REGALIAN DOCTRINE: 1. [G.R. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.

No.

167707,

October

08,

2008] AND

G.R.

NO.

173775

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands. There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) [2] affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, [3] and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land. The Antecedents G.R. No. 167707 Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier [4] [5] Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants who live in the bone-shaped island's three barangays. On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay [6] [7] Island, which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President [9] Marcos later approved the issuance ofPTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan. In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax [10] purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for [11] disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants' reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land [12] they were occupying for tax purposes. The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of [13] their respective memoranda. The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and [15] [16] 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. The titles were issued on August 7, 1933. RTC and CA Dispositions On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
[14] [8] [1]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land. SO ORDERED. The RTC upheld respondents-claimants' right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA [18] Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. The Circular itself recognized [19] [20] [21] private ownership of lands. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of [22] lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve. The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.
[23] [17]

The

Republic

then

appealed

to

the

CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the [24] decision of the lower court. The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. G.R. No. 173775
[25]

Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

[26]

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, Wilfredo Gelito, and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an [30] original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. [31] They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land [32] Act. Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition. On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land [33] classification of Boracay Island. Issues G.R. No. 167707 The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those [34] similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island. G.R. No. 173775 Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely: I. AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705? II. HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE? III.
[27] [28] [29]

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM? IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657. V.

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE [35] APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY? (Underscoring supplied) In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws. Our Ruling Regalian Doctrine to reclassify lands of the public domain and power of the executive

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of [36] [37] [38] 1902 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; (b) Proclamation No. 1801 issued by [39] then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts. But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other [41] [42] classes as may be provided by law, giving the government great leeway for classification. Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 [43] [44] Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to [45] ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and [46] 1987 Constitutions. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been [48] acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of [49] ownership. Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and [50] possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by [51] grant, belong to the public domain." The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic [52] registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory [54] information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree. Under [55] Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title, when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and [56] [57] adverse, from the date of its inscription. However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the [58] Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2)concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by [59] purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.
[53] [47] [40]

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or [61] forest lands. The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease [62] [63] (leasehold system). It also provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands." Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" [64] under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government: x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber [65] or mineral lands. x x x (Emphasis Ours) On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of [66] registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system. Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public [67] domain. Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years [68] preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was [69] required. After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 onDecember 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and [70] [71] mineral lands, and privately owned lands which reverted to the State. Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time [72] immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty[73] year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073, which now provides for [74] possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The issuance of PD No. 892 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the [77] effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344. On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the [78] various laws relative to registration of property. It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including [79] chattel mortgages. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and [80] again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into [81] disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which [82] have been "officially delimited and classified." The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration [83] (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, [84] incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; [85] an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a [86] certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be [87] assumed. They call for proof. Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was [88] already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the PhilippineIslands (1919) and De Aldecoa v. The Insular [89] Government (1909). These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these [90] old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." Private claimants' reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or
[75] [76]

[60]

portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with [91] implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. This was the Court's ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. [92] Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.: x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands. xxxx Petitioner's reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending [93] upon the preponderance of the evidence. To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum inAnkron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are [94] agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands. If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine. The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State. In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated: In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow.Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. [95] Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra) (Emphasis ours) Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became [96] private lands. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the 96-a President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no [97] longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain. Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933, did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the property's land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land
[98]

the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the property's land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926. We note that the RTC decision in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. [101] [102] [103] Insular Government, De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government, and Ankron v. Government of the PhilippineIslands. Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as [104] an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural. Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, [105] including Ankron and De Aldecoa. As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral. Private claimants' continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend [106] that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name. A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals. Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice 107-a Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, ruled: "Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands." Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private [108] individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable. (Emphasis Ours) Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such [109] unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR and the National Mapping and Resource Information [110] Authority certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain. PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land. Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island; that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island's tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest. Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and [114] underbrushes.[113] The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly instructive: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingincultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of [115] imperfect title do not apply. (Emphasis supplied) There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as [116] appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to
[112] [111] [107] [99] [100]

alienable

agricultural

land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership. Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the [117] Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands" and "areas declared as alienable and disposable"[118] does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides: No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development's authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides: Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development. Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801. The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA - to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas' tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands fortourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas' [119] alienability. More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation. It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 [120] and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to [121] classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, [122] through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released [123] and rendered open to disposition. Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. Contrary to private claimants' argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights. Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus: SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program: (a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. Noreclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain. That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests. While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and [125] rendered open to disposition. (Emphasis supplied) Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case [126] of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice on this point: Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a). Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the [127] provisions of the Revised Forestry Code. Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land [128] of the public domain. As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property. Private claimants' bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of [129] the law itself. Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or [130] possessory rights. Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945. We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession. The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945. Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064. The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island. One Last Note The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants' plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail.Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess. For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their

[124]

possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead [132] patent, subject to the conditions imposed by

[131]

or sales law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain [133] requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide. In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress. To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation's survival. Their promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by [134] Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz: The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property - crops, livestock, houses, and highways - not to mention [135] precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman's decalogue. WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. REPUBLIC VS. MUNOZ,. GR NO. 151910 AZCUNA, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the August 29, 2001 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58170, as well as its January 29, 2002 Resolution, which affirmed the October 3, 1997 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao, Albay, Branch 13, granting the application for land registration of respondent Ludolfo V. Muoz. The following facts prompted the present controversy. On June 14, 1996, respondent filed an Application for Registration of Title of a parcel of residential land before the RTC of Ligao, Albay containing an area of 1,986 square meters situated, bounded, and described as follows: A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot No. 2276 of the Cadastral Survey of Ligao) with the building and improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio of Bagonbayan, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay. Bounded on the S., along line 1-2, by Lot No. 2277, Ligao Cadastre; on the W., along Line 2-3, by Mabini Street; on the N., and E., along lines 3-4-5-6-4-7, by Lot 2284; and on the S., along line 7-8, by Lot 2281; and along line 8-1, by Lot 2278 all of Ligao Cadastre, containing an area of ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX (1,986) square meters. [3]

In his application for registration, respondent averred that no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affects his property and that no other person has an interest, legal or equitable, on the subject lot. Respondent further declared that the property was acquired by donation inter vivos, executed by the spouses Apolonio R. Muoz and Anastacia Vitero on November 18, 1956, and that the spouses and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since time immemorial for more than 70 years. On November 7, 1996, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application on the following grounds: (1) That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48[b], C.A. 141 as amended by P.D. 1073). (2) That the muniment/s of title and/or the tax payment/s receipt/s of application/s, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands acquired for or his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. Said muniment/s of title as well as the title do not appear to be genuine and that the tax declaration/s and/or tax payment receipt/s indicate the pretended possession of application to be of recent vintage. (3) That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by P.D. No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was recently filed.

(4) (5) time.[4]

That the parcel applied for is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation. That this application was filed beyond December 31, 1987, the period set forth under Sec. 2, P.D. No. 1073 and therefore, is filed out of

In respondents Answer to Opposition, he professed that the land in question is a residential lot originally owned and possessed by Paulino Pulvinar and Geronimo Lozada. Sometime in April 1917, Pulvinar sold his share of the unregistered land to the spouses Muoz and Vitero, respondents parents. In June 1920, Lozada likewise sold his remaining part to the parents of respondent. Thereafter, the ownership and possession of the property were consolidated by the spouses and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Muoz in 1920. Furthermore, it was stated that during the cadastral survey conducted in Ligao, Albay in 1928, the land was designated as Lot No. 2276, as per Survey Notification Card issued to Muoz dated October 2, 1928. Finally, respondent contended that from 1920 up to 1996, the time of application, the land taxes for the property had been fully paid. On February 6, 1997, an Order of General Default[5] was entered by the trial court against the whole world except for the government and a certain Alex Vasquez, who appeared during the scheduled initial hearing stating that he would file an opposition to the application. In the Opposition[6] filed by Vasquez dated February 19, 1997, he declared that he owns parcels of land, Lot Nos. 2284-A-2 and 2275, adjoining that of the subject matter of the application. He added that certain portions of his lands are included in the application as respondents concrete fence is found within the area of his lots. Respondent, in his answer to the opposition,[7] alleged that his property, Lot No. 2276, is covered by a technical description, duly certified correct by the Bureau of Lands and approved for registration by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), which specified the exact areas and boundaries of Lot No. 2276. Granting that there is an encroachment to the oppositors adjoining land, respondent reasoned that it is not for the court a quo, sitting as a Land Registration Court, to entertain the opposition because the case should be ventilated in a separate proceeding as an ordinary civil case. During the trial, respondent was presented as the sole witness. Respondent, who was 81 years old at that time, testified that he acquired the property in 1956 when his parents donated the same to him. [8] He presented as Exhibit H[9] Tax Declaration No. 048-0267, evidencing the payment of realty taxes for Lot No. 2276 in 1997. A Certification from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer [10] was likewise introduced by the respondent showing the payment of real estate taxes from 1956 up to the year 1997. He further declared that the property is a residential land with improvements such as a house made of solid materials and fruit-bearing trees. In 1957, respondent told the court that he constructed a concrete wall surrounding the entire property. Respondent also narrated that he grew up on the subject lot and spent his childhood days in the area. [11] On cross-examination, respondent claimed that he has six brothers and sisters, none of whom are claiming any interest over the property.[12] On June 16, 1997, the trial court noted[13] a Report[14] submitted by the Director of Lands, which informed the court that as per records of the Land Management Bureau in Manila, Lot No. 2276, CAD-239 is covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 of Anastacia Vitero. The RTC rendered a Decision dated October 3, 1997 granting the application for registration. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered finding the petitioner entitled to registration. Accordingly, after the finality of this decision, let a decree and, thereafter the corresponding certificate of title over Lot No. 2276 of the Ligao Cadastre as delimited by the Technical Description, Annex A-2 of the application, together with the improvements thereon, issue in the name of LUDOLFO Y. MUOZ, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to JOSEFINA PALENCIA, of Mabini Street, Barangay Tinago, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay. Conformably with the above findings, as prayed for by the Director, Department of Registration, Land Registration Authority in his Report dated March 6, 1997, the application, if any, in Cad. Case No. 53, Cadastral Record No. 1404 is hereby ordered dismissed. The opposition of Alex Vasquez for lack of merit is hereby ordered dismissed. Let copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General, Provincial Prosecutor of Albay, Oppositor Alez Vasquez and Petitioner. SO ORDERED.[15]

On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject lot because: (1) the notice of initial hearing was not timely filed; (2) the applicant failed to present the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be registered during the trial; and (3) the applicant failed to present evidence that the land is alienable and disposable. Subsequently, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo. The appellate court explained that there was conclusive proof that the jurisdictional requirement of due notice had been complied with as mandated under Section 24 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Furthermore, the failure to present in evidence the tracing cloth plan of the subject property did not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to act on the application in question. Lastly, the CA ruled that respondent need not adduce documentary proof that the disputed property had been declared alienable and disposable for the simple reason that the lot had once been covered by free patent application; hence, this alone is conclusive evidence that the property was already declared by the government as open for public disposition. The petitioner, through the OSG, raises the following grounds for the petition: I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. II. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT PROVEN BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE PROPERTY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.[16] Anent the first issue, petitioner maintains that the failure to present the original tracing cloth plan is a fatal omission which necessarily affected the trial courts jurisdiction to proceed with the case. It bears stressing that the constructive seizure of land accomplished by posting of notices and processes upon all persons mentioned in notices by means of publication and sending copies to said persons by registered mail in effect gives the court jurisdiction over the lands sought to be registered.[17] While petitioner correctly contends that the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan is a mandatory and even a jurisdictional requirement, this Court has recognized instances of substantial compliance with this rule.[18] It is true that the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, but blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification.[19] In the present application for registration, respondent submitted, among other things, the following supporting documents: (1) a blueprint copy of the survey plan [20] approved by the Bureau of Lands; and (2) the technical descriptions[21] duly verified and approved by the Director of Lands. The Court held in Recto v. Republic[22] that the blueprint copy of the cloth plan together with the lots technical description duly certified as to their correctness by the Bureau of Lands are adequate to identify the land applied for registration, thus On the first challenge, the petitioner invokes the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes, where it was held that the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for which must be approved by the Director of Lands was a statutory requirement of mandatory character for the identification of the land sought to be registered. As what was submitted was not the tracing cloth plan but only the blueprint copy of the survey plan, the respondent court should have rejected the same as insufficient. We disagree with this contention. The Court of Appeals was correct when it observed that in that case the applicant in effect had not submitted anything at all to identify the subject property because the blueprint presented lacked the approval of the Director of Lands. By contrast In the present case, there was considerable compliance with the requirement of the law as the subject property was sufficiently identified with the presentation of blueprint copy of Plan AS-06-000002 (San Pedro v. Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 65332-R, May 28, 1981). It should be noted in this connection that the Bureau of Lands has certified to the correctness of the blueprint copy of the plan including the technical description that go with it. Hence, we cannot ignore the fact, absent in the Reyes case, that applicant has provided ample evidence to establish the identity of the subject property. (Emphasis supplied) x x x.[23] Moreover, if the survey plan is approved by the Director of Lands and its correctness has not been overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, the presentation of the tracing cloth plan may be dispensed with. [24] All the evidence on record sufficiently identified the property as the one applied for by respondent, and containing the corresponding metes and bounds as well as area. Consequently, the original tracing cloth plan need not be presented in evidence.[25] Anent the second issue, petitioner stresses that in proving the alienable and disposable nature of the property, there has to be a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO). The CA is of the opinion that respondent need not adduce documentary proofs that the disputed property has been declared alienable and disposable because of the fact that it had once been covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 in the name of respondents mother, which was unfortunately not acted upon by the proper authorities. The CA declares that this is proof enough that the property was declared by the government as open for public disposition. This contention was adopted by the respondent both in his Comment and Memorandum filed before the Court. Notwithstanding all the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument of respondent that the subject property was already declared alienable and disposable land. Petitioner is correct when it remarked that it was erroneous for the appellate court to assume that the property in question is alienable and disposable based only on the Report dated May 21, 1997 of the Director of Lands indicating that the land involved in said case described as Lot 2276, CAD-239 is covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 of Anastacia Vitero. It must be pointed out that in its Report[26] dated March 6, 1997, the LRA stated that: 3. This Authority is not in a position to verify whether or not the parcel of land subject of registration is already covered by land patent, previously approved isolated survey and is within forest zone. WHEREFORE, to avoid duplication in the issuance of titles covering the same parcel of land and the issuance of titles for lands within the forest zone which have not been released and classified as alienable, the foregoing is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court with the recommendation that the Lands Management Bureau, Manila, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Lands Management Sector and Forest Management Bureau, all in Legazpi City, be ordered to submit a report to the Court on the status of the land

applied for, to determine whether or not said land or any portion thereof, is already covered by land patent, previously approved isolated survey and is within the forest zone and that should the instant application be given due course, the application in Cad. Case No. 53, Cadastral Record No. 1404 with respect to Lot 2276 be dismissed.[27] Noteworthy is the fact that neither the Director of Lands nor the LRA attested that the land subject of this proceeding is alienable or disposable. For clarity, applications for confirmation of imperfect title must be able to prove the following: (1) that the land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. [28] Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands.[29] Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to declare what lands are open to disposition or concession. Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are officially delimited and classified. Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. Therefore, all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the alienable public domain.[30] As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[31] To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[32] The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the land applied for is alienable and disposable.[33] In the present case, respondent failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the land subject for registration is indeed alienable and disposable. A CENRO certificate, which respondent failed to secure, could have evidenced the alienability of the land involved. Considering that respondent has failed to convince this Court of the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Court cannot approve the application for registration. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision dated August 29, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58170, as reiterated in itsresolution of January 29, 2002, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the application for registration filed by respondent Ludolfo V. Muoz is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. RURAL BANK OF ANDA VS ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF LINGAYEN-DAGUPANGR NO. 155051 This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 66478. The Facts The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley, Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imeldas Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1. Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley. In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736 from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure was already bothering the priests living in the seminary. [3] The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day.[4] On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and approved Resolution Nos. 104 [5] and 105.[6] Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot. Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 with an area of 252 square meters. [7] In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped.

On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and restore the concrete fence. On 20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736. On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On 4 January 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [Roman Catholic Archbishop of LingayenDagupan]: 1. Making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent;

2. Ordering the defendants to cause to be restored the concrete wall with iron railings, to cause to be removed the sawali fence, both at the expense of the defendants, jointly and severally, and 3. Condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally, to the plaintiff the amount of P25,000.00 as litigation expenses, attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED.[8]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with the modification that the awards of litigation expenses, attorneys fees, and costs should be deleted. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda.

The Ruling of the Trial Court The trial court found that Lot 736 is not covered by any Torrens title either in the name of respondent or in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. The trial court held that Lot 736 is public in nature. Since Lot 736 is property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce of man. Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan exceeded its authority when it adopted Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 converting Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot and authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a 252 square meter portion of Lot 736 .

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Lot 736 is property of public dominion and is used by the public as a pathway. Respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley are mere claimants with no sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of Lot 736. The Court of Appeals held that property of public dominion is intended for the common welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation either by the state or by private persons. Since Lot 736 is for public use, it is a property of public dominion and it is not susceptible of private ownership. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void for being enacted beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley. The contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda is therefore void. The Court of Appeals also ruled that since neither the respondent nor the Municipality of Binmaley owns Lot 736, there is no basis for the monetary awards granted by the trial court.

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are valid.

The Ruling of the Court The petition has no merit. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not have title over Lot 736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management Services in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to their office.[9] Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise. Even the witnesses for respondent testified that Lot 736 was used by the people as pathway, parking space, and playground.[10]

On the other hand, the Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant of Lot 736 based on the Property Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll of the Municipality of Binmaley, and the Lot Data Computation in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. However, these documents merely show that the Municipality of Binmaley is a mere claimant of Lot 736. In fact, the chief of Survey Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, San Fernando City, La Union testified that the cadastral survey[11] of Lot 736, which was surveyed for the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had not been approved. [12] The cadastral survey was based on the Lot Data Computation[13] of Lot 736 which was likewise contracted by the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989. The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the seminary, or the church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736.[14] Lot 736 was also used for parking and playground.[15] In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in general. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state. As held in Hong Hok v. David:[16] There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain. For it is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government. It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes follows: The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain. This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and waters of the public domain. [17] Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state. Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior grant from the government. [18] Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals. Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909) Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands Syllabus Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to this Court. The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases, and the former is proper to bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming a judgment of the Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of land. Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one who actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of 1902, which applies to the whole archipelago. While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically it is a question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and how far it will recognize actual facts. Page 212 U. S. 450 The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law. The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act. Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the continued possession thereof. 7 Phil. 132 reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Page 212 U. S. 455

Official Supreme Court caselaw is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia caselaw is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources. B. TORRENS SYSTEM MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, . TRENT, J.: These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba, are the only heirs of Doa Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey, deceased. Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the petitioners, was married on the 21st day of March, 1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the 13th of July, 1905, without leaving any heirs except her husband. The four petitioners, as coowners, sought to have registered the following-described property: A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, upon which are situated three houses and one camarin of light material, having a superficial area of 52 hectares, 51 ares, and 22 centares; bounded on the north by the highway (calzada) of Talampas and the lands of Rita Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz Mateo, Hermenegildo Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on the south by the same stream and the lands of the capellania; and on the west by the stream called Sapang Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de la Cruz, Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo. This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane and is assessed at $1,000 United States currency. The petition, which was filed on the 18th of December, 1906, was accompanied by a plan and technical description of the above-described parcel of land. After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of February, 1908, a decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, directing that the land described in the petitioner be registered in the names of the four petitioners, as coowners, subject to the usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of Remedios Grey. On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two parcels of land which are described in said motion, and which, according to his allegations, are included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleged that the decree of February 12, 1908, was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said two parcels of land. He further alleged that he was the absolute owner of the two parcels of land, having inherited them from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same. He therefore asked, under the provisions of section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties, rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its decision modifying the former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed and now insist, first, that the trial court erred in reopening the case and modifying its decree dated the 12th of February, 1908, for the reason that said decree was not obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the court erred in holding that the two parcels of land described in the appellee's motion are not their property. It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute forma part of the land described in the petition and were included in the decree of February 12, 1908, and that the petitioners are the owners of the remainder of the land described in the said decree. The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the same, including the two small parcels in question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a public document dated the 26th of November, 1864, duly executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor and judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan. Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a state grant for several parcels of land, including the two parcels in question. This grant was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on the 6th of April of the same year. It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this case the appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is also admitted that the name of the appellee does not appear in the said petition as an occupant of the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that the appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this reason they did not include his name in their petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends that he was occupying the said parcels as the absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance. The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of purchase of 1864. The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father died prior to that time. Manuela, the oldest of the petitioners, was about six years of age when their mother died. So these children were minors when the father of the appellee obtained the estate grant. On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the petitioners, who were then minors, rented the land owned by the petitioners' deceased parents to one Irineo Jose for a period of three years. On the 23d of March, 1895, the said Jose Grey, as the representative of the petitioners, rented the same land for a period of six years to Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee. This rental contract was duly executed in writing. This land was cultivated during these six years by Baldomero R. de la Cruz and his children, one of whom is the appellee. On the 14th of December, 1905, Jose Grey, for himself and the other petitioners, rented the same land to Estanislao R. de la Cruz for a period of two years. Estanislao de la Cruz on entering into this rental contract with Jose Grey did so for himself and his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the appellee admits that his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners' land, nevertheless he insists that the two small parcels in question were not included in these contracts. In the rental contract between the uncle of the petitioners and he father of the appellee the land is not described. In the rental contract between Jose Grey, one of the petitioners, and Estanislao R. de la Cruz, brother of the appellee, the two small parcels of land in question are included, according to the description given therein. This was found to be true by the court below, but the said court held that as this contract was made by Estanislao R. de la Cruz it was not binding upon Anacleto R. de la Cruz, the appellee.

The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of the petitioners in 1864, as is evidenced by the public document of purchase and sale of that year. The same two parcels of land are included in the state grant issued in favor of Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant was obtained after the death of the petitioners' parents and while they were minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include in their application the names of their tenants. Under these circumstances, did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered in February of the same year? The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain an accurate description of the land. It shall contain the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. In the form of notice given by statute, which shall be sworn to, the applicant is required to state and set forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrances affecting said land, if any, the rights and interests, legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder, reversion, or expectancy of all persons, with their names in full, together with their place of residence and post office addresses. Upon receipt of the application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling to be published twice in the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be directed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land sought to be registered and to the adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may concern." In addition to the notice in the Official Gazette the Land Court shall, within seven days after said publication, cause a copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be mailed by the clerk to every person named in the application whose address is known; to cause a duly attested copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be posted in a conspicuous place on every parcel of land included in the application, and in a conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of the town in which the land is situated. The court may also cause other or further notice of the application to be given in such manner and to such persons as it may deem proper. The certificate of the clerk that he has served the notice as directed by the court by publication or mailing shall be conclu sive proof of such service. Within the time allowed in the notices, if no person appears and answers, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default. By the description in the published notice "to all whom it may concern," and by express provisions of law "all the word are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default an order." If the court, after hearing, finds that the applicant has title, as stated in his application, a decree or registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "to all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.) The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38 referred to above. It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the outstanding interest which he admits but also all claims of interest, though denied by him. By express provision of law the world are made parties defendant by the description in the notice "to all whom it may concern." Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question under the circumstances as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he was made a party defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree on the 12th of February, 1908, must be held to be conclusive against all persons, including the appellee, whether his (appellee's) name is mentioned in the application, notice, or citation. The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. That decree was not obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed that the appellee was occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor when the original plan was made. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud. The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian statutes has been frequently raised. Two distinctions have been noted by the Australian courts; the first is the distinction between the meaning of the word "fraud" in the sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, and its meaning in the sections relating to the protection of bona fide purchasers from registered proprietors. The second is the distinction between "legal," "equitable," or "constructive" fraud, and "actual" or "moral" fraud. In none of the groups of the sections of the Australian statutes relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, and in which fraud is referred to, is there any express indication of the meaning of "fraud," with the sole exception of that of the South Australian group. (Hogg on Australian Torrens System, p. 834.) With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, it has been held in some cases that the "fraud" there mentioned means actual or moral fraud, not merely constructive or legal fraud. In other cases "fraud" has been said to include constructive, legal, and every kind of fraud. In other cases, against, knowledge of other persons' right, and the deliberate acquisition of registered title in the face of such knowledge, has been held to be "fraud" which rendered voidable the certificates of title so obtained; and voluntary ignorance is, for this purpose, the same as knowledge. But in none of these three classes of cases was there absent the element of intention to deprive another of just rights, which constitutes the essential characteristics of actual as distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in notes Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89 at bottom of pages 835 and 836.) By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of Privy Council in Assets Co. vs. Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi, decided in March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his Supplementary Addendum to his work on Australian Torrens System, supra.) The same meaning should be given to the word "fraud" used in section 38 of our statutes (Act No. 496). The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within the meaning of the word as used in our statutes, will in each case be a question of fact. We will not attempt to say what acts would constitutes this kind of fraud in other cases. This must be determined from the fact an circumstances in each particular case. The only question we are called upon to determine, and have

determined, is whether or not, under the facts and circumstances in this case, the petitioners did obtain the decree of February 12, 1908, by means of fraud. It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property without due process of law, in violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill," which provides "that no law shall be enacted in the said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice by registered mail. This did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication "to all whom it may concern." If this section of the Act is to be upheld this must be declared to be due process of law. Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note the history and purpose of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System." This system was introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in 1857 and was there worked out in its practicable form. The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we have said, upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an application for the registration of the title to lands, under this system, the theory of the law is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have have a right to appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the proceeding is against the whole word. This system was evidently considered by the Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act No. 496. The interest of the community at large was considered to be preferred to that of private individuals. At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are coming to registration of title to land, because immovable property is becoming more and more a matter of commercial dealing, and there can be no trade without security. (Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.) The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he may evicted because his vendor had, unknown to him, already sold the and to a third person. . . The registered proprietor may feel himself protected against any defect in his vendor's title. (Id., p. 21.) The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of titles, made by Sir Robert Torrens, has been fully justified in its use: First. It has substituted security for insecurity. Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from months to days. Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage. Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the "three R's" can transact his own conveyancing. Fifth. It affords protection against fraud. Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.) The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to land was made by Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South Australia in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system title by registrationtakes the place of "title by deeds" of the system under the "general" law. A sale of land, for example, is effected by a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is issued. The certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions, constitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein. Under the old system the same sale would be effected by a conveyance, depending for its validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on the correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object of the Torrens system, them, is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of the old conveyancing system. (Duffy & Eagleson on The Transfer of Land Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.) By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration of transactions with interest in land whose declared object . . . is, under governmental authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on Australian Torrens system,supra, pp. 1, 2.) Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all countries in which the Torrens system has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will always occur. The percentage of errors, as compared with the number of registered dealings in Australia, is very small. In New South Wales there were, in 1889, 209, 894 registered dealings, the average risk of error being only 2 cents for each dealing. In Queensland the risk of error was only 1 cents, the number of registered dealings being 233,309. In Tasmania and in Western Australia not a cent was paid for compensation for errors during the whole time of operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This system has been adopted in various countries of the civilized world, including some of the States of the American Union, and practical experience has demonstrated that it has been successful as a public project. The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens system has been the subject of judicial decision in the courts of the United States. (People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.) Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land Registration Act," was copied substantially from the Massachussetts law of 1898. The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts of those States. It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we never heard of it before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs. California, 110 U. S., 516.) Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a proceedingin rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.) This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The Mary (9 Cranch, 126); Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 606, 611. If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. In this jurisdiction, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody, although the only notice of the proceedings given is by general notice to all persons interested. The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did not rest its judgment as to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground that the State has absolute power to determine the persons to whom a man's property shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a proceeding in rem. So we conclude that the proceedings had in the case at bar, under all the facts and circumstances, especially the absolute lack on the part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitute due process of law. As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide. For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915 CONSUELO LEGARDA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee. JOHNSON, J.: From the record the following facts appear: First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila. Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall. Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall. Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant. Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall. Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it? The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.) While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.

Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law. For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons. The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration. The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237). Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way. We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration unde r said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail. In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts". As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years whic h elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became

irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the n ame of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him. We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate. We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections. May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]). When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.) Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation. While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indis pensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record. In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innoc ent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee

gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence. The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land. It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected. In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued. Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur. C. INDEAFISIBILITY SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, vs. ANGELA V. MADAYAG, Respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: 1 This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 19, 2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 2004, which set aside the lower courts order to suspend the proceedings on respondents application for land registration. On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application for 2 registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 square meters located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 1, San Fernando City. On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional Survey Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the respondents survey plan because the lot encroached on the properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that, despite being the new owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified of the survey conducted on June 8, 3 2001. Petitioner then manifested its opposition to the respondents application for registration. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their respective oppositions. On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its formal opposition. Petitioner alleged that it had recently bought seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta, delineated as Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in Consolidation-Subdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by the Land Registration Commission on August 26, 1976, and previously covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-236090 approved by the Bureau of Lands on December 29, 1970. These parcels of land are covered by separate certificates of title, some of which are already in the name of the petitioner while the others are still in the name of the previous owners. On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general default, except as to the petitioner, the Republic, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas. Thereafter, respondent commenced the presentation of evidence. Meanwhile, acting on petitioners request for the cancellation of the respondents survey plan, DENR Assistant Regional Executive Director for Legal Services and Public Affairs, Allan V. Barcena, advised the petitioner to file a petition for cancellation in due form so 4 5 that the DENR could properly act on the same. Accordingly, petitioner formally filed with the DENR a petition for cancellation of the survey plan sometime in March 2002, alleging the following grounds: I. THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT LOT IN THIS CASE II. NO NOTICE WAS MADE UPON PETITIONER (AS ADJOINING LANDOWNER AND WHO BEARS INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT LOT) MUCH LESS THE OWNERS OF ADJOINING LANDS. III. THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENTLY SHOW THAT BAD FAITH AND/OR MALICE ATTENDED THE APPROVAL OF (PLAN WITH 6 PSU NO. 01-008438). 7 On July 17, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the land registration case, alleging that the court should await the DENR resolution of the petition for the cancellation of the survey plan "as the administrative case is prejudicial to the determination" of the land registration case. On October 8, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion, thus: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant motion and suspends the proceedings herein. In the meantime, and until receipt by this Court of a copy of the resolution of the petition for cancellation by the DENR, the instant case is hereby ARCHIVED. 8 SO ORDERED.

Emphasizing that a survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in land registration proceedings, the RTC agreed with the 9 petitioner that the cancellation of the survey plan would be prejudicial to the petition for land registration. 10 On February 13, 2003, the RTC denied the respondents motion for reconsideration of its order. Respondent thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the order suspending the proceedings. On March 19, 2004, finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings, the CA granted the petition for certiorari, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Orders dated October 8, 2002 and February 13, 2003 of the respondent Court are declared NULL and VOID. The Court a quo is directed to continue the proceedings until its final determination. No pronouncement as to costs. 11 SO ORDERED. The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was duly approved by the DENR should be accorded the presumption of regularity, and 12 that the RTC has the power to hear and determine all questions arising from an application for registration. 13 On July 15, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner was, thus, compelled to file this petition for review, ascribing the following errors to the CA: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE IS LEGAL AND PROPER PENDING THE DETERMINATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCESREGION 1. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE LOWER COURT HAVE PROPER AND SUFFICIENT BASES IN FACT AND IN LAW. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSPENDING THE PROCEEDINGS AND ARCHIVING THE CASE. IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, UNDER RULE 65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IS NOT THE ONLY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND 14 ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW ON THE PART OF HEREIN RESPONDENT. The petition has no merit. Petitioner contends that, since the respondents cause of action in the land registration case depends heavily on the survey plan, it was only prudent for the RTC to suspend the proceedings therein pending the resolution of the petition for cancellation of the survey plan by 15 the DENR. It, therefore, insists that recourse to a petition for certiorari was not proper considering that respondent was not arbitrarily 16 deprived of her right to prosecute her application for registration. Undeniably, the power to stay proceedings is an incident to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases in its dockets, with economy of time and effort for the court, counsel and litigants. But courts should be mindful of the right of every party to a speedy disposition of his case and, thus, should not be too eager to suspend proceedings of the cases before them. Hence, every order suspending proceedings must be guided by the following precepts: it shall be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and 17 prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts, or when the rights of parties to the second 18 action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled. Otherwise, the suspension will be regarded as an arbitrary exercise of the courts discretion and can be corrected only by a petition for certiorari. None of the circumstances that would justify the stay of proceedings is present. In fact, to await the resolution of the petition for cancellation would only delay the resolution of the land registration case and undermine the purpose of land registration. The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (Presidential Decree No. 1529) is to finally settle title to real property in order to preempt any question on the legality of the title except claims that were noted on the certificate itself at the time of registration or those that arose subsequent thereto.1avvphi1 Consequently, once the title is registered under the said law, owners can rest secure on 19 their ownership and possession. Glaringly, the petition for cancellation raises practically the very same issues that the herein petitioner raised in its opposition to the respondents application for registration. Principally, it alleges that the survey plan should be cancelled because it includes portions of the seven properties that it purchased from several landowners, which properties are already covered by existing certificates of title. Petitioner posits that it is the DENR that has the sole authority to decide the validity of the survey plan that was approved by the 20 LMS. It cites Section 4(15), Chapter 1, Title XIV, Administrative Code of 1987 which provides that the DENR shall (15) Exercise (of) exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies. However, respondent argues that the land registration court is clothed with adequate authority to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties, and that even if the DENR cancels her survey plan, the land registration court is not by duty bound to dismiss the application for 21 registration based solely on the cancellation of the survey plan. lawphil.net Without delving into the jurisdiction of the DENR to resolve the petition for cancellation, we hold that, as an incident to its authority to settle all questions over the title of the subject property, the land registration court may resolve the underlying issue of whether the subject property overlaps the petitioners properties without necessarily having to declare the survey plan as void. It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious resolution of cases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latters limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and 22 contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues. When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed 23 to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. It may, therefore, hear and determine all questions that arise from a petition for registration. In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the issuance of a new certificate of 24 title will alter a valid and existing certificate of title. An application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack 25 26 on the existing title, which is not allowed by law. But the RTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in order to determine whether the subject property is already titled or forms part of already titled property. The court may now verify this allegation based on the respondents survey plan vis--vis the certificates of title of the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not

overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be 27 overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court may require the filing of additional papers to aid in its determination of the propriety of the application, based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529: SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. The court may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may require the filing of any additional papers. The court may also directly require the DENR and the Land Registration Authority to submit a report on whether the subject property 28 has already been registered and covered by certificates of title, like what the court did in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals. In that case, we commended such move by 29 the land registration court for being "in accordance with the purposes of the Land Registration Law." WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 19, 2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in L.R.C. Case No. U-1134 and to resolve the same with dispatch. SO ORDERED. CAMILO F. BORROMEO, G.R. No. 159310 Petitioner, - versus ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, DECISION PUNO, C.J.: What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquired real properties in the country as against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were registered under the Torrens system? The facts are as follows: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his employer, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project inMindoro. In 1984, he transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. There, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of additional income to support her children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were held in Antoniettas residence at a squatters area in Gorordo Avenue. Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to [1] their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, [2] 1986 covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, [3] 1987 was likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrichs name was erased from the document. But it could be noted that his signature remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondents signature as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties were issued in respondents name alone. [4] Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN, and per Decision of [5] the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5, 1988. However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondents sons for only two months after the break up. Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, [6] as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment. On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged. On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed in his favor. In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that she solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question, and that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines. At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed property with money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G. In its decision, the court a quo found Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of [the] properties under litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is not only supported by documentary evidence but also by the admission made by [7] the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrichs financial capacity to acquire and purchase the properties . . . is not disputed. x x x

On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter part of 1984, she was only working as a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of P1,000.00 a month and was . . . renting and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area at Gorordo Ave., Cebu City; that Jambrich took pity of her and the situation of her children that he offered her a better life which she readily accepted. In fact, this miserable financial situation of hers and her two children . . . are all stated and reflected in the Child Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. G and G-1) which facts she supplied to the Social Worker who prepared the same when she was personally interviewed by her in connection with the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that, if such facts were not true because these are now denied by her . . . and if it was also true that during this time she was already earning as much as P8,000.00 to P9,000.00 as profit per month from her copra business, it would be highly unbelievable and impossible for her to be living only in such a miserable condition since it is the observation of this Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an expensive person and not thrifty as she wanted to impress this Court in order to have a big saving as clearly shown by her actuation when she was already cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to her . . . the allowance given . . . [8] by him in the amount of $500.00 a month is not enough to maintain the education and maintenance of her children. This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the properties under litigation or could contribute any amount for their acquisition which according to her is worth more than P700,000.00 when while she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning P1,000.00 a month as salary and tips of more or less P2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the daily needs of her family so much so that it is safe to conclude that she was really in financial distress when she met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and live with him [9] because that was a big financial opportunity for her and her children who were already abandoned by her husband. x x x The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included in [the contracts to sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated November 16, 1987] as buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and exploitive woman, she has taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good attitude shown by her to him since he could still very well provide for everything she needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by this Court, the acquisition of these properties under litigation was at the time when their relationship was still going smoothly and [10] harmoniously. [Emphasis supplied.] The dispositive portion of the Decision states: WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla by: 1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the residential house of strong materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City; 2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City; 3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new ones in the name of plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo; 4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits I, K and L as avoided insofar as they appear to convey rights and interests over the properties in question to the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar; 5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the amount of P25,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00; and, 6) To pay the costs. [12] Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the respondent, the Court of Appeals held: We disagree with the lower courts conclusion. The circumstances involved in the case cited by the lower court and similar cases decided on by the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title of the subsequent Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the title to the subject property has been issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez et al., vs. Fong Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phils. 461; United Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title [13] thereto. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner assigns the following errors: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING RESPONDENTS JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING JAMBRICHS PARTICIPATION, INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUND BY THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT THEREFORE TRANSFER AND ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
[11]

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELL-REASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN [14] IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE). First, who purchased the subject properties? The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary ofP50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one year where his monthly salary was approximately P90,000.00. On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of not more than P1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as admitted by her during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a copra business were unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was actually the business of her mother and their family, with ten siblings. She has no license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax return. All the motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and the last one left [15] standing was already scrap. Further, the Child Study Report submitted by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondents two sons by Jambrich disclosed that: Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz Restaurant in 1984. At first she had no problem with money because most of the customers of St. Moritzare (sic) foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no more foreigners coming because of the situation in the Philippines at that time. Her financial problem started then. She was even renting a small room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was during her time of great financial distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich who [16] later offered her a decent place for herself and her children. The DSWD Home Study Report further disclosed that: [Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw Antonietta Descallar, one of the waitresses of the said Restaurants. He made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the] English language. Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need of additional income to support [her] 2 young children who were abandoned by their father. Their session was agreed to be scheduled every afternoon at the residence of Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation of the family particularly the children who were malnourished. After a few months sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent place. He told Antonietta that the place is not good for the children. Antonietta who was miserable and financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for the sake of [18] the children. Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon: (1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-direct examination and during the proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as buyer. (2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated checks issued by Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account with any bank. Receipts of the installment payments were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent. (3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two children for ten months, where she was completely under the support of Jambrich. (4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject properties to respondent. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991. Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the instant case, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court did not controvert the factual findings of the trial court. They differed only in their conclusions of law. Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that coownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise [19] capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and [20] equal contribution do not apply. Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of respondent alone. Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent? [21] It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the [22] world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title [23] [24] is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is [25] not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration. This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich. Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 [26] [27] Constitution, which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 [28] Constitution. The capacity to acquire private land is dependent on the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of [29] legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
[17]

Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World [30] [31] Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.: [W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential house of strong materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial court likewise ordered respondent to pay petitioner P25,000 as attorneys fees and P10,000 as litigation expenses, as well as the costs of suit. We affirm the Regional Trial Court. [32] The rationale behind the Courts ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases, is this since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nations land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 119682 January 21, 1999 FRANCISCO BAGUIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MENDOZA, J.: 1 This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, of Mandaue City, nullifying Free Patent No. 7757 and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 issued in the name of petitioner Francisco Baguio. The patent and certificate of title cover a parcel of land, consisting of 5,870 sq. m., in Catarman, Liloan, Cebu. Known as Lot 1426, Case 2, Pls. 823, the land was declared by the government public land in 1963. The evidence shows that, on August 2, 1963, private respondent Ricardo Michael's predecessor-in-interest, William Michael, filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for foreshore lease of the land. The application was recommended for approval by the land investigator who also recommended that the applicant be granted a provisional permit to occupy the land for one year from October 4, 1963 to October 3, 1964. On October 8, 1963, by virtue of a permit granted to him by the Bureau of Lands, William Michael made some reclamation on the land, built a fence around the premises, and constructed a bridge over a portion which was under water. Upon the expiration of the permit on October 4, 1964, the Highways District Engineer recommended to the Director of Lands that the land be leased to Michael. On the other hand, the land investigator recommended granting Michael the authority to survey the foreshore land in view of the completion of the reclamation made by him on the premises. On February 25, 1968, Michael filed a miscellaneous sales application covering the reclaimed foreshore land. On November 9, 1976, petitioner Baguio applied to the Bureau of Lands for a free patent covering the same land. In his application, petitioner stated that the land was agricultural land and not claimed or occupied by any other person and that he had been in actual and continuous possession and cultivation of the same. On the basis of these representations, a free patent was issued to him and, on January 10, 1978. Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 was issued in his name by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. On April 6, 1978, petitioner demanded payment of rentals from William Michael for the use of the land occupied by Michael Slipways Inc.. On August 4, 1981, petitioner filed an opposition to Michael's miscellaneous sales application covering the land on the ground that he was the registered owner thereof. William Michael in turn protested the issuance by the Bureau of Lands of a free patent to petitioner. He claimed that he had been in actual possession of the land since 1963 and that he had introduced substantial improvements thereon. On February 16, 1989, upon the recommendation of the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the government, represented by the Director of Lands, filed a petition for cancellation of title and/or reversion of land against petitioner Baguio and the Register of Deeds of Cebu. The case case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City which granted private respondent Ricardo Michael leave to intervene as heir and successor-in-interest of William Michael and as president of Michael Slipways, Inc. On July 20, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision canceling the free patent and the certificate of title of petitioner Baguio, ordering the reversion of the land to the public domain, and declaring private respondent Michael the true and lawful occupant of the land. The trial court ruled that the false statements made by petitioner Baguio in his application for free patent had the effect of ipso facto canceling the free patent and the title of petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on February 28, 1995, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner contends that . The public respondent erred in not declaring that respondent Republic of the Philippines action was already barred by prescription.

Granting arguendo that respondent's action was not barred by prescription, nonetheless, the Regional Trial Court, erred in finding that petitioner "acted in bad faith and procured the issuance of the Free Patent (VII-I)-7757 and the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 through fraud and misrepresentation. Granting arguendo that respondent Republic's action should prosper, nonetheless, the Regional Trial Court erred in "(d)eclaring intervenor (private respondent herein) as the true and lawful possessor and occupant of the land subject of the intervention. The Regional Trial court erred in finding that the land in question is a foreshore land. We find these contentions to be without merit. First. It is true that, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon 2 3 the expiration of one year from the date of issuance of such patent. However, as held in Director of Lands v. De Luna, even after the 4 lapse of one year, the State may still bring an action under 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 for the reversion to the public domain 5 6 of land which has been fraudulently granted to private individuals. Such action is not barred by prescription, and this is settled law. 7 Indeed, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the title by means of fraud. Public policy 8 demands that one who obtains title to public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit therefrom. Second. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding that he was guilty of fraud in procuring the issuance of the free patent and the corresponding certificate of title. He insists that what he stated in his application for free patent (that the subject land is agricultural land not claimed or occupied by persons other than himself and that he had been in actual and continuous possession and cultivation of the same) were all true. He also assails the finding of the trial court that the subject land is foreshore land. Petitioner puts in issue the findings of fact of the trial court. But the only errors which are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals are those allegedly committed by the latter court and not those of the trial court. Petitioner's assignment of errors is thus misplaced, and for this reason, the petition should be dismissed. Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review oncertiorari. In the absence of any showing of lack of basis for the conclusions made by the 9 Court of Appeals, this Court wiill not disturb the factual findings of the appellate court. In this case, petitioner has not shown that the decision of the Court of Appeals is not supported by substantial evidence so as to justify this Court in departing from the general rule which regards the findings of the appellate court as final. At any rate, we have decided to consider the issues raised insofar as they are pertinent to the appellate court's decision in order to put them to rest once and for all. In his free patent application, petitioner declared under oath that the land in question was an agricultural land not claimed or occupied by any other person; that he had continuously possessed and occupied it; and that he had introduced improvements thereon. These declarations constitute fraud and misrepresentation. The government has proven that, contrary to these allegations, as early as September 2, 1963, i.e., thirteen (13) years before the alleged entry of petitoner on the land, private respondent's predecessor-ininterest, William Michaell, had already filed a foreshore lease application over the same; that on February 25, 1968. William Michael filed a miscellaneous sales application over the land; that since 1963 up to the present, private respondent has been continuously in possession of the land on which he has been operating a drydocking service under the style of Michael Slipways, Inc.; and that private respondent Ricardo Michael had made improvements thereon consisting of the reclamation of a portion of the land, the construction of the fence thereon, and the construction of a bridge over a portion under water. In addition, it has been duly established that the land in question is foreshore land, not agrcultural. The fact that the land is being used by private respondent Ricardo Michael in his drydocking operations is evidence that the land is foreshore land. Moreover, there would have been no need to reclaim a portion of the land if it had not been under seawater. Petitioner is guilty of making false statements in his application for a free patent thus justifying the annulment of his title. Sec. 91 of C.A. No. 141 (Public Land Act) provides: The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable; to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the purpose of such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpuenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecumlawfully issued by the Director of Land or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may issue without further proceedings. As already stated, the indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. The registration of a patent under the Torrens System merely confirms the registrant's title. It does not vest title where there is none because registration 10 under this system is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Third. Petitioner assails the trial court's finding, as affirmed by the appellate court, that private respondent Michael is the true and lawfull possessor of the subject land. He argues that private respondent, being a mere heir and successor-in-interest of William Michael and not the person who filed the foreshore lease and the miscellaneous sales applications, has no right to the land in dispute. Suffice it to state that it was clearly proven that William Michael had already been in possession of the land under a provisional permit to occupy the same in 1963. Petitioner applied for a free patent only in 1976, thirteen (13) years later. In addition, William Michael had filed a sales application covering the land in 1968, i.e., eight (8) years before petitioner filed his free patent application. The trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly held William Michael and private respondent Ricardo Michael to be the true and rightful possessors of the land in question. The fact that private respondent Michael is merely the successor of the original foreshore lease and sales applicant, William Michael, does not make him any less entitled to the possession of the land. Sec. 105 of the Public Land Act provides that, in case of his death, the original applicant shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations by his legal heirs with respect 11 to the land applied for or leased. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.1wphi1.n

t-- REGISTRATION PO SUN TUN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. W. S. PRICE and THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF LEYTE, defendants-appellees. MALCOLM, J.: The undisputed facts in this case are the following: On November 29, 1921, Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap was the owner of a certain parcel of land situated in the municipality of Tacloban, Province of Leyte. On the date mentioned, he sold the land to Po Tecsi for the sum of P8,000. On June 21, 1923, Po mortgaged the land to W. S. Price in the amount of P17,000. The mortgage was duly noted in the office of the register of deeds of Leyte on August 18th of the same year. On December 17, 1924, Po executed a deed of sale of the land to Price in consideration of P17,000. This sale was recorded with the register of deeds on January 22, 1925. Price in turn, with the consent of his wife, sold the land on February 16, 1927, to the Province of Leyte for P20,570. In connection with the above facts, it should further be stated that when the Tacloban Cadastral Case was before the courts in 1918, this land was claimed by Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap acting through his agent, Po Tecsi, but subsequently on motion the names of Mr. and Mrs. Price were substituted as claimants. On March 17, 1927, the original certificate of title was issued in the name of the spouses Price. Later, the proper transfer certificate of title was provided for the Province of Leyte. Returning again to the original date of November 29, 1921, on that date Po Tecsi gave a general power of attorney including the right to sell to Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap. Acting under this power, Gabino sold the land on November 22, 1923, for P8,000 to Jose H. Katigbak. On this document there appears on the upper right-hand margin the following: "Register of Deeds, Received, Dec. 15, 1923, Province of Leyte." In turn Jose H. Katigbak transferred the property to Po Sun Tun on October 12, 1927, for P8,000. Further explaining the relationship of the parties, it should be taken into consideration that Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap and Po Tecsi, between whom was the original transaction and between whom was the provision made for the power of attorney, are brothers. Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap and Po Sun Tun, the first the original vendor, and the latter the person to whom the property eventually returned pursuant to the power of attorney, are father and son. As to the possession of the property, it has been under the control of Price and the Provincial Government of Leyte and has not been under the material control of Po Sun Tun. Predicated on these facts, Po Sun Tun began an action in the Court of First Instance of Leyte to gain the possession of the property and to secure damages in the amount of P3,600. Judge Causing sitting in first instance decided the case on the pleadings and the evidence, absolving the defendants W. S. Prince and the Province of Leyte from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. The principal error assigned on appeal by the plaintiff in connection with this judgment is that the trial judge erred in finding that the deed, Exhibit D, in favor of Jose H. Katigbak had not been registered in the corresponding registry of property. The provision of law relied upon by the trial judge as authority for his decision was the second paragraph of article 1473 of the Civil Code, which provides that if the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, "Si fuere inmueble, la propiedad pertenecera al adquirente que antes la haya inscrito en el Registro," or, as translated by Fisher, "Should it be real property, it shall belong to the purchaser who first recorded it in the Registry of Deeds." Recalling that the deed of Po Tecsi to Price was duly registered on January 22, 1925, and that thereafter a Torrens title was obtained in the name of Price, and that the deed of Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap to Jose H. Katigbak has noted on it "Register of Deeds, Received, Dec. 15, 1923, Province of Leyte," can it be said that within the meaning of the law this latter deed was ever recorded? We are clearly of the opinion that it was not. The law and the authorities are overwhelmingly demonstrative of this statement. The mere presentation to the office of the register of deeds of a document on which acknowledgment of receipt is written is not equivalent to recording or registering the real property. Escriche says that registration, in its juridical aspect, must be understood as the entry made in a book or public registry of deeds. (See Altavas, Land Registration in the Philippine Islands, 2d ed., p. 151.) Soler and Castello in their Diccionario de Legislacion Hipotecaria y Notarial, vol. II, p. 185, state: Registration in general, as the law uses the word, means any entry made in the books of the Registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal notes. In its strick acceptation, it is the entry made in the Registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. The American authorities conform in this respect to the Spanish authorities for the term "To register" it has been said that it means to "enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list" (Reck vs.Phoenix Ins. Co. [1889], 7 N. Y. Suppl., 492; 54 Hun., 637; Harriman vs. Woburn Electric Light Co. [1895], 163 Mass., 85). If any doubt remained on the subject, it would be dispelled by turning to Act No. 2837 amendatory of section 194 of the Administrative Code, and recalling that it is therein provided that "No instrument or deed establishing, transmitting, acknowledging, modifying or extinguishing rights with respect to real estate not registered under the provisions of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, entitled "The Land Registration," and its amendments, shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, until such instrument or deed has been registered, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, in the office of the register of deeds for the province or city where the real estate lies." (There follows in the law the requirements regarding the books which it is the duty of the register of deeds to keep and use.) It results as a matter of course since the deed made by Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap in favor of Jose H. Katigbak was not only not first recorded in the registry of deeds but never legally so recorded, and since the purchaser who did record his deed was Price, who secured a Torrens title and transferred the same to the Province of Leyte, that Po Sun Tun, the holder of a defeasible title, has no legal rights as against Price and the Province of Leyte, the holders of indefeasible titles. Also, if necessary, it could be ruled that within the meaning of section 38 of the Land Registration Law, Price and the Province of Leyte are innocent purchasers for value of the disputed property. Finding the judgment appealed from to be correct from all points of view, it will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. WILFREDO T. VAGILIDAD VS GABINO VAGILIDAD, JR. PUNO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision [1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-68318 dated March 19, 2003 and November 13, 2003, respectively, reversing and setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Sixth Judicial Region, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2825 dated January 26, 1999. The facts are stated in the assailed Decision[3] of the appellate court, viz.:

A parcel of land, Lot No. 1253, situated in Atabay, San Jose, Antique, measuring 4,280 square meters, was owned by Zoilo [Labiao] (hereafter ZOILO) as per Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2301 issued on March 3, 1931. Sometime in 1931, ZOILO died. Subsequently, on May 12, 1986, Loreto Labiao (hereafter LORETO), son of ZOILO, sold to Gabino Vagilidad Jr. (hereafter GABINO JR.) a portion of Lot No. 1253 (hereafter Lot 1253-B), measuring 1,604 square meters as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by LORETO. In view of the death of ZOILO, his children, LORETO, Efren Labiao (hereafter EFREN) and Priscilla Espanueva (hereafter PRISCILLA) executed an Extrajudicial x x x Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987, adjudicating the entire Lot No. 1253, covering 4,280 square meters, to LORETO. On January 29, 1987, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-16693 was issued in favor of LORETO, EFREN and PRISCILLA, but on even date, TCT No. T-16693 was cancelled and TCT No. T-16694, covering the said property, was issued in the name of LORETO alone. On July 31, 1987, GABINO JR., as petitioner, filed a Petition for the Surrender of TCT No. T-16694, covering Lot No. 1253, with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Sixth Judicial Region, against LORETO, docketed as Cadastral Case No. 87-731-A. The plaintiff alleged that, being the owner of x x x Lot No. 1253-B, under TCT No. T-16694, by virtue of the sale that took place on May 12, 1986, he is entitled to ask for the surrender of the owners copy of TCT No. T-16694 to the Register of Deeds of Antique in order to effect the transfer of title to the name of the petitioner. However, as per motion of both counsels[,] since the parties seemed to have already reached an amicable settlement without the knowledge of their counsels, the trial court issued an Order dated March 21, 1994 sending the case to the archives. On September 21, 1988, [GABINO JR.] paid real estate taxes on the land he bought from LORETO as per Tax Declaration No. 1038 where the property was specified as Lot No. 1253-B. GABINO JR. thereafter sold the same lot to Wilfredo Vagilidad (hereafter WILFREDO) as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989. On even date, Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Land involving the opt-described property was also executed by LORETO in favor of WILFREDO. The aforementioned deeds, which were both executed on December 7, 1989 [and] notarized by Atty. Warloo Cardenal[,] [appear] to have been given the same entry number in his notarial books as both contained the designation Document No. 236, Page No. 49, Book No. XI, Series of 1989[.] Corollarily, on February 14, 1990, the sale of Lot No. 1253-B to WILFREDO was registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Antique under Entry No. 180425. Consequently, TCT No. T-18023, cancelling TCT No. 16694, was issued in favor of WILFREDO pursuant to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989. On October 24, 1991, spouses WILFREDO and LOLITA obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB for brevity) in the amount of P150,000.00 and mortgaged Lot No. 1253-B as collateral of the said loan and the transaction was inscribed at the back of TCT No. 18023 as Entry No. 186876. Subsequently, the xxx real estate mortgage was cancelled under Entry No. 191053 as per inscription dated November 17, 1992 in xxx TCT No. 18023. Subsequently, WILFREDO obtained another loan from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP for brevity) in the amount of P200,000.00 and mortgaged Lot No. 1253-B as collateral of the xxx loan and the transaction was inscribed at the back of TCT No. 18023 as Entry No. 196268. The said loan was paid and, consequently, the mortgage was cancelled as Entry No. 202500. On September 29, 1995, spouses GABINO and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad (hereafter DOROTHY), as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages, with the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Sixth Judicial Region, Branch 11, against spouses WILFREDO and Lolita Vagilidad (hereafter LOLITA), docketed as Civil Case No. 2825. The plaintiffs claimed that they are the lawful owners of Lot No. 1253-B which was sold to him by LORETO in 1986. They alleged that [GABINO JR.] is a nephew of defendant WILFREDO. They likewise raised that when GABINO SR. died, defendant WILFREDO requested GABINO JR. to transfer the ownership of Lot No. 1253-B in defendant WILFREDOs name for loaning purposes with the agreement that the land will be returned when the plaintiffs need the same. They added that, pursuant to the mentioned agreement, plaintiff GABINO JR., without the knowledge and consent of his spouse, DOROTHY, executed the Deed of Sale dated December 7, 1989 in favor of defendant WILFREDO receiving nothing as payment therefor. They pointed out that after defendant WILFREDO was able to mortgage the property, plaintiffs demanded the return of the property but the defendants refused to return the same. The plaintiffs claimed that the same document is null and void for want of consideration and the same does not bind the non-consenting spouse. They likewise prayed that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiffs not less than P100,000.00 as actual and moral damages, P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses. For their part, the defendants, on January 15, 1996, filed their Answer, denying the material allegations of the plaintiffs. Defendants claimed that they are the lawful owners of Lot No. 1253-B. They alleged that LORETO, with conformity of his wife, sold to them Lot No. 1253 on December 7, 1989 for P5,000.00 and the transaction was registered with the Register of Deeds of the Province of Antique under Entry No. 180425. They added that, subsequently, TCT No. T-18023, covering Lot No. 1253-B, was issued in favor of the defendants. Hence, they claimed that the plaintiffs be directed to pay the defendants P200,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and P30,000.00 for litigation expenses.[4] The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners WILFREDO and LOLITA and held that LORETO did not validly convey Lot No. 1253-B to GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 since at that time, the heirs of ZOILO had not partitioned Lot No. 1253.[5] It ruled that LORETO could only sell at that time his aliquot share in the inheritance. He could not have sold a divided part thereof designated by metes and bounds. Thus, it held that LORETO remained the owner of the subject lot when he sold it to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989. It further found that there was no proof that WILFREDO knew of the sale that took place between LORETO and GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986. The dispositive portion of the decision states: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing pronouncements and a preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. FINDING the defendants WILFREDO VAGILIDAD and LOLITA VAGILIDAD to have duly acquired ownership of Lot No. 1253-B containing an area of 1,604 square meters, more or less, situated inSan Jose, Antique; 2. SUSTAINING the validity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18023 covering the subject Lot No. 1253-B and issued in the name of the defendant WILFREDO VAGILIDAD, married to the defendant LOLITA VAGILIDAD;

3. DISMISSING the complaint of the plaintiffs GABINO VAGILIDAD, JR. and MA. DOROTHY VAGILIDAD, as well as the counterclaims of the defendants WILFREDO VAGILIDAD and LOLITA VAGILIDAD and of the defendants LORETO LABIAO and FRANCISCA LABIAO; and 4. PRONOUNCING no cost.[6]

GABINO, JR. and DOROTHY filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the court a quo, viz.: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Sixth Judicial Region, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 2825, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered: (1) declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale [of Portion of Land] dated December 7, 1989 executed by appellee LORETO in favor of appellee WILFREDO null and void; (2) ordering the defendants-appellees WILFREDO and LOLITA to reconvey Lot No. 1253-B to plaintiffs-appellants GABINO, JR. and DOROTHY; and (3) ordering the defendants-appellees to pay the plaintiffs-appellants P100,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.[7] The appellate court ruled that the sale made by LORETO in favor of GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 is valid. The rights of LORETO to succession are transmitted from the moment ofZOILOs death in 1931. Thus, when LORETO sold the 1,604-square meter portion of Lot No. 1253 to GABINO JR., he already had the right as co-owner to his share to Lot No. 1253, even if at that time the property had not yet been partitioned. Consequently, the sale made by LORETO in favor of WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 is void because LORETO and FRANCISCA were no longer the owners of Lot No. 1253-B as of that time. The appellate court also held WILFREDO and LOLITA liable for moral damages for falsifying the fictitious deeds of sale onDecember 7, 1989. WILFREDO and LOLITA moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied in the questioned Resolution dated November 13, 2003. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the following errors: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 1349 AND ARTICLE 1460 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IN THE CASE AT BAR. II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 1544 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE SALE THAT THE BUYER WHO IS IN POSSESSION OF THE TORRENS TITLE AND HAD THE DEED OF SALE REGISTERED MUST PREVAIL. III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 1391 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE DOCTRINE THAT IN CASE OF FRAUD, ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE MUST BE BROUGHT WITHIN FOUR (4) YEARS FROM THE DISCOVERY OF THE FRAUD. IV THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING PRIVATE RESPONDENT MORAL DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.[8] We deny the petition. I First, petitioners contend that the Deed of Absolute Sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. does not have a determinate object. They anchor their claim on the following discrepancies: (1) the object of the Deed of Absolute Sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. is Lot No. 1253 with an area of 1,604 square meters; (2) the object of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land between LORETO and WILFREDO is a portion of Lot No. 1253, known as Lot No. 1253-B, also with an area of 1,604 square meters;[9] (3) the Deed of Absolute Sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. shows that its object, Lot No. 1253, is not registered under the Land Registration Act nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law; and (4) the property subject of this action, Lot No. 1253-B, was taken from Lot No. 1253 containing an area of 4,280 square meters previously registered in the name of ZOILO under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2301.[10] With these discrepancies, petitioners contend that either the Deed of Absolute Sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. does not have a determinate object or that Lot No. 1253-B, the subject parcel, is not the object thereof. Hence, absent a determinate object, the contract is void. They rely on Articles 1349 and 1460 of the Civil Code, viz.: Art. 1349. The object of every contract must be determinate, as to its kind. The fact that the quantity is not determinate shall not be an obstacle to the existence of the contract, provided it is possible to determine the same, without the need of a new contract between the parties.

Art. 1460.

A thing is determinate when it is particularly designated or physically segregated from all others of the same class.

The requisite that a thing be determinate is satisfied if at the time the contract is entered into, the thing is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties.

Petitioners err. The evidence on record shows that Lot No. 1253-B, the subject parcel, and the lot described as Lot No. 1253 in the Deed of Absolute Sale of May 12, 1986 between LORETO and GABINO, JR., are the same. In the Deed of Absolute Sale, Lot No. 1253 is described, viz.: A parcel of land (Lot No. 1253 of the Cadastral Survey of San Jose), with the improvements thereon. Bounded on the North [by] 1254 and 1255; on the South by road; on the East by 1253 and road on the West by 1240-Angel Salazar; containing an area of 1,604 square meters more or less declared under Tax Declaration No. 4159.[11] In the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land of December 7, 1989 between LORETO and WILFREDO, the subject parcel is described, viz.: A parcel of land (Lot No. 1253. Ap-06-00271) of the Cadastral Survey of San Jose, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 936), situated at Atabay, San Jose, Antique. Bounded on the N. and E. along lines 1-2-3 by lot 1255; San Jose Cadastre; on the S. along line 3-4 by Road; on the W. along line 4-5 by Lot 1240; San Jose Cadastre; and on the N. along line 5-1 by Lot 1254, San Jose Cadastre containing an area of [Four] Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (4,280) square meters, more or less. of which a portion of land subject of this sale is hereinbelow (sic) particularly described as follows, to wit: A portion of Lot No. 1253-B of the Cadastral Survey of San Jose, situated at Atabay, San Jose, Antique. Bounded on the North by Lot No. 1254; South by Road; West by Lot 1253-A; and on the East by Lot No. 1253-C; containing an area of 1,604 square meters, more or less.[12] The description of Lot No. 1253, the object of the Deed of Absolute Sale, as not registered under Act No. 196[,] otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law[13] is a stray description of the subject parcel. It is uncorroborated by any evidence in the records. This description solely appears on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the discrepancy was not explained by LORETO who signed the Deed of Absolute Sale as vendor. LORETO does not, in fact, deny the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale. He merely counters that the Deed of Absolute Sale was purportedly a mortgage. However, LORETOs claim that it was one of mortgage is clearly negated by a Certification [14] issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue dated May 12, 1986. It certified that LORETO was not required to pay the capital gains tax on the transfer of Lot No. 1253 to GABINO, JR. because the property was classified as an ordinary asset. To be sure, petitioners could have easily shown that LORETO owned properties other than Lot No. 1253 to bolster their claim that the object of the Deed of Absolute Sale was different from Lot No. 1253-B which is the object described in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. They did not proffer any evidence. The trial court itself comprehensively traced the origin of Lot No. 1253-B. It clearly demonstrated that the subject parcel was originally part of the registered lot of ZOILO. It also showed how the subject parcel was eventually bounded by Lot No. 1253-A on the West and by Lot No. 1253-C on the East, as the lot would be later described in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. The trial court found that ZOILO previously owned Lot No. 1253 under OCT No. RO-2301 issued on March 3, 1931. On November 14, 1986, Entry No. 167922 was inscribed in the certificate of title, per Order dated March 30, 1978 of Judge Noli Ma. Cortes of the then Court of First Instance of Antique, stating that it was a reconstituted certificate of title. [15] Lot No. 1253 was subdivided by virtue of a subdivision plan dated June 19, 1987. On January 20, 1987, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate executed by LORETO, EFREN and PRISCILLA was entered as Entry No. 170722. The OCT of ZOILO was cancelled by TCT No. T-16693 in the names of LORETO, EFREN and PRISCILLA on January 29, 1987. TCT No. T-16693 was cancelled on the same day by TCT No. T-16694 in the name of LORETO alone. The TCT was partially cancelled by the issuance of TCTs covering Lot Nos. 1253-A, 1253-C and 1253-D. The TCT of Lot No. 1253-B was issued in the name of WILFREDO married to LOLITA on February 15, 1990. WILFREDOs TCT No. T-18023 appears to be a transfer from LORETOsTCT No. T-16694. II Next, petitioners contend that the appellate court should have upheld the title of WILFREDO under Article 1544 of the Civil Code and the doctrine of double sale where the buyer who is in possession of the Torrens Title must prevail.[16] First, petitioners title was issued pursuant to the purported Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land dated December 7, 1989. Second, WILFREDO did not see any encumbrance at the back of the title of the subject lot when he purchased it from LORETO on December 7, 1989. Thus, since he is not bound to go beyond the certificate of title, he has acquired the subject property in due course and in good faith. We disagree. Article 1544 of the Civil Code states, viz.: Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. Petitioners reliance on Article 1544 is misplaced. While title to the property was issued in WILFREDOs name on February 15, 1990, the following circumstances show that he registered the subject parcel with evident bad faith. First, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land dated December 7, 1989 between LORETO and WILFREDO is tainted with blatant irregularities. It is a fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land and the Deed of Absolute Sale between GABINO, JR. and WILFREDO

are of even date. Both Deeds had the same object Lot No. 1253-B. Both deeds were notarized by Atty. Warloo Cardenal and bear the same entry in his notarial register: Document No. 236, Page No. 49, Book No. XI, Series of 1989. Second, the testimony of a disinterested witness, Febe Mabuhay, established the irregularity. Mabuhay used to work as secretary for Atty. Cardenal and co-signed as witness in both Deeds. She stated that Atty. Cardenal instructed her to prepare the two documents in the last week of November 1989. She was present when GABINO, JR. signed the Deed of Absolute Sale. She testified that after GABINO, JR. left, LORETO and his wife FRANCISCA arrived and signed the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. [17] The Decision of the court a quo further states, viz.: [Mabuhay testified that when she prepared the two documents, she] noticed the similarity of Lot No. 1253 as technically described in both documents but she did not call the attention of Atty. Warlo[o] Cardenal. [She likewise stated that Atty. Cardenal] specifically instructed her to assign the same document number to the two documents notarized on December 7, 1989.[18] Third, the testimony of Atty. Ernesto Estoya, then Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, supports the claim that there was bad faith in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. Atty. Estoya brought the notarial record of Atty. Cardenal for the year 1989 pursuant to a subpoena. He stated that he had not brought both Deeds as required in the subpoena because Doc. No. 236; Page No. 49; Book No. XI; Series of 1989 as entered in the notarial register of Atty. Cardenal could not be found in the files. He further explained that the last document on page 48 of the notarial register of Atty. Cardenal is Document No. 235, while the first document on page 49 is Document No. 239, leaving three unexplained gaps for document numbers 236, 237 and 238. Atty. Estoya stated that he was not the one who received the 1989 notarial register of Atty. Cardenal when the latter surrendered it since he assumed office only in 1994. [19] Fourth, we give credence to the testimony of GABINO, JR. that LORETO and WILFREDO had employed the scheme to deprive him and his wife of their lawful title to the subject property. The facts speak for themselves. WILFREDO knew that he could not use the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in his favor by GABINO, JR. because the latter had no title to transfer. Without a title, WILFREDO could not use the subject property as collateral for a bank loan. Hence, LORETO, who had refused to surrender the title to GABINO, JR. and in whose name the land remained registered, had to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land in favor of WILFREDO. Hence, it was convenient for WILFREDO to deny the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale of December 7, 1989 between him and GABINO, JR. But the evidence on record shows that after he was able to register the subject property in his name on February 15, 1990, WILFREDO used the title as collateral in the loans that he contracted with the Philippine National Bank on October 24, 1991 and the Development Bank of the Philippines on December 1, 1993. This supports the claim of GABINO, JR. that WILFREDO needed the lot for loaning purposes. With these corroborating circumstances and the following irrefragable documents on record, the evidence preponderates in favor of GABINO, JR. One, he acquired Lot No.1253-B from LORETO on May 12, 1986[20] by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Two, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued a Certification, also on May 12, 1986, for the exemption from the payment of capital gains tax when LORETO sold to him the subject parcel. Three, GABINO, JR. paid the real estate tax on the subject parcel in 1987. Four, he filed a Petition for the Surrender of LORETOs title on July 31, 1987 so he could transfer the title of the property in his name. Petitioners likewise err in their argument that the contract of sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. is void on the ground that at the time of the sale on May 12, 1986, LORETO had a right to dispose only an aliquot part of the yet undivided property of ZOILO. The subject parcel, being an inherited property, is subject to the rules of co-ownership under the Civil Code. Co-ownership is the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided.[21] Before the partition of the property held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. [22] LORETO sold the subject property to GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 as a co-owner. LORETO had a right, even before the partition of the property on January 19, 1987,[23] to transfer in whole or in part his undivided interest in the lot even without the consent of his co-heirs. This right is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person for its enjoyment. [24] Thus, what GABINO, JR. obtained by virtue of the sale on May 12, 1986 were the same rights as the vendor LORETO had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. [25] LORETO sold some 1,604 square meters of Lot No. 1253 to GABINO, JR. Consequently, when LORETO purportedly sold to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 the same portion of the lot, he was no longer the owner of Lot No. 1253-B. Based on the principle that no one can give what he does not have,[26] LORETO could not have validly sold to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 what he no longer had. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, the sale made by LORETO in favor of WILFREDO is void as LORETO did not have the right to transfer the ownership of the subject property at the time of sale. III Petitioners contend that since the subdivision plan of Lot No. 1253 was only approved on January 19, 1987, the appellate court can not presume that the aliquot part of LORETO was the parcel designated as Lot 1253-B.[27] Petitioners err. The mere fact that LORETO sold a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and bounds before partition does not, per se, render the sale a nullity. We held inLopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong[28] that the fact that an agreement purported to sell a concrete portion of a co-owned property does not render the sale void, for it is well-established that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.[29] In the case at bar, the contract of sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 could be legally recognized. At the time of sale, LORETO had an aliquot share of one-third of the 4,280-square meter property or some 1,426[30] square meters but sold some 1,604 square meters to GABINO, JR. We have ruled that if a co-owner sells more than his aliquot share in the property, the sale will affect only his share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.[31] Be that as it may, the co-heirs of LORETO waived all their rights and interests over Lot No. 1253 in favor of LORETO in an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987. They declared that they have previously received their respective shares from the other estate of their parents ZOILO and PURIFICACION. [32] The rights of GABINO, JR. as owner over Lot No. 1253-B

are thus preserved. These rights were not effectively transferred by LORETO to WILFREDO in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. Nor were these rights alienated from GABINO, JR. upon the issuance of the title to the subject property in the name of WILFREDO. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership.[33] Its alleged incontrovertibility cannot be successfully invoked by WILFREDO because certificates of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for the commission of fraud.[34] IV On the issue of prescription, petitioners contend that the appellate court failed to apply the rule that an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes after the lapse of four years.[35] They cite Article 1391[36] of the Civil Code and the case of Gerona v. De Guzman.[37] We disagree. This Court explained in Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals,[38] viz.: An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin v. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona v. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190 was applied, the New Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 xxx. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456 are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.[39] [Thus,] under the present Civil Code, xxx just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of xxx Art. 1456, xxx so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis--vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable[, viz.:] Art. 1144. 1) The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

Upon a written contract; 2) Upon an obligation created by law; 3) Upon a judgment.[40] (emphases supplied)

Thus, in the case at bar, although the TCT of WILFREDO became indefeasible after the lapse of one year from the date of registration, the attendance of fraud in its issuance created an implied trust in favor of GABINO, JR. under Article 1456 [41] of the Civil Code. Being an implied trust, the action for reconveyance of the subject property therefore prescribes within a period of ten years from February 15, 1990. Thus, when respondents filed the instant case with the court a quo on September 26, 1995, it was well within the prescriptive period. V On the issue of damages, petitioners contend that the grant is erroneous and the alleged connivance between Atty. Cardenal and WILFREDO lacks basis. We disagree. The evidence on record is clear that petitioners committed bad faith in the execution of the purported Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land dated December 7, 1989between LORETO and WILFREDO. As stated by the appellate court, viz.: xxxx From the series of events, it can be reasonably inferred that appellees WILFREDO, LORETO and Atty. Cardenal connived in attempting to deprive appellants of Lot No. 1253-B, hence, the appellants entitlement to moral damages. Further, it is a well-settled rule that attorneys fees are allowed to be awarded if the claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party for whom it is sought. xxxx To protect themselves, the appellants engaged the services of counsel and incurred expenses in the course of litigation. Hence, we deem it equitable to award attorneys fees to the appellant xxx. [42] IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-68318 dated March 19, 2003 and November 13, 2003, respectively, are AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent. Vicente Llanes for petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. Makalintal, J.: Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC Consulta No. 366. On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owners certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled Deed of Donation inter-vivos, with the request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (/) portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law. It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers. The pertinent entries read: Entry No. 5658. Sales. Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with

respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu thereof, the name of the vendee is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation in interest of the vendor. Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, xxxxxxxxx Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion. Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion. Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an area of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains an additional memorandum stating that three co-owners duplicate certificates of title No. 548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees, this 5th day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur. Mainly because these three other co-owners copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation. Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in controversy, the Commissioner observed: (1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold undivided portions thereof on three different occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside from the owners duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owners duplicates which are presumably in the possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to the owners duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-owners duplicates must likewise be surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees that the issuance of the three co-owners duplicates was unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these titles are presumed to have been lawfully issued. Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would want to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which provides that the production of the owners duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument. Under this provision, according to petitioners, the presentation of the other copies of the title is not required, first, because it speaks of registered owner and not one whose claim to or interest in the property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three vendees-co-owners in this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor was illegal or unauthorized. We find no merit in petitioners contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable. One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in upholding the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia Mina, there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance. This legal conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its implications, for without a previous settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse may dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein subject of course to the result of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character of the property is assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of said property which he donated was more than his one-half share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to three other parties. It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the

different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices of lis pendens. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs. Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur. Capistrano, J., took no part. Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave. Footnotes *Section 43. Certificates where land registered in names of two or more persons. Where two or more persons are registered owners as tenants in common, or otherwise, one owners duplicate certificate may be issued for the whole land, or a separate duplicate may be issued to each for his undivided share.