The 2003 District Council Elections in Hong Kong Author(s): Joseph Y. S. Cheng Source: Asian Survey, Vol.

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THE2003 DISTRICT COUNCIL IN ELECTIONS HONGKONG

Joseph Y. S. Cheng

Abstract
After a massive July 1, 2003, protest rally,Hong Kong people voted in local elections to again express their demand for democratization.The electoral victoryand the prospect of winningin the LegislativeCouncilelections in September 2004 symbolize the revival of the pro-democracy movement.' The expectations also generate considerable pressure on the Beijingauthorities, who could not accept a scenario in which China lost controlof Hong Kong.

Introduction
District Council elections, like local elections in most are normallynot very exciting or significantin Hong Kong. However, countries, in the wake of the massive rally on July 1, 2003, in which more thanhalf a million people marchedin the streetsto protestlegislationon Article 23 of the territory's Basic Law concerningsubversion,theft of state secrets, etc.-legislation perceivedto have a significantpotentialadverseimpacton Hong Kong people's freedoms-the 2003 District Council elections have attractedconsiderable attention from the Chinese leadershipand the international media.
Joseph Y. S. Cheng is Professor and Chair of Political Science and China ResearchProject, City University of Hong Kong. Coordinator the Contemporary of 1. The Chinese authoritiessubsequentlytried hard to prevent the pro-democracymovement from winning half the seats of the legislature. In the Legislative Council elections in September 2004, pro-democracycandidateswon slightly over 60% of the popularvote in the direct elections, in the context of a recordvoter turnoutrate, on a platformof demandinguniversal suffrage for the elections of the Chief Executive in 2007 and the entire legislature in 2008. However, because of the design of the electoral arrangements (only 30 seats out of 60 were up for direct election) and some tactical errors,the pro-democracycamp won only 25 seats, which was a relief to the Hong Kong governmentand the Chinese authorities.For analyses of the Legislative Council elections, see all majornewspapersin Hong Kong on September 13-14, 2004. Asian Survey,Vol. 44, Issue 5, pp. 734-754, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. C 2004 by The Regents of the Universityof California.All rightsreserved.Please directall requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press's Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.

734

JOSEPH Y. S. CHENG

735

TABLE

1 Composition of Eighteen District Councils in Hong Kong, 2004-2007 Number Numberof of Elected Candidates* Members 30 (2) 23 (1) 71(9) 33 (6) 40 (2) 45 (3) 53 (0) 52 (6) 70 (7) 37 (2) 59 (6) 63 (6) 33 (2) 41 (2) 41 (4) 68 (9) 61 (5) 15 11 37 17 16 21 22 25 34 17 29 29 16 19 20 36 28 Total Numberof Numberof Membership Appointed Ex-officio of District Members Members Council 4 3 9 4 4 5 5 6 8 5 7 7 5 5 5 9 7 2 1 6 4 2 2 1 1 19 14 46 21 20 26 27 31 42 24 37 42 25 26 27 46 36

Name of District Council Centraland Western WanChai Eastern Southern YauTsim Mong Sham Shui Po Kowloon City Wong Tai Sin KwunTong TsuenWan TuenMun Yuen Long North Tai Po Sai Kung Sha Tin Kwai Tsing

Island
Total

17(2)

8
400

4
102

8
27

20
529

SOURCE: HKSARG, <http://www.elections.gov.hk/elections/dc2003/tc-chi/dcb/dcb.html>. * Numbers parentheses who of the in indicate number candidates wereelectedunopposed.

Hong Kong is divided into 18 districts, and each is served by a District Council. The council is mainly a consultative organ, and it advises the Hong Kong Special AdministrativeRegion Government(HKSARG) on the following: (a) mattersaffectingthe well-being of people in the district;(b) the provision and use of public facilities and services within the district; (c) the adequacy and prioritiesof governmentprogramsfor the district;and (d) the use of public funds allocated to the districtfor local public works and community activities. Each District Council is also given limited funding to engage in: (a) environmental improvements; (b) the promotion of recreational and cultural activities; and (c) community activities. A District Council is composed of elected members, appointedmembers, and in the case of District Councils in ruralarof eas, the chairpersons RuralCommittees as ex officio members (see Table 1).

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ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIV, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER

TABLE 2 Numberof Candidates Who Were Full-time Politicians in the District CouncilElections in 1999 and 2003

PoliticalParty Democratic Party Democratic AlliancefortheBetterment HongKong of for and HongKongAssociation Democracy People's
Livelihood

2003 65 (54%)* 106(51%)

22(59%)

1999 50 (29%) 58 (33%)

13(41%)

Liberal Party TheFrontier

6 (26%) 9 (69%)

5 (11%) 3 (33%)

IvanChoyChi-keung, SOURCE: for has "Canzheng Zhuanye" Yicheng (Running elections been 20, professionalized), Pao (HongKong),October 2003. Ming * Figures parentheses in showthe percentage full-time of of politicians amongthe totalnumber from candidates a political party.

Although District Councils have no concrete powers, District Council seats are important politicalpartiesin many ways. In the firstplace, they are useful to for grooming younger generationsof politicians. District Councilors are given a salaryof HK$17,000 (US$2,125) per month, as well as a monthly allowance of about HK$20,000 ($2,500) for constituency work. District Councils provide an excellent traininggroundfor young politicians who intend to establish their networks for future electoral campaigns to join the Legislative Council. Hence, nominationsto run in the District Council elections help political parties recruittalent; the networks and resources of District Councilors and candidates are importantassets of political parties. A political party or a coalition of parties securing a majority in a District Council can also exploit the funding available for community, recreational, and culturalactivities to its advantage.The facilities such as community halls at the disposal of the District Councils may also be similarly exploited. An interesting phenomenonin the 2003 elections in termsof political recruitment was that an increasing numberof candidateswere full-time politicians, i.e., they were either full-time politicians serving as Legislative Councilors and/orDistrict Councilors, assistantsto Legislative Councilors, or staff members of political parties (see Table2). Difficulties in findingjobs have reduced the opportunitycost for young people taking up political careers,and political parties have been eager to enhance their appeal by recruitingyoung talent, to demonstratethat their candidatesare younger and better educated than previous candidates.This high percentageof full-time politicians among candidates also revealsthatDistrictCouncilors'work is becoming more and more demanding, and those who cannot devote full time to the job will find it very difficult to meet constituents'expectations.

JOSEPH Y. S. CHENG

737

The GeneralPoliticalClimateand the SignificantCampaignIssues

In response to the July 1 protestrally, the Chinese leadershipindicated strong support for the administrationof Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Cheehwa. This naturallyreinforcedthe sense of political impotence and frustration for on the partof Hong Kong people. Chineseleaders'support Tungalso silenced criticisms from the pro-Beijingunited front and the business community,who obviously do not want a confrontationwith Beijing. At the same time, the central governmenttried to help Hong Kong solve its economic problems.Assistance included a sharp increase in the number of Chinese tourists allowed to visit Hong Kong, a Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement(CEPA) giving Hong Kong better access to the China market,2and political pressure on neighboringGuangdongProvince to improve cooperationwith the territory. While Hong Kong residents are grateful for the central government's economic support,they also feel embarrassedthat a place where people enjoy a per capita average annual GDP of over $24,000 is seeking assistance from a place with a per capita average GDP of about $1,000. Actually, the Hong Kong community, given its wealth, should consider contributingto povertyalleviation programsin China and the development of its poor interior provthe inces.3More important, heavy involvementof Chineseleadersin Hong Kong affairs further weakens the autonomy, the effectiveness, and therefore, the legitimacy of the Tung administration.Business leaders probably feel that if they need anything, they should lobby Beijing. In the second half of 2003, Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong received delegations from the three pro-Beijing parties, the Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), the Hong Kong ProgressiveAlliance, and the Liberal Party,in a highprofile manner and praised them for their contributionsto the territory.This event was unprecedentedand may be interpretedas political intervention in supportof the pro-Beijing political parties, as the Chinese authoritieshave refusedany contactwith the territory's campsince the 1989 Tiananpro-democracy in men Incident.Further, recentyears the DAB has been visiting the Guangdong and Shanghai authorities;with their help, the party can claim to serve Hong Kong by reflecting the community's views and demands to the provincial or municipal governments,a service which obviously cannot be delivered by the pro-democracycamp. The Tung administrationhas been trying to avoid controversies and confrontationssince the massive protest rally, in orderto arrestdeclining support
in 2. Fordetailsof CEPA, all major see 30, newspapers HongKongon September 2003.
3. See the author's"Shameon Us," South ChinaMorningPost (Hong Kong, in English), September 1, 2003.

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ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XLIV, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER

for the Hong Kong governmentand bettermaintainpolitical stability.On Sepannouncedthe indefinitewithdrawalof the tember5, 2003, the administration Article 23 legislation4that had sparkedthe protests;most people believed that this move had Beijing's endorsement.Subsequently,the Tung administration made several concessions: when an environmentalgroup protested against a reclamationproject in Victoria Harbor,when pro-democracygroups opposed efforts to close District Council polls three hours early, and when public houswanted to ing tenantsobjected to a ban on pets. Apparently,the administration social and political harmonybefore the District Council elections in preserve November 2003 and the Legislative Council elections in September2004. The pro-democracygroups attemptedto shape the political agenda in the District Council elections and maintain the momentum of the July 1 protest rally. Organizedby a small pro-democracygroup, Power for Democracy, all candidatesof the pro-democracygroups and 79 independents(altogether 264 candidates)pledged to supporta united political platformdemandingelection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage by 2007, election of all Legislative Council seats by universalsuffrageby 2008, abolitionof appointedseats on the District Councils after the 2003 elections, and initiationof public consultation on political reformsby the governmentbefore the end of 2003. The united political platform redefined the focus of local elections and prompted Hong and camps.5 Kongpeople to choose betweenthe pro-democracy pro-government Local Catholic and Protestantchurches, which played an importantrole in mobilizing participationin the July 1 protestrally, also jointly released a pamphlet to encourage the estimated 600,000 Christiansin Hong Kong to vote in the District Council elections and to study the positions of the candidates and their affiliatedpolitical groups on matters including the Article 23 legislation,
4. Article23 of the Basic Law (Hong Kong's Constitution)states:"TheHong Kong Special AdministrativeRegion shall enact laws on its own to prohibitany act of treason, secession, sedition, subversionagainst the CentralPeople's Government,or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizationsor bodies from conductingpolitical activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizationsor bodies of the Region from establishingties with foreign political organizations or bodies." This articlewas writteninto the draftBasic Law afterthe massive protestrallies in Hong Kong duringthe TiananmenIncidentin 1989; the Chinese authoritieswere obviously concerned aboutthe possibility of a repetitionof such activities. Tung's administrationwas wise enough not to initiate the controversiallegislative process in his first term. In response to the open promptingof the Chinese authorities,a paperaddressingthe implementationof Article 23 of the Basic Law was finally unveiled for public consultationin September2002. As expected, the proposalsstirredfears of a crackdownon humanrights groups and Falun Gong. The pro-democracycamp in the territoryalso perceived the proposals as a threatto civil liberties.See ibid., September25, 2002. The contentsof the proposedlegislation and the highin handedmannerof the Tung administration pushing throughthe consultativeand legislative processes led to the massive protestrally on July 1, 2003. 5. TheSun (Hong Kong, in Chinese), October20, 2003.

JOSEPH S. CHENG Y.

739

elections of the Chief Executive and legislatorsby universalsuffrage,and labor issues and the underprivileged.6 Many pro-democracygroups also organized and encouragedpeople to vote, while Power for Democracyorganized meetings an unprecedentedcampaignrally for all pro-democracycandidates, along the Taiwanmodel. In contrast,the pro-governmentDAB and Hong Kong ProgressiveAlliance adopted a very low political profile. They avoided the mass media, avoided debates with their pro-democracyopponents, and simply concentrated on reporting their grassrootsservices. They even refused to attendthe radio forums organized by Radio Television Hong Kong (the government radio station), which then decided to cancel the forums. The pro-democracycamp candidates criticized their pro-governmentopponents for not showing up and Radio Television Hong Kong for cancelling the programs, thus denying the groups the opportunityto articulatetheir views. There were more restrictionson placing campaign posters in public places and visiting voters in their apartments,the traditionaland probablymost effective ways of reaching the electorate, given the strictrestrictionson campaignexpenditure.The governmentwas criticized for not doing enough publicity work, as the Home Affairs Departmentgave up organizingforums for the candidatesin each constituency,which had been the practice in previous District Council elections. There was a conspiracy theory that the governmentdid not want to see a high voter turnoutrate, which would be expected to favor the pro-democracycamp. It was generally believed that the DAB and Hong Kong Progressive Alliance relied mainly on their wellestablished networks and would benefit from a low turnout rate. The prodemocracycampwas particularly annoyedbecausean opinion surveyconducted the University of Hong Kong in mid-Septemberrevealed that only 18.5% by of respondentscould cite the exact election date, comparedwith 35.4% for the 1999 elections.7 The same poll indicated that 77% of respondentsconsidered that a candithe date'sposition on livelihoodissues would be theirmajorconsideration, same as in 1999. Candidates'performancesand platformswere still consideredvery important,but the ratio of respondentswho attachedmore importanceto platforms rose from 24.3% in 1999 to 35.2% in 2003, while those who attached more importanceto job performance slipped from 41.9% to 37.9%. Meanwhile, those who accordedmore significance to a candidate'spolitical orientationincreased from 2.2% to 4%, and to his or her political affiliation from 6.2% to 10.2%. These figures showed the impact of the politicization of local elections; the impact became considerablymore significanttwo months afterward in the actual elections.
6. Apple Daily (Hong Kong, in Chinese), October 8, 2003. 7. South ChinaMorningPost, October20, 2003.

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ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XLIV, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER

The Candidates
Altogether, there were 837 qualified candidates registered for the 2003 elections, 37 more than in 1999. As 74 of the candidateswere elected unopposed, 763 candidatescompeted for the remaining326 seats (see Table 1). This time, competition was seen as intense, because in similar past local elections, incumbentsenjoyed a reelection rate of about 82%. The pro-governmentDAB fielded 206 candidates, compared with 176 in 1999. The increase showed that the party, with its substantialresources, had been actively cultivating new candidates.It was the only party in the territory that organizedwell-designed trainingprogramsfor their new talent, including a tripto the U.S. Observersspeculatedthat some pro-DAB candidateschose to run as independentsbecause the DAB label might become a political liability, Some in view of the community'sstrongangeragainstthe Tung administration. of these candidatesmay in fact join the party after the elections, as seven District Councilorsdid in 1999. DAB's close pro-governmentally, the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, fielded 23 candidates,comparedwith 30 in 1999. While its chairman,Lau Honchuen, indicated in a New ChinaNews Agency interview that 40 members of his group took part in the electoral races, only 23 of them formally indicated their political affiliation.8This phenomenon was another indicator of the unpopularityof the Tung administration. On the other hand, the Democratic Party registered 120 candidates, a decline of 53 comparedwith 1999. This reductionwas largerthan the increases in the numberof candidatesfieldedby the Alliance of Democracyfor the People and Livelihood (ADPL) (from 32 in 1999 to 37 in 2003) and The Frontier (from nine in 1999 to 13 in 2003). All three are pro-democracyparties, which are seen as the opposition in the eyes of the governmentand which have been demandingrealization of full democracy in the elections for Chief Executive in 2007 and for the entire legislaturein 2008. Before the July 1, 2003, protest rally, the Democratic Party had been suffering from a decline in political appeal, defections, and inadequateresources. Its membershipremained stagnant and it had not attractedmuch new talent. Hence, the Democratic Party chose to reducethe numberof its candidatesto avoid being overextended.It also insisted that its candidates should work in their respective constituencies for at least one year before being eligible for nomination. This represented an atwho joined the party shortly before the elections, tempt to bar "opportunists" to claim its banner. just While other pro-democracy groups increased their respective numbers of candidates, some new splinter groups were also formed, gathering mainly
8. Ming Pao (Hong Kong, in Chinese), November 22, 2003.

JOSEPH Y. S. CHENG

741

around individual legislators. Albert Chan Wai-yip, who had earlier left the Democratic Party,wanted to consolidate his political base in New Territories West. He formed two groups known as the Yuen Long Democratic Alliance and the Yuen Long Tin Shui Wai DemocraticAlliance, which together fielded 23 candidates,including himself, in New TerritoriesWest. Another legislator, Cyd Ho Sau-lan, who plans to run in the Hong Kong Island constituency in the coming Legislative Council elections, helped form a new political group, Civic Act-up, which fielded five candidatesin the Wan Chai District. At the same time, pro-democracytrade unions were slightly more active of thanin previouselections.The Hong Kong Confederation TradeUnions fielded threecandidatesthis time, althoughit had presentednone in previous elections. The Neighborhood and Workers Service Center fielded four candidates, an increase of one over 1999. The emergence in 2003 of a small youth political group, 7.1 People Pile, was interestingand attractedconsiderablemedia attention. This group of young people were all in their twenties (the oldest of them was 28); they claimed to representtheir generation's frustrationand political demands. The young people had no political experience and did not consider Theirobjective was to encourageotheryoung people winning a seat important. to take part in the elections; many observers agreed that youth participationin the District Council elections seemed to have increasedthis time. Finally, the pro-businessLiberal Party presented 25 candidates,nine fewer than in 1999. This was a slight surprise to the public: James Tien Pei-chun, leaderof the LiberalParty,had become a hero in the eyes of the community in efforts to early July because of his refusal to supportthe Tung administration's forwardwith Article 23 legislation as scheduled. By late 2003, the Libpress eral Partyhad still failed to establish a grassrootsnetwork and had no legislators returnedby direct election. Hence, for its political survival,the partymust defend the maintenanceof functionalconstituencies in the legislature.

The ElectionResults
featureof the 2003 District rate The recordvoterturnout was the most important After the July 1 massive protest rally, Council elections (see Tables 3 and 4). Hong Kong people came out to vote in the local elections to express their dissatisfactionwith the governmentand to repeat their demandsfor democratizain tion. While the pro-Beijingunited fronthad tried to explain the participation the protestrally as an expressionof concern over currenteconomic difficulties, noting that people had various types of grievances, the record voter turnout rate was a clear indication that people remained dissatisfied with the Tung administration,even though Beijing strongly backed Tung and had provided fromthe pro-democracy candidates economicassistancefor Hong Kong. Further, DAB suffereda seriousdefeat. while the pro-government campwon handsomely,

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TABLE

ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XLIV, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER

Rates in District Council Elections, 3 Votersand VoterTurnout 1982-2003

District Seats Board/Council to Be Constituencies* Elected

No. of

No. of

Voter
No. of Registered Voters 2,973,612 No. of Actual Voters** 1,065,363 Turnout Rate** (%) 44.1

2003

400

400

1999 1994
1991

390 346
209

390 346
272

2,832,524 2,450,372
1,840,413

816,503 693,215
423,923

35.8 33.1
32.5

1988
1985 1982

157
145 122

264
237 132

1,610,998
1,421,391 899,559

424,201
476,558 342,764

30.3
37.5 38.1

* DistrictCouncilswere knownas DistrictBoardsbefore 1997;in the electionsin 1991 and each. returned members two someconstituencies before, **Because votersdidnothaveto vote; someregistered were somecandidates elected unopposed, rates thevoterturnout wereadjusted accordingly.

TABLE

4 Performance of Major Political Parties in District Council

Number Percentage Number Numberof of Seats of Contested of Seats Candidates Wonin Seats Won Wonin 1999 in 2003 in 2003 2003 Number of Seats Wonin 1994

Elections, 1994-2003

Democratic Party DAB

ADPL LiberalParty

120 206
37 25

95 62
25 13

79.2 30.1
67.6 52.0

86 83
19 15

75 37
29 18

TheFrontier HongKongProgressive Alliance

13 38

6 20

46.1 52.6

4 21

0 2

* Percentageof contested seats won includes seats won unopposed.

In the previous District Council elections, networks assumed a very importantrole in mobilizing voters to vote. Hence, voter turnoutrates were typically highest in the most ruraldistrictsof the New Territories,and usually higher in the New Territoriesthan in the urban districts. Among the latter, those with higher concentrationsof public-housingestates normally enjoyed higher turn-

JOSEPH S. CHENG Y.

743

out rates. Old residentialand middle-class districts often had the lowest rates. In the November 2003 elections, with the exception of Wan Chai, the other 17 that districtsall achievedratesexceeding 40%. It appeared more votershad been motivated by factors other than networks to come out and vote, especially in the middle-class residentialdistricts. An exit poll conductedby the Universityof Hong Kong on the day of the 2003 elections produced some interesting data. As expected, 62% of the respondents indicated that they had voted because of fulfillment of civic duty; 13% out of habit; only 13%hoped to make use of the elections to improve society, community and people's livelihood, while 2% wanted to show their support for the cause of democracy.It is obvious that Hong Kong people normally do not expect much from local elections. In terms of voters' political orientations, 81% of respondentssupporteddirect election of the Chief Executive by 2007, and 84% supported direct elections of all seats of the legislature by 2008. Thirty-fivepercent said that the July 1, 2003, rally enhanced their motivation to vote, while 65% indicatedthat there was no impact. Twenty-ninepercent of respondents,however, actually took partin the rally. Regardingthe basis of the voters' choice, 54% of respondentsrevealed that their choices were mainly based on supportfor individualcandidatesand 28% on support for political parties. Sixty percent of respondents indicated that candidates' most importantattractionwas their past performance;5%, their political backgroundor partyaffiliation;and 15%,their political platformsand views.9 Relative to similar surveys for past elections, more voters accorded priorityto the candidates'partyaffiliationsand political platforms. In view of the record voter turnoutrate and voters' expressed political values, it is hardlysurprisingthat the DAB lost badly. The DAB fielded 206 candidatesand won 62 seats, including 16 unopposed,with a success rateof 30.1%; if the unopposed seats are discounted, then the success rate drops to 24.2%. DAB candidatesvied with their counterparts from the Democratic Party in 83 constituencies, and won in only 12 (14.5%); in encounterswith ADPL candidates,DAB candidateswon 6 and lost 18, achievinga success rateof only 25%. DAB legislatorslost in the DistrictCouncilelections,LauKongThreeincumbent wah, YeungYiu-chung,and Ip Kwok-him. The latter'sloss was especially dramatic. Ip was the legislatorreturned the District Councilorsin 2000, and he by chairedthe bills committeeon the Article 23 legislation.He thereforebecame a conspicuous targetfor the pro-democracycamp, despite holding a "safe" seat. Subsequently, Cyd Ho Sau-lan,a legislatorfrom the Hong Kong Island constitoffered to challenge Ip in the Kwun Lung constituency of the Central uency, and WesternDistrict. It was a competition between two legislators:Ho had no
of is for director the 9. Theauthor mostgrateful the dataoffered Robert Chung by Ting-yiu, of Public University HongKong. Opinion Program,

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ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XLIV, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER

workbeforethe election,but she had manypoliticalstarsof the proconstituency democracycamp campaigningfor her. Her victory, therefore,was highly symbolic, indicatingthat voters had come out to supportthe cause of democracy and to punishthe political partysupportingthe unpopularTung administration. In the beginning of 2003, most observers agreed that the DAB should be able to secure a majorvictory in the upcoming District Council elections. The DAB, with massive political donations from the pro-Beijing business groups, had cultivated an impressive grassroots network over the past decades. Further, DAB District Councilors and candidates-in-waitinghad been very hardThey providedmany subsidizedbanquets, workingin servingtheirconstituents. were attentiveto local needs and offered many picnics, and packagetours;they services ranging from free haircutsto free medical consultation,free medicine for Severe Acute RespiratorySyndrome(SARS), etc. But the DAB's support for the Tung administration and its position on the Article 23 legislation became conspicuous political liabilities. On the other hand, the DAB gained 50,000 more votes in the 2003 District Council elections than in 1999, although it fielded 30 more candidates and there were a quarterof a million more voters in 2003. But it cannot be denied that the DAB did not lose many votes; in other words, its grassrootsnetwork remained intact. It lost the elections because it could not appeal to floating voters who did not have clear, definite preferencesand new voters. According to Robert Chung Ting-yiu's exit poll, 12% of voters had been registered for less thanthreeyears,which meantthatthey voted for the firsttime in theirlife.'0 According to Ma Ngok, in addition to formal DAB candidates, there were at least 150 more pro-Beijing candidates under the banners of Civil Force, the Hong Kong ProgressiveAlliance, and various local grassroots groups. These candidates secured 44.7% of the vote in their constituencies, on average, roughly equivalentto the DAB's share of the votes in its contested constituencies in 1999. These candidates enjoyed an electoral success rate of 48%, though they lost in two-thirdsof their encounterswith Democratic Party candidates." According to Ma Ngok's calculations on the shares of votes respectively won by the pro-Beijingand pro-democracycamps in the five Legislative Council constituencies, the two camps won roughly the same numberof votes in Hong Kong Island, Kowloon East, and New TerritoriesEast (the differences amounted to less than 10,000 votes in each constituency), while the pro-democracy camp enjoyed a distinct edge in Kowloon West and led its West.12 opponentby more than 10,000 votes in New Territories
10. Ibid. 11. Ma Ngok, "QinzhongzheJiang 'YincangShenfen' Canxuan" [Pro-Chinacandidates will hide theirpolitical identities in the coming elections], Ming Pao, December 9, 2003. 12. Ibid.

JOSEPH S. CHENG Y.

745

A study by Ivan Choy foundthatin the 101 constituenciesin which the DAB fielded candidates both in 1999 and 2003, DAB candidates still managed to increase their votes in 16 districts,and suffered a decline in votes in only two districts,namely,Yuen Long and Kwai Tsing.13 Both Ma Ngok and Ivan Choy argue that the District Council elections were not so much a victory for the pro-democracycamp but a serious defeat for the DAB, because its supportfor the Tung administration angeredthe silent majorityin the community. The other pro-governmentparty,the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, did not do too badly. It lost only one seat as it secured 20 seats, comparedwith 21 in 1999. Its low political profile and the fact that it was not well known to Hong Kong people probably helped. The pro-government,pro-business Liberal Party also lost two seats, a decline to 13 from 15 seats in 1999. Apparently, the partyhad not been able to fully exploit the goodwill generatedby its refusal to supportthe Tung administration's efforts to enact Article 23 legislation as scheduled. The crucial weaknesses of the party have been that it has not built up its grassrootsnetworks and none of its legislators were returned by direct election. The party'ssole reliance on functionalconstituencies determines its conservativeposition on political reforms. The Democratic Party has reversed its decline in recent years and in 2003 gained nine more seats to reach 95, comparedwith 86 in 1999. The party certainly benefited from the public's dissatisfactionwith the Tung administration, the associated anger with the DAB, and the upsurge in demand for democracy in the community, symbolized by the July 1 protest. The Democratic Party fielded 120 candidates;in its 83 encounterswith DAB candidates, it won 69, lost 12, and in the remainingtwo constituencies,othercandidateswon the electoral races. In the other 37 constituencies where Democratic Party candidates the competedwith those fromotherpartiesor independents, partywon 26 seats. It appearsthat the DemocraticParty's strategyof reducingthe numberof candidates and stipulatinga one-year work requirementfor them in their respective constituencies worked fairly well. The relatively large numberof District Councilors is an importantasset of the Democratic Party in terms of financial and human resources and grassrootsnetworks. The party remains the largest and the most powerful organizationwithin the pro-democracycamp; it has the base from which to lead the movement if it can improve its relations with the otherpro-democracygroups and win back their trust. The otherpro-democracygroups also performedwell in the District Council elections. The Frontier,for example, fielded 13 candidates and won six seats (two more thanin 1999). In its six encounterswith DAB candidates,it won four; In with independents one of the raceswas won by an independent. its competition
13. Ivan Choy Chi-keung,"ShuishuoMinzhupaiQuxuanDashing" [Who says the pro-democracy camp won a majorvictory in the District Council elections?], ibid., December 12, 2003.

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in five constituencies, The Frontierwon only one. Its candidates defeated the of candidate the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance,but lost to the ADPL candidate two constituencies. As with the Democratic Party, candiin the remaining betterin theirencounterswith DAB candidates, dates of The Frontier performed illustratingthe impact of the protest vote. Similar patternsemerge when one examines the 23 candidatesfielded by local groups in New TerritoriesWest, groups thatwere newly formedby pro-democracylegislatorAlbert Chan Waiyip. These candidateswon seven seats in their 14 encounterswith candidates of the DAB and the Hong Kong ProgressiveAlliance; the latterwon five seats, and the other two went to independents. However, in their nine encounters with the candidates from other political groups and independents, the New West groups lost seven seats and secured only two. Territories ADPL, the second largest political group within the pro-democracycamp, also made solid gains in the District Council elections, increasing from 19 seats in 1999 to 25 in 2003. ADPL has furtherconsolidated its political base in Kowloon districts,with three seats in the Yau Tsim Mong district, 13 in Sham Shui Po, three in Kowloon City, two in Wong Tai Sin, plus a foothold (four seats) in Tuen Mun district.ADPL subsequentlyfielded three candidatesin the Legislative Council elections in September2004, two in Kowloon West, and West. one in New Territories Other pro-democracy groups also performed reasonably well. The Hong Kong Confederationof Trade Unions won two seats, the Neighborhood and WorkersService Centre secured four, and Civic Act-up won three (not counting the seat of Cyd Ho Sau-lan). 7.1 People Pile attractedconsiderablemedia attention,but failed to win any seats. Though in the 2003 elections the pro-democracycamp is seen to have won and the DAB to have suffered a serious setback, in terms of actual distribution of political force in the 18 District Councils, the pro-democracycamp enjoys a majorityin only seven councils, while pro-governmentmembers hold the majority in 10, with a balanced situationin Kowloon City (see Table 5). The victory for democracy therefore should be seen largely in terms of the political messages sent by the voters.

The Issue of AppointedMembers

In the final years of the British administration,the Chris Patten government abolishedthe system of appointedseats on District Boards. The Tung administration,however, restoredthe practice in 1999, appointing 102 District Counwere: (a) the appointed cilors. The two reasonsgiven by the Tungadministration would enhance the representativenessof District Councils, because system some local community leaders would decline to take part in elections and the appointmentsystem would facilitate their inclusion, and (b) the appointment

Y. JOSEPH S. CHENG

747

TABLE 5 Distribution of Political Forces in the Eighteen District Councils,

2004-2007 Name of District Council Numberof Pro-Beijing Elected Pro-Democracy United Members Front Camp Liberal Party or Neutral

Central Western and Eastern WanChai Southern YauTsimMong ShamShuiPo

Wong Tai Sin Kowloon City

15 37 11 17 16 21
25 22

9 12 6 2 9 16
12 11

1 20 2 5 4 2
11 7

5 5 3 10 3 3
2 4

KwunTong Tsuen Wan

Tuen Mun Yuen Long North Tai Po Sai Kung Sha Tin Kwai Tsing Islands

34 17
29 29 16 19 20 36 28 8

19 7
13 7 10 6 7 14 19 0

13 4
10 11 6 9 11 18 3 4

2 6
6 11 0 4 2 4 6 4

SOURCE: 25, MingPao, November 2003.

system would enable the governmentto recruitprofessionals and other talent to join the District Councils to strengthentheir work. These arguments,as can be expected, have been severely rebuttedby the pro-democracy political groups. They believe that since direct elections to District Councils are partof the democraticprocess, restorationof the appointment system is a serious step backwardin terms of democraticdevelopment. If professionalsand othertalenthad to be recruitedto improvethe performance of District Councils, they could be appointedas advisors or in other appropriate capacities, instead. According to an occupational analysis of appointed District Councilors in 1999-2003 conductedby Ma Ngok, businesspersonsor company directors took up 41 seats and professionals (accountants, medical doctors, lawyers, academics, etc.) occupied 21 seats. These proportions were roughly equivalent to those among elected members, i.e., about 40% were from business and 17.5%were professionals.14 Hence the Tung adminis14. Ma Ngok, "QuyihuiWeirenzhi Pianbang Zhengdang"[DistrictCouncils' appointmentsystem favors political parties],Apple Daily, October 30, 2003.

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tration'srationale for appointingDistrict Councilors was not observed in actual practice. The appointmentsystem is a kind of pork-barrelpolitics that allows the to Tung administration rewardits supporters.After the 1999 District Council the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance received 12 appointed seats, elections, the DAB 11, and the Liberal Party nine.15 Altogether, more than 30% of the appointedseats went to political partieswithin Tung's governing coalition. As expected, the pro-democracypolitical groups received no appointments(they had earlierindicatedthatthey would not accept such appointments). The appointmentsystem furtherstrengthenedpro-governmentforces in the District Councils. The elections of chairpersonswas a good indicatorof this. After the 1999 elections, pro-democracypolitical groups could only secure two chairmanshipsout of 18. This meant that with the help of the appointed seats, pro-government members controlled a majority in 16 District Councils. They therefore managed largely to allocate the resources of the District Councils in accordance with their preferences, from chairmanships and vice-chairmanships of committees and working groups to financial resources for minor construction projects, cultural, entertainment, and sports activities, etc. These privileges were normally reinforced by appointments to territory-wideadvisory committees and other honors bestowed by the Tung The appointmentsystem is, therefore,widely perceived as an administration. unfair way of twisting the allocation of political resources against the prodemocracy camp. Abolition of the system was included as one of four major demands in the united political platformof the pro-democracycandidatesin the 2003 District Council elections. Buoyed by their success in the elections and determinedto continue to exert pressureon the Tung administration,the pro-democracypolitical groups formed an ad-hoc Alliance Against the Appointment System to organize meetings, signature campaigns, and protest activities to appeal for abolition. The appeal attractedthe support of the community and the mass media, because it was almost impossible to justify continuationof the appointment system. Out of respectfor the existing legislation, a compromise formula was proposed, i.e., the Tung administration might choose to continue to appointone or two membersonly to each District Council. The administration,however, rejected such an appeal and in December 2003 appointed 102 District Council members, the same number as in 1999. Among the pro-governmentpolitical groups, the Liberal Party received eight appointments(one less than in 1999), the DAB six (five fewer), the Hong Kong ProgressiveAlliance six (six fewer), and the New CenturyForum one. In response to the community's criticisms, the number of appointees with
December 2003. 15. SingTao 18, Daily(HongKong,in Chinese),

Y. JOSEPH S. CHENG

749

political party affiliationswas reduced from 39 in 1999 to 21 this time.16 Government sources indicated that the Tung administrationwas determined to maintainits authorityand refused to concede before its review of the political system, scheduled to be held before 2007 under the territory'sBasic Law.17 was eager to maximize its control of the District CounTung's administration cils to try to demonstratethat governmentpolicies have Hong Kong people's support. The administrationhad used the support of a majority of District Councils as evidence of the community'sendorsementof its controversialpolicies such as soccer gambling, and it was unwilling to abandonthis important base of support,given its weak position. Hence, officials were willing to pay the political price. There was speculation that some people took part in the protest rally on January 1, 2004, in part because they were antagonized by the decision, as this was perceived as anotherproof that the Tung administration has no inclinationto listen to the people.18 Before the appointments, the pro-democracy camp enjoyed an edge in seven District Councils, namely, Centraland Western,Wan Chai, Kwun Tong, Yau Tsim Mong, Sham Shui Po, North, and Kwai Tsing. The camp also capturedhalf the seats in Kowloon City (see Table 5). But after the appointments, the pro-democracycamp only enjoyed a majorityon two District Councils. It can certainly claim that the appointmentsystem devalues people's votes and twists their expressed choices. The Liberal Partyand the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance nonetheless openly stated that reducing political party-affiliated appointeeswas unfair,as this would discourage people who are eager to serve the public from joining political parties.19 In subsequent election of District Council chairpersons (see Table6), the pro-democracycamp won in two coundistrict won in two, and the rest went to pro-establishment cils, independents did slightly betterin the elections of vicecouncilors.The pro-democracy camp chairpersons,winning in five District Councils, but pro-establishmentforces won in the rest.

The PoliticalImplications
Since District Councils are mainly advisory bodies and the pro-democracy camp has not secured a majority of seats overall, immediate pressure on the Tung administrationat the District Council level is insignificant. The 2003 election results, however, representmuch more than a serious defeat for the
16. See all majornewspapersin Hong Kong on December 18, 2003. 17. OrientalDaily (Hong Kong, in Chinese), December 31, 1999. 18. Organizersestimatedthat about 100,000 people took partin the protestrally on January1, 2004, under the theme of "ReturnPolitical Power to the People, Improve People's Livelihood"; see all majornewspapersin Hong Kong on January2, 2004. 19. Ming Pao, December 18, 2003.

TABLE 6 Party Affiliations of Chairpersons of District Councils, 2000-2003

and 2004-2007

Name of District Council CentralandWestern Eastern WanChai Southern Yau Tsim Mong Sham Shui Po Wong Tai Sin Kowloon City Kwun Tong

2004-2007 Name Party Affiliation Chairperson Mr.ChanTak-chor Liberal Party Ms. Ting Yuk-chee,Christina Pro-establishment Ms. WongYing-kay,Ada Independent Ms. MarYuet-har Pro-establishment Mr. ChanMan-yu,Henry Independent Mr.TamKwok-kiu ADPL Mr.Wong Kam-chi Pro-establishment Mr.Wong Kwok-keung Pro-establishment Mr. ChanChung-bun,Bunny Pro-establishment ViceChairperson Mr.Wu Chor-nam Pro-establishment* Mr.Wong Kwok-hing DAB Dr. Tse Wing-ling, John DemocraticParty Mr.Chu Ching-hong Pro-establishment Mr.Leung Wai-kuen,Edward Pro-establishment Mr.Leung Lai ADPL Mr.Kan Chi-ho DAB Mr. ChanKa-wai DemocraticParty Ms. Leung Fu-wing Pro-establishment

TsuenWan

Mr.ChauHow-chen Pro-establishmentrepresenting rural interests Mr.the Hon Lau Wong-fat Liberal Party Dr. the Hon Tang Siu-tong HK ProgressiveAlliance Mr.Li Kwok-fung Pro-establishment Mr.Cheng Chun-ping HK ProgressiveAlliance Mr.Ng Sze-fuk HK ProgressiveAlliance Mr.Wai Kwok-hung Civil Force Mr.Chow Yick-hay DemocraticParty Mr.Lam Wai-keung Pro-establishment representing rural interests

Mr. ChungWai-ping Pro-establishment Mr.Leung Kin-man DAB Mr.Leung Che-cheung DAB Mr.Chow Kam-siu, Joseph Democratic Party Mr.WanHok-lim Pro-establishment Mr.ChauYin-ming, Francis Pro-establishment Mr.Pang Cheung-wai,Thomas DAB Mr.Leung Wing-kuen Service Neighborhoodand Workers Centre,TheFrontier Ms. ChauChuen-heung DAB

Tuen Mun YuenLong North

Tai Po Sai Kung Sha Tin Kwai Tsing

Island

* Pro-establishment means the and and here against pro-democracy camp. pro-HKSARG pro-Beijing normally

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DAB. The recordvoter turnoutrate and the election resultsclearly indicatethat that Beijing's Hong Kong people remain angry with the Tung administration, of supportingTung does not work, and that the community's demand policy for democracycannotbe ignored. According to the Basic Law, changing the electoral system for the Legislative Council requiresthe approvalof two-thirds of the legislators and the endorsementof the Chief Executive. Changingthe electoral system for the Chief Executiverequiresthe above, plus the green light from the StandingCommittee of the National People's Congressin Beijing. It is politically impossible for the pro-democracymovement to pass over these hurdles unless the Chinese leadership accepts political reformsin Hong Kong. Actually the HKSAR political system allows the Chinese leadershipto enjoy veto power on all significant issues and the electoral system has also been designed to preventthe opposition, i.e., the pro-democracycamp, from gaining a majority in the legislature. The fact thatthe pro-democracy campnow has a small chance of securing30 seats in the legislatureshows thatthe extent of public dissatisfactionwith the Tung administrationis threateningBeijing's fundamentalpolicy towardHong Kong. The first importantconsequence of the 2003 election resultwas a leadership change in the DAB and redefinitionof its political line. DAB chairmanTsang Yok-sing assumed responsibilityfor the party's loss and resigned his post; he was replacedby Ma Lik, who was known to be very critical of the Chief Executive. For its own political survival, especially in the following Legislative Council elections, the DAB adopted a low profile and maintained distance from the Tung administration. Soon afterthe change of leadership,DAB legislators refused to supportthe government's plan to cut funding for the territory's tertiaryinstitutions,forcing Educationand Manpower SecretaryArthur Li Kwok-cheung to withdrawhis proposal. On the same day, DAB legislators also abstained from voting on a proposal from pro-democracylegislators requesting the Chief Executive to brief the Legislative Council after each of his reportingtrips to Beijing, thus allowing the proposal to go through.20 The LiberalPartyalso refused to staunchlysupportthe government.Hence, at least in the months before the Legislative Council elections, the Tung administrationwas a "lame duck," in the sense that it could not introduce any controversialor unpopularmeasures. This meant that precious time had been lost in tacklingeconomic recoveryandthe budgetdeficits.As expected,the governmenthad to raise revenue and cut expenditurein orderto reduce the budget deficit, which amountedto about HK$60 billion ($7.5 billion) in the 2002-03 financial year.21These measures were bound to be unpopular,and the Tung
20. See all majornewspapersin Hong Kong on December 20, 2003. 21. Under the accrualsystem of accounting,the HKSARG's deficit for the 2002-03 financial

to billion(US$5.56billion).But afternon-operational werereitems yearamounted HK$43.38

JOSEPH Y. S. CHENG

753

administrationdid not have the political will and supportto prescribe "bitter pills." It adopted a low profile, avoided controversies and simply hoped that the economy would improve, and in the process alienated the business community and adversely affected the reputationof Hong Kong as an international financial and business center. The victory in the District Council elections and the prospect of securing half the seats in the Legislative Council elections in September2004 symbolized the revival of the pro-democracy movement. The expectations, at the same time, also generatedconsiderablepressure from the Chinese authorities. The various pro-democracygroups attemptedto appear united, but failed to present themselves as an alternativeadministration,not an opposition operating merely for the sake of opposition. Cooperationamong the pro-democracy political groups in the Legislative Council elections proved to be much more difficult than in the District Council elections, and coordinationwas unsatisfactory.The latteradopteda single-memberconstituency and simple majority system, and the pro-democracycamp did not have enough candidatesto run in the 400 constituencies.Cases of directconfrontationamong the pro-democracy candidates in more than 20 constituencies were tolerated because the undesirable outcomes (e.g., benefitting the pro-government candidate) were insignificant. Legislative Council candidates, on the other hand, competed in constituenciesand voters could only vote for one medium-sizedmulti-member slate of candidates.Pro-democracypolitical groups, in fact, competed against each other in the past two elections, in 1998 and 2000. In orderto maximize the numberof seats won in September2004, they basically succeeded in presenting to Hong Kong people a list of candidates endorsed by the entire prodemocracy camp. Ideally, pro-democraticgroups had to agree on a united political platform and a shadow cabinet. It was not enoughjust to fight for democracy,i.e., to demand election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrageby 2007 and of the Legislative Council by universalsuffrageby 2008. But the achievement in this areawas not impressive. Chinese leaders were very concerned about the demand for democracy in the territory.They sent many agents to Hong Kong after the huge July 2003 protest, to ensure that Beijing would be better informed. The District Council elections were closely monitoredin an unprecedentedway. The elections and that despite improvethe protestrally on January1, 2004, amply demonstrated ments in the economy, Hong Kong people remaineddissatisfiedwith the Tung and administration wanted democracy.Since the issue of political reformshad
moved, the operatingdeficit stood at HK$59.48 billion (US$7.63 billion), close to the HK$61.7 billion (US$7.91 billion) recordedundercash accountingin the previous financial year. See South ChinaMorning Post, January6, 2004.

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been taken over by the Chinese leadership, and the Tung administrationwas broadlyperceived to be incompetentand unpopular,Beijing will have to tackle the challenge itself. Two measuresseemed to have been adoptedby the leaderhad and ship: procrastination lowering expectations. The Tung administration earlier promised to release a timetable on the review of the political system before the end of 2003, and it failed to fulfill the pledge. It also promised to initiate public consultationon political reforms at the beginning of 2004, and the community wondered what form the consultation would take. According to the pro-democracymovement, public consultation must involve a formal consultative document (a Green Paper)listing all possible options, clearly defined channels for Hong Kong people to articulatetheir views and choices, a designated organ to collect such views and present a report, and a guarantee that the community's expressed choices will be implemented. On December 3, 2003, PresidentHu Jintao met Tung Chee-hwa in Beijing and indicatedthatthe centralgovernmentwas "highly concerned"over the development of Hong Kong's political system, which, Hu said, should evolve accordingto the territory's"practicalsituation."The next day, the official Xinhua News Agency released an interview with three persons who helped draft the Basic Law, ProfessorsXu Chongde, Xiao Weiyun, and Wu Jianfan,as well as a Mainland China member of the Basic Law Committee of the National People's Congress, Xia Yong. These legal experts termed it a "misunderstanding" that some in Hong Kong had regardedthe constitutionalchanges, i.e., the political reform demands of the pro-democracycamp involving revisions of the Basic Law, as "entirelythe special administrativeregion's internalaffair." Xu Chongde was even quoted as saying that the past six years had shown that Hong Kong's political system suited its "practicalsituation,"met the requirements for the "objective development of the special administrativeregion," and was aligned with the fundamentalinterests of the territory'sresidents.22 Analytically, it was clear that these messages were an informalway of telling the community that political reforms would be decided by Beijing, and Hong Kong people might not get what they want. Meanwhile, two developments will continue to have an importantbearing on the progress of democracy in the territory:the relations across the Taiwan Strait and the pace of political reforms in China. President Chen Shui-bian won his second term in March2004 and tension may well escalate across the TaiwanStrait;undersuch circumstances,Beijing will be more conservative on democratizationin Hong Kong. Further, if the Chinese leadership secures enough political will and supportfor political reforms in China, democratization in the HKSAR may have a brighterprospect. But both are beyond Hong Kong people's control.
22. Ibid., December 5, 2003.