IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE In re: ALLIED SYSTEMS HOLDINGS, INC., et al.

, Debtors.
1

Chapter 11 Case No. 12-11564 (CSS) (Jointly Administered)

Re: D.I. 425, 430, 445 & 453

DEBTORS OBJECTION TO THE MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM STAY OF DONALD AND DORY SMODIC, FRED AND JOYCE WESSELS, GLADYS WALKER, MICHAEL JAY MEYER, AND DALE AND TONIA WOUDSTRA The above-captioned debtors and debtors-in-possession (collectively, the Debtors) hereby respond and object to each of the following: (i) Motion of Norman Frederick Wessels, Joyce Elaine Wessels, and Gladys Walker for Relief from the Automatic Stay to Pursue Personal Injury Claims [Docket No. 425] (the Wessels Motion) filed with this Court on September 11, 2012 by Norman Frederick Wessels, Joyce Elaine Wessels, and Gladys Walker (the Wessels), and joined by Michael Jay Meyer (Meyer) [Docket No. 445] and Dale and Tonia Woudstra (the Woudstras) [Docket No. 453]; and (ii) Motion of Donald Smodic and Dory Smodic for Relief From the Automatic Stay Pursuant to 362(d) to Pursue Personal Injury Claim [Docket No. 430] filed by Donald and Dory Smodic (the Smodics,) on September 13, 2012 (the Smodic Motion and together with the Wessels Motion, the Motions). The Wessels, Meyer, the Woudstras, and the Smodics are hereinafter collectively referred to as the Movants.

The Debtors in these cases, along with the federal tax identification number (or Canadian business number where applicable) for each of the Debtors, are: Allied Systems Holdings, Inc. (58-0360550); Allied Automotive Group, Inc. (58-2201081); Allied Freight Broker LLC (59-2876864); Allied Systems (Canada) Company (900169283); Allied Systems, Ltd. (L.P.) (58-1710028); Axis Areta, LLC (45-5215545); Axis Canada Company (875688228); Axis Group, Inc. (58-2204628); Commercial Carriers, Inc. (38-0436930); CT Services, Inc. (382918187); Cordin Transport LLC (38-1985795); F.J. Boutell Driveaway LLC (38-0365100); GACS Incorporated (58-1944786); Logistic Systems, LLC (45-4241751); Logistic Technology, LLC (45-4242057); QAT, Inc. (592876863); RMX LLC (31-0961359); Transport Support LLC (38-2349563); and Terminal Services LLC (910847582). The location of the Debtors corporate headquarters and the Debtors address for service of process is 2302 Parklake Drive, Bldg. 15, Ste. 600, Atlanta, Georgia 30345.

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The Movants seek relief from the automatic stay to prosecute certain pre-petition personal injury claims pending (and yet-to-be-filed) resulting from trucking accidents in Iowa and Pennsylvania (collectively the Actions). The Movants also seek relief from the automatic stay to recover on any judgment from the Debtors insurance policies. As set forth in greater detail below, the Debtors oppose the relief sought in the Motions at this early stage of these Chapter 11 Cases for the following reasons: (1) the Debtors management and employees will be distracted and forced to focus on issues not critical to the Debtors reorganization efforts at this critical time in these Chapter 11 Cases; (2) granting the Movants the relief they seek would open the floodgates of creditors seeking similar relief, further hindering the Debtors reorganization efforts; and (3) the Debtors financial resources will be negatively impacted by its deductible reimbursement obligation under its insurance policies. As set forth in detail below, the Movants cannot satisfy their burden of establishing that cause exists to lift the automatic stay at this time. Jurisdiction and Venue 1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 157 and

1334. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 157(b). Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. 1408 and 1409. Background A. The Bankruptcy Cases 2. On May 17, 2012, involuntary petitions were filed against Allied Systems

Holdings, Inc. (Allied Holdings) and its subsidiary Allied Systems, Ltd. (L.P.) (Allied Systems and collectively with Allied Holdings, Allied) under the Bankruptcy Code in this Bankruptcy Court (the Court). On June 10, 2012, the remaining Debtors (the U.S. and

Canadian direct or indirect subsidiaries of Allied Holdings), filed voluntary petitions in this Court. On June 11, 2012 Allied Holdings and Allied Systems consented to the entry of an order -220108670v5

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for relief (the Consent Date). The Petition Date of such Debtor is the date that such involuntary petition or voluntary petition was filed by or against such Debtor. The Chapter 11 cases commenced thereby are, collectively, the Chapter 11 Cases. 3. The Debtors are authorized to operate their businesses as debtors-in-possession

pursuant to Sections 1107 and 1108 of title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. 101 et seq. (the Bankruptcy Code). An official committee of unsecured creditors was appointed by the Office of the United States Trustee on June 20, 2012. B. The Actions 4. The Motions currently pending before the Court involve two separate truck

collision cases, one involving a two-vehicle accident in Pennsylvania in 2006, and the other involving a multi-vehicle collision which occurred in Iowa in 2010. The Smodic Action 5. On December 19, 2007, the Smodics initiated a civil action by filing a praecipe

for writ of summons (the Smodic Action) against Allied in Pennsylvania state court alleging that Mr. Smodic was injured when an Allied truck ran into his vehicle and trailer while he was in a stopped position on an interstate highway. The accident, which occurred on January 9, 2006, involved a low-speed impact in which Allieds driver was traveling at somewhere between three (3) and six (6) miles per hour. The accident resulted in approximately $3,500.00 in damages to the Smodics trailer. Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Smodic admitted that he did not hit his head as a result of the impact, he seeks damages for, among other things, an alleged traumatic brain injury and post-concussion syndrome. Allied has admitted liability for the Smodic

Accident but disputes the injuries claimed by the Smodics and the amount of damages they seek to recover. Prior to the commencement of these Chapter 11 Cases, the Smodic Action was scheduled for a trial to commence on November 5, 2012. -320108670v5

Notwithstanding the trial date,

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substantial expert discovery remains to be completed prior to trial. The Debtors litigation counsel estimates that between eight and ten depositions remain to be taken between both parties, and substantial work would need to be undertaken in order to properly prepare the matter for trial if stay relief is granted. The Wessels Action 6. The second action at issue resulted from a multi-vehicle accident involving an

Allied Systems truck which occurred in Iowa on October 7, 2010. Following the accident, Frederick and Joyce Wessels commenced separate civil actions against Allied in state court in Iowa, which were subsequently consolidated into one case (the Wessels Action and together with the Smodic Action, the Actions). Multiple third parties, including Gladys Walker,

Meyer, and the Woudstras, allege that they were also injured in the same accident, but they had not filed actions against Allied as of the Petition Date. The Wessels Action is in its early stages with limited written discovery undertaken to date. No deposition testimony has been undertaken, and no trial date has been scheduled. C. The Debtors Liability Insurance Coverage 7. In addition to other kinds of insurance policies, the Debtors have historically

maintained, and are legally required to maintain, commercial automobile liability coverage for every vehicle in their fleet. In the 2006-2007 insurance coverage yearthe applicable policy period for the Smodic Actionthe Debtors commercial automobile liability policy (the 2006 Policy) contained a maximum per-accident payout of $4,000,000.00. During the 2010-2011 insurance coverage yearthe applicable policy period for the Wessels Actionthe Debtors commercial automobile liability policy (the 2010 Policy) contained a maximum per-accident payout of $5,000,000.00. The 2006 Policy and the 2010 Policy each contain a $1,000,000.00 per-accident deductible (the Deductibles), meaning that the Debtors must pay the first -420108670v5

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$1,000,000.00 of liability in each automobile accident in which an automobile or employee of the Debtors is involved. 8. As of the date of this Objection, the Debtors have paid $105,704.32 toward the

Deductible in the Smodic Action, leaving the Debtors potential exposure for additional liability on its deductible for the claim of up to $894,295.68. Similarly, the Debtors have paid

$37,878.90 toward the Deductible in the Wessels Action, leaving the Debtors potentially liable for up to $962,121.10 in claims relating to that accident. 9. The Debtors previously filed with this Court a Motion to Authorize Debtors to

Continue Their Insurance Programs [Docket No. 73], which motion was granted by order of this Court on July 10, 2012 [Docket No. 209]. Pursuant to the terms of that order, the Debtors are authorized, but not required, to pay in the ordinary course of business as they become due, deductible reimbursements for commercial auto liability claims arising before or after the Petition Date. If stay relief is granted, potential exposure for deductible reimbursement

obligations arising from the Actions could total as much as $1,856,416.78. For the reasons set forth in detail below, the Debtors oppose granting the Movants relief from the automatic stay at this early stage of these Chapter 11 Cases. Argument A. Legal Precedent 10. Section 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of (1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance of employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim -520108670v5

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against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title (emphasis added). 11. The automatic stay is one of the fundamental protections afforded to debtors See Midatlantic Natl Bank v. New Jersey Dept of Envtl

under the Bankruptcy Code.

Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 503 (1986). The automatic stay provisions operate primarily to stop all creditor collection efforts, stop all harassment of a debtor seeking relief, and to maintain the status quo between the debtor and [his] creditors, thereby affording the parties and the Court an opportunity to appropriately resolve competing economic interests in an orderly and effective way. Taylor v. Slick, 178 F.3d 698, 702 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (alteration in original); see also H&H Beverage Distribs. v. Dept of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 166 (3d Cir. 1988). 12. The automatic stay broadly extends to all matters that may have an effect on a

debtors estate and supports the equality of distribution among similarly situated creditors by preventing the race of diligent creditors to dismantle the debtor. See Reliance Acceptance Group, Inc. v. Levin (In re Reliance Acceptance Group, Inc.), 235 B.R. 548, 559 (D. Del. 1999) (citing House Report to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code); see also In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that the automatic stay imposes a moratorium on all actions against the debtor or its property and assets and thereby ensures a respite for the debtor so that it may attempt to reorganize or decide to liquidate and promotes the overriding bankruptcy policy of equal distribution of a debtors assets among creditors); In re Fidelity Mortgage Inv. v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1976) (Such jurisdiction is necessary to exclude any interference by the acts of others or by proceedings in other courts where such activities or proceedings tend to hinder the process of reorganization. (citation omitted) (superseded on other grounds).

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13.

The Movants request relief from the automatic stay pursuant to Section 362(d)(1)

of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides in relevant part: (d) On request of party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section . . . (1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest. Whether cause exists to lift the automatic stay is a decision entrusted to the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court. See, e.g., In re SCO Group, Inc., 395 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). Because Section 362(d)(1) does not define cause, courts are left to determine what constitutes cause based on the totality of the circumstances and on a case-by-case basis. See In re Wilson, 116 F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1997). 14. In determining whether cause exists to lift the automatic stay, courts have

employed a balancing test that considers whether: (a) [a]ny great prejudice to either the bankrupt estate or the debtor will result from continuation of the civil suit, (b) the hardship to the non-bankrupt party by maintenance of the stay considerably outweighs the hardship to the debtor, and (c) the creditor has a probability of prevailing on the merits. Id. at 576 (citations omitted). Courts have considered other factors as well, including the degree of interference with the debtors bankruptcy case and whether permitting the litigation to proceed would prejudice the interests of other creditors. See, e.g., In re SCO Group, Inc., 395 B.R. at 857; see also In re DBSI, Inc., 407 B.R. 159, 166 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). Even slight interference with the

administration [of the debtors estates] may be enough to preclude relief in the absence of a commensurate benefit. In re W.R. Grace & Co., No. 01-01139, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1214, at *9 n.7 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 13, 2007) (quoting In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah

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1984)). See also In re DBSI, Inc., 407 B.R. at 167 (Courts also place emphasis on whether lifting the automatic stay will impeded [sic] the orderly administration of the debtors estate.). 15. Before the Court can determine whether cause exists to lift the stay, the Court

must determine whether the [creditor] has made a prima facie showing that it is entitled to the relief it seeks. In re DBSI, Inc., 432 B.R. 126, 132 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010); In re Rexene Products Co., 141 B.R. 574, 577 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992) (Generally, in the determination of cause, section 362(g) is interpreted as placing an initial burden on the moving party to establish its prima facie case which must then be rebutted by the party opposing such relief. To apply section 362(g)(2) otherwise to section 362(d)(1) would force the debtor to prove a negative, that no cause exists.). In support of the Motions, the Movants have simply attached a police report, the declarations page of an insurance policy, and various state court filings. The Debtors submit that the Movants cannot carry their burden of making a prima facie showing that cause exists to lift the stay at this time, and as such, the Motions should be denied. See e.g., In re Stranahan Gear Co., 67 B.R. 834, 838 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (noting that a creditor bears the burden of proving a prima facie case, and the creditor cannot carry this burden simply by introducing into evidence a state court complaint). B. Lifting the Stay Will Prejudice the Debtors and the Debtors Estates 16. As described more fully below, the Court should deny the Motions for the

following reasons: (1) The Debtors management and employees will be distracted and forced to focus on issues not critical to the Debtors reorganization efforts at this crucial time in these Chapter 11 Cases; (2) granting the Movants the relief they seek would open the floodgates of creditors seeking similar relief, further hindering the Debtors estates, and (3) the Debtors financial resources will be negatively impacted by the deductible reimbursement obligations under its insurance policies if such relief is granted. The purpose of the automatic stay is three-820108670v5

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fold: to prevent certain creditors from gaining a preference for their claims against the debtor; to forestall the depletion of the debtors assets due to legal costs in defending proceedings against it; and, in general, to avoid interference with the orderly liquidation or rehabilitation of the debtor. In re Rexene, 141 B.R. at 576 (citations omitted). Lifting the stay in these cases to permit the prosecution of the Actions against the Debtors would be contrary to each of these purposes. (a) 17. The Loss Of Time and Diversion of Attention Will Prejudice the Debtors

The Debtors are in a critical phase of their Chapter 11 Cases. In the first few

months of these cases the Debtors have focused much time and effort in minimizing disruptions to their business operations resulting from the commencement of these cases. During this period, the Debtors have secured debtor-in-possession financing, worked to maintain vendor and customer relationships, prepared schedules of assets and liabilities and statements of financial affairs, and have identified and been provided with reorganization alternatives. Notwithstanding those efforts, substantial obstacles remain to be overcome in these Chapter 11 Cases. There is a lack of consensus among Debtors secured lenders as to how the Chapter 11 Cases should proceed, and the Debtors have not yet resolved what type of plan to propose in the Chapter 11 Cases. The Debtors are currently evaluating their reorganization options. The Debtors

remaining personnel (including persons who would be involved with the Actions if they were allowed to proceed) are working diligently to facilitate an effective reorganization. 18. If the Motions are granted, the time and attention of the Debtors key personnel

(including those involved in the reorganization process) will be diverted away from the reorganization process, a result which by its very nature negatively impacts the Debtors and their estates. Given that the Debtors are in a critical period in their Chapter 11 Cases, the potential -920108670v5

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harm to the Debtors and their estates from lifting the stay at this time is substantial and (as further discussed below) outweighs any harm to the Movants from the continuation of the stay or benefit to the Movants from lifting the stay at this time. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1214 at *11 (noting prejudice to the debtors because litigation would require the time and commitment of a number of debtors key personnel); In re The Fairchild Corp., No. 0910899, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3815, at *26 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 1, 2009) (noting prejudice to debtors because state litigation would distract debtors management and professionals). (b) 19. Relief From the Stay Would Open the Debtors to Dozens of Similar Motions

If the Court grants the relief requested in the Motions, the Debtors will likely

become inundated with similar motions. The motions of eight (8) claimants are currently before the Court. The Debtors believe that these claims represent merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg. In addition to the claims which are the subject of the current Motions, the Debtors have already received informal requests from at least five other claimants requesting the exact same relief. In all, a total of ninety-eight (98) automobile accident claims have been filed against the Debtors insurance policies in the United States and Canada, and the Debtors anticipate a substantial number of those claimants may likewise seek relief from the automatic stay. Granting the Motions, the Debtors believe, will open the floodgates for other and additional requests for relief from the stay, all of which will needlessly distract the Debtors from their important reorganization efforts. See In re DBSI, Inc., 407 B.R. at 167 ([B]y lifting the stay, I may encourage a race to the courthouse by parties seeking similar orders, which will cause undue hardship and expense to the estate.); In re Northwest Airlines, No. 05-17930, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 477 at *6 (relief from the automatic stay may result in similar motions for relief where the debtor was party to numerous lawsuits). - 10 20108670v5

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(c) 20.

The Financial Impact Will Prejudice the Debtors

The Movants assert that because the Debtors have insurance, relief from the

automatic stay will not prejudice the Debtors. However, as mentioned above, the Debtors commercial automobile liability policies contain deductible provisions under which the Debtors must reimburse the insurer for the first $1,000,000.00 in damages for each claim. If the

automatic stay is lifted and the Actions are successful, the Debtors exposure for these claims alone could be as much as $1,856,416.78. Such obligations would have a direct and negative impact on the Debtors cash flow situation at this crucial time in these Chapter 11 Cases. Such potential prejudice is not insignificant, and when viewed in the context of the total number of claims that are pending against the Debtors, cannot be ignored. C. Movants Will Not be Prejudiced by Maintaining the Stay 21. The second factor considered by courts is whether the hardship to the movant

considerably outweighs the hardship to the debtors and their estates. See, e.g., In re W.R. Grace & Co., 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1214, at *11 (holding that the party seeking relief from the stay bears the heavy and possibly insurmountable burden of proving that the balance of hardships tips significantly in favor of granting relief.) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Micro Design, Inc., 120 B.R. 363, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1990)); see also In re RNI Wind Down Corp., 348 B.R. 286, 299 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) ([T]he party seeking relief from the stay must show that the balance of hardships from not obtaining relief tips significantly in [its] favor. (quoting In re Am. Classic Voyages Co., 298 B.R. 222, 225 (D. Del. 2003)). Here, the Movants cannot demonstrate any real harm from the continuation of the stay at this time. 22. First, the Movants rely on their own fading memories to assert that they might

suffer a hardship if the Motions are denied. As the Movants contend, [I]n the event the stay is not lifted, the PI Claimants may be negatively affected by any delay insofar as the parties and - 11 20108670v5

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witnesses memories will fade, handicapping the PI Claimants efforts to obtain accurate and complete discovery in pursuit of the PI Claims. Smodic Motion, 19 (emphasis added); Wessels Motion, 20 (same). Importantly, the accident at issue in the Smodic Action occurred more than six years ago, and it seems highly unlikely that any delay resulting from the Debtors reorganization will have the suggested debilitating effect on the witnesses memories. The accident in the Wessels Action occurred almost two years ago, and the Debtors submit that any short delay resulting while the Debtors are given a breathing spell to reorganize will not negatively affect the Movants claims. 23. Moreover, the Smodics seek relief from the automatic stay to proceed with a trial

of the case on November 5, 2012. In order to be properly prepared for trial, eight to ten depositions remain to be taken between both parties, and substantial trial preparation would have to be undertaken. The Debtors submit that it is unfair and prejudicial to its defense of the case to require its litigation counsel to be prepared on such short notice. 24. In contrast, the Wessels Action is only in its formative stages, with limited written

discovery taken to date. No depositions have been taken in the case and no trial date has been set. The Debtors, therefore, assert that there will be no prejudice to the plaintiffs in the Wessels Action from any delay resulting while the Debtors focus their attention on their reorganization efforts. 25. As the Movants have not demonstrated either prejudice or countervailing benefit

to the harm to be suffered by the Debtors, ample precedent supports the Courts denial of the Motions. For example, in DBSI, Inc., the court held hav[ing] to wait a few extra months to determine and recover its claim was little prejudice and did not justify lifting the stay. In re DBSI, Inc., 407 B.R. at 167. In W.R. Grace & Co., the court found that the State of Montana had

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not sufficiently asserted prejudice to merit lifting the stay because it was in no different position than any other creditor claiming an injury by the Debtor entities. In re W.R. Grace & Co., 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1214, at *11. Likewise, in Fairchild, the movant argued that it would be

prejudiced if it were forced to litigate once against the debtors co-defendants and later against the debtors. 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3815, at *27. The Court, however, found that the prejudice to the debtors from participating in the non-bankruptcy litigation outweighed any prejudice to the movant from having to litigate the matter multiple times. Id. D. The Movants Likelihood of Success on the Merits 26. The final factor courts consider when determining whether to grant stay relief is

whether the moving party has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits in the state court action. The Debtors assert that this factor as well weighs in favor of denying relief from the automatic stay at this time. 27. While the Debtors have admitted liability in the Smodic Action, substantial

disagreement exists as to what damages the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover. As discussed above, the Allied driver in the Smodic case was driving between three (3) and six (6) miles per hour at the time of impact; the damage to the Smodics trailer was minimal, and Mr. Smodic admitted that he did not hit his head as a result of the impact. Mr. Smodics claims of postconcussion syndrome and traumatic brain injuries are disputed by the Debtors. Thus, while the Debtors have stipulated to liability in the Smodic Case, substantial issues remain as to the amount of any damages and whether such damages will exceed or even approach the Debtors deductible under the 2006 Policy. 28. As discussed above, the Wessels Action is in its formative stages. No depositions

have been taken, and the Wessels rely on a simple police report to show a likelihood of success on the merits. For this point of law, the Wessels cite In re Rexene Products Co., 141 B.R. 574, - 13 20108670v5

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578 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992). However, in Rexene, the plaintiffs had already withstood a motion for summary judgment in the state court litigation. In the Wessels Action, discovery is still in its infancy and not all plaintiffs have been joined to the case. Because the Wessels Action is only in its infancy, the Debtors believe it is too soon to determine whether the plaintiffs can establish a likelihood of success on the merits.

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Conclusion WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing reasons the Debtors respectfully request that the Court deny the Motions and award the Debtors such other relief as is just and appropriate. Dated: September 25, 2012 Wilmington, Delaware Respectfully submitted, /s/ Marisa A. Terranova Mark D. Collins (No. 2981) Christopher M. Samis (No. 4909) Marisa A. Terranova (No. 5396) RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A. One Rodney Square 920 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Telephone: (302) 651-7700 Facsimile: (302) 651-7701 E-mail: collins@rlf.com E-mail: samis@rlf.com E-mail: terranova@rlf.com and Jeffrey W. Kelley (GA Bar No. 412296) Ezra H. Cohen (GA Bar No. 173800) Jeffery W. Cavender (GA Bar No. 117751) Benjamin R. Carlsen (GA Bar No. 940614) TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP Bank of America Plaza 600 Peachtree Street, Suite 5200 Atlanta, Georgia 30308-2216 Telephone No.: (404) 885-3000 Facsimile No.: (404) 885-3900 Email: jeffrey.kelley@troutmansanders.com Email: ezra.cohen@troutmansanders.com Email: jeffery.cavender@troutmansanders.com Email: benjamin.carlsen@troutmansanders.com Attorneys for the Debtors and Debtors-inPossession

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