Thomas Samuel Kuhn (19221996) is one of the most inuential philosophers of science of the twentieth century, perhaps the

most inuential. His 1962 book The Structure of Scientic Revolutions is one of the most cited academic books of all time. Kuhn's contribution to the philosophy of science marked not only a break with several key positivist doctrines, but also inaugurated a new style of philosophy of science that brought it closer to the history of science. His account of the development of science held that science enjoys periods of stable growth punctuated by revisionary revolutions. To this thesis, Kuhn added the controversial incommensurability thesis, that theories from differing periods suffer from certain deep kinds of failure of comparability.
- Alexander Bird, introduction to the Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Thomas Kuhn

When Kuhn's The Structure of Scientic Revolutions was rst published, it was at one point being used as a textbook in seven different departments in my university. Then everybody was talking about Kuhn. One can try to say, "Oh, well, Kuhn, he's not a big representative of philosophy of science, he is a kind of a historian-philosopher".You can say that, but at that time everybody talked about Kuhn.
- Noretta Koertge (philosopher of science) interview 1999

(the Kuhnian revolution in the history and philosophy of science)

1900 1960s 1960s present

positivist/ empiricist philosophy of science

post-positivist philosophy of science

science studies sociology of science feminist science studies constructivist/relativist traditions in the philosophy of science

physics chemistry biology : sociology anthropology psychology history political science :

positivism
natural sciences are superior to social sciences social sciences should aspire to the methods and rigor of the natural sciences

physics chemistry biology : sociology anthropology psychology history political science :

post-Kuhn
social sciences much more important in explaining how and why science works if relativist interpretations of Kuhn are correct, then no way to say that the natural sciences are better than the social sciences -- theyre just different

P1
(normal science)

(revolutionary science)

P2
(normal science)

P1
(normal science)

(revolutionary science)

P2
(normal science)

normal science

foundational assumptions NOT challenged, NOT open to revision scientic activity is primarily a form of puzzle solving within a paradigm failed predictions, unsolved puzzles viewed as anomalies, not as falsifying evidence

P1
(normal science)

(revolutionary science)

P2
(normal science)

normal science

rules and rule-following in his description of normal science and revolutionary science. e.g. hypothetico-deductive conrmation and falsication, other logical/methodogical rules - scientists dont usually follow these kinds of rules

Important: Kuhn downplays the role of

What rules do scientists follow during normal science?

paradigm (broader sense) paradigm (narrow sense)

an exemplar, a specic achievement that serves as a model for how successful science is to be done e.g. Newtons Principia Mathematica, or Einsteins 1905 and 1915 papers introducing the special and general theories of relativity

The rule is to try to approach problem-solving by mimicking as closely as possible the model of the exemplar, the paradigm (narrow sense).

What about revolutionary science?

P1
(normal science)

(revolutionary science)

P2
(normal science)

What about revolutionary science?

P1
(normal science)

(revolutionary science)

P2
(normal science)

revolutionary science

anomalies build up, generate a sense of crisis foundational assumptions are questioned eventually a new approach appears that addresses the anomalies better than the old approach

P1
(normal science)

(revolutionary science)

P2
(normal science)

revolutionary science

the new approach is adopted by a new generation of scientists defenders of the old approach generally dont convert -- they die off when conversions do occur, theyre more like political conversions than logical responses to scientic arguments

P1
(normal science)

(revolutionary science)

P2
(normal science)

revolutionary science

during periods of revolutionary crisis, the paradigms themselves are up for grabs. The models for what counts as good or bad science are contested. This opens the door for external factors (psychological, social, political, institutional) to play a role in theory choice and scientic practice.

(paradigm shift) (revolutionary science)

P1
(normal science)

P2
(normal science)

Examples

(paradigm shift) (revolutionary science)

P1
(normal science)

P2
(normal science)

Aristotelian Physics Newtonian Physics Pre-Darwinian Biology

Newtonian Physics Einsteinian Physics Post-Darwinian Biology

Today ...

(paradigm shift) (revolutionary science)

P1
(normal science)

P2
(normal science)

Aristotelian Physics Newtonian Physics

Pre-Darwinian

incommensurable incommensurable incommensurable

Newtonian Physics Einsteinian Physics

Post-Darwinian

Biology

Biology

Two types of incommensurability (discussed in the reading -- there are others ...): 1. linguistic
- incommensurability with respect to the MEANING of scientic terms and scientic language (scientists across paradigms are speaking a different language)

2. standards

- incommensurability with respect to standards of evidence, what counts as a good scientic explanation, what counts as a good argument, etc. (e.g. whether good science requires causal explanations or not ...)

Kuhn: what follows from incommensurability of paradigms? There is no independent, external standard or perspective from which to judge or compare different paradigms, with respect to which is better or worse, which is closer or farther from the truth, etc.
(successor paradigms are better at solving certain kinds of puzzles, but thats about the extent of the comparison that can be made)

Note:
These views about incommensurability -and especially the relativistic implications -have been very popular OUTSIDE of philosophy, but not very popular INSIDE. Most philosophers of science dont nd the arguments compelling for the more radical forms of incommensurability. e.g. Peter Godfrey-Smith in the reading