WORLD WAR II

Organized Crime?
Part 3: Bombings, Atrocities, & Genocide

By William P. Litynski

From the Grassy Knoll in Prague:

Lone Gunman or Patsy?

The Assassination of Nazi German SS terrorist and Holocaust er etrator !einhard He"drich on #a" $%, &'($

Nazi German SS General !einhard He"drich, acting Protector of Bohemia and #ora)ia and former *irector of the Gesta o, +as assassinated b" ,zech atriots -an .ubi/ and -ozef Gab012 in Prague, ,zechoslo)a2ia 3 resent4da" ,zech !e ublic5 on #a" $%, &'($6 -ozef Gab012 attem ted to assassinate He"drich +ith a Sten sub4machine gun7 ho+e)er, the sub4machine gun 8ammed and failed to fire6 -an .ubi/ then thre+ a bomb 3a con)erted anti4tan2 mine5 at the rear of the car as the car sto ed7 the e9 losion +ounded He"drich6 He"drich died of his +ounds in Prague on -une (, &'($6 ,zech atriots -an .ubi/ and -ozef Gab012 died inside ,hurch of St6 ,"ril and St6 #ethodious in !esslo)a Street in Prague during a shootout +ith the Nazi SS on -une &:, &'($6

!einhard He"drich;s car 3left5 in the streets of Prague, ,zechoslo)a2ia shortl" after the assassination attem t

Nazi SS General !einhard He"drich 3abo)e5 died of his +ounds in Prague on June 4, 19427 the Battle of #id+a" bet+een <m erial -a an and America began on June 4, 19426 !einhard He"drich attended the =annsee ,onference, a conference held to determine the fate of >uro ean -e+s, on -anuar" $?, &'($6

The =annsee ,onference, a conference held to determine the fate of >uro ean -e+s, +as held in suburban Berlin on January 20, 19426 @ifteen high4ran2ing Nazi Part" and German go)ernment officials gathered at a )illa in the Berlin suburb of =annsee to discuss and coordinate the im lementation of +hat the" called the A@inal Solution of the -e+ish Buestion6C Among the indi)iduals +ho attended the conference +ere !einhard He"drich, Adolf >ichmann, and Heinrich #Dller6

Map used to illustrate the Stahlecker's report to Heydrich on January 31, 1 !". #rom the $.S. Holocaust Museum% Map &rom Stahlecker's report entitled 'Je(ish )*ecutions +arried ,ut -y )insat./ruppe 01 and stamped 2Secret 3eich Matter.2 4t sho(s the num-er o& Je(s e*ecuted in the Baltic States and Belarus in 1 !1. 5he le/end at the -ottom states that 2the estimated num-er o& Je(s still on hand is 1"6,777.2 )stonia is marked as 28uden&rei2. Held in the Lat9ian State Historical 0rchi9es, 3i/a. :Source% $nited States Holocaust Memorial Museum;

=annsee ,onference and the E@inal SolutionE Fn -anuar" $?, &'($, &G high4ran2ing Nazi Part" and German go)ernment officials gathered at a )illa in the Berlin suburb of =annsee to discuss and coordinate the im lementation of +hat the" called the E@inal Solution of the -e+ish Buestion6E !e resenting the SS at the meeting +ere: SS General !einhard He"drich, the chief of the !eich Securit" #ain Fffice 3Reichssicherheitshauptamt-RSHA5 and one of Reichsfhrer-SS 3SS chief5 Heinrich HimmlerHs to de uties7 SS #a8or General Heinrich #Dller, chief of !SHA *e artment <I 3Gesta o57 SS Jieutenant ,olonel Adolf >ichmann, chief of the !SHA *e artment <I B ( 3-e+ish Affairs57 SS ,olonel >berhard SchKngarth, commander of the !SHA field office for the Go)ernment General in .ra2o+, Poland7 SS #a8or !udolf Jange, commander of !SHA >insatz2ommando $, de lo"ed in Jat)ia in the autumn of &'(&7 and SS #a8or General Ftto Hofmann, the chief of SS !ace and Settlement #ain Fffice6 !e resenting the agencies of the State +ere: State Secretar" !oland @reisler 3#inistr" of -ustice57 #inisterial *irector =ilhelm .ritzinger 3!eich ,abinet57 State Secretar" Alfred #e"er 3!eich #inistr" for the Fccu ied >astern Territories4German4occu ied LSS!57 #inisterial *irector Georg Jeibrandt 3!eich #inistr" for the Fccu ied >astern Territories57 Lndersecretar" of State #artin Juther 3@oreign Fffice57 State Secretar" =ilhelm Stuc2art 3#inistr" of the <nterior57 State Secretar" >rich Naumann 3Fffice of Pleni otentiar" for the @our4Mear Plan57 State Secretar" -osef BDhler 3Fffice of the Go)ernment of the Go)ernor General4German4 occu ied Poland57 and #inisterial *irector Gerhard .lo fer 3Nazi Part" ,hanceller"56 The E@inal SolutionE +as the code name for the s"stematic, deliberate, h"sical annihilation of the >uro ean -e+s6 At some still undetermined time in &'(&, Hitler authorized this >uro ean4+ide scheme for mass murder6 He"drich con)ened the =annsee ,onference 3&5 to inform and secure su ort from go)ernment ministries and other interested agencies rele)ant to the im lementation of the A@inal Solution,C and 3$5 to disclose to the artici ants that Hitler himself had tas2ed He"drich and the !SHA +ith coordinating the o eration6 The men at the table did not deliberate +hether such a lan should be underta2en, but instead discussed the im lementation of a olic" decision that had alread" been made at the highest le)el of the Nazi regime6 At the time of the =annsee ,onference, most artici ants +ere alread" a+are that the National Socialist regime had engaged in mass murder of -e+s and other ci)ilians in the German4occu ied areas of the So)iet Lnion and in Serbia6 Some had learned of the actions of the >insatzgru en and other olice and militar" units, +hich +ere alread" slaughtering tens of thousands of -e+s in the German4 occu ied So)iet Lnion6 Fthers +ere a+are that units of the German Arm" and the SS and olice +ere 2illing -e+s in Serbia6 None of the officials resent at the meeting ob8ected to the @inal Solution olic" that He"drich announced6 Not resent at the meeting +ere re resentati)es of the German Armed @orces 3 Wehrmacht5 and the !eich !ailroads 3Reichsbahn5 in the German #inistr" of Trans ortation6 The SS and olice had alread" negotiated agreements +ith the German Arm" High ,ommand on the murder of ci)ilians, including So)iet -e+s, in the s ring of &'(&, rior to the in)asion of the So)iet Lnion6 <n late Se tember &'(&, Hitler had authorized the !eich !ailroads to trans ort German, Austrian, and ,zech -e+s to locations in German4occu ied Poland and the German4occu ied So)iet Lnion, +here German authorities +ould 2ill the o)er+helming ma8orit" of them6 He"drich indicated that a ro9imatel" &&,???,??? -e+s in >uro e +ould fall under the ro)isions of the E@inal Solution6E <n this figure, he included not onl" -e+s residing in A9is4controlled >uro e, but also the -e+ish o ulations of the Lnited .ingdom, and the neutral nations 3S+itzerland, <reland, S+eden, S ain, Portugal, and >uro ean Tur2e"56 @or -e+s residing in the Greater German !eich and holding the status of sub8ects of the German !eich, the Nuremberg Ja+s +ould ser)e as a basis for determining +ho +as a -e+6 He"drich announced that Aduring the course of the @inal Solution, the -e+s +ill be de lo"ed under a ro riate su er)ision at a suitable form of labor de lo"ment in the >ast6 <n large labor columns, se arated b" gender, able4bodied -e+s +ill be brought to those regions to build roads, +hereb" a large number +ill doubtlessl" be lost through natural reduction6 An" final remnant that sur)i)es +ill doubtless consist of the elements most ca able of resistance6 The" must be dealt +ith a ro riatel", since, re resenting the fruit of natural selection, the" are to be regarded as the core of a ne+ -e+ish re)i)al6C The artici ants discussed a number of other issues raised b" the ne+ olic", including the establishment of the Theresienstadt cam 4 ghetto as a destination for elderl" -e+s as +ell -e+s +ho +ere disabled or decorated in =orld =ar <, the deferment until after the +ar of A@inal SolutionC measures against -e+s married to non4-e+s or ersons of mi9ed descent as defined b" the Nuremberg la+s, ros ects for inducing German"Hs A9is artners to gi)e u their -e+ish o ulations, and re arator" measures for the Ae)acuations6C *es ite the eu hemisms +hich a eared in the rotocols of the meeting, the aim of the =annsee ,onference +as clear to its artici ants: to further the coordination of a olic" aimed at the h"sical annihilation of the >uro ean -e+s6 Source: htt :NN+++6ushmm6orgN+lcNenNarticle6 h O#odule<dP&???G(%%

Concentration Camps & Extermination of Jews, o!es, & C"i!dren

0merican soldiers (alkin/ past ro(s and ro(s o& corpses at the <ordhausen concentration camp 8ust a&ter its li-eration in <ordhausen, =ermany in 0pril 1 !>. 0n estimated si* million Je(s as (ell as millions o& people o& 9arious nationalities, includin/ =ermans, Poles, Hun/arians, #rench, 3ussians, $kranians, Bel/ians, and ?utch, died in 9arious concentration camps at the hands o& 4.=. #ar-en chemical cartel, 3eichs-ank :=ermany@s central -ank;, the <ational Socialist =erman Workers@ Party, and the =estapoASchutsta&&el death sBuads. :Photo -y John #loreaC5ime Li&e;

=eneral =eor/e S. Patton, =eneral ?(i/ht )isenho(er, and the $.S. 0rmy e*amine the corpses inside ,hrdru& concentration camp in =otha, =ermany on 0pril 1", 1 !>. 0n estimated si* million Je(s as (ell as millions o& people o& 9arious nationalities, includin/ =ermans, Poles, Hun/arians, #rench, 3ussians, and ?utch, died in 9arious concentration camps at the hands o& 4.=. #ar-en chemical cartel, 3eichs-ank :=ermany@s central -ank;, the <ational Socialist =erman Workers@ Party, and the =estapoASchutsta&&el death sBuads. Ma* War-ur/ ser9ed as a director o& 4.=. #ar-enD Ma* War-ur/ (as a Je(ish -anker &rom Ham-ur/, =ermany (ho ser9ed as the head o& M.M. War-ur/ E +o. Ma* War-ur/@s -rother Paul War-ur/ (as the &ounder o& the #ederal 3eser9e. :<ational 0rchi9es;

AFn the e)e of =orld =ar << the German chemical com le9 of <6G6 @arben +as the largest chemical manufacturing enter rise in the +orld, +ith e9traordinar" olitical and economic o+er and influence +ithin the Hitlerian Nazi state6 <6 G6 has been a tl" described as Ea state +ithin a state6E The @arben cartel dated from &'$G, +hen organizing genius Hermann Schmitz 3+ith =all Street financial assistance5 created the su er4giant chemical enter rise out of si9 alread" giant German chemical com anies Q Badische Anilin, Ba"er, Agfa, Hoechst, =eiler4ter4#eer, and Griesheim4>le2tron6 These com anies +ere merged to become <nternationale Gesellschaft @arbenindustrie A6G6 Q or <6G6 @arben for short6 T+ent" "ears later the same Hermann Schmitz +as ut on trial at Nuremberg for +ar crimes committed b" the <6 G6 cartel6 Fther <6 G6 @arben directors +ere laced on trial but the American affiliates of <6 G6 @arben and the American directors of <6 G6 itself +ere Ruietl" forgotten7 the truth +as buried in the archi)es6 <t is these L6S6 connections in =all Street that concern us6 =ithout the ca ital su lied b" =all Street, there +ould ha)e been no <6 G6 @arben in the first lace and almost certainl" no Adolf Hitler and =orld =ar <<6 German ban2ers on the @arben Aufsichsrat 3the su er)isor" Board of *irectors5 in the late &'$?s included the Hamburg ban2er #a9 =arburg, +hose brother Paul =arburg +as a founder of the @ederal !eser)e S"stem in the Lnited States6 Not coincidentall", Paul =arburg +as also on the board of American <6 G6, @arbenHs +holl" o+ned L6S6 subsidiar"6 <n addition to #a9 =arburg and Hermann Schmitz, the guiding hand in the creation of the @arben em ire, the earl" @arben Iorstand included ,arl Bosch, @ritz ter #eer, .urt F enheim and George )on Schnitzler6 All e9ce t #a9 =arburg +ere charged as A+ar criminalsC after =orld =ar <<6C S Anton" ,6 Sutton, Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler, ,ha ter $ 3The >m ire of <6G6 @arben5

=eneral ?(i/ht )isenho(er and the $.S. 0rmy e*amine the corpses inside ,hrdru& concentration camp in =otha, =ermany on 0pril 1", 1 !>.

3o(s o& -odies o& dead inmates &ill the yard o& La/er <ordhausen, a =estapo concentration camp in =ermany on 0pril 1", 1 !>. 5his photo sho(s less than hal& o& the -odies o& the se9eral hundred inmates (ho died o& star9ation or (ere shot -y =estapo men. :Photo% <ational 0rchi9es;

=erman ci9ilians remo9e piles o& corpses at the <ordhausen concentration camp -y ad9ancin/ 0llied troops in <ordhausen, =ermany in 0pril 1 !>. :Photo -y John #loreaC5ime Li&e;

20 truck load o& -odies o& prisoners o& the <a.is, in the Buchen(ald concentration camp at Weimar, =ermany. 5he -odies (ere a-out to -e disposed o& -y -urnin/ (hen the camp (as captured -y troops o& the 3rd $.S. 0rmy.2 Photo taken on 0pril 1!, 1 !>. :Photo -y Pri9ate #irst +lass W. +hichersky, $.S. 0rmy, <ational 0rchi9es;

British soldiers su er)ise a +or2 detail in +hich female Nazi German SS guards bur" the bodies of concentration cam )ictims at Bergen4Belsen ,oncentration ,am on A ril $:, &'(G6 3Photo: htt :NN+++6mi9edmartialarts6comNmma6cfmOgoPforum6 osts&forumP$&threadP$?G&?$T& ageP&5

4n 0pril 1 !>, =erman male ci9ilians in <ordhausen, =ermany are -ein/ &orced -y the 0llies to di/ /ra9es &or the prisoners killed at the <ordhausen concentration camp. :Photo% John #loreaCLi&e 4ma/es;

20 =erman /irl is o9ercome as she (alks past the e*humed -odies o& some o& the 677 sla9e (orkers murdered -y SS /uards near <amerin/, =ermany, and laid here so that to(nspeople may 9ie( the (ork o& their <a.i leaders.2 :Photo -y +pl. )d(ard Bel&er. May 1F, 1 !>; 111AS+A"G!6 >. :(("H163.8p/; :Photo% <ational 0rchi9es;

Iictims o& <ational Socialism and <a.i =erman terrorism

Nazi German officers forcibl" se arate -e+ish men and +omen at a train station ad8acent to a concentration cam 6

The infamous Ausch+itz4Bir2enau ,oncentration ,am in Poland

Je(s &rom the Warsa( /hetto at the $mschla/plat. on their (ay to the 5re-linka death camp :4P<;.

Je(s in narro(A/au/e cars on their (ay to the death camp at +heJmno.

A Buchen+ald SS guard a ears in front of tortured inmates at Buchen+ald ,oncentration ,am 6 3!i82sinstituut )oor Forlogsdocumentatie, Amsterdam5

APolitical o+er gro+s out of the barrel of a gun6C S #ao Tse4tung

0 <a.i =erman soldier is seen preparin/ to shoot the last Je( le&t ali9e in Iinica, $kraine in 1 !1. :Photo% Li-rary o& +on/ress;

)*ecutions o& Kie9 Je(s -y =erman army mo-ile killin/ units :)insat./ruppen; near 49an/orod $kraine. 5he photo (as mailed &rom the )astern #ront to =ermany and intercepted at a Warsa( post o&&ice -y a mem-er o& the Polish resistance collectin/ documentation on <a.i (ar crimes. 5he ori/inal print (as o(ned -y 5adeus. Ma.ur and Jer.y 5omas.e(ski and no( resides in Historical 0rchi9es in Warsa(. 5he ori/inal =erman inscription on the -ack o& the photo/raph reads, '$kraine 1 !", Je(ish 0ction LoperationM, 49an/orod.1

<a.i =erman occupation &orces han/ So9iet partisans in January 1 !3. :Photo% =erman #ederal 0rchi9es;

The Stairs of *eath at #authausen ,oncentration ,am near #authausen, Austria 3Photo: German @ederal Archi)es5 3Note: The &$4hour da"s of hard h"sical labor on a meager diet +ere lethal for man" of the inmates6 But there +ere other more direct methods of 2illing6 The UStairs of *eath; in)ol)ed long lines of risoners carr"ing G?2g granite bloc2s u the stairs6 Those +ho stumbled +ould fall on the risoners follo+ing them, creating a domino effect that 2illed or in8ured dozens65

Nazi SS ,hief Heinrich Himmler e9amines a grou of risoners at a concentration cam during =orld =ar <<6

Nazi German firing sRuads 2illing a grou of risoners

A ma of Nazi German concentration cam s in Poland during =orld =ar <<

Warsaw #"etto $prising %&'()*

0 /roup o& Je(s, includin/ (omen and children, is escorted &rom the Warsa( =hetto in Warsa(, Poland -y <a.i =erman soldiers on 0pril 1 , 1 !3, the &irst day o& the Warsa( =hetto $prisin/. 5he Warsa( =hetto $prisin/ lasted &rom 0pril 1 , 1 !3 to May 1G, 1 !3.

Warsa( =hetto $prisin/ N Photo &rom JOr/en Stroop 3eport to Heinrich Himmler &rom May 1 !3. 5he ori/inal =erman caption reads% '0skaris used durin/ the operation1. 5he unit trained in 9illa/e o& 5ra(niki (as made up o& $krainians, 3ussians, Belorussians, Poles, )stonians, Lithuanians, Lat9ians, ethnic =ermans, Ka.akhs and 5artars.

Je(ish ci9ilians surrender to the <a.i =erman army a&ter Je(s attempted to resist the <a.i =erman army in a &ailed uprisin/ durin/ the destruction o& the Warsa( =hetto in Warsa(, Poland in 0prilAMay 1 !3. 0n estimated G million Je(s as (ell as millions o& Poles and =ermans (ere e*terminated in concentration camps durin/ World War 44. :Photo% <ational 0rchi9es;

=affen SS soldier guards -e+s that +ere ca tured during the =arsa+ Ghetto L rising in &'(36 3Photo: Mad Iashem Photo Archi)es5

-e+s that +ere ca tured during the u rising being ta2en to the Lmschlag latz 3transfer oint56 3Photo: Mad Iashem Photo Archi)es5

=affen SS soldiers remo)e -e+s from a building +here the" had ta2en refuge during the =arsa+ Ghetto L rising in &'(36 3Photo: Mad Iashem Photo Archi)es5

-e+s ca tured during the liRuidation of the =arsa+ Ghetto in &'(3 are gathered in the Lmschlag latz 3transfer oint5 on their +a" to being de orted to the death cam 6 3Photo: Mad Iashem Photo Archi)es5

A -e+ish erson lies unconscious on a side+al2 in the =arsa+ Ghetto in &'(&6

Warsa( =hetto in June 1 !" :Photo% =erman #ederal 0rchi9es;

Warsa( =hetto in June 1 !"% Je(ish police o&&icers /uard an access point &rom outside the /hetto. :Photo% =erman #ederal 0rchi9es;

Nazi German soldiers o)ersee the de ortation of -e+s from the .ra2o+ Ghetto in .ra2o+, Poland in #arch &'(36

>ntrance to the .ra2o+ Ghetto in circa &'(&

0n au*iliary Je(ish police &orce kept order in the Lod. =hetto :the secondAlar/est Je(ish /hetto located in Lod., Poland; and (as (as used -y the =ermans to or/anise the selection o& people &or deportation.

0 Je(ish policeman in the Warsa( =hetto salutes the photo/rapher. :Photo% Pad Iashem Photo 0rchi9es;

0 se/re/ated trolley car reser9ed &or Je(s operate inside the Warsa( =hetto. :Photo% Pad Iashem Photo 0rchi9es;

0 cro(ded street scene in the Warsa( =hetto captured &rom inside a mo9in/ 9ehicle. :Photo% Pad Iashem Photo 0rchi9es;

0 Je(ish police o&&icer directs tra&&ic in the Warsa( =hetto on May ">, 1 !1. :Photo% Bundesarchi9C=erman #ederal 0rchi9es;

0n SS Ser/eant :,-erschar&uehrer; interro/ates reli/ious Je(s captured durin/ the suppression o& the Warsa( =hetto $prisin/ in 1 !3. 5he ori/inal =erman caption reads% 2Je(ish ra--is.2 :Photo% 5he Stroop 3eportCSS Ma8or =eneral Juer/en Stroop; http%CCresources.ushmm.or/CinBueryCuiaHdoc.phpCphotosCG!3 QhrRnull

Jeft hoto: =itold Pilec2i 3#a" &3, &'?&S#a" $G, &'(:5 +as a Polish arm" officer +ho )olunteered to infiltrate Ausch+itz4 Bir2enau ,oncentration ,am in Poland and conduct es ionage inside Ausch+itz during =orld =ar <<6 Pilec2i AinfiltratedC Ausch+itz b" deliberatel" getting himself arrested b" the Nazis during a =arsa+ street roundu on Se tember &', &'(?6 Pilec2i ro)ided the Polish go)ernment4in4e9ile a detailed account of Nazi German atrocities that occurred inside Ausch+itz6 Pilec2i esca ed from Ausch+itz in &'(3 and fought against the Nazi German arm" during the =arsa+ L rising in August &'((6 !ight hoto: AThe #ass >9termination of -e+s in German Fccu ied PolandC +as a re ort ublished b" the #inistr" of @oreign Affairs of the !e ublic of Poland in Jondon in &'($6 The information inside the re ort +as ro)ided b" =itold Pilec2i6

Ausch+itz concentration cam

hotos of =itold Pilec2i in &'(&6

,a tain =itold Pilec2i stands on the doc2et during a ,ommunist Asho+ trialC in =arsa+, ,ommunist Poland in #arch &'(:6 Pilec2i +as sentenced to death for committing crimes against the ,ommunist Polish regime and es ionage7 Pilec2i +as e9ecuted b" the Polish ,ommunist go)ernment on #a" $G, &'(:6

Ausch+itz concentration cam sur)i)or and Polish atriot =itold Pilec2i a in &'(%6

ears in a rison hoto at #o2otV+ rison in Poland

AGerman policy to ar!s the Polish people as simple in its ruthlessness" #t aime! at the complete annihilation o$ the more outstan!ing elements o$ the Polish nation" %he rest as to &e re!uce! to uncon!itional ser'itu!e $or the greater glory o$ the (eich" Pri'ate property as !eli&erately !estroye!" Factories, in!ustry, e'en mo!ern &uil!ings an! &loc)s o$ $lats &elonging to in!i'i!uals ere ta)en o'er &y the Germans" *'ery means o$ e!ucation as a&olishe!" +ni'ersities ere close!, secon!ary schools !is&an!e!" ,nly lo er 'ocational schools ere tolerate! so that &oys an! girls coul! learn some manual tra!eGermany as in nee! o$ traine! or)ers" The "outh of Poland +ould ha)e been entirel" de ri)ed of education if it +ere not for the initiati)e of the Polish eo le themsel)es, +ho, at the ris2 of great sacrifice and danger, had organised clandestine schooling6 +n!er German occupation, a Pole ha! no right to o n property, no right to participate in any sort o$ cultural acti'ity, no right to stu!y" .e as only to s eat an! la&our un!er the super'ision o$ German sla'e-!ri'ers" *'en so he coul! ne'er $eel sa$e or &e sure to sur'i'e" %his inclu!e! e'ery&o!y, not only the mem&ers o$ the +n!ergroun! organisation, &ut also those hose e/istence as per$ectly regular $rom the German point o$ 'ie " %here as no $amily in Polan! that !i! not su$$er, not one that !i! not mourn some&o!y !ear, either )ille! or imprisone! or hel! in a concentration camp" All this is difficult to imagine for an"one +ho +as not then in Poland6 Fnl" those +ho, da" after da", li)ed through the traged" can understand6 =e in Poland ne)er met the so4called Agood Germans6C To+ards us the" +ere al+a"s ruthless t"rants and murderers, into9icated +ith )ictor" and out to drain e)er" dro of rofit from our sub8ugated countr"6C S The Secret Army b" General Tadeusz Bor4.omoro+s2i 3 ublished in &'G?5, 6 3: AThe main to ic of our con)ersations +as, ho+e)er, the Ruestion of the German olic" of hostages6 The Germans had t+o aims in im osing this s"stem of communal res onsibilit"6 <n the first lace, the" tried to force the members of the Lnderground to consider the fight not +orth the a alling cost6 And, secondl", the" e9 ected to dri)e a +edge bet+een the o ulation and the Lnderground7 to discredit the leaders of the latter in the e"es of the nation b" re resenting them as res onsible for the mass re risals6 %error is, ho e'er, a !angerous eapon" 0ass reprisals amounte! to the in!iscriminate use o$ terror hich a$$ecte! e'ery&o!y an! pro!uce! a $eeling o$ uni'ersal !anger in!epen!ent o$ hether the in!i'i!ual as playing an acti'e part in the $ight or not" #t as all a matter o$ luc), since the choice o$ su&1ects $or the arrests, !eportations to concentration camps an! e/ecutions as ma!e ithout the slightest !iscrimination" <n fact, a member of a secret organisation could actuall" feel safer than others in the circumstances6 He had the rotection of his organisation;s intelligence ser)ice, +hich +as often in a osition to +arn him of a roaching danger, and, +ith his false documents, he +as much safer6 The method of im osing mass res onsibilit", stri2ing as it did at the o ulation as a +hole, roduced a result Ruite o osite to the one intended6 <t de)elo ed a strong tendenc" to strengthen the bond uniting the +hole nation, increased the general feeling of solidarit" and o ened all e"es to the necessit" for uni)ersal co4 o eration6 The results thus roduced +ere ideal for the de)elo ment of cons irac"6 Fn the other hand, these articular German methods forced us to act carefull" and to ado t +ides read recautions6 The rule that oison and not re)ol)ers should be used in self4 defence, came as a necessar" conseRuence6 <n such circumstances, a man is not rotecting his o+n life so much as those of the others +hom he might betra" under torture6 The second rinci le +hich had constantl" to be borne in mind +as that e)er" act directed against the Germans had to be of )ital im ortance and be necessitated b" a strong reason clearl" understandable to e)er" Pole6 =e +ere forced to a)oid an" action dictated merel" b" desire for re)enge or ins ired b" hatred and de ri)ed of an" dee er militar" significance6 A re resentati)e t" e of +or2 underta2en b" the Lnderground during the first eriod of occu ation +as sabotage on the rail+a"s6 The number of rail+a" engines to be sabotaged each month +as fi9ed b" headRuarters in =arsa+ in a monthl" rogramme6 <t became necessar" to create s ecial units for that ur ose6 S ecial instructions for this +or2 +ere de)elo ed and rinted +ith the collaboration of engine4dri)ers and engineers6 Fnl" such methods as could not be ro)ed to ha)e been sabotage +ere ado ted, and the" +ere graduall" im ro)ed u on6 <n &'(?, the a)erage eriod of disablement for each engine damaged +as fourteen hours7 in &'($ the eriod had risen to fi)e da"s7 b" &'(3 to fourteen da"s6 A s eciall" re ared chemical roduct +as added to the grease in the greasing4bo96 Fnl" ten da"s later, our obser)ers in rail+a" maintenance sho s all o)er Poland re orted that about $?? engines had had to be +ithdra+n from circulation, some for three da"s, some for three months, according to ho+ soon the engine4dri)er in each case realised that something +as out of order6 The Germans +ere Ruite unable to diagnose the cause6 @or nearl" three +ee2s, rail traffic in Poland +as com letel" disorganised7 a large number of trains had to be +ithdra+n, and dela"s in the timetable often assed the t+ent"4four hour mar26 Another rail+a" ob8ecti)e +as the material being sent b" !ussia across Poland to German"6 At that time !ussia +as hel ing Hitler considerabl" in his fight against the =est6 !ussia;s main e9 orts to German" +ere oil, coal, cotton +astes and ores6 Fne of the regular lines used for this traffic ran through Przem"sl, ,raco+ and Breslau S that is to sa", across m" region6 The Germans had de)elo ed this line and made it ca able of an increased turno)er in order to get the su lies through more Ruic2l"6 Przem"sl Station 3on the demarcation line fi9ed b" the #oloto)4!ibbentro Agreement5 had been rebuilt and enlarged, and here, therefore, the Germans had made s ecial installations for loading su lies6 T+o or three trains of etrol +agons assed along the line e)er" da"6 @or the destruction of these, +e used incendiar" bombs of our o+n roduction6 A container charged +ith e9 losi)e +as fi9ed on a neumatic le)er6 Fne mo)ement of the hand +as sufficient to fi9 the bomb firml" under the tan24car6 A some+hat rimiti)e cloc2+or2 attachment fi9ed the moment of detonation7 it +as +or2ed b" the rh"thm of the train going o)er slee ers6 Thus +e could time the distance from Przem"sl at +hich the e9 losion +ould ta2e lace6 Germans ne)er 2ne+ +here the sabotage had originated, in Poland or German"6C S The Secret Army b" General Tadeusz Bor4.omoro+s2i 3 ublished in &'G?5, 6 3:4(?

AThe rinci le of collecti)e res onsibilit" im osed b" the Germans u on the o ulation for e)er" act of resistance or sabotage +hich +e carried out forced us to ado t methods of attac2 +hich +ould, so far as ossible, a)oiR these German mass re risals on the ci)ilian o ulation6 =e had, too, to establish a balance bet+een our o+n losses and those +e inflicted u on the enem"6 But the end of &'($ mar2ed a turning4 oint in the ci)ilian state of mind6 The change +as not onl" due to the situation on the )arious +ar fronts7 its immediate cause +as in Poland ro er: # re$er to the massacres o$ the Je s" @rom the )er" beginning, German olic" had been mo)ing steadil" and s"stematicall" to+ards the e9termination of the -e+s in Poland4a communit" of about 3W million souls6 <mmediatel" after the Se tember, &'3', cam aign all -e+s +ere obliged to +ear an armband sho+ing the star of *a)id6 <n *ecember, &'3', the" +ere ordered to settle in certain s ecified districts, thus re)i)ing the idea of the medice)al Ghetto6 Fn No)ember &(th, &'(?, the =arsa+ Ghetto +as closed6 2ny Je $oun! &eyon! its con$ines as shot on the spot" %he Je ish !istricts ha! &een surroun!e! &y alls 3 $eet high an! German sentries ere poste! at the $e entrances" Signs +ere erected, bearing the inscri tion: ES otted T" hus6 >ntr" and e9it forbidden6E The ne9t Nazi ste +as the liRuidation of communities of -e+s in the smaller to+ns and their transfer to the Ghettos of the larger to+ns6 At the beginning of &'($, the =arsa+ Ghetto, +hich +as a )er" small area, held o)er (??,??? -e+s6 The houses +ere indescribabl" o)ercro+ded, +ith as man" as fifteen eo le to a room6 The food rations allo+ed them b" the Germans consisted of (W lb6 of bread er month4nothing else6 %hus the Je ish population as con!emne! to !eath &y star'ation" Human life, ho+e)er, is stronger than the most hea)il" armed guards, and food tric2led into the Ghetto b" the most fantastic channels7 through the cellars of ad8oining houses, through the se+ers, and through ga s +hich +ere torn in the Ghetto +alls almost e)er" night6 But all this smuggling in of food +as utterl" insufficient, and a alling miser", +ant and hunger reigned +ithin6 Trams +hich had to ass through the Ghetto +ere allo+ed to 2ee to their route at first, although the" +ere not ermitted to sto in the Ghetto region6 This ga)e me an o ortunit" to see conditions for m"self on se)eral occasions6 The general im ression +as one of s+arming humanit"6 The a earance of a uniformed German among the seething mass roduced indescribable anic6 *ri)en b" fear, the cro+d +ould tr" to rush a+a" and, almost miraculousl", the street became deserted6 The mortalit" rate +as so high that < often sa+ cor ses l"ing in the street, co)ered +ith ne+s a ers6 There the" +ould remain till the munici al rubbish carts came and cleared them a+a" the ne9t morning6 The area +as com letel" blac2ed out at night as the electric current +as cut off6 Before the +ar, the -e+ish districts in Poland had been inhabited b" onl" the oorest -e+s6 The Germans had steadil" increased their miser" and +ant6 And no+ to these districts +ere dri)en -e+ish doctors, attorne"s, industrialists and scholars6 <n the course of months, the Ghetto in =arsa+ became almost hermeticall" sealed from the outside +orld6 Ier" occasionall", under the s ur of star)ation, an indi)idual -e+ +ould succeed in esca ing +hen hunger o)ercame fear of death S for it +as certain death for an" -e+ to fall into German hands outside the Ghetto6C S The Secret Army b" General Tadeusz Bor4.omoro+s2i 3 ublished in &'G?5, 6 'G4'T AThe EliRuidationE of the Ghetto began +ith the a earance of official notices announcing that b" order of the German authorities all -e+s li)ing in =arsa+, regardless of se9 or age, E+ere to be trans orted to the east6E >)er" erson de orted +as ermitted to ta2e all )aluables such as mone", 8e+eller", gold, etc6 This sounded sus icious4doubl" so since, according to re)ious German orders, no -e+ +as allo+ed to be in ossession of an" gold6 The +ild and indiscriminate firing +hich had gone on all night +as designed solel" to terrorise the -e+s into com lete sub8ection6 To+ards noon, mass hunts began6 Small grou s, +hen rounded u , +ere dri)en to the sRuare near Sta+2i Street, ad8oining a rail+a" siding6 Hurried and 8ostled, the -e+s +ere cro+ded into closed lorries, +hich +ere then secured b" barbed +ire6 <n this +a", G,??? eo le +ere ta2en a+a" in one da"6 =e +ere to learn that this +as to be a dail" e)ent6 <n the Ghetto, the anic4stric2en -e+s fled from lace to lace, from street to street, see2ing shelter in the cellars6 #an" thousands s ent the night in the s"nagogues, +ailing and ra"ing6 The horror of it +as increased because the Germans endea)oured to force the s eciall" organised -e+ish olice force to assist in the +or26 The ,hairman of the -e+ish ,ouncil in the Ghetto, ,zernia2o+, +ho +as also chief of the olice force, +as instructed b" the Germans to assemble a certain number of his co4religionists in the so4called Lmschlag Platz, near Sta+2i Street, e)er" da"6 Ln+illing to assist in the e9termination of his fello+ -e+s, ,zernia2o+ oisoned himself +ith otassium c"anide6 The names of concentration cam s such as Belzec, Sobibor and so on, began to be mentioned6 !umours arose among the -e+s that those +ho had alread" left had been gi)en +or2, food and housing accommodation6 These rumours +ere clearl" started b" the Germans in order to reduce their )ictims to docilit"6 As earl" as -ul" $'th +e had learned from the re orts of railroad +or2ers that the trans orts +ere being sent to the concentration cam at Treblin2a and that there the -e+s disa eared +ithout trace6 There could be no further doubt this time that the de ortations +ere but a relude to e9termination6C S The Secret Army b" General Tadeusz Bor4.omoro+s2i 3 ublished in &'G?5, 6 ''
AB" August :th X, &'($Y, &G?,??? -e+s had been de orted from the =arsa+ Ghetto6 Fne month after the beginning of the massacre +e 2ne+ all the details concerning their fate, des ite the e9ce tional measures ta2en b" the Germans to re)ent an" lea2age of information from the concentration cam at Treblin2a6 At first +e onl" recei)ed fragments of ne+s, such as that assenger trains +ere no longer ermitted to sto at Treblin2a Station6 Jater, the +hole stor" reached us6 Train loads of -e+s dre+ u at the cam situated in the forest +here the -e+s +ere dri)en from the +agons and ordered to de osit all their ossessions4in articular, mone" and )aluables6 The" +ere then made to stri and roceed to the Abaths6C An enormous sign board announced that clothing +ould be gi)en out after the bath and that the" +ould then be sent out in batches to their )arious laces of +or26 2s the orl! no )no s the 4&aths5 ere poison gas cham&ers" %he ne/t stage as simply a communal gra'e, hich as e/ten!e! !ay an! night &y t o mechanical e/ca'ators" #nto the pit ere $lung ro upon ro o$ corpses o$ men, omen an! chil!ren" After a time, trains from Treblin2a began to ass through =arsa+6 The" +ere full of enormous stoc2s of clothes for transformation into ra+ materials for the German te9tile mills6 So )anished the last trace of the )ictims6 Polish rail+a"men on the =arsa+ 8unction noted three +agons loaded +ith human hair6 =e had a sam le of this hair anal"sed and found that the Je s ha! &een mur!ere! &y gas $orme! $rom some compoun! o$ cyani!e hy!rogen6 <t +as later re laced b" ordinar" steam, so that the -e+s +ere no longer oisoned, but suffocated6 Se tember &?th +as to be the last da" of the e9termination cam aign6C S The Secret Army b" General Tadeusz Bor4.omoro+s2i 3 ublished in &'G?5, 6 &?$

=arsa+ L rising 3August &, &'((4Fctober $, &'((5

A Polish arm" atrol in =arsa+, Poland on August &, &'((, led b" Jieut6 StanisZa+ -an2o+s2i 3EAgatonE5 from Batalion Pi , during the beginning of the =arsa+ L rising6

#embers of the =affen4SS artici ate in street fighting during the =arsa+ L rising of &'(( in =arsa+, Poland in August &'((6 3Photo: German @ederal Archi)es5

+iti.ens o& L(S(, Poland LL9i9, $kraineM look &or their &riends and relati9es that (ere pre9iously arrested -y So9iet <KI? and detained in prison. 5he corpses o& 9ictims o& So9iet <KI? murdered in last days o& June 1 !1 occured 8ust a&ter out-reak o& =ermanASo9iet War :and <KI? prisoner massacres; and the escape o& So9iet 3ed 0rmy and <KI? troops &rom the 3ussianAoccupied Polish cities. :Photo% Wikipedia;

General Tadeusz Bor4.omoro+s2i, ,ommander of the Polish Home Arm" during the =arsa+ L rising in &'(( and risoner of +ar in Nazi German ca ti)it"

General Tadeusz Bor4.omoro+s2i 3left5, ,ommander of the Polish Home Arm", sha2es hands +ith a Nazi German arm" officer 3right5 in =arsa+, Poland as he re ares to surrender his ortion of the Home Arm" in Fctober &'((6

Aeria! +om,ing of E-ropean Cities

St6 Paul;s ,athedral in Jondon is ictured during the Nazi German bombing raid on Sunda", *ecember $', &'(?6 3Photo: National Archi)es5

AThe clima9 raid of these +ee2s came once more to Jondon, on Sunda", *ecember $'6 All the ainfull"4gathered German e9 erience +as e9 ressed on this occasion,E ,hurchill +rote of the infamous *ec6 $'th raid6 E<t +as an incendiar" classic6 The +eight of the attac2 +as concentrated u on the ,it" of Jondon itself6 <t +as timed to meet the dead4lo+4+ater hour6 The +ater4 mains +ere bro2en at the outset b" )er" hea)" high4e9 losi)e arachute4mines6 Nearl" fifteen hundred fires had to be fought6 The damage to rail+a" stations and doc2s +as serious6 >ight X,hristo herY =ren churches +ere destro"ed or damaged6 The Guildhall +as smitten b" fire and blast, and St6 Paul;s ,athedral +as onl" sa)ed b" heroic e9ertions6C S British Prime #inister =inston ,hurchill, !ife magazine, @ebruar" $:, &'(' 3also from Their "inest Hour b" =inston S6 ,hurchill, 6 3335

A Jondon bus rests in a massi)e crater left b" a German bomb during an air raid o)er Jondon in &'(?6

Jondon during the Blitz2rieg in *ecember &'(?6

!esidents of Jondon rest inside an underground 3sub+a"5 station during an air raid in the summer of &'(?6 3LP<N,orbis4Bettmann5

British Prime #inister =inston ,hurchill, +hose mere resence among the eo le, encourages them to erse)ere against Nazi German"6

.ing George I< of Great Britain and Bueen >lizabeth 3the Bueen #other5 stand amongst the rubble left from the bombing of Buc2ingham Palace in Jondon in &'(?6 3-ac2 Bar2erNTimes Ne+s a ers Jtd5

British Prime #inister =inston ,hurchill sur)e"s the damage done to the House of ,ommons 3British Parliament5 in Jondon b" Nazi German bombers in #a" &'(&6 3LP<N,orbis4Bettmann5

The Nazi German ultimatum ordering the *utch commander of !otterdam to cease fire +as deli)ered to him at &?:3?h on &( #a" &'(?6 At &3:$$h, Nazi German air force bombers set the +hole inner cit" of !otterdam ablaze, 2illing :&( of its inhabitants6 The hoto +as ta2en after the remo)al of all debris6 3Photo: National Archi)es5

German sur)i)ors in *resden, German" loo2 for their relati)es after the British !o"al Air @orce fire4bombed the cit" from @ebruar" &34&G, &'(G6 According to an in)estigation s onsored b" the *resden cit" council, an estimated $G,??? Germans died in the fire4bombing, although some Germans 3 rimaril" Nazi s"m athizers and neo4Nazis5 claim that an estimated $G?,??? died in the bombing6

Pile of cor se after the bombing of *resden6 3Source: =i2i edia5

?resden in #e-ruary 1 !> a&ter the &ire-om-in/

?resden, =ermany in #e-ruary 1 !>. :Photo% =erman #ederal 0rchi9e;

0 soldier &rom the So9iet 3ed 0rmy plants the So9iet sickleAandAhammer &la/ on top o& the 3eichsta/ in Berlin on May ", 1 !>.

A hoto of Berlin, including Lnter den Jinden and Pariser Platz, in -ul" &'(G 3Photo: =illiam Iandi)ertNTime Jife5

5he destruction o& +olo/ne, =ermany in 1 !>, (ith the +olo/ne +athedral standin/ in the -ack/round. :Photo% =erman #ederal 0rchi9es;

+olo/ne, =ermany in 1 !>% +olo/ne +athedral, +entral Station, and the destroyed Hohen.ollern-rOcke Brid/e o9er the 3hine 3i9er.

0 midA1 !> aerial 9ie( o& #rank&urt am Main, =ermany de9asted -y the ra9a/es o& (ar and strate/ic -om-in/. 5he 4= #ar-en Hochhaus :4= #ar-en headBuarters;, already in use as HeadBuarters $nited States #orces )uropean 5heater :HT $S#)5;, is clearly 9isi-le on the top. :$nited States 0ir #orce )urope photo;

5he HeadBuarters o& the 0merican #orces in =ermany in the &ormer 4.=. #ar-en Buildin/ in #rank&urt am Main, =ermany in 1 !

0 =erman (oman appears (ith all her possessions on the side o& a street amid ruins o& +olo/ne, =ermany in late 1 !>. :5ime Li&e photo;

.at/n 0assacre1 Extermination of o!is" Officers %&'(2*

Secretary o& State o& the Iichy #rench re/ime #ernand de Brinon appear at the /ra9es o& Polish Bri/adier =eneral Miec.ysJa( Smora(iUski and Polish =eneral BronisJa( Bohatyre(ic. in Katyn, So9iet $nion L(estern 3ussiaM in 0pril 1 !3. :Photo% =erman #ederal 0rchi9es;

Bri/. =en. Miec.ysJa( Smora(iUski :le&t; and =eneral BronisJa( Bohatyre(ic. (ere murdered -y the So9iet 3ed 0rmy at Katyn in 1 !7.

Fne of the mass gra)es at .at"n in &'(36

The &'(3 e9humation at .at"n6 3Photo b" the Polish !ed ,ross delegation5

#arch G, &'(? memo from Ja)renti" Beria to -ose h Stalin, ro osing e9ecution of Polish militar" officers6

Translation of #emorandum: The acce ted ro osal of Ja)renti" Beria to e9ecute former Polish arm" and olice officers in N.I* risoner of +ar cam s and risons6 #arch &'(?6 TFP S>,!>T @rom the ,entral ,ommittee of the ,ommunist Part" of the So)iet Lnion to comrade STAJ<N <n the N.I* PF= cam s and in the risons of the +estern oblasts of L2raine and Belorussia there is currentl" a large number of former officers of the Polish arm", former Polish olice officers and em lo"ees of intelligence agencies, members of Polish nationalist c4r 3counterre)olutionar"5 arties, artici ants in underground c4r rebel organizations, defectors and so on6 All of them are im lacable enemies of So)iet o+er and full of hatred for the So)iet s"stem6 PF= officers and olicemen located in the cam s are attem ting to continue c4r +or2 and are leading anti4So)iet agitation6 >ach of them is sim l" +aiting to be freed so the" can ha)e the o ortunit" to acti)el" 8oin the fight against So)iet o+er6 N.I* agents in the +estern oblasts of L2raine and Belorussia ha)e unco)ered a number of c4r rebel organizations6 <n each of these c4r organizations the former officers of the former Polish arm" and former Polish olice officers la"ed an acti)e leadershi role6 Among the detained defectors and )iolators of the state4 3Signatures: <n fa)or 4 Stalin, Ioroshilo), #oloto), #i2o"an5 3<n margin: ,omrade .alinin 4 <n fa)or6 ,omrade .agano)ich 4 <n fa)or65 htt :NNen6+i2i edia6orgN+i2iN@ile:.at"n[4[decision[of[massacre[ &68 g

The .at"n massacre, also 2no+n as the .at"n @orest massacre, +as a mass murder of Polish nationals carried out b" the So)iet secret olice N.I* in A rilS#a" &'(?6 <t +as based on Ja)renti" Beria;s ro osal to e9ecute all members of the Polish Ffficer ,or s, dated #arch G, &'(?6 This official document +as then a ro)ed and signed b" the So)iet Politburo, including -ose h Stalin6 The number of )ictims is estimated at about $$,???, the most commonl" cited number being $&,%T:6 The )ictims +ere murdered in the .at"n @orest in !ussia, the .alinin and .har2o) risons and else+here6 About :,??? +ere officers ta2en risoner during the &'3' So)iet in)asion of Poland, the rest being Polish doctors, rofessors, la+ma2ers, olice officers, and other ublic ser)ants arrested for allegedl" being Eintelligence agents, gendarmes, lando+ners, saboteurs, factor" o+ners, la+"ers, officials and riests6E Since PolandHs conscri tion s"stem reRuired e)er" une9em ted uni)ersit" graduate to become a reser)e officer, the N.I* +as able to round u much of the Polish intelligentsia, and the !ussian, L2rainian, Protestant, #uslim Tatar, -e+ish, Georgian, and Belarusian intelligentsia of Polish citizenshi 6 The term E.at"n #assacreE originall" referred s ecificall" to the massacre at .at"n @orest, near the )illages of .at"n and Gnezdo)o 3about &$ miles +est of Smolens2, !ussia5, of Polish militar" officers in the .ozels2 risoner4of4+ar cam 6 This +as the largest of the simultaneous e9ecutions of risoners of +ar from geogra hicall" distant Starobels2 and Fstash2o) cam s, and the e9ecutions of olitical risoners from =est Belarus and =est L2raine, shot at .at"n @orest, at the N.I* headRuarters in Smolens2, at a Smolens2 slaughterhouse, and at risons in .alinin 3T)er5, .har2o), #osco+, and other So)iet cities6 The Belorussian and L2rainian .at"n Jists are N.I* lists of names of Polish risoners to be murdered at )arious locations in Belarus and =estern L2raine6 The modern Polish in)estigation of the .at"n massacre co)ered not onl" the massacre at .at"n forest, but also the other mass murders mentioned abo)e6 There are Polish organisations such as the .at"n ,ommittee and the @ederation of .at"n @amilies, +hich again are inclusi)e of )ictims of the )arious mass murders at the )arious locations6 Nazi German" announced the disco)er" of mass gra)es in the .at"n @orest in &'(36 The re)elation led to the end of di lomatic relations bet+een #osco+ and the Polish go)ernment4in4e9ile in Jondon6 The So)iet Lnion continued to den" res onsibilit" for the massacres until &''?, +hen it officiall" ac2no+ledged and condemned the er etration of the 2illings b" the N.I*, as +ell as the subseRuent co)er4u 6

Imperia! Japanese 0i!itar/ Aggression & Atrocities

Minister o& the 0rmy =eneral Hideki 5o8o :center; and Japanese #orei/n Minister Posuke Matsuoka :ri/ht; propose a toast (ith the =erman and 4talian 0m-assadors to Japan and o&&icers &rom the Japanese Ministry o& #orei/n 0&&airs in 5okyo, Japan in Septem-er 1 !7. 5he occasion (as the si/nin/ o& the 5ripartite Pact, a de&ense a/reement -et(een 4mperial Japan, <a.i =ermany and #ascist 4taly. :Photo% +ourtesy o& 0ustralian War Memorial; http%CC8ohn.curtin.edu.auCen9oyCe*pansion.html

5he 3epresentati9es o& the 0*is po(ers cele-rate in 5okyo, Japan in 1 !3. :Mainichi Photos;

The #ilitar" Policemen of the <m erial -a anese Arm", better 2no+n as .en eitai 3 5, ose for a grou hoto in in &'3G6 The .en eitai +as <m erial -a an;s notorious secret olice6 The .en eitai +as the eRui)alent of the Gesta o and the Ab+ehr6 3Source: -a anese boo2 ESho+a Histor" Iol6%: @ebruar" $T <ncidentE ublished b" #ainichi Ne+s a ers ,om an"65 htt :NNen6+i2i edia6orgN+i2iN@ile:.en ei6-PG

A .en eitai officer 3right5 a ears +ith a ca tured ,hinese soldier in ,hina, ossibl" in Shanghai or #anchuria in circa &'3$ or &'3%6 3Photo: htt :NN+++6++$incolor6comN8a anN,[[ ia\de\b\Shanghai\[$:[[??&6html5

<m erial -a anese Arm" troo s enter Saigon in &'(&6

Le&t% Japanese troops enter Hon/ Kon/ on ?ecem-er "G, 1 !1 led -y Lieutenant =eneral 5akashi Sakai and Iice 0dmiral Masaichi <iimi. 3i/ht% 4mperial Japanese 0rmy soldiers march throu/h do(nto(n Sin/apore in #e-ruary 1 !". 5he 4mperial Japanese 0rmy e*terminated up to >7,777 +hinese men durin/ the &irst month o& occupation o& Sin/aporeD the incident is kno(n as the 'Sook +hin/ massacre1.

4mperial Japanese troops run &or co9er durin/ mop up operations in Kuala Lumpur :British Malaya, later Malaysia; in January 1 !". :Photo courtesy the 4mperial War Museum; http%CC(((.cityAdata.comC&orumChistoryC6>!G FAdayAhistoryA8anuaryA1A31AaA".html

0 Malayan ?ollar <ote :promissory note; issued -y the 4mperial Japanese /o9ernment durin/ World War 44

-a anese militar" forces land on -a)a 3*utch >ast <ndies5 in earl" &'($6 -a an conRuered the *utch >ast <ndies in an attem t to acRuire oil X etroleumY, rubber, and other ra+ materials that e9isted +ithin the *utch colon"7 etroleum and rubber +ere )ital to the <m erial -a anese militar"4industrial com le96 <m erial -a an ossessed no oil fields +ithin mainland -a an, and oil roduced in #anchuria +as inadeRuate to meet the needs of the -a anese industr"6 <n &'(&, the *utch >ast <ndies +as the fourth4largest e9 orter of oil in the +orld7 the other three rimar" oil e9 orters in &'(& +ere America, <ran, and !omania6 The ca ital of the *utch >ast <ndies in &'(& +as Bata)ia6 The cit" of Bata)ia +as renamed -a2arta in &'($6 The *utch arm" surrendered the *utch >ast <ndies to the <m erial -a anese Arm" on #arch :, &'($6 <ndonesia declared its inde endence from the Netherlands on August &%, &'(G6 3Photo: =i2i edia5

0 ,ne =ulden <ote :promissory note; &or the ?utch )ast 4ndies issued -y the 4mperial Japanese /o9ernment durin/ World War 44.

The -a anese lines of ad)ance in the *utch >ast <ndies, Sara+a2 and North Borneo3British5, and Portuguese Timor

Soldiers o& the 4mperial Japanese 0rmy :4J0; 1>th 0rmy prepare to march into Burma, a pro9ince o& British 4ndia, in January 1 !". :Photo% Mainichi <e(spaper +ompany;

Ta2en during the #arch of *eath from Bataan to the rison cam march at ,abanatuan6 Source: National Par2 Ser)ice 3L6S6 *e artment of *efense, LS#, &&(,G(?, National Archi)es5 htt :NNen6+i2i edia6orgN+i2iN@ile:#arch[of[*eath[from[Bataan[to[the[ rison[cam [4[*ead[soldiers68 g

#a of Bataan *eath #arch

0&ter de&endin/ the island &or nearly a month, 0merican and #ilipino soldiers surrender to Japanese in9asion troops on +orre/idor 4sland, Philippines in May 1 !". 5his photo/raph (as captured &rom the Japanese durin/ Japan's threeAyear occupation. :0P Photo;

Beginning of Bataan *eath #arch after the fall of ,orregidor in the Phili ines, near #anila, in &'($ 3Photo: htt :NNblog6ne+so26comN+orld+art+oN$??%N&?N&?Nthe48a anese4had4no4merc"4on4usN5

<m erial -a an;s Ain)asion mone"C for the Phili ines

Prisoners in the rison cam in the Phili

ines in #a" &'($, after the Bataan *eath #arch6 3Photo: National Archi)es5

<m erial -a an;s Ain)asion mone"C for Singa ore and British #ala"a 3#ala"sia5

American risoners carr" the remains of their comrades on burial detail at ,am FH*onnell in the Phili ines in #a" &'($, +ee2s after the Bataan *eath #arch6 This hotogra h, ca tured from the -a anese, sho+s American risoners using im ro)ised litters to carr" those of their comrades +ho, from the lac2 of food or +ater on the march from Bataan, fell along the road6 The <m erial -a anese Arm" rohibited American risoners4of4+ar from resting and eating during the forced march from Bataan to the nearb" rison cam s6 3Photo: National Archi)es5

Bataan *eath #arch 3Photo: htt :NNblog6ne+so26comN+orld+art+oN$??%N&?N&?Nthe48a anese4had4no4merc"4on4usN5

Bataan *eath #arch 3Photo: htt :NNblog6ne+so26comN+orld+art+oN$??%N&?N&?Nthe48a anese4had4no4merc"4on4usN5

-a anese soldiers are seen shooting Si2h risoners +ho are sitting blindfolded in a rough semi4circle about $? "ards a+a" in circa &'(& or &'($6 3Photo: htt :NNen6+i2i edia6orgN+i2iN-a anese[+ar[crimes5

Jeft hoto: The hoto sho+s a ca tured Australian Sergeant Jeonard G6 Siffleet being beheaded b" Masuno ,hi2ao in Aita e, Ne+ Guinea on Fctober $(, &'(37 from the Australian =ar #emorial, original ca tion: EAita e, Ne+ Guinea6 $( Fctober &'(36 A hotogra h found on the bod" of a dead -a anese soldier sho+ing N]&(33&( Sergeant 3Sgt5 Jeonard G6 Siffleet of E#E S ecial Lnit, +earing a blindfold and +ith his arms tied, about to be beheaded +ith a s+ord b" Masuno ,hi2ao6 The e9ecution +as ordered b" Iice Admiral .amada, the commander of the -a anese Na)al @orces at Aita e6 Sgt6 Siffleet +as ca tured +ith Pri)ate 3Pte5 Patti+ahl and Pte !eharin, Ambonese members of the Netherlands >ast <ndies @orces, +hilst engaged in reconnaissance behind the -a anese lines6 !ight hoto: <m erial -a anese Arm" soldier re ares to murder a ,hinese risoner6 3Source: htt :NN+++6 rinceton6eduN^nan2ingNhtmlNimage[%6html5

0 Japanese ne(spaper report o& the +ontest 5o +ut ?o(n 177 People. 5his ne(s (as ori/inally reported -y the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shinbun in ?ecem-er 13, 1 3F. Both soldiers (ere e*tradited to +hina a&ter the (ar, tried &or their actions in +hinese court, and (ere e*ecuted on January "6, 1 !6. 0n estimated "77,777 +hinese people died in <ankin/ &ollo(in/ the Japanese conBuest o& the capital city.

A icture of Acomfort +omenC +ho +ere forced into se9ual sla)er" b" the <m erial -a anese militar" during =orld =ar <<6 3Source: htt :NNenglish6chosun6comN+$&dataNhtmlNne+sN$??T?'N$??T?'&(??&(6html5

#ormer 2com&ort (oman2 Lee Pon/ASoo :L; appears (ith her supporters holdin/ portraits o& +hinese, Philippine, South Korean and 5ai(anese com&ort (omen (ho (ere se* sla9es &or Japanese soldiers durin/ World War 44, at a protest held in &ront o& the Japanese parliament in 5okyo, in this 1! June "77F &ile photo. Japan on June "F, "77F -rushed aside calls &rom 0merican la(makers &or a &resh apolo/y to (artime se* sla9es, e9en as the &ormer 2com&ort (omen2 rene(ed their demands &or 5okyo to ackno(led/e their pli/ht. Japan said the $.S. mo9e to pass a resolution callin/ &or an 2unam-i/uous2 apolo/y &rom Japan &or the coercion o& (omen into army -rothels durin/ World War 44 (ould not dama/e relations -et(een the t(o allies. :0#PC=etty 4ma/es;

#ormer 2com&ort (omen,2 Jan 3u&& ,'Herne, 63, :L; and Pon/ Soo Lee, F6, speak durin/ a ne(s con&erence at the o&&ice o& 0mnesty 4nternational #e-ruary 1G, "77F in Washin/ton, ?+. 5here (ere and estimated "77,777 soAcalled 2com&ort (omen2 (ho (ere se*ually ensla9ed -y the 4mperial Japanese 0rmy -e&ore and durin/ World War 44. 5he (omen ha9e (orked since 1 !> 2to hold the Japanese /o9ernment accounta-le &or the Japanese military's actions in World War 44.2 Jan 3u&& ,'Herne, -orn in (hat is no( 4ndonesia, (as imprisoned -y the Japanese military (hen she (as "1AyearsAold in 1 !". Separated &rom her &amily, ,'Herne (as taken to a 2com&ort station2 (here she (as a-used, -eaten and raped day a&ter day &or three months. Pon/ (as kidnapped in her home country o& Korea -y the Japanese at the a/e o& 1! and taken to a ship (here she (as -eaten, tortured and raped. Her imprisonment lasted t(o years durin/ (hich time she (as /i9en a Japanese name. 5he (omen are no( seekin/ an o&&icial apolo/y and compensation &rom the Japanese /o9ernment. :Photo -y +hip Somode9illaC=etty 4ma/es;

,cto-er ">, 1 !!% 4mperial Japanese Kamika.e pilot in a Mitsu-ishi Vero 0GM> Model >" crashAdi9es on escort carrier $SS White Plains :+I)AGG;. 5he aircra&t is missin/ the &li/ht deck and impacts the (ater 8ust o&& the port Buarter o& the ship a &e( seconds later. :$.S. <a9y photoC<ational 0rchi9es;

4mperial Japanese plane shot do(n as it attempted to attack $SS K45K$< B0P.2 <ear Mariana 4slands, June 1 !!. :Photo% <ational 0rchi9es;

Bom-in/ o& Hon/ Kon/ -y the $nited States 1!th 0ir #orce, ,cto-er 1G, 1 !! :Photo% http%CC&orum.-ody-uildin/.comCsho(thread.phpQtR1!3 G!371Epa/eR1 ;

3"e Atomic +om,s & 4-c!ear 5o!oca-st

Japanese children in Hiroshima huddle to/ether shortly a&ter the $.S. 0rmy 0ir #orces dropped an atomic -om- on 0u/ust G, 1 !>. 5he photos and &ilms taken immediately a&ter the -last (ere con&iscated and suppressed -y the $.S. /o9ernment &or more than G7 years. 5he 1 !> atomic -om- in the Japanese city o& Hiroshima, one o& the only times that nuclear (eapons (ere used in (ar&are, instantly killed an estimated 177,777 people and in8ured thousands more, (ith the ma8ority o& its 9ictims -ein/ ci9ilians. +asualties o& the atomic -om-s in Hiroshima and <a/asaki included ethnic Korean mi/rant (orkers, 0merican and British prisonersAo&A(ars, 3oman +atholic nuns :primarily in <a/asaki;, and (omen and children. :Source% http%CC(((.&latrock.or/.n.CtopicsChistoryCstalinsH(i&eHandHotherHtales.htm;

5he e*act moment o& detonation o& the atomic -om- at <a/asaki, Japan is captured in this photo/raph on 0u/ust , 1 !>. :Photo% http%CCpicdit.(ordpress.comC"776C7FC"1C6AinsaneAnuclearAe*plosionsC;

5he remains o& $rakami +athedral :le&t; appear on a hill in <a/asaki, Japan in late 1 !>, months a&ter the atomic -om- destroyed most o& <a/asaki. :Photo% $.S. <ational 0rchi9es;

Le&t photo% Japanese -urn 9ictims &rom the atomic -om-s 3i/ht% 0 mushroom cloud produced -y an atomic -om-.

Le&t photo% Japanese -urn 9ictims &rom the atomic -om-s 3i/ht photo% ,nly a small part o& a 3oman +atholic cathedral is le&t standin/ in its o(n ruins a&ter the -om-in/ o& <a/asaki, Japan in 1 !>. +atholic nuns (ere amon/ the casualties o& the atomic -om-in/ o& <a/asaki on 0u/ust , 1 !>. :+,3B4S;

5he 'Ialley o& ?eath1 N <a/asaki, Japan in 1 !> :Photo% http%CC(((.&lickr.comCphotosCa&i/alloC1!G7!"FF31CinCsetAF"1>FG7"13">3>>1 C;

Battered religious figures stand +atch on a hill abo)e a tattered )alle"6 Nagasa2i, -a an on Se tember $(, &'(G, si9 +ee2s after the cit" +as destro"ed b" the +orld;s second atomic bomb attac26 3Photo b" ,or oral J"nn P6 =al2er, -r6, L6S6 #arine ,or s, National Archi)es5

<a/asaki in 0u/ust 1 !>

Aerial )ie+ sho+ing ruins of the #itsubishi factor", +hich roduced munitions, tor edoes and armor, amid the de)astation of Nagasa2i, -a an on Se tember T, &'(G6 3Photo: George Sil2NTime Jife5

,harred remains of -a anese ci)ilians after a firebombing

A sacred Torii Gate stands erect o)er the com letel" destro"ed area of a Shinto shrine in Nagasa2i in Fctober &'(G, after the second atomic bomb e)er used in +arfare +as dro ed b" the L6S6 o)er the -a anese industrial center6 *ue to its structure, the blast of the e9 losion could go around it, therefore lea)ing the arch intact6 The bombing 2illed more than %?,??? eo le instantl", +ith ten thousands d"ing later from effects of the radioacti)e fallout6 3AP Photo5

The Lra2ami ,atholic ,athedral in Nagasa2i, seen Se tember &3, &'(G, is laid +aste in the aftermath of the detonation of the atom bomb o)er a month ago o)er this cit"6 3AP PhotoNA,#>NStanle" Troutman5

Aerial )ie+ of Hiroshima the da" after, August %, &'(G, the Lnited States dro -a an6 3Photo b" Hulton Archi)eNGett" <mages5

ed the atomic bomb on it during =orld =ar <<,

Shortl" after the first atomic bomb e)er used in +arfare +as dro ed b" the Lnited States o)er the -a anese cit" of Hiroshima, sur)i)ors are seen as the" recei)e emergenc" treatment b" militar" medics, on Aug6 T, &'(G6 The e9 losion instantl" 2illed more than T?,??? eo le, +ith ten of thousands others d"ing later from effects of the radioacti)e fallout6 3AP Photo5

,olor hotogra h of the ruins of central Hiroshima in autumn of &'(G6 3L6S6 National Archi)es5

An American corres ondent )ie+s the Atomic *ome in Hiroshima on Se tember :, &'(G6 3AP Photo5

A man +heels his bic"cle thorough Hiroshima, da"s after the cit" +as le)eled b" an atomic bomb blast, -a an6 The )ie+ here is loo2ing +est4north+est, about GG? feet from +here the bomb landed, 2no+n as ], on August T, _ moreA man +heels his bic"cle thorough Hiroshima, da"s after the cit" +as le)eled b" an atomic bomb blast, -a an6 The )ie+ here is loo2ing +est4 north+est, about GG? feet from +here the bomb landed, 2no+n as ], on August T, &'(G6 3Photo b" .e"stoneNGett" <mages5

The area around the Sang"o4Shorei4.an 3Trade Promotion Hall5 area of Hiroshima is laid +aste, after an atomic bomb e9 loded +ithin &?? meters of here in &'(G6 3AP Photo5

The shell of a building stands amid acres of rubble in this )ie+ of the -a anese cit" of Hiroshima on August :, &'(G6 3AP PhotoN#itsugi .ishida5

Iie+ of the atomic bomb, codenamed HJittle Bo",H as it sits on trailer cradle in a bomb it on the North @ield of Tinian airbase, North #arianas <slands, earl" August, &'(G6 The bomb +as loaded onto the B4$' Su erfortress H>nola Ga"H and dro ed on the -a anese cit" of Hiroshima on August T6 3Photo b" PhotoBuestNGett" <mages5

Iie+ of the B4$' Su erfortress H>nola Ga",H on its return from the bombing mission o)er Hiroshima, as it is ta9is on the North @ield of Tinian airbase, North #arianas <slands, August T, &'(G6 The lane had dro ed an atomic bomb, codenamed HJittle Bo",H on the -a anese cit"6 3Photo b" PhotoBuestNGett" <mages5

To2"o, -a an in &'(G after a series of American air raids

>m eror Hirohito sur)e"s damage from bombing in To2"o, -a an on #arch &:, &'(G6 3,arl #"dans NTime Jife5

3"e 6ina! Da/s at 6!ens,-rg & Arrest of t"e 73"ree 3ramps8 in 6!ens,-rg

%he 2rrest o$ the %hree %ramps o$ the Flens&urg Go'ernment: General Alfred -odl 3left5, *r Albert S eer 3center5, and Grand Admiral .arl *oenitz 3foreground, center5, are seen handcuffed after their arrest b" the Allies in @lensburg, German" on #a" $3, &'(G6 The Nazi German go)ernment and the German High ,ommand officiall" ceased to e9ist that da"6 Prominent members of the @lensburg Go)ernment included: Grand Admiral .arl *oenitz 3!eich President and #inister of =ar5, Albert S eer 3#inister of <ndustr" and Production5, and General Alfred -odl 3,hief of F erations Staff of the =ehrmacht5 3Photo: German @ederal Archi)es5

Albert S eer 3$nd left5, Grand Admiral .arl *oenitz 33rd left5, and General Alfred -odl 3(th left5 are arrested b" the British Arm" at @lensburg, German" on #a" $3, &'(G6 3Photo: <m erial =ar #useums, Jondon5 htt :NN+++6i+m6org6u2NcollectionsNitemNob8ectN$?G&'(%%:

Albert S eer 3left5, .arl *oenitz 3center5, and Alfred -odl a ear at a meeting at @lensburg, German" on #a" $3, &'(G before the" +ere arrested and handcuffed b" the Allies6 Alfred -odl +as hanged at Nuremberg, German" on Fctober &T, &'(T6

Prisoners being led a+a" from the house in #ui)i2, a fe+ miles from @lensburg, in #a" &'(G +here members of the German Go)ernment +ere located6 The o eration +as carried out b" men of HAH ,om an", &st Battalion, The ,heshire !egiment6 <n total, t+el)e HGrade &H risoners +ere ta2en including General -odl6 3Photo: <m erial =ar #useums, Jondon5

General Alfred -odl 3center5, the ,hief of F erations Staff of the =ehrmacht, signs the German <nstrument of Surrender at !heims, @rance on #a" %, &'(G6

0merican 0rmy =en. Walter Bedell Smith :second &rom ri/ht; and other 0merican, British, and So9iet 3ed 0rmy o&&icers meet (ith =eneral 0l&red Jodl at 3heims, #rance on May F, 1 !> to discuss surrender terms.

=eneral ?(i/ht )isenho(er and other 0llied o&&icers cele-rate in 3heims, #rance on May F, 1 !> shortly a&ter <a.i =ermany surrendered to the 0merican and British &orces.

@ield #arshal =ilhelm .eitel 3center5 surrenders to the Allies in Berlin on #a" :, &'(G6

@ield #arshal =ilhelm .eitel sign the ratified surrender terms for the German Arm" at !ussian HeadRuarters in Berlin on #a" %, &'(G6 3National Archi)es5

The signing the German <nstrument of Surrender at the So)iet headRuarters in .arlshorst, Berlin, German" on #a" :, &'(G6 Standing in the middle is So)iet #arshal Georg" `hu2o)6

The Su reme ,ommanders in Berlin on -une G, &'(G7 from left to right: @ield #arshal Bernard #ontgomer" 3Great Britain5, General *+ight *6 >isenho+er 3America5, So)iet #arshal Georg" `hu2o), and General -ean de Jattre de Tassign" 3@rance56

Blac24mar2et trading bet+een soldiers and ci)ilians at theTiergarten in Berlin in the summer of &'(G6 ,ameras, household goods, and hierlooms +ere traded for mone" or cigarettes, to then urchase scarce food6

German citizens in Allied4occu ied Berlin loo2ing for an"thing of )alue that can be used for barter6 3LP<N,orbis4Bettmann5

DACHAU CONCENTRATION CAMP LIBERATION

A Documentary U.S. Massacre of Waffen SS April 29, 1945

0 !00 Waffen SS-Obersturmfhrer (Lt.) Heinrich Skodzensky, the new, hasti y desi!nated "am# "ommandant, ho ds mornin! ro ca for the !arrison now !uardin! $achau. His ro ca ta ied %&' men, many of them in hos#ita . ( mere ieutenant had ne)er before commanded the massi)e concentration cam#, but the rea SS "ommandant, *artin +ottfried Weiss, had ,run off, the day before, a on! with more than a thousand of the ( !emeine and $eath-s Head SS !uards stationed at the cam# #rior to the (merican a##roach. Skodzensky-s orders were to surrender. ($achau (rchi)e) 0"!#5 .rd /atta ion, 0%1th 2nfantry 3e!iment, of the 4.S. 5%th (6hunderbird) $i)ision, as #art of 6ask 7orce Lo)e, 8um#s off from the )i a!e of +ross 2nzemoos (0' mi es northeast of (u!sbur!) with three rif e com#anies su##orted by tanks. 0$!#0 (fter e iminatin! sni#er #ockets, .rd /atta ion is tem#orari y ha ted by a b own brid!e near (m#ermockin!, some four mi es from the city of $achau. 09!#0 6anks of the 0'0st 6ank /atta ion enter the city of $achau after an a ternate ri)er crossin! is found. 10!00 6wo rif e com#anies (9 and L) of .rd /atta ion are dis#atched to attack toward *unich. 2 "om#any is he d in reser)e. 10!15 .rd /atta ion H: recei)es orders to ca#ture the cam# at $achau. 10!#0 2 "om#any and e ements of * "om#any (.rd /atta ion) are dis#atched in the direction of the concentration cam#. 6anks are he d u# by a brid!e o)er the (m#er 3i)er which is b own when armor is within ;' yards, ki in! a ar!e number of +erman so diers who are unab e to cross in time.

10!45 0st Lt. L.3. Stewart and 0st S!t. 3obert Wi son of L "om#any find a footbrid!e defended by a one +erman machine !unner. (fter firin! one be t of ammunition the +erman retreats and 2 "om#any then crosses. 6anks and L "om#any remain behind to c ear $achau and continue the attack toward *unich.

10!55 (n 2nte i!ence < 3econnaissance (2 < 3) #atro reaches the outskirts of the concentration cam# and recei)es enemy fire. ( 8ee# with four men sent from H: to acce#t the +erman surrender turns around and f ees the scene. Obersturmfhrer Skodzensky attem#ts to surrender the cam# to the (mericans, but is somehow shot and ki ed in the confusion.

11!00 7orward e ements of 2 "om#any enter the concentration cam# after findin! and ins#ectin! a train oad of dead #risoners. =fc. >ohn $e!ro of /urton, Ohio is be ie)ed to be the first (merican iberator to enter the concentration cam# and come within )iew of the inmates. (Avenger)

11!20 (merican so diers reach the inner com#ound where inmates are im#risoned. See ocation ((). 11!25 6he crematorium and !as chamber are soon disco)ered at ocation (/). =andemonium rei!ns and dead bodies are e)erywhere.

6he ori!ina cam# crematorium, bui t in 0?5' as the death rate in the cam# be!an to increase, was re# aced by the structure abo)e in 0?5;. 2t has a ar!er #hysica # ant, a !as chamber and four so#histicated incinerators of the so-ca ed ,/aracke @, ty#e. (ccordin! to most historians, the !as chamber, which was dis!uised as a shower room, was ne)er #ut into use. Se)era former inmates ha)e said otherwise. ("ourtesy of $achau (rchi)e)

11!#0 6he (merican +2s in a frenzy or horror, an!er and !ui t !un down some 0;; ca#tured +erman so diers most of them Waffen SS. $ozens of inmates break out of the #rison enc osure and ki a##roAimate y 5' !uards, some with their bare hands. =ri)ate >ohn Lee of 2 "om#any ater to d news#a#ers that he was #ersona y in)o )ed in at east &' of the ki in!s. 12!00 ( resistance is si enced and esca#ed inmates are rounded u#. Order is tem#orari y restored. .%B +erman so diers are taken #risoner, many of them wounded Waffen SS men forced from their beds in the mi itary hos#ita . 12!05 ( +2 machine !unner nicknamed ,/irdeye, from * "om#any sudden y ye s, ,6hey-re tryin! to !et away,, and o#ens u# with his ..' ca iber machine !un. Lt. "o one 7e iA S#arks char!es him from behind and kicks him away from the !un, sayin! ,What in the He are you doin!C,

$ead +erman so diers at $achau. DAact ocation unknown. 6hey are wearin! 6arn8acke, camouf a!e uniforms, of Waffen-SS combat troo#s. 6he head wound on the man in fore!round a##ears to ha)e been made by a 4S .5% ca iber #isto . 2t ooks as if he saw the bu et comin! and shie ded his eyes. (ccordin! to Ddwin 7. +orak, who took this #hoto on (#ri .', 0?5%, ,the way the bodies were #i ed u# seems to indicate they were s ain simu taneous y, as by machine !un fire., ("ourtesy of Ddwin 7. +orak, 0%Bth 7ie d (rti ery)

12!15 Order is restored once a!ain. ( moment of re ati)e Euiet ensues. 12!25 /ri!adier +enera Hennin! Linden and #arty arri)e. ( ady news#a#er re#orter o#ens !ate to inner com#ound and a number of inmates esca#e. 12!#0 *ost inmates are rounded u# and returned to enc osure. 12!#5 ( )erba batt e eru#ts between +enera Linden and "o one S#arks. 12!45 +enera Linden and #arty de#art. 12!50 +uards ha)e been #osted, tem#ers ha)e coo ed, emotions are bein! brou!ht under contro . 6he cam# is fina y secure. "o . S#arks re#orts to 3e!imenta HeadEuarters and describes the e)ents of the day.

( !rou# of about ;'' ca#tured +ermans so diers bein! marched to a ho din! enc osure in the same hos#ita area where the eAecution wa was ocated. Lt. Wi iam Wa sh is fourth from eft with back to camera. 7i)e inmates can be seen assistin! the (mericans. 6he +erman medic with the 3ed "ross f a! is one of the few +erman staffers known to ha)e sur)i)ed the iberation. ("ourtesy of the 5%th $i)ision *useum)

1#!#0 "o one Wa ter O-/rien and "a#tain *inor S. Shirk tour the cam#.

14!#0 "o . S#arks sets u# a command #ost outside of the cam# and awaits the arri)a of his su#erior, +enera 7rederick. *eanwhi e, Lt. Wa sh and e ements of 2 "om#any withdraw to #re#are for an attack on *unich. "ha# ain Loy returns to city of $achau.

( !rou# of +erman !uards bein! turned o)er to an (merican so dier by an armed inmate carryin! a +erman rif e. 6his same man can be seen be ow armed on y with a sho)e . ("ourtesy of 5%th $i)ision *useum)

14!#5 Lt. Howard /uechner and Lt. 3obert 9imsey arri)e outside the cam#. /oth are medica officers and are the first doctors to arri)e at the scene. 14!45 .5& +erman so diers are machine !unned by 0st Lt. >ack /ushyhead, the DAecuti)e Officer of 2 "om#any, at ocation ("). Lt. /ushyhead was a fu -b ooded Fati)e (merican ("herokee) from Ok ahoma.

6he #hoto abo)e shows about &' dead or wounded +erman !uards yin! at the base of a on! wa . On y about one fourth of the tota en!th of the wa is )isib e. ( machine !unner crouches o)er a mode 0?0?(5 machine !un, center fore!round. 6he four +erman so diers sti standin! and three or four of their fa en comrades at eft who are sti a i)e were shot on y seconds after this #hoto was taken. ( hos#ita bui din! can be seen at ri!ht. (=hoto by (r and /. *usser, 4S Si!na "or#s. "ourtesy Fationa (rchi)es, Washin!ton $.".)

14!4" Lt. /uechner hears the sound of machine !un fire and arri)es at the scene of the massacre 8ust minutes after the #hoto abo)e is taken. 14!49 *edica S!t. 3a #h 3osa and his #arty of medics arri)e at the site of massacre.

$rawin! of the eAecution site by Lt. /uechner. $ead +erman so diers are re#resented by ,@s,, b ack dots are (merican so diers, machine !uns are shown as circ es, shown with a##roAimate ines of fire. ( /(3 man stands behind and to the ri!ht of the machine !un on eft. ,(, shows the #ath of Lt. /uechner. 6he other is S!t. 3osa-s #ath. ,;%, indicates the ocation of the two inmates beatin! the +erman !uard with a sho)e be ow. (/uechner)

6wo inmates #re#arin! to ki a fa en SS !uard with a sho)e . 2n back!round rows of machine !unned +erman !uards can be seen yin! in #i es a on! the base of the hos#ita wa . ( ar!e hos#ita bui din! can be seen abo)e ri!ht. 6he man on the eft is same indi)idua as abo)e. (=hoto!ra#her unknown, #robab y 6G5 (r and /. *usser, 4S Si!na "or#s. 3e#roduced from ,$ay of the (mericans, by Ferin +un.)

14!5# Lt. 9imsey #eers o)er the wa (see dia!ram abo)e) and sees that the e imination of the cam# !arrison has been com# eted. ( ca#tured +ermans so diers are either dead or dyin!. Fone of the 4.S. medica #ersone , inc udin! $r. /uechner, attem#ts to treat the wounded. Dach man is shot indi)idua y. 15!00 Lt. /uechner and #arty ins#ect the cam# unti 01''. 15!15 "o . S#arks and +en. 7rederick tour the cam# unti 01''.

SS rif e ran!e at Hebertshausen near $achau where thousands of So)iet #risoners of war were eAecuted in 0?50 and 0?5;. *any unknown #risoners were a so secret y eAecuted here between 0?.. and 0?5%. 6heir eAact number wi ne)er be known. ($achau (rchi)e)

1$!00 D ements of the 0st /atta ion (" "om#any) and one # atoon of L "om#any (0%1th 2nf.) arri)e to assist with !uard duty.

7rom 0?.. to 0?5%, ;'&,;'& #risoners had been re!istered at $achau. 6he tota number of dead wi ne)er be known. So)iet #risoners of war were summari y eAecuted by the thousands, ci)i ians were assi!ned by the +esta#o to the cam# for Sonderbehandlung (,S#ecia 6reatment,, a Fazi eu#hemism which si!nified ,ki in!,), and a !reat many died in e)acuation marches and death marches. 6hese deaths were ne)er re!istered. 6he 2nternationa 6racin! Ser)ice in (ro son re#orts .0,%?0 dead amon! the #risoners that were re!istered. 6he

tota number of >ews who died at $achau from 0?.. to 0?5% was re ati)e y ow, #robab y no more than %,'''. On the day of iberation, some ;,%'' of the .;,''' remainin! inmates were >ewish. (Avenger)

H2ndi)idua #artici#ants in the iberation ha)e !i)en )arious, conf ictin! re#orts concernin! the actua time of the first (merican arri)a at $achau. 6he eAact time can ne)er be #recise y estab ished e)en with the he # of officia batt e re#orts, most of which are confusin!, contradictory and often based on !uesses, estimates and a##roAimations. 6here is, howe)er, a most !enera a!reement that the cam# was ,c eared, by ;I.' =.*. 6he time ine abo)e is be ie)e to be accurate within no more than a )ariance of one hour and is based ar!e y on the war diary of Lt. Howard (. /uechner, his book ,Hour of the ()en!er, and batt e re#orts of (#ri ;?, 0?5%. 2n Se#tember 0?B&, more than 5' years after the massacre at $achau, retired 4.S. (rmy "o one Howard /uechner #ub ished the first hardco)er edition of his on!-su##ressed book, ,6he Hour of the ()en!er,, detai in! the !ris y e)ents of (#ri ;?, 0?5%. 2t was not unti 0??0 that the 4.S. (rmy Euiet y dec assified its secret re#ort on the ki in!s at $achau. 2t detai s se)era other incidents that dayI a 4.S. ieutenant ordered four +erman so diers into an em#ty boAcar and #ersona y shot each of them. (nother (merican so dier c ubbed and shot those sti moanin!. Se)era +2s turned their backs on two inmates beatin! a +erman !uard to death with a sho)e . 2t was said that one of the inmates had been castrated by the +erman they were murderin!. See #hoto abo)e. D=2LO+4D - ,(76D3 6HD L2/D3(62OF, ( 3i!hts 3eser)ed. Dducationa 4se On y. "o#yri!ht J ;''; 3.H. =erez

Source: htt :NN+++6humanitas4international6orgNarchi)eNdachau4liberationN

War Crimes 3ri,-na!s

Japanese (ar criminals :ri/ht; are tried in a courtroom at the 5okyo 5rials in 1 !G. :Photo% 0l&red )isenstaedtC5ime Li&e;

0 rare color photo/raph o& Hideki 5o8o, a&ter t(o years and more than !77 courtroom days, seated in a courtroom at the 5okyo 5rials in 5okyo, Japan on 0pril 1>, 1 !6, -e&ore recei9in/ the 9erdict o& the Military 5ri-unal &or the #ar )ast. :Photo% W BettmannC+,3B4S;

'Why, o& course the people don't (ant (ar. Why (ould some poor slo- on a &arm (ant to risk his li&e in a (ar (hen the -est that he can /et out o& it is to come -ack to his &arm in one pieceQ <aturally, the common people don@t (ant (arD neither in 3ussia nor in )n/land, nor in 0merica, nor &or that matter in =ermany. 5hat is understood. But, a&ter all, it is the leaders o& the country (ho determine the policy and it is al(ays a simple matter to dra/ the people alon/ (hether it's a democracy, a &ascist dictatorship, a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. X-ut 9oice or no 9oice, the people can al(ays -e -rou/ht to the -iddin/ o& the leaders. 5hat is easy. 0ll you ha9e to do is tell them they are -ein/ attacked, and denounce the paci&ists &or lack o& patriotism and e*posin/ the country to dan/er. 4t (orks the same (ay in any country.2 N Hermann =oerin/, 0pril 16, 1 !G

0n 0merican 0rmy military policeman (atches Hideki 5o8o :le&t;, (artime Prime Minister o& Japan, sit in the (itness chair at a (ar crimes trial in 5okyo, Japan on January >, 1 !6. :BettmannC+,3B4S;

The defendants at the <nternational #ilitar" Tribunal for the @ar >ast <chiga"a ,ourt: Accused -a anese +ar criminals in the risonersH bo9 in #a"4-une &'(T6 @ront ro+ of defendants from left to right: General .en8i *oihara7 @ield #arshal Shunro2u Hata7 .o2i Hirota, former Prime #inister of -a an7 General -iro #inami7 General Hide2i To8o, former Prime #inister of -a an7 Ta2asumi F2a7 General Moshi8iro Lmezu7 General Sadao Ara2i7 General A2ira #uto7 Nao2i Hoshino7 F2inori .aga7 #arRuis .oichi .ido6 Bac2 ro+: ,olonel .ingiro Hashimoto7 General .unia2i .oiso7 Admiral Fsami Nagano7 General Hiroshi Fshima7 General <+ane #atsui7 Shumei F2a+a7 Baron .iichiro Hiranuma7 Shigenori Togo7 Mosu2e #atsuo2a7 #amoru Shigemitsu7 General .enr"o Sato7 Admiral Shigetaro Shimado7 Toshio Shiratori7 Teiichi Suzu2i6

5omoyuki Pamashita :+;, &ormer Japanese 0rmy +ommander in the Philippines, is administered the oath, (ith an interpreter :L;, as he takes the (itness stand in his o(n trial &or (ar crimes in Manila, Philippines on ?ecem-er >, 1 !>. Ma8or 3o-ert M. Kerr :3;, o& Portland, ,re/on, administers the oath. :W BettmannC+,3B4S;

An American #ilitar" Police officer leans for+ard to fasten a button on e94official Shumei F2a+a;s shirt after he sla former remier Hide2i To8o 3@ront !o+ $J5 during their arraignment on +ar crimes in To2"o, -a an in #a" &'(T6 3Photo: Alfred >isenstaedtNTime Jife5

ed

American L6S6 Arm" #ilitar" Police guards stand at attention as -a anese +ar criminal Hide2i To8o +ears a translation headset +hile testif"ing during his trial in To2"o, -a an in *ecember &'(:6 3Photo: ,arl #"dansNTime Jife5

Koki Hirota; listens to death sentence read -y Sir William We-- :0ustralia; :not sho(n;, President o& the 4nternational Military 5ri-unal &or the #ar )ast, at the 5okyo 5rials in 5okyo, Japan on <o9em-er 1", 1 !6. Koki Hirota (as Prime Minister o& 4mperial Japan &rom March , 1 3G to #e-ruary ", 1 3F and #orei/n Minister under Saito, ,kada and Konoe. Koki Hirota and Hideki 5o8o (ere e*ecuted at Su/amo Prison in 5okyo on ?ecem-er "3, 1 !6. :Photo% <ational 0rchi9es;

Hideki 5o8o reads his 9erdict at the 5okyo 5rials.

-a anese +ar criminals, inclu!ing General .i!e)i %o1o 6thir! $rom right7, eat their meal insi!e the 8ugamo Prison in %o)yo, Japan in &'(T6 3Photo: Alfred >isenstaedtNTime Jife5

A Time4Jife hotogra h of -a anese +ar criminal Hide2i To8o smo2ing +hat a ears to be a cigarette 3o iumO5 at his 8ail cell in To2"o, -a an in *ecember &'(:6 Hide2i To8o +as e9ecuted at Sugamo Prison in To2"o on *ecember $3, &'(:6 3Photo: ,arl #"dansNTime Jife5

%rial o$ .enri Petain: @ormer Premier of @rance >douard Herriot 3left5 oints an accusing finger at former @rench @ield #arshal Henri Petain, :', the hero of Ierdun during =orld =ar <, during his trial in a courtroom at Palais de -ustice in Paris, @rance in Se tember &'(G 6 #arshal Petain +as accused of treason, collaboratiang +ith the Nazi German regime, and lotting against the @rench !e ublic before the +ar, 3Photo: *a)id >6 SchermanNJife <mages5

5he ?e&endants@ ?ock at the <urem-er/ 5rials circa 1 !>A1 !G. #ormer 3eichs-ank chie& H8almar Schacht is seated on the &ar ri/ht in the &ront ro( o& the de&endants@ dock. Hermann =oerin/ is seated on the &ar le&t in the &ront ro( o& the de&endants@ dock. :Photo% <ational 0rchi9es;

?is/raced <a.i Party leaders :Le&t to ri/ht; 3udolph Hess, Joachim Ion 3i--entrop and Hermann =oerin/ are seated in the de&endents@ -o* in <urem-er/, =ermany in March 1 !G. :Photo% 3alph MorseCLi&e 4ma/es;

5he de&endants at the <urem-er/ <a.i trials in <urem-er/, =ermany on January 1, 1 !G. Pictured in the &ront ro( are% Hermann =oerin/, 3udol& Hess, Joachim Ion 3i--entrop, Wilhelm Keitel and )rnst Kalten-runner. 4n the -ack ro( are% Karl ?oenit., )rich 3aeder, Baldur 9on Schirach, and #rit. Sauckel. :BettmannC+,3B4S;

5he de&endants at the <urem-er/ <a.i trials in <urem-er/, =ermany. Pictured in the &ront ro( are% Hermann =oerin/, 3udol& Hess :sleepin/;, Joachim Ion 3i--entrop :sleepin/;, Wilhelm Keitel, and )rnst Kalten-runner :missin/;. 4n the -ack ro( are% Karl ?oenit., )rich 3aeder, Baldur 9on Schirach, and #rit. Sauckel. :BettmannC+,3B4S;

A A+orld ma of <6G6 @arbenC is on dis la" in a courtroom in Nuremberg, German" during the <6G6 @arben +ar crimes trial in Se tember &'(%6 3Photo: Ton" Jinc2NTime Jife5

=erman <a.i industrialist #riedrich #lick is &lanked -y t(o 0merican army /uards in a courtroom in the Palace o& Justice in <urem-er/, =ermany on January 1>, 1 !F. :Photo -y KeystoneC=etty 4ma/es;

=erman <a.i industrialist #riedrich #lick, accused o& usin/ sla9e la-or in his &actories, sei.in/ pri9ate properties, and -elon/in/ to Hitler's '+ircle o& #riends', sits in the dock at the Palace o& Justice in <urem-er/, =ermany durin/ a postA(ar trial in 1 !F. #riedrich #lick &unded the <a.i SS durin/ World War 44D #lick (as considered the richest man in =ermany at the time o& his death in 1 F". John Mc+loy, the $.S. Hi/h +ommissioner to =ermany, commuted #lick@s se9enAyear prison term in 1 >1. :Photo -y KeystoneC=etty 4ma/es;

0l&ried Krupp stands on trial in <urem-er/, =ermany a&ter World War 44. John Mc+loy (ould /rant him clemency a&ter the trial.

Le&t photo% #ormer Prime Minister o& 4mperial Japan =en. Hideki 5o8o slumps unconscious in his chair a&ter he attempted to commit suicide in his su-ur-an home in 5okyo, Japan on Septem-er 11, 1 !>. Blood -u--les &rom the /apin/ pistol (ound in his a-domen. 5o8o, slated &or possi-le arrest as a (ar criminal, shot himsel& (hile 0merican o&&icers (aited to take him to Mac0rthur's headBuarters in 5okyo. :BettmannC+,3B4S; <a.i SS chie& Heinrich Himmler lies on the &loor o& a 9illa in Luene-er/, =ermany on May "G, 1 !> a&ter he -it into a 9ial o& poison he had concealed in his mouth. :BettmannC+,3B4S;

3udol& Hess lau/hs (hile Hermann =oerin/ tells a 8oke inside the courtroom at <urem-er/.

Le&t to ri/ht% 3udolph Hess, Joachim Ion 3i--entrop and Hermann =oerin/ sit in the de&endants@ -o* in <urem-er/ in March 1 !G. :Photo% 3alph MorseC5ime Li&e;

Karl ?oenit. and 0l-ert Speer talks to 0dmiral Karl ?oenit..

0l-ert Speer :ri/ht; 9isits the in&amous Mauthausen concentration camp near Lin., 0ustria on Lin., July 1>, 1 !!.

Wilhelm Keitel :le&t; chats (ith )rnst Kalten-runner :center;, and Joachim 9on 3i--entrop (hile sittin/ in the dockets durin/ the <urem-er/ 5rials. 0ll three <a.i =erman o&&icers (ere con9icted o& (ar crimes and han/ed to death.

5he <a.i =erman military -rass sit on the docket durin/ the <urem-er/ tri-unal in 1 !G. #ront ro(, &rom le&t to ri/ht% Hermann =oerin/, 3udol& Hess, &ormer <a.i =erman #orei/n Minister Joachim 9on 3i--entrop, and Wilhelm Keitel.

Heinrich Himmler inspects the ?achau concentration camp in May 1 3G. :Photo% =erman #ederal 0rchi9es;

<a.i (ar criminal 0dol& )ichmann is seen sittin/ in a courtroom in 4srael. )ichmann (as a <a.i SS o&&icer (ho committed atrocities in concentration camps durin/ World War 44.

<a.i (ar criminal 0dol& )ichmann listens as the 4sraeli 8ud/es announce his 9erdict in a Jerusalem court on ?ecem-er 1>, 1 G1. 5he 8ud/es sentenced )ichmann to death. :4srael =o9ernment Press ,&&ice :=P,; Photo;

)rnst Kalten-runner lies dead a&ter his e*ecution -y han/in/ &or (ar crimes in ,cto-er 1 !G. :5ime Li&e;

0l&red 3osen-er/ lies dead a&ter his e*ecution -y han/in/ &or (ar crimes in ,cto-er 1 !G. :5ime Li&e;

<a.i =eneral Kurt Waldheim, second &rom le&t, stands at a meetin/ on May "", 1 !3, at an airstrip in &ormer Pu/osla9ia, le&t A )scola 3onca/li, 4talian commander and +ol. Hans Her-ert Macholt., a =erman o&&icer, second &rom ri/ht, and =eneral o& the Fth SSA?i9ision, =eneral 0rtur Phelps. :0ssociated Press photo;

'My &riends don@t (ant me to mention Kurt's name, -ecause o& all the recent <a.i stu&& and the $.<. contro9ersy, -ut 4 lo9e him and Maria does too, and so thank you, Kurt.1 A 0rnold Sch(ar.ene//er

Le&t Photo% 0rnold Sch(ar.ene//er appears (ith his &riend and suspected <a.i (ar criminal Kurt Waldheim. Kurt Waldheim (as a &ormer $nited <ations SecretaryA=eneral.

Hermann =oerin/ and his henchmen in9esti/ate the con&erence room inside 'Wol&@s Lair1 on July "7, 1 !!, hours a&ter a -om- detonated inside. 0dol& Hitler (as in8ured &rom the -om-in/. :=erman #ederal 0rchi9e;

Le&t photo% +ount +laus Schenk 9on Stau&&en-er/ (as the =erman o&&icer (ho attempted to assassinated 0dol& Hitler on July "7, 1 !!D he (as sentenced to death -y the <a.is &or attemptin/ to sa9e =ermany &rom total destruction. 3i/ht photo% 3aoul Wallen-er/, S(edish diplomat (ho rescued countless Je(s and others in Budapest, Hun/ary in 1 !!. Wallen-er/ (as captured -y the So9iet 3ed 0rmy and (as reportedly sent to a prison in Mosco(. 5he cause o& Wallen-er/@s death remains a mystery.

Benito Mussolini and his mistress +lara Petacci (ere displayed upsideAdo(n at a /as station on Pia..ale Loreto in Milan, 4taly on 0pril " , 1 !>.

4taly@s deceased dictator Benito Mussolini and his mistress lie dead in Milan, 4taly on on 0pril " , 1 !>.

Prominent 4ndi9iduals )liminated -y 0dol& Hitler E #riends

Ernst Rohm <a.i S0 stormtrooper and coA&ounder o& the <a.i PartyD Assassinated on July 2 1934 during the Night of the Long Knives

Kurt von S hlei her +hancellor o& =ermany :1 3"A1 33;D Minister o& ?e&ense :1 3"A1 33;D Assassinated on June 3!" 1934 during the Night of the Long Knives

#ield $arshal Er%in Rommel 4mplicated in the July "7 PlotD &ommitted 'sui ide( in )ermany on * to+er 14" 1944

&ount &laus S hen, von Stauffen+erg ?esi/nated 0ssassin and Mastermind o& the July "7 PlotD E-e uted in .erlin on July 21" 1944

#riedri h /erner von der S hulen+urg =erman 0m-assador to So9iet $nion :1 3!A1 !1;D 4mplicated in the July "7 PlotD 0anged in .erlin on Novem+er 1!" 1944

/olf10einri h )raf von 0elldorf +hie& o& the Berlin Police :1 3>A1 !!;D 4mplicated in the July "7 PlotD 0anged in .erlin on August 12" 1944

Admiral /ilhelm #ran3 &anaris +hie& o& =erman Military 4ntelli/ence LAbwehrM :1 3>A1 !!; 4mplicated in the July "7 PlotD E-e uted in )ermany on A4ril 9" 1942

&arl #riedri h )oerdeler Mayor o& Leip.i/, =ermany :1 37A1 3F;D 4mplicated in the July "7 PlotD 0anged in .erlin on #e+ruary 2" 1942

Johannes 5o4it3 #inance Minister o& Prussia :1 33A1 !!;D 4mplicated in the July "7 PlotD 0anged in .erlin on #e+ruary 2" 1942

)ustav Ritter von Kahr MinisterAPresident o& Ba9aria :1 "7A1 "1;D participated in Beer Hall Putsch in Munich in <o9em-er 1 "3D Assassinated in $uni h on June 3!" 1934 during the Night of the Long Knives

Anne #ran, 1>AyearAold Je(ish Holocaust 9ictim and author o& her personal diaryD ?ied at Ber/enA Belsen +oncentration +amp in March 1 !>

So4hie S holl Mem-er o& the 'White 3ose1 resistance mo9ement )*ecuted in Munich on #e-ruary "", 1 !3

0ans S holl Mem-er o& the 'White 3ose1 resistance mo9ement )*ecuted in Munich on #e-ruary "", 1 !3

&hristo4h 5ro+st Mem-er o& the 'White 3ose1 resistance mo9ement )*ecuted in Munich on #e-ruary "", 1 !3

Rudolf 0ilferding #inance Minister o& =ermany :1 "3, 1 "6A 1 " ; and Je(ish Mar*ist economistD $urdered +y the )esta4o in 5aris on #e+ruary 11" 1941

War rofiteers, Enem/ Co!!a,orators, & erpetrators of Wor!d War II

Nazi German +ar criminal Alfried .ru

ears at the third Nuremberg Trials in Nuremberg, German" in *ecember &'(%6

Nazi German arm" officer !einhard Gehlen, later an ad)isor to the ,entral <ntelligence Agenc" 3,<A5

=erman War Pro&iteers, )nemy +olla-orators, and Perpetrators%

#riedrich #lick steel -aron and <a.i =erman &inancierD descri-ed as (ealthiest man in =ermany

#rit. 5hyssen <a.i =erman &inancier and -usinessmen

H8almar Schacht President o& the 3eichs-ank :1 "3A1 37, 1 33A1 3 ;

Ma* M. War-ur/ ?irector o& 4.=. #ar-enD head o& M.M. War-ur/ E +o. LJe(ish -ank in Ham-ur/, =ermanyM

0l&ried Krupp head o& Krupp industries

Hermann =oerin/ 3eichsminister o& 09iation :1 33A1 !>;

Heinrich Himmler 3eichs&Ohrer o& the Schut.sta&&el :SS; :G Jan. 1 " N " 0pril 1 !>;

0dol& Hitler +hancellor and #uhrer o& <a.i =ermany :1 33A1 !>;

Joseph =oe--els Minister o& Pu-lic )nli/htenment and Propa/anda :1 33A 1 !>;D =auleiter o& Berlin :1 "GA1 !>;

Martin Bormann 0dol& Hitler@s assistant

Joachim 9on 3i--entrop #orei/n Minister o& <a.i =ermany :1 36A1 !>;D <a.i =erman 0m-assador to =reat Britain :1 3GA1 36;

0l-ert Speer Minister o& 0rmaments and War Production :1 !"A1 !>;D Hitler@s personal architect

Wilhelm #rick 3eichsminister o& the 4nterior :1 33A1 !3;

3udol& Hess ?eputy #uhrer o& <a.i =ermany :1 33A1 !1;

3einhard Heydrich +hairman o& the Wannsee +on&erence in 1 !"D Protector o& Bohemia and Mora9ia :1 !1A1 !";

=rand 0dmiral )rich 3aeder +ommanderAinA+hie& o& the =erman <a9y :1 "6A1 !3;

=rand 0dmiral Karl ?oenit. +ommanderAinA+hie& o& the =erman <a9y :1 !3A 1 !>;D President o& =ermany :1 !>;

#ield Marshal Wilhelm Keitel +hie& o& the Supreme +ommand o& the 0rmed #orces :1 36A1 !>;

=en. 0l&red Jodl #ield Marshal Keitel@s chie& o& sta&&

)rnst Kalten-runner SS Bri/ade&uhrer and head o& the =estapo

?r. 0rthur SeyssA4nBuart <a.i =erman Hi/h +ommissioner o& the <etherlands :1 !7A1 !>;

3o-ert Ley Hitler@s spokesmanD &ormer 4.=. #ar-en employee

0l&red 3osen-er/ Philosopher o& the <a.i Party and &ormer 3eichsminister &or the ,ccupied )astern 5erritories

Julius Streicher editor o& <a.i =erman propa/anda ne(spaper '?er Sturmer1

,tto Skor.eny <a.i SS +ommando

Hans #rank <a.i =erman =o9ernorA =eneral o& Poland :1 3 A1 !>;

Baldur 9on Schirach =auleiter o& Iienna :1 !7A1 !>;D head o& the HitlerAJu/end LHitler PouthM :1 31A1 !7;

#ran. 9on Papen +hancellor o& =ermany :1 3";D Iice +hancellor o& =ermany :1 33A1 3!;D =erman 0m-assador to 0ustria :1 3!A1 36;D =erman 0m-assador to 5urkey :1 3 A1 !!;

Konstanin 9on <eurath =auleiter o& Bohemia and Mora9ia :1 3 A1 !1;D #orei/n Minister o& =ermany :1 3"A1 36;D =erman 0m-assador to =reat Britain :1 37A1 3";

?r. Walther #unk President o& the 3eichs-ank :1 3 A1 !>;D 3eichsminister o& )conomics :1 36A1 !>;

?r. Leonard +onti <a.i =erman State Health +ommissioner

#rit. Sauckel =auleiter o& 5hurin/ia :1 "FA1 !>;

0lois Brunner <a.i =erman SS o&&icer and Heinrich Himmler@s assistant

Jose& Men/ele <a.i =erman SS doctor (ho en/a/ed in scienti&ic e*periments on children in concentration camps

#ran. Stan/l Kommandant o& 5re-linka +oncentration +amp :1 !"A1 !3;

<ikolaus 'Klaus1 Bar-ie 'Butcher1 o& Lyon, #rance

0dol& )ichmann SS o&&icer (ho (as captured -y 4srael@s Mossad a/ents (hile li9in/ in e*ile in 0r/entina

Ma8or =eneral 3einhard =ehlen <a.i =erman intelli/ence o&&icerD +ommander o& #orei/n 0rmies )ast durin/ World War 44

#ield Marshal )rhard Milch Lu&t(a&&e o&&icerD &ormer +hairman o& Lu&thansaD Na3i 5arty mem+er of Je%ish des ent

)mil Maurice +oA#ounder o& the Schut.sta&&el :SS;D Na3i 5arty mem+er of Je%ish des ent

Japanese War Pro&iteers, )nemy +olla-orators, and Perpetrators%

=en. Hiroshi ,shima Japanese 0m-assador to <a.i =ermany :1 36A 1 3 , 1 !1A1 !>;

5oyotaro Puki =o9ernor o& the Bank o& Japan :1 3FA1 !!;

Koyata 4(asaki President o& Mitsu-ishi :1 1GA1 !>;D B.0. $ni9ersity o& +am-rid/e :Pem-roke +olle/e; 1 7>

,kinori Kaya #inance Minister o& Japan :1 !1A1 !!;

Koichi Kido Lord Keeper o& the Pri9y Seal :1 !7A1 !>;

Koki Hirota Prime Minister o& 4mperial Japan :1 3GA1 3F;D #orei/n Minister o& Japan :1 33A1 3G, 1 3FA1 36;

Posuke Matsuoka #orei/n Minister o& Japan :1 !7A1 !1;D President o& South Manchuria 3ailroad :1 3>A1 3 ;

=en. Hideki 5o8o Prime Minister o& 4mperial Japan :1 !1A1 !!;D War Minister o& Japan :1 !7A 1 !!;D +hie& o& Sta&& o& the K(an/tun/ 0rmy :1 3F;

=en. Kuniaki Koiso Prime Minister o& 4mperial Japan :1 !!A1 !>;D Japanese =o9ernorA =eneral o& Korea :1 !"A 1 !!;

0dm. Shi/etaro Shimada Minister o& the <a9y :,cto-er 16, 1 !1AJuly 1F, 1 !!;D +ommander o& Pokosuka <a9al Station :1 !1;

=en. Seishiro 4ta/aki Minister o& War :1 36A 1 3 ;D +hie& o& Sta&& o& the +hina )*peditionary 0rmy :1 3 A1 !1;D +ommander o& the +hosen LKoreanM 0rmy :1 !1A1 !>;

#ield Marshal Shunroku Hata Minister o& War :1 3 A 1 !7;D +ommanderAinA +hie& o& the +hina )*peditionary 0rmy :1 !1;

<aoki Hoshino Iice Minister o& #inancial 0&&airs o& Manchukuo :circa 1 36;D director o& State ,pium Monopoly Bureau in Manchukuo

=en. Jiro Minami Japanese =o9ernorA =eneral o& Korea :1 3GA 1 !";D =o9ernorA=eneral o& K(antun/ Leased 5erritory :1 3!A1 3G;

Shi/enori 5o/o #orei/n Minister o& Japan :1 !1A1 !", 0pril 1 !>A 0u/ust 1 !>;D Japanese 0m-assador to the So9iet $nion :1 36A1 !7;

0dm. ,sami <a/ano +hie& o& the 4mperial Japanese <a9y =eneral Sta&& :1 !1A1 !!;D Minister o& the <a9y :1 3GA1 3F;

=en. 0kira Muto +hie& o& Sta&& o& the Japanese #ourteenth 0rea 0rmy under =eneral 5omoyuki Pamashita in the Philippines

=en. Ken8i ?oihara +ommanderAinA+hie& o& the Japanese Se9enth 0rea 0rmy in Sin/apore :1 !!A1 !>;D +ommander o& Japanese >th 0rmy LManchuriaM:1 3 A1 !7;

=en. 4(ane Matsui +ommander o& the Shan/hai )*peditionary #orce durin/ the Battle o& Shan/hai in 1 3F

=en. Sadao 0raki War Minister o& Japan :1 31A1 3!;

0merican War Pro&iteers, )nemy +olla-orators, and Perpetrators%

J.P. 'Jack1 Mor/an Jr. 0.B. Har9ard 166 +hairman o& the -oard o& J.P. Mor/an E +o., 4nc. :1 13A1 !3;

5homas H. McKittrick 0.B. Har9ard 1 11 President o& the Bank &or 4nternational Settlements :1 !7A1 !G;

#ranklin ?. 3oose9elt 0.B. Har9ard 1 7! President o& the $nited States :1 33A1 !>;

Winthrop W. 0ldrich 0.B. Har9ard 1 7F +hairman o& +hase <ational Bank :1 3!A1 >3;

5homas W. Lamont 0.B. Har9ard 16 " +hairman o& the -oard o& J.P. Mor/an E +o., 4nc. :1 !3A1 !6;

Harold Stanley B.0. Pale 1 76 Partner, Mor/an, Stanley E +o. :1 !1A1 >>;

W. 09erell Harriman B.0. Pale 1 13 $.S. 0m-assador to the So9iet $nion :1 !3A1 !G;

Henry L. Stimson B.0. Pale 1666 Secretary o& War :1 11A1 13, 1 !7A1 !>;

Hu/h 3o-ert Wilson B.0. Pale 1 7G $.S. 0m-assador to <a.i =ermany :1 36;

=eor/e L. Harrison B.0. Pale 1 17 President o& the #ederal 3eser9e Bank o& <e( Pork :1 "6A1 !7;

Henry 3. Luce B.0. Pale 1 "7 )ditorAinA+hie& o& Time ma/a.ine :1 "3A1 G!;

3o-ert 0. Lo9ett B.0. Pale 1 16 0ssistant Secretary o& War &or 0ir :1 !1A1 !>;

Prescott S. Bush B.0. Pale 1 1F Partner o& Bro(n Brothers Harriman E +o. :1 31A1 F";

). 3oland Harriman B.0. Pale 1 1F Partner o& Bro(n Brothers Harriman E +o. :1 31A1 F6;

3ussell +. Le&&in/(ell B.0. Pale 16 Partner o& J.P. Mor/an E +o. :1 "3A1 >7;

5homas J. Watson Sr. +hairman :1 ! A1 >G; and President :1 1!A 1 ! ; o& 4nternational Business Machines +orp.

,(en ?. Poun/ +hairman o& the -oard o& =eneral )lectric +o. :1 ""A1 3 , 1 !"A1 !!;

<orman H. ?a9is +hairman o& 0merican 3ed +ross :1 36A1 !!;

0llen W. ?ulles Secretary o& the +ouncil on #orei/n 3elations :1 33A1 !!;D ,SS a/ent durin/ World War 44

Henry #ord +hairman o& #ord Motors +o.

4nternational War Pro&iteers, )nemy +olla-orators, and Perpetrators%

0ndrei =romyko So9iet 0m-assador to the $nited States o& 0merica :1 !3A1 !G;

Iyachesla9 Moloto9 #orei/n Minister o& the So9iet $nion :1 3 A1 ! , 1 >3A1 >G;D Premier o& the So9iet $nion :1 37A1 !1;

Jose& Stalin +ommissar o& the So9iet $nion :1 "!A1 >3;D People's +ommissar &or ?e&ence :1 !1A1 !F;

La9rentiy Pa9lo9ich Beria So9iet Minister o& 4nternal 0&&airs :1 36A1 !>, 1 >3;

Mikhail 49ano9ich Kalinin +hairman o& the Presidium o& the Supreme So9iet o& the So9iet $nion :1 ""A1 !G;

09raham Stern #ounder o& Vionist terrorist or/ani.ation Stern =an/ :Lehi;D a Je(ish <a.i sympathi.er

Ha8 0min alAHusseini =rand Mu&ti o& Jerusalem and 0ra- <a.i colla-orator

Benito Mussolini Prime Minister o& 4taly :1 "3A1 !3;D in&ormally kno(n as '4l ?uce1

Pierre La9al #rench <a.i colla-oratorD Prime Minister o& #rance :1 31A1 3", 1 3>A1 3G, 1 !7, 1 !"A1 !!;

Philippe Petain #rench <a.i colla-oratorD +hie& o& the #rench State LIichy #ranceM :1 !7A 1 !!;

=eneralissimo #rancisco #ranco +audillo o& :#ascist; Spain :1 ,cto-er 1 3G N "7 <o9em-er 1 F>;

Pope Pius Y44 head o& Iatican +ity and the 3oman +atholic +hurch :1 3 A1 >6;

?aniel #. Malan Prime Minister o& South 0&rica :1 !6A1 >!;D desi/nated =auleiter o& South 0&rica in the e9ent o& =erman in9asion o& South 0&ricaD =od&ather o& South 0&rican 0partheid

Iidkun Tuislin/ <or(e/ian <a.i colla-oratorD Minister President o& <or(ay :#e-ruary 1, 1 !"AMay , 1 !>;D ?e&ense Minister o& <or(ay :1 31A1 33;

Kurt Waldheim <a.i =erman o&&icerD $nited <ations SecretaryA =eneral :1 F"A1 61;D President o& 0ustria :1 6GA1 ";

0nte Pa9eliZ Po/la9nik L+hie&M o& the 4ndependent State o& +roatia :1 !1A1 !>;

Su-has +handra Bose 4ndian <a.i colla-oratorD antiABritish 4ndian independence acti9ist

British =o9ernment ,&&icials durin/ World War 44

Sir Kin/sley Wood +hancellor o& the )*cheBuer :May 1", 1 !7N Septem-er "1, 1 !3; 6ed in offi e on Se4tem+er 21" 1943

Monta/u +. <orman =o9ernor o& the Bank o& )n/land :1 "7A1 !!;

Kin/ =eor/e I4 o& the $nited Kin/dom :rei/n, ?ecem-er 11, 1 3GN #e-ruary G, 1 >";

Winston +hurchill Prime Minister o& =reat Britain :May 17, 1 !7A July "G, 1 !>;D Minister o& ?e&ence o& =reat Britain :May 17, 1 !7AJuly "G, 1 !>;D Born to 0merican mother Jeanette Jerome

0nthony )den #orei/n Secretary o& =reat Britain :1 3>A1 36, 1 !7A1 !>, 1 >1A1 >>;

Her-ert Morrison Home Secretary :,cto-er !, 1 !7N May "3, 1 !>;

0l-ert Iictor 0le*ander #irst Lord o& the 0dmiralty :May 11, 1 !7A May ">, 1 !>, 1 " A1 31, 1 !>A1 !G;

<e9ille +ham-erlain Prime Minister o& =reat Britain :May "6, 1 3FA May 17, 1 !7;D +hancellor o& the )*cheBuer :1 "3A1 "!, 1 31A1 3F;D 6ied Novem+er 9" 194!

Sir Harold 0l&red MacMichael Hi/h +ommissioner o& LBritishM Palestine :1 36A1 !!;

John 0nderson, 1st Iiscount Wa9erley +hancellor o& the )*cheBuer :Sept. "!, 1 !3AJuly "G, 1 !>;D Lord President o& the +ouncil :,ct. 3, 1 !7N Septem-er "!, 1 !3;D Home Secretary :1 3 A1 !7;

)d(ard #rederick Lindley Wood, 1st )arl o& Hali&a* British 0m-assador to the $nited States :1 !7A1 !G;

+lement 0ttlee ?eputy Prime Minister o& the $nited Kin/dom :#e-ruary 1 , 1 !"A May "3, 1 !>;

John Simon, 1st Iiscount Simon Lord Hi/h +hancellor o& =reat Britain :May 17, 1 !7NJuly "F, 1 !>;D +hancellor o& the )*cheBuer :May "6, 1 3FNMay 17, 1 !7;

William Ma*(ell 2Ma*2 0itken, 1st Baron Bea9er-rook Lord Pri9y Seal :1 !3A1 !>;D Minister o& 0ircra&t Production :May 1 !7AMay 1 !1;

)rnest Be9in #orei/n Secretary o& =reat Britain :1 !>A1 >1;D Minister o& La-our and <ational Ser9ice :1 !7A1 !>;

Nazi +ar criminal Ni2olaus A.lausC Barbie esca ed to Boli)ia at the end of =orld =ar << through the AratlinesC6 Fther Nazi +ar criminals +ho esca ed >uro e using the AratlinesC +ere Adolf >ichmann 3+ho esca ed to Argentina before he +as arrested b" <sraeli #ossad agents5, @ranz Stangl 3,ommander of Treblin2a concentration cam +ho esca ed to Brazil5, Alois Brunner 3Heinrich Himmler;s assistant and SS officer5, and Nazi SS doctor -osef #engele6

5ersons of S4e ial 7nterest8 +arl Bosch, Put.i Han&staen/l, Hans #rit.sche, 0nton ?re*ler, John Mc+loy
+arl Bosch N ?irector o& 4.=. #ar-en chemical company in =ermany )rnst 'Put.i1 Han&staen/l N 0dol& Hitler@s pianist and $.S. President #ranklin ?. 3oose9elt@s ad9isor Hans #rit.sche N ?irector o& the 3eich Ministry o& Propa/anda 0nton ?re*ler N 0dol& Hitler@s assistant and coA&ounder o& the <ational Socialist =erman Workers@ Party in Munich in 1 1 John J. Mc+loy N Hi/h +ommissioner to ,ccupied =ermany :1 ! A1 >";D /ranted clemency to 0l&ried Krupp and other <a.i (ar criminals

War rofiteers, Enem/ Co!!a,orators, & erpetrators of Wor!d War II

<a.i =ermany% #riedrich #lick N steel -aron and <a.i =erman &inancierD descri-ed as (ealthiest man in =ermany #rit. 5hyssen N <a.i =erman &inancier and -usinessmenD deposited [3,777,777 into the $nion Bankin/ +orporation L-ank in <e( Pork +ityD author o& '4 Paid Hitler1 H8almar Schacht N President o& the 3eichs-ank :1 "3A1 37, 1 33A1 3 ; Ma* M. War-ur/ N ?irector o& 4.=. #ar-enD head o& M.M. War-ur/ E +o. LJe(ish -ankin/ &irm in Ham-ur/, =ermanyM 0l&ried Krupp N head o& Krupp industries 0dol& Hitler N +hancellor and #uhrer o& <a.i =ermany :1 33A1 !>; Hermann =oerin/ N 3eichsmarshal and head o& the <a.i Lu&t(a&&e Heinrich Himmler N Head o& the SS Joseph =oe--els N Min. o& Pu-lic )nli/htenment and Propa/anda :13 Mar 1 33A37 0pr 1 !>;D =auleiter o& Berlin : <o9. 1 "G N 1 May 1 !>; Martin Bormann N 0dol& Hitler@s assistant Joachim 9on 3i--entrop N #orei/n Minister o& <a.i =ermany :1 36A1 !>;D <a.i =erman 0m-assador to =reat Britain :1 3GA1 36; 0l-ert Speer N Minister o& 0rmaments and War Production :#e-ruary 6, 1 !" N May "3, 1 !>;D Hitler@s personal architect Wilhelm #rick N 3eichsminister o& the 4nterior :37 January 1 33 N "7 0u/ust 1 !3;D Protector o& Bohemia and Mora9ia :1 !3A1 !>; 3udol& Hess N ?eputy #uhrer o& <a.i =ermany :"1 0pril 1 33 N 1" May 1 !1;D Hitler@s personal secretary 3einhard Heydrich N +hairman o& the Wannsee +on&erence in 1 !"D Protector o& Bohemia and Mora9ia :1 !1A1 !";D assassinated in Pra/ue on May "F, 1 !" died in Pra/ue on June !, 1 !" =rand 0dmiral )rich 3aeder N +ommanderAinA+hie& o& the =erman <a9y :1 "6A 1 !3; =rand 0dmiral Karl ?oenit. N +ommanderAinA+hie& o& the =erman <a9y :1 !3A1 !>;D President o& =ermany at #lens-ur/ :0prilAMay "3, 1 !>; #ield Marshal Wilhelm Keitel N +hie& o& the Supreme +ommand o& the 0rmed #orces L,-erkommando der Wehrmacht :,KW;M :1 36A1 !>; )rnst Kalten-runner N SS Bri/ade&uhrer and head o& the =estapoD President o& 4nterpol :37 January 1 !3 N 1" May 1 !>; =en. 0l&red Jodl N #ield Marshal Keitel@s chie& o& sta&& 0dol& )ichmann N SS o&&icer (ho (as captured -y 4srael@s Mossad a/ents (hile li9in/ in e*ile in 0r/entina ,tto Skor.eny N <a.i SS +ommando Ma8. =en. 3einhard =ehlen N <a.i =erman intelli/ence o&&icerD +ommander o& #orei/n 0rmies )ast durin/ World War 44 3o-ert Ley N Hitler@s spokesmanD &ormer 4.=. #ar-en employee ?r. Leonard +onti N <a.i =erman State Health +ommissioner ?r. 0rthur SeyssA4nBuart N <a.i =erman Hi/h +ommissioner o& the <etherlands :1 !7A1 !>; 0l&red 3osen-er/ N Philosopher o& the <a.i Party and &ormer 3eichsminister &or the ,ccupied )astern 5erritories Julius Streicher N editor o& <a.i =erman propa/anda ne(spaper '?er Sturmer1 #rit. Sauckel N =auleiter o& 5hurin/ia :1 "FA1 !>; Baldur 9on Schirach N =auleiter o& Iienna :1 !7A1 !>;D head o& the HitlerAJu/end LHitler PouthM :1 31A1 !7; Hans #rank N <a.i =erman =o9ernorA=eneral o& Poland :1 3 A1 !>; #ran. 9on Papen N +hancellor o& =ermany :1 3";D Iice +hancellor o& =ermany :1 33A1 3!;D =erman 0m-assador to 0ustria :1 3!A1 36;D =erman 0m-assador to 5urkey :1 3 A1 !!; Konstanin 9on <eurath N =auleiter o& Bohemia and Mora9ia :1 3 A1 !1;D #orei/n Minister o& =ermany :1 3"A1 36;D =erman 0m-assador to =reat Britain :1 37A1 3"; ?r. Walther #unk N President o& the 3eichs-ank :1 3 A1 !>;D 3eichsminister o& )conomics :1 36A1 !>; 0lois Brunner N <a.i =erman SS o&&icer and Heinrich Himmler@s assistant Jose& Men/ele N <a.i =erman SS doctor (ho en/a/ed in scienti&ic e*periments on children in concentration camps )rnst 3ohm N <a.i S0 stormtrooper and coA&ounder o& the <a.i PartyD assassinated on July " 1 3! :<i/ht o& the Lon/ Kni9es; #ran. Stan/l N Kommandant o& 5re-linka +oncentration +amp :1 !"A1 !3;D arrested in Bra.il in 1 GF and tried in West =ermany &or murder #ield Marshal )rhard Milch N <a.i =erman Lu&t(a&&e :0ir #orce; o&&icerD &ormer +hairman o& Lu&thansaD mem-er o& the <a.i PartyD con9icted at <urem-er/ &or crimes a/ainst humanityD Je(ish o&&icer (ho (as '0ryani.ed1 -y Hitler )mil Maurice N +oA#ounder o& the Schut.sta&&el :SS;D Je(ish o&&icer (ho (as '0ryani.ed1 -y Hitler 4mperial Japan% =en. Hiroshi ,shima N Japanese 0m-assador to <a.i =ermany :1 36A1 3 , 1 !1A1 !>; 5oyotaro Puki N =o9ernor o& the Bank o& Japan :1 3FA1 !!; Koyata 4(asaki :16F A1 !>; N President o& Mitsu-ishi :1 1GA1 !>;D B.0. $ni9ersity o& +am-rid/e :Pem-roke +olle/e; 1 7> ,kinori Kaya N #inance Minister o& Japan :1 !1A1 !!; Koichi Kido N Lord Keeper o& the Pri9y Seal :1 !7A1 !>;D Japanese Minister o& )ducation :1 3FA1 36; Koki Hirota N Prime Minister o& 4mperial Japan :1 3GA1 3F;D #orei/n Minister o& 4mperial Japan :1 33A1 3G, 1 3FA1 36; Posuke Matsuoka N #orei/n Minister o& 4mperial Japan :1 !7A1 !1;D President o& South Manchuria 3ailroad :1 3>A1 3 ; =en. Hideki 5o8o N Prime Minister o& 4mperial Japan :,ct. 16, 1 !1AJuly "", 1 !!;D War Minister o& Japan :1 !7A1 !!;D +hie& o& Sta&& o& the K(an/tun/ 0rmy :1 3F; =en. Kuniaki Koiso N Prime Minister o& 4mperial Japan :1 !!A1 !>;D Japanese =o9ernorA=eneral o& Korea :1 !"A1 !!; 0dm. Shi/etaro Shimada N Minister o& the <a9y :,cto-er 16, 1 !1AJuly 1F, 1 !!;D +ommander o& Pokosuka <a9al Station :1 !1; 0dm. ,sami <a/ano N +hie& o& the 4mperial Japanese <a9y =eneral Sta&& :0pril 1 !1A#e-ruary 1 !!;D Minister o& the <a9y :1 3GA1 3F; =en. 0kira Muto N +hie& o& Sta&& o& the Japanese #ourteenth 0rea 0rmy under =eneral 5omoyuki Pamashita in the Philippines =en. Ken8i ?oihara N +ommanderAinAchie& o& the Japanese Se9enth 0rea 0rmy in Sin/apore :1 !!A1 !>;D +ommander o& Japanese >th 0rmy LManchuriaM:1 3 A1 !7;D o&&icer in Manchuria (ho (as in9ol9ed in the Mukden 4ncident in Septem-er 1 31 =en. 4(ane Matsui N +ommander o& the Shan/hai )*peditionary #orce durin/ the Battle o& Shan/hai in 1 3F =en. Sadao 0raki N Minister o& War :1 31A1 3!;D mem-er o& Kokuhonsha :<ational #oundation Society; =en. Seishiro 4ta/aki N Minister o& War :1 36A1 3 ;D +hie& o& Sta&& o& the +hina )*peditionary 0rmy :1 3 A1 !1; #ield Marshal Shunroku Hata N Minister o& War :1 3 A1 !7;D +ommanderAinA+hie& o& the +hina )*peditionary 0rmy :1 !1; <aoki Hoshino N Iice Minister o& #inancial 0&&airs o& Manchukuo :circa 1 36;D +hie& +a-inet Secretary under Prime Minister =en. Hideki 5o8oD director o& State ,pium Monopoly Bureau in Manchukuo

=en. Jiro Minami N Japanese =o9ernorA=eneral o& Korea :1 3GA1 !";D =o9ernorA=eneral o& K(antun/ Leased 5erritory :1 3!A1 3G;D Minister o& War :0pril 1 31A?ecem-er 1 31; Shi/enori 5o/o N #orei/n Minister o& 4mperial Japan :1 !1A1 !", 0pril 1 !>A0u/. 1 !>;D Japanese 0m-assador to So9iet $nion :1 36A1 !7; 0merican% 5homas J. Watson N President o& 4nternational Business Machines +orp. :4BM; :1 1!A1 ! ; Winthrop W. 0ldrich N +hairman o& +hase <ational Bank :1 3!A1 >3; 5homas H. McKittrick N President o& the Bank &or 4nternational Settlements :1 !7A1 !G; ,(en ?. Poun/ N +hairman o& the -oard o& =eneral )lectric +o. :1 ""A1 !7;D author o& the Poun/ Plan 5homas W. Lamont N +hairman o& J.P. Mor/an E +o. :1 !3A1 !6;D Partner o& J.P. Mor/an E +o. :1 11A1 !6;D 9isited 4mperial Japan and met (ith )mperor Hirohito in ,cto-er 1 "F W. 09erell Harriman N $.S. 0m-assador to the So9iet $nion :1 !3A1 !G;D Partner o& Bro(n Brothers Harriman E +o. Prescott S. Bush N ?irector o& $nion Bankin/ +orporationD Partner o& Bro(n Brothers Harriman E +o. :1 31A1 F"; Henry L. Stimson N Secretary o& War :1 !7A1 !>;D Secretary o& State :1 " A1 33; 3o-ert 0. Lo9ett N 0ssistant Secretary o& War &or 0ir :1 !1A1 !>;D Partner o& Bro(n Brothers Harriman E +o. :1 31A1 !7, 1 !GA1 !F, 1 ! A 1 >7, 1 >3A1 6G;D $.S. Secretary o& ?e&ense :1 >1A1 >3; ). 3oland Harriman N ?irector o& $nion Bankin/ +orporationD Partner o& Bro(n Brothers Harriman E +o. Hu/h 3. Wilson N $.S. 0m-assador to <a.i =ermany :1 36;D $.S. Minister to S(it.erland :1 "FA1 3F; Harold Stanley N President o& Mor/an, Stanley E +o. :1 3>A1 !1;D Partner o& J.P. Mor/an E +o. :1 "6A1 3>; 3ussell +. Le&&in/(ell N Partner o& J.P. Mor/an E +o. :1 "3A1 >7; #ranklin ?elano 3oose9elt N President o& the $nited States :1 33A1 !>; =eor/e L. Harrison N President o& the #ederal 3eser9e Bank o& <e( Pork :1 "6A1 !7; Henry 3. Luce N )ditorAinA+hie& o& 5ime, 4nc. :1 "3A1 G!; <orman H. ?a9is N President o& the +ouncil on #orei/n 3elations :1 3GA1 !!; Henry #ord N +hairman o& #ord Motors +o. 0llen W. ?ulles N ,SS o&&icer durin/ World War 44D ?irector o& the +ouncil on #orei/n 3elations :1 "FA1 G ;D ?irector o& +entral 4ntelli/ence 0/ency :1 >3A1 G1; John Mc+loy N Hi/h +ommissioner to ,ccupied =ermanyD /ranted clemency to 0l&ried Krupp and other <a.i (ar criminals J.P. 'Jack1 Mor/an Jr. N +hairman o& the -oard o& J.P. Mor/an E +o., 4nc. :1 13A1 !3; #orei/n :4nternational;% Monta/u +. <orman N =o9ernor o& the Bank o& )n/land :1 "7A1 !!; Benito Mussolini N ?ictator and 4l ?uce o& #ascist 4taly :1 "3A1 !3; 09raham Stern N &ounder o& the Stern =an/, a Vionist terrorist or/ani.ation Ha8 0min alAHusseini N =rand Mu&ti o& Jerusalem Iyachesla9 Moloto9 N Premier o& the So9iet $nion :1 37A1 !1;D #orei/n Minister o& the So9iet $nion :1 3 A1 ! , 1 >3A1 >G; Jose& Stalin N ?ictator o& the So9iet $nion :1 "!A1 >3; <e9ille +ham-erlain N Prime Minister o& =reat Britain :May "6, 1 3FAMay 17, 1 !7;D +hancellor o& the )*cheBuer :1 31A1 3F; Pope Pius Y44 N head o& Iatican +ity and the 3oman +atholic +hurch :1 3 A1 >6; Iidkun Tuislin/ N <or(e/ian <a.i colla-oratorD Minister President o& <or(ay :#e-ruary 1, 1 !"AMay , 1 !>;D ?e&ense Minister o& <or(ay :1 31A1 33; Kurt Waldheim N <a.i =erman o&&icer &rom 0ustriaD $nited <ations SecretaryA=eneral :1 F"A1 61; Philippe Petain N #rench <a.i colla-oratorD +hie& o& the #rench State LIichy #ranceM :11 July 1 !7 N 1 0u/ust 1 !!; Pierre La9al N #rench <a.i colla-oratorD Prime Minister o& #rance :1 31A1 3", 1 3>A1 3G, 1 !7, 1 !"A1 !!; =eneralissimo #rancisco #ranco N +audillo o& :#ascist; Spain :1 ,cto-er 1 3G N "7 <o9em-er 1 F>; ?aniel #. Malan N Prime Minister o& South 0&rica :1 !6A1 >!;D desi/nated =auleiter o& South 0&rica in the e9ent o& =erman in9asion o& South 0&ricaD =od&ather o& South 0&rican 0partheid and <a.i colla-orator Su-has +handra Bose N British 4ndia@s <a.i colla-orator 0nte Pa9eliZ N Po/la9nik L+hie&M o& the 4ndependent State o& +roatia :1 !1A1 !>; Sir Harold 0l&red MacMichael A Hi/h +ommissioner o& LBritishM Palestine :March 3, 1 36A0u/ust 37, 1 !!;

=orld =ar << ,asualties 3&'3'4&'(G5

Total o ulation &N&N&'3' &,?%3,??? T,'':,??? T,TG3,??? :,3:%,??? (?,$:',??? T,(G:,??? &T,&&',??? &&,$T%,??? G&%,GT:,??? (,$3G,??? &G,3??,??? 3,%'G,??? T',(3G,??? &,&3(,??? &%,%??,??? 3,%??,??? (&,%??,??? $(,T??,??? T',3&?,??? %,$$$,??? ',&$',??? &&',??? 3%:,???,??? &(,3(?,??? 3,T':,??? $,'T?,??? ((,3'(,??? %&,3:?,??? $3,(??,??? &,''G,??? $,G%G,??? $'G,??? (,3'&,??? $T',??? &',3$?,??? :&',??? G,G33,??? $?,??? to 3G,&?? 3??,??? :%,??? $?? G?? 3?&,(?? $,&$?,??? $?? &(G,&?? G??,??? to &,???,??? 3%:,??? to (:3,??? &(%,??? $&$,??? &,3?? &??,??? &,G?? &?? 3?? &?,G?? G,??? 'G,??? $&%,T?? &$,&?? &,??? $$,??? $$,??? (G,(?? 3,???,??? to (,???,??? $G,??? $,&?? #ilitar" deaths ,i)ilian deaths -e+ish Holocaust due to deaths 3see notes5 +ar and re ression 3?,??? $?? 3',:?? %?? G:,%?? (',T?? &,??? 3,??? $G?,??? %,???,??? to &T,???,??? &?? (3,??? &,??? 3,???,??? to (,???,??? G?,??? 'G,??? $,??? $T%,??? &,???,??? to &,G??,??? '??,??? to 3,&%?,??? $$?,??? to %??,G?? :?,??? $?? &,G??,??? to $,G??,??? TG,??? $(,(?? Total deaths 3?,$?? (?,G?? &$3,%?? :T,&?? $,??? $G,??? $%$,??? (G,(?? &?,???,??? to $?,???,??? &?? 3(G,??? 3,$?? 3,???,??? to (,???,??? G&,??? &??,??? '%,??? GT%,T?? &,???,??? to &,G??,??? T,G'3,??? to :,:T3,??? 3?',G?? to :?G,&?? G:?,??? $?? &,G:%,??? to $,G:%,??? $?? G?? $?? (G%,??? $,T$?,??? to 3,&$?,??? 3%:,??? to (:3,??? $$%,??? 3G3,??? $,??? &??,??? &,G?? &?? 3?? *eaths as a of &'3' o ulation $6:& ?6G% see table belo+ &6?$ ?6?$ ?63: &6T' ?6(? &6'3 to 36:T ?6?? $6$G ?6?: (63 to G6%T (6G? ?6T $6T$ &63G (6?% to T6& see table belo+ (6$' to &&6&G T63G ?6&% ?6(3 to ?6TT ?6?? ?6?& ?6?? &6?3 36T% to (63% &6T to $6?T &&63: &36%& ?6T: $6$: ?6GT ?6?? ?6?(

,ountr" Albania Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Burma 3Britain5 ,anada !e ublic of ,hina ,uba ,zechoslo)a2i *enmar2 *utch >ast <ndies >stonia 3+ithin &'3' borders5 >thio ia @inland @rance @rench <ndochina Nazi German" Greece Hungar" <celand <ndia 3Britain5 <ran <raR <reland @ascist <tal" <m erial -a an .orea 3-a an5 Jat)ia 3+ithin &'3' borders5 Jithuania 3+ithin &'3' borders5 Ju9embourg #ala"a 3Britain5 #alta 3Britain5 #e9ico #ongolia

$%%,??? &??

&,???

:3,???

&T?,??? T',G?? $??,???

:?,??? &(&,??? %??

Nauru Netherlands Ne+foundland Ne+ `ealand Nor+a" Pa ua and Ne+ Guinea 3Britain5 Phili ines 3L6S6A65

3,(?? :,%$',??? 3??,??? &,T$',??? $,'(G,??? &,$'$,??? &T,???,??? 3(,:(',??? G??,??? &','3(,??? (,$??,??? %$:,??? &?,&T?,??? &,'??,??? &T:,G??,??? $G,T3%,??? T,3(&,??? (,$&?,??? &G,?$3,??? (%,%T?,??? &3&,?$:,??? &G,(??,??? &,'T%,?'G,(??

&%,??? included +ith L6.6 &&,'?? 3,???

G?? &:?,??? &?? G,:?? &G,???

&?(,???

G?? 3?&,??? &??

&(6% 36(G ?6?3 ?6%3 ?63$ &6&% 36(: to T6T &T6& to &T6% :6?? to &(6?? (6$$ ?6??to %6&a T6:% ?6&$ 36?? &(6$& ?6?$ ?6?& ?6?? ?6?( ?6'( ?63$ T6T% 36&% to (6

%??

&&,'?? ',G?? &G,??? GG%,??? to &,?G%,??? G,T$?,??? to G,:$?,??? (?,??? to %?,??? :33,??? ? to 3??,??? G?,??? &&,'?? G%,???

G%,??? $(?,???

Poland 3+ithin &'3' borders5 Portuguese Timor !omania 3+ithin &'3' borders5 !uanda4Lrundi Singa ore 3Britain5 South Africa South Pacific #andate 3-a an5 So)iet Lnion @ascist S ain S+eden S+itzerland Thailand Lnited .ingdom Lnited States Mugosla)ia Totals

G??,??? to &,???,??? $,3:?,??? to $,G:?,??? (?,??? to %?,??? T(,??? ? to3??,??? G?,???

3,???,???

3??,???

(T',???

&&,'?? G%,??? :,:??,??? to &?,%??,??? (,G?? &$,$G(,??? to &(,&G(,??? T?? &?? $,??? T%,&?? &,%?? G&(,??? 3$,&TT,G?? to (','G$,$?? &,???,???

$3,'G(,??? (,G?? T?? &?? %,%?? (G?,%?? (&:,G?? &,?$%,??? <2,;9<,<:0 to :9,293,1:0

G,T?? 3:3,T?? (&T,:?? ((T,??? $$,G%T,%?? to $G,('&,:??

T%,??? 9,:9;,100

War %esponsi&ility an' (istorical Memory! (iro)ito*s Apparition (er&ert +. ,iSince the a##earance of Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan in ;''', the unearthin! in >a#an of new information on the (sia-=acific war has #roceeded a#ace. Historica war narrati)es usin! new documentary e)idence and drawin! on the insi!hts of )arious disci# ines continue to a##ear. Ora history, womenKs history, studies of war #risoners and internationa aw, e)en theories of #ostwar Lreconci iation,M ha)e widened the #ers#ecti)es of >a#anese historians. 6hanks to the work of many #ro!ressi)e historians the ethica dimensions of mi itary history are bein! o#ened u# and eA# ored as ne)er before. N0O /ut in no fundamenta way ha)e these scho ar y efforts a tered the #icture of Hirohito as the acti)ist, dynamic, #o itica y em#owered em#eror who # ayed a centra ro e in >a#anKs undec ared wars. 6he fo owin! discussion reca#itu ates some of the ar!uments that 2 #resented ear ier when ana yzin! HirohitoKs eadershi# at the #o icy e)e , then !oes beyond them to address #rob ems of historica memory. N;O 6he same Furember! and 6okyo #rinci# es of indi)idua and state res#onsibi ity for war crimes, howe)er, inform this essay 8ust as they did my book. .ntro'uction >a#anKs wars of the 0?.'s and ear y 0?5's inf icted on the #eo# es of (sia and the =acific tremendous human and materia osses. O)er ten mi ion "hinese died from the effects of the war that be!an in 0?.1, with some estimates of actua deaths runnin! twice as hi!h. Within countries occu#ied after 0?50 by >a#anese forces and ater fou!ht o)er by the ( ies, massi)e numbers of combatants and non-combatant ci)i ians died, inc udin! o)er a mi ion 7i i#inos. 6ens of thousands of war #risoners fe into >a#anese hands. *any of them died in ca#ti)ity and many others from 4S Lfriend y fire.M >a#anese forces detained 0.',''' to more than 05',''' ci)i ians for the duration of the war. N.O (t its end, >a#an itse f ay #rostrate, its cities in ruins, its #eo# e demora ized. Officia >a#anese !o)ernment underestimates say that ..0 mi ion >a#anese died in the (sia-=acific War. Of that number about B'',''' were non-combatant ci)i ians, most of them )ictims of (merican fire bombin! and atomic bombin! in the warKs fina months. N5O (merican combat deaths of about 0;.,''' in the =acific #a e in com#arison. N%O 6he indi)idua who o)ersaw these wars and in whose name they were fou!ht, Hirohito, was forty-one-years-o d when >a#an unconditiona y surrendered its armed forces. 6wo decades ear ier, u#on ascendin! the throne, he had taken the aus#icious rei!n-tit e LShowaM (Li ustrious #eaceM). /ut for the em#eror and his sub8ects, and es#ecia y for the #eo# e of (sia and the =acific, there wou d be no #eacefu times in the two decades that fo owed. (iro)ito! /apan*s 0ast 1mpo2ere' 1mperor 2n the years between Fo)ember 0?;0 and $ecember ;%, 0?;&, before the shy, taciturn Hirohito succeeded his ai in! father, the 6aisho em#eror, he had been dis# ayed to the >a#anese nation as the dynamic re#resentati)e of Lyoun! >a#an,M the embodiment of >a#anese mora ity, the #erson destined to in)i!orate the im#eria house. 6wo years ater the Showa em#eror and his entoura!e stren!thened the monarchyKs inks to state Shinto throu!h year- on! enthronement ceremonies that miAed Western-sty e mi itary re)iews with nati)istic re i!ious rites whi e e e)atin! Hirohito to the status of a i)in! deity.

(iro)ito*s ent)ronement portrait HirohitoKs enthronement he #ed to mo)e >a#an in a more nationa istic direction. 2t was based on the theocratic myth of an im#eria house whose destiny was defined by the em#erorPa human in form but actua y a deity ru in! the country in an

uninterru#ted ine of succession. Fo matter what #ro8ect the em#eror undertook, his Lsub8ectsM were #resumed and reEuired to be abso ute y oya in Lassistin!M him from be ow. 2n news#a#ers and on the radio the messa!e echoed throu!hout the and that >a#an had broken with its immediate #astQ it now had a monarch cast in the mo d of his i ustrious !randfather, Dm#eror *ei8i, who (in the words of HirohitoKs first im#eria rescri#t) had Lenhanced the !randeur of our em#ireM and ne)er a owed himse f to be treated as a #u##et. 7or Hirohito, ike most Western heads of state, em#ire, nationa defense, and nationa !reatness were #rimary. +i)en his stron! y o##ortunistic nature, he wou d eAtend >a#anKs contro o)er "hina when !i)en the chance. 2n other words, as a traditiona im#eria ist and nationa ist, he was firm y committed to #rotectin! >a#anKs estab ished ri!hts and interests abroad e)en in the face of the risin! wor d tide of anti-co onia nationa ism. /ut he was a so hi!h y sensiti)e to the interna ba ance of #o itica forces and e)en more tota y dedicated to #reser)in! the monarchy. Hirohito differed from other contem#orary ru ers in the ty#e of *achia)e ianism that he #racticed in order to maintain the monarchy and eAtend the reach of the >a#anese state. Like successfu Western im#eria ists, Hirohito was ab e to effecti)e y de# oy the rhetoric of ethics, )irtue, and mora ity as means to mobi ize his nation for war. He and the e ites who #rotected him treated internationa aw as a fetter on their freedom of action and they were not a)erse to usin! schemin! and trickery for #ur#oses of nationa defense. N&O Hirohito a one, howe)er, cou d dis# ay eadershi# by usin! the techniEue of the substanti)e Euestion that carried the force of a command. He was a so uniEue in his )iew of >a#anKs co onia and semico onia ri!hts as his !enea o!ica inheritance from his dead ancestors. Since chi dhood he had been tau!ht that his ancestors, not his i)in! Lsub8ects,M were the source of his authority and the ob8ect of his res#onsibi ityPthe so e entities to whom he was mora y accountab e. N1O HirohitoKs denia of res#onsibi ity for errors of #o icy and 8ud!ment #er)aded the entire structure of >a#anese co ecti)e decision-makin!. 6he youn! Hirohito was neither be icose nor inte ectua y sha ow. He was serious, methodica , ener!etic, and inte i!entQ he was a so #hysica y s i!ht and Euite inarticu ate. He had been carefu y !roomed to eAercise im#eria o)ersi!ht throu!h bui din! and maintainin! consensus so as to achie)e unity in #o icy-makin!. (bo)e a , he had been trained to make rationa 8ud!ments as both head of state and su#reme commander. NBO Ret from the start occasions arose when #assion and ideo o!y intrudedQ on these occasions Hirohito, the unifier, b undered bad y. 6he *ei8i constitution !a)e him !reat #ower and authority which cou d not be restricted by the #o itica #arties in the $iet. 2t #ositioned him at the intersection of #o itics and mi itary affairsPa owin! him on occasion to mo)e the entire !o)ernment. Da!er to assert the #rero!ati)es of im#eria #ower that his own father had been unab e to eAercise, Hirohito, with the stron! encoura!ement of his entoura!e, soon fired his first #rime minister. 6heir main !rie)ance a!ainst #rime minister +enera 6anaka +iichi, was that 6anaka wanted to #unish two youn! officers who in >une 0?;B had assassinated the "hinese war ord "han! 6so- in (>a#anKs chief co aborator in "hinaKs *anchuria), rather than hush u# their crime as 6anakaKs cabinet ministers wanted. N?O Hirohito #ersisted in inf uencin! from behind the scenes the #o icies and conduct of the two #rime ministers that fo owed. 2n 0?.' his determination to achie)e arms contro in concert with the 4S and /ritain ed him and his c ose ad)isers to !i)e inadeEuate attention to consensus-bui din! amon! the e ites. 6hey forced throu!h >a#anKs acce#tance of the London Fa)a 6reaty of 0?.' o)er the ob8ections of the na)yKs minority faction, who be ie)ed that >a#an had to be ab e to brandish na)a #ower on a #ar with the (n! o-(mericans if it was to achie)e its nationa !oa s. 6he back ash from the minority factions in both ser)ices, and from #o iticians in the $iet who a!reed with them, came swift y. /y makin! the "ourt a new, institutiona y inde#endent # ayer in an era of #arty cabinets, Hirohito and his "ourt +rou# undermined the tenuous system of #arty cabinet !o)ernment that had be!un to de)e o# around the time of *ei8iKs death. N0'O *eanwhi e, out of #ub ic )iew, Hirohito was s ow y formin! his own #o itica s#ace within a com# eA system of institutions and #rocesses, desi!ned to #rotect him, so that he cou d eAercise #ositi)e eadershi# at wi , and not mere y ser)e as a #assi)e monarch sanctionin! #o icies #resented to him by the cabinet. Hirohito te s us that o)er time he im#ro)ed his modus o#erandi, becomin! more ade#t at #racticin! se f-restraint and a)oidin! actions and comments that cou d incur criticism. (fter the eru#tion of the *anchurian 2ncident in Se#tember 0?.0, in the face of the ! oba +reat $e#ression, >a#anKs domestic #o itica situation became increasin! y unstab e.

/apanese forces on t)e marc) in Manc)uria in 19#1 Hirohito and the men surroundin! him then made a series of decisions with disastrous conseEuences for both "hina and >a#an. 2nstead of demandin! the #unishment of insubordinate officers who had sta!ed that incident, Hirohito acce#ted the armyKs fait accom# i, 8oined in the co)er-u# of the facts, and fai ed to back the efforts of the incumbent #arty cabinet to brin! the 9wantun! (rmy to hee . On y by im#utation may Hirohito (who was fo owin! his inner circ e) be deemed crimina y iab e for these actions committed by senior and intermediate e)e officers in both 6okyo and *anchuria who, thou!h under his command, were not yet under his actua contro . /ut once he had earned the true facts, he not on y fai ed to #unish the wron!doers, but acti)e y 8oined in aidin! and abettin! the armyKs seizure of *anchuria. 2n these ways, Hirohito a owed the mi itary in !enera and army fie d commanders in #articu ar to effecti)e y take o)er >a#anKs "hina #o icy and turn it o#en y a!!ressi)e. N00O 2n s#rin! 0?.;, fo owin! the assassination of a #rime minister by youn! na)a officers, Hirohito and the "ourt +rou# abandoned their su##ort for constitutiona !o)ernment conducted by #arty cabinets, thereby Euickenin! the mi itaristic drift in >a#anese #o itics. "abinets of nationa unity headed by admira s mo)ed to the fore. >a#an was a si!natory to the 9e o!!/riand =act (0?;B), which ob i!ated it to refrain from usin! force a!ainst other states, and the Fine-=ower 6reaty (0?;;), which sti#u ated res#ect for "hinaKs so)erei!nty and territoria inte!rity. When in the fa of 0?.; >a#an forma y reco!nized the #u##et state of L*anchukuo,M it )io ated both treaties. Hirohito was # eased that his army had eA#anded the em#ire and #artia y redressed >a#anKs strate!ic weakness in natura resources such as coa and iron, but a so a!ricu tura and and its #roduce. So rather than abandon this hu!e territoria !ain in the face of )ehement 4S and "hinese criticism, he sanctioned >a#anKs withdrawa from the Lea!ue of Fations in *arch 0?.. and issued an im#eria rescri#t announcin! the mo)e. 6he rhetoric of Lnationa emer!encyM and endan!ered L ife ine,M !enerated durin! the *anchurian crisis, continued to effect thinkin! about >a#anKs domestic situation. Letha conf icts in)o )in! mi itary officers had shaken the country and Hirohito was uncertain how to #roceed in the face of mu ti# e #ressures. 3adica ri!htist #o iticians in the $iet ca ed for the disso ution of #o itica #arties. 6he army and na)y, dissatisfied with their res#ecti)e bud!etary a ocations, wanted a com# ete break with the Washin!ton treaty system and an end to the courtKs #ro-(n! o-(merican ine in di# omacy. Hirohito, keen y aware of >a#anKs economic de#endence on the West for resources, techno o!y, and markets, ho#ed to be ab e to coo#erate with /ritain and the 4. S., and simu taneous y seek to iso ate "hina di# omatica y. O)er the neAt four years Hirohito !ro#ed for ways to restore disci# ine amon! a ienated mi itary officers im#atient for domestic #o itica reform, by which they meant main y acce erated rearmament. ( thou!h concerned about the armyKs o)erreach on the continent, he worried e)en more about domestic disorder, which cou d undermine the monarchy. 6hen in 0?.% army and ci)i ian eAtremists tried to o)ercome a constitutiona restraints #re)entin! the em#eror from ru in! Ldirect yM without re yin! on his ad)isers. 6heir nationwide cam#ai!n attacked aw #rofessor *inobe 6atsukichiKs or!an theory of the constitution that had been used to e!itimize #arty !o)ernment and od!e the monarchy more firm y within the constitutiona order. 6he cabinet that the eAtremists tar!eted for o)erthrow counter-attacked by aunchin! its own cam#ai!n to re#udiate the or!an theory and em#hasize the em#erorKs LdirectM #ersona ru e, which had been the core conce#t of the *ei8i 3estoration. Hirohito ent his authority to both mo)es, #art y to #re)ent his #ower from bein! dwarfed by !rou#s actin! from be ow, and #art y to #rotect his c osest ad)isers whom the radica s had sin! ed out for attack. N0;O

2n ate 7ebruary 0?.&, a mi itary insurrection in 6okyo took the ife of HirohitoKs c osest #o itica ad)iser and many others.

3roops occupy 4a5ata6c)o, 3o7yo after t)e insurrection On y after inter)enin! forcefu y to su##ress the u#risin! and #unish the rebe officers, did Hirohito sanction a ar!e eA#ansion of the mi itary bud!et, a threefo d increase in the size of the armyKs sma !arrison force in north "hina, and nationa #o icies that LreEuired >a#an Sto become the stabi izin! force in Dast (sia.M N0.O 6hereafter the army and na)y # ayed the !uidin! ro e in sha#in! domestic #o icyQ and Hirohito, who sti ima!ined himse f to be a traditiona Lbene)o ent monarch,M threw off his ear ier indecisi)eness and s ow y be!an to assert LdirectM im#eria ru e in his ca#acity as uniformed commander-in-chief. 2n >u y 0?.1, >a#anese and "hinese Fationa ist troo#s c ashed brief y at the *arco =o o /rid!e south of =ekin!. 6he different army factions on the +enera Staff di)ided as to how to hand e the fi!htin!. One faction wanted to sett e this minor #ro)ocation oca y in order to concentrate resources on bui din! >a#anKs economic and mi itary mi!htQ the other wanted to use the incident to reso )e at a stroke a the outstandin! issues with "hian! 9ai-shekKs Fationa ist !o)ernment. Hirohito, from the outset, su##orted the territoria eA#ansionists. When thousands of troo#s had been dis#atched, he sanctioned a broad >a#anese offensi)e in the =ekin!-6ientsin area. Short y afterwards, on >u y ;?-.', "hinese troo#s, students, and workers ki ed the remnants of the >a#anese !arrison force in the city of 6un!chow, east of =ekin!, and a so massacred ;;. >a#anese and 9orean ci)i ians, inc udin! many women and chi dren. N05O 6hen, on (u!ust 0., "hian! sudden y s#read the fi!htin! in north "hina to Shan!hai, in the ower Ran!tze 3i)er re!ion, where the interests of the forei!n #owers were most hea)i y concentrated. 6he conf ict de)e o#ed into an a -out, undec ared war. N0%O Wantin! to end it Euick y, Hirohito ur!ed ma8or troo# reinforcements and the strate!ic bombin! of "hinaKs cities. He a so Lendorsed the NarmyKsO decision to remo)e the constraints of internationa aw on the treatment of "hinese #risoners of war.M N0&O 2n ate Fo)ember 0?.1, ha)in! seized Shan!hai after a bitter stru!! e, >a#anese troo#s and na)a and army air units be!an con)er!in! on "hinaKs symbo ica y im#ortant ca#ita of Fankin!. Hirohito sanctioned the estab ishment of an 2m#eria HeadEuarters and the reor!anization of the command structure so as to brin! his constitutiona command res#onsibi ities and his rea contro into harmony. 6hereafter he was in a better #osition to assess inte i!ence, authorize and initiate fie d o#erations, and #erform as an acti)e su#reme commander !uidin! from behind c osed doors the actua conduct of the war. When Fankin! fe , Fationa ist so diers fai ed to com# ete y e)acuate the city and many donned ci)i ian c othes, !i)in! the )en!efu >a#anese mi itary an eAcuse to massacre "hinese war #risoners and ci)i ians en masse.

/apanese forces enter 4an7in5 Hirohito, who must ha)e earned about these e)ents e)en if he did not !ras# their seriousness, ke#t si ent and a##ears ne)er to ha)e ordered an in)esti!ation into the crimina beha)ior of his armed forces. (s the L"hina 2ncidentM dra!!ed on, with the mi itary refusin! to com# y with internationa aw to "hina, >a#anese war atrocities increased. 7or these atrocities, Hirohito, as commander-in-chief, shares indirect, deri)ati)e res#onsibi ity. He bore more direct res#onsibi ity for sanctionin! >a#anKs use of #oison !as. (nd he si!ned off on the order (6airikumei ;50) that ed to the Forth "hina (rea (rmyKs mu ti# e, far more destructi)e and on!er astin!, Lannihi ation cam#ai!ns,M that one >a#anese scho ar estimates to ha)e ki ed o)er two and a ha f mi ion "hinese noncombatants. N01O 2n 0?.B the "hina War sta emated. D)en with thirty-ei!ht di)isions and 0.0. mi ion troo#s in "hina by the end of that year, >a#anKs eaders saw no way to end it Euick y unti Fazi +ermany started Wor d War 22 and occu#ied Western Duro#e. N0BO /y then, an inter!o)ernmenta iaison body, the 2m#eria HeadEuarters-+o)ernment Liaison "onference, in which Hirohito #artici#ated, had a ready reso )ed on a southern ad)ance to com# ete "hinaKs encirc ement and #osition >a#an to mo)e into resource-rich areas of co onia Southeast (sia. 2n Se#tember 0?5' Hirohito ordered the army to be!in its entry into 7rench 2ndochina in #re#aration for strikin! further south. 6he 4S res#onded by a## yin! economic sanctions. Hirohito then re uctant y assented to the 6ri#artite mi itary a iance with the dictatorshi#s in +ermany and 2ta y. 6hree months ater he ratified a treaty of friendshi# and #eace with the inde#endent, forma y neutra state of 6hai and, sti#u atin! res#ect for 6hai so)erei!nty. Ha)in! 6hai and on >a#anKs side wou d, it was fe t, faci itate the ad)ance southward by force. /y >anuary 0?50, a most ha f a year before the +erman-So)iet war broke out, Hirohito was eAercisin! the fu #rero!ati)es of his #osition. 6hen on $ecember B (6okyo time), >a#an attacked the mi itary forces and out#osts of /ritain and the 4nited States, its ma8or Western o##onents, each of which was an im#eria ist state ho din! (sian #eo# es in co onia sub8u!ation. Hirohito fussed o)er different drafts of his fina memorandum to the 4S !o)ernment in order to insure that not a sin! e sentence in it hinted at a decision to dec are war. /y issuin! his war rescri#t without !i)in! #rior notification to the 4S or any other tar!eted country, he de iberate y )io ated internationa aw. (s for the Fether ands, co onia master of the Fether ands Dast 2ndies, the main #rize of the southern ad)ance, Hirohito saw no need e)en to bother with a war dec aration. (nd when # ans ca ed for >a#anese armed forces to aunch attacks from shi#s in the South "hina Sea on Sin!ora in southern 6hai and and 9ota /haro in the northernmost *a ay State, Hirohito did not hesitate to tram# e on the recent y conc uded >a#an-6hai 7riendshi# 6reaty either. N0?O 6o summarizeI 7or war crimes committed by >a#anKs mi itary forces, which were the authorized ser)ants of the em#erorstate durin! the undec ared >a#an-"hina War, Hirohito, as commander-in-chief, bore the stron!est share of #o itica , e!a , and mora res#onsibi ity. He !a)e #ost-facto sanction to >a#anKs take-o)er of *anchuria in )io ation of internationa treaties and a!reements. He ater #artici#ated acti)e y in the # annin! and wa!in! of >a#anKs tota war of a!!ression in "hina. (s >a#anKs sacred s#iritua eader and symbo of nationa identity he (and his "ourt +rou#) framed the "hina conf ict as a Lho y war.M Workin! in c ose coo#eration with the mi itary, Hirohito brou!ht em#eror worshi# to fe)er #itch. He a so ordered and monitored the bombin! of "hinese cities, use of #oison !as, and annihi ation cam#ai!ns to wi#e out the entire #o#u ations of contested areas in Forth and "entra "hina. N;'O 7or the war crimes and other )io ations of internationa aw committed by >a#anKs mi itary forces after $ecember 1, 0?50, the ar!est share of res#onsibi ity may a!ain be attributed to Hirohito as both commander in chief and head of state. (t e)ery sta!e on the road to Sin!ora, 9ota /haro, and =ear Harbor he was free to choose a ternati)e courses of action rather than acce#t the thinkin! of his mi itary chiefs. When, for eAam# e, =rime *inister 9onoe 7umimaro, on Se#tember %, 0?50, !a)e him the chance to sto# the rush to war a!ainst /ritain and the 4S, he re8ected it. N;0O O)er the neAt four years, unti mid-0?5%, whene)er confronted with the o#tion of #eace, he chose war.

>a#anese historians ha)e carefu y documented HirohitoKs key ro e in war and #ostwar actions throu!hout the 0?.'s and S5's. 2t is now understood that he se dom a owed his !enera s and admira s to fi!ht the war 8ust as they wished, and that he de ayed >a#anKs surrender in order to #reser)e the im#eria throne with himse f on it. 6his ast #oint must be em#hasized. (ccordin! to the accounts of indi)idua s c ose to Hirohito, the em#eror reco!nized by summer 0?55 that >a#an wou d e)entua y ha)e to seek a ne!otiated end to the osin! war. /ut he insisted that his armed forces first had to achie)e at east one substantia mi itary resu t in order to im#ro)e the surrender terms. He a so re8ected the idea of a owin! the ( ies to #unish >a#anese war crimina s or abo ish >a#anKs armed forces, for they wou d be needed to check the So)iet 4nion and #re)ent the s#read of communism at home. ( year ater, in ate >une 0?5%, Hirohito abandoned these #reconditionsI the batt e of Okinawa had been ostQ there wou d not be one- ast-)ictory. ( thou!h he was not thinkin! of immediate ca#itu ation, he was #re#ared to a ow the ( ies to #unish war crimina sQ and e)en contem# ated disarmament. /ut he (and other hard iners on the Su#reme War Leadershi# "ounci ) #ersisted in maneu)erin! for #eace throu!h the !ood offices of the sti neutra So)iet 4nion, with the so e aim of #reser)in! and #rotectin! himse f and the monarchy. Fone of this means that Hirohito #rescribed a #o icy, made a the decisions, or eAercised unbounded inf uence. On the contrary, he had been tau!ht ne)er to #erform as a Western-sty e dictator eAercisin! #ower arbitrari y. N;;O 6he stereoty#ed Western understandin! of this LsystemM as a mi itary dictatorshi# in which the mi itary a ways !ot its way, and the em#eror was mere y its #ower ess #u##et, did not ref ect rea ity. Whene)er Hirohito chose to do so, he !uided and made contributions to the conduct of the war in a four theatersI *anchuria (0?.0-5%), "hina-within-the +reat Wa (0?.1-5%), co onia Southeast (sia (0?50-5%), and the Western =acific (0?50-5%), where the 4S a ways focused its main mi itary effort. He a so mediated and acted as the fina arbiter of conf icts amon! the hi!h commandersQ read the directi)es of both hi!her and ower e)e officersQ and sent his aides to the front to in)esti!ate what the armies were doin!. (nd on! after mi itary defeat and the massi)e destruction of >a#anese cities stared him in the facePindeed, two fu years after !enera staff studies showed that >a#an had no #ros#ect of achie)in! )ictory, Hirohito remained stubborn y committed to fi!htin! on. He wou d de ay surrender unti his future as a #o itica y-em#owered so)erei!n was internationa y !uaranteed. 6he atomic bombin! of Hiroshima and, #erha#s e)en more, the So)iet entrance into the war, fina y created a situation in which the ru in! e ites wou d risk acce#tance of the =otsdam $ec aration. N;.O (fter >a#anKs surrender Hirohito did not abdicate as many eA#ected, and as his own brothers and some members of the eAtended im#eria fami y ur!ed. 2nstead, he remained on the throne acti)e y eAercisin! #o itica inf uence throu!hout the #eriod of the first two #ost-surrender cabinets. D)en after the new L"onstitution of >a#anM had stri##ed him of a #o itica #ower and turned him into a ceremonia fi!urehead who was ess than a Lconstitutiona monarch,M he #ersisted in tryin! to inf uence e)ents. (s for the >a#anese 7orei!n *inistry, it wou d a ways be Euick to condemn the So)iet )io ation of its Feutra ity 6reaty with >a#an but say nothin! #ub ic y about >a#anKs )io ation of the >a#an-6hai 7riendshi# 6reaty, which wou d ha)e weakened the force of its char!e and drawn Hirohito into the #icture. N;5O W)y (iro)ito Was 4ot 3rie' When the ( ies #ut on tria for war crimes and crimes a!ainst #eace a sma , re#resentati)e !rou# of eadin! !o)ernment and mi itary officia s of the (Ais states, why was >a#anKs commander-in-chief not indicted and tried, or, at the )ery east, Euestioned by 4S occu#ation officia s about his res#onsibi ity for the warC "ertain y the manner in which Westerners understood the monarchy and the #o itica cu ture that su##orted the em#eror had somethin! to do with the fai ure of (mericans to Euestion him. N;%O /ut more im#ortant factors were a so at work, both within >a#an and abroad, determinin! that Hirohito wou d not be tried or the monarchy abo ished. Of the interna factors, none was more im#ortant than HirohitoKs own actions and those of his entoura!e and hi!h !o)ernment officia s between (u!ust 0%, 0?5% (when a recordin! of his )oice announcin! the end of the war was broadcast to the >a#anese nation) and ear y Se#tember (when he to d a s#ecia session of the BBth im#eria $iet that >a#an wou d stri)e to Lbui d a #eace state and contribute to the cu ture of mankind.M) N;&O $urin! the crucia first two weeks of transition to #eace, before occu#ation forces took contro and reforms commenced, >a#anKs ru in! e ites astute y inked Hirohito to the idea of #eace and en8oined the #eo# e to b ame themse )es rather than their eaders for the disaster. /y c osin! ranks to concea the em#erorKs hands-on ro e in # annin! and wa!in! war, they ho#ed to #rotect the throne, its occu#ant, and their own ru e. 7or ike no other e)ent, the on! war had im#o)erished the nation and #roduced a e)e in! of c asses, !i)in! new )oice to indi)idua s from the #oorest socia !rou#s. 3u in! e ites feared that their re ationshi# with the #eo# e cou d be torn asunder.. 6o #rotect their state and themse )es, >a#anKs decision-makers destroyed and hid massi)e amounts of documentary e)idence. 6hese materia s #ertained to war atrocities, massacres, seAua s a)ery, the treatment of war #risoners, and Rasukuni Shrine, as we as the em#erorKs ro e in the com# eA bureaucratic #rocess eadin! to war in 0?50 and durin! the war itse f. (nother of their methods was to foist a b ame for the war onto army eaders whi e #retendin! that the em#eror and the #eo# e had done nothin! wron!fu because they had been Ldecei)edM by Lthe mi itary,M which in the minds of most >a#anese meant the army. N;1O 2n fact, at e)ery im#ortant turnin! #oint on >a#anKs road to wars in "hina, Southeast (sia, and the =acific, senior na)a eaders were eEua y at fau t. Fe)erthe ess, the myth #ersisted in #ostwar >a#anese cu ture and memory that the senior officers of the im#eria na)y had been ess mi itaristic and had a more rationa #ers#ecti)e on the wor d than the army. (dditiona y, in thinkin! about why Hirohito a)oided a meanin!fu accountabi ity, one cannot fai to note the #owerfu effect of his war termination rescri#tPthe so-ca ed Lsacred decisionM that brou!ht #eace. 6he drafters of this document ne)er used

the word Ldefeat,M affirmed the officia war aims of se f-defense and se f-#reser)ation, em#hasized the future, and !a)e encoura!ement to rebui din! from the ruins. $etermined to L#rotect the kokutai in an un#recedented situation of mi itary co a#se, they ski fu y concea ed Hirohito-s de ayed surrender. Hirohito and his chief #o itica ad)iser, 9ido 9oichi then chose =rince Hi!ashikuni Faruhiko to head the first Lim#eria fami y cabinetM formed ri!ht after the surrender.

(iro)ito recor'in5 t)e surren'er speec) Hi!ashikuni fo owed u# on the em#erorKs rescri#t by ur!in! the entire nation to re#ent and not seek 8ustice for those who had ruined and dis!raced the nation. His successor, former forei!n minister Shidehara 9i8uro, made denia of HirohitoKs war res#onsibi ity >a#anKs officia #o icy by definin! the em#eror under the *ei8i "onstitution as a norma , #eace-minded constitutiona ist, which he ne)er was. 6he Shidehara cabinetKs decision on the em#eror remained throu!hout the #ostwar Showa era, #art of >a#anKs dominant ideo o!y of ru e, fu y su##orted by the 4S !o)ernment. (D)en today, ar!uments constructed to defend Hirohito sti breathe the s#irit of this decision.) 7or this and other reasons the war !eneration as a who e durin! the occu#ation years did not #ersist in c arifyin! the causes of defeat but instead channe ed its ener!ies into reconstructin! and bui din! a better >a#an, so that the nation cou d re!ain its di!nity and the trust of the wor d. When assessin! the eAterna factors that contributed to HirohitoKs sur)i)a into the #ost-surrender #eriod, one confronts a different set of facts, ar!uments, and assum#tions. 6o be!in with, the decision-makers in the 6ruman administration were di)ided o)er Hirohito, whereas +enera $ou! as *ac(rthur, before he had e)en arri)ed on >a#anese soi , assumed incorrect y that Hirohito had been a mere fi!urehead em#eror and a )irtua y #ower ess #u##et of >a#anKs Lmi itarists.M 6his he #ed the 4S mi itary to use him 8ust as >a#anKs mi itarists had once done, to ease their ru e, e!itimize reforms, and insure their smooth im# ementation. >ose#h ". +rewPformer ambassador to >a#an and, at warKs end, the actin! secretary of statePa so tried to #rotect the em#eror. His efforts and those of other inf uentia (merican friends of >a#an #ro)ed he #fu to >a#anKs ru ers. 2n Washin!ton +rew #romoted the myth of the em#erorKs innocence and the notion that the men who surrounded him were Lmoderates,M committed to #eace. 2n 6okyo +H: worked to sa)e Hirohito from bein! he d accountab e for his actions. 6hese (merican efforts #romoted the fiction that the em#eror had a ways been a #eace-minded constitutiona ist ke#t in the dark about the detai s of the war. /ut +H: a so ordered the remo din! of >a#anese o#inion on the ost war throu!h news artic es seria ized in the (merican-censored >a#anese #ress and occasiona y broadcast on the (merican-censored radio. 6hese accounts # aced the entire b ame for the war and defeat on the Lmi itarists.M Such occu#ation-s#onsored myths stren!thened >a#anese )ictim consciousness and im#ede the search for truth. 6he #ostwar tria of war crimina s had been an ( ied war aim, incor#orated in the =otsdam $ec aration. (fter >a#anKs forma surrender (Se#t. ;, 0?5%) the 4S mi itary under Su#reme "ommander *ac(rthur be!an to ru e indirect y, issuin! orders to the >a#anese !o)ernment from +H: offices in 6okyo whi e kee#in! in the back!round an (merican occu#ation force of o)er 0'','''. (rrests of war crimina sus#ects soon be!an, and in s#rin! 0?5& the 2nternationa *i itary 6ribuna for the 7ar Dast (or 6okyo 6ria ) commenced. 2n the course of its en!thy #roceedin!s, the >a#anese #eo# e earned that the "hinese were not to b ame for either the "han! 6so- in assassination or the *anchurian 2ncident, and that their own armed forces had committed count ess war crimes. ( thou!h the #rosecution ne)er #resented a fu #icture of the Fankin! atrocities, enou!h materia was submitted in court to shock the >a#anese nation. Simi ar y, the issue of forced seAua ens a)ement (Lcomfort womenM) was aired in court with documents estab ishin! that the army and na)y had committed this war crime throu!hout the >a#anese-occu#ied #arts of (sia and the =acific. What was ne)er a owed, howe)er, was any discussion of (merican war crimes, inc udin! Western co onia ism. *eanwhi e, *ac(rthur had carefu y remo)ed from (rtic e & of his charter for the 6okyo 6ria , dea in! with the officia #osition of defendants, any eA# icit reference to LHead of State,M as stated in the Furember! charter. He and his subordinates #reser)ed, in addition, the #rinci# e of head of state immunity for HirohitoKs #remises and #ro#erty. 6he atter inc uded a of HirohitoKs officia and #ri)ate #a#ers # us the #a#ers of his mi itary aides-de-cam# that cou d ha)e re)ea ed )a uab e facts about his war ro e. N;BO *ac(rthur then went to eAtraordinary en!ths to shie d Hirohito from e)ery #hase of the tria , inc udin! inf uencin! the testimony of former wartime #rime minister +enera 6o8o Hideki, who was #ressured to !o to his death ha)in! assumed a res#onsibi ity for the ost war. N;?O

3o8o at t)e 3o7yo 3rial Hirohito too did not stand id e. (t +H:Ks #roddin! he toured the country, intent on sa)in! the monarchy, resuscitatin! what remained of its mystiEue, and estab ishin! his bona fides as the LhumanM em#eror, a L#acifistM in tune with the democratic )a ues of his #eo# e. Hirohito #artici#ated with the LmoderatesM and others in the court mi ieu in a concerted cam#ai!n to shift a b ame for war and atrocities onto subordinates. 6hey entertained the "hief =rosecutor at the 6okyo 6ria , >ose#h /. 9eenanQ they !athered inte i!ence on what hi!h officia s of *ac(rthurKs +enera HeadEuarters thou!ht about the em#erorQ and they inf uenced the awyers on the 2nternationa =rosecution Section who were #re#arin! the case a!ainst L" ass-(M war crimina sus#ects. 9ey members of HirohitoKs "ourt +rou# a so ser)ed as Lsecret informantsM for the #rosecution, he #in! to se ect the men who wou d be indicted as L" ass (M war crimina sus#ects, and in the #rocess sett in! scores. HirohitoKs famous L*ono o!uePthe account of his ro e durin! the war years, which he dictated to fi)e c ose aides startin! *arch 0?5&Pwas a de iberate attem#t to counter the 6okyo tribuna by # acin! the em#erorKs )ersion of e)ents in *ac(rthurKs hands. N.'O 6hat Hirohito was !i)en immunity from #rosecution for his officia acts and ater #rotected from the tria #roceedin!s indicates how far at odds 6okyo was from the etter and s#irit of Furember!. 6he Hirohito case set a bad eAam# e by reestab ishin! the ancient tradition of immunity from #rosecution for heads of state, which the Furember! charter had undermined. /ut when some of the 8ud!es on the 6okyo tribuna fe t com#e ed to ca attention in their dissentin! fina 8ud!ments to the em#erorKs tota , unEua ified #o itica immunity from eadershi# crimes e)en thou!h he had aunched the a!!ressi)e war, they insured that the Hirohito case wou d be remembered. War %emem&rance! t)e 1n'less Searc) for 3rut) an' /ustice One shou d not ay a b ame for >a#anKs war crimes at HirohitoKs feet any more than one shou d b ame Hit er for a the war crimes of the Wehrmacht and the +erman #eo# e. For, for the same reason shou d one assi!n eAc usi)e res#onsibi ity to =resident +eor!e W. /ush for a the war crimes and crimes a!ainst humanity committed by (merican forces in the i e!a wars that he started in 2raE and (f!hanistan. What the architects of the first internationa war crimes tria s intended to #rioritize was not b ame #er se but rather the #rinci# e that # annin!, #re#arin!, initiatin! and wa!in! an a!!ressi)e war is i e!a . (#ro#os of this #rinci# e, 2m#eria >a#anKs ministers of state, chiefs of staff, some of its "ourt +rou# officia s and certain y most of its midd e-eche on army and na)y officers, were e)en more cu #ab e for # un!in! >a#an e)er dee#er into a!!ressi)e wars. So too were #rominent war mon!ers at esser e)e s of #ower in the bureaucracy and in the mass media. >ourna ists, their editors, radio scri#t writers, and assorted o#inion eaders dutifu y #ro#a!andized the myth of the i)in! deity. On matters of war they disseminated a the ies and #ro#a!anda that their !o)ernment #ut out, 8ust as the ma8or (merican #rint, te e)ision, and radio news media do today with res#ect to 4S wars and occu#ations in the *idd e Dast. *any of >a#anKs bureaucrats, business, re i!ious, and educationa eaders had a so embraced the !oa of endin! by force (n! o-(merican domination of (sia and the =acific, substitutin! in its # ace >a#anese ru e in "hina and Southeast (sia, thou!h that did not make them eEua y b ameworthy as war crimina s. Hirohito, howe)er, was at the )ery center of the #o icy-makin! #rocess throu!h e)ery sta!e of warQ he #ro)ided continuous o)ersi!ht for wars that he knew were a!!ressi)eQ and he incurred steadi y mountin! res#onsibi ity for those a!!ressions. He a so fi!ured centra y in the cu tura #rocess that nurtured the actua #er#etrators of war crimes. 2n short, he made the system work and was the reason why it worked. 2n Fo)ember-$ecember 0?5%, accordin! to the 4S Strate!ic /ombin! Sur)ey, siAty-two #ercent of the >a#anese #eo# e sti

wanted Hirohito to rei!n. N.0O 3ather than Euick y distancin! themse )es from their em#eror the way the +ermans did from Hit er, in their effort to e)ade #unishment and mora res#onsibi ity, >a#anKs #o itica e ites drew c oser and did a in their #ower to #rotect him. N.;O 6his te in! difference ref ected not on y the distincti)e nature of eadershi# in >a#an but a so the ethos that informed decision-makin!. 7urthermore, most >a#anese #eo# e ne)er ref ected that since the end of the nineteenth century the monarchy as an institution had been the )ita ynch#in to a c ass system that o##ressed farmers, workers, and women. They did not understandnor did the American occupation authorities help them to understandthat this institution was an agent of their prewar and wartime oppression !t had narrowed their intellectual hori"ons and encouraged many to see themselves as powerless vis#a#vis the state 6hus, as on! as Hirohito remained on the throne, unaccountab e to anyone for his officia actions, most >a#anese had itt e reason to Euestion their su##ort of him or fee res#onsibi ity for the war, et a one ook beyond the narrow boundaries of )ictim-consciousness. 6hrou!h four decades of 4S-So)iet co d war conf ict, the reformed >a#anese state conni)ed at the officia )ersion of the ost war as one of Lse f defense and se f #reser)ation,M which the em#eror and his ministers had reaffirmed at the time of surrender. Historica researchers who attem#ted to #ursue HirohitoKs wartime conduct found the )ast resources of the !o)ernment a but c osed off. On y after >a#an norma ized di# omatic re ations with the =eo# eKs 3e#ub ic of "hina in 0?1;, in a )a!ue y worded L>a#an-"hina >oint "ommuniEue,M was )ictim-consciousness increasin! y cha en!ed by those who came to reco!nize that >a#an had a so been a ma8or #er#etrator of war crimes. $urin! the 0?1's, >a#anese tourism to cities in *anchuria, to former co onia areas, and to =acific war batt efie ds he #ed to widen inte ectua horizons and foster the !rowth of #er#etrator consciousness. /ut it was main y in the 0?B's and 0??'s that ma8or historica studies eA# orin! the re ationshi# between #o itics, the mi itary, and the em#eror be!an to a##ear. (nd many more years had to #ass after HirohitoKs death in 0?B? before the >a#anese mass media ended its se f-im#osed taboo on 8ud!ments about the em#erorKs fau ts and discussed his unacknow ed!ed war res#onsibi ity. D)en then, efforts by neonationa ists and conser)ati)es to obfuscate the em#erorKs ro e in #o itica and mi itary affairs ham#ered #ub ic reco!nition of HirohitoKs enormous war res#onsibi ity. >ust the same, >a#anese citizens continued to Euestion and to widen the boundaries of war res#onsibi ity. 6he end of the "o d War, the abru#t breaku# of the So)iet 4nion, and the concurrent rise of "hina hastened the de)e o#ment of new economic and financia ties, bindin! >a#an and its (sian nei!hbors and s#urrin! attem#ts at reconci iation. N..O *any >a#anese, )iewin! these ar!e-sca e #o itica and economic chan!es, wondered why their country remained mi itari y tied so ti!ht y to the 4S, the wor dKs eadin! #ractitioner of state terror and mi itarism. 6heir #erce#tions of recent wars and the current ba ance of forces in the wor d ha)e sha#ed the >a#anese search for historica truth and 8ustice. 2n addition, some (merican #o iticians ha)e now added their )oices to (sian mo)ements #ressin! >a#an to confront #rob ems eft unreso )ed from the (sia-=acific War, e)en thou!h the 4nited States has not direct y a#o o!ized to the >a#anese #eo# e for its historic terror bombin! of their citiesQ nor has it #aid re#arations to Tietnam, a nation that it once tar!eted for a!!ression 8ust as it does in 2raE. Lookin! c oser, whi e bearin! in mind ! oba #atterns of hy#ocrisy on issues of war res#onsibi ity, the first #oint to note is that >a#anese #ub ic discussion of #rob ems from the ost war has ser)ed mu ti# e #ur#oses. Sometimes debate o)er war remembrance ad)anced the #o itica #osition of different ci)ic or!anizationsQ at other times it camouf a!ed narrow institutiona a!endas, !eneratin! #o itica ca#ita for $iet members and their #arties. N.5O Such debate was re ati)e y intense durin! the ear y years of forei!n occu#ation (0?5%-%;). 6his was the #eriod when >a#an ad)anced further than +ermany did at any time whi e under ( ied occu#ation and durin! the era of "hance or "onrad (denauer (0?5?-&.). 6hrou!hout that #eriod with few eAce#tions, itt e debate occurred on +erman war crimes. /ut when the 4S chan!ed its occu#ation #o icy to bui din! u# >a#an as a "o d War a y rather than #ursuin! war crimina s, >a#anese discussion waned, and a on! with it concern o)er HirohitoKs unacknow ed!ed war res#onsibi ity. 2nterest did not rekind e unti Hirohito tra)e ed abroad in the ear y- and mid-0?1'sPfirst to /ritain and West +ermany where he was !reeted with hosti e #ub ic demonstrations. 2n 0?1%, after makin! his first and on y state )isit to the 4nited States, Hirohito returned home and he d #ress inter)iews with >a#anese and forei!n 8ourna ists. 6hese e)ents continued to shake oose memories of his wartime beha)ior and ed a )an!uard of >a#anese historians to in)esti!ate the machinery of the wartime monarchy and the indi)idua s of the "ourt +rou# who o#erated it, startin! with its most im#ortant member, Hirohito. N.%O (s the co d war mo)ed to its sudden end, >a#an entered an era in which issues of war res#onsibi ity cou d be o#en y debated on the basis of a tro)e of new y #ub ished documents, diaries, and other first-hand accounts of the em#eror by his innermost circ e of ad)isers, men who had ser)ed him in war and #eace. "onseEuent y, many more >a#anese were ab e to free themse )es from fa sehoods about the ost war, the #ractices of the >a#anese state, and the ro e of Hirohito. Ret as historian Roshida Rutaka and others ha)e shown, e)ery #hase of >a#anKs debates on war res#onsibi ity has a so been a #hase in the eA#ression of nationa ist sentiment. $iscussions of teAtbook re)ision to e iminate references to war crimes, re i!ious rites of remembrance for the war dead, or re)isin! the 2m#eria Househo d Law to a ow a fema e em#eror, a re)ea ed dee# cracks in #ub ic o#inion. 7or eAam# e, one of the most irreconci ab e s# its concerns how to mourn the nationa war dead. O)er near y fourteen years, about 5.%,&'' >a#anese combatants were ki ed in "hina (eAc udin! *anchuria) and Hon! 9on! a one. N.&O >a#anese ci)i ians in the home is ands a so died in hu!e numbers from 4S terror bombin!. /ut it was the remembrance of the enormous number of soldiers who had died futilely on a fronts in the war of a!!ression that main y re)i)ed the Rasukuni Shrine issue. Rasukuni Shrine is a state-estab ished site of co ecti)e war remembrance, connected to state-worshi# and dedicated to #reser)in! both the em#eror-centered )iew of the #ast and the officia inter#retation of the LWar of +reater Dast (sia.M 6he

(rmy and Fa)y *inistries once administered this Shinto re i!ious institution and its attached center for disseminatin! war #ro#a!anda (the Rushukan), and made it an inte!ra #art of >a#anese state worshi# and mi itarism. 6here the s#irits of ;.51 mi ion #eo# e, inc udin! a sma number of 6aiwanese and 9oreans, who died fi!htin! for the em#eror, are enshrined. N.1O /efore, durin!, and soon after the war Dm#eror Hirohito eA#ressed his !ratitude and res#ect for the war dead by )isitin! or sendin! emissaries to #artici#ate in the annua nationa memoria rites to assua!e their s#irits.

(iro)ito 9isits :asu7uni S)rine, 19#5 *ac(rthurKs HeadEuarters, determined to de- e!itimize officia state worshi#, disestab ished Shinto, c osed the Rushukan bui din!, and ordered the em#eror to sto# )isitin! the shrine, sayin! that +H:Ks intention was to #rotect the monarchy from criticism. Fatura y, Hirohito com# ied. N.BO Fot unti the occu#ation ended did the Lsymbo em#erorM resume his )isits. *eanwhi e, des#ite the new constitutionKs se#aration of #o itics from re i!ion, Rasukuni Shrine had reestab ished its symbiotic re ationshi# with the >a#anese !o)ernment throu!h the We fare *inistry, which !ranted #ensions and sorted out those Eua ified for enshrinement. 2n 0?1B, three years after HirohitoKs ei!hth #ostwar )isit, Rasukuni co ecti)e y enshrined the s#irits of fourteen con)icted war crimina s, i!nitin! forei!n and domestic criticism. Hirohito, re#orted y u#set that some men whom he b amed for #er#etratin! the war had been enshrined, abru#t y ended his )isits. +o)ernment officia s and cabinet ministers continued )isitin! in their #ri)ate ca#acity, thou!h not without #ro)okin! criticism. 2n (u!ust 0?B%, on the fortieth anni)ersary of the warKs end, =rime *inister Fakasone Rasuhiro, who since 0?B. had made more #ri)ate )isits to Rasukuni than any #re)ious #rime minister, announced that this time he was !oin! to worshi# at Rasukuni in his officia ca#acity. ( most immediate y, the shrine became embroi ed in >a#anKs internationa affairs. Fakasone #u ed back. 6he neAt year, howe)er, the Rushukan reo#ened and be!an disseminatin! its anachronistic )iew of the ost war. $urin! the 0??'s and ear y ;'''s, as conser)ati)e #o iticians ooked for ways to !enerate #ub ic su##ort for abandonin! >a#anKs officia anti-war stance, they contem# ated usin! this anachronistic but ha owed # ace of war memory to create a new nationa ism. Libera $emocratic =arty =rime *inister 9oizumi >unichiro is remembered for, amon! other thin!s, ha)in! dis#atched >a#anKs Se f $efense 7orceKs o)erseas in b ind su##ort of the 4S war and occu#ation in 2raE. He a so made four officia )isits to Rasukuni, startin! in ;''0, which ed to a series of di# omatic #rotests from "hina and 9orea, as we as stron! criticism at home. D)er since, Rasukuni has ser)ed as a too for #o iticians seekin! to hei!hten nationa ism amon! the youn!. =ri)ate #ressure !rou#s such as the (ssociation of Shinto Shrines and the /erea)ed 7ami ies (ssociation a so use Rasukuni as a too , dreamin! to restore further e ements of state Shinto. What the #o itica dynamics of this symbo of co ecti)e war remembrance distorts, howe)er, is the natura human need of #eo# e, es#ecia y fami y members, to remember their dead. When neonationa ist #o itician (be Shinzo succeeded 9oizumi in ;''&, he #romised to mend re ations with >a#anKs nei!hbors. 2nstead, his own remarks denyin! that the >a#anese mi itary had systematica y coerced women into seAua s a)ery a!ain disa##ointed >a#anKs (sian trade #artnersPabo)e a "hina and 9orea. (be a so turned back the c ock on issues of educationa reform and constitutiona re)ision. $urin! his short, scanda -# a!ued tenure, he made com#u sory the teachin! of #atriotism in schoo s and raised the status of >a#anKs $efense (!ency to a fu ministry. /ut when, durin! the siAtieth anni)ersary of >a#an-s #eace constitution (*ay ., ;''1), (be announced that the "onstitution had ,become inca#ab e of ada#tin! to the !reat chan!es, in the wor d, the #ub ic took a arm. 2n an 4##er House e ection two months ater he was sound y re#udiated for, amon! other reasons, seekin! to draw >a#an c oser to a be icose 4nited States. (s this e ection showed, it is not on y the dee#enin! economic and cu tura re ations between >a#an and "hina, South 9orea,

and the nations of Southeast (sia that are kee#in! transnationa conf icts o)er war issues and memories from the #ast within mana!eab e bounds. So too is the !ood sense of the ma8ority of the >a#anese #eo# e, who continue to su##ort the L#eaceM "onstitution because they fee more secure with (rtic e Fine intact. Fe)erthe ess, the #ar iamentary ba ance of #ower remains frau!ht. 6he L$=Ks a!enda for constitutiona re)ision has been #ost#oned, but neither current =rime *inister 7ukuda Rasuo nor the #owerfu business federations which su##ort re)ision ha)e !i)en u# the fi!ht. >a#anese historians, 8ourna ists, and concerned citizens continue to rethink the historica issues that the #ost-Wor d War 22 tribuna s fai ed to adeEuate y confront. 6he best histories not on y show how di)erse the >a#anese res#onses to war actua y were, but a so cast an e)er-widenin! net of res#onsibi ity for the (sia-=acific WarPa net in which Hirohito is in)ariab y ca#tured. 6hrou!h books, 8ourna artic es, and documentary fi ms they he # >a#an to understand where it went wron!, who committed war crimes and why, and what shou d be done to maintain #eace in (sia and the =acific. Ret >a#anKs conser)ati)e #o itica e ites and bureaucrats remain an obstac e. 6he re#eated a#o o!ies that they make for the dama!e caused by the im#eria armed forces are undermined by the Rasukuni Euestion, the whitewashin! of history teAtbooks, and their stubborn refusa to acknow ed!e the >a#anese stateKs res#onsibi ity to #ay re#arations to war )ictims. 6he >a#anese !o)ernment, and the district courts that usua y mirror its #o icies, fai ed to !i)e satisfaction to former ( ied #risoners of >a#an who sou!ht re#arations and officia a#o o!y. Teteran so diers, who were recruited from >a#anKs co onies but ater denied #ensions, sued and ost in >a#anese domestic courts. "hinese and 9orean aborers, seekin! economic com#ensation and officia a#o o!y for ha)in! been kidna##ed from their homes and forcib y brou!ht to work in wartime >a#an, fared no better. Women coerced into seAua s a)ery ha)e been e)en more dismissi)e y treated. >a#anese courts fai ed not on y the war )ictims in (sian countries. 6hey were a so unab e to #ro)ide 8ustice to the berea)ed fami ies of >a#anese ci)i ians murdered by the army and na)y durin! the batt es of Sai#an and Okinawa, and to the >a#anese )ictims of the im#eria mi itaryKs i e!a (#re- and #ost-surrender) courts martia of so diers and officers who had been forced to surrender on the batt e fie d, and were ater tried and #unished for desertion. N.?O 2n (#ri ;''1, >a#anKs Su#reme "ourt forec osed a #endin! and future awsuits arisin! from actions taken by >a#an in the course of #rosecutin! its ost war. 6he 8ud!es cited as a main !round the re e)ant #ro)isions of the 4S-im#osed San 7rancisco =eace 6reaty, drafted at the hei!ht of the 4S-So)iet co d war, which has ne)er brou!ht 8ustice to the )ictims of >a#anKs wartime a!!ression. 2!norin! the treatyKs contested e!a #ro)isions, the 8ud!es c aimed that the si!natories had sett ed these #rob ems by wai)in! re#arations c aims at the state e)e . N5'O On the issue of #ayin! re#arations to a war )ictims, +ermanyKs #ractice since ;''', when the /undesta! estab ished a re#arations mechanism, eu#hemistica y abe ed a L7und for 3emembrance, 3es#onsibi ity, and the 7uture,M contrasts )i)id y with >a#anKs continued intransi!ence. 6here is no doubt, howe)er, that throu!hout the co d war +erman #ro!ress was s ow. 6he initiati)e came in the ate 0??'s from +erman industries, concerned that awsuits brou!ht by )ictims of Fazism wou d harm their re#utations and #rofitsQ c ass action awsuits od!ed in 4S courts a so # ayed an im#ortant ro e. DEua y im#ortant are the different #o itica dynamics and ideo o!ies that inform #o itics in #ost-"o d War +ermany and >a#an. One of the characteristics of this difference is #recise y the historica Hirohito and the many meanin!s that he carries for >a#an and the >a#anese #eo# e. 6he war dead cannot be officia y remembered without himQ the fu truth of the war cannot be known in his absence. (s on! as the record of im#eria >a#anKs misdeeds is aired and issues of eadershi# and war res#onsibi ity are debated, the a##arition of Hirohito wi in!er and he wi ha)e an eterna # ace in >a#anese #o itics.

Herbert $ %i&' author of the $ulit"er $ri"e#winning Hirohito and the *akin! of *odern >a#an' writes on problems of war and empire A Japan (ocus associate' he prepared this article for Japan (ocus $osted May )' *++, 4otes N0O 7or re#resentati)e recent works on #rob ems of war and #ostwar, see the essays in the ei!ht-)o ume 2wanami 9oza (8ia 6aiheiyo senso (2wanami Shoten, ;''%-1)Q and 9osu!e Fobuko, Sen!o wakaiI Fihon wa SkakoK kara tokihanatareru no ka ("huko Shinsho, ;''%). N;O Herbert =. /iA, Hirohito and the *akin! of *odern >a#an (Har#er"o ins =erennia Ddition, ;''0) contains &BB #a!es of teAt. *ore than .%' of these #a!es treat the (sia-=acific War and the 6okyo tria . /ut the remainin! ha f addresses the #rewar em#eror, the nature of the em#ire, and #rob ems of #ostwar remembrance and accountabi ity. See 9awashima 6akane, LHaabaato /ikkusu, SShowa 6ennoK no yomarekata,M in 9ikan senso sekinin kenkyu, Fo. 50 (7a ;''.), ##. ;-0'. N.O 7or the Lo)er 0.','''M fi!ure see /ernice (rcher, 6he 2nternment of Western "i)i ians 4nder the >a#anese 0?50-0?5% (3out ed!e "urzon, ;''5), #. %. +a)an $aws, =risoners of the >a#aneseI =OWS of Wor d War 22 in the =acific (Wi iam *orrow < "o., 0??&), #. ?&, !i)es the hi!her estimate. N5O D!uchi 9eiichi, 6aikei Fihon no rekishi 05, 7utatsu no taisen (6okyoI Sho!akukan, 0?B?), #. .1;. N%O 2n the Duro#ean and =acific War theaters, tota (merican deaths did not eAceed ;?.,''', accordin! to T adis a) *. Uubok, ( 7ai ed Dm#ireI 6he So)iet 4nion in the "o d War 7rom Sta in to +orbache) (4ni). of Forth "aro ina =ress, ;''1),

#. ;Q Rui $aizaburo, LSekaishi no naka no (8ia 6aiheiyo senso,M in 2wanami kozaI (8ia 6aiheiyo senso 0, Faze, ima (8ia, 6aiheiyo senso ka (2wanami Shoten, ;''%), #. ;&0, citin! 3obert +ora ski, Wor d War 22 ( manacI 0?.0-0?5% (Hamish Hami ton, 0?B0), ##. 5;0-;B. N&O See the comments of Roshida Rutaka, L9anshusha ato!aki,M ##. ..&-1, Euotin! from the work of *asumi >unnosuke, in Showa tenno, !eI Hirohito and the *akin! of *odern >a#an (9odansha ;'';). 6rans ated by Okabe *akio, 9awashima 6akane, and Fa!ai Hitoshi. N1O /iA, Hirohito and the *akin! of *odern >a#an, #. .?. NBO 7or e)idence, see /iA, cha#ters 0 throu!h 5. N?O /iA, ##. 0B5-&, 0?B, ;'B-?, ;00-0;, ;01-0?. N0'O 7rom the start of his rei!n, Hirohito and his "ourt +rou#, with the aid of the ast +enro, became the a##ointers of the #rime minister, takin! into account, thou!h on y when it ser)ed their #ur#oses, the #references of the ma8ority conser)ati)e #arty in the Lower House of the im#eria $iet. (t such moments they c arified their #o icy #references to the #rime minister desi!nate. 2f he ater fai ed to take them into account he wou d ose their confidence and be unab e to !o)ern. 2n *ei8iKs time the system was ess com# eAI the +enro chose the #rime minister and #o itica #arties were at a nascent sta!e. See /iA, #. 1'', endnote %;. N00O *ori Shi!eki, L6he SWashin!ton SystemK and 2ts (ftermathI 3ee)a uatin! (fter 2m#eria ism 7rom the =ers#ecti)e of >a#anese Historio!ra#hy,M 2nternationa >ourna of (sian Studies, ..; (;''&), #. ;&%. N0;O /iA, ##. ;BB-?. N0.O /iA, ##. .%?, .'1. N05O /iA, #. .;;. N0%O /iA, #. .;.. N0&O /iA, #. .%?. N01O /iA, ##. .&0-;, .&%, .&1. N0BO Ramada (kira, LHeishitachi no Fit"hu senso,M in 2wanami kozaI (8ia 6aiheiyo senso %, Sen8o no shoso (2wanami Shoten, ;''&), #. .%. N0?O /iA, ##. 5.5-%Q Roshida Rutaka, (8ia 6aiheiyou senso (2wanami Shinsho, ;''1), ##. ;'-;0Q 6akashima Fobuyoshi, L3ekishikanP*edeia Watchin!,M 9ikan senso sekinin kenkyu, dai %B !o (Winter ;''1), ##. ?5-?%. (s 6akashima notes, e)er since >a#anKs surrender the 7orei!n *inistry has a)oided #ub ic mention of the >a#an-6hai 7riendshi# 6reaty whi e condemnin! the So)iet 4nion for its )io ation of the >a#an-So)iet Feutra ity 6reaty. N;'O /iA, ##. .&;-.&1. N;0O /iA, ##. 5'?-0'. N;;O 2n contrast to the authoritarian #o itica order in the 4nited States under the /ush administration, where the Lcommander-in-chiefM and his subordinates #ub ic y defend torture, contem#t for the ru e of aw was ne)er the !o)ernin! #rinci# e of the im#eria state. N;.O /iA, "h. 0., es#. ##. %'&-%0?. N;5O 6akashima, L3ekishikanP*edia Watchin!,M ##. ?5-?%. N;%O (kazawa Shiro, L6enno no senso sekininron e no shateiM N6he 6ra8ectory of the Dm#erorKs War 3es#onsibi ityO in 2wanami 9ozaI (8ia-6aiheiyo senso, dai nikan, Senso no sei8i!aku (2wanami Shoten, ;''%), ##. ;.%-&. N;&O "ited in Roshida Rutaka, LSenso sekininron no !enzai,M in 2wanami 9ozaI (8ia-6aiheiyo senso, dai ikkan, Faze, ima (8ia6aiheiyo senso ka (2wanami Shoten, ;''&), #. ?5. N;1O Roshida, LSenso sekininron no !enzai,M #. ?&. N;BO (rthur Watts, L6he Le!a =osition in 2nternationa Law of Heads of State, Heads of +o)ernment and 7orei!n *inister,M 3ecuei des cours, To. ;51, Fo. ? (0??5), ##. B;-B.. N;?O /iA, ##. %B%-&.

N.'O /iA, ,6he Showa Dm#eror-s -*ono o!ue- and the =rob em of War 3es#onsibi ity, in >ourna of >a#anese Studies, To . 0B, Fo. ; (Summer 0??;), ;?%-.&.. N.0O Roshimi Roshiaki, 9usa no ne fuashizumuI Fihon minshu no senso taiken (6okyo $ai!aku Shu##ankai, 0??0), #. ;1.. N.;O On ear y #ostwar attitudes toward Hit er, see 6ony >udt, =ostwarI ( History of Duro#e Since 0?5% (6he =en!uin =ress, ;''%), #. B'?. N..O On the disinte!ration of the So)iet 4nion, see Uubok, ##. .'.-.%. N.5O See 7ranziska Sera#him, War *emory and Socia =o itics in >a#an, 0?5%-;''% (Har)ard 4ni). =ress, ;''&, es#. cha#ters B, ?, 0', and "onc usion. N.%O 7or detai ed #eriodization and discussion see (kazawa, ##. ;;&, ;.1ffQ /iA, ##. &15-11. N.&O Ramada (kira, LHeishitachi no Fit"hu sensou,M in 2wanami 9oza (8ia-6aiheiyou sensou, $ai % kan, Sen8ou no shosou (2wanami Shoten, ;''&), #..., citin! 9uwata Uei and *aehara 6oshie, Fihon no senso zukai to deeta (Hara Shobo, 0?B;). N.1O Roshida Rutaka, LRasukuni 8in8a, !okoku 8in8a,M in Hara 6akeshi, Roshida Rutaka, hen, 2wanami 6enno, koshitsu 8iten (2wanami Shoten, ;''%), #. .;;Q Rasumaru Roshio, L9okkashu!i to musubu tokui na sonzai subete no rei no hifun ni kenmoku oM in (sahi shinbun ((u!. ?, ;''0). Rasumaro ca s attention to the medie)a /uddhist tradition of no discrimination between enemy and a y (onshin byodo) and contrasts it to the Rasukuni #ractice of sortin! out the war dead. N.BO On #rotectin! the monarchy by refrainin! from )isitin! Rasukuni, see 6akamatsu Fomiya nikki B ("huo 9oronsha, 0??1), #. .5&, entry of (#ri .', 0?5&. N.?O Roshida Rutaka, ,Sen!oshi no naka no !unkeiho,, in 9ikan senso sekinin kenkyu, Fo. ;% (7a 0???), ##. ;5-;?. N5'O *ark (. Le)in, LFishimatsu "onstruction "o. ). Son! >iAiao et a Q 9o Hanako et a . ). >a#an,M in (merican >ourna of 2nternationa Law, To . 0';, Fo. 0 (>an. ;''B), ##. 05B-?. 6he San 7rancisco =eace treaty, si!ned in Se#tember 0?%0, has been in force since (#ri 0?%;. 6he ar!e y (merican mishand in! of its re#arations c auses, which were cursory in nature and acked eA# icit detai , was a cause of acute disa!reements at the time.

Source: htt :NN+++68a anfocus6orgN4Herbert[P[4Bi9N$%(&

Last Words of the Tiger of Malaya, General Yamashita Tomoyuki

By Yuki Tanaka
The final reflections of a convicted war criminal enshrined at Yasukuni Jinja ,ne o& the ma8or reasons &or +hinese and Korean pu-lic criticism o& Prime Minister Koi.umi's 9isit to Pasukuni Shrine is that 1! out o& "6 0A+lass Japanese (ar criminals are enshrined there. Se9en amon/ them includin/ 5o8o Hideki and Matsui 4(ane (ere e*ecuted at the conclusion o& the 5okyo War +rimes 5ri-unal and the other se9en died either durin/ the tri-unal or (hile ser9in/ their sentences. Pasukuni Shrine also sancti&ies many B and +A+lass (ar criminals, many o& (hom (ere directly responsi-le &or atrocities committed throu/hout the 0siaAPaci&ic re/ion. ,ne o& those is 5omoyuki Pamashita, (ho (as enshrined on 1F ,cto-er 1 > . 0s the commander (ho led the Japanese 4mperial 0rmy troops to in9ade Sin/apore in #e-ruary 1 !", he (as nicknamed the '5i/er o& Malaya.' 0t "%1> am on the mornin/ o& 6 ?ecem-er 1 !1, ad9ance troops o& the ">th 0rmy led -y Lieutenant =eneral Pamashita landed at Kota Bharu on the east coast o& the Malay Peninsula (ith the aim o& sei.in/ Sin/apore. 5his landin/ (as an hour and "7 minutes -e&ore the attack on Pearl Har-or and thus, strictly speakin/, marks the -e/innin/ o& the Paci&ic War. 5he ">th 0rmy s(i&tly ad9anced south to(ards Sin/apore, completely unsuspected -y the British &orces armed (ith lar/eA-ore artillery that (ere de&endin/ Sin/apore &rom sea-orne attack 9ia the Straits o& Malacca. 5he Japanese troops num-ered "7,777D the de&endin/ troops consisted o& 66,777 British, 0ustralian, and 4ndian soldiers and Malay 9olunteers. 0lthou/h the British &orces had the ad9anta/e o& much /reater num-ers, Sin/apore &ell relati9ely Buickly, the British not only ha9in/ underestimated the a-ility o& the Japanese &orces, -ut -ein/ insu&&iciently trained in 8un/le (ar&are and lackin/ adeBuate communication amon/ their &orces. ,n the e9enin/ o& 1> #e-ruary 1 !", Pamashita and Lieutenant =eneral 0.). Perci9al o& the British #orces met at the #ord Motor &actory outside Sin/apore to ne/otiate the surrender o& the +ommon(ealth &orces. Japanese correspondents reportin/ the meetin/ claimed that Pamashita a//ressi9ely demanded% 24s the British 0rmy /oin/ to surrender immediatelyQ 0ns(er 'Pes' or '<o'.2 4n &act, he had simply instructed his interpreter to ask Perci9al (hether he (as prepared to accept unconditional surrender. 5he story o& this ne/otiation (as, ho(e9er, em-ellished and proudly pu-lici.ed -y the Japanese media as em-lematic o& Japan's ne( con&idence and stren/th. ?ue to the s(i&t 9ictory o& his military campai/n and the success&ul capture o& Sin/apore, Pamashita (on the so-riBuet '5i/er o& Malaya.' 0 &eature &ilm under the same title (as screened throu/hout Japan and the occupied territories o& 0sia, creatin/ an ima/e o& him as a ruthless militarist. Less than &i9e months a&ter the &all o& Sin/apore, he (as posted to remote northern Manchuria as commander o& the #irst 0rea 0rmy -y =eneral Hideki 5o8o, the then Prime Minister and Minister o& the 0rmy. )&&ecti9ely, 5o8o demoted Pamashita (hom he percei9ed as a threat, Pamashita -elon/in/ to a di&&erent military &action to his o(n. Pamashita (as promoted to =eneral in #e-ruary 1 !3, -ut in 1 !!, (ith the (ar situation deterioratin/ &or Japan, he (as dispatched as +ommander o& the 1!th 0rea 0rmy in the Philippines. He arri9ed in Manila on G ,cto-er 1 !!, 8ust t(o (eeks prior to the landin/ o& $.S. &orces on Leyte 4sland. He opposed the plan de9ised -y the 4mperial HeadBuarters in 5okyo to send some o& his troops to Leyte -ecause o& the lack o& &ood and ammunition supplies as (ell as ships to transport them there. )9entually, ho(e9er, he (as una-le to diso-ey his immediate superior, =eneral 5erauchi Hisaichi, =eneralA+ommander o& the Southern 0rmy, and sent appro*imately 67,777 troops to Leyte -y early ?ecem-er. 5he result (as a disaster AA F percent died, many &rom star9ation. 4n the middle o& the Battle o& Leyte, 5erauchi mo9ed his headBuarters &rom Manila to Sai/on in Iietnam, there-y escapin/ the dan/erous -attle&ield situation that en9eloped all Japanese &orces in the Philippines. 0s lar/e Buantities o& supplies had already -een e*hausted in the Battle o& Leyte, there (ere insu&&icient arms and ammunition &or the "6F,777 Japanese troops stationed across Lu.on 4sland under Pamashita's command as they &aced 1 1,777 $.S. troops (ho landed at the island's Lin/aen Bay on January 1 !>. 4n midA?ecem-er 1 !!, anticipatin/ the landin/ o& the $.S. &orces, Pamashita had ordered all troops stationed in Manila to e9acuate the city (ithin si* (eeks and his headBuarters (as also mo9ed to Ba/uio in the mountains o& northern Lu.on. 0-out "7,777 troops o& the 31st <a9al Base #orce, initially under the command o& 3earA0dmiral 4(a-uchi, came under Pamashita's command -y late ?ecem-er, -ut they re&used to mo9e. #or &our (eeks, these troops &ou/ht &iercely a/ainst the $.S. &orces that entered the city on 3 #e-ruary. 0s a result, a-out 177,777 #ilipino ci9ilians (ere killed. 4n the course o& the campai/n, Japanese tortured and killed many ci9ilians -elie9ed to -e mem-ers or colla-orators o& /uerrilla /roups opposin/ Japan. Many (omen (ere raped -y the Japanese troops, and numerous ci9ilians -ecame 9ictims o& aerial -om-in/ conducted -y the $.S. &orces. )9entually all the Japanese troops (ho had remained in the city to &i/ht the 0mericans perished. Pamashita's troops continued to &i/ht in the mountains despite su&&erin/ (idespread disease and star9ation. By the time Pamashita surrendered to the $.S. &orces in June 1 !>, "17,777 Japanese soldiers (ere dead. 4mmediately a&ter the surrender, Pamashita, as commander o& all Japanese &orces in the Philippines, (as arrested as a (ar criminal, char/ed (ith responsi-ility &or atrocities committed -y Japanese &orces under his command a/ainst ci9ilians in Manila. 5he e9idence su//ests, ho(e9er, that he (as una(are o& the crimes committed -y the mem-ers o& the <a9al Base #orce (ho had re&used to o-ey his order to mo9e out o& Manila, and that he e*ercised no command o9er those &orces durin/ the -attle. ?espite (eak le/al /rounds &or his personal responsi-ility &or those crimes, the $.S. court martial conducted a s(i&t trial and sentenced him to death on F ?ecem-er 1 !>. 5he -ack/round to this a&&air (as =eneral Mac0rthur's determination to turn the trial o& the '5i/er o& Malaya' into a sho(case. Mac0rthur, (ho had -een =o9ernor o& the Philippines, &led shortly a&ter the Japanese in9asion in late ?ecem-er 1 !1. 0 /roup o& 0merican military la(yers (ho de&ended Pamashita appealed the 9erdict to the $.S. Supreme +ourt. Ho(e9er, the appeal (as re8ected -y &i9e to t(o. Pamashita (as han/ed in Manila on "3 #e-ruary 1 !G. What (as Pamashita's responsi-ility &or the crimes committed -y Japanese troops a/ainst local ci9ilians and P,Ws in the PhilippinesQ When he arri9ed in Manila as +ommander o& the 1!th 0rea 0rmy in ,cto-er 1 !!, the Japanese communication and supply system

(as already in turmoil, and the morale o& the troops (as 9ery lo(. 5hese pro-lems intensi&ied a&ter his headBuarters (as mo9ed to Ba/uio (hile the troops (ere scattered throu/hout the mountains o& northern Lu.on. By this sta/e the soldiers (ere desperate in the &ace o& se9ere shorta/es o& &ood, medicine and ammunition. Many soldiers ne9er recei9ed Pamashita's orders and instructions, and many commands (ere i/nored, e9en -y 8unior o&&icers. 5he re8ection -y the 31st <a9al Base #orce o& Pamashita's order to e9acuate Manila (as a typical e*ample o& a situation a//ra9ated -y the lon/standin/ 0rmyA<a9y ri9alry. #or this reason, the de&ense la(yers, themsel9es mem-ers o& the 0merican armed &orces, thou/ht the trial a 2kan/aroo court2 AA a political e*ercise AA sta/ed -y the $.S. 0rmy, particularly =eneral Mac0rthur. Ho(e9er, this does not automatically e*empt Pamashita &rom responsi-ility &or all Japanese military atrocities. ,n 16 #e-ruary 1 !", three days a&ter the capture o& Sin/apore, Pamashita issued an order to 'select and remo9e hostile +hinese.' 0t the time, a-out G77,777 +hinese li9ed in Sin/apore and antiAJapanese sentiment (as ri&e a&ter a decade o& Japanese in9asion and (ar -e/innin/ in Manchuria in 1 31 and continuin/ in +hina &rom 1 3F. 4ndeed, a +hinese /uerilla &orce set up (ith the help o& British &orces support &ou/ht &iercely a/ainst the in9adin/ Japanese troops a&ter the &all o& Sin/apore. #or their part, the Japanese occupation &orce amassed and interro/ated "77,777 +hinese men a/ed -et(een 1> and >7, in an attempt to root out the soAcalled 2antiAJapanese elements,2 such as communists and supporters o& the =uomindan/, as (ell as criminals. ,ne o&&icer, Masano-u 5su8i, reportedly -oasted that he (ould reduce the +hinese population o& Sin/apore to hal& -y implementin/ Pamashita's order. ?ue to the hapha.ard methods used to &ind these 2antiAJapanese elements,2 ho(e9er, the e*ercise ended as a massacre o& lar/e num-ers o& innocent ci9ilians. )stimates o& the toll 9aried -et(een G,777 and 177,777, althou/h it (as pro-a-ly around !7,777. Similar atrocities (ere also carried out across the Malaya Peninsula, resultin/ in the deaths o& a &urther G7,777 +hinese. 4& the British &orces had conducted Pamashita's (ar crime tri-unal, he (ould certainly ha9e -een &ound /uilty &or this appallin/ lar/eAscale massacre o& +hinese. Surprisin/ly, it seems that Pamashita (as pro&oundly a&&ected -y the tri-unal, e9en thou/h the proceedin/s conducted -y the $S 0rmy (ere patently un&air. 0t the hearin/, a-out "77 9ictims and (itnesses to 9arious Japanese atrocities /a9e detailed accounts o& Japanese atrocities. 4t must ha9e -een an e*cruciatin/ e*perience &or Pamashita, listenin/ day a&ter day to pain&ul stories o& the 9ictimi.ation o& many men, (omen and children. 4n the courtroom, on the ad9ice o& his 0merican la(yers, he denied responsi-ility &or the crimes committed -y those under his command, -ut in his personal (ill he hum-ly ackno(led/ed his &ailure as commander to discipline his soldiers and punish those (ho committed crimes a/ainst the people o& the Philippines. Moreo9er, he appears to ha9e internali.ed the pain o& the 9ictims o& Japanese atrocities, displayin/ remorse &or his troops' (ar crimes, someho( o9ercomin/ his o(n oldA&ashioned militarist ideolo/y and replacin/ it (ith a remarka-le sel&Acriticism. 5his is clear &rom his last (ords, dictated to Buddhist prison chaplain Morita Shokaku, shortly -e&ore he (as han/ed. 5hese (ords, a messa/e to the Japanese people, (ere an addition to his (ritten (ill, in (hich he sincerely apolo/i.ed to all the people o& the Philippines &or the atrocities that his troops committed. His dictated messa/e started in a state o& con&usion AA many ideas must ha9e rushed to mind 8ust hours -e&ore his e*ecution. 5hus some o& his (ords in the &irst &e( para/raphs do not really make sense. 4t seems that he (ished to 8usti&y his decision to surrender rather than commit suicide. He o-9iously had a deep sense o& /uilt at ha9in/ sur9i9ed (hile many men under his command died. Such statements o& remorse at not ha9in/ died in com-at are not unusual and most (ar criminals' &inal statements are &ull o& sel&A8usti&ication &or (hat they did durin/ the (ar. 4nterestin/ly ho(e9er, in contrast to other =enerals, Pamashita made no e*cuses &or the atrocities that his soldiers committed a/ainst the people o& the Philippines. ,n the contrary, he clearly accepted responsi-ility as commander and the 8ud/ment 2-y ri/orous -ut impartial la(.2 4t seems ironic that many conser9ati9e politicians (ho support Prime Minister Koi.umi's o&&icial 9isits to Pasukuni Shrine no( claim that the (ar crime tri-unals conducted -y the 0llied &orces (ere simply 29ictor's 8ustice2 and there&ore had no le/al 9alidity. $ndou-tedly the trials (ere un&air -ecause the 0llies ruled out consideration o& (ar crimes committed -y their o(n &orces AA the most o-9ious e*ample o& (ar crimes committed -y the $nited States -ein/ the droppin/ o& atomic -om-s on Hiroshima and <a/asaki. :5he 0A-om- dropped on Hiroshima killed -et(een F7,777 and 67,777 people in an instant, and an estimated 1!7,777 died -y the end o& 1 !>. 4n <a/asaki, F7,777 people are -elie9ed to ha9e died -y the end o& the same year. Many more (ould die a/oni.in/ deaths in su-seBuent years &rom the -last, (ounds, and radiation. 4t is a (ellAesta-lished &act that the killin/ o& ci9ilians in (artime is contrary to international la(.; Ho(e9er, un&airness in the tri-unals themsel9es does not in9alidate the criminality o& the numerous atrocities committed -y Japanese soldiers durin/ the 0siaAPaci&ic War, nor does it call into Buestion the responsi-ility o& their commanders, includin/ that o& the Supreme +ommander, )mperor Hirohito. When Pamashita o9ercame his initial di&&iculty in e*plainin/ himsel& and started talkin/ a-out his hopes &or the Japanese people, his tone -ecame Buite strai/ht&or(ard and con&ident. He ascri-ed the &undamental cause o& (ar crimes to the Japanese peoples' ina-ility to make independent moral 8ud/ments. 0lthou/h he did not use the term 2human ri/hts2 :and pro-a-ly he (as not &amiliar (ith that terminolo/y;, the (ords 2moral 8ud/ment2 are repeatedly used in order to ur/e the Japanese people to respect the human ri/hts o& others. 5his is indicated -y his e*pression 2your personal responsi-ility in relations (ith other people2 :emphasis added;. By the time he &aced e*ecution, he clearly had come to the reali.ation that Japan's -rutal military actions (ere due to the lack o& a sense o& personal responsi-ility to(ard others that may -e eBuated (ith the concept o& 2human ri/hts2, and that this e9entually led people in 0sia and else(here to distrust Japan. He concluded that this (as one o& the crucial reasons &or Japan's de&eat in (ar. He (elcomed the prospect that the Japanese in de&eat (ould -elatedly -e /i9en the &reedom to make their o(n moral 8ud/ments. But he remained apprehensi9e a-out their a-ility to do so, and ur/ed the Japanese to -ecome 2cultured and di/ni&ied2 people. We need to re&lect on this statement care&ully, particularly in the current situation (here some nationalist scholars and many Japanese politicians AA includin/ Prime Minister Koi.umi AA seek to saniti.e Japan's military conduct durin/ the 0siaAPaci&ic War. Pamashita's second point (as that there could -e no (eapons or military strate/ies to de&end oursel9es a/ainst nuclear (eapons. 5his should also -e reAemphasi.ed on the occasion o& the G7th anni9ersary o& the -om-in/ o& Hiroshima and <a/asaki in 0u/ust "77>, and a-o9e all in li/ht o& the &ailure o& the <P5 3e9ie( +on&erence in May "77> to ad9ance the a-olition o& nuclear (eapons. Politicians like Mr. 0-e Shin.o, (ho think that Japan should de9elop nuclear arms &or de&ense purposes, should also -e reminded o& =eneral

Pamashita's (ords that the 2only method to de&end oursel9es a/ainst atomic -om-s2 is 2to esta-lish nations all o9er the (orld that (ould ne9er contemplate the use o& such (eapons.2 4ndeed, these (ords o& a Japanese /eneral at the hour o& his e*ecution are &ully consistent (ith the spirit o& eternal peace that the 0A-om- 9ictims o& Hiroshima and <a/asaki ha9e lon/ ad9ocated. 4t is remarka-le that hal& o& his &inal (ords (ere addressed to (omen. Here (e can discern Pamashita's hope that the ne( Japanese society should -e -uilt on the principles o& (omen, not those o& men, speci&ically po(er and 9iolence. His statement that 2the dri9in/ &orce o& peace is in the heart o& (omen2 sums up his thou/hts on this issue. He (as surely that rare person amon/st Japanese military leaders (ho (as a-le to see the &undamental link -et(een (ar and male 9iolence. He came to hold the 9ie( that (omen should play more important roles in -uildin/ peace, especially in the &ield o& education. 4 am not sure ho( he o9ercame his o(n patriarchal -elie&s in the ei/ht months -et(een his surrender and e*ecution. ?urin/ the conduct o& his trial, somethin/ must ha9e occurred that led him to dramatically chan/e his 9ie(s on /ender and society, and indeed on (ar and peace. His last point emphasi.in/ the importance o& mothers educatin/ their children sounds like male chau9inism, imposin/ all responsi-ilities &or raisin/ children on (omen. We must understand, ho(e9er, that his 9ie(s on this issue (ere closely intert(ined (ith his deep sense o& personal responsi-ility &or the deaths o& many youn/ men under his command. Perhaps &or this reason he romantici.ed the -ond -et(een mothers and their children, usin/ 2-reast&eedin/2 as an o9erridin/ metaphor &or nurturin/ and educatin/ children. 4t should -e noted that his /oal (as to educate Japanese youth 2to -e a-le to li9e independently, cope (ith 9arious circumstances, lo9e peace, appreciate cooperation (ith others and ha9e a stron/ (ill to contri-ute to mankind (hen they /ro( up.2 +losely e*aminin/ Pamashita's last (ords, it -ecomes crystalAclear that the conclusions he dre( &rom his (ar e*perience are &undamentally at odds (ith the rei/nin/ ideolo/y o& Pasukuni Shrine and its supporters. 4t is an historical irony that =eneral Pamashita is (orshipped -y neoAnationalist politicians (ho claim that Pasukuni Shrine is sacred, deride the le/ality o& the 5okyo War +rimes 5ri-unal as 9ictor's 8ustice, deny Japan's (ar responsi-ilities, promote nationalistic education policies and te*t-ooks, ad9ocate the a-olition o& the Peace +onstitution, su//est the necessity o& possessin/ nuclear arms 2&or the purpose o& de&endin/ the country,2 and sho( no interest at all in impro9in/ (omen's social and economic status. Pamashita 5omoyuki's Last Messa/e to the Japanese People ?ue to my carelessness and personal crassness, 4 committed an ine*cusa-le -lunder as the commander o& the entire L1!th 0reaM 0rmy and conseBuently caused the deaths o& your precious sons and dearest hus-ands. 4 am really sorry and cannot &ind appropriate (ords &or sincere apolo/ies as 4 am really con&used -ecause o& my e*cruciatin/ a/ony. 0s the commander o& your -elo9ed men, 4 am soon to recei9e the death penalty, ha9in/ -een 8ud/ed -y ri/orous -ut impartial la(. 4t is a stran/e coincidence that the e*ecution is to -e carried out on the -irthday o& the &irst $.S. president, =eor/e Washin/ton. 4 do not kno( ho( to e*press my apolo/y, -ut the time has come to atone &or my /uilt (ith my death. Ho(e9er, 4 do not think that all the crimes &or (hich 4 am responsi-le can easily -e liBuidated simply -y my death. Iarious indeli-le stains that 4 le&t on the history o& mankind cannot -e o&&set -y the mechanical termination o& my li&e. #or a person like me (ho constantly &aced death, to die is not at all di&&icult. ,& course 4 should ha9e committed suicide (hen 4 surrendered, as ordered -y the emperor in accordance (ith the Japanese code o& the samurai. 4n &act, 4 once decided to do so (hen 4 attended the surrender ceremonies at Kian/an and Ba/uio, at (hich =eneral Perci9al, (hom 4 had de&eated Lin Sin/aporeM, (as also present. What pre9ented me &rom committin/ such an e/ocentric act (as the presence o& my soldiers, (ho did not yet kno( that the (ar (as o9er at that time. By re&usin/ to take my o(n li&e, 4 (as a-le to set my men &ree &rom meanin/less deaths, as those stationed around Kian/an (ere ready to commit suicide. 4 really &elt pain &rom the shame o& remainin/ ali9e, in 9iolation o& the samurai's code o& 2dyin/ at the appropriate time in an appropriate place.2 4 there&ore can ima/ine ho( much more di&&icult it is &or people like you to remain ali9e and reA-uild Japan rather than -ein/ e*ecuted as a (ar criminal. 4& 4 (ere not a (ar criminal, 4 (ould still ha9e chosen a di&&icult path, -earin/ shame to stay ali9e and atone &or my sins until natural death comes, no matter ho( you all mi/ht despise me. Sun 5.u said '5he art o& (ar is o& 9ital importance to the State. 4t is a matter o& li&e and death, a road either to sa&ety or to ruin. Hence it is a su-8ect o& inBuiry (hich can on no account -e ne/lected.' #rom these (ords, (e learn that our military &orces (ere lethal (eapons and their 9ery e*istence (as a crime. 4 tried my -est to pre9ent the (ar. 4 am really ashamed o& ha9in/ -een una-le to do so -ecause o& my (eakness. Pou may think that 4 am a -orn a//ressor and a typical militarist, -ecause my campai/n in Malaya and the &all o& Sin/apore e*cited the entire Japanese nation. 4 understand that this is Buite natural. 4 do not e*cuse mysel&, as 4 (as a pro&essional soldier and dedicated mysel& to the military. But e9en (hile -ein/ a military man, 4 also ha9e a relati9ely stron/ sense as a Japanese citi.en. 5here is no resurrection any lon/er &or the ruined nation and the dead. #rom ancient times, (ar has al(ays -een a matter &or e*ceptional prudence -y (ise rulers and sensi-le soldiers. 4t (as entirely due to our military authorities' ar-itrary decisions, (hich (ere made -y 8ust a hand&ul o& people, that a lar/e num-er o& our people died and the rest o& the nation (as dra//ed into its present un-eara-le su&&erin/. 4 &eel as i& my heart (ill -reak (hen 4 think that (e pro&essional soldiers (ill -ecome the o-8ect o& your -itter resentment. 4 -elie9e that the Potsdam ?eclaration (ill (ipe out the leaders o& military cliBues (ho led the nation to its do(n&all, and Japan (ill start re-uildin/ as a peace&ul nation under ne( leaders elected -y the popular (ill. Ho(e9er, the path o& re-uildin/ the nation (ill not -e easy in the &ace o& many o-stacles. 5he e*perience that you (ent throu/h, endurin/ 9arious di&&iculties and po9erty in the last ten years o& (ar, (ill ine9ita-ly /i9e you some stren/th, e9en thou/h it (as as an un(elcome result o& pressure &rom the military authorities. 5o construct a ne( Japan, you really must not include militarists (ho are the relics o& the past or opportunistic unprincipled politicians, or scholars patroni.ed -y the /o9ernment (ho try to rationali.e an a//ressi9e (ar. Pro-a-ly some appropriate policies (ill -e adopted -y the 0llied ,ccupation #orces. But 4 (ould like to say somethin/ on this point, as

4 am 8ust a-out to die and thus ha9e /reat concern a-out Japan's &uture. Weeds ha9e a stron/ li&e &orce, and /ro( a/ain (hen sprin/ comes, no matter ho( hard they are trodden under&oot. 4 am con&ident that, (ith stron/ determination &or de9elopment, you (ill re-uild our nation no( completely destroyed, and make it a hi/hly cultured one like ?enmark. ?enmark lost its &ertile land in Schles(i/A Holstein as the result o& the =ermanA?enmark War in 16G3, -ut /a9e up rearmin/ themsel9es and made their in&ertile areas into one o& the most cultured o& )uropean nations. 0s a ruined people, (e repent ha9in/ done (ron/. 4 (ill pray &or Japan's restoration &rom a /ra9e in a &orei/n country. Japanese people, you ha9e e*pelled the militarists and (ill /ain your o(n independence. Please stand up &irmly a&ter the ra9a/es o& (ar. 5hat is my (ish. 4 am a simple soldier. #aced (ith e*ecution in a 9ery short time, a thousand emotions o9er(helm me. But in addition to apolo/i.in/, 4 (ant to e*press my 9ie(s on certain matters. 4 &eel sorry that 4 cannot e*press mysel& 9ery (ell, -ecause 4 am a man o& action, reticent and (ith a limited 9oca-ulary. 5he time o& my e*ecution is dra(in/ near. 4 ha9e only one hour and &orty minutes le&t. Pro-a-ly only con9icts on death ro( are capa-le o& comprehendin/ the 9alue o& one hour and &orty minutes. 4 asked Mr. Morita, a prison chaplain, to record these (ords and 4 hope he (ill pass my ideas on to you some day. #acin/ death, 4 ha9e &our thin/s to say to you, the people o& the nation o& Japan as it resurrects. #irst, is a-out carryin/ out one's duty. #rom ancient times, this topic has repeatedly -een discussed -y scholars, yet it remains most di&&icult to achie9e. Without a sense o& duty, a democratic and cooperati9e society cannot e*ist. ?uty has to -e &ul&illed as a result o& sel&Are/ulatin/ and naturally moti9ated action. 4 &eel some mis/i9in/s in thinkin/ a-out this, considerin/ that you are suddenly to -e li-erated &rom the social restraints under (hich you ha9e lon/ li9ed. 4 o&ten discussed this (ith my 8unior o&&icers. 5he moral decay o& our military (as so /ra9e that the 4mperial +ode o& Military +onduct as (ell as the #ield Ser9ice +ode (ere simply dead letters. 5here&ore, (e had to remind people o& this all the time, e9en in the military (here o-edience (as stron/ly demanded and de&yin/ orders (as not allo(ed at all. 4n this (ar, it (as &ar &rom true that o&&icers under my command carried out their duties satis&actorily. 5hey (ere una-le to &ul&ill e9en the duties that (ere imposed upon them. 5here&ore 4 ha9e some concern o9er your a-ility to &ul&ill your duty 9oluntarily and independently, a&ter -ein/ released &rom lon/Astandin/ social restraints. 4 (onder i& you'll -e da..led -y suddenly -esto(ed &reedom, and (hether some may &ail to carry out your duty as reBuired in relations (ith others, as you'9e recei9ed -asically the same education as military men. 4n a &ree society, you should nurture your o(n a-ility to make moral 8ud/ments in order to carry out your duties. ?uties can only -e carried out correctly -y a socially mature person (ith an independent mind and (ith culture and di/nity. 5he &undamental reason (hy the (orld has lost con&idence in our nation, and (hy (e ha9e so many (arAcrime suspects (ho le&t u/ly scars on our history, (as this lack o& morals. 4 (ould like you to culti9ate and accept the common moral 8ud/ment o& the (orld, and -ecome a people (ho &ul&ill duties on your o(n responsi-ility. Pou are e*pected to -e independent and car9e out your o(n &uture. <o one can a9oid this responsi-ility and choose an easy (ay. ,nly throu/h that path can eternal peace -e attained in the (orld. Second, 4 (ould like you to promote education in science. <o one can deny that the le9el o& Japan's modern science, apart &rom certain minor areas, is (ell -elo( (orld standards. 4& you tra9el outside Japan, the &irst thin/ you notice is the unscienti&ic (ay o& li&e o& the Japanese. 5o search &or truth (ith Japan's irrational and cliBuish mentality is like searchin/ &or &ish amon/ the trees. We soldiers had /reat di&&iculties in securin/ the necessary materials to &i/ht and to make up &or the lack o& scienti&ic kno(led/e. We tried to &i/ht a/ainst the superior &orces o& the $nited States and to (in the (ar -y thro(in/ a(ay the priceless li9es o& our nation as su-stitutes &or -ullets and -om-s. Iarious methods o& horrendous suicide attack (ere in9ented. We e*posed our pilots to dan/er -y strippin/ 9ital eBuipment &rom the planes in order to 8ust sli/htly impro9e their mo-ility. 5his sho(s ho( little kno(led/e (e had &or conductin/ (ar. We made the /reatest mistake AA unprecedented in (orld history AA -y tryin/ to make up &or the lack o& materials and scienti&ic kno(led/e (ith human -odies. My present state o& mind is Buite di&&erent &rom that at the time o& surrender. 4n the car on the (ay to Ba/uio &rom Kian/an, Mr. 3o-ert MacMillan, a 8ournalist o& the ma/a.ine Pouth asked, (hat 4 thou/ht (as the &undamental reason &or Japan's de&eat. Somethin/ suppressed &or a lon/ time in my su-Aconsciousness suddenly -urst out and 4 instantly responded 2science,2 -e&ore re&errin/ to other important issues. 5his (as -ecause my lon/Alastin/ &rustration and intense an/er (ere loosened all at once (hen the (ar (as o9er. 4 am not sayin/ that this is the only reason, -ut it (as clearly one important reason &or Japan's de&eat. 4& there (ill -e another (ar some(here in the (orld :althou/h 4 hope there (on't -e;, it is e*pected end in a short time throu/h the use o& horri&ic scienti&ic (eapons. 5he &oolish methods o& (ar that Japan adopted (ill -e re/arded as the illusions o& an idiot. Human -ein/s throu/hout the (orld, 4 presume, (ill make e&&orts to pre9ent such a terri-le (ar AA not 8ust the Japanese (ho thorou/hly endured the horror o& this (ar. 5his is the task that is /i9en to humanity. 5he atomic -om-s dropped on Hiroshima and <a/asaki (ere horrendous (eapons. <e9er -e&ore ha9e so many people -een killed instantly in the lon/ history o& slau/hterin/ human -ein/s. 0s 4 ha9e -een in prison, 4 ha9e not had enou/h time to study the 0A-om-, -ut 4 think that no (eapon (ill -e in9ented to de&end a/ainst atomic (eapons. 4t used to -e said that it (ould al(ays -e possi-le to &i/ht a/ainst a ne( method o& attack. 5his is still true. 4& there is any method to de&end a/ainst atomic -om-s AA the (eapon that has made o-solete all past (ar&are AA it (ould simply -e to create nations all o9er the (orld that (ould ne9er contemplate the use o& such (eapons. 0 de&eated o&&icer like me re&lects sadly that i& (e had had superior scienti&ic kno(led/e and su&&icient scienti&ic (eapons, (e (ould not ha9e killed so many o& our o(n men. 4nstead (e could ha9e sent them -ack home to use the kno(led/e as the &oundation to re-uild a

/lorious and peace&ul country. Ho(e9er, the science that 4 mean is not science that leads mankind to destruction. 4t is science that (ill de9elop natural resources still to -e tapped, that (ill make human li&e rich, and (ill -e used &or peace&ul purposes to &ree human -ein/s &rom misery and po9erty. 5hird, 4 (ant to mention the education o& (omen. 4 ha9e heard that Japanese (omen ha9e -een li-erated &rom the &eudal state authorities and -een /i9en the pri9ile/e o& su&&ra/e. #rom my e*perience o& li9in/ in &orei/n countries &or a lon/ time, 4 can say that the position o& modern Japanese (omen is in&erior to that o& (omen in the (est. 4 am sli/htly apprehensi9e a-out the &act that &reedom &or Japanese (omen is a /enerous /i&t &rom the ,ccupation #orces, not one that they stru//led to acBuire themsel9es. 0 /i&t is o&ten en8oyed as an o-8ect o& appreciation and not actually put to direct use. 5he hi/hest 9irtues &or Japanese (omen used to -e 2o-edience2 and 2&idelity.2 5hat (as no di&&erent &rom 2o-edient alle/iance2 in the military. 0 person (ho respects such castrated and sla9eAlike 9irtues has -een called a 2chaste (oman2 or praised as a 2loyal and -ra9e soldier.2 4n such 9alues, there is no &reedom o& action or &reedom o& thou/ht, and they are not the 9irtues -y (hich one can sel&Ae*amine autonomously. My hope is that you (ill -reak out o& your old shell, enrich your education, and -ecome ne( acti9e Japanese (omen, (hile maintainin/ only the /ood elements o& e*istin/ 9alues. 5he dri9in/ &orce &or peace is the heart o& (omen. Please utili.e your ne(ly /ained &reedom e&&ecti9ely and appropriately. Pour &reedom should not -e 9iolated or taken a(ay -y anyone. 0s &ree (omen, you should -e united (ith (omen throu/hout the (orld and /i9e &ull play to your uniBue a-ilities as (omen. 4& not, you (ill -e sBuanderin/ all the pri9ile/es that you ha9e -een /i9en. #inally, there is one more thin/ that 4 (ould like to tell (omen AA you are either already a mother or (ill -ecome a mother in &uture. Pou should clearly reali.e that one o& a mother's responsi-ilities is a 9ery important role in the 2human education2 o& the ne*t /eneration. 4 ha9e al(ays -een unhappy a-out the idea that modern education -e/ins at school. 5he home is the most appropriate place &or educatin/ in&ants and the most appropriate teacher is the mother. Pou alone can lay the &oundation &or education in its true meanin/. 4& you do not (ant to -e critici.ed as (orthless (omen, please do your -est in educatin/ your o(n children. )ducation does not -e/in at kinder/arten or on entry to elementary school. 4t should -e/in (hen you -reast&eed a ne(-orn -a-y. 4t is a mother's pri9ile/e to ha9e a special &eelin/ that no one else can ha9e (hen she cuddles and -reast&eeds her -a-y. Mothers should /i9e their lo9e to their -a-y -oth physically and mentally, as they are the -a-y's source o& li&e. Breast&eedin/ can -e done -y another, and nourishment can -e pro9ided -y other animals, or can -e su-stituted &or -y a -ottle. Pet nothin/ else can su-stitute &or mother's lo9e. 4t is not enou/h &or a mother to think only a-out ho( to keep her children ali9e. She should raise them to -e a-le to li9e independently, cope (ith 9arious circumstances, lo9e peace, appreciate cooperation (ith others and ha9e a stron/ desire to contri-ute to humanity (hen they /ro( up. Pou should raise the 8oy&ul &eelin/ o& -reast&eedin/ to the le9el o& intellectual emotion and re&ined lo9e. Mother's lo9e (ill constantly &lo( into her -a-y's -ody throu/h -reast&eedin/. 5he &undamental elements o& &uture education must e*ist in em-ryo in mother's milk. 0ttention to the -a-y's needs can -e the -asis &or education. $ntirin/ motherin/ skills should naturally de9elop into a hi/her le9el o& educational skill. 4 am not a specialist on education and there&ore 4 am not sure ho( appropriate it is, -ut 4 (ould like to call this kind o& education 2-reast&eedin/ education.2 Please -ear this simple and ordinary phrase in your mind. 5hese are the last (ords o& the person (ho took your children's li9es a(ay &rom you. 9u,i :ana,a is resear h 4rofessor at the 0iroshima 5ea e 7nstitute" a &oordinator of Ja4an #o us" and author of Ja4an;s &omfort /omen< Se-ual slavery and 4rostitution during /orld /ar 77 and the =S * u4ation< 0e 4re4ared this arti le for Ja4an #o us< 5osted Se4tem+er 22" 2!!2<

The Asia4Pacific -ournal: -a an @ocus htt :NN+++68a anfocus6orgN[Mu2i[TANA.A4 Jast[=ords[of[the[Tiger[of[#ala"a[[General[Mamashita[Tomo"u2i

/*RL6 /AR 77 '&ELE.R7:7ES( *N :0E #R*N: &*>ER *# 0ENR9 L=&E?S TIME $A)A@7NE

<a.i =erman 'leaders1 0dol& Hitler :le&t, 0pril 1!, 1 !1 edition; and Hermann =oerin/ :ri/ht, 0u/ust "1, 1 33 edition;

<a.i =erman 'leaders1 Joseph =oe--els :le&t, July 17, 1 33 edition; and Heinrich Himmler :ri/ht, #e-ruary 1", 1 !> edition;

Le&t% <a.i =erman 0dmiral )rich 3aeder appears on the &ront co9er o& the 0pril "7, 1 !" edition o& Time ma/a.ine. 3i/ht% <a.i =erman 0dmiral Karl ?oenit. appears on the &ront co9er o& the #e-ruary ", 1 !" edition o& Time ma/a.ine.

Le&t% <a.i =erman #ield Marshal #rit. )rich 9on Manstein appears on the &ront co9er o& the January 17, 1 !! o& Time ma/a.ine. 3i/ht% Iichy #rench leader Pierre La9al appears on the &ront co9er o& the 0pril "F, 1 !" o& Time ma/a.ine.

Le&t% =eneral Hideki 5o8o, Prime Minister o& Japan :1 !1A1 !!;, Minister o& War :1 !7A1 !!;, and con9icted (ar criminal (ho (as e*ecuted -y han/in/ in 5okyo on ?ecem-er "3, 1 !6, appears on the &ront co9er o& the <o9em-er 3, 1 !1 edition o& Time ma/a.ine. 3i/ht% Koki Hirota, Prime Minister o& Japan :1 3GA1 3F;, #orei/n Minister o& Japan :1 33A1 3G, 1 3FA1 36;, and con9icted (ar criminal, appears on the &ront co9er o& the May "1, 1 3! edition o& Time ma/a.ine.

Le&t% Posuke Matsuoka, #orei/n Minister o& Japan :1 !7AJuly 1 !1; (ho (as tried as a (ar criminal, appears on the &ront co9er o& the July F, 1 !1 edition o& Time ma/a.ine. Posuke Matsuoka ser9ed as the President o& South Manchuria 3ailroad &rom 1 3> until 1 3 . 3i/ht% =eneral 5omoyuki Pamashita, +ommander o& 4mperial Japan@s #ourteenth 0rea 0rmy in the Philippines :1 !!A1 !>; and con9icted (ar criminal (ho (as sentenced to death in the Philippines on #e-ruary "3, 1 !G, appears on the &ront co9er o& the March ", 1 !" edition o& Time ma/a.ine.

Le&t% 0dmiral Shi/etaro Shimada, Minister o& the <a9y :,cto-er 16, 1 !1AJuly 1F, 1 !!; and con9icted (ar criminal, appears on the &ront co9er o& the July 3, 1 !! edition o& Time ma/a.ine. 3i/ht% =eneral Seishiro 4ta/aki, Minister o& War :1 36A1 3 ;, +hie& o& Sta&& o& the +hina )*peditionary 0rmy :1 3 A1 !1;, and con9icted (ar criminal (ho (as han/ed in 5okyo on ?ecem-er "3, 1 !6, appears on the &ront co9er o& 0u/ust 3, 1 !" edition o& Time ma/a.ine.

Le&t% #leet 0dmiral ,sami <a/ano, +hie& o& the 4mperial Japanese <a9y =eneral Sta&& :0pril 1 !1A#e-ruary 1 !!;, (as tried as a '+lass 01 (ar criminal a&ter World War 44. ,sami <a/ano appears on the &ront co9er o& the #e-ruary 1>, 1 !3 edition o& Time ma/a.ine. 3i/ht% 0dmiral Mineichi Ko/a, the +ommander in +hie& o& the +om-ined #leet o& the 4mperial <a9y o& Japan :1 !3A1 !!;, appears on the &ront co9er o& the <o9em-er 6, 1 !3 edition o& Time ma/a.ine. 0dmiral Ko/a died in a plane crash near Palau on March 31, 1 !!.

Le&t% #ranklin ?elano 3oose9elt, President o& the $nited States and Time ma/a.ine@s Man o& the Pear, appears on the &ront co9er o& the January >, 1 !" edition o& Time ma/a.ine. 3i/ht% Winston +hurchill, Prime Minister o& =reat Britain and Time ma/a.ine@s Man o& the Pear, appears on the &ront co9er o& the January G, 1 !1 edition o& Time ma/a.ine.

Le&t% 4taly@s &ascist dictator Benito Mussolini appears on the &ront co9er o& the 0pril 6, 1 !7 edition o& Time ma/a.ine. 3i/ht% Joseph Stalin, the dictator o& So9iet $nion and Time ma/a.ine@s Man o& the Pear, appears on the &ront co9er o& the January 1, 1 !7 edition o& Time ma/a.ine.

Le&t% Henry L. Stimson, $.S. Secretary o& War :1 !7A1 !>;, appears on the &ront co9er o& the 0u/ust ">, 1 !1 edition o& Time ma/a.ine. 3i/ht% 3o-ert 0. Lo9ett, 0ssistant $.S. Secretary o& War &or 0ir :1 !1A1 !>;, appears on the &ront co9er o& the #e-ruary , 1 !" edition o& Time ma/a.ine. Henry L. Stimson and 3o-ert 0. Lo9ett (ere mem-ers o& Skull E Bones, a secret society at Pale $ni9ersity. Henry Luce, the )ditorAinA+hie& o& Time ma/a.ine durin/ World War 44, (as also a mem-er o& Skull E Bones.

Le&t% Joseph +. =re(, the $.S. 0m-assador to Japan, appears on the &ront co9er o& the <o9em-er 1", 1 3! edition o& Time ma/a.ine. 3i/ht% Sumner Welles, the $.S. $nder Secretary o& State, appears on the &ront co9er o& the 0u/ust 11, 1 !1 edition o& Time ma/a.ine. Joseph +. =re(, Sumner Welles, Henry L. Stimson, and 3o-ert 0. Lo9ett (ere mem-ers o& the +ouncil on #orei/n 3elations.

The Atomic *ome in Hiroshima, -a an

Ausch+itz4Bir2enau ,oncentration ,am in Poland

Arlington National ,emeter" in Arlington, Iirginia

Tomb of the Ln2no+n Soldier

;oice an' Silence in t)e <irst 4uclear War! Wilfre' ,urc)ett an' (iros)ima
,y %ic)ar' 3anter=
Hiroshima had a #rofound effect u#on me. Sti does. *y first reaction was #ersona re ief that the bomb had ended the war. 7rank y, 2 ne)er thou!ht 2 wou d i)e to see that end, the casua ty rate amon! war corres#ondents in that area bein! what it was. *y an!er with the 4S was not at first, that they had used that wea#on V a thou!h that an!er came ater. Once 2 !ot to Hiroshima, my fee in! was that for the first time a wea#on of mass destruction of ci)i ians had been used. Was it 8ustifiedC "ou d anythin! 8ustify the eAtermination of ci)i ians on such a sca eC /ut the rea an!er was !enerated when the 4S mi itary tried to co)er u# the effects of atomic radiation on ci)i ians V and tried to shut me u#. *y emotiona and inte ectua res#onse to Hiroshima was that the Euestion of the socia res#onsibi ity of a 8ourna ist was #osed with !reater ur!ency than e)er. Wi fred /urchett 0?B' N0O Wi fred /urchett entered Hiroshima a one in the ear y hours of . Se#tember 0?5%, ess than a month after the first nuc ear war be!an with the bombin! of the city. /urchett was the first Western 8ourna ist - and a most certain y the first Westerner other than #risoners of war - to reach Hiroshima after the bomb. 6he story which he ty#ed out on his battered /aby Hermes ty#ewriter, sittin! amon! the ruins, remains one of the most im#ortant Western eyewitness accounts, and the first attem#t to come to terms with the fu human and mora conseEuences of the 4nited States- initiation of nuc ear war. 7or /urchett, that eA#erience was a turnin! #oint, -a watershed in my ife, decisi)e y inf uencin! my who e #rofessiona career and wor d out ook-. SubseEuent y /urchett came to understand that his honest and accurate account of the radio o!ica effects of nuc ear wea#ons not on y initiated an animus a!ainst him from the hi!hest Euarters of the 4S !o)ernment, but a so marked the be!innin! of the nuc ear )ictor-s determination ri!id y to contro and censor the #icture of Hiroshima and Fa!asaki #resented to the wor d. 6he story of /urchett and Hiroshima ended on y with his ast book, Shadows of Hiroshima, com# eted short y before his death in 0?B.. 2n that book, /urchett not on y went back to the history of his own des#atch, but more im#ortant y showed the broad dimensions of the -coo y # anned- and manufactured co)er-u# which continued for decades. With his ast book, com# eted in his fina years in the conteAt of =resident 3ea!an-s -Star Wars- s#eech of *arch 0?B., /urchett fe t -it has become ur!ent - )irtua y a matter of ife or death - for #eo# e to understand what rea y did ha##en in Hiroshima near y forty years a!o . . . 2t is my c ear duty, based on my own s#ecia eA#eriences, to add this contribution to our co ecti)e know ed!e and consciousness. With a#o o!ies that it has been so on! de ayed . . .M N;O 6hat one day in Hiroshima in Se#tember 0?5% affected /urchett as a #erson, as a writer, and as a #artici#ant in #o itics for the neAt forty years. /ut /urchett-s story of that day, and his subseEuent writin! about Hiroshima, ha)e a !reater si!nificance sti , by !i)in! a c ue to the de iberate su##ression of the truth about Hiroshima and Fa!asaki, and to the dee#er, missin! #arts of our cu tura com#rehension of that ho ocaust. >ne Day in (iros)ima! # Septem&er 1945 N.O (fter co)erin! the end of the b oody Okinawa cam#ai!n, from the moment that he heard re#orts of the atomic bombin! on (u!ust &, /urchett-s !oa was to reach Hiroshima as soon as #ossib e after the >a#anese surrender on 0% (u!ust. He reached >a#an in ate (u!ust aboard the trans#ort shi# 4SS *i ett and anded with the ad)ance #arty of 4S *arines at Rokosuka in 6okyo /ay. With two 8ourna ist friends /urchett reached 6okyo by train, days ahead of *ac(rthur-s occu#yin! forces. 7ew amon! the hundreds of 8ourna ists who swarmed to >a#an with the occu#yin! forces contem# ated the hazardous twenty-one-hour tri# south to Hiroshima or Fa!asaki. *ost acce#ted the c aim that the months of aeria and na)a bombardment of >a#an #rior to the surrender had reduced the rai way system to rubb e, and that it was im#ossib e to tra)e beyond 6okyo. D)en this officia discoura!ement a##ears to ha)e been a most unnecessary, at east at that sta!e. 6he #re)ai in! (and sti hard y chan!ed) news

)a ues dictated the choice of the ma8orityI &'' ( ied 8ourna ists co)ered the officia >a#anese surrender aboard the batt eshi# *issouriI on y one went to Hiroshima. N5O /urchett s#oke on y #hrasebook >a#anese, but recei)ed enthusiastic he # from the staff of the >a#anese $omei news a!ency in 6okyo, who were !reat y concerned for their Hiroshima corres#ondent, Fakamura. ( 4S Fa)y #ress officer, tick ed at the idea of -one of his boys- reachin! Hiroshima ahead of corres#ondents attached to the other ser)ices, #ro)ided #ro)isions for Fakamura and for /urchett. (t & a.m. on the mornin! of ; Se#tember, /urchett boarded an o)ercrowded train headin! for Hiroshima. 2n his kna#sack he carried an a -im#ortant etter of introduction to Fakamura, the na)y-su## ied #ro)isions, a /aby Hermes #ortab e ty#ewriter and a most un8ourna istic "o t .5%, thou!htfu y thrust into his hands by an (ustra ian friend before /urchett eft Rokosuka. Outside 6okyo, news of the war-s end had come after the Dm#eror-s announcement of >a#an-s unconditiona surrender two weeks ear ier. 6here were as yet, howe)er, no occu#yin! forces. /urchett had anded with the )an!uard of *arines, but *ac(rthur had bare y enou!h troo#s to occu#y centra 6okyo and the #orts, and at e)ery #oint on his 8ourney to Hiroshima and back, /urchett found himse f actua y eadin! the occu#ation. /oardin! the train, /urchett crammed in amon! ordinary so diers, -)ery su en at first, chatterin! ob)ious y about me - in a )ery hosti e way-. /ut a #acket of ci!arettes, dis# ays of a scar from a wound inf icted by a >a#anese # ane in /urma, and the /aby Hermes as the si!n of a 8ourna ist, and -from then on it was smi es and friendshi#, more ci!arettes a!ainst bits of fish - and e)en a dro# of sake-. (fter a few hours- tra)e in!, the new friends dro##ed off the train, and /urchett mana!ed to !et into a com#artment which turned out to be fu of be i!erent 2m#eria (rmy officers. (s /urchett was ater to a##reciate, one of the main im#ediments to the desire of the >a#anese Dm#eror and =rime *inister to surrender in >u y 0?5% was their fear of mutiny by the most eAtreme of the mi itarists in the 2m#eria (rmy. *emories of the assassinations by zea ous mi itarists of wa)erin! =rime *inisters and cabinet ministers in the ear y 0?.'s, understandab y disturbed ministers and the Dm#eror-s chamber ains as they searched for a form of words acce#tab e to the ( ies after =otsdam. 6hey feared that a sma !rou# of, army officers wou d react to news of an im#eria rescri#t of surrender by seizin! the Dm#eror himse f, and Euite #ossib y usin! the sacred hosta!e as the basis for a -out resistance to the death. N%O On his s ow twenty-one-hour tri# south, /urchett sensed the de#th of enmity towards the )ictors fe t by officers nursin! their humi iation. Here the hosti ity was tota . (mon! the #assen!ers was an (merican #riest, accom#anied by armed !uards. He had been brou!ht to 6okyo from internment to broadcast to (merican troo#s on how they shou d beha)e in >a#an to a)oid friction with the oca #o#u ation, he eA# ained, warnin! me in )ei ed tones that the situation in the com#artment was )ery tense and that a fa se mo)e mi!ht cost us our i)es. 6he officers were furious and humi iated at their defeat. (bo)e a 2 was not to smi e as this wou d be taken as ! oatin! o)er what was ha##enin! aboard the *issouri. Watchin! those ! owerin! officers toyin! with the hi ts of their swords and the on! samurai da!!ers that many of them wore, 2 fe t no inc ination to smi e, es#ecia y as the train was in com# ete darkness as we #assed throu!h what seemed ike end ess tunne s. D)entua y, at two the neAt mornin!, /urchett-s nei!hbour #rodded him awake with the news of their arri)a in Hiroshima. (t what was eft of the city station, /urchett was arrested by two sabre-carryin! #o icemen, and # aced in a makeshift ce for the ni!ht, where he #rom#t y co a#sed into s ee#. FeAt mornin!, /urchett showed the !uards his etter of introduction from the 6okyo $omei office, and they made no attem#t to sto# him ea)in!. 2 fo owed a tram ine which seemed to ead fair y direct y towards the standin! bui din!s, branchin! off at cross streets for a few hundred yards and then returnin! to the tram ine. Wa kin! those streets 2 had the fee in! of ha)in! been trans ated to some death-stricken a ien # anet. 6here was de)astation and deso ation, and nothin! e se. Lead-!rey c ouds hun! o)er the waste that had been a city of more than a Euarter of a mi ion #eo# e. Smoky )a#ours drifted from fissures in the soi and there was a dank, acrid, su #hurous sme . 6he few #eo# e in the streets hurried #ast each other without #ausin! or s#eakin!, white

masks co)erin! their nostri s. /ui din!s had been #ounded into !rey and reddish dust, so idified into rid!es and banks by the freEuent rains . . . Fo one sto##ed to ook at me. D)eryone hurried, intent on whate)er it was that brou!ht them into this city of death. N&O (t the #o ice station where he went for he #, /urchett was understandab y i -recei)ed. (fter he eA# ained his #ur#ose, the #o ice found Fakamura, who in turn brou!ht a "anadian-born woman as trans ator. (t the headEuarters of the sur)i)in! #o ice force Fakamura eA# ained /urchett-s #ur#ose and his reEuest for he #. -6he #o ice were eAtreme y hosti e and the atmos#here was tense . . . 6he more Fakamura eA# ained the more the tension increased. 6here was some shoutin! and the inter#reter became #a e.Fakamura ater to d /urchett that most of the #o icemen had wanted to ha)e a three shot. (stonishin! y, it was the oca head of the 9em#eitai, the 6hou!ht "ontro =o ice, who acce#ted /urchett-s eA# anation of his task, #ro)ided a #o ice car, and set out with /urchett to -show him what his #eo# e ha)e done to us-. +uided by Fakamura and the #o ice chief, /urchett went to the Hiroshima "ommunications Hos#ita , 0.. ki ometres from the hy#ocentre. One of the city-s siA hos#ita s, it was, ike the others, )ery hea)i y dama!ed, most of the staff ha)in! become nuc ear casua ties. (t that time it he d about ;,.'' in-#atients. Of the .'' doctors in the city, ;1' were either ki ed or serious y in8ured in the atomic attack, as were ?. #er cent of the city-s nurses. N1O 3e ief medica teams from outside the city had been Euick y or!anized. /y the end of Se#tember some ;,''' medica workers at makeshift re ief stations had treated 0'%,B&0 in-#atients and another ;0','5B had recei)ed out-#atient treatment. NBO >a#anese scientists and doctors had a ready made considerab e #ro!ress in de)e o#in! #rocedures for aidin! the sufferin! sur)i)ors with imited resources and an a most com# ete ack of #rior know ed!e of the effects of who e-body radiation. 6he day that /urchett arri)ed in Hiroshima, a medica meetin! was he d on what were to become known as (-bomb diseases, with ectures !i)en on treatment of )ictims by the >a#anese re ief medica workers and researchers who had been studyin! and treatin! the )ictims- i nesses for a most a month. 6he a##a in! si!hts /urchett witnessed in ward after ward were to affect him far more than the #hysica de)astation he had a ready seen. =atients - and their fami ies - on fi thy tatami mats amon! the rubb e were bein! ra)a!ed by the effects of massi)e b ast and #rimary and secondary burn trauma combined with ad)anced sta!es of radiation i nesses, resu tin! in fe)er, nausea, haemorraha!ic stoo s and diathesis (s#ontaneous b eedin!, from mouth, rectum, urethra and un!s), e#i ation ( oss of hair), i)id #ur#ura on the skin, and !in!i)itis and tonsi itis eadin! to swe in!, and e)entua y haemorrha!in! of !ums and soft membranes. N?O 2n many cases, without effecti)e dru!s, ar!e burns and the haemorrha!in! #arts of the body had turned !an!renous. 3eco)ery was inhibited by the effects of wides#read ma nutrition, resu tin! from the cumu ati)e effects of on!-term wartime shorta!es and the ( ied b ockade of the #ast year. (fter the #arty #assed throu!h the wards, the doctor in char!e asked /urchett to ea)eI -2 can no on!er !uarantee your safety. 6hese #eo# e are a marked down to die. 0 wi a so die. 2 was trained in (merica. 0 be ie)ed in Western ci)i ization. 2-m a "hristian. /ut how can you "hristians do what you ha)e done hereC Send some of your scientists at east. 6hey know what this is - they must know how we can sto# this terrib e sickness. $o that at east. Send your scientists down Euick yW/urchett eft to write the uniEue des#atch to the $ai y DA#ress, sittin! on a #iece of rubb e not far from the hy#ocentre, sometime in the ear y afternoon. What /urchett fe t and saw that day is best con)eyed as it a##eared in the $ai y DA#ress three days ater. N0'O .'th $ay in HiroshimaI 6hose who esca#ed be!in to die, )ictims of 6HD (6O*2" =L(+4D -2 Write this as a Warnin! to the Wor d$O"6O3S 7(LL (S 6HDR WO39 =oison !as fearI ( wear masks

DA#ress Staff 3e#orter =eter /urchett was the first ( ied 3e#orter to enter the atom-bomb city. He tra)e ed 5'' mi es from 6okyo a one and unarmed, carryin! rations for se)en mea s - food is a most unobtainab e in >a#an - a b ack umbre a, and a ty#ewriter. Here is his story from VH23OSH2*(, 6uesday 2n Hiroshima, .' days after the first atomic bomb destroyed the city and shook the wor d, #eo# e are sti dyin!, mysterious y and horrib y - #eo# e who were unin8ured in the catac ysm - from an unknown somethin! which 2 can on y describe as the atomic # a!ue. Hiroshima does not ook ike a bombed city. 2t ooks as if a monster steamro er had #assed o)er it and sEuashed it out of eAistence. 2 write these facts as dis#assionate y as 2 can in the ho#e that they wi act as a warnin! to the wor d. 2n this first testin! !round of the atomic bomb 2 ha)e seen the most terrib e and fri!htenin! deso ation in four years of war. 2t makes a b itzed =acific is and seem ike an Dden. 6he dama!e is far !reater than #hoto!ra#hs can show. When you arri)e in Hiroshima you can ook around and for ;% and #erha#s .' sEuare mi es you can see hard y a bui din!. 2t !i)es you an em#ty fee in! in the stomach to see such man-made de)astation. 2 #icked my way to a shack used as a tem#orary #o ice headEuarters in the midd e of the )anished city. Lookin! south from there 2 cou d see about three mi es of reddish rubb e. 6hat is a the atomic bomb eft of dozens of b ocks of city streets, of bui din!s, homes, factories, and human bein!s. S62LL 6HDR 7(2L 6here is 8ust nothin! standin! eAce#t about ;' factory chimneys, Xchimneys with no factories. 2 ooked west. ( !rou# of ha f a dozen !utted bui din!s. (nd then a!ain nothin!. 6he #o ice chief of Hiroshima we comed me ea!er y as the first ( ied corres#ondent to reach the city. With the oca mana!er of $omei, eadin! >a#anese news a!ency, he dro)e me throu!h or, #erha#s, 2 shou d say o)er, the city. (nd he took me to hos#ita s where the )ictims of the bomb are sti bein! treated. 2n these hos#ita s 2 found #eo# e who when the bomb fe , suffered abso ute y no in8uries, but now are dyin! from the uncanny after-effects . . . 6HD S4L=H43 S*DLL *y nose detected a #ecu iar odour un ike anythin! 2 ha)e e)er sme ed before. 2t is somethin! ike Su #hur, but not Euite. 2 cou d sme it when 2 #assed a fire that was sti smou derin!, or at a s#ot where they were sti reco)erin! bodies from the wrecka!e. /ut 2 cou d a so sme it where e)erythin! was sti deserted. 6hey be ie)e it is !i)en off by the #oisonous !as sti issuin! from earth soaked with radioacti)ity re eased by the s# it uranium atom. (nd so the #eo# e of Hiroshima today are wa kin! throu!h the for orn deso ation of their once #roud city with !auze masks o)er their mouths and noses. 2t #robab y does not he # them #hysica y.

/ut it he #s them menta y. . 7rom the moment that this de)astation was oosed u#on Hiroshima the #eo# e who sur)i)ed ha)e hated the white man. 2t is a hate the intensity of which is a most as fri!htenin! as the bomb itse f. -(LL "LD(3- WDF6 6he counted dead number %.,'''. (nother .',''' are missin!, which means -certain y dead-. 2n the day 2 ha)e stayed in Hiroshima - and this is near y a month after the bombin! - 0'' #eo# e ha)e died from its effects. 6hey were some of the 0.,''' serious y in8ured by the eA# osion. 6hey ha)e been dyin! at the rate of 0'' a day. (nd they wi #robab y a die. (nother 5',''' were s i!ht y in8ured. 6hese casua ties mi!ht not ha)e been as hi!h eAce#t for a tra!ic mistake. 6he authorities thou!ht this was 8ust another routine Su#er-7ort raid. 6he # ane f ew o)er the tar!et and dro##ed the #arachute which carried the bomb to its eA# osion #oint. 6he (merican # ane #assed out of si!ht. 6he a -c ear was sounded and the #eo# e of Hiroshima came out from their she ters. ( most a minute ater the bomb reached the ;,'''-foot a titude at which it was timed to eA# ode - at the moment when near y e)eryone in Hiroshima was in the streets. Hundreds and hundreds of the dead were so bad y burned in the terrific heat !enerated by the bomb that it was not e)en #ossib e to te whether they were men or women, o d or youn!. Of thousands of others, nearer the centre of the eA# osion, there was no trace. 6hey )anished. 6he theory in Hiroshima is that the atomic heat was so !reat that they burned instant y to ashes V eAce#t that there were no ashes. HD(= O7 34//LD 6he 2m#eria =a ace, once an im#osin! bui din!, is a hea# of rubb e three feet hi!h, and there is one #iece of wa . 3oof, f oors and e)erythin! e se is dust. Hiroshima has one intact bui din! - the /ank of >a#an. 6his in a city which at the start of the war had a #o#u ation of .0','''. ( most e)ery >a#anese scientist has )isited Hiroshima in the #ast three weeks to try to find a way of re ie)in! the #eo# e-s sufferin!. Fow they themse )es ha)e become sufferers. 7or the first fortni!ht after the bomb dro##ed they found they cou d not stay on! in the fa en city. 6hey had dizzy s#e s and headaches. 6hen minor insect bites de)e o#ed into !reat swe in!s which wou d not hea . 6heir hea th steadi y deteriorated. 6hen they found another eAtraordinary effect of the new terror from the skies. *any #eo# e had suffered on y a s i!ht cut from a fa in! s# inter of brick or stee . 6hey shou d ha)e reco)ered Euick y. /ut they did not. 6hey de)e o#ed an acute sickness. 6heir !ums be!an to b eed and then they )omited b ood. (nd fina y they died. ( these #henomena, they to d me, were due to the radioacti)ity re eased by the atomic bomb-s eA# osion of the uranium atom. W(6D3 =O2SOFD$ 6hey found that the water had been #oisoned by chemica reaction. D)en today e)ery dro# of water consumed in Hiroshima comes from other cities. 6he #eo# e of Hiroshima are sti afraid.

6he scientists to d me they ha)e noted a !reat difference between the effect of the bombs in Hiroshima and in Fa!asaki. Hiroshima is in #erfect y f at de ta country. Fa!asaki is hi y. When the bomb dro##ed on Hiroshima the weather was bad, and a bi! rain-storm de)e o#ed soon afterwards. (nd so they be ie)e that the uranium radiation was dri)en into the earth and that, because so many are sti fa in! sick and dyin!, it is sti the cause of this man-made # a!ue. (t Fa!asaki on the other hand the weather was #erfect, and scientists be ie)e that this a owed the radioacti)ity to dissi#ate into the atmos#here more ra#id y. 2n addition, the force of the bomb eA# osion was, to a ar!e eAtent, eA#ended in the sea, where on y fish were ki ed. 6o su##ort this theory, the scientists #oint to the fact that, in Fa!asaki, death came swift y and sudden y, and that there ha)e been no after-effects such as those that Hiroshima is sti sufferin!. %eturn to 3o7yo 2f reachin! Hiroshima had been difficu t, transmittin! the story to London was a so frau!ht. Fakamura undertook to ta# the story out on a hand-set in *orse code to the 6okyo $omei office. /ut whi e /urchett was in Hiroshima, *ac(rthur dec ared 6okyo off- imits to 8ourna ists. 6his frustrated the # an for his friend Henry 9eys to wait in the 6okyo $omei office for the story to be ta##ed throu!h from /urchett. 6wice turned off the train from Rokohama to 6okyo by (merican *i itary =o ice, 9eys hired a >a#anese 8ourna ist to wait for /urchett-s story in 6okyo and brin! it to Rokohama immediate y. Late on the e)enin! of . Se#tember the story arri)ed and 9eys bu ied the re uctant wartime censors to a ow the un#recedented story throu!h unchan!ed. /urchett was not the on y forei!n 8ourna ist to arri)e in Hiroshima on . Se#tember. ( =enta!on #ress -2n)esti!atory +rou#- arri)ed by # ane from 6okyo 8ust as /urchett was finishin! his #iece. (ccordin! to /urchett, ha)in! been !uaranteed an -eAc usi)e-, the 8ourna ists in the officia #arty were sur#rised to see him there. Whi e the 8ourna ists fe t #iEued and threatened by /urchett-s scoo# the officia s accom#anyin! them as #ress hand ers were hosti e and sus#icious. 2n /urchett-s eyes, most of the =enta!on #ress team were headEuarters hacks s#ecia y f own in from the 4S, eAce#t for a few who had shared his #ath on the dan!erous is and-ho##in! cam#ai!ns. (ccordin! to /urchett, none serious y attem#ted to sur)ey the human conseEuences of the atomic bombin!, a thou!h he ad)ised one whom he knew that -the rea story is in the hos#ita s-. N00O . . . the moment they heard a ri)a had !ot to Hiroshima before them they demanded to !et back to their # ane and on to 6okyo as soon as #ossib e to fi e their des#atches. 6hey had no contact with the oca #o#u ation, as they were a so id -a -(merican- body with #erha#s a >a#anese-s#eakin! inter#reter attached. 6hey saw #hysica wrecka!e on y. N0;O 6he re#orters toured the wrecka!e, and ater he d a #ress conference at the Hiroshima =refectura Office. N0.O (fter the #ress conference, and with fo! threatenin! to c ose in, the re#orters #re#ared to !et back to 6okyo as soon as #ossib e. 2 asked if 2 cou d f y back with them to 6okyo, the train 8ourney bein! rather risky. -Our # ane-s o)er oaded as it is,- re# ied the co one -Rou-)e used u# more #etro !ettin! here than 2 wei!h,- 2 ar!ued. Res. /ut this airstri#-s a )ery short one and we can-t take on any eAtra wei!ht.-Wi you take a co#y of my story back to 6okyo at east, and !i)e it to the $ai y DA#ress corres#ondentC-We-re not !oin! back to 6okyo,- was the co one -s brusEue re# y. He ca ed the 8ourna ists to!ether and they #i ed into their minibus and headed back for the air#ort. N05O

(s it ha##ened, Fakamura had s ow y but successfu y transmitted the on! story. /ut /urchett cou d not be sure, and he must ha)e been dee# y an!ered at the refusa to he # him back to 6okyo. 6hat ni!ht, as the story was wired throu!h to London, /urchett be!an an e)entfu tri# back to 6okyo by train. 2n the midd e of the neAt day, as the train #assed throu!h 9yoto, /urchett saw two unmistakab e (ustra ians - #risoners of war from a oca cam# eft in ess than beni!n confusion as the war ended, with no effecti)e arran!ements to feed the star)in! =OWs. Word had fi tered in to the cam# about the end of the war, and the so diers had )o unteered to ea)e to ook for food in 9yoto. 6he emaciated #air be!!ed /urchett to come back to the cam# to meet their fe ow inmates to con)ince them (and the confused !uards) that the war was indeed o)er. 2n the neAt two days /urchett )isited siA =OW cam#s, s#eakin! to the #risoners, te in! them of the ( ied )ictory and the comin! of the occu#ation forces. 2t was necessary to b uff the >a#anese cam# commanders, with whate)er authority 2 cou d muster, that 2 had come officia y to ensure that the surrender terms were bein! com# ied with and that i)in! conditions for the =OWs were bein! immediate y im#ro)ed. 2 ha)e addressed )arious ty#es of audiences in my time, but ne)er such ea!er isteners as these. 6hese men were famished. 6hey bore on their faces and bodies a the e)idence of #hysica hun!er, but abo)e a their eyes to d that they were famished for news. Hesitatin! for a moment, at that first encounter, whi e 2 tried to formu ate the most economic way of te in! them what they yearned to hear, 2 fe t the com#u sion in scores of #airs of eyes ! itterin! with the intensity of their a##ea to be!in, to te them it was a o)er and they wou d soon be on their way home a!ain, with a few detai s of how it came to be o)er so sudden y. N0%O ?onfrontin5 t)e Man)attan +ro8ect /ack in 6okyo, -the (merican nuc ear bi!-shots were furious-. /urchett-s artic e had raised a storm. Fot on y had the $ai y DA#ress head ined the story -6HD (6O*2" =L(+4D - 2 Write this as a Warnin! to the Wor d-, and #ut it on the front #a!e, but they had re eased it !ratis to the wor d-s #ress. On the surface, 4S officia s were main y an!ry about /urchett-s c aim that residua radiation was sti hazardous and that, a month after the bombin!, #eo# e were sti dyin! from radiation i ness - what he had referred to as -the atomic # a!ue-. On the mornin! of 1 Se#tember /urchett stumb ed off the train in 6okyo to disco)er that senior 4S officia s had ca ed a #ress conference at the 2m#eria Hote to refute his artic e. He reached the #ress conference 8ust in time to hear /ri!adier-+enera 6homas 7arre , the de#uty head of the *anhattan atomic bomb #ro8ect, eA# ain that the bomb had been eA# oded at a sufficient hei!ht o)er Hiroshima to a)oid any risk of -residua radiation-. 6here was a dramatic moment as 2 rose to my feet, fee in! that my scruffiness #ut me at a disad)anta!e with the e e!ant y uniformed and bemeda ed officers. *y first Euestion was whether the briefin! officer had been to Hiroshima. He had not. 2 then described what 2 had seen and asked for eA# anations. He was )ery #o ite at first, a scientist eA# ainin! thin!s to a ayman. 6hose 2 had seen in the hos#ita were )ictims of b ast and burn, norma after any bi! eA# osion. (##arent y the >a#anese doctors were incom#etent to hand e them, or acked the ri!ht medication. He discounted the a e!ation that any who had not been in the city at the time of the b ast were ater affected. D)entua y the eAchan!es narrowed to my askin! how he eA# ained the fish sti dyin! when they entered a stream runnin! throu!h the centre of the city. -Ob)ious y they were ki ed by the b ast or o)erheated water.-Sti there a month aterC-2t-s a tida ri)er. so they cou d be washed back and forth.-/ut 2 was taken to a s#ot in the city outskirts and watched i)e fish turnin! on their stomachs u#wards as they entered a certain #atch of the ri)er. (fter that they were dead within seconds.6he s#okesman ooked #ained. -2-m afraid you-)e fa en )ictim to >a#anese #ro#a!anda.- he said, and sat

down. 6he customary -6hank you- was #ronounced and the conference ended. ( thou!h my radiation story was denied, Hiroshima was immediate y #ut out of bounds, and 2 was whisked off to a 4S (rmy hos#ita for tests. N0&O (t the hos#ita , /urchett-s white-b ood-ce count was found to be ower than norma . (t the time /urchett acce#ted the eA# anation of the ow white-cor#usc e count as the work of antibiotics he had been !i)en ear ier for a knee infection. On y many years ater did /urchett disco)er that the eA# anation was Euite wron!I the number of white cor#usc es in his b ood ou!ht to ha)e increased to fi!ht the infection. On the other hand a ow white-b ood-ce count is characteristic of radiation i ness. N01O /y the time /urchett emer!ed from hos#ita a few days ater, his camera containin! uniEue shots of Hiroshima and its )ictims had been sto en. *ac(rthur had withdrawn his #ress accreditation and announced his intention to eA#e /urchett from occu#ied >a#an. ( thou!h the inter)ention of friends in the 4S Fa)y with whom /urchett had worked for much of the =acific cam#ai!n ed to the withdrawa of the eA#u sion order, /urchett eft >a#an at the ca of the /ea)erbrook #ress short y afterwards, not to return for o)er two and a ha f decades. (iros)ima! ?onstructin5 t)e Silence ( thou!h /urchett dismissed most of the obstructions # aced in his way at the time of the Hiroshima story as the #redictab e o)erreactions of bureaucrats, he e)entua y came to see a more dee# y disturbin! #attern. 3ef ectin! ater on his difficu ty in transmittin! his story, his hos#ita ization, the theft of his camera, the eAtreme hosti ity of 4S mi itary officia s in Hiroshima and 6okyo, and the efforts to imit access to Hiroshima, /urchett came to see his own story in a broader conteAt of officia 4S #o icy to concea the truth of Hiroshima. -2n 0?5% 2 was too o)erwhe med by the enormity of what ha##ened at Hiroshima and Fa!asaki to a##reciate the coo de iberation and ad)ance # annin! that went into manufacturin! the subseEuent co)er-u#.- N0BO Here /urchett Euite ri!ht y saw his own scoo# as #ro)okin! an officia 4S !o)ernment res#onse. How much was #remeditated and # anned before the bombin! is unc ear, but there is itt e doubt that with /urchett-s announcement to the wor d of the effects of radiation i ness, the true character of the ho ocausts of Hiroshima and Fa!asaki cou d not easi y be contained. Hiroshima and Fa!asaki were to take on a meanin! different to other, com#arab e ho ocausts such as the firebombin! of $resden, Hambur! and 6okyo. 6he eAtent of the su##ression of the truth of the first nuc ear bombin!s is #robab y e)en !reater than /urchett !uessed, and certain y more com# eA. /e!innin! with the attack on /urchett, there were three strands to officia (merican #o icy towards information about Hiroshima and Fa!asaki. 7irst, access to Hiroshima was denied to ( ied 8ourna ists. Second, #ub ic discussion of the to#ic was banned in >a#an. 7ina y, throu!h the censorshi# and officia disinformation #ro!ram as a who e, Western #erce#tions were channe ed in such a way as to minimize understandin! of the human, as o##osed to the #hysica , destructi)eness of the wea#on. 6he first ste# in the attem#t to su##ress the truth about Hiroshima was to attack c aims of radiation i ness, and to deny authority to >a#anese-sourced accounts of Hiroshima and Fa!asaki. 6he dismissa of /urchett was #art of this. 2n the week after /urchett-s c aim of continuin! radiation i ness and residua radiation, *anhattan =ro8ect officia s #ub ic y attacked such c aims se)era times. Statements by +enera 7arre and his chief, *a8or +enera Les ie +ro)es, a##eared in the Few Rork 6imes describin! c aims such as /urchett-s as ->a#anese #ro#a!anda-, and cate!orica y denyin! any residua radiation effects. N0?O (ccordin! to the *anhattan =ro8ect-s officia #ub icist and historian, Few Rork 6imes science writer, Wi iam L. Laurence, 6his historic !round in Few *eAico, scene of the first atomic eA# osion on earth and crad e of a new era in ci)i ization, !a)e the most effecti)e answer to >a#anese #ro#a!anda that radiations were res#onsib e for deaths e)en the day after the eA# osion, (u!. & and that #ersons enterin! Hiroshima had contracted mysterious ma adies due to #ersistent radioacti)ity. 6he >a#anese are continuin! their #ro#a!anda aimed at creatin! the im#ression that we won the war unfair y, and thus attem#tin! to create sym#athy for themse )es . . . 6hus, at the be!innin!, the >a#anese described -sym#toms- that did not rin! true. *ore recent y they ha)e sent in a radio o!ist, and since then the sym#toms they describe a##ear to be more

authentic on the surface, accordin! to the radio o!ists #resent here today. N;'O2n fact, >a#anese radio o!ists and nuc ear s#ecia ists had arri)ed in Hiroshima within days of the bombin!I the first confirmation that the wea#on that struck Hiroshima was an atomic bomb was #ro)ided by >a#an-s eadin! nuc ear #hysicist, Fishina Roshio, on 0' (u!ust. Systematic radio o!ica soi sam# in! was commenced the same day by 9yoto 2m#eria 4ni)ersity scientists, and continued around Hiroshima for the neAt week. Within two weeks of the bombin! some twenty-fi)e auto#sies had been #erformed to estab ish the effects of radiation i ness. N;0O Lea)in! aside the fact that 4S scientists and mi itary # anners knew #erfect y we the #otentia V and eA#ected - radiation effects of the wea#on, at that time, 4nited States scientists were in no #osition to be authoritati)eI no 4S scientists entered either of the bombed cities unti ? Se#tember, siA days after /urchett. 6he 4S rebutta did not stand u#. /urchett, and his >a#anese sources in Hiroshima, were Euite ri!ht to stress the radiation effects of the bombin!. "ontrary to +ro)es- and 7arre -s c aims, scores of thousands of #eo# e became i and died from eA#osure to radiation emitted from the bomb, #rinci#a y !amma rays and neutrons. /urchett-s news#a#er account of #eo# e dyin! from the after-effects of the bomb without any )isib e in8ury is Euite accurateI 7or no a##arent reason their hea th be!an to fai . 6hey ost a##etite. 6heir hair fe out. / uish s#ots a##eared on their bodies. (nd then b eedin! be!an from the ears, nose and mouth. (t first, doctors to d me, they thou!ht these were the sym#toms of !enera debi ity. 6hey !a)e their #atients Titamin ( in8ections. 6he resu ts were horrib e. 6he f esh started rottin! from the ho e caused by the in8ection of the need e. (nd in e)ery case the )ictim died. 3adiation deaths were sti occurrin! in ar!e numbers when /urchett )isited the "ommunications hos#ita V and sti occur today as the on!-term effects of eA#osure to radiation are re)ea ed in the form of a )ariety of b ood diseases, eukaemia and other cancers. N;;O /urchett was a so correct on the #ossibi ity of residua radiation at dan!erous e)e s. 3esidua radiation comes main y from irradiated materia s that ha)e turned into radio isoto#es and from #artic es of uranium from the bomb that esca#ed fission. (s fa out, residua radiation cou d dis#erse wide y and in an-une)en #attern of concentration. 3adio isoto#es thou!ht to ha)e been !enerated in the eA# osion had ha f- i)es )aryin! from a few minutes or hours (e.!. man!anese %&, ha f- ife ;.& hours) throu!h to se)era years (e.!. cesium 0.5, ha f- ife ;.'% years). >a#anese studies ha)e conc uded that -the tota !amma-ray dose from induced radiation u# to 0'' hours after the eA# osion one metre abo)e the !round at the hy#ocentre in Hiroshima a)era!ed about 0'' rads- and fe off shar# y away from the hy#ocentre. 7a out effects wou d be additiona , and une)en y distributed accordin! to weather #atterns which #re)ai ed after the bombin!. N;.O 6hese are certain y e)e s that cou d induce radiation i ness either throu!h direct eA#osure or throu!h the breathin! or swa owin! of induced-radioacti)e materia . 2n the days after the bombin! many #eo# e entered the city to he # and to search for re ati)es. *orta ity rates cannot confirm the effects of residua radiation amon! these ear y entrants N;5O, but morbidity rates amon! sur)i)ors certain y do. 2mmediate radiation effects were c ear amon! substantia numbers who entered the hy#o centre area within two or three days. 2n the on! term, Sthe crude morta ity rate for eukaemia, accordin! to the 0?&' nationa census, was three times !reater for those enterin! Hiroshima within three days after the bombin! than the a)era!e crude eukaemia rate in a of >a#an.- N;%O 6here had been !reat anAiety about the #ossibi ity of the atomic wea#on renderin! both cities bio o!ica y steri e in toto. 6he announceXment by 6okyo 3adio of the s#routin! of the first !reen shoots in the ate summer after the bombin! was understandab y a matter of !reat 8oy and re ief. N;&O 7arre returned to attack the credibi ity of >a#anese witnesses and scientists on 0? Se#tember when he denied news#a#er re#orts of bio o!ica steri ity. N;1O 2n fact, tem#orary steri ity amon! men was Euite common, and 7arre -s attack wron!. -Since s#ermato!onia of the testis and fo icu ar ce s of the o)ary are radio-sensiti)e, disturbance of the re#roducti)e function was an ine)itab e conseEuence of eA#osure to the atomic bomb.K N;BO 6he month after /urchett-s )isit, sur)eys of s#erm of men eA#osed to the bomb showed that nineteen out of twentytwo men one ki ometre or ess from the hy#ocentre were effecti)e y steri e. One third of a ar!er sam# e of

men were steri e in ate 0?5%. Within fi)e years, the ma8ority returned to norma ferti ity. (mon! women u# to fi)e ki ometres from the hy#ocentre, some se)enty #er cent suffered irre!u ar menstruation, and o)arian disorders were common. N;?O (t this #oint !rowth disorders such as microce#ha y (a sma er than norma head, often accom#anied by menta retardation) as a resu t of eA#osure of chi dren in utero to massi)e radiation had not yet emer!ed. 2mmediate y after /urchett-s story on the radiation effects of the bomb was #ub ished, se)ere restrictions were a## ied to 8ourna ists, both ( ied and >a#anese. On % Se#tember, *ac(rthur-s headEuarters banned ( ied 8ourna ists from 6okyo as *ac(rthur-s troo#s #re#ared to enter the city. -2t is not mi itary #o icy for corres#ondents to s#earhead the occu#ation,- dec ared a s#okesman for +enera *ac(rthur. N.'O Hiroshima and Fa!asaki were # aced com# ete y out of bounds. So#histicated censorshi# # ans had been drawn u# in (#ri 0?5% at *ac(rthur-s =hi i##ines headEuarters in #re#aration for the eA#ected O#eration O ym#ic in)asion in Fo)ember 0?5%. N.0O 6he most serious restriction on both 8ourna istic re#ortin! of Hiroshima and Fa!asaki and #ub ic >a#anese scientific and medica sur)eys was a series of ci)i - iberties and #ress codes issued by *ac(rthur-s headEuarters. 6he first ci)i - iberties code, issued on 0' Se#tember, was aimed at achie)in! -an abso ute minimum of restrictions u#on freedom of s#eech-. 6he directi)e commanded the >a#anese !o)ernment to -issue the necessary orders to #re)ent dissemination of news . . . which fai s to adhere to the truth or which disturbs the #ub ic tranEui ity-. N.;O 2n the fo owin! week the tranEui ity of *ac(rthur-s headEuarters was disturbed on three frontsI #ub ic o#inion at home, the >a#anese media and the >a#anese !o)ernment. Dach was to contribute to a ti!htenin! of censorshi# about the nuc ear bombin!. (s wartime news restrictions were ifted, and #risoner-of-war cam#s iberated, a##a in! accounts of >a#anese atrocities towards ( ied so diers f ooded the front #a!es of Western news#a#ers. 7ar outwei!hin! the co)era!e of the nuc ear bombin!s, these stories whi##ed u# an atmos#here of re)en!e where any su!!estion of sym#athy for the defeated was to be scour!ed. Fews#a#er re#orts from 6okyo carried the su!!estion that the ( ied #owers were treatin! the conEuered enient y. *ac(rthur-s actions in 6okyo immediate y came under scrutiny for e)idence of -softness towards the >a#anese-. 2n >a#an, news#a#ers and radio were attem#tin! to dea with ( ied re)e ations of 2m#eria army war atrocities main y by denia . (sahi Shimbun wroteI -Tirtua y a >a#anese who ha)e read the re#ort are unanimous in sayin! that the atrocities are hard y be ie)ab e.- N..O (s was to be the case for decades to come, >a#anese an!er o)er the use of the atomic bomb ob iterated reco!nition and !ui t of the atrocities of a decade of mi itarism. 2n some cases this continued the distortion and fa se re#ortin! characteristic of the state-contro ed media of wartime >a#an, as when the $omei #ress a!ency defended the Dm#ire, dec arin! ->a#an mi!ht ha)e won the war but for the atomic bomb, a wea#on too terrib e to face, and one which on y barbarians wou d use.K N.5O 6he basic fact that a war crime of massi)e #ro#ortions had been committed to brin! down a ferocious y mi itarist !o)ernment #ro)ided the on!oin! !rounds for the f awed mora cha en!e to the authority of the ( ied #owers. On 0% Se#tember (sahi Shimbun reiterated the ar!ument of the >a#anese cabinet when it described the use of the atomic bomb as -a breach of internationa aw-, which it most certain y was. 6wo days ater the #a#er ar!ued that if it were correct, as the occu#yin! #ower ar!ued, that >a#anese atrocities in the =hi i##ines had ed to 7i i#inos abandonin! their #re)ious su##ort for the >a#anese, then wou d that not a so a## y to the ( ied forces in >a#anC N.%O *ac(rthur-s headEuarters was not on y dea in! with unre#entant >a#anese media and )en!efu )ictorious (merican (and (ustra ian and /ritish) #ub ic o#inion, but a so with a cynica >a#anese !o)ernment sti attem#tin! to eAtract maAimum #o itica concessions from their conEuerors. (ccordin! to dec assified 4S mi itary inte i!ence documents, the 4S code-breakin! system *(+2" interce#ted the fo owin! messa!e from 7orei!n *inister Shi!emitsu *amoru on 0. Se#tember to >a#anese missions in Lisbon and Stockho mI -6he news#a#ers ha)e !i)en wide #ub icity to the +o)ernment-s recent memorandum concernin! the atomic bomb dama!e to Hiroshima and Fa!asaki . . . since the (mericans ha)e recent y been raisin! an u#roar about the Euestion of our mistreatment of #risoners, 2 think we shou d make e)ery effort to eA# oit the atomic bomb Euestion in our #ro#a!anda.- N.&O 6he interce#ted

re# y of the >a#anese minister in Stockho m was e)en more dama!in!. Why not, radioed the di# omat, take a more subt e a##roach, and or!anize domestic >a#anese re#ortin! of Hiroshima and Fa!asaki to be #icked u# by o)erseas news bureauAC /etter sti , ha)e -(n! o-(merican news#a#ermen write stories on the bomb dama!e and thus create a #owerfu im#ression around the wor d-. 6his #ro)ided *ac(rthur-s hawks with the e)idence they needed to 8ustify the most strin!ent censorshi#. /urchett-s artic e #ub ished a week ear ier cou d not ha)e come at a worse time from the #ers#ecti)e of the censors. Tictors- 8ustice #re)ai ed. 6he enra!ed *ac(rthur ordered -one hundred #er cent censorshi# . . . Fo more fa se stateXments, no more mis eadin! statements are to be #ermittedQ no destructi)e criticism of the ( ied #owers.6he #ress code issued on 0? Se#tember was desi!ned to educate the >a#anese by #rescribin! 8ourna istic ethicsI 0. ;. .. &. 1. ?. Fews must strict y adhere to the truth. Fothin! sha be #rinted which mi!ht, direct y or by inference, disturb the #ub ic tranEui ity. 6here sha be no fa se or destructi)e criticism of the ( ied #owers. Fews stories must be factua y written and com# ete y de)oid of editoria o#inion. Fews stories sha not be co ored to conform with any #ro#a!anda ine . . . Fo news story sha be distorted by the omission of #ertinent detai s. N.1O

=re-#ub ication censorshi# was eAercised by +H:, with any eAcisions to be rewritten #ro#er y, without b ack #atches of ink or @@@s or any other hints of censorshi#. 6he #retence of free s#eech was )ita to achie)e the fu effecti)eness of the censorshi#. 6he atomic bombin!s were a #riority concern of the censors. 6o be!in with the #ress code se)ere y restricted s#oken and written re#ortin! about the bombed cities. Fo >a#anese scientific or medica data cou d be #ub ished. 2t was not unti the end of the occu#ation #eriod in 0?%0 that news#a#er #hoto!ra#hs of the )ictims of the nuc ear bombin!, the hibakusha, showin! the ke oids on their bodies, were #ub ished by (sahi Shimbun. (s a resu t of the censorshi#, a #ub ic discussion of the bomb dama!e, and a medica treatment re#orts, disa##eared, !reat y im#edin! both #ub ic understandin! of what had taken # ace and the ur!ent y needed diffusion of medica research and treatment information. *eanwhi e the occu#ation authorities were meticu ous y co ectin! scientific information on the bomb and its hea th effects for (merican scientific consum#tion. 6he #ress code was not a## ied sim# y to su##ress unfa)ourab e or critica or accurate re#ortin! and discussion of the atomic bombin!s. Such discussion as was a owed had to be s anted in #articu ar directions. (ccordin! to >a#anese historians, the on y acce#tab e treatment of the bombin! had to acce#t and ref ect the )iew that the bombs shortened the war, and were effecti)e y instruments of #eace. N.BO 2n (#ri 0?51, durin! the first mayora e ection in Hiroshima which inau!urated the nationa ci)ic democratization #ro!ramme, a candidate was cut off in the midd e of his radio s#eech by a 4S mi itary obser)er because of his fai ure to comment fa)ourab y on the bombin!. N.?O When the no)e ist Fa!ai 6akashi attem#ted to #ub ish his book Fa!asaki no 9ane (6he /e s of Fa!asaki), he was to d that it cou d a##ear on y if a descri#tion of >a#anese atrocities were added to the )o ume. Fa!ai, a "atho ic who be ie)ed that the bomb was +od-s wi , in fact acceded to the censor-s demand and the book became a best se er. /ut, as Lifton remarks, -What the #articu ar (merican, or !rou#s of (mericans, who made this decision did not rea ize was that the eEuation of the two was a tacit admission that dro##in! the bomb was a so an atrocity.- N5'O Fot sur#risin! y, Lifton su!!ests that beneath the censorshi# #o icy-s o)ert concern to minimize any #ossib e reta iation a!ainst the )ictors, or succourin! of resur!ent mi itarism, there ay both (merican !ui t and horror o)er the effects of the bombin!, as we as what Lifton rather coy y refers to as -wider (merican #o itica concerns-. Sur)i)ors of the bombin! turned to writin! as testimony to the ho ocaust. 6hey too immediate y encountered the censor. *any #oems and other writin!s were distributed i e!a y. 6he Hiroshima #oet, 9urihara Sadako, #ub ished her #oem -Let the "hi d be /orn- in 0?5& in a Hiroshima ma!azine edited by her husband. 6he #oem, based on a story she had heard, which te s of a baby born in a ce ar amid -the sme of fresh b ood, the stench of death-, is an e)ocation of ife and its renewa amid otherwise unendin! sufferin!I

-2 am a midwife. Let me he # the de i)ery,said one of the serious y wounded, who 8ust now was !roanin!. So, in the de#ths of this ! oomy he , a new ife was born. /ut before the i!ht of the dawn the midwife, sti stained with b ood, dies. Let the chi d be born, et the chi d be born, e)en if it means throwin! away one-s own ife. (fter #ub ishin! this #oem 9urihara and her husband were taken to +enera HeadEuarters and interro!ated about the #oem, which was he d to )io ate the #ress code, and the unwritten code sti#u atin! suitab e treatment of the atomic bombin!. N50O One e)ent in #articu ar has come to symbo ize the 4S censorshi# a##roach. (s #art of the 8oint >a#anese scientific and medica sur)ey of Hiroshima and Fa!asaki, the fi m com#any Fi##on Di!a-sha fi med materia for a com#rehensi)e )isua documentation of the effects of the bombin!. 6he fi m was immediate y #rohibited. When the >a#anese scientific sur)ey staff #rotested, the +H: re)ersed its decision, and a owed the fi min! to #roceed. 6hen, in 7ebruary 0?5& when the fi min! of the 0 ,'''-foot Dffects of the (tom /omb (edited from %%,''' feet) was submitted to the 4S authorities, it was des#atched to Washin!ton, to!ether with a known #rints and ne!ati)es. 2n fact, a !rou# of the fi m workers secret y made an unauthorized #rint and hid ten ree s of the fi m, kee#in! its eAistence secret unti the end of the occu#ation. N5;O ?ele&ratin5 t)e ,om& ( sti more #rofound form of distortion, one which was to ha)e a si!nificant effect on Western understandin! of nuc ear war, becomes e)ident if /urchett-s artic e is com#ared with other accounts of Hiroshima and Fa!asaki by ( ied 8ourna ists at the time. 2n the West, the common ima!es of the nuc ear ho ocaust ha)e a ways been essentia y techno o!ica , or more #recise y, without human content. 6he hands of the c ock tickin! towards midni!ht refer to the machine- ike and a##arent y ineAorab e mo)e to the termina eA# osion. 6he most !enera ima!e, the mushroom c oud, is e)en further remo)ed from the earth and the fate of human bein!s. 6he associations of the bi owin!, technico ored eru#tion are with an awesome and #erha#s terrib e #ower but not at a with the human bein!s consumed within it. Sti ess does that ima!e su!!est the res#onsibi ity of the human a!ency in)o )ed - the #ressin! of the button and the decision that it shou d be #ressed. >ust how #otent an effect this remo)a of the human e ement has been on our ima!inin!s of nuc ear war is re)ea ed by com#arin! it to the common ima!es of other twentieth-century horrors of war. 6he 7irst Wor d War #roduced an eAtraordinary set of )isua and written ima!es, but a essentia y human in sca e and im# ication - trenches, barbed wire, bodies in mud. 6he Fazi war on the >ews is remembered in the #o#u ar ima!ination throu!h the concentration cam#, the SS master and inmate-s a)e, !uards and the a most unbe ie)ab e industria ized ki in! of the !as chambers. /ut, howe)er far beyond the eA#erience of the watcher, the ima!es are sti on a human sca e, a direct si!nification of human sufferin!. 6his is not true of our understandin! of Hiroshima and Fa!asaki. 2n #art, this is a matter of censorshi# and su##ression. /ut as a com#arison of /urchett-s account and that of his contem#oraries shows, there was another e)e of distortion in)o )ed. 2n contrast to the #o icy of su##ressin! critica accounts of the effects of the atomic bombin!, -artic es that #ub icized the #ower of the atomic bomb were warm y we comed by +H:K. N5.O What was to become the dominant officia assessment of the nuc ear bombin! was c ear to the >a#anese at the )ery be!innin!. (s some of them wrote aterI ( !rou# of (merican re#orters who )isited Hiroshima on . Se#tember 0?5% eA#ressed satisfaction with the com# ete destruction of the city. (t a #ress conference he d at the #refectura office, a Few Rork 6imes re#orter NW.H. LawrenceO noted the tota de)astation of the city and eAto ed the ob)ious su#eriority of the bomb-s #otentia . Some >a#anese re#orters #resent at this #ress conference raised Euestions from the

stand#oint of the bomb-s )ictims . . . but NLawrenceO refused to answer such Euestions. His concern was so e y with the #ower of the bombI its )ictims interested him on y as #roof of that mi!ht. N55O 6he day /urchett-s -(tomic = a!ue- artic e was #ub ished in the $ai y DA#ress, W.H. Lawrence, with the =enta!on-a##ro)ed #ress team wrote of his )isit to Hiroshima in the Few Rork 6imes. N5%O ( readin! of the on! artic e substantiates the >a#anese re#orters- comments on the #ress conference. Lawrence and his #arty anded at 9ure Fa)a /ase near Hiroshima, and toured the city with a >a#anese na)a sur!eon, s#eakin! occasiona y to witnesses. 6here is no indication that he )isited any hos#ita or medica re ief station. 6he dominant concern of this descri#tion of Hiroshima is the #hysica dama!e which made it -the wor d-s most dama!ed city, worse than Warsaw or Sta in!rad that he d the record for Duro#eK. 6he tour of the rubb e, amid the decay of the remainin! bodies, is inters#ersed with brief co)era!e of the medica situation, but without any of /urchett-s attem#ts to #ortray the situation of the burn and radiation )ictims in the hos#ita s. Lawrence wrote )a!ue y that >a#anese doctors to d us they were he # ess to dea with burns caused by the bomb-s !reat f ash or with the other #hysica ai ments caused by the bomb . . . 6hey to d us that #ersons who had been on y s i!ht y in8ured on the day of the b ast ost B& #er cent of their white b ood cor#usc es, their hair be!an to dro# out, they ost a##etites, )omited b ood and fina y died. NDm#hasis added.O Sur#risin! y for eA#erienced 8ourna ists, the #arty a##arent y made no attem#t to substantiate these dramatic c aims, or to eA#and on them. (stonishin! y, the #resumab y we -briefed 8ourna ists of the officia #arty made no eA# icit reference to the effects of radiation. (s we ha)e a ready seen, Lawrence re#orted the officia refutation of >a#anese sourced c aims of wides#read radiation i ness after his return to 6okyo without referrin! to his own )isit. 2n his re#ort on a )isit to Fa!asaki, a!ain ar!e y concerned with #hysica dama!e, he said, -2 am con)inced that, horrib e as the bomb undoubted y is, the >a#anese are eAa!!eratin! its effects in an effort to win sym#athy for themse )es in an attem#t to make the (merican #eo# e for!et the on! record of co d-b ooded >a#anese bestia ity.- N5&O Dchoin! the emer!in! officia 4S 8ustification for retainin! a mono#o y of nuc ear-wea#ons use, Lawrence went on, -2t shou d be the ast e)idence needed to con)ince any doubter of the need to retain and #erfect our air offense est the fate of Hiroshima or Fa!asaki be re#eated in 2ndiana#o is or Washin!ton or $etroit or Few Rork.Lawrence-s basic attitude, and the one which was to under#in the dominant -officia - meanin! of Hiroshima that came to be constructed, is c ear from his comment on his own fee in!sI -( )isit to Hiroshima is an eA#erience to ea)e one shaken by the terrib e, incredib e si!hts. Here is the fina #roof of what the mechanica and scientific !enius of (merica has been ab e to accom# ish in war.6hree themes had by now emer!ed in officia y sanctioned (merican co)era!e of the nuc ear bombin!. 6he first was that the bombs were a 8ust and necessary contribution to wor d #eace, and that a continued 4S nuc ear mono#o y wou d maintain the #eace. 6he second was that the most im#ortant Eua ity of the bombs to be em#hasized was their #hysica #ower. 7ina y, the human conseEuences were to be conceded so far as was necessary to estab ish the c aim of techno o!ica omni#otence, but were otherwise to be i!nored or su##ressed. 6o!ether these made #ossib e the e imination of any e!itimate #ers#ecti)e other than that of the )ictors and the ce ebration of their #ower. 6he contrast between /urchett-s )iew of the bombin!s and the duty of the 8ourna ist becomes e)en more c ear when /urchett-s writin! on Hiroshima is com#ared with that of another Few Rork 6imes writer, Wi iam L. Laurence (not to be confused with W.H. Lawrence). N51O Seconded from his news#a#er to the *anhattan =ro8ect, Laurence became the officia #ub icist and historian of the first nuc ear wea#ons. (s a science writer he had written on the #ossibi ity of nuc ear wea#ons before the war, and been !i)en the task of eA# ainin! the atomic bomb to the wor d #ub ic, inc udin! writin! the statement with which =resident 6ruman announced the first atomic bombin!. Laurence witnessed the 6rinity test at ( amo!ordo on 0& >u y 0?5%, and accom#anied the 4S(7 %'?th /ombin! +rou# to 6inian ater that month. Listenin! to 6ruman-s announcement on the radio, he wrote of

his #ride as a 8ourna istI -6he wor d-s !reatest story was bein! broadcast, and mine had been the honor, uniEue in the history of 8ourna ism, of #re#arin! the War $e#artment-s officia #ress re ease for wor dwide distribution. Fo !reater honor cou d come to any news#a#erman, or anyone e se for that matter.K N5BO 6wo days ater Laurence f ew in an obser)er # ane in the attack on Fa!asaki, about which he wrote a on! account #ub ished a month ater in the Few Rork 6imes. N5?O 7or Laurence the Fa!asaki # utonium bomb was -a thin! of beauty to beho d, this ,!ad!et,-. /ein! c ose to it and watchin! it as it was bein! fashioned into a i)in! thin!, so eAEuisite y sha#ed that any scu #tor wou d be #roud to ha)e created it, one somehow crossed the border ine between rea ity and non-rea ity and fe t onese f in the #resence of the su#ernatura . "ou d it be that this innocent- ookin! ob8ect, so beautifu y desi!ned, so safe to hand e, cou d in much ess time than it takes to wink an eye annihi ate an entire city and its #o#u ationC >ust as his near-namesake Lawrence had concei)ed of the bombin! as an eA#ression of -the mechanica and scientific !enius of (merica-, Laurence saw the bomb in s#iritua and aesthetic terms that rendered the death y Eua ities of the wea#on somehow in)isib e. 6he aesthetic, mora , #o itica and scientific c aims were interwo)en and mutua y reinforcin!. 2n ima!ery redo ent of a ienated #ower and seAua ity, the resu t V the resu t of the eAEuisite techno o!y that Laurence reco!nizes in his transcendent adoration V is a c oud that i)esI 6he mushroom to# was e)en more a i)e than the #i ar, seethin! and boi in! in a white fury of creamy foam, sizz in! u#ward and then descendin! earthward, a thousand !eysers ro ed into one. 2t ke#t stru!! in! in an e ementa fury, ike a creature in the act of breakin! the bonds that he d it down . . . 2t was as thou!h the deca#itated monster was !rowin! a new head. $eath and res#onsibi ity were banished. 2n the air o)er Fa!asaki, Laurence - a##arent y for the on y time addressed himse f to the mora EuestionI -$oes one fee any #ity or com#assion for the #oor de)i s about to dieC- His answer was resoundin!I -Fot when one thinks of =ear Harbor and of the $eath *arch on /ataan.6his ref eAi)e (merican defence of the s au!hter of the ci)i ians who made u# the tar!et was hy#ocrisy. One mi!ht su##ose that the innocents be ow had #artici#ated in or bore res#onsibi ity for the ear ier e)ents. (s we as estab ishin! the innocence of the bomb, another im#ortant myth was bein! created here, that of the c ean atomI -2 saw the atomic substance Ni.e. # utoniumO before it was # aced inside the bomb. /y itse f it is not dan!erous to hand e.K Laurence returned to ( ama!ordo after the Fa!asaki bombin!, and from there wrote the 0; Se#tember attack on /urchett and the >a#anese-sourced c aims of ar!e numbers of radiation deaths. N%'O 2t is )ery hard to ima!ine a more com# ete contrast between two a##roaches to 8ourna ism than that between /urchett and Laurence. Laurence #ro)ides the archety#e for 3obert Lifton-s study of nuc earism that ate-twentieth-century secu ar re i!ion -in which ,!race, and e)en ,sa )ation, V the mastery of death and e)i V are achie)ed throu!h the #ower of a new techno o!ica deity . . . ca#ab e not on y of death and destruction but a so un imited creation.K N%0O 7or Laurence, the dro##in! of the nuc ear bomb on Hiroshima was a #oint in a secu ar crusade for the new re i!ion. 2n this new muscu ar deism, there was no # ace for the )ictims of the ho ocaustQ on y a transcendent fusion of techno o!y and the #ower that directed it. @3)e Alienation is 3emporary, t)e (umanity .mminent.* /urchett himse f was not innocent of this #redominant y mascu ine worshi# of techno o!y. (s a war corres#ondent in the =acific, he had not eA#ected to sur)i)e the war. Whi e was more radica than most in antici#atin! sym#athetica y the emer!ence of #ost-co onia (sia, /urchett was in some res#ects a ty#ica ma e war corres#ondent. 2n $emocracy with a 6ommy!un, a##arent y written in the ast year of the war (the cha#ter on Hiroshima is -( =ostscri#t-), /urchett describes Le*ay-s 4S (ir 7orce firebombin! of >a#anese cities from Fo)ember

0?55 in ! owin! and admirin! terms. Writin! here of the on!-ran!e bombin! cam#ai!n /urchett #raised the wonder of -(merXican # annin!, #roduction and or!anization-. 6he aircraft in Euestion, the /-;?, e)oked /urchett-s !reatest admiration, as a s#ecifica y (merican achie)ementI -6he Su#erfortress, a#art from bein! ab e to de i)er hea)ier bomb oads farther than any other # ane, is a so the most beautifu aircraft yet #roduced. Smooth y ta#erin! ike an artist-s brush hand e, it rides ike a feathered dart.K N%;O 6his admiration of (merican techno o!y carries o)er into a descri#tion of the 6okyo fire raid of 0' *arch 0?5%I -6he wor d-s !reatest incendiary tar!et had been touched off by the war-s !reatest incendiary raid. Fe)er since the !reat fire of London had there been a conf a!ration as started ear y that Saturday mornin! in the centre of downtown 6okyo, where in the most inf ammab e #ortion of the city, the #o#u ation density eAceeds 0'',''' #eo# e #er sEuare mi e.- N%.O 2n a descri#tion )ery simi ar to that of W.H. Lawrence describin! Hiroshima in statistics, /urchett te s the eAterna s of that a##a in! ni!ht, essentia y from the #ers#ecti)e of the #i ots and aircrew whose i)es and dan!ers he shared. 6hat ni!ht went beyond e)en the horrors of $resden and Hambur!. 6he 4nited States (ir 7orce had de)e o#ed the na#a m bomb es#ecia y for the firin! of >a#anese cities. N%5O 6o test the new incendiaries de)e o#ed for the hi!h y inf ammab e >a#anese cities, the air force bui t a miniature >a#anese city b ock, com# ete with rooms and furniture. ( nearby army firefi!htin! team was then eEui##ed with >a#anese fire eEui#ment and #itted a!ainst the new #roducts. When the new 8e ied #etro eum bomb #roduced a fire that defeated the firefi!hters, the researchers knew they had met the air force-s reEuirements. Se)era hundred /-;?s, carryin! siA tons of na#a m or oi -fi ed incendiaries a#iece, each b anketed an area ;,%'' feet by %'' feet with burnin! !aso ine. N%%O ( factory worker, 6suchikura Hidezo, s#oke of the scenes amon! the 1%',''' #eo# e tra##ed in the wor d-s most crowded urban area when 0'',''' diedI 7ire winds with burnin! #artic es ran u# and down the streets. 2 watched #eo# e, adu ts and chi dren, runnin! for their i)es, dashin! mad y about ike rats. 7 ames ran after them ike i)in! thin!s, strikin! them down. 6hey died by the hundreds in front of me . . . 6he who e s#ectac e with its b indin! i!hts and thunderin! noise reminded me of the #aintin!s of #ur!atory - a rea inferno out of the de#ths of he . N%&O What is strikin!, and to /urchett-s credit, is that as soon as he actua y saw the human resu ts of the work of his comrades of the #ast year, he immediate y res#ondedI in the # ain and decent #rose of his Hiroshima account he described the un#recedented sufferin! before him which amounted to what he ca ed -the watershed in my ife-. /urchett-s re)ersion to a shared humanity #ara e ed that of others who had com# ete y su##orted the war-s aims in the =acific. (n (ustra ian #risoner of war who reached Hiroshima a few days ater wrote of the immediate transformation of his consumin! hatredI -. . . we fe t no sense of either history or trium#h. Our brother man went by cri## ed and burned, and we knew on y shame and !ui t . . . Our hatred for the >a#anese was swe#t away by the enormity of what we had seen.- N%1O (t the heart of war is a #rofound a ienation from the enemy, an a ienation eA#erienced as hatred, fear and a sunderin! of any #ossibi ity of communion or fe ow fee in!. /ut, as *ichae Wa zer has #ut it, -6he a ienation Nof the enemyO is tem#orary, the humanity imminent.- N%BO /urchett and the =OW both eA#erienced what the re i!ious ca the con)ersion of the heart, which makes #ossib e a reconstitution of a shared humanity. 7rom that #osition /urchett wrote his #ro#hetic warnin! from the hos#ita s of Hiroshima. (t the heart of the state is the e!itimation of its ri!ht to )io ence and its ri!ht to demand that the citizen take #art in or!anized )io ence. (s a resu t, states are a ways en!a!ed in a contest of e!itimation with their #eo# es V e!itimation, not of this re!ime rather than that, but e!itimation of the ri!ht of war. Such ri!hts are ne)er who y acce#ted, who ehearted y, by the who e #o#u ation in societies di)ided by seA, c ass, and ethnicity, and the humanity of the enemy is a ways in dan!er of eru#tin! throu!h the statemana!ed artifice of hatred and a ienation. /ut in the twentieth century, e!itimation of the )io ence of the state has become at the same time more contin!ent and more necessary than before. Hiroshima, whi e markin! a turnin! #oint in some ways, is in other res#ects sim# y the cu mination (or more #essimistica y, the owest #oint so far) of a trend towards a oss or restraint o)er the s au!hter of ci)i ians that has marked this century. 6hrou!hout the century, the #ro#ortion of ci)i ians ki ed in wars has

tended to rise as a #ro#ortion of the dead. *ost im#ortant in this trend has been -the terrific !rowth of air warfare, and the swee#in! disre!ard for a humane imitations on bombardment from the air. 6his has #roduced an eAtent of de)astation, and in some #art a de!radation of i)in! conditions, that has not been a##roached since the end of the 6hirty Rears- War.Writin! in 0?5% before the atomic bomb was dro##ed on Hiroshima, Lidde Haft continuedI -2t is the combination of an un imited aim with an un imited method - the ado#tion of a demand for tota surrender to!ether with a strate!y of tota b ockade and bombin! de)astation Xwhich, in this war, has ine)itab y #roduced a dee#enin! dan!er to the re ati)e y sha ow foundations of ci)i ized ife.KN%?O 6he need for e!itimation of this new sta!e of tota warfare !rew from the resistance to unthinkin! - or unfee in! - acEuiescence in what was #a #ab y atrocious, 8ustifiab e, if at a , on y by a ca cu ation of means and ends. 6he (merican 8ustification was, in fact, wide y cha en!ed, both at a #o itica e)e and by the immediate re)u sion fe t by many. (t the time /urchett wrote, #ub ic o#inion was Euite miAed about the nuc ear bombin!, and the (merican 8ustification was by no means uni)ersa y acce#ted. 6he day after the Hiroshima bombin! the Tatican eA#ressed serious concern. N&'O 4S news#a#ers re#orted wides#read Duro#ean concern and dismayI the Few Rork 6imes ran an artic e three days after the bombin! headed -/ritons 3e)o ted by 4se of (tom /omb-. (t home, the Few Rork Sun c aimed that -the entire city is #er)aded by a sense of o##ression. *any fee they wou d ha)e been ha##ier if the ;,''',''','''-do ar eA#eriment had fai ed, or the know ed!e had been thrown in the ri)er ike an unwanted kitten.K N&0O /efore on! an ar!ument emer!ed that a #rinci#a reason for the haste to use the bomb was as a warnin! to the So)iet 4nion, and to end the war before the wartime a y wou d ha)e to be !i)en a ma8or ro e in a =acific sett ement in)o )in! >a#an. 6his was buttressed by the re#ort of the 4nited States Strate!ic /ombin! Sur)ey of >a#an which conc uded that e)en without the nuc ear bombin!, >a#an cou d not ha)e continued the war for more than a few months, and that an in)asion costin! many ( ied i)es wou d not ha)e been necessary. ( that was at stake was the s#eed of )ictory. N&;O 2t was a time of historic decision, if on y the co ecti)e means cou d be found to make it. /urchett sensed it, and wrote his warnin! to the wor d with that aim. 2n this settin!, e!itimation of the atomic bombin! was not at a certain, and since the 4nited States ra#id y decided to bui d its #ost-war ! oba dominance around a nuc ear mono#o y, securin! #ub ic acEuiescence was of #aramount im#ortance. 6he uncensored disco)eries of /urchett about the human effects of the bomb, and #articu ar y the de)astatin! im#act of radiation i ness, needed to be sto##ed and an officia inter#retation rendered secure. *i itary and forei!n #o icy is a ways the east democratic area of state decision. On nuc ear matters the state reso )ed that it wou d to erate no serious #ub ic discussion either of the human im#act of the bomb or of the o#tion of not usin! the bomb. 4S state mana!ers were not sure of the reactions of the (merican #eo# e. (s Fationa Security "ounci $ocument Fo. .' of 0?5B #ut itI 2n this matter, #ub ic o#inion must be reco!nized as a factor of considerab e im#ortance. $e iberation or decision on a sub8ect of this si!nificance, e)en if c ear y affirmati)e, mi!ht ha)e the effect of # acin! before the (merican #eo# e a mora Euestion of )ita si!nificance at a time when the fu security im#act of the Euestion had not become a##arent. 2f this decision is to be made by the (merican #eo# e, it shou d be made in the circumstances of an actua emer!ency when the #rinci#a factors are in the forefront of #ub ic consideration. N&.O =o#u ar in)o )ement in decisions of the nuc ear state was seen as a risk that cou d be taken on y at a time of war fe)er, when the #ossibi ity of a ca m and informed decision cou d be minimized. 6he si ence of Hiroshima is a crucia #art of the nuc ear state-s strate!y of maintainin! the #er#etua a ienation of the enemy. /urchett-s sma but ur!ent )oice from Hiroshima he #ed to render the imminent shared humanity #a #ab e, to this eAtent contributin! to the #ossibi ity of a co ecti)e decision to refuse acEuiescence in the neAt nuc ear war. -One of e)i -s #rinci#a modes of bein!,- says >ohn /er!er, -is ookin! beyond (with indifference) that which is before the eyes.K N&5O D)i , in this sense, is or!anized and orchestrated by state and mass media, but ne)er Euite successfu y. -2n )isitin! Hiroshima-, /urchett ater wrote, 2 fe t that 2 was seein! in the ast hour of WW; what wou d be the fate of hundreds of cities in a WW.. 2f that does not make a 8ourna ist want to sha#e history in the ri!ht direction, what doesC Or shou dCKN&%O

After2or' (u!ust &, ;''%Ori!ina y written for the fortieth anni)ersary of the 4S attack on Hiroshima, Toice and Si ence in the 7irst Fuc ear WarI Wi fred /urchett and Hiroshima was #ub ished a year ater in a on! out of #rint book re)iewin! the ife of the (ustra ian 8ourna ist Wi fred /urchett. N&&O 6wenty years after writin! Toice and Si ence what strikes me is its continued sa ience. 6he threat of nuc ear war is if anythin! !reater now than at the hei!ht of the 3ea!an years, with the dan!ers comin! from mu ti# e sourcesI Y 6he number of nuc ear-armed states has increased shar# y, by and ar!e with acEuiescence if not co usion of the so e remainin! su#er#ower. Y 6he risks of nuc ear terrorism by non-state actors ha)e eA#anded !reat y, and shou d not be i!nored by those accustomed to concerns about nuc ear-armed states. Y 6he structura characteristics of the new nuc ear wor d are e)en more dan!erous than before. 6he "o d War was at root a bi atera nuc ear contest, c ose y ana ysed by !ame theorists seekin! Lrationa so utionsM to the =risonersK $i emma, which ay on y in hei!htened trust and communication between the o##osin! sides. 2n !ame theory terms outside that co d war conteAt, when the number of effecti)e # ayers rises abo)e nZ;, strate!ic stabi ity, deterrence, b uffin! and war a)oidance a become #rob ematic, resu tin! in eAtreme uncertainty. N&1O Y 2n an effort to o)ercome restrictions on the use of nuc ear wea#ons arisin! from both mora concerns about !enocide and #ractica mi itary concerns about the counter-#roducti)e conseEuences of such use, the 4nited States has been #ressin! ahead with the de)e o#ment of new ty#es of nuc ear wea#ons, such as Lbunker-busterM tactica nuc ear wea#ons. Y =ressure for disarmament within !o)ernments and in ! oba ci)i society has ebbed. Dar y #ost-"o d War commitments to dismant e eAistin! nuc ear wea#ons ha)e been set aside. *ore im#ortant y sti , the actions of successi)e 4S administrations ha)e a most ho#e ess y com#romised the core internationa e!a #o itica restraints on nuc ear #ro iferationI the Fon-=ro iferation 6reaty and the "om#rehensi)e 6est /an 6reaty. Y 6he #sycho-cu tura state of nuc ear terror endured by the #o#u ations of the nuc ear-wea#ons countries that was a crucia #art of the structures that maintained the "o d War has been effecti)e y re-constituted V on a much wider sca e in the conteAt of ! oba ization V throu!h the disab in! conseEuences of the #ost ?.00 motif of terrorism. N&BO Y 6he wor dwide #eace mo)ements s#arked by the nuc ear esca ation of the 3ea!an years ha)e a but disa##eared, with itt e effecti)e #ub ic restraint on the actions of the nuc ear states, des#ite e)erythin! that is known about the in)asion and occu#ation of 2raE. 6hese sources of dan!er intersect with others such as the hi!h e)e of irrationa ity and ideo o!ica moti)ation of decision-makin! in the /ush administration, and the intertwinin! of the nuc ear threat to security with other #rob ems of !enuine y ! oba sca e such as c imate chan!e, threats to biodi)ersity, and the contradictory conseEuences of market-dri)en ! oba ization. 6he com# eAity of these threats, combined with their ! oba rather than sim# e nationa character makes the task of bui din! socia mo)ements for #eace and sustainabi ity both more difficu t and more ur!ent than a Euarter of a century a!o. A3)e Atomic +la5ueB! t)e in'u&ita&le ac)ie9ement /urchettKs Se#tember &th $ai y DA#ress artic e was the first eyewitness #ub ished account. Ret the im#ortance of /urchettKs artic e was not 8ust the fact that he was the first to write from the site of the ho ocaust, but a so what he wrote about V and what his co ea!ues embedded in the 4.S. Occu#ation #ress cor#s did notI the human conseEuences of the techno o!y he had hitherto admired uncritica y. 6his is

c ear from the head ine to his $ai y DA#ress artic eI L.'th $ay in HiroshimaI 6hose who esca#ed be!in to die, )ictims of 6HD (6O*2" =L(+4DI -2 Write this as a Warnin! to the Wor d-M. 2n res#onse, 4.S. occu#ation forces and the 4.S. $efence $e#artment denied his c aims of radiation #oisonin!, brandin! him a )ictim of >a#anese #ro#a!anda, and commenced the decades- on! 4S !o)ernment censorshi# of the fu effects of the bombin!. /urchett was no saint, nor did he aim for LdetachmentM. His account of the human effects of the Hiroshima bombin!, stands as the one indubitab e achie)ement in a on! and contro)ersia workin! ife, durin! which he was banned from his own country, abe ed traitor and worse. N&?O "har!es that /urchett #artici#ated in Forth 9orean and "hinese brainwashin! of 4S and a ied #risoners of war #ursued him unti his death in 0?B.. 6he most carefu study of those c aims, by +a)an *c"ormack, refutes them, conc udin! When a the fa se, !arb ed and ma icious stories of his acti)ities in 9orea are discounted, what remains is the #ortrait of an honest man who tried to te the truth, who was a most a one in seein! the war #rimari y from the #oint of )iew of the sufferin! 9orean #eo# e rather than that of the S+reat =owersK or his own or any other !o)ernment. N1'O (t the hei!ht of the Tietnam War, /urchett accom#anied a Fationa Liberation 7orce unit into South Tietnam, re#ortin! the ife of the !uerri a resistance V for which he was merci ess y #i oried in the mainstream media. Whi e /urchettKs coura!e in re#ortin! from the FL7 side was ne)er in doubt, e)en eadin! #eace mo)ement acti)ists of the time were concerned about the re iabi ity of his re#ortin!. $a)id *arrKs on! and carefu assessment of /urchettKs Euarter century of writin! about Tietnam from the #eace ta ks of 0?%5 onwards to the ate 0?1's confirms the f aws as we as )irtuesI $id /urchett te the truth about TietnamC 6he record is more miAed. He certain y worked hard to di! out the facts, or!anize them and #resent them forcefu y to readers. On the other hand, he sometimes de iberate y eft out e)idence, and he wi fu y distorted e)idence #resented by the Sother sideK. N10O 6oday, re!ard ess of the fina assessment of /urchettKs re#ortin! of Tietnam, the Euestion that comes immediate y to mind is why so few of his co ea!ues V of whate)er #o itica stri#e - took the same chance to re#ort the other side. Lookin! at the #attern of com# aisant contem#orary re#ortin! in a new a!e of destructi)e im#eria o)er-reach, the same Euestion arises e)en more forcefu y. 6he contrast between the work of 3obert 7isk, $ahr >amai , >ohn *artinkus and other inde#endent 8ourna ists on the one hand, and that of their co ea!ues embedded in the +reen Uone of /a!hdad makes the same #oint V unbearab y, a most dai y. N1;O 6he ro e of 8ourna ists was, and remains, as /urchett maintained, centra to this te in! and re-te in! of history. /urchett was #i oried. 6he Few Rork 6imesK Wi iam L. Laurence, who denied his eAtensi)e know ed!e of the radiation effects of the bomb when he wi in! y ed the char!e to deny /urchettKs c aims, went on to win a =u itzer =rize. N1.O %eco9erin5 )istorical memory 2n his book Shadows of Hiroshima, /urchett amented the oss of the series of on! re#orts from Fa!asaki fi ed to the "hica!o $ai y Fews by his friend +eor!e We er. Like /urchett, We er had 8um#ed off the officia cara)an of embedded 8ourna ists in Rokohama, and headed south a one to Fa!asaki. 4n ike /urchett We er submitted his co#y to the +H: censors, who b ocked it, and it was ne)er seen a!ain. /ut 8ust recent y, a on! ost carbon co#y of the re#orts wrote from Fa!asaki was disco)ered by We erKs son, and the first of the re#orts was fina y #ub ished. N15O Since Toice and Si ence was written, it has come to i!ht that 4S authorities su##ressed not on y the >a#anese foota!e of Hiroshima and Fa!asaki discussed there, but a so e)en more foota!e, in co our, fi med by a 4S mi itary fi m unit. N1%O Since this essay was written historians in the 4S and >a#an and e sewhere ha)e !reat y eA#anded our know ed!e of the wider #attern of re#ortin! about Hiroshima and the 4S censorshi# cam#ai!n. :uestions about the re ationshi# between history and memory that #reoccu#ied me in the ast #art of Toice and

Si ence twenty years a!o ha)e now come to centre sta!e in the com# eA and #owerfu work of (merican historians of the =acific War and of >a#an. N1&O ,orn of t)e conCuerors 6here is a fina im#ortance to be discerned in 6he (tomic = a!ue. 2t is a #roduct of )ictory, written by an (ustra ian who had f own as a comrade with the youn! (merican crews of the /-;?s as they incinerated hundreds of thousands in the cities of >a#an in the s#rin! of 0?5%. $es#ite its focus on the human conseEuences of the techno o!y and mi itary or!anization /urchett had hitherto admired uncritica y, its author was not >a#anese, was not o##osed to the war effort, and was not V at that time - hosti e to the 4nited States. 6his se#arates /urchettKs act of witness from most >a#anese accounts, contem#orary and otherwise, inc udin! that of many officia >a#anese acts of remembrance. *any of these, es#ecia y the )oices of officia >a#an, stress the undoubted si!nificance of humanity as a who e, mora y and #o itica y, but in a way that truncates the s#ecifica y >a#anese story of Hiroshima and Fa!asaki, makin! a story that starts ear y one hot summer mornin! in 0?5%. Fotorious y, the Hiroshima =eace =ark, site of the annua nationa commemoration attended by e)ery #ost-war #rime minister, for many years continued the work of the war by erasin! memory of the many 9orean hibakusha who died in the city. (t its worst, Hiroshima becomes a symbo not of a uni)ersa ca#acity for sufferin! and a ca to abandon war, but a bad!e of a s#ecifica y >a#anese )ictim status. When 9urihara Sadako died in *arch ;''%, a!ed ?;, it was her 8ust y famous 0?5& #oem, -Let the "hi d be /orn- that was wide y re#roduced in >a#an. Ret in her ater #oems ike LHiroshima and the Dm#erorKs Few " othesM and most famous y LWhen we say SHiroshimaKM 9urihara tar!eted the hy#ocrisy of this officia >a#anese )a orizin! of >a#an-s #osition as )ictim. When we say ,Hiroshima,, do #eo# e answer, !ent y, S(h, -HiroshimaKCM ... Say ,Hiroshima,, and hear ,=ear Harbor.M Say ,Hiroshima,, and hear ,3a#e of Fan8in!., Say ,Hiroshima,, and hear women and chi dren in *ani a thrown into trenches, doused with !aso ine, and burned a i)e. Say ,Hiroshima,, and hear echoes of b ood and fire. (h, -Hiroshima-, we first must wash the b ood off our own hands. N11O 9urihara reminded her >a#anese #ost-war audience that witness to e)ents of transhistorica human si!nificance is a ways conducted by women and men standin! in history at #articu ar # aces. (n authentic V or at east a decent y com# ete V >a#anese account cannot be!in on that summer mornin!. One of the )irtues of L6he (tomic = a!ueM was that it was written for the )ictors by one of its best war corres#ondents, writin! a most direct y from the worst his ci)i ization cou d do ri!ht before his eyes. 9urihara is ri!ht, that the >a#anese of her !eneration shou d not a)ert their eyes from the e)ents in which, dictatorshi# or not, they were to )aryin! de!rees com# icit. /urchett, writin! from the )ictors for the )ictors, is demandin! that they face what had been done in their name. 6hat story had to start in Hiroshima, the other side of )ictory. 6oday, for (mericans and their a ies of the =acific War (reborn ha f a century ater as the "oa ition of the Wi in!) it is sti difficu t to face the fact that the =acific War came to an end with an un#recedented act of mass terror, a crime ne)er before committed. So far as it is human y #ossib e to make such 8ud!ments, Hiroshima, to!ether with Fa!asaki and the firebombin!s that #receded them, rendered the sca es of atrocity eEua y hea)y on both sides.

6he dee# y entrenched trium#ha ism of the )ictorsK subseEuent #o itica cu tures endures to this day, maskin! and fosterin! the #atho o!ies that #oison the dee# structure of re ations between >a#an and the 4.S., and he #in! in turn to shie d the 4nited States from se f-doubt in its on!oin! im#eria )entures. One istens in )ain to unendin! demands from (merican and (ustra ian #o iticians for fu >a#anese a#o o!y for the =acific War waitin! in )ain for the other shoe to dro#. (s with a such su##ressed #atho o!ies, there is a terrib e #sycho o!ica V and #o itica V #rice to be #aid with the return of the re#ressed. D>ne of e9ilDs principal mo'es of &ein5* ( of this work confirms the rea ity of the su##ression of the historica record that /urchett V unwittin! y V documented for the first time, the com# eAity of trauma on the side of the nuc ear )ictors as much as the defeated. /urchettKs achie)ement confirms the continuin! sa ience - now as much as twenty years a!o V of >ohn /er!erKs comment on our com# icity in e)i , then and nowI -One of e)i -s #rinci#a modes of bein!,says >ohn /er!er, -is ookin! beyond (with indifference) that which is before the eyes.K N1BO [[[[[[ 4otes H 6he ori!ina )ersion of this essay was first #ub ished in /en 9iernan (ed.), /urchett 3e#ortin! the Other Side of the Wor d 0?.?-0?B., :uartet, London, 0?B&. 6hat )ersion has not been chan!ed eAce#t to remo)e obscurities and infe icities of eA#ression. 2n the (fterword 2 note se)era im#ortant subseEuent de)e o#ments in our know ed!e of the e)ents dea t with here, es#ecia y concernin! the 4.S. censorshi# of the radiation effects of the bombin!. >oe 9o)e , +a)an *c"ormack and /e inda =robert were #articu ar y he #fu in commentin! on the ori!ina )ersion, and 2 am !ratefu to *ark Se den for carefu and #roducti)e editin! of this )ersion. 0. Letter to $a)id +our ay, ? >u y 0?B'. ;. Shadows of Hiroshima, Terso, London, 0?B., ##.B-?. .. /urchett to d the story of how he !ot to Hiroshima a number of times in #ub ished form. 6he first is in -HiroshimaI ( =ostscri#t- in his $emocracy with a 6ommy!un (7.W. "heshire, *e bourne, 0?5&)Q a!ain in his autobio!ra#hies =ass#ort (Fe son, *e bourne, 0?&?) and (t the /arricades (0?B')Q and fina y in Shadows of Hiroshima (Terso, London, 0?B.). 6he story of /urchett-s tri# to Hiroshima and back as to d here is drawn from a three. 5. One other 8ourna ist a so broke throu!h officia restrictions at the time and reached Fa!asaki. +eor!e We er of the "hica!o $ai y Fews a)oided mi itary #ub ic re ations -hawks- and reached Fa!asaki by subterfu!e on & Se#tember. 6he ;%,'''-word artic e he wrote on the basis of inter)iews with witnesses and medica workers was much more detai ed than /urchett-s. -(s a oya , disci# ined member of the #ress cor#s, 2 sent the materia to *ac(rthur-s #ress headEuarters for c earance and transmission . . . 6he #a#er . . . recei)ed nothin!. *ac(rthur had ,ki ed, the ot.K (cited in (t the /arricades, #.0 &.) %. 7or the we -founded fears of the Dm#eror-s circ e see =acific War 3esearch Society, >a#an-s Lon!est $ay, 9odansha 2nternationa , 6okyo, 0?B'. &. =ass#ort, #.0&1. /urchett ater Euotes one of the remainin! doctors as sayin! that they knew they were not dea in! with an infection, but that use of these masks #ro)ided some comfort in the face of an otherwise incom#rehensib e eA#erience. 1. "ommittee for the "om#i ation of *ateria s on $ama!e "aused by the (tomic /ombs in Hiroshima and Fa!asaki, Hiroshima and Fa!asakiI the =hysica *edica and Socia Dffects of the (tomic /ombin!s, Hutchinson, London, 0?B0, #.%0&. B. 2bid., #.%0?. ?. 2bid., ##.0.'ff. 0'. 6he #iece that was #ub ished in the $ai y DA#ress on & Se#tember 0?5% was s i!ht y a tered by an editor who thou!ht -#oor =eter N/urchettO- had been o)ercome by the si!hts of the inferno, and who inserted some !ratuitous #ara!ra#hs from the Science Dditor. 6he artic e is re#rinted in Shadows and in Harry +ordon (ed.), 6he Dyewitness History of (ustra ia, "urrey O-Fei , *e bourne, 0?B0, ##. .&0-;. 00. Shadows, #. 5 . 0;. =ass#ort, #.01.. 0.. Hiroshima and Fa!asaki, o#.cit., #.0%. 05. =ass#ort, #. 1;. 2n the )arious #ub ished )ersions of the story, /urchett re#eated y acknow ed!ed the su##ort he recei)ed from se)era of the )eteran war corres#ondents in the officia #arty who #rotested at

this un#rofessiona beha)iour. 0%. =ass#ort, ##.015-%. ( contem#orary account of /urchett-s =OW-cam# eA# oits by >im Tine was #ub ished in the /risbane "ourier-*ai , 00 Se#tember 0?5%, and re#rinted in +ordon, o#.cit., #..&5. /urchett must ha)e been the source. /urchett mentions encounters in the 9yoto-6suru!a area and 9obeOsaka. Tine # aces the iberated cam#s as two on the west coast of Honshu and three on the 2n and Sea. 0&. Shadows, ##.;;-.. 01. D)en as ate as 0?1' /urchett sti acce#ted that initia eA# anation (=ass#ort, #.01&). =resumab y his reassessment of the #robab e ink between his own ow white-b ood. ce count and his eA#osure to residua radiation in Hiroshima be!an when he returned to Hiroshima for the first time a year ater. 0B. Shadows, #.?. 0?. 7arre is re#orted in an artic e in the Few Rork 6imes, 0. Se#tember 0?5%, #5 by W.H. Lawrence and date ined 6okyoQ +ro)es-s statement is re#orted by Wi iam L. Laurence in the FR6, 0; Se#tember 0?5%, ##. 0,5 in an artic e, date ined Few *eAico, ? Se#tember, de ayed. ;'. Laurence, ibid. ;0. Hiroshima and Fa!asaki. #.%'5. ;;. 2bid., ##. 1.-?. ;.. 2bid. ;5. 2bid., #.;5.. ;%. 2bid., #.;1'. ;&. Few Rork 6imes, 1 Se#tember 0?5%, #.1. ;1. Hiroshima and Fa!asaki. o#.cit., #.&0&. ;B. 2bid., #. %0. ;?. 2bid., ##. %;-. .'. Few Rork 6imes, % Se#tember 0?5%, cited in Shadows, o#.cit., #.;.. .0. *ar ene >. *ayo, -"i)i "ensorshi# and *edia "ontro in Dar y Occu#ied >a#anI 7rom *inimum to Strin!ent Sur)ei ance-, 3obert Wo fe (ed.), (mericans as =roconsu sI 4nited States *i itary +o)ernment in +ermany and >a#an, 0?55-0?%;, Southern 2 inois 4ni)ersity =ress, "arbonda e, 0?B5, ##.;?;-.. *ayo-s im#ortant new study of 4S censorshi# #o icy is based on dec assified 4S officia documents. Howe)er, she de)otes no attention to the Euestion of censorshi# of the effects of the atomic bombin!. .;. 6oshio Fishi, 4nconditiona $emocracyI Dducation and =o itics in Occu#ied >a#an, 0?5%-0?%;, Hoo)er 2nstitution =ress, Stanford, 0?B;, ##.B&-1. ... Few Rork 6imes, 0B Se#tember 0?5%. .5. Fishi, o#.cit., #.B1. .%. 2bid., #.BB. .&. *ayo, o#.cit., #.;?5 .1. Fishi, o#.cit., ##.BB-?. .B. 2bid., #.0'0. .?. 2bid., #.0';. 3obert >. Lifton, $eath in LifeI the Sur)i)ors of Hiroshima, Weidenfe d and Ficho son. London, 0?&B, #..;?. 5'. Lifton, o#.cit. 50. 7or the story of the #oem (trans ated by +a)an *c"ormack) and its fu teAt see 3okuro Hidaka, 6he =rice of (ff uenceI $i emmas of "ontem#orary >a#an, =en!uin (ustra ia. 3in!wood, 0?B%, ##..'-0. See a so Lifton. o#.cit. #..;?. Hidaka re#orts 9uriharaKs subseEuent critica ref ections on the meanin! of Hiroshima for >a#an. 5;. Hiroshima and Fa!asaki, o#.cit., #.%0'Q Fishi, o#.cit., #.0';. 6he fi m was e)entua y returned in 0?&1 after a >a#anese cam#ai!n, but e)en then cou d not be seen by the >a#anese #ub ic, or the )ictimsI -6he *inistry of Dducation howe)er, did not fu y re ease the fi m to the #ub ic. reasonin! that much of it wou d )io ate the #ri)acy of those #eo# e who had been eA#osed to the bombs and that it contained too many crue scenes.- 2bid. 5.. Hiroshima and Fa!asaki, o#.cit., #.05. 55. 2bid., #. %. 5%. -Tisit to Hiroshima =ro)es 2t Wor d-s *ost $ama!ed "ity-, Few Rork 6imes, % Se#tember 0?5%, ##.0,5. 5&. -(tom /omb 9i ed Fa!asaki "a#ti)es-. Few Rork 6imes, 0' Se#tember 0?5%, ##.0,%. 51. /urchett V and the chronic ers of Hiroshima and Fa!asaki V confuse the two Few Rork 6imes re#orters, W.H. Lawrence, the war corres#ondent in Hiroshima the same day as /urchett, and W.L. Laurence, the *anhattan =ro8ect #ub icist. 2n one #assa!e, /urchett tries to work out how and why LaurenceGLawrence took so on! to #ub ish his Hiroshima account after )isitin! Hiroshima the same day as /urchett (Lawrence-s re#ort was in fact #ub ished the day before /urchett-s), and why he mo)ed

backwards and forwards across the =acific. 6hat /urchett has confused the two is c ear from ##.0B-0? of Shadows, where the author of the Few Rork 6imes artic e -Fo radioacti)ity in Hiroshima ruin-, date ined -6okyo, 0. Se#t.- is !i)en as W.H. Laurence (in the ori!ina 6imes by- ine, W.H. Lawrence). 6he author of the artic e -4S (tom /omb Site /e ies 6okyo 6a es-, date ined -(tom /omb 3an!e. Few *eAico, Se#t. ?- is correct y !i)en as Wi iam L. Laurence. 6he chronic ers of Hiroshima and Fa!asaki a so note the #resence at a #ress conference in Hiroshima on . Se#tember 0?5% of -W.L. Laurence- rather than W.H. Lawrence, (#.0%). 6o make matters worse, 3obert Lifton-s discussion of W.L. Laurence and nuc earism refers to -Wi iam L. Lawrence-. 5B. Wi iam L. Laurence, $awn O)er Uero, ( fred 9no#fI Few Rork, 0?51, #.;;5. 5?. -(tomic /ombin! of Fa!asaki 6o d by 7 i!ht *ember-, Few Rork 6imes, (? (u!. de ayed). ? Se#tember 0?5%. ##.0, .%. 6he same materia was ater inc uded in $awn O)er Uero. %'. -4S (tom /omb Site /e ies 6okyo 6a es-, Few Rork 6imes, 0; Se#tember 0?5%, ##.0, 5. %0. 6he /roken "onnection, 6ouchstone, Few Rork, 0?B', ##..10-&. %;. $emocracy with a 6ommy!un, #.;.B. %..2bid., #.;5;. %5. +ene +urney, -6he +iant =ays 2ts Way-, in >ames 7. Sunderman (ed.), Wor d War in the (irI 6he =acific, Watts, Few Rork, 0?&;. #.;5?. %%. 2bid., #.;%BQ see a so, Wes ey 7rank "a)en and >ames Lea "ate (eds.), 6he (rmy (ir 7orces in Wor d War ;. To ume % - 6he =acificI *atterhorn to Fa!asaki, 4ni)ersity of "hica!o =ress, "hica!o and London, 0?%.. %&. "ited in >ohn "oste o, 6he =acific War, 3awson, Few Rork, 0?B0, #.%%0. %1. 9enneth Harrison, 3oad to Hiroshima, 3i!by, (de aide, 0?B., ##.0%, ;&1. %B. *ichae Wa zer, >ust and 4n8ust WarsI an (r!ument with Historica 2 ustrations, =en!uin, Harmondsworth, 0?B', #.05;. %?. /.H. Lidde Hart, 6he 3e)o ution in Warfare, 7aber and 7aber, London, 0?5&, ##. &1, 15. &'. Few Rork 6imes, B (u!ust 0?5%, #.0. &0. 3e#orted in -7ears of ,(tomic, Wars in 4S-, Hera d, *e bourne, ? (u!ust 0?5%, #.;. &;. See, for eAam# e, =.*.S. / ackett, 7ear, War and the /omb, *c+raw-Hi , Few Rork, 0?5?. 2n one of " io-s itt e ironies, the eader of the bombin! sur)ey in >a#an, was =au Fitze, a eadin! nuc ear ad)ocate for the "ommittee on the =resent $an!er forty years ater. &.. "ited by =eter =rin! e and Wi iam (rkin in S O=I Fuc ear War from the 2nside, S#here, London, 0?B., #.;B. &5. >ohn /er!er, -Hiroshima - a #ortrait of e)i -, Few Society, & (u!ust 0?B0, #.;;;. &%. Wi fred /urchett, etter to $a)id +our ay, ? >u y 0?B'.Fotes to (fterword &&. /en 9iernan (ed.), /urchettI 3e#ortin! the Other Side of the Wor d 0?.?-0?B., :uartet, London, 0?B&. &1. See =au /racken, L6he Second Fuc ear (!eI How *uch Has "han!ed, How *uch 3emains the SameCM (;'';), Fauti us 2nstitute + oba Scenarios Worksho# ;''5I Who Wi Sto# Fuc ear FeAt 4se, (#ri ;1-;B, ;''5. htt#IGGwww.nauti us.or! G!#sGscenariosG#a#er.htm , and =atrick *or!an, $eterrence Fow, "ambrid!e 4.=., ;''.. &B. See >oe 9o)e , (!ainst the State of Fuc ear 6error, Southend =ress, 0?B5. &?. Our know ed!e of /urchettKs ife and work wi be !reat y enriched by to soon-to-be #ub ished works. 6om HeenanKs critica bio!ra#hy, ori!ina y a *onash 4ni)ersity History $e#artment =h$, 6he Life of Wi fred /urchett, is to be #ub ished by *e bourne 4ni)ersity =ress. (nd a conso idated and definiti)e edition of /urchettKs )arious memoirs edited by his son, +eor!e /urchett, and Fick Shimmin, as *emoirs of a 3ebe >ourna istI 6he (utobio!ra#hy of Wi fred /urchett (B&' ##.) is due from 4ni)ersity of Few South Wa es =ress in October ;''%.. 1'. +a)an *c"ormack, L9oreaI /urchettKs 6hirty yearsK WarM, in 9iernan, /urchett, o#.cit. #.;'%. 10. $a)id +. *arr, L/urchett on TietnamM, in 9iernan, /urchett, o#.cit. ##.;.%-&. 1;. L6om!ramI $ahr >amai on i)in! in two wor dsMQ and >ohn *artinkus, 6ra)e s 2n (merican 2raE, (/ ack 2nc., *e bourne, ;''5). htt#IGGwww.tomdis#atch.com GindeA.mhtm C#idZ;&0? 1.. See +re! *itche and 3obert >. Lifton, Hiroshima in (mericaI 7ifty Rears of $enia , =utnam, 0??%, and the demand by (my +oodman and $a)id +oodman to rescind LaurenceKs =u itzerI LHiroshima "o)er-u#I How the War $e#artment-s 6imesman Won a =u itzerM, "ommon $reams Fews "enter, (u!ust 0', ;''%, htt#IGGwww.commondreams.or!G)iews'5G'B0'-'0.htm. 15. We erKs much on!er account confirms /urchettKs im#ressions, referrin! to the effects of radiation as L$isease @M. 6he first of We erKs re#orts is #ub ished in Dn! ish by the *ainichi $ai y Fews, >une ;?, ;''%, at htt#IGGwww.editorand#ub isher.comGeand#GsearchGartic e[dis# ay.8s#C)nu[content[idZ0'''?&.5.?. 7or

two detai ed accounts see +re! *itche , LS=D"2(L 3D=O36I ( +reat Fuc ear-(!e *ystery So )edM, Dditor and =ub isher, >une 0&, ;''%, htt#IGGwww.editorand#ub isher.comGeand#GsearchGartic e[dis# ay.8s#C )nu[content[idZ0'''?&.5.? and *ark Se den, ,Fa!asaki 0?5%I Whi e 2nde#endents were Scorned, Dmbed Won =u itzer, >a#an 7ocus, >u y 1, ;''%. htt#IGG8a#anfocus.or!Gartic e.as#C idZ.;% 1%. +re! *itche , LS=D"2(L 3D=O36I Hiroshima 7i m "o)er-4# DA#osedM, Dditor and =ub isher, (u!ust ., ;''%. htt#IGGwww.editorand#ub isher.comGeand#GnewsGartic e[dis# ay.8s#C)nu[content[idZ0''0''0%B.. 1&. See *itche and Lifton, o#.cit.Q *ichae Ho!an, ed., Hiroshima in History and *emory. "ambrid!e 4.=., 0??&Q >ohn $ower, War Without *ercyI 3ace and =ower in the =acific War, =antheonQ Laura Hein and *ark Se den, eds., Li)in! With the /ombI (merican and >a#anese "u tura "onf icts in the Fuc ear (!e, *.D. Shar#e, 0??1. 6he Fuc ear Dducation =ro8ect by =eter 9uznick and *ark Se den on >a#an 7ocus #ro)ides a com#rehensi)e istin! of re e)ant studies in Dn! ishI htt#IGG8a#anfocus.or!Gcate!ory.as#CidZ&&. 11. 6rans ated by 3ichard *inear in Sadako 9urihara, When We Say HiroshimaI Se ected =oems, *ichi!an *ono!ra#h in >a#anese Studies ;., 4ni)ersity of *ichi!an =ress, 0??B. See a so his trans ation of LHiroshima and the Dm#erorKs Few " othesM in his L9urihara Sadako, 0?0. V ;''%M, >a#an 7ocus, *arch 0%, ;''%. htt#IGG8a#anfocus.or!Gartic e.as#CidZ;.1 1B. >ohn /er!er, -Hiroshima - a #ortrait of e)i -, Few Society, & (u!ust 0?B0, #.;;;. 3ichard 6anter is Senior 3esearch (ssociate at the Fauti us 2nstitute for Security and Sustainabi ity (www.nauti us.or!). His book *asters of 6errorI 2ndonesia-s *i itary and Tio ence in Dast 6imor in 0??? (eA#anded and u#dated edition) is in #ress. He wrote this artic e for >a#an 7ocus. =osted (u!ust 00, ;''%.

Source: htt :NN8a anfocus6orgN4!ichard4TanterN$?TT