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Impact and Consequences of Nationalism on the Yugoslav Civil Wars

Lindy Young 11/27/12 HIS3051

The dissolution of Yugoslavia throughout the 1990's stands as a testament to some of the worst aspects of humanity. Lasting almost the entire decade, the Yugoslav civil wars became the setting for some of the worst military crimes committed since World War II. Under the reigns of strongly nationalistic leaders such as the now infamous Slobodan Milosevic, the country was violently torn through a chain of successions and wars between the newly independent states. For most, the decade long violence is remembered for its ethnic cleansings, war crimes, and large-scale military offensives against civilian populations. Although Yugoslavia was one of the most liberal communist states in Europe, it served as a harsh reminder to the world that unchecked power, when coupled with nationalistic fanaticism, can have disastrous results on a massive scale. Exactly how nationalistic movements attained such a monopoly of power within the military and government, and acquired such a dedicated following among the populous, remains unclear. While the Yugoslavian wars will certainly become a common example of modern warfare alongside other conflicts such as the Iraq/Afghanistan wars and Chechnya, it's actual causes are much less defined. Although conspiracies abound, as with almost anything of such a scale, the current wars in the middle east and Chechnya can be directly linked to their respective triggers. The breakup of Yugoslavia, however, does not offer such a clearly defined link of causation. Following the path from the outbreaks leads to a multitude of sources, all intricately intertwined. Totalitarian regimes, nationalistic movements within both the populous & military, the call of irredentism towards territories controlled by long-dead empires, and ethnic tension along border regions all played a part in the downfall. Within almost every factor of the wars is nationalism, influencing each facet of the greater picture. The exact degree to which nationalism influenced these factors, and the end result of this influence in each sector, is hazy at best. Was nationalism an underlying cause for the outbreaks, or a dormant epidemic caused by the tension of the wars themselves? This paper serves to clarify my position on the topic: I believe that nationalism, after the loss of Tito and other unifying factors,

3 morphed from a positive force among Yugoslavia's myriad ethnicities to a rallying cry for war. Without the checks on each individual republic and its corresponding ethnic group, nationalism became a justification for wars against succeeding states and systematic cleansings of ethnic populations. At a glance, it would be easy to simply write off the wars as simply another casualty of the fall of Communism in Europe, or just another war in the long history of wars within the Balkans. Unfortunately, these topical causes have fallen into regular use for the wars. To most scholars, Yugoslavia served as an interesting study in both communist and multi-ethnic states, but little else. The United States saw an opportunity in making Yugoslavia a political ally, but beyond the country's usefulness in the Cold War, cared little else. This lack of interest in the region is part of a much larger trend in both politics and scholarly research. Eastern Europe as a whole has long been stereotyped by the West as an unstable region of constant war.1 Only now, partially due to the fall of the Iron Curtain, has study of the region began gaining importance. This research seeks to further this trend not only by adding to the new historiography of the Balkans, but also doing so in an unbiased and carefully researched manner. Historically, Yugoslavia was a fairly short lived country. In 1914, during the initial days of World War I, the Prime Minister of Serbia Nikola Pasic began talks with the Allied Powers for the creation of what would eventually become Yugoslavia.2 With German hostility rapidly increasing following the Austrian Arch Duke's death, a unified Serb, Croat, and Slovene state was deemed necessary for defense in the coming war. With the Allied victory at the end of the war, this idea became reality. Following its forced dissolution under Nazi rule during WWII, it was reborn again after the allied victory.3 The Soviet Unions tactic for acquisition of new communist states was to liberate as many countries as possible from Nazi rule, quickly followed by instating Moscow sanctioned governments. The United States adopted a similar strategy, but both powers failed to solidify control over Yugoslavia, as the local partisan fighters managed against all odds to free
1 2 3

Kent, Sarah A. Writing the Yugoslav Wars: English-Language Books on Bosnia (1992-1996) and the Challenges of Analyzing Contemporary History. Stokes, Gale. The Walls Came Tumbling Down Prousis, Theo C. Lecture notes

4 themselves without either. Josip Broz Tito, a leader within the Partizan forces, quickly amassed a political following and became an instrumental player during the recreation of Yugoslavia. He would go on to serve as both Prime Minister and first President of Yugoslavia from 1953 to his death in 1980. Widely viewed as a unifying force without such a diverse country, Tito ruled with a mixture of public approval and communist social control. Throughout this life, Tito made Yugoslavia a glaring exception among Communist states. Soon after his rise to power he made sweeping changes to communist doctrine, including an open, mixed economy and reduced form of police state. This lead to an immediate reaction from Moscow, but the country's difficult, mountainous terrain and growing army deterred direct intervention. The Stalin-Tito split would destroy communication between the countries until Stalin's death in 1953 and Krushchev's different roads to communism speech helped to relieve tensions.4 Even with this eventual mending of ties, Yugoslavia would remain outside of the Soviet Bloc and Warsaw Pact. This unique position of communist state outside of direct control from Moscow had a massive impact on the country. Tito was able to morph and adapt communist doctrine as he saw fit: We study and take as an example the Soviet system, but we are developing socialism in our country in somewhat different forms.5 This also allowed Yugoslavia to act as a neutral party between the Warsaw Pact and it's military/political rival NATO. This also made the country an object of great interest during the Cold War.6 Tito's most important influence on Yugoslavia, though, was in his quality as a unifier of the myriad ethnic groups. This was achieved through a tempered police state; although his government would be labeled as a totalitarian regime by most Western standards, it was still much more lenient than it's counterparts in Russia and other Soviet Bloc countries. Through this system, Tito was allowed enough direct control to institute social reforms and stabilize the constant competition between ethnic groups in politics and society in general.7 The loss of this balance would take a dire toll later on, and is often cited as a leading factor for the civil wars.
4 5 6 7

Prousis, Theo C. Jelavich, Barbara. History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century. Volume 2 CIA CAESAR Document #22 CIA CAESAR Document #46

5 Following his death, he was succeeded by a conglomerate of leaders from each constituent republic. This system, however, soon began to show flaws. The economic and political power of the republics was drastically unequal. With Serbia rapidly increasing its military and political power, many republics began planning for succession from the Yugoslavian union. In 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia both moved for independence. Serbia, through the Yugoslav national military, soon took retaliatory actions against both republics. As Slovenia was almost entirely populated by ethnic Slovenes, a cease fire was called within 10 days. Croatia, however, had large populations of ethnic Serbs within its borders. Declaring its military actions as being in defense of these groups, Serbia soon began a full scale military assault on the Croatian republic. Bosnia-Hercegovina, while mainly composed of Bosnian Muslims (referred to as Bosniaks), also had large Serb population groups within its borders, and was likewise invaded by the Serbian controlled Yugoslav military.8 The invasions of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina mark the true outbreak of large-scale war during the crisis. As the military invasions themselves were based in nationalism, the effects soon spiraled beyond simply securing land deemed Serbian. While Serbia was traditionally Christian, most Bosnians were Muslim (as mentioned), as well as most Croatians typically being Catholic. This only served to further divide the line between Serbian forces and their targets. Defense of Serbian groups quickly devolved into what has been deemed ethnic cleansing; the forced migration and mass execution of ethnic groups, most notably Bosnian Muslims. These cleansings (never admitted to being genocide) would become a hallmark of wars wracked by crimes against humanity. Only after years of open conflict between the militaries of the independent countries, as well as NATO intervention, was the crises ended.9 To many, this tragedy was little more than the newest example of the Balkans penchant for violence. Long thought of as a region whose history is measured merely in its countless wars, the Yugoslav civil wars seemed to simply be a continuation of this millennia old trend. German statesman
8 9

Jelavich, Barbara Kenney, Padraic. The Burdens of Freedom

6 Otto von Bismarck was often quoted as having said If there is ever another war in Europe, it will come from some damned thing in the Balkans. His statement would become eerily prophetical when the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo started World War I. That Sarajevo would become an epicenter of war at both at the beginning and end of the 20th century only solidified this sentiment of the Balkans as a region prone to outbreaks of violence. The stereotype was neither new nor rare when Bismarck made it famous, and it has only become more acceptable following the Yugoslav wars. This bias only serves to retard the already tedious job of parsing through historiography of Yugoslavia, and the Balkans in general. Although the censorship and alteration of internal histories pales when compared to Stalin era Russia (nearly all censorship falls short of the achievements of Soviet censors), it is still a problem that must be contended with. While Yugoslavia operated outside of the Warsaw Pact and the Com Bloc in general, it was still affected by Marxist-Leninist censorship doctrine.10 This leads to an over reliance on foreign information supposedly free of the rampant censorship, which only replaces it with the bias against the Balkans held by many European historians. Both approaches to research can lead to insightful information, but each much be filtered to get to the underlying facts. However, the fall of the country itself, and the tyrannical regimes that oversaw its death, has opened up a trove of information spanning its entire existence. This combination of inherent bias and lack of reliable research leaves the state of the field with much room to improve upon. Generally, histories of the wars tend to pick a single factor of the outbreak and focus on it as the sole cause. While specifying upon a single topic and researching it in depth is certainly not a bad trait, doing so in the context of using it as the single all-encompassing cause for the crisis is inadequate. The fall of the Communist Bloc, its ensuing economic impact, the loss of Titos unifying leadership, irredentism, and foreign influences leading from WWI are often listed as the key elements, and all are almost equally important to the history. Despite the growing amount of research on each individual subject, details of how these disparate factors interacted with each other to
10

Vucinich, Wayne S. Postwar Yugoslav Historiography.

7 reach the end result is rather scarce. Ties between economic trouble and political unrest, or irredentist movements and ill-planned WWI borders can easily be drawn, but little literature on these interactions exists. This paper seeks to fill this gap, not only by showing the seemingly ignored connections between each facet, but also by exploring the part nationalism played within each. It will also follow in the efforts of current research to undo the years of bias against the region, and help bring a true historiography into the new millennia. In a country as ethnically and religiously diverse as Yugoslavia, nationalism becoming a defining point for population groups certainly makes sense. While unified in the larger sense, most republics were based around their own ethnic group, making the country essentially a collection of nation-states. Slovenia was (and still is) almost entirely populated by ethnic Slovenes, Croatia to a somewhat lesser extent is primarily Croatian, etc. This allowed each group to retain a strong sense of individuality, as well as social and political distinctions. For most of the countrys history, this made nationalism a powerful and pervasive, yet ultimately positive aspect. It served to enable groups of all sizes to rally together and ensure equal rights for themselves, even when compared to larger majorities such as Serbs. In many ways, Yugoslavia appeared as a direct model of ancient Kosovo; a conglomerate of many distinct ethnic groups, all living and cooperating together for mutual benefit. For centuries, the system proved both effective and stable. These ties between ethnic groups, both political and social, have then been integral to the region for centuries.11 That the effect of nationalism would be ignored by most of the historiography, especially when taken in the context of Yugoslavias history, is troubling. I propose that through a combined analysis of all facets of the crisis, along with the context of nationalism, we can come closer to truly understanding the civil wars. While a broad analysis obviously cannot achieve the attention to detail of a focused approach, it is much more useful to the overall understanding of an event. Even a menial effort in taking nationalisms effects on the wars into account leads to the discovery of its true interests. More involved investigation shows how deeply nationalism is rooted in almost every cause; social, political,
11

Karahasan, Dzevad. Sarajevo, Exodus of a City

8 economic, and military issues both before and during the wars are all at least partially based in nationality or ethnicity. By far the most well-known example of nationalisms effects in the war is the Serbian ethnic cleansings of Bosnian Muslims. While originally explained as either being in the defense of local Serb populations or the retaking of ancestral lands, the military actions taken against Bosnian civilian populations soon lost any claim to these justifications. Serbian nationalist parties had at this point achieved massive political and military power within Yugoslavia, giving them free reign once the wars began. These actions were driven by a strong national unity against the Bosniaks, who were also a nearly homogenous group in regards to nationality/ethnicity/religion. As a clearly foreign population living in lands once controlled by the ancient Serb kingdom, they quickly became easy targets for a government and military run by known radicals. The effects of these ethnic cleansings reached levels unseen since WWII, with forced migrations of populations and one of the longest military sieges in history taking place at Sarajevo. What is not quite so well-known is one of the leading reasons for these ethnic cleansings: irredentism. Put simply, irredentism is a call to reclaim ancestral or historical lands. For Serbia, this was the 14th century Serb kingdom, a short lived power within the Balkans region. Regardless of this, the ancient empire had become a point of pride amongst Serbs, especially the region of Kosovo, which had been a cultural center for the kingdom. That current populations in many holdings of the former Serb empire had become multi-ethnic, with some even having Serbs as a minority, did not seem to matter. Kosovo and Bosnia-Hercegovina would become the biggest targets for this movement, and both were glaring examples of the previously mentioned fallacy. Bosnia-Hercegovina was an incredibly diverse republic, with populations of Bosniaks as well as nationalities from across all other Yugoslav republics. This did include Serb populations, but they were far from a majority. Kosovo is even more susceptible to this problem; at the time, the region (part of southern Serbia) was populated by a vast Albanian majority, estimated at roughly 95-98%.12 Despite the fact that the population was
12

Hall, Derek R. Representations of Place: Albania.

9 overwhelmingly of Albanian descent, Kosovo had been a bastion of the ancient Serb empire, and thus was a priority for the irredentist movement. Another problem that worked in conjunction with irredentism was the ill-planned borders of Yugoslavia & its republics. As mentioned, Yugoslavia was officially created following the Allied victory of WWI. However, it was the major Allied nations (US, Britain, & France namely) that would create the borders for both Yugoslavia and the constituent republics. Local ethnic populations were used as the model for these internal borders, but since most of those who made the borders were unfamiliar with the region, they were flawed at best.13 This is quite possibly one of the reasons for Kosovos predominately Albanian population, although it had more subtle effects over the entirety of Yugoslavia. Trying to perfectly match state borders with population groups was essentially impossible, as pocket groups lived within the regions of others. As such, many of these groups found themselves living in the republics of other ethnicities. While not a large problem during Titos reign, this isolation of ethnic populations within other nations would have dire consequences when used by the Serbian government to excuse liberating Serbian groups in other nations. Each country's involvement in the wars can be directly linked to the accuracy of its borders when compared to those of its ethnic populations.14 The solution to this problem was quickly found in ethnic cleansing. This differed from genocide in that not all populations were outright killed, but also simply moved en masse to regions outside of those deemed Serbian. That these forced population movements often resulted in high casualties was of no concern. The Ottoman Empire used similar techniques during WWI against Armenian populations, forcing mass migrations to inhospitable regions. In some cases, UN Peacekeepers stationed in the area would have their buses and other transportation taken by Serbian military units and used to expedite the expulsion of non-Serbs. Bosniaks and Albanians were to be the primary target of these cleansings, though others would feel their effect. The tactic was not unique to
13 14

Sepic, Dragovan. The Question of Yugoslav Union in 1918. National Geographic, Yugoslavia, A House Much Divided.

10 Serbia, thought the Serb use is by far the most famous. The Croatian military, following its rapidly increasing counter attacks against Serbian forces, soon adopted the same tactics, although to a slightly lesser degree. The republic, having suffered considerable damage from the Serb lead Yugoslav national military following its succession, used the ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Croatian territory as a retaliatory act. Within territories both held by Croatia before the wars and captured/retaken during them, the same atrocities committed by Serbian forces would befall civilian groups of Serbs. These crimes were often committed regardless of any lack of connection between the civilians and the military of their respective nation. The cleansings stand as the most extreme manifestation of nationalism during the wars, more than earning their place as the trademark of the crisis.15 Albanian populations throughout Yugoslavia faced all of these problems. As mentioned, Kosovo was almost entirely populated by Albanians. Albania itself had always been independent from the Yugoslav republics despite sharing borders with three of them (Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia), but its populations had settled among the Balkan lands through the centuries. Kosovo happened to be one of such lands, likely in part because of its close proximity. The sudden takeover of the region by Serbian forces, followed quickly by removal of local populations, has thus been compared to the situation in the West Bank.16 Not until its recent independence has Kosovo been able to free itself from the Serbian control, though Serbia still refuses to acknowledge its sovereignty Beyond the crimes of war committed during the wars themselves, nationalism played an integral role in the destabilization of the country before open fighting began. The economies of individual republics were grossly unequal; before the war, Slovenia had the highest GPD of all, nearly three times that of Macedonia, Montenegro, or Bosina-Hercegovina.17 Whether this was due to Slovenia's nearly ethnically homogenous population is not clear, but homogeneity within populations generally tends to help stability. Regardless, this massive economic gap certainly played a part in political tension between the republics. At the time, Eastern Europe was also going through a massive
15 16 17

Kenney, Padraic Kaplan, Robert D. Balkan Ghosts Zizmond, Egon. The Collapse of the Yugoslav Economy.

11 shock therapy to their economies. Following the collapse of Communism across Europe, the countries formerly under the system began to slide into chaos. Yugoslavia had an easier time during this transition thanks to Tito's mixed market system, but could not be spared the collapse of economies across the entire region. The already fragile economy soon began to decay, leading to further unrest amongst the population. The living conditions made necessary by the struggling economy quickly took a toll on the populous. Slavenka Drakulic recalls a Croatian journalist's thoughts on the conditions most citizens lived in at the time: We are like rats in a pot. We fight and bite each other for no reason. 18 This daily unrest only further agitated the already caustic political situation of the late 80's and early 90's. Politics also became strongly influenced by nationalism. Legislative oppression against ethnicities quickly followed events within the wars. Soon after declaring its independence, Croatia passed legislation which stripped many civil rights from its Serb population, quite possibly as further revenge for Serbia's aggression. Serbia itself passed similar laws following its takeover of Kosovo, rendering the massive Albanian populations subservient to the Serb minority.19 Regardless of their severity, these acts made the will of nationalistic movements law, legitimizing their claims of ethnic superiority or right. This also caused irreparable damage to intra-ethnic politics. How could political policies of peace and cooperation be supported when the governments themselves were creating ethnic tensions through new laws. The unequal power share among political groups themselves enabled Slobodan Milosevic, the Butcher of the Balkans, as well as the leader of the Bosnian Serb party Radovan Karadzic, to rise to power. Although the Serbian SDS (Bosnian political party) had only been a single entity within the Bosnian-Hercegovinan government, it soon pushed for illegal autonomy. Milosevic began shipments from the Zastava weapons factories in Serbia in order to arm the national partys forces. Having now attained a small army to rival those of neighboring republics, the military takeover of Bosnia18 19

Drakulic, Slavenka. How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed Hayden, Robert M. Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics.

12 Hercegovina began by securing areas of Serb populations.20 This would soon spread to the entirety of Bosnia, starting the ground war that would lead to the deaths of thousands of ethnic Bosniaks within the country. Foreign interaction with Yugoslavia before and during the wars also fell victim to the effects of nationalism. Even when open military actions began, most foreign powers had little information or understanding on each participant republic, greatly slowing aid. While the United States did begin an air drop campaign to give aid to Bosnian civilians, appreciable military action would not come until the very end of the war. The United States Army had been documenting the escalation, but could not decide on either a reasonable response to the civil wars or an overall strategy for its foreign policy towards the splintering country.21 UN protection forces (UNPROFOR) had previously been called into the region following the aforementioned Serbian aggression towards peacekeepers, but had little authority to do more than set up designated Safe Zones. Srebrenica, one of these safe zones, testifies to the effectiveness of the UNPROFOR's efforts. Armed with a token defense at best, the town was quickly overrun by national Serb forces, and the entire population executed.22 Further UN action was called for throughout the wars, most by civilian leaders seeking protection from the spreading battle lines23, but little was received. In a conflict between two clearly defined sides, choosing the correct one to support can be a fairly easy decision. Yugoslavia offered to such ease. In a situation with such a complexity of parties involved and reasons for involvement, foreign powers simply did not have the ability to quickly respond without the risk of supporting the wrong side. Study of the region by Western powers had mostly been done for reasons directly relating to the Cold War, not out of any actual interest in the country or its myriad ethnic groups. Without this background on the nationalities involved, support could not be given until the conflict was further researched. By the time that foreign powers had enough grasp on the region to officially offer military support, the wars had already began to decline in severity. Though this is more of a failure of international politics than anything, nationality
20 21 22 23

Gjelten, Tom. Sarajevo Daily Blank, Stephen J. Yugoslavia's Wars: The Problem From Hell Padraic, Kenney Selim, Beslagic. Open Letter to the UN Security Council

13 still helped to cripple the military responses of UN and NATO forces. Every facet of the Yugoslav civil wars had been touched by nationalism. Whether in in the underlying causes, the parties involved, or the actions themselves, nationalism played at least some influencing role. Yugoslavia was a country built upon the premise of bringing together all southern Slavic ethnic groups, yet the international community has largely ignored these very same groups as being a factor in the implosion witnessed during the 90's. The Balkans have long been a victim of centuries old ignorance, and this no doubt continues to play a part in the general lack of understanding regarding the complex situation in which the republics found themselves. Only with new research can this glaring oversight be corrected. The importance of understanding the wars, as well as their causes, must be addressed. Such a massive failure on the part of international peace keeping forces proves that further study is necessary. Without learning from the mistake, it is bound to occur again, and the amount of life lost in Yugoslavia due to it cannot be repeated. Albanian and Bosniak populations are still reeling from the damage done during the wars, especially in regions targeted for ethnic cleansing. 24 While the wars in the Middle East (specifically US wars in Afghanistan & Iraq as well as the Russian wars in Chechnya) have begun to be intensely studied, the same cannot be said for Yugoslavia. These wars in particular are of great interest mainly due to the initial failures of conventional militaries to either understand or successfully counter guerrilla forces. Though not for the same reason, the UN/NATO failures to apply much needed aid still shows a vast gap in crisis management knowledge. A similar example would be the current events in Syria and Libya; multiple factions fighting against a military controlled by an oppressive government, including crimes against civilian populations. And just like in Yugoslavia, UN/NATO responses have been either political (such as sanctions & embargoes) or of paltry military counters far from what is necessary. With the advent of these new crises in previously ignored areas, the study of Yugoslavia becomes even more important. Research into counter-guerrilla and counter-terrorist tactics has
24

Sardon, Jean-Paul. Demographic Change in the Balkans Since the End of the 1980's.

14 provided great strides towards solving such problems; proactively studying how to handle international response to wars involving multiple ethnic groups backing numerous national militaries can help to provide faster and more effective responses. As Yugoslavia is by far one of the most complex examples of such a problem, it serves as the perfect subject for study. We have much to learn from the structure and interaction of the nationalities that comprised the former haven of Slavic peoples. Tito's dream may have died with him, but the example it left can benefit future groups and prevent similar atrocities. Truly knowing the extent nationalism played in the dissolution of Yugoslavia is a monumental task, as it requires research across the entire spectrum of the former country. As the wars lasted nearly until the new millennium, it can easily be argued that the time to complete such all-encompassing research simply has not passed. This does not, however, mean that the research should lose precedence simply due to its relative youth. The new wave of historiography has already been established, providing an excellent spring board for further research, and this opportunity should not be passed on. Nationalism, as well as its effects, stands as the perfect solution to understanding the chaotic climate which would ultimately end in the literal shattering of Titos dream. By furthering research in this particular area, the historiography will gain not only a connection between its previously established explanations, but also information hopefully free of the bias which has plagued the region for so long. To fully understand Yugoslavia (and Eastern Europe in general) requires viewing it without the aforementioned bias. Not as a backwater area notable only for a history of violence, or as a transition zone phasing from European to Eastern dominated control, but with the same respect and attention to detail given to the histories of traditional civilized Western European regions. It is in this unbiased approach that this paper is pertinent to the historiography of the region. In the aftermath of the wars, scholars are presented with unprecedented access to the region for study. Without the barriers of Communism and the censorship endemic to it gone, national archives are slowly becoming available to foreign research in their entirety. With much of Eastern Europe joining the European Union, including former republics of Yugoslavia itself, the biased history of the Balkans finally stands to be overturned.

15 The Yugoslav wars serve as a symbolic end to the traditions of the 20th century regarding both Communism and popular beliefs of the region, and current research into the causes of the wars offers the first glimpse of a previously veiled past.

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Bibliography

Primaries:

CIA CAESAR document #22. http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/CAESAR/caesar-22.pdf CIA CAESAR document #46. http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/ESAU/esau-46.pdf Yugoslavia, A House Much Divided. National Geographic Vol. 178, No. 2, August 1990. Yugoslavia's Wars: The Problem From Hell. Blank, Stephen J. U.S. Army War College.

o http://nara-wayback001.us.archive.org/peth04/20041024074606/http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/P UB160.pdf
Beslagic, Selim. Open Letter to the United Nations Security Council. May 25th, 1995.

Secondaries:

Stokes, Gale; Lampe, John; Rusinow, Dennison; Mostov, Julie. Instant History: Understanding the Wars of Yugoslav Succession. Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 1, 1996: 136-160

Hayden, Robert M. Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics. Slavic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1992: 654-673

Kent, Sarah A. Writing the Yugoslav Wars: English-Language Books on Bosnia (1992-1996) and the Challenges of Analyzing Contemporary History. The American Historical Review, Vol. 102, No. 4, 1997: 1085-1114

Sepic, Dragovan. The Question of Yugoslav Union in 1918. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1918-1919: 29-43

Vucinich, Wayne S. Postwar Yugoslav Historiography. The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 23, No. 1,

17
1951: 41-57

Zizmond, Egon. The Collapse of the Yugoslav Economy. Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1992: 101-112 Kenney, Padraic. The Burdens of Freedom. Zed Books Ltd. 2006 Stokes, Gale. The Walls Came Tumbling Down: Collapse and Rebirth in Eastern Europe. Oxford University Press, 1993

Hall, Derek R. Representations of Place: Albania. The Geographical Jounral Bjelic, Dusan I. Exile and Geopolitics of the Balkans. Slavic Review Sardon, Jean-Paul. Demographic Change in the Balkans Since the end of the 1980's. Population: An English Selection

Prousis, Theo C. Class lecture notes Gjelten, Tom. Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper Under Siege. Harper Collins, 1995 Dzevad Karahasan. Sarajevo, Exodus of a City. Kodansha America, Inc. 1994 Kaplan, Robert D. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History. St. Martin's Press, 1993 Drakulic, Slavenka. How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed. Harper Collins, 1993