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ANALELE UNIVERSITII BUCURETI

FILOSOFIE

2011 Volumul II

SUMAR SOMMAIRE CONTENTS


ISTORIA FILOSOFIEI CONSTANTIN STOENESCU, Argumentul lui Berkeley mpotriva materialitii lumii ... CRISTIAN IFTODE, Dublul sens al analogiei n opera lui Platon ..................................... 3 13

ETIC CORNELIA MARGARETA GPREL, Reiterri etice privind conceptul de contiin moral. Jean Piaget Jean Libis Max Scheler ...................................................... CONSTANTIN VIC, Relaia etic-politic n filosofia practic aristotelic .................... DAN NICA, Originile disputei etice dintre particularism i generalism: Platon i Aristotel ...

29 39 51

VARIA MIHAELA POP, Probleme ale artei contemporane ............................................................ GHEORGHE TEFANOV, What Is It for Someone to Have Unconscious Opinions? ...... 63 81

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MIHAI VACARIU, GABRIEL VACARIU, The Synchrony or Temporal Coding Theory (Temporal Binding) ................................................................................................. SEEMA BOSE, Focus on Ageing A Neglected Aspect of Simone de Beauvoirs Radicalism ............................................................................................................... OANA ZAMFIRACHE, Is Pornography a Perversion? ...................................................... ADRIANA NICOLETA SORA, Explanation and Understanding ......................................

87 103 109 117

ARGUMENTUL LUI BERKELEY MPOTRIVA MATERIALITII LUMII


CONSTANTIN STOENESCU

Abstract My aim in this article is to do both a survey and an assessment of Berkeley skeptical argument against the materiality of the word. I suppose that a historical understanding of this argument as a strong critique of Lockes empiricist theory should be the right approach. In the same time, I take into account Graylings recent ideas about the Berkeleys argument as one for immaterialism and the connection between this argument and his skeptical epistemological attitude. Keywords: Lockes theory of ideas, Berkeleys argument against materiality, Graylings approach, idealism, skepticism.

O motenire cartezian n acest studiu mi propun s pun n discuie argumentul lui Berkeley mpotriva materialitii lumii n condiiile asumrii unei analize unificate, adic o cercetare care ia n seam relaia dintre argumentele epistemologice i cele teologice. Mai mult dect att, ncerc s ofer, n msura posibilitilor, o reconstrucie n contextul ntregii opere filosofice a lui Berkeley. De asemenea, adaug i faptul c, n linii mari, demersul meu urmeaz, n unele dintre aspectele aa-zis hotrtoare, ipotezele interpretative propuse de A. C. Grayling1. n fine, susin c o analiz istoric, deopotriv de tip contextual i reconstructiv, poate asigura cea mai bun interpretare a argumentului lui Berkeley, i anume, ca un critic al teoriei ideilor a lui Locke. Se consider n mod tradiional c Berkeley a formulat un argument sceptic cu privire la materialitatea lumii. El neag existena materiei sau a substanei materiale. Face acest lucru, este o prere mprtit de majoritatea exegeilor, n relaie cu alte trei teze filosofice de amplitudine metafizic maximal, categorial: 1. Teza idealist spiritul constituie realitatea ultim; 2. Teza solipsist existena lucrurilor const n a fi percepute; 3. Teza infinitii spiritul este o substan infinit, adic este Dumnezeu.
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Universitatea din Bucureti Vezi GRAYLING (1986), (2008).

CONSTANTIN STOENESCU

Istoricii filosofiei pun aceste teme n relaie de continuitate cu filosofia lui Descartes i susin c i Berkeley, asemenea altor filosofi de la nceputurile modernitii, nu face nimic altceva dect s ncerce s ofere rspunsuri la provocrile teoretice carteziene. Cu alte cuvinte, Descartes a stabilit temele dezbaterii, iar cei de dup el au purtat o controvers rodnic asupra diverselor soluii ale problemelor. Putem vorbi astfel despre o tradiie filosofic a modernitii n care l situam pe Descartes ca punct de pornire.

Berkeley, inconsistent sau interpretat unilateral? Cum l situm ns pe Berkeley n aceast tradiie? Cred c reconsiderarea unor cliee interpretative se poate face printr-o reconstrucie istoric riguroas. De fapt, lecturile unilaterale, centrate pe scoaterea la iveal a unui anumit aspect al gndirii lui Berkeley sunt acelea care trebuie depite printr-o hermeneutic integrativ. n consecin, pentru a fi corect neles, Berkeley trebuie vzut din perspectiva a trei ipostaze, ca autor al unei viziuni metafizice asupra naturii sau realitii, fiind n acest sens un metafizician speculativ, ca susintor al simului comun, fiind drept urmare un empirist, n fine, ca aprtor doctrinar al religiei i moralei, fiind asemenea unui teolog2. Argumentele lui Berkeley sunt ndreptate mpotriva materialitii lumii. Totui, nu cumva o schimbare de perspectiv, nu doar n scop euristic, ar duce la o mai bun nelegere a tezelor lui Berkeley i ne-ar favoriza o nou interpretare asupra atitudinii epistemologice a acestuia? Grayling inverseaz perspectiva tradiional i susine c, de fapt, Berkeley formuleaz un argument n favoarea imaterialitii lumii, argument care, considerat mpreun cu celelalte trei teze enunate mai sus, servete scopului de a respinge dou tipuri de scepticism. Primul este scepticismul epistemologic, ideea c cunoaterea realitii este problematic sau imposibil deoarece avem acces empiric doar la aparene. Al doilea este scepticismul teologic, ateismul, chiar deismul, de vreme ce acesta din urm presupune c universul subzist fr activitatea creatoare continu a divinitii. n opoziie cu scepticismul epistemologic, Berkeley apr simul comun i elimin cauzele erorilor din tiin, iar n opoziie cu cel teologic apr religia. Dac ne raportm la opera lui Berkeley, atunci vom cosemna c n Treatise (Principii) i Trei dialoguri scepticismul teologic este atacat pe baze metafizice, pe cnd n Alciphron se ocup de bazele doctrinare. n cele din urm, Berkeley susine c ofer o dovad a existenei lui Dumnezeu.
Aceast tripl poziionare filosofic a lui Berkeley este descris de Warnock n Introducere la Principii: Nu este deloc surprinztor faptul c a fost n mare msur greit neles, pentru c, de fapt, poziia lui este foarte dificil de interpretat n mod consistent. Din cauza convingerilor sale metafizice stranii, nu poate fi privit ca fiind doar un prieten i aprtor al simului comun: i totui, de vreme ce ataamentul su fa de simul comun a fost, n felul su, att autentic, ct i justificat, el nu poate fi vzut nici ca fiind doar un metafizician foarte speculativ. El a fost de fapt ambele i, n plus, un apologet al religiei. (WARNOCK, Introducere, n Berkeley (2004), p. 10).
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ARGUMENTUL LUI BERKELEY MPOTRIVA MATERIALITII LUMII

Berkeley, critic al lui Locke Teoria ideilor a lui Locke, arat Berkeley n Principii, presupune o dubl existen a obiectelor, una inteligibil, n minte, alta n realitate, independent de minte. Apare astfel o prpastie ntre experien i realitate care duce la scepticism: de unde tim c ceea ce percepem este asemntor cu obiectele ca atare? Dac suntem contieni direct doar de percepiile noastre i nu de lucruri ca atare, atunci cum putem cunoate aceste lucruri? Avem temeiuri pentru a aserta existena lor? nainte de Berkeley a fost formulat distincia dintre caliti primare i caliti secundare. Calitile primare cauzeaz n noi ideile care le reprezint, ideile fiind asemntoare lucrurilor. Substana material este suportul calitilor, un concept tehnic non-empiric pe care Berkeley nu-l accept ca empirist consecvent. Locke intrase ntr-o ncurctur n legtur cu teoria sa despre substan. Substana este definit de Locke drept acel ceva sau acel substrat cruia i aparin calitile Acestea din urm nu pot exista de sine stttor. Dar a spune c substana este acel ceva imperceptibil i indescriptibil cruia i aparin calitile nu nseamn a defini substana nsi. Nu putem spune ns mai mult de att, deoarece a spune ceva nseamn a-i atribui substanei o calitate, deci nu putem ajunge la un rspuns cu privire la ntrebarea despre ce anume este substana. O a doua ncurctur ine de trasarea distinciei dintre o substan material, substrat al calitilor lucrurilor materiale, i o substan imaterial, substrat al proprietilor i fenomenelor imateriale, aa cum sunt contiina, gndirea sau sensibilitatea senzorial. Dar dac nu tim nimic despre substan, atunci nseamn c nu avem nici un temei pentru a deosebi ntre cele dou tipuri de substane. De unde rezult c nu putem respinge ipoteza c exist o singur substan, substrat att pentru proprieti materiale ct i pentru fenomene imateriale. Berkeley supune unei critici severe aceast concepie despre substan a lui Locke. n primul rnd, teoria lui Locke duce la scepticism religios. Dac universul fizic este un mecanism newtonian, atunci care este locul lui Dumnezeu n aceast ordine cosmic? Locke pare s accepte ideea c Dumnezeu este creatorul mecanismului cosmic, dar pune n discuie i ipoteza c universul exist dintotdeauna, ceea ce ar face redundant ipoteza existenei lui Dumnezeu. i ipoteza existenei a dou feluri de substane, aceea material i aceea imaterial, l duce pe Locke la o atitudine sceptic. El nu lmurete relaia dintre suflet i corp, ceea ce las loc n teoria sa pentru ipoteza c contiina este o proprietate a materiei i, prin urmare, ea depinde de un corp. Berkeley consider c teoria lui Locke este periculoas din punct de vedere religios i absurd din perspectiv filosofic, n primul rnd prin consecinele sale sceptice. Cheia respingerii teoriei lui Locke const n analiza deosebirii dintre caliti primare i caliti secundare n legtur cu distincia

CONSTANTIN STOENESCU

dintre idei i obiecte n condiiile filosofice ale asumrii realismului reprezentaional. Dup Locke, obiectele nu sunt aa cum par, deoarece calitile secundare nu le aparin. Dup Berkeley, aceast dintre cele dou tipuri de caliti vine mpotriva simului comun i nu este nici ntemeiat. ntr-adevr, recunoate Berkeley, unele obiecte pot aprea altfel dect sunt n funcie de condiiile de observaie, dar acest lucru este valabil pentru ambele tipuri de caliti. Dac schimbarea condiiilor de luminozitate poate duce la modificarea culorii percepute, asemntor, schimbarea unghiului din care privim un obiect poate duce la modificarea formei percepute. Mai mult dect att, Berkeley duce pn la ultimele consecine teoria lui Locke. Dac noi suntem contieni numai de imaginile din minte ale obiectelor, atunci cum putem ti c unele sunt diferite de obiecte, iar altele nu? Dac am fi contieni numai de imaginile din mintea noastr, adic de reprezentrile obiectelor, atunci nu am avea cum s comparm aceste imagini cu obiectele din lumea extern, acestea din urm fiind inaccesibile pentru noi. n al doilea rnd, nu am mai avea temeiuri nici pentru a fi siguri de existena lumii externe. Cderea lui Locke n scepticism este fr putin de salvare. Totui, Locke nu ne ofer chiar nici o ans pentru a presupune cumva c exist obiecte ntr-o lume extern? La o privire atent vom spune c o eventual cercetare a procesului cauzal prin care sunt produse imaginile din mintea noastr ne va duce la presupunerea c exist obiectele din lumea extern. Locke ofer o explicaie mecanicist, i anume c obiectele ar exercita o aciune mecanic asupra organelor de sim. Dup Berkeley aceast tentativ de explicaie este un eec factual, deoarece nu ne este deloc clar n ce fel aceste micri din impuls ale obiectelor produc micri n creier, iar aceste micri produc apoi idei. Pe de alt parte, principial, conceptual sau teoretic, Locke ar grei iari, ideea sa de cauzalitate mecanic nefiind clar, ci mai degrab doar o descriere a regularitii producerii unor evenimente. Hume va lmuri aceast problem a relaiei dintre succesiune i uniformitate. Locke i Berkeley au i preri diferite cu privire la virtutea explicativ a ideii de mecanism. Locke crede c explicaia prin mecanisme i explicaia mecanicist sunt forme corecte ale explicaiei tiinifice. El consider c ideea de mecanism este un model de inteligibilitate, c obiectele pot fi cercetate asemenea unor mainrii i c analogia cu ceasornicul are un caracter euristic. n schimb, ideea de mecanism este considerat neatrgtoare de ctre Berkeley. El respinge cu trie explicaia mecanicist, precum i ideea c natura ar fi asemenea unei mainrii3. Drept consecin, teoria lui Locke este n contradicie cu simul comun, duce la scepticism i este periculoas pentru religie i moral.

Vezi WARNOCK, n Berkeley (2004), p. 21.

ARGUMENTUL LUI BERKELEY MPOTRIVA MATERIALITII LUMII

Soluiile lui Berkeley Aadar, din perspectiva unei reconstrucii istorice riguroase i integrative a criticii fcute de Berkeley teoriei lui Locke, acesta din urm se confrunt cu eecuri n toate privinele. Presupunnd c este aa, c Berkeley are dreptate, atunci care sunt soluiile sale la problemele puse n discuie? Dup Berkeley soluia pentru a iei din ncurcturile lui Locke const n respingerea existenei materiei. Drept consecin, eforturile lui Locke de a teoretiza pe seama substanei materiale devin inutile. Nu vom mai discuta nici despre ideea de substan material i nici despre corpuri exterioare n sensul lui Locke. Corpurile exterioare vor fi identificate cu ideile, nu deosebite de acestea n sensul lui Locke. Este n afara oricrei ndoieli c noi avem idei, iar dac ideile sunt identificate cu corpurile, atunci este n afara oricrei ndoieli i faptul c exist corpuri exterioare. Locke a dedublat lumea n corpuri i idei despre corpuri i a pus un vl al aparenei ntre ele, ajungnd la scepticism. Dup Berkeley noi suntem contieni n mod nemijlocit de corpurile externe, copaci i case, nu prin intermediul unor imagini mintale. Ct privete ipoteza c aceste corpuri externe sunt cauze ale ideilor, Berkley o neutralizeaz prin presupunerea c adevrata cauz a apariiei ideilor este o substan spiritual activ. Dar dac obiectele externe sunt colecii de idei, atunci nu ar trebui s presupunem c ele exist numai cnd sunt percepute, adic sunt idei ntr-o minte? Berkeley nu vede nici o dificultate aici deoarece nu este vorba de o minte omeneasc, ci de mintea lui Dumnezeu, adic un spirit infinit, omniprezent, care percepe i obiecte nepercepute de vreo minte omeneasc. Drept urmare, respingerea ipotezei lui Locke cu privire la existena obiectelor externe duce i la anihilarea oricror ameninri la adresa credinei religioase. Orice obiect perceput este un efect i o dovad a existenei lui Dumnezeu. n fine, este respins i ipoteza cu privire la conceperea universului asemenea unei mainrii. Exist numai mini finite i mintea lui Dumnezeu, nu o lume de corpuri aflate n interaciune mecanic. Dar care ar fi atunci statutul tiinelor fizice n care sunt folosite asemenea explicaii? Berkeley pare s nu fie ngrijorat n Principii i n Dialoguri de dificultile presupuse de respingerea teoriei corpusculare a materiei, teorie de succes n epoc, susinut de Galilei, Newton, Boyle i ali mari fizicieni. Berkeley susine iniial c tiinele fizice trebuie s ofere doar reguli generale ale experienei sau generalizri empirice, nu i ipoteze cu privire la ceea ce este imperceptibil. Ulterior, n De motu, va accepta c ne putem folosi de anumite presupoziii, care sunt doar utile, nu i adevrate. De exemplu, putem discuta despre lumin ca i cum aceasta ar avea o natur corpuscular. Berkeley are meritul de a fi intuit aici o problem discutat mai trziu n legtur cu relaia dintre observaie i construcia teoriei.

8 Interpretarea propus de Grayling

CONSTANTIN STOENESCU

Dup Grayling4 negarea existenei materiei nu este o negare a existenei lumii externe i a obiectelor fizice pe care ea le conine, precum scaune i copaci. Mai mult dect att, Berkeley n-ar susine nici c lumea exist numai pentru c este perceput de o minte finit. ntr-un sens special al termenului, Berkeley este un realist deoarece susine c existena lumii fizice este independent de minile finite. Berkeley susine ns c existena lumii nu este independent de Spirit. Ne reamintim c Berkeley argumenteaz mpotriva scepticismului, artnd c exist o prpastie ntre experien i lume, ntre idei i lucruri, deoarece lucrurile sunt idei. Acest argument foarte cunoscut este expus n paragrafele 1-7 din Principiile cunoaterii. Aceste teze sunt apoi aprate n ntreaga lucrare. Pe scurt, lucrurile pe care le contientizm prin experiene perceptuale episodice copaci, pietre, mere sunt colecii de idei. Ideile sunt obiecte imediate ale contiinei. Pentru a exista, ele trebuie percepute, ele nu pot exista fr spirit. Prin urmare, spiritul este substana lumii5. Grayling coreleaz aceast interpretare cu teza c metoda analitic de analiz ne cere s deosebim ntre trei niveluri ale experienei6. Nivelul I privete fenomenologia experienei, const din datul senzorial de care suntem contieni, culori, sunete, etc. Nivelul al II-lea const din fenomenele de experien, copaci, mese, pe care le vedem i le atingem. Nivelul I este aparent din perspectiva unei examinri stricte a experienei. Fenomenele nivelului al II-lea sunt constituite din datele nivelului I, nu n mod reductiv, ci mediat de nivelul al III-lea, cel metafizic de explicaie, care descrie activitatea cauzal intenional a minii n producerea nivelelor I i II. Aceasta l va duce pe Berkeley la o filosofie proto- pozitivist a tiinei. Spiritul activ produce n noi regulariti pentru nivelul al II-lea, care apare cauzal i pentru nivelul I, care este coerent. Drept urmare, susine Grayling mpotriva unei puternice tradiii de interpretare, este o greeal s-l clasificm pe Berkeley drept fenomenalist7. Fenomenalismul susine c obiectele fizice sunt construcii (logice) din date senzoriale actuale sau posibile. Masa exist i cnd nu o percepem dac lum ca adevrat propoziia condiional contrafactual c masa ar putea fi perceput de cineva care s-ar afla acolo. Berkeley are o concepie complet diferit. Esse est percipi nseamn c un lucru trebuie s fie perceput actual pentru a exista, fiind perceput actual de o minte infinit. n fenomenalism avem numai nivelele I i al II-lea.

4 5 6 7

GRAYLING (2008), p. 6. Pentru aceast interpretare vezi GRAYLING (2008), p. 9, pp. 18-19. GRAYLING (1986), pp. 22-49. GRAYLING (2008), p. 11.

ARGUMENTUL LUI BERKELEY MPOTRIVA MATERIALITII LUMII

Teza celor trei niveluri este nsoit de alte trei susineri, i anume, 1. opiunea pentru empirism, 2. caracterul epistemic al modalitii, 3. vaguitatea noiunii de idee abstract8. Nu este aici timpul i locul pentru o discuie de detaliu a acestor aspecte. Pe scurt, din perspectiv epistemologic Berkeley este un empirist riguros, un susintor al unei teorii empiriste radicale, adic al ideii c numai experiena justific semnificaia cognitiv. Tema va fi reluat de empirismul logic al Cercului de la Viena. Pe de alt parte, Berkeley este un antirealist epistemologic i un idealist metafizic n sensul c el susine c nu exist o substan material. Berkeley respinge conceptul de substan material deoarece nu l putem ntemeia empiric9. Pentru Berkeley ideile sunt inerte i dependente de minte. Berkeley l anticipeaz n aceast privin pe Hume. El susine, aa cum o va face Hume ulterior, c, mai nti, nu avem o conexiune necesar ntre idei, n al doilea rnd, c ideile senzoriale sunt mai puternice dect cele ale imaginaiei10. Acum putem lmuri i sensul n care Grayling l consider pe Berkeley un realist. Acesta este un realist ntr-un sens special al termenului deoarece consider c lumea exist independent de gndire i experienele unei mini finite11. Exist lucruri, nu substana material. Lucrurile sunt percepute continuu de mintea infinit, de Dumnezeu. Altfel spus, Dumnezeu ine lumea printr-un act de continu creaie. Divinitatea cauzeaz ideile de care suntem contieni. Constatm c teoria lui Berkeley se bazeaz pe asumpia, mprumutat de la Locke, care o luase de la Descartes, i anume c ncepem filosofarea cu datele private ale contiinei individuale, cele care constituie experiena individual. Devine posibil obiecia c Berkeley confund calitile sensibile cu ideile senzoriale. Condiiile de adevr ale propoziiilor Aceast mas este mare i Masa mi se pare maro sunt diferite. Masa ar putea fi mare fr s mi se par astfel i invers, ceea ce nseamn c argumentul lui Berkeley cade12. Dar acest ultim argument mpotriva lui Berkeley se bazeaz pe asumpia c enunurile despre calitile obiectelor sunt independente de enunurile despre felul n care ele pot fi cunoscute, ceea ce este echivalent cu aseriunea c exist fapte de observaie independente de calitile obiectelor care pot fi enunate, fr vreo referire la experienele cu privire la ele, ceea ce Berkeley respinge. Dup el, orice caracterizare a calitilor sensibile trebuie s fac referire la felul n care ele apar pentru o fiin care percepe, actual sau potenial. Cum am putea explica roeaa independent de felul n care ea apare n simurile celui ce percepe? Aa c, conchide Grayling13 , obiecia cade ca urmare a respingerii distinciei pare/este, care duce la scepticism.
8 9 10 11 12 13

GRAYLING (2008), p. 13. Vezi GRAYLING (2008), pp. 19-20. GRAYLING (2008), pp. 21-22. GRAYLING (2008), p. 23. Vezi GRAYLING (2008), p. 25. Vezi GRAYLING (2008), p. 25.

10

CONSTANTIN STOENESCU

Drept consecin, obiectele sensibile sunt colecii de caliti sensibile, deci, de idei. Contrastul este ntre obiecte sensibile (colecii de caliti sensibile percepute nemijlocit) i obiecte care exist independent de percepie i o cauzeaz, ceea ce este altceva dect contrastul dintre obiecte sensibile i date senzoriale n sensul de coninuturi neinterpretate ale strilor senzoriale. Pentru Berkeley ceea ce este nemijlocit prezent n experien este obiectul sensibil, iar nu reprezentarea mediat diferit de obiect. De aceea Berkeley ar fi un antireprezentaionalist. El ar fi de accord c nu putem infera de la pete de culoare i alte date senzoriale la existena n lume a copacilor, la ceea ce vedem nemijlocit. Apare o alt problem 14 . Berkeley spune c percepem obiecte precum copacii i, n acelai timp, percepem nemijlocit culori. Grayling face apel la o dezbatere recent pentru a lmuri aceste aspecte. Copacii sunt interpretri sau inferene ale datelor senzoriale i a vorbi despre copaci nseamn a trece dincolo de a vorbi despre culori. Obiectele fizice sunt considerate independente, ele sunt disponibile public, aa c obiectele sensibile i datele senzoriale trebuie separate strict. l aprm pe Berkeley apelnd la discuia despre nivelurile experienei. La nivelul 1 percepem nemijlocit culori i suprafee, la nivelul 2 copacii, iar nivelul 2 const din ceea ce furnizeaz nivelul 1. Este greit s credem c percepem separat verdele i separat copacul, ca i cum copacul ar fi suplimentar calitilor sensibile care l constituie. S considerm acum acele obiecii care vizeaz conceptul metafizic de spirit infinit. Berkeley formuleaz un argument prin excluziune materia este redundant i face cteva consideraii antimaterialiste. Berkeley recunoate c tiina a fcut progrese pe baza filosofiei corpusculare, dar susine c puterea explicativ a tiinei nu depinde de ipoteza materialist. Teoriile sunt instrumente, nu adevrate sau false, ci utile sau nu. Materialismul ar fi doar un apel la cea mai simpl explicaie. Postularea existenei materiei simplific explicaiile, asemenea aplicrii briciului lui Ockham.. Punctul cheie ar consta, mai nti, n considerarea tezei c materia este non-mental i nu poate fi suportul calitilor deoarece acestea sunt idei care subzist ntr-o substan gnditoare, n al doilea rnd, n teza c materia este inert cauzal, nu poate produce schimbare, micare sau idei15. Dac Locke susine c prin experiena calitilor primare intrm n contact cu realitatea independent de mintea noastr, Berkeley arat c nimic nu poate fi asemenea unei idei n afara unei idei. Unii au susinut c putem respinge materialismul fr a respinge distincia dintre caliti primare i caliti secundare. Dar Berkeley chiar asta face16. Rmne de analizat baza cartezian a proiectului lui Berkeley i teza c un spirit infinit percepe orice tot timpul. Din aceast perspectiv capt contur ideea c Berkley construiete un argument al existenei lui Dumnezeu17. Las pentru alt ocazie analiza de detaliu a acestui argument.
14 15 16 17

Vezi GRAYLING (2008), p. 26. Vezi GRAYLING (2008), pp. 30-31. GRAYLING (2008), p. 31. Vezi GRAYLING (2008), pp. 36-40.

ARGUMENTUL LUI BERKELEY MPOTRIVA MATERIALITII LUMII

11

Evaluare oarecum concluziv ntrebarea legitim este dac proiectul filosofic propus de Berkeley reuete n anihilarea scepticismului i revigorarea simului comun. i gsesc oare soluiile sale filosofice o ndreptire pornind de la simul comun? Chiar aici ntlnim o dificultate, deoarece Berkeley, dei elimin scepticismul prin punerea n condiie de identitate a ideilor cu fiinele percepute, neag existena lucrurilor materiale. n termenii lui Warnock: axioma sa care spune c esse este percipi sau percipere, c a exista nseamn a fi perceput sau a percepe, este cu siguran adevrat despre lumea sa, dar fals despre lumea noastr. 18 Aceasta pentru c respingerea materiei i pstrarea doar a ideilor l oblig s susin c este autocontradictoriu s presupunem c exist vreun obiect care nu este actualmente perceput19. Chiar dac, aa cum crede Warnock, aceast presupoziie nu ar duce la dificulti pentru viziunea simului comun, rmne problema diferenei dintre lumea nesubstanial presupus de Berkeley i lumea substanial n care presupunem c trim. Dar nu cumva ncercarea de a reface aceast diferen duce napoi la Locke? Sau este posibil o alt cale fr lumea obiectelor externe a lui Locke? Dup prerea mea, problema ine de condiia epistemic a realismului reprezentaional i de posibilitatea elaborrii unui realism direct care nu ar dubla entitile i ar fi deopotriv o alternativ la fenomenalism. Cred c o rentoarcere la teoriile simului comun poate fi un punct de plecare, cel puin ca exerciiu filosofic, n readucerea n prim plan a realismului direct.

BIBLIOGRAFIE

BERKELEY, GEORGE, 2004, Tratat asupra principiilor cunoaterii omeneti, introducere i note de G. J. Warnock, traducere de Laureniu Staicu, Bucureti, Editura Humanitas. GRAYLING, A. C, 1986, Berkeley: The Central Argument, London, Duckworth. GRAYLING, A. C., 2008, Berkeleys Argument for Immaterialism, n A. C. Grayling, Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge, New York-London, Continuum. LOCKE, JOHN, 1961, Eseu asupra intelectului omenesc, 2 volume, traducere de Armand Rou i Teodor Voiculescu, Bucureti, Editura tiinific.

18 19

WARNOCK (2004), p. 35. WARNOCK (2004), p. 35.

DUBLUL SENS AL ANALOGIEI N OPERA LUI PLATON


CRISTIAN IFTODE

Dintre legturi, cea mai frumoas este (...) analogia. (Platon, Timaios, 31c)

Abstract The goal of this paper is to emphasize the key methodological role played by the notion of analogy in Platos philosophy. My main thesis is that Plato doesnt operate with two relatively distinct concepts of analogy, one being the mathematical analogy and the other a participative and ontological concept of analogy, but that he considers the participation not so much the other meaning of analogy as the other side of it or rather the necessary condition in order to transfer the mathematical notion of proportion in the field of ontology. Keywords: analogy, Plato, the Good, being, participation, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.

Platon nu a fost, desigur, primul gnditor grec care a apelat la analogii n textele sale. Se pare ns c el a fost primul care a teoretizat utilizarea analogiei, ba chiar a ridicat-o la rangul unei metode filosofice fundamentale1. Anterior lui Platon, Empedocle este, probabil, filosoful care se folosete cel mai mult de analogii, examinarea fragmentelor rmase de la acesta evideniind aproape o sut de cupluri de termeni analogi (cum ar fi: ureche/cochilie, femeie/lun, frunz/pr, ochi/soare, univers/ou .a.m.d.)2. Chiar dac se pare c Empedocle nu utiliza termenii analogia sau analogon, putem afirma c analogia devenise deja mijlocul de a descoperi similitudinile secrete dintre lucruri i de a unifica diversele registre ale realitii. Nu ntmpltor, unele dintre analogiile sugerate de Empedocle vor putea fi reluate n contextul mai riguros al biologiei aristotelice.

Universitatea din Bucureti Aa cum demonstreaz, de pild, minuioasa analiz ntreprins de P. GRENET, Les origines de lanalogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon, Paris, Ed. Boivin & Co, 1948. 2 Cf. J. BOLLACK, Empdocle, apud J. BORELLA, Penser lanalogie, Genve, Ed. Ad Solem, 2000, pp. 25-26.
1

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Putem ns merge chiar mai departe: semnele fiinei parmenidiene, determinaii n fond, dac nu i n form, negative (relund o idee a lui A. Frenkian3), atest de fapt un mod de a gndi prin analogie (trecndu-se de la multiple la unu, de la nscut la nenscut, de la pieritor la nepieritor)4. Ba chiar putem afirma c, deja, Thales i Anaximandros gndeau analogic, plecnd, adic, de la lumea aceasta , sau cum avea s-i zic Platon, de aici enthade, ca, n temeiul faptului de a exista s-o poat aproxima pe aceea de dincolo , tot platonic, ekei5. Iar analogia, n msura n care deplaseaz de aici, din locul su obinuit de referin, un nume, o poate face (legitim) doar cu condiia ca aceast numire (simbolic) s nu fie arbitrar, ci s asculte de un imbold de dincolo. Aceast conversie a sensului, repetnd, n profunzimea sa, circulaia cercului hermeneutic 6 , i gsete, probabil, cea mai ilustr ocuren n concepia lui Platon despre anamnsis, n strns legtur cu doctrina cauzalitii eponimice a Formelor7. Aa cum avertiza Gh. Vlduescu, la limit (pentru c aceast trecere la limit este indispensabil exerciiului metafizic), nici fiina nsi nu este numele propriu al acelui ceva n sine, suportul pe care s-ar edifica toate ulterioarele numiri analogice ale temeiului (arch): acesta, n sine aprat de agnostos , se dezvluie/apare prin i n semne. A fi ( firea , fiina ) este unul dintre ele, cel mai de seam, ns unul ntr-o serie fr de sfrit8. Textul platonician nu e strin de un atare efect hiperbolic9, o lectur transgresiv putnd evoca celebra (de)situare a Binelui, din Republica 509b, dincolo de esen (epekeina ts ousias)10, dar i liminala sa indistincie n raport cu acea misterioas chra, din Timaios 52b, receptacolul oricrei generri, locul-neloc, fiina a crei esen este de a nu avea una11; indistincie care prefigureaz, a spune, chiar ambivalena teologie negativ/deconstrucie. Semnele arat i ascund acel ceva n sine12. Fiina, n msura n care nu e dect un atribut, chiar i cel
3 Vezi A. FRENKIAN, Les origines de la thologie ngative de Parmenide Plotin, republicat n Scrieri filosofice. Studii de filosofie greac i comparat, Bucureti, Ed. Ararat, 1998, pp. 271-272. 4 GH. VLDUESCU, Ontologie i metafizic la greci. Platon, Bucureti, Ed. Academiei Romne, 2005, p. 16 (sublinierea mi aparine). 5 Ibidem. 6 Formul mprumutat de la J. DERRIDA (Le retrait de la mtaphore, n Psych. Inventions de lautre, Paris, Ed. Galile, 1987, p. 82), dintr-un context, desigur, nu lipsit de legtur cu ceea ce sugerez aici. 7 Vezi PLATON, Phaidon, 102b: Tocmai prin participarea lor la Forme celelalte lucruri i primesc numele. 8 GH. VLDUESCU, op. cit., p. 17. 9 Hyperbol, ca proiectare dincolo sau depire (eventual, a msurii ), dar i ca ntrziere sau amnare (cf. A. BAILLY, Dictionnaire Grec-Franais, Paris, Ed. Hachette, 2000). 10 De acolo, Binele genereaz inteligibilele prin asemnare (analogon) cu sine nsui. 11 Vezi GH. VLDUESCU, op. cit., p. 149. 12 Chiar determinaia de n sine nu este, n fond, dect tot o metafor spaial.

DUBLUL SENS AL ANALOGIEI N OPERA LUI PLATON

15

mai ilustru, implic aadar o doz de inadecvare. Iar filosofia se vede, n acest punct, neputincioas: cum s nu vorbeasc despre ceea ce, excednd valoarea lexical-semantic a lui a fi adic fiina ca prezen , nu se las gndit nici ca simpl absen? Analogia, ca mijloc de a aproxima o unitate inaccesibil, sau cel puin inaccesibil n mod direct, rmne astfel instrumentul principal la care va apela onto(teo)logia. n cele ce urmeaz, voi ncerca, sprijinindu-m pe examinarea ctorva contexte decisive din opera lui Platon, s formulez unele consideraii cu privire la rolul esenial pe care l joac analogia n filosofia acestuia. Pe msur ce ne pierdeam sperana de a ntlni vreodat la Platon structura analogic a noiunii de fiin, ni se ntmpla s ntlnim, subneleas n aproape toate dialogurile i ieind la iveal n mai mult de un loc, credina constant n analogia dintre toate fiinele, mrturisea P. Grenet 13 . Pentru a putea fi ns validat, o asemenea ipotez trebuie susinut printr-o interpretare corespunztoare a statutului i sensului Formelor inteligibile (eid, ideai) n platonism. n acest sens, P. Grenet propune s distingem trei registre, diferite att din punct de vedere ontologic, ct i gnoseologic: Formele inteligibile, apoi lucrurile sensibile i, n fine, reprezentarea conceptual a Formelor plecnd de la lucruri14, aceast reprezentare jucnd un rol intermediar, ca un soi de termen mediu ntre planul sensibil i cel inteligibil. O reprezentare conceptual a unei Forme este, de fapt, o noiune analogic (aa cum este soarele n raport cu ideea Binelui, n Republica, VI), indispensabil n absena unei cunoateri intuitive, nemijlocite, a Formei n cauz. De fapt, un asemenea tip de cunoatere ar fi rmas, n concepia lui Platon, doar un ideal15 ca atare inaccesibil n aceast via, sau accesibil, cel mult, numai n cteva rare momente de extaz. Grenet va respinge, astfel, att interpretarea lui Natorp, pentru care Forma se reduce la concept, ct i pe cea opus, a lui Festugire, acordnd omului posibilitatea unui contemplaii nemijlocite a Formelor. Noiunile analogice, care se substituie Formelor pure n cunoaterea uman, ar fi acei logoi la care se refer Platon n Phaidon, 99e - 100a, n Republica, VI, 507b, n Omul politic, 286a i care rezult din logismos n Phaidros, 249b-c. Fiecare dintre aceste contexte extrem de dificile ar merita o analiz minuioas. M voi rezuma ns la indicarea liniilor de for ale interpretrii unitare a acestor pasaje (interpretare propus de P. Grenet), referindu-m n mod precis doar la unele dintre ele. Astfel, n Phaidon 99e-100a16, recurgnd, ca
P. GRENET, op. cit., p. 15. Ibidem, p. 63. 15 Ibidem, p. 242. 16 Voi reda acest pasaj n traducerea P. Creia din PLATON, Opere IV, Bucureti, Ed. tiinific i Enciclopedic, 1983, menionnd ns c aceast traducere face destul de greu inteligibil opiunea hermeneutic a lui P. Grenet: am socotit c trebuie s m feresc de a pi ca cei care privesc i observ o eclips de soare; unii se pare c i pierd vederea dac privesc, direct, chiar
14 13

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n attea alte locuri, la o analogie mprumutat din registrul vizual, Platon precizeaz c lucrurile sensibile sunt orbitoare. E vorba de reafirmarea tezei potrivit creia datele oferite de simuri nu pot constitui un fundament pentru cunoaterea tiinific (epistm), cea care stabilizeaz (stnai) fluxul senzorial n tipare invariante. Pentru a evita aceast orbire a sufletului, e nevoie s ne refugiem de partea logoi-lor, comparai cu acele oglinzi de ap n care astronomii observ eclipsele. Platon se grbete s adauge c aceast comparaie este doar parial valabil: pe de-o parte, logoi sunt imagini copiate dup lucrurile sensibile, ns pe de alt parte, ei sunt termenul mediu, medium-ul n care (en) noi putem examina modelele inteligibile17. Un alt pasaj relevant este cel din Phaidros 249b 6-c 1, unde Platon afirm c omul trebuie s se exerseze potrivit cu ceea ce numim Form (eidos), plecnd de la o multiplicitate de senzaii ctre o unitate a crei cuprindere este un act de reflecie (eis hen logism synairoumenon). Din acelai context, se poate deduce c tehnica reminiscenei (anamnsis), cea care d aripi gndirii (249c 4-5), reprezint de fapt o sintez, o compoziie, ale crei elemente sunt date n experiena sensibil i a crei unitate este rezultatul unui act constructiv18. n sprijinul acestei interpretri ar putea fi invocat i precizarea din Republica, VI, 510d (context asupra cruia voi reveni mai pe larg) n legtur cu procedeul geometrilor de a figura conceptele matematice: tii deci c ei se folosesc de figuri vizibile i raioneaz pe baza acestora (tous logous peri autn poiountai) gndindu-se [de fapt] nu la aceste figuri ca atare, ci la originalele pe care acestea le reproduc; raionamentele lor (tous logous) vizeaz ptratul n sine i diagonala n sine, iar nu diagonala pe care o traseaz, i la fel pentru restul (510d 5-e 1). Grenet consider c aceast afirmaie ne permite s distingem ntre ptratul n sine; logoi ai ptratului; i figurile sensibile pe care le putem desena 19 . Se impune, totui, nc o precizare: continuarea acestui pasaj ne autorizeaz s stipulm, relund exemplul oferit de Platon, c sintagma ptratul n sine (tou tetragnou autou) nu trimite nici ea, cel puin n acest context, la ideea de ptrat ca atare, ci reprezint doar o noiune intermediar20, fcnd obiectul cunoaterii dianoetice, iar nu al intuiiei noetice.
astrul i nu doar un reflex al su n ap sau ceva asemntor, i m-am gndit s nu pesc i eu la fel, cuprins de team c, tot aintindu-mi ochii asupra lucrurilor, tot ncercnd s vin cu ele n contact uznd de fiecare sim al meu, sufletul meu s-ar putea s orbeasc pe deplin. Astfel c am crezut c nu am alt cale dect s m refugiez ntre raionamente (eis tous logous) i s ncerc s vd n ele adevrul lucrurilor. De bun seam comparaia mea nu este potrivit dect ntr-o privin, cci nu merg pn la a admite c acela care cerceteaz realitile prin raionamente (ton en logois) recurge la imagini ntr-o msur mai mare dect acela care cerceteaz lucrurile nemijlocit. 17 P. GRENET, op. cit., p. 64. 18 Ibidem, p. 65. 19 Ibidem, p, 66. 20 Cf. R. BACCOU, nota 448 la PLATON, La Rpublique, Paris, Ed. Garnier-Flammarion, 1966, p. 439.

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17

Interpretarea extrem de incitant propus de P. Grenet ar trebui, desigur, susinut de inventarierea locurilor n care Platon se folosete n mod explicit de analogie. Nu voi putea evoca, n cele ce urmeaz, toate aceste pasaje, mulumindu-m cu discutarea textului pe care l socotesc decisiv n aprecierea dublului sens al analogiei n opera lui Platon: este vorba despre finalul crii a VI-a i nceputul crii a VII-a din Republica. n acest text, Platon pune n eviden trei structuri analogice: prima dintre ele se instituie ntre Ideea de Bine, situat dincolo de fiin sau esen, i acela pe care Binele l-a zmislit ca analog al su sensibil, adic Soarele (hon tagathon egennsen analogon Rep., VI, 508b 13); cea de-a doua este reprezentarea a patru (sau cinci) niveluri ontologice (crora le corespund patru trepte n cunoatere) sub forma unei linii divizate n segmente proporionale; n fine, cea de-a treia structur analogic e constituit de faimoasa alegorie a Peterii. n ceea ce privete alegoria sau parabola metafizic21 a Peterii, m voi rezuma s formulez cteva observaii care mi se par relevante prin prisma studiului de fa, nemaiconsidernd necesar prezentarea acestui pasaj arhicunoscut22. S notm, n primul rnd, c aceast alegorie poate fi considerat ilustrarea Liniei analogiei, anterior descris n textul platonician (aceast structur va fi analizat mai trziu n studiul de fa). Exist ns o diferen semnificativ: n cazul Liniei, care pare a avea un sens ascendent, nu se indicase, cel puin de o manier explicit, posibilitatea coborrii din nou n sensibil23. n plus, vedem c Linia cu ale sale patru (sau cinci) diviziuni pare reluat de dou ori n structura mitului: o dat n Petera subteran 1) umbrele, 2) prizonierii, 3) simulacrele fabricate, 4) purttorii simulacrelor prin spatele zidului, 5) focul care proiecteaz imaginile i a doua oar n aer liber, adic n paideia iniiat la lumina zilei 1) umbrele, 2) imaginile oamenilor i ale celorlalte lucruri reflectate n ap, 3) vietile i lucrurile din natur, 4) luna i astrele nopii, 5) soarele, cauza tuturor24. Ar mai fi de evideniat un aspect decisiv. Nu are rost s cutm o coresponden riguroas ntre structura mitului i cea a Liniei, la fel cum i diviziunea matematico-filosofic a Liniei nu este propriu-zis o proporie geometric ci, mai degrab, o analogie chioap, imperfect (J. Borella), n sensul c nu admite o tratare pur matematic. n fond, noiunea matematic de proporie nu poate sluji filosofului (fie el Platon, Aristotel sau oricare altul) dect ca un termen de comparaie, aa cum recunotea, de pild, i Ricoeur25. Slbirea sensului analogiei prin transferul acesteia n plan filosofic era inevitabil, de aici decurgnd o anumit doz de ambiguitate, de inexactitate, de incomensurabil. Tocmai acest rest ambiguu se va dovedi o fertil rezerv de
21 22 23 24 25

Cf. J. BORELLA, op. cit., p.168. Vezi PLATON, Republica, VII, 514a-517c. J. BORELLA, op. cit., p.171. Sugestie preluat de la acelai J. BORELLA, op. cit., p. 172. Cf. P. RICOEUR, La mtaphore vive, Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 1975, p. 339.

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sens, imboldul care, pentru a-l parafraza pe Kant 26 , ndeamn gndirea s gndeasc mai mult, mai departe. S ne concentrm acum atenia asupra celebrei Linii a analogiei din finalul crii a VI-a27, considerat ndeobte a constitui reprezentarea canonic a regimurilor ontologice i a treptelor cunoaterii n viziunea lui Platon. Schema sugerat presupune divizarea unei linii n dou segmente inegale, apoi subdivizarea fiecruia dintre aceste segmente n conformitate cu acelai raport ca n cazul primei divizri. Se obin astfel patru segmente, a, b, c, d, ntre care este stipulat urmtoarea egalitate de raport:

a+b a c = = . Printr-o serie de c+d b d

calcule decurgnd din teoria proporiilor se poate arta c formula de mai sus implic i egalitatea dintre segmentele b i c (adic relaia: b = c), segmente care corespund, aa cum vom vedea imediat, cunoaterii prin experien credina sau opinia dreapt (b) , respectiv cunoaterii dianoetice (c). Considernd c o asemenea egalitate ar implica fie c gradul de claritate i de certitudine ale celor dou domenii sunt identice, fie c ntre originale i copiile lor nu apare nici o diferen de numr, iar ambele ipoteze sunt absurde, A. Cornea prefer, n traducerea sa, leciunea n pri egale (isa ori an isa, n loc de anisa). Aceasta nseamn c de fapt ar fi vorba, n reprezentare, de patru segmente cu lungimi egale, diferenele de claritate dintre nivelurile ontologico-gnoseologice rmnnd a fi simbolizate doar de dispunerea segmentelor respective mai jos sau mai sus pe o linie vertical (e drept c Platon nu stipuleaz n chip explicit c Linia trebuie construit pe vertical, ns corespondena cu alegoria Peterii pare a sugera acest lucru)28. n ceea ce m privete, faptul c avem de-a face cu o proporie continu, n care doar b = c , nu mi se pare o problem insurmontabil, ct vreme admitem c Platon, excelent cunosctor al geometriei, era n acelai timp contient de faptul c aplicarea teoriei proporiilor n ontologie nu poate fi una exact, c acest transfer pstreaz, cum sugeram anterior, o doz de incomensurabil. Semnificaia corespunznd fiecruia dintre cele patru segmente este indicat n mod explicit chiar de Platon. Primul segment (a) figureaz ceea ce are doar realitatea de umbr i reflexie n ap sau pe suprafaa unui corp lucios, acestui nivel inferior de fiin corespunzndu-i cunoaterea prin imaginaie i conjectur (eikasia). Cel de-al doilea segment (b) simbolizeaz lucrurile sensibile, fie naturale, fie fabricate, i, de asemenea, fiinele vii; la acest nivel putem vorbi de cunoatere prin experien, ceea ce Platon numete credin (pistis) sau opinie dreapt, ns nefundamentat n chip raional. Cu cel de-al
26 Vezi I. KANT, Despre facultile sufleteti ale geniului, n Critica facultii de judecare, trad. V. Dem. Zamfirescu i Al. Surdu, Bucureti, Ed. Trei, 1995, pp. 150-152. 27 PLATON, Republica, VI, 509d-511e. 28 Cf. A. CORNEA, nota 246 la Republica, n PLATON, Opere V, trad. A. Cornea, Bucureti, Ed. tiinific i Enciclopedic, 1986, pp. 471-473.

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treilea segment (c) trecem, din sfera opiniei (doxa), n cea a cunoaterii tiinifice (epistm), aici fiind vorba de conceptele abstracte ale lucrurilor, n particular, de conceptele matematice, obiecte pentru cunoaterea prin raiune discursiv (dianoia). n fine, cel de-al patrulea segment (d) nu mai ntruchipeaz inteligibilele gndite (conceptele obiective), ci Inteligibilele n sine, Ideile: el corespunde cunoaterii prin intuiie intelectiv 29 (nous, nosis). Dincolo de acest segment, am putea situa, aa cum procedeaz J. Borella, un al cincilea nivel, la drept vorbind nonfigurabil: cel al Binelui-Unu. Se cuvine ns fcut o observaie de maxim importan: scoas din context, schema nfiat mai sus risc s produc impresia unei viziuni despre o lume ncremenit pe mai multe niveluri ce nu comunic ntre ele. n realitate, aa cum se va vedea mai clar odat cu tematizarea primei structuri analogice semnalate anterior, reprezentnd cheia dublului sens al analogiei platonice, Linia trebuie considerat, mai degrab, ca fiind revelaia unei mimsis cosmice, fiindc orice fiin este imaginea unei realiti superioare la care trimite, pn ce, n fine, din analogie n analogie, urcm, n msura n care e posibil, la Binele suprem30. nainte de a discuta analogia capital dintre Soare i Bine, mi se pare important s abordm o problem specific pe care o ridic epistemologia platonician: este vorba de statutul noiunilor matematice i, implicit, de natura raportului dintre noez i dianoez. Poate prea ciudat ca tocmai noiunile matematice, noiunile tiinifice prin excelen31 n viziunea lui Platon, s fac obiectul unei cunoateri inferioare n raport cu intuiia noetic (nosis). S-a sugerat, astfel, c n acest text Platon nu s-ar referi la cunoaterea matematic pur 32 , ce ar presupune un fundament independent, care nu este pus, anhypothetos, ci doar la acea latur practic a geometriei, ale crei principii nu sunt clarificate n chip dialectic. Traducerea pe care o ofer A. Cornea pasajului de la 511d poate sprijini aceast interpretare: (...) deoarece ei nu privesc nlai la nivelul principiului, ci pornind de la postulate, i apar ie a nu dispune de intelectul pur, fa n fa cu acele realiti, dei acestea, fiind inteligibile, se afl laolalt cu principiul /lor/. Interpretarea de mai sus nu este ns ntru totul convingtoare. Pe de-o parte, arat R. Baccou, i ipotezele pe care le folosete dialecticianul trebuie s-i gseasc o confirmare ntr-un principiu anipotetic33, iar n acest caz nu nelegem de ce ipotezele matematicianului ar trebui situate ntr-o clas inferioar; pe de alt parte, se pare c Platon nu considera aplicaiile matematice ca innd cu adevrat de domeniul tiinei34.
J. BORELLA, op. cit., p. 165. Ibidem, p. 163. 31 Cf. G. MILHAUD, Les Philosophes Gomtres de la Grce, apud R. BACCOU, nota 449 la PLATON, La Rpublique, p. 439. 32 Ibidem. 33 R. BACCOU, loc. cit., p. 439. 34 Cf. PLATON, Republica, VII, 527a.
30 29

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R. Baccou e de prere c diviziunea operat de Platon n registrul inteligibil e una ct se poate de net, decurgnd din imposibilitatea de a reduce metoda matematic la metoda dialectic35. Matematica ar rmne astfel o cunoatere de tip analitic, ce pleac de la ipoteze pentru a deduce de aici diverse proprieti: de pild, proprietile triunghiului, implicit coninute n conceptul de triunghi. ns, n msura n care ipotezele sau postulatele din matematic nu sunt fixe, n msura n care matematicianul poate gndi plecnd de la postulatele alternative, cunoaterea sa rmne una ex hypotheses, iar conceptele sale, nite simpli posibili (Rodier), inferiori ideilor. Se pare, totui, c, n viziunea lui Platon noiunile matematice au arhetipuri ideale: de pild, conceptul de ptrat ar reprezenta imaginea ideii de ptrat, imagine construit pe baza unor reprezentri sensibile, avnd astfel statutul unei noiuni mixte. Dar dac geometrul poate cerceta aceste arhetipuri doar fcnd apel la noiuni intermediare, dialecticianul le-ar putea contempla ca atare? Sau ar trebui s considerm c asemenea idei fac parte dintr-o clas special, astfel nct dialecticianul nu le poate cunoate intuitiv, aa cum cunoate, de pild, frumosul36? S-a sugerat c imposibilitatea de a reduce conceptele dianoetice ale matematicii la forme ideale echivaleaz, n fond, cu imposibilitatea de a le reduce la elemente absolut simple i determinate prin pura relaie. Platon pare contient c o asemenea imposibilitate ine chiar de natura cunoaterii dianoetice, chiar dac, aa cum crede Gomperz, va fi ncercat o reducie de acest gen n scrierile trzii, atunci cnd se refer la ideile de limit i ilimitat 37 . Acelai exeget nota c o tiin precum geometria analitic modern se apropie destul de mult de dezideratul acestei reducii, de vreme ce transform conceptele spaiale n concepte numerice, exprimnd, de exemplu, cercul i elipsa prin aceeai formul uor modificat. Cu toate acestea, nici chiar geometria analitic sau teoria general a numerelor nu se pot dispensa de orice ipotez, rmnnd astfel inferioare cunoaterii dialectice, n accepia platonician a termenului. Se ridic ns o ntrebare crucial: intuiia eidetic, n sensul unei contemplaii nemijlocite a Formelor, reprezenta oare, n viziunea lui Platon, un tip efectiv de cunoatere, de sine stttor i ca atare accesibil n principiu oricrei fiine nzestrate cu raiune? Desigur c un rspuns afirmativ la aceast ntrebare ar limita serios aplicabilitatea ipotezei hermeneutice a lui P. Grenet, pentru care reprezentrile analogice ale ideilor n sine sunt singurele concepte disponibile n cunoaterea uman, hotarul de sus al acestei cunoateri. Rmne ns deschis posibilitatea ca noeza s nu constituie, de fapt, un tip de cunoatere alturi de celelalte, o cunoatere efectiv a Formelor, prin intuiie intelectual, ci doar condiia liminal ce ar garanta veridicitatea sintezelor i
Cf. R. BACCOU, loc. cit., p. 440. Ibidem, pp. 440-441. 37 Cf. TH. GOMPERZ, Les Penseurs de la Grce, apud R. BACCOU, Introduction la PLATON, La Rpublique, p. 37.
36 35

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diviziunilor operate de dialectician38, imboldul care anim sau d aripi gndirii, pentru a relua metafora din Phaidros. A sosit momentul s lum n discuie prima structur analogic enunat n finalul crii a VI-a din Republica39. Centrul acestei structuri e reprezentat de analogia dintre Soarele sensibil i Binele inteligibil: ceea ce este binele n domeniul inteligibil n raport cu intelectul i inteligibilele (en t not top pros te noun kai ta nooumena), este soarele n domeniul sensibil n raport cu vederea i lucrurile vizibile (Rep., VI, 508b 13-c2). Pornind de aici, putem depista mai multe cupluri de termeni analogi: ceea ce este izvorul vederii, Soarele (hlios), n raport cu izvorul cunoaterii, Binele (agathon), este i locul vizibilului (to oraton) n raport cu locul inteligibilului (to noton), vederea (opsis) n raport cu cunoaterea (gnsis), obiectul vederii (ta orata) n raport cu obiectul cunoaterii (ta noeta, ideai), ochiul (omma) n raport cu intelectul (nous), mediul vederii, lumina (phs), n raport cu mediul cunoaterii, adevrul (altheia), i generarea (genesis) n raport cu fiina ca esen (ousia)40. ns Platon nu face doar s expliciteze un sistem de proporii (A. Cornea): el precizeaz c soarele joac n registrul sensibil acelai rol ca i Binele n registrul inteligibil, pentru c soarele este fiul Binelui, pe care Binele l-a zmislit asemntor (analogon) cu el nsui (Rep., VI, 508b 12-13). n al doilea rnd, aa cum n registrul sensibil putem afirma c lumina i vederea sunt asemntoare soarelui (hlioeid), dar n niciun caz acestea nu trebuie socotite a fi soarele, la fel, n registrul inteligibil, este drept (orthon) s gndim c tiina i adevrul sunt i una i cealalt asemntoare binelui (agathoeid), dar nu este drept s credem c una sau cealalt ar fi binele (508c 6 - 509a 4): de fapt, ideea Binelui (tou agathou idean) poate fi considerat precum un obiect al cunoaterii (hs gignskomenn) 41 doar n calitate de principiu (aitia) al tiinei i adevrului, dar nu n sine, depindu-le pe acestea dou n frumusee. n al treilea rnd, aa cum Soarele d lucrurilor vizibile nu doar putina de a fi vzute, ci i generarea, creterea i hrana, fr a fi el nsui generare, la fel, celor inteligibile le vine de la Bine nu doar inteligibilitatea lor, ci le vine pe deasupra, de la acesta, i fiina (to einai), i esena (kai tn ousian), chiar dac binele nu este esen (ouk ousias ontos tou agathou), ci se situeaz dincolo de esen prin demnitate i putere (all eti epekeina ts ousias presbeia kai dynamei hyperechontos) (509b 2-10). Puterea Binelui de a zmisli inteligibilele i de a le face s fie ceea ce sunt cognoscibile, adic inteligibile pare a presupune c Binele asum, uznd de
Vezi, de pild, PLATON, Phaidros, 265d sau Sofistul, 253d. Idem, Republica, VI, 508a-509c. 40 Cf. A. CORNEA, nota 243 la PLATON, Republica, p. 470. 41 Motivele pentru care este de preferat leciunea hs gignskomenn n locul lui hs gignskomens la 508e 4 sunt excelent nfiate de R. BACCOU, nota 438 la PLATON, La Rpublique, pp.436-437.
39 38

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vocabularul aristotelic, att rolul de cauz eficient, ct i pe acela de cauz formal n raport cu ideile. De aici cred c decurg dou consecine extrem de importante: (a) n primul rnd, n msura n care Binele este sursa ideilor, principiul a ceea ce numim idee, rezult c nici nu putem vorbi, la propriu, de o idee a Binelui, ci doar prin analogie, ca s nu spunem doar metaforic; (b) n al doilea rnd, de vreme ce Binele nu este doar condiia de posibilitate a cunoaterii inteligibilelor, ci chiar acela care d fiin esenelor inteligibile, nseamn c ideile, n msura n care sunt, presupun n esena lor o asemnare cu principiul care le determin. Dar dac Binele este dincolo de esen, despre ce fel de asemnare mai poate fi vorba? Asemnare cu ce (anume)? Sau ntre ce i ce? i, de fapt, despre ce fel de asemnare putea fi vorba chiar n relaia dintre Binele mai presus de toate i odrasla sa celest, Soarele, pe care Binele l-a zmislit asemntor (analogon) cu el nsui? Teza pe care o susin ar putea fi rezumat n felul urmtor: Platon nu presupune, n acest pasaj, un concept de analogie participativ diferit de analogia matematic, ci las mai degrab s se neleag c participaia este nu att cellalt sens al analogiei, ct reversul sau condiia noiunii de proporie, n transferul acesteia n plan ontologic42. nainte de a trece mai departe, se cuvine s abordm o ultim problem pe care o ridic tematizarea acestei structuri analogice n miezul dialogului Republica: e vorba de regimul ontologic al Binelui. Unii interprei au scos n eviden faptul c, n pasajul mai sus discutat Platon atribuie Ideilor i fiina (einai), i esena (ousia), afirmnd n schimb doar c Binele este dincolo de esen, nu i de fiin. Ar urma de aici c Binele n sine nu admite vreo determinaie esenial, dar c admite predicatul fiinei ntr-un sens absolut 43 : fiina Binelui ar fi astfel sinonim cu faptul de a fi pur i simplu, cu fiina n sine. Totui, nu se cuvine s escamotm gravitatea aporiei n care ne regsim la acest nivel de interpretare. Admind c Binele este fr a avea o esen, se cuvine s ne ntrebm n ce sens spunem, de fapt, c Binele este, care s poat fi disociat de cel mai slab sens al fiinei la Aristotel, accidentul. O atare indistincie semantic ntre principiu i accident nu era, desigur, acceptabil. Vom fi atunci ndemnai s credem c Binele desemneaz un mai mult dect fiina care ns, la rndul su, se vdete imposibil de disociat, din punct de vedere conceptual, dianoetic, de acel mai puin dect fiina care este chra...
n legtur cu sensul participativ al analogiei la Platon, vezi i CH. YANNARAS, Analogia platonic, n Persoan i Eros, trad. Z. Luca, Bucureti, Ed. Anastasia, 2000, pp. 213-215. Mi se pare, totui, c filosoful grec risc o tratare unilateral a subiectului n cauz, reducnd sensul analogiei la posibilitatea de participare prin cunoatere la adevrul fiinei i desconsidernd, n acest fel, accepia proporional a noiunii n cauz. 43 Cf. A. FOUILLE, La Philosophie de Platon, apud R. BACCOU, nota 439 la PLATON, La Rpublique, p. 437.
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Iat cum, n msura n care interpretarea sensului fiinei ca prezen Anwesenheit, (par)ousia va fi fost decisiv pentru istoria ontologiei44, ideea unui Bine de dincolo de prezen ar putea fi socotit focarul meontologiei45 platoniciene. Oricum ar fi, ipoteza Binelui de dincolo de fiin va constitui apoi un veritabil laitmotiv al neoplatonismul (incluznd i neoplatonismul cretin), reverbernd pn n fenomenologia contemporan, la E. Lvinas (Autrement qutre ou au-del de lessence) sau J.-L. Marion (Dieu sans ltre). Revenind acum la problema enunat nc din titlul acestui studiu, a vrea s remarc faptul c persistena unui dublu sens al analogiei n opera lui Platon corespunde, n fond, necesitii doctrinare de a considera c orice sintez operat pornind de la o multiplicitate sensibil, orice sesizare pe orizontal a similitudinilor dintre lucruri ce culmineaz n postularea unui eidos comun, reprezint, pe o ax vertical, reflexul sau imitaia unei uniti inaccesibile sau, cel puin, inaccesibil n chip nemijlocit. Or, aceast ax vertical a participaiei presupune, la rndul ei, un dublu sens sau direcie: relund exemplul paradigmatic al analogiei dintre Bine i Soare, putem vorbi, n acest caz, att de o analogie descendent a Binelui ctre Soarele pe care l zmislete, ct i de o analogie ascendent a Soarelui ctre Binele despre care Soarele ne permite s vorbim46. Cerina acestui dublu sens gireaz, ntr-o anumit msur, i alegerea metaforelor participaiei 47 sugerate de Platon n opera sa, ntr-o ncercare polifonic, din mai multe unghiuri, de a lmuri termenul-cheie al ntemeierii48. S evocm dou dintre aceste metafore, mimsis i parousia. Mimsis este utilizat cu sens metafizic chiar n Rep., 510b, Platon sugernd, n acest context, c lucrurile din registrul sensibil pot fi privite att ca originale pe care le imit reflexiile i imaginile de pe treapta de jos a Liniei analogiei (tois tote mimtheisin), ct i ca imagini (hs eikosin) ale realitilor de pe treapta superioar, a conceptelor (dianoetice)49. Parousia intervine n Phaidon, 100d 5, unde Platon afirm c nimic altceva nu confer acelui lucru frumusee dect prezena n el (parousia) a Frumosului n sine, sau comunicarea (koinnia) cu el.
Pe urmele lui Heidegger, Derrida afirma: Se poate demonstra c toate numele date temeiului, principiului ori centrului au desemnat ntotdeauna invariantul unei prezene (eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (esen, existen, substan, subiect), aletheia, transcendentalitate, contiin, Dumnezeu, om etc.) (J. DERRIDA, Structura, semnul i jocul n discursul tiinelor umane, n Scriitura i diferena, trad. B. Ghiu i D. epeneag, Bucureti, Ed. Univers, 1998, p. 376). 45 Cf. J. BORELLA, op. cit., pp. 92-95. 46 Ibidem, p. 169. 47 ARISTOTEL va califica nsui termenul methexis drept o metafor poetic, n Metafizica, A, 9, 991a 19-22. 48 Un excelent inventar al vocabularului participaiei ntlnim la GH. VLDUESCU, op. cit., pp. 100-105. 49 Sufletul este nevoit s se foloseasc de originalele din lumea vizibil ca de nite imagini (PLATON, Republica, VI, 510b 4-5).
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Am putea astfel considera c lucrurile imit Ideile, dar i, n sens invers, c Ideile (sau Formele) sunt prezente n lucruri. Fr condiia acestei prezene-n a Formei, conceptele noastre generice risc s nu fie altceva dect nite ficiuni utile, cum ar spune Vaihinger. Trebuie ns adugat c Formele sau Ideile considerate n sine par a desemna, la Platon, ceva mai subtil dect un soi de atomi de inteligibilitate; ele sunt acele fiine-relaii 50 cu statut paradigmatic, de vreme ce msoar, definesc i constituie toate relaiile analogice care ordoneaz ierarhic universul: relaii arhetipale, matrice structurante, numere numrtoare (iar nu numere numrate )51. Am vzut c participaia, n viziunea lui Platon (i, implicit, analogia n accepie participativ) comport acest dublu sens: imitare a Formelor de ctre lucruri, dar i o form de prezen a Formelor n aceste lucruri sensibile, prezen care nu poate ns anula separaia planurilor ontologice. ndrznesc s afirm c acelai dublu sens se va regsi, ulterior, n tematizarea genitivului dublu presupus de noiunea aristotelic de mimsis: imitaie a naturii, nelegnd prin aceasta c natura se las reprezentat n msura n care vine n prezen (parousia), se descoper. Dar aceast ieire din ascundere, pentru a uza de un vocabular de sorginte heideggerian, nu reclam din partea subiectului deplina pasivitate, ci, n mod paradoxal, poteneaz activitatea sa de creator. De aceea mimsis, gndit grecete, e creatoare52, de aceea se urmrea s imii nu produsele, ci productivitatea naturii, actele acelei natura naturans, cum se va spune mai trziu53. De altfel, dac trecem dincolo de locurile comune i reprezentrile caricaturale sau grosiere ale concepiei platoniciene depre mimsis n art, ni se relev exact aceast condiie a imitaiei bune mai sus menionat: nu un decalc servil, ci o re-creare54. Actul de a imita al artistului, la egal distan de reverberaia absolut a modelului ideal ca i de repetiia standardizat a unei copii gata fcute, nu poate fi dect alegere, interpretare, simbolizare, stilizare. O materie cu proprieti definite, instrumente cu puteri limitate, iat ce mpiedic iradierea integral a ideii. O sensibilitate particular, o expresie personal a esenialului aa cum l percepe artistul, iat ce permite rennoirea vechii teme55. E adevrat c exist mai multe pasaje n care Platon presupune o lege a imitaiei prin care tot ceea ce este esenial n model trebuie s treac n copie56. ns
50 Ideile, care sunt ceea ce sunt prin relaiile lor mutuale, numai n aceast raportare a lor ntre ele i au fiina (ousia) (PLATON, Parmenide, 133c 8-9). 51 J. BORELLA, op. cit., p. 185. 52 Cf. P. RICOEUR, La Mtaphore vive, p. 61. 53 Cf. J. DERRIDA, Economimesis, n Mimesis. Des articulations (vol. col.), Paris, Ed. Flammarion, 1975, pp. 67-69. 54 Vezi P. GRENET, op. cit., pp. 186-189. 55 Ibidem, p. 186. Se cuvine amintit, n acest context, faptul c artei greceti i era strin fabricarea n serie (cf. POTTIER, Le Dessin chez les Grecs, apud P. GRENET, op. cit., p. 186). 56 De exemplu, n Sofistul, 235d-236c.

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filosoful a susinut cu egal for, conform lui Grenet, i o alt lege, potrivit creia copia nu trebuie pur i simplu s dubleze originalul. n sprijinul acestei ipoteze invocm, n primul rnd, faimosul pasaj din Cratylos, 432b-d: ar trebui ca imaginea s nu reprezinte ntru totul trsturile lucrului pe care-l imit, dac ea e sortit s fie imagine (eikn); trebuie cutat o alt dreapt potrivire (orthotta) a imaginii ... fr s fie necesar ca, atunci cnd ceva lipsete sau e adugat, imaginea s nceteze a mai exista. Sau tu nu simi ct le lipsete imaginilor s poat avea aceleai date pe care le au lucrurile ale cror imagini sunt? (trad. S. Noica). n fond, copia nu apare ca imagine dect disprnd ca lucru. Sau dac preferm: ea nu este asemntoare ca imagine dect n msura n care este diferit ca lucru57. Rezult c imitaia artistic nu va solicita dect o similitudine analogic, aadar o asemnare care las loc pentru diferene58. Apropiindu-m de finalul acestui studiu, doresc s lansez o ultim ipotez de lucru: dublul sens al analogiei n opera lui Platon (proporia susinut de participaia ontologic) pare s corespund unei strategii la care filosoful va fi apelat i n tematizarea nelesurilor frumosului. Se poate arta c Platon nu a promovat o concepie unitar despre frumos. Pe de-o parte, el vehiculeaz, la un moment dat, ideea de sorginte socratic a frumosului potrivire (kalon prepon), convenien sau adecvare funcional59. ns o asemenea teorie utilitar plete n faa postulatului ontologic al Ideii de Frumos n sine, exprimat n Symposion, 211a, printr-o definiie ce pare a relua canonul parmenidian al fiinei n sine 60 : frumosul care, mai presus de orice, este etern, nu se nate i nu piere, nu sporete i nu scade, care nu este frumos dintr-un punct de vedere i urt din altul ... care nu este un raionament sau o tiin (oude tis logos oude tis epistm), care nu st n alt fiin fie i cu o parte a sa, ntr-o vieuitoare, de pild, din cer sau de pe pmnt, sau n orice altceva, ci se manifest n i prin sine nsui, etern n identitate cu sine prin unitatea/unicitatea formal (all auto kath auto meth autou monoeides aei on) (trad. Gh. Vlduescu). Este vorba de frumosul la care particip toate cele frumoase, fr ca prin apariia i dispariia acestora el s sporeasc, s se micoreze sau s sufere vreo modificare61. Pe de alt parte, Platon crediteaz, n dialogurile trzii, concepia pitagoreic despre frumos ca proporie (symmetria) i msur (metriots)62. ns dialogul Phaidros oferea un altfel de indiciu cu privire la natura frumuseii: rnduit ntre lucrurile acestei lumi, frumuseea am descoperit-o strlucind cu nentrecut claritate (stilbon enargestata); iat c numai frumuseii i-a fost
P. GRENET, op. cit., p. 189. Rmnnd fidel noiunii de analogie ca proporie matematic, P. GRENET crede c este vorba, n ultim instan, chiar de similitudinea ntre raporturile elementelor n model i n copie (p. 189). 59 Cf. PLATON, Hippias Maior, 291b. 60 Cf. GH. VLDUESCU, op. cit., p. 84. 61 PLATON, Symposion, 210e 6-211b 5. 62 Cf. Idem, Philebos, 64c; Sofistul, 228a; Timaios, 87c.
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sortit s se nfieze att de limpede [strlucitoare] privirii (ekphanestaton), ea singur menit pentru iubirea noastr (erasmitaton) (trad. G. Liiceanu) 63 . Pasajul n cauz prefigureaz concepia plotinian despre frumos: Trebuie s spunem aici c frumuseea const mai degrab n ceea ce lumineaz buna proporionare (to epi t symmetria epilampomenon) dect n bunele proporii nsei, i tocmai acest lucru ne place64. Care este ns regimul acestui frumos ekphanestaton kai erasmitaton? Hegel va defini frumosul ca reflectare sensibil a ideii 65 sau revelarea idealului n form sensibil66. Dar frumosul din Phaidros pare mai degrab a indica acel ceva care strlumineaz n sensibil fr a fi pur i simplu inteligibil; de aici i statutul su indecis. Pe de-o parte, n msura n care frumuseea rmne ancorat n registrul sensibil, n timp ce nelepciunea pur nu poate fi supus prin vedere (h phronsis ouk horatai), s-ar prea c frumosul ocup treapta intermediar ntre sensibil i inteligibil, fiind, dup spusa lui Heidegger, chiar das Berckend Entrckende (cel care ademenete i ndeprteaz, captivez i duce cu sine sau, aa cum traduce G. Liiceanu, cel-care-pune-n-micare-transpunnd). Frumosul este, aadar, ceea ce ne smulge din uitarea fiinei i ceea ce ne deschide privirea asupra fiinei, comenteaz Heidegger. Frumuseea, strluminnd n aparen, ne transpune n adevr, fr a se identifica ns cu adevrul, neles de filosoful german ca neascuns al fiinei, nonsensibil 67 . Dar, pe de alt parte, ne amintim c n Republica, VI, 508e 3-6, Platon afirma c Ideea Binelui depete n frumusee adevrul i tiina! Fr a mai insista pe aceste pasaje incitante din opera lui Platon, s adugm c neoplatonismul va valoriza teoria platonician despre frumos mai ales prin prisma unei metafizici a luminii, la fel cum va asimila noiunea de analogie punnd accent pe nelesul acesteia participativ. Analogia va ajunge astfel s ocupe un loc central i n tratatele lui Dionisie pseudo-Areopagitul 68 . Mai degrab dect s anticipeze accepiile thomiste ale analogiei, Dionisie vizeaz prin termenii analogia, kata tn analogian, analogs etc. o dubl semnificaie: acelai cuvnt desemneaz
Idem, Phaidros, 250c 8-e 1. PLOTIN, Enneades, VI, 7, 22, 24-26. 65 G. W. F. HEGEL, Despre art i frumos (antologie de I. Ianoi), vol. I, Bucureti, Ed. Minerva, 1979, p. 102. 66 K. E. GILBERT i H. KUHN, Istoria esteticii, trad. S. Mrculescu, Bucureti, Ed. Meridiane, 1972, p. 381. 67 Cf. M. HEIDEGGER, Platons Phaidros: Schnheit und Wahrheit in einem beglckenden Zwiespalt, n Nietzsche, vol. I, Neske, Pfullingen, 1961, pp. 221-230, reprodus, n traducerea lui G. Liiceanu, n Platon, Opere IV, Bucureti, Ed. tiinific i Enciclopedic, 1983, pp. 387-394. 68 V. Lossky a numrat mai bine de aptezeci de ocurene ale analogiei n scrierile areopagitice (cf. V. LOSSKY, La notion des analogies chez Denys le Pseudo-Aropagite, n Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littraire du Moyen Age, nr. 5, 1930, p. 279).
64 63

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totodat raportul creaturilor fa de Dumnezeu (iubire i dorin de ndumnezeire) i raportul lui Dumnezeu fa de fiinele create (idei divine i teofanii)69. Iat cum dublul sens (ascendent / descendent) presupus de analogia platonician reapare n contextul (onto)teologiei cretine. Analogia, nainte de a desemna un tip de discurs sau un procedeu filosofic, va fi fost numele acestui dublu raport ontologic mai sus menionat. Iar dac, n contextul teologiei dionisiene, raportul de la cauze la efecte poate fi numit manifestare, raportul de la efecte la cauzele acestora este participaia (methexis) sau imitaia (mimsis)70. Creaturile se individualizeaz participnd dup modul care i-a fost prescris, hrzit fiecreia, la virtuile divine (n timp ce natura supraesenial a lui Dumnezeu rmne inaccesibil, tainic, dincolo de orice posibil afirmaie sau negaie cu privire la ea). Iat cum analogia devine fundamentul oricrei teologii catafatice, mijlocul care face cu putin cunoaterea virtuilor divine, fr ns a implica existena vreunei proporii ntre fiine i Dumnezeu, cel care nu este obiect71. n aceste condiii, analogia dintre toate fiinele i Dumnezeu, dup care El este ludat72, semnific de fapt, aa cum interpreteaz V. Lossky, mijlocul ce determin imitarea posibil a Inimitabilului73, dup putina (kata to dynaton)74 fiecrei creaturi, aadar ntr-o msur mai mic sau mai mare. Analogia desemneaz, prin urmare, capacitatea proporional a creaturilor de a participa la virtuile creatoare ale lui Dumnezeu. Aceast capacitate definete rangul fiecrei fiine n ierarhia universal75, fr ns a fi sinonim cu o calitate pasiv, ci cu dorina de ndumnezeire proprie fiecrei creaturi76, prin care aceasta devine un colaborator al lui Dumnezeu (Theou synergon), lsnd s apar n ea nsi, dup capacitate (kata to dynaton), aciunea lui Dumnezeu fcut vizibil77. Dionisie dubleaz aceast analogie-mijloc cu o analogie-scop (sintagma aparine lui V. Lossky), atunci cnd vorbete de analogia proprie fiecrei creaturi n sensul de limit suprem a iubirii fiinelor create78, limit (pre)stabilit de Divinitate ca diferen a createlor fa de Creator, sinonim cu o anumit idee divin ca mod prescris de participaie. Raportul dintre cele dou raporturi (analogii), anume dintre dorina creaturii de ndumnezeire i ideea divin care i-a fost hrzit, nu poate fi, el nsui, altceva dect un raport de iubire, un cerc etern unirea fr amestec a ideilor divine cu voinele create, ntr-un cuvnt, synergeia 79 .
69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

Ibidem, p. 309. Ibidem, p. 285. Ibidem, p. 288. DIONISIE PSEUDO-AREOPAGITUL, Despre numele divine, VII, 3. Ibidem, IX, 7. Cf. DIONISIE PSEUDO-AREOPAGITUL, Ierarhia cereasc, III, 2. Cf. V. LOSSKY, op. cit., p. 292. Ibidem, p. 294. DIONISIE PSEUDO-AREOPAGITUL, Ierarhia cereasc, III, 2. V. LOSSKY, op. cit., p. 298. Ibidem, pp. 302-306.

REITERRI ETICE PRIVIND CONCEPTUL DE CONTIIN MORAL1 JEAN PIAGET JEAN LIBIS MAX SCHELER
CORNELIA MARGARETA GPREL2

Abstract During the development of science, a series of changes in terms of real events that today we find in contemporary moral concepts were done upon the ancient moral virtues in terms of scientific and social aspects. In this context of changes in the paradigm of moral values we refer to the epistemic concept of moral judgment in children and we make a classification of moral events. Among all intentionality plays a major role and captures the moral character of any human feelings and moral events. In the moral judgment, intention is everything. We believe, therefore, that intentionality, will and memory are indicators that point us to the moral conscience substrate which is fundamental to any interpretation of ethics. We assume that the failure to interpret the role of moral conscience and manifestations must start with the paradigm of ethical knowledge which puts at stake the moral judgment. This paper captures the transformation of moral values from a psychological, epistemological, and mythological-religious theories perspective. Moral judgment tells us that somewhere in the history of science there has been a reversal of moral values and one of these consequences could be this imbalance created by the interpretation of the universe based on male predilection forces. Should be moral conscience different in terms of masculine and feminine concepts, of anima and animus, yin and yang? How much of this universe is feminine and masculine? Or do we talk of different energies that govern from the particular to the universal everything that manifests in the universe? Therefore, we advocate for a balanced interpretation of scientific and religious aspect of what are the moral virtues governing any scientific or social work. The paper Ethical Iterations on the concept of moral conscience makes a smooth transition from an epistemological perspective of psychological knowledge to the mythological and philosophical perspective of what we call moral conscience. Keywords: moral judgment, law, memory-freedom-will, cooperation, im-mediate moral, gender equality-moral equality, autonomy, self-awareness, moral conscience.

Geneza moralei de la judecata moral la copil la contiina moral a adultului De la societile primitive pn la cele democratice, morala a fost dat de structurile de raionare, specifice intervalului i putea fi influenat de cutume,
1 Articolul a stat la baza comunicrii susinute la Conferina Internaional Consciousness and Personal Identity. Philosophical Perspectives and Neuroscience, Vatican Italia, 2012. 2 Academia Romn, Filiala Iai, gasparelc@yahoo.com

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legi, religie, obinuine, modele umane, etc. Morala societilor este cu alte cuvinte morala membrilor comunitii ce o compun, iar ntre toate acestea memoria, obinuina i intenionalitatea rmn repere pentru analiza acestui itinerar ce ine de trecutul i prezentul a tot ceea ce reprezint concepte morale i care se constituie n fundamente etice pentru teorie i practic, pentru experien i tiin. Separarea aceasta a omului interior de cel exterior, a contiinei morale de contiina de sine, a condus n timp la accentuarea unei moraliti3 imediate, formale, bazate doar pe principiul convieuirii cu ceilali, care are la baz o disensiune de fond ntre bine i datorie. Iar conceptul de memorie este strict legat de cel de incontient, fie c ne referim la incontientul filosofic, ereditar, sau cerebral 4 , i, implicit toate acestea sunt subsumate principiilor etice care stau la baza relaiei dintre om i societate, religie i tiin. Fundamentul etic al oricrui raionament moral este strns legat de aceste concepte cheie intenionalitate, memorie, voin, libertate alturi, evident, de o serie de alte concepte tranzitorii, ce se impun a fi reluate i reiterate n materialul de analiz a principiilor morale, pentru c fac parte din morala imediat a societii5. Geneza moralei, dac facem abstracie de abordarea mitico-religioas, ncepe o dat cu ceea ce numim judecata moral la copil i ne indic cursul evoluiei morale existente la adult. Jean Piaget analizeaz judecata moral a copilului i face doar analogii subtile cu privire la momentele cheie ale moralei adultului. ntre morala copilului care include componenta ludic i morala adultului care impune cu necesitate componenta muncii exist doar acele diferene pe care experiena personal i societatea le impun prin reguli, cutume i obiceiuri, sursele moralei fiind doar societatea, prin ansamblul de credine i legi a cror unitate confer gradul de moralitate corespunztor societii, grupului, individului. Raionamentul moral este astfel strict legat de contextul juridic, prin prisma responsabilitii morale i juridice sau individual-colective, care poate cpta valenele sanciunii, ceea ce presupune o trecere rapid de la nivelul abstract la cel concret, de la lumea ideilor la lumea real. Cnd, n cursul unui rzboi, un ntreg popor este tras la rspundere pentru greelile conductorilor si sau cnd, ntr-o religie, ntreaga omenire este condamnat pentru greelile primilor ei strmoi, exist desigur, o responsabilitate colectiv.6 Or, n baza acestei responsabiliti colective funcioneaz adesea morala ntr-o societate
3 Morala imediat este acea moral ca form de rspuns mimetic, lipsit de voin i autonomia alegerii, deci o form de rspuns la o cerin imediat, dar care nu are ca fundament trirea moral. 4 MARCEL GAUCHET, Incontientul cerebral, Bucureti, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1997. 5 Utilitarismul, sau mai bine zis criteriul acesta etic care ine de numr, cantitate i mai puin de ceea ce este vital, poate fi ncadrat n ceea ce numim morala imediat a societii, adic ceea ce ine de contextualitate, de o mod a vremii, chiar dac aici ne referim la componenta tiinific a dezbaterii. 6 JEAN PIAGET, Judecata moral la copil, Bucureti,Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, 1980, p. 213.

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care poate avea ca reper mai curnd numrul dect viaa, obinuina ca substitut al virtuilor. Aceast cauzalitate explic n bun parte tipul de judecat moral pe care adultul o prezint copilului prin concepte morale, la care se adaug modelul su propriu de via, care de fapt reprezint accesul la generaiile anterioare. De aceea Jean Piaget este de prere c morala constrngerii este morala datoriei pure i a eteronomiei: copilul primete de la adult un numr de consemne, crora trebuie s li se supun, oricare ar fi mprejurrile. Binele este ceea ce se conformeaz acestor consemne, iar rul, ceea ce nu li se conformeaz; intenia nu are dect un rol redus n aceast concepie, iar responsabilitatea este obiectiv. Morala cooperrii are drept principiu solidaritatea i pune accent pe autonomia contiinei, pe intenionalitate i pe responsabilitate subiectiv.7 Morala unei societi este de aceea, din punctul nostru de vedere memoria colectiv, arhetipul moral al societilor anterioare. Anumite trsturi culturale sau valori morale supravieuiesc mult timp sau doar n anumite societi i perioade pentru c acestea rspund unei nevoi interior umane. A fost un timp cnd curajul reprezenta o virtute i era adesea atribuit masculinului, astzi probabil c forma hibridizat a acestei virtui ar putea fi identificat mai curnd n mulime, iniiativ i prezen vocal. Principiile morale rezist aadar pe parcursul mai multor generaii n msura n care ele au un ecou argumentativ n incontientul membrilor unei societi, n msura n care sunt explicite i fac dovada celei mai bune alternative. i cnd spunem aceasta avem n vedere perspectiva extins asupra geneticii a lui Richard Dawkins potrivit creia limba pare s evolueze prin mijloace nongenetice i ntr-un ritm cu cteva ordine de mrime mai accelerat dect evoluia genetic8. Principiile morale sunt structuri vii n incontientul colectiv al unei societi n msura n care ele au fost transmise i nelese. Or, perioada copilriei este poate cea mai important pentru ca aceste structuri s-i dovedeasc gradul de generare a ceea ce noi vom numi mai trziu contiin de sine i mai cu seam contiin moral. ns pentru aceasta adultul trebuie s fie contient de cteva premise ce se impun n modul de transmitere a principiilor morale i anume: s coopereze i s nu induc propriile percepii i experiene morale ca repere de via prime i ultime. Suntem de prere c experiena i gradul de contiin moral se dobndesc printrun efort de judecat i trire individuale. De aceea judecata moral la copil impune prezena ludicului, a imaginarului, a unui coninut magico-religios care va conferi mai trziu fundament pentru un echilibru psihic i moral. Copilul nu se nate nici bun, nici ru, att din punct de vedere intelectual, ct i din punct de vedere moral, dar se nate stpn al destinului su. 9 De aceea Jean Piaget este de prere c
7 8 9

JEAN PIAGET, op. cit., p. 211. RICHARD DAWKINS, Gena egoist, Bucureti, Editura Tehnic, 2006, p. 320. JEAN PIAGET, op. cit., p. 67.

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valoarea epistemic a judecii morale la copil const tocmai n aceast transformare a egocentrismului n altruism, care reprezint lege social-moral de la copil pn la adult. Att timp ct copilul rmne egocentric, adevrul ca atare nu poate s-l intereseze i el nu poate s vad nimic ru n transpunerea realitii n funcie de dorinele sale.10 Cu alte cuvinte graiile lui Homer i Hesiod strlucirea (Aglaia), senintatea (Eufrosina) i prospeimea (Talia) reprezint prima lege din codul moral al convieuirii n comunitile umane. Echivalena acestor virtui putnd fi reiterat astfel: strlucirea bucuria de a drui, senintatea satisfacia primirii darului i prospeimea generarea de triri i experiene moral-umane. Pornind de aici vedem ce valoare recapt intenionalitatea i n ce msur se realizeaz legtura cu exterioritatea. Mai concret cooperarea, gradul de libertate i autonomia individual i pot conferi copilului i mai apoi adultului, posibilitatea de a identifica rolul i semnificaia raionamentului moral care determin apariia contiinei morale. Intenionalismul care caracterizeaz animismul, artificialismul i ntrebrile de ce? , nainte de 6-7 ani, decurg dintr-o confuzie ntre psihic i fizic, n timp ce primatul intenionalitii fa de regula exterioar presupune, dimpotriv, o difereniere tot mai rafinat ntre spiritual i material.11 De aceea se impune o reconciliere a binelui cu datoria, a moralei interioare cu cea exterioar, a autonomiei cu respectul. Doctrinele se formeaz, genereaz idei i trec, ns valoarea unei teorii o confer timpul, ns chiar i aa s-a dovedit c au existat secole care au agreat diferite forme de totalitarism i aceasta chiar dac era n defavoarea principiilor morale vitale, cum ar fi omul, generarea viului i viaa n sine. De aceea important pentru o epoc sau alta, pentru o persoan sau o comunitate moral-uman este gradul de judecat moral. Puterea situaiei slbete atunci cnd trecutul i viitorul intervin conjugat pentru a controla excesele prezentului. De exemplu, cercetarea indic faptul c acei non-evrei din Olanda care i-au ajutat pe compatrioii evrei s se ascund de naziti nu s-au angajat n raionalizri, aa cum au fcut vecinii lor care cutau motive pentru a nu ajuta. Aceti eroi s-au bazat pe structuri morale derivate din trecutul lor i nu au pierdut niciodat din vedere un viitor n care ei vor privi napoi la aceast teribil situaie i vor fi forai s se ntrebe dac au fcut bine atunci cnd au ales s nu cedeze n faa fricii i a presiunii sociale.12 Morala adultului are la baz matricele comportamentale de origine moral care sunt consolidate prin deprinderi i modaliti de raionare moral nc din perioada copilriei. Privii modul n care se joac copiii i respect regula jocului i putei avea n fa tabloul adultului de mai trziu, care a tiut sau nu s se bucure de joc ca experien sau ca dorin de putere. Xenofobia, rasismul,
Ibidem, p. 108. Ibidem. 12 PHILIP ZIMBARDO, Efectul Lucifer de la experimentul concentraionar Stanford la Abu Ghraib, Bucureti, Editura Nemira, 2009, p. 687.
11 10

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misoginia, etc. sunt efectele unei culturi tradiionale transmise de-a lungul mai multor generaii i aceasta explic gradul i intensitatea la care acestea se manifest. Credem de aceea c din responsabilitatea individual deriv contiina moral, iar din responsabilitatea colectiv contiina de sine. Gradul de acceptare a celuilalt presupune respectarea unor legi scrise i nescrise, dintre care prima este regula de convieuire cu cellalt pe baz de acceptan i bunvoin i aceasta presupune pentru nceput contiin de sine. Suprema agerime i libertate a spiritului presupun o convingere, ca i abilitatea de a adapta modul tu de gndire tuturor formelor, de a-l aplica nesilit tuturor prilor cunoaterii umane, de a risipi cu uurin toate dubiile iscate i de a-i folosi, n genere, sistemul mai mult ca instrument dect ca obiect: spontaneitatea, veselia i buna-dispoziie duc la concluzia unei mpcri cu sine; astfel poate Leibniz a fost convins i poate a fost singurul om convins din istoria filosofiei.13

Exist diferene ntre contiina moral feminin i respectiv cea masculin? Iat o ntrebare pertinent pentru exegeii i gnosticii din trecut, asupra creia probabil c s-a pus deja amprenta interpretativ prin nsi textul Genezei. Mai mult dect att noi ne ntrebm: exist diferene ntre contiina moral feminin i contiina moral masculin? i dac exist care sunt aceste diferene epistemice de gen care pot influena filosofia moralei? Johann Gottlieb Fichte14 este de prere c unele din reprezentrile noastre sunt reflectate pe de o parte de sentimentul libertii i pe de alt parte de sentimentul necesitii. Iar noi gndim prin aceasta c interpretrile miticoreligioase de pn acum nu au fcut altceva dect s reflecte tocmai aceast reprezentare a sentimentului necesitii, adic a experienei, care pune de fapt n joc reflecii ale judecii morale anterioare. Tocmai rolul colosal jucat n teologie i n cosmologii de schema bisexualitii ne ndreptete s ne gndim c diferena dintre sexe este o enigm crucial pentru Incontient. ntre masculin i feminin se ntinde un mister abisal, deasupra cruia Omul urzete construciile verbale fragile ale Dorinei. (...) Androginia, marc a divinului sau form originar a lumii, s-a pierdut oarecum: n spaiul dislocrii nete cuvntul, care se dovedete, de la bun nceput, a fi o form de protest.15 Sub aspect etic problematica diferenei gradelor de contiin moral de la masculin la feminin, dezvluie modalitile de cooperare i acceptan prezente n societile primitive dar i n cele existente astzi. Predispoziia de a nu accepta diferenele ce in de o categorie sau alta, dezvluie prezena unui teren
13 14 15

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE, Doctrina tiinei, Bucureti, Editura Humanitas, 1995, p. 106. Ibidem, p. 13. JEAN LIBIS, Mitul androginului, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Dacia, 2005, p. 64.

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deschis la orice tip de rejecie, care poate fi una de gen sau una de ras. i pentru c am ajuns la aceast intersecie interpretativ sub aspect etic, care poate avea n subsidiar mii de ani de istorie i ncrctur filosofico-religioas, ne mai adresm urmtoarea ntrebare: exist oare diferene ntre sufletul feminin i cel masculin? i l-a fcut Dumnezeu pe om dup chipul Su; dup chipul lui Dumnezeu l-a fcut; brbat i femeie i-a fcut16. Litera textului ne invit s raionm doar asupra faptului c armonia dintre componenta masculin i cea feminin a existat nc de dinainte de cderea n pcatul primordial, iar cderea nu a schimbat ordinea instaurat nainte, adic omul brbat i femeie au rmas. Din punct de vedere epistemic, dac exist egalitate de gen, atunci ea exist ca egalitate moral sub aspectul nondiferenei, reprezentat de suflet, neles ca un construct ontogenetic. n intenia noastr de reiterare etic a conceptului de contiin moral se are n vedere tocmai ideea aceasta a restabilirii, mcar i pentru o etic a intervalului, dac nu a timpului n care trim, a unei contientizri a ceea ce presupune separarea dintre masculin i feminin, ncepnd dinspre particular spre universal. Reflecia asupra universului ne dezvluie prezena energiei feminine (ap, pmnt, ntuneric etc.) n aceeai msur cu cea masculin (foc, lumin, vnt etc.), precum i ntreptrunderea dintre cele dou, de unde aceast generare continu de vitalitate i for a naturii.

IAN STEWART, mblnzirea infinitului. Povestea matematicii, Humanitas, 2011

De la natura vie la natura uman exist un salt natural dat de tiin, n sensul de cunoatere prin intermediul raiunii, care ne arat c brbatul, ca de altfel i femeia dein ntr-un echilibru firesc dat de genetic, educaie i experien personal acelai echilibru de fore, ceea ce filosofia chinez numete yin si yang i care la K. Gustav Jung se regsete sub denumirea de anima i animus.
16

Biblia, Facerea, cap. 1, 27, Bucureti, Editura Litera, 2011, p. 25.

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Armonia naturii i a universului exist tocmai ca urmare a alternanei acesteia ntre forele feminine i masculine, ceea ce ne determin s credem c aceasta exist i la nivelul umanului, chiar dac de-a lungul timpului femeia n raport cu brbatul a avut de trecut printr-o serie de ncercri de ordin existenial (inchiziii, rolul femeii n societile patriarhale, democratice, etc.). Cu excepia unora dintre interpretrile filosofice i teologice, spaiul conceptual etic indic faptul c femeia este egal cu brbatul sub aspect moral. Trirea ntru moral este poate singura experien care nu poate fi nvat, ci experimentat. i tocmai de aceea se impune o revenire la ceea ce incontientul filosofic presupune sub aspect tiinific, printr-o serie de lucrri care vizeaz deprtarea de ludic, n sensul de cunoatere i accesul la lumea ideilor pe criteriul voinei de putere. Frumuseea unei femei ar consta aadar n ceea ce are ea masculin, n aceeai msur n care frumuseea unui brbat este dat de ceea ce are el feminin17. Incontientul uman are ca fundament moral diada anima-animus, iar dezechilibrul dintre ele nu poate crea dect o dizarmonie la nivel de percepie i reprezentare, a cror transpunere sub diverse forme simbolice, metaforice mai pot fi cu greu recunoscute, mai ales cnd sunt fundamentate tiinific i mbrac aspectul teoriei cunoaterii. Integrarea coninuturilor incontiente este un act individual de realizare, de nelegere, de evaluare moral. Este o sarcin extrem de dificil, care cere un grad nalt de responsabilitate etic. Numai relativ puini indivizi se presupune a fi capabili de asemenea realizare, iar ei nu sunt liderii politici, ci liderii morali ai umanitii. Meninerea i dezvoltarea n continuare a civilizaiei depinde de asemenea indivizi. 18 n msura n care exist aceast integrare la nivelul incontientului, se poate vorbi de contiin moral, care nu poate include vreo diferen de gen sau ras, ci doar diferene de experien moral-uman care fac diferena n spaiul tririlor, deci a sufletului sau a teoriei cunoaterii.

Afectele umane o cauz a mutaiilor valorilor morale clasice? n aria de cuprindere a teoriei cunoaterii, care include toate acele tiine preocupate de o cunoatere unitar a condiiei i manifestrilor moral-umane, se impune a se avea n vedere o reiterare etic a conceptelor de memorie-voin-libertate. ncepnd cu psihanaliza ortodox, intenionalitatea sub spectrul incontientului i pierde din valoarea moral pe care religia o acord prin intermediului actului i astfel omul i recapt o libertate aparent pierdut. Datul moral are n structura sa genetic arta memorrii, chiar i mimetic, pe care o regsim n trirea afectiv pe
17 18

JEAN LIBIS, op. cit.. FRIEDA FORDHAM, Introducere n psihologia lui C. G. Jung, Bucureti, Editura IRI, 1998, p. 154.

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care omul o investete liber i din proprie voin n actul cunoaterii. Liber este doar omul n forul cruia dezacordul dintre bine i datorie n sens a priori sau a posteriori a fost restabilit. Fiecare aciune uman, spune J. S. Mill, are trei dimensiuni, aspecte ce trebuie urmrite: aspectul ei moral sau acela al corectitudinii i incorectitudinii sale; aspectul su estetic sau acela al frumuseii sale; i aspectul su simpatetic (sympathetic) sau acela al caracterului su atrgtor (its loveableness). Primul se adreseaz raiunii i contiinei noastre, al doilea, imaginaiei noastre, al treilea, sentimentului de umanitate fa de semenii notri (our human-feeling). Conform primului, noi aprobm sau dezaprobm; conform celui de-al doilea, admirm sau dispreuim; conform celui de-al treilea, noi iubim, comptimim sau antipatizm. 19 Logica deontic este astfel dificil de acceptat, pentru c presupune a depi o serie de bariere psihologice care se constituie din pasiuni, sentimente i afecte, care n constructul unei viei sociale presupune renunare de sine. Incontientul nostru filosofic sau ereditar arhiveaz teorii variate, de la cele utilitariste pn la teoriile virtuii i le reactiveaz, poate, n aceeai msur. i de aceea a plasa omul n societate i a considera c acolo el devine moral prin simpla adaptare la cerinele societii, ca reprezentare numeric, arat simplitatea abordrii din dou perspective: a omului ca dat ontologic, i sub aspect tiinific, prin limitarea eticii la secvene de realitate care nu includ reconcilierea sub aspectul contiinei morale dintre bine i datorie. Perspectiva eticii actuale este predispus la valorizarea numrului n defavoarea unor valori vitale cum ar fi viaa i aceasta arat nu numai un viciu de interpretare, ci mai ales faptul c scrierile etice i pierd din valoarea lor prim, i anume reactivarea sentimentului moral.
Contiina noastr cunosctoare, manifestat ca sensibilitate extern i intern (receptivitate), ca intelect i raiune, se divide n subiect i obiect i nu conine nimic altceva. A fi obiect pentru subiect i a fi reprezentarea noastr nseamn acelai lucru. Toate reprezentrile noastre sunt obiecte ale subiectului i toate obiectele subiectului sunt reprezentrile noastre. Dar ntre toate reprezentrile noastre exist o legtur legic determinabil apriori potrivit formei, o legtur creia nimic din ceea ce exist pentru sine i n mod independent, precum i nimic din ceea ce este izolat i discontinuu nu poate deveni obiect pentru noi.20

Trecerea n subsidiarul teoriilor a acestei uniti pe care o confer reprezentrile i gradul de experien moral are dup noi o explicaie n dominana resentimentului. Cauzalitatea prim a acestei scindri a spaiului etic este resentimentul ca unitate de triri i afecte care falsific valorile morale i care poate fi identificat n teoriile cunoaterii i tiin, nu numai n

J. STUART MILL, Eseuri etice, Bucureti, Editura Paideia, 2003, p. 127. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, Despre mptrita rdcin a principiului raiunii suficiente, Bucureti, Editura Humanitas, 2008, p. 49.
20

19

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manifestrile sociale21. Ceea ce numim n epoca modern comportament etic ascunde adesea n subsidiar de fapt afecte resentimentare. Credem de aceea c nici Antichitatea, nici cretinismul n-au cunoscut aceast evaluare care smulge valoarea moral i semnificaia vieii din toate conexiunile interne cu universul, cu originea biologic, cu istoria i, n cele din urm, cu Dumnezeu, cutnd s pun totul numai pe seama forei proprii, singulare i mrginite a individului.22 Se impune de aceea o revenire din perspectiva neurotiinelor la fundamentul moral al memoriei, care reitereaz valorarea prim a filosofiei morale prin valenele contiinei morale. O reducere a dreptului penal valabil n Europa de azi la ierarhia bunurilor juridice, pe care o presupun legile lui, ar arta c pretutindeni valorile vitale sunt subordonate n aceast ierarhie a valorilor utilitii, iar prejudicierea acestora din urm este mai aspru pedepsit dect a celor dinti. S privim, de pild, doar raportul dintre vtmarea corporal i furt. n timpul rzboiului mondial aceast pervertire a evalurii a devenit de-a dreptul groteasc. Exigenele statelor europene au fost mult mai mari n privina averii cetenilor dect n privina corpului i a sngelui lor! i ct de prudent i de ovielnic au nclcat regula proprietii!23 Etica timpului nostru este caracterizat adesea de accente resentimentare, care prezint omul ca un construct al crui suflet i-a pierdut din valoarea sa epistemic, de subiect cunosctor de intelect.

BIBLIOGRAFIE DAWKINS, RICHARD, Gena egoist (Selfish Gene), Bucureti, Editura Tehnic, 2006. FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB, Doctrina tiinei (Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre Aus dem Jahre 1801), Bucureti, Editura Humanitas, 1995. GAUCHET, MARCEL, Incontientul cerebral (LInconscient crbral), Bucureti, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1997. LIBIS, JEAN, Mitul androginului ( Le mythe de landrogyne), Cluj-Napoca, Editura Dacia, 2005. MILL, JOHN STUART, Eseuri etice, Bucureti, Editura Paideia, 2003. MILL, JOHN STUART, Remarks on Benthams Philosophy, in idem, The Collected Works, ed. J.M. Robson, Volume 10, Routledge, 1974. PIAGET, JEAN, Judecata moral la copil (Le jugement moral chez lenfant), Bucureti, Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, 1980. SCHELER, MAX, Omul resentimentului, Editura Humanitas, Bucureti, 2007; for English we use Max Scheler, Ressentiment, Marquette University Press, 1994, SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR, Despre mptrita rdcin a principiului raiunii suficiente (ber Die Vierfache Wurzel Des Satzes Vom Zureichenden Grunde), Bucureti, Editura Humanitas, 2008. ZIMBARDO, PHILIP, Efectul Lucifer de la experimentul concentraionar Stanford la Abu Ghraib (The Lucifer Effect), Bucureti, Editura Nemira, 2009. Biblia, Bucureti, Editura Litera, 2011.

21 22 23

MAX SCHELER, Omul resentimentului, Bucureti, Editura Humanitas, 2007. MAX SCHELER, op. cit., p. 148. Ibidem, p. 167.

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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between ethics and politics as it was initially stated by Aristotle in the first two paragraphs (1094a-1094b10) of the Nicomachean Ethics first Book. In the beginning I looked at the anteriority relation as an explanatory pattern used by Aristotle to sketch the link between the political body of the city and the individual citizen. The aim was to clarify the two kinds of anteriority relation, natural and logic, and to explain the role of phronesis as a common ground for politics and morality. I endorse an integrative interpretation of eudaimonia and I conclude that politics is the space in which personal moral endeavors take place. Keywords: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ethics, politics, phronesis, practical knowledge, eudaimonia.

Intenia mea este s analizez relaia dintre etic i politic, aa cum apare n primele dou paragrafe (1094a 1094b10) ale crii I din Etica nicomahic. Punctul de pornire vor fi cele dou paragrafe, dar voi apela i la alte fragmente, att din Etica nicomahic (en), ct i din Politica (pol) lui Aristotel, cu intenia de a oferi un tablou ct mai clar al relaiei complexe, de tip conceptual, ontologic i metodologic, dintre cele dou discipline. Aa cum observa un comentator, termenii lui Aristotel sunt speciali i nu pot avea echivaleni riguroi n limbile moderne2. De aceea voi acorda o atenie aparte intensiunii i extensiunii acestor termeni, precum i relaiilor lingvistice care se nasc ntre termeni, relaii care descriu implicit o stare de fapt social a epocii aristotelice3. Nu m voi limita la a urmri doar argumentarea aristotelic, ci voi ncerca s aduc i interpretri care pornesc de la situaia istoric a societii greceti (polis-ul ca unitate politic i social fundamentat pe un set de reguli) n vremea lui Aristotel astfel, cred, inteniile filosofului stagirit vor fi mai uor de neles.
1 Articolul a fost realizat n cadrul proiectului CNCSIS TE_61 Modelri evoluioniste ale emergenei normelor interaciunii sociale, contractul nr. 22/2010. Universitatea din Bucureti 2 ADKINS, 1984: 30. 3 De multe ori n demersul meu voi nelege etica, politica i discursul despre acestea ca fcnd parte din acelai joc de limbaj, aceeai form de via.

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(1) E un loc comun afirmaia c n domeniul eticii i politicii Aristotel apeleaz la elemente din teoriile lui Platon, n mare msur pentru a le critica. Voi introduce o alt afirmaie: Aristotel utilizeaz un pattern de argumentare (o configuraie argumentativ), care apare pentru prima dat n abordarea lui Platon din Republica, pentru a stabili relaia dintre etic i politic. Chiar dac termenii se schimb, configuraia anterioritii ca metod explicativ este folosit i de Aristotel. n cartea a II-a a Republicii (Rep), Platon propune cercetarea dreptii n primul rnd n cetate, chiar dac afirmm c exist dreptate i n cazul unui singur om, dar i n cazul unei ceti ntregi (Rep 368e). S cercetm mai nti n ce fel este dreptatea n ceti. i apoi s o privim i n indivizi, urmrind asemnarea cu elementul mai mare n nfiarea celui mai mic (s.m.) (Rep 369a) aici apare pentru prima dat ideea unei anterioriti; ea este de ordin metodologic: cetatea e o mulime care cuprinde elementele individuale, astfel caracteristicile mulimii sunt i caracteristicile elementelor sale, doar la o scar inferioar. Platon nu caut i o anterioritate natural n relaia suflet (individual) cetate, ci mai degrab o analogie de tip funcional: am acceptat c aceleai pri sunt n cetate i aceleai i n sufletul individual i c ele sunt egale la numr (Rep 441c 5). Cele trei pri ale sufletului (raional, nflcrat i apetent), ca i virtuile sufletului, sunt n acelai fel cu cele din cetate. Astfel provocarea de a gsi dreptatea ca oikeiopragia (fiecare s fac ceea ce i este propriu) se poate duce pe dou planuri care difer doar ca scar, nu i n configuraie, pattern. Platon, stabilind o analogie ntre sufletul individului i cetate, deschide calea relaiei dintre etic i politic. Am putea afirma c etica i politica sunt aceeai configuraie de procese, reguli, principii, doar c au obiecte de studiu care difer ca mrime. Pentru Platon, anterioritatea politicii este una de tip metodologic, nu natural sufletul nu este condiionat de existena cetii, dar cutarea oikeiopragiei nu este posibil fr a stabili aceast mulime a indivizilor, cetatea. S nu uitm c Republica este totui un experiment mental, o proiecie conceptual cu rol explicativ. (2) La Aristotel aceast relaie se stabilete pe un teren mai degrab empiric, Politica sa fiind un tratat de guvernare n acord cu starea de fapt i cu dezbaterile din epoc. Aristotel ncepe orice argumentare de la endoxa opiniile care merit luate n seam i din ntlnirea crora, inductiv, se pot nate teoriile i scopul su este s stabileasc regulile dup care o via n comun poate asigura activitatea care s duc la cea mai mare fericire pentru toi (eudaimonia cetii sau cel mai mare bine, cel al cetii). S pornim de la propoziia cu care se ncheie Etica nicomahic: S ne ncepem deci expunerea (En 1181b 24). Cele dou tratate (En i Pol) sunt pri ale aceluiai curriculum educaional (cursul de etic l preceda pe cel de politic n cadrul Lykeion-ului 4 ) i n lumina acestui fapt
4

MUREAN, 2007: 77 i ARISTOTEL, 1998: 378, nota 171.

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trebuie s interpretm i primele dou paragrafe din cartea I. Dar aici apar ntrebrile: domeniul eticii precede domeniul politicii aa cum En precede Pol? Cele dou tratate au n fond dou discipline diferite sau trateaz, la scar diferit, aceeai disciplin? Anterioritatea curricular (i editorial) a En asupra Pol se regsete i ntr-o anterioritate natural sau logic a dou domenii diferite? Etica i politica sunt pri ale aceluiai tip de cunoatere: tiina politic, care se ocup cu activitile cele mai importante, ea este tiina cu cea mai mare autoritate (En 1094b) sau tiina arhitectonic5. Exist trei mari forme de cunoatere discursiv-raional6 n funcie de natura obiectului de studiu: cunoaterea theoretic sau tiina contemplativ (n care includem fizica, matematica, metafizica), cunoaterea productiv sau poietic (artele i meteugurile denumite prin termenul techne) i cunoaterea practic, care are ca scop aciunea bun (e o cunoatere cu un scop imanent: cunoaterea e chiar aciunea7). n acest tip de cunoatere se plaseaz morala i politica; am putea afirma c e cunoaterea de care are nevoie un politician pentru a fi un bun politican8. Dar dac privim cu atenie configuraia cetii greceti, nu exist o distincie ntre politician i cetean: viaa cetii era participativ, nu existau experi i votani, ceteanul era n mod general i cel care lua decizia i cel care o implementa9. A fi cetean presupunea a fi un om politic: toi cetenii particip la viaa politic (Pol 1332a 35). Activitatea politic a cetenilor era terenul de aplicaie al eticii ca disciplin de educare i construcie a caracterului10. Legile cetii nu sunt produse, ci aciuni, activiti11. Astfel, politica i etica nu pot fi considerate o cunoatere productiv, chiar dac politica, ca form de educaie pentru a conduce cetatea, poate fi considerat o art. Politica e o tiin practic ct timp obiectul ei este aciunea corect (nobil) i scopul fericirea cetii (adic a comunitii politice a cetenilor); poate fi considerat o art/meteug atunci cnd intenia ei este s creeze, s conserve i s reformeze sistemele politice n care o comunitate se dezvolt.

1.1. Argumentul lui Aristotel pentru o tiin arhitectonic (3) Din deschiderea Eticii nicomahice se stabilete c toate artele sunt subordonate unei discipline superioare (En 1094a 10). Subordonarea se traduce prin

REEVE, 1992: 76, 111. MUREAN, 2007: 77. 7 MUREAN, 2007: 76. 8 MUREAN, 2007: 77. 9 STRANG, 1998. Constituia Atenei n vremea lui Aristotel cerea fiecrui cetean o practic politic ce includea n primul rnd datoria de a apra cetatea pe timp de rzboi. Acesta este unul dintre motivele pentru care femeile nu erau ceteni. 10 STRANG, 1998. 11 STRANG, 1998.
6

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tipul de scop avut n vedere; este o anterioritate aprut din relaia mijloc-scop12. Disciplina superioar este cea care deine scopul practic ultim aceasta e chiar politica13. Argumentul lui Aristotel se bazeaz pe necesitatea unei cauze finale; n lipsa ei procesele ar avea o regresie (sau progresie) la infinit, ceea ce logic e inacceptabil. Exist un scop suprem unic n cadrul vieii practice i el este obiectul de studiu al politicii14. Aici Aristotel folosete termenul politik (ca derivat din politik epistm). n Politica filosoful va folosi des i nomothetik ca desemnnd politica15, adic activitatea productiv de legi, ramura legislativconstituional a politicii. S reinem c n Etica nicomahic discuia vizeaz politik ca tiin practic, n care accentul cade pe demonstrarea unicitii binelui suprem, adic fericirea cetii. Dac scopul este acest bine suprem, el este imanent i lui i se vor subordona toate celelalte discipline i tiine practice, cum ar fi economia, retorica sau legislaia (nomothetik)16. De ce ar exista un bine suprem unic? Sunt trei argumente aristotelice n favoarea acestei teze: cel al scopului ultim (teleion), cel al autarhiei i cel al funciei. Acest bine i este suficient siei, este specific domeniului su i, mai ales, e ultim n sens absolut, nu mai poate fi mijloc pentru un alt scop17. Dac acceptm acest fapt, va trebui s acceptm c pe lng binele individual de care se ocup etica (eudaimonia) exist i un alt bine binele uman prin excelen (En 1094b 5-7). Acesta nu coincide exact cu binele individual18, este un bine comunitar, al ntregii comuniti (ceti) i chiar dac nu e identic cu binele individual, totui exist o relaie de implicaie reciproc ntre acestea. ntrebarea care apare este dac relaia de implicaie se poart pe terenul mai larg al politicii sau e o relaie care se poate vedea i ntre cele dou discipline, etic i politic? Voi susine c relaia de implicaie are loc pe terenul politicii ca tiin a binelui uman prin excelen. Voi apela la o traducere n englez a En19, care descrie mai bine relaia dintre cele dou tipuri de bine:
Chiar dac binele e acelai pentru un individ i pentru o cetate, cel al cetii e cu eviden un lucru mai mare i mai complet de obinut i de pstrat. Cci n timp ce binele unui individ e un lucru dezirabil, ceea ce e bun pentru un popor sau pentru ceti e un lucru mai nobil i mai divin. Cercetarea noastr e aadar un fel de tiin politic deoarece acestea sunt scopurile vizate de ea. (En 1094b 7-12)

MUREAN, 2007: 78. MUREAN, 2007: 78-81. 14 MUREAN, 2007: 79. 15 STRANG, 1998. 16 MUREAN, 2007: 79. 17 MUREAN, 2007: 81. 18 MUREAN, 2007: 82. 19 ARISTOTEL, 2004: 4, traducere de Roger Crisp, re-tradus n limba romn n MUREAN, 2007: 83.
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Diferit de cazul lui Platon, anterioritatea cetii/comunitii nu e una metodologic: binele cetii/comunitii e cu necesitate un bine mai complet (care integreaz toate activitile) i mai nobil (depind subiectivitatea pe care eudaimonia individual o pstreaz totui ca etic a raportului cu sine). Binele cetii este anterior binelui individual, pentru c n afara acestuia binele individual ca activitate nu este posibil (anterioritate natural). Acest lucru implic subordonarea cercetrii binelui individual unei cercetri cu un scop mai mare: binele suprem unic al cetii. Dar aceast implicaie ne foreaz s acceptm o condiie de posibilitate: anterioritatea (n actul cercetrii a) eticii n faa politicii20. 1.2. Anterioritate natural i logic (4) Funcia omului ca om se poate exercita doar n interiorul cetii/comunitii i prin acest fapt cetatea e anterioar prin natur individului21. Aristotel explic n Politica:
Cauza final i scopul sunt binele suprem, iar autarhia este att un scop ct i binele suprem. Din acestea rezult c cetatea este natural i c omul este n mod natural un vieuitor politic, pe cnd cel lipsit de o cetate se afl fie mai presus fie mai prejos de om, asemeni celui ponegrit de Homer: fr un neam, fr o lege i fr un sla (POL 1253a) Cetatea este anterioar n mod natural familiei i fiecruia dintre noi, cci ntregul trebuie s existe naintea prii. (POL 1253a 19-20)

Centralitatea conceptului de zoon politikon este incontestabil n filosofia practic aristotelic. Stabilind anterioritatea natural a cetii, Aristotel impune deja o cheie de lectur a tratatelor sale care privesc filosofia practic (cele dou etici, Politica etc.): problema funciei omului ca om se poate rezolva doar n acest raport care exist ntre activitatea pentru desvrirea binelui individual (eudaimonia) i binele comunitii. Cetatea este o condiie necesar pentru realizarea fericirii individuale22. Aceast tez a fost denumit i teza prioritii civice23: partea (individul) nu poate funciona fr ntreg (comunitatea). Dar aceast tez nu implic i studierea anterioar a politicii n raport cu etica, pentru c etica este o cercetare care d rspunsuri despre virtuile necesare unei ceti s existe, iar aceste virtui, chiar dac le regsim n cetate, ele sunt activitatea unor indivizi autonomi. Dar dac privim etica drept o parte din tiina politic (iar Aristotel ne ofer premisele i o ierarhie24 s credem acest lucru), atunci
20 21

MUREAN, 2007: 84. MUREAN, 2007: 85. 22 MUREAN, 2007: 86. 23 KRAUT, n Murean, 2007: 86. 24 Exist ase discipline pe care Aristotel le consider politice: etica, legislaia, economia domestic, activitatea deliberativ, tiina funciilor publice i tiina judiciar n En 1141b 24-34.

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anteroritatea sa, ca i cercetare, nu mai intr n conflict cu anterioritatea natural a cetii n faa ceteanului. Etica trateaz individul drept cetean (discuia despre virtutea dreptii are sens doar ntr-o comunitate), dar nu l circumscrie n totalitate acestei funcii de cetean. Discuia asupra virtuilor i activitilor din Etica nicomahic nu este o cercetare care urmeaz s stabileasc cum se atinge binele suprem unic al cetii (de aceasta se ocup Politica), ci vrea s caute natura activitii care asigur binele individual. n lipsa unui rspuns asupra acestui tip de bine, care e n acelai gen cu binele suprem, este imposibil definirea i stabilirea celui din urm. Discuia etic e anterioar logic celei politice25 pentru c politica are nevoie de dezvoltarea unor noiuni pe cmpul eticii, iar individul are nevoie de o anumit interogare i disciplin asupra propriei persoane ca s poat deveni un cetean. Organizarea propriei viei este similar n configuraie organizrii vieii cetii. Pattern-ul e comun, diferena e de scar26. Jocul anterioritilor s-ar putea prezenta aa: fericirea cetii ofer o configuraie pentru fericirea individual, iar studiul activitii care duce la fericirea individual ofer o configuraie pentru studiul fericirii cetii. tiina politic nu e o disciplin omogen, ci mai degrab o mulime de sisteme de activiti27. Funcia sa e una de convergen comun a celorlalte funcii, la fel cum cetenii au o funcie comun: sigurana cetii. Funcia eticii este s studieze caracterul indivizilor i al fericirii individuale28 prin aceasta ea este o parte a tiinei politice fr a fi totui politica ca atare, adic fr a ndeplini funcia politicii. Dar dac am stabilit parial relaia de incluziune ntre tiina politic i etic, tot nu tim care e configuraia final a relaiei dintre etic i politica privit ca phronesis sau dintre etic i celelalte pri ale tiinei politice.

2. Phronesis, ergon i cele patru moduri ale politicii (1) Politica este nelepciunea practic (phronesis) aplicat la cetate (EN 1141b 24). Aceast observaie lrgete considerabil aria de nelegere a politicii. Phronesis deine multe similariti cu o cunoatere productiv (techne), dar scopul ei este activitatea cu un scop imanent, nu producia29. Politica i nelepciunea practic sunt unul i acelai habitus (hexis), dei esena (einai) lor nu este aceeai (EN 1141b 23-24). Sunt acelai hexis pentru c abilitile i virtuile de care un individ are nevoie pentru a-i atinge eudaimonia sunt aceleai de care are nevoie un om politic al cetii30: nelepciunea practic este
25 26 27 28 29 30

MUREAN, 2007: 84, 88-89. MUREAN, 2007: 89. MUREAN, 2007: 90. MUREAN, 2007: 91. REEVE, 1992: 74. REEVE, 1992: 76.

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singura virtute proprie conductorului (POL 1277b 27-28). S nu uitm c n vremea lui Aristotel toi cetenii erau i oameni politici i toi, pe rnd, jucau rolul conductorului. Phronesis, chiar dac n nelesul su individualist monopolizeaz toat utilizarea sa, acoper de fapt toate domeniile politicului: alte forme de nelepciune practic au fost numite economie domestic, legislaie, politic, mprit la rndul ei n deliberativ i judiciar (EN 1141b 32-34). Phronesis se refer n mod special la binele individual, pe cnd politica ar lua n considerare ctigarea i conservarea eudaimoniei pentru un popor ntreg i pentru cetate (EN 1094b 7-11)31. Dar dac tiina politic este o tiin arhitectonic, de ce nu ar fi i phronesis o astfel de tiin? Distincia dintre phronesis i tiina practic trebuie stabilit, chiar dac acest fapt este dificil32. Dar dac phronesis i politica sunt acelai hexis, iar phronesis este o dispoziie a prii reflexive/deliberative sau opinative a prii raionale a sufletului, atunci de ce nu ar fi i politica o astfel de dispoziie? Politica e o politik epistm, pe cnd phronesis e un hexis praktike obiectul ei sunt aciunile particulare contingente; e o cunoatere probabil, pe cnd politica se ocup cu lucrurile necesare i universale33 . De aceea cu necesitate cetatea e anterioar ceteanului. Phronesis nu poate da sens singur asupra aciunii bune pentru binele suprem unic al cetii, dar ea este utilizat de omul politic34 n activitatea politic legislativ, adic n regulile particulare care trebuie date unei comuniti contingente. Ea nu poate oferi rspunsuri despre ce este comunitatea i care e funcia sa, ci doar despre decizii relative la o comunitate dat. Dar este necesar pentru fiecare cetean. Aceast afirmaie poate fi demonstrat dac acceptm c un hexis trebuie activat. Phronesis n aciune implic i activarea politicii, fiind acelai hexis. Phronesis devine activitate practic pentru binele de gradul nti, eudaimonia individului, n acelai timp i mod cum politica devine activitate practic pentru binele suprem al cetii35. Diferena apare n aceast aciune: phronesis are n fond drept scop studiul (un scop contingent), pe cnd politica ca practic are drept scop producerea i conservarea pcii, producerea virtuilor civice care converg spre scopul final: binele suprem al cetii (un scop imanent). (2) Funcia omului ca om se poate exercita i desvri doar n interiorul comunitii. Ergon este tradus adesea prin funcie specific. Ceea ce caut Aristotel este funcia omului ca om (eidos-ul su), adic viaa raional: o activitate a

REEVE, 1992: 76. REEVE, 1992: 76. 33 MUREAN, 2007: 222-223. 34 Chiar dac unii oameni politici au fler (phronesis) i iau deciziile corecte rapid, iar alii nu au, acest lucru nu afecteaz conceptul de comunitate/cetate. 35 REEVE, 1992: 113.
32

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sufletului i aciuni raionale36. Binele omului este diferit de funcia sa, el e activitatea sufletului conform cu virtutea sa (psyches energeia kat areten) (En 1098a 16). Am putea astfel infera, prin analogie, c binele cetii const n activitatea cetenilor conform cu virtuile civice? Astfel, ergon-ul omului s-ar manifesta la un nivel subiectiv, individual, dar i la nivelul colectiv, social. n Pol 1276b 34-1277a 14 Aristotel demonstreaz c virtutea (arete) unui brbat bun nu e aceeai cu virtutea unui bun cetean. Nu toi cetenii sunt la fel, nu toi i ndeplinesc funcia (ergon) bine pentru c nu toi i-au desvrit virtutea (arete). Dar e clar utilizarea noiunii de ergon pentru a stabili poziia, rolul i funcia pe care un cetean le are ntr-o cetate 37 . Astfel, un individ devine cetean tocmai pentru c n funcia sa ca om exist cu necesitate i o dominant civic. Dac nu ajunge la ndeplinirea ei (fie pe plan individual, fie pe cel civic), acest fapt e doar contingent. O alt analogie se face ntre calitile unui brbat agathos (aner) i cele ale unui cetean agathos (polites)38: este posibil un cetean destoinic fr ca virtutea lui s fie alctuit dup criteriul brbatului ales (Pol 1276b 34). O cetate poate face ceteni destoinici (prin politic) chiar dac acetia nu s-au desvrit etic. Aceast observaie deschide o nou interpretare: ceea ce nu reuete educaia moral pe plan individual poate reui partea din tiina politic care se ocup cu legislaia, sau cu economia domestic, sau cu activitatea deliberativ etc. Dar cum e posibil un cetean agathos n lipsa unui brbat agathos? Rspunsul ne vine tot de la Aristotel: Noi spunem c un conductor de valoare trebuie s fie bun (agathos) i s dein nelepciune practic (phronesis) pe cnd ceteanul nu trebuie s fie un phronimos (Pol 1277a 14-16). Conductorul, omul politic, trebuie s treac prin travaliul eticii pentru exersarea phronesis-ului i desvrirea caracterului, iar pentru acesta anterioritatea logic a eticii n faa politicii poate deveni chiar una natural. Faptul c un bun cetean nu trebuie s fie un phronimos pune probleme acestei anterioriti etic-politic. Ct timp (a) politica e tiina arhitectonic prin care cetenii ating binele suprem i ea (b) se fundamenteaz logic pe explicarea i fixarea unor concepte etice, dar (c) nu toi cetenii neleg (b), cum mai poate fi politica o asemenea tiin? Dac viaa politic e posibil i n afara educaiei etice, atunci etica e doar o parte opional a tiinei politice, rezervat celor care vor fi conductori politici. E o concluzie repugnant, care se bazeaz pe faptul c doar cei care conduc i folosesc phronesis-ul n viaa cetii, restul limitndu-se la a fi condui i neexersndu-i virtutea (arete). Dar atunci cum am mai putea susine c funcia omului ca om se exercit doar n interiorul comunitii?

36 37 38

MUREAN, 2007: 74. ADKINS, 1984: 36. ADKINS, 1984: 42.

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(3) Probabil dezbaterea ar avea de ctigat dac am urmri care sunt cele dou concepii principale radical diferite ale lui Aristotel asupra politicii 39 . Prima presupune politica drept o activitate didactic cu scopul mbuntirii virtuilor cetenilor, a doua vede politica drept o alocare a puterii dup merit, celor care sunt cei mai desvrii sau au dus cele mai desvrite aciuni pentru cetate40. Cele dou concepii (politica drept educaie i politica drept recompens) nu sunt compatibile, ct timp condiiile uneia anuleaz realizarea celeilalte. Periferic, Aristotel mai folosete dou concepii: politica drept meteug al guvernrii i politica drept legislaie care produce protecia ceteanului41. Politica-meteug are ca rezultat divizarea comunitii n dou prin relaia condus-conductor. Autoritatea politic nu mai rezid n consimmntul dintre egali, ci se bazeaz pe o cunoatere care e limitat doar unor alei42 (ca la Platon) mulimea ignorant vs. aleii, phronimos. Politica-educaie reprezint dimensiuna republican43 a filosofiei practice aristotelice. Polis-ul are drept scop dezvoltarea inteligenei morale i transformarea ceteanului ntr-un individ moral. ntregul determin partea, astfel nct binele suprem unic devine farul cluzitor al ntregii concepii etice. Funcia pedagogic a polis-ului ncepe cu educaia copiilor (aa cum e prezentat n Politica, crile VII i VIII), dar culmineaz cu activitile politice ale ceteanului adult. Prin exerciiul partajat i participativ al puterii, ceteanul generalist i perfecioneaz virtuile dreptii, moderaiei i curajului, iar conductorul (statesman, omul de stat sau funcionarul public) virtutea prudenei44. Politica-legislaie privete dreptatea procedural, Aristotel susinnd uneori c o guvernare prin legi corecte e preferabil unui guvernmnt al oamenilor45: Cel care pretinde ca raiunea (nous) s fie conductoare pare c dorete ca zeul s conduc mpreun cu legile, dar cel care dorete o guvernare a omului, adaug la aceasta i <o guvernare> a fiarei. Cci dorina de felul acesta (epithumia) i pasiunea (thumos) i conduc la divergene pe magistrai, chiar dac ei sunt cei mai buni brbai. Prin urmare, legea reprezint raiunea (nous) lipsit de voin (orexeos) (Pol 1287a 28-33). Politica-recompens aduce dou noiuni n centru: suveranitatea i dreptatea distributiv. Concepiile principale combinate l fac pe Aristotel s stabileasc meritocraia drept cel mai bun regim politic: Trebuie aadar admis faptul c o comunitate politic (politiken koinonian) exist n vederea faptelor bune (kalon praxeon) i nu doar n vederea vieii n comun. Din acest motiv, celor care contribuie cel mai mult la o asemenea comunitate le revine mai mult din partea cetii (Pol 1281a 2-5). Polis-ul este o comunitatea natural a egalilor46? Cetenii sunt egali, dar un bun
39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

COBY, 1986: 480. COBY, 1986: 480. COBY, 1986: 480. COBY, 1986: 482. COBY, 1986: 484. COBY, 1986: 484. COBY, 1986: 485. COBY, 1986: 495.

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cetean nu e neaprat un brbat bun, cum am observat mai sus. Polis-ul urmrete excelena (kalon praxeon) i atunci, prin dreptatea distributiv, va acorda mai mult recunoatere cetenilor care i exerseaz mai bine virtuile etice. Rezultatul dezirat al polis-ului este conservarea unei comuniti a egalilor sau emergena unui campion, unui om politic care s ating excelena47? Acesta ar fi monarhul, conductorul. Aristotel nu e decis n aceast opiune urcarea monarhului pe tron ar echivala cu dispariia egalitii. Tensiunea dintre excelena politic (a virtuilor civice) i cerina egalitii ca fundament al naturalitii cetii/comunitii urmrete ntregul tratat despre politic al lui Aristotel48. (4) Voi face o ultim observaie despre prioritatea binelui suprem asupra binelui individual. Scopul organizrii politice este s promoveze o via bun pentru toi cetenii, ceea ce presupune c fundamentele acestei organizri rezid tot n felul n care fiecare cetean i stabilete binele individual (eudaimonia)49. Comunitatea civil este rezultatul agregrii preferinelor tuturor. Dar oare preferinele sunt att de diferite? ntregul demers al Eticii nicomahice este s stabileasc acele preferine dezirabile, cele mai alese activiti pentru dezvoltarea omului virtuos, pentru nflorirea sa (eudaimonia). Dac etica precede politica att logic, ct i educaional, cetenii vor avea cam toi aceleai preferine i agregarea lor va fi un fenomen simplu de sintez. Dezideratele unei viei morale raionale i autonome odat agregate nu vor cauza conflicte50 (pentru c regula dezideratului e aceeai) i comunitatea se va nate spontan, fr negocieri i compromisuri (specifice politicii moderne, artei rului cel mai mic). De ce totui acest deziderat al vieii autonome i raionale necesit existena polis-ului51? ntrebarea este foarte important, pentru c rspunsul la ea ne ajut s stabilim i preferina lui Aristotel pentru cel mai fericit mod de via: cel contemplativ sau cel acional. O viaa bun este viaa condus de phronesis, i cea mai bun exersare a phronesis-ului se petrece n domeniul binelui comun. Cu alte cuvinte, cea mai bun via necesit participarea la guvernarea unei ceti (a) care aparine unei comuniti (b) care se autoguverneaz 52 . Chiar dac activitatea (filosofic) de contemplare e cea mai dezirabil activitate, nu o via exclusiv contemplativ (deci o via a-social) e viaa cea mai bun. Omul bun i exerseaz phronesis-ul pentru a deveni un phronimos, iar phronimos-ul ideal e politikos, omul politic53. Astfel polis-ul trebuie s fie o democraie, mai bine zis o isonomie () participativ.

47 48 49 50 51 52 53

COBY, 1986: 495. COBY, 1986: 499. TAYLOR, 1995: 240. TAYLOR, 1995: 241. TAYLOR, 1995: 241. TAYLOR, 1995: 241. TAYLOR, 1995: 242.

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3. Concluzii Am nceput prin a urmri un pattern pe care l-am numit configuraia anterioritii. Nu este un passe-partout care s deschid ua ctre minile filosofilor (nu rspunde la ntrebarea cum gndea Aristotel?), dar e o form de a investiga constrngerile logice la care a fost supus Aristotel n construcia relaiei dintre etic i politic. Nu cred c am avansat prea mult, dar am clarificat cele dou tipuri de anterioriti (natural i logic), apoi am ncercat s cercetez implicaiile pe care acestea le au n filosofia practic (ca ansamblu) a filosofului stagirit. A decide cu exactitate ce rol acord n polis politicii nseamn a decide cu rigurozitate ce este un cetean bun i ce este un individ (brbat) bun (i relaia dintre aceste dou proiecii). i aceast sarcin e prea dificil pentru a putea fi rezolvat ntr-un scurt articol. Am avansat n direcia n care rolul phronesis-ului n viaa indivizilor comunitii poate stabili natura politicii ca practic a vieii sociale: politica e mulimea de activiti care duce la excelena n virtute. Etica este o parte a tiinei politice att ca educaie, ct i ca exersare a virtuilor civice. Cum afirma un comentator, etica este ntr-un sens fundamental o mulime de activiti publice care necesit egali (peers)54. Viaa politic este un mediu de expresie a personalitii: caracter i phronesis. Politica neleas ca economie domestic sau ca activitate legislatoare este o form mai apropiat de o tiin productiv. Politica ca tiin practic (care se bazeaz pe ergon) se petrece n afara casei, n viaa public, liber, n care nu exist instituii bazate pe rol sau poziie social (astfel suntem obligai s rejectm viziunea politicii ca recompensare). n viaa public funcia omului ca om, adic activitatea raional autonom i producerea de faptele bune (kalon praxeon), poate fi exersat. Politica stabilete res publica 55 , bunurile publice, comune, adic terenul pe care activitatea etic n vederea eudaimoniei se poate petrece.

BIBLIOGRAFIE ADKINS, A. W. H., 1984, The Connection between Aristotles Ethics and Politics, Political Theory, 12, 29. ARISTOTEL, 1998, Etica nicomahic (EN), traducere de Stella Petecel, Bucureti, IRI. ARISTOTEL, 2004, Nicomachean Ethics (EN), traducere de Roger Crisp, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. ARISTOTEL, 2001, Politica (POL), traducere de Alexander Baumgarten, Bucureti, IRI. COBY, PATRICK, 1986, Aristotles Four Conceptions of Politics, The Western Political Quarterly, 39, 3. MUREAN, VALENTIN, 2007, Comentariu la Etica Nicomahic, Bucureti, Humanitas.
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STRANG, 1998. STRANG, 1998.

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PLATON, 1998, Republica (rep), traducere de Andrei Cornea, Bucureti, Teora. REEVE, C. D. C., 1992, Practices of Reason. Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford, UK, Clarendon Press. STRANG, JOHN V., 1998, Ethics as Politics: On Aristotelian Ethics and its Context, comunicare inut la Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, Massachusetts, 10-15 august 1998, online la adresa: http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anci/AnciStra.htm TAYLOR, C. C. W., 1995, Politics, n The Cambridge Companion to Aristotel, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

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Abstract This paper is a critical investigation about the historical origins of two contemporary approaches in ethics: moral particularism and moral generalism. Moral particularism states that there are no defensible moral principles and that moral thought doesnt consist in the application of moral principles to cases, but in understanding the morally relevant features of an action, which vary from case to case. In opposition, moral generalism is the traditional claim that moral decisions are made by applying general rules to particular actions. Plato is often seen as a moral generalist for his appeal to Forms which are universal standards, while Aristotle is regarded as a precursor of moral particularism for stressing the importance of the the prudence, which is the intellectual capacity to perceive the irreducible specificity of a context, and the importance of the means which differs from person to person. First I will take Plato into discussion, and I will briefly reconstruct his theoretical account on Justice and virtue in order to establish his generalist orientation. Then I will analyze Aristotles alleged particularism by appealing to his texts and assessing some considerations of a few contemporary authors. At the end of the paper, I will question both particularism and generalism for the appropriation of the two ancient philosophers, on the ground that modern moral philosophy, which is an action centered ethics, is hard to reconcile with ancient moral thought which was an agent centered one. Keywords: moral particularism, moral generalism, universal principles, moral reasons, Plato, Aristotle, virtue ethics, prudence, contextualism, moral judgement, action centered ethics, agent centered ethics.

De-a lungul istoriei filosofiei, ideea central n etic a fost aceea c gndirea moral este legat n mod esenial de existena principiilor i a regulilor morale. Iar importana crucial a principiilor i a regulilor morale a prut s fie dat de funciile pe care acestea le ndeplinesc. Principiile furnizeaz criteriile universale ale corectitudinii i a incorectitudinii morale a aciunilor i ne ajut s derivm judeci morale adecvate situaiilor care reclam un verdict moral. Principiile i regulile sistematizeaz judecile noastre morale particulare i unific sfera moralitii. Acestea justific i explic convingerile morale pe care le avem, precum i deciziile etice pe care le lum. Ele funcioneaz ca standarde publice de evaluare moral i genereaz o serie de proceduri de decizie care pot fi ncorporate n politicile publice. Principiile structureaz percepia unui agent asupra situaiei sale astfel nct ceea ce

Universitatea din Bucureti

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percepe s fie o lume cu trsturi morale. Ele i permit s selecteze acele elemente ale contextului care necesit atenie moral1. Aceast atitudine tradiional poart numele de generalism moral. Particularismul moral este o concepie moral dezvoltat la sfritul secolului trecut n filosofia moral analitic i susinut de autori precum John McDowell, Jonathan Dancy sau David McNaughton, care neag toate aceste funcii ale principiilor i regulilor. n sens larg, particularismul moral este caracterizat att de susintori ct i de critici ca fiind o poziie negativ sau privativ, mai exact c particularismul este o concepie etic potrivit creia nu exist reguli morale universale2. Partizanii doctrinei particulariste susin c temeiurile morale pentru corectitudinea sau incorectitudinea aciunilor sunt variabile, adic ele sunt diferite de la situaie la situaie. Aceast idee este totuna cu teza care afirm c o trstur non-moral care are o valoare moral pozitiv ntr-un anumit caz poate fi moralmente neutr n alt caz, sau poate avea o valoare moral negativ n altul3. Una din principalele revendicri ale doctrinei particulariste este c, dei exist cunoatere moral, aceasta nu se nva din coduri sau manuale, ci se deprinde prin antrenament i exersare a intuiiei morale. A fi o persoan competent moral nseamn a fi o persoan sensibil la faptele morale prezente n situaii particulare. O astfel de persoan are capacitatea de a nelege care este modalitatea optim de aciune ntr-un anumit context. Importana contextului n concepia particularist se datoreaz faptului c moralitatea este necodificabil. Acest lucru nseamn c realitatea este mult prea complex pentru ca noi s putem formula reguli valabile pentru toate cazurile. De aceea cunoaterea moral nu poate fi sistematizat, iar persoana competent moral gndete flexibil i acioneaz n consecin, adaptndu-i judecile i comportamentul de la caz la caz4 Dei disputa dintre generalism i particularism n forma actual i are originile la sfritul secolului abia ncheiat, rdcinile acestei tensiuni par la fel de vechi ca filosofia. Abordarea deductiv-normativist a fenomenului moral i investigarea etic contextualist-particularist reprezint doi poli care i gsesc paternitatea n cadrul teoriilor etice ale lui Platon i Aristotel. Evident, strategiile argumentative au suferit mutaii, iar resursele conceptuale au fost
1 B. HERMAN, The Practice of Moral Judgement, n idem, The Practice of Moral Judgement, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 77. 2 J. MCDOWELL, Virtue and Reason, The Monist, vol. 62, 1979, p. 336; J. DANCY, Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties, Mind, vol. 92, no. 368, 1983, p. 530; D. MCNAUGHTON, Moral Vision, Oxford, Blackwell, 1988, p. 62. 3 O exemplificare aproximativ ar fi urmtoarea: a oferi o informaie corect n cazul unui proces este moralmente corect, a oferi o informaie corect n cazul unei conversaii despre vreme este moralmente neutru, iar a dezinforma un criminal care urmrete o persoan nevinovat este o aciune corect. Pentru particulariti, dac temeiurile morale sunt variabile, atunci nu exist principii morale, adic nu exist enunuri morale universale capabile s specifice trsturile non-morale care determin trsturi morale. 4 J. DANCY, Moral Reasons, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, p. 64.

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marcate de ameliorri istorice i tehnicizri inevitabile, dar polaritatea fundamental a rmas aceeai. De o parte a baricadei, se afl generalistul Platon pentru care cazurile particulare nu pot fi nelese dect prin recursul la Forme, adic la un principiu universal. De cealalt parte l regsim pe Aristotel, particularistul care exalt virtutea nelepciunii practice, adic o capacitate de a identifica specificul ireductibil al contextelor i media relativ la fiecare individ. Astfel de reprezentri sunt fatalmente unilaterale, reducnd complexitatea filosofic a celor doi autori la scheme conceptuale moderne i contemporane. n primul rnd, etica antic fr a ignora importana crucial a aciunii era centrat pe realizarea unui proiect de via armonios i pe cutarea fericirii prin intermediul cultivrii virtuilor. Modernitatea deplaseaz accentul de pe cutarea unei formule optime de via pe depistarea temeiurilor pentru care aciunile pot fi catalogate drept corecte sau incorecte. Este adevrat c interesul pentru trirea unei viei mplinite nu dispare, dar odat cu modernitatea i contemporaneitatea, atenia eticianului se mut de pe agent5 pe aciune. n al doilea rnd, aa cum voi arta, elemente generaliste i particulariste se gsesc la ambii filosofi. Exist germeni particulariti la Platon, la fel cum exist componente generaliste la Aristotel. Dei sunt contient de abuzul comis, voi asuma aceast abordare din dou motive. Primul motiv ine de caracterul funcional al aplicrii unor astfel de grile. De aceea, atunci cnd voi ncerca s evideniez generalismul platonician i particularismul aristotelic, voi opera cu dou noiuni slabe, nu cu ncadrri riguroase. Ceea ce voi face va fi o tentativ de spa ctre rdcinile celor dou concepii morale i de a descoperi mtcile istorice de sugestii ale dezbaterii contemporane. Al doilea motiv este legat chiar de discuiile actuale, care gsesc o surs de legitimitate n gndirea celor doi mari filosofi. Problema originii acestei dispute etice o preiau din discuiile contemporane, ncercnd s aduc mici contribuii critice acolo unde cred c este cazul.

1. Despre caracterul generalist al eticii lui Platon n cadrul concepiei morale platoniciene se regsesc puternice elemente generaliste: oferirea de temeiuri invariabile pentru care aciunile sunt drepte sau nu, elucidarea aporiilor prin descoperirea unor definiii i recursul la universal prin teoria Formelor. Aceste aspecte sunt interconectate, ns pentru claritatea expunerii le voi aborda pe rnd, dar fr a intra n detalii. Aporiile care marcheaz dialogurile timpurii ale lui Platon i au sursa ntr-o interogaie de maxim generalitate pe care Socrate le-o pune interlocutorilor
5 Termenul de agent nu este unul foarte fericit, deoarece anticii nu aveau conceptul agency pe care l avem astzi. Poate c mai potrivit ar fi fost termenul de subiect, dar am preferat s pstrez terminologia standard.

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si. Acetia primesc o ntrebare de forma Ce este X? i ncearc s ofere diverse rspunuri care fac obiectul criticii lui Socrate. Eecul acestor rspunsuri st n caracterul particular i provizoriu al rspunsurilor: dac acetia sunt ntrebai Ce este virtutea?, ei rspund prin indicarea tipurilor de virtui sau prin enumerarea unor instanieri ale virtuii. Rspunsurile devin materia prim a interveniei lui Socrate, care dovedete inconsistena acestor soluii gsite prin intermediul opiniei. Rspunsurile sunt bazate pe experiena, angajamentele preliminare i pe alte prejudeci locale ale interlocutorilor. Or, Socrate dorete o soluie de ordin general, care s nglobeze fiecare rspuns al celor ntrebai. Pentru a rspunde unei astfel de ntrebri, Platon solicit indicarea temeiului. Iar rspunsul ar fi trebuit s aib forma [ceva] este, adic s apar sub forma unei definiii. n cuvintele sale, acesta ar fi fost un temei (logos) de existen a unui lucru, iar n cuvintele noastre o definiie esenial. Aceast trstur a gndirii lui Platon este comun, pn la un punct, i lui Aristotel. Pentru interlocutorul lui Socrate, rspunsul la o astfel de ntrebare trimite la existena etern i imuabil a Formei, iar definirea nu e altceva dect descrierea acesteia (a Formei). Nu e sigur dac Socrate mprtea aceeai opinie, este ns sigur c Aristotel n-o fcea, dei la fel ca maestrul lui cuta s surprind ntr-o definiie aspectele comune ale unei entiti6. Aceast definiie nu este accesibil oricui, ci numai filosofului, adic acelui individ care abandoneaz opinia (ceea ce nseamn raportarea la cpii, adic la particular) i se angajeaz pe drumul tiinei (ceea ce nseamn raportarea la universal). n investigaia etic, ar trebui ca filosof s nu poate fi numit acela care i ntemeiaz concepia moral pe detalii locale, pe educaia inculcat social i pe bunul sim cotidian, ci doar acela care are n vedere nite standarde de maxim generalitate, precum Formele. S-ar putea spune c, pentru Platon, soluia oricrei probleme practice st n apelul filosofului la nite parametri imuabili, obiectivi i c decizia etic reclam recursul la temeiuri invariabile i principii universale. Aceasta ar fi o reconstituire frugal n spirit generalist a eticii lui Platon. Exist ns interpretri extinse i sistematice ale filosofiei sale morale, care asociaz concepia platonician cu marile teorii etice generaliste ale modernitii. Cea mai frecvent asociere fcut de comentatorii operei morale a lui Platon este ntre doctrina acestuia i teoria etic utilitarist. Interpretarea comun a filosofiei morale platoniciene are la baz conflictul fundamental dintre datorie i interes7. (Aici cred c interesul trebuie interpretat nu n sensul noiunii din filosofia social i a economiei, ca interes egoist, ci mai degrab n sensul antic al unei fericiri obiective). Cea mai categoric i influent expresie a interpretrii utilitariste8 i
6 7 8

Cf. R. M. HARE, Platon, Bucureti, Humanitas, 2006, p. 72. N. WHITE, A Companion to Platos Republic, Hacket, 1979, p. 11. Ibidem.

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aparine lui H. A. Prichard, un autor care, puternic ataat de etica lui Kant, denun tranarea de ctre Platon a acestui conflict n favoarea interesului 9 . Conform lui Prichard, cnd apare un conflict ntre datorie i interes, strategia optim este aceea care urmrete interesul, concluzia fiind c Platon justific efectiv moralitatea prin caracterul ei profitabil10, deoarece i atunci cnd i faci datoria i satisfaci finalmente interesul. Pe aceast linie, s-a creat un ntreg curent exegetic consecinialist al operei morale platoniciene, nuntrul cruia dreptatea este exaltat pentru beneficiile subsecvente pe care le ofer: plcere, o bun reputaie, sntatea sufletului, chiar ncorporarea Formei Binelui. Totui, etica lui Platon poate fi interpretat i ntr-o manier deontologist. n aceast interpretare, teza principal se ese n jurul afirmaiei lui Platon conform creia dreptatea este bun n sine, i nu doar prin consecinele sale. Acest mod de a-l nelege pe Platon e similar cu modul n care privea Kant voina bun, ca pe ceva dezirabil n mod absolut, nu doar raportat la avantajele pe care le ofer (IMM, Sec. I). Pentru a ntri interpretarea deontologist, unii autori adopt o alt strategie, fcnd un inventar al pasajelor n care Platon pare s vorbeasc despre principii ce trebuie s fie respectate necondiionat, iar la sfrit trag concluzia c Platon susine c exist principii morale, care l oblig pe om (binding on man) i c o aciune e corect n msura n care se conformeaz principiului, indiferent de rezultatele dezirabile pe care le are11. Fie c e vorba de o abordare utilitarist sau deontologist, percepia asupra lui Platon pare s fie una care confirm ipoteza generalist, potrivit creia moralitatea este legat de anumite fundamente invariabile. Dar, pe lng aceast optic mai exist i o alt modalitate de a-l privi pe Platon. n lumina acesteia, nu se mai poate vorbi de o ncadrare att de ferm n patternul generalist. Una din variante const n abandonarea alternativei utilitarist/deontologist i n resuscitarea componentei aretologice specific lumii antice. J. Annas, spre exemplu, evit dihotomia modern mai sus menionat, susinnd c filosofia moral a lui Platon este o teorie a virtuii, relativiznd astfel importana componentelor generaliste din opera filosofului grec. Conform acestei autoare, obiectivul lui Platon nu este fixarea unor criterii de evaluare a aciunilor, ci forjarea caracterului prin continua cultivare a virtuilor. Sub aceste auspicii interpretative, moralitatea nu are de-a face cu reguli, ci se nfieaz ca o dezvoltate i o realizare a naturii umane, de aceea Platon privete persoana dreapt ca pe cineva care face aciuni drepte fr conflict intern sau efort: aciunile drepte sunt rezultatul unui caracter bine dezvoltat12. Temeiurile invariabile i principiile universale care stabilesc corectitudinea aciunilor devin mai puin relevante pentru o persoan virtuoas. Aceasta deine facultatea de a sesiza aciunea just datorit
9 10 11 12

H. A. PRITCHARD, Duty and Interest, Oxford, 1968, pp. 203-238. Idem, Does Morality Rest on a Mistake?, Mind, vol. XXI, no. 81, Jan. 1912. R. DEMOS, Plato on Moral Principles, Mind, vol. 76, no. 301, Jan. 1976, pp. 125-126. J. ANNAS, An introduction to Platos Republic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 326.

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experienei morale, nu datorit unor norme. De altfel, aa cum observ chiar i un generalist pur snge cum este R. M. Hare, nelepciunea practic e preluat de Aristotel de la Platon din Omul Politic (260b)13.

2. A fost Aristotel un particularist avant la lettre? Dei exist elemente care submineaz ncadrarea lui Platon n sfera generalismului moral, exist totui un acord al interpreilor asupra caracterului universalist al eticii sale. Acest acord este mai degrab tacit, factura generalist a eticii platoniciene fiind privit ca de la sine neleas. Nu la fel stau lucrurile cu Aristotel, care este revendicat att de particularitii, ct i de generalitii contemporani. Criticii generalismului ncearc s gseasc un aliat n figura Stagiritului, proclamnd ferm caracterul particularist al acestuia. Prin particularismul aristotelic acetia neleg c a vedea ce este bine i ce este ru nu e o chestiune de aplicare deductiv a unor reguli codificabile despre cum trebuie s trieti. John McDowell este primul care vorbete tranant de particularismul lui Aristotel, susinnd c
scepticismul su fa de adevruri etice universale implic faptul c esena (content) concepiei sale [adic, ce nseamn s acionezi corect] nu poate fi redat ntr-o form potrivit pentru deducia concluziilor practice particulare14.

Dancy l confirm ulterior, susinnd i el c


oricine a citit Etica Nicomahic va surprinde stilul lui Aristotel att n refuzul de a vedea judecile morale ca subsumarea unui caz nou sub un pricipiu formulat anterior, ct i n evidenierea rolului pe care l are educaia moral.15

Iar M. Nussbaum, analiznd unele pasaje din Aristotel, spune c acesta pretinde explicit c prioritatea n alegerile practice ar trebui acordat nu principiului, ci percepiei, dei autoarea admite c i principiile joac un rol n etica aristotelic16. n ce ar consta particularismul lui Aristotel? Voi ncerca s dau un rspuns, pornind de la revendicrile i sugestiile autorilor de mai sus, prin analiza conceptelor de phronesis (nelepciune practic) i medie, care ocup un loc central n etica aristotelic. Phronesis este o virtute intelectual de un tip aparte, adic o dispoziie habitual a sufletului care, prin intermediul deliberrii, ajunge la un anumit adevr practic, adic la o soluie pentru aciunea uman [al crei
R. M. HARE, op.cit., p. 81. J. MCDOWELL, Comments on Some rational aspects of incontinence, n Southern Journal of Philosophy, 27 (1988), p. 93 15 J. DANCY, Moral Reasons, p. 50. 16 M. NUSSBAUM, Loves Knowledge, Oxford Universiy Press, 1990.
14 13

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rol este de a optimiza viaa (individual i comunitar)]. Dar fiindc obiectul acestei virtui dianoetice sunt aciuni particulare contingente, ceea ce rezult nu este o cunoatere necesar (adic o tiin), ci o cunoatere inexact. nelepciunea practic e o abilitate de a evalua moral aciuni individuale, nu de a explica cazurile prin apel la principii cu statut de principii universale (EN, 1141b, 15-16). Phronesis este facultatea care gestioneaz att alegerea unui scop bun al aciunilor (prin mobilizarea dorinei raionale n direcia binelui), ct i mijloacele necesare atingerii acelui scop (prin cluzirea alegerii deliberate). Dar, pentru a atinge un scop bun, este necesar identificarea mediei, iar media la Aristotel nu este o medie aritmetic, ci o medie n raport cu noi ( EN, 1106b, 6). Msura just e relativ la situaii i afecte singulare i comport un dinamism aparte, ce variaz n funcie de timp (cnd trebuie), de motiv (pentru ce trebuie), de cantitate (ct trebuie), de persoan (fa de cine trebuie) i de modalitate (cum trebuie) (1106b, 22). Fiind att de complex, nu exist aa cum afirm i Mc Dowell o ecuaie a mediei i nu poate fi prins n reete generale17. Iat de ce Aristotel spune c
raionamentele [] privitoare la cazurile particulare nu trebuie s caute o prea mare precizie cci acestea nu cad sub incidena nici unei arte i nici unei reguli, ci totdeauna cel care acioneaz trebuie s in seama de momentul i mprejurrile oportune aa cum se procedeaz n medicin i navigaie (EN, 1104a, 5)18.

Nu ntmpltor Aristotel introduce chiar n definiia virtuii etice o formulare care surprinde la prima vedere: ceea ce e bine depinde de felul n care o determin posesorul nelepciunii practice (1106b, 36). Totui Aristotel ofer i nite standarde ale mediei, dar care au un caracter empiric, spre exemplu: abinndu-ne de la plceri devenim temperai, obinuindu-ne s dispreuim i s nfruntm ce ne produce teama, devenim curajoi (1104a, 35). Tot aa, Aristotel i ncheie Politica printr-o serie de sfaturi utile pentru consolidarea caracterului; dar toate acestea nu sunt reguli de evaluare sau datorii (n sensul dat de generaliti), ci dup o observaie a lui Dancy reguli pedagogice menite s ghideze progresul moral19. Cultivarea virtuilor, urmarea acestor reguli i exersarea intelectului recomandate n teoria aristotelic pot, ntr-adevr, nate un legislator performant, dar nu reprezint o surs a moralitii neleas ca un sistem de obligaii i exigene stricte20. Legile pot prescrie comportamente virtuoase (EN, 1129b, 20-25) i exist descrieri ale unor aciuni ce stau sub o asemenea regul, care s fie identice cu descrierea unei aciuni eminamente virtuoase. Dar simpla suprapunere ntre
J. MCDOWELL, Comments on Some Rational..., p. 95. Citatele sunt date din ediia romneasc: ARISTOTEL, Etica Nicomahic, intr., trad., com i index de S. Petecel, Ed. a II-a, IRI, Bucureti, 1998. 19 J. DANCY, Moral Reasons, p. 53. 20 Cf. V. MUREAN, Comentariu la Etica Nicomahic, Bucureti, Humanitas, 2006, p. 352.
18 17

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legalitate i virtuozitate nu este echivalent cu un comportament moral. Iat ce spune Aristotel despre regulile ce descriu dreptatea: prescripiile legale nu coincid cu dreptatea dect n mod accidental (1137a, 12). n mod real, nu acioneaz drept dect acela care depete stadiul simplei legaliti dat de principii universale i atinge punctul n care aciunea este determinat de o dispoziie habitual (adic de virtute) pe care numai neleptul practic o posed n mod deplin (1137a, 24). E o situaie asemntoare celei descrise de Kant n ntemeierea metafizicii moravurilor: simpla legalitate nu este un criteriu suficient al moralitii, deoarece conformitatea cu principiul poate fi contingent. Ingredientul suplimentar este respectul fa de lege, aciunea trebuind s fie fcut din datorie, nu doar conform cu aceasta (IMM, Sect. I). Diferena ntre particularistul Aristotel i generalistul Kant este c la cel dinti aciunea trebuie s fie patronat de o excelen a caracterului, pe cnd la cel de-al doilea, de o facultate strict raional. n plus, acesta din urm admite necesitatea unor proceduri de decizie, pe cnd Stagiritul nu pare s lase loc pentru existena unei metode obiective a deciziei morale. Cazurile individuale sunt judecate de Aristotel prin prisma experienei acumulate de nelepciunea practic, pe care consideraiile teoretice o pot doar explica, nu i a o ghida n mod efectiv. Singurul ghidaj real pe care l ofer teoria aristotelic i legile cetii ine de scenariul pedagogiei morale, nu de tranarea corectitudinii sau incorectitudinii aciunilor particulare. Abia acesta este obiectivul adevrat al Stagiritului, care fixeaz n persoana neleptului practic (phronimos) idealul ultim al moralitii. Iar phronimos nu deine mecanisme obiective de evaluare, nu este nici mcar cel ce a ntreprins un studiu sistematic de cercetare a virtuilor, din moment ce cunoaterea singur nu e suficient pentru a fi moral. n schimb, phronimos i-a cultivat un repertoriu extins de virtui i e n posesia unei nelepciuni practice ndelung exersate. Dac pentru un generalist persoana ireproabil moral deine un amplu portofoliu de principii i are competena manevrrii lor, pentru Aristotel, persoana care ntruchipeaz excelena moral este tocmai acela care tie cnd s ncalce o regul omologat. Utiliznd o metod contrafactual, V. Murean afirm c dac dorim totui s vorbim de o procedur de decizie aristotelic atunci aceasta ar trebui s constea n comportamentul phronimos-ului21. Aceast abordare cvasi-matematic amintete de teoria observatorului ideal al lui Adam Smith i ar consta n luarea aceleiai decizii pe care ar lua-o un nelept moral. Potrivit acestei interpretri, standardul nu este codul, ci omul (evident o ficiune euristic, nu un individ empiric). Exist i alte tentative de a reconstrui o procedur aristotelic de decizie, dintre care amintim ncercarea unor specialiti n etica aplicat de a utiliza media ca pe o metod obiectiv22. Aceasta ar consta n evitarea extremelor. Spre exemplu, dac e s optm ntre proliferarea
21 22

Ibidem, pp. 356-357. G. CLIFFORD et alii., apud V. Murean, op.cit, pp. 354-357.

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armelor nucleare i restricionarea acesteia, moral e s alegem media dintre aceste extreme. ntrebarea este ns: cine i prin ce mijloace stabilete care e msura just pe care o reclam o astfel de situaie? Exist o gam ntreag de opiuni ntre aceste dou extreme i nici un criteriu obiectiv pentru stabilirea unui punct de medie pe segmentul delimitat de aceste extreme. Cci Aristotel nu ofer criterii ale mediei, ci doar indic un prototip moral apt s o identifice. Varianta unei proceduri ce const n phronimos pare mai atractiv. Este evident c aceasta nu e o metod fezabil de decizie, dar cel puin nu denatureaz spiritul operei aristotelice. Aceast abordare contrafactual a metodei de evaluare este asemntoare procedurii unui generalistului Hare, care propunea expertiza unui arhanghel pentru soluionarea dilemelor morale. Un arhanghel este o fiin imparial n mod absolut care deine o capacitate excelent de raionare dup canoanele logicii deontice i are o descriere factual complet a unui caz. ns prezena unei astfel de fiine nu are dect o valoare metodologic la Hare, neprnd s aibe un corespondent empiric. Dar phronimos-ul lui Aristotel? La Aristotel, neleptul practic nu e doar un model matematic fr omolog n lumea noastr. Un individ precum Pericle, chiar dac e un exemplar empiric (ale crui aciuni nu au cum s nu conin i cteva aciuni vicioase) rmne un model fezabil. De asemenea, comunitatea ofer mereu repere (ntruchipate de indivizi empirici) de comportament virtuos. Iat ce spune Aristotel: n consecin, aa nedemonstrabile cum sunt, afirmaiile i opiniile oamenilor cu experien, ale btrnilor sau ale nelepilor practici, trebuie luate n seam nu mai puin dect demonstraiile, pentru c experiena le-a dat ochi sigur, cu care vd corect lucrurile (1143b, 10-15). Iar acetia nu judec n funcie de principii universale i temeiuri invariabile. Pn aici, revendicarea particularitilor pare atractiv, acetia avnd de partea lor evidene textuale i argumente constrngtoare pentru teza susinut. Exist ns i o ripost generalist care placnd de la presupoziia c dac ipoteza precedentului aristotelic este adevrat, atunci i preteniile particularismului sunt legitime ncearc s demoleze aceast ipotez. Cea mai vehement contestare a particularismului aristotelic i aparine lui T. Irwin, el nsui traductor i comentator al lui Aristotel. Dei Irwin este de acord c, pentru Stagirit, percepia moral este absolut necesar (deoarece etica nu poate furniza o ndrumare precis, ea nefiind o tiin exact), el susine totui c regulile generale ofer orientare n aciune23. Conform lui Irwin, Aristotel introduce att doctrina mediei, ct i virtuile etice cu scopul de a furniza agenilor morali o ndrumare normativ 24 . Faptul c virtuile i msura just au o valoare practic nu reprezint un risc pentru poziia particularist, ns Irwin merge mai
23 T. IRWIN, Ethics as an Inexact Science: Aristotles Ambition for Moral Theory, n Moral Particularism, ed. Brad Hooker and Margaret Hooker, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 100-130. 24 Ibidem, pp. 109, 111, 121-122, 129.

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departe spunnd c acestea sunt generalizri etice25, adic au valoare de principii. Prin acest termen, Irwin pare s afirme c orice virtute poate fi prescris printr-un imperativ, spre exemplu: pentru a prescrie virtutea generozitii, noi putem spune Fii generos. Dar aa cum am menionat mai sus, nu e suficient ca o aciune s aib o aparen virtuoas pentru a fi moral, ci trebuie s fie cauzat de virtute, altfel acestea sunt incomplete. Da, dar cu toate astea, astfel de ndrumri au valoare prescriptiv care poate angaja aciuni particulare. Chiar dac aceste generalizri sunt incomplete, caracterul lor normativ nu dispare. ns un particularist ar putea s spun c n lipsa unor specificaii clare, o generalizare precum Fii generos este lipsit de coninut. n plus, particularistul ar mai putea spune c, n anumite momente, o virtute (respectiv o aciune) ar trebui manifestat mai degrab dect alta (s zicem justa indignare n locul blndeii fa de un criminal) i c n funcie de context o aciune i schimb proprietatea relevant moral. Irwin mai amintete sfaturi aristotelice precum acela de a nu da dovad de curaj dac miza unei aciuni e trivial sau alt sfat potrivit cruia e ntotdeauna greit s cultivi o atitudine nenfricat oamenilor care dispreuiesc att de mult viaa nct nu le pas dac mor (EN, 1126b, 36; 1128a, 7). Tot o generalizare i se pare lui Irwin c este i media: cnd ne prezint msura just, Aristotel are o atitudine normativ i ne prezint lmuriri suplimentare pentru aplicarea acesteia: ne spune s acionm la momentul potrivit, la locul potrivit, fa de persoana potrivit etc. (1106b, 22). Rmne ns destul de neclar statutul acestui cuvnt. Cine tie ce nseamn potrivit ntreab particularitii dac nu neleptul practic care nu acioneaz dup reguli? Dar n privina nelepciunii practice, Irwin are o exegez ndrznea; el crede c principiile au prioritate fa de percepia singularitii situaiei i afirm c rolul phronesis-ului este de a aplica principiile la cazurile adecvate. n acest caz nu dispare nedeterminarea, dar se restaureaz importana principiului, mutndu-se accentul de pe capacitatea omului de a intui proprietile relevante moral ale unei aciuni, pe capacitatea sa de a intui principiul care trebuie aplicat26. Aici cred c se impune o ntrebare despre geneza virtuii i a normei. Care apare mai nti: norma sau virtutea? Aristotel nu pare s rspund la aceast ntrebare, dar rspunsul l putem intui fr apel direct la text. E mult mai plauzibil s afirmm c naintea regulii, individul dezvolt o excelen de caracter, care iniial poate fi descris sub forma unei naraiuni27, iar mai apoi este prescris printr-o norm. Spre exemplu, comportamentul drept nu este impus a priori, ci este marca unui individ (s zicem Pericle) a crei conduit este redat n formulri descriptive, iar apoi este propus ca model pedagogic prin formulri prescriptive. ns, din acest punct de vedere particularismul n
Ibidem, p. 111. Aici, Irwin l transform pe Aristotel ntr-un soi de intuiionist n sensul teoriei datoriilor prima facie a lui D. Ross. 27 Ideea phronimos-ului ca model narativ este inspirat din opera lui MacIntyre. Cf. A. MACINTYRE, Tratat de moral. Dup virtute, trad. C. Pleu, Bucureti, Humanitas, 1998.
26 25

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varianta sa radical devine din nou fragil. Chiar dac nu putem vorbi despre principii universale, putem oricnd gndi moralitatea aristotelic sub forma unui set de meta-reguli care au caracteristica universalitii. n loc de Fii generos! se poate spune n aceast situaie, comport-te cum s-a comportat X! (unde X este un individ generos), dei la nivelul deciziei curente e greu s cunoti astfel de detalii. n lipsa unei descrieri complete a situaiei n cauz i a modului cum s-a comportat X, se poate aplica procedura contrafactual schiat de V. Murean, iar principiul ar avea forma: Acioneaz aa cum ar aciona un nelept practic!, subminnd refuzul particularist al standardelor. n ncheierea primului capitol, voi dezvolta ntr-o manier mai puin riguroas remarca fcut la nceput despre caracterul inadecvat al aplicrii unor astfel de etichete (particularist vs. generalism) lui Platon i lui Aristotel. Este evident c toi autorii angajai n aceast ntreprindere exegetic sunt contieni de faptul c sunt puse laolalt dou moduri (cel antic i cel modern) de a privi moralitatea foarte diferite, dar cu toate acestea i analizeaz pe cei doi filosofi ca i cum ar uita de aceast diferen. Faptul c generalitii, dar n special particularitii reclam o motenire att de prestigioas este lesne de neles. Dar dincolo de dorina de a te afla ntr-o companie select, aplicarea unor scheme moderne unor autori antici rmne o eroare. Interogaia fundamental a eticii antice era Cum trebuie s triasc oamenii?, sau Cum arat o via mplinit?. Evident aceste ntrebri nu rmneau doar pretextul unor speculaii vagi, ci coborau pn la nivelul aciunii efective, al praxis-ului elementar. Dar ceea ce i interesa pe Platon sau pe Aristotel nu era decelarea unor teste de evaluare moral, ci posibilitatea de a duce o via reuit. Perspectiva asupra aciunii nu era una atomist, ci una holist, faptul particular fiind doar un pretext i un fragment ce trimitea ctre o preocupare global. Odat cu epoca modern28 i naterea individualismului, atenia se mut pe cazurile singulare. Cnd reperele comunitare se erodeaz, moralitatea trebuie tranat ntr-o manier cvasi-juridic, iar coeziunea corpului social trebuie asigurat prin delimitarea clar a corectitudinii de incorectitudine. De aici necesitatea unor proceduri obiective de evaluare a aciunilor. ntrebarea fundamental devine acum: Ce aciuni sunt corecte?. Aceast ntrebare permite att desprinderea unei aciuni de trsturile ireductibile ale agentului care o nfptuiete, ct i izolarea ei de scopul pe care l are n economia unei viei reuite. Teoriile generaliste ofer criterii clare i teste riguroase n lumina crora aciunile pot fi numite corecte sau incorecte. Dei pare s denune generalismul pentru uitarea specificului irepetabil al cazurilor, particularismul rmne fidel aceleiai preocupri fa de aciuni. Aplicarea acestei taxonomii la etica antic are menirea s distorsioneze opera lui Platon sau Aristotel, deoarece pune ntrebrile nepotrivite. De aici i o oarecare imposibilitate de a trana ncadrarea celor doi filosofi n schemele actuale.
28 Este drept c prima deplasare a accentului ctre aciuni individuale apare n cadrul teologiei morale catolice care propune o metod cazuistic, dar rspndirea eticii acionale are loc odat cu modernitatea.

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1. ARISTOTEL, Etica Nicomahic, intr., trad., com. i index de S. Petecel, ed. a II-a, Bucureti, IRI, 1998. 2. ANNAS, JULIA, An Introduction to Platos Republic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981. 3. DANCY, JONATHAN, Moral Reasons, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 4. DANCY, JONATHAN, Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties, Mind, vol. 92, no. 368, 1983. 5. DEMOS, RAPHAEL, Plato on Moral Principles, Mind, vol. 76, no. 301, Jan. 1976. 6. HARE, RICHARD MERVYN, Platon, Bucureti, Humanitas, 2006. 7. HERMAN, BARBARA, The Practice of Moral Judgement, n idem, The Practice of Moral Judgement, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1993. 8. IRWIN, TERRENCE, Ethics as an Inexact Science: Aristotles Ambition for Moral Theory, n Moral Particularism, ed. Brad Hooker and Margaret Hooker, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 100-130. 9. MACINTYRE, ALASDAIR, Tratat de moral. Dup virtute, Bucureti, Humanitas, 1998. 10. MC DOWELL, JOHN, Comments on Some Rational Aspects of Incontinence, n Southern Journal of Philosophy, 27, 1988. 11. MCDOWELL, JOHN, Virtue and Reason, The Monist, vol. 62, 1979. 12. MCNAUGHTON, DAVID, Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell, 1988. 13. NUSSBAUM, MARTHA, Loves Knowledge, Oxford Universiy Press, 1990. 14. MUREAN, VALENTIN, Comentariu la Etica Nicomahic, Humanitas, Bucureti, 2006. 15. PRITCHARD, HAROLD ARTHUR, Duty and Interest, Oxford, 1968. 16. PRITCHARD, HAROLD ARTHUR, Does Morality Rest on a Mistake?, Mind, vol. XXI, no. 81, Jan. 1912. 17. WHITE, NICHOLAS, A Companion to Platos Republic, Hacket, 1979.

PROBLEME ALE ARTEI CONTEMPORANE


MIHAELA POP

Abstract This paper aims at discussing some problems of the contemporary art through some of Arthur Dantos theories. The concept of the end of art, the new way of making art, how to understand the contemporary art are some fundamental problems of nowadays art criticism. Comparisons among artistic techniques used by various avant-gardist movements, especially cubist, abstractionist and dadaist ones are intended to build a comprehensive image of the evolution in art creativity towards post-wars period represented by new contributions (Andy Warhol and Joseph Beuys). These examples prove that the contemporary art needs a more attentive interpretation and a better understanding of the material-form connection within the art work and the process of plastic creativity. Keywords: art of the Avant-garde, material of art, interpretation, end-of-art, ready-made, installation, artistic representation, mimesis in art.

Arta secolului XX se caracterizeaz prin faptul c manifestrile ei sunt aproape complet diferite de ceea ce artitii europeni creaser de-a lungul secolelor anterioare. Dac avem n vedere cubismul, abstracionismul, dadaismul i surparealismul, adic micrile avangardiste majore, putem s nelegem rapid ct de puternic i profund a fost desprinderea, trit uneori mai degrab ca o ruptur violent de tradiia veacurilor precedente. Pentru esteticienii i istoricii artei, creaiile artistice din primele decenii ale secolului XX preau s demonstreze practic profeia hegelian fcut cu aproape un veac nainte i care anuna epuizarea sau dispariia artei. Dar, a avut loc oare cu adevrat aceast moarte a artei aa cum s-au grbit muli s o considere? Iar acum suntem oare lipsii de art, ne aflm oare ntr-o perioad post-istoric n care nu mai avem nevoie de art? ntrebri de acest fel i multe altele, adiacente, au suscitat varii rspunsuri i analize. Pentru acest articol am considerat interesant s abordm cteva dintre ideile pe care le-a enunat Arthur Danto cu privire la aceste probleme. Am apelat, n construcia demersului nostru, la mai multe lucrri relevante ale autorului american contemporan, n special la: Dup sfritul artei, Dincolo de cutiile Brillo, Transfigurarea banalului, Dezmrginirea artei.1
Universitatea din Bucureti The transfiguration of the commonplace: a philosophy of art, Harvard Univ. Press, 1981 (T.O.C.); After the End of Art: contemporary art and the pale of history, Princeton Univ. Press, 1997 (A.E.A.); The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, Columbia University Press, 1986 (P.D.A.); Beyond the
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Textele acestui gnditor abordeaz probleme fundamentale ale avangardelor i mai ales ale artei postbelice, n special cea american. Prin analizele sale autorul reuete s conving asupra faptului c problema morii artei este, de fapt, o problem tratat oarecum n cheie melodramatic. Exist un dup sfritul artei, cci dispare un anumit fel de art plastic, acela ale crui temeiuri fuseser stabilite n Renatere prin reactualizarea unor principii precum cel pitagoreic, al frumuseii proporiilor. La aceste moteniri greco-romane se aduga n special metoda perspectival care era o aplicaie renascentist a mimesis-ului aristotelic. Pentru Danto, dadaismul i n special creaia lui Marcel Duchamp constituie momentul de cotitur definitiv din arta plastic. Aceast micare aduce n dezbatere probleme de filosofia artei din nsui interiorul artei. Duchamp, Picabia, Man Ray i ceilali membri ai grupului dadaist sunt artiti, iar creaiile lor, artistice fiind, vin s problematizeze ntreaga gndire artistic. Tema ready-made-ului, a micrii captate de arta plastic printr-o spaio-temporalitate nou, mutarea treptat a interesului spre procesualitatea creaiei, renunarea la vechiul principiu mimesis dublat, ca revan, de includerea unei materialiti concrete prin colaj i inovaiile ulterioare, preluarea unor teorii tiinifice din domeniul fizicii i al chimiei, introducerea n domeniul artei a unor aparate de sugestie tiinific sunt doar cteva dintre explorrile care vor continua s strneasc atenia artitilor chiar i n perioada postbelic. Or, toate acestea sunt considerate de Danto ca dovezi ale unor meditaii profunde, cu caracter filosofic i care provin din interiorul artei. Ele au n vedere menirea artei. Odat cu aceste abordri se ncheia etapa istoricitii artei n sens hegelian. Arta european evoluase pn la acel moment printr-un parcurs n care fiecare curent, fiecare micare fuseser considerate ca o etap care aduga un plus n evoluia spiritualitii artistice. Istoricitatea artei ca istoricitate a spiritului se ncheia, consider Danto, n momentul n care arta nsi se transforma n filosofia artei. Iar acest moment ncepe cu marile micri avangardiste cubismul i abstracionismul i se afirm vehement prin dadaism. Ca urmare, sfritul artei presupune atingerea unui sens filosofic despre propria identitate a artei, o reflexivitate pentru sine a artei nsi2. Cubismul explorase, mai ales n etapa sa analitic, teoria dezvluirii unei materialiti eseniale i elementare. O fcea cu ajutorul figurilor geometrice primare, ncercnd s dezvluie multitudinea faetelor i perspectivelor din care poate fi vzut un obiect. Se sugera astfel c imaginea realitii perceput de noi este doar una aparent. Arta era chemat s exploreze, printr-o imagine multipl, nenumratele posibiliti de apariie ale obiectului. Acesta i pierdea ntr-o prim faz tridimensionalitatea, pentru a o rectiga ulterior printr-o recompunere intelectiv sugerat de multitudinea imaginilor variate i simultane oferite de deconstrucia analitic.
Brillo Box: The visual arts in Post-Historical Perspective, The University of California Press, 1998 (B.B.B.) Hegels End-of-Art Thesis, 1999, www.wikipedia/arthurdanto/works/20dec.2011(H.E.A.). n paginile care urmeaz vom face referiri la aceste texte menionnd doar iniialele titlurilor i pagina. 2 A. DANTO, A.E.A., p.31.

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Fig. 1. P. PICASSO Femeie plngnd

Fig. 2. G. BRAQUE Omul cu ghitara

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Fig. 3. J. GRIS Natur moart

Dac gndirea cubist se pstra n limitele materialitii, n schimb, abstracionismul lui Kandinski i Klee renun la figurativ i tridimensionalitate. Materialul plastic (desenul i culoarea) sunt astfel eliberate de rolul lor de instrumente n recompunerea mimetic a realitii, a obiectului reprezentat. Desenul este analizat n componentele lui eseniale i elementare totodat: punctul, linia i suprafaa. De fapt, innd seam de faptul c linia i suprafaa sunt rezultate cantitative dar i dinamice ale punctului, se poate spune c abstracionismul se constituie ca o dezbatere despre dinamica punctului i a culorii3.

Fig. 4. W. KANDISNKY Compoziie VII

3 WASSILY KANDINSKY, Spiritualul n art, Bucureti, Meridiane, 1994; idem, Point et ligne sur plan, Gallimard, Paris, 1991; PAUL KLEE, La pense cratrice. crits sur lart, Dessein et Tolra, Paris, 1973.

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Fig. 5. P. MONDRIAN Ptrat rotit

Se ajunge astfel la momentul purificrii artei de tot ce aparinea aparenei obiectuale. Figurativul era abandonat iar punctul i culoarea erau eliberate de orice subordonare. Astfel arta devenea un metalimbaj spune Danto4 cci materialul artistic era acum nsui subiectul abstracionismului. Or aceasta nsemna c spiritul artistic (n sens hegelian) i atinsese deja momentul final, momentul contiinei de sine. Inelegnd aceasta, dadaismul putea s afirme cu vehemen, Arta a murit! i s pun musti i barb Giocondei n semn de revolt categoric. Dar, ulterior, abstraciunea a fost vzut doar ca o posibilitate de manifestare nu o necesitate exclusiv cci lumea artei este o lume de posibiliti n care nimic nu e necesar i nimic nu e obigatoriu afirm Danto.5 Ca urmare, n perioada post-belic teoria pluralismului artistic va dobndi tot mai mult autoritate. Dup anii 50 se va reveni la figurativ, rmnnd active i direciile abstracioniste, n special n America. Danto polemizeaz cu Clement Greenberg, care susinuse o idee exclusivist: ce nu e pur nu este art 6 . O asemenea afirmaie ngusta enorm posibilitile de manifestare ale artei, permind propriu-zis doar abstracionismului libertatea de afirmare. Danto, dimpotriv, sensibil i la deschiderea universului artistic spre spaii culturale noi, altele dect cel european sau american, a neles c viitorul artei se baza nu pe puritanismul abstracionist ct, mai degrab, pe pluralismul concepiilor artistice. De altfel, deschiderea spre alte spaii culturale i, n consecin, spre alte modaliti de a gndi fenomenul artistic ntemeiat pe alte
A. DANTO, P.D.A., p. 23. A. DANTO, B.B.B., p. 45. 6 CLEMENT GREENBERG, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, Partisan Review, 1939, www.wikipedia/clementgreenberg/15dec.2011.
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strucuri culturale, a avut un rol semnificativ n evoluia gndirii artistice avangardiste de la sfritul secolului XIX i nceputul secolului XX. Cum ar fi artat oare lucrrile lui Degas, Toulouse-Lautrec sau Van Gogh de pild, fr contribuia artei japoneze, sau cum ar fi artat lucrrile lui Gauguin fr ntlnirea lui cu universul haitian? Dar cum ar fi artat oare Domnioarele din Avignon dac Picasso nu ar fi fost sensibil la influena artei africane i a artei iberice populare? Sau cum ar fi artat arta lui Brncui fr influena african sau egiptean i a creaiei populare romneti? Iar ntrebri de acest fel pot s continue nc multe rnduri. Pentru Danto, trstura principal a artei postbelice este pluralismul modalitilor de exprimare artistic7. n acest caz, devine explicabil i revenirea la figurativ, dup 1950. Exemple de prim mrime sunt date de Robert Rauschenberg sau Jasper Johns.

Fig. 6. R. RAUSCHENBERG Monogram

Fig. 7. J. JOHNS
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A. DANTO, A.E.A., p. 35.

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Dar, ntr-o lume artistic asaltat de pluralismul manifestrilor, problema fundamental care se cerea rezolvat era: cum putem deosebi o oper valoroas de non-art? Rspunsul lui Danto este: conceptualul, nu vizualul ne poate ajuta8. De ce? Pentru c arta postbelic a atins pragul contiinei de sine, a reuit s ajung la propria ei filosofie. Aceasta nseamn c ea are alte motivaii, cci s-a eliberat de restriciile istoricitii devenirii spiritului artistic. Ea e chemat s realizeze transfigurarea banalului. Doar c transfigurarea aceasta se poate realiza n modaliti variate cci arta se instituie ca un mod individual de a gndi i rosti lumea. De fapt, chiar filosofia contemporan ne atrage atenia asupra faptului c obiectul filosofiei nu este lumea ci modul n care lumea e gndit. Altfel spus, lumea gndit i rostit este lumea. Or, n acest context filosofic arta nu poate rmne complet inefabil, ea se instituie prin analiza semantic. Deci, conceptualul primeaz asupra sensibilului, potrivit accepiei lui Danto. Este evident prelungirea gndirii hegeliene i n aceast interpretare. Dac dimensiunea coninutului rmne preponderent, ea nu este strict i riguros determinabil conceptual ca n filosofie. n domeniul artei funcioneaz, potrivit lui Danto, ceea ce Wittgenstein numise asemnri de familie, o anumit comunitate de idei care sunt transmise prin materialul artistic fr a ajunge la formulri conceptuale clare. Pentru a fi mai convingtor, Danto analizeaz distincia dintre opera de art ca obiect i alte obiecte existente n realitatea concret. Autorul se ntreab, relund problema omonimiei aristotelice, de ce dou lucruri care se aseamn exterior pot s se deosebeasc fundamental la nivel ontologic. De pild, cteva fructe i o caraf cu ap aflate n realitatea contingent i imaginea lor ntr-un tablou cu natur moart pictat de Czanne.

Fig. 8. P. CEZANNE Natur moart


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A. DANTO, B.B.B., p. 89.

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Fig. 9. M. DUCHAMP Usctor de sticle

Rspunsul lui Danto este urmtorul: opera de art are o structur intenional, cci este reprezentare propos de ceva, pe cnd obiectul real se limiteaz s fie. Ideea este dezvoltat amplu de Heidegger n Originea operei de art. Opera de art are o component cu caracter reprezentaional, ea trimite la ceva, are intenionalitate, tot aa cum limbajul reprezint dar este altceva dect ceea ce reprezint, idee pe care o semnalase deja Platon in Cratylos. Ca urmare, avnd o intenionalitate i semnificaii multiple, opera necesit o activitate reflexiv profund, o interpretare atent i laborioas.

Nevoia interpretrii operei de art Tocmai de aceea, un punct relevant n aceast dezbatere l constituie problema interpretrii n art. Gnditorul american atrage atenia c arta nu trebuie considerat doar la nivelul sensibilului, al perceptivului sau esteticului n sensul etimologic al cuvntului9 . Opera are un strat mai profund, acela care implic intenionalitatea i capacitatea de interpretare creativ. Ea se nate prin interpretare, afirm Danto10.
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aisthesis = simire, senzaie, trire cauzat de simire. A. DANTO, T.O.C., p. 47.

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Aceat formulare ar trebui neleas n dou semnificaii majore, n opinia noastr. Pe de o parte, este vorba de interpretarea artistului n procesul creativ. El d expresie (form) unor idei, gnduri. Expresia este aleas intenionat, n funcie de necesitile spiritului artistului nsui. Forma i materialul pentru care opteaz sunt ele nsele rezultatul acestui proces de interpretare creativ. Pe de alt parte, avem n vedere interpretarea operei ca proces de receptare a ei. Pentru receptor, opera se constituie tocmai n procesul receptrii adic atunci cnd ea este pentru noi dup afirmaiile lui Dufrenne11. Am putea spune c n acest mod, treptat, opera i completeaz (dezvluie pentru receptor) semnificaiile sale, pe msur ce receptorul nsui reuete s descopere noi valene ale ei. Danto insist ns asupra primei dimensiuni a interpretrii, semnalnd c tocmai procesul intepretrii asigur constituirea identitii artistice a operei. Prin interpretare, artistul reuete transfigurareaunui material banal n unul intenional. Astfel, materialul natural devine material artistic. Nicolai Hartmann12 fcuse o distincie oarecum asemntoare ntre materie i material. Materia era nsi materia natural, iar materialul presupunea contribuia spiritual determinat de intenionalitate. Danto observ totodat c identitatea operei, constituit prin transfigurarea materialului banal, se ntemeiaz pe interpretare. i aici s-ar deschide dou niveluri de nelegere n opinia noastr. La nivelul creaiei, autorul construiete opera potrivit unei interpretri personale, care determin ulterior o anumit direcie de abordare de ctre receptor. Totodat intervine ceea ce Danto numete identificarea non-literal, care l ajut pe receptor s descopere valenele multiple ale operei. Exemplul devenit deja clasic este acela al ready-made-ului lui Duchamp. Usctorul de sticle este un obiect care aparine banalului cotidian. Ideea expunerii lui ca obiect de art i aparine lui Duchamp nsui. Ted Cohen atrage atenia tocmai asupra ideii creatoare, inventivitii personale a lui Duchamp13. A aduce n spaiul artei nalte obiecte gata fcute i care aparin cotidianului era, pentru vremea aceea, o adevrat revoluie n gndire. Ready-made-ul pune multiple probleme de estetic. El neag, renun la teoria creaiei unice. Obiectul prezentat nu este o creaie personal, ci este un produs de serie. S nu uitm c Heidegger semnalase i el distincia dintre obiectul artistic i celelalte lucruri. Datorit contribuiei artistului, obiectul artistic dobndete un statut ontologic diferit. Prin el, artistul reuete s dezvluie Lumea. Obiectele aduse de Duchamp n spaiul artei devin obiecte-ntrebare, potrivit formulrii lui Danto14 , tocmai pentru c ele nu aparin de la nceput acestui spaiu. Aceste obiecte ridic
MIKEL DUFRENNE, Fenomenologia experienei estetice, Bucureti, Meridiane, 1976, vol. I, p. 121. 12 NICOLAI HARTMANN, Estetica, Bucureti, Univers, 1974, pp. 124-135. 13 TED COHEN, Notes on Metaphor, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 34, nr. 3, 1976, pp.249-259. 14 A. DANTO, T.O.C., p.64.
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ntrebri despre rolul artei n dezvluirea unor teme de profunzime printre care se poate include i dimensiunea lor ontologic. De aici rezult i sugestia c obiectul trebuie gndit odat cu opera i c opera este prin interpretarea ei, dup cum afirm Danto15. Duchamp a reuit astfel s semnaleze c obiectul banal se transfigureaz cci ncepe s semnifice axiologic genernd astfel o gndire nou referitoare la rolul obiectelor banale 16 privite n dimensiunea lor filosofic i estetic. Se extinde astfel mult aria de cuprindere a obiectelor ce pot deveni obiecte estetice i din care, pn atunci, artefactele industriale nu fcuser parte.

Materialul operei de art Odat cu apariia lor n domeniul esteticii, inclusiv noiunea materialului din art i schimb semnificaia. Nu mai este vorba doar de un material brut care ateapt prelucrarea inspirat a artistului. Materialul nsui conine n sine trsturile unei civilizaii pregtit s se exprime. Un exemplu n acest sens este opera lui Andy Warhol, Secera i ciocanul.

Fig. 10

n cazul acestei lucrri putem constata cum dou obiecte banale sunt resemnificate. Ele au fost elemente simbolice relevante pentru regimul comunist afirmnd pretinsa unitate dintre rnime i muncitorime gndite ca forele sociale conductoare. In acelai timp, Warhol a preferat s pstreze marca firmei productoare indicnd astfel c aceste obiecte, n condiia lor concret, sunt rezultatul unei producii industriale, realizat de o firm capitalist din Statele Unite. Marca firmei vorbete despre faptul c obiectul are o valoare de pia i este un produs capitalist. Danto observ c artistul a reprezentat aceste obiecte fr o strlucire specific optimist aa cum se ntmpl n reprezentarea
15 16

Ibidem, p. 70. Ibidem, p. 57.

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cutiilor Brillo. Strlucirea, luminozitatea cutiilor Brillo spune ceva, consider Danto, despre magia capitalismului care reuete s fac din fiecare obiect, prin intermediul publicitii, un adevrat idol sau star de cinema. Pentru Danto, este evident o anumit exaltare sacramental a realitii banale capitaliste17. Ideea reapare n reprezentarea sticlelor de Coca-Cola. Iluzia magic a conturului ferm i a formei de-a dreptul senzuale a sticlei subliniaz acelai fenomen al sacralizrii banalului.

Fig. 11

Avnd n vedere aceste comparaii, putem s nelegem c simbolistica de sorginte comunist era contestat prin nsei obiectele folosite ca simboluri. Evident c n acest caz interpretarea constituie dimensiunea cea mai important a nelegerii operei n ansamblul ei.
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A. DANTO, B.B.B., p. 73.

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Dar Warhol nu se limiteaz la reinterpretarea temei ready-made. In ultima perioad a creaiei, va realiza nite lucrri cu caracter religios create dup modelul crilor cu desene de colorat pentru copii. Aceste lucrri pledeaz tot n favoarea sacralizrii cotidianului sau a transfigurrii banalului. Este vorba de lucrri precum Cina cea de tain, Dove Sfntul Duh (n care este evident apropierea dintre Harul divin i spunul cu marca respectiv pornind de la reclama : Dove, cur i purific. O alt lucrare, Raphael I, conine n colul din stnga sus desenul unei etichete cu preul de 6,99 dolari, aluzie direct la caracterul de marf al oricrui produs capitalist. O ntrebare care se ridic n urma celor expuse ar fi urmtoarea: oare problema transfigurrii (banalului) prin art este specific numai secolului XX? Rspunsul este clar: transfigurarea este specific artei din toate timpurile. Termenul presupune, aa cum indic i structura lui semnificant o figurare printr-un intermediar, printr-un mediu. Acesta este n primul rnd gndirea creatoare a artistului, idee deja exprimat de Plotin n Eneada V, 8. Apoi mediul mai presupune i materialul care este in-format pentru a face s apar imaginea mental. La ntrebarea suplimentar: ce este transfigurat? rspunsurile sunt diferite ns banalul, cotidianul face parte dintre temele cercetate de art nc din antichitate, ncepnd fie i numai cu Aristofan. Dadaismul i continuatorii au fcut ca obiectul banal s fie adus n spaiul artei. Din punctul de vedere al concepiei clasice, el a nlocuit opera. Reprezentanii gndirii clasice nu puteau s accepte n spaiul artei obiecte preexistente procesului creaiei. Or obiectul banal nu nlocuiete opera ci este opera n msura n care aducerea lui n planul expoziiei de art aparine gndirii creatoare a artistului care simte astfel c pune n discuie noiuni, concepte, teme a cror autoritate prea incontestabil. S-ar putea spune deci, urmndu-l pe Danto, c sfritul total al artei este departe de a se fi produs. Dimpotriv, considerm c prin problematizarea condiiei materialului artistic, a metodelor de creaie sau a accenturii rolului aciunii creativ-artistice n defavoarea contemplrii obiectului artistic finalizat, secolul XX a reactivat interesul pentru art. Arta plastic s-a simit eliberat de ngustrile gndirii teoretice anterioare reuind astfel s exploreze noi abordri, pn atunci negndite. De pild, ideea de a face art n care s fie implicat mediul nconjurtor fie urban, fie natural. Sau ideea unor opere de art n care se poate ptrunde i care ofer astfel o viziune multipl, dinamic i din interior. Este vorba de instalaii. Prin acest tip de creaie artistic se renun complet la teoria perspectivei unice, la teoria operei finite, ncheiate, la ideea unicei interpretri dat de titlul lucrrii. Cteva idei despre rolul artei n gndirea lui Joseph Beuys Spre exemplificare, vom aborda in rndurile care urmeaz cazul instalaiilor lui Joseph Beuys18. Foarte activ n anii 1960-1980, Beuys i pune acut problema
JOSEPH BEUYS (1921-1986), artist german cunoscut pentru creaiile sale care se nscriu ntr-o arie larg de manifestri artistice contemporane: performance, instalaii, grafic. Beuys a
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elaborrii de forme noi de modelare a vieii i de trire a ei. Pentru aceasta, el abordeaz creaia printr-un proces amplu de interpretare a formelor n aa numite ateliere de creaie. El consider c artistul trebuie s aib o variat experien a formei. De aceea, ntr-una din ntlnirile cu studenii i chiar cu publicul larg, folosete bee aduse din pdure pe care le aeaz pe pardoseal n diverse poziii analiznd efectele optice obinute dar i relaiile care se stabilesc ntre ele. De pild, care dintre beele compoziiei sale sunt puse n eviden printr-o anume distribuire n spaiu sau care dintre ele pot fi eliminate fr a afecta efectul artistic al compoziiei. Artistul constat astfel c o reducere la minim a cantitii acestor elemente compoziionale nu atrage dup sine i o golire de semnificaii a compoziiei. Dimpotriv, observ c energia i forele generate n relaia dintre componente par s fie mai intense. n plus, aceste fore nu sunt toate egale, unele prnd s fie foarte active pe cnd altele s-ar afla mai degrab n stare de potenialitate. De altfel Beuys admite c acest demers poate s fie considerat o aplicaie a textelor lui Wassily Kandinsky i Paul Klee despre studiul formelor fundamentale i a polaritii dintre ele. Ceea ce i aparine este faptul c utilizeaz teorii ale celor doi artiti abstracioniti pentru crearea unor compoziii cu obiecte banale (crengi, bee, buci de fier de diverse lungimi i grosimi, etc.), nu cu elemente abstracte, geometrice cum este cazul pentru cei doi abstracioniti. Problema modelrii Beuys este convins c arta este un domeniu care aparine vieii fiind astfel dominat de micare neleas n toate sensurile date deja de Arsitotel deci i n sensul de devenire sau de proces calitativ fie el pozitiv sau negativ, evolutiv sau distructiv. Artistul precizeaz c obiectele lui (nu le numete opere de art) ndeamn la transformarea semnificaiei noiunii de plastic. Aceasta dobndete n interpretarea lui, semnificaii ample. Termenul i are originea n limba greac. Euplastia presupunea tocmai modelarea corect i plcut. Astfel noiunea ne poate ajuta s nelegem cum s ne modelm ideile gndirii dar i cum s le transpunem pe acestea n cuvinte. Ar exista astfel chiar i o plastic social prin care nvm s modelm lumea n care trim. Ca urmare, plastica presupune un proces evolutiv i, cu ajutorul ei, fiecare om poate deveni un artist. Trebuie totui avut n vedere c modelarea nu e niciodat ncheiat pentru c procesele care au loc sunt continue cci elementele naturii se afl ntr-o permanent nlnuire de reacii chimice i fizice care modific fr ncetare materialul. Constatm c Beuys propune o situare a artei n lumea vie, gndete deci arta ntr-un sens radical extins. Ea este privit acum din perspectiv
fost totodat un teoretician i un profesor preocupat s transmit celor interesai, noile concepte ale artei. Gndirea sa artistic se ntemeiaz pe un umanism de larg cuprindere, pe filosofie social i antroposofie (n special aceea construit de Rudolf Steiner). Beuys dezvolt o definiie extins a artei i ideea de sculptur social. A avut un rol creativ-artistic n modelarea societii i a gndirii politice germane. Multe dintre ideile sale au fost preluate mai ales n spaiul cultural american.

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antropologic i este considerat un produs al interioritii umane dotat cu intenionalitate. Or, tocmai intenionalitatea este motorul care poate s modifice forma operei. Chiar dac opera capt o form final ea este vzut doar ca un rezultat provizoriu. Dincolo de aceast finalizare de moment exist o devenire, o dezvoltare continu n natur. De aceea pentru Beuys, arta este mereu pe drum ctre ceva, ea nu poate conine o perfeciune definitiv care s corespund tuturor principiilor posibile ale spiritului universal. Se d astfel o replic la gndirea hegelian prin aceast viziune vitalist a unei permanente deveniri. Arta este ceva viu, este doar un impuls fragmentar, afirm Beuys19.

Pompa de miere Este vorba despre una dintre instalaiile realizate de Beuys. Ea presupune o viziune ampl asupra semnificaiilor artei. Lucrarea este plasat n mai multe spaii. Intr-o sal se afl pompa simboliznd centrul gndirii i al cunoaterii dar i centrul vieii organice inima. Pompa este totodat un simbol al centrului gndirii necesare muncii. Sistemul de cabluri i fire distribuite de la centru spre celelalte spaii simbolizeaz sistemul de circulaie neles n varii semnificaii (circulaia sngelui prin corp, circulaia cunoaterii prin mijloacele de comunicare dar i circulaia banilor din sistemul economic mondial).

Fig. 12. J. BEUYS Baterii i grsime (a); Pompa de miere i motoarele (b); Sistemul de cabluri (c)

Un alt element component al instalaiei este grsimea. Ea este gndit ca expresie a substanelor productoare de energie. Instalaia mai cuprinde dou motoare cuplate la un cilindru gros de cupru n care se amestec grsimea. Cldura produs de cele dou motoare i micarea de amestecare produc topirea
HARLAN VOLKER, Ce este arta? Discuie-atelier cu Joseph Beuys, Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Idea Design & Print, 2003.
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grsimii. Se sugereaz, pe de o parte, ideea de plasticitate, bun-modelare care este necesar producerii operei de art i, n aceeai msur, oricrei activiti umane. Aciunea sugereaz nu numai micarea transformatoare dar i voina de fptuire. Lucrarea ofer astfel un posibil rspuns la ntrebarea Ce este omul? Se poate observa astfel c artistul caut esenialitatea n orice obiect i ansamblu pe care l compune. Materialele banale ale cotidianului biologic sunt articulate astfel nct s constituie metafore revelatorii. Gndind n spirit vitalist, artistul ine s semnaleze necesitatea polaritilor. Pe de o parte, forma obinut prin rcire, cristalizare (procese chimice, fizice) i, pe de alt parte, dinamismul transformrilor interioare. El constat c n natur lucrurile cresc din interior, precum fagurele de miere, cuibul psrilor sau dezvoltarea tulpinii copacilor prin adugarea an de an a unui strat interior. Pietrele de ru sunt modelate din exterior de curgerea apelor, tot aa cum cristalele de cuar au o anumit dispunere ordonat rezultat n urma procesului de cristalizare. Artistul este convins c n cazul operei de art exist o necesitate asemntoare de nelegere a ei din interiorul procesului de construcie-devenire a operei. Astfel, nelegerea nu se rezum doar la ordonarea componentelor. Ea asigur i o bun comunicare ntre oameni i natur. Tocmai de aceea agricultura nu ar trebui considerat doar o activitate de subordonare (civilizare) a naturii la nevoile omului; ea ar trebui neleas i ca o problem artistic. La rndul lui, artistul ar trebui s completeze mediul nu s-l polueze. Ideea este aplicat de artitii din domeniul land art. Constatm c tema euplastiei este o tem fundamental n gndirea lui Beuys. Sarcina ei este s asigure modelarea spiritual a artistului prin nsui procesul creaiei i totodat, modelarea mediului folosit. In aceast manier, artistul devine un demiurg dar unul diferit de cel platonic care era un Meteugar al universului. Artistul, n viziunea lui Beuys, este un demiurg care se modeleaz pe sine odat cu modelarea operei i a mediului. Tocmai de aceea sunt folosite modaliti diverse de descoperire a concretului originar, primordial: desenul, construcia de obiecte, sculptura, performance, cunoaterea mediului nconjurtor specific obiectului studiat. Problema care apare ulterior este aceea a finitudinii operei sau cnd tie autorul c opera este ncheiat? Beuys afirm: judecata mea trebuie s porneasc de la lucrul nsui, de la dinamica lui20; trebuie avut n vedere materialul i procesul cu care te confruni21. Ca urmare, nu autorul, ci materialul decide cnd se ncheie procesul creativ. ncerc s urmresc ce vor de la ele i pentru ele lemnul sau piatra 22 . Constatm astfel c acest artist acord o importan precumpnitoare materialului utilizat. Grsimea, mierea, lemnul, piatra, avndu-i modaliti specifice de manifestare, trebuie lsate s se
20 21 22

Op.cit., p. 35. Ibidem, p. 36. Ibidem.

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exprime potrivit naturii lor. n acest context, artistul observ c gndirea avangardist a renunat la tehnica perspectivei clasice tocmai pentru a oferi artistului posibilitatea de a descoperi intenia fundamental a fiecrui material folosit. Numai astfel opera are valoare. Masa trebuie s fie la fel de frumoas ca un templu pentru c trebuie s fie un lucru viu. Dac nu e bun, este ca un animal bolnav.23 Ce nseamn c trebuie s fie bun i frumoas? Materialul i forma trebuie s se potriveasc, s fie n acord. Opera se ntemeiaz pe ceva atemporal, pe o valabilitate etern. Ea trebuie s conin mereu esenialitatea ei. Doar astfel opera poate s fie mulumit cu ea nsi, poate s fie autosuficient siei, potrivit semnificaiei kantiene. Aa se ntmpl n cazul templului grec, observ Beuys, dar i n cazul mslinului de lng el, cci acordul acesta este unul n care naturalul se transfigureaz n art tot aa cum arta se oglindete (prin esenialitatea ei) n natura nconjurtoare. Aceast unitate armonic nu este prezent doar n operele antichitii. Beuys consider c sticla de Coca-Cola poate constitui un exemplu n aceeai ordine de idei pentru arta contemporan. El vede n form, n nervurile sticlei, gtul ei, baza solid i elegant totdeodat, n liniile unduitoare ale scriiturii de pe sticl, un complex de elemente care ar putea fi considerat o metafor a vitalitii, a energiilor care urc i coboar ntr-un organism viu. In aceeai msur, maina, copilul favorit al omului secolului XX24, este cel mai lefuit (modelat) obiect contemporan. Dac o idee politic ar fi la fel de mult prelucrat i rafinat i dac ea ar reui s devin la fel de popular precum maina, probabil c omenirea ar cunoate o evoluie uimitoare, consider Beuys. n aceeai direcie de gndire, agricultura poate fi vzut ca o problem a artei. Ea trebuie s in seam de mineralele pe care plantele le extrag din sol i pe care le nmagazineaz n compoziia lor. In mod similar, arta trebuie s neleag spiritul materialelor folosite. Artistul este convins c arta ar putea s contribuie la crearea unei noi culturi. El consider c azi, semnificaia libertii este distorsionat n bun-plac. Pentru a ajunge la adevrata libertate responsabil se impune efortul de a nelege semnificaiile ei. Dar gndirea liber presupune voin i responsabilitate. Sensul libertii este crearea unei lumi. Constatm c artistul construiete un concept cuprinztor al artei. Acesta include o semnificaie profund a creativitii. Sunt sesizabile idei prezente n gndirea lui Kandinsky, Klee, Malevici i Mondrian. Joseph Beuys ine s constate c arta sfritului de veac XX a trecut dincolo de prag. nelege prin prag, punctul de ntlnire i de confruntare dintre arta clasic anterioar i cea orientat spre prezent i viitor. Iat o viziune n care desprinderea de tradiie
23 24

Ibidem, p. 42. Ibidem, p. 57.

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se face cu mai mult echilibru, fr abordri violente ca n cazul afirmaiilor dadaiste. Trecerea presupune un prag care are n vedere un concept extins al artei. Trstura fundamental este i de ast dat procesul de transfigurare a banalului, menionat de Danto. Transfigurarea se petrece n primul rnd la nivelul semnificaiilor. Banalul, organicul, vitalul dobndesc semnificaiile unui limbaj propriu. Sunt aduse n prim plan substane, elemente i constelaii de fore care modeleaz plastic lucrurile i fenomenele exterioare dar care modeleaz n acelai timp i gndirea artistului iar mai departe, gndirea receptorului. Astfel, lumea se gndete pe sine, se gsete pe sine i se inventeaz pe sine n noi, afirm Beuys25. Conceptul extins al artei este vzut ca o modalitate de explicare a modelului christic. Fora christic a druirii de sine este considerat de Beuys ca principiu al evoluiei. Christos este gndit de artist asemeni unei substae invizibile prezent n fiecare col de spaiu i n fiecare element temporal. Este o form pur spiritual de manifestare dar omniprezent; o form vegetal care moare va fi reconfigurat ntr-o form vie nou, capabil s dea, n continuare, noi forme vieii. ntr-o asemenea viziune general se pot aplica mai uor idei preluate din gndirea lui Kandinsky i Klee referitoare la culoare. De altfel Beuys ine s observe c preocuparea pentru rolul culorii i-a preocupat pe artiti cu mult nainte. Goethe a manifestat un interes special pentru culoare la sfritul secolului XVIII 26 . Goethe gndea culoarea independent de realia ei cu obiectele. Acest fapt l-a determinat s dedice un capitol ntreg din lucrarea sa Studiu asupra culorii cercetrii efectelor psiho-morale ale culorii. Kandinsky i Klee au fost, la rndul lor, preocupai de efectul culorii asupra procesului receptrii. * Constatm astfel, prin aceste cteva noiuni i teme abordate c tema sfritului artei este cu adevrat bogat n nelesuri. Dei formularea poate prea pesimist i distructiv, o abordare responsabil ne arat c este vorba cel mult de sfritul unei anumite arte i de deschiderea unor noi modaliti de interpretare a fenomenului artistic. Fcnd efortul necesar de interpretare devenim contieni de bogia de semnificaii pe care arta contemporan o dezvluie.

25 26

Ibidem, p. 85. Goethe a scris un studiu de optic n 1790 i un studiu asupra culorii n 1810.

WHAT IS IT FOR SOMEONE TO HAVE UNCONSCIOUS OPINIONS?


GHEORGHE TEFANOV

Abstract My paper is an attempt to show that the best way in which we could distinguish between conscious and unconscious opinions in everyday cases is provided by a linguistic approach in the speech act theoretical framework. For this, I distinguish between expressing an opinion and attributing an opinion to oneself, in order to point out that a typical case in which we would speak of unconscious opinions is that in which a person attributes an opinion to herself for the past without having expressed it in the past. Alternative approaches analyzing the distinction as one between different types of objects or relations, or as a distinction between epistemically different belief attributions are considered and rejected in turn. Since my treatment is not exhaustive, a few other interesting cases which could require us to talk about unconscious opinions and, as such, could function as test cases for the proposed linguistic approach are listed at the end. Keywords: unconscious opinions, belief attribution, speech acts, mind, epistemology.

1. Let us start by looking at an example. John and George, who are not philosophers, are having the following discussion. John tells George: So you believe that you should avoid making friends with male homosexuals. George replies: I have never thought that. John continues along the same line, trying to convince George that, although he never had the thought that he should avoid making friends with male homosexuals, his behaviour exhibits this opinion. For this, he may point at several situations when, on meeting a male homosexual, George has avoided getting too personal with him. This behaviour of yours, John says, expresses the opinion that you should avoid making friends with male homosexuals. Eventually, George agrees. This example, I think, may be enough for some to start asking questions like: What are unconscious opinions?, How do they differ from conscious opinions? and so on. For now, the question I will consider is: What distinguishes Georges unconscious opinion that he should avoid making friends with male homosexuals from his regular conscious opinions? 2. Before taking a closer look at this problem, I want to note that there are people for which the above scenario is not a plausible one.

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On one hand, the Cartesians would hold that something not accessible by introspection for a subject couldnt be attributed to that subject1. If I cannot find out by introspection that I have a certain opinion, then it is not in my mind. Thus, for such a Cartesian2, the above scenario is unacceptable. George should not have agreed that he held the respective opinion unconsciously. There cannot be unconscious opinions, or unconscious mental objects of any sort. I suppose that for a Cartesian rejecting this scenario the first-person belief attribution prevails over the third-person belief attribution. In addition, the first-person belief attribution is probably defined like this: I have the opinion that p IFF I remember myself having thought that p in the past, together with a feeling that I was accepting that p. Now, I do not want to discuss about this position right now. I think that the above scenario is plausible. As such it is also functioning as a counterexample to the necessity of the Cartesian condition3. On the other hand, we have the eliminativists about beliefs4. I suppose that they will say nothing against the example per se, but they will deny our talk about beliefs, either conscious, or unconscious. The reason for this, I think, is that they do not see cognitive processes as related to manipulation of sentences. A different reason could be this5. Belief attribution has not only the normative assumption that the subject is reasonable, but also requires evaluation of beliefs, which can be done only on normative grounds. Therefore, since the naturalist approach should be descriptive, if we are going to be naturalists about knowledge, we should give up speaking about beliefs or opinions. Again, I do not want to start a controversy about eliminativism regarding beliefs now. I accept the example and I think that one could speak of unconscious opinions starting from it. For now, I just wanted to point out that there are people for which my talk would be meaningless from now on. I only hope that those less inclined to use such philosophical intuitions at this point will follow me well. 3. Let us now consider briefly a few attempts to give an answer to our problem. First I will consider some ontological approaches of beliefs, then some epistemological approaches. In the end I will provide my own answer.
I take this thesis to be different from the one relating justification to introspection. I think Sidney Shoemaker is such a Cartesian, in this respect. 3 It can be shown, in addition, that the Cartesian condition is not even sufficient. Moreover, I think that the addition of other conditions related to mental states or processes accessible by introspection will never lead to a set of sufficient conditions. However, this is not related to the matters I am discussing right now. 4 The Churchlands and Stephen Stich, that is. 5 This is provided by Kim, at a point of his comments on naturalized epistemology.
2 1

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From an ontological point of view, the answer should probably consist either in saying that Georges opinion is a different kind of object from his regular opinions, or in saying that, while being the same sort of objects, the different opinions have different properties, or at least different relations to George. Thus, I do not see how Frege could answer our question, since he says that all the beliefs are propositions, i. e. abstract objects, and he is not very clear about the relation between the subject having a belief and the respective belief, seen as an abstract object. In addition, it seems evident that neither the syntactic, nor the semantic properties of propositions are enough to distinguish between conscious and unconscious propositions. Fodors view that beliefs are sentences in the Language of Thought physically instantiated as neural processes in our brains does not seem very helpful either. I never observe myself or someone else speaking in the Language of Thought. From this point of view, all my opinions are unconscious. Again, the relation between a subject and these private sentences is not at all clear and the semantic or syntactic properties of such sentences are of no use for our distinction. Generally speaking, it is not at all clear how an object could be called conscious only because of its sort, some of its properties or some particular relation with other objects. The ontological approach, it seems, either makes all the opinion conscious (as it was the case with Descartes), or makes them all unconscious. In fact, I do not see how the sort of an object, any of its properties or its relations with other objects could render it conscious. This goes not only for propositions (abstract objects), regular sentences, sentences in Mentalese, neural processes, but for Cartesian mental objects as well. For this reason, I will leave aside other views according to which beliefs or opinions are some sort of objects, for now. The epistemological approach seems to be rather centered on belief attribution. Let us see what could provide us with an answer to our question here. The folk psychology view holds that we attribute beliefs to someone by interpreting that persons behaviour in view of a common sense theory of psychology which contains generalizations about relations between psychological states (beliefs, desires, fears) and relations between these states and inputs from the environment or between these states and the subjects behaviour. On this account, there is no difference between the way we attribute opinions to others and the way we attribute opinions to ourselves. So, in a sense, there are still no conscious opinions. It is only an accident that it was John the one who rightly attributed the opinion about homosexuals to George, and not George himself. We are inclined to say that Georges opinion was unconscious because he did not attribute it to himself. But why should it matter who makes the attribution, since there is no difference between first person attributions and third person attributions? Shouldnt we say, if we are to agree with this view, that the opinion does not become conscious after being attributed to the subject, no matter by whom?

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The Simulation theory 6 rises other problems. It is not clear how undergoing a so-called belief-forming process or simulating one would lead someone to belief attribution. It may lead to asserting a sentence, but not necessarily with the intention to express an opinion. And if we want to say that the verbal behaviour of uttering p expresses the opinion that p, and thus to attribute the opinion that p to the subject we are considering, we must take a further step, beyond the simple simulation. To conclude, the only way in which a theory about the belief attributions could be able to make the distinction between conscious and unconscious beliefs seems to be by distinguishing between first person and third person attributions. For now I cannot see how this could be done without bringing introspection back into the game. But then the first-person belief attributions and the third-person belief attribution might be two completely different processes, with no relation to each other. So one might ask: Why are both called belief attribution? 4. Let me look now at some useful distinctions. Uttering a sentence is not always expressing an opinion, for the simple reason that not all our sentences are assertions. More than this, we could assert something without believing it. So asserting a sentence does not always amount to expressing an opinion. We could say that p with the intention to suppose that p and see what does follow from it, to pretend for a moment that p, to ask whether or not p and so on. It is also possible to say something that we believe is true without expressing the respective opinion. George might say, for instance, The door is open, believing that the door is open, with the intention to make his guest leave. I do not think that in this case he is expressing the opinion that the door is open. His opinion has nothing to do with his intentions while saying The door is open. We might continue along this line for a bit. A judge says George is guilty and he also believes that George is guilty. Still, the point is not what the judge believes at present. The judge pronounces a sentence. We would not usually say that he did express his opinion at that moment. It is clear by now, I hope, that I take expressing an opinion to be a sort of a speech act, different from inviting, pledging, informing and so on. The explicit act of expressing an opinion would most probably look like this: I believe that p I have the opinion that p I think that p7
6 7

See GORDON, R. (1986), Folk Psychology as Simulation, Mind and Language 1: 158-71. Further distinctions between these sentences are not important right now.

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On the other hand, it is obvious that when I say of someone else that she believes that p, I do not express her opinion, but I attribute an opinion to her. I could attribute an opinion to myself, of course, which is different from expressing an opinion of mine. Expressing opinions and attributing opinions could be regarded as two completely different speech acts. In addition, I could attribute an opinion to someone else considering that something the other person says or does expresses that particular opinion. This is a different use of the phrase to express an opinion, since the intentions of the other person do not matter in this case. And of course, since asserting a sentence is not necessarily expressing an opinion, I could say I believe that p without expressing the opinion that p. To sum up, I think it could be useful to distinguish between: S expresses the opinion that p / S says that p / S says I believe that p S expresses the opinion that p / S pretends that p / S predicts that p / S informs (someone) that p a. s .o. S expresses the opinion that p / Ss (verbal) behaviour expresses the opinion that p S expresses the opinion that p / S attributes the opinion that p to herself. 5. Now, let us look at a very simple example related to our initial scenario. George avoids Smith. On seeing this, John concludes that Georges behaviour expresses the opinion I should avoid Smith and attributes to George the opinion I should avoid Smith. At the same time, George does not avoid Smith with the intention to express the opinion that he should avoid Smith. Neither does he attribute to himself the opinion that he should avoid Smith. After having a discussion with John, George agrees that he had the opinion that he should avoid Smith. How is this possible? George is also willing to attribute opinions (and perhaps even intentions) to himself by interpreting his behaviour. He does this all the time. So what is the difference between Georges unconscious opinion that he should avoid making friends with male homosexuals and his conscious opinion that, lets say, his name is George? George has perhaps expressed the opinion My name is George in the past, either to someone else, or to himself. In any case, he has attributed this opinion to himself at a certain point in the past. No one has pointed out to him that the opinion that his name is George could have been attributed to him even before his own attribution (and perhaps that he could have agreed with this attribution even then). Therefore, having this in view, he could say that he has the conscious opinion, or, more simply, the opinion that his name is George. In the case of I should avoid making friends with male homosexuals, George has accepted that he could have attributed this

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opinion to himself in the past even without having expressed it, based on his behaviour, and decided to attribute this opinion to himself for that time (even before expressing it at present). Perhaps the source of our puzzle was the difficulty to understand what George meant when he said, after his discussion with John, something like: Right, so I had the opinion that I should avoid making friends with male homosexuals in the past. We were familiar with utterances like I had the opinion that my name is George in the past, which are normally used both to express an opinion for oneself for the past and to attribute an opinion to oneself for the past, but we were not so familiar with an utterance used to attribute an opinion to oneself for the past without expressing it for oneself for the past. I believe that this was our problem and that the only possible solution can come from a better understanding of our language, with no need for an ontology of beliefs or of a theory about belief attribution. 6. In the end I want to remind you that I have tried to focus on one case only. There are other cases that could perhaps rise problems of unconscious opinions. To name only a few: S knows the right answer to a question without accepting it. S could compute a very large sum, although he never made that computation before. S acts as if he believes that he is the most intelligent person in the world, although he would never agree to that. S acts as if he believes that All objects fall down, but he cannot use generalizations. S usually believes that all emeralds are green, without thinking it right now. (He is asleep right now.) Someone attributes to S the assumptions of his view. We could attribute to S the sentences entailed, conventionally implied, conversationally implied or presupposed by what S is saying, although S has never said those sentences, not even to himself. German speakers attribute to S, who is a monolingual English speaker, the opinion that Die Schnee ist wei. I want to suggest that there is nothing wrong with speaking about unconscious opinions with respect to at least some of the cases enumerated above. However, if we are going to find ourselves at a loss, the solution should be provided by a better understanding of our language. This is an opinion for which I hope I have offered a small support in this paper.

THE SYNCHRONY OR TEMPORAL CODING THEORY (TEMPORAL BINDING)


MIHAI VACARIU, GABRIEL VACARIU

Abstract The binding problem remains one of the most important and unsolved problems in cognitive science. One of the proposed solutions, which is probably the most accepted in the scientific community, involves the synchronized oscillations. According to this theory, the integration of the brain areas responsible for various features, such as color or spatial dimension of a perceived object, is the outcome of the synchronized oscillations of the neurons. Electroencephalogram (EEG) results show us that different frequency bands are correlated with particular mental states. However, after presenting in detail this approach, we try to show that it still encounters serious obstacles to be considered the definitive solution for the binding problem. Keywords: oscillations, frequency bands, gamma range, EEG, binding problem.

1.The Binding Problem: a Brief Description In the last decades, there has been a significant progress in the area of cognitive science and related fields such as neuroscience and cognitive neuroscience. Particularly, the advances in functional neuroimaging technology have offered to scientists the possibility to understand better the relationship between the activity in certain brain areas and certain explicit mental functions. Nevertheless, one of the most important issues in cognitive science, the binding problem (and its related problem localization), has not yet been solved. It is still difficult to approach and further to understand the relationship between the function of the mind and the brain processes1. Several definitions of the notion of binding have been proposed, but many of them refer, in one or another way, to the modality of how specific activated neural patters of neurons are correlated with certain features or properties of an object (like color, size,
University of Bucharest ROSKIES (1999) considers the binding problem to be one of the most puzzling and fascinating issues that the brain and cognitive sciences have ever faced; TREISMAN (1996) points out that a solution to the binding problem may also throw light on the problem of the nature of conscious awareness (in VELIK 2010, p. 994) .
1

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motion, orientation) and how, in the end, they generate the mental unity of that object. Researchers such as Velik (2010), Plate (2007), Robertson (2003), Feldman (2010), Flevaris, Bentin and Lynn (2010), Humphreys et al. (2002) bring into discussion various forms of binding: spatial (location2) or temporal, conscious or unconscious, visual (linking together color, form, motion, size, and location of a perceptual object or binding various perceptual objects), auditory, cognitive (explains how a concept is connected to a percept), binding in language understanding, in reasoning, cross-modal binding, sensory-motor binding, memory binding and the causes of an unified conscious experience. However, there is something else that we always need to take into account (that is to use) when we analyze, in any way, the binding problem: that we need a very specific framework to situate the entire analyze in order to find the right solutions. The same framework should be suitable for investigating the mindbody problem too (and the more specific problem of representation). If we look carefully to the history of these problems, we can notice that one single framework has always been used for both problems. This framework is based on the idea that we live in a single unified world in which we can observe and correlate various entities of different nature, such as activated patterns of neurons, mental states, and so on. Within this framework, the binding problem still remains unsolved and it seems to be the main challenge for cognitive (neuro)scientists. Velik writes that the binding mechanism is almost everywhere in the brain and in all processing levels (Velik, 2010, p. 994). Out of the proposed solutions to the problem, the idea of synchronized oscillations in neuronal networks seems to be most accepted today, so we present it in detail below. In the last part of the essay, we try to show the main problems of this approach.

2. Synchronized Oscillations a General Framework An alternative for the superposition problem of population coding and the combinatorial problem of convergent hierarchical coding is the temporal binding hypothesis initiated and developed by C. Legendy (1970), P. Milner (1974) and C. von der Malsburg (1981) (Von der Malsburg, 1999). The binding problem is realized through the synchronous neuronal oscillations under different frequencies. Using EEG 3 or MEG, electrophysiological signals are obtained at the scalp level, signals that mirror the synchronization of weak
Treisman specify that objects and location seem to be separately coded in dorsal and ventral pathways raising what may be the most basic binding problem: linking what to where (TREISMAN 1996). 3 Intracranial EEG (iEEG) has a far better signal-to-noise ratio than scalp EEG, since it is recorded from the brain itself. iEEG voltages typically are measured in millivolts; scalp EEG is measured in microvolts. (BAARS and GAGE 2010, p. 262).
2

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synaptic currents across a large number of neurons: scalp signals therefore necessarily reflect synchronized neural activity (Tallon-Baudry 2009, p. 322) or rhythmic modulation of discharge activity (neuronal oscillations). The coupling of neurons through synchronization depend on the adjusting the phase relationship or frequency of the cells from that neuronal group. The phase of an oscillation provides the window for processing information. Inputs in good phase of the ongoing oscillation are selected, inputs in bad phase are suppressed (Moser et al. 2010, p. 199). There is the hypothesis that the synchronization between the different areas is achieved through the zero-phase lag between the same frequent-oscillatory activities.
When two brain regions fire in synchrony with a lag time, the term phase locking is more accurate than synchrony. Sound waves echoing in a canyon are phase locked but not synchronous, because they echo back and forth with a brief lag time. Because neurons also take time to send their axonal spikes, there is a lag time in echoing among related brain regions, leading to phase locking rather than synchrony. Both synchrony and phase locking are commonly observed in the brain.4 (Baars and Gage 2010, p. 252)

Experiment results showed that zero-phase lag synchronization can occur over local brain areas or large distances even if there are great conduction delays of pathways that connect the synchronized neural groups. (Moser et al. 2010, p. 205)
A power increase in a given frequency band at an electrode or MEG sensor is thus considered as measure of local oscillatory synchrony, probably generated through local, within-area neural interactions. Long-range oscillatory synchrony, thought to arise from between-area recurrent feed-forward/feed-back loops, is best characterized by phase synchronization (20), although some care has to be taken when using this measure at the scalp level (). (Tallon-Baudry 2009, p. 322)

According to Baars and Gage (2010, p. 107), the main frequency bands and their features are roughly these ones: delta wave (less than 4 Hz) the slowest wave with the greatest amplitude, typically for deep sleep (unconscious) states. It is known that if our awareness of the external world decreases, delta wave increases. Theta wave (3.5 to 7.5 Hz Hz) available for sleep states and meditation or, creating communications between hippocampus and cortex, it is involved in short term memory and memory retrieval tasks; alpha wave (7.5 to 13 Hz) arises in relaxation moments (when the eyes are close; if the eyes are open, alpha wave is attenuated); beta wave (13-26 Hz) irregular, low voltage available for waking conscious states, symmetrically distributed in both hemispheres (most evident in

Sometimes perfect synchrony is not attainable, so that there is a brief time lag between the peak of the wave in one place (like the hippocampus) and another place (like the frontal lobe). In those cases, the better term is phase locking or phase coherence, a little bit like a syncopated off-beat rhythm in music. It is synchrony with a time lag. (BAARS and GAGE 2010, p. 261).

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the frontal area); gamma wave (26-70 Hz5, centered around 40 Hz) available for conscious states (conscious perceptions and other cognitive states) and in REM dreams (rapid eyes movement sleep) creating communications between cortex and subcortical areas. It is important to note that EEG technique captures only the surface waves, while under these there are other important wave interactions (locked in synchrony with each other, phase-locked, transiently coordinated, cross-frequency coupling) and they are within different ranges (recent findings indicate that they range from 0.01 to 1000 Hz) (Baars and Gage 2010, p. 254). The research in the field evolves rapidly and these results might indeed be just approximations. Baars warns us in this respect: Keep in mind that brain rhythms are a moving target, as new evidence appears with remarkable rapidity (Baars and Gage 2010, p. 261) According to Singer, segmentation up to 90 Hz, for large distances is beta and gamma frequencies between 30-60 Hz, consciousness is associated with phase locking of gamma oscillations across widely distributed cortical areas, while unconscious processes are associated with local gamma oscillations (Singer 2010, p. 165 or 2009, p. 49) Singer, among others, mentions that the firing rate (discharge rate) is characteristic for particular features, while synchronization correlates these features (Singer 2010, p. 164; see also Singer 2009). Moser and his colleagues suggest that the phase of oscillations (relative timing) is used for coding. The responses of synchronized cell populations to the strong excitatory inputs on the rising phase of the oscillation are earlier comparing with the responses to the weak inputs. They claim that the intensity can be encoded in the time of spiking relative to the oscillation phase. This is a convenient way of coding since the latency of first spikes already contains all information about the amplitude of the driving input. (Moser et al. 2010, p. 199) Oscillations are necessary for synchronizing the spikes for propagating them in sparsely networks, spikes timing has to be adjusted with high precision for the definition of relations in learning processes such as spike timing-dependent plasticity and the information about input amplitude or the relationships between distributed processes is found in timing relations between spikes or between spikes and the phase of a population oscillation (Moser et al. 2010, p. 200).
An oscillatory modulation of membrane potential, such as occurs in oscillating cell assemblies, confines spiking to the rising slope of the depolarizing phase. Thus, spikes emitted by networks engaged in synchronous oscillations become synchronized. The temporal precision of this synchronization increases with oscillation frequency. In the case of gamma oscillations, output spikes can be synchronized with a precision in the range of a few milliseconds. Because of the coincidence sensitivity of neurons, this synchronization greatly increases the impact that the output of synchronized cell assemblies has on subsequent target neurons. (Moser et al., p. 199)

The actual taxonomy of gamma band is low band (30-60 Hz) and high band (60-120 Hz).

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One of the most exciting issue in cognitive neuroscience today regards the integration of different neural patterns of activation that are correlated with particular mental functions (the correspondent issue in the visual binding problem involves the features of a perceived object). It is usually considered that the activity of certain neural patterns responsible for the presence of a particular mental (perceptual) feature, while grouping all the features of one (perceived) entity are due to synchronization processes. Such an integration is correlated with the unity of consciousness/mind/subjectivity (the biding problem is the unity of perceptual scene/object). A related area of research which has to do with the dynamic coordination in the brain/mind has been recently approached by various researchers in a new book Dynamic Coordination in the Brain From Neurons to Mind, edited by Philips, von der Malsburg, Singer (2010). The main interest regards the coordinated interactions that produce coherent and relevant overall patterns of activity, while preserving the essential individual identities and functions of the activities coordinated.6 (Philips et. al, 2010, p. 1) The main problem then remains the combination of the global information (relational Gestalt organization) with the local information in the brain (information that is correlated with local and global mental functions/states). There are two main mechanisms for this coordination: by gain modulation (synaptic gain changes, activity-dependent gating when dendritic segments are switched off by shunting inhibition the activation of synapses along a dendrite is change, etc.) or by synchronization of oscillation patterns (Moser et al. 2010, pp. 198-9). However, the gain is not that suitable for the speed and flexibility of cognitive processes. Therefore, the oscillatory synchrony approach is probably a better alternative to the issue and this is the main reason it is more popular among scientists. Among the groups of neurons, the frequency and phase adjustments are necessary for the selective routing activity and the dynamic gating of interactions between neural areas. Moreover, through the same mechanisms, the groups of neurons can be connected into coupled assemblies or segregated into functionally subgroups. The oscillations with these mechanisms could serve three complementary functions: gain control, selective and flexible routing of information between neuronal groups, and formation of coherent representations. (Melloni and Singer 2010, p. 20) Neural oscillations determine the relationships (coordination) among distributed neurons through synchronization. It is largely accepted the idea that the oscillatory synchrony is not the only mechanism for coordination in the brain. All these mechanisms are in fact complementary.

Coordination is quite similar with binding. For VON DER MALSBURG coordination is the ability to create internal scenes that capture the reality of environment. (2010, p. 155). According to the editors of the book, neural synchrony oscillations and vector coding are two distinct and complementary processes that can be correlated with various cognitive processes.

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Singer claims that the features of perceptual objects are encoded at subcorticals levels, while the objects as a whole and the relationships among these features and objects with their environment are encoded by intracortical neuronal connections and iterative recombination of feed-forward connections from lower- to higher-order neurons (Singer 2010, p. 159). The brain has obviously a hierarchical structure, with systems and subsystems, neural codes and oscillations, feed-forward and feed-back signals and other entities and processes. However, all these elements have to be correlated somehow with the mental functions and the overall unity any individual. The problem is that the neural patterns (modalities or subsystems) have to be reliable (neural codes must code for the same thing when used at different times and in different contexts) and flexible (codes must be used in different ways at different times and in different contexts (Philips, von der Malsburg and Singer 2010, p. 2). The relational information encoded by different neural areas under dynamic coordination framework has to change in a context-, task, and goal-dependent way (Moser et al. 2010, p. 194). Notions such as coding and coordinating interactions are applied at each level of neuronal processing from single-unit to population coding that form the hierarchical structure of the brain. The frequency bands are the most attractive tool for grasping the neural integration. Among the first who introduced this approach is von der Malsburg with his binding-by-synchrony hypothesis. However, we have to integrate even the frequency bands before to talk about the binding problem. For any perceptual scene, we need not some vectors of activity able to grasp all the entities and their relations from that scene, but dynamical graphs that change more rapidly (Moser et al. 2010, p. 204). Numerous cognitive neuroscientists are working hard to explain which neural states are responsible for each perceptual feature (segmentation/localization) and how of all these features get integrated in a single perceptual scene (the binding problem). For acquiring a mental representation of the perceived object, a temporal correlation or a synchronization of the firing neurons occurs among the neuronal patterns involved. It is plausible to believe that different synchronous neuronal oscillations are correlated with mental features.7 In this context, it seems that we cannot talk about the binding problem without taking into account the segmentation/localization problem.

3. Frequency Bands: in What Neural Areas Are Active; What Cognitive Functions Are Correlated with Each Band? Tallon-Baudry reminds us that in the past, each frequency band was associated with a cognitive function or state: delta waves were associated with
7 For the perception of a single, simple object, more than 36 neuronal areas are activated in occipital, temporal and parietal lobes. It seems quite difficult, but not impossible, to identify the frequencies bands responsible for the integration of so many neuronal areas in different lobes.

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sleep, theta8 band with memory, alpha wave with vigilance fluctuations (more recently, with mental imagery and other mental processes Baars and Gage 2010, p. 270), beta and gamma ranges with active awake stages and later with feature binding, attention, and memory (Tallon-Baudry 2010, p. 239 or 2009). Quoting different authors, she offers some examples of actual such associations: gamma range (plus alpha range) for the binding perceptual features, from theta to gamma frequency bands (but also alpha frequency) for various attentional tasks or for episodic memory encoding and retrieval, gamma and beta range for visual short-term memory (pp. 239-40 or 2009, p. 326). Singer also presents functions which are associated with synchronization: binding (see below), attention (gamma and beta frequency bands) stimulus selection, and consciousness. Results in the last decade indicate that subdivisions of some frequency bands (for instance, gamma sub-bands) correspond to particular cognitive functions and vice-versa. Some researchers want to prove that the interactions within large-scale cortical areas (i.e., communication among various cortical areas) are produced by long-range synchronization of oscillatory signals. Singer specifies that synchronization among distant neuronal areas occur at oscillations in the theta or beta frequency range; synchronization among local groups of neurons is produced by gamma oscillations. As we mentioned above, oscillations in different frequency bands can coexist and exhibit complex phase relations (Roopun et al. 2008). We should consider then the nested relations hypothesis (Singer 2010, Moser et al. 2010) necessary for encoding the compositionality (for instance, the representation of composite perceptual objects and movement trajectories) 9 . More recently, Hipp et al. (2011) argue that beta-band synchronization (20 Hz) work in fronto-parietooccipital areas, while gamma-band synchronization (80 Hz) in centro-temporal areas. Hipp and colleagues analyze the results of EEG recordings in human subjects that report the alternation of a perceptual ambiguity (audiovisual stimulus). Regarding the beta-band synchronization they show that the
intrinsic uctuations of synchrony may predict10 the subjects alternating perception of the constant physical stimulus. Indeed, we found that beta-synchrony was not only enhanced during stimulus processing but also predicted the subjects percept of the stimulus. (Hipp et al. 2011, p. 389)

8 Theta (also alpha) seems to carry gamma oscillations in much the way an AM radio frequency carries a voice signal. It plays a role in episodic memory being involved in actions of frontal lobe and hippocampus. 9 So-called nested oscillations attracted a great deal of interest because of an influential model of memory storage that would account for the limits of human memory capacity by an interplay between theta and gamma oscillations (LISMAN and IDIART 1995), and there is growing evidence in humans for such theta/gamma relationships (CANOLTY et al. 2006; SAUSENG et al. 2008). (TALLON-BAUDRY 2010, p. 243). 10 The role of oscillatory synchrony in top-down attention appears also before stimulus onset, when subjects anticipate the appearance of the stimulus: pre-stimulus gamma oscillations successfully

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Recent experiments show that the temporal structure of activity patterns indicates the states of expectancy or anticipation before the appearance of stimuli (Engel et al., 2001 in Velik 2010, p. 999). It seems that the fluctuations of large-scale beta-synchrony determined the perceptual interpretation of stimulus (p. 389). Hipp proposes that the beta-band synchronization is the mechanism that mediates large-scale interactions among frontal, parietal and extrastriate areas. The gamma-band synchronization is implicated in the subjects percept of the ambiguous stimulus and it is directly linked to the cross-modal integration of auditory and visual information. (Hipp et al. 2011, p. 389, 390) The gammaband synchronization includes central (sensorimotor and premotor regions) and temporal areas involved in multisensory processing. Premotor regions are involved in auditory, visual, and somato-sensory stimuli, while temporal regions in cross-modal integration of audiovisual stimuli 11 (Hipp et al. 2011, p. 392). Mentioning the work of some cognitive neuroscientists, Tallon-Baudry indicates disparate results regarding these correlations: occipital, temporal, parietal and frontal regions or a focal activation, confined to the occipital pole. The problem is that MEG and EEG provide a different image of the visually induced oscillations: while EEG data reveal a short-lived burst of oscillatory synchrony between 30 and 60 Hz and 200 and 300 ms, MEG studies consistently report sustained oscillations at higher frequencies. (Tallon-Baudry 2009, pp. 322-3) The results show that visual stimulus produce gamma oscillations at different areas and different frequencies (p. 324). Fries emphasizes three main reasons gamma-band synchronization is so important in cortical computation: this frequency band (30-100 Hz) is involves in many brain regions (visual, auditory, somato-sensory, motor, parietal cortex and outside the neocortex, the hippocampus; we can identify it at various species (from insects to humans); it is correlated with many human cognitive activities (sensory stimulation, attentional selection, working memory maintenance and so on. (Fries et al. 2009, p. 309) Other experiments suggest that visual attention is correlated with increases in coherence between local field potentials from the frontal and parietal cortex (Buschman and Miller 2007, 2009 in Moser et al. 2010, p. 200). Theta oscillations seem to have a role in local hippocampal functions and in long-range coordination between the hippocampus and neocortex (Baars and Gage 2010, p. 259). Tallon-Baudry strongly emphasize that there is no strict correspondence between
predict the speed of reaction times (55-57), are modulated by the degree of predictability of the stimulus (57-60) or the information content of the warning cue (61, 62). Oscillatory synchrony in the gamma range thus appears as an efficient mechanism to establish a neural state facilitating the processing of forthcoming stimuli in other words, anticipatory attention. (TALLON-BAUDRY 2009, p. 324). 11 Interestingly for Hipp is that the experiments indicate a surprising dissociation between local oscillatory activity and long-range synchronization. (HIPP et al. 2011, p. 392) Importantly for the main topic of this work, like many others, these authors indicate that the large-scale cortical synchronization are strong related to the perceptual organization of sensory information. (p. 392).

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a frequency band and a cognitive process12 (p. 239 or 2009, p. 325). However, in spite of this extensive research on synchronized oscillations, it is still not clear whether we can correlate a frequency band with a particular cognitive function. Tallon-Baudry is even more explicit:
the functional role of oscillatory synchrony in distinct frequency bands may simply depend on the functional specialization of the area that generates these oscillations (Tallon-Baudry et al. 2005), much as the functional significance of ERPs depends on the areas that generate them. (Tallon-Baudry 2010, p. 240)

The correlation between a cognitive function and a frequency band depend on two sets of features: physiological needs (networks size and geometry, time, coding precision required, and metabolic costs for oscillations) and cognitive constraints (time, chunks of processing, the number of cognitive function can be multiplexed) (Tallon-Baudry 2010, p. 241-2). Scheeringa and his team obtained some interesting results in respect to the relationships between BOLD signals and different frequency bands (alpha, beta and gamma powers) 13 . The main conclusion of their empirical results (simultaneously recorded EEG and BOLD while subjects engaged in a visual attention task) is that low-frequency (alpha and beta bands) neuronal synchronization are correlates negatively with BOLD signal changes, while high-frequency (high-gamma band) neuronal synchronization correlates positively with BOLD signal changes (Scheeringa et al. 2011). All the above results regard mainly the issue of segmentation and they should bring some new insight on the more difficult problem of integration of different brain areas with variable frequency bands. Following different criteria, there are various alternatives for cross-frequency coupling, but three main interactions are co-variations in amplitude (the power of one frequency that increases can determine the increase or decrease of the power of another frequency), phase coupling between frequencies (it coupling an oscillation with n cycles to another with m cycles, i.e., n:m phase synchrony) 14 , or phaseThere is no doubt that gamma-band oscillations are influenced by stimulus low-level features in sensory regions (HALL et al. 2005; ADJAMIAN et al. 2008), but whether this still holds true for higher-level areas remains an open issue. (TALLON-BAUDRY 2010, p. 241) Moreover, we have to take into account that the visible EEG waves are just the waves on top of the oscillatory lake. Underneath the irregular scalp EEG there are known to be synchronized rhythms. (BAARS and GAGE 2010, p. 270). 13 Tallon-Baudry emphasizes that there is no event-related potential element correlated with gamma range for perceiving an object. Therefore, the neural properties reflected by induced gamma power synchronization and ERPs are different (TALLON-BAUDRY 2009, p. 322). 14 Cross-frequency phase coupling links alpha, beta and gamma oscillations in humans during mental calculation and in a working memory task. (PALVA, J. M., S. PALVA & K. KAILA 2005, in Tallon-Baudry 2009, p. 326). For a review regarding the role of gamma-band for attention and memory, see JENSEN et al. (2007).
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amplitude coupling. The phase of an oscillation could influence the amplitude of another oscillation (Tallon-Baudry 2009, p. 326). There is the hypothesis that the faster waves (for instance, gamma range) may multiplex on slower waves (theta or alpha range) (VanRullen and Koch in Baars and Gage 2010, p. 255). In other words, theta oscillations (or even alpha), for instance, can group gamma band. Alpha band can group gamma oscillations in working memory (Palva and Palva 2007 in Baars and Gage 2010, p. 270). Steriade (2006) has suggested that slow oscillations may generally work to group faster ones. Even the newly discovered slow oscillations that range from 0.1 to the delta range may serve to group theta, alpha, beta, and gamma. (Baars and Gage 2010, p. 269) The conjecture is that cross-frequency phase synchrony between alpha, beta, and gamma oscillations coordinates the selection and maintenance of neuronal object representations during working memory, perception, and consciousness (Palva and Palva 2007 in Baars and Gage 2010, p. 270). But, we now have a number of separate sources of brain evidence showing coherent gamma bursts in association with conscious perceptual moments, paced by rhythms near theta or alpha. (Baars and Gage 2010, p. 290) It seems that our knowledge about oscillations is still contradictory. We mention He and Raichle (2009) who emphasize the difference between oscillation and fluctuation. They introduce the notion of slow cortical potential (SCP), a low-frequency end of eld potentials (< 4 Hz), that seems to be the best alternative for carrying out large-scale information integration in the brain. SCP is the neural activity correlated with consciousness. Nevertheless, they consider SCP being a kind of fluctuation and not oscillation. They classify the EEG results in three distinct groups: rhythmic, arrythmic, and dysrhythmic.
The first two appear in normal subjects and refer to waves of approximately constant frequency and no stable rhythms, respectively. The latter refers to pathological rhythms in patient groups. Rhythmic EEG is further subdivided into frequency bands known as d, u, a, b and g, etc. The SCP frequency range does not normally contain any true rhythmic activity, except the up-and down states (). The up-and-down states is a distinct phenomenon that can be easily differentiated from the SCP (). Therefore SCP is a fluctuation rather than oscillation (B. J. He et al., unpublished) (He and Raichle 2009, p. 303).

Inspired by the work of several researchers, the authors conclude that the SCP has a close correspondence to the fMRI signal and the synaptic activities at apical dendrites in supercial layers produce the SCP. More exactly, it is about the long-lasting excitatory postsynaptic potentials (EPSPs) at these apical dendrites underlie negative-going surface recorded SCPs () (p. 303). Introducing various experiments, He and Raichle conclude that long-range intracortical and feedback cortico-cortical connections, as well as the nonspecic thalamic inputs, all contribute directly and signicantly to the SCP. (p. 305) They believe that it is possible the SCP to be a more fundamental correlate of the fMRI signal than LFP

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power is (idem). Thus, the SCP is the best alternative for neural process that are correlated with consciousness since (i) its slow time scale allows synchronization across long distance despite axonal conduction delays [15,44-46]; (ii) long-range intracortical and corticocortical connections terminate preferentially in supercial layers and thus contribute signicantly to the SCP. (idem) He and Raichle introduce experiments that show that many mental processes (attention, perception, volition) require the presence of the SCP.

4. Gamma Range in Visual Cognition All these results in neuroscience should have, in the end, an impact on the binding problem. As an example, we present the role of gamma range in human visual cognition. Gamma band is between 30-120 Hz, being low range (30-60) and high range (60-120) with various cognitive functions. In the late 1980s and early 1990, von der Malsburg, Singer, Engel and Gray were the firsts who showed that the gamma band frequency is related to the visual binding (Tallon-Baudry 2009 or Fries 2005). It has been later discovered that this range is involved in many other cognitive functions related with attention, memory or awareness.
Induced gamma oscillations are thus not related to a single cognitive function, and are probably better understood in terms of a population mechanism taking advantage of the neuron's fine temporal tuning: the 10-30 ms time precision imposed by gamma-band rhythms could favor the selective transmission of synchronized information (attention) and foster synaptic plasticity (memory). Besides, gamma oscillatory synchrony also seems related to the emergence of visual awareness. The recent discovery that gamma oscillations could appear simultaneously in distinct areas at distinct frequencies and with different functional correlates further suggests the existence of a flexible multiplexing schema, integrating frequency bands within the gamma range but also at lower frequency bands. (Tallon-Baudry 2009, p. 321; also p. 326)

The best solution to the perceptual binding problem seems to be the synchronized oscillations alternative, a process that is involved probable in all visual levels (from retina to the highest cortical area) solving both segmentation and integration processes (Singer 2010, p. 163; about gamma-band and conscious perception, see also Singer 2009).
In all cases, synchronization probability reflects some of the Gestalt criteria that are used for scene segmentation and perceptual grouping. In the retina, ganglion cell responses synchronize with millisecond precision if evoked by continuous contours (Neuenschwander and Singer 1996). This synchronization is associated with high frequency oscillations (up to 90 Hz) and is based on horizontal interactions within the network of coupled amacrine cells. In the visual cortex, synchrony is often associated, especially when it is observed over larger distances, with an oscillatory pattern of spike discharges in the beta and gamma frequency range (30-60 Hz). (Singer 2010, p. 163)

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The perception of a meaningful object is correlated with a burst of induced gamma oscillatory synchrony over occipital electrodes between 200 and 300 ms. With new methods of investigations, segmentations and object identification take place within less than 200 ms, grouping operations happening in 10 to 20 ms (Thorpe et al. 1996; VanRullen and Thorpe 2001 in Singer 2010, p. 163). When the perceived object spans the vertical meridian, gamma oscillations in both hemispheres become phase-locked (). The latency of this burst of oscillations correlates with object recognition delays (). (Tallon-Baudry 2009, p. 322) Among binding features, gamma oscillations are involved in spatial, feature-based and object-based attention (Tallon-Baudry 2009, p. 324). Frgnac et al (2010) analyze the notion of dynamic coordination applied certain neural processes correlated with non-attentional perception and in respect to the relationship between the whole and the parts, that is segmentation and integration (binding) regarding the sensory stimulus correlated with neural processes/states, the authors concluded that
to a certain extent, both in invertebrate ganglia and the vertebrate brain, the dogma of separability between intrinsic and extrinsic factors in the control of cellular excitability is doomed to fail. Thus, the whole cannot be the sum of the parts, and segmentation does not always coexist with perceptual binding. (Frgnac et al. 2010, p. 172)

Using the results of in the area of perception (visual illusions), Frgnac and colleagues try to show that the Gestalt rule is correct: the whole precedes the detection of the parts in time. They show that within the dynamic coordination, the dynamical agent could be an internal supervisor embedded in the network, the sensory drive or an external prior. Using binocular rivalry in the cat, Engel and Singer explore the role of gamma oscillations in comparing conscious versus unconscious stimulus processing in the visual cortex with identical physical input to the both eyes. In more detail, in the cats cortex, the dominant (conscious) eye demonstrated gamma synchrony locked to the conscious eye, whereas the nondominant (unconscious) eye showed no synchrony.15 (in Baars
Direct evidence for an attention related facilitation of synchronization has been obtained from cats that had been trained to perform a visually triggered motor response (). Simultaneous recordings from visual, association, somatosensory and motor areas revealed that the cortical areas involved in the execution of the task synchronized their activity, predominantly with zero phase-lag, as soon as the animals prepared themselves for the task and focused their attention on the relevant stimulus. Immediately after the appearance of the visual stimulus, synchronization increased further over the recorded areas, and these coordinated activation patterns were maintained until the task was completed. However, once the reward was available and the animals engaged in consummatory behaviour, these coherent patterns collapsed and gave way to low frequency oscillatory activity that did not exhibit any consistent phase relations. This close correspondence between the execution of an attention demanding visuo-motor performance and the occurrence of zero phase-lag synchrony suggests a functional role of the temporal patterning in the large scale coordination of cortical activity. (SINGER 2009, p. 47).
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and Gage 2010, p. 265). An interesting hypothesis is advanced by Singer who claims that in the case of binocular rivalry, the two patterns that are perceived in alternation necessitate a mechanism which selects in alternation the signals arriving from the two eyes for access to conscious processing (Singer 2009, p. 48).

5. The Main Difficulties with the Temporal Coding Hypothesis In spite of some advances regarding the synchrony oscillations, it is still unclear their role in binding. The general hypothesis has to do more with how binding is signaled and not how binding is computed, as Velik remarks (Velik 2010, p. 997), and synchronization cannot be an alternative for the enduring trait of representation of an object (LaRock 2010, p. 455 or 457). The synchrony oscillatory hypothesis is flexible regarding the long-term memory, but the problem is that even features that are very likely to co-occur would need to be bound anew every time they are encountered. Thus this kind of binding would be economical in terms of cognitive structure but wasteful in terms of processing time. (Hommel and Colzato 2009 in Veliko 2010, p. 998). The synchrony oscillatory does not explain the spatial structure necessary for binding the features16 (LaRock 2007, p. 801). Also, Van der Velde and de Kamps accentuate the idea that synchronization does not solve the productivity in the case of binding (Van der Velde and de Kamps 2006, p. 41). They indicate that for the binding constituents in combinatorial structures, synchrony detectors will be missing for novel such structures (Van der Velde and de Kamps 2006, p. 41). Some very recent experiments on visual mechanism of monkeys show that the synchronization does not depend on the binding problem, but only on the selectivity of finding the border-ownership of an object (Yi Dong et al. 2008). That is to say, the synchronization process takes place for the detection of an objects border and not for the binding of the objects features. Moreover, Robertson emphasizes that empirical evidence from neuropsychology indicate that preattentive binding can influence performance (Robertson 2003, 2005), while Humphreys et al. indicate that perceptual performance is facilitated by unconscious binding17 (Humphreys et al. 2002, p. 363).

6. Conclusion As it is the case with all the other solutions to the binding problem, the synchronized oscillations paradigm still encounters fundamental difficulties. In
16 17

It is suggested that parietal lobes are necessary for spatial feature (ROBERTSON 2003). For more arguments against the idea that synchronized oscillations hypothesis can explain the binding problem see VELICK (2010).

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order to solve the binding problem, we have to bring somehow into the equation the issue of the unity of self (and of consciousness) and, also, the more other essential issue of the relationship between mental states (representations) and the self. In our opinion, it has no sense to try to establish a direct relationship between mental entities and neural patterns in the brain as they belong to epistemologically different worlds (as we call them18). From such a perspective, it would be beyond any framework of understanding the attempt to explain the unity of an entity or object, for example a table, through the role of the microforces among the microparticles which compose that table. The unity of that object does not exist at the level of microparticles (which includes the interactions between these microparticles). Entities such as the microparticles together with their interactions belong to a different framework, while the object in discussion, a table, belongs to another framework, that is, to an epistemological different world. Following this analogy, we claim that the binding problem is in itself a pseudo-problem, as it is meaningless to explain the unity of a mental state (for example, a mental representation) through entities and processes that take place in the brain. They are different entities which belong to epistemologically different worlds. Thus, exactly like the more general issue, the mind-body problem, the binding problem seems to be impossible to be solved within the current general framework, in which it is considered and accepted that we can explain processes and entities through other processes and entities which are actually situated in different worlds19.

REFERENCES

BAARS, J. B. (2002), The Conscious Access Hypothesis: Origins and Recent Evidence, Trends in Cognitive Science, 6, pp. 47-52. BAARS, J. B., FRANKLIN, S. (2007), An Architectural Model of Conscious and Unconscious Brain Functions: Global Workspace Theory and IDA, Neural Networks, 20, pp. 955-961. BAARS, J. BERNARD, GAGE, M. NICOLE (2010), Cognition, Brain and Consciousness Introduction to Cognitive Neuroscience, second edition, Elsevier Ltd. FELDMAN, JEROME (2010), The Binding Problem(s) https://docs.google.com/viewer?url= http%3A%2F%2Fwww.computational-logic.org%2Fcontent%2Fevents%2Ficcl-ss-2010% 2Fslides%2Ffeldman%2Fpapers%2FBinding8.pdf FLEVARIS, V. ANASTASIA, BENTIN, SHLOMO, ROBERTSON, C. LYNN (2010), Local or Global? Attentional Selection of Spatial Frequencies Binds Shapes to Hierarchical Levels, Psychological Science 21(3), pp. 424 -431.

From an EDWs perspective, levels is a meaningless notion, since mind and brain belong to EDWs (See VACARIU 2005, 2008, 2011a and b, VACARIU and VACARIU 2010). 19 For a detailed explanation of the epistemologically different worlds perspective see VACARIU (2009, 2011a, 2011b) and VACARIU and VACARIU (2010).

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FRGNAC, YVES, CARELLI, V. PEDRO, PANANCEAU, MARC, MONIER, CYRIL (2010) Stimulus-Driven Coordination of Cortical Cell Assemblies and Propagation of Gestalt Belief in V1, in Christoph Von der Malsburg, William A. Phillips, and Wolf Singer (2010), Dynamic Coordination in the Brain From Neurons to Mind, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England. HE, J. BIYU, RAICHLE, E. MARCUS (2009), The fMRI Signal, Slow Cortical Potential and Consciousness, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 13, no. 7, pp. 302-309. HIPP, F. JOERG, ENGEL, K. ANDREAS, SIEGEL, MARKUS (2011), Oscillatory Synchronization in Large-Scale Cortical Networks Predicts Perception, Neuron 69, pp. 387-396. HUMPHREYS, GLYN W., RIDDOCH, JANE M., NYS, GUDRUN, HEINKE, DIETMAR (2002), Transient Binding by Time: Neuropsychological Evidence from Anti-Extinction, Cognitive Neuropsychology 19 (4), pp. 361-380. HOLCOMBE, A. O. (2009), The Binding Problem, in E. Bruce Goldstein (ed.), The Sage Encyclopedia of Perception (preprint), Thousand Oaks: Sage. MELLONI, LUCIA, SINGER, WOLF (2010), Neuronal Synchronization and Consciousness, in New Horizons in the Neuroscience of Consciousness, Elaine Perry, Daniel Collerton, Fiona LeBeau, Heather Ashton (eds.), John Benjamin Publishing Company. MOSER, I. EDVARD, CORBETTA, MAURIZIO, DESIMONE, ROBERT, FRGNAC, YVES, FRIES, PASCAL, GRAYBIEL, ANN M., HAYNES, JOHN-DYLAN, ITTI, LAURENT, MELLONI, LUCIA, MONYER, HANNAH, SINGER, WOLF, Von der MALSBURG, CHRISTOPH, WILSON, MATTHEW A. (2010), Coordination in Brain Systems, in Von der Malsburg, Christoph, Phillips A. William, and Singer, Wolf (2010). PHILLIPS, A. WILLIAM, Von der MALSBURG, CHRISTOPH, SINGER, WOLF (2010), Dynamic Coordination in Brain and Mind, in Von der Malsburg, Christoph, Phillips A. William, and Singer, Wolf (2010), Dynamic Coordination in the Brain From Neurons to Mind, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England. PLATE, JAN (2007), An Analysis of the Binding Problem, Philosophical Psychology, 20:6, pp. 773-792. ROBERTSON, LYNN C. (2003), Binding, Spatial Attention and Perceptual Awareness, Nature reviews Neuroscience, vol. 4, pp. 93-102. ROOPUN, A. K., KRAMER, M. A., CARRACEDO, L. M., KAISER, M., DAVIES, C. H., TRAUB, R. D., KOPELL, N. J., WHITTINGTON, M. A. (2008), Temporal Interactions between Cortical Rhythms, Frontiers in Neuroscience, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 145-154. SCHEERINGA, RENE, HAGOORT, PETER, FRIES, PASCAL, PETERSSON, KARL-MAGNUS, OOSTENVELD, ROBERT, GROTHE, IRIS, NORRIS, DAVID G., MARCEL, BASTIAANSEN C. M. (2011), Neuronal Dynamics Underlying High- and Low-Frequency EEG Oscillations Contribute Independently to the Human BOLD Signal, Neuron 69, pp. 572-583. SEYMOUR, KILEY, CLIFFORD, COLIN W. G., LOGOTHETIS, NIKOS K., BARTELS, ANDREAS (2009), The Coding of Color, Motion, and Their Conjunction in the Human Visual Cortex, Current Biology 19, pp. 177-183. SINGER, WOLF (2009), Consciousness and Neuronal Synchronization, in Steven Laureys, Giulino Tononi (eds.) The Neurology of Consciousness, Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropathology, Elsevier Ltd., 2009. SINGER, W. (2007), Binding by Synchron, Scholarpedia, 2, 165. SINGER, WOLF (2009), Consciousness and Neuronal Synchronization, in Steven Laureys, Giulio Tononi, The Neurology of Consciousness: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropathology, Elsevier Ltd. SINGER, WOLF (2010), Neocortical Rhythms: an Overview, in Christoph Von der Malsburg, William A. Phillips, Wolf Singer, (2010), Dynamic Coordination in the Brain from Neurons to Mind, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England. TALLON-BAUDRY, CATHERINE (2009), The Roles of Gamma-Band Oscillatory Synchrony in Human Visual Cognition, Frontiers in Bioscience 14, pp. 321-332.

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TALLON-BAUDRY, CATHERINE (2010), Neural Coordination and Human Cognition, in Christoph Von der Malsburg, William A. Phillips, Wolf Singer, (2010), Dynamic Coordination in the Brain from Neurons to Mind, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England. TREISMAN, ANNE (1996), The Binding Problem, Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 6, pp. 171-178. TREISMAN, ANNE (1998), Feature Binding, Attention, and Object Perception, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 353, pp. 1295-1306. TREISMAN, ANNE (1999), Solutions to the Binding Problem: Progress Through Controversy and Convergence, Neuron, 24, pp. 105-110. VACARIU, GABRIEL (2011b), The Mind-Body Problem Today, The Open Journal of Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 24-36. VACARIU, GABRIEL (2011a), Being and the Hyperverse, University of Bucharest Press. VACARIU, GABRIEL, VACARIU, MIHAI (2010), Mind, Life and Matter in the Hyperverse, University of Bucharest Press. VACARIU, GABRIEL (2008), Epistemologically Different Worlds, University of Bucharest Press. VACARIU, GABRIEL (2005), Mind, Brain and Epistemologically Different Worlds, Synthese Review, 147, pp. 515-548. VACARIU, GABRIEL, TERHESIU, DALIA, VACARIU, MIHAI (2001), Towards a Very Idea of Representation, Synthese, 129, pp. 275-295. VELIK, ROSEMARIE (2010), From Single Neuron-ring to Consciousness Towards the True Solution of the Binding Problem, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 34, pp. 993-1001. VON DER MALSBURG, C. (1981), The Correlation Theory of Brain Function, Internal Report 81-2, Gttingen: Max-Planck-Institute for Biophysical Chemistry. VON DER MALSBURG, CRISTOPH, The What and Why of Binding: the Modelers Perspective, Neuron, vol. 24, 1999, pp. 95-104. VON DER MALSBURG, CHRISTOPH, PHILLIPS, WILLIAM A., SINGER, WOLF (2010), Dynamic Coordination in the Brain from Neurons to Mind, Cambridge, Massachusetts / London, England, The MIT Press. YI, DONG, MIHALAS, S., QIU, F., Von der HEYDT, R., NIEBUR, E. (2008), Synchrony and the Binding Problem in Macaque, Journal of Vision, 8, pp. 1-16. VELIK, ROSEMARIE (2010), From Single Neuron-ring to Consciousness Towards the True Solution of the Binding Problem, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, vol. 34, pp. 993-1001.

FOCUS ON AGEING A NEGLECTED ASPECT OF SIMONE DE BEAUVOIRS RADICALISM


SEEMA BOSE

Abstract My paper focuses on a particular aspect of Simone de Beauvoirs work, namely her treatment of the ageing process. She draws on her own experience of nursing her mother, and the way this brought home to her own mortality. She is aware that although everyone experiences ageing, apart from those who have an early death, each person experiences it in a different way. For some it is a long drawn-out process with or without painful illness. The various modalities of ageing appeared in her various writings and perhaps have not received much attention before. Keywords: Beauvoir, Bergson, Lifeworld, Sartre, Death, Illness, Oldage.

The theme of time has been notably presented in German phenomenological and existentialist writings in the works of Husserl and Heidegger, with a death-centred emphasis in the case of the latter. Among French thinkers, Bergson pioneered the notion of lan vital centring his treatment on a future-oriented approach which clarified how different duration was from the time that clocks measured, and also freed lived time from absorption with death. A further development in the understanding of lived time comes about when we consider how lived experience varies with times of life such as youth, middle age, and advanced age, for these point up the ways in which our bodily experience as well as our mental attitudes are intimately related. Husserl, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty along with Sartre and Marcel, all provide a rich background for French philosophical work on the theme of the lifeworld. What is radical about Simone de Beauvoirs contribution to this on-going discourse is the way in which she draws on her own personal history as well as the times in which she lived in her own country. Her experiences of war, relationships with friends, especially with Sartre, and with her mother, all shape her understanding of life and death, self and others. The reader discovers within her writing a special sensitivity to the experiences of ageing, illness and death, and a profound awareness of the relation between death and life, a metaphysical issue which has occupied many

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French-speaking philosophers among others in recent years. In what follows, the radicality of her analysis of the process of ageing will be our focus. As she moved into her sixties the experiences of growing old resulted in the writing of La Vieillesse (Fr. edn. 1970), tr. in English as The Coming of Age and more appropriately translated as Old Age. She wrote in detail about the death of her mother in A Very Easy Death (1964), and about Sartres illness and death in Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre (1981). As she writes about the death of Sartre, and of her mother, she at the same time explores her own situated, ageing self. As a woman, I managed to explain the feminine condition. As I approached old age, I wished to understand what it means to be old.1 Drawing on different perspectives, she sets out to break the conspiracy of silence2 about ageing, showing that, with regard to the aged, society is not only guilty but downright criminal3. She draws attention to the barbarous treatment the elderly suffer, 4 concluding that in most countries the financial condition of the elderly people is perilous. Young people can earn and be productive. But many are unemployed and the process of ageing sets in early among the underprivileged. If the elderly are used by others, it is usually for the benefit of others e.g. looking after grandchildren. This can apply to both men and women. In the case of elderly women it amounts to an extension of something that Beauvoir stresses in her writing, namely the fact that women spend their time in making an environment in which others can live. Beauvoir is something of a pioneer in recognizing that sexual desire often persists in old age, hardly recognized in her own day but accepted today. At the age of thirty she felt that she was old, that her youth was lost. As we age, the body is transformed not only in the physical sense but more importantly in the sense of restricted existential possibilities. Objectively they are seen as deteriorating. They ask Can I have become a different being while I still remain myself?5 Eventually they recognize themselves the same way as others see them. As Beauvoir puts it in order to resolve the identification crisis we must unresolvedly accept a new image of ourselves.6 How people view the elderly varies. But they all agree in stating that our face is that of an elderly person....7 Beauvoir writes in her memoirs that age has taken her by surprise and she is terrified by her appearance when looking at her image in the mirror. In this case she is a victim of her own look when she confronts herself as an ageing
SIMONE de BEAUVOIR, All Said and Done, tr. by Andr Deutsch, New York, G. P. Putnams Sons, 1974, p. 148. 2 SIMONE de BEAUVOIR, The Coming of Age (OA), tr. by Patrick OBrian, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 1972, pp. 7, 8. 3 Ibidem, p. 8. 4 Ibidem. 5 Ibidem, p. 283. 6 Ibidem, p. 296. 7 Ibidem, p. 296, 297.
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woman. Confrontation with the ageing process, and along with it the increasing sense of frustration augmented with desperation, lead her to contemplate her own death these are the themes that find expression in her work. Moreover, in her deeply felt analysis of ageing, we are made aware of a stage in life which is left out of consideration when we quote the truism All men are mortal. In Old Age Beauvoir writes that women generally live longer than men. Women continue to perform household work and derive satisfaction from this as long as they are not overburdened by the task. She remembers that her mother experienced intense freedom and independence as an ageing woman, and that in spite of limited and diminished bodily capacities she was willing to embark on new activities during her last days of life. Men seem less able to do this. She writes: From the day a woman consents to growing old, her situation changes. Up to that time she was still a young woman, intent on struggling against a misfortune that was mysteriously disfiguring and deforming her, now she becomes a different being, unsexed but complete: an old woman.8 The old undergo a further deprivation the loss of contemporaries through death. The death of someone who is close to us, of a friend, Beauvoir wrote in Old Age, deprives us not only of a presence but also of that whole part of our life which was entwined with theirs.9 She is plagued by the anguish of death, her own non-existence. I have the feel of nothingness in my bones.10 This anguish had always been the opposite side of her immense desire to live and to be happy. The idea of death, she wrote, provokes a reflex toward life.11 Awareness of our mortality is the basic source of anxiety. Beauvoirs mother was in bed for three months, suffering from a broken pelvic bone and cancer. At first she felt that her mother was not going to die. At the same time it seemed that to be seventy-eight was an ideal age for death. She never felt the same way when she imagined her own death or that of Sartres. She did in fact nurse Sartre. In her mothers suffering body she saw her own ageing body, and when her mother died she experienced an intimation of her own death. For the aged person death is no longer a general, abstract fate: it is a personal event, an event that is near at hand,12 for, as one grows old, death becomes closer. During her mothers illness Beauvoir had the chance to look back not just to her past but also to her mothers past. Having lived with and through it, when she writes about the close mother-daughter relationship, which is not an easy relationship in general, she also acknowledges its conflictual nature. As it
SIMONE de BEAUVOIR, The Second Sex, tr. by H. M. Parshley, New York, Knopf, 1993, p. 649. 9 SIMONE de BEAUVOIR, The Coming of Age, p. 389. 10 SIMONE de BEAUVOIR, All Said and Done, p. 360. 11 Ibidem, p. 50. 12 SIMONE de BEAUVOIR, The Coming of Age, p. 440.
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happens, Beauvoirs memoirs relate to two illnesses of her own and two almost fatal accidents when she was close to death. All this made her realise that a sick person loses individuality, withdraws from engagement with others, becoming an object for others, and is reduced to flesh. In this way she shows how bodily changes alter our experience of time. We act in the present in the light of the more or less specific goals relating to the future. This is how transcendence is accomplished. But, for the elderly, the future looks brief. For them the world falls silent.13 Sometimes time seems to pass more quickly. At other times, just the opposite. With age comes the consciousness of mortality, leading man to cognize the time limit onto his own life. As the years go by the future shortens while our past grows heavier.14 The elderly identify themselves with the projects they executed in the past. In the present, projects are undertaken by those younger than themselves, while the elderly daydream and think of the past. So, old age, according to Beauvoir, is haunted by the memories of childhood and youth. Because of the shrinkage of the future, the elderly take refuge in habit15 and repetitive behaviour. Memory links us to the past. But, in old age, memory is unreliable. Beauvoir gives several examples of this from her personal experience. Looking at a photograph of herself in 1929, she does not recognize herself or the surroundings. While Beauvoir reminds us that ageing is a universal existential process, it is not the same for each person. In addition to conditions of health, sociocultural situations are all-important. She exemplifies her own view that a more privileged old age is available to an intellectual, and to the rich, than to the manual worker. As a true existentialist she followed the advice she gave in Old Age up to her last year, up to her death, to go on pursuing ends that give our existence a meaning devotion to individuals, to groups, or to causes, social, political, intellectual, or creative work.16 Her life is an example of her own philosophy that ones life has value so long as one attributes value to the life of others, by means of love, friendship, indignation, compassion.17 She surrounded herself with intimate relationships in her old age. Moreover, her book Old Age also has an ethical purpose. The aged have their own dignity in spite of enduring biological deterioration. In a society based on equal human worth their lives still have meaning and value for us all. She writes old age exposed the failure of our entire civilization. It is the whole man that must be remade, it is the whole relation between man and man that must be recast if we wish the old persons state to be acceptable. 18 And so she
13 14 15 16 17 18

Ibidem, p. 484. Ibidem, p. 542. Ibidem, p. 466. Ibidem, p. 540. Ibidem, p. 541. Ibidem, p. 806.

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advocates radical transformation of the whole society as a solution of the problems of the old. This shows her debt to the Marxist preoccupations of the France of her day. But unlike the Marxists, she is anxious to stress human individuality as against collectivism. In Beauvoirs ideal society old age will cease to be feared. She concludes that we must live a life so committed, so justified, that we can continue to cherish it even when all our illusions are lost and our ardor for life has cooled.19

19

Ibidem, p. 567.

IS PORNOGRAPHY A PERVERSION?
OANA ZAMFIRACHE

Abstract In the western line of thought, there is a close relation between pornography and perversion. But are pornographic representations really perverse? And how should we understand perversion? We shall try to answer these questions using psychoanalytical tools, but without engaging in a truly Freudian approach. We shall analyze two hypotheses: first, the connection between the gaze and the superego as we observed it in pornography and secondly, we shall explore the suggestion given by Daniel Sibony, according to whom perversion is always a relational concept and not an intrinsic quality of a subject or of an act. Keywords: pornography, perversion, male gaze, superego, psychoanalysis, fantasy, sexual representation.

Perversion is one of those terms that are so vague they become subjective. But once the label of perversion is assigned to something or someone, there are concrete, objective consequences. For example, if one is to display explicit sexual materials in public he or she will probably face legal charges. But are pornography related acts perverse? And what does perversion really mean? Since any sexual act whose aim is not reproduction might be labeled as being perverse well have to analyze the problem deeper if we are to understand the perversion of pornography. For some, talking about sex is a perversion. Since sexuality was traditionally a subject matter related to the private sphere, to intimacy and also to guilt and sin for most of the westerners, to tackle this problem was consider an indiscretion, an undermining of mores. Psychoanalysis changed all that by underlining the importance of sexuality in every individuals life and in the construction of identity. The purpose of the present article is to analyze the relation between pornography and perversion with psychoanalytical tools since they seem to be the most appropriate given the undisclosed status of the topic. One of the most important assumptions in the psychoanalytical approach is that the subject is not a unity, that there is an internal split: I dont know who

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I am replaced the Cartesian cogito, sure of its boundaries and its abilities. If the psyche is not one, but three (id, ego, superego) then we can expect conflict between these positions. And there is conflict more often than not.1 With this heterogeneous subject in mind, we will first analyze the hypothesis that pornography expresses a special kind of curiosity, a curiosity from the same family with voyeurism. A distinctive trait of pornography which distinguishes it from a normal sexual relationship is the fact that there is always a third presence: the spectator, the watcher. By being a representation about sex and not only a concrete sexual relationship, pornography involves another level: that where the sexual act will be consumed. What is the relation between pornography, the watcher and his representative, the pornographers gaze? What are the role of the gaze and implicitly the role of camera in the pornographic scene? Who is really watching when the camera is rolling? The strange eye that gazes at the sexual scene is an essential part of pornography. One can argue that gazing at something means transforming it, acting upon it. The object, once it is gazed at, enters another reality, the reality of the watchers desires, sensibility, interests and fantasies. The camera is a technological extension of the pornographers eye and in being so it does not only faithfully record the scene, but also modifies it by constructing a perspective: its an instrument of power. Apparently, the goal of pornography is to exhibit a body or a sexual act. But it is more than that: the gaze seems to want to enter the womans body to see that there is no mystery, no secret. What the pornographic gaze wants to see is never visible: the enigma, the difference, the secret of the feminine sexual organ...2 The spectator seeks an intimate disclosure. The nudity is not only real, but symbolic. The actors nudity itself implies vulnerability, availability and a lack of defense that is not only physical, but emotional and psychological, as it happens in actual sexual relationship. But if in real life the disclosure comes along with at least a promise of care, with a veritable bond to the body and the identity of other, pornography cancels this very dimension: the context. And a relation without context is always a violent one. In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud considers that in scopophilia and exhibitionism the eye corresponds to an erotogenic zone.3 In the same study, Freud establishes the connection between knowledge and
This is probably best exemplified by individuals with multiple personalities disorder whose alters behave, think and feel totally different from one another. 2 MICHELA MARZANO, Malaise dans la sexualit. Le pige de la pornographie, J. C. Lattes, Paris, 2006, p. 118. 3 SIGMUND FREUD, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. J. Strachey, Anna Freud, Hogarth Press, London, 1953-1964, p. 1494.
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sexuality: we have learnt from psycho-analysis that the instinct for knowledge in children is attracted unexpectedly early and intensively to sexual problems and is in fact possibly first aroused by them.4 These ideas apply to pornography, where it is apparent a desire to know, to unveil, to annihilate through the eye a mystery, that of the feminine sexuality. The eye and its substitute, the camera, symbolically penetrate what the male organ penetrates in reality. The pornographic sexuality is a child-like sexuality: a total immersion ones own sense experience, for which one paradigm must certainly be infancy. For adults this totality, the total sexualization of everything can only be a fantasy.5 We will elaborate subsequently on this notion of infantile perversion, but for now let us analyze the hypothesis that there is a connection between the gaze and the superego. In the psychoanalytical theory, once the Oedipal complex declines, a sever superego appears and its function is to form ideals, to observe the self and to make moral judgments. The superego replaces the father: it prescribes specific actions and forbids others. The difference is that the subject commands to himself. Once the superego is formed, the individual is said to be independent and autonomous from the parental relations. In our analysis we began by saying that the role of the camera is not only to record, to capture the sexual activity on the set. The suggestion was that the pornographers gaze modifies the scene and by offering a perspective, a point of view that is necessarily subjective it constructs meaning. The pornographer is taking upon himself the function of gazing and thus he is relating to the potential consumer whose desires he tries to predict when he chooses an angle, a point of view that favors some body parts more than others. This vicarious relation between the consumer and the pornographer is due to a common pleasure: scopophilia. The pornographer knows that his eye is an erogenous zone, as it is for the consumer and that the object of his mastery is theirs to enjoy. But beyond this vicarious relation, who is the true addressee of the pornographic representation? The pornographic gaze is orientated towards the feminine sexual organs so that there would be no doubt that there is nothing to see and to know. And also, towards the masculine sexual organ that is there to control and to submit. But who is the authentic but unconscious witness of the whole scene? If the superego is the fathers heir, if it assumes, it absorbs its limitative, ordering and punitive function, if it is the part of the subject that observes and evaluates, then it represents the internalized eye of the father. Thus, the gaze and its role to judge and to subordinate gives us reasons to say that pornography is
Ibidem, p. 1514. ANN BARR SNITOW, Mass Market Romance: Pornography for Women is Different, in Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, Sharon Thompson (eds), Powers of Desire, The Politics of Sexuality, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1983, p. 256.
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there for the delight of the superego as well. The eye that tries to know and to possess the object is an attribute of the father and apparently there is a strange connection here. The superego forbids some acts, censors some fantasies and makes moral judgment calls about other. But by being a point of observation, of examination, it is related to the eye. The eye makes the gaze possible and the gaze is essential to the pornographic scene. We would think that the superego forbids the pornographic act, but instead it is there from the beginning. The pornographic representation is thus an arena where the three folded structure of the psyche manifest itself: the unconscious manifests through the unveiled fantasies, the ego through the conscious seeking of pleasure and the superego manifests itself through the constant watching: it observes so that it could later punish. The pornographic scene refers to the psychic split and all its drama. When two or more sexual partners welcome a strangers eye in their intimacy, be it virtually or actually, what they want is an augmentation of their sexual experience; being watched brings them more pleasure. But this strange presence is always there, because in that moment, like in any other moment of their lives, the superego watches. And it is not a simple mirror, but a vehicle of power, an active participant to the sexual scene. The fact that the pornographic desire is aimed at something more than the immediate gratification is betrayed by its being based on multiplication and accumulation ad infinitum: more bodies, more sexual positions, more explicit content. Moreover, there is no reciprocity, because the desired body is virtual and interchangeable. In fact, the pornographic desire is not a sexual desire, but a simulacrum. In the pornographic scene, there is no real encounter between two or several partners, but rather we witness a relation of consumption. The male devours the female, the pornographic gaze possesses them both so that the spectator can pleasure himself by watching. Since there is no real other to respond and establish boundaries, the pornographic desire isolates the subject in an omnipotent solipsism, where the limit and the norm, if it exists, has to come from within. But the norm and the limit is the prerogative of the superego, as we have seen. What does this entail? One possible answer is that the entire mechanism is perverse, that the structure of the psyche is constantly undermining itself and that pornography shows us how the superego, the screening-mechanism which normally seeks to limit the pleasure-seeking drives of the id by imposing restrictions, is now a mocking and active presence in the whole scene. Hence the perverse character of pornography. In the second part of this article I will try to argue that the perversion of pornography does not necessarily rely on its imagery or its outrageous sexual scenarios, but in its special relation to the Law. If we understand perversion in a large sense, i.e. any sexual act whose aim is not reproduction, then its ubiquity brings it closer to the norm. Nevertheless, what

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makes perversion a distinct manifestation that society easily identifies and judges? What does perversion really mean and what is its relation to the Law? Since Freud, we know that normality is not that common and that there is a strong connection between perversion and general manifestations of sexuality. When he argues that the child can, under the influence of seduction, become polymorphously perverse,6 the dominant moral of his time suffers a powerful blow. But how are we to understand this predisposition and its relation with the moral laws? Freud admits that the line between perversion and normality is a fragile and fluctuating one and that transgression has an important role in every individuals sexual life. If he or she cannot put into effect those deviances which we call perversions, then it is the role of the fantasy to compensate for that lack. Should we understand that every fantasy is perverse? That the unconscious driven by domination, death and pleasure is perverse? That since the unconscious is unruled and steeped in all kinds of sexual activities it is the paradigm of perversion? Daniel Sibony thinks that there is a family resemblance between the sadist, the masochist, the drug addict and the mystic. In his book, the author constructs his argument based on a simple idea: the perversion is a relation, not the essential quality of a person or of an act.7 The fantasy cannot be perverse, and the same goes for the unconscious. But the relation one has with the fantasy or with the unconscious can. But how does the pervert come to be a pervert and what makes him different from other forms of deviations from the norm? Daniel Sibony considers that the origin of perversion is a trauma and the same goes for the neurosis for example. But if the neurotic runs, represses, overshadows, the pervert takes upon himself, ascribes to himself something that isnt really ascribable. He or she does not think about the shock, the fault, the punishment as being something exterior and hence subject to compromise, defense, but rather he or she tries to appropriate and give new value to this traumatic event. No matter who is the real source, the pervert says: it is I who does that, it is I who is the origin of this gesture. The trauma is no longer a burden or a threat from which the subject runs or defends himself through symptoms, but becomes Law. The pervert is caught between two laws: the social (moral, juridical) law that he breaks and his own law, i.e. that traumatic event that he does not ignore, but lives endlessly by ritualizing it and therefore rationalizing it. This is his way

SIGMUND FREUD, op.cit., p. 1510. DANIEL SIBONY, Perversions. Dialogues sur des folies actuelles, Paris, ditions du Seuil, 2000.
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to master his founding moment. Perversion is a trauma taken upon oneself which is nothing else but a slap in the face of Other, a refusal of its alterity.8 In spite of the philosophical tradition that establishes a divorce between speech and reality, between victim and aggressor, between object and subject etc, the perverse arrangement targets the union of the body with the word: the symbolic order becomes flesh, it is incarnated. The perverts success would mean the hypostatization of the Law: it would become palpable, manageable, and operative. Thats why the study of perversion is the genealogy of totalitarianism (of Origin, of Truth, Of Morals). It is a desired bondage, desired because it is already there. To ascribe it means to tame it, to mitigate its arbitrary character. 9 The fact that the pervert desires to capture the Other brings him in the proximity of the creator, the mystic, the saint, since his project too is total: realizing the Law, i.e. destroying it as symbolic order through rituals. Perversion is trying to fixate the fantasy in the real and maybe the most important fantasy is that of an identity without fault, without split, a true identity, an authentic identity. What the pervert really wants is to secrete his own existence, to create himself and his law. He wants to be God, but a real god, where the real is fetishized. The target of the pervert is the real of the Law, not the real of the others body.10 Most people do not know their root, their foundation, but the pervert creates it, even if this costs him his life (physically or socially). But to exercise ones will in order to assume something that is beyond assuming is a negative modality to relate to the origins. The difference between the neurotic and the pervert is that the pervert knows what he is doing, he is putting his will in the service of his ritual and in doing so he strikes below the belt the social laws. By identifying himself with the Law he makes it visible, from ineffable and invisible, the law becomes sonant and palpable, because it is inscribed in the perverts body. Once appropriated, the Law becomes his only concern; he cannot stop talking about it, because he can finally express it without alienating himself. In this point, the perverse character of pornography becomes obvious. Wendy McElroy, in her book about womens right to pornography, recounts how the people involved in the pornographic industry (actresses, actors, producers and directors) put on a condescending attitude towards common people.11 We can easily understand this attitude as a defense mechanism against the social stigma they have to endure every single day. But it is more than this: they see themselves as being part of a sexual elite. Because they live something
Ibidem, p. 113. Ibidem, pp. 117-119. 10 Ibidem, p. 136. 11 WENDY MCELROY, XXX. A Womans Right to Pornography, New York, St. Martin Press, 1995, pp. 14-15.
9 8

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usually considered a mere fantasy, if not a taboo, they relate to pornography as if it were a religion. What for others is wantonness, for them is Law. A law even more important since it is the result of a choice: the choice to live the sexual fantasy to the end. Pornography is not perverse because it trades fantasies, but because it transforms them in a program, in a war machine which blows anything that stands in the way of its satisfaction. One can inform the actors that the orgasm they seek is not at the reach of their hands, because the true object of desire is and will remain untouchable. But this will not change their lives because the covenant is already made and made valuable accordingly: they have vowed not to betray their pleasure, not to hide their sexuality, but to exhibit it proudly. The shock that produces the split of the subject and that, if we are to give credit to psychoanalysis, is something common to all of us, is given a new meaning by the voluntary participants to the pornographic industry. Thats why their project is perverse: because beyond the common meaning of sexuality, the people involved in pornography are making an implant of meaning; beyond the pleasure principle, (they) implant another pleasure, their own, a pleasure that instead illuminates the genesis of the human pleasure: not only discharge, but constructing some islands of facticity where names and bodies are touching and communicating.12 One might say that pornography is an outlet created by the social system itself, that it is a perverse move by which its structure and configuration are maintained intact; the aim is to keep sexuality a cursed and abject trait which must be hidden from the gaze of the father. But in this loop, there are people that work, live and pleasure themselves. And they are showing off to any father figure that might try to intervene and put a stop to their debauchery. When we mentioned the relation between pornography and fantasy we saw that there was a need for repetition and substitution and we have associated that with the absence of the authentic object of desire. Because it is irreplaceable and untouchable, the object of desire becomes an endless serial of bodies that, like any other surrogate, can only ease the desire: the satisfaction hoped for is not obtained and the entire process will restart again at the first given chance. There is a constant oscillating movement between the different structures of the subject and it shows every time he or she produces or consumes pornography. For this internal split to appear there must have been a threat, a danger. A threat that the gaze is trying to control, since seeing is knowing and knowledge is power. Danger, fear, repression, fantasy, desire to know and desire to dominate. The consumer sends the pornographer into the land of fantasy to observe and to report back that in fact there is nothing to be afraid, since the
12

DANIEL SIBONY, op. cit., p. 282.

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human body in general and the feminine body in particular hides no mystery. And even if it were a threat or a mystery, the male sexual organ is there to control and subdue. The simple fact that pornography is a representation institutes a fissure in the sexual relation. The conscious aim to present sexual acts to a spectator and the unconscious aim to know and to control ones own sexual imagery collaborate for the effective satisfaction, but in the symbolic way, the agent will remain unsatisfied, because his identity is unclear. Regarding the relation between perversion and norm, we saw that the pornographic pervert is not that far from other forms of deviations and this is due to the psychic mechanisms that come into play. Those involved in pornography seem to have made a convent as important as those who are its enemies. The former get their satisfaction from living the fantasy to the end, from being loyal to their own pleasure, and the latter, those who analyze it, judge it and eventually punish it get their satisfaction exactly from this judicative attitude that resembles what the superego normally does. The relation between perversion/pathology and norm is more than tense. The history of cogito is a war machine against madness, and madness, like perversion, is often the name we give to that strange manifestation that our conscience cannot accept at a given moment. If we give trauma a general and thus generous meaning (e.g. a simple shock or punishment), then the fault associated with the founding scene is common to all individuals. And everybody is doing his best to cope with it. Most take the neurotic way, but some choose the perverse one. Thus, perversion is only a label, pathology has only a discursive role, and mental health is an ideal and not a majority rule. As for pornography, its perversion has many layers and we only began to reveal them.

REFERENCES

FREUD, SIGMUND, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, in J. Strachey, Anna Freud (eds), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, London, Hogarth Press, 1953-1964. MARZANO, MICHELA, Malaise dans la sexualit. Le pige de la pornographie, Paris, J. C. Lattes, 2006. MCELROY, WENDY, XXX. A Womans Right to Pornography, New York, St. Martin Press, 1995. SIBONY, DANIEL, Perversions. Dialogues sur des folies actuelles, Paris, ditions du Seuil, 2000. SNITOW, ANN, Mass Market Romance: Pornography for Women is Different, in Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, Sharon Thompson (eds), Powers of Desire. The Politics of Sexuality, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1983.

EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING


ADRIANA NICOLETA SORA1

Abstract One of the most influential papers in the contemporary literature about explanation is Friedmans paper Explanation and scientific understanding (1974), in which the author proposes a theory of explanation in terms of understanding. Following this way of exploration of explanation, we can notice a contemporary debate between theories of explanation which aim to define explanation in terms of understanding, so that a theory is explanatory if it gives understanding of the target phenomena and theories on which understanding is only a byproduct of a good scientific theory, their explanatory character being given by other criteria. In the following essay I will explore this relationship between explanation and understanding by comparing two points of view situated on different sides of this debate. In this paper I attempt a comparison between Henk De Regt and Dennis Dieks (RD for short) paper A Contextual Approach to Understanding (2005) on explanation and understanding and Michael Strevens paper No Understanding without Explanation (2011) on the same topic. I will analyze understanding on three dimensions: 1. as theory of explanation on the form of understanding things; 2. as criterion of assessment of the value of theories and 3. as grasping a theory. I will offer criticisms to RDs view on all these three dimensions by arguing that we better have a theory of explanation instead of a theory of understanding and better keep the idea of truth as criterion for the value of a theory; more than that I will argue for a notion of understanding as a psychological counterpart of knowledge and of truth. In the last section I will distinguish between a subjective and an objective idea of understanding, considering that the term understanding is more suitable for the subjective one. Keywords: scientific explanation, understanding, knowledge, scientific community, truth, scientific theory.

I. A Comparison between the Two Theories 1. Two main ideas of understanding play a central role in RDs paper (2005): on the one hand, we have understanding of the phenomena and on the other hand we have understanding of the theories themselves with the help of which we understand phenomena. Depending on the level of complexity of the theories, we have then some other derivative ideas of understanding. On the

University of Bucharest, adriana.nicoleta.s@gmail.com

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other hand, Strevens text (2011) deals with three kinds of understanding. In this first section I will explore the notion of understanding things or phenomena. So, on the one sense, RDs paper can be interpreted as offering a theory of explanation as a theory of understanding. Usually, the goal of a theory of this kind (a theory of explanation) is to offer the criteria which a piece of work in science must meet in order to be considered an explanation and also the criteria for a good explanation. What does it mean to understand a phenomenon? A plausible answer to this question, in the context of a theory of explanation, could be that understanding a phenomenon means to understand why the phenomenon happens, and why it happens in the particular way it happens. So long as our why question can be extended also to laws, we can say that we seek to understand why particular laws of nature hold. The result is that we understand a phenomenon when we are given an explanation which proceeds roughly in the following manner: from knowing certain initial conditions and some laws (which are depicted by our theories) we can derive the phenomenon that we have as explanandum. The same story goes for prediction: knowing that certain conditions happen and knowing the laws that govern the fragment of reality with which we deal, we can predict future events. On the other hand, Strevens puts forward three notions of understanding: understanding that, understanding why and understanding with. The first of them concerns things and refers to the particular state of mind of grasping that some states of affairs happen. We can link this idea of understanding that with information/knowledge that is not derived and can consider that it is something specific for the knowledge of the initial conditions in an explanation. As far as understanding why is concerned, the result is a theory of explanation: we understand why a phenomenon happens if we have a good explanation of the phenomenon (and the entire picture previously given fits this notion very well). If we interpret RDs understanding of things as understanding why, the type of understanding that the two papers seek is of the same type: the type of understanding that a scientific theory or an explanatory text provides us, and which is an answer to a why question. As we have put Strevens and RD on a common ground, we can proceed to appreciate their answers to the question of explanation, answers which are very different. On the one hand, Strevens proposes a theory of explanation in terms of causality and unification, which is a categorical definition of the notion of explanation, therefore providing necessary and sufficient conditions for being in the category of explanation. Every explanation worth bearing this name, no matter when it is given and in no matter what community, must uncover the causes that matter for the bringing about of the explanandum or uncover the causal mechanism that underlies a certain law. On the other hand, RD put forward a relativistic theory of explanation, according to which every scientific

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community has a particular view on explanation and tends to favor particular kinds of explanations over other kinds. They criticize all theories of explanation that tend to offer necessary and sufficient criteria for what counts as a good explanation, or intelligible theory in their terms, and offer a cluster of features that count as objective standards for an intelligible theory (or a good theory, a real explanatory theory in the above rephrasing): causality, visualisability, locality, determinism, power of unification. The interesting fact is that a good theory does not have to possess all the properties in this bunch, but only some of them and the combination is different according to historic period and scientific community. 2. The second idea of understanding, as we saw, applies to the theories themselves and again the two papers have different answers to this question: for RD, intelligible theory means at the same time correct or valuable theory, as they use intelligible as a criterion for the value of theories instead of truth. For Strevens, intelligible theory means theory which could be grasped by an epistemic subject; the product to which grasping applies is a correct theory, namely a coherent theory which mirrors the facts. Having this criterion in hand, by grasping a correct theory, the epistemic subject grasps at the same time the things with which the theory is concerned. Let us see now see the criteria that a good theory (= a theory that provides understanding) has to meet, and that are supposed to vary contextually. First, there are the logical criteria, which could be specified as formal constraints on a good theory: the text of a theory should be a collection of statements put in some order not a random collection, there should be a pattern of dependence between them. Do these criteria seem to be relative? Yes and not. I think that the fact that they shouldnt be random is something that transcends locality and is universally accepted; on the other hand, whether they should be linguistic or other kinds of entities (such as diagrams) or which particular relations and patterns they should instantiate is relative and dependent on scientific and philosophical community. Second, there are empirical criteria, which RD suggests that are interpreted differently according to historical period and scientific community. A good theory must give true predictions about the facts for sure, because otherwise it is totally unmotivated; this is a fact that every scientific community accepts, but how this desideratum is achieved depends on context. Third, there are methodological constraints on a theory; the question that arises in connection to these ones in particular is whether we can include under this tag of methodological constraints all the considerations invoked in the previous paragraphs in connection to scientific explanation. Is the fact that explanation should take a causal form a methodological constraint? I think yes and the entire discussion about intelligibility raised in connection to explanation

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could be put in this context. On that basis we can raise the question of whether there are non-relativistic answers to what counts as an explanation. Every point is touched by Strevens even though in a less detailed manner in his short paper. As far as the logical criteria are concerned, a valuable theory should be a collection of sentences with some pattern. As far as the empirical criteria are concerned, the conditions of internal coherence and conformity to the facts seem to be the answer. I think that besides the different views of the methodology and ontology of explanation, the point in which the two views under discussion differ is the different account of the empirical criteria of a theory and of how tight must be the relation of conformity between theory and facts. How can we assess the truth of a particular theory on Strevens model? Probably by good predictions offered by a particular theory, given some initial known conditions; the value of good predictions is assured by conformity to the facts. But do we have grounds to suppose that a theory that gives good predictions is also a true theory in the sense of constituting an image of the facts? From this considerations, on a realist perspective, we can derive a consequence concerning the correctness of theories: a theory that gives good predictions at a particular time could be considered correct and by performing an argument to the best explanation true according to reality (independent of the fact that it proves false at a later stage of science). By comparison, RD do not seem to have as aim an answer to this particular question: I underlie seem because it does not appear explicitly in the text but we can presuppose it so long as they talk of the value of theories in particular contexts. Their point seems to be the following one: a theory is valuable so long as it offers good predictions, so long as it is useful for our purposes, no matter whether or not it mirrors the facts. Nonetheless this is only an interpretation and the question still persists: can we suppose that their relativist criteria of a good explanation go hand in hand with a relativist conception of truth or a relativist criterion of the value of theories? 3. One particular principle of intelligibility of theories plays a major role in RDs paper and this deserves a longer discussion: a theory is intelligible if it allows us to make good qualitative predictions. This is the only trans-historical principle which the two authors put forward and which is supposed to give a definition of understanding, definition that seems to lack from other conceptions that make use of it (like Friedmans in Friedman (1974)) but leave it unexplained. The two authors identify two aspects of a scientific theory: a qualitative aspect, which can be linked with the empirical content of the theory and a quantitative aspect which can be linked with the mathematical factors introduced to describe the qualitative aspects. In other words, a scientific theory depicts a range of objects, between which it states certain relations; these relations in turn, can be

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described in a more or less specific manner, the mathematical equations being the most exact manner of describing these relations. The understanding of a theory presupposes both these levels, it is a sum of the two components. Nevertheless, the two authors believe that the two components can be dissociated and that we can understand the theory although we have only the qualitative one, without a technical mastering of formulas deployed in exact calculations. One of their arguments is the idea that a computer that can master very well the mathematical apparatus and can deliver precise calculations does not have understanding of the theories it employs or understanding of the phenomena depicted by the theories. On the other hand, RD do not discuss in detail what does it mean for a scientist or group of scientists to understand a theory, apart from the fact that they can give accurate qualitative predictions with the help of the theory. Strevens is more clear on this point, by considering that understanding means grasping a correct theory; he does not elucidate the concept of grasping, but leaves open the possibility of a characterization of this concept in a theory different from a theory of explanation, namely in epistemology or in the philosophy of mind. In light of the objection that we can understand false theories, Strevens introduces his third concept of understanding, namely understanding with. Can we reconcile here the views of the papers and consider that understanding with is focused on understanding theories and is related to predictability? I think that the two views can be reconciled: Strevens understanding with implies the use of some particular theory to derive explanations and predictions of particular events, while on RDs view a theory is intelligible when you succeed in deriving qualitative predictions of the things which the theory is aimed at explaining.

II. Critical points In this section I will present three objections to the kind of conception offered by RD: 1. the paper does not sufficiently characterize the idea of understanding; 2. constructing a theory of understanding instead of a theory of explanation and using understanding as a criterion for the value of theories are problematic; 3. they tend to underestimate the quantitative side of predictions and the fact that understanding things by explanations comes into degrees 1. A particular objection which could be raised in connection with such a theory as RDs one, promoting the idea of understanding besides some other ideas of truth or knowledge is that it is inflationist. Is there something special that understanding can offer above and beyond knowledge or above and beyond truth? My answer is yes, but I do not endorse this idea for the same reason as

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RD. Therefore, in the following pages of this section I will develop two points: 1. we dont need a theory of understanding instead of a theory of explanation as far as understanding phenomena/things is concerned, unless we want to be relativists; but at the same time we can offer strong reasons for not being relativists; 2. a theory of understanding is well motivated in the case of understanding the theories themselves, and via theories the things themselves. 1.1. In RDs paper, the introduction the notion of understanding is motivated by the need to unify scientific theories. Instead of saying that the theories in every scientific community aim at providing truth/knowledge, where truth is relative to the community (given their different means of insight into the nature of things) you can say that every scientific community provides understanding. The latter concept becomes a measure of the success of a scientific theory and of the scientific practice of a community; it is also accompanied by a plurality of models of explanatory theories. Given RDs point of view concerning the theory of explanation, my question is: why do we need to accept more than one model of explanation? In my view there is only one reason why we should accept different models of explanation: there is no unity at the level of things that could allow us to have a single model of explanation, so that different kinds of things compel us to have different kinds of explanations. RDs motivation is far from this idea. The motivation that can support their plurality of models of explanations is a particular view of science, one that does not construct scientific explanations as images of things, models where truth does not play a central role, but where other values play a central role. RD do not have an explicit position concerning these matters, but their point seems to be the following one: a theory is valuable so long as it offers good predictions, so long as it is useful for our purposes, no matter whether or not it mirrors the facts. And understanding comes along with a good theory. If we do not pursue this line of interpretation it is hard to justify their relativist principle of contextual understanding. From this situation we can conclude that they favor the pragmatic side of science over its epistemic side: scientific theories are good as long as they help us to obtain good predictions and to deal with the world, no matter how faithful an image of the facts they offer. This being the case, we are free to impose our ideals of natural order, be it at the level of the ontology presupposed by our theories or the level of the shape of the explanations. But we can raise the following question for such a point of view: how can a theory that does not reflect reality help us deal with reality in a successful way? If we want science to offer a faithful image of the world, given that causality is a relation between things, our theories must explain by invoking causal relations. On the other hand, if we consider that the world does not have a causal structure or that it is impossible to get access to the structure of the

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world, the methodological constraints as far as an explanation is concerned are left open. Therefore, we can have the following combinations: 1. the structure of the world is causal and explanation is given in terms of causality; 2. the structure of the world is causal and explanation is not given in terms of causality; 3. the structure of the world is not causal and explanation in given in terms of causality; 4. the structure of the world is not causal and explanation is not given in terms of causality. In the first case, our idea of natural order is a faithful image of the world and the fact that successful explanations are given in terms of causality is not a surprising coincidence. Furthermore, a true explanation must be causal and there is no space for historic divergence. The second and the third cases seem a little bit strange, because on these models it is hard to account for the success of science. The fact that relativism makes it difficult to explain the success of science, gives us a good reason to reject relativism. Therefore, I think that the understanding of things (in RDs terms) has to be objective and not historical and context-relative. And if it is context-relative, this state should be overcome by better developments, so that science should be continuous and cumulative. In this context, we better give up the theory of understanding as theory of explanation for a realist theory of explanation (and also give back to truth and knowledge their central place) and keep the notion of understanding for better purposes. 1.2. The previous section pictured the image of science as aiming at constructing better and better theories as better and better images of things. In connection to this idea two points could be raised: 1. the construction of scientific explanations is a dynamic process which involves human minds, so that an explanation is not only a piece of information in a book, it is a tool with which we unravel the world and which we should master. Therefore, I think that we can find a place to the idea of understanding in this particular context, as a psychological side of the process of acquiring scientific information. 2. in our lives we need to uncover more or less of the structure of why things happen, so that we can put forward the idea that understanding comes into degrees. 1.2.1. By saying that understanding has its own role in acquiring scientific information about things I am in line with RD. Nevertheless, my objection to their theory is that they do not make this idea explicit enough. Theories themselves are complex constructions which involve a pattern of dependence between their statements. Therefore, some of the statements are considered as immediately known, like the mathematical axioms and do not need further justification, whereas others stand in need of justification. This justification is achieved by comparison and support from the facts or by derivation from other statements considered true and justified. Is there any need of understanding in this picture? Yes, and I will try to explain why: I think that

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we can view the acquisition of scientific information as a complex process, in which our mind is involved and seeks to grasp something from outside itself. This complex process involves also the mental process of understanding. When it comes to explaining the intelligibility of theories, we can see that RD shed light only on one of the two equally important features of theories, namely qualitative prediction, leaving aside the fact that theories have also other functions. Nevertheless, I think that choosing this aspect is not unmotivated and it helps us shed light on the definition of understanding that somehow lurks in the background: understanding is the psychological grasp of scientific information, so that we can say that we have understanding of information when it (having a justified true belief) is accompanied by a feeling of confidence that things are the way our statements say they are.2 For a better image of the previously stated ideas, let us consider the following case: at a particular time in a scientific community, scientists are presented with a theory from future, let's say a theory that in normal conditions they would have reached after 200 years; the theory is true as far as its target of phenomena is concerned and more than that it is perfectly justified, so that it constitutes valuable scientific information. Can we say that the scientists of that particular community understand the theory in question? I think that the answer is no, they do not understand the theory and from considering this possibility, we can see where understanding can be placed. It occurs in the active process of achieving information and in the process of justification. The scientists of the community in question will achieve understanding when they will succeed to retrace the process of construction and justification of the theory in question. We can now better see why knowledge should be accompanied by understanding at the level of the human mind and why understanding is a counterpart of knowledge. The truth of the belief has to be made manifest to the human mind, a true proposition for which I can not assess the truth is unintelligible for my mind. And the same observation could be made for justification: in order to see or to understand that a statement is justified I have to be capable to reconstruct this process of justification. On the other hand, the fact that a particular piece of scientific information is true and even justified (with justification things are more complicated because justification seems to be context-relative, so that a statement or collection of statements is justified for someone) does not guarantee that it is also intelligible or understood. 1.2.2. The following point I want to raise is the possibility of constructing a concept of understanding (I mention here that I will use in this section the
2 Some authors even identify a specific and irreducible phenomenology of understanding, like the phenomenology of perception or emotions (view BAYNE and MONTAGUE (2011), especially the introduction).

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term understanding as RD use it, meaning explanation/understanding things and not in the sense introduced in the previous paragraph of psychological counterpart of knowledge even though they are related) that allows degrees. RD seem to suggest that understanding does not come in degrees: every scientific community has understanding in its own right and does not seem to be superior to the understanding of other communities; on the other hand quantitative prediction does not seem to count at all in the process of understanding things and this is the second point where we can introduce the idea if degrees of understanding. What I want to suggest in the following paragraphs is that RDs principle of intelligibility of theories is false or at least incomplete. I think that we can assess the value of this principle if we relate it to the functions of a scientific theory, about which I have already made some remarks in the context of discussing explanation. The aim of science is to give us good explanations and predictions. This process of explaining and predicting is applied both to particular events and to laws. We want to understand why certain general groups of events happen and we want also to understand why a certain event happened: for example we want to understand both why buildings collapse under certain kinds of pressure and want to understand why a particular building collapsed given an earthquake of magnitude x. A good physical theory will provide us with a general theory of why buildings are likely to collapse in cases where some forces are applied to certain objects and also with a formula/equation that is aimed at describing the phenomenon. Using this theory and information about the conditions about the particular case which we want to understand, we can derive an explanation why the event happened. RD seem to ignore this level of understanding of particular events when they put forward their criterion of intelligibility of theories. We can introduce here a distinction between superficially and profoundly understanding an event (or why a particular event happened). Therefore, I can say that I understand why the building collapsed because I know that it was a devastating earthquake, and in case of this kind of earthquakes most buildings are likely to collapse. Can I say in this case that I have a profound understanding of the event rather than a merely superficially one or no understanding at all? I think not. More than that, I don't seem to have a scientific understanding of the event rather than a common sense one; therefore, we can conclude that science is concerned with a profound understanding because otherwise it would be useless. For not depriving the common people of understanding, I think that it is better to introduce the idea that understanding is linked with our aims, and to say that when it comes to everyday life it does not matter whether we have a profound or superficial understanding, but when it comes to science, or when we exercise our profession it matters. Now we can reanalyze the principle from the point of view suggested above. The point that I raised in connection with science is one that I firmly

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endorse: science must give both quantitative and qualitative explanations and predictions and to offer us the possibility to go as deep as possible into the structure of the matter. This aspect is very well reflected in the construction of scientific theories which offer not only qualitative descriptions of the relations between things but also precise mathematical descriptions of these relations. But apart from the scientific construction per se, there is the application of our theories to phenomena and I think that here we have a space of relativity because the application of science seems to come in degrees and to depend on contextual needs. Therefore, if I am involved in the business of constructing buildings I must have the profound understanding invoked before, on the other hand if I watch the news and want to understand what happened, it is sufficient to have the less profound understanding.

III. Some Thoughts about Understanding I think that the prospect of understanding a false theory gives us grounds to consider that understanding is a weaker notion than truth and is concerned directly with the psychological aspect of knowledge and only indirectly with understanding things in the sense of having true theories about them. Understanding seems to be linked more with giving reasons; in this sense, as long as you can reconstruct the events in a coherent manner with a causal structure or a structure of reasons, you understand. The important fact is that this structure does not need to correspond faithfully to the things in order to convey understanding, I think that it is sufficient to be plausible and coherent in order to do so. On the other hand, as far as understanding the theories is concerned, we can conclude that understanding is concerned more with the semantic level of our scientific information than with the relation between information and the object it represents. Therefore, the notion of understanding is more suitable to describe the idea of grasping theories or explanations. Now let us analyze some examples from everyday language for the idea of understanding. 1. We say that we understand someones discourse in the sense that we can represent the information the message is intended to convey given the fact that we have access to the meaning of the words it is composed of. 2. For understanding as coherent structure of causes and reasons we can analyze the following example. Suppose that one of someone's friends suddenly begins to behave in a strange way and as this person can not see any reason for this change of behavior we say that he cant understand his behavior or he doesnt understand why he behaves in such a manner. Lets suppose that one of my friends suddenly begins not to communicate with me; at the same time, we

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both know that he owes me a large sum of money. Meanwhile, he has a sudden accident which leads to a partial loss of memory but I do not have any information about this fact. So long as in the first scenario I can construct with the available pieces a coherent story considering that the cause of the strange behavior is the debt, I will say that I understand his behavior even though the available information does not describe the true reasons of the strange behavior, the real cause being the loss of memory not the fact that owes me money and avoids me for this reason. More than that, if I happen to find out the real causal structure of the behavior my previous state of understanding does not seem to vanish into lack of understanding, which suggest that understanding is little dependent on the relation of truth as correspondence. Is my state understanding different when I do not know the real cause but can construct a plausible story different from the understanding which results from knowledge of the real cause? Can I say that in the first case I had only the impression of understanding, having real understanding only in the second case? I think that this story can give us sufficient ground to argue that understanding is the sum of two factors: an impression of understanding, which from the subjective point of view represents understanding and which we can associate with the psychological side of knowledge as characterized in the previous section in connection with RDs theory and an objective idea of understanding which is necessarily linked with having a correct explanation. This second type of understanding associates to the subjective impression of understanding the objective dimension that the things correspond to this subjective image. Given this context I think that it is more appropriate to keep the term understanding for the subjective impression/felling of understanding and to keep for the objective idea the notion of valuable scientific information or truth as explained in the previous section; this does not preclude the fact that in the cases of grasping valuable theories the two aspects are both present. Understanding in the objective sense is an ideal before our eyes in the same measure as having a true theory of phenomena is an ideal. Our successive gaining of knowledge is a process of perpetually giving up impressions of understanding; the point when we give up this impression is the point where we detect an incoherence in our explanations, in our ways of giving account of the things. On the other hand, we can link explanation with a particular context so that in some cases a superficial explanation is sufficient for our purposes and in other cases we need a more profound explanation; we can apply the same kind of argument for understanding, or more specifically for the objective counterpart of the subjective process of understanding (explanation as we saw in the previous section comes into degrees). Therefore, the contextual purposes determine a particular amount of understanding which is sufficient for the context. In some contexts it can happen to need less than an exact quantitative explanation of some event or less than the actual causes that brought about the event.

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Now we can apply these ideas to the previous discussed notions of understanding. First, understanding as grasping theories. Here the semantic dimension of understanding seems to play a major role. And given this context I think that it is relatively easy to account for the phenomena of understanding false theories; the presence of this fact reveals us that we can grasp not only true theories but also false theories so that understanding is not necessary linked with truth. We understand false theories as far as on the one hand understand the meaning of the statements implied in the construction of such a theory and on the other hand we are in a position to see that they put a rational structure in the things they are dealing with, even though they are false when confronted with further experiments. A person who is not quite a scientist can understand a true theory even in the absence of the skills to put the theory in practice and to actually derive some predictions and to construe explanations for actual events; as long as he grasps the meaning of the sentences and perceives an apparent rational structure in the information grasped and comes to see the things in the manner of the theories. On the other hand, scientists seem to have a more profound grasping which involves the capacity to put the theory to work, to understand things with the help of the theory. But even scientists happen to understand with the help of theories which are not quite in correspondence with the facts so long as we can derive good predictions from a false theory. Therefore, if understanding with involves the actual ability to derive empirical consequences from the theory and to compare them with the facts, it is a too high standard imposed on understanding, which makes this notion tied only to scientific practice, which seems counter-intuitive. This seems to be the thesis of RD which I think is very strong. The analysis of understanding involves at least two things in my opinion: 1. we seek to have an image of things with the help of better and better theories, with theories which are closer and closer to truth (understood as correspondence), but in this process we do not have access to the objective relation of correspondence of our theories to facts and thus are confined to the circle of the subjective condition of knowledge, which we choose to name understanding; 2. we can say that we obtain an image of the things with the help of intelligible theories, theories which we can grasp by grasping the meaning of their statements and by succeeding to see that the things are as they depict them to be.

REFERENCES

Bayne, T., Montague, M. (eds), 2012, Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. FRIEDMAN, M., 1974, Explanation and Scientific Understanding, The Journal of Philosophy, 71: 5-19. REGT, H. W. de, DIEKS, D., 2005, A Contextual Approach to Understanding, Synthese, 144: 137-170. STREVENS, M., 2008, Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation, Harvard University Press. STREVENS, M., 2011, No Understanding without Explanation, web draft.

Tiparul s-a executat sub c-da nr. 519/2012 la Tipografia Editurii Universitii din Bucureti

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VIOREL VIZUREANU RADU J. BOGDAN (Tulane University, New Orleans) MONIQUE CASTILLO (Universit de Paris XII) KIT FINE (New York University) MIRCEA FLONTA (membru corespondent al Academiei Romne) VASILE MORAR (Universitatea din Bucureti) ILIE PRVU (membru corespondent al Academiei Romne) GHEORGHE VLDUESCU (membru al Academiei Romne) JEAN-JACQUES WUNENBURGER (Universit Jean Moulin Lyon 3)

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ANUL LX 2011 Vol. II