Hegeler Institute

Aquinas on Divine Simplicity Author(s): John Lamont Reviewed work(s): Source: The Monist, Vol. 80, No. 4, Analytical Thomism (OCTOBER 1997), pp. 521-538 Published by: Hegeler Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903548 . Accessed: 03/09/2012 23:18
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Hegeler Institute is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Monist.

http://www.jstor.org

Aquinas

on Divine

Simplicity

sentations, and counter the attacks, by setting out what Aquinas actually meant by divine simplicity, and arguing that there is good reason to accept his position. 1.Metaphysical foundations

A central feature of St. Thomas Aquinas's understanding of the divine nature is his conception of God's a conception which has been simplicity, and much attacked. Here I intend to correct themisrepre misrepresented

thatAquinas uses the term 'form' in two senses. In some cases he uses it tomean forms per se, in others he uses it tomean individualized forms. Forms per se are what we speak of when we describe a single character

In order to grasp Aquinas's first understand his conception

conception of the divine nature, we must of form. Peter Geach rightly points out1

space, which is not true of redness itself (or of any form per se). Nor is it a substance; it is rather a particular form of a particular substance, that is different from other individualized forms of redness?different from, say, the redness of Plato's nose. Although Aquinas did not use the term 'indi form', he understood what was meant makes clear; passage vidualized _we by it, as the following

forms, on the other hand, are forms that belong to particular things, and that cannot be multiplied or have instances. The redness of Socrates' nose is an individualized form; it is not redness itself, since it only exists in Socrates, and not in all red things, and since it has a location in time and

to a form red per se, thatexists in many different things.Individualized

istic as existing

in different things. The

term 'redness', for example,

refers

men; whereas we do not say thatSocrates, Plato and Cicero are three the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are threeGods, but one God; for in the say three supposita of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in the threedivine Persons there is but one essence, (la, q.39, a.3.)2

"Aquinas on Divine Simplicity" by JohnLamont, The Monist, vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 521-538. Copyright ? 1997, THE MONIST, La Salle, Illinois 61301.

522

JOHN LAMONT

The

redness of Socrates'

nose

is an individualized

accidental

form.

As thispassage shows,Aquinas also holds thatthereare individualized

thus differs from the conception of a trope. Trope theorists hold sub to be things that have properties, and would not allow that being a substance of a particular sort could constitute a kind of trope; I owe this stances substantial forms, such as the humanity of Socrates, that are different from forms the substances that have them. (His conception of individualized

point to Eleonore Stump.) forms are one way in which forms per se exist. They Individualized are the only way in which forms per se really exist, when such forms are forms of redness exist in particular red things. The other way in which

forms material things;rednessreallyexists ifand only if individualized of of. formsexist is by being thought Forms existing inmatter have what

calls esse naturale, forms existing in the intellect have esse in Aquinas forms. tentionale. The forms that exist in thought are not individualized form individualized is This is so because what makes an individualized it informs, and particular bits of matter are not thinkable (al 'matter', 'a bit of matter' are). though the concepts distinction between a property (Eigenschaft) of a concept, Frege's and a component characteristic of a concept (Merkmal, also translated as the matter

'mark'), can be usefully transferred toAquinas's theory of forms. Char acteristics of forms, like characteristics of concepts in Frege's theory, are what make up the content of a form; thus 'animal' is a characteristic of the form 'elephant'. Properties of a form, on the other hand, will consist of any facts about the existence of forms, whether in thought or in reality.

he is saying. It explains why, on his view, the fact that a form exists im in our minds does not mean that when we think the form, we materially one of its properties, not a characteristic thatmakes

AlthoughAquinas does not explicitlyname and describe thisdistinction, and it is implicitinhis theory, bringingitout helps inunderstanding what in thinkof somethingimmaterial;its existing immaterially ourmind is Inmaking thiscomparison betweenAquinas and Frege we should
up part of its content.

keep inmind an important difference between them. For Frege, thoughts are abstract objects, that are not actual, and that exist when no-one is

of Aquinas does not believe inabstractobjects. For him, thinking them.3 that exists is actual or a property something of actual. (Things everything
are actual when they can change or can cause effects.) Thoughts, forms intentionale, are actualizations of beings that are actual. The ad

with esse

AQUINAS

ON DIVINE

SIMPLICITY

523

are obvious. to Frege's view when compared of Aquinas's does not need to postulate a third realm of abstract objects, or to Aquinas face insoluble mysteries about the relations between human minds, the abstract objects that they think, and the non-abstract world that these vantages objects Frege Frege makes to preserve. apply to. Nor does he face the inconsistency that results when says that concepts and thought exist on their own. In doing this, concepts out to be a kind of object, although an immaterial

blurs a distinction he that isrightly and atemporalkind, and thus anxious

view is also superior to the view of concepts embraced by Aquinas's modern followers of Frege likeMichael Dummett, that holds the grasp of a concept to consist in possession in a of the ability to use expressions language correctly. Dummett asserts The importance of the denial of themental character of thoughts did not lie in the philosophical mythology to which it gave rise?Frege's myth of the one accepts the initial step? 'thirdrealm', orHusserl's of 'ideal being'-if the extrusion of thoughts and theircomponents from the mind?one may yet feel unhappy with the ontological mythology . . . .One in this position has therefore to look about him to find something non-mythological but objective and external to the individual mind to embody the thoughtswhich the individual subject grasps and may assent to or reject. Where better to find it than in the institutionof a common language? ... Given the initial step ... whereby thoughtswere removed from the innerworld ofmental experience, the second step, of regarding them, not as merely transmitted, but as generated, by language, was virtually inevitable.. . .4 But step, the step of giving an account of thought and the in terms of the ability to use language instead of vice grasp of meaning versa, involves us in insuperable difficulties. It renders it impossible for us to explain what gives us the ability to use language. It does not allow this second use of language, or an understanding of the truth-conditions or conditions for warranted assertibility for linguistic expressions, because these expla nations make use of the notions of understanding and meaning, which

us to explain thisabilityby reference an understanding rules for the to of

to plaining; it is not satisfactory simplytreatitas a bare disposition. Dummett could replyto thislineof criticism objecting thatitdoes by
not take into account in terms of grasping the differences between an account of understanding truth-conditions and in terms of warranted assertibil

notions are supposed to be explained by, not to explain, the ability to use language. And the ability to use language is something that needs ex

524

JOHN LAMONT

ity.The grasp of truth-conditions, since it is an irreducibly prepositional piece of knowledge, cannot be used to explain grasp of meaning without to grasp themeaning of a falling into circularity; but ifwe hold that "... statement is to be able

to recognize a verification of one if one is produced, without needing to have a procedure for arriving at one,"5 cir cularity is avoided. It is not clear however that this does follow that if the ability to recognize avoid circularity. It does not a verification for a sentence does not

plicitly,when he rejects the view which he attributesto the logical where theverificationis thought method of itsverification, knowing the
. . . ",6 and asserts that of as something itself independent of language "... if you give an account of what is involved in understanding some sentence, which may be in terms of verification, that verification will in general involve some reasoning which is itself carried out in language."7 the ability to recognize reasons presupposes the ability to understand the ability to grasp meanings and have reasons, which in turn presupposes thoughts; so the circularity reappears.8 positivists to the effect that "... we attach a meaning to the sentence by

such a verification can be characterized in non-propositional recognize terms. The ability to recognize a verification for a sentence involves the ability to recognize reasons for the sentence. Dummett recognizes this ex

involve the ability to describe such a verification,then the ability to

But

escapes Frege's and Dummett's difficulties because he does Aquinas not assume, as they do, that a person's mental contents must be subjective, he is thus not forced peculiar to that person, and hence incommunicable;

who

contents toextrudethoughts and their fromthe mind. He speaks (normally and of thoughts concepts as occurringin the minds of thepeople enough)
them, and thus of them being mental contents, but he draws a distinction between thoughts and concepts, on the one hand, and sharp sensations and mental images, on the other, and asserts that one and the have same thought can be grasped two men by many men, whereas mental images are

when has',

What people thinkare forms,and peculiar to thepersonwho has them.

think the same thought, they think one and the same form. refer to the content of their thoughts, the char

X The phrases 'what is thinking', 'what is thinking', 'the thought Y X

'the thought Y has',

are thinking same When they acteristics theformtheyare thinking. of the is with thecontent form,thecontentofX's thought numericallyidentical

AQUINAS

ON DIVINE

SIMPLICITY

525

of Y's G

cannot exist in thought. Rather, assimilation

thought.9 The form G that exists inX's thought of G, and the form that exists inY's thought of G, cannot be two different instances of the same form; thoughts are not material, and forms can only have different inmatter, so individualized forms instances through being individualized

of thoughts with mental images and sensations. If we think that thoughts are likemental images, and we ask ourselves how something that is like a mental image can mean or be about something that is outside

His positionallows him toavoid a mistake that has resulted fromthe

they are numerically

identical.

sign of X, or something that represents X. Often, its representing X is held to arise from its being a mental image that resembles X. A thought that makes an assertion about X, on this theory, is a true thought when it stands for or resembles the state of affairs thatX thatmeans) blance (whatever is actually in.A correct resem will give rise to a relation of correspondence

the of mind, theonly answer thatsuggests itselfis thata thought X is a

Hilary Putnam, among others.10 As he points out, "thought words and mental pictures do not intrinsically represent what they are about."11 Because this is so, there is nothing thatmakes a thought word or a mental image represent one thing rather than another; hence, the idea that thoughts are mental images of things or mental words for things leaves the content of thought indeterminate. On Aquinas's view, the forms we think do not represent things that exist in the world, and do not resemble the forms that exist in the world;

will be true and theworld, and thoughts when such a between thoughts relationobtains.Theories of thiskind have been effectively criticizedby

they are the same as the forms that exist in things. There is a difference between forms existing inminds and forms existing inmaterial things, but this difference is not part of the content of our thoughts. The difference

minds and existing in material thingsis a property between existing in of

forms, not a characteristic of them. This means thatwhen our thoughts are true,what we think and what exists in theworld are one and the same, are identical. argument for divine simplicity

numerically 2. Aquinas's

positions where a grasp of the arguments for a position is necessary not only to determine whether or not it is true, but also to understand what it

belongs to thatclass of Aquinas's conception of divine simplicity

526

JOHN LAMONT

means. An examination an examination

The argumentfordivine simplicity whether begins by considering out that bodies are subject tochange and all God is a body. Aquinas points
God can be causally affected; since neither of these things can happen toGod, is not a body. Aquinas goes on to argue that there is no difference between God and his essence. He states the argument forGod's being the same as his essence standing of his views in a rather summary fashion, that presumes an under on individuation. For Aquinas, what individuates a

of this conception of his arguments for it.

is thus best undertaken

through

or predicate'.12 He thinks that if two things are different, there has to be something thatmakes them different. They can't just be barely different;

'individuate' in the subjective or linguistic senses used by some modern thinkers, who understand 'that which indi viduates' to be 'in the first instance a thinker, and derivatively a substantive viduals. He does not understand

different from other indi all thingiswhatmakes ita particularindividual

matter

things possess besides their form, it can only be their them different from their forms. If a thing is immateri al, there is no feature of it that can make itdifferent from (i.e., not identical with) its form. To put it crudely and inaccurately, ifyou subtract thematter feature thatmaterial thatmakes from their forms, theymust be identical with identical with their forms. There is no in

identical, and not in any other respect. Material things, as we saw above, as their forms. But all there is tomaterial things is their are not the same forms and the matter that composes them. Since theirmatter is the only

it is not possible for thereto be two thingsthatdiffer only inbeing not

But if immaterialthings not differ all you will have leftis the form. do termediatestatebetween being identical with somethingand not being
it; immaterial things thus are their forms, are forms sub on their own. But God, as has been established, is an immaterial sisting level we want to substitute "having a particular location in space

he with his form.(If at some being. Since God is immaterial, is identical

and

time" for "being composed of a particularbit ofmatter"when talking aboutmaterial thingsand theway inwhich theyare distinguishedfrom will their this forms, argument notbe invalidated thesubstitution, by provided
that we

a form per se. Forms per se are individualized

space and timedoes not consist inhaving a formof some kind.) but God, likeother immaterial beings, is not an individualizedform,
when

accept Aquinas's

position

that to have

a particular

position

in

in thingsthatare not identical But in thecase of theformsof with them.

they are instantiated

AQUINAS

ON DIVINE

SIMPLICITY

527

immaterial being

forms, since material things have forms without being those forms; that is asserts that forms are individualized by matter. It follows why Aquinas that immaterial forms cannot be individualized forms. It is very odd tomaintain thatGod not only has a form, but is a form per se, rather like a Platonic form. One might protest that such a being is and Aquinas would agree. As mentioned bizarre and incomprehensible; he held that the only forms that we have available to us to think above, with are the forms of material objects that our senses provide us with. We cannot conceive

with them. This is only possible for material thingsthatare not identical

things, there is no difference between having the form and the form, so it is not possible for such forms to be instantiated in

of the natures of immaterial beings, because we have no of discovering what these natures would be. That does not mean that way we cannot, in our present situation, know that there are immaterial beings, or thatwe cannot know that certain things are true of such beings. Aquinas thinks thatwe can do both of these things. Itmeans thatwe cannot know what cannot know the essential natures of these these things are?we natures in virtue of which our true descriptions of them are true. things, the Part of the case for believing stantial form?a

that there can be such a thing as a sub form existing on its own?lies in the strength of the reasons we have for postulating such a being. Aquinas thinks that sound deductive arguments can be given for there being a God, and for God's being form. The other part of the case must be a defence doubts raised about the possibility of there being substantial forms. against a substantial

Platonic

forms do not apply toAquinas's theory of substantial forms. The difficulty thatAquinas himself raises in connection with Plato's theory is

A preliminarypoint to be made is that the usual objections to

a.4), and that the forms of material things have real existence only in matter (see, e.g., la q.65 a.4). But this objection obviously does not apply

the impossibility theforms material things of of He existingimmaterially. follows Aristotle inmaintaining that "it is contraryto the nature of sensible thingsthattheir formsshould subsist matter"13(la q.84 without

to immaterialsubstantialforms. Nor do thedifficulties involved in the arise for notion of participation material Aquinas. He does not hold that or that in immaterial different immaterial forms, participate things things
participate

different fromeveryotherimmaterial tially being. It is actually misleading

to think of Aquinas's substantial forms as being like Platonic forms.

in the same form; in his view, every immaterial being

is essen

528

JOHN LAMONT

Platonic

given, since this sense implies that there are universals that particulars fall under.14 That is why Aquinas often says thatGod is neither universal nor particular (e.g., in la q.13 a.9 ad2). lar' is usually Plantinga has argued against Aquinas's conception. Plantinga No property could have created the world: no property objects that "... could be omniscient, or, indeed, know anything at all. IfGod is a property, Alvin

forms are universale, which particulars participate in.Aquinas's it is not possible for things forms are not universals, because to participate in them. Nor are they particulars, in the sense that 'particu substantial

then he isn't a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, ifGod is awareness, power, love or life."15 He also objects that "... identical with each of his properties, so that God has but one property.

identicalwith each of his properties, then each of his properties is

This seems flatlyincompatible with theobvious fact that God has several
properties; he has both power identical with the other."16 and mercifulness, say, neither of which is

in time or space.) Belief in properties as abstract objects is a mistake that arises from recognizing that the forms we think exist in our thought im materially and without causal powers, and supposing, like Frege, that the content of our thoughts exists in thisway even when we are not thinking them. could reply that this answer does not leave Aquinas's Plantinga that God is a form per se. But theory any better off. Aquinas maintains forms per se, according to his own theory, exist only in thought, and as such do not have any causal powers. We do not want to say thatGod exists powers; so we cannot

object, because he does not believe that properties are abstract objects. to him, there are no abstract objects. (I take 'abstract object' to According mean something that exists, but is not actual, and does not have a location

God is a property, thenhe is an abstract Aquinas would deny thatif

only in thought, or that he does not have any causal say that he is a form per se.

per se can only exist as such in thought. It is true that the forms of material causal powers in thismode of existence. But this is true precisely because

would be thatit is false tobelieve thatall forms Aquinas's response

can only exist as forms and do per se in thought, thatthey not have things

cannot exist on its own, because for a material form to really exist is to exist inmatter, and whiteness itself cannot be a material thing. Since it is their being material forms thatmakes it impossible for such forms to exist

A per se, likewhiteness, theyare formsofmaterial things. material form

AQUINAS

ON DIVINE

SIMPLICITY

529

on their own and be actual per se, we cannot infer that immaterial forms are unable to exist and be actual per se.We can be tempted to believe that forms cannot be actual, ifwe confuse the statement 'any form we can conceive of cannot be actual' with the statement 'we cannot conceive of the only any form's being actual'. The first statement is true, because forms thatwe can conceive of are the forms of material things. But these statements are not equivalent, and the first does not imply the second.

He thedoctrineof divine simplicity. immediately suggestsan answer to it not God is identical, with that iswidely held. "Perhaps the idea is that not indeedthat but would thusimply, power and knowledge are identical, thattheyare,we might say, identicalinGod; his knowledge is identical
with power and knowledge, but with his power and his knowledge. The view

Plantinga's

second difficulty is one that has often been raised against

his power."17 This description of Aquinas's position cannot be it describes God's nature as an individualized form, and because correct, itputs Aquinas held that forms are individualized by matter. Nevertheless, instance ofmore

than one form per se. But forms per se can also fall under forms per se, as determinates, for instance, fall under deter and it is possible for a single form per se to fall under more than minables; one broader form. The property of being a man falls under the property of being an animal and the property of being rational, but it is a single broader

us on the A for formcan be an righttrack a solution. single individualized

property; it does not consist in the conjunction of two properties, in the way that being a mathematical bicyclist is a conjunction of two properties. The properties thatwe attribute to the divine nature are not like de terminates that admit of no furtherdetermination. There are many different kinds of power, wisdom, goodness, beauty. Even in created things there are forms of one of these properties that are also forms of another; being

a good painting is the same as being a beautifulpainting,forexample, X. althoughbeing a good X isnot thesame as being a beautiful Thus it is to suppose thatthereis a property thatfallsunder all these quite possible we attribute God, and is thehighest to different general propertiesthat to would be like?as Aquinas is thefirst pointout?but thatisno property we This explains Aquinas's paradoxical view that can truly predicate terms God in theirliteralsense (cf. la q.13 a.3), while being ignorant of we apply in of his nature. There is no difficulty thisview ifthepredicates
reason to suppose that it does not exist. form of every one of these properties. We have no idea what such a

530

JOHN LAMONT

himself or having some property or other, but Aquinas wants to say that we can literally ascribe to God properties like knowledge or power. This is possible because the real properties that we can ascribe to God are

toGod are formalones or highlyvague ones, like being identical with

does not tellus thedeterminate formthattheytake God, butknowing this

in the divine nature, and is thus compatible with his essence.

general

ones,

as described

above.

These

properties

are

literally true of

Since this identity results from God's being immaterial, all immaterial beings?not substantial forms. The differ just God?are ence between God and the other substantial forms is thatGod is the only being who is identical with his existence as well as with his essence.

God is theonly beingwho is identical Aquinas does not thinkthat

with ignorance of that nature.

God's

essence, because thatwould mean that he would cause his own existence, which is impossible. It cannot be caused by something else, because he is cause. Therefore the uncaused it is false that his existence is not his essence, and his existence is his essence. to say that God's It is reasonable existence The that will be raised about cannot result from his is why,

in la q.3 a.5, is straightforward. If The argument for this conclusion, existence is not his essence, it either follows from his essence or is caused by something other than himself. It cannot follow from his

God's

question existence is not his essence, by something other than himself. Why can't we say thatGod's is not his essence, but that itdoes not have any cause? Why can't be a brute fact?

essence.

this argument itmust be that his existence

if

is caused just

existence God

Aquinas gives an answer to this question inArticle 7, where he holds that for a thing to have any sort of composition is for it to be caused. Having an essence that is different from one's existence is a form of com position;

may be trueto say thatsome of these formsof composition Although it implybeing an effect,it is dubious to extend thisgeneralization to all theseformsof composition. It is especially dubious in thecase of things

with accidents, in being a composite of form and matter, and in having an existence that is not one's essence, are all highly unlike one another.

position involved inbeing a whole made up of parts, inbeing a substance

different things under the term 'composition'.

This position is open toobjection. very Aquinas seems tobe lumping

The various forms of com

thus, it cannot exist inGod.

AQUINAS

ON DIVINE

SIMPLICITY

531

whose

essence

an essence composition

that differs from one's

is tionat all. Some justification needed for supposingthatit is a formof

Aquinas speculate about why he may that implies that a thing is an effect. does not offer any such justification. We have assumed can, however, this to be so, and use these

is not their existence. One might question whether having existence is really a form of composi

not belong to its essence, it is contingent. We can ask the question "Why does it exist?", assume that the thing is an effect, and set about looking for its cause. They do not require some further feature to inform them that it

If existencedoes speculationstofillup thehole inhis argument. a thing's

is an effect, before they think itworthwhile to look for a cause for it.18 Since being contingent means being an effect, God cannot be contingent. Since it belongs to his nature to not be contingent, his existing is a feature of his nature. Since he is his nature, he must also be his existence. This argument, together with the argument for God's being stantial form, gets us the essence of Aquinas's conception a sub

of the divine points out, is

not essential

for the proof of the doctrine, which, as Aquinas already established by the preceding articles. of divine necessity

The argument God's entiresimplicity for found in Article 7 is simplicity.

3. Aquinas's Several

conception

scholars would

Aquinas as holdinga view that They would object to itbecause itpresents that God existsnecessarily,in thesenseof its implies being impossiblefor
him not to exist. They deny thatAquinas believes God to be necessary in thisway; they assert that forAquinas, God's necessity consists in his being and not being dependent on anything else for his existence. Aquinas holds that there are many different necessary beings. A nec essary being is a being that cannot cease to exist or come into existence

the identity of God's

view of question the description of Aquinas's essence and existence that has been given above.

uncaused

through any natural process, and that does not have anything in its nature that would cause it to cease to exist. Necessary beings can come into existence only through creation ex nihilo, and can cease to exist only if God annihilates view. Although all necessary on Aquinas's caused by something other than themselves, God's them. Angels, the heavenly bodies, and prime matter are the necessity of these beings is necessity is not caused

532

JOHN LAMONT

attributes to God means thatAquinas 'There is a God' makes the proposition Several

by something other than himself. God is necessary in himself, and is the cause of the necessity of all other necessary beings. statements about Aquinas's view of necessity are generally These What scholars disagree on is the question of whether the necessity accepted. that God could not not exist, and

logically necessary. have denied that this is the case. of Aquinas interpreters describes many beings Patterson Brown19 has pointed out thatAquinas aside from God as necessary, and that this kind of necessity, as described above, does not mean it exist. Brown maintains that it is logically necessary that the beings who the difference between that forAquinas,

possess God and the other necessary beings is thatGod causes the necessity of the other necessary beings, and that God's supposition and his essence are identical. He explains this as follows: ... to add that a first being's existence is the same as its suppositum-cum essence is just to say that it exists of itself, that is, is uncreated. The mistake is oftenmade of thinking thatSt. Thomas's doctrine of identical essence and being is the same as his doctrine of necessary existence; but this is emphati cally not so. Only a being which is both necessary and also uncreated is ... So the supposed by Aquinas to have an identity of essence and being. of God's essence and being by no means implies that he actually identity exists, but only thathis existence would be underived. After all, Aquinas ex plicitly rejected the idea of basing an ontological argument on the unity of God's essence and being.20 The crucial step here is Brown's 'existing of itself with being equating and underived. These terms are purely negative ones. If that is

uncreated

action explains the existence of everything else, but whose own existence is simply the ultimate brute fact. God's has no explanation. He being necessary, on this view; rather, it implies that it is logically contingent. Brian Davies gives a similar account of Aquinas's conception of God's and simplicity.21What are we tomake of this account? necessity

God ends up as a being whose all thereis toGod's existingof himself,

does not implythat 'There is a God' is logically necessary inhimselfthus

It is quite clear that Aquinas held thatthe statement'God exists' is logicallynecessary.He says so explicitly in his discussion ofAnselm's ontological argument.In replyto thecontentionthattheproposition 'God between twoways inwhich exists' is self-evident, Aquinas distinguishes
can be self-evident.

propositions

AQUINAS

ON DIVINE

SIMPLICITY

533

... A thing can be self-evident in either of twoways; on the one hand, self evident in itself, though not to us; on the other hand, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject: e.g.,Man is an animal, for animal is contained in the essence ofman. If, therefore, the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all_If, however, there are some towhom the essence of the predicate and the subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know themeaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition, (la q.2
a.l).22

states that 'God exists' is self-evident in itself. "Therefore I say Aquinas that this proposition 'God exists', of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is his own existence, as will is the same as the subject; because God hereafter be shown."23

(la q.2 a.l). Thus, he holds 'God exists' to be argument in the logically necessary. In his remarks on the ontological Summa contra Gentiles, he states: For assuredly that God exists is, absolutely speaking, self-evident, since what God is is his own being. Yet, because we are not able to conceive in our minds that which God is, that God exists remains unknown in relation to us. So, too, that every whole is greater than itspart is, absolutely speaking, self would perforce be unknown to one who could not conceive the evident; but it nature of a whole.24 (SCG bk. 1 ch. 11)

to us, because we do not grasp the essence of God. We find out that 'God exists' is self-evident in itself through reasoning from God's effects, essence which enables us to establish the conclusion that God's is identical with his existence. essence and understand what For the blessed it is, 'God exists' in heaven, who is self-evident see God's to them as

is greater than its part' is a clear example of a logically 'Every whole necessary truth, and Aquinas's comparing it to 'God exists' illustrates his belief that 'God exists' is necessarily true. 'God exists' is not self-evident

a well as in itself. "For just as it is evident tous that whole is greaterthan a part of itself, so to those seeing the divine essence in itself it is evident that God exists because his essence is his being. But, supremely
because

but through effects."25 his being, not through God himself, his deduces thelogicalnecessityof 'God exists' fromthedivine Aquinas to not simplicity, from thenecessity thathe attributes God in theThird He does not say thatthenecessity that attributes God implies to he Way.

we are not able to see his essence, we arrive at the knowledge

of

534

JOHN LAMONT

that 'God exists' his essence

of thatfor Aquinas, whatmakes God necessary inhimself is the identity

and his existence. Since this identity entails that 'God exists' in himself makes 'God being necessary

is logically necessary. But it seems reasonable

to suppose

is logically necessary, God's exists' logically necessary.

Why do Brown andDavies deny that Aquinas holds thisposition,26 evenwhile citing thevery textsinwhich he states it? The most likelyex thinkit is possible for 'God exists' to be logicallynecessary,so theydo
is that they want to protect Aquinas from himself. They do not

planation not want

to think thatAquinas believes it is. This is seen most clearly in Davies. Davies accepts the account of existence that is given by Frege, who describes existence as a property of concepts, not of objects, and who understands statements of the form 'There are Xs' tomean "X" has instances'.27 We may conjecture thatDavies at least in part to Peter Geach.28 The desire felt interpretation of Aquinas to give a pious interpretation of Aquinas Davies and Geach is by Brown, an understandable one. It should be noted that Frege's account does not 'The concept and Brown owe their

possible

bility of the converse, of there being a that there is necessarily an object that that Aquinas gives for 'God planation difficult on the face of it to reconcile

to infer from some concepts, such as the concept of a round that there is necessarily no object that satisfies them; there does square, not seem to be anything in Frege's account thatwould rule out the possi

rule out thepossibilityof 'There is a God' being logicallynecessary. It is

concept from which we can infer satisfies it. But this is not the ex exists' being necessary. It seems is a Frege's view that existence is necessarily this threat to a view that is

property of concepts with the contention that 'God exists' true because God is identical with his existence. One might dismiss Brown's presupposes and Davies's worry about

on Frege's view of Aquinas's view of divine simplicity thegrounds that

existence

forms, Frege's ar replace Frege's concepts with Aquinas's for existence being a property of concepts can be changed into guments arguments for existence being a property of forms. Frege's view thus poses objects. a serious difficulty forAquinas's conception of divine simplicity. However,

But this would be tooquick.As we have seen, highlyimplausible. Aquinas's to tobe preferred Frege's belief inconcepts as abstract of theory formsis
If we

the truth of his view of concepts,

AQUINAS

ON DIVINE

SIMPLICITY

535

our examination us in a position

thinks and understands of what God's

God is a rationalbeing that Aquinas holds, reasonablyenough, that

himself. thinking of himself In order to arrive at some understanding involves, we must consider what is

of Aquinas's understanding to answer this objection.

of divine

simplicity has put

have such a thought, it is true, but there is nothing impossible about doing so. Consider thinking of an immaterial being other than God, such as an In this case, the form of the angel will exist with esse intentionale angel. in our intellect. But the angel, since it is immaterial, is a form. Does

We are not in a position to involved in thinking an immaterial of being.

this

mean thatthe angel itselfexists in our intellect? Aquinas rightlydenies

it is to be an angel is to be actual, to have causal But actuality is not part of the content of the forms of angels?it powers. is a property of such forms, not a characteristic of them. A thought of an (the thought) has esse angel, held, say, by another angel, is not actual?it that it does. Part of what intentionale only, not esse naturale. The angel itself is the form existing as actual, not just in thought. In God's case, though, this is not so. God's existence is his essence, so we cannot distinguish between God's form existing as actual and God's

form existing in thought in the way thatwe can with angels. Being actual is a feature of the content of the form that is God, which is not the case with the angels. This is difficult to grasp, but reflection shows that it is true. For God, to exist means to be wholly actuality are the same as essence inGod's tic of the form that isGod, actual, and since existence and case, actuality is a characteris

God is identical with the characteristics his form, of which includehis

actuality, and the characteristics of a form are what make

and cannot be separated from that form. Since

a exists in thought, thought God isGod himself. of This conclusion enables us to resolve thedifficulty thedoctrine for divine simplicitythat is posed by Frege's analysis of the concept of of of of existence. Since a thought God isGod, God's thought himself is Since God is a subsistent God is thought itself. his God; form, thinking means that is a formthatis an instance a thought thatthinks itself he being of itself. But a form that is an instanceof itselfis a form thathas the
property of existing, 'existence'. Aquinas's in our revised version of Frege's sense of the word understanding of the divine nature thus not only

up a form that

536

JOHN LAMONT

permits God to have existence as a property, it requires him to have it. true Since God exists and has his properties necessarily, it is necessarily that existence, in the revised Fregean sense, is a property of God. Accep tance of this sense of existence thus does not require us to deny God's

One might object to thisaccount,on thegrounds thatitstatesthatthe If is formthinking identicalto theformthought. theseare identical,there no distinction and thought; such a distinction will be between thinker but The replyto thisobjection is that is essential for theexistenceof thought. we must distinguish of between theproperties theformthatisGod and the
content of the form. The content of the form thinking is numerically identical with the content of the form that is thought?it is one and the same form form being thought are not the same. Being thought is a property, not a characteristic, of a form; and the difference in properties between the form entails that they are not identical.

simplicity or his necessary

existence.29

thatthinks and is thought. But theproperties theformthinking of and the

serves to individuatethe two, and and the formbeing thought thinking

in his Trinitarian

God thinks himselfplays an important of role Aquinas's belief that

theology. In his view, God's thought of himself is the of intellect that generates the second person of the Trinity, the is the thought of the form that is God. As well as a procession postulates a procession of will inGod, whereby God

procession Son, who

of intellect, Aquinas

The first person, the Father, is the form that thinks and loves. The divine of the simplicity enables us to see that it is not only the procession of the divine nature. Love is an aspect of the divine nature, that can be

loves his thought himself; this love is the third of person, the Holy Spirit. but intellect, also theprocession of the will, that gives rise to an instance

means thatin theprocession of the But that will, predicatedof it. literally a form that is love loves itself. Love loving itselfis a form that is an instance itself. of The divine simplicity Persons are explainswhy thethree not three Gods. God is thedivine nature itself, content theone form the of
that exists in the three Persons. Since the three Persons are not three

The account given ofAquinas's conceptionof divine simplicity has, I hope, succeeded in showing thatitcan be supported solid arguments. by These argumentsare based in part on philosophical positions thatare are in but thatcannotbe dismissed as untenable,and that hotlycontested,

different divine natures, but only one, they are not three different Gods.

AQUINAS

ON DIVINE

SIMPLICITY

537

my opinion correct. A complete defence of Aquinas's of a single paper.30

views would

a defence of thesepositions,but such a task would go beyond the limits

require

John Lamont The Queen's College,

Oxford NOTES
80.

1. InAnscombe and Geach, Three Philosophers (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1961), p.

2. Aquinas, Summa theologica, la q.39 a.3, in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas

Aquinas, vol. I, Anton C. Pegis ed. (NewYork: Random House, 1945), p. 368. 3. See Gottlob Frege, "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,"collected inPhilosophical Logic, P. F. Strawson ed. (London:Oxford UniversityPress, 1967), esp. p. 29. 4. Michael Dummett,Origins ofAnalyticPhilosophy (London:Duckworth, 1993), pp.
25-26. 6. 7. 5. Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., p. p. p. 190. 190. 191.

would

8. One could avoid thiscircularity giving an extensional,and presumably physi by calistic, account of what it is to possess ?ie ability to use language.But such an account
be open to all the problems about inscrutability of reference and indeterminacy of

the that have beenmade familiartous through work ofQuine. Itwould also be translation about rule-following thatSaul Kripke has setout in vulnerable to the skepticaldifficulties MA: Harvard University his Wittgensteinon Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Press, 1982).Kripke's skepticalproblem is thatit is possible forany exercise of theability to use language to be understood as expressing indefinitely many different concepts. I cannotdo justice here to theextensivedebate that Kripke's problemhas given rise to,and we accept thatthe will only expressmy opinion thatthisproblem can only be resolved if ability to use language presupposes thegrasp of the concepts that language expresses, to of insteadof trying explain thegrasp of concepts in terms thisability. 9. AnthonyKenny makes thispoint inhis important paper "Aquinas: Intentionality," collected in Past, Ted Honderich ed. (London: Penguin, 1984).My Philosophy Through its ofAquinas's views owes much to Kenny. exposition 10. See e.g., his Reason, Truthand History (Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1981) and his "WhyThere Isn't a Ready-madeWorld," inRealism & Reason: Philosoph ical Papers, vol. 3 (NewYork: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1983), pp. 205-28. 12. David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Oxford:Blackwell, 1980), p. 5. 13. la q.84 a.4, inPegis, Basic Writings,vol. I, p. 802. formscan all be described as formsand as immaterial, but 14. It is truethatimmaterial thereare no essential universals thattheyare instancesof, since theyare all essentially
11. Reason, Truth and History, p. 5.

538

JOHN LAMONT

different particular

from one

15. Alvin Plantinga, "Does God Have a Nature?", 1980Aquinas Lecture (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette UniversityPress, 1980), p. 47.
16. 17. Ibid., p. 41. Ibid.,p.4S. 18. This repeats 19. Patterson Ibid., a point I have made in "An Argument on Necessary Being," for an Uncaused Philosophical The vol.

another; one cannot to. immaterial forms belong

speak

of essential

kinds

of immaterial

forms,

that

Thomist, April 1995. LXXIII

20. p. 89.

Cause," Review,

(Jan. 1964), pp. 76-90.

Brown,

"St. Thomas

21. See Brian Davies, O.P.,The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 56-57.
22. 23. 24. la q.2 a.l, in Pegis, Basic Writings, vol. I, p. 19. Ibid., p. 19. contra gentiles, Summa book I, ch. 11; trans. Anton

C.

Image Books, 1955), p. 81.

25. Ibid., p. 82. 26. W. L. Craig

Pegis

(Garden

City, NY:

and William

Rowe

also

derstandingof God's necessity; see Craig's The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Aquinas (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 183, and Rowe's The Cosmological Argument NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1975), pp. 40-41. (Princeton,
27. Davies has

accept

Brown's

description

of Aquinas's

un

tionalPhilosophical Quarterly 30 (1990), pp. 151-57. 28. See Anscombe and Geach, Three Philosophers (Oxford:Blackwell, 1961), p. 89. 29. One might use thepossibilityof there being a God thatis a formthatis an instance of itselfto argue for theexistence ofGod. I don't know if this would work or not.
30. I must express Marion, Prof. Mathieu my thanks for helpful to Fr. Brian comments O.P., Prof. Michael Davies, Dummett, on earlier versions of this paper. and

argued

for this conception

in "Does

God

Create

Existence?",

Interna