-\:iidemy of Management Review 1981. Vol. 6. No. 3.

363-374

The Ethics of Organizational

GERALD F. CAVANAGH
University of Detroit

DENNIS J. MOBERG
MANUEL VELASQUEZ
University of Santa Clara

Political uses of power demand explicit consideration of ethical restraints,

in part because current management theory focuses on the value of out-
comes rather than on the value of the means chosen. We have developed a
normative model of ethical analysis that can be helpful in determining what
these restraints are. The model integrates three kinds of ethical theories:
utilitarianism, theories of moral rights, and theories of justice.

Power is the cornerstone of both management
theory and management practice. Few concepts are
more fundamental to the study of organizations,
and power is a vital and ubiquitous reality in
organizational life [Dahl, 1957; Zald, 1970;
Zalesnik, 1970]. Our primary purpose here is to
develop a framework for evaluating the ethical
quality of certain uses of power within organiza-
tions. We will first distinguish political from non-
political uses of power and then canvass the litera-
ture of normative ethics in order to construct a
model of ethical analysis that can be applied to
political uses of power in organizations.
Organizational Politics
The contemporary view of power in organizations
is that it is the ability to mobilize resources, energy,
and information on behalf of a preferred goal or
strategy [Tushman, 1977]. T^hus, power is assumed
to exist only when there is conflict over means or
ends [Drake, 1979; Pfeffer, 1977]. More
'Portions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of
the Academy of Management, Detroit, 1980.
'We wish to thank David Caidweli, Andre Delbecq, Peter Mills,
James Morris, and Barry Posner for their thoughtful review of
various drafts of this paper.
© !9SI by the Academy of Management 0363-7425
363
specifically, this view of power is based on two fun-
damental propositions:
1. Organizations are composed of individuals and
coalitions that compete over resources, energy,
information, and influence [Hickson, Hinings,
Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971; Thompson,
1967].
2. Individuals and coalitions seek to protect their
interests through means that are unobtrusive
when compared to existing controls, norms, and
sanctions [Allen, Madison, Porter, Renwick, &
Mayes, 1979; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974].
This perspective has led some authors to
distinguish between political and nonpolitical uses
of power [Gandz & Murray, 1980]. For example,
Mayes and Allen [1977] draw the distinction in terms
of organizational sanctions: nonpolitical uses of
power are those that involve sanctioned means for
sanctioned ends, and political uses involve unsanc-
tioned means, or sanctioned means for unsanction-
ed ends. That is, when individuals and coalitions
choose to move outside of their formal authority,
established policies and procedures, or job descrip-
tions in their use of power, that use is political.
When they use power within these sanctions for ends
that are not formally sanctioned through goal
statements, this too is a political use of power, ac-
cording to the Mayes and Allen definition.
Unlike more encompassing conceptualizations
that equate politics with any use of power [e.g.,
Martin & Sims, 1956], the Mayes and Allen defini-
tion underlines the discretionary nature of organiza-
tional politics. In spite of formal systems designed to
control the use of power, organizational members
can and do exercise political power to influence their
subordinates, peers, superiors, and others [Schein,
1977]. And coalitions may employ politics in their
reaction to policy changes that threaten their own
interests [Crozier, 1964; Pettigrew, 1973].
When individuals and coalitions move outside
formal sanctions, the traditional authority/respon-
sibility linkage is broken, and important ethical
issues emerge. However, current treatments of
organizational politics either beg the ethical issues
entirely [e.g., Kotter, 1977] or offer simplistic
ethical criteria. For example. Miles asserts that "it is
. . . important to recognize that politics need not be
bad, though common parlance uses the term in a pe-
jorative sense. The survival of an organization may
depend on the success of a unit or coalition in over-
turning a traditional but outdated formal organiza-
tion objective or policy" [1980, p. 155]. However,
there are a host of political actions that may be
justified in the name of organizational survival that
many would find morally repugnant. Among these
are such Machiavellian techniques as "situational
manipulation," "dirty tricks," and "backstabbing."
There is, then, a clear need for a normative theory
of organizational politics that addresses ethical
issues directly and from the standpoint of the exer-
cise of discretion. Unfortunately, the business and
society literature, where one might expect to find
such issues discussed, offers little guidance in this
regard. The emphasis in this literature is on institu-
tional interactions (e.g., government regulations)
and on broad human resource policy issues (e.g.,
affirmative action), and not on the day-to-day poli-
tical decisions made in the organization.
Discussions of political tactics in the management
literature also offer little guidance. The literature is,
of course, rich with political guidelines: there are
leadership theories, lateral relations prescriptions,
notions about how to design and implement reward
and control systems, conflict resolution strategies,
and the like, all of which provide fodder for the
development of political behavior alternatives
(hereinafter PBA). However, the form of these theo-
retical notions tends to reduce decisions to cal-
culations based on effect — that is, they provide the
364
manager with an understanding and prediction of
what PBAs are likely to evoke in terms of an out-
come or set of outcomes. Armed with contemporary
leadership theories, for example, managers can
presumably determine the type of face-to-face direc-
tion that will result in the desired level of perform-
ance and satisfaction. This calculative emphasis
defines theoretical debate over ethics in terms of the
desirability of outcomes and tends to ignore the
value of the activities, processes, and behaviors in-
volved, independent of the outcomes achieved.
What a manager should do is thus determined by the
desirability of the outcomes and not by the quality
of the behaviors themselves. Such an emphasis in-
evitably leads to a kind of ends-justify-the-means
logic that fails to provide guidance for managers
beyond linking alternatives to outcomes. Consider
the following case.
Lorna is the production manager of a noncohesive
work group responsible for meeting a deadline that
will require coordinated effort among her subor-
dinates. Believing that the members of the work
group will pull together and meet the deadline if they
have a little competition, Lorna decides in favor of a
PBA. She tries to create the impression among her
subordinates that members of the sales department
want her group to fail to meet the deadline so that
sales can gain an edge over production in upcoming
budgetary negotiations.
How might we evaluate this PBA? Management
theory tends to focus our attention on consequences.
One might argue that if it works arid Loma's group
pulls together and meets the deadline, it's okay. Or, a
more critical observer might argue that even if the ob-
jective is accomplished, an important side effect could
be the loss of a cooperative relationship between the
sales and production departments. What we tend to
lose sight of, though, is that "creating an impression"
is a euphemism for lying, and lying may not be
ethically acceptable in this situation.
This example illustrates what may be termed the
teleological or goal-oriented form of management
theory [Keeley, 1979; Krupp, 1961; Pfeffer, 1978].
This leads managers and management scholars alike
to restrict normative judgments about organiza-
tional behavior to outcomes (e.g., performance,
satisfaction, system effectiveness) rather than con-
sider the ethical quality of the means employed.
In contrast, the field of normative ethics provides
fertile ground on which to develop a normative
 theory of organizational politics. We will therefore
turn to the literature of this field in order to draw out
a set of principles that can provide the basis for a
normative analysis of organizational politics that
may reduce the ethical uncertainty surrounding the
political use of power.
Ethical Criteria Relevant to
Political Behavior Decisions
Work in the field of normative ethics during this
century has evolved from three basic kinds of moral
theories: utilitarian theories (which evaluate beha-
vior in terms of its social consequences), theories of
rights (which emphasize the entitlements of indi-
viduals), and theories of justice (which focus on the
distributional effects of actions or policies). Each of
these has a venerable heritage. Utilitarian theory
was precisely formulated in the eighteenth century
[Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1863; Sidgwick, 1874]. For-
mulations of rights theories appeared in the seven-
teenth century [Hobbes, 1651; Locke, 1690; Kant,
1785]. Aristotle and Plato first formulated theories
of justice in the fifth century B.C. This past decade
has seen a continuing discussion of a subtle and
powerful variant of utilitarianism called "rule
utilitarianism" [Brandt, 1979; Sobel, 1970], an
elaboration of several rights theories [Dworkin,
1978; Nozick, 1974], and the publication of
sophisticated treatments of justice [Bowie, 1971;
Rawls, 1971].
Utilitarian Theory
Utilitarianism holds that actions and plans should
be judged by their consequences [Sidgwick, 1874;
Smart, 1973]. In its classical formulation,
utilitarianism claims that behaviors that are moral
produce the greatest good for the greatest number
[Mill, 1863]. Decision makers are required to
estimate the effect of each alternative on all the par-
ties concerned and to select the one that optimizes
the satisfactions of the greatest number.
What can be said about the ethical quality of
PBAs from a utilitarian standpoint? In its present
form, utilitarianism requires a decision maker to
select the PBA that will result in the greatest good
for the greatest number. This implies not only con-
sidering the interests of all the individuals and
365
groups that are affected by each PBA, but also
selecting the PBA that optimizes the satisfactions of
these constituencies. Obviously, this can amount to
a calculative nightmare.
Accordingly, there are several shortcuts that may
be used to reduce the complexity of utilitarian
calculations. Each of these involves a sacrifice of
elegance for calculative ease. First, a decision maker
can adopt some ideological system that reduces
elaborate calculations of interests to a series of
utilitarian rules. For example, some religious ide-
ologies specify rules of behavior that, if followed,
are supposed to result in an improved human condi-
tion (e.g., the Golden Rule). Certain organizational
ideologies, like professionalism, allow complex
utilitarian calculations to be reduced to a focus on
critical constituencies [Schein, 1966]. Second, a
decision maker can adopt a simplified frame of
reference in evaluating the interests of affected par-
ties. For example, an economic frame of reference
presupposes that alternatives are best evaluated in
terms of dollar costs and dollar benefits. In this way,
utilitarian calculations can be quantified. And third,
a decision maker can place boundaries on utilitarian
calculations. For example, a decision maker can con-
sider only the interests of those directly affected by a
decision and thus exclude from analysis all indirect or
secondary effects. Similarly, a decision maker can
assume that by giving allegiance to a particular
organizational coalition or set of goals (e.g., "official
goals"), everyone's utilities will be optimized.
Calculative shortcuts like these do not auto-
matically free decision makers from moral respon-
sibility for their actions. Normative ethicians
typically suggest that decision makers should
periodically assess these simplifying strategies to
assure themselves that certain interests are not being
ignored or that decision rules do not lead to subop-
timal outcomes [e.g., Bok, 1980].
Whatever form of utilitarianism is employed, two
types of PBAs are typically judged unethical: (1)
those that are consistent with the attainment of some
goals (e.g., personal goals) at the expense of those
that encompass broader constituencies (e.g.,
societal goals), and (2) those that constitute com-
paratively inefficient means to desired ends. Take
the case of an employee of a company who uses per-
sonal power to persuade policy makers to grant
unusually high levels of organizational resources to
a project by systematically excluding important in-
formation about the progress of the project. This
PBA is unethical if other resource allocation
schemes would better satisfy a greater number of
individuals or if persuasion of this kind is less effi-
cient than being more open about how the project is
progressing.
Theory of Rights
A theory of moral rights asserts that human be-
ings have certain fundamental rights that should be
respected in all decisions. Several fundamental
rights have been incorporated into the American
legal system in the form of the Constitutional Bill of
Rights. In light of these Constitutional guarantees,
advocates of moral rights have suggested the follow-
ing:
1. The right of free consent. Individuals within an
organization have the right to be treated only as
they knowingly and freely consent to be treated
[Bennis & Slater, 1968; Hart, 1955].
2. The right to privacy. Individuals have the right
to do whatever they choose to do outside work-
ing hours and to control information about their
private life, including information not intended
to be made public [Miller, 1971; Mironi, 1974;
Wasserstrom, 1978].
3. The right to freedom of conscience. Individuals
have the right to refrain from carrying out any
order that violates moral or religious norms to
which they adhere [Ewing, 1977; Waltzer, 1967].
4. The right of free speech. Individuals have the
right to criticize conscientiously and truthfully
the ethics or legality of the actions of others so
long as the criticism does not violate the rights of
other individuals [Bok, 1980; Eells, 1962;
Walters, 1975].
5. The right to due process. Individuals have the
right to a fair and impartial hearing when they
believe their rights are being violated [Ewing,
1977, 1981; Evan, 1975].
Making decisions based on a theory of rights is
much simpler than with utilitarian theory. One need
only avoid interfering with the rights of others who
might be affected by the decision. This can be com-
plicated, of course, but generally a theory of rights
does not involve the decision complexities that
utilitarianism requires.
Theory of Justice
A theory of justice requires decision makers to be
guided by equity, fairness, and impartiality. Canons
366
of justice may specify three types of moral prescrip-
tions: distributive rules, principles of administering
rules, and compensation norms.
Distributive rules The basic rule of distributive
justice is that differentiated treatment of individuals
should not be based on arbitrary characteristics:
individuals who are similar in the relevant respects
should be treated similarly, and individuals who dif-
fer in a relevant respect should be treated differently
in proportion to the differences between them
[Perelman, 1963]. This rule is the basis for conten-
tions that certain resource allocations are "fair."
When applied to salary administration, for example,
it would lead to a distribution of rewards such that
those whose jobs are equal in terms of importance,
difficulty, or some other criterion receive equal
rewards.
A second distributive rule is that the attributes
and positions that command differential treatment
should have a clear and defensible relationship to
goals and tasks [Daniels, 1978]. Clearly, it is unjust
to distribute rewards according to differences
unrelated to the situation at hand.
Principles of administering rules Justice requires
that rules should be administered fairly [Feinberg,
1973; Fuller, 1964]. Rules should be clearly stated
and expressly promulgated. They should be con-
sistently and impartially enforced. They should ex-
cuse individuals who act in ignorance, under duress,
or involuntarily [Rawls, 1971].
Compensation norms A theory of justice also
delineates guidelines regarding the responsibility for
injuries [Brandt, 1959]. First, individuals should not
be held responsible for matters over which they have
no control. Second, individuals should be compen-
sated for the cost of their injuries by the party
responsible for those injuries.
While a theory of justice does not require the com-
plicated calculations demanded by utilitarian
theory, it is by no means easy to apply. There is the
problem of determining the attributes on which dif-
ferential treatment is to be based. There are fact-
finding challenges associated with administering
rules. And there is the thorny problem of establish-
ing responsibility for mistakes and injuries.
However, as applied to political behavior deci-
sions, these cannons of justice are useful in clarifying
some ethical issues. First, PBAs for the purpose of
acquiring an advantageous position in the distribu-
 Table 1
Ethical Theories Relevant to Judging Political Behavior Decisions

Theory Strengths as an Ethical Guide Weaknesses as an Ethical Guide

Utilitarianism 1. Facilitates calculative shortcuts (e.g.,
(Bentham, Ricardo, owing loyalty to an individual, coalition,
Smith) or organization).
2. Promotes the view that the interests
accounted for should not be solely
particularistic except under unusual
circumstances (e.g., perfect compe-
tition).
3. Can encourage entrepreneurship,
innovation, and productivity.
Theory of Rights 1. Specifies minimal levels of satis-
(Kant, Locke) faction for all individuals.
2. Establishes standards of social
behavior that are independent of
outcomes.
Theory of Justice 1. Ensures that allocations of re-
(Aristotle, sources are determined fairly.
Rawls)
2. Protects the interests of those
who may be underrepresented in
organizations beyond according
them minimal rights.
^Political behavior alternative.
1. Virtually impossible to assess the effects
of a PBA^ on the satisfaction of all
affected parties.
2. Can result in an unjust allocation of
resources, particularly when some in-
dividuals or groups lack representation
or "voice."
3. Can result in abridging some per-
sons' rights to accommodate utilitarian
outcomes.
1. Can encourage individualistic,
selfish behavior — which, taken to an ex-
treme, may result in anarchy.
2. Reduces political prerogatives that
may be necessary to bring about just
or utilitarian outcomes.
1. Can encourage a sense of entitlement
that reduces entrepreneurship, inno-
vation, and productivity.
2. Can result in abridging some
persons' rights to accommodate the
canons of justice.

tion of resources are ethically questionable if there is
no legitimate basis for the advantage. Second, PBAs
based on an exchange of rule leniency for other
favors are patently unethical unless everyone
qualifies for the same level of leniency. Finally,
political advantage should not be based on favor-
able attributions of responsibility or the compensa-
tion for injury [Allen et al., 1979]. In short, a theory
of justice demands that inequality or advantage be
determined fairly.
An Analytical Structure for
Evaluating Political Behavior Decisions
Each of the three kinds of ethical theories has
strong and weak points, as depicted in Table 1. Most
important for our purposes, each can be shown to be
inadequate in accounting for issues accounted for by
367
another. Utilitarian theory cannot adequately ac-
count for rights and claims of justice [Lyons, 1965].
Rights theories proved deficient in dealing with social
welfare issues [Singer, 1978]. And theories of justice
have been criticized for both violating rights [Nozick,
1974] and diminishing incentives to produce goods
and services [Okum, 1975]. One solution to the prob-
lem of theoretical inadequacy is to combine these
three theories into a coherent whole.
To that end, we have incorporated all three nor-
mative theories in a decision tree, diagrammed in
Figure 1. The three categories of ethical criteria that
bear on a political behavior decision are arbitrarily
arranged in the diagram. In addition to incor-
porating all three theories, the decision tree accounts
for overwhelming factors that preclude the applica-
tion of any of these criteria. These overwhelming
factors will be specified after two cases illustrating
the use of the decision tree have been presented.
Does the PBA (political behavior alternative) result No
in the efficient optimization of the satisfactions of
interests inside and outside the organization?

Yes

>

Yes Are there overwhelming factors that justify

suboptimizing these goals and satisfactions?

No

Does the PBA respect the rights of all the af- No

fected parties? Reject PBA

Yes

>f

Yes Are there overwhelming factors that justify the

abrogation of a right?

No

>r
No
Does the PBA respect the canons of justice? Reject PBA

Yes

>f

Yes Are there overwhelming factors that justify the

violation of a canon of justice?

No

f >

Accept PBA Reject PBA

Figure 1
A Decision Tree for Incorporating Ethics into Political Behavior Decisions
368
 Illustrative Cases
Sam and Bob are highly motivated research scien-
tists who work in the new-product development lab
at General Rubber. Sam is by far the most technical-
ly competent scientist in the lab, and he has been
responsible for several patents that have netted the
company nearly six million dollars in the past
decade. He is quiet, serious, and socially reserved.
In contrast. Bob is outgoing and demonstrative.
While Bob lacks the technical track record Sam has,
his work has been solid.though unimaginative.
Rumor has it that Bob will be moved into an ad-
ministrative position in the lab in the next few years.
According to lab policy, a $300,000 fund is
available every year for the best new-product de-
velopment idea proposed by a lab scientist in the
form of a competitive bid. Accordingly, Sam and
Bob both prepare proposals. Each proposal is
carefully constructed to detail the benefits to the
company and to society if the proposal is accepted,
and it is the consensus of other scientists from blind
reviews that both proposals are equally meritorious.
Both proposals require the entire $300,000 to realize
any significant results. Moreover, the proposed line
of research in each requires significant mastery of
the technical issues involved and minimal need to
supervise the work of others.
After submitting his proposal, Sam takes no fur-
ther action aside from periodically inquiring about
the outcome of the bidding process. In contrast. Bob
begins to wage what might be termed an open cam-
paign in support of his proposal. After freely admit-
ting his intentions to Sam and others. Bob seizes
every opportunity he can to point out the relative
advantages of his proposal to individuals who might
have some influence over the decision. So effective is
this open campaign that considerable informal
pressure is placed on those authorized to make the
decision on behalf of Bob's proposal. Bob's proposal
is funded and Sam's is not.
An ethical analysis of Bob's action in this case
could begin by using the decision tree shown in
Figure 1. The first question in the sequence requires a
utilitarian analysis. Clearly, Bob's interests are bet-
ter served than Sam's. However, the nature of the
two proposals seems to require one of the two to be
disappointed. Moreover, the outcome in terms of
broader interests (i.e., company, society) appears
not to be suboptimal, since both proposals were
369
judged equivalent in the blind reviews. Conse-
quently, it is appropriate to answer the first question
affirmatively.
The second question inquires into the rights re-
spected by Bob's behavior. Here again, the evidence
seems persuasive that no one's rights were violated.
Sam did not have (did not create) the same oppor-
tunity to point out the advantages of his proposal to
those at whom Bob directed his lobbying campaign,
but Bob's open campaign involved no deceit, and
Sam's inaction may be taken as implied consent.
It is in light of the third question that Bob's actions
are most suspect. Justice would have best been
served in this case if there had been a clear situation-
relevant difference between the two proposals. The
blind reviews found them equivalent, so some other
basis for differentiating between the proposals
presumably had to be found. Bob's efforts served to
create irrelevant differences between them. If
anything, Sam's superior technical track record
would have been a more relevant factor than Bob's
initiative and social skills in determining who should
be favored to perform a technical task. Bob's actions
in this regard were therefore unjust. Interestingly,
had the proposals required supervision of others or
the ability to persuade others, Bob's approach
would have been justified.
Let us examine another case. Lee, 61, has been
Director of Engineering for American Semiconduc-
tor for 14 years. He is very bright and a fine super-
visor but he has not kept abreast of new devel-
opments in technology.
American Semiconductor's manufacturing pro-
cess creates substantial quantities of toxic materials.
Lee's rather casual attitude toward the disposal of
these chemicals has resulted in a number of en-
vironmental citations. The firm is now tied up in
court on two cases and will probably be forced to
pay a considerable amount in damages. Yet, Lee still
does not perceive the disposal problem as urgent.
For three years, Charlie, the executive vice presi-
dent, has tried to persuade Lee to make this a prior-
ity issue but has failed. Charlie has reluctantly con-
cluded that Lee must be taken out of his position as
Director of Engineering.
Charlie recognizes that it would demoralize the
other managers if he were to fire Lee outright. So,
Charlie decides that he will begin to tell selected in-
dividuals that he is dissatisfied with Lee's work.
When there is open support for Lee, Charlie quietly
sides with Lee's opposition. He casually lets Lee's
peers know that he thinks Lee may have outlived his
usefulness to the firm. He even exaggerates Lee's
deficiencies and failures when speaking to Lee's co-
workers. Discouraged by the waning support from
his colleagues. Lee decides to take an early retire-
ment.
In response to the first question in the decision
tree, we can conclude that getting Lee out of his posi-
tion may indeed bring about the "greatest good for
the greatest number," presuming a suitable replace-
ment can be found. Not only is Lee hindering the
achievement of the apparent goals of the organiza-
tion, but he is also causing external diseconomies in
the disposal of the toxic wastes. Both of these prob-
lems, especially when taken together, bring us to the
conclusion that Lee is hurting both American
Semiconductor and many other people. Thus,
Charlie's PBA seems to pass utilitarian criteria.
On the issue of rights, however, there are some
difficulties with Charlie's PBA. Namely, Lee's right
of free consent was violated. Lee has the right to be
treated honestly and forthrightly and Charlie's at-
tempt to destroy Lee's reputation behind his back
failed to respect this right.
Overwhelming Factors
A still-unexplained qualification in the decision
tree we have described is the concept of an "over-
whelming factor" — i.e., a situational factor that
may, in a given case, justify overriding one of the
three ethical criteria: utilitarian outcomes, in-
dividual rights, or distributive justice. What counts
as an overwhelming factor?
Conflicts between criteria As we have sug-
gested, the three criteria are intended to sys-
tematically focus our attention on three kinds of
decision factors: (1) the congruence between the
decision and the efficient satisfaction of the greatest
number of people, (2) the effect of the decision on in-
dividuals who have rights, and (3) the distributional
consequences of the decision. Obviously, these three
factors may come into conflict. As in the American
Semiconductor case, the decision maker may be
faced with a situation in which a choice must be
made between, on the one hand, a course of action
that achieves the greatest good for the greatest
370
number but at the price of violating an individual's
rights, and, on the other hand, a course of action
that respects the individual's rights but at the price of
a substantial reduction in the achievement of the
greatest good.
There are no well-defined rules for solving the
moral dilemmas that these conflicts pose. The dilem-
mas can be resolved only by making a considered
judgment concerning which of the conflicting
criteria should be accorded the most weight in the
given situation. In some cases the judgment may be
easier than in others. Suppose, for example, that
violating an employee's right to privacy on the job is
the only way to stopping continuing thefts that
deprive thousands of customers from getting quality
pharmaceutical products. Then the utilitarian
criterion may be given greater weight than the rights
criterion — employee's rights must be sacrificed for
the "greatest good."
Although there are no hard and fast rules for
resolving moral dilemmas of this sort, there is a
systematic procedure for handling them — the prin-
ciple of double effect. Stated simply, this principle
holds that it is acceptable to make a decision that has
two effects, one good and one bad, provided that the
decision maker's dominant motivation is to achieve
the good effect and provided that the good effect is
important enough to permit the bad effect [Grisez,
1970].
Conflicts within criteria Not only may the three
criteria conflict with each other, but each may con-
flict with itself as well. First, there may be conflict
between the utilitarian consequences of those in-
volved or with the means chosen to accomplish the
appropriate goals. This is probably typical in
organizations that have coalitions with conflicting
goals or where there is conflict among coalitions
about the appropriate means to consensual goals.
Second, there may be conflict between therightsof
competing individuals. The decision maker may be
forced to choose between permitting one person to
preserve the right to privacy and allowing another
person to exercise the right of free speech. Third,
there may be a conflict between different canons of
justice. Administering a rule with literal consis-
tency, for example, may conflict with the principle
that individuals who differ in relevant ways should
be treated differently. Or there may be a conflict be-
tween individuals. A situation may, for example,
 call for hard choices between using seniority or
using merit as the basis for deciding who is to be
given preference.
As with conflicts between ethical criteria, there
are no well-defined rules for resolving the dilemmas
within ethical criteria. Again, the decision maker is
forced to employ a weighting procedure. For ex-
ample, when rights come into conflict, the decision
maker must make a conscientious judgment con-
cerning the relative importance of the interests pro-
tected by one right as compared to the interests pro-
tected by the conflicting right. Although sometimes
easy and obvious, such judgments can also be ex-
ceedingly difficult to make.
Lack of capacity to employ the criteria Three
kinds of factors might legitimately relieve the deci-
sion maker of the responsibility of adhering to the
ethical criteria relevant to a certain decision. All
three of these factors relate to the decision maker's
personal incapacity to adhere to the relevant
criteria.
firsf, the decision maker may legitimately lay
aside a certain ethical criterion if there is no freedom
to use it. For example, a manager may be so
pressured by others that ethical criteria cannot be
brought to bear on the decision. Or a decision maker
may be only in partial control of a certain decision
and thus unable to use a specific ethical criterion.
Second, the decision maker might legitimately fail
to employ a certain ethical criterion owing to a lack
of adequate information for using that criterion. As
we have seen, this is more often the case with the
utilitarian and justice criteria than with the rights
criterion.
Third, the decision maker who has strong and
reasonable doubts about the legitimacy of an ethical
criterion can legitimately be excused from adhering
to that criterion. There is nothing sacred about the
specific ethical criteria proposed in this article. They
represent a consensus among normative ethicians,
but that does not preclude other, more or less con-
straining norms being employed, as long as they are
arrived at conscientiously.
Faced with any of these three kinds of incapaci-
tating factors, the decision maker may legitimately
accord a lesser weight to one criterion. The underly-
ing rationale for such systematic devaluation of
ethical criteria is simple. Persons cannot be held
responsible for matters they cannot control or for
371
matters about which they are ignorant or sincerely
in doubt. However, determining whether a decision
maker's lack of freedom, lack of information, or
lack of certitude is sufficient to abrogate ethical
responsibility requires one to make some exceed-
ingly difficult judgments.
Implications
An important implication of any research on
ethics lies in the area of education and development.
This is particularly true regarding the subject of
organizational politics. Presented in an ethically
bland fashion, theories of organizational politics
tend to evoke an unfortunate combination of
cynicism, defeatism, and paranoia. Without ethical
paradigms, individuals too often infer that success is
controlled by others or attained only by those who
engage in unproductive behavior. In contrast, con-
fronting the ethical issues in organizational politics
leads individuals to assume responsibility for their
political behavior decisions. It is unlikely that such
an approach will enable individuals to solve all the
ethical dilemmas they will face in their careers, but it
may stimulate "moral" development [Kohlberg,
1973].
Several lines of research are also suggested by the
foregoing analysis. First, there would be some value
in further developing ethical paradigms for other
areas of discretion faced by organizational
members. For example, the areas of obedience,
whistle blowing, self-promotion, and bottom-up
social intervention all cry out for ethical guidance.
Second, there is a need to conduct empirical research
regarding what rights, canons of justice, and
utilitarian rules are commonly accepted in general
and in specific dilemmas. Third, the process of
ethical judgment about politics and other issues
needs empirical work. For example, what antece-
dent conditions are associated with ethical actions?
Similarly, how do ethical codes formalized in an
organization influence political behavior decisions?
Concluding Remarks
As should be clear from this discussion, reducing
the ethical uncertainty surrounding political
behavior decisions places significant cognitive
burdens on the decision maker [Simon, 1976]. Judg-
ing the normative equality of PBAs can involve con-
fronting complicated ethical dilemmas. Yet, there
seems to be no satisfactory substitute for individual
discretion that addresses these complexities directly
and to the limits of one's cognitive capabilities.
As we have seen, management theory offers little
guidance in this regard. Its calculative form in-
fluences us to be ethically myopic when we evaluate
political behavior. Instead of determining whether
human rights or standards of justice are violated, we
are often content to judge political behavior ac-
cording to its outcomes. This orientation invites
cynicism about what are termed the political
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Gerald F. Cavanagh is Professor of Management, University of

Detroit.

Dennis J. Moberg is Associate Professor of Management,

Graduate School of Business and Administration, University of
Santa Clara, Santa Clara, California. He is presently serving as
Visiting Professor of Management, Netherlands School of
Business, Breuklen, The Netherlands.

Manuel Velasquez is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, School of

Humanities, University of Santa Clara, Santa Clara, California.

Received 6/23/80

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