holdin. them to be as real as the terms united by them+B@3C The 5orld it represents as a collection7 some parts o, 5hich are conJuncti-ely and others disJuncti-ely related+ T5o parts7 themsel-es disJoined7 may ne-ertheless han. to.ether by intermediaries 5ith 5hich they are se-erally connected7 and the 5hole 5orld e-entually may han. to.ether similarly7 inasmuch as some path o, conJuncti-e transition by 5hich to pass ,rom one o, its parts to another may al5ays be discernible+ Such determinately -arious han.in.2 to.ether may be called concatenated union7 to distin.uish it ,rom the Dthrou.h2and2throu.h> type o, union7B%. /14C Deach in all and all in each> Funion o, total conflux7 as one mi.ht call itG7 5hich monistic systems hold to obtain 5hen thin.s are ta6en in their absolute reality+ In a concatenated 5orld a partial con,luH o,ten is eHperienced+ Our concepts and our sensations are con,luentE successi-e states o, the same e.o7 and ,eelin.s o, the same body are con,luent+ Where the eHperience is not o, con,luH7 it may be o, conterminousness Fthin.s 5ith but one thin. bet5eenGE or o, conti.uousness Fnothin. bet5eenGE or o, li6enessE or o, nearnessE or o, simultaneousnessE or o, in2nessE or o, on2nessE or o, ,or2nessE or o, simple 5ith2nessE or e-en o, mere and2ness7 5hich last relation 5ould ma6e o, ho5e-er disJointed a 5orld other5ise7 at any rate ,or that occasion a uni-erse Do, discourse+> &o5 *r+ Bradley tells us that none o, these relations7 as 5e actually eHperience them7 can possibly be real+B@AC *y neHt duty7 accordin.ly7 must be to rescue radical empiricism ,rom *r+ Bradley+ ortunately7 as it seems to me7 his .eneral contention7 that the -ery notion o, relation is unthin6able clearly7 has been success,ully met by many critics+B@MC B%. /10C

It is a burden to the ,lesh7 and an inJustice both to readers and to the pre-ious 5riters7 to repeat .ood ar.uments already printed+ So7 in noticin. *r+ Bradley7 I 5ill con,ine mysel, to the interests o, radical empiricism solely+ ( The ,irst duty o, radical empiricism7 ta6in. .i-en conJunctions at their ,ace2-alue7 is to class some o, them as more intimate and some as more eHternal+ When t5o terms are similar7 their -ery natures enter into the relation+B%. //1C Bein. !hat they are7 no matter 5here or 5hen7 the li6eness ne-er can be denied7 i, asserted+ It continues predicable as lon. as the terms continue+ Other relations7 the !here and the !hen7 ,or eHample7 seem ad-entitious+ The sheet o, paper may be Do,,> or Don> the table7 ,or eHampleE and in either case the relation in-ol-es only the outside o, its terms+ Ha-in. an outside7 both o, them7 they contribute by it to the relation+ It is eHternal: the term>s inner nature is irrele-ant to it+ Any boo67 any table7 may ,all into the relation7 5hich is created pro hac vice7 not by their eHistence7 but by their casual situation+ It is Just because so many o, the conJunctions o, eHperience seem so eHternal that a philosophy o, pure eHperience must tend to pluralism in its ontolo.y+ So ,ar as thin.s ha-e space2relations7 ,or eHample7 5e are ,ree to ima.ine them 5ith di,,erent ori.ins e-en+ I, they could .et to be7 and .et into space at all7 then they may ha-e done so separately+ Once there7 ho5e-er7 they are additives to one another7 and7 5ith no preJudice to their natures7 all sorts o, space2relations may super-eneB%. ///C bet5een them+ The Kuestion o, ho5 thin.s could come to be anyho57 is 5holly di,,erent ,rom the Kuestion 5hat their relations7 once the bein. accomplished7 may consist in+ *r+ Bradley no5 a,,irms that such eHternal relations as the space2relations 5hich 5e here tal6 o, must hold o, entirely di,,erent subJects ,rom those o, 5hich the absence o, such relations mi.ht a moment pre-iously ha-e been plausibly asserted+ &ot only is the situation di,,erent 5hen the boo6 is on the table7 but the boo( itself is di,,erent as a boo67 ,rom 5hat it 5as 5hen it 5as o,, the table+B@@C He admits that <such eHternal relations seem possible and e-en eHistin.++++ That you do not alter 5hat you compare or rearran.e in space seems to common sense Kuite ob-ious7 and that onB%. //3C the other side there are as ob-ious di,,iculties does not occur to common sense at all+ And I 5ill be.in by pointin. out these di,,iculties++++ There is a relation in the result7 and this relation7 5e hear7 is to ma6e no di,,erence in its terms+ But7 i, so7 to 5hat does it ma6e a di,,erenceI B4oesn1t it ma(e a difference to us onloo(ers% at least:C and 5hat is the meanin. and sense o, Kuali,yin. the terms by itI BSurely the meaning is to tell the truth about their relative position.B@?CC I,7 in short7 it is eHternal to the terms7 ho5 can it possibly be true o, themI B*s it the 0intimacy1 suggested by the little !ord 0of%1 here% !hich * have underscored% that is the root of Mr. Bradley1s trouble:C +++ I, the terms ,rom their inner nature do not enter into the relation7 then7 so ,ar as they are concerned7 they seem related ,or no reason at all++++ Thin.s are spatially related7 ,irst in one 5ay7 and then become related in another 5ay7 and yet in no 5ay themsel-es are alteredE ,or the relations7 it is said7 are but eHternal+ But I reply that7 i,B%. //AC so7 I can not understand the lea-in. by the terms o, one set o, relations and their adoption o, another ,resh set+ The process and its result to the terms7 i, they contribute nothin. to it BSurely they contribute to it all there is 0of1 it;C seem irrational throu.hout+ B*f 0irrational1 here means simply 0non' rational%1 or nondeductible from the essence of either term singly% it is no reproach+ if it means 0contradicting1 such essence% Mr. Bradley should sho! !herein and ho!.C But7 i, they contribute anythin.7 they must surely be a,,ected internally+ BWhy so% if they contribute only their surface:

*n such relations as 0on1 0a foot a!ay%1 0bet!een%1 0next%1 etc.% only surfaces are in ,uestion.C +++ I, the terms contribute anythin. 5hate-er7 then the terms are a,,ected Bin!ardly altered:C by the arran.ement++++ That ,or 5or6in. purposes 5e treat7 and do 5ell to treat7 some relations as eHternal merely I do not deny7 and that o, course is not the Kuestion at issue here+ That Kuestion is +++ 5hether in the end and in principle a mere eHternal relation Bi.e.% a relation !hich can change !ithout forcing its terms<Pg ==>? to change their nature simultaneouslyC is possible and ,orced on us by the ,acts+=B@:C *r+ Bradley neHt re-erts to the antinomies o, space7 5hich7 accordin. to him7 pro-e it to be unreal7 althou.h it appears as so proli,ic a medium o, eHternal relationsE and he then concludes that <Irrationality and eHternality can not be the last truth about thin.s+ Some5here there must be a reason 5hy this and that appear to.ether+ And this reason and reality must reside in the 5hole ,rom 5hich terms and relations are abstractions7 a 5hole in 5hich their internal connection must lie7 and out o, 5hich ,rom the bac6.round appear those ,resh results 5hich ne-er could ha-e come ,rom the premises+= And he adds that <Where the 5hole is di,,erent7 the terms that Kuali,y and contribute to it must so ,ar be di,,erent++++ They are altered so ,ar only B5o! far: farther than externally% yet not through and through:C but still they are altered++++ I must insist that in each case the terms are Kuali,ied by their 5hole B@ualified ho!:24o their external<Pg ==A? relations% situations% dates% etc.% changed as these are in the ne! !hole% fail to ,ualify them 0far1 enough:C7 and that in the second case there is a 5hole 5hich di,,ers both lo.ically and psycholo.ically ,rom the ,irst 5holeE and I ur.e that in contributin. to the chan.e the terms so ,ar are altered+= &ot merely the relations7 then7 but the terms are altered: und .!ar Dso ,ar+> But Just ho! ,ar is the 5hole problemE and Dthrou.h2and2throu.h> 5ould seem Fin spite o, *r+ Bradley>s some5hat undecided utterancesB@4CG to be the ,ull Bradleyan ans5er+ The D5hole> 5hich he here treats as primary and determinati-e o, each part>s manner o, Dcontributin.7> simply must7 5hen it alters7 alter in its entirety+ There must be total con,luH o, its parts7 each into and throu.h each other+ The Dmust> appears here as a Machtspruch7 as an ipse dixit o, *r+ Bradley>s absolutistically tempered Dunderstandin.7> ,or he candidly con,esses that ho5 the parts do di,,er as they contribute to di,,erent 5holes7 is un6no5n to him+B@0CB%. //?C Althou.h I ha-e e-ery 5ish to comprehend the authority by 5hich *r+ Bradley>s understandin. spea6s7 his 5ords lea-e me 5holly uncon-erted+ DEHternal relations> stand 5ith their 5ithers all un5run.7 and remain7 ,or au.ht he pro-es to the contrary7 not only practically 5or6able7 but also per,ectly intelli.ible ,actors o, reality+B%. //:C (I *r+ Bradley>s understandin. sho5s the most eHtraordinary po5er o, percei-in. separations and the most eHtraordinary impotence in comprehendin. conJunctions+ One 5ould naturally say Dneither or both7> but not so *r+ Bradley+ When a common man analyLes certain !hats ,rom out the stream o, eHperience7 he understands their distinctness as thus isolated+ But this does not pre-ent him ,rom eKually 5ell understandin. their combination 5ith each other as originally experienced in the concrete7 or their con,luence 5ith ne5 sensible eHperiences in 5hich they recur as Dthe same+> Returnin. into the stream o, sensible presentation7 nouns and adJecti-es7 and

thats and abstract !hats7 .ro5 con,luent a.ain7 and the 5ord Dis> names all these eHperiences o, conJunction+ *r+ Bradley understands the isolation o, the abstracts7 but to understand the combination is to him impossible+B?1C <To underB%. //4Cstand a compleH AB7= he says7 <I must be.in 5ith A or B+ And be.innin.7 say 5ith A7 i, I then merely ,ind B7 I ha-e either lost A7 or I ha-e .ot beside A7 Bthe !ord 0beside1 seems here vital% as meaning a con&unction 0external1 and therefore unintelligibleC somethin. else7 and in neither case ha-e I understood+B?/C or my intellect can not simply unite a di-ersity7 nor has it in itsel, any ,orm or 5ay o, to.etherness7 and you .ain nothin. i,7 beside A and B7 you o,,er me their conJunction in ,act+ or to my intellect that is no more than another eHternal element+ And D,acts7> once ,or all7 are ,or my intellect not true unless they satis,y it++++ The intellect has in its nature no principle o, mere to.etherness+=B?3C B%. //0C O, course *r+ Bradley has a ri.ht to de,ine Dintellect> as the po5er by 5hich 5e percei-e separations but not unionsNpro-ided he .i-e due notice to the reader+ But 5hy then claim that such a maimed and amputated po5er must rei.n supreme in philosophy7 and accuse on its behoo, the 5hole empirical 5orld o, irrationalityI It is true that he else5here attributes to the intellect a proprius motus o, transition7 but says that 5hen he loo6s ,or these transitions in the detail o, li-in. eHperience7 he Dis unable to -eri,y such a solution+>B?AC )et he ne-er eHplains 5hat the intellectual transitions 5ould be li6e in case 5e had them+ He only de,ines them ne.ati-elyNthey are not spatial7 temporal7 predicati-e7 or causalE or Kualitati-ely or other5ise serialE or in any 5ay relational as 5e naP-ely trace relations7 ,or relations separate terms7 and need themsel-es to be hoo6ed on ad infinitum+ The nearest approach he ma6es to describin. a truly intellectual transition is 5here he spea6s o,B%. /31C A and B as bein. Dunited7 each ,rom its o5n nature7 in a 5hole 5hich is the nature o, both ali6e+>B?MC But this F5hich7 pace *r+ Bradley7 seems eHKuisitely analo.ous to Dta6in.> a con.eries in a Dlump7> i, not to Ds5ampin.>G su..ests nothin. but that conflux 5hich pure eHperience so abundantly o,,ers7 as 5hen Dspace7> D5hite> and Ds5eet> are con,luent in a Dlump o, su.ar7> or 6inesthetic7 dermal7 and optical sensations con,luent in Dmy hand+>B?@C All that I can -eri,y in the transitions 5hich *r+ Bradley>s intellect desiderates as its proprius motus is a reminiscence o, these and other sensible conJunctions Fespecially space2conJunctionsG7 but a reminiscence so -a.ue that its ori.inals are not reco.niLed+ Bradley in short repeats the ,able o, the do.7 the bone7 and its ima.e in the 5ater+ With a 5orld o, particulars7 .i-en in lo-eliest union7 in conJunction de,initely -arious7 and -ariously deB%. /3/C,inite7 the Dho5> o, 5hich you Dunderstand> as soon as you see the ,act o, them7B??C ,or there is no Dho5> eHcept the constitution o, the ,act as .i-enE 5ith all this .i-en him7 I say7 in pure eHperience7 he as6s ,or some ine,,able union in the abstract instead7 5hich7 i, he .ained it7 5ould only be a duplicate o, 5hat he has already in his ,ull possession+ Surely he abuses the pri-ile.e 5hich society .rants to all us philosophers7 o, bein. puLLle2headed+ %olemic 5ritin. li6e this is odiousE but 5ith absolutism in possession in so many Kuarters7 omission to de,end my radical empiricism a.ainst its best 6no5n champion 5ould count as either super,iciality or inability+ I ha-e to conclude that its dialectic has not in-alidated in the least de.ree the usual conJunctions by 5hich the 5orld7 as eHperienced7 han.s so -ariously to.ether+ In particular it lea-es an empirical theory o, 6no5led.eB?:C intact7 and lets us continue to belie-e

5ith common sense that one obJect may be 6no5n7 i, 5e ha-e any .round ,or thin6in. that it is 6no5n7 to many 6no5ers+ B%. /33C In Bthe neHt essayC I shall return to this last supposition7 5hich seems to me to o,,er other di,,iculties much harder ,or a philosophy o, pure eHperience to deal 5ith than any o, absolutism>s dialectic obJections+

FOOTNOTES
BMAC BReprinted ,rom The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ ii7 &o+ 37 January /07 /01@+ Reprinted also as AppendiH A in A Pluralistic Universe7 pp+ AM:2A?0+ The author>s corrections ha-e been adopted in the present teHt+ Ed+C BMMC B + H+ Bradley: Appearance and #eality7 second edition7 pp+ /@32/@A7 3A7 //47 /1M7 /142 /107 @:1+C BM@C 'ompare %ro,essor *ac!ennan>s admirable Auseinanderset.ung 5ith *r+ Bradley7 in The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ I7 B/01MC7 pp+ M1A ,,+7 especially pp+ M1@2M1:+ BM?C BHume: Treatise of 5uman 9ature7 AppendiH7 Selby2Bi..e>s edition7 p+ ?A?+C BM:C Technically7 it seems classable as a D,allacy o, composition+> A duality7 predicable o, the t5o 5holes7 82M and M297 is ,orth5ith predicated o, one o, their parts7 M+ BM4C See abo-e7 pp+ M3 ,,+ BM0C I may perhaps re,er here to my Principles of Psychology7 -ol+ i7 pp+ M@0 ,,+ It really seems D5eird> to ha-e to ar.ue Fas I am ,orced no5 to doG ,or the notion that it is one sheet o, paper F5ith its t5o sur,aces and all that lies bet5eenG 5hich is both under my pen and on the table 5hile I 5riteNthe Dclaim> that it is t5o sheets seems so braLen+ )et I sometimes suspect the absolutists o, sincerityR B@1C B or the author>s criticism o, He.el>s -ie5 o, relations7 c,+ Will to Believe7 pp+ 3:423:0+ Ed+C B@/C B',+ A+ Spir: 4en(en und Wir(lich(eit7 part i7 b6+ iii7 ch+ i- Fcontainin. also account o, HerbartG+ Ed+C B@3C BSee abo-e7 pp+ M37 M0+C B@AC Here a.ain the reader must be5are o, slippin. ,rom lo.ical into phenomenal considerations+ It may 5ell be that 5e attribute a certain relation ,alsely7 because the circumstances o, the case7 bein. compleH7 ha-e decei-ed us+ At a rail5ay station 5e may ta6e our o5n train7 and not the one that ,ills our 5indo57 to be mo-in.+ We here put motion in the 5ron. place in the 5orld7 but

in its ori.inal place the motion is a part o, reality+ What *r+ Bradley means is nothin. li6e this7 but rather that such thin.s as motion are no5here real7 and that7 e-en in their abori.inal and empirically incorri.ible seats7 relations are impossible o, comprehension+ B@MC %articularly so by Andre5 Seth %rin.le2%attison7 in his Man and the 7osmosE by !+ T+ Hobhouse7 in chapter Hii F<The Validity o, Jud.ment=G o, his Theory of 6no!ledgeE and by + '+ S+ Schiller7 in his 5umanism7 essay Hi+ Other ,atal re-ie5s Fin my opinionG are Hodder>s7 in the Psychological #evie!7 -ol+ i7 B/40MC7 p+ A1:E Stout>s in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society7 /01/237 p+ /E and *ac!ennan>s in BThe 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ i7 /01M7 p+ M1AC+ B@@C Once more7 don>t slip ,rom lo.ical into physical situations+ O, course7 i, the table be 5et7 it 5ill moisten the boo67 or i, it be sli.ht enou.h and the boo6 hea-y enou.h7 the boo6 5ill brea6 it do5n+ But such collateral phenomena are not the point at issue+ The point is 5hether the successi-e relations Don> and Dnot2on> can rationally Fnot physicallyG hold o, the same constant terms7 abstractly ta6en+ %ro,essor A+ E+ Taylor drops ,rom lo.ical into material considerations 5hen he instances color2contrast as a proo, that A7 Das contra2distin.uished ,rom B7 is not the same thin. as mere A not in any 5ay a,,ected> F$lements of Metaphysics7 p+ /M@G+ &ote the substitution7 ,or Drelated> o, the 5ord Da,,ected7> 5hich be.s the 5hole Kuestion+ B@?C But <is there any sense7= as6s *r+ Bradley7 pee-ishly7 on p+ @:07 <and i, so7 5hat sense in truth that is only outside and Dabout> thin.sI= Surely such a Kuestion may be le,t unans5ered+ B@:C Appearance and #eality7 second edition7 pp+ @:@2@:?+ B@4C I say Dundecided7> because7 apart ,rom the Dso ,ar7> 5hich sounds terribly hal,2hearted7 there are passa.es in these -ery pa.es in 5hich *r+ Bradley admits the pluralistic thesis+ Read7 ,or eHample7 5hat he says7 on p+ @:47 o, a billiard ball 6eepin. its Dcharacter> unchan.ed7 thou.h7 in its chan.e o, place7 its DeHistence> .ets alteredE or 5hat he says7 on p+ @:07 o, the possibility that an abstract Kuality A7 B7 or '7 in a thin.7 Dmay throu.hout remain unchan.ed> althou.h the thin. be alteredE or his admission that in red2hairedness7 both as analyLed out o, a man and 5hen .i-en 5ith the rest o, him7 there may be Dno chan.e> Fp+ @41G+ Why does he immediately add that ,or the pluralist to plead the non2mutation o, such abstractions 5ould be an ignoratio elenchiI It is impossible to admit it to be such+ The entire elenchus and inKuest is Just as to 5hether parts 5hich you can abstract ,rom eHistin. 5holes can also contribute to other 5holes 5ithout chan.in. their inner nature+ I, they can thus mould -arious 5holes into ne5 gestalt,ualitBten7 then it ,ollo5s that the same elements are lo.ically able to eHist in di,,erent 5holes B5hether physically able 5ould depend on additional hypothesesCE that partial chan.es are thin6able7 and throu.h2and2throu.h chan.e not a dialectic necessityE that monism is only an hypothesisE and that an additi-ely constituted uni-erse is a rationally respectable hypothesis also+ All the theses o, radical empiricism7 in short7 ,ollo5+ B@0C p. cit.7 pp+ @::2@:0+ B?1C So ,ar as I catch his state o, mind7 it is some5hat li6e this: DBoo67> Dtable7> Don>Nho5 does the eHistence o, these three abstract elements result in this boo6 bein. li-in.ly on this table+ Why

isn>t the table on the boo6I Or 5hy doesn>t the Don> connect itsel, 5ith another boo67 or somethin. that is not a tableI *ustn>t somethin. in each o, the three elements already determine the t5o others to it7 so that they do not settle else5here or ,loat -a.uelyI *ustn>t the !hole fact be pre'figured in each part7 and eHist de &ure be,ore it can eHist de factoI But7 i, so7 in 5hat can the Jural eHistence consist7 i, not in a spiritual miniature o, the 5hole ,act>s constitution actuatin. e-ery partial ,actor as its purposeI But is this anythin. but the old metaphysical ,allacy o, loo6in. behind a ,act in esse ,or the .round o, the ,act7 and ,indin. it in the shape o, the -ery same ,act in posseI Some5here 5e must lea-e o,, 5ith a constitution behind 5hich there is nothin.+ B?/C Apply this to the case o, Dboo62on2table>R W+ J+ B?3C p. cit.7 pp+ @:17 @:3+ B?AC p. cit.7 pp+ @?47 @?0+ B?MC p. cit.7 p+ @:1+ B?@C Ho5 meanin.less is the contention that in such 5holes For in Dboo62on2table7> D5atch2in2 poc6et7> etc+G the relation is an additional entity bet!een the terms7 needin. itsel, to be related a.ain to eachR Both Bradley Fop. cit.7 pp+ A32AAG and Royce FThe World and the *ndividual7 -ol+ i7 p+ /34G lo-in.ly repeat this piece o, pro,undity+ B??C The D5hy> and the D5hence> are entirely other Kuestions7 not under discussion7 as I understand *r+ Bradley+ &ot ho5 eHperience .ets itsel, born7 but ho5 it can be 5hat it is a,ter it is born7 is the puLLle+ B?:C Abo-e7 p+ @3+ B%. /3AC

I(
7OW TWO MINDS CAN :NOW ONE T7IN8%;<'
In Bthe essayC entitled D(oes 'onsciousness EHistI> I ha-e tried to sho5 that 5hen 5e call an eHperience Dconscious7> that does not mean that it is su,,used throu.hout 5ith a peculiar modality o, bein. FDpsychic> bein.G as stained .lass may be su,,used 5ith li.ht7 but rather that it stands in certain determinate relations to other portions o, eHperience eHtraneous to itsel,+ These ,orm one peculiar DconteHt> ,or itE 5hile7 ta6en in another conteHt o, eHperiences7 5e class it as a ,act in the physical 5orld+ This Dpen7> ,or eHample7 is7 in the ,irst instance7 a bald that7 a datum7 ,act7 phenomenon7 content7 or 5hate-er other neutral or ambi.uous name you may pre,er to apply+ I called it in that article a Dpure eHperience+> To .et classed either as a physical pen or as some one>s percept o, a pen7 it must assume aB%. /3MC function7 and that can only happen in a more complicated 5orld+ So ,ar as in that 5orld it is a stable ,eature7 holds in67 mar6s paper and obeys

the .uidance o, a hand7 it is a physical pen+ That is 5hat 5e mean by bein. Dphysical7> in a pen+ So ,ar as it is instable7 on the contrary7 comin. and .oin. 5ith the mo-ements o, my eyes7 alterin. 5ith 5hat I call my ,ancy7 continuous 5ith subseKuent eHperiences o, its Dha-in. been> Fin the past tenseG7 it is the percept o, a pen in my mind+ Those peculiarities are 5hat 5e mean by bein. Dconscious7> in a pen+ In Section VI o, another BessayCB?0C I tried to sho5 that the same that7 the same numerically identical pen o, pure eHperience7 can enter simultaneously into many conscious conteHts7 or7 in other 5ords7 be an obJect ,or many di,,erent minds+ I admitted that I had not space to treat o, certain possible obJections in that articleE but in Bthe last essayC I too6 some o, the obJections up+ At the end o, that BessayC I said that still more ,ormidable2soundin. obJections remainedE so7 to lea-e my pure2eHperience theory in as stron. a state as possible7 I propose to consider those obJections no5+B%. /3@C I The obJections I pre-iously tried to dispose o, 5ere purely lo.ical or dialectical+ &o one identical term7 5hether physical or psychical7 it had been said7 could be the subJect o, t5o relations at once+ This thesis I sou.ht to pro-e un,ounded+ The obJections that no5 con,ront us arise ,rom the nature supposed to inhere in psychic ,acts speci,ically+ Whate-er may be the case 5ith physical obJects7 a ,act o, consciousness7 it is alle.ed Fand indeed -ery plausiblyG7 can not7 5ithout sel,2 contradiction7 be treated as a portion o, t5o di,,erent minds7 and ,or the ,ollo5in. reasons+ In the physical 5orld 5e ma6e 5ith impunity the assumption that one and the same material obJect can ,i.ure in an inde,initely lar.e number o, di,,erent processes at once+ When7 ,or instance7 a sheet o, rubber is pulled at its ,our corners7 a unit o, rubber in the middle o, the sheet is a,,ected by all ,our o, theB%. /3?C pulls+ It transmits them each7 as i, it pulled in ,our di,,erent 5ays at once itsel,+ So7 an air2particle or an ether2particle Dcompounds> the di,,erent directions o, mo-ement imprinted on it 5ithout obliteratin. their se-eral indi-idualities+ It deli-ers them distinct7 on the contrary7 at as many se-eral Drecei-ers> Fear7 eye or 5hat notG as may be Dtuned> to that e,,ect+ The apparent paradoH o, a distinctness li6e this sur-i-in. in the midst o, compoundin. is a thin. 5hich7 I ,ancy7 the analyses made by physicists ha-e by this time su,,iciently cleared up+ But i,7 on the stren.th o, these analo.ies7 one should as6: <Why7 i, t5o or more lines can run throu.h one and the same .eometrical point7 or i, t5o or more distinct processes o, acti-ity can run throu.h one and the same physical thin. so that it simultaneously plays a rQle in each and e-ery process7 mi.ht not t5o or more streams o, personal consciousness include one and the same unit o, eHperience so that it 5ould simultaneously be a part o, the eHperience o, all the di,,erent mindsI= one 5ould be chec6ed by thin6in. o, a certain peculiarity byB%. /3:C 5hich phenomena o, consciousness di,,er ,rom physical thin.s+ While physical thin.s7 namely7 are supposed to be permanent and to ha-e their Dstates7> a ,act o, consciousness eHists but once and is a state+ Its esse is sentiriE it is only so ,ar as it is ,eltE and it is unambi.uously and uneKui-ocally eHactly !hat is ,elt+ The hypothesis under consideration 5ould7 ho5e-er7 obli.e it to be ,elt eKui-ocally7 ,elt no5 as part o, my mind and a.ain at the

same time not as a part o, my mind7 but o, yours F,or my mind is not yoursG7 and this 5ould seem impossible 5ithout doublin. it into t5o distinct thin.s7 or7 in other 5ords7 5ithout re-ertin. to the ordinary dualistic philosophy o, insulated minds each 6no5in. its obJect representati-ely as a third thin.7Nand that 5ould be to .i-e up the pure2eHperience scheme alto.ether+ 'an 5e see7 then7 any 5ay in 5hich a unit o, pure eHperience mi.ht enter into and ,i.ure in t5o di-erse streams o, consciousness 5ithout turnin. itsel, into the t5o units 5hich7 on our hypothesis7 it must not beIB%. /34C II There is a 5ayE and the ,irst step to5ards it is to see more precisely ho5 the unit enters into either one o, the streams o, consciousness alone+ Just 5hat7 ,rom bein. Dpure7> does its becomin. Dconscious> once meanI It means7 ,irst7 that ne5 eHperiences ha-e super-enedE and7 second7 that they ha-e borne a certain assi.nable relation to the unit supposed+ 'ontinue7 i, you please7 to spea6 o, the pure unit as Dthe pen+> So ,ar as the pen>s successors do but repeat the pen or7 bein. di,,erent ,rom it7 are Dener.etically>B:1C related to it7 it and they 5ill ,orm a .roup o, stably eHistin. physical thin.s+ So ,ar7 ho5e-er7 as its successors di,,er ,rom it in another 5ell2determined 5ay7 the pen 5ill ,i.ure in their conteHt7 not as a physical7 but as a mental ,act+ It 5ill become a passin. Dpercept7> my percept o, that pen+ What no5 is that decisi-e 5ell2determined 5ayI In the chapter on DThe Sel,7> in my Principles<Pg =CD? of Psychology7 I eHplained the continuous identity o, each personal consciousness as a name ,or the practical ,act that ne5 eHperiencesB:/C come 5hich loo6 bac6 on the old ones7 ,ind them D5arm7> and .reet and appropriate them as Dmine+> These operations mean7 5hen analyLed empirically7 se-eral tolerably de,inite thin.s7 -iL+: /+ That the ne5 eHperience has past time ,or its Dcontent7> and in that time a pen that D5as>E 3+ That D5armth> 5as also about the pen7 in the sense o, a .roup o, ,eelin.s FDinterest> aroused7 Dattention> turned7 Deyes> employed7 etc+G that 5ere closely connected 5ith it and that no5 recur and e-ermore recur 5ith unbro6en -i-idness7 thou.h ,rom the pen o, no57 5hich may be only an ima.e7 all such -i-idness may ha-e .oneE A+ That these ,eelin.s are the nucleus o, Dme>E M+ That 5hate-er once 5as associated 5ith them 5as7 at least ,or that one moment7 Dmine>Nmy implement i, associated 5ith hand2,eelin.s7 my Dpercept> only7 i, only eye2,eelin.s and attention2 ,eelin.s 5ere in-ol-ed+B%. /A1C The pen7 realiLed in this retrospecti-e 5ay as my percept7 thus ,i.ures as a ,act o, Dconscious> li,e+ But it does so only so ,ar as Dappropriation> has occurredE and appropriation is part of the content of a later experience 5holly additional to the ori.inally Dpure> pen+ That pen7 -irtually both obJecti-e and subJecti-e7 is at its o5n moment actually and intrinsically neither+ It has to be

loo6ed bac6 upon and used7 in order to be classed in either distincti-e 5ay+ But its use7 so called7 is in the hands o, the other eHperience7 5hile it stands7 throu.hout the operation7 passi-e and unchan.ed+ I, this pass muster as an intelli.ible account o, ho5 an eHperience ori.inally pure can enter into one consciousness7 the neHt Kuestion is as to ho5 it mi.ht concei-ably enter into t5o+ III Ob-iously no ne5 6ind o, condition 5ould ha-e to be supplied+ All that 5e should ha-e to postulate 5ould be a second subseKuentB%. /A/C eHperience7 collateral and contemporary 5ith the ,irst subseKuent one7 in 5hich a similar act o, appropriation should occur+ The t5o acts 5ould inter,ere neither 5ith one another nor 5ith the ori.inally pure pen+ It 5ould sleep undisturbed in its o5n past7 no matter ho5 many such successors 5ent throu.h their se-eral appropriati-e acts+ Each 5ould 6no5 it as Dmy> percept7 each 5ould class it as a Dconscious> ,act+ &or need their so classin. it inter,ere in the least 5ith their classin. it at the same time as a physical pen+ Since the classin. in both cases depends upon the ta6in. o, it in one .roup or another o, associates7 i, the supersedin. eHperience 5ere o, 5ide enou.h Dspan> it could thin6 the pen in both .roups simultaneously7 and yet distin.uish the t5o .roups+ It 5ould then see the 5hole situation con,ormably to 5hat 5e call Dthe representati-e theory o, co.nition7> and that is 5hat 5e all spontaneously do+ As a man philosophiLin. Dpopularly7> I belie-e that 5hat I see mysel, 5ritin. 5ith is doubleNI thin6 it in its relations to physical nature7 andB%. /A3C also in its relations to my personal li,eE I see that it is in my mind7 but that it also is a physical pen+ The paradoH o, the same eHperience ,i.urin. in t5o consciousnesses seems thus no paradoH at all+ To be Dconscious> means not simply to be7 but to be reported7 6no5n7 to ha-e a5areness o, one>s bein. added to that bein.E and this is Just 5hat happens 5hen the appropriati-e eHperience super-enes+ The pen2eHperience in its ori.inal immediacy is not a5are o, itsel,7 it simply is7 and the second eHperience is reKuired ,or 5hat 5e call a5areness o, it to occur+B:3C The di,,iculty o, understandin. 5hat happens here is7 there,ore7 not a lo.ical di,,iculty: there is no contradiction in-ol-ed+ It is an ontolo.ical di,,iculty rather+ EHperiences come on an enormous scale7 and i, 5e ta6eB%. /AAC them all to.ether7 they come in a chaos o, incommensurable relations that 5e can not strai.hten out+ We ha-e to abstract di,,erent .roups o, them7 and handle these separately i, 5e are to tal6 o, them at all+ But ho5 the eHperiences e-er get themselves made7 or !hy their characters and relations are Just such as appear7 5e can not be.in to understand+ "rantin.7 ho5e-er7 that7 by hoo6 or croo67 they can .et themsel-es made7 and can appear in the successions that I ha-e so schematically described7 then 5e ha-e to con,ess that e-en althou.h Fas I be.an by Kuotin. ,rom the ad-ersaryG Da ,eelin. only is as it is ,elt7> there is still nothin. absurd in the notion o, its bein. ,elt in t5o di,,erent 5ays at once7 as yours7 namely7 and as mine+ It is7 indeed7 Dmine> only as it is ,elt as mine7 and Dyours> only as it is ,elt as yours+ But it is ,elt as neither by itself7 but only 5hen Do5ned> by our t5o se-eral rememberin. eHperiences7 Just as one undi-ided estate is o5ned by se-eral heirs+B%. /AMC I(

One 5ord7 no57 be,ore I close7 about the corollaries o, the -ie5s set ,orth+ Since the acKuisition o, conscious Kuality on the part o, an eHperience depends upon a conteHt comin. to it7 it ,ollo5s that the sum total o, all eHperiences7 ha-in. no conteHt7 can not strictly be called conscious at all+ It is a that7 an Absolute7 a Dpure> eHperience on an enormous scale7 undi,,erentiated and undi,,erentiable into thou.ht and thin.+ This the post29antian idealists ha-e al5ays practically ac6no5led.ed by callin. their doctrine an *dentitBtsphilosophie+ The Kuestion o, the Beseelung o, the All o, thin.s ou.ht not7 then7 e-en to be as6ed+ &o more ou.ht the Kuestion o, its truth to be as6ed7 ,or truth is a relation inside o, the sum total7 obtainin. bet5een thou.hts and somethin. else7 and thou.hts7 as 5e ha-e seen7 can only be conteHtual thin.s+ In these respects the pure eHperiences o, our philosophy are7 in themsel-es considered7 so many little absolutes7 the philosophy o, pure eHperienceB%. /A@C bein. only a more comminuted *dentitBtsphilosophie+B:AC *ean5hile7 a pure eHperience can be postulated 5ith any amount 5hate-er o, span or ,ield+ I, it eHert the retrospecti-e and appropriati-e ,unction on any other piece o, eHperience7 the latter thereby enters into its o5n conscious stream+ And in this operation time inter-als ma6e no essential di,,erence+ A,ter sleepin.7 my retrospection is as per,ect as it is bet5een t5o successi-e 5a6in. moments o, my time+ Accordin.ly i,7 millions o, years later7 a similarly retrospecti-e eHperience should anyho5 come to birth7 my present thou.ht 5ould ,orm a .enuine portion o, its lon.2span conscious li,e+ D orm a portion7> I say7 but not in the sense that the t5o thin.s could be entitati-ely or substanti-ely oneNthey cannot7 ,or they are numerically discrete ,actsNbut only in the sense that the functions o, my present thou.ht7 its 6no5led.e7 its purpose7 its content and Dconsciousness7> in short7 bein. inherited7 5ould be continued practicallyB%. /A?C unchan.ed+ Speculations li6e echner>s7 o, an Earth2soul7 o, 5ider spans o, consciousness en-elopin. narro5er ones throu.hout the cosmos7 are7 there,ore7 philosophically Kuite in order7 pro-ided they distin.uish the ,unctional ,rom the entitati-e point o, -ie57 and do not treat the minor consciousness under discussion as a 6ind o, standin. material o, 5hich the 5ider ones consist+ B:MC

FOOTNOTES
B?4C BReprinted ,rom The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ ii7 &o+ :7 *arch A17 /01@+C B?0C <A World o, %ure EHperience7= abo-e7 pp+ A020/+ B:1C B or an eHplanation o, this eHpression7 see abo-e7 p+ A3+C B:/C I call them Dpassin. thou.hts> in the boo6Nthe passa.e in point .oes ,rom pa.es AA1 to AM3 o, -ol+ i+ B:3C Shad5orth Hod.son has laid .reat stress on the ,act that the minimum o, consciousness demands t5o sub,eelin.s7 o, 5hich the second retrospects the ,irst+ F',+ the section DAnalysis o, *inima> in his Philosophy of #eflection7 -ol+ i7 p+ 3M4E also the chapter entitled DThe *oment o, EHperience> in his Metaphysic of $xperience7 -ol+ i7 p+ AM+G DWe li-e ,or5ard7 but 5e understand bac65ard> is a phrase o, 9ier6e.aard>s 5hich HT,,din. Kuotes+ BH+ HT,,din.: <A %hilosophical 'on,ession7= 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ ii7 /01@7 p+ 4?+C

B:AC B',+ belo57 pp+ /0:7 313+C B:MC B',+ A Pluralistic Universe7 !ect+ i-7 D'oncernin. echner7> and !ect+ -7 DThe 'ompoundin. o, 'onsciousness+>C B%. /A:C

(
T7E PLACE OF AFFECTIONAL FACTS IN A WORLD OF P"RE E#PERIENCE%6)'
'ommon sense and popular philosophy are as dualistic as it is possible to be+ Thou.hts7 5e all naturally thin67 are made o, one 6ind o, substance7 and thin.s o, another+ 'onsciousness7 ,lo5in. inside o, us in the ,orms o, conception or Jud.ment7 or concentratin. itsel, in the shape o, passion or emotion7 can be directly ,elt as the spiritual acti-ity 5hich it is7 and 6no5n in contrast 5ith the space2,illin. obJecti-e Dcontent> 5hich it en-elopes and accompanies+ In opposition to this dualistic philosophy7 I tried7 in Bthe ,irst essayC to sho5 that thou.hts and thin.s are absolutely homo.eneous as to their material7 and that their opposition is only one o, relation and o, ,unction+ There is no thou.ht2stu,, di,,erent ,rom thin.2stu,,7 I saidE but the same identical pieceB%. /A4C o, Dpure eHperience> F5hich 5as the name I .a-e to the materia prima o, e-erythin.G can stand alternately ,or a D,act o, consciousness> or ,or a physical reality7 accordin. as it is ta6en in one conteHt or in another+ or the ri.ht understandin. o, 5hat ,ollo5s7 I shall ha-e to presuppose that the reader 5ill ha-e read that BessayC+B:?C The commonest obJection 5hich the doctrine there laid do5n runs up a.ainst is dra5n ,rom the eHistence o, our Da,,ections+> In our pleasures and pains7 our lo-es and ,ears and an.ers7 in the beauty7 comicality7 importance or preciousness o, certain obJects and situations7 5e ha-e7 I am told by many critics7 a .reat realm o, eHperience intuiti-ely reco.niLed as spiritual7 made7 and ,elt to be made7 o, consciousness eHclusi-ely7 and di,,erent in nature ,rom the space2,illin. 6ind o, bein. 5hich is enJoyed by physical obJects+ In Section VII+ o, Bthe ,irst essayC7 I treated o, this class o, eHperiences -ery inadeKuately7B%. /A0C because I had to be so brie,+ I no5 return to the subJect7 because I belie-e that7 so ,ar ,rom in-alidatin. my .eneral thesis7 these phenomena7 5hen properly analyLed7 a,,ord it po5er,ul support+ The central point o, the pure2eHperience theory is that Douter> and Dinner> are names ,or t5o .roups into 5hich 5e sort eHperiences accordin. to the 5ay in 5hich they act upon their nei.hbors+ Any one Dcontent7> such as hard7 let us say7 can be assi.ned to either .roup+ In the outer .roup it is Dstron.7> it acts Dener.etically> and a..ressi-ely+ Here 5hate-er is hard inter,eres 5ith the space its nei.hbors occupy+ It dents themE is impenetrable by themE and 5e call the hardness then a physical hardness+ In the mind7 on the contrary7 the hard thin. is no5here in particular7 it dents nothin.7 it su,,uses throu.h its mental nei.hbors7 as it 5ere7 and interpenetrates them+ Ta6en in this .roup 5e call both it and them Dideas> or Dsensations>E and the basis o, the t5o .roups respecti-ely is the di,,erent type o, interrelation7 the mutual

impenetrability7B%. /M1C on the one hand7 and the lac6 o, physical inter,erence and interaction7 on the other+ That 5hat in itsel, is one and the same entity should be able to ,unction thus di,,erently in di,,erent conteHts is a natural conseKuence o, the eHtremely compleH reticulations in 5hich our eHperiences come+ To her o,,sprin. a ti.ress is tender7 but cruel to e-ery other li-in. thin.Nboth cruel and tender7 there,ore7 at once+ A mass in mo-ement resists e-ery ,orce that operates contrari5ise to its o5n direction7 but to ,orces that pursue the same direction7 or come in at ri.ht an.les7 it is absolutely inert+ It is thus both ener.etic and inertE and the same is true Fi, you -ary the associates properlyG o, e-ery other piece o, eHperience+ It is only to5ards certain speci,ic .roups o, associates that the physical ener.ies7 as 5e call them7 o, a content are put ,orth+ In another .roup it may be Kuite inert+ It is possible to ima.ine a uni-erse o, eHperiences in 5hich the only alternati-e bet5een nei.hbors 5ould be either physical interaction or complete inertness+ In such a 5orld theB%. /M/C mental or the physical status o, any piece o, eHperience 5ould be uneKui-ocal+ When acti-e7 it 5ould ,i.ure in the physical7 and 5hen inacti-e7 in the mental .roup+ But the uni-erse 5e li-e in is more chaotic than this7 and there is room in it ,or the hybrid or ambi.uous .roup o, our a,,ectional eHperiences7 o, our emotions and appreciati-e perceptions+ In the para.raphs that ,ollo5 I shall try to sho5: F/G That the popular notion that these eHperiences are intuiti-ely .i-en as purely inner ,acts is hasty and erroneousE and F3G That their ambi.uity illustrates beauti,ully my central thesis that subJecti-ity and obJecti-ity are a,,airs not o, 5hat an eHperience is abori.inally made o,7 but o, its classi,ication+ 'lassi,ications depend on our temporary purposes+ or certain purposes it is con-enient to ta6e thin.s in one set o, relations7 ,or other purposes in another set+ In the t5o cases their conteHts are apt to be di,,erent+ In the case o, our a,,ectional eHperiences 5e ha-e no permanent and stead,ast purpose thatB%. /M3C obli.es us to be consistent7 so 5e ,ind it easy to let them ,loat ambi.uously7 sometimes classin. them 5ith our ,eelin.s7 sometimes 5ith more physical realities7 accordin. to caprice or to the con-enience o, the moment+ Thus 5ould these eHperiences7 so ,ar ,rom bein. an obstacle to the pure eHperience philosophy7 ser-e as an eHcellent corroboration o, its truth+ irst o, all7 then7 it is a mista6e to say7 5ith the obJectors 5hom I be.an by citin.7 that an.er7 lo-e and ,ear are a,,ections purely o, the mind+ That7 to a .reat eHtent at any rate7 they are simultaneously a,,ections o, the body is pro-ed by the 5hole literature o, the James2!an.e theory o, emotion+B::C All our pains7 moreo-er7 are local7 and 5e are al5ays ,ree to spea6 o, them in obJecti-e as 5ell as in subJecti-e terms+ We can say that 5e are a5are o, a pain,ul place7 ,illin. a certain bi.ness in our or.anism7 or 5e can say that 5e are in5ardly in a Dstate> o, pain+ All our adJecti-es o,B%. /MAC 5orth are similarly ambi.uousNI instanced some o, the ambi.uities Bin the ,irst essayC+B:4C Is the preciousness o, a diamond a Kuality o, the .emI or is it a ,eelin. in our mindI %ractically 5e treat it as both or as either7 accordin. to the temporary direction o, our thou.ht+ DBeauty7> says %ro,essor Santayana7 Dis pleasure obJecti,ied>E and in Sections /1 and // o, his 5or67 The Sense of Beauty7 he treats in a masterly 5ay o, this

eKui-ocal realm+ The -arious pleasures 5e recei-e ,rom an obJect may count as D,eelin.s> 5hen 5e ta6e them sin.ly7 but 5hen they combine in a total richness7 5e call the result the Dbeauty> o, the obJect7 and treat it as an outer attribute 5hich our mind percei-es+ We disco-er beauty Just as 5e disco-er the physical properties o, thin.s+ Trainin. is needed to ma6e us eHpert in either line+ Sin.le sensations also may be ambi.uous+ Shall 5e say an Da.reeable de.ree o, heat7> or an Da.reeable ,eelin.> occasioned by the de.ree o, heatI Either 5ill doE and lan.ua.e 5ould lose most o, its esthetic and rhetorical -alueB%. /MMC 5ere 5e ,orbidden to proJect 5ords primarily connotin. our a,,ections upon the obJects by 5hich the a,,ections are aroused+ The man is really hate,ulE the action really meanE the situation really tra.icNall in themsel-es and Kuite apart ,rom our opinion+ We e-en .o so ,ar as to tal6 o, a 5eary road7 a .iddy hei.ht7 a Jocund mornin. or a sullen s6yE and the term Dinde,inite> 5hile usually applied only to our apprehensions7 ,unctions as a ,undamental physical Kuali,ication o, thin.s in Spencer>s Dla5 o, e-olution7> and doubtless passes 5ith most readers ,or all ri.ht+ %sycholo.ists7 studyin. our perceptions o, mo-ement7 ha-e unearthed eHperiences in 5hich mo-ement is ,elt in .eneral but not ascribed correctly to the body that really mo-es+ Thus in optical -erti.o7 caused by unconscious mo-ements o, our eyes7 both 5e and the eHternal uni-erse appear to be in a 5hirl+ When clouds ,loat by the moon7 it is as i, both clouds and moon and 5e oursel-es shared in the motion+ In the eHtraordinary case o, amnesia o, the Re-+ *r+ Hanna7 pubB%. /M@Clished by Sidis and "oodhart in their important 5or6 on Multiple Personality7 5e read that 5hen the patient ,irst reco-ered consciousness and <noticed an attendant 5al6 across the room7 he identi,ied the mo-ement 5ith that o, his o5n+ He did not yet discriminate bet5een his o5n mo-ements and those outside himsel,+=B:0C Such eHperiences point to a primiti-e sta.e o, perception in 5hich discriminations a,ter5ards need,ul ha-e not yet been made+ A piece o, eHperience o, a determinate sort is there7 but there at ,irst as a Dpure> ,act+ *otion ori.inally simply isE only later is it con,ined to this thin. or to that+ Somethin. li6e this is true o, e-ery eHperience7 ho5e-er compleH7 at the moment o, its actual presence+ !et the reader arrest himsel, in the act o, readin. this article no5+ 9o! this is a pure eHperience7 a phenomenon7 or datum7 a mere that or content o, ,act+ 0#eading1 simply is% is thereE and 5hether there ,or some one>s consciousness7 or there ,or physical nature7 is a Kuestion not yet put+ At the moment7 it is there ,orB%. /M?C neitherE later 5e shall probably Jud.e it to ha-e been there ,or both+ With the a,,ectional eHperiences 5hich 5e are considerin.7 the relati-ely Dpure> condition lasts+ In practical li,e no ur.ent need has yet arisen ,or decidin. 5hether to treat them as ri.orously mental or as ri.orously physical ,acts+ So they remain eKui-ocalE and7 as the 5orld .oes7 their eKui-ocality is one o, their .reat con-eniences+ The shi,tin. place o, Dsecondary Kualities> in the history o, philosophyB41C is another eHcellent proo, o, the ,act that Dinner> and Douter> are not coe,,icients 5ith 5hich eHperiences come to us abori.inally stamped7 but are rather results o, a later classi,ication per,ormed by us ,or particular needs+ The common2sense sta.e o, thou.ht is a per,ectly de,inite practical haltin.2place7 the place 5here 5e oursel-es can proceed to act unhesitatin.ly+ On this sta.e o, thou.ht thin.s act on each other as 5ell as on us by means o, their secondaryB%. /M:C Kualities+ Sound7 as such7 .oes throu.h the air and can be intercepted+ The heat o, the ,ire passes o-er7 as such7 into the 5ater 5hich it sets a2boilin.+ It is the -ery li.ht o, the arc2lamp 5hich displaces the dar6ness o, the midni.ht street7 etc+ By en.enderin. and translocatin. Just these Kualities7 acti-ely

e,,icacious as they seem to be7 5e oursel-es succeed in alterin. nature so as to suit usE and until more purely intellectual7 as distin.uished ,rom practical7 needs had arisen7 no one e-er thou.ht o, callin. these Kualities subJecti-e+ When7 ho5e-er7 "alileo7 (escartes7 and others ,ound it best ,or philosophic purposes to class sound7 heat7 and li.ht alon. 5ith pain and pleasure as purely mental phenomena7 they could do so 5ith impunity+B4/C E-en the primary Kualities are under.oin. the same ,ate+ Hardness and so,tness are e,,ects on us o, atomic interactions7 and the atoms themsel-es are neither hard nor so,t7 nor solid nor liKuid+ SiLe and shape are deemedB%. /M4C subJecti-e by 9antiansE time itsel, is subJecti-e accordin. to many philosophersEB43C and e-en the acti-ity and causal e,,icacy 5hich lin.ered in physics lon. a,ter secondary Kualities 5ere banished are no5 treated as illusory proJections out5ards o, phenomena o, our o5n consciousness+ There are no acti-ities or e,,ects in nature7 ,or the most intellectual contemporary school o, physical speculation+ &ature eHhibits only changes7 5hich habitually coincide 5ith one another so that their habits are describable in simple Dla5s+>B4AC There is no ori.inal spirituality or materiality o, bein.7 intuiti-ely discerned7 thenE but only a translocation o, eHperiences ,rom one 5orld to anotherE a .roupin. o, them 5ith one set or another o, associates ,or de,initely practical or intellectual ends+ I 5ill say nothin. here o, the persistent ambi.uity o, relations+ They are undeniable parts o, pure eHperienceE yet7 5hile common sense and 5hat I call radical empiricism standB%. /M0C ,or their bein. obJecti-e7 both rationalism and the usual empiricism claim that they are eHclusi-ely the D5or6 o, the mind>Nthe ,inite mind or the absolute mind7 as the case may be+

Turn no5 to those a,,ecti-e phenomena 5hich more directly concern us+ We soon learn to separate the 5ays in 5hich thin.s appeal to our interests and emotions ,rom the 5ays in 5hich they act upon one another+ It does not !or( to assume that physical obJects are .oin. to act out5ardly by their sympathetic or antipathetic Kualities+ The beauty o, a thin. or its -alue is no ,orce that can be plotted in a poly.on o, compositions7 nor does its Duse> or Dsi.ni,icance> a,,ect in the minutest de.ree its -icissitudes or destiny at the hands o, physical nature+ 'hemical Da,,inities> are a purely -erbal metaphorE and7 as I Just said7 e-en such thin.s as ,orces7 tensions7 and acti-ities can at a pinch be re.arded as anthropomorphic proJections+ So ,ar7 then7 as the physical 5orld means the collection o, contents that determine in each other certainB%. /@1C re.ular chan.es7 the 5hole collection o, our appreciati-e attributes has to be treated as ,allin. outside o, it+ I, 5e mean by physical nature 5hate-er lies beyond the sur,ace o, our bodies7 these attributes are inert throu.hout the 5hole eHtent o, physical nature+ Why then do men lea-e them as ambi.uous as they do7 and not class them decisi-ely as purely spiritualI The reason 5ould seem to be that7 althou.h they are inert as re.ards the rest o, physical nature7 they are not inert as re.ards that part o, physical nature 5hich our o5n s6in co-ers+ It is those -ery appreciati-e attributes o, thin.s7 their dan.erousness7 beauty7 rarity7 utility7 etc+7 that primarily appeal to our attention+ In our commerce 5ith nature these attributes are 5hat .i-e

emphasis to obJectsE and ,or an obJect to be emphatic7 5hate-er spiritual ,act it may mean7 means also that it produces immediate bodily e,,ects upon us7 alterations o, tone and tension7 o, heart2 beat and breathin.7 o, -ascular and -isceral action+ The Dinterestin.> aspects o, thin.s are thusB%. /@/C not 5holly inert physically7 thou.h they be acti-e only in these small corners o, physical nature 5hich our bodies occupy+ That7 ho5e-er7 is enou.h to sa-e them ,rom bein. classed as absolutely non2obJecti-e+ The attempt7 i, any one should ma6e it7 to sort eHperiences into t5o absolutely discrete .roups7 5ith nothin. but inertness in one o, them and nothin. but acti-ities in the other7 5ould thus recei-e one chec6+ It 5ould recei-e another as soon as 5e eHamined the more distincti-ely mental .roupE ,or thou.h in that .roup it be true that thin.s do not act on one another by their physical properties7 do not dent each other or set ,ire to each other7 they yet act on each other in the most ener.etic 5ay by those -ery characters 5hich are so inert eHtracorporeally+ It is by the interest and importance that eHperiences ha-e ,or us7 by the emotions they eHcite7 and the purposes they subser-e7 by their a,,ecti-e -alues7 in short7 that their consecution in our se-eral conscious streams7 as Dthou.hts> o, ours7 is mainly ruled+ (esire introduces themE interestB%. /@3C holds themE ,itness ,iHes their order and connection+ I need only re,er ,or this aspect o, our mental li,e7 to Wundt>s article D#eber psychische 'ausalitUt7> 5hich be.ins Volume $+ o, his Philosophische Studien+B4MC It thus appears that the ambi.uous or amphibious status 5hich 5e ,ind our epithets o, -alue occupyin. is the most natural thin. in the 5orld+ It 5ould7 ho5e-er7 be an unnatural status i, the popular opinion 5hich I cited at the outset 5ere correct+ I, Dphysical> and Dmental> meant t5o di,,erent 6inds o, intrinsic nature7 immediately7 intuiti-ely7 and in,allibly discernible7 and each ,iHed ,ore-er in 5hate-er bit o, eHperience it Kuali,ied7 one does not see ho5 there could e-er ha-e arisen any room ,or doubt or ambi.uity+ But i,7 on the contrary7 these 5ords are 5ords o, sortin.7 ambi.uity is natural+ or then7 as soon as the relations o, a thin. are su,,iciently -arious it can be sorted -ariously+B%. /@AC Ta6e a mass o, carrion7 ,or eHample7 and the Ddis.ustin.ness> 5hich ,or us is part o, the eHperience+ The sun caresses it7 and the Lephyr 5ooes it as i, it 5ere a bed o, roses+ So the dis.ustin.ness ,ails to operate 5ithin the realm o, suns and breeLes7Nit does not ,unction as a physical Kuality+ But the carrion Dturns our stomach> by 5hat seems a direct operationNit does ,unction physically7 there,ore7 in that limited part o, physics+ We can treat it as physical or as non2physical accordin. as 5e ta6e it in the narro5er or in the 5ider conteHt7 and con-ersely7 o, course7 5e must treat it as non2mental or as mental+ Our body itsel, is the palmary instance o, the ambi.uous+ Sometimes I treat my body purely as a part o, outer nature+ Sometimes7 a.ain7 I thin6 o, it as Dmine7> I sort it 5ith the Dme7> and then certain local chan.es and determinations in it pass ,or spiritual happenin.s+ Its breathin. is my Dthin6in.7> its sensorial adJustments are my Dattention7> its 6inesthetic alterations are my De,,orts7> its -isceral perturbations are my Demotions+>B%. /@MC The obstinate contro-ersies that ha-e arisen o-er such statements as these F5hich sound so paradoHical7 and 5hich can yet be made so seriouslyG pro-e ho5 hard it is to decide by bare introspection 5hat it is in eHperiences that shall ma6e them either spiritual or material+ It surely can be nothin. intrinsic in the indi-idual eHperience+ It is their 5ay o, beha-in. to5ards each other7 their system o, relations7 their ,unctionE and all these thin.s -ary 5ith the conteHt in 5hich 5e ,ind it opportune to consider them+

I thin6 I may conclude7 then Fand I hope that my readers are no5 ready to conclude 5ith meG7 that the pretended spirituality o, our emotions and o, our attributes o, -alue7 so ,ar ,rom pro-in. an obJection to the philosophy o, pure eHperience7 does7 5hen ri.htly discussed and accounted ,or7 ser-e as one o, its best corroborations+

FOOTNOTES
B:@C BReprinted ,rom The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ ii7 &o+ //7 *ay 3@7 /01@+C B:?C It 5ill be still better i, he shall ha-e also read the BessayC entitled DA World o, %ure EHperience7> 5hich ,ollo5s Bthe ,irstC and de-elops its ideas still ,arther+ B::C B',+ The Principles of Psychology7 -ol+ ii7 ch+ HH-E and <The %hysical Basis o, Emotion7= The Psychological #evie!7 -ol+ i7 /40M7 p+ @/?+C B:4C BSee abo-e7 pp+ AM7 A@+C B:0C %a.e /13+ B41C B',+ Janet and SVailles: 5istory of the Problems of Philosophy7 trans+ by *onahan7 part i7 ch+ iii+C B4/C B',+ (escartes: Meditation iiE Principles of Philosophy7 part i7 $!VIII+C B43C B',+ A+ E+ Taylor: $lements of Metaphysics7 b6+ iii7 ch+ i-+C B4AC B',+ 9+ %earson: -rammar of Science7 ch+ iii+C B4MC It is enou.h ,or my present purpose i, the appreciati-e characters but seem to act thus+ Belie-ers in an acti-ity an sich7 other than our mental eHperiences o, acti-ity7 5ill ,ind some ,arther re,lections on the subJect in my address on DThe EHperience o, Acti-ity+> BThe neHt essay+ ',+ especially7 p+ /?0+ Ed+C B%. /@@C

(I
T7E E#PERIENCE OF ACTI(ITY%<)'
Brethren o, the %sycholo.ical Association: In castin. about me ,or a subJect ,or your %resident this year to tal6 about it has seemed to me that our eHperiences o, acti-ity 5ould ,orm a .ood oneE not only because the topic is so naturally

interestin.7 and because it has lately led to a .ood deal o, rather inconclusi-e discussion7 but because I mysel, am .ro5in. more and more interested in a certain systematic 5ay o, handlin. Kuestions7 and 5ant to .et others interested also7 and this Kuestion stri6es me as one in 5hich7 althou.h I am pain,ully a5are o, my inability to communicate ne5 disco-eries or to reach de,initi-e conclusions7 I yet can sho57 in a rather de,inite manner7 ho5 the method 5or6s+B%. /@?C The 5ay o, handlin. thin.s I spea6 o,7 is7 as you already 5ill ha-e suspected7 that 6no5n sometimes as the pra.matic method7 sometimes as humanism7 sometimes as (e5eyism7 and in rance7 by some o, the disciples o, Ber.son7 as the %hilosophie nou-elle+ %ro,essor Woodbrid.e>s 3ournal of PhilosophyB4?C seems unintentionally to ha-e become a sort o, meetin. place ,or those 5ho ,ollo5 these tendencies in America+ There is only a dim identity amon. themE and the most that can be said at present is that some sort o, .estation seems to be in the atmosphere7 and that almost any day a man 5ith a .enius ,or ,indin. the ri.ht 5ord ,or thin.s may hit upon some uni,yin. and conciliatin. ,ormula that 5ill ma6e so much -a.uely similar aspiration crystalliLe into more de,inite ,orm+ I mysel, ha-e .i-en the name o, Dradical empiricism> to that -ersion o, the tendency in Kuestion 5hich I pre,erE and I propose7 i, you 5ill no5 let me7 to illustrate 5hat I mean by radical empiricism7 by applyin. it to acti-ityB%. /@:C as an eHample7 hopin. at the same time incidentally to lea-e the .eneral problem o, acti-ity in a sli.htlyNI ,ear -ery sli.htlyNmore mana.eable shape than be,ore+ *r+ Bradley calls the Kuestion o, acti-ity a scandal to philosophy7 and i, one turns to the current literature o, the subJectNhis o5n 5ritin.s includedNone easily .athers 5hat he means+ The opponents cannot e-en understand one another+ *r+ Bradley says to *r+ Ward: <I do not care 5hat your oracle is7 and your preposterous psycholo.y may here be .ospel i, you pleaseE +++ but i, the re-elation does contain a meanin.7 I 5ill commit mysel, to this: either the oracle is so con,used that its si.ni,ication is not disco-erable7 or7 upon the other hand7 i, it can be pinned do5n to any de,inite statement7 then that statement 5ill be ,alse+=B4:C *r+ Ward in turn says o, *r+ Bradley: <I cannot e-en ima.ine the state o, mind to 5hich his description applies++++ BItC reads li6e an unintentional tra-estyB%. /@4C o, Herbartian psycholo.y by one 5ho has tried to impro-e upon it 5ithout bein. at the pains to master it+=B44C *Onsterber. eHcludes a -ie5 opposed to his o5n by sayin. that 5ith any one 5ho holds it a "erstBndigung 5ith him is <grundsBt.lich ausgeschlossen=E and Royce7 in a re-ie5 o, Stout7B40C hauls him o-er the coals at .reat len.th ,or de,endin. De,,icacy> in a 5ay 5hich I7 ,or one7 ne-er .athered ,rom readin. him7 and 5hich I ha-e heard Stout himsel, say 5as Kuite ,orei.n to the intention o, his teHt+ In these discussions distinct Kuestions are habitually Jumbled and di,,erent points o, -ie5 are tal6ed o, durcheinander+ F/G There is a psycholo.ical Kuestion: <Ha-e 5e perceptions o, acti-ityI and i, so7 5hat are they li6e7 and 5hen and 5here do 5e ha-e themI=

F3G There is a metaphysical Kuestion: <Is there a fact o, acti-ityI and i, so7 5hat idea must 5e ,rame o, itI What is it li6eI and 5hatB%. /@0C does it do7 i, it does anythin.I= And ,inally there is a lo.ical Kuestion: FAG <Whence do 5e (no! acti-ityI By our o5n ,eelin.s o, it solelyI or by some other source o, in,ormationI= Throu.hout pa.e a,ter pa.e o, the literature one 6no5s not 5hich o, these Kuestions is be,ore oneE and mere description o, the sur,ace2sho5 o, eHperience is pro,erred as i, it implicitly ans5ered e-ery one o, them+ &o one o, the disputants7 moreo-er7 tries to sho5 5hat pra.matic conseKuences his o5n -ie5 5ould carry7 or 5hat assi.nable particular di,,erences in any one>s eHperience it 5ould ma6e i, his ad-ersary>s 5ere triumphant+ It seems to me that i, radical empiricism be .ood ,or anythin.7 it ou.ht7 5ith its pra.matic method and its principle o, pure eHperience7 to be able to a-oid such tan.les7 or at least to simpli,y them some5hat+ The pra.matic method starts ,rom the postulate that there is no di,,erence o, truth that doesn>t ma6e a di,,erence o, ,act some5hereE and it see6s to determine the meanin. o, all di,,erences o,B%. /?1C opinion by ma6in. the discussion hin.e as soon as possible upon some practical or particular issue+ The principle o, pure eHperience is also a methodical postulate+ &othin. shall be admitted as ,act7 it says7 eHcept 5hat can be eHperienced at some de,inite time by some eHperientE and ,or e-ery ,eature o, ,act e-er so eHperienced7 a de,inite place must be ,ound some5here in the ,inal system o, reality+ In other 5ords: E-erythin. real must be eHperienceable some5here7 and e-ery 6ind o, thin. eHperienced must some5here be real+ Armed 5ith these rules o, method let us see 5hat ,ace the problems o, acti-ity present to us+ By the principle o, pure eHperience7 either the 5ord Dacti-ity> must ha-e no meanin. at all7 or else the ori.inal type and model o, 5hat it means must lie in some concrete 6ind o, eHperience that can be de,initely pointed out+ Whate-er ulterior Jud.ments 5e may e-entually come to ma6e re.ardin. acti-ity7 that sort o, thin. 5ill be 5hat the Jud.ments are about+ The ,irst step to ta6e7 then7 is to as6 5here in the stream o, eHperience 5e seem to ,ind 5hatB%. /?/C 5e spea6 o, as acti-ity+ What 5e are to thin6 o, the acti-ity thus ,ound 5ill be a later Kuestion+ &o5 it is ob-ious that 5e are tempted to a,,irm acti-ity 5here-er 5e ,ind anythin. going on+ Ta6en in the broadest sense7 any apprehension o, somethin. doing7 is an eHperience o, acti-ity+ Were our 5orld describable only by the 5ords Dnothin. happenin.7> Dnothin. chan.in.7> Dnothin. doin.7> 5e should unKuestionably call it an Dinacti-e> 5orld+ Bare acti-ity then7 as 5e may call it7 means the bare ,act o, e-ent or chan.e+ D'han.e ta6in. place> is a uniKue content o, eHperience7 one o, those DconJuncti-e> obJects 5hich radical empiricism see6s so earnestly to rehabilitate and preser-e+ The sense o, acti-ity is thus in the broadest and -a.uest 5ay synonymous 5ith the sense o, Dli,e+> We should ,eel our o5n subJecti-e li,e at least7 e-en in noticin. and proclaimin. an other5ise inacti-e 5orld+ Our o5n reaction on its monotony 5ould be the one thin. eHperienced there in the ,orm o, somethin. comin. to pass+B%. /?3C This seems to be 5hat certain 5riters ha-e in mind 5hen they insist that ,or an eHperient to be at all is to be acti-e+ It seems to Justi,y7 or at any rate to eHplain7 *r+ Ward>s eHpression that 5e are only as 5e are acti-e7B01C ,or 5e are only as eHperientsE and it rules out *r+ Bradley>s

contention that <there is no ori.inal eHperience o, anythin. li6e acti-ity+=B0/C What 5e ou.ht to say about acti-ities thus elementary7 5hose they are7 5hat they e,,ect7 or 5hether indeed they e,,ect anythin. at allNthese are later Kuestions7 to be ans5ered only 5hen the ,ield o, eHperience is enlar.ed+ Bare acti-ity 5ould thus be predicable7 thou.h there 5ere no de,inite direction7 no actor7 and no aim+ *ere restless Li.La. mo-ement7 or a 5ild *deenflucht7 or #hapsodie der Wahrnehmungen7 as 9ant 5ould say7B03C 5ould constitute an acti-e as distin.uished ,rom an inacti-e 5orld+ B%. /?AC But in this actual 5orld o, ours7 as it is .i-en7 a part at least o, the acti-ity comes 5ith de,inite directionE it comes 5ith desire and sense o, .oalE it comes complicated 5ith resistances 5hich it o-ercomes or succumbs to7 and 5ith the e,,orts 5hich the ,eelin. o, resistance so o,ten pro-o6esE and it is in compleH eHperiences li6e these that the notions o, distinct a.ents7 and o, passi-ity as opposed to acti-ity arise+ Here also the notion o, causal e,,icacy comes to birth+ %erhaps the most elaborate 5or6 e-er done in descripti-e psycholo.y has been the analysis by -arious recent 5riters o, the more compleH acti-ity2situations+B0AC In their descriptions7 eHKuisitelyB%. /?MC subtle some o, them7B0MC the acti-ity appears as the gestalt,ualitBt or the fundirte inhalt For as 5hate-er else you may please to call the conJuncti-e ,ormG 5hich the content ,alls into 5hen 5e eHperience it in the 5ays 5hich the describers set ,orth+ Those ,actors in those relations are 5hat 5e mean by acti-ity2situationsE and to the possible enumeration and accumulation o, their circumstances and in.redients there 5ould seem to be no natural bound+ E-ery hour o, human li,e could contribute to the picture .alleryE and this is the only ,ault that one can ,ind 5ith such descripti-e industryN5here is it .oin. to stopI Ou.ht 5e to listen ,ore-er to -erbal pictures o, 5hat 5e ha-e already in concrete ,orm in our o5n breastsIB0@C They ne-er ta6e us o,, the super,icial plane+ We 6ne5 the ,acts alreadyNless spread out and separated7 to be sureNbut 5e 6ne5 them still+ We al5ays ,elt our o5n acti-ity7 ,or eHample7 as Dthe eHpansion o, an idea 5ith 5hich our Sel, is identi,ied7 a.ainst an obstacle>EB0?C and the ,ollo5in. out o, such a de,inition throu.h a multitude o, cases elaborates the ob-ious so as to be little more than an eHercise in synonymic speech+ B%. /?@C All the descriptions ha-e to trace ,amiliar outlines7 and to use ,amiliar terms+ The acti-ity is7 ,or eHample7 attributed either to a physical or to a mental a.ent7 and is either aimless or directed+ I, directed it sho5s tendency+ The tendency may or may not be resisted+ I, not7 5e call the acti-ity immanent7 as 5hen a body mo-es in empty space by its momentum7 or our thou.hts 5ander at their o5n s5eet 5ill+ I, resistance is met7 its a.ent complicates the situation+ I, no57 in spite o, resistance7 the ori.inal tendency continues7 e,,ort ma6es its appearance7 and alon. 5ith e,,ort7 strain or sKueeLe+ Will7 in the narro5er sense o, the 5ord7 then comes upon the scene7 5henB%. /??Ce-er7 alon. 5ith the tendency7 the strain and sKueeLe are sustained+ But the resistance may be .reat enou.h to chec6 the tendency7 or e-en to re-erse its path+ In that case7 5e Fi, D5e> 5ere the ori.inal a.ents or subJects o, the tendencyG are o-erpo5ered+ The phenomenon turns into one o, tension simply7 or o, necessity succumbed2to7 accordin. as the opposin. po5er is only eKual7 or is superior to oursel-es+

Whosoe-er describes an eHperience in such terms as these describes an eHperience of acti-ity+ I, the 5ord ha-e any meanin.7 it must denote 5hat there is ,ound+ There is complete acti-ity in its ori.inal and ,irst intention+ What it is D6no5n2as> is 5hat there appears+ The eHperiencer o, such a situation possesses all that the idea contains+ He ,eels the tendency7 the obstacle7 the 5ill7 the strain7 the triumph7 or the passi-e .i-in. up7 Just as he ,eels the time7 the space7 the s5i,tness or intensity7 the mo-ement7 the 5ei.ht and color7 the pain and pleasure7 the compleHity7 or 5hate-er remainin. characters the situation may in-ol-e+ He .oes throu.h all that e-er can be ima.ined 5hereB%. /?:C acti-ity is supposed+ I, 5e suppose acti-ities to .o on outside o, our eHperience7 it is in ,orms li6e these that 5e must suppose them7 or else .i-e them some other nameE ,or the 5ord Dacti-ity> has no ima.inable content 5hate-er sa-e these eHperiences o, process7 obstruction7 stri-in.7 strain7 or release7 ultimate ,ualia as they are o, the li,e .i-en us to be 6no5n+ Were this the end o, the matter7 one mi.ht thin6 that 5hene-er 5e had success,ully li-ed throu.h an acti-ity2situation 5e should ha-e to be permitted7 5ithout pro-o6in. contradiction7 to say that 5e had been really acti-e7 that 5e had met real resistance and had really pre-ailed+ !otLe some5here says that to be an entity all that is necessary is to gelten as an entity7 to operate7 or be ,elt7 eHperienced7 reco.niLed7 or in any 5ay realiLed7 as such+B0:C In our acti-ity2eHperiences the acti-ity assuredly ,ul,ils !otLe>s demand+ It ma6es itsel, gelten+ It is 5itnessed at its 5or6+ &o matter 5hat acti-ities there may really be in this eHtraordinary uni-erse o, ours7 it is impossibleB%. /?4C ,or us to concei-e o, any one o, them bein. either li-ed throu.h or authentically 6no5n other5ise than in this dramatic shape o, somethin. sustainin. a ,elt purpose a.ainst ,elt obstacles and o-ercomin. or bein. o-ercome+ What Dsustainin.> means here is clear to anyone 5ho has li-ed throu.h the eHperience7 but to no one elseE Just as Dloud7> Dred7> Ds5eet7> mean somethin. only to bein.s 5ith ears7 eyes7 and ton.ues+ The percipi in these ori.inals o, eHperience is the esseE the curtain is the picture+ I, there is anythin. hidin. in the bac6.round7 it ou.ht not to be called acti-ity7 but should .et itsel, another name+ B%. /?0C This seems so ob-iously true that one mi.ht 5ell eHperience astonishment at ,indin. so many o, the ablest 5riters on the subJect ,latly denyin. that the acti-ity 5e li-e throu.h in these situations is real+ *erely to ,eel acti-e is not to be acti-e7 in their si.ht+ The a.ents that appear in the eHperience are not real a.ents7 the resistances do not really resist7 the e,,ects that appear are not really e,,ects at all+B04C ItB%. /:1C is e-ident ,rom this that mere descripti-e analysis o, any one o, our acti-ity2eHperiences is not the 5hole story7 that there is somethin. still to tell about them that has led such able 5riters to concei-e o, a Simon'pure acti-ity7 o, an acti-ity an sich7 that does7 and doesn>tB%. /:/C merely appear to us to do7 and compared 5ith 5hose real doin. all this phenomenal acti-ity is but a specious sham+ The metaphysical Kuestion opens hereE and I thin6 that the state o, mind o, one possessed by it is o,ten somethin. li6e this: <It is all -ery 5ell7= 5e may ima.ine him sayin.7 <to tal6 about certain eHperience2series ta6in. on the ,orm o, ,eelin.s o, acti-ity7 Just as they mi.ht ta6e on musical or .eometric ,orms+ Suppose that they do soE suppose 5e ,eel a 5ill to stand a strain+ (oes our ,eelin. do more than record the ,act that the strain is sustainedI The real acti-ity7 mean5hile7 is the doing o, the ,actE and 5hat is the doin. made o, be,ore the record is made+ What in the 5ill

enables it to act thusI And these trains o, eHperience themsel-es7 in 5hich acti-ities appear7 5hat ma6es them go at allI (oes the acti-ity in one bit o, eHperience brin. the neHt bit into bein.I As anB%. /:3C empiricist you cannot say so7 ,or you ha-e Just declared acti-ity to be only a 6ind o, synthetic obJect7 or conJuncti-e relation eHperienced bet5een bits o, eHperience already made+ But 5hat made them at allI What propels eHperience )berhaupt into bein.I There is the acti-ity that operatesE the acti-ity felt is only its super,icial si.n+= To the metaphysical Kuestion7 popped upon us in this 5ay7 I must pay serious attention ere I end my remar6sE but7 be,ore doin. so7 let me sho5 that 5ithout lea-in. the immediate reticulations o, eHperience7 or as6in. 5hat ma6es acti-ity itsel, act7 5e still ,ind the distinction bet5een less real and more real acti-ities ,orced upon us7 and are dri-en to much soul2searchin. on the purely phenomenal plane+ We must not ,or.et7 namely7 in tal6in. o, the ultimate character o, our acti-ity2eHperiences7 that each o, them is but a portion o, a 5ider 5orld7 one lin6 in the -ast chain o, processes o, eHperience out o, 5hich history is made+ Each partial process7 to him 5ho li-es throu.h it7 de,ines itsel, by its ori.in and itsB%. /:AC .oalE but to an obser-er 5ith a 5ider mind2span 5ho should li-e outside o, it7 that .oal 5ould appear but as a pro-isional haltin.2place7 and the subJecti-ely ,elt acti-ity 5ould be seen to continue into obJecti-e acti-ities that led ,ar beyond+ We thus acKuire a habit7 in discussin. acti-ity2eHperiences7 o, de,inin. them by their relation to somethin. more+ I, an eHperience be one o, narro5 span7 it 5ill be mista6en as to 5hat acti-ity it is and 5hose+ )ou thin6 that you are actin. 5hile you are only obeyin. someone>s push+ )ou thin6 you are doin. this7 but you are doin. somethin. o, 5hich you do not dream+ or instance7 you thin6 you are but drin6in. this .lassE but you are really creatin. the li-er2cirrhosis that 5ill end your days+ )ou thin6 you are Just dri-in. this bar.ain7 but7 as Ste-enson says some5here7 you are layin. do5n a lin6 in the policy o, man6ind+ "enerally spea6in.7 the onloo6er7 5ith his 5ider ,ield o, -ision7 re.ards the ultimate outcome o, an acti-ity as 5hat it is more really doin.E and the most previous agentB%. /:MC ascertainable7 bein. the ,irst source o, action7 he re.ards as the most real a.ent in the ,ield+ The others but transmit that a.ent>s impulseE on him 5e put responsibilityE 5e name him 5hen one as6s us DWho>s to blameI> But the most pre-ious a.ents ascertainable7 instead o, bein. o, lon.er span7 are o,ten o, much shorter span than the acti-ity in -ie5+ Brain2cells are our best eHample+ *y brain2cells are belie-ed to eHcite each other ,rom neHt to neHt Fby conti.uous transmission o, 6atabolic alteration7 let us sayG and to ha-e been doin. so lon. be,ore this present stretch o, lecturin.2 acti-ity on my part be.an+ I, any one cell2.roup stops its acti-ity7 the lecturin. 5ill cease or sho5 disorder o, ,orm+ 7essante causa% cessat et effectusNdoes not this loo6 as i, the short2span brain acti-ities 5ere the more real acti-ities7 and the lecturin. acti-ities on my part only their e,,ectsI *oreo-er7 as Hume so clearly pointed out7B00C in my mental acti-ity2situation the 5ords physically to beB%. /:@C uttered are represented as the acti-ity>s immediate .oal+ These 5ords7 ho5e-er7 cannot be uttered 5ithout intermediate physical processes in the bulb and -a.i ner-es7 5hich processes ne-ertheless ,ail to ,i.ure in the mental acti-ity2series at all+ That series7 there,ore7 since it lea-es out -itally real steps o, action7 cannot represent the real acti-ities+ It is

somethin. purely subJecti-eE the facts o, acti-ity are else5here+ They are somethin. ,ar more interstitial7 so to spea67 than 5hat my ,eelin.s record+ The real ,acts o, acti-ity that ha-e in point o, ,act been systematically pleaded ,or by philosophers ha-e7 so ,ar as my in,ormation .oes7 been o, three principal types+ The ,irst type ta6es a consciousness o, 5ider time2span than ours to be the -ehicle o, the more real acti-ity+ Its 5ill is the a.ent7 and its purpose is the action done+ The second type assumes that Dideas> stru..lin. 5ith one another are the a.ents7 and that the pre-alence o, one set o, them is the action+B%. /:?C The third type belie-es that ner-e2cells are the a.ents7 and that resultant motor dischar.es are the acts achie-ed+ &o5 i, 5e must de2realiLe our immediately ,elt acti-ity2situations ,or the bene,it o, either o, these types o, substitute7 5e ou.ht to 6no5 5hat the substitution practically in-ol-es+ What practical difference ought it to ma(e if7 instead o, sayin. naP-ely that DI> am acti-e no5 in deli-erin. this address7 I say that a !ider thin(er is active7 or that certain ideas are active7 or that certain nerve'cells are active7 in producin. the resultI This 5ould be the pra.matic meanin. o, the three hypotheses+ !et us ta6e them in succession in see6in. a reply+ I, 5e assume a 5ider thin6er7 it is e-ident that his purposes en-elope mine+ I am really lecturin. for himE and althou.h I cannot surely 6no5 to 5hat end7 yet i, I ta6e him reli.iously7 I can trust it to be a .ood end7 and 5illin.ly conni-e+ I can be happy in thin6in. that my acti-ity transmits his impulse7 and that his ends prolon. my o5n+ So lon. as I ta6e himB%. /::C reli.iously7 in short7 he does not de2realiLe my acti-ities+ He tends rather to corroborate the reality o, them7 so lon. as I belie-e both them and him to be .ood+ When no5 5e turn to ideas7 the case is di,,erent7 inasmuch as ideas are supposed by the association psycholo.y to in,luence each other only ,rom neHt to neHt+ The Dspan> o, an idea or pair o, ideas7 is assumed to be much smaller instead o, bein. lar.er than that o, my total conscious ,ield+ The same results may .et 5or6ed out in both cases7 ,or this address is bein. .i-en anyho5+ But the ideas supposed to Dreally> 5or6 it out had no pre-ision o, the 5hole o, itE and i, I 5as lecturin. ,or an absolute thin6er in the ,ormer case7 so7 by similar reasonin.7 are my ideas no5 lecturin. ,or me7 that is7 accomplishin. un5ittin.ly a result 5hich I appro-e and adopt+ But7 5hen this passin. lecture is o-er7 there is nothin. in the bare notion that ideas ha-e been its a.ents that 5ould seem to .uarantee that my present purposes in lecturin. 5ill be prolon.ed+ * may ha-e ulterior de-elopments in -ie5E but thereB%. /:4C is no certainty that my ideas as such 5ill 5ish to7 or be able to7 5or6 them out+ The li6e is true i, ner-e2cells be the a.ents+ The acti-ity o, a ner-e2cell must be concei-ed o, as a tendency o, eHceedin.ly short reach7 an Dimpulse> barely spannin. the 5ay to the neHt cellN,or surely that amount o, actual Dprocess> must be DeHperienced> by the cells i, 5hat happens

bet5een them is to deser-e the name o, acti-ity at all+ But here a.ain the .ross resultant7 as * percei-e it7 is indi,,erent to the a.ents7 and neither 5ished or 5illed or ,oreseen+ Their bein. a.ents no5 con.ruous 5ith my 5ill .i-es me no .uarantee that li6e results 5ill recur a.ain ,rom their acti-ity+ In point o, ,act7 all sorts o, other results do occur+ *y mista6es7 impotencies7 per-ersions7 mental obstructions7 and ,rustrations .enerally7 are also results o, the acti-ity o, cells+ Althou.h these are lettin. me lecture no57 on other occasions they ma6e me do thin.s that I 5ould 5illin.ly not do+ The Kuestion Whose is the real activity: is thus tantamount to the Kuestion What !ill be the actual results:B%. /:0C Its interest is dramaticE ho5 5ill thin.s 5or6 outI I, the a.ents are o, one sort7 one 5ayE i, o, another sort7 they may 5or6 out -ery di,,erently+ The pra.matic meanin. o, the -arious alternati-es7 in short7 is .reat+ It ma6es no merely -erbal di,,erence 5hich opinion 5e ta6e up+ )ou see it is the old dispute come bac6R *aterialism and teleolo.yE elementary short2span actions summin. themsel-es Dblindly7> or ,ar ,oreseen ideals comin. 5ith e,,ort into act+ &aP-ely 5e belie-e7 and humanly and dramatically 5e li6e to belie-e7 that acti-ities both o, 5ider and o, narro5er span are at 5or6 in li,e to.ether7 that both are real7 and that the lon.2span tendencies yo6e the others in their ser-ice7 encoura.in. them in the ri.ht direction7 and dampin. them 5hen they tend in other 5ays+ But ho5 to represent clearly the modus operandi o, such steerin. o, small tendencies by lar.e ones is a problem 5hich metaphysical thin6ers 5ill ha-e to ruminate upon ,or many years to come+ E-en i, such control should e-entually .ro5 clearly picturable7B%. /41C the Kuestion ho5 ,ar it is success,ully eHerted in this actual 5orld can be ans5ered only by in-esti.atin. the details o, ,act+ &o philosophic 6no5led.e o, the .eneral nature and constitution o, tendencies7 or o, the relation o, lar.er to smaller ones7 can help us to predict 5hich o, all the -arious competin. tendencies that interest us in this uni-erse are li6eliest to pre-ail+ We 6no5 as an empirical ,act that ,ar2seein. tendencies o,ten carry out their purpose7 but 5e 6no5 also that they are o,ten de,eated by the ,ailure o, some contemptibly small process on 5hich success depends+ A little thrombus in a statesman>s menin.eal artery 5ill thro5 an empire out o, .ear+ I can there,ore not e-en hint at any solution o, the pra.matic issue+ I ha-e only 5ished to sho5 you that that issue is 5hat .i-es the real interest to all inKuiries into 5hat 6inds o, acti-ity may be real+ Are the ,orces that really act in the 5orld more ,oreseein. or more blindI As bet5een Dour> acti-ities as D5e> eHperience them7 and those o, our ideas7 or o, our brain2cells7 the issue is 5ell2de,ined+B%. /4/C I said a 5hile bac6B/11C that I should return to the Dmetaphysical> Kuestion be,ore endin.E so7 5ith a ,e5 5ords about that7 I 5ill no5 close my remar6s+ In 5hate-er ,orm 5e hear this Kuestion propounded7 I thin6 that it al5ays arises ,rom t5o thin.s7 a belie, that causality must be eHerted in acti-ity7 and a 5onder as to ho5 causality is made+ I, 5e ta6e an acti-ity2situation at its ,ace2-alue7 it seems as i, 5e cau.ht in flagrante delicto the -ery po5er that ma6es ,acts come and be+ I no5 am ea.erly stri-in.7 ,or eHample7 to .et this truth 5hich I seem hal, to percei-e7 into 5ords 5hich shall ma6e it sho5 more clearly+ I, the 5ords come7 it 5ill seem as i, the stri-in. itsel, had dra5n or pulled them into actuality out ,rom the state o, merely possible bein. in 5hich they 5ere+ Ho5 is this ,eat per,ormedI Ho5 does the

pullin. pullI Ho5 do I .et my hold on 5ords not yet eHistent7 and 5hen they come by 5hat means ha-e I made them comeI Really it is the problem o, creationE ,or in the end the Kuestion is: Ho5 doB%. /43C I ma6e them beI Real acti-ities are those that really ma6e thin.s be7 5ithout 5hich the thin.s are not7 and 5ith 5hich they are there+ Acti-ity7 so ,ar as 5e merely ,eel it7 on the other hand7 is only an impression o, ours7 it may be maintainedE and an impression is7 ,or all this 5ay o, thin6in.7 only a shado5 o, another ,act+ Arri-ed at this point7 I can do little more than indicate the principles on 5hich7 as it seems to me7 a radically empirical philosophy is obli.ed to rely in handlin. such a dispute+ I, there be real creati-e acti-ities in bein.7 radical empiricism must say7 some5here they must be immediately li-ed+ Some5here the that o, e,,icacious causin. and the !hat o, it must be eHperienced in one7 Just as the 5hat and the that o, Dcold> are eHperienced in one 5hene-er a man has the sensation o, cold here and no5+ It boots not to say that our sensations are ,allible+ They are indeedE but to see the thermometer contradict us 5hen 5e say Dit is cold> does not abolish cold as a speci,ic nature ,rom the uni-erse+ 'old is in the arcticB%. /4AC circle i, not here+ E-en so7 to ,eel that our train is mo-in. 5hen the train beside our 5indo5 mo-es7 to see the moon throu.h a telescope come t5ice as near7 or to see t5o pictures as one solid 5hen 5e loo6 throu.h a stereoscope at them7 lea-es motion7 nearness7 and solidity still in bein.Ni, not here7 yet each in its proper seat else5here+ And 5here-er the seat o, real causality is7 as ultimately 6no5n D,or true> Fin ner-e2processes7 i, you 5ill7 that cause our ,eelin.s o, acti-ity as 5ell as the mo-ements 5hich these seem to promptG7 a philosophy o, pure eHperience can consider the real causation as no other nature o, thin. than that 5hich e-en in our most erroneous eHperiences appears to be at 5or6+ EHactly 5hat appears there is 5hat 5e mean by 5or6in.7 thou.h 5e may later come to learn that 5or6in. 5as not eHactly there+ Sustainin.7 perse-erin.7 stri-in.7 payin. 5ith e,,ort as 5e .o7 han.in. on7 and ,inally achie-in. our intentionNthis is action7 this is e,,ectuation in the only shape in 5hich7 by a pure eHperience2philosophy7 the 5hereabouts o, itB%. /4MC any5here can be discussed+ Here is creation in its ,irst intention7 here is causality at 5or6+B/1/C To treat this o,,hand as the bare illusory sur,ace o, a 5orld 5hose real causality is an unima.inable ontolo.ical principle hidden in the cubic deeps7 is7 ,or the more empirical 5ay o, thin6in.7 only animism in another shape+ )ou eHplain your .i-en ,act by your Dprinciple7> but the principle itsel,7 5hen you loo6 clearly at it7 turns out to be nothin. but a pre-ious little spiritual copy o, the ,act+ A5ay ,rom that one and only 6ind o, ,act your mind7 considerin. causality7 can ne-er .et+B/13C B%. /4@C I conclude7 then7 that real e,,ectual causation as an ultimate nature7 as a Dcate.ory7> i, you li6e7 o, reality7 is &ust !hat !e feel it to be7 Just that 6ind o, conJunction 5hich our o5n acti-ity2series re-eal+ We ha-e the 5hole butt and bein. o, it in our handsE and the healthy thin.B%. /4?C ,or philosophy is to lea-e o,, .rubbin. under.round ,or 5hat e,,ects e,,ectuation7 or 5hat ma6es action act7 and to try to sol-e the concrete Kuestions o, 5here e,,ectuation in this 5orld is located7 o, 5hich thin.s are the true causal a.ents there7 and o, 5hat the more remote e,,ects consist+

rom this point o, -ie5 the .reater sublimity traditionally attributed to the metaphysical inKuiry7 the .rubbin. inKuiry7 entirely disappears+ I, 5e could 6no5 5hat causation really and transcendentally is in itsel,7 the only use o, the 6no5led.e 5ould be to help us to reco.niLe an actual cause 5hen 5e had one7 and so to trac6 the ,uture course o, operations more intelli.ently out+ The mere abstract inKuiry into causation>s hidden nature is not more sublime than any other inKuiry eKually abstract+ 'ausation inhabits no more sublime le-el than anythin. else+ It li-es7 apparently7 in the dirt o, the 5orld as 5ell as in the absolute7 or in man>s unconKuerable mind+ The 5orth and interest o, the 5orld consists not in its elements7 be these elementsB%. /4:C thin.s7 or be they the conJunctions o, thin.sE it eHists rather in the dramatic outcome in the 5hole process7 and in the meanin. o, the succession sta.es 5hich the elements 5or6 out+ *y collea.ue and master7 Josiah Royce7 in a pa.e o, his re-ie5 o, Stout>s Analytic PsychologyB/1AC has some ,ine 5ords on this point 5ith 5hich I cordially a.ree+ I cannot a.ree 5ith his separatin. the notion o, e,,icacy ,rom that o, acti-ity alto.ether Fthis I understand to be one contention o, hisG ,or acti-ities are e,,icacious 5hene-er they are real acti-ities at all+ But the inner nature both o, e,,icacy and o, acti-ity are super,icial problems7 I understand Royce to sayE and the only point ,or us in sol-in. them 5ould be their possible use in helpin. us to sol-e the ,ar deeper problem o, the course and meanin. o, the 5orld o, li,e+ !i,e7 says our collea.ue7 is ,ull o, si.ni,icance7 o, meanin.7 o, success and o, de,eat7 o, hopin. and o, stri-in.7 o, lon.in.7 o, desire7 and o, inner -alue+ It is a total presence that embodies 5orth+ To li-e our o5n li-es better in this presence is the true reason 5hy 5e 5ish to 6no5 the elements o, thin.sE so e-en 5e psycholo.ists must end on this pra.matic note+B%. /44C The ur.ent problems o, acti-ity are thus more concrete+ They are all problems o, the true relation o, lon.er2span to shorter2span acti-ities+ When7 ,or eHample7 a number o, Dideas> Fto use the name traditional in psycholo.yG .ro5 con,luent in a lar.er ,ield o, consciousness7 do the smaller acti-ities still co2eHist 5ith the 5ider acti-ities then eHperienced by the conscious subJectI And7 i, so7 do the 5ide acti-ities accompany the narro5 ones inertly7 or do they eHert controlI Or do they perhaps utterly supplant and replace them and short2circuit their e,,ectsI A.ain7 5hen a mental acti-ity2process and a brain2cell series o, acti-ities both terminate in the same muscular mo-ement7 does the mental process steer the neural processes or notI Or7 on the other hand7 does it independently short2circuit their e,,ectsI Such are the Kuestions that 5e must be.in 5ith+ But so ,ar am I ,rom su..estin. any de,initi-e ans5er to suchB%. /40C Kuestions7 that I hardly yet can put them clearly+ They lead7 ho5e-er7 into that re.ion o, panpsychic and ontolo.ic speculation o, 5hich %ro,essors Ber.son and Stron. ha-e lately enlar.ed the literature in so able and interestin. a 5ay+B/1MC The results o, these authors seem in many respects dissimilar7 and I understand than as yet but imper,ectlyE but I cannot help suspectin. that the direction o, their 5or6 is -ery promisin.7 and that they ha-e the hunter>s instinct ,or the ,ruit,ul trails+

FOOTNOTES
B4@C %resident>s Address be,ore the American %sycholo.ical Association7 %hiladelphia *eetin.7 (ecember7 /01M+ BReprinted ,rom The Psychological #evie!7 -ol+ Hii7 &o+ /7 Jan+7 /01@+ Also reprinted7 5ith some omissions7 as AppendiH B7 A Pluralistic Universe7 pp+ A:12A0M+ %p+ /??2 /?: ha-e also been reprinted in Some Problems of Philosophy7 p+ 3/3+ The present essay is

re,erred to in ibid.7 p+ 3/07 note+ The author>s corrections ha-e been adopted ,or the present teHt+ Ed+C B4?C BThe 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods.C B4:C Appearance and #eality7 second edition7 pp+ //?2//:+NOb-iously 5ritten at Ward7 thou.h Ward>s name is not mentioned+ B44C BMind7 -ol+ Hii7 /44:7 pp+ @:A2@:M+C B40C Mind7 &+ S+7 -ol+ -i7 B/40:C7 p+ A:0+ B01C 9aturalism and Agnosticism7 -ol+ ii7 p+ 3M@+ One thin6s naturally o, the peripatetic actus primus and actus secundus here+ B<Actus autem est duplex: primus et secundus+ Actus Kuidem primus est ,orma7 et inte.ritas sei+ Actus autem secundus est operatio+= Thomas AKuinas: Summa Theologica7 edition o, !eo $III7 F/40MG7 -ol+ i7 p+ A0/+ ',+ also Blanc: 4ictionnaire de Philosophie7 under Dacte+> Ed+C B0/C BAppearance and #eality7 second edition7 p+ //?+C B03C B6riti( der reinen "ernunft% Wer(e7 F/01@G7 -ol+ i-7 p+ //1 Ftrans+ by *aH *Oller7 second edition7 p+ /34G+C B0AC I re,er to such descripti-e 5or6 as !add>s FPsychology% 4escriptive and $xplanatory7 part i7 chap+ -7 part ii7 chap+ Hi7 part iii7 chaps+ HH- and HH-iGE as Sully>s FThe 5uman Mind7 part -GE as Stout>s FAnalytic Psychology7 boo6 i7 chap+ -i7 and boo6 ii7 chaps+ i7 ii7 and iiiGE as Bradley>s Fin his lon. series o, analytic articles on %sycholo.y in MindGE as Titchener>s F utline of Psychology7 part i7 chap+ -iGE as Shand>s FMind7 &+ S+7 iii7 MM0E i-7 M@1E -i7 340GE as Ward>s FMind7 Hii7 ?:E @?MGE as !o-eday>s FMind7 &+ S+7 H7 M@@GE as !ipps>s FVom Ohlen7 Wollen und (en6en7 /0137 chaps+ ii7 i-7 -iGE and as Ber.son>s F#evue Philosophi,ue7 !III7 /GNto mention only a ,e5 5ritin.s 5hich I immediately recall+ B0MC Their eHistence ,orms a curious commentary on %ro,+ *Onsterber.>s do.ma that 5ill2 attitudes are not describable+ He himsel, has contributed in a superior 5ay to their description7 both in his Willenshandlung7 and in his -rund.)ge Bder PsychologieC7 part ii7 chap+ iH7 S :+ B0@C I ou.ht mysel, to cry peccavi7 ha-in. been a -oluminous sinner in my o5n chapter on the 5ill+ BPrinciples of Psychology7 -ol+ ii7 chap+ HH-i+C B0?C B',+ + H+ Bradley7 Appearance and #eality7 second edition7 pp+ 0?20:+C B0:C B',+ abo-e7 p+ @07 note+C B04C "erborum gratiE: <The ,eelin. o, acti-ity is not able7 ,uE ,eelin.7 to tell us anythin. about acti-ity= F!o-eday: Mind7 &+ S+7 -ol+ H7 B/01/C7 p+ M?AGE <A sensation or ,eelin. or sense of acti-ity +++ is not7 loo6ed at in another 5ay7 an eHperience of acti-ity at all+ It is a mere sensation

shut up 5ithin 5hich you could by no re,lection .et the idea o, acti-ity++++ Whether this eHperience is or is not later on a character essential to our perception and our idea o, acti-ity7 it7 as it comes ,irst7 is not in itsel, an eHperience o, acti-ity at all+ It7 as it comes ,irst7 is only so ,or eHtraneous reasons and only so ,or an outside obser-er= FBradley7 Appearance and #eality7 second edition7 p+ ?1@GE <In dem TUti.6eits.e,Ohle lie.t an sich nicht der .erin.ste Be5eis ,Or das Vorhandensein einer psychischen TUti.6eit= F*Onsterber.: -rund.)ge der PsychologieG+ I could multiply similar Kuotations and 5ould ha-e introduced some o, them into my teHt to ma6e it more concrete7 sa-e that the min.lin. o, di,,erent points o, -ie5 in most o, these author>s discussions Fnot in *Onsterber.>sG ma6e it impossible to disentan.le eHactly 5hat they mean+ I am sure in any case7 to be accused o, misrepresentin. them totally7 e-en in this note7 by omission o, the conteHt7 so the less I name names and the more I stic6 to abstract characteriLation o, a merely possible style o, opinion7 the sa,er it 5ill be+ And apropos o, misunderstandin.s7 I may add to this note a complaint on my o5n account+ %ro,essor Stout7 in the eHcellent chapter on D*ental Acti-ity7> in -ol+ i o, his Analytic Psychology7 ta6es me to tas6 ,or identi,yin. spiritual acti-ity 5ith certain muscular ,eelin.s and .i-es Kuotations to bear him out+ They are ,rom certain para.raphs on Dthe Sel,7> in 5hich my attempt 5as to sho5 5hat the central nucleus o, the acti-ities that 5e call Dours> is+ BPrinciples of Psychology7 -ol+ i7 pp+ 3002A1@+C I ,ound it in certain intracephalic mo-ements 5hich 5e habitually oppose7 as DsubJecti-e7> to the acti-ities o, the transcorporeal 5orld+ I sou.ht to sho5 that there is no direct e-idence that 5e ,eel the acti-ity o, an inner spiritual a.ent as such FI should no5 say the acti-ity o, Dconsciousness> as such7 see Bthe ,irst essayC7 D(oes 'onsciousness EHistI>G+ There are7 in ,act7 three distin.uishable Dacti-ities> in the ,ield o, discussion: the elementary acti-ity in-ol-ed in the mere that o, eHperience7 in the ,act that something is .oin. on7 and the ,arther speci,ication o, this something into t5o !hats7 an acti-ity ,elt as Dours7> and an acti-ity ascribed to obJects+ Stout7 as I apprehend him7 identi,ies Dour> acti-ity 5ith that o, the total eHperience2process7 and 5hen I circumscribe it as a part thereo,7 accuses me o, treatin. it as a sort o, eHternal appenda.e to itsel, FStout: op. cit.7 -ol+ i7 pp+ /?32/?AG7 as i, I Dseparated the acti-ity ,rom the process 5hich is acti-e+> But all the processes in Kuestion are acti-e7 and their acti-ity is inseparable ,rom their bein.+ *y boo6 raised only the Kuestion o, !hich acti-ity deser-ed the name o, Dours+> So ,ar as 5e are Dpersons7> and contrasted and opposed to an Den-ironment7> mo-ements in our body ,i.ure as our acti-itiesE and I am unable to ,ind any other acti-ities that are ours in this strictly personal sense+ There is a 5ider sense in 5hich the 5hole Dchoir o, hea-en and ,urniture o, the earth7> and their acti-ities7 are ours7 ,or they are our DobJects+> But D5e> are here only another name ,or the total process o, eHperience7 another name ,or all that is7 in ,actE and I 5as dealin. 5ith the personal and indi-idualiLed sel, eHclusi-ely in the passa.es 5ith 5hich %ro,essor Stout ,inds ,ault+ The indi-idualiLed sel,7 5hich I belie-e to be the only thin. properly called sel,7 is a part o, the content o, the 5orld eHperienced+ The 5orld eHperienced Fother5ise called the D,ield o, consciousness>G comes at all times 5ith our body as its centre7 centre o, -ision7 centre o, action7 centre o, interest+ Where the body is is Dhere>E 5hen the body acts is Dno5>E 5hat the body touches is Dthis>E all other thin.s are Dthere> and Dthen> and Dthat+> These 5ords o, emphasiLed position imply a systematiLation o, thin.s 5ith re,erence to a ,ocus o, action and interest 5hich lies in the bodyE and the systematiLation is no5 so instincti-e F5as it e-er not soIG that no de-eloped or acti-e eHperience eHists ,or us at all eHcept in that ordered ,orm+ So ,ar as Dthou.hts> and D,eelin.s> can be acti-e7 their acti-ity terminates in the acti-ity o, the body7 and only throu.h ,irst arousin. its acti-ities can they be.in to chan.e those o, the rest o, the 5orld+

B',+ also A Pluralistic Universe7 p+ AMM7 note 4+ Ed+C The body is the storm centre7 the ori.in o, co2ordinates7 the constant place o, stress in all that eHperience2train+ E-erythin. circles round it7 and is ,elt ,rom its point o, -ie5+ The 5ord DI7> then7 is primarily a noun o, position7 Just li6e Dthis> and Dhere+> Acti-ities attached to Dthis> position ha-e prero.ati-e emphasis7 and7 i, acti-ities ha-e ,eelin.s7 must be ,elt in a peculiar 5ay+ The 5ord Dmy> desi.nates the 6ind o, emphasis+ I see no inconsistency 5hate-er in de,endin.7 on the one hand7 Dmy> acti-ities as uniKue and opposed to those o, outer nature7 and7 on the other hand7 in a,,irmin.7 a,ter introspection7 that they consist in mo-ements in the head+ The Dmy> o, them is the emphasis7 the ,eelin. o, perspecti-e2interest in 5hich they are dyed+ B00C B$n,uiry 7oncerning 5uman Understanding7 sect+ -ii7 part i7 Selby2Bi..e>s edition7 pp+ ?@ ,,+C B/11C %a.e /:3+ B/1/C !et me not be told that this contradicts Bthe ,irst essayC7 D(oes 'onsciousness EHistI> Fsee especially pa.e A3G7 in 5hich it 5as said that 5hile Dthou.hts> and Dthin.s> ha-e the same natures7 the natures 5or6 Dener.etically> on each other in the thin.s F,ire burns7 5ater 5ets7 etc+G but not in the thou.hts+ *ental acti-ity2trains are composed o, thou.hts7 yet their members do 5or6 on each other7 they chec67 sustain7 and introduce+ They do so 5hen the acti-ity is merely associational as 5ell as 5hen e,,ort is there+ But7 and this is my reply7 they do so by other parts o, their nature than those that ener.iLe physically+ One thou.ht in e-ery de-eloped acti-ity2series is a desire or thou.ht o, purpose7 and all the other thou.hts acKuire a ,eelin. tone ,rom their relation o, harmony or oppu.nancy to this+ The interplay o, these secondary tones Famon. 5hich Dinterest7> Ddi,,iculty7> and De,,ort> ,i.ureG runs the drama in the mental series+ In 5hat 5e term the physical drama these Kualities play absolutely no part+ The subJect needs care,ul 5or6in. outE but I can see no inconsistency+ B/13C I ha-e ,ound mysel, more than once accused in print o, bein. the assertor o, a metaphysical principle o, acti-ity+ Since literary misunderstandin.s retard the settlement o, problems7 I should li6e to say that such an interpretation o, the pa.es I ha-e published on E,,ort and on Will is absolutely ,orei.n to 5hat I meant to eHpress+ BPrinciples of Psychology7 -ol+ ii7 ch+ HH-i+C I o5e all my doctrines on this subJect to Renou-ierE and Renou-ier7 as I understand him7 is For at any rate then 5asG an out and out phenomenist7 a denier o, D,orces> in the most strenuous sense+ B',+ 'h+ Renou-ier: $s,uisse d1une 7lassification SystFmati,ue des 4octrines Philosophi,ues F/44@G7 -ol+ ii7 pp+ A012A03E $ssais de 7riti,ue -FnFrale F/4@0G7 -ol+ ii7 SS iH7 Hiii+ or an ac6no5led.ment o, the author>s .eneral indebtedness to Renou-ier7 c,+ Some Problems of Philosophy7 p+ /?@7 note+ Ed+C Sin.le clauses in my 5ritin.7 or sentences read out o, their connection7 may possibly ha-e been compatible 5ith a transphenomenal principle o, ener.yE but I de,y anyone to sho5 a sin.le sentence 5hich7 ta6en 5ith its conteHt7 should be naturally held to ad-ocate that -ie5+ The misinterpretation probably arose at ,irst ,rom my de,endin. Fa,ter Renou-ierG the indeterminism o, our e,,orts+ D ree 5ill> 5as supposed by my critics to in-ol-e a supernatural a.ent+ As a matter o, plain history the only D,ree 5ill> I ha-e e-er thou.ht o, de,endin. is the character o, no-elty in ,resh acti-ity2situations+ I, an acti-ity2process is the ,orm o, a 5hole D,ield o, consciousness7> and i, each ,ield o, consciousness is not only in its totality uniKue Fas is no5 commonly admittedG but has its elements uniKue Fsince in that

situation they are all dyed in the totalG then no-elty is perpetually enterin. the 5orld and 5hat happens there is not pure repetition7 as the do.ma o, the literal uni,ormity o, nature reKuires+ Acti-ity2situations come7 in short7 each 5ith an ori.inal touch+ A Dprinciple> o, ,ree 5ill i, there 5ere one7 5ould doubtless mani,est itsel, in such phenomena7 but I ne-er sa57 nor do I no5 see7 5hat the principle could do eHcept rehearse the phenomenon be,orehand7 or 5hy it e-er should be in-o6ed+ B/1AC Mind7 &+ S+7 -ol+ -i7 /40:E c,+ pp+ A032A0A+ B/1MC B',+ A Pluralistic Universe7 !ect+ -i Fon Ber.sonGE H+ Ber.son: 7reative $volution7 trans+ by A+ *itchellE '+ A+ Stron.: Why the Mind has a Body7 ch+ Hii+ Ed+C B%. /01C

(II
T7E ESSENCE OF 7"MANISM%=>)'
Humanism is a ,erment that has Dcome to stay+>B/1?C It is not a sin.le hypothesis or theorem7 and it d5ells on no ne5 ,acts+ It is rather a slo5 shi,tin. in the philosophic perspecti-e7 ma6in. thin.s appear as ,rom a ne5 centre o, interest or point o, si.ht+ Some 5riters are stron.ly conscious o, the shi,tin.7 others hal, unconscious7 e-en thou.h their o5n -ision may ha-e under.one much chan.e+ The result is no small con,usion in debate7 the hal,2conscious humanists o,ten ta6in. part a.ainst the radical ones7 as i, they 5ished to count upon the other side+B/1:C B%. /0/C I, humanism really be the name ,or such a shi,tin. o, perspecti-e7 it is ob-ious that the 5hole scene o, the philosophic sta.e 5ill chan.e in some de.ree i, humanism pre-ails+ The emphasis o, thin.s7 their ,ore.round and bac6.round distribution7 their siLes and -alues7 5ill not 6eep Just the same+B/14C I, such per-asi-e conseKuences be in-ol-ed in humanism7 it is clear that no pains 5hich philosophers may ta6e7 ,irst in de,inin. it7 and then in ,urtherin.7 chec6in.7 or steerin. its pro.ress7 5ill be thro5n a5ay+ It su,,ers badly at present ,rom incomplete de,inition+ Its most systematic ad-ocates7 Schiller and (e5ey7 ha-e published ,ra.mentB%. /03Cary pro.rams onlyE and its bearin. on many -ital philosophic problems has not been traced eHcept by ad-ersaries 5ho7 scentin. heresies in ad-ance7 ha-e sho5ered blo5s on doctrinesNsubJecti-ism and scepticism7 ,or eHampleNthat no .ood humanist ,inds it necessary to entertain+ By their still .reater reticences7 the anti2humanists ha-e7 in turn7 perpleHed the humanists+ *uch o, the contro-ersy has in-ol-ed the 5ord Dtruth+> It is al5ays .ood in debate to 6no5 your ad-ersary>s point o, -ie5 authentically+ But the critics o, humanism ne-er de,ine eHactly 5hat the 5ord Dtruth> si.ni,ies 5hen they use it themsel-es+ The humanists ha-e to .uess at their -ie5E and the result has doubtless been much beatin. o, the air+ Add to all this7 .reat indi-idual di,,erences in both camps7 and it becomes clear that nothin. is so

ur.ently needed7 at the sta.e 5hich thin.s ha-e reached at present7 as a sharper de,inition by each side o, its central point o, -ie5+ Whoe-er 5ill contribute any touch o, sharpness 5ill help us to ma6e sure o, 5hat>sB%. /0AC 5hat and 5ho is 5ho+ Anyone can contribute such a de,inition7 and7 5ithout it7 no one 6no5s eHactly 5here he stands+ I, I o,,er my o5n pro-isional de,inition o, humanismB/10C no5 and here7 others may impro-e it7 some ad-ersary may be led to de,ine his o5n creed more sharply by the contrast7 and a certain Kuic6enin. o, the crystalliLation o, .eneral opinion may result+ I The essential ser-ice o, humanism7 as I concei-e the situation7 is to ha-e seen that though one part of our experience may lean upon another part to ma(e it !hat it is in any one of several aspects in !hich it may be considered% experience as a !hole is self'containing and leans on nothing+ Since this ,ormula also eHpresses the main contention o, transcendental idealism7 it needs abundant eHplication to ma6e itB%. /0MC unambi.uous+ It seems7 at ,irst si.ht7 to con,ine itsel, to denyin. theism and pantheism+ But7 in ,act7 it need not deny eitherE e-erythin. 5ould depend on the eHe.esisE and i, the ,ormula e-er became canonical7 it 5ould certainly de-elop both ri.ht2 5in. and le,t25in. interpreters+ I mysel, read humanism theistically and pluralistically+ I, there be a "od7 he is no absolute all2eHperiencer7 but simply the eHperiencer o, 5idest actual conscious span+ Read thus7 humanism is ,or me a reli.ion susceptible o, reasoned de,ence7 thou.h I am 5ell a5are ho5 many minds there are to 5hom it can appeal reli.iously only 5hen it has been monistically translated+ Ethically the pluralistic ,orm o, it ta6es ,or me a stron.er hold on reality than any other philosophy I 6no5 o,Nit bein. essentially a social philosophy7 a philosophy o, Dco7> in 5hich conJunctions do the 5or6+ But my primary reason ,or ad-ocatin. it is its matchless intellectual economy+ It .ets rid7 not only o, the standin. Dproblems> that monism en.enders FDproblem o, e-il7> Dproblem o, ,reedom7> and theB%. /0@C li6eG7 but o, other metaphysical mysteries and paradoHes as 5ell+ It .ets rid7 ,or eHample7 o, the 5hole a.nostic contro-ersy7 by re,usin. to entertain the hypothesis o, trans2empirical reality at all+ It .ets rid o, any need ,or an absolute o, the Bradleyan type Fa-o5edly sterile ,or intellectual purposesG by insistin. that the conJuncti-e relations ,ound 5ithin eHperience are ,aultlessly real+ It .ets rid o, the need o, an absolute o, the Roycean type Fsimilarly sterileG by its pra.matic treatment o, the problem o, 6no5led.e Ba treatment o, 5hich I ha-e already .i-en a -ersion in t5o -ery inadeKuate articlesC+B//1C As the -ie5s o, 6no5led.e7 reality and truth imputed to humanism ha-e been those so ,ar most ,iercely attac6ed7 it is in re.ard to these ideas that a sharpenin. o, ,ocus seems most ur.ently reKuired+ I proceed there,ore to brin. the -ie5s 5hich * impute to humanism in these respects into ,ocus as brie,ly as I can+B%. /0?C II

I, the central humanistic thesis7 printed abo-e in italics7 be accepted7 it 5ill ,ollo5 that7 i, there be any such thin. at all as 6no5in.7 the 6no5er and the obJect 6no5n must both be portions o, eHperience+ One part o, eHperience must7 there,ore7 either F/G 9no5 another part o, eHperienceNin other 5ords7 parts must7 as %ro,essor Woodbrid.e says7 B///C represent one another instead o, representin. realities outside o, Dconsciousness>Nthis case is that o, conceptual 6no5led.eE or else F3G They must simply eHist as so many ultimate thats or ,acts o, bein.7 in the ,irst instanceE and then7 as a secondary complication7 and 5ithout doublin. up its entitati-e sin.le2ness7 any one and the same that must ,i.ure alternately as a thin. 6no5n and as a 6no5led.e o, the thin.7 by reason o, t5o di-er.ent 6inds o, conteHt into 5hich7 in the .eneral course o, eHperience7 it .ets 5o-en+B//3C B%. /0:C This second case is that o, sense2perception+ There is a sta.e o, thou.ht that .oes beyond common sense7 and o, it I shall say more presentlyE but the common2sense sta.e is a per,ectly de,inite haltin.2place o, thou.ht7 primarily ,or purposes o, actionE and7 so lon. as 5e remain on the common2sense sta.e o, thou.ht7 obJect and subJect fuse in the ,act o, Dpresentation> or sense2 perceptionNthe pen and hand 5hich I no5 see 5ritin.7 ,or eHample7 are the physical realities 5hich those 5ords desi.nate+ In this case there is no sel,2transcendency implied in the 6no5in.+ Humanism7 here7 is only a more comminuted *dentitBtsphilosophie+B//AC In case F/G7 on the contrary7 the representati-e eHperience does transcend itsel, in 6no5in. the other eHperience that is its obJect+ &o one can tal6 o, the 6no5led.e o, the one by the other 5ithout seein. them as numerically distinct entities7 o, 5hich the one lies beyond the other and a5ay ,rom it7 alon. some directionB%. /04C and 5ith some inter-al7 that can be de,initely named+ But7 i, the tal6er be a humanist7 he must also see this distance2inter-al concretely and pra.matically7 and con,ess it to consist o, other inter-enin. eHperiencesNo, possible ones7 at all e-ents7 i, not o, actual+ To call my present idea o, my do.7 ,or eHample7 co.niti-e o, the real do. means that7 as the actual tissue o, eHperience is constituted7 the idea is capable o, leadin. into a chain o, other eHperiences on my part that .o ,rom neHt to neHt and terminate at last in -i-id sense2perceptions o, a Jumpin.7 bar6in.7 hairy body+ Those are the real do.7 the do.>s ,ull presence7 ,or my common sense+ I, the supposed tal6er is a pro,ound philosopher7 althou.h they may not be the real do. ,or him7 they mean the real do.7 are practical substitutes ,or the real do.7 as the representation 5as a practical substitute ,or them7 that real do. bein. a lot o, atoms7 say7 or o, mind2stu,,7 that lie !here the sense2perceptions lie in his eHperience as 5ell as in my o5n+ B%. /00C III The philosopher here stands ,or the sta.e o, thou.ht that .oes beyond the sta.e o, common senseE and the di,,erence is simply that he Dinterpolates> and DeHtrapolates7> 5here common sense does not+ or common sense7 t5o men see the same identical real do.+ %hilosophy7 notin. actual di,,erences in their perceptions7 points out the duality o, these latter7 and interpolates somethin.

bet5een them as a more real terminusN,irst7 or.ans7 -iscera7 etc+E neHt7 cellsE then7 ultimate atomsE lastly7 mind2stu,, perhaps+ The ori.inal sense2termini o, the t5o men7 instead o, coalescin. 5ith each other and 5ith the real do.2obJect7 as at ,irst supposed7 are thus held by philosophers to be separated by in-isible realities 5ith 5hich7 at most7 they are conterminous+ Abolish7 no57 one o, the percipients7 and the interpolation chan.es into DeHtrapolation+> The sense2terminus o, the remainin. percipient is re.arded by the philosopher as not Kuite reachin. reality+ He has only carried the procession o, eHperiences7 the philosopher thin6s7B%. 311C to a de,inite7 because practical7 haltin.2place some5here on the 5ay to5ards an absolute truth that lies beyond+ The humanist sees all the time7 ho5e-er7 that there is no absolute transcendency e-en about the more absolute realities thus conJectured or belie-ed in+ The -iscera and cells are only possible percepts ,ollo5in. upon that o, the outer body+ The atoms a.ain7 thou.h 5e may ne-er attain to human means o, percei-in. them7 are still de,ined perceptually+ The mind2stu,, itsel, is concei-ed as a 6ind o, eHperienceE and it is possible to ,rame the hypothesis Fsuch hypotheses can by no lo.ic be eHcluded ,rom philosophyG o, t5o 6no5ers o, a piece o, mind2stu,, and the mind2stu,, itsel, becomin. Dcon,luent> at the moment at 5hich our imper,ect 6no5in. mi.ht pass into 6no5in. o, a completed type+ E-en so do you and I habitually represent our t5o perceptions and the real do. as con,luent7 thou.h only pro-isionally7 and ,or the common2sense sta.e o, thou.ht+ I, my pen be in5ardly made o, mind2stu,,7 there is no con,luence no! bet5eenB%. 31/C that mind2stu,, and my -isual perception o, the pen+ But concei-ably there mi.ht come to be such con,luenceE ,or7 in the case o, my hand7 the -isual sensations and the in5ard ,eelin.s o, the hand7 its mind2stu,,7 so to spea67 are e-en no5 as con,luent as any t5o thin.s can be+ There is7 thus7 no breach in humanistic epistemolo.y+ Whether 6no5led.e be ta6en as ideally per,ected7 or only as true enou.h to pass muster ,or practice7 it is hun. on one continuous scheme+ Reality7 ho5soe-er remote7 is al5ays de,ined as a terminus 5ithin the .eneral possibilities o, eHperienceE and 5hat 6no5s it is de,ined as an eHperience that 0represents1 it% in the sense of being substitutable for it in our thin(ing because it leads to the same associates7 or in the sense of 0pointing to it1 throu.h a chain o, other eHperiences that either inter-ene or may inter-ene+ Absolute reality here bears the same relation to sensation as sensation bears to conception or ima.ination+ Both are pro-isional or ,inal termini7 sensation bein. only the terminus at 5hich the practical man habitually stops7B%. 313C 5hile the philosopher proJects a Dbeyond> in the shape o, more absolute reality+ These termini7 ,or the practical and the philosophical sta.es o, thou.ht respecti-ely7 are sel,2supportin.+ They are not Dtrue> o, anythin. else7 they simply are7 are real+ They Dlean on nothin.7> as my italiciLed ,ormula said+ Rather does the 5hole ,abric o, eHperience lean on them7 Just as the 5hole ,abric o, the solar system7 includin. many relati-e positions7 leans7 ,or its absolute position in space7 on any one o, its constituent stars+ Here7 a.ain7 one .ets a ne5 *dentitBtsphilosophie in pluralistic ,orm+B//MC I(

I, I ha-e succeeded in ma6in. this at all clear Fthou.h I ,ear that bre-ity and abstractness bet5een them may ha-e made me ,ailG7 the reader 5ill see that the Dtruth> o, our mental operations must al5ays be an intra2eHperiential a,,air+ A conception is rec6oned true by common sense 5hen it can be made to lead to aB%. 31AC sensation+ The sensation7 5hich ,or common sense is not so much Dtrue> as Dreal7> is held to be provisionally true by the philosopher Just in so ,ar as it covers Fabuts at7 or occupies the place o,G a still more absolutely real eHperience7 in the possibility o, 5hich to some remoter eHperient the philosopher ,inds reason to belie-e+ *ean5hile 5hat actually does count ,or true to any indi-idual tro5er7 5hether he be philosopher or common man7 is al5ays a result o, his apperceptions+ I, a no-el eHperience7 conceptual or sensible7 contradict too emphatically our pre2eHistent system o, belie,s7 in ninety2nine cases out o, a hundred it is treated as ,alse+ Only 5hen the older and the ne5er eHperiences are con.ruous enou.h to mutually appercei-e and modi,y each other7 does 5hat 5e treat as an ad-ance in truth result+ BHa-in. 5ritten o, this point in an article in reply to *r+ Joseph>s criticism o, my humanism7 I 5ill say no more about truth here7 but re,er the reader to that re-ie5+B//@CC In no case7 ho5e-er7 need truthB%. 31MC consist in a relation bet5een our eHperiences and somethin. archetypal or trans2eHperiential+ Should 5e e-er reach absolutely terminal eHperiences7 eHperiences in 5hich 5e all a.reed7 5hich 5ere superseded by no re-ised continuations7 these 5ould not be true7 they 5ould be real7 they 5ould simply be7 and be indeed the an.les7 corners7 and linchpins o, all reality7 on 5hich the truth o, e-erythin. else 5ould be stayed+ Only such other thin.s as led to these by satis,actory conJunctions 5ould be Dtrue+> Satis,actory connection o, some sort 5ith such termini is all that the 5ord Dtruth> means+ On the common2sense sta.e o, thou.ht sense2presentations ser-e as such termini+ Our ideas and concepts and scienti,ic theories pass ,or true only so ,ar as they harmoniously lead bac6 to the 5orld o, sense+ I hope that many humanists 5ill endorse this attempt o, mine to trace the more essential ,eatures o, that 5ay o, -ie5in. thin.s+ I ,eel almost certain that *essrs+ (e5ey andB%. 31@C Schiller 5ill do so+ I, the attac6ers 5ill also ta6e some sli.ht account o, it7 it may be that discussion 5ill be a little less 5ide o, the mar6 than it has hitherto been+

FOOTNOTES
B/1@C BReprinted ,rom The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ ii7 &o+ @7 *arch 37 /01@+ Also reprinted7 5ith sli.ht chan.es in The Meaning of Truth7 pp+ /3/2/A@+ The author>s corrections ha-e been adopted ,or the present teHt+ Ed+C B/1?C BWritten apropos o, the appearance o, three articles in Mind7 &+ S+7 -ol+ Hi-7 &o+ @A7 January7 /01@: <DAbsolute> and DRelati-e> Truth7= H+ H+ JoachimE <%ro,essor James on DHumanism and Truth7>= H+ W+ B+ JosephE <Applied AHioms7= A+ Sid.5ic6+ O, these articles the second and third <continue the humanistic For pra.matisticG contro-ersy7= the ,irst <deeply connects 5ith it+= Ed+C B/1:C %ro,essor Bald5in7 ,or eHample+ His address DOn Selecti-e Thin6in.> FPsychological #evie!7 B-ol+ -C7 /4047 reprinted in his -olume7 4evelopment and $volutionG seems to me an unusually 5ell25ritten pra.matic mani,esto+ &e-ertheless in DThe !imits o, %ra.matism> Fibid.7 B-ol+ HiC7 /01MG7 he Fmuch less clearlyG Joins in the attac6+

B/14C The ethical chan.es7 it seems to me7 are beauti,ully made e-ident in %ro,essor (e5ey>s series o, articles7 5hich 5ill ne-er .et the attention they deser-e till they are printed in a boo6+ I mean: DThe Si.ni,icance o, Emotions7> Psychological #evie!7 -ol+ ii7 B/40@C7 p+ /AE DThe Re,leH Arc 'oncept in %sycholo.y7> ibid.7 -ol+ iii7 B/40?C7 p+ A@:E D%sycholo.y and Social %ractice7> ibid.7 -ol+ -ii7 B/011C7 p+ /1@E DInterpretation o, Sa-a.e *ind7> ibid.7 -ol+ iH7 B/013C7 p+ 3/:E D"reen>s Theory o, the *oral *oti-e7> Philosophical #evie!7 -ol+ i7 B/403C7 p+ @0AE DSel,2 realiLation as the *oral Ideal7> ibid.7 -ol+ ii7 B/40AC7 p+ ?@3E DThe %sycholo.y o, E,,ort7> ibid.7 -ol+ -i7 B/40:C7 p+ MAE DThe E-olutionary *ethod as Applied to *orality7> ibid.7 -ol+ Hi7 B/013C7 pp+ /1:7 A@AE DE-olution and Ethics7> Monist7 -ol+ -iii7 B/404C7 p+ A3/E to mention only a ,e5+ B/10C BThe author employs the term Dhumanism> either as a synonym ,or Dradical empiricism> Fc,+ e.g.7 abo-e7 p+ /@?GE or as that .eneral philosophy o, li,e o, 5hich Dradical empiricism> is the theoretical .round Fc,+ belo57 p+ /0MG+ or other discussions o, Dhumanism7> c,+ belo57 essay Hi7 and The Meaning of Truth7 essay iii+ Ed+C B//1C BOmitted ,rom reprint in Meaning of Truth+ The articles re,erred to are D(oes 'onsciousness EHistI> and DA World o, %ure EHperience7> reprinted abo-e+C B///C In Science7 &o-ember M7 /01M7 p+ @00+ B//3C This statement is probably eHcessi-ely obscure to any one 5ho has not read my t5o articles7 D(oes 'onsciousness EHistI> and DA World o, %ure EHperience+> B//AC B',+ abo-e7 p+ /AME and belo57 p+ 313+C B//MC B',+ abo-e7 pp+ /AM7 /0:+C B//@C BOmitted ,rom reprint in Meaning of Truth+ The re-ie5 re,erred to is reprinted belo57 pp+ 3MM23?@7 under the title <Humanism and Truth Once *ore+= Ed+C B%. 31?C

(III
LA NOTION DE CONSCIENCE%==;'
Je -oudrais -ous communiKuer KuelKues doutes Kui me sont -enus au suJet de la notion de 'onscience Kui rW.ne dans tous nos traitVs de psycholo.ie+ On dV,init habituellement la %sycholo.ie comme la Science des ,aits de 'onscience7 ou des phFnomGnes7 ou encore des Ftats de la 'onscience+ ;u>on admette Ku>elle se rattache X des moi personnels7 ou bien Ku>on la croie impersonnelle X la ,aYon du <moi transcendental= de 9ant7 de la Be!usstheit ou du Be!usstsein )berhaupt de nos contemporains en Allema.ne7 cette conscience est touJours re.ardVe comme possVdant une essence propre7 absolument distincte de l>essence des choses matVrielles7 Ku>elle a le don mystVrieuH de reprVsenter et deB%. 31:C

connaZtre+ !es ,aits matVriels7 pris dans leur matVrialitV7 ne sont pas FprouvFs7 ne sont pas obJets d1expFrience7 ne se rapportent pas+ %our Ku>ils prennent la ,orme du systWme dans leKuel nous nous sentons -i-re7 il ,aut Ku>ils apparaissent7 et ce ,ait d>apparaZtre7 suraJoutV X leur eHistence brute7 s>appelle la conscience Kue nous en a-ons7 ou peut2[tre7 selon l>hypothWse panpsychiste7 Ku>ils ont d>euH2m[mes+ VoilX ce dualisme in-VtVrV Ku>il semble impossible de chasser de notre -ue du monde+ 'e monde peut bien eHister en soi7 mais nous n>en sa-ons rien7 car pour nous il est eHclusi-ement un obJet d>eHpVrienceE et la condition indispensable X cet e,,et7 c>est Ku>il soit rapportV X des tVmoins7 Ku>il soit connu par un suJet ou par des suJets spirituels+ ObJet et suJet7 -oilX les deuH Jambes sans lesKuelles il semble Kue la philosophie ne saurait ,aire un pas en a-ant+ Toutes les Vcoles sont d>accord lX2dessus7 scolastiKue7 cartVsianisme7 6antisme7 nVo26antisme7 tous admettent le dualisme ,ondamental+ !e positi-isme ou a.nosticisme de nosB%. 314C Jours7 Kui se piKue de rele-er des sciences naturelles7 se donne -olontiers7 il est -rai7 le nom de monisme+ *ais ce n>est Ku>un monisme -erbal+ Il pose une rValitV inconnue7 mais nous dit Kue cette rValitV se prVsente touJours sous deuH <aspects7= un cQtV conscience et un cQtV matiWre7 et ces deuH cQtVs demeurent aussi irrVductibles Kue les attributs ,ondamentauH7 Vtendue et pensVe7 du (ieu de SpinoLa+ Au ,ond7 le monisme contemporain est du spinoLisme pur+ Or7 comment se reprVsente2t2on cette conscience dont nous sommes tous si portVs X admettre l>eHistenceI Impossible de la dV,inir7 nous dit2on7 mais nous en a-ons tous une intuition immVdiate: tout d>abord la conscience a conscience d>elle2m[me+ (emandeL X la premiWre personne Kue -ous rencontrereL7 homme ou ,emme7 psycholo.ue ou i.norant7 et elle -ous rVpondra Ku>elle se sent penser7 Jouir7 sou,,rir7 -ouloir7 tout comme elle se sent respirer+ Elle perYoit directement sa -ie spirituelle comme une espWce de courant intVrieur7 acti,7 lV.er7 ,luide7 dVlicat7 diaphane pour ainsiB%. 310C dire7 et absolument opposV X Kuoi Kue ce soit de matVriel+ Bre,7 la -ie subJecti-e ne paraZt pas seulement [tre une condition lo.iKuement indispensable pour Ku>il y ait un monde obJecti, Kui apparaisse7 c>est encore un VlVment de l>eHpVrience m[me Kue nous Vprou-ons directement7 au m[me titre Kue nous Vprou-ons notre propre corps+ IdVes et 'hoses7 comment donc ne pas reconnaZtre leur dualismeI Sentiments et ObJets7 comment douter de leur hVtVro.VnVitV absolueI !a psycholo.ie soi2disant scienti,iKue admet cette hVtVro.VnVitV comme l>ancienne psycholo.ie spiritualiste l>admettait+ 'omment ne pas l>admettreI 'haKue science dVcoupe arbitrairement dans la trame des ,aits un champ o\ elle se parKue7 et dont elle dVcrit et Vtudie le contenu+ !a psycholo.ie prend Justement pour son domaine le champ des ,aits de conscience+ Elle les postule sans les critiKuer7 elle les oppose auH ,aits matVrielsE et sans critiKuer non plus la notion de ces derniers7 elle les rattache X la conscience par le lien mystVrieuH de la connaissance7 de7 l>aperception Kui7 pour elle7 estB%. 3/1C un troisiWme .enre de ,ait ,ondamental et ultime+ En sui-ant cette -oie7 la psycholo.ie contemporaine a ,[tV de .rands triomphes+ Elle a pu ,aire une esKuisse de l>V-olution de la -ie consciente7 en conce-ant cette derniWre comme s>adaptant de plus en plus complWtement au milieu physiKue en-ironnant+ Elle a pu Vtablir un parallVlisme dans le dualisme7 celui des ,aits psychiKues et des V-Vnements cVrVbrauH+ Elle a eHpliKuV les illusions7 les hallucinations7 et JusKu>X un certain point7 les maladies mentales+ 'e sont de beauH pro.rWsE

mais il reste encore bien des problWmes+ !a philosophie .VnVrale surtout7 Kui a pour de-oir de scruter tous les postulats7 trou-e des paradoHes et des emp[chements lX o\ la science passe outreE et il n>y a Kue les amateurs de science populaire Kui ne sont Jamais perpleHes+ %lus on -a au ,ond des choses7 plus on trou-e d>Vni.mesE et J>a-oue pour ma part Kue depuis Kue Je m>occupe sVrieusement de psycholo.ie7 ce -ieuH dualisme de matiWre et de pensVe7 cette hVtVro.VnVitV posVe comme absolue des deuH essences7 m>a touJours prVsentV desB%. 3//C di,,icultVs+ '>est de KuelKues2unes de ces di,,icultVs Kue Je -oudrais maintenant -ous entretenir+ (>abord il y en a une7 laKuelle7 J>en suis con-aincu7 -ous aura ,rappVs tous+ %renons la perception eHtVrieure7 la sensation directe Kue nous donnent par eHemple les murs de cette salle+ %eut2on dire ici Kue le psychiKue et le physiKue sont absolument hVtVro.WnesI Au contraire7 ils sont si peu hVtVro.Wnes Kue si nous nous plaYons au point de -ue du sens communE si nous ,aisons abstraction de toutes les in-entions eHplicati-es7 des molVcules et des ondulations VthVrVes7 par eHemple7 Kui au ,ond sont des entitVs mVtaphysiKuesE si7 en un mot7 nous prenons la rValitV naP-ement et telle Ku>elle nous est donnVe tout d>abord7 cette rValitV sensible d>o\ dVpendent nos intVr[ts -itauH7 et sur laKuelle se portent toutes nos actionsE eh bien7 cette rValitV sensible et la sensation Kue nous en a-ons sont7 au moment o\ la sensation se produit7 absolument identiKues l>une X l>autre+ !a rValitV est l>aperception m[me+ !es mots <murs de cette salle= ne si.ni,ient Kue cette blancheur ,raZche et sonoreB%. 3/3C Kui nous entoure7 coupVe par ces ,en[tres7 bornVe par ces li.nes et ces an.les+ !e physiKue ici n>a pas d>autre contenu Kue le psychiKue+ !e suJet et l>obJet se con,ondent+ '>est Ber6eley Kui le premier a mis cette -VritV en honneur+ $sse est percipi. &os sensations ne sont pas de petits duplicats intVrieurs des choses7 elles sont les choses m[mes en tant Kue les choses nous sont prVsentes+ Et Kuoi Kue l>on -euille penser de la -ie absente7 cachVe7 et pour ainsi dire pri-Ve7 des choses7 et Kuelles Kue soient les constructions hypothVtiKues Ku>on en ,asse7 il reste -rai Kue la -ie publiKue des choses7 cette actualitV prVsente par laKuelle elles nous con,rontent7 d>o\ dVri-ent toutes nos constructions thVoriKues7 et X laKuelle elles doi-ent toutes re-enir et se rattacher sous peine de ,lotter dans l>air et dans l>irrVelE cette actualitV7 dis2Je7 est homo.Wne7 et non pas seulement homo.Wne7 mais numVriKuement une7 a-ec une certaine partie de notre -ie intVrieure+ VoilX pour la perception eHtVrieure+ ;uand on s>adresse X l>ima.ination7 X la mVmoire ouB%. 3/AC auH ,acultVs de reprVsentation abstraite7 bien Kue les ,aits soient ici beaucoup plus compliKuVs7 Je crois Kue la m[me homo.VnVitV essentielle se dV.a.e+ %our simpli,ier le problWme7 eHcluons d>abord toute rValitV sensible+ %renons la pensVe pure7 telle Ku>elle s>e,,ectue dans le r[-e ou la r[-erie7 ou dans la mVmoire du passV+ Ici encore7 l>Vto,,e de l>eHpVrience ne ,ait2elle pas double emploi7 le physiKue et le psychiKue ne se con,ondent2ils pasI Si Je r[-e d>une monta.ne d>or7 elle n>eHiste sans doute pas en dehors du r[-e7 mais dans le r[-e elle est de nature ou d>essence par,aitement physiKue7 c>est comme physiKue Ku>elle m>apparaZt+ Si en ce moment Je me permets de me sou-enir de ma maison en AmVriKue7 et des dVtails de mon embarKuement rVcent pour l>Italie7 le phVnomWne pur7 le ,ait Kui se produit7 Ku>est2ilI '>est7 dit2 on7 ma pensVe7 a-ec son contenu+ *ais encore ce contenu7 Ku>est2ilI Il porte la ,orme d>une partie du monde rVel7 partie distante7 il est -rai7 de siH mille 6ilomWtres d>espace et de siH semaines de temps7 mais reliVe X la salle o\ nous sommes par une ,oule de choses7 obJetsB%.

3/MC et V-Vnements7 homo.Wnes d>une part a-ec la salle et d>autre part a-ec l>obJet de mes sou-enirs+ 'e contenu ne se donne pas comme Vtant d>abord un tout petit ,ait intVrieur Kue Je proJetterais ensuite au loin7 il se prVsente d>emblVe comme le ,ait Vloi.nV m[me+ Et l>acte de penser ce contenu7 la conscience Kue J>en ai7 Kue sont2ilsI Sont2ce au ,ond autre chose Kue des maniWres rVtrospecti-es de nommer le contenu lui2m[me7 lorsKu>on l>aura sVparV de tous ces intermVdiaires physiKues7 et reliV X un nou-eau .roupe d>associVs Kui le ,ont rentrer dans ma -ie mentale7 les Vmotions par eHemple Ku>il a V-eillVes en moi7 l>attention Kue J>y porte7 mes idVes de tout X l>heure Kui l>ont suscitV comme sou-enirI 'e n>est Ku>en se rapportant X ces derniers associVs Kue le phVnomWne arri-e X [tre classV comme pensFeE tant Ku>il ne se rapporte Ku>auH premiers il demeure phVnomWne ob&ectif+ Il est -rai Kue nous opposons habituellement nos ima.es intVrieures auH obJets7 et Kue nous les considVrons comme de petites copies7B%. 3/@C comme des calKues ou doubles7 a,,aiblis7 de ces derniers+ '>est Ku>un obJet prVsent a une -i-acitV et une nettetV supVrieures X celles de l>ima.e+ Il lui ,ait ainsi contrasteE et pour me ser-ir de l>eHcellent mot de Taine7 il lui sert de rFducteur+ ;uand les deuH sont prVsents ensemble7 l>obJet prend le premier plan et l>ima.e <recule7= de-ient une chose <absente+= *ais cet obJet prVsent7 Ku>est2il en lui2m[meI (e Kuelle Vto,,e est2il ,aitI (e la m[me Vto,,e Kue l>ima.e+ Il est ,ait de sensationsE il est chose perYue+ Son esse est percipi7 et lui et l>ima.e sont .VnVriKuement homo.Wnes+ Si Je pense en ce moment X mon chapeau Kue J>ai laissV tout X l>heure au -estiaire7 o\ est le dualisme7 le discontinu7 entre le chapeau pensV et le chapeau rVelI '>est d>un -rai chapeau absent Kue mon esprit s>occupe+ J>en tiens compte pratiKuement comme d>une rValitV+ S>il Vtait prVsent sur cette table7 le chapeau dVterminerait un mou-ement de ma main: Je l>enlW-erais+ (e m[me ce chapeau conYu7 ce chapeau en idVe7 dVterminera tantQt la direction de mes pas+ J>irai le prendre+B%. 3/?C !>idVe Kue J>en ai se continuera JusKu>X la prVsence sensible du chapeau7 et s>y ,ondra harmonieusement+ Je conclus donc Kue7Nbien Ku>il y ait un dualisme pratiKueNpuisKue les ima.es se distin.uent des obJets7 en tiennent lieu7 et nous y mWnent7 il n>y a pas lieu de leur attribuer une di,,Vrence de nature essentielle+ %ensVe et actualitV sont ,aites d>une seule et m[me Vto,,e7 Kui est l>Vto,,e de l>eHpVrience en .VnVral+ !a psycholo.ie de la perception eHtVrieure nous mWne X la m[me conclusion+ ;uand J>aperYois l>obJet de-ant moi comme une table de telle ,orme7 X telle distance7 on m>eHpliKue Kue ce ,ait est d] X deuH ,acteurs7 X une matiWre de sensation Kui me pVnWtre par la -oie des yeuH et Kui donne l>VlVment d>eHtVrioritV rVelle7 et X des idVes Kui se rV-eillent7 -ont X la rencontre de cette rValitV7 la classent et l>interprWtent+ *ais Kui peut ,aire la part7 dans la table concrWtement aperYue7 de ce Kui est sensation et de ce Kui est idVeI !>eHterne et l>interne7 l>Vtendu et l>inVtendu7 se ,usionnentB%. 3/:C et ,ont un maria.e indissoluble+ 'ela rappelle ces panoramas circulaires7 o\ des obJets rVels7 rochers7 herbe7 chariots brisVs7 etc+7 Kui occupent l>a-ant2plan7 sont si in.Vnieusement reliVs X la toile Kui ,ait le ,ond7 et Kui reprVsente une bataille ou un -aste paysa.e7 Kue l>on ne sait plus distin.uer ce Kui est obJet de ce Kui est peinture+ !es coutures et les Joints sont imperceptibles+

'ela pourrait2il ad-enir si l>obJet et l>idVe Vtaient absolument dissemblables de natureI

Je suis con-aincu Kue des considVrations pareilles X celles Kue Je -iens d>eHprimer auront dVJX suscitV7 cheL -ous aussi7 des doutes au suJet du dualisme prVtendu+ Et d>autres raisons de douter sur.issent encore+ Il y a toute une sphWre d>adJecti,s et d>attributs Kui ne sont ni obJecti,s7 ni subJecti,s d>une maniWre eHclusi-e7 mais Kue nous employons tantQt d>une maniWre et tantQt d>une autre7 comme si nous nous complaisions dans leur ambi.uPtV+ Je parle des KualitVs Kue nous apprFcions7 pour ainsi dire7 dans lesB%. 3/4C choses7 leur cQtV esthVtiKue7 moral7 leur -aleur pour nous+ !a beautV7 par eHemple7 o\ rVside2t2elleI Est2elle dans la statue7 dans la sonate7 ou dans notre espritI *on collW.ue X Har-ard7 "eor.e Santayana7 a Vcrit un li-re d>esthVtiKue7B//:C o\ il appelle la beautV <le plaisir obJecti,iV=E et en -VritV7 c>est bien ici Ku>on pourrait parler de proJection au dehors+ On dit indi,,Vremment une chaleur a.rVable7 ou une sensation a.rVable de chaleur+ !a raretV7 le prVcieuH du diamant nous en paraissent des KualitVs essentielles+ &ous parlons d>un ora.e a,,reuH7 d>un homme haPssable7 d>une action indi.ne7 et nous croyons parler obJecti-ement7 bien Kue ces termes n>eHpriment Kue des rapports X notre sensibilitV Vmoti-e propre+ &ous disons m[me un chemin pVnible7 un ciel triste7 un coucher de soleil superbe+ Toute cette maniWre animiste de re.arder les choses Kui paraZt a-oir VtV la ,aYon primiti-e de penser des hommes7 peut trWs bien s>eHpliKuer Fet *+ Santayana7 dans un autre li-re tout rVcent7B//4C B%. 3/0C l>a bien eHpliKuVe ainsiG par l>habitude d>attribuer X l>obJet tout ce Kue nous ressentons en sa prVsence+ !e parta.e du subJecti, et de l>obJecti, est le ,ait d>une rV,leHion trWs a-ancVe7 Kue nous aimons encore aJourner dans beaucoup d>endroits+ ;uand les besoins pratiKues ne nous en tirent pas ,orcVment7 il semble Kue nous aimons X nous bercer dans le -a.ue+ !es KualitVs secondes elles2m[mes7 chaleur7 son7 lumiWre7 n>ont encore auJourd>hui Ku>une attribution -a.ue+ %our le sens commun7 pour la -ie pratiKue7 elles sont absolument obJecti-es7 physiKues+ %our le physicien7 elles sont subJecti-es+ %our lui7 il n>y a Kue la ,orme7 la masse7 le mou-ement7 Kui aient une rValitV eHtVrieure+ %our le philosophe idValiste7 au contraire7 ,orme et mou-ement sont tout aussi subJecti,s Kue lumiWre et chaleur7 et il n>y a Kue la chose2en2soi inconnue7 le <noumWne7= Kui Jouisse d>une rValitV eHtramentale complWte+ &os sensations intimes conser-ent encore de cette ambi.uPtV+ Il y a des illusions de mou-ement Kui prou-ent Kue nos premiWresB%. 331C sensations de mou-ement Vtaient .VnVralisVes+ '>est le monde entier7 a-ec nous7 Kui se mou-ait+ *aintenant nous distin.uons notre propre mou-ement de celui des obJets Kui nous entourent7 et parmi les obJets nous en distin.uons Kui demeurent en repos+ *ais il est des Vtats de -erti.e o\ nous retombons encore auJourd>hui dans l>indi,,Vrenciation premiWre+ Vous connaisseL tous sans doute cette thVorie Kui a -oulu ,aire des Vmotions des sommes de sensations -iscVrales et musculaires+ Elle a donnV lieu X bien des contro-erses7 et aucune opinion n>a encore conKuis l>unanimitV des su,,ra.es+ Vous connaisseL aussi les contro-erses sur la nature de l>acti-itV mentale+ !es uns soutiennent Ku>elle est une ,orce purement spirituelle Kue nous sommes en Vtat d>aperce-oir immVdiatement comme telle+ !es autres prVtendent Kue ce Kue

nous nommons acti-itV mentale Fe,,ort7 attention7 par eHempleG n>est Kue le re,let senti de certains e,,ets dont notre or.anisme est le siW.e7 tensions musculaires au cr^ne et au .osier7 arr[t ou passa.e de la respiration7 a,,luH de san.7 etc+B%. 33/C (e KuelKue maniWre Kue se rVsol-ent ces contro-erses7 leur eHistence prou-e bien clairement une chose7 c>est Ku>il est trWs di,,icile7 ou m[me absolument impossible de sa-oir7 par la seule inspection intime de certains phVnomWnes7 s>ils sont de nature physiKue7 occupant de l>Vtendue7 etc+7 ou s>ils sont de nature purement psychiKue et intVrieure+ Il nous ,aut touJours trou-er des raisons pour appuyer notre a-isE il nous ,aut chercher la classi,ication la plus probable du phVnomWneE et en ,in de compte il pourrait bien se trou-er Kue toutes nos classi,ications usuelles eussent eu leurs moti,s plutQt dans les besoins de la pratiKue Kue dans KuelKue ,acultV Kue nous aurions d>aperce-oir deuH essences ultimes et di-erses Kui composeraient ensemble la trame des choses+ !e corps de chacun de nous o,,re un contraste pratiKue presKue -iolent X tout le reste du milieu ambiant+ Tout ce Kui arri-e au dedans de ce corps nous est plus intime et important Kue ce Kui arri-e ailleurs+ Il s>identi,ie a-ec notre moi7 il se classe a-ec lui+ Ame7 -ie7 sou,,le7 Kui saurait bien les distin.uer eHactementI *[me nos ima.es et nosB%. 333C sou-enirs7 Kui n>a.issent sur le monde physiKue Kue par le moyen de notre corps7 semblent appartenir X ce dernier+ &ous les traitons comme internes7 nous les classons a-ec nos sentiments a,,ecti,s+ Il ,aut bien a-ouer7 en somme7 Kue la Kuestion du dualisme de la pensVe et de la matiWre est bien loin d>[tre ,inalement rVsolue+ Et -oilX terminVe la premiWre partie de mon discours+ J>ai -oulu -ous pVnVtrer7 *esdames et *essieurs7 de mes doutes et de la rValitV7 aussi bien Kue de l>importance7 du problWme+ ;uant X moi7 aprWs de lon.ues annVes d>hVsitation7 J>ai ,ini par prendre mon parti carrVment+ Je crois Kue la conscience7 telle Ku>on se la reprVsente communVment7 soit comme entitV7 soit comme acti-itV pure7 mais en tout cas comme ,luide7 inVtendue7 diaphane7 -ide de tout contenu propre7 mais se connaissant directement elle2m[me7 spirituelle en,in7 Je crois7 dis2Je7 Kue cette conscience est une pure chimWre7 et Kue la somme de rValitVs concrWtes Kue le mot conscience de-rait cou-rir7 mVrite une toute autre description7 description7 du reste7 Ku>une philosophie attenti-e auH ,aits etB%. 33AC sachant ,aire un peu d>analyse7 serait dVsormais en Vtat de ,ournir ou plutQt de commencer X ,ournir+ Et ces mots m>amWnent X la seconde partie de mon discours+ Elle sera beaucoup plus courte Kue la premiWre7 parce Kue si Je la dV-eloppais sur la m[me Vchelle7 elle serait beaucoup trop lon.ue+ Il ,aut7 par consVKuent7 Kue Je me restrei.ne auH seules indications indispensables+

Admettons Kue la conscience7 la Be!usstheit7 conYue comme essence7 entitV7 acti-itV7 moitiV irrVductible de chaKue eHpVrience7 soit supprimVe7 Kue le dualisme ,ondamental et pour ainsi dire ontolo.iKue soit aboli et Kue ce Kue nous supposions eHister soit seulement ce Ku>on a appelV JusKu>ici le contenu7 le *nhalt7 de la conscienceE comment la philosophie -a2t2elle se tirer d>a,,aire a-ec l>espWce de monisme -a.ue Kui en rVsulteraI Je -ais t^cher de -ous insinuer KuelKues su..estions positi-es lX2dessus7 bien Kue Je crai.ne Kue7 ,aute du dV-eloppement nVcessaire7 mes idVes ne rVpandront pas une clartV trWs .rande+ %our-u Kue J>indiKue unB%. 33MC commencement de sentier7 ce sera peut2[tre asseL+

Au ,ond7 pourKuoi nous accrochons2nous d>une maniWre si tenace X cette idVe d>une conscience suraJoutVe X l>eHistence du contenu des chosesI %ourKuoi la rVclamons2nous si ,ortement7 Kue celui Kui la nierait nous semblerait plutQt un mau-ais plaisant Ku>un penseurI &>est2ce pas pour sau-er ce ,ait indVniable Kue le contenu de l>eHpVrience n>a pas seulement une eHistence propre et comme immanente et intrinsWKue7 mais Kue chaKue partie de ce contenu dVteint pour ainsi dire sur ses -oisines7 rend compte d>elle2m[me X d>autres7 sort en KuelKue sorte de soi pour [tre sue et Ku>ainsi tout le champ de l>eHpVrience se trou-e [tre transparent de part en part7 ou constituV comme un espace Kui serait rempli de miroirsI 'ette bilatVralitV des parties de l>eHpVrience7NX sa-oir d>une part7 Ku>elles sont a-ec des KualitVs propresE d>autre part7 Ku>elles sont rapportVes X d>autres parties et suesNl>opinion rV.nante la constate et l>eHpliKue par un dualisme ,ondamental de constitutionB%. 33@C appartenant X chaKue morceau d>eHpVrience en propre+ (ans cette ,euille de papier il n>y a pas seulement7 dit2on7 le contenu7 blancheur7 minceur7 etc+7 mais il y a ce second ,ait de la conscience de cette blancheur et de cette minceur+ 'ette ,onction d>[tre <rapportV7= de ,aire partie de la trame entiWre d>une eHpVrience plus comprVhensi-e7 on l>Vri.e en ,ait ontolo.iKue7 et on lo.e ce ,ait dans l>intVrieur m[me du papier7 en l>accouplant X sa blancheur et X sa minceur+ 'e n>est pas un rapport eHtrinsWKue Ku>on suppose7 c>est une moitiV du phVnomWne m[me+ Je crois Ku>en somme on se reprVsente la rValitV comme constituVe de la ,aYon dont sont ,aites les <couleurs= Kui nous ser-ent X la peinture+ Il y a d>abord des matiWres colorantes Kui rVpondent au contenu7 et il y a un -Vhicule7 huile ou colle7 Kui les tient en suspension et Kui rVpond X la conscience+ '>est un dualisme complet7 o\7 en employant certains procVdVs7 on peut sVparer chaKue VlVment de l>autre par -oie de soustraction+ '>est ainsi Ku>on nous assure Ku>en ,aisant un .rand e,,ort d>abstraction introspecti-e7 nous pou-onsB%. 33?C saisir notre conscience sur le -i,7 comme une acti-itV spirituelle pure7 en nV.li.eant X peu prWs complWtement les matiWres Ku>X un moment donnV elle Vclaire+ *aintenant Je -ous demande si on ne pourrait pas tout aussi bien ren-erser absolument cette maniWre de -oir+ Supposons7 en e,,et7 Kue la rValitV premiWre soit de nature neutre7 et appelons2la par KuelKue nom encore ambi.u7 comme phFnomGne7 donnF7 "orfindung+ *oi2m[me J>en parle -olontiers au pluriel7 et Je lui donne le nom d>expFriences pures+ 'e sera un monisme7 si -ous -ouleL7 mais un monisme tout X ,ait rudimentaire et absolument opposV au soi2disant monisme bilatVral du positi-isme scienti,iKue ou spinoListe+ 'es eHpVriences pures eHistent et se succWdent7 entrent dans des rapports in,iniment -ariVs les unes a-ec les autres7 rapports Kui sont euH2m[mes des parties essentielles de la trame des eHpVriences+ Il y a <'onscience= de ces rapports au m[me titre Ku>il y a <'onscience= de leurs termes+ Il en rVsulte Kue des groupes d>eHpVriences se ,ont remarKuer etB%. 33:C distin.uer7 et Ku>une seule et m[me eHpVrience7 -u la .rande -ariVtV de ses rapports7 peut Jouer un rQle dans plusieurs .roupes X la ,ois+ '>est ainsi Kue dans un certain conteHte de -oisins7 elle serait classVe comme un phVnomWne physiKue7 tandis Kue dans un autre entoura.e elle ,i.urerait comme un ,ait de conscience7 X peu prWs comme une m[me particule d>encre peut appartenir simultanVment X deuH li.nes7 l>une -erticale7 l>autre horiLontale7 pour-u Ku>elle soit situVe X leur intersection+

%renons7 pour ,iHer nos idVes7 l>eHpVrience Kue nous a-ons X ce moment du local o\ nous sommes7 de ces murailles7 de cette table7 de ces chaises7 de cet espace+ (ans cette eHpVrience pleine7 concrWte et indi-ise7 telle Ku>elle est lX7 donnVe7 le monde physiKue obJecti, et le monde intVrieur et personnel de chacun de nous se rencontrent et se ,usionnent comme des li.nes se ,usionnent X leur intersection+ 'omme chose physiKue7 cette salle a des rapports a-ec tout le reste du b^timent7 b^timent Kue nous autres nous ne connaissons et ne connaZtrons pas+B%. 334C Elle doit son eHistence X toute une histoire de ,inanciers7 d>architectes7 d>ou-riers+ Elle pWse sur le solE elle durera indV,iniment dans le tempsE si le ,eu y Vclatait7 les chaises et la table Ku>elle contient seraient -ite rVduites en cendres+ 'omme eHpVrience personnelle7 au contraire7 comme chose <rapportVe7= connue7 consciente7 cette salle a de tout autres tenants et aboutissants+ Ses antVcVdents ne sont pas des ou-riers7 ce sont nos pensVes respecti-es de tout X l>heure+ BientQt elle ne ,i.urera Kue comme un ,ait ,u.iti, dans nos bio.raphies7 associV X d>a.rVables sou-enirs+ 'omme eHpVrience psychiKue7 elle n>a aucun poids7 son ameublement n>est pas combustible+ Elle n>eHerce de ,orce physiKue Kue sur nos seuls cer-eauH7 et beaucoup d>entre nous nient encore cette in,luenceE tandis Kue la salle physiKue est en rapport d>in,luence physiKue a-ec tout le reste du monde+ Et pourtant c>est de la m[me salle absolument Ku>il s>a.it dans les deuH cas+ Tant Kue nous ne ,aisons pas de physiKue spVculati-e7B%. 330C tant Kue nous nous plaYons dans le sens commun7 c>est la salle -ue et sentie Kui est bien la salle physiKue+ (e Kuoi parlons2nous donc si ce n>est de cela7 de cette m[me partie de la nature matVrielle Kue tous nos esprits7 X ce m[me moment7 embrassent7 Kui entre telle Kuelle dans l>eHpVrience actuelle et intime de chacun de nous7 et Kue notre sou-enir re.ardera touJours comme une partie intV.rante de notre histoire+ '>est absolument une m[me Vto,,e Kui ,i.ure simultanVment7 selon le conteHte Kue l>on considWre7 comme ,ait matVriel et physiKue7 ou comme ,ait de conscience intime+ Je crois donc Ku>on ne saurait traiter conscience et matiWre comme Vtant d>essence disparate+ On n>obtient ni l>une ni l>autre par soustraction7 en nV.li.eant chaKue ,ois l>autre moitiV d>une eHpVrience de composition double+ !es eHpVriences sont au contraire primiti-ement de nature plutQt simple+ Elles deviennent conscientes dans leur entier7 elles deviennent physiKues dans leur entierE et c>est par voie d1addition Kue ce rVsultat se rValise+ %ourB%. 3A1C autant Kue des eHpVriences se prolon.ent dans le temps7 entrent dans des rapports d>in,luence physiKue7 se brisant7 se chau,,ant7 s>Vclairant7 etc+7 mutuellement7 nous en ,aisons un .roupe X part Kue nous appelons le monde physiKue+ %our autant7 au contraire7 Ku>elles sont ,u.iti-es7 inertes physiKuement7 Kue leur succession ne suit pas d>ordre dVterminV7 mais semble plutQt obVir X des caprices Vmoti,s7 nous en ,aisons un autre .roupe Kue nous appelons le monde psychiKue+ '>est en entrant X prVsent dans un .rand nombre de ces .roupes psychiKues Kue cette salle de-ient maintenant chose consciente7 chose rapportVe7 chose sue+ En ,aisant dVsormais partie de nos bio.raphies respecti-es7 elle ne sera pas sui-ie de cette sotte et monotone rVpVtition d>elle2m[me dans le temps Kui caractVrise son eHistence physiKue+ Elle sera sui-ie7 au contraire7 par d>autres eHpVriences Kui seront discontinues a-ec elle7 ou Kui auront ce .enre tout particulier de continuitV Kue nous appelons sou-enir+ (emain7 elle aura eu sa place dans chacun de nos passVsE mais les prVsents di-ers auHKuels tousB%. 3A/C ces passVs seront liVs demain seront bien di,,Vrents du prVsent dont cette salle Jouira demain comme entitV physiKue+

!es deuH .enres de .roupes sont ,ormVs d>eHpVriences7 mais les rapports des eHpVriences entre elles di,,Wrent d>un .roupe X l>autre+ '>est donc par addition d>autres phVnomWnes Ku>un phVnomWne donnV de-ient conscient ou connu7 ce n>est pas par un dVdoublement d>essence intVrieure+ !a connaissance des choses leur survient7 elle ne leur est pas immanente+ 'e n>est le ,ait ni d>un moi transcendental7 ni d>une Be!usstheit ou acte de conscience Kui les animerait chacune+ $lles se connaissent l1une l1autre7 ou plutQt il y en a Kui connaissent les autresE et le rapport Kue nous nommons connaissance n>est lui2m[me7 dans beaucoup de cas7 Ku>une suite d>eHpVriences intermVdiaires par,aitement susceptibles d>[tre dVcrites en termes concrets+ Il n>est nullement le mystWre transcendant o\ se sont complus tant de philosophes+ *ais ceci nous mWnerait beaucoup trop loin+ Je ne puis entrer ici dans tous les replis de laB%. 3A3C thVorie de la connaissance7 ou de ce Kue7 -ous autres Italiens7 -ous appeleL la .nosVolo.ie+ Je dois me contenter de ces remarKues VcourtVes7 ou simples su..estions7 Kui sont7 Je le crains7 encore bien obscures ,aute des dV-eloppements nVcessaires+ %ermetteL donc Kue Je me rVsumeNtrop sommairement7 et en style do.matiKueNdans les siH thWses sui-antes: =o 8a 7onscience% telle ,u1on l1entend ordinairement% n1existe pas% pas plus ,ue la MatiGre% H la,uelle Ber(eley a donnF le coup de grEce+ Co 7e ,ui existe et forme la part de vFritF ,ue le mot de I7onscienceJ recouvre% c1est la susceptibilitF ,ue possGdent les parties de l1expFrience d1Ktre rapportFes ou connues+ Lo 7ette susceptibilitF s1expli,ue par le fait ,ue certaines expFriences peuvent mener les unes aux autres par des expFriences intermFdiaires nettement caractFrisFes% de telle sorte ,ue les unes se trouvent &ouer le rMle de choses connues% les autres celui de su&ets connaissants+ >o n peut parfaitement dFfinir ces deux rMles<Pg CLL? sans sortir de la trame de l1expFrience mKme% et sans invo,uer rien de transcendant+ Ao 8es attributions su&et et ob&et% reprFsentF et reprFsentatif% chose et pensFe% signifient donc une distinction prati,ue ,ui est de la derniGre importance% mais ,ui est d1ordre O&'TIO&&E! seulement% et nullement ontologi,ue comme le dualisme classi,ue se la reprFsente+ No $n fin de compte% les choses et les pensFes ne sont point fonciGrement hFtFrogGnes% mais elles sont faites d1une mKme Ftoffe% Ftoffe ,u1on ne peut dFfinir comme telle% mais seulement Fprouver% et ,ue l1on peut nommer% si on veut% l1Ftoffe de l1expFrience en gFnFral.

FOOTNOTES
B//?C BA communication made Fin renchG at the i,th International 'on.ress o, %sycholo.y7 in Rome7 April A17 /01@+ It is reprinted ,rom the Archives de Psychologie7 -ol+ -7 &o+ /:7 June7 /01@+C 'ette communication est le rVsumV7 ,orcVment trWs condensV7 de -ues Kue l>auteur a eHposVes7 au cours de ces derniers mois7 en une sVrie d>articles publiVs dans le 3ournal of

Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 /01M et /01@+ BThe series o, articles re,erred to is reprinted abo-e+ Ed+C B//:C The Sense of Beauty7 pp+ MM ,,+ B//4C The 8ife of #eason B-ol+ i7 <Reason in 'ommon Sense7= p+ /M3C+ B%. 3AMC

I#
IS RADICAL EMPIRICISM SOLIPSISTIC$%==?'
I, all the criticisms 5hich the humanistic Weltanschauung is recei-in. 5ere as sachgemBss as *r+ Bode>s7B/31C the truth o, the matter 5ould more rapidly clear up+ &ot only is it eHcellently 5ell 5ritten7 but it brin.s its o5n point o, -ie5 out clearly7 and admits o, a per,ectly strai.ht reply+ The ar.ument Funless I ,ail to catch itG can be eHpressed as ,ollo5s: I, a series o, eHperiences be supposed7 no one o, 5hich is endo5ed immediately 5ith the sel,2 transcendent ,unction o, re,erence to a reality beyond itsel,7 no moti-e 5ill occur 5ithin the series ,or supposin. anythin. beyond it to eHist+ It 5ill remain subJecti-e7 and contentedly subJecti-e7 both as a 5hole and in its se-eral parts+ B%. 3A@C Radical empiricism7 tryin.7 as it does7 to account ,or obJecti-e 6no5led.e by means o, such a series7 e.re.iously ,ails+ It can not eHplain ho5 the notion o, a physical order7 as distin.uished ,rom a subJecti-ely bio.raphical order7 o, eHperiences7 e-er arose+ It pretends to eHplain the notion o, a physical order7 but does so by playin. ,ast and loose 5ith the concept o, obJecti-e re,erence+ On the one hand7 it denies that such re,erence implies sel,2 transcendency on the part o, any one eHperienceE on the other hand7 it claims that eHperiences point+ But7 critically considered7 there can be no pointin. unless sel,2transcendency be also allo5ed+ The conJuncti-e ,unction o, pointin.7 as I ha-e assumed it7 is7 accordin. to my critic7 -itiated by the ,allacy o, attachin. a bilateral relation to a term a ,uo7 as i, it could stic6 out substanti-ely and maintain itsel, in eHistence in ad-ance o, the term ad ,uem 5hich is eKually reKuired ,or it to be a concretely eHperienced ,act+ I, the relation be made concrete7 the term ad ,uem is in-ol-ed7 5hich 5ould mean Fi, I succeed inB%. 3A?C apprehendin. *r+ Bode ri.htlyG that this latter term7 althou.h not empirically there7 is yet noetically there7 in ad-anceNin other 5ords it 5ould mean that any eHperience that Dpoints> must already ha-e transcended itsel,7 in the ordinary Depistemolo.ical> sense o, the 5ord transcend+

Somethin. li6e this7 i, I understand *r+ Bode>s teHt7 is the upshot o, his state o, mind+ It is a reasonable soundin. state o, mind7 but it is eHactly the state o, mind 5hich radical empiricism7 by its doctrine o, the reality o, conJuncti-e relations7 see6s to dispel+ I -ery much ,earNso di,,icult does mutual understandin. seem in these eHalted re.ionsNthat my able critic has ,ailed to understand that doctrine as it is meant to be understood+ I suspect that he per,orms on all these conJuncti-e relations Fo, 5hich the a,oresaid Dpointin.> is only oneG the usual rationalistic act o, substitutionNhe ta6es them not as they are .i-en in their ,irst intention7 as parts constituti-e o, eHperience>s li-in. ,lo57 but only as they appear in retrospect7 each ,iHed as aB%. 3A:C determinate obJect o, conception7 static7 there,ore7 and contained 5ithin itsel,+ A.ainst this rationalistic tendency to treat eHperience as chopped up into discontinuous static obJects7 radical empiricism protests+ It insists on ta6in. conJunctions at their D,ace2-alue7> Just as they come+ 'onsider7 ,or eHample7 such conJunctions as Dand7> D5ith7> Dnear7> Dplus7> Dto5ards+> While 5e li-e in such conJunctions our state is one o, transition in the most literal sense+ We are eHpectant o, a Dmore> to come7 and be,ore the more has come7 the transition7 ne-ertheless7 is directed to!ards it+ I ,ail other5ise to see ho57 i, one 6ind o, more comes7 there should be satis,action and ,eelin. o, ,ul,ilmentE but disappointment i, the more comes in another shape+ One more 5ill continue7 another more 5ill arrest or de,lect the direction7 in 5hich our eHperience is mo-in. e-en no5+ We can not7 it is true7 name our di,,erent li-in. Dands> or D5iths> eHcept by namin. the di,,erent terms to5ards 5hich they are mo-in. us7 but 5e live their speci,ications and di,,erences be,ore thoseB%. 3A4C terms eHplicitly arri-e+ Thus7 thou.h the -arious Dands> are all bilateral relations7 each reKuirin. a term ad ,uem to de,ine it 5hen -ie5ed in retrospect and articulately concei-ed7 yet in its li-in. moment any one o, them may be treated as i, it Dstuc6 out> ,rom its term a ,uo and pointed in a special direction7 much as a compass2 needle Fto use *r+ Bode>s eHcellent simileG points at the pole7 e-en thou.h it stirs not ,rom its boH+ In %ro,essor HT,,din.>s massi-e little article in The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7B/3/C he Kuotes a sayin. o, 9ier6e.aard>s to the e,,ect that 5e li-e ,or5ards7 but 5e understand bac65ards+ #nderstandin. bac65ards is7 it must be con,essed7 a -ery ,reKuent 5ea6ness o, philosophers7 both o, the rationalistic and o, the ordinary empiricist type+ Radical empiricism alone insists on understandin. ,or5ards also7 and re,uses to substitute static concepts o, the understandin. ,or transitions in our mo-in. li,e+ A lo.ic similar to that 5hich my critic seems to employB%. 3A0C here should7 it seems to me7 ,orbid him to say that our present is7 5hile present7 directed to5ards our ,uture7 or that any physical mo-ement can ha-e direction until its .oal is actually reached+ At this point does it not seem as i, the Kuarrel about sel,2transcendency in 6no5led.e mi.ht dropI Is it not a purely -erbal disputeI 'all it sel,2transcendency or call it pointin.7 5hiche-er you li6eNit ma6es no di,,erence so lon. as real transitions to5ards real .oals are admitted as thin.s .i-en in eHperience7 and amon. eHperience>s most inde,easible parts+ Radical empiricism7 unable to close its eyes to the transitions cau.ht in actu7 accounts ,or the sel,2transcendency or the pointin. F5hiche-er you may call itG as a process that occurs 5ithin eHperience7 as an empirically mediated thin. o, 5hich a per,ectly de,inite description can be .i-en+ DEpistemolo.y7> on the other hand7 denies thisE and pretends that the sel,2transcendency is unmediated or7 i, mediated7 then mediated in a super2empirical 5orld+ To Justi,y this pretension7

epistemolo.y has ,irst toB%. 3M1C trans,orm all our conJunctions into static obJects7 and this7 I submit7 is an absolutely arbitrary act+ But in spite o, *r+ Bode>s mal2treatment o, conJunctions7 as I understand themNand as I understand himNI belie-e that at bottom 5e are ,i.htin. ,or nothin. di,,erent7 but are both de,endin. the same continuities o, eHperience in di,,erent ,orms o, 5ords+ There are other criticisms in the article in Kuestion7 but7 as this seems the most -ital one7 I 5ill ,or the present7 at any rate7 lea-e them untouched+

FOOTNOTES
B//0C BReprinted ,rom The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ ii7 &o+ 07 April 3:7 /01@+C B/31C BB+ H+ Bode: <D%ure EHperience> and the EHternal World7= 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ ii7 /01@7 p+ /34+C B/3/C Vol+ ii7 B/01@C7 pp+ 4@203+ B%. 3M/C

#
MR* PIT:INS REF"TATION OF !RADICAL EMPIRICISM%=&&'
Althou.h *r+ %it6in does not name me in his acute article on radical empiricism7B/3AC B+++C I ,ear that some readers7 6no5in. me to ha-e applied that name to my o5n doctrine7 may possibly consider themsel-es to ha-e been in at my death+ In point o, ,act my 5ithers are entirely un5run.+ I ha-e7 indeed7 saidB/3MC that Dto be radical7 an empiricism must not admit into its constructions any element that is not directly eHperienced+> But in my o5n radical empiricism this is only a methodological postulate7 not a conclusion supposed to ,lo5 ,rom the intrinsic absurdity o, transempirical obJects+ I ha-e ne-er ,elt the sli.htest respect ,or the idealisticB%. 3M3C ar.uments 5hich *r+ %it6in attac6s and o, 5hich errier made such stri6in. useE and I am per,ectly 5illin. to admit any number o, noumenal bein.s or e-ents into philosophy i, only their pra.matic -alue can be sho5n+ Radical empiricism and pra.matism ha-e so many misunderstandin.s to su,,er ,rom7 that it seems my duty not to let this one .o any ,arther7 uncorrected+

*r+ %it6in>s Dreply> to me7B/3@C B+++C perpleHes me by the obscurity o, style 5hich I ,ind in almost all our youn.er philosophers+ He as6s me7 ho5e-er7 t5o direct Kuestions 5hich I understand7 so I ta6e the liberty o, ans5erin.+

irst he as6s: (o not eHperience and science sho5 Dthat countless thin.s areB/3?C eHperienced as that 5hich they are not or are only partiallyI> I reply: )es7 assuredly7 as7 ,or eHample7 Dthin.s> distorted by re,racti-e media7 Dmolecules7> or 5hate-er else is ta6en to be more ultimately real than the immediate content o, the percepti-e moment+ B%. 3MAC Secondly: <I, eHperience is sel,2supportin.B/3:C Fin any intelli.ible senseG does this ,act preclude the possibility o, FaG somethin. not eHperienced and FbG action o, eHperience upon a noumenonI= *y reply is: Assuredly not the possibility o, eitherNho5 could itI )et in my opinion 5e should be 5ise not to consider any thin. or action o, that nature7 and to restrict our uni-erse o, philosophic discourse to 5hat is eHperienced or7 at least7 eHperienceable+B/34C

FOOTNOTES
B/33C BReprinted ,rom the 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ iii7 &o+ 3?7 (ecember 317 /01?E and ibid.7 -ol+ i-7 &o+ M7 ebruary /M7 /01:7 5here the ori.inal is entitled <A Reply to *r+ %it6in+= Ed+C B/3AC BW+ B+ %it6in: <A %roblem o, E-idence in Radical Empiricism7= ibid.7 -ol+ iii7 &o+ 3M7 &o-ember 337 /01?+ Ed+C B/3MC BAbo-e7 p+ M3+ Ed+C B/3@C B<In Reply to %ro,essor James7= 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods7 -ol+ i-7 &o+ 37 January /:7 /01:+ Ed+C B/3?C *r+ %it6in inserts the clause: Dby reason o, the -ery nature o, eHperience itsel,+> &ot understandin. Just 5hat reason is meant7 I do not include this clause in my ans5er+ B/3:C BSee abo-e7 p+ /0A+ Ed+C B/34C BElse5here7 in spea6in. o, Dreality> as <conceptual or perceptual eHperiences7= the author says: <This is meant merely to eHclude reality o, an Dun6no5able> sort7 o, 5hich no account in either perceptual or conceptual terms can be .i-en+ It includes7 o, course7 any amount o, empirical reality independent o, the 6no5er+= Meaning of Truth7 p+ /117 note+ Ed+C B%. 3MMC

#I
7"MANISM AND TR"T7 ONCE MORE*%=&?'

*r+ Joseph>s criticism o, my article DHumanism and Truth>B/A1C is a use,ul contribution to the .eneral clearin. up+ He has seriously tried to comprehend 5hat the pra.matic mo-ement may intelli.ibly meanE and i, he has ,ailed7 it is the ,ault neither o, his patience nor o, his sincerity7 but rather o, stubborn tric6s o, thou.ht 5hich he could not easily .et rid o,+ *inute polemics7 in 5hich the parties try to rebut e-ery detail o, each o, the other>s char.es7 are a use,ul eHercise only to the disputants+ They can but breed con,usion in a reader+ I 5ill there,ore i.nore as much as possible the teHt o, both our articles Fmine 5as inadeKuate enou.hG and treat once more the .eneral obJecti-e situation+ B%. 3M@C As I apprehend the mo-ement to5ards humanism7 it is based on no particular disco-ery or principle that can be dri-en into one precise ,ormula 5hich thereupon can be impaled upon a lo.ical s6e5er+ It is much more li6e one o, those secular chan.es that come upon public opinion o-er2ni.ht7 as it 5ere7 borne upon tides Dtoo ,ull ,or sound or ,oam7> that sur-i-e all the crudities and eHtra-a.ances o, their ad-ocates7 that you can pin to no one absolutely essential statement7 nor 6ill by any one decisi-e stab+ Such ha-e been the chan.es ,rom aristocracy to democracy7 ,rom classic to romantic taste7 ,rom theistic to pantheistic ,eelin.7 ,rom static to e-olutionary 5ays o, understandin. li,eNchan.es o, 5hich 5e all ha-e been spectators+ Scholasticism still opposes to such chan.es the method o, con,utation by sin.le decisi-e reasons7 sho5in. that the ne5 -ie5 in-ol-es sel,2contradiction7 or tra-erses some ,undamental principle+ This is li6e stoppin.B%. 3M?C a ri-er by plantin. a stic6 in the middle o, its bed+ Round your obstacle ,lo5s the 5ater and D.ets there all the same+> In readin. *r+ Joseph7 I am not a little reminded o, those 'atholic 5riters 5ho re,ute (ar5inism by tellin. us that hi.her species can not come ,rom lo5er because minus ne,uit gignere plus7 or that the notion o, trans,ormation is absurd7 ,or it implies that species tend to their o5n destruction7 and that 5ould -iolate the principle that e-ery reality tends to perse-ere in its o5n shape+ The point o, -ie5 is too myopic7 too ti.ht and close to ta6e in the inducti-e ar.ument+ )ou can not settle Kuestions o, ,act by ,ormal lo.ic+ I ,eel as i, *r+ Joseph almost pounced on my 5ords sin.ly7 5ithout .i-in. the sentences time to .et out o, my mouth+ The one condition o, understandin. humanism is to become inducti-e2minded onesel,7 to drop ri.orous de,initions7 and ,ollo5 lines o, least resistance Don the 5hole+> <In other 5ords7= *r+ Joseph may probably say7 <resol-e your intellect into a 6ind o, slush+= <E-en so7= I ma6e reply7 N<i, you 5illB%. 3M:C consent to use no politer 5ord+= or humanism7 concei-in. the more Dtrue> as the more Dsatis,actory> F(e5ey>s termG has to renounce sincerely rectilinear ar.uments and ancient ideals o, ri.or and ,inality+ It is in Just this temper o, renunciation7 so di,,erent ,rom that o, pyrrhonistic scepticism7 that the spirit o, humanism essentially consists+ Satis,actoriness has to be measured by a multitude o, standards7 o, 5hich some7 ,or au.ht 5e 6no57 may ,ail in any .i-en caseE and 5hat is Dmore> satis,actory than any alternati-e in si.ht7 may to the end be a sum o, pluses and minuses7 concernin. 5hich 5e can only trust that by ulterior corrections and impro-ements a maHimum o, the one and a minimum o, the other may some day be approached+ It means a real chan.e o, heart7 a brea6 5ith absolutistic hopes7 5hen one ta6es up this -ie5 o, the conditions o, belie,+

That humanism>s critics ha-e ne-er ima.ined this attitude in5ardly7 is sho5n by their in-ariable tactics+ They do not .et into it ,ar enou.h to see obJecti-ely and ,romB%. 3M4C 5ithout 5hat their o5n opposite notion o, truth is+ *r+ Joseph is possessed by some such notionE he thin6s his readers to be ,ull o, it7 he obeys it7 5or6s ,rom it7 but ne-er e-en essays to tell us 5hat it is+ The nearest he comes to doin. so is 5hereB/A/C he says it is the 5ay <5e ou.ht to thin67= 5hether 5e be psycholo.ically compelled to or not+ O, course humanism a.rees to this: it is only a manner o, callin. truth an ideal+ But humanism eHplicates the summariLin. 5ord Dou.ht> into a mass o, pra.matic moti-es ,rom the midst o, 5hich our critics thin6 that truth itsel, ta6es ,li.ht+ Truth is a name o, double meanin.+ It stands no5 ,or an abstract somethin. de,ined only as that to 5hich our thou.ht ou.ht to con,ormE and a.ain it stands ,or the concrete propositions 5ithin 5hich 5e belie-e that con,ormity already rei.nsNthey bein. so many Dtruths+> Humanism sees that the only con,ormity 5e e-er ha-e to deal 5ith concretely is that bet5een our subJects and our predicates7 usin. these 5ords in a -eryB%. 3M0C broad sense+ It sees moreo-er that this con,ormity is D-alidated> Fto use *r+ Schiller>s termG by an inde,inite number o, pra.matic tests that -ary as the predicates and subJects -ary+ I, an S .ets superseded by an S% that .i-es our mind a completer sum o, satis,actions7 5e al5ays say7 humanism points out7 that 5e ha-e ad-anced to a better position in re.ard to truth+ &o5 many o, our Jud.ments thus attained are retrospecti-e+ The S>es7 so the Jud.ment runs7 5ere S%>s already ere the ,act 5as humanly recorded+ 'ommon sense7 struc6 by this state o, thin.s7 no5 rearran.es the 5hole ,ieldE and traditional philosophy ,ollo5s her eHample+ The .eneral reKuirement that predicates must con,orm to their subJect7 they translate into an ontolo.ical theory+ A most pre-ious SubJect o, all is substituted ,or the lesser subJects and concei-ed o, as an archetypal RealityE and the con,ormity reKuired o, predicates in detail is reinterpreted as a relation 5hich our 5hole mind7 5ith all its subJects and predicates to.ether7 must .et intoB%. 3@1C 5ith respect to this Reality+ It7 mean5hile7 is concei-ed as eternal7 static7 and una,,ected by our thin6in.+ 'on,ormity to a non2human Archetype li6e this is probably the notion o, truth 5hich my opponent shares 5ith common sense and philosophic rationalism+ When no5 Humanism7 ,ully admittin. both the naturalness and the .randeur o, this hypothesis7 ne-ertheless points to its sterility7 and declines to chime in 5ith the substitution7 6eepin. to the concrete and still lod.in. truth bet5een the subJects and the predicates in detail7 it pro-o6es the outcry 5hich 5e hear and 5hich my critic echoes+ One o, the commonest parts o, the outcry is that humanism is subJecti-istic alto.etherNit is supposed to labor under a necessity o, Ddenyin. trans2perceptual reality+>B/A3C It is not hard to see ho5 this misconception o, humanism may ha-e arisenE and humanistic 5riters7 partly ,rom not ha-in. su,,iciently .uarded their eHpressions7 and partly ,rom not ha-in. yet <.ot round= Fin the po-erty o, theirB%. 3@/C literatureG to a ,ull discussion o, the subJect7 are doubtless in some de.ree to blame+ But I ,ail to understand ho5 any one 5ith a 5or6in. .rasp o, their principles can char.e them 5holesale 5ith subJecti-ism+ I mysel, ha-e ne-er thou.ht o, humanism as bein. subJecti-istic ,arther than to this eHtent7 that7 inasmuch as it treats the thin6er as bein. himsel, one portion o, reality7 it must also allo5 that some o, the realities that he declares ,or true are created by his bein. there+ Such realities o, course are either acts o, his7 or relations bet5een

other thin.s and him7 or relations bet5een thin.s7 5hich7 but ,or him7 5ould ne-er ha-e been traced+ Humanists are subJecti-istic7 also in this7 that7 unli6e rationalists F5ho thin6 they carry a 5arrant ,or the absolute truth o, 5hat they no5 belie-e in in their present poc6etG7 they hold all present belie,s as subJect to re-ision in the li.ht o, ,uture eHperience+ The ,uture eHperience7 ho5e-er7 may be o, thin.s outside the thin6erE and that this is so the humanist may belie-e as ,reely as any other 6ind o, empiricist philosopher+B%. 3@3C The critics o, humanism Fthou.h here I ,ollo5 them but dar6lyG appear to obJect to any in,usion 5hate-er o, subJecti-ism into truth+ All must be archetypalE e-ery truth must pre2eHist to its perception+ Humanism sees that an enormous Kuantity o, truth must be 5ritten do5n as ha-in. pre2eHisted to its perception by us humans+ In countless instances 5e ,ind it most satis,actory to belie-e that7 thou.h 5e 5ere al5ays i.norant o, the ,act7 it al5ays !as a ,act that S 5as S%+ But humanism separates this class o, cases ,rom those in 5hich it is more satis,actory to belie-e the opposite7 e+.+7 that S is ephemeral7 or % a passin. e-ent7 or S% created by the percei-in. act+ Our critics seem on the other hand7 to 5ish to uni-ersaliLe the retrospecti-e type o, instance+ Reality must pre2eHist to e-ery assertion ,or 5hich truth is claimed+ And7 not content 5ith this o-eruse o, one particular type o, Jud.ment7 our critics claim its monopoly+ They appear to 5ish to cut o,, Humanism ,rom its ri.hts to any retrospection at all+B%. 3@AC Humanism says that satis,actoriness is 5hat distin.uishes the true ,rom the ,alse+ But satis,actoriness is both a subJecti-e Kuality7 and a present one+ $rgo Fthe critics appear to reasonG an obJect7 ,uE true7 must al5ays ,or humanism be both present and subJecti-e7 and a humanist>s belie, can ne-er be in anythin. that li-es outside o, the belie, itsel, or ante2dates it+ Why so preposterous a char.e should be so current7 I ,ind it hard to say+ &othin. is more ob-ious than the ,act that both the obJecti-e and the past eHistence o, the obJect may be the -ery thin.s about it that most seem satis,actory7 and that most in-ite us to belie-e them+ The past tense can ,i.ure in the humanist>s 5orld7 as 5ell o, belie, as o, representation7 Kuite as harmoniously as in the 5orld o, any one else+ *r+ Joseph .i-es a special turn to this accusation+ He char.es meB/AAC 5ith bein. sel,2 contradictory 5hen I say that the main cate.ories o, thou.ht 5ere e-ol-ed in the course o, eHperience itsel,+ or I use these -eryB%. 3@MC cate.ories to de,ine the course o, eHperience by+ EHperience7 as I tal6 about it7 is a product o, their useE and yet I ta6e it as true anteriorly to them+ This seems to *r+ Joseph to be an absurdity+ I hope it does not seem such to his readersE ,or i, eHperiences can su..est hypotheses at all Fand they notoriously do soG I can see no absurdity 5hate-er in the notion o, a retrospecti-e hypothesis ha-in. ,or its obJect the -ery train o, eHperiences by 5hich its o5n bein.7 alon. 5ith that o, other thin.s7 has been brou.ht about+ I, the hypothesis is Dsatis,actory> 5e must7 o, course7 belie-e it to ha-e been true anteriorly to its ,ormulation by oursel-es+ E-ery eHplanation o, a present by a past seems to in-ol-e this 6ind o, circle7 5hich is not a -icious circle+ The past is causa existendi o, the present7 5hich in turn is causa cognoscendi o, the past+ I, the present 5ere treated as causa existendi o, the past7 the circle mi.ht indeed be -icious+ 'losely connected 5ith this pseudo2di,,iculty is another one o, 5ider scope and .reaterB%. 3@@C complicationNmore eHcusable there,ore+B/AMC Humanism7 namely7 as6in. ho5 truth in point o, ,act is reached7 and seein. that it is by e-er substitutin. more satis,actory ,or less satis,actory

opinions7 is thereby led into a -a.ue historic s6etch o, truth>s de-elopment+ The earliest Dopinions7> it thin6s7 must ha-e been dim7 unconnected D,eelin.s7> and only little by little did more and more orderly -ie5s o, thin.s replace them+ Our o5n retrospecti-e -ie5 o, this 5hole e-olution is no57 let us say7 the latest candidate ,or Dtruth> as yet reached in the process+ To be a satis,actory candidate7 it must .i-e some de,inite sort o, a picture o, 5hat ,orces 6eep the process .oin.+ On the subJecti-e side 5e ha-e a ,airly de,inite pictureNsensation7 association7 interest7 hypothesis7 these account in a .eneral 5ay ,or the .ro5th into a cosmos o, the relati-e chaos 5ith 5hich the mind be.an+ But on the side o, the obJect7 so to call it rou.hly7 our -ie5 is much less satis,actory+B%. 3@?C O, 5hich o, our many obJects are 5e to belie-e that it truly !as there and at 5or6 be,ore the human mind be.anI Time7 space7 6ind7 number7 serial order7 cause7 consciousness7 are hard thin.s not to obJecti,yNe-en transcendental idealism lea-es them standin. as Dempirically real+> Substance7 matter7 ,orce7 ,all do5n more easily be,ore criticism7 and secondary Kualities ma6e almost no resistance at all+ &e-ertheless7 5hen 5e sur-ey the ,ield o, speculation7 ,rom Scholasticism throu.h 9antism to Spencerism7 5e ,ind an e-er2recurrin. tendency to con-ert the pre2human into a merely lo.ical obJect7 an un6no5able ding'an'sich7 that but starts the process7 or a -a.ue materia prima that but recei-es our ,orms+B/A@C The reasons ,or this are not so much lo.ical as they are material+ We can postulate an eHtra2 mental that ,reely enou.h Fthou.h some idealists ha-e denied us the pri-ile.eG7 but 5hen 5e ha-e done so7 the !hat o, it is hardB%. 3@:C to determine satis,actorily7 because o, the oppositions and entan.lements o, the -ariously proposed !hats 5ith one another and 5ith the history o, the human mind+ The literature o, speculati-e cosmolo.y bears 5itness to this di,,iculty+ Humanism su,,ers ,rom it no more than any other philosophy su,,ers7 but it ma6es all our cosmo.onic theories so unsatis,actory that some thin6ers see6 relie, in the denial o, any primal dualism+ Absolute Thou.ht or Dpure eHperience> is postulated7 and endo5ed 5ith attributes calculated to Justi,y the belie, that it may Drun itsel,+> Both these truth2claimin. hypotheses are non2dualistic in the old mind2and2matter senseE but the one is monistic and the other pluralistic as to the 5orld process itsel,+ Some humanists are non2dualists o, this sortNI mysel, am one und .!ar o, the pluralistic brand+ But doubtless dualistic humanists also eHist7 as 5ell as non2dualistic ones o, the monistic 5in.+ *r+ Joseph pins these .eneral philosophic di,,iculties on humanism alone7 or possibly on me alone+ *y article spo6e -a.uely o, aB%. 3@4C Dmost chaotic pure eHperience> comin. ,irst7 and buildin. up the mind+B/A?C But ho5 can t5o structureless thin.s interact so as to produce a structureI my critic triumphantly as6s+ O, course they can>t7 as purely so2named entities+ We must ma6e additional hypotheses+ We must be. a minimum o, structure ,or them+ The (ind o, minimum that might ha-e tended to increase to5ards 5hat 5e no5 ,ind actually de-eloped is the philosophical desideratum here+ The Kuestion is that o, the most materially satis,actory hypothesis+ *r+ Joseph handles it by ,ormal lo.ic purely7 as i, he had no acKuaintance 5ith the lo.ic o, hypothesis at all+ *r+ Joseph a.ain is much be5ildered as to 5hat a humanist can mean 5hen he uses the 5ord 6no5led.e+ He tries to con-ict meB/A:C o, -a.uely identi,yin. it 5ith any 6ind o, .ood+ 9no5led.e is a di,,icult thin. to de,ine brie,ly7 and *r+ Joseph sho5s his o5n constructi-e hand

here e-en less than in the rest o, hisB%. 3@0C article+ I ha-e mysel, put ,orth on se-eral occasions a radically pra.matist account o, 6no5led.e7B/A4C the eHistence o, 5hich account my critic probably does not 6no5 o,Nso perhaps I had better not say anythin. about 6no5led.e until he reads and attac6s that+ I 5ill say7 ho5e-er7 that 5hate-er the relation called 6no5in. may itsel, pro-e to consist in7 I can thin6 o, no concei-able 6ind o, ob&ect 5hich may not become an obJect o, 6no5led.e on humanistic principles as 5ell as on the principles o, any other philosophy+B/A0C I con,ess that I am pretty steadily hampered by the habit7 on the part o, humanism>s critics7 o, assumin. that they ha-e truer ideas than mine o, truth and 6no5led.e7 the nature o, 5hich I must 6no5 o, and can not need to ha-e re2de,ined+ I ha-e conseKuently to reconstruct these ideas in order to carry on the discussion FI ha-e e+.+ had to do so in some partsB%. 3?1C o, this articleG and I thereby eHpose mysel, to char.es o, caricature+ In one part o, *r+ Joseph>s attac67 ho5e-er7 I reJoice that 5e are ,ree ,rom this embarrassment+ It is an important point and co-ers probably a .enuine di,,iculty7 so I ta6e it up last+ When7 ,ollo5in. Schiller and (e5ey7 I de,ine the true as that 5hich .i-es the maHimal combination o, satis,actions7 and say that satis,action is a many2dimensional term that can be realiLed in -arious 5ays7 *r+ Joseph replies7 ri.htly enou.h7 that the chie, satis,action o, a rational creature must al5ays be his thou.ht that 5hat he belie-es is true7 5hether the truth brin.s him the satis,action o, collateral pro,its or not+ This 5ould seem7 ho5e-er7 to ma6e o, truth the prior concept7 and to rele.ate satis,action to a secondary place+ A.ain7 i, to be satis,actory is 5hat is meant by bein. true7 !hose satis,actions7 and !hich o, his satis,actions7 are to countI (iscriminations notoriously ha-e to be madeE and the upshot is that only rational candidates andB%. 3?/C intellectual satis,actions stand the test+ We are then dri-en to a purely theoretic notion o, truth7 and .et out o, the pra.matic atmosphere alto.ether+ And 5ith this *r+ Joseph lea-es usNtruth is truth7 and there is an end o, the matter+ But he ma6es a -ery pretty sho5 o, con-ictin. me o, sel,2stulti,ication in accordin. to our purely theoretic satis,actions any place in the humanistic scheme+ They cro5d the collateral satis,actions out o, house and home7 he thin6s7 and pra.matism has to .o into ban6ruptcy i, she reco.niLes them at all+ There is no room ,or disa.reement about the ,acts hereE but the destructi-e ,orce o, the reasonin. disappears as soon as 5e tal6 concretely instead o, abstractly7 and as67 in our Kuality o, .ood pra.matists7 Just 5hat the ,amous theoretic needs are 6no5n as and in 5hat the intellectual satis,actions consist+ *r+ Joseph7 ,aith,ul to the habits o, his party7 ma6es no attempt at characteriLin. them7 but assumes that their nature is sel,2e-ident to all+ Are they not all mere matters o, consistencyNand emphatically not o, consistencyB%. 3?3C bet5een an Absolute Reality and the mind>s copies o, it7 but o, actually ,elt consistency amon. Jud.ments7 obJects7 and manners o, reactin.7 in the mindI And are not both our need o, such consistency and our pleasure in it concei-able as outcomes o, the natural ,act that 5e are bein.s that de-elop mental habitsNhabit itsel, pro-in. adapti-ely bene,icial in an en-ironment 5here the same obJects7 or the same 6inds o, obJects7 recur and ,ollo5 Dla5>I I, this 5ere so7 5hat 5ould ha-e come ,irst 5ould ha-e been the collateral pro,its o, habit7 and the theoretic li,e 5ould ha-e .ro5n up in aid o, these+ In point o, ,act this seems to ha-e been the probable case+

At li,e>s ori.in7 any present perception may ha-e been Dtrue>Ni, such a 5ord could then be applicable+ !ater7 5hen reactions became or.aniLed7 the reactions became Dtrue> 5hene-er eHpectation 5as ,ul,illed by them+ Other5ise they 5ere D,alse> or Dmista6en> reactions+ But the same class o, obJects needs the same 6ind o, reaction7 so the impulse to react consistently must .radually ha-e been established7 5ith aB%. 3?AC disappointment ,elt 5hene-er the results ,rustrated eHpectation+ Here is a per,ectly plausible .erm ,or all our hi.her consistencies+ &o5adays7 i, an obJect claims ,rom us a reaction o, the 6ind habitually accorded only to the opposite class o, obJects7 our mental machinery re,uses to run smoothly+ The situation is intellectually unsatis,actory+ To .ain relie, 5e see6 either to preser-e the reaction by re2 interpretin. the obJect7 or7 lea-in. the obJect as it is7 5e react in a 5ay contrary to the 5ay claimed o, us+ &either solution is easy+ Such a situation mi.ht be that o, *r+ Joseph7 5ith me claimin. assent to humanism ,rom him+ He can not appercei-e it so as to permit him to .rati,y my claimE but there is enou.h appeal in the claim to induce him to 5rite a 5hole article in Justi,ication o, his re,usal+ I, he should assent to humanism7 on the other hand7 that 5ould dra. a,ter it an un5elcome7 yea incredible7 alteration o, his pre-ious mental belie,s+ Whiche-er alternati-e he mi.ht adopt7 ho5e-er7 a ne5 eKuilibrium o, intellectual consistency 5ould in the end be reached+ He 5ould ,eel7B%. 3?MC 5hiche-er 5ay he decided7 that he 5as no5 thin6in. truly+ But i,7 5ith his old habits unaltered7 he should simply add to them the ne5 one o, ad-ocatin. humanism Kuietly or noisily7 his mind 5ould be rent into t5o systems7 each o, 5hich 5ould accuse the other o, ,alsehood+ The resultant situation7 bein. pro,oundly unsatis,actory7 5ould also be instable+ Theoretic truth is thus no relation bet5een our mind and archetypal reality+ It ,alls !ithin the mind7 bein. the accord o, some o, its processes and obJects 5ith other processes and obJects NDaccord> consistin. here in 5ell2de,inable relations+ So lon. as the satis,action o, ,eelin. such an accord is denied us7 5hate-er collateral pro,its may seem to inure ,rom 5hat 5e belie-e in are but as dust in the balanceNpro-ided al5ays that 5e are hi.hly or.aniLed intellectually7 5hich the maJority o, us are not+ The amount o, accord 5hich satis,ies most men and 5omen is merely the absence o, -iolent clash bet5een their usual thou.hts and statements and the limited sphere o, sense2perceptions in 5hich their li-esB%. 3?@C are cast+ The theoretic truth that most o, us thin6 5e Dou.ht> to attain to is thus the possession o, a set o, predicates that do not contradict their subJects+ We preser-e it as o,ten as not by lea-in. other predicates and subJects out+ In some men theory is a passion7 Just as music is in others+ The ,orm o, inner consistency is pursued ,ar beyond the line at 5hich collateral pro,its stop+ Such men systematiLe and classi,y and schematiLe and ma6e synoptical tables and in-ent ideal obJects ,or the pure lo-e o, uni,yin.+ Too o,ten the results7 .lo5in. 5ith Dtruth> ,or the in-entors7 seem pathetically personal and arti,icial to bystanders+ Which is as much as to say that the purely theoretic criterion o, truth can lea-e us in the lurch as easily as any other criterion+ I thin6 that i, *r+ Joseph 5ill but consider all these thin.s a little more concretely7 he may ,ind that the humanistic scheme and the notion o, theoretic truth ,all into line consistently enou.h to yield him also intellectual satis,action+

FOOTNOTES

B/30C BReprinted 5ithout chan.e ,rom Mind7 &+ S+7 -ol+ Hi-7 &o+ @M7 April7 /01@7 pp+ /012/04+ %a.es 3M@23M:7 and pp+ 3?/23?@7 ha-e also been reprinted in The Meaning of Truth7 pp+ @M2@:7 and pp+ 0:2/11+ The present essay is re,erred to abo-e7 p+ 31A+ Ed+C B/A1C BDHumanism and Truth> ,irst appeared in Mind7 &+ S+7 -ol+ Hiii7 &o+ @37 October7 /01M+ It is reprinted in The Meaning of Truth7 pp+ @/2/1/+ ',+ this article passim+ *r+ H+ W+ B+ Joseph>s criticism7 entitled <%ro,essor James on DHumanism and Truth7>= appeared in Mind7 &+ S+7 -ol+ Hi-7 &o+ @A7 January7 /01@+ Ed+C B/A/C p. cit.7 p+ A:+ B/A3C B',+ abo-e7 pp+ 3M/23MA+C B/AAC p. cit.7 p+ A3+ B/AMC BThisC *r+ Joseph deals 5ith Fthou.h in much too petti,o..in. and lo.ic2choppin. a 5ayG on pp+ AA2AM o, his article+ B/A@C 'ompare some elaborate articles by *+ !e Roy and *+ Wilbois in the #evue de MFtaphysi,ue et de Morale7 -ols+ -iii7 iH7 and H7 B/0117 /01/7 and /013+C B/A?C B',+ The Meaning of Truth7 p+ ?M+C B/A:C BJoseph: op. cit.7 p+ A?+C B/A4C *ost recently in t5o articles7 <(oes D'onsciousness> EHistI= and <A World o, %ure EHperience+= BSee abo-e7 pp+ /20/+C B/A0C or a recent attempt7 e,,ecti-e on the 5hole7 at sKuarin. humanism 5ith 6no5in.7 I may re,er to %ro,+ Woodbrid.e>s -ery able address at the Saint !ouis 'on.ress7 <The ield o, !o.ic7= printed in Science7 &+ )+7 &o-ember M7 /01M+ B%. 3??C

#II
A@SOL"TISM AND EMPIRICISM%=9>'
&o see6er o, truth can ,ail to reJoice at the terre2X2terre sort o, discussion o, the issues bet5een Empiricism and Transcendentalism For7 as the champions o, the latter 5ould probably pre,er to say7 bet5een Irrationalism and RationalismG that seems to ha-e be.un in Mind+B/M/C It 5ould seem as i,7 o-er concrete eHamples li6e *r+ J+ S+ Haldane>s7 both parties ou.ht ine-itably to come to a better understandin.+ As a reader 5ith a stron. bias to5ards Irrationalism7 I ha-e studied his articleB/M3C 5ith the li-eliest admiration o, its temper and its painsta6in. e,,ort to be clear+ But the cases discussed ,ailed to satis,y me7 and I 5as at ,irst tempted to 5rite a &ote

animad-ertin. upon them in detail+ The .ro5th o, the limb7 the sea>s contour7 the -icarious ,unctionin. o, the ner-e2centre7 the di.italis curin. the heart7 are un,ortunatelyB%. 3?:C not cases 5here 5e can see any through'and'through conditionin. o, the parts by the 5hole+ They are all cases o, reciprocity 5here subJects7 supposed independently to eHist7 acKuire certain attributes throu.h their relations to other subJects+ That they also exist throu.h similar relations is only an ideal supposition7 not -eri,ied to our understandin. in these or any other concrete cases 5hatsoe-er+ I,7 ho5e-er7 one 5ere to ur.e this solemnly7 *r+ Haldane>s ,riends could easily reply that he only .a-e us such eHamples on account o, the hardness o, our hearts+ He 6ne5 ,ull 5ell their imper,ection7 but he hoped that to those 5ho 5ould not spontaneously ascend to the &otion o, the Totality7 these cases mi.ht pro-e a spur and su..est and symboliLe somethin. better than themsel-es+ &o particular case that can be brou.ht ,or5ard is a real concrete+ They are all abstractions ,rom the Whole7 and o, course the <throu.h2and2throu.h= character can not be ,ound in them+ Each o, them still contains amon. its elements 5hat 5e call things7 .rammatical subJects7B%. 3?4C ,ormin. a sort o, residual caput mortuum o, EHistence a,ter all the relations that ,i.ure in the eHamples ha-e been told o,,+ On this <eHistence7= thin6s popular philosophy7 thin.s may li-e on7 li6e the 5inter bears on their o5n ,at7 ne-er enterin. relations at all7 or7 i, enterin. them7 enterin. an entirely di,,erent set o, them ,rom those treated o, in *r+ Haldane>s eHamples+ Thus if the di.italis 5ere to 5ea6en instead o, stren.thenin. the heart7 and to produce death Fas sometimes happensG7 it 5ould determine itsel,7 throu.h determinin. the or.anism7 to the ,unction o, <6ill= instead o, that o, <cure+= The ,unction and relation seem ad-entitious7 dependin. on 5hat 6ind o, a heart the di.italis .ets hold o,7 the di.italis and the heart bein. ,acts eHternal and7 so to spea67 accidental to each other+ But this popular -ie57 *r+ Haldane>s ,riends 5ill continue7 is an illusion+ What seems to us the <eHistence= o, di.italis and heart outside o, the relations o, 6illin. or curin.7 is but a ,unction in a 5ider system o, relations7 o, 5hich7 pro hac vice7 5e ta6e no account+ The lar.er systemB%. 3?0C determines the existence Just as absolutely as the system <6ill7= or the system <cure7= determined the function o, the di.italis+ Ascend to the absolute system7 instead o, bidin. 5ith these relati-e and partial ones7 and you shall see that the la5 o, throu.h2and2throu.hness must and does obtain+ O, course7 this ar.ument is entirely reasonable7 and debars us completely ,rom choppin. lo.ic about the concrete eHamples *r+ Haldane has chosen+ It is not his ,ault i, his cate.ories are so ,ine an instrument that nothin. but the sum total o, thin.s can be ta6en to sho5 us the manner o, their use+ It is simply our mis,ortune that he has not the sum total o, thin.s to sho5 it by+ !et us ,all bac6 ,rom all concrete attempts and see 5hat 5e can do 5ith his notion o, throu.h2and2 throu.hness7 a-o5edly ta6en in abstracto+ In abstract systems the <throu.h2and2throu.h= Ideal is realiLed on e-ery hand+ In any system7 as such7 the members are only members in the system+ Abolish the system and you abolish its members7 ,or you ha-e concei-ed them throu.h noB%. 3:1C other property than the abstract one o, membership+ &either ri.htness nor le,tness7 eHcept throu.h bi2laterality+ &either mort.a.er nor mort.a.ee7 eHcept throu.h mort.a.e+ The lo.ic o, these cases is this:N*f A7 then BE but if B7 then A: 5here,ore if either7 BothE and i, not Both7 &othin.+ It costs nothin.7 not e-en a mental e,,ort7 to admit that the absolute totality o, thin.s may be or.aniLed eHactly a,ter the pattern o, one o, these <throu.h2and2throu.h= abstractions+ In ,act7 it

is the pleasantest and ,reest o, mental mo-ements+ Husband ma6es7 and is made by7 5i,e7 throu.h marria.eE one ma6es other7 by bein. itsel, otherE e-erythin. sel,2created throu.h its oppositeNyou .o round li6e a sKuirrel in a ca.e+ But i, you stop and re,lect upon 5hat you are about7 you lay bare the eHact point at issue bet5een common sense and the <throu.h2and2 throu.h= school+ What7 in ,act7 is the lo.ic o, these abstract systemsI It is7 as 5e said abo-e: I, any *ember7 then the Whole SystemE i, not the Whole System7 then &othin.+ But ho5 can !o.icB%. 3:/C possibly do anythin. more 5ith these t5o hypotheses than combine them into the sin.le disJuncti-e propositionN<Either this Whole System7 Just as it stands7 or &othin. at all+= Is not that disJunction the ultimate 5ord o, !o.ic in the matter7 and can any disJunction7 as such7 resol-e itselfI It may be that *r+ Haldane sees ho5 one horn7 the concept o, the Whole System7 carries real eHistence 5ith it+ But i, he has been as unsuccess,ul as I in assimilatin. the He.elian re2 editin.s o, the Anselmian proo,7B/MAC he 5ill ha-e to say that thou.h !o.ic may determine !hat the system must be7 if it is7 somethin. else than !o.ic must tell us that it is+ *r+ Haldane in this case 5ould probably consciously7 or unconsciously7 ma6e an appeal to act: the disJunction is decided7 since nobody can dispute that no57 as a matter o, ,act7 something7 and not nothin.7 is+ We must therefore7 he 5ould probably say7 .o on to admit the Whole System in the desiderated sense+ Is not then the -alidity o, the B%. 3:3CAnselmian proo, the nucleus o, the 5hole Kuestion bet5een !o.ic and actI Ou.ht not the e,,orts o, *r+ Haldane and his ,riends to be principally de-oted to its elucidationI Is it not the real door o, separation bet5een Empiricism and RationalismI And i, the Rationalists lea-e that door ,or a moment o,, its hin.es7 can any po5er 6eep that abstract7 opaKue7 unmediated7 eHternal7 irrational7 and irresponsible monster7 6no5n to the -ul.ar as bare act7 ,rom .ettin. in and contaminatin. the 5hole sanctuary 5ith his presenceI 'an anythin. pre-ent aust ,rom chan.in. <Am An,an. 5ar das Wort= into <Am An,an. 5ar die ThatI= &othin. in earth or hea-en+ Only the Anselmian proo, can 6eep act out o, philosophy+ The Kuestion7 <Shall act be reco.niLed as an ultimate principleI= is the 5hole issue bet5een the Rationalists and the Empiricism o, -ul.ar thou.ht+ O, course7 i, so reco.niLed7 act sets a limit to the <throu.h2and2throu.h= character o, the 5orld>s rationality+ That rationality mi.htB%. 3:AC then mediate bet5een all the members o, our conception o, the 5orld7 but not bet5een the conception itsel, and reality+ Reality 5ould ha-e to be .i-en7 not by Reason7 but by act+ act holds out blan6ly7 brutally and blindly7 a.ainst that uni-ersal deliKuescence o, e-erythin. into lo.ical relations 5hich the Absolutist !o.ic demands7 and it is the only thin. that does hold out+ Hence the ire o, the Absolutist !o.icNhence its non2 reco.nition7 its Dcuttin.> o, act+ The reasons it .i-es ,or the Dcuttin.> are that act is speechless7 a mere 5ord ,or the ne.ation o, thou.ht7 a -acuous un6no5ability7 a do.2in2the2man.er7 in truth7 5hich ha-in. no ri.hts o, its o5n7 can ,ind nothin. else to do than to 6eep its betters out o, theirs+ There are t5o points in-ol-ed here: ,irst the claim that certain thin.s ha-e ri.hts that are absolute7 ubiKuitous and all per-asi-e7 and in re.ard to 5hich nothin. else can possibly eHist in

its o!n ri.htE and second that anythin. that denies this assertion is pure ne.ati-ity 5ith no positi-e conteHt 5hatsoe-er+B%. 3:MC Ta6e the latter point ,irst+ Is it true that 5hat is ne.ati-e in one 5ay is thereby con-icted o, incapacity to be positi-e in any other 5ayI The 5ord < act= is li6e the 5ord <Accident7= li6e the 5ord <Absolute= itsel,+ They all ha-e their ne.ati-e connotation+ In truth7 their 5hole connotation is ne.ati-e and relati-e+ All it says is that7 5hate-er the thin. may be that is denoted by the 5ords7 other thin.s do not control it+ Where ,act7 5here accident is7 they must be silent7 it alone can spea6+ But that does not pre-ent its spea6in. as loudly as you please7 in its o5n ton.ue+ It may ha-e an in5ard li,e7 sel,2transparent and acti-e in the maHimum de.ree+ An indeterminate ,uture -olition on my part7 ,or eHample7 5ould be a strict accident as ,ar as my present sel, is concerned+ But that could not pre-ent it7 in the moment in !hich it occurred7 ,rom bein. possibly the most intensely li-in. and luminous eHperience I e-er had+ Its Kuality o, bein. a brute ,act ab extra says nothin. 5hate-er as to its in5ardness+ It simply says to outsiders: DHands o,,R>B%. 3:@C And this brin.s us bac6 to the ,irst point o, the Absolutist indictment o, act+ Is that point really anythin. more than a ,antastic disli6e to lettin. anything say DHands o,,>I What else eHplains the contempt the Absolutist authors eHhibit ,or a ,reedom de,ined simply on its <ne.ati-e= side7 as ,reedom <,rom7= etc+I What else prompts them to deride such ,reedomI But7 disli6e ,or disli6e7 5ho shall decideI Why is not their disli6e at ha-in. me <,rom= them7 entirely on a par 5ith mine at ha-in. them <throu.h= meI I 6no5 -ery 5ell that in tal6in. o, disli6es to those 5ho ne-er mention them7 I am doin. a -ery coarse thin.7 and ma6in. a sort o, intellectual Orson o, mysel,+ But7 ,or the li,e o, me7 I can not help it7 because I ,eel sure that li6es and disli6es must be amon. the ultimate ,actors o, their philosophy as 5ell as o, mine+ Would they but admit itR Ho5 s5eetly 5e then could hold con-erse to.etherR There is somethin. ,inite about us both7 as 5e no5 stand+ We do not 6no5 the Absolute Whole yet+ Part o, it is still ne.ati-e to us+ Amon.B%. 3:?C the !hats o, it still stal6s a mob o, opaKue thats7 5ithout 5hich 5e cannot thin6+ But Just as I admit that this is all possibly pro-isional7 that e-en the Anselmian proo, may come out all ri.ht7 and creation may be a rational system throu.h2and2throu.h7 5hy mi.ht they not also admit that it may all be other5ise7 and that the shado57 the opacity7 the ne.ati-ity7 the <,rom=2ness7 the plurality that is ultimate7 may ne-er be 5holly dri-en ,rom the scene+ We should both then be a-o5edly ma6in. hypotheses7 playin. 5ith Ideals+ AhR Why is the notion o, hypothesis so abhorrent to the He.elian mindI And once do5n on our common le-el o, hypothesis7 5e mi.ht then admit scepticism7 since the Whole is not yet re-ealed7 to be the soundest logical position+ But since 5e are in the main not sceptics7 5e mi.ht .o on and ,ran6ly con,ess to each other the moti-es ,or our se-eral ,aiths+ I ,ran6ly con,ess mineNI can not but thin6 that at bottom they are o, an _sthetic and not o, a lo.ical sort+ The <throu.h2and2throu.h= uni-erse seems toB%. 3::C su,,ocate me 5ith its in,allible impeccable all2per-asi-eness+ Its necessity7 5ith no possibilitiesE its relations7 5ith no subJects7 ma6e me ,eel as i, I had entered into a contract 5ith no reser-ed ri.hts7 or rather as i, I had to li-e in a lar.e seaside boardin.2house 5ith no pri-ate bed2room in 5hich I mi.ht ta6e re,u.e ,rom the society o, the place+ I am distinctly a5are7 moreo-er7 that the old Kuarrel o,

sinner and pharisee has somethin. to do 5ith the matter+ 'ertainly7 to my personal 6no5led.e7 all He.elians are not pri.s7 but I someho5 ,eel as i, all pri.s ou.ht to end7 i, de-eloped7 by becomin. He.elians+ There is a story o, t5o cler.ymen as6ed by mista6e to conduct the same ,uneral+ One came ,irst and had .ot no ,arther than <I am the Resurrection and the !i,e7= 5hen the other entered+ <* am the Resurrection and the !i,e7= cried the latter+ The <throu.h2and2 throu.h= philosophy7 as it actually eHists7 reminds many o, us o, that cler.yman+ It seems too buttoned2up and 5hite2cho6ered and clean2sha-en a thin. to spea6 ,or the -ast slo52breathin. unconsciousB%. 3:4C 9osmos 5ith its dread abysses and its un6no5n tides+ The <,reedom= !e 5ant to see there is not the ,reedom7 5ith a strin. tied to its le. and 5arranted not to ,ly a5ay7 o, that philosophy+ <!et it ,ly a5ay7= 5e say7 <,rom usR What thenI= A.ain7 I 6no5 I am eHhibitin. my mental .rossness+ But a.ain7 *ch (ann nicht anders. I sho5 my ,eelin.sE 5hy !ill they not sho5 theirsI I 6no5 they have a personal ,eelin. about the throu.h2 and2throu.h uni-erse7 5hich is entirely di,,erent ,rom mine7 and 5hich I should -ery li6ely be much the better ,or .ainin. i, they 5ould only sho5 me ho5+ Their persistence in tellin. me that ,eelin. has nothin. to do 5ith the Kuestion7 that it is a pure matter o, absolute reason7 6eeps me ,or e-er out o, the pale+ Still seein. a that in thin.s 5hich !o.ic does not eHpel7 the most I can do is to aspire to the eHpulsion+ At present I do not e-en aspire+ Aspiration is a ,eelin.+ What can 6indle ,eelin. but the eHample o, ,eelin.I And i, the He.elians !ill re,use to set an eHample7 5hat can they eHpect the rest o,B%. 3:0C us to doI To spea6 more seriously7 the one fundamental Kuarrel Empiricism has 5ith Absolutism is o-er this repudiation by Absolutism o, the personal and _sthetic ,actor in the construction o, philosophy+ That 5e all o, us ha-e ,eelin.s7 Empiricism ,eels Kuite sure+ That they may be as prophetic and anticipatory o, truth as anythin. else 5e ha-e7 and some o, them more so than others7 can not possibly be denied+ But 5hat hope is there o, sKuarin. and settlin. opinions unless Absolutism 5ill hold parley on this common .roundE and 5ill admit that all philosophies are hypotheses7 to 5hich all our ,aculties7 emotional as 5ell as lo.ical7 help us7 and the truest o, 5hich 5ill at the ,inal inte.ration o, thin.s be ,ound in possession o, the men 5hose ,aculties on the 5hole had the best di-inin. po5erI

FOOTNOTES
B/M1C BReprinted ,rom Mind7 -ol+ iH7 &o+ AM7 April7 /44M+C B/M/C BIn /44M+C B/M3C B<!i,e and *echanism7= Mind7 -ol+ iH7 /44M+C B/MAC B7f. %+ Janet and "+ SVailles: 5istory of the Problems of Philosophy7 trans+ by *onahan7 -ol+ ii7 pp+ 3:@23:4E A1@2A1:+ Ed+C B%. 341C

B%. 34/C

INDE#

Absolute Idealism: M?7 ?17 007 /137 /AM7 /0@7 3@? ,,+7 Essay $II+ Acti-ity: H7 Essay VI+ A,,ectional acts: AM ,,+7 Essay V7 3/: ,,+ A.nosticism: /0@+ Appreciations+ See A,,ectional acts+ Ber.son7 H+: /@?7 /44+ Ber6eley: /12//7 MA7 :?7 ::7 3/37 3A3+ Bode7 B+ H+: 3AM ,,+ Body: :47 4M ,,+7 /@A7 33/+ Bradley7 + H+: ?17 047 007 /117 /1: ,,+7 /@:7 /?3+ 'ause: /?A7 /:M7 /4/ ,,+ 'han.e: /?/+ 'o.niti-e Relation: @3 ,,+ See also under 9no5led.e+ 'oncepts: /@ ,,+7 337 AA7 @M ,,+7 ?@ ,,+ 'onJuncti-e Relations: H7 MM ,,+7 @07 :17 0M7 /1M7 /1: ,,+7 //: ,,+7 /?A7 3M1+ 'onsciousness: Hi7 Essay I7 :@7 417 /3: ,,+7 /A0 ,,+7 /@M7 /4M7 Essay VIII+ 'ontinuity: M4 ,,+7 @07 :17 0M+ (emocritus: //+ (escartes: A1+ (e5ey7 J+: @A7 /@?7 /0/7 31M7 3M:7 3?1+ (isJuncti-e Relations: H7 M3 ,,+7 /1@7 /1: ,,+ (ualism: /17 31: ,,+7 33@7 3@:+

Empiricism: i-2-7 -ii2Hiii7 M/7 M?2M:7 Essay $II+ See also under Radical Empiricism+ Epistemolo.y: 3A0+ See also under 9no5led.e+ Ethics: /0M+ EHperience: -ii7 Hii7 4 ,,+7 @A7 ?37 ,,+7 :/7 417 4:7 037 3/?7 33M7 3AA7 3M37 3MA+ See also under %ure EHperience+ EHternal Relations: //1 ,,+ See also under Relations7 and (isJuncti-e+ eelin.+ See under A,,ectional acts+ ree Will: /4@+ Haldane7 J+ S+: 3?? ,,+ He.el: /1?7 3:?7 3::+ Herbart: /1?+ Hobhouse7 !+ T+: /10+ Hodder7 A+ !+: 337 /10+ Hod.son7 S+: iH7 M4+ HT,,din.7 H+: 3A4+ Humanism: 017 /@?7 Essay VII7 Essay $I+ Hume: H7 M37 MA7 /1A7 /:M+ Idealism: A07 M17 /AM7 3/07 3M/7 3@?+ Ideas: @@ ,,+7 :A7 /::7 310+ Identity7 %hilosophy o,: /AM7 /0:7 313+ Indeterminism: 017 3:M+

Intellect: 0: ,,+ Joseph7 H+ W+ B+: 31A7 3MM ,,+ B%. 343C 9ant: /7 A:7 /?37 31?+ 9ier6e.aard: 3A4+ 9no5led.e: M7 3@7 @? ,,+7 ?4 ,,+7 4:2447 /0? ,,+7 3A/+ See also under 'o.niti-e Relation7 ObJecti-e Re,erence+ !i,e: 4:7 /?/+ !oc6e: /1+ !o.ic: 3?0 ,,+ !otLe: @07 :@7 /?:+ *aterialism: /:07 3A3+ *ill7 J+ S+: H7 MA7 :?+ *ill7 James: MA+ *iller7 (+: @M+ *inds7 their 'onterminousness: :? ,,+7 Essay IV+ *onism: -ii7 3147 3?: ,,+ *oore7 "+ E+: ?2:+ *Onsterber.7 H+: /7 /42317 /@4+ &atorp7 %+: /7 :24+ &aturalism: 0?+

&eo29antism: @2?+ ObJecti-e Re,erence: ?: ,,+ ObJecti-ity: 3A ,,+7 :0+ %anpsychism: 407 /44+ %arallelism: 3/1+ %erception: // ,,+7 /:7 AA7 ?@7 :47 43 ,,+7 /0:7 3117 3// ,,+ %erry7 R+ B+: 3M+ %hysical Reality: /M7 337 A37 /3M ,,+7 /A0 ,,+7 /M0 ,,+7 /@M7 3// ,,+7 3307 3A@+ %it6in7 W+ B+: 3M/ ,,+ %luralism: 407 017 //1+ %ra.matism: i-7 H7 Hi2Hii7 //7 :37 0: ,,+7 /@?7 /@07 /:?7 3M37 3?/+ %rimary ;ualities: /M:+ %rince7 *+: 44+ %rin.le2%attison7 A+ S+: /10+ %sycholo.y: 31?7 310 ,,+ %ure EHperience: M7 3A7 3?23:7 A@7 Essay II7 :M7 017 0A ,,+7 0?+ /3/7 /3A7 /AM7 /A@7 /A47 /A07 /?17 /0A7 3117 33? ,,+7 3@:+ Radical Empiricism: i-2-7 -ii7 iH2Hiii7 M/ ,,+7 M:7 M47 ?07 :?7 407 0/7 /1:7 /107 /3/7 /M47 /@?7 /@07 /437 3A@7 3A:7 3A47 3A07 3M/7 3M3+ Rationalism: M/7 0? ,,+7 3A:7 3??+ Realism: /?7 M17 :?7 43 ,,+ Rehm6e7 J+: /+ Relations: H7 /?7 3@7 M3 ,,+7 :/7 4/7 Essay III7 /M47 3?4+ See also under 'onJuncti-e and

(isJuncti-e+ Reli.ion: Hiii7 /0M+ Renou-ier: /4M2/4@+ Representation: ?/7 /0? ,,+7 3/3 ,,+ See also under Substitution+ Royce7 J+: 3/7 /@47 /4?2/4:7 /0@+ Santayana7 "+: /MA7 3/4+ Schiller7 + '+ S+: /107 /0/7 31M7 3M07 3?1+ Schubert2Soldern7 R+ -+: 3+ Schuppe7 W+: /+ Secondary ;ualities: /M?7 3/0+ Sel,: M@7 M?7 0M7 /34 ,,+ Sensation: A17 31/+ Sidis7 B+: /MM+ Solipsism: Essay I$+ Space: A12A/7 4M7 0M7 //17 //M+ Spencer7 H+: /MM+ SpinoLa: 314+ Spir7 A+: /1?+ Stout7 "+ +: /107 /@4+ Stron.7 '+ A+: @M7 447 407 /44+ SubJecti-ity: 3A ,,+7 3AM ,,+7 3@/ ,,+ Substitution: ?3 ,,+7 /1M7 31/+ B%. 34AC Taine: 317 ?3+

Taylor7 A+ E+: ///+ Teleolo.y: /:0+ Thin.s: /7 0 ,,+7 34 ,,+7 A:7 Essay III7 310+ Thou.ht: /7 337 34 ,,+7 A:7 3/A+ See also under 9no5led.e+ Time: 3:7 0M+ Transcendentalism: A07 @37 ?:7 :/7 :@7 3A0+ Truth: 3M7 047 /037 313 ,,+7 3M: ,,+ Ward7 J+: /@:7 /?3+ Will: /?@7 /4M+ Woodbrid.e+ + J+ E+: /0?+ Worth: /4?2/4:+ Wundt7 W+: /@3+ The Ri-erside %ress %RI&TE( B) H+ O+ HO#"HTO& 8 'O+ 'A*BRI("E7 *ASS+ #+ S+ A+

Transcriber>s &ote: Some intra2teHtual cross2re,erences may ha-e remained unlin6ed+ The ,ollo5in. chan.es 5ere made to the teHt+ %a.e 04: )et 5hen so bro6en it is less consistent then e-er+ 'han.ed to )et 5hen so bro6en it is less consistent than e-er+ %a.e /41: some comtemptibly small process on 5hich success depends+

'han.ed to some contemptibly small process on 5hich success depends+ &ote 0A: HH- aud HH-i 'han.ed to HH- and HH-i &ote /1/: D(oes 'onsciousuess EHistI> 'han.ed to D(oes 'onsciousness EHistI> &ote /10: either as a syuonym ,or Dradical empiricism> 'han.ed to either as a synonym ,or Dradical empiricism> &ote /10: or other discussions o, Dhumauism7> 'han.ed to or other discussions o, Dhumanism7> &ote /A1: DHumanism and Truth> ,irst appeared iu 'han.ed to DHumanism and Truth> ,irst appeared in

```E&( O THE %ROJE'T "#TE&BER" EBOO9 ESSA)S I& RA(I'A! E*%IRI'IS*```