Alloy 600

Proceedings
Materials Reliability Program:

Proceedings of the 2005
International PWSCC of Alloy 600
Conference and Exhibit Show
(MRP-154)

EPRI Project Manager
C. King
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94304-1395 PO Box 10412, Palo Alto, California 94303-0813 USA
800.313.3774 650.855.2121 askepri@epri.com www.epri.com
Materials Reliability Program:
Proceedings of the 2005
International PWSCC of Alloy 600
(MRP-154)

1012089
Proceedings, December 2005
Cosponsors
AREVA
3315 Old Forrest Road
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Westinghouse
P.O. Box 158
Madison, PA 15663-0158
Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.
6855 S. Havana Street, Suite 350
Centennial, CO 80112-3869
Welding Services, Inc.
1115 Syland Court
Norcross, GA 30071

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iii
CITATIONS
This report was prepared by
11730 Plaza America Drive, Suite 310
Reston, VA 20190
Principal Investigators
G. White
J. Gorman
N. Nordmann
This report describes research sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI),
AREVA, Westinghouse, Structural Integrity Associates, Inc., and Welding Services, Inc.
The report is a corporate document that should be cited in the literature in the following manner:
Materials Reliability Program: Proceedings of the 2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600
Conference and Exhibit Show (MRP-154). EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, AREVA, Lynchburg, VA,
Westinghouse, Madison, PA, Structural Integrity Associates, Inc., Centennial, CO, and Welding
Services, Inc., Norcross, GA: 2005. 1012089.

v
REPORT SUMMARY

Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) can lead to increased costs for operation,
maintenance, assessment, repair, and replacement of pressurized water reactor (PWR)
components. This international conference was a forum for exchange of technical information
related to PWSCC of Alloy 600 components including J-groove penetrations and dissimilar
metal piping butt welds.
Background
Previous conferences have provided extensive coverage of PWSCC of Alloy 600 materials in
pressurizer instrument nozzles, pressurizer heater sleeves, and hot leg instrument nozzles.
Studies of crack growth rates and investigations to determine the causes and consequences of
control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzle PWSCC have been presented in the past and the
results have been incorporated into industry practice. Over the last five years, the issue of
PWSCC of Alloy 600 materials has received considerable attention with discoveries of PWSCC
in new locations such as piping butt welds and reactor vessel bottom mounted nozzles and many
plants considering replacement of reactor vessel closure heads.
Objectives
To bring together key nuclear engineers, scientists, and vendors to provide a forum for
summarizing nuclear experience with PWSCC of Alloy 600 material in nozzles and welds of
PWR plants. The conference provided a forum for updates on recent research activities
conducted by EPRI and other utility programs including both Alloy 600 and its replacement
material, Alloy 690, as well as for sharing field experience with Alloy 600 inspection, mitigation,
and replacement activities.
Approach
The 2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conferenceheld March 710, 2005, in Santa
Ana Pueblo, New Mexicoattracted approximately 180 representatives from U.S. and
international utilities, PWR vendors, research laboratories, regulatory authorities, and consulting
organizations. The workshop included sessions on predictive modeling, strategic planning,
replacement materials, repair methods, laboratory investigations, field experience, boric acid
corrosion, inspection methods, possible remedial measures, and regulatory issues.
Results
In recent years, considerable attention has been devoted in the United States and abroad to
managing PWSCC of Alloy 600 components in PWRs. In reflection of the wide range of
activities associated with PWSCC of Alloy 600 components other than steam generator tubes,
the conference used two parallel sessions during most of the meeting time, and 72 presentations,
including four keynote addresses, were made in total during the 12 half-day sessions. The

vi
keynote speakers emphasized the need for proactive management of materials degradation issues
and provided utility, EPRI, and regulatory perspectives.
Presentations addressed the specific approaches to managing PWSCC applied in various
countries, including inspection methods and crack evaluation criteria. In the United States, the
PWR industry has recently adopted generic guidance for comprehensive programs addressing all
plant Alloy 600 components (EPRI report 1009561), and crack growth rate disposition curves
have been developed for thick-wall Alloy 600 wrought material (EPRI report 1006695) and for
Alloy 82 and 182 weld materials (EPRI report 1006696). Other presentations addressed recent
developments in inspection, repair, and mitigation technologies. Discussion in this area
emphasized new repair options, improvements made in the weldability of Alloy 52/152
replacement weld materials, and advances in stress improvement remediation technologies. One
session was devoted to cracking and reliability studies of Alloy 690 replacement materials
including Alloy 52 and 152 weld metals. Work is ongoing to demonstrate the long-term
resistance of these materials to cracking. Another session addressed recent laboratory state-of-
the-art crack characterization studies and other destructive examination projects focused on the
fundamental factors that promote PWSCC. Finally, one session was devoted to the related issue
of boric acid corrosion of carbon and low-alloy steel components, which can potentially result
from through-wall cracking and pressure boundary leakage. This session on boric acid corrosion
included plant experience, results of laboratory testing, recommended generic inspection
guidance, and one example of a local leak detection technology.
EPRI Perspective
This international conference met its objective of promoting a worldwide information exchange
on issues related to management of PWSCC in Alloy 600 PWR components. EPRI continues to
coordinate its work in this area with the domestic PWR owners groups and the Nuclear Energy
Institute. Related EPRI reports on this subject include 1009561 (Generic Guidance for Alloy 600
Management (MRP-126)), 1009807 (Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Safety
Assessment for U.S. Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Plants (MRP-110)), 1009549 (Alloy
82/182 Pipe Butt Weld Safety Assessment for U.S. PWR Plant Designs (MRP-113)), 1010087
(Primary System Piping Butt Weld Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines (MRP-139)), and
1009801 (Resistance to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of Alloys 690, 52, and 152 in
Pressurized Water Reactors (MRP-111)). The report numbers of the five previous PWSCC of
Alloy 600 conferences sponsored by EPRI from 1991 to 2000 are TR-100852, TR-103345,
TR-105406, TR-109138, and 1000873.
Keywords
Alloy 52/152
Alloy 82/182
Alloy 600
Alloy 690
Boric acid corrosion
Mitigation
Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC)
Strategic planning

ABSTRACT
An international meeting was organized on primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) of
Alloy 600 pressure boundary parts in PWRs (other than steam generator tubing) to give those
working in the area an opportunity to share their experiences, thoughts, and plans regarding: the
causes of PWSCC in Alloy 600 pressure boundary parts, field experience, predictive modeling,
laboratory investigations, strategic planning, inspection methods, repair methods, replacement
materials, possible remedial measures, boric acid corrosion, and regulatory issues.
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks are extended to the utility, contractor, and laboratory personnel who made presentations
at the workshop. The individuals who attended the workshop are recognized for their thoughtful
questions and participation in the discussion of presentations.
Gratitude and recognition are also extended to the conference co-sponsoring organizations:
AREVA, Westinghouse, and Structural Integrity Associates, Inc./Welding Services, Inc.
ix
xi
CONTENTS
Keynote Speakers and Discussion Panel .............................................................................1-2
Session 1A: Crack Growth and Initiation...............................................................................1-4
Session 1B: Strategic Planning.............................................................................................1-6
Session 2A: Cracking and Reliability Studies of Alloy 690....................................................1-7
Session 2B: Repair Methods and Technologies ...................................................................1-8
Session 3A: Laboratory Investigations of Cracks................................................................1-10
Session 3B: Field Experience - Mitigation and Repair ........................................................1-12
Session 4A: Boric Acid Corrosion .......................................................................................1-14
Session 4B: Inspection Technologies and Planning ...........................................................1-15
Session 5A: Mitigation Methods..........................................................................................1-16
Session 5B: Field Experience - Inspections........................................................................1-18
Session 6: Regulatory Issues..............................................................................................1-20
2 KEYNOTE ADDRESSES .......................................................................................................2-1
U.S. Utility Keynote, address by David Mauldin, Arizona Public Service (Keynote K.1) .......2-1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Keynote, address by Allen Hiser, U.S. NRC
(Keynote K.2) ........................................................................................................................2-2
EPRI Keynote, address by Robin Jones, EPRI (Keynote K.3)..............................................2-3
International Utility Keynote, address by Franois Cattant, EDF (Keynote K.4) ...................2-5
Keynote Speaker Panel Discussion ......................................................................................2-6
3 SESSION 1A: CRACK GROWTH AND INITIATION.............................................................3-1
MRP Development of Crack Growth Rate Disposition Curves for Primary Water
Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Thick-Section Alloy 600 Components and
Alloy 82, 182, and 132 Weldments, presented by G. White, DEI (Paper 1A.1) ....................3-1
Comparative PWSCC Crack Growth Rate Studies of Alloy 52M and Alloy 182 Weld
Metals, presented by R. Jacko, Westinghouse (Paper 1A.2)................................................3-3
1991, 1992, 1994, 1997, and 2000 Workshops ....................................................................1-1
Overview of 2005 Workshop .................................................................................................1-1
1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY........................................................................................1-1
Outline of "Evaluation Technology for SCC Growth of Ni Base Alloys (NiSCC) Project"
in Japan and Current Results in PWR Environment, presented by Y. Yamamoto,
JNES (Paper 1A.3)................................................................................................................3-5
Finite-Element Analysis of Welding Residual Stresses in Piping Butt Weldments and
their Effect on Crack Tip Stress Intensity Factors, presented by J. Broussard, DEI
(Paper 1A.4) ..........................................................................................................................3-6
A Novel Approach for the Mitigation of PWSCC, presented by B. Templeton,
Structural Integrity Associates (Paper 1A.5) .........................................................................3-7
Effect of Cyclic Loadings on the Stress Corrosion Crack Growth Rate in PWR Primary
Water, presented by C. Guerre, CEA (Paper 1A.6) ..............................................................3-8
4 SESSION 1B: STRATEGIC PLANNING................................................................................4-1
MRP Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management (MRP-126), presented by S. Chu,
EPRIsolutions (Paper 1B.1) ..................................................................................................4-1
Programmatic Approach to the Management of PWSCC/Alloy 600 Issues, presented
by D. Peltola, Duke (Paper 1B.2) ..........................................................................................4-2
Development of Alloy 600 Management Plans, presented by G. White, DEI (Paper
1B.3)......................................................................................................................................4-4
Strategic Planning for Alloy 600 Programs, presented by G. Elder, Westinghouse
(Paper 1B.4) ..........................................................................................................................4-5
Probabilistic PWSCC Failure Assessment of Alloy 600/82/182 Reactor Vessel
Subcomponents at Beznau 1&2 for a Sixty Year Life Extension, presented by G. Rao,
Westinghouse (Paper 1B.5) ..................................................................................................4-6
A Matrix Evaluation of Repair/Modification Options for Reactor Pressure Vessel
Bottom Mounted Nozzles, presented by R. Payne, Framatome ANP (Paper 1B.6) .............4-7
Assessment of the Repair/Remediation/Mitigation Techniques for Dissimilar Metal
Butt Welds, presented by D. Waskey, Framatome ANP (Paper 1B.7)..................................4-8
5 SESSION 2A: CRACKING AND RELIABILITY STUDIES OF ALLOY 690 ..........................5-1
Assessment of PWSCC Resistance of Alloy 690: Overview of Laboratory Results
and Field Experience, presented by F. Vaillant, EDF (Paper 2A.1) ......................................5-1
A Review of PWSCC, Weldability, and Thermal Ageing of Nickel Weld Metals in PWR
Primary Water, presented by J.-M. Boursier, EDF (Paper 2A.2)...........................................5-2
Integrity of TT Alloy 690 Piping Material, presented by T. Yonezawa, MHI (Paper
2A.3)......................................................................................................................................5-4
Status of MRP Work to Demonstrate the Long-Term Resistance of Alloys 690, 152
and 52 to PWSCC, presented by J. Hickling, EPRI (Paper 2A.4) .........................................5-6
PWSCC Growth Rates of Cold Worked Alloy 690 & Alloys 52/152 Weld Metal,
presented by P. Andresen, GE Global Research Center (Paper 2A.5).................................5-8
6 SESSION 2B: REPAIR METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES.................................................6-1
xii
Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly for Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Instrument
Nozzles, presented by W. Sims, Entergy (Paper 2B.1).........................................................6-1
"Small Pad" Weld Repair of Pressurizer Heater Sleeves and BMI Nozzles, presented
by B. Newton, PCI Energy Services (Paper 2B.2) ................................................................6-3
Mid-Wall Weld Repairs for Pressurizer Heater Sleeves, presented by P. Amador,
Welding Services Inc. (Paper 2B.3) ......................................................................................6-4
The Embedded Flaw Process for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations,
presented by W. Bamford, Westinghouse (Paper 2B.4) .......................................................6-6
Advances in Design and Implementation of Alloy 52 Structural Weld Overlay Repair
Welding, presented by B. Newton, PCI Energy Services (Paper 2B.5) ................................6-7
Beneficial Application of Alloy 52M Filler Materials to Dissimilar Metal Weldments,
presented by P. Amador, Welding Services Inc. (Paper 2B.6)..............................................6-8
7 SESSION 3A: LABORATORY INVESTIGATIONS OF CRACKS.........................................7-1
Laboratory Investigation of PWSCC of CRDM Nozzle 3 and its J-Groove Weld on the
Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Head, presented by S. Fyfitch, Framatome
ANP (Paper 3A.1)..................................................................................................................7-1
Laboratory Investigation of the Stainless Steel Cladding on the Davis-Besse Reactor
Vessel Head, presented by J. Hyres, BWXT Services (Paper 3A.2) ....................................7-3
Laboratory Investigation of the Alloy 600 Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Nozzle
Samples and Weld Boat Sample from South Texas Project Unit 1, presented by A.
McIlree, EPRI (Paper 3A.3)...................................................................................................7-4
Selection, Removal, Decontamination and NDE of North Anna 2 Retired Reactor
Vessel Head CRDM Penetrations, presented by F. Cattant, EDF (Paper 3A.4)...................7-7
Destructive Examination of North Anna 2 Retired Reactor Vessel Head CRDM
Penetration No. 54 (Status Review), presented by G. Rao, Westinghouse (Paper
3A.5)......................................................................................................................................7-7
High-Resolution Analytical Electron Microscopy Characterization of Environment-
Assisted Cracks in Alloy 182 Weldments, presented by S. Bruemmer, PNNL (Paper
3A.6)......................................................................................................................................7-8
8 SESSION 3B: FIELD EXPERIENCEMITIGATION AND REPAIR......................................8-1
Mitigation of PWSCC on Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles by Waterjet
Peening, presented by G. Elder, Westinghouse (Paper 3B.1) ..............................................8-1
Field Implementation Experience at Asco Unit 1 and 2 with Upper Head Temperature
Reduction, presented by H. Lenz, Westinghouse (Paper 3B.2)............................................8-2
Alloy 52 Welding in Nuclear Applications: Performance Issues and Weldability
Testing, presented by D. Waskey, Framatome ANP (Paper 3B.3) .......................................8-3
Florida Power and Light Turkey Point 3 Reactor Vessel Closure Head Replacement,
presented by M. Moran, FPL (Paper 3B.4) ...........................................................................8-4
Westinghouse Experience with Reactor Vessel Head Replacements, presented by J.
Hydeman, Westinghouse (Paper 3B.5).................................................................................8-5
xiii
Pre-emptive Pressurizer Heater Sleeve Repairs at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
Station, presented by P. Riccardella, Structural Integrity Associates, for R. Meeden,
APS (Paper 3B.6)..................................................................................................................8-6
RPV Outlet Nozzle Repair (SAFEPLAY) for Ringhals Units 3 and 4, presented by B.
Kroes, Westinghouse Electric Belgium (Paper 3B.7) ............................................................8-7
9 SESSION 4A: BORIC ACID CORROSION............................................................................9-1
Boric Acid Corrosion of the Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Head, presented
by S. Fyfitch, Framatome ANP (Paper 4A.1) ........................................................................9-1
Generic Guidance for an Effective Boric Acid Inspection Program for PWRs,
presented by T. S. Sharma, American Electric Power (Paper 4A.2).....................................9-3
MRP Boric Acid Corrosion Testing Program Task 1 Static/RI and Task 3 Separate
Effects/DEI, presented by A. McIlree, EPRI (Paper 4A.3).....................................................9-4
Inspection Automation Software, presented by R. Pedersen, Real-Time Software
(Paper 4A.4) ..........................................................................................................................9-6
FLS: Leak Detection System, presented by D. Schemmel, Framatome ANP (Paper
4A.5)......................................................................................................................................9-6
Corrosion of Reactor Pressure Vessel Steel by an Impinging Jet of PWR Coolant,
presented by J. Pongpuak, UNB (Paper 4A.6)......................................................................9-7
10 SESSION 4B: INSPECTION TECHNOLOGIES AND PLANNING....................................10-1
The Challenges of Compliance with ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, "Performance
Demonstration for Ultrasonic Examination Systems," presented by T. McAlister,
SCE&G, for J. Lindberg, Framatome ANP (Paper 4B.1).....................................................10-1
Development of MRP Inspection Plan for RPV Top Head Nozzles Part INozzle
Leakage, Ejection and Examination Volume Evaluations, presented by P. Riccardella,
Structural Integrity Associates (Paper 4B.2) .......................................................................10-1
Development of a Comprehensive Inspection Program for RPV Top Head Nozzles:
Part IIFailure Mode and Effect Analysis, Wastage Evaluation, and Safety
Assessment Report, presented by G. White, DEI (Paper 4B.3)..........................................10-3
Advances in NDE of Alloy 182 Components, presented by C. King, EPRI, for F.
Ammirato, EPRI (Paper 4B.4) .............................................................................................10-5
Experience in Reactor Head Nozzle and J Weld Inspections, presented by J. Lareau,
Westinghouse (Paper 4B.5) ................................................................................................10-6
Thermal Imaging for the Detection of PWSCC in Alloy 82/182 Welds, presented by J.
Lareau, Westinghouse (Paper 4B.6) ...................................................................................10-8
11 SESSION 5A: MITIGATION METHODS............................................................................11-1
Laser Peening: A Surface Stress Improvement Technique for Alloy 600 PWSCC
Mitigation, presented by A. Demma, EPRI (Paper 5A.1) ....................................................11-1
Application of Surface Stress Improvement for the Mitigation of Alloy 600 PWSCC,
presented by R. Payne, Framatome ANP (Paper 5A.2)......................................................11-3
xiv
The Applicability of MSIP for Mitigating PWSCC in Pressurizer Nozzle to Safe-end
Welds, presented by M. Badlani, AEA Technology Engineering Services, Inc. (Paper
5A.3)....................................................................................................................................11-5
Preemptive Weld OverlaysA Cost Effective Solution to PWSCC Concerns in PWR
Piping System Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds, presented by P. Riccardella, Structural
Integrity Associates (Paper 5A.4)......................................................................................11-13
Corrosion Resistant Barriers for Repair and Mitigation of Alloy 600 Cracking,
presented by J. Lareau, Westinghouse (Paper 5A.5) .......................................................11-15
Effects of Dissolved H
2
, B/Li/pH and Zn on PWSCC of Alloy 600: Interim Report on
MRP Testing, presented by P. Andresen, GE Global Research Center (Paper 5A.6)......11-16
Review of Primary Chemistry Effects on PWSCC, presented by J. Gorman, DEI
(Paper 5A.7) ......................................................................................................................11-18
12 SESSION 5B: FIELD EXPERIENCEINSPECTIONS......................................................12-1
Situation of the Alloys 600 and 182 Issues in the Belgian Nuclear Power Plants,
presented by R. Grard, Tractebel Engineering (Paper 5B.1) ............................................12-1
A Swedish Perspective on PWSCC of Alloy 182, presented by A. Jenssen, Studsvik
Nuclear (Paper 5B.2)...........................................................................................................12-3
Control Rod Drive Mechanism Examinations at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, presented
by W. Jensen, NMC (Paper 5B.3) .......................................................................................12-4
Some Recent Experiences on Stress Corrosion Cracking in B/P-WR Environments
and Remedies/Strategies from a Utility Point of View, presented by P. Efsing,
Ringhals (Paper 5B.4) .........................................................................................................12-6
Cracking of Alloy 600 Nozzles and Welds in PWRs: A Review of Cracking Events and
Repair Service Experience, presented by W. Bamford, Westinghouse (Paper 5B.5).........12-7
BMI Cleaning and Inspection at PVNGS, presented by T. Wilfong, APS, for E.
Fernandez, APS (Paper 5B.6).............................................................................................12-9
13 SESSION 6: REGULATORY ISSUES ...............................................................................13-1
EPRI MRP Alloy 600 Issue Task Group Interaction with the NRC, presented by C.
Harrington, TXU Energy (Paper 6.1) ...................................................................................13-1
Industry Management of Materials Degradation, presented by J. Riley, NEI (Paper
6.2) ......................................................................................................................................13-3
Alloy 82/182 Piping Butt Welds: Developing Inspection Guidance, presented by C.
King, EPRI (Paper 6.3)........................................................................................................13-5
Comparison of Leak Rates from Alloy 82/182 Butt Weld Cracks for Leak-Before-
Break Assessment, presented by A. Nana, Framatome ANP (Paper 6.4)..........................13-7
Potential Cracking in Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles, presented by C.
Morgan, Westinghouse (Paper 6.5) ....................................................................................13-9
Summary of NRC Funded Efforts Involving Alloy 600 Base Material and Weldments
for Piping and CRDM Applications, presented by G. Wilkowski, Engineering
Mechanics Corporation of Columbus (Paper 6.6) .............................................................13-10
xv
xvi
APPENDIX A: AGENDA.......................................................................................................... A-1
APPENDIX B: ATTENDANCE LIST BY LAST NAME ............................................................ B-1
APPENDIX C: ATTENDANCE LIST BY COMPANY............................................................... C-1

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 11-1 Mockup Details, Flaw/Repair Details and Residual Stress Measurements..........11-6
xvii
1-1
1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
1991, 1992, 1994, 1997, and 2000 Workshops
The first five EPRI workshops on PWSCC of non-steam generator Alloy 600 materials in PWR
power plants were held in Charlotte, North Carolina, on October 911, 1991; in Orlando,
Florida, on December 13, 1992; in Tampa, Florida, on November 1517, 1994; in Daytona
Beach, Florida on February 2527, 1997; and in St. Pete Beach, Florida on February 1416,
2000. The first workshop was directed towards the emerging problem of PWSCC in pressurizer
instrument nozzles, pressurizer heater sleeves and hot leg instrument nozzles. The second
workshop provided additional information on PWSCC in the above types of penetrations plus the
results of initial findings regarding cracks in CRDM nozzles. Emphasis in the third workshop
was primarily on cracking of CRDM nozzles. The fourth workshop was directed primarily
towards the results of work performed in 1995 and 1996 to determine the causes and
consequences of CRDM nozzle PWSCC. The fifth workshop continued to emphasize CRDM
nozzle PWSCC with some experience also presented for other Alloy 600 J-groove penetrations,
and the fifth workshop also reflected developments in inspection, repair, and mitigation
technologies, predictive modeling, and laboratory investigations. Proceedings of these five
workshops are published as EPRI reports TR-100852, TR-103345, TR-105406, TR-109138, and
1000873.
Overview of 2005 Workshop
Subsequent to the 2000 conference, considerable attention has been devoted in the U.S. and
abroad to managing PWSCC of Alloy 600 components in PWRs. In reflection of the wide range
of activities associated with PWSCC of Alloy 600 components (other than steam generator
tubes), the conference used two parallel sessions during most of the meeting time, and 72
presentations, including four keynote addresses, were made in total during the 12 half-day
sessions. The keynote speakers emphasized the need for proactive management of materials
degradation issues, with utility, EPRI, and regulatory perspectives provided.
Presentations were made addressing the specific approaches to managing PWSCC applied in
various countries, including inspection methods and crack evaluation criteria. In the U.S., the
PWR industry has recently adopted generic guidance for comprehensive programs addressing all
plant Alloy 600 components [1], and crack growth rate disposition curves have been developed
for thick-wall Alloy 600 wrought material and for Alloy 82 and 182 weld materials. Other

1
Materials Reliability Program: Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management (MRP-126), EPRI, Palo Alto,
CA: 2004. 1009561.
Introduction and Summary
1-2
presentations addressed recent developments in inspection, repair, and mitigation technologies.
Discussion in this area emphasized new repair options, improvements made in the weldability of
Alloy 52/152 replacement weld materials, and advances in stress improvement remediation
technologies. One session was devoted to cracking and reliability studies of Alloy 690
replacement materials including Alloy 52 and 152 weld metals. Work is ongoing to demonstrate
the long-term resistance of these materials to cracking. Another session addressed recent
laboratory state-of-the-art crack characterization studies and other destructive examination
projects focused on the fundamental factors that promote PWSCC. Finally, one session was
devoted to the related issue of boric acid corrosion of carbon and low-alloy steel components,
which can potentially result from through-wall cracking and pressure boundary leakage. This
session on boric acid corrosion included plant experience, results of laboratory testing,
recommended generic inspection guidance, and one example of a local leak detection
technology.
The rest of Section 1 below provides summaries of each of the 12 half-day sessions, beginning
with the four keynote addresses. Sections 2 through 13 provide brief summaries of each
presentation made along with questions/comments and responses from the question period at the
end of each presentation:
Section 2 Keynote Addresses
Section 3 Session 1A: Crack Growth and Initiation
Section 4 Session 1B: Strategic Planning
Section 5 Session 2A: Cracking and Reliability Studies of Alloy 690
Section 6 Session 2B: Repair Methods and Technologies
Section 7 Session 3A: Laboratory Investigations of Cracks
Section 8 Session 3B: Field Experience - Mitigation and Repair
Section 9 Session 4A: Boric Acid Corrosion
Section 10 Session 4B: Inspection Technologies and Planning
Section 11 Session 5A: Mitigation Methods
Section 12 Session 5B: Field Experience Inspections
Section 13 Session 6: Regulatory Issues
The presentation slides and in most cases extended abstracts written by the presenters and co-
authors were compiled for each presentation. These materials are electronically linked to this
proceedings report.
Keynote Speakers and Discussion Panel
Keynote addresses were given by four invited speakers. The speakers discussed current efforts
to manage PWSCC of Alloy 600 and its weld metals, and also discussed programs to identify
and address other potential materials degradation issues. These topics were discussed from the
U.S. utility perspective, the U.S. regulator perspective, the EPRI perspective, and an
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international utility perspective. All of the keynote addresses emphasized the need for proactive
approaches for dealing with PWSCC and also for anticipating and dealing with possible new
materials degradation issues. It was emphasized that the Davis-Besse event has demonstrated
that not taking such a proactive approach can lead to serious problems. Both the industry and
regulatory speakers indicated that programs are now in place to prevent the future occurrence of
similar events.
EPRI described the detailed program managed by the MRP that is underway to manage the
PWSCC issue. There are five steps in this program. The first step is to characterize the
degradation mechanism by defining the effects of stress, materials, and chemistry variables on
the rate of PWSCC. The second is to determine all Alloy 600/82/182 locations in the RCS for all
vendor designs and conduct generic operability and safety assessments assuming the occurrence
of PWSCC at these locations. The third is to develop flaw inspection and evaluation technology
and guidelines for all locations, starting with those for which the potential consequences of
failure are most severe. The fourth is to evaluate available mitigation options and, if necessary,
develop additional options. The fifth and final step is to evaluate available repair/replacement
options and, where necessary, encourage the development of additional options. Work is
underway, with significant progress being made, on all of these five steps. EPRI noted that, in
the absence of a chemistry countermeasure for PWSCC, location-specific mitigation and repair
measures will have to be used and are likely to have a significant effect on production.
EDF noted that, because of the large size and standardized nature of their PWR fleet, they take a
generic and rigorous approach at dealing with material degradation issues such as PWSCC. This
approach involves development and use of models based on laboratory tests, destructive
examinations, and field NDE to assist in setting inspection intervals and component
replacements, and has limited the impact of PWSCC problems on production.
During the keynote speaker panel discussion several important points were made, including:
x The Materials Technical Advisory Group (MTAG) and the Materials Executive Oversight
Group (MEOG) are expected to remain in operation for at least a few more years, thereby
giving continued industry emphasis to management of materials degradation issues. These
groups are also working to ensure that international experience is appropriately considered.
x While the effects of temperature on occurrence of PWSCC in CRDMs have some times not
been as strong as expected, the general situation is that temperature has a strong effect such
that reactor vessel heads with higher temperatures are more likely to experience PWSCC of
their CRDMs earlier than lower temperature heads.
x Efforts are being made to ensure that lessons learned from materials degradation experience
in currently operating plants is reflected in new plant designs.
x The use of zinc additions to primary coolant to mitigate PWSCC shows considerable
promise. However, additional work to quantify its effects on PWSCC initiation and growth
rate is still required.
x The ASME Code no longer requires hydrostatic tests to be performed during 10 year
inservice inspections, but rather allows use of lower pressure tests. A concern was expressed
that this might significantly reduce the likelihood of detecting cracks such as observed during
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the hydrostatic test of Bugey 3 during its ten year inspection. Discussion by those involved in
the ASME decision indicated that the effect on leak detection involved with lowering the
pressure was small, and that increased reliance on NDE makes the pressure test no longer
required. The NRC indicated that effective NDE is of most importance, with leak detection
during pressure tests limited to providing defense-in-depth support.
Session 1A: Crack Growth and Initiation
This session reviewed recent information concerning development of crack growth rate (CGR)
disposition curves for Alloy 600 and its weld metals. There were several presentations regarding
measurement of CGRs in Alloy 600 and its weld metals; the measured CGRs were generally
consistent with the disposition curves. The effects of cyclic loading on CGR were also
investigated and found to be minimal. This session also covered the use of finite element
analyses (FEA) to quantify the stress intensity values needed for determining CGRs in
components. In addition, this session reviewed a novel approach that is being examined in the
laboratory of trying to use applied potentials to reduce the likelihood of PWSCC initiation and to
slow crack growth rates. Highlights of this session were as follows:
x A CGR disposition curve was issued in 2002 for wrought Alloy 600 base material via
MRP-55 report [2]. The disposition curve established in that work has since been
incorporated into the ASME Section XI Code for flaw evaluation. In 2004, the MRP
completed a report (MRP-115) on the appropriate crack growth rate disposition curves for
the Alloy 82/182/132 weld metals [3]. Both the MRP-55 and MRP-115 studies were
extensively supported by the work of an international expert panel on PWSCC, organized by
EPRI.
x The MRP-115 study mentioned above included an assessment of the potential effect on CGR
of the environment on the OD of a reactor vessel closure head nozzle following leakage of
primary coolant into the annulus between the penetration nozzle and the vessel head. Based
on this evaluation, the MRP recommended that a factor of 2 be conservatively applied to the
MRP CGR curve for evaluation of postulated flaws in Alloy 600 RVH nozzle base metals
that are in contact with a wetted annulus environment for leak rates up to 1 liter/h (0.004
gpm).
x MRP-115 contains two separate CGR curves as a function of temperature and stress intensity
factor for Alloys 82 and 182/132, including consideration of the effects of dendrite
orientation. For stress intensity factors greater than 20 MPam, the CGR curve for Alloy
182/132 weld metal in MRP-115 is nearly parallel to, and about four times higher than, the
MRP-55 curve for Alloy 600 wrought material.

2
Materials Reliability Program (MRP) Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating Primary Water Stress Corrosion
Cracking (PWSCC) of Thick-Wall Alloy 600 Materials (MRP-55NP) Revision 1, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2002.
1006695-NP. NRC ADAMS Accession No. ML023010510.
3
Materials Reliability Program Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking
(PWSCC) of Alloy 82, 182, and 132 Welds (MRP-115NP), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1006696-NP. NRC
ADAMS Accession No. ML051450555.
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x CGR tests were reported by Westinghouse for Alloy 52M and Alloy 182 weld metals in
simulated primary coolant environments at 340C (644F). Tests were performed with the
crack growth direction both parallel to and perpendicular to the weld dendrites. The
measured CGRs for Alloy 182 weld metal were consistent with published literature for this
alloy and slightly below the EPRI disposition curve. The CGR parallel to dendrites was
about 2.5 times higher than the CGR perpendicular to the dendrites. No intergranular
cracking was detected in Alloy 52M weld metal. A small amount of transgranular crack
growth was observed, but this was attributed to corrosion fatigue associated with periodic
unloading of the test specimens, and not to PWSCC. If the observed crack growth was
nevertheless attributed to PWSCC, it would be about 20 times slower than the CGR observed
with Alloy 182.
x CGR tests were performed by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) of
Alloy 600, Alloy 132, and Alloy 82 in simulated primary coolant environments at 340C
(644F) and 360C (680F). Tests were performed with the crack growth direction both
parallel to and perpendicular to the weld dendrites. The CGRs in Alloy 82 and 132 weld
metals were nearly the same, and were about one order of magnitude faster than those of base
metal Alloy 600. The CGRs of the base metals were less than 1/5 of the predicted curve
from the MRP curve or the modified Scott model, while those of the weld metals were
approximately 5 times larger than the predicted curve. The apparent activation energy for
CGR was about 27 kcal/mol or 113 kJ/mol). The crack propagation direction in the weld
metals was along the dendrite direction, even when the dendrite direction and the direction
perpendicular to the peak tensile stress direction were different.
x Classical strength of materials analysis methods and published fracture mechanics solutions
can be used to estimate stresses and crack tip stress intensity factors for use in CGR
calculations. However, these methods do not readily handle anomalies such as weld repairs,
are based on linear superposition, and do not fully consider the effect of stress redistribution
upon crack growth. Finite element analysis (FEA) methods are capable of handling factors
not readily addressed by classical superposition methods. In addition, FEA models using
parametric inputs permit different cases to be evaluated quickly. For these reasons, FEA
methods should be used for important analyses, and as a check of classical superposition
models for other analyses.
x Crack initiation tests and CGR tests indicate that increasing the potential a relatively small
amount could possibly inhibit both the initiation and growth of PWSCC cracks. A test
program started in February 2005 that involves use of constant extension rate tests to
determine the effects of increasing potential on PWSCC initiation, and to determine if
increasing the potential can stop already initiated cracks.
x CGR tests were performed at 289C (552F) and 325C (617F) of two heats of Alloy 600
base material in simulated primary water at high R ratios and using both static and cyclic
loading. For the conditions and the materials tested, no systematic enhancing effect of cyclic
loading was observed. This could be the result of the heats being too sensitive to SCC, i.e.,
increases in crack growth due to cyclic loading might occur for less sensitive heats with
lower crack growth rates. Tests at the lower temperature resulted in lower crack growth rates
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consistent with an apparent activation energy found in the literature for constant load
conditions.
Session 1B: Strategic Planning
This session reviewed the industry situation with regard to development and application of
strategic plans for managing PWSCC of Alloys 600/182/82. The main conclusions from this
session are that guidance for development of strategic plans was issued by EPRI MRP via
MRP-126, and that the guidance of MRP-126 is in the process of being implemented by utilities,
with the assistance of contractors. The session also provided examples of strategic plans for
specific plants and specific components. Highlights of this session were as follows:
x MRP-126 was issued in December 2004 to provide guidance regarding development of
strategic plans for management of PWSCC. The objectives of the plans are to maintain plant
safety, minimize the impact of PWSCC on plant availability, and to develop and execute
long-term strategies for Alloy 600/182/82 management. MRP-126 provides a list of good
practices for the management strategies.
x Duke Energy has developed a programmatic approach for management of PWSCC at its
seven PWRs that is consistent with the guidance in MRP-126. It ranks the risk for the
different pressure boundary Alloy 600 parts considering temperature, stress, operating
experience, failure consequences, and economic risks. Alloy 600 components attached to the
pressurizer were found to have the highest risk ranking, with components attached to the
reactor vessel being next highest. The rankings reflect the fact that steam generators and
reactor vessel heads at all Duke units have been replaced with PWSCC resistant components.
The models will be updated to reflect operating experience and economic analyses, and
repair and contingency strategies will be developed.
x Several contractors described generic methods for developing strategic plans for managing
PWSCC of Alloys 600/182/82 components. These methods involve evaluation of the full
scope of issues that need to be considered, e.g., safety impacts of the occurrence of PWSCC,
dose rate consequences of inspections and repairs, economic and operational impacts of the
occurrence of PWSCC and of the application of mitigating measures, practicality and
effectiveness of available mitigation options, etc. The methods for developing strategic plans
include: models to predict the probability of PWSCC affecting various components;
probabilistic fracture mechanics to predict the probability of cracks growing to unacceptable
sizes; evaluation of a range of inspection, repair, replacement, and water chemistry options;
evaluation of dose rate effects; and economic models.
x Application of a specific PWSCC evaluation methodology to the reactor vessel upper and
lower heads of a two unit European plant was described. In addition, detailed results were
described of the application of PWSCC evaluation methodologies to bottom mounted
instrument nozzles and to dissimilar metal butt welds.
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Session 2A: Cracking and Reliability Studies of Alloy 690
This session reviewed the results of laboratory tests and service experience regarding the
resistance of Alloy 690 and its weld metals to PWSCC. The main conclusion from this review is
that Alloy 690 and its weld metals (all with ~30% chromium) are highly resistant to PWSCC,
especially when processed in accordance with industry standards. Highlights of this session
were as follows:
x Current field experience around the world has been that no SCC has been detected in Alloy
690 components after 25 years of service in the case of SG tubes, over 20 years of service for
tube plugs, and over 10 years of service in the case of CRDM nozzles. Similarly, there has
been no cracking detected in Alloy 690 type weld materials, with service times up to 10
years.
x All of the many the laboratory tests that have been performed have demonstrated a very high
resistance to SCC of Alloy 690 in PWR primary water. However, in a few cases, a limited
susceptibility to PWSCC has been observed in laboratory tests for Alloy 690 with abnormal
microstructures when subjected to severe loadings. This susceptibility is increased by local
cold work. No SCC is expected for industrial products having the specified microstructure.
x Investigations were performed of 19% Cr, 22%, 26% Cr and 30% Cr weld alloys that
compared them with Alloy 182, which has about 15% Cr. SCC susceptibility in primary
water at 360C (680F) was evaluated using constant load tests, RUB tests, and slow strain
rate tests. A strong correlation was found to exist between SCC susceptibility in primary
water at 360C (680F) and the chromium content, with neither crack initiation nor crack
growth occurring for material containing more than 26% Cr. Hot cracks, which were
frequently present in alloys containing 30% Cr, did not propagate during the stress corrosion
tests.
x EPRI guidelines for cold worked and annealed steam generator tube material were published
in 1991 and 1999. However, there are no industry guidelines for hot finished thermally
treated (TT) Alloy 690. To fill this gap, MHI has developed material specifications for hot
finished TT Alloy 690 that, without causing deterioration of PWSCC resistance, result in
material meeting mechanical property requirements. They require a mill anneal following
the hot finishing operation, and control the carbon content and mill anneal temperature to
obtain the desired microstructure and strength, and to achieve a grain size that is compatible
with good examination by UT. USA personnel noted that satisfactory hot finished material
can be obtained without a final mill anneal, since the hot working raises the materials
temperature and, in effect, applies a mill anneal.
x Report MRP-111 [4] evaluated existing field and laboratory test data regarding the behavior
of Alloys 690/52/152 in order to demonstrate and quantify the margin of improvement of
Alloys 690/52/152 over Alloys 600/82/182. The estimated factor of improvement for Alloy
690 relative to Alloy 600MA was about 27. However, some specific knowledge gaps were
identified in MRP-111. These include:

4
Materials Reliability Program: Resistance to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of Alloys 690, 52, and
152 in Pressurized Water Reactors (MRP-111), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1009801.
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Insufficient testing of Alloy 52 and 152 weld metals.
The effects of different product forms on PWSCC behavior have not been definitively
resolved.
Insufficient investigation of the effects of subtle changes in chemical composition,
changes in thermo-mechanical processing, and surface finish on PWSCC resistance.
There is essentially no information regarding crack growth rates in base or weld metals if
PWSCC should occur.
A potential concern regarding the susceptibility of the HAZ to PWSCC (by analogy with
Alloy 600).
Corrosion fatigue behavior needs to be better defined (however, behavior similar to that
of Alloy 600 is expected).
LTCP (low temperature crack propagation) has been shown by tests to be a possible
concern.
x Planned future work by the MRP regarding the PWSCC resistance of Alloy 690 and its weld
metals includes continuing to follow the NDE of thick-walled Alloy 690 components (e.g.
replacement RPV heads in France), revision of MRP-111 in 2006, addition of data from a
WOG test program that compared Alloy 52M and 182 weld metals, and the possible addition
of data from a long-term Japanese test program on Alloy 690 and its weld metals. An
experimental program is currently being initiated to assess the PWSCC resistance of the
HAZ in welded, thick-section material of Alloys 600 and 690. The results from MRP-111
and the additional test programs will be used, together with field inspection data, to develop
and refine a less-stringent NDE program for thick-walled components made of Alloy 690.
x MRP test results published in 2004 showed that Alloy 690 is not completely "immune" to
PWSCC crack growth, but that the growth rates are low [4]. A follow-on program is
evaluating crack growth rates in Alloys 690, 52 and 152 using sophisticated test techniques.
In this regard, CGR tests in simulated primary water at 340360C (644680F) have been
performed of cold worked Alloy 690 material. The cold work is intended to simulate
residual strains present in the heat affected zone (HAZ) of welds. These tests indicate that
slow crack growth appears to occur in some (but not all) cold worked Alloy 690 materials,
even at constant K, but that fully intergranular crack propagation has not yet been
demonstrated for Alloy 690 materials. Similar testing of Alloys 152 and 52 is now starting.
Future work will also examine the possibility of increased PWSCC susceptibility in the HAZ
of Alloy 690.
Session 2B: Repair Methods and Technologies
This session reviewed recent developments in repair methods for Alloy 600/82/182 components.
The first presentation covered recent developments with the Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly
(MNSA) device, in particular the new MNSA-2 design. The other five presentations addressed
the range of weld repair methods applicable CRDM nozzles, pressurizer heater sleeves, BMI
nozzles, and Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds. The weld repair options covered were weld pad
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nozzle repair, mid-wall nozzle repair, embedded flaw repair, and weld overlay of piping butt
welds. Brief summaries of the presentations in this session are as follows:
x The Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly (MNSA) device provides both sealing and structural
support for small-bore nozzle connections. It was developed starting in 1993 as an
alternative to weld repair for leaks in J-groove welds of Alloy 600 instrumentation nozzles,
and it can also prevent potential leakage at susceptible nozzle sites. MNSA installation is
faster than welded repairs, can be installed with water in the vessel (core offload is not
required), and no NDE (PT or UT) is required as part of the repair operation. MNSAs have
been installed at more than 10 plants in the U.S. since 1998. The presentation on the MNSA
technology included a description of the plant-specific engineering analysis required, along
with licensing issues, installation tooling descriptions, process steps, and schedule durations
for a typical MNSA-2 installation.
x One vendor described improvements to its conventional weld repair process for Alloy 600
pressurizer heater sleeves and reactor vessel bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzles.
The basic improvement to this permanent repair option is the use of an integrated ("small")
pad design that reduces installation time and cost, reduces manual intervention by
eliminating any J-groove weld, and improves volumetric NDE coverage. The presentation
on the "small pad" weld repair option discussed the repair equipment and the automated
repair process, including comparisons with other repair options.
x Another vendor described recent developments in its welded repair options for pressurizer
heater sleeves including the new mid-wall repair option. The mid-wall repair option is
intended to further reduce repair time beyond the advances realized for OD weld pad repairs.
This presentation reviewed the mid-wall repair method including procedures, the licensing
process, the status of its first implementation at Waterford 3, and other potential applications
such as reactor vessel bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzles. The presentation also
briefly covered the experience with weld pad repairs at Palo Verde Unit 2 and 3 in fall 2003
and fall 2004, respectively.
x The embedded flaw repair for reactor vessel head penetrations (such as CRDM nozzles) was
developed in 1993, and first implemented at DC Cook 2 in 1996. The process was adopted
for OD weld repairs subsequent to the initial work in the early 1990s for CRDM nozzle ID
surfaces. The process has been given generic approval by the U.S. NRC including for
J-groove weld surfaces through issuance of Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs). Inspections
required by the July 3, 2003, SER are consistent with those for a structural weld, with both
UT and surface examinations required in most cases.
x One weld repair vendor discussed its development of structural weld overlay designs for
PWR piping, including a recent Alloy 52 weld development program. This program, which
addressed the key issues of welding sequence, welding equipment design, and process
parameters, resulted in the process improvements necessary for high quality (i.e., reduced
oxides, artifacts, and inclusions) weld overlays to be produced using orbital progression. The
improvements to the orbital progression process were achieved through improved process
controls and use of advanced welding equipment. The engineering design of the weld
overlays was coordinated with field inspection capabilities.
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x The authors of the final presentation in Session 2B have worked together to evaluate the use
of Alloy 52 and 52M materials for weld overlays (particularly for ambient temper bead
applications) and for pressurizer mid-wall heater sleeve repairs. Their presentation described
the experiments and testing conducted, using field-simulated geometries, to evaluate the
weldability of Alloy 52M. Significant advantages were observed in the Alloy 52M weld
deposits that improved the dye penetrant surface examinations and the ultrasonic volumetric
examinations. Results also suggest that Alloy 52M has a greater tolerance to variations in
welding parameters that avoid cracking in the weld (both hot and cold cracking). In addition,
the metallurgical evaluations confirmed a significant reduction in the presence of oxides and
small microfissures dispersed throughout the weld deposit. The program concluded that high
quality welds can be made reliably using Alloy 52M filler material, and that the probability
for making successful welds is very high.
Session 3A: Laboratory Investigations of Cracks
This session reviewed the results of laboratory investigations of cracked Alloy 600/82/182 parts
removed from plants. These investigations show that the PWSCC induced cracking is
intergranular and/or interdendritic. Cracked base materials typically had "highly susceptible"
microstructures, with many intragranular carbides and few intergranular carbides. No special
microstructural features were identified of the Alloy 182 weld materials that correlate with high
susceptibility. Weld flaws appear to have been involved in the cracking of the STP bottom
mounted instrument nozzle weldment, but were not involved in the Ringhals and Davis-Besse
welds that were examined. Highlights of the session were as follows:
x Laboratory examinations were performed of an Alloy 600 nozzle and its attached Alloy 182
J-groove weld that had been removed from the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head. Cracks in
the nozzle and weld were believed to be the cause of the leaks that resulted in the
development of the large cavity in the head. Laboratory examination confirmed the presence
of intergranular/interdendritic cracks in the nozzle and weld with morphologies consistent
with PWSCC. The microstructures of the nozzle and weld material were found to be typical
of those seen in the industry. There were several axial cracks in the nozzle, with two of them
through wall. One of the cracks had initiated at the nozzle ID surface, propagated through
the wall and through the adjacent weld, and was the source of the leak that caused the large
cavity. A cluster of shallow circumferential cracks was found on the bottom J-groove weld
surface that had been exposed to normal primary coolant, and another cluster of shallow
circumferential cracks was found on the top weld surface where it had been exposed to the
concentrated boric acid slurry inside the cavity.
x Examination was performed of the Type 308 stainless steel cladding that was located at the
bottom of the large cavity in the Davis-Besse head. The cladding thickness was above the
specified minimum value. There were numerous shallow cracks in the top surface of the
cladding that were attributed to exposure to the concentrated boric acid in the cavity. The
minimum remaining uncracked thickness of the cladding was 0.139 in. (3.5 mm).
NRC/ORNL estimated that the additional operating time that would have led to cladding
failure was 2 to 13 months (these were 5% and 95% percentile estimates). These estimates
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were based on the rate of opening up of the cavity rather than on crack propagation in the
cladding.
x Laboratory examination was performed of a small boat sample removed from the nozzle to
J-groove juncture of a leaking bottom mounted instrument (BMI) nozzle of STP Unit 1. The
nozzle base material was also examined using a full diameter sample of the nozzle removed
from the below the weld. The nozzle base material was found to have a susceptible
microstructure and to have high cold work at the nozzle ID surface. The cracks in the nozzle
and weld material were intergranular and consistent with PWSCC. The cracks intersected
cavities located at the nozzle to weld juncture; these cavities are attributed to entrapment of
weld flux (which was found to be present in one of the cavities). Within the boat sample
material, the main crack appeared to have grown outward, in the nozzle ID to OD direction.
This is contrary to conclusions based on NDE, which indicated that the cracks had initiated at
the OD and were growing toward the nozzle ID. There are two main hypotheses regarding
the nature of the cracking in the BMI as discussed below; it was concluded that a definitive
answer as to which is correct will never be developed:
One hypothesis is that the cracks initiated at the top OD weld surface, probably as the
result of a cavity just below the weld surface, and grew in a complex fashion such that the
main crack grew outward in the small region included in the boat sample. This
hypothesis is largely based on results of NDE, including a helium leak test. UT indicated
the presence of several cracks in the affected nozzle and in a second nozzle that were part
wall with no penetration to the nozzle ID. The helium leak test indicated that there was
no ID to OD leak path, but rather that the leak went from the nozzle OD in the annulus
below the weld up to the top surface of the weld, e.g., along the heat affected zone and/or
nozzle to weld interface.
The second hypothesis, which was emphasized in the presentation made at the meeting, is
that the main crack initiated in the cold worked material at the nozzle ID and grew
outward. The main bases for this hypothesis are the presence of a susceptible
microstructure in the nozzle, the presence of a severely cold worked layer at the nozzle
ID, and the outward direction of crack growth deduced from examination of the boat
sample.
x CRDM nozzles and welds have been removed from the retired North Anna 2 reactor vessel
head. Standard and developmental NDE has been performed for use in later comparisons
with the results of the destructive examination, which are still in process. Silastic molds of
the ID surface have been taken and are being examined using laser profilometry. One nozzle
(#54) is being destructively examined by Westinghouse, and two have been provided to the
NRC for destructive examination at PNNL. Examination to date of nozzle #54 indicates that
there was no accumulation of boric acid in the annulus above the weld, nor any wastage of
the low alloy steel.
x Cracks in Alloy 182 weld material from Ringhals 3 and 4 outlet nozzles and a Davis-Besse
CRDM J-groove weld were examined using scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and
analytical transmission electron microscopy (ATEM). The goal of this work was to
investigate the causes of the cracking in these welds. SEM observations showed that the
cracks occurred along grain boundaries, and not along interdendritic boundaries. X-ray
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mapping revealed there to be a cored weld structure with segregated Mn and coincident Nb
carbide precipitates. In the Davis-Besse material, MnS inclusions were also common. High-
resolution ATEM showed no segregation along the grain boundaries ahead of the cracks in
the Ringhals welds, and few intergranular carbide particles. In contrast, the grain boundaries
in the Davis-Besse material were highly decorated by both MC and M
23
C
6
-type carbides.
The weld materials contained high densities of dislocations, apparently caused by welding
strains. Detailed ATEM examinations of the cracks and crack tips revealed microstructures
consistent with stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) in primary water. Corrosion products in the
cracks included fine-grained, Cr-rich spinel oxide often with adjacent Ni-rich metal, as well
as spinel containing high Nb. In addition, the weld materials showed a distinctive structure
consisting of oxide-filled corrosion tunnels in the weld metal up to the leading edges of
cracks. The corrosion products and crack-tip microstructures indicate that the cracks were
fully penetrated by primary water. No evidence of solidification hot cracking was found.
Session 3B: Field Experience - Mitigation and Repair
This session concentrated on the plant experience for a range of mitigation and repair options,
although some process development work was also described during the session. The mitigation
methods covered during two of the presentations were water jet peening of BMI nozzles and
temperature reduction for reactor vessel closure heads. Three presentations were made on weld
repair options that can also be used as preventive measures for components such as pressurizer
heater sleeves and large-diameter piping butt welds. Two presentations covered practical
experience with replacement of reactor vessel closure heads including one utility perspective.
Brief summaries of the presentations in this session are as follows:
x The leakage discovered at South Texas Project in 2003 has shown that reactor vessel bottom
mounted instrumentation (BMI) penetrations may be susceptible to PWSCC. One vendor
discussed a water jet peening process that can be used to impart a compressive stress to the
inside diameter of the BMI nozzle and also to the wetted surface of the J-groove weld and
nozzle outside diameter near the weld to eliminate susceptibility to PWSCC. This process
has been implemented at seven PWRs in Japan to date. Even though the probability of
PWSCC leading to leakage of these nozzles is low due to their reduced temperature, the
water jet peening process can provide additional margin which may be particularly important
for plants employing license extension.
x One vendor described a strategy for upper head temperature reduction (UHTR) as an
effective program to reduce the propensity for cracking of reactor vessel head nozzles and
J-groove welds. Different processes for UHTR implementation are available based on the
particular plant design configuration. A field modification program of reactor upper and
lower internals components was developed to provide additional bypass flow to the upper
head region of the reactor vessel, lowering the bulk fluid temperature in contact with the
closure head, and thus the head penetration temperature, to cold-leg temperature levels. The
UHTR also provides a benefit in terms of increased margin for LOCA safety analyses.
x One welding vendor addressed the performance and weldability issues specific to Alloy 52
GTAW weld filler material, which is being used as a substitute for Alloy 82. Weldability
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issues for Alloy 52 have significantly delayed plant repair schedules in some cases. Welding
tests such as the "Chabenat" weldability test in combination with application specific
mockups are being used by this vendor to substantiate field weldability performance. Several
case studies were presented, and an ongoing filler material evaluation/selection program was
described.
x The reactor vessel closure head at Turkey Point Unit 3 was replaced in fall 2004 because of
the generic susceptibility to PWSCC of the original Alloy 600 CRDM nozzles. An FPL
evaluation considered ongoing inspection and repair costs versus replacement or application
of mitigation techniques. The conclusion of this evaluation favored replacement, and FPL
chose an extensive replacement project including other associated components.
x One presentation discussed a vendor's experience with replacement of reactor vessel closure
heads. At the time of the conference, three head replacements had been performed by this
vendor, including head package upgrades accompanying two of these replacements. Head
replacement removes the Alloy 600 nozzles that are susceptible to PWSCC and addresses
head inspectability issues. This vendor has completed a total of five simplified head
upgrades, which provide both critical path time and worker exposure savings during future
refueling activities. This vendor is applying lessons learned to current projects, and
installation times, worker exposure, and safety events are showing decreasing trends.
x Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station described its process for management and
replacement of Alloy 600 pressurizer heater sleeves. The overall management process was
presented including repair/replacement study results, recommendations to plant management,
the selected repair alternative, and net present value economic study results. The
management process has led to replacement of all pressurizer heater sleeves in Palo Verde
Units 2 and 3. Replacement of the heater sleeves in Palo Verde Unit 1 was scheduled for fall
2005. The past replacements used a pad weld repair approach, but the mid-wall repair option
is under consideration for Unit 1.
x The final presentation of Session 3B discussed the repair/mitigation technique applied to the
Alloy 182 reactor vessel outlet nozzle to safe end welds at Ringhals Units 3 and 4 in Sweden.
Axially oriented PWSCC indications were discovered in these units at this location in 2000
and 2001. In response, a repair system was developed capable of restoring the full structural
capacity of the nozzle and the normal 10-year ISI interval by (1) weld repair of the boat
sample divots and (2) application of a corrosion resistant ID overlay onto the existing Alloy
182 safe end weld. This overlay precludes future PWSCC cracking by removing the Alloy
182 material from the primary water environment. Based on risk, cost, and schedule
evaluations, an ID repair method was preferred as compared to the safe end replacement
option previously implemented at the VC Summer station. For this repair method, the plant
is configured to allow dry access to the inside of the reactor vessel outlet nozzles via the top
of the reactor vessel.
1-14
Session 4A: Boric Acid Corrosion
This session reviewed work underway to better define the causes and rates of boric acid
corrosion, how best to inspect for it, and ways to detect precursor primary coolant leaks.
Highlights presented regarding these topics include:
x Detailed evaluation in the laboratory has been completed of the cavity in the Davis-Besse
head that occurred as the result of a small leak in an adjacent CRDM nozzle. The evaluation
confirmed that a large volume of low alloy steel had been corroded away (~260 in.
3
(~4261
cm
3
)), exposing a large area of cladding (~16.5 in.
2
(106 cm
2
)). Examination of the cavity
did not reveal the detailed mechanisms involved in the corrosion, but did indicate that flow
effects were not important to the final stages of the corrosion (based on absence of
directionality of the surface features). Some preferential attack, probably due to galvanic
effects, was observed at the low alloy steel to stainless steel clad interface. There appeared to
be some correlation between the rate of corrosion of the low alloy steel and bands of
inclusions in the steel; however this was not very strong and may not be significant.
x Several EPRI sponsored tests regarding the mechanisms and rates of boric acid corrosion are
underway. These include four phases of testing: stagnant low flow tests, flow impingement
tests, separate effects tests, and full scale mockup tests. Tests results to date indicate:
Corrosion rates in deaerated primary coolant are less than 0.001 in. (40 Pm) per year.
Corrosion rates in extreme concentrated conditions can be as high as 6 in./year (150
mm/year).
Corrosion rates are highest at intermediate temperatures and boric acid concentrations. In
these conditions the presence of lithium strongly reduces corrosion rates, galvanic effects
are not significant, and the absence of oxygen reduces corrosion rates by no more than a
factor of two.
In jet impingement conditions, higher leak rates and higher velocities increase the rate of
corrosion, and the effect of heat flux appears to be important. Tests to quantify the
effects of heat flux are planned.
x Generic guidance for boric acid corrosion control programs has recently been issued by
Revision 1 to WCAP-15988 [5]. The guidance was developed by the Westinghouse Owners
Group (WOG) for the MRP. Based on NEI, NRC and INPO concerns, Revision 1 added
binding "executive muscle" to direct utilities to implement its requirements. It falls within
the scope NEI-03-08, the NEI Materials Implementation Protocol, and thus must be
addressed by all PWRs. Revision 1 incorporates enhanced or new requirements regarding
personnel training, documentation, pump and valve screening, gap analysis vs. INPO
guidance, and implementation.
x Software has been developed that allows boric acid control program inspection data to be
entered into handheld devices that automatically transfer the data to a plant's central

5
G. Rao, T. S. Sharma, and S. S. Barshay, Generic Guidance for an Effective Boric Acid Inspection Program for
Pressurized Water Reactors, Westinghouse, Pittsburgh, PA: 2005. WCAP-15988-NP.
1-15
computer system. The software has been tailored to make data entry easy and to ensure that
all required data are obtained. Use of the software is reported to reduce the time and
radiation exposure involved with boric acid control inspections. The software is currently in
use at the Cook station, with good results.
x A leak detection system called "FLS" is available that can be installed in areas such as the
top reactor vessel head or the bottom reactor vessel head to monitor for leaks. Twelve such
systems have been installed worldwide since 1994. The system works by measuring the
humidity in small samples of air withdrawn from the monitored area. It is reported to be
sensitive to leaks as low as 0.005 gpm (1 liter/hour). Its lead application in the USA is at the
lower reactor vessel head of Davis-Besse.
Session 4B: Inspection Technologies and Planning
This session discussed developments in inspection technology and experience for Alloy 82/182
piping butt welds and CRDM nozzles and for the U.S. industry's Performance Demonstration
Initiative (PDI). A two-part presentation addressed the U.S. industry's development of a
comprehensive inspection program for reactor vessel closure head penetrations including
deterministic and probabilistic safety evaluations. Brief summaries of the presentations in this
session are as follows:
x The presentation of one NDE service vendor gave its perspective of the challenges associated
with complying with the ultrasonic examination performance demonstration process for
examinations performed on PWRs. Work on the various supplements of the Performance
Demonstration Initiative (PDI) process is in various stages of completion. PDI addresses the
requirements for ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, "Performance Demonstration for
Ultrasonic Examination Systems." The EPRI NDE Center maintains detailed information on
the status of the various PDI programs.
x The MRP has developed a comprehensive inspection program for reactor vessel closure
heads in U.S. PWRs to address PWSCC of Alloy 600 head penetrations, which has led to
cracking and leakage in a number of plants. The inspection program is based on a safety
assessment that addressed all safety-related concerns that could develop as a consequence of
PWSCC in the closure heads. The main safety concerns are the potential for nozzle ejection
as a result of circumferential cracking of the nozzles above the attachment welds to the
vessel, and severe wastage of the closure head that could develop as a result of significant
leakage occurring over an extended period without corrective action. Specific elements of
this work discussed in a two-part presentation included the following:
Weibull analysis for expected frequency of nozzle leakage versus time
Probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) model predicting the probability of a
circumferential crack growing to a significant size that could potentially lead to nozzle
ejection
Examination coverage requirements for both visual and volumetric/surface examinations
to ensure that the inspections address the entire region in which PWSCC may reasonably
be expected to occur
1-16
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)
Deterministic and probabilistic wastage evaluations
Summary of the industry inspection plan document (MRP-117)
x Under the Materials Initiative of the U.S. nuclear power industry, programs are now in place
to accelerate the development, qualification, and implementation of innovative NDE devices
and techniques. EPRI described the NDE developments sponsored by the Materials Initiative
with particular attention to NDE of nickel-based materials and weldments. The Materials
Initiative is a new major initiative to comprehensively and aggressively address materials
degradation issues.
x One NDE services vendor presented its inspection technology and experience for PWR
reactor vessel upper and lower head penetrations. An average of one inspection has been
performed each month by this vendor since the time that the NRC order on upper heads was
issued. Several types of probes are used to perform volumetric and surface examinations
from the ID and OD/weld surfaces, and three basic systems are available for inspection of
bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzles in reactor vessel lower heads. Leak path
inspections are not applicable to the BMI nozzles because these nozzles have a nominal
clearance fit, rather than the interference fit for CRDM nozzles. Repair technology,
including a robotically delivered remote fluorescent dye penetrant testing (FPT) system, is
integrated with the inspection systems.
x A thermal imaging inspection technique that has not yet been applied to the commercial
nuclear power industry is under development. The technique is a non-contact technique that
detects surface breaking discontinuities on the basis of a discontinuity causing an asymmetry
in the temperature response to a laser spot. The technique may be used to complement eddy
current techniques for complex geometries where tooling becomes an issue. The system has
the advantage that flaws that tend to go subsurface along parts of their lengths can still be
detected.
Session 5A: Mitigation Methods
This session reviewed work completed or underway to identify and qualify methods for
mitigating the occurrence of PWSCC in Alloy 600/82/132/182 parts in PWRs. In this regard,
some mitigation measures have been applied to a limited extent in several plants, including two
that were originally developed and applied in BWRs, and work is continuing on further
development and qualification of these and other mitigation measures. Highlights in this regard
include:
x Several types of peening processes have been developed that can be applied to the wetted
surfaces of Alloy 600/82/132/182. These processes are also known as "stress improvement"
(SI) processes. These SI processes result in a thin compressive surface layer on the wetted
surface that is expected to inhibit crack initiation, and that may also inhibit growth of
undetected small cracks that are shallower than the peening-induced compressive layer. The
status of development of these processes is as follows:
1-17
Abrasive water jet conditioning has been used in conjunction with repairs and is thus
ready for use as a mitigation method, although it has not as yet been applied solely as a
mitigation method. Fiber laser peening has been applied as a mitigation method by
Toshiba in Japan in BWRs and at the nozzle ID of BMIs in one PWR, and thus is ready
for use as a mitigation method. Laser peening, in air, is also judged to be a possible
mitigation method, but has not as yet been applied in PWRs for this purpose. Cavitation
peening is under development and appears promising.
Testing is underway of laser peening, fiber laser peening, and cavitation peening to better
determine the residual stresses and the SCC resistance of treated areas.
Even though the growth of small cracks on peened surfaces may be inhibited by
development of the compressive layer developed by peening, it is preferable to ensure
that there are no cracks remaining on the wetted surface before application of the
peening. One of the peening processes, abrasive water jet conditioning, removes about
0.03 in. (0.8 mm) of the treated surface, and thus can remove small cracks. Other
methods for removing thin surface layers before application of peening are under review,
such as flapper wheel polishing.
Some questions remain regarding the long term effectiveness of peening processes on
mitigation of PWSCC. These include (1) the issue of pre-existing undetected small flaws
as discussed above, (2) concerns about possible "shakeout" (reduction of the induced
compressive stresses) due to cyclic stresses that may reduce the effectiveness of peening
over the long term, (3) the ability to reliably apply peening to complex geometries such
as J-grove welds, and (4) ensuring that all susceptible wetted surfaces are effectively
peened.
x A "mechanical stress improvement process" (MSIP) is available that involves
mechanically compressing areas such as butt welds to develop deep seated compressive
stresses on the ID wetted surface. Since 1986 it has been applied to over 1300 BWR welds,
including safe end welds, with no problems reported. It has been qualified by analyses and
tests for use on PWR welds, and is expected to be ready for implementation on PWR
pressurizer nozzle welds by June 2005. The process is available from AEA Technology
Engineering Services, Inc./Westinghouse.
x Weld overlays (WOLs) have been used successfully for many years in BWRs, and have been
used in several cases as a repair method for PWSCC affected nozzles in PWRs.
Qualification of preventive weld overlay repairs (PWOL) as a mitigation method for non-
cracked Alloy 600/82/182 welds is underway. Use of PWOLs is intended to result in relief
from augmented inservice inspection requirements. Design and analysis in support of use of
PWOL as a mitigation method are complete for pressurizer nozzles, and an MRP project has
been initiated to confirm residual stresses and inspectability using a mockup. A patent
covering use of weld overlays on a preventive basis has been applied for, with rights to be
assigned to EPRI. The PWOL process is available from Structural Integrity Associates.
x A process for applying coatings to areas such as the wetted surface of a dissimilar metal butt
weld is under development. The process is called "supersonically induced mechanical alloy
technology" (SIMAT) and involves development of a protective layer or coating (e.g., of
nickel) by impingement with a high velocity flow stream of particles. SCC tests of pre-
1-18
cracked and then coated specimens indicated that the coating prevented growth of pre-
existing flaws as well as initiation of new flaws. Plans for development include further
optimization of the process and completion of bond strength and corrosion testing,
development of field tooling, and NRC licensing.
x With regard to use of water chemistry changes as a PWSCC mitigation method, the situation
is as follows:
Tests indicate that that changes in the B/Li/pH regime have little effect on PWSCC
growth rates, and it is considered unlikely that strategies for modifying B/Li/pH regimes
to mitigate PWSCC will be developed.
Tests indicate the control of hydrogen concentration in the upper end of the currently
allowed 2550 cc/kg range, or even higher, may result in reduced crack growth rates,
with the benefit depending on the temperature, the alloy, and change in hydrogen
concentration that can be achieved. Testing in this area is continuing.
Tests of the effect of zinc on PWSCC initiation indicate that use of zinc strongly inhibits
initiation, and several PWRs are currently adding zinc for this purpose. However, crack
growth rate tests do not show consistent benefits, and tests of the effects of zinc on crack
growth rate are continuing. Service experience at Diablo Canyon is encouraging cracks
but not conclusive with regard to the effects of zinc inhibiting both PWSCC initiation and
growth; a project to analyze the Diablo Canyon data is underway and is expected to
provide firmer conclusions during the summer of 2005.
Session 5B: Field Experience - Inspections
This session discussed plant experience with surface and volumetric examinations (NDE) for
PWSCC indications, as well as for visual inspections for evidence of primary coolant leakage
due to PWSCC. One presentation was a general review of PWSCC experience, especially but
not exclusively for U.S. plants. Two presentations addressed experience and practices in
Sweden, including the development of a crack growth rate disposition curve. Another
presentation covered the detailed experience for the PWR units operating in Belgium. Finally,
two presentations gave perspectives of two multiple unit PWR stations in the U.S. One plant
described its detailed experience with inspection of CRDM nozzles including an unexpected
repair operation, and a second described its development of a robotic system to remove coatings
from BMI penetrations that may interfere with effective visual examinations for evidence of
boric acid deposit accumulations. Brief summaries of the presentations in this session are as
follows:
x An overview of PWSCC practices and experience was presented for the seven PWR units
operating in Belgium. Information and data were presented regarding inspections and
analyses performed and the general strategy applied for Alloy 600 reactor vessel closure head
nozzles, Alloy 182 piping butt welds, reactor vessel safety injection nozzles, and Alloy 600
reactor vessel bottom head penetrations. The only case of significant CRDM nozzle cracking
was at Tihange 1, where a long axial through-wall crack extending below the weld all the
way down to the bottom of the penetration was detected in one penetration in 1998. A small
1-19
axial indication was detected in October 2002 at the inside surface of the Alloy 182
pressurizer nozzle to surge line transition weld of Tihange 2. This indication is located close
to a fabrication repair on the outside surface, but repeated inspections have not shown any
growth.
x In Sweden, a bounding bi-linear crack growth rate expression has been developed in order to
disposition PWSCC in Alloy 182 welds. A review of available worldwide data for crack
growth rate testing using controlled Alloy 182 weld fracture mechanics samples was used to
develop the disposition curve. Data from a series of crack growth rate tests performed by
Studsvik in Sweden supports the bi-linear Ringhals disposition curve, although the plateau
level suggested by the laboratory data is three times lower than the disposition line.
x In 2001, the Nuclear Management Company (NMC) embarked on an effort to ensure that the
latest automated ultrasonic (AUT) techniques would be used during the upcoming CRDM
nozzle examinations at Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP). Point Beach described the
experience and lessons learned from the inspections performed in 2002, 2003, and 2004 at
this two-unit station for the relatively small head size associated with Westinghouse-design
two-loop PWRs. An unexpected nozzle repair was performed for Nozzle 26 of Unit 1 in
spring 2004 due to faint spiderlike indications on the J-groove weld surface of this nozzle.
The steep angle of this nozzle on the head necessitated a repair in which the new Alloy 52
weld material overlapped with the existing Alloy 182 J-groove weld. To address this weld
overlap issue, a crack growth analysis was performed that conservatively assumed Alloy 52
to be subject to the same crack growth rate as Alloy 600.
x Ringhals AB discussed its experience with SCC at the Ringhals and Barsebck stations in
Sweden, including both PWR and BWR experience, as well as the approach taken to
inspection, repair, and replacement at these plants. The utility estimates that an average
production loss of 20 days per year has resulted due to SCC at these stations over the
preceding 10 years. Indications have been found in Alloy 600 wrought material and Alloy
82/182 weld metals in such different locations as heavy section pipe welds in both BWR and
PWR, small-bore instrumentation nozzle welds, brackets to piping systems in reactor vessel
internals in BWR, and reactor vessel upper head penetrations of the PWRs.
x Additional Alloy 600/182/82 components have now experienced cracking in PWRs,
including steam-space pressurizer butt welds, reactor vessel bottom head nozzles, and steam
generator bowl drains. In addition, circumferential indications (but located inside the
pressure boundary) have been reported for Alloy 600 pressurizer heater sleeves at one plant.
More than 600 CRDM penetration J-groove welds have now been inspected in the U.S., and
significant differences have been observed for these inspections on the basis of vessel
fabricator. No indications of PWSCC have been found in reactor vessel bottom mounted
instrumentation (BMI) nozzles since the leakage detected at South Texas Project.
x Palo Verde has developed a process for cleaning and inspecting BMI nozzles to allow
sensitive bare metal visual inspections to be performed in the case that pre-existing
conditions such as coating remnants, stains, and other obstructions are present at the
intersection of the nozzle and outer head surface. The process uses a robot that delivers CO
2
"dry ice" media to clean a localized area on each penetration. The process works by freezing
1-20
the target coating, which is subsequently blown off by the expanding CO
2
. Palo Verde is
currently in the process of completing this cleaning operation for the 61 BMI nozzles in each
of its three units.
Session 6: Regulatory Issues
The presentations in this session discussed efforts in the U.S. to address materials degradation
issues including regulatory interactions. The first two presentations gave overviews of the high-
level efforts of the U.S. industry to proactively manage material degradation including PWSCC
of Alloy 600. Two presentations gave status reports on efforts specific to PWSCC of Alloy
82/182 piping butt welds and Alloy 600 reactor vessel bottom mounted nozzles (i.e., BMI
nozzles). Subsequent to the conference, the U.S. industry issued guidance for inspection and
evaluation of Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds. Another presentation described the crack leak rate
modeling work being sponsored by the U.S. industry to support evaluations of piping systems
covered by leak-before-break (LBB) assessments given the potential for PWSCC of Alloy
82/182 piping butt welds. The final presentation covered some of the work sponsored by the
U.S. NRC in the Alloy 600 area, including analytical work for CRDM nozzles and assessments
of the risk of piping LOCAs. Brief summaries of the presentations in this session are as follows:
x The Materials Reliability Program (MRP) is a utility-directed oversight structure with a
mission to proactively address and resolve, on a consistent industry-wide basis, existing and
emerging performance, safety, reliability, operational, and regulatory PWR material-related
issues. The MRP is directed by the PWR utilities and managed by EPRI. The Alloy 600
Issue Task Group (ITG) within the MRP has within its scope all Alloy 600 base material
(with the exception of steam generator tubing) and Alloy 82/182 weld metal locations in
PWR primary systems. The unexpected cracking detected at North Anna Unit 2 in fall 2002
led to a significant reassessment within the Alloy 600 ITG to ensure that the approaches
taken in the Alloy 600 area are sufficiently proactive to anticipate potential crack locations or
geometries that have not yet been observed in the field.
x In August 2002, the U.S. industry initiated a self-assessment process to determine the
activities needed to ensure that the industry "gets ahead" of materials degradation issues.
The scope covered a broad range of PWR and BWR materials. The self-assessment process
resulted in a series of recommendations including that the formal NEI Initiative Process be
used and that a Materials Initiative be established. The objective of the Materials Initiative is
to assure safe, reliable, and efficient operation of U.S. nuclear power plants in the
management of materials issues. Under the Materials Initiative, the U.S. industry is
developing proactive tools for the management of material degradation such as the
Degradation Matrix and the Issues Management Table.
x EPRI discussed the process being used by the MRP to develop inspection guidance for Alloy
82/182 piping butt welds in U.S. PWR plants. Subsequent to the conference, this inspection
guidance was finalized and issued to U.S. utilities as report MRP-139. The presentation also
discussed the effect of PWSCC on piping butt welds classified as leak-before-break (LBB)
locations. Considered in development of the inspection guidance was BWR experience,
1-21
Alloy 82/182 piping butt weld plant experience, and NDE capabilities for dissimilar metal
welds.
x Past leak-before-break (LBB) submittals have not considered PWSCC cracks in Alloy
82/182 piping butt welds or Alloy 600 base metals, and the leak rate calculations have only
considered the conventional fatigue crack morphology. Based on the best fit to a sensitivity
study of five example LBB piping systems, the KRAKFLO leak rate code predicts a 37%
increase in the crack length resulting in a leak rate of 10 gpm when considering an SCC
morphology over the conventional fatigue morphology. A safety factor of 10 on the
detectable leak rate is maintained to account for the uncertainties in geometry, materials, and
loading.
x The U.S. industry is currently in the process of addressing the issues associated with potential
cracking in reactor vessel bottom mounted nozzles (BMNs, also known as BMI nozzles), and
the impacts of leakage or failure of one or more BMNs. The work is being performed as a
cooperative effort of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG), B&W Owners Group
(B&WOG), and EPRI/MRP, and the coordinated response of the U.S. PWR industry is being
performed under NEI Initiative 03-08. EPRI/MRP will produce an overall industry report
addressing the overall risk associated with cracking of BMNs and will provide inspection and
repair guidance. Volumetric examinations have been performed of BMNs in more than 25
units to date worldwide, with only two penetrations at South Texas Project Unit 1 showing
cracks or leaks.
x The U.S. NRC continues to fund activities related to PWSCC of Alloy 600 CRDM nozzles
and Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds. A probabilistic computer code is being developed for
LOCA predictions. This new code will incorporate the results of recent and future
deterministic analyses for residual stress fields, leak rate, and fracture. A key goal of the new
code is to predict crack growth and multiple initiation sites for SCC mechanisms more
realistically than any existing piping probabilistic fracture mechanics code. Other work is
investigating the effect of weld repairs and the potential concern of long circumferential
surface cracks for Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds. In the CRDM nozzle area, the effect of
the residual stress field on the growth of axial CRDM nozzle cracks was investigated using a
matrix of 37 fracture mechanics FEA cases in which the distribution of stress intensity
factors along the crack front was calculated. These CRDM nozzle results are being used to
provide comments on ASME Code Case N-694-1.
2
KEYNOTE ADDRESSES
Following brief introductory remarks, keynote addresses were given by four invited speakers.
Viewpoints were given of the current state of efforts to address PWSCC of Alloy 600 and other
materials degradation issues from the U.S. utility perspective, the U.S. regulator perspective, the
EPRI perspective, and an international utility perspective. The keynote speakers emphasized the
need for proactive management of materials degradation issues
U.S. Utility Keynote, address by David Mauldin, Arizona Public Service
(Keynote K.1)
This initial keynote address was given by Mr. David Mauldin, Vice President, Nuclear
Engineering and Support, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Arizona Public Service. Mr.
Mauldin is former Chairman of the Materials Technical Advisory Group (MTAG) and also a
member of the Materials Executive Oversight Group (MEOG). Mr. Mauldin described current
initiatives in the materials integrity area that have been taken by the U.S. industry to address
PWSCC and other materials degradation issues, and he discussed some of the main conclusions
and objectives developed by this program, as summarized below.
Maintaining and ensuring materials integrity is the single greatest challenge to the long-term
operability of currently operating nuclear power plants, and addressing the problems posed by
materials integrity issues in a proactive manner is essential to achieving the goal of maintaining
long-term operability. In this regard, many utilities still have a "wait and see" mentality
regarding materials integrity issues. One of the objectives of this conference is to urge the
attendees to bring to their management's attention the need for a proactive approach, including
active participation in Issue Task Groups and other EPRI meetings. Another aspect of this
needed proactive approach is to ensure that younger personnel in the utilities develop the
required expertise to address materials integrity issues, and are trained as to how to make proper
decisions.
The MTAG deals with all materials degradation and chemistry issues, not just PWSCC, with the
other issues including topics such as fuel clad issues and nondestructive inspection technology.
The MTAG provides strategic direction, and in some cases funding, for some of the large
materials research and development activity that is now ongoing in the PWSCC and other
materials integrity areas. Under the MTAG, a strategic plan for dealing with all materials
degradation issues is being developed. The Strategic Plan shows where U.S. utilities are going,
and covers the long term as well as the past and current situations. As part of this effort, a
Degradation Matrix is being developed that addresses each degradation mechanism and, for each
2-1
Keynote Addresses
mechanism, shows what is currently being done and what needs to be investigated in the future.
A road map will be issued to support utilities in the management of materials degradation issues.
The MTAG is providing oversight to the Issue Programs solving materials degradation problems
and is developing a tool kit for use in this area. It is important that utilities be aware of this tool
kit and use it for the full range of materials management activities: assessment and evaluation of
problems, inspections, application of mitigation methods, and repair/replacement. These
programs are needed for license extension and for life cycle management.
The primary responsibility of the nuclear power industry is to ensure nuclear safety. A main
element in addressing this responsibility is ensuring that pressure boundary integrity of the
reactor coolant system is maintained with high assurance. The industry has learned lessons from
past experience that failure to address this responsibility leads to long outages and costly repairs.
The industry is aware that there is a great deal of research and development still required, such as
regarding how to ensure the continued integrity of reactor internals.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Keynote, address by Allen Hiser, U.S.
NRC (Keynote K.2)
This keynote address was given by Dr. Allen Hiser who is Chief, Materials Integrity Branch,
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He has served
as the technical leader for development of most of the NRC's generic communications regarding
PWSCC of upper vessel head penetrations for the past five years.
The industry and NRC have learned many lessons from the Davis-Besse event, where a football
size cavity was identified in the upper reactor vessel head caused by boric acid corrosion that had
resulted from through-wall PWSCC cracks in a CRDM penetration. Although the cavity was
identified in March 2002, investigation of the event showed that there had been many prior
indications of something unacceptable occurring on top of the Davis-Besse head, but that these
indications were either ignored or not recognized as serious in nature. A significant event was
avoided by the slimmest of margins, provided by the ability of the stainless steel cladding to
resist rupture and the plant having shut down when it did.
The NRC believes that there will never be another vessel head corrosion event like that identified
at Davis-Besse. This is due to the increased awareness and sensitivity developed by the industry
and at the NRC. The challenge for the future is transferring the vigilance that everyone involved
now has for reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage to produce an attitude or culture where
the incentive for identifying and resolving other potential safety issues is no less than that for
achieving or exceeding operational or outage expectations.
As the regulator, the NRC has a unique role to play in handling emergent issues of degradation in
reactor pressure boundary materials. In developing a regulatory response, the NRC has to deal
with several aspects that must be kept in a balance. First and most critically, the safety aspects of
the issue must be considered. In addition, concerns such as long term health and environmental
quality need to be considered.
2-2
Keynote Addresses
The lessons learned from the investigation into the causes of the Columbia shuttle failure provide
insights as to how failures can occur and the approaches needed to preclude them. Similar to
Davis-Besse, there were multiple indications of potential precursor events over a period of time,
a failure to recognize the significance of the indications, and a failure by managers to ask the
needed hard questions. There were also production issues and schedules to be met. The
physical cause of the accident was determined to be from debrisin this case, foam from the
external fuel tankstriking insulation tile attached to the leading edge of the left wing, and
penetrating it during the launch, thus allowing superheated gasses to enter the wing structure
during reentry, causing the destruction of the orbiter. Precursors to this event had occurred,
including cases where failure had been avoided by only slim margins, but the lessons from these
precursors were not properly taken into account. Reliance was placed on past success (absence
of serious failure) as a substitute for sound engineering practices such as testing to understand
why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements. This is an example of
individuals having been "conditioned by success," very similar to the prevailing thought prior to
Davis-Besse that the operational history of boric acid leaks demonstrated that conditions
conducive to significant wastage of the reactor pressure vessel head could not exist.
With regard to the future of materials degradation in the nuclear industry, it is unlikely that we
can prevent all forms of cracking from occurring in nuclear power plant components. For
example, regarding PWSCC, there are to date, no consensus environmental changes that can be
used to eliminate cracking. However, component replacement with more resistant materials,
stress improvement or weld overlays, and the implementation of effective inspection approaches
at a sufficient frequency, can provide robust management schemes that give high assurance
against reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage, and prevent the cracking from challenging
safety.
For degradation mechanisms or locations currently not anticipated, the industrys materials
degradation matrix and the NRCs Proactive Materials Degradation Assessment are shedding
light on areas that may demand attention in the future. Gathering information on the rate of
degradation, how it may manifest itself and approaches for effective detection will arm us with
the tools necessary to handle future degradation, should it occur.
In summary with regard to the NRCs approach to addressing materials issues facing commercial
nuclear power plants, the NRC will continue to consider all approachespreventive approaches,
mitigative approaches, and maintenance or inspection based approaches. Each will be
evaluated based on sound engineering principles and data. Risk assessments and insights will
continue to be used in our decision-making. NRC will be conservative in its decision-making,
and will strive to be realistically conservative.
EPRI Keynote, address by Robin Jones, EPRI (Keynote K.3)
This keynote address was given by Dr. Robin L. Jones, Technical Executive, Materials, EPRI.
He has been involved for many years in management and technical positions at EPRI, and has
dealt extensively with materials degradation issues.
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Keynote Addresses
EPRI's perspective on the Alloy 600/82/182 cracking issue in PWRs is that, while PWSCC of
Alloy 600 and its weld metals is a serious degradation issue, significant progress is being made
towards the development and implementation of an effective issue management program. The
PWSCC issue has been identified as the single biggest challenge facing the PWR industry.
This level of concern is based on the fact that issues of this type can be very costly to manage
and thus could make operating PWRs significantly less cost competitive with other forms of
power generation than they are today. In response to this concern, a comprehensive approach is
underway to address the problem.
The experience with IGSCC at BWRs provides useful insights regarding management of
PWSCC at PWRs. Management of IGSCC at butt welds in BWR stainless steel piping resulted
in significant reductions in capacity factors for many years, largely due to the need to apply
mitigation measures to the welds on an individual component basis. Management of IGSCC of
BWR reactor internals has had a much reduced impact, largely as a result of the application of a
water chemistry remedy, noble metal chemical addition, which addresses all components at one
time. In summary, the BWR experience with IGSCC adjacent to welds in stainless steel piping
and internals suggests that implementing the actions needed to address the Alloy 600/82/182
cracking issue in PWRs could potentially reduce PWR capacity factors significantly for several
years, particularly if one-location-at-a-time mitigation and repair methods are the principal
basis of the issue management approach.
The occurrences of PWSCC of Alloy 600 vessel penetrations and Alloy 82/182 weldments have
raised concerns regarding the structural integrity of reactor coolant systems in PWRs. There is a
need to address these concerns and to assure that the practices and techniques used in managing
PWSCC are consistent industry-wide and are adequate to maintain plant safety, minimize
leakage events and permit optimum asset utilization. An industry-wide program, lead by EPRIs
Materials Reliability Program (MRP), is in progress to address these needs. The program has 3
main objectives. The first objective is to develop a standard management protocol for plants to
use in developing their plant-specific Alloy 600 management plans that provides short- and long-
term guidance for inspection, evaluation and management of all Alloy 600/82/182 applications in
the PWR primary system other than steam generator tubing. The second objective is to provide
the supporting technical/regulatory basis for the standard protocol. The final objective is to
reach, as soon as practicable, the point at which this issue is fully under control and is regarded
by the U.S. licensees and the USNRC as an example of highly-effective materials degradation
management.
The approach being used by the MRP to pursue these three objectives consists of five steps. The
first step is to characterize the degradation mechanism by defining the effects of stress, materials,
and chemistry variables on the rate of PWSCC. The second is to determine all Alloy 600/82/182
locations in the RCS for all vendor designs and conduct generic operability and safety
assessments assuming the occurrence of PWSCC at these locations. The third is to develop flaw
inspection and evaluation technology and guidelines for all locations, starting with those for
which the potential consequences of failure are most severe. The fourth is to evaluate available
mitigation options and, if necessary, develop additional options. The fifth and final step is to
evaluate available repair/replacement options and, where necessary, encourage the development
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Keynote Addresses
of additional options. Work is underway, with significant progress being made, on all of these
five steps.
In the absence of a chemistry countermeasure for PWSCC, potentially more costly, location-
specific mitigation and repair measures will have to be used when existing cracks are found. A
considerable number of such measures are being developed. In addition, alternative materials
have been identified for use in repair and replacement efforts. While these materials (which
include Alloy 690 and its weld metals as well as stainless steels) are not immune to cracking,
they are much more resistant to PWSCC than Alloy 600 and its weld metals. These more
resistant materials also can be used for potentially cost-effective pre-emptive replacements that
reduce the number of susceptible locations (for example, a reactor vessel head replacement can
eliminate all of the susceptible CRDM penetrations at once).
Regulatory acceptance obviously is one of the keys to success of any issue-management program
and is being pursued here by the industry via NEI. Regular informal meetings are held to
communicate program results and status and some joint R&D activities have been started
between NRC Research and EPRI-MRP.
Cost-effectively managing this material degradation issue for the remaining life of the existing
U.S. PWRs will be a significant challenge and a well-coordinated, multi-year effort is needed,
involving all U.S. PWR licensees together with EPRI, the NSSS Vendors and Owners Groups,
NEI and INPO. The Industry Initiative on Management of Materials Issues has established the
type of proactive, industry-wide program needed for success but much work remains to be done
on this issue. PWSCC of Alloy 600 and its weld metals can be effectively managed via the 5-step
process discussed above but the implementation of remedies, repairs and replacements may have
a significant adverse impact on PWR capacity factors and power production costs during the next
five to ten years unless the industry can identify, develop and deploy an effective chemistry
countermeasure.
International Utility Keynote, address by Franois Cattant, EDF (Keynote
K.4)
This keynote address was given by Dr. Franois Cattant, Materials Program Manager at the
research laboratories of Electricit de France (EDF). He has been involved for many years in the
evaluation of materials degradation issues, both at EDF and at EPRI.
Because EDF operates a large fleet of standardized PWRs and because it relies heavily on the
PWR fleet for electricity production (88% in 2004), it treats material degradation issues,
including PWSCC, on a rigorous and generic basis. The approach used relies heavily on models
of the degradation that are developed to manage the issues. These models for the progression of
the degradation are continuously validated using results of destructive examinations of removed
parts and nondestructive examinations of parts in operating plants. The modeling effort is also
supported by a large in-house laboratory based research and development program.
The first occurrence of non-steam generator tube PWSCC in EDF plants affected nozzles in
pressurizers of the 20 four loop plants. Destructive examination showed that all of the Alloy 600
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Keynote Addresses
nozzles of the four loop plants had to be replaced, which was accomplished with limited impact
on plant availability.
The next non-steam generator PWSCC event was the detection of cracks in a CRDM nozzle at
Bugey 3 during a 10 year hydrostatic test. Destructive examination showed that leak was due to
through wall PWSCC, that wastage of the head material was minimal, but that OD PWSCC had
occurred of the Alloy 600 base material. In subsequent years, EDF conducted destructive
examinations of 25 additional reactor vessel head penetrations. Data from these examinations
was used to benchmark the field NDE and to confirm the absence of circumferential cracks.
Destructive examinations were performed of the "triple point" in several retired steam
generators. The "triple point" is the location where the tubesheet, divider plate and channel head
meet. In some cases the examinations showed the presence of shallow PWSCC.
EDF laboratories have performed both crack initiation and crack growth rate tests of Alloy 600
and Alloy 182. In addition, a PWSCC susceptibility index has been developed. The models
have been improved over time to consider factors such as surface states. EDF maintenance
policies rely heavily on the PWSCC initiation and susceptibility index models, e.g., regarding the
life expectation of Alloys 600TT and 182 vs. Alloy 600MA. Crack propagation models are used
to set inspection intervals and optimize vessel head replacement schedules. The laboratory
studies together with field inspections have minimized the need for extensive repairs and
prevented further leakage incidents.
Keynote Speaker Panel Discussion
Following the four keynote addresses, the keynote speakers participated in a panel discussion
with the audience. Mr. Robin Dyle of Southern Nuclear substituted for Mr. David Mauldin
during the panel discussion. Questions/comments and responses were as follows:
x Question (C. King): The MEOGMTAG organization was established in response to NEI
03-08 (Guideline for the Management of Materials Issues). How long is this organization
expected to remain in place? Please describe the role of this organization.
Response (R. Dyle): The MEOG and MTAG are expected to last for several years. They
are a single focus point for all materials issues, which did not exist before establishment of
the MEOG and MTAG. They have a coordination and integration function, and do not take
the place of the Issues Groups, which carry out the detailed management of technical work.
x Question (G. Turluer): Temperature is known to be a key parameter governing PWSCC
crack initiation. Referring to the French experience, it seems that the temperature effect on
field data has been overestimated. Hence this question to the US keynote speakers: What is
the current appraisal in the USA of the temperature effect on field data, as compared to
laboratory data?
Response (F. Cattant): This is a point of controversy. It is true that the time to cracking of
the French cold head and hot head plants overlap. Speculatively, this could be due to the
assumed temperatures of the two groups of plants not being correct, such that the difference
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Keynote Addresses
is only 1015qC rather than the expected 40qC. Nevertheless, the time-temperature model
for PWSCC is quite well supported by laboratory and plant experience.
Response (A. Hiser): Plant experience is that higher ranked plants (a higher ranking reflects
a higher head temperature) are generally the first to crack. However, it is possible that the
lower susceptibility plants will eventually crack.
Comment (C. King): By 2008 the RVH nozzles of all US PWRs will have been inspected.
Comment (G. Rao): Regarding the temperature effect, EDF plotted all of their inspection
results for cold and hot heads on one chart. As a result of the large spread in the data, the
data for the two types of heads overlapped, and EDF concluded that there was less
significance to the temperature effect than expected based on laboratory results. However, I
have re-examined the data by carefully separating the data for the different material
conditions (conditions A, B and C) of the EDF penetrations. I found a clear and significant
effect of the temperature on the cracking. As many are aware, the EDF penetration materials
have large variations in microstructure, varying from full grain boundary coverage to nil
grain boundary coverage depending on the heat type, i.e., A, B or C.
x Question (V. Nilekani): Alloy 600 work related to PWSCC in PWRs is going on in France,
Japan and the US. Unlike the situation for BWRs in the US, where there is only one NSSS,
for PWRs in the US there are many NSSS designs and multiple vendors. Is there any global
coordination to get consensus on issue resolution and to avoid duplication and conflicting
conclusions and positions?
Response (R. Jones): The MEOG and MTAG coordinate and integrate efforts by the USA
NSSSs and also, to the extent practical, efforts by international organizations. This is a
reason for the MEOG and MTAG staying in operation for a long time. In this regard,
international input is being sought on the strategic plan that is being developed for addressing
materials issues. This current meeting is another example of an effort being made to achieve
international input and coordination.
Response (R. Dyle): The utility Chief Nuclear Officers (CNOs) want more focus on
international experience, and the Issues Groups are expected to do this, i.e., to place
increased emphasis on staying cognizant of international experience, and appropriately
reflecting this experience in their work.
x Question (U. Ehrnsten): As part of this new proactive approach to dealing with materials
issues, is attention being systematically given to problems that might develop in newly
constructed plants?
Response (R. Dyle): It is recognized that there is a need to look at the potential for
degradation to occur as the result of changes in environments and materials in either new
plants or new parts in older plants.
Response (R. Jones): We (EPRI) had an internal seminar last week that discussed this topic,
i.e., regarding whether we have appropriately addressed materials requirements for new
alloys. This topic will be addressed this year.
Followup Question: Does this reply also apply to advanced reactors?
Response (R. Jones): This has been briefly discussed, but not in detail.
Response (F. Cattant): For the new EPR design, EDF experience is being directly used.
x Question (R. Jacko): The presentation by R. Jones pointed to the potential benefit involved
with a beneficial water chemistry change. From that point of view, I would think that zinc
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Keynote Addresses
addition should be looked at by most PWRs. By my estimate about 9 US PWRs are currently
adding zinc. In your estimation, what additional activities are needed to endorse zinc
addition at other PWRs to help mitigate PWSCC?
Response (R. Jones): The issues involved with use of zinc depend on the concentration of
zinc that is used, with high levels of zinc leading to fuel issues that take time and money to
resolve. There is a need to sort out the possible side effects of zinc on other components.
Comment (J. Hickling): It should be noted that EPRI (C. King, MRP) and K. Fruzzetti
(Chemistry) hosted a very successful workshop on zinc addition to PWR primary water in
2004 (now published as an EPRI report). With regard to the extent that zinc addition at an
appropriate level can help to mitigate PWSCC of Alloy 600, there is a good deal of consent
that it will definitely improve resistance to crack initiation. Unfortunately, the data are less
conclusive with regard to crack propagation and the MRP has work ongoing in this area since
existing Alloy 600 or 182/82 components may well have passed the initiation phase. In other
words, in the field it is necessary to assume that these materials already contain
"microcracks" below NDE detection levels.
Comment (unidentified attendee): Zinc was tested at Halden before use at Farley, and has
been used at Farley for over ten years. A lot of work has been performed to evaluate possible
side effects, with positive results. For example, use of zinc has not caused problems with
pump seals or with valve sealing or wear.
Response (R. Jones): My point was that the long term effects of zinc on PWSCC initiation
and crack growth rate have not as yet been fully investigatedmore work remains to be
done.
x Question (C. Castelao): Several leaks were detected in France when performing hydrostatic
tests. What are the parameters of the hydrostatic tests in France (pressure, temperature,
time)? Hydrostatic tests are no longer required according to Section XI of the ASME Code
for Class 1 and 2 components. Based on the French experience, shouldn't use of hydrostatic
tests be again required in order to detect flaws in Alloy 600/82/182 components? What is the
US view on this question?
Response (F. Cattant): In France we use a higher pressure for the 10 year inservice
inspection pressure test, about 3000 psi (20.7 MPa), or about 1.2 times the design pressure.
In the US, pressure tests are performed at about 1.0 times the temperature-adjusted normal
operating pressure, i.e., at about 2475 psi (17.1 MPa), which equals 1.1 times the non-
temperature-adjusted normal operating pressure. We are not certain that the Bugey CRDM
crack that was discovered during a hydrostatic test in 1991 would have been discovered if the
lower pressure used in the USA had been applied.
Response (R. Dyle): This question has been thoroughly investigated from a Code
perspective. The ability to detect leaks is not strongly affected by the increase in pressure
from 1.1 times normal operating pressure to 1.2 times design pressure, but the difficulty of
performing the test is very strongly increased, such that it was judged not worth requiring the
higher pressure.
Comment (P. Riccardella): I was a member of the Section 11 Committee when we changed
the test requirement from 1.1 times operating pressure to a range of 1.1 to 1.02 times
operating pressure (depending on test temperature). Our thinking at the time was that this
10% reduction in test pressure would not make a significant difference on whether a through-
wall crack will leak or not. The Committee felt that the leakage detectability (i.e., how
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Keynote Addresses
thorough a visual test is performed) is more important than a minor decrease in test pressure,
which makes the test much easier to conduct.
Comment (W. Bamford): The main concern was the increased radiation exposure to
personnel involved when applying the higher pressure. An additional consideration is that,
while use of high hydrostatic test pressures was appropriate when it was the main method
used to assure pressure boundary integrity, now that the main reliance is on NDE, the high
pressure test is no longer required.
Comment (A. Hiser): Plant Technical Specifications permit no reactor coolant pressure
boundary leakage. Effective inspection programs of sufficient frequency and high reliability
can be successful in identifying degradation before Code margins are exceeded, which would
thereby preclude or minimize the occurrence of through-wall breaks. Therefore, the role of
leakage detections would be as a defense-in-depth approach.
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U.S. Utility Keynote
David Mauldin, Arizona Public Service
This initial keynote address was given by Mr. David Mauldin, Vice President, Nuclear
Engineering and Support, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Arizona Public Service. Mr.
Mauldin is former Chairman of the Materials Technical Advisory Group (MTAG) and also a
member of the Materials Executive Oversight Group (MEOG). Mr. Mauldin described current
initiatives in the materials integrity area that have been taken by the U.S. industry to address
PWSCC and other materials degradation issues, and he discussed some of the main conclusions
and objectives developed by this program, as summarized below.
Maintaining and ensuring materials integrity is the single greatest challenge to the long-term
operability of currently operating nuclear power plants, and addressing the problems posed by
materials integrity issues in a proactive manner is essential to achieving the goal of maintaining
long-term operability. In this regard, many utilities still have a "wait and see" mentality
regarding materials integrity issues. One of the objectives of this conference is to urge the
attendees to bring to their management's attention the need for a proactive approach, including
active participation in Issue Task Groups and other EPRI meetings. Another aspect of this
needed proactive approach is to ensure that younger personnel in the utilities develop the
required expertise to address materials integrity issues, and are trained as to how to make proper
decisions.
The MTAG deals with all materials degradation and chemistry issues, not just PWSCC, with the
other issues including topics such as fuel clad issues and nondestructive inspection technology.
The MTAG provides strategic direction, and in some cases funding, for some of the large
materials research and development activity that is now ongoing in the PWSCC and other
materials integrity areas. Under the MTAG, a strategic plan for dealing with all materials
degradation issues is being developed. The Strategic Plan shows where U.S. utilities are going,
and covers the long term as well as the past and current situations. As part of this effort, a
Degradation Matrix is being developed that addresses each degradation mechanism and, for each
mechanism, shows what is currently being done and what needs to be investigated in the future.
A road map will be issued to support utilities in the management of materials degradation issues.
The MTAG is providing oversight to the Issue Programs solving materials degradation problems
and is developing a tool kit for use in this area. It is important that utilities be aware of this tool
kit and use it for the full range of materials management activities: assessment and evaluation of
problems, inspections, application of mitigation methods, and repair/replacement. These
programs are needed for license extension and for life cycle management.
The primary responsibility of the nuclear power industry is to ensure nuclear safety. A main
element in addressing this responsibility is ensuring that pressure boundary integrity of the
reactor coolant system is maintained with high assurance. The industry has learned lessons from
past experience that failure to address this responsibility leads to long outages and costly repairs.
The industry is aware that there is a great deal of research and development still required, such as
regarding how to ensure the continued integrity of reactor internals.
Session K: Keynote Speakers
2-11
A REGULATORS APPROACH TO ADDRESSING MATERIALS ISSUES
by
Allen L. Hiser, Jr., and Terence L. Chan
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
EPRI/NRC PWSCC Conference
Santa Ana Pueblo, New Mexico
March 7, 2005
Good morning - it is my pleasure to be here with you today. Normally an address like this would
be given by a senior manager in the NRC. However, this meeting coincides with the Regulatory
Information Conference in Rockville and all of our senior managers are tied up at that
conference. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Terence Chan, my co-author on this
presentation. This is the result of a true collaborative effort.
This morning, Id like to share with you my view of a regulators approach to addressing
materials issues. As many of you are aware, I have some familiarity with the issues related to
materials degradation and primary water stress corrosion cracking on components containing
Alloy 600, having served as the technical leader for the development of most of the generic
communications on this issue related to upper vessel head penetrations, from Bulletin 2001-01
through the issuance of Order EA-03-009.
In March 2002, a discovery was made that eventually commanded the attention of a number of
people - Congress, the regulated community, the regulator, local politicians, and the public. In
fact, the three year anniversary of this discovery was just two days ago, last Saturday. Two
words describe it all - Davis-Besse. Davis-Besse is one of those events so significant that I can
remember where I was when I first heard about it. The Davis-Besse plant identified a football-
sized cavity in its upper reactor vessel head, caused directly by boric acid corrosion that
resulted from through-wall cracks in the control rod drive mechanism penetrations in the head.
Although the cavity in the Davis-Besse head was identified in March 2002 we now know that
the events that lead to the development of the cavity were likely many years in the making. As
a result of inspections and investigations, some of which continue to this day, we know that
there were many indications of something unacceptable occurring on top of the Davis-Besse
head, but that these indications were either ignored or not recognized at the time as serious in
nature. There were photographs and other documentary information that were clear indications
of a problem. There were numerous indirect signs of a problem, from clogged radiation monitor
filters, upward unidentified leakage trends, and containment air coolers clogging with boron
deposits. We also know that we were very, ... very,... lucky. By the slimmest of margins, if it
werent for the stainless steel cladding and if the plant didnt shut down when it did, there could
have been a significant accident. How would the plant have responded? What state would the
nuclear industry be in now? While I dont want to belabor the lessons learned from the events
at Davis-Besse, as stated by Chairman Diaz, there will never be another vessel head corrosion
event like that identified at Davis-Besse. This is due to the increased awareness and sensitivity
developed by everyone involved in the industry and at the NRC from plant personnel, licensee
engineering staff, contractors, plant management, and industry groups such as EPRI and INPO,
to NRC headquarters and regional staff, and NRC management - in part, due to renewed
respect for corrosion by boric acid. The difficulty is taking the vigilance that everyone involved
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now has for reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage on the reactor vessel upper head, and
hopefully other locations, and transferring that vigilance and insights that come from it to
produce an attitude - a culture if you will, where the incentive for identifying and resolving
potential safety issues is no less than that for achieving or exceeding operational or outage
expectations. That is the challenge that we face in securing a safe future for nuclear power.
As the regulator, the NRC has a unique role to play in handling emergent issues of degradation
in reactor pressure boundary materials. In developing a regulatory response, the NRC has to
deal with several aspects that must kept in a balance. First and most critically, the safety
aspects of the issue must be considered. Should it be possible to demonstrate that the risk
from a particular problem exceeds some level of assurance of safety, then the need for a
certain type of response by the NRC is readily apparent. NRC has many stakeholders, and
each group may have a different definition of an adequate level of assurance. The perspective
on an issue by plant and licensee personnel may differ substantially from that of a resident near
the plant or that of an elected representative whose constituents may or may not be supportive
of the plants presence. Concerns such as local employment and quality of life issues - in
particular things like long term health and environmental quality - help shape the way an issue is
viewed by the public. The NRC is entrusted with the responsibility to assure adequate
protection to the public and the environment, and as such, NRCs response will do that, while
being cognizant of the factors I just mentioned.
So what is the NRCs approach to addressing materials issues facing commercial nuclear power
plants? Before I get into that Id like to share with you some insights gained from another recent
event that received a lot of public attention. This event, like Davis-Besse, garnered immense
Congressional scrutiny, resulted in lessons-learned introspection by the responsible agency,
and resulted in operational changes. Also, like Davis-Besse, there were multiple indications of
potential precursor events over a period of time, a failure to recognize the significance of the
indications, and a failure by managers to ask the hard questions. There were also production
issues and schedules to be met. However, unlike Davis-Besse, this event resulted in loss of
life, in a very public way.
On February 1, 2003, nearly one year after the Davis-Besse head was identified with a
corrosion cavity, the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated upon its reentry into earths
atmosphere, claiming the lives of all seven of its crew. Like Davis-Besse, where I was when I
first heard of, and saw, this event on television is etched in my mind. As a member of the
public, I wondered how anything like that could have happened, given the Challenger accident
in 1986 and the Apollo 1 launchpad fire in January 1967. The physical cause of the accident
was determined to be from debris - in this case, foam from the external fuel tank - striking
insulation tile attached to the leading edge of the left wing, and penetrating it during the launch,
thus allowing superheated gasses to enter the wing structure during reentry, causing the
destruction of the orbiter.
Shortly after the accident, the Columbia Accident Investigative Board was formed, and after six
months it issued its report. Many of the observations by the Board are enlightening regarding
the development of cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety. These
include - reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as
testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements),
organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and
stifled professional differences of opinion, lack of integrated management across program
elements, and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making processes
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that operated outside the organizations rules. The Board also made an observation that many
investigations stop at identifying a technical cause of an incident as some variant of operator
error - once corrections are implemented lead, there is a mistaken belief that the problem is
solved.
The entire report is nearly 230 pages long, so let me give you a very condensed summary of
some of their findings and conclusions.
The following is an example of what is termed Conditioned by Success where the occurrence
of an observed safety-significant problem over time morphed into what the nuclear community
would term a nonsafety issue.
The space shuttle program had a design requirement that no debris shall emanate from
the critical zone of the external fuel tank on the launch pad or during ascent. Yet foam
strikes were observed on virtually all shuttle flights - in particular such strikes were a
specific topic of management concern at the time of the Challenger accident in 1986.
However, with each successful landing, NASA engineers and managers increasingly
regarded foam-shedding as inevitable, and as either unlikely to jeopardize safety or
simply an acceptable risk.
The issue of foam strikes, which was originally considered a serious threat to the orbiter,
came to be treated as in-family - a reportable problem that was within the known
experience base, was believed to be understood and was not regarded as a safety-of-
flight issue.
A serious foam strike two missions before Columbia was not classified as a more
serious threat, and for the next flight managers accepted a flight rationale that it was
safe to fly with foam losses. An action (and not a more serious in-flight anomaly) was
identified to determine the root cause of the foam loss and to propose corrective action -
however, this report and resolution were delayed until after the Columbia launch.
Even after it was clear from launch videos that foam had struck the Columbia orbiter in a
manner never before seen, Space Shuttle program managers were not unduly alarmed.
They could not imagine why anyone would want a photo of something that could be
fixed after landing. By this time, foam strikes were being seen as a maintenance issue.
This is a clear example of individuals having been conditioned by success, very similar
to the prevailing thought prior to Davis-Besse that the operational history of boric acid
leaks clearly demonstrated that conditions conducive to significant wastage of the
reactor pressure vessel head could not exist.
The report found that schedule pressures contributed to the actions of the Shuttle managers
leading up to the Columbia launch.
There was a timeliness aspect of the space shuttle program at this time. With a delay in
the flight before Columbia, a launch date related to the International Space Station
would not have been met, creating a public relations and political problem for NASA. To
stress the importance of meeting the Space Station milestones, NASA distributed a
screen saver with a countdown to the flight critical to the space station. This schedule
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was on the minds of shuttle managers in a manner that may not be very different to the
effect that an end-of-refueling outage countdown clock has on plant management.
How about the use of risk tools? Surely the use of sophisticated Probabilistic Risk Assessments
and Failure Modes and Effects Analyses would provide some quantitative measure of risk, and
by extension, safety. Here is what the Board reported, in part.
Some of the logic used to not disrupt the flight schedule was that the probability of loss
of foam was no higher/no lower than previous flights - with no engineering analysis, past
success was used as justification for future flights.
However, the Board identified that the calculations of foam not being shed from the
same area was a sleight of hand effort that made the probability appear low rather than
a serious grappling with the issue. The Board characterized this as rooted in an attitude
of what you dont see wont hurt you. Conversely, actual sampling over all flights with
imagery would have given a different picture with a much higher incidence rate.
How about organization issues and the presence of a questioning attitude? This is what the
Board found.
A flight in 1988 was a precursor to the Columbia accident. In 1988, the Atlantis was
described as looking like it had been blasted by a shotgun. In the case of Atlantis, one
of the heat-deflecting tiles was completely knocked off, exposing the orbiters skin to the
heat of re-entry. Post-flight analysis concluded that structural damage was confined to
this area, and burn-through prevented, only because of a thick aluminum plate at this
location - that sounds like NASAs version of stainless steel cladding.
With the later foam strike just two flights prior to the Columbia flight, shuttle program
management did not request a detailed examination of the orbiter for damage, in spite of
the experience from 1988. The Board concluded that the lack of institutional memory
indicated that NASA was not functioning as a learning organization.
The Board concluded that shuttle program managers appear to have confused the
notion of foam posing an accepted risk with foam not being a safety of flight issue.
The Board drew comparisons with the Challenger accident, where continued problems
with erosion of solid rocket booster O-rings fell outside of design requirements.
However, the continued success of the O-rings led to a false belief in the lack of a
challenge from O-ring erosion.
After the realization that Columbia had suffered a foam strike, engineers at NASA found
themselves in the position of having to prove that the situation was unsafe, a reversal of
the usual requirement to prove that a situation is safe. In addition, some experts stated
that foam strike damage was only a maintenance-level concern and on-orbit imaging of
possible wing damage was not necessary. Finally, the Board concluded that mission
management welcomed this opinion and sought no others, and further that this constant
reinforcement of managers pre-existing beliefs added another block to the wall between
decision-makers and concerned engineers.
Over all, the Columbia Accident Investigative Board paints a picture of organizational mis-
evolution that can be destructive to an engineering organization functioning as intended.
2-16
-5-
What does the future hold for materials degradation in the nuclear industry? It is unlikely that
we can prevent any form of cracking from occurring in nuclear power plant components. With
primary water stress corrosion cracking, there are to date, no consensus environmental
changes that can be used to eliminate cracking. Component replacement with a more resistant
material - such as with the upper heads and pressurizer heater sleeves at many of the plants in
the US - is the most likely approach to prevent cracking. Other approaches may include stress
improvement or weld overlays as preventative or mitigative measures. Alternatively, the
implementation of effective inspection approaches at a sufficient frequency can provide a robust
management scheme that gives a high assurance against reactor coolant pressure boundary
leakage, and prevents the cracking from challenging safety.
For degradation mechanisms or locations currently not anticipated, the industrys materials
degradation matrix and the NRCs Proactive Materials Degradation Assessment are shedding
light on areas that may demand attention in the future. Gathering information on the rate of
degradation, how it may manifest itself and approaches for effective detection will arm us with
the tools necessary to handle future degradation, should it occur.
So getting back to the original question - What is the NRCs approach to addressing materials
issues facing commercial nuclear power plants? The NRC will continue to consider all
approaches - preventive approaches, mitigative approaches, and maintenance or inspection-
based approaches. Each will be evaluated based on sound engineering principles and data.
Risk assessments and insights will continue to be used in our decision-making. NRC will be
conservative in its decision-making, and will strive to be realistically conservative.
As Ive tried to illuminate, there are many causal similarities between the Davis-Besse event and
the Columbia accident. We must strive to learn from past experiences, not only from within our
industry, but from outside it as well, and to put into practice what we have learned. We must
guard against complacency and remain inquisitive because we are so adept at convincing
ourselves that we have adequately resolved an issue - and in some cases, we may have. By
the slimmest of margins, Davis-Besse did not become an accident. Unfortunately, by the
slimmest of margins, Columbia was only minutes from a safe touchdown. Man may know more
than it ever has, and we may have available more tools and information than we ever have had,
but the future will always show our knowledge to be temporary and incomplete.
In closing, my experience with the way primary water stress corrosion cracking has been
addressed in the past reminds me of something the 19
th
century German philosopher, Arthur
Schopenhauer, once said, Every truth passes through three stages before it is recognized. In
the first, it is ridiculed, in the second it is opposed, and in the third it is regarded as self-evident.
More recent efforts within the industry, most notably activities related to the development of
inspection requirements for upper vessel head penetrations and Alloy 600 weld locations, have
been quite comprehensive, and your contributions are recognized. Industrys efforts to be
proactive in the management of materials issues should pay dividends in the future. But our
collective efforts in this area will not lead to long term success unless we periodically assess the
reasons for our successes to the causes of our past failures. The challenge before us in
securing a safe future for nuclear power is to maintain continued vigilance in identifying and
addressing both direct and indirect indications of materials degradation.
Thank you very much. I wish you all a very successful conference.
2-17
PWSCC of Alloys 600/82/182: An EPRI Perspective
Robin L. Jones
Technical Executive, Materials, EPRI
This presentation is intended to provide an EPRI perspective on the Alloy 600/82/182 cracking issue in PWRs but it
is likely that some of the authors personal biases also will become clear. The main point that the presentation
attempts to communicate is that, while PWSCC of Alloy 600 and its weld metals is certainly a serious degradation
issue, a lot of progress is being made towards the development and implementation of an effective issue
management program.
Concerns about the vulnerability of the existing U.S. nuclear plants to a variety of materials degradation and aging
issues have prompted the CNOs to launch an Industry Materials Initiative, which became effective at the beginning
of last year. One of the first activities undertaken within this Initiative was the preparation of a Strategic Plan
identifying the U.S. nuclear industrys highest priority materials degradation issues. The Alloy 600/82/182 cracking
issue showed up at the top of the PWR list in the Strategic Plan where it was characterized as the single biggest
challenge facing the PWR industry. This level of concern is based on the fact that issues of this type can be very
costly to manage and thus could make the existing PWRs significantly less cost competitive with other forms of
power generation than they are today.
Apart from hydroelectric power, nuclear power is currently the lowest cost electricity source in the U.S. in terms of
average production costs, virtually tied with coal and well below natural gas and oil, both of which have been losing
ground recently as fuel prices have soared to record levels. Nuclear production costs have declined steadily since
about 1988. In part, this reflects a concurrent improvement in nuclear plant capacity factors which have climbed
from around 60% in the early 1980s to near 90% today. To learn what it will take to maintain future nuclear power
production costs at low levels, its useful to review why capacity factors were so much lower in the 1980s than they
are today.
Although there were other problems involved in the low capacity factors observed in the 1980s, materials
degradation problems, particularly due to corrosion, were certainly a significant contributor. Corrosion-related
capacity factor losses in U.S. BWRs peaked in 1984 at over 18% and one corrosion issue, IGSCC adjacent to butt
welds in stainless steel reactor coolant system piping, was dominant throughout most of the decade. This issue had a
number of similarities to todays Alloy 600 PWSCC problem and can teach us some important lessons.
The BWR pipe-cracking problem actually surfaced during the 1970s and the large losses of capacity factor during
the 1980s reflect the impact of the implementation of remedies (mainly aimed at the reduction of inside-surface
tensile residual stresses adjacent to the welds) and repairs (mainly weld overlay repairs using IGSCC-resistant
materials) of cracked pipes found by inspection, and of other apparently uncracked but potentially-susceptible
locations. These high-impact measures were used to manage the pipe-cracking issue because the development of an
effective water chemistry remedy for BWR pipe cracking (which would have been much less expensive to
implement) proved to be difficult and time-consuming.
However, IGSCC mitigation via water chemistry changes came into its own in BWRs when the cracking of stainless
steel RPV internals emerged as a BWR issue in the early 1990s. Access limitations made other countermeasures
very difficult to apply, so major emphasis was placed on the development of a chemistry countermeasure. The
result was the Noble Metal Chemical Addition or NMCA process which has been widely used and which, to date,
has proved to be very effective.
The internals cracking issue has had much less impact on BWR capacity factors than the pipe-cracking issue which
preceded it. This difference illustrates two of the important lessons that can be learned from the past, namely that
generic materials degradation and aging problems can have large impacts on nuclear plant capacity factors and that
mitigation via water chemistry changes often can minimize those impacts. This is because water chemistry remedies
mitigate all the susceptible locations in the coolant system at once whereas other types of remedies and repairs must
be applied one location at a time. However, mitigation via water chemistry changes is much more difficult to
qualify than stress reduction and repair techniques.
2-19
The coolant contacts many components in the RCS so a change in RCS coolant chemistry to solve a particular
materials degradation problem may promote a new degradation problem in other RCS components made from
different materials, or result in a fuel cladding performance problem, or cause an undesirable redistribution of
radioactive materials within the system. Consequently, proper qualification of chemistry remedies involves
extensive and time-consuming testing and demonstration programs. Furthermore, implementation of a chemistry
change often requires plant-specific optimization because of plant-to-plant differences in materials and equipment.
In summary, the BWR experience with IGSCC adjacent to welds in stainless steel piping and internals suggests that
implementing the actions needed to address the Alloy 600/82/182 cracking issue in PWRs could potentially reduce
PWR capacity factors significantly for several years, particularly if one-location-at-a-time mitigation and repair
methods are the principal basis of the issue management approach.
The susceptibility of Alloy 600 to SCC in pure water was demonstrated in the laboratory some 50 years ago and
Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of mill annealed Alloy 600 steam generator tubes was one of
the degradation mechanisms responsible for the replacement of the majority of the original steam generators in U.S.
PWRs. During the 1980s and 1990s there were also several cases of PWSCC of Alloy 600 and its weld metals in
other primary system components. Nevertheless, the increased frequency and severity of cracking seen in the U.S.
PWRs during the early years of the new millennium did come as something of a surprise.
During the past few years, PWSCC of Alloy 600 vessel penetrations and Alloy 82/182 weldments in U.S. PWRs has
resulted in unexpected leakage in main coolant piping at one plant and in vessel penetrations at several other plants.
These events have raised concerns regarding the structural integrity of reactor coolant piping systems and vessel
penetrations in existing U.S. PWRs. There is a need to address these concerns and to assure that the practices and
techniques used in managing PWSCC are consistent industry-wide and are adequate to maintain plant safety,
minimize leakage events and permit optimum asset utilization. An industry-wide program, lead by EPRIs Materials
Reliability Program (MRP), is in progress to address these needs.
MRPs Alloy 600/82/182 Degradation Management Program has 3 main objectives. The first objective is to
develop a standard management protocol for plants to use in developing their plant-specific Alloy 600 management
plans that provides short- and long-term guidance for inspection, evaluation and management of all Alloy
600/82/182 applications in the PWR primary system other than steam generator tubing. The second objective is to
provide the supporting technical/regulatory basis for the standard protocol. The final objective is to reach, as soon
as practicable, the point at which this issue is fully under control and is regarded by the U.S. licensees and the
USNRC as an example of highly-effective materials degradation management.
The approach being used by the MRP to pursue these three objectives is based on the approach recommended in the
Industry Initiatives Strategic Plan and consists of five steps. The first step is to characterize the degradation
mechanism by defining the effects of stress, materials, and chemistry variables on the rate of PWSCC. The second is
to determine all Alloy 600/82/182 locations in the RCS for all vendor designs and conduct generic operability and
safety assessments assuming the occurrence of PWSCC at these locations. The third is to develop flaw inspection
and evaluation technology and guidelines for all locations, starting with those for which the potential consequences
of failure are most severe. The fourth is to evaluate available mitigation options and, if necessary develop additional
options and the fifth and final step is to evaluate available repair/ replacement options and, where necessary,
encourage the development of additional options.
Although there is no agreement yet on the mechanistic details of the PWSCC degradation process, a good deal is
known about the effects of stress and chemistry variables. However, test data under nominally the same conditions
of stress and environment show a high degree of scatter, apparently due to micro-structural variables which, at this
point, are not well understood. This is an area of much current research and some improvements can be anticipated
during the next few years.
The second step of the program is to define all the plant locations that are susceptible to this form of damage and to
assess the consequences if PWSCC does occur at those locations. Generic assessments of where Alloy 600 and its
weld metals are used in the PWR primary system have been completed and the resulting location maps show that
there are many potentially vulnerable locations in all U.S. PWRs, irrespective of the NSSS vendor or the plant
2-20
vintage. Of course, we dont have standard plants in the U.S. so the generic location maps have to be supplemented
by plant-specific studies, which will be completed by 2006.
In the meantime, safety and operability assessments are underway which assume the occurrence of PWSCC at the
generic locations. These assessments are essentially complete for CRDM nozzles and butt welds and indicate that
the consequences of undetected cracking are likely to be easily detectable leakage well in advance of any possibility
of a LOCA. The assessments will be extended to bottom-mounted nozzles and other components during 2005/6.
It would, of course, be desirable to detect and deal with cracking well in advance of any leakage and work is in
progress to develop and qualify the required non-destructive inspection methods. Good progress is being made in
this area but the work cannot be completed until after the plant-specific information about potential cracking
locations is available in 2006 because some plant-specific geometries may be found that cannot be covered by the
inspection methods now under development.
The third step of the MRPs program plan also requires the industry to develop the technology needed to evaluate
the significance of any cracks found and sized by NDE. First-generation disposition curves have been developed for
use in such evaluations. However, the laboratory data on which the current curves are based show a lot of scatter
(mostly because of the poorly-understood materials variables mentioned earlier) and additional testing is underway
to allow the development of more solidly-based second-generation curves.
The fourth and fifth steps in the program address the availability of options for mitigation, repair and replacement
and an initial evaluation of the current situation has recently been completed. Given the large number of susceptible
locations (many of which are difficult to access) mitigation of PWSCC via a primary water chemistry change
obviously would be a very attractive option. However, a fully qualified, effective chemistry countermeasure has not
yet been developed. Zinc addition appears to be the most promising possibility identified to date but laboratory data
suggest that zinc addition is more effective in preventing initiation than in slowing the growth of existing cracks.
Additional work in this area is needed, including further laboratory tests on the effects of zinc addition and, if
warranted based on the results of these tests, an in-plant demonstration of the costs and benefits of zinc addition
under plant operating conditions should be considered.
In the absence of a chemistry countermeasure for PWSCC, potentially more costly, location-specific mitigation and
repair measures will have to be used when existing cracks are found. A considerable number of such measures
(some of which are based on the BWR pipe-cracking remedies mentioned earlier) are being developed. In addition,
alternative materials have been identified for use in repair and replacement efforts. While these materials (which
include Alloy 690 and its weld metals as well as stainless steels) are not immune to cracking, they are much more
resistant to PWSCC than Alloy 600 and its weld metals. These more resistant materials also can be used for
potentially cost-effective pre-emptive replacements that reduce the number of susceptible locations (for example, a
reactor vessel head replacement can eliminate all of the susceptible CRDM penetrations at once).
Regulatory acceptance obviously is one of the keys to success of any issue-management program and is being
pursued here by the industry via NEI. Regular, informal meetings are held to communicate program results and
status and some joint R&D activities have been started between NRC Research and EPRI-MRP.
Cost-effectively managing this material degradation issue for the remaining life of the existing U.S. PWRs will be a
significant challenge and to get ahead of the curve a well-coordinated, multi-year RD&D effort is needed,
involving all U.S. PWR licensees together with EPRI, the NSSS Vendors and Owners Groups, NEI and INPO. The
Industry Initiative on Management of Materials Issues has established the type of proactive, industry-wide
program needed for success but much work remains to be done on this issue. PWSCC of Alloy 600 and its weld
metals can be effectively managed via the 5-step process outlined earlier but the implementation of remedies, repairs
and replacements may have a significant adverse impact on PWR capacity factors and power production costs
during the next five to ten years unless the industry can identify, develop and deploy an effective chemistry
countermeasure.
2-21
EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Not to be copied or distributed without written authorization from EPRI
PWSCC of Alloys
600/82/182: An EPRI
Perspective
Robin L. Jones
Technical Executive, Materials
EPRI, USA
March 7, 2005
2-22
2
Introduction
In May 2003, the U.S. Chief Nuclear Officers unanimously
approved the Industry Initiative on Management of Materials
Issues and the associated Guideline for the Management of
Materials Issues, NEI 03-08.
One of the requirements of NEI 03-08, which became effective
January 2, 2004, is the preparation and annual updating of a
strategic plan that identifies the U.S. nuclear industrys high
priority materials degradation issues.
Rev. 0 of the Integrated Materials Issues Strategic Plan, which
was issued in March 2004, identifies PWSCC of Alloy 600/82/182
as the single biggest challenge facing the PWR industry.
2-23
3
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
Nuclear 1.71
Coal 1.85
Gas 4.06
Oil 4.41
Source: RDI /EUCG . Converted to 2002 dollars by NEI Updated 8/03
U.S. Electricity Production Costs (1981-2002)
in 2002 cents per kilowatt-hour
2-24
4
89.6
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
8
0
8
1
8
2
8
3
8
4
8
5
8
6
8
7
8
8
8
9
9
0
9
1
9
2
9
3
9
4
9
5
9
6
9
7
9
8
9
9
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
C
a
p
a
c
i
t
y

F
a
c
t
o
r

(
%
)
Source: NRC Updated 02/04
U.S. Nuclear Industry Is Achieving Record
Levels of Performance
2-25
5
Corrosion-Related Capacity Factor Losses
in BWRs
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
C
a
p
a
c
i
t
y

F
a
c
t
o
r

L
o
s
s

(
%
)
NSSS Piping Reactor Internals All Other Causes
2-26
6
Barbara will put the graphic
here
if you like
Top guide
Core
shroud
Core
Plate
ICM guide
tube
'P/SLC
piping
Jet pump
Feedwater
Sparger
Core Spray
Sparger
Steam
Dryer
Major BWR RPV Internal Components
2-27
7
Corrosion-Related Capacity Factor Losses
in BWRs
Through December 31, 1998 Through December 31, 1998
Capacity Factor Loss (%)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
All Other Causes
Reactor Internals
NSSS Piping
2-28
LWR Chemistry Optimization
Materials
Degradation
Radiation
Exposure
Water
Chemistry
Guidelines
Chemistry
Control Issues
Fuel
Performance
2- 2-29
8
9
89.6
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
8
0
8
1
8
2
8
3
8
4
8
5
8
6
8
7
8
8
8
9
9
0
9
1
9
2
9
3
9
4
9
5
9
6
9
7
9
8
9
9
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
C
a
p
a
c
i
t
y

F
a
c
t
o
r

(
%
)
Source: NRC Updated 02/04
U.S. Nuclear Industry Is Achieving Record
Levels of Performance
2-30
10
PWSCC Experience Outside of SG
1980s
Leak - pressurizer instrument nozzle
Leak - pressurizer heater sleeve
Leak - two steam generator drain nozzles
Leaks - 20 pressurizer heater sleeves
Fail - steam generator tube plug
Leaks - pressurizer instrument nozzles (non-
US)
1990s
Leak - control rod drive mechanism nozzle
(non-US)
Leak replaced pressurizer instrument
nozzle (original nozzle involved)
Cracks - two hot leg piping instrument
nozzles
DE of Leaking CRDM nozzle - indications
near the top of the J-groove weld (included
OD circ crack and cracks in weld)
Leak - circ crack pressurizer relief valve
nozzle safe end.
7 mm deep crack - CRDM nozzle
2000s
Shallow ID cracks - hot leg nozzle butt welds
(non-US).
Leak - reactor vessel hot leg nozzle pipe butt
weld
Leaks - CRDM nozzle and five thermocouple
nozzles
Through-wall circ crack - in CRDM nozzle above
the J-groove weld
Leaks - two CRDM nozzles - significant boric
acid wastage of the reactor vessel top- head
surface.
Several CRDM nozzle leaks after full
inspection, most of the welds had cracks with
many requiring repair.
Leaks - Two bottom mounted instrument (BMI)
nozzles
Circ through-wall cracks five pressurizer heater
sleeves
Cracks CRDM Nozzle weld
Leaks and Cracks pressurizer relief nozzle
and safety nozzles
Crack surge line butt weld
Cracks hot leg drain line butt weld and cold
leg drain line butt weld
2-31
11
V. C. Summer
Fall 2000, Discovered
Crack
A Hot Leg Nozzle to Pipe
Weld (Alloys 182 and 82)
Carbon Steel Nozzle Stainless Steel Pipe
Extent of Axial Crack
Extent of Circumferential Crack
Blunts at Carbon Steel
2-32
12
Oconee 1
November 2000, Discovered Leaking Alloy 600
Penetration
2-33
13
RPVH Penetrations, Davis-Besse,
Replacement Head, BMIs
2-34
14
Alloy 600/82/182 Degradation Management
Program
Issue:
PWSCC of Alloy 600 vessel penetrations and Alloy
82/182 weldments in U.S. PWRs has resulted in
unexpected leakage in main coolant piping at one plant
and in vessel penetrations at several other plants.
These events have raised concerns regarding the
structural integrity of reactor coolant piping systems and
vessel penetrations in existing U.S. PWRs.
There is a need to assure that industry practices and
techniques used in managing PWSCC are consistent and
adequate to maintain plant safety, minimize leakage
events and permit optimum asset utilization.
2-35
15
Program
Objectives
Develop a standard management protocol for plants to
use in developing their plant-specific Alloy 600
management plans that provides short- and long-term
guidance for inspection, evaluation and management of
all Alloy 600/82/182 applications in the PWR primary
system other than steam generator tubing.
Provide the supporting technical/regulatory basis for the
standard protocol.
As soon as practicable, reach a point at which this issue
is is regarded by the U.S. licensees and NRC as an
example of routine and effective materials degradation
management.
2-36
16
Program
Steps Required to Reach Objective
Define the effects of stress, materials, and chemistry variables on
the rate of PWSCC (i.e., characterize the degradation mechanism).
Determine all Alloy 600/82/182 locations in the RCS for all vendor
designs and conduct generic operability and safety assessments
assuming the occurrence of PWSCC at these locations.
Develop flaw inspection and evaluation technology and guidelines
for all locations, starting with those for which the potential
consequences of failure are most severe.
Evaluate available mitigation options and, if necessary develop
additional options.
Evaluate available repair/replacement options and, where
necessary, encourage the development of additional options.
2-37
17
PWSCC Mechanism
Chemistry variables
Temperature
ECP (hydrogen)
Zinc
Stress variables
Residual stress
Stress relief
Service stress
Stress concentrators
Materials variables
Alloy composition
Comp. and morph. of GB
carbides?
Cr depletion at GBs?
Heat-to-heat variability?
2-38
18
Define Locations of Alloys 600/82/182
Progress to Date
Typical locations identified for each NSSS design
Mandatory requirement in place for all utilities to identify plant-
specific Alloy 600 locations by June 2006
Plans for 2005-2006
Identify all remaining pressure boundary and non-pressure
boundary Alloy 600 locations
Determine where 82/182 may have been allowed in fabrication
procedures
Review design basis for these locations
2-39
19
Alloy 600 Locations in Westinghouse Plants
2-40
20
Alloy 600 Locations in Combustion Engineering Plants
2-41
21
Alloy 600 Locations in B&W Plants
2-42
22
Generic Operability and Safety Assessments
Progress to date
Completed for CRDM Nozzles and Butt Welds:
Failure modes and effects analysis
Stress analysis
Fracture Mechanics
Leakage and Wastage
Effect of Repairs
Plans for 2005-2006
Bottom Mounted Nozzles
Failure modes and effects analysis
Stress analysis
Fracture Mechanics
Leakage and Wastage
Effect of Repairs
2-43
23
Generic Operability and Safety Assessments
Analyses to Date
CRDM Nozzles and J-groove welds
Deterministic and probabilistic analysis
Calculated probability of net section collapse due to circ flaw above the j-groove weld
Calculated probability of head failure due to wastage
Calculated change in core damage frequency
Alloy 82/182 Piping butt welds
Calculated time to through wall flaw
Calculated time from 1 gpm to failure (or 10 gpm)
Evaluated the effect of PWSCC for LBB locations
Analyses Planned for 2005-2006
Bottom Mounted Nozzles and J-groove welds (WOG & B&WOG)
Calculated probability of net section collapse due to circ flaw below the j-groove weld
Calculated probability of head failure due to wastage
2-44
24
Develop I&E Technology and Guidelines
Progress to Date
CRDM Nozzles and J-groove Welds
MRP-75: focused on visuals as primary examination
NRC Order EA 03-009
MRP-117: baseline volumetric with re-inspection dependent on
results
ASME Code Case N-729 (alternative to the Order?)
Plans for 2005-2006
Alloy 82/182 Piping Butt Welds
Existing code requirements
MRP-139: supplemental volumetric (recognize mitigation)
MRP-140: Implications of PWSCC on LBB
Define inspection methods and frequencies
2-45
25
PWSCC Crack Growth Rates for Alloy 600 in
Laboratory Tests (MRP-55NP)
1.E-12
1.E-11
1.E-10
1.E-09
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Stress Intensity Factor, K (MPam)
C
r
a
c
k

G
r
o
w
t
h

R
a
t
e
,

d
a
/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
MRP Curve
Modified Scott Curve
MRP Lab CGR Database (158
points)
Cook2 #75 Length Increase
Cook2 #75 Depth Increase
All data adjusted to 325C (617F)
using an activation energy of
130 kJ/mole (31.0 kcal/mole)
1 mm/yr
MRP Curve
Modified Scott
2-46
26
PWSCC Mitigation/Repair/Replacement
Chemical Mitigation
Zinc
ECP/Hydrogen
Stress Improvement
Mitigation
MSIP
PWOL
Peening
Alternative materials for
repairs/replacements
(including inlays)
Alloy 690
Alloys 52 and 152
Stainless steels (300 series)
2-47
27
Evaluate/Develop Mitigation/Repair/
Replacement Options
Progress to Date
MRP-111: Summary of Alloy 690 Experience
Developed list of Ideal Repair Attributes for Bottom Mounted
Nozzles for utilities and vendors use
Survey of available mechanical mitigation technologies
Lab investigations for chemical mitigation
Lab investigations for novel mitigation
Lab testing of Alloy 690
Plans for 2005-2006
Continue lab studies
Qualification work for stress improvement processes
Laser peening
Cavitation peening
Preventative weld overlay
2-48
28
Program
Steps to Reach Objective
Define the effects of stress, materials, and chemistry variables on the rate
of PWSCC (i.e., characterize the degradation mechanism).
Determine all Alloy 600/82/182 locations in the RCS for all vendor designs
and conduct generic operability and safety assessments assuming the
occurrence of PWSCC at these locations.
Develop flaw inspection and evaluation technology and guidelines for all
locations, starting with those for which the potential consequences of
failure are most severe.
Evaluate available mitigation options and, if necessary develop additional
options.
Evaluate available repair/replacement options and, where necessary,
encourage the development of additional options.
Obtain regulatory acceptance of all of the above.
2-49
29
Program Outlook
Cost-effectively managing this degradation issue for the
remaining life of the existing U.S. PWRs will be a significant
challenge and to get ahead of the curve a well-coordinated,
multi-year RD&D effort is needed, involving all U.S. PWR
licensees together with EPRI, the NSSS Vendors and Owners
Groups, NEI and INPO
It is very important to recognize that all PWRs in the U.S. (and
almost all PWRs worldwide) are vulnerable to this degradation
mechanism
PWR licensees throughout the world are being invited to
participate in this degradation management program.
2-50
Contribution of hot and cold laboratories investigations to the
resolution of EDF Alloys 600/182/82 PWSCC issues.
F. Cattant, F. Vaillant, J-M. Boursier, S. de-Vito Electricit de France
Abstract
The high level of standardization across the EDF PWR fleet drives the French Utility to
focus special attention to generic issues. Consequently, EDF applies a rigorous approach
to materials issues, especially to those associated with A600/182/82 because they are
always generic. Traditionally the EDF approach to material issues does not rely solely or
to any great extent, on engineering studies, but makes extensive use of models developed
to manage the material issues. These models are continuously validated and up-dated
through laboratory Destructive Examinations (DEs) and field Non Destructive
Examination (NDE). This paper presents some examples of DEs of harvested field
components or specimens, conducted in the EDF hot laboratory at Chinon. The paper
shows how these DE contributed to the resolution of A600/182/82 issues. Similarly, the
paper also gives a flavor of the types of tests and studies, undertaken in the EDF
Research and Development (R&D) materials laboratories, to support the management of
A600/182/82 issues. Recently, the US Utilities and EDF approaches regarding the
management of A600/182/82 issues have moved closer than they were in the 1990s. Both
are now adopting more proactive approaches and have integrated some DEs of field
components or specimens.
Background
With almost 88% of its electricity production generated by nuclear power plants in 2004,
EDF must apply a rigorous approach to material issues that can severely impact on its
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fleets reliability. Consequently, EDF take
conservative actions to prevent generic material issues developing. The EDF approach
includes physical or semi-empirical-based models which are continuously validated and
up-dated by laboratory testing and field NDE. In this approach, field components DE are
paramount. Notwithstanding this conservative approach the Bugey 3 Reactor Pressure
Vessel (RPV) head leaked in 1991. However at that time, no RPV head penetration had
been removed from the field for DE. Since then, EDF has performed many DEs on RPV
head penetrations, without further leakage incidents. However, this good result cannot
simply be attributed to field components DEs, since this variable is only part of failure
mitigation equation. Another specialty that EDF does not share with that many Utilities is
that of a large in-house R&D, with laboratories capable of conducting detailed materials
research investigations. For the past 30 years, EDF R&D material laboratories have
undertaken many tests to support field components investigations and in fine, the
maintenance policy. This paper presents the work EDF has been conducting for many
years in both their hot and cold laboratories to support the resolution of Alloy 600/182/82
Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) issues. This paper excludes steam
generator tubing PWSCC.
2-51
A600/182/82 field components Destructive Examinations in EDF hot laboratory
With the exception of the Steam Generator
(SG) tubes and tube plugs, when EDF
decided to perform the DE of a retired SG,
no A600 field failures had occurred in
France. EDF made this decision, as early as
1988 (Dampierre 1 Steam Generator
Replacement (SGR) took place in 1990). At
that time, the developing SG tubes and
tubes-plug PWSCC, along with some
laboratory studies, engineering analyses and
modeling, drove EDF to the conclusion that
A600 PWSCC could extend to other
components and that laboratory DE of
retired component could valuably
supplement field NDE. However, the first
A600 component leaks (SG tubes excluded)
occurred before Dampierre 1 SGR. A
pressurizer nozzle at Nogent 1 leaked in
1989, after 12,110 hours of operation. The
leak was discovered following the first In
Service Inspection (ISI) hydro test. The
crack responsible for the leak is visible on
Figure 1. Various light optical microscopy
and Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM)
examinations concluded that this crack was
typical of PWSCC. Further, the nozzle DE
demonstrated that the original PWSCC
susceptible A600 material had to be replaced
with a more PWSCC resistant material. To
this end, all of the A600 pressurizer nozzles
on four-loop units were replaced by nozzles
manufactured from stainless steel.
Figure 1: Nogent 1 pressurizer nozzle. View
of the through wall leaking crack.
If pressurizer nozzles leaks had a limited
impact on the 20 four-loop units availability,
the next reported leak is different story.
During the 10-year RPV hydro test of Bugey
unit 3, on September 23
rd
1991, a leak was
first detected by the acoustic monitoring
system, and then visually at the outer
diameter of the head, at the 207 bar (3002
PSI) pressure hold. Visual examination of
the relevant head area, with the RCS
pressurized to 25 bar (363 PSI), confirmed
the presence of water and crystalline boric
acid at the base of a peripheral penetration
(#54). Once the head had been removed, the
CRDM and the thermal sleeve dismantled, a
series of inspections revealed ID cracks at
the weld elevation of this penetration. The
penetration #54 was then harvested from the
head and sent to the hot laboratory for DE.
Once again, the leak originated from through
wall PWSCC. As the leak was quite recent,
head wastage was minimal (60 m 2.4
mils, Figure 2).
Figure 2: assessment of the head low alloy
steel wastage in the vicinity of the leak path.
Bugey 3, penetration #54.
However, the bad news was that even with a
small leak and a limited wastage, some OD
PWSCC had initiated in the base metal
(Figure 3) and eventually in the weld too.
Such events could have a significant impact
on plant integrity, and demonstrated that
operating with a leaking penetration was not
recommended. Following Bugey 3, the EDF
hot laboratory conducted 25 other DEs of
Nozzle OD
<= Pressurizer ID
Field
cut
Lab
cut
Nozzle ID
Leak path
Leak path to the annulus exit
Weld
location
Clad
Low alloy
steel
View
of the
head
bore
#54
ID
2-52
RPV head penetrations specimens. Data
from these DE programs provided
significant contributions to benchmarking
the field NDE, especially regarding PWSCC
Crack Growth Rate (CGR) and to confirm
the absence of circumferential PWSCC.
Figure 3: OD initiated PWSCC crack at the
bottom of the annulus. Longitudinal section
around angle 30.Bugey 3, penetration #54.
Despite the limited cracking found by the
DE of Dampierre 1 SG triple point (Figure
4), EDF decided to examine two other triple
points, again from retired SGs. One of these
hot channel heads had been hammered by
loose parts during the commissioning tests.
The DE of these channel head triple points
always revealed some degree of shallow
PWSCC, either in the base metal or in the
weld, mainly in hammered areas.
Figure 4: overview of the channel head
specimen removed from Dampierre 1
retired steam generator.
Despite the on-going EDF RPV head
replacement policy being more than 80%
completed, this is not the end for penetration
DE programs. There are still other
A600/182/82 locations that would benefit
from future RPV head penetration DE, i.e.:
bottom mounted instrumentation.
A600/182/82 PWSCC tests in EDF cold laboratories
EDF conducted laboratory studies on both
PWSCC initiation (and associated
susceptibility index) and propagation.
Figure 5 shows that PWSCC occurs in three
steps. The first one is the incubation period
which lasts until crack initiates. Then, the
crack propagates slowly until it reaches a
critical depth (typically: 100 m). The third
stage is the rapid propagation.
Figure 5: the three steps of PWSCC.
Penetration
base metal
Weld
Tubesheet
Stub
Partition
plate
SG head
d : IGSCC depth
t : time
Slow propagation
Rapid propagation
Incubation
K
Iscc
ld
c
Initiation
d : IGSCC depth
t : time
Slow propagation
Rapid propagation
Incubation
K
Iscc
ld
c
Initiation
2-53
PWSCC initiation studies.
Over the past 30 years, EDF R&D material
laboratories performed a large number of
PWSCC initiation tests on the heats used for
various studies. For example, Figure 6 shows
the PWSCC initiation time for as-welded
A182 in various surface state conditions (in
reality, Figure 6 displays the time to failure
of the specimens, however the time of rapid
propagation is very short given the kind of
test ran here) .
Figure 6: as welded A182 PWSCC initiation
time for various surface conditions.
In the early 90s, when thick-walled A600
components PWSCC started becoming a
major issue, a susceptibility index was
developed in order to predict which of the
A600 locations would crack first. Index 1
was given to a SG tube cracking in 10,000
hours. Other A600 locations were compared
to this tube, taking into account a material
index, the operating temperature and a stress
index. Figure 7 plots this PWSCC
susceptibility index for various A600
locations or components, as of late 90s.
Regarding EDF PWRs A600 components,
the RPV head penetrations were not ranked
as the most susceptible location because the
stresses there were underestimated.
Moreover, the first susceptibility models did
not take into account the surface state factor,
which often proved to have a very
significant impact on the initiation time.
Figure 7: A600 locations or components
PWSCC initiation time versus
susceptibility index.
The A600/182/82 zones or components
maintenance policy relies heavily on these
PWSCC initiation studies, for example
regarding the life expectation of TT600
components compared to those made from
MA600, or the locations of A182 versus
A600.
PWSCC propagation studies.
Following the Bugey 3 leak discovery in
1991, some EDF PWRs had to operate for a
few years with cracked RPV heads. As deep
cracks were not tolerated, a good knowledge
of the PWSCC growth rate was needed in
order to set relevant inspection intervals.
Another strong incentive for PWSCC CGR
determination was in the optimization of the
heads replacement planning. Therefore,
EDF, developed a PWSCC propagation
model taking into account the influence of
the stress intensity factor, the temperature
and the material (Figure 8). This model has
been validated further by the field
inspections (the Figure 8 upper bound curve
is consistent with the crack growth rates
measured from the field inspections).
100
1000
100 1000 10000 100000 1000000
Dure quivalente 325C (h)
C
o
n
t
r
a
i
n
t
e

a
p
p
l
i
q
u
e

(
M
P
a
)
CC-polie
CC-crouie
CC-poli-NF
CC-crouie-NF
200
300
400
500
600
absence de
fissuration
Rp0,2
2-54
Figure 8: PWSCC propagation model (upper
bound curve) for A600 RPV head
penetration material.
The laboratory studies, along with the field
inspections, contributed to the success of the
RPV head penetrations PWSCC
management. Only a few penetration repairs
were needed, mostly in the early 90s. Over
the past 10 years, a smooth RPV head
replacement program has cut the need for
extensive repairs and prevented further
leakage incidents.
Conclusion
Because of the high level of standardization across the EDF PWR fleet , materials issues,
especially those associated with A600/182/82, are always generic. Traditionally the EDF
approach to material issues does not rely solely or to any great extent, on engineering
studies, but makes extensive use of models developed to manage the material issues.
These models are continuously validated and up-dated through laboratory destructive
examinations and field non destructive examination.
Over the past 15 years, destructive examinations have been carried out in the EDF hot
laboratory of Chinon on specimens from 26 RPV head penetrations, from half a dozen
pressurizer nozzles, and from 3 steam generator partition plates.
Over the same period, cold laboratory studies on materials provided major support to the
safety analyses and to the maintenance policy, i.e.: CGR curves, new alloys qualification.
This approach has been successful in France with no RPV heads leak since the first one,
which occurred in 1991.
1,00E-12
1,00E-11
1,00E-10
1,00E-09
1,00E-08
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
KT initial (MPam1/2)
(
d
a
/d
t
)
m
a
x
(
m
/s
)
WF675
WH220
HB400
2-55
Contribution of hot and cold laboratory
investigations to the resolution of EDF
Alloys 600/182/82 PWSCC issues.
F. Cattant, F. Vaillant, J.M. Boursier,
S. De-Vito - EDF
EPRI 2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600
Santa Ana Pueblo, NM March 7-10, 2005
2-56
18/10/2005 2
Contribution of hot and cold laboratory investigations to the resolution of EDF Alloys 600/182/82 PWSCC
issues. F. Cattant, F. Vaillant, J.M. Boursier, C. Bibollet, S. De-Vito EDF EPRI 2005 International
PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference and Exhibit Show. Santa Ana Pueblo, NM March 7-10, 2005
Content
Background.
Hot Laboratory DEs, some examples
Pressurizer Nozzles
RPV Head Penetrations
SG Channel Heads
Cold Laboratory Studies
PWSCC Initiation Studies
PWSCC Propagation Studies
Conclusion.
2-57
18/10/2005 3
Background
In 2004, 88% of EDF electricity
was generated by PWRS.
High level of standardization
across the EDF PWR fleet.
Any material issue is generic.
EDF has extensive in-house
capabilities (hot and cold
laboratories) to conduct material
investigations.
Material investigations are key
to a successful A600 component
management strategy.
2-58
18/10/2005 4
Pressurizer Nozzles (1)
1989: EDF first leak
in a thick-walled
component
Nogent 1 first ISI,
after only 12,110 hours
of operation
Visual leak detection
during RCS hydro test
(~3,000 PSI)
2-59
18/10/2005 5
Pressurizer Nozzles (2)
High stresses: hard
roll transition
High temperature:
(345C/653F)
Susceptible Material:
LTMA600
Failure root cause =
PWSCC
All A600 nozzles
replaced by 316 SS
nozzles
Nozzle ID
Nozzle OD
Field
cut
Lab
cut
2-60
18/10/2005 6
RPV Penetrations (1)
1991: 10-year RCS hydro test
of Bugey 3 (207 bar 3,002 PSI)
Penetration #54 leak detected
by acoustic monitoring system
Confirmed by visual at 25 bar
(363 PSI)
Penetration #54 harvested
from the head for hot laboratory
DE
2-61
18/10/2005 7
DE revealed:
A through wall
longitudinal PWSCC crack
propagating in both A600
and A182 materials
Leak path clearly visible
in the annulus
Limited head low alloy
steel wastage: 60 m (2.4
mils)
2-62
18/10/2005 8
DE revealed occurrence
of PWSCC at the OD of
the penetration:
PWSCC in the base
metal
PWSCC in the heat
affected zone
PWSCC in the J-
Groove weld
2-63
18/10/2005 9
The good news was that the RCS hydro test was
efficient in finding the leak before it became a safety
concern
The bad news was that even with a recent & small
leak and a limited head wastage, some OD PWSCC
had already initiated in the base metal and
eventually in the weld too
Consequently: operating with CDRM leak was not
recommended
2-64
18/10/2005 10
SG channel heads (1)
The SG channel head is a PWSCC susceptible
area, in particular the triple point zone
PT indications revealed defects in some channel
heads
SGRs provide opportunities for harvesting areas
with PT indications
EDF performed several DEs of specimens
removed from channel heads
2-65
18/10/2005 11
SG channel
heads (2)
Dampierre 1
SG 3 triple
point
PWSCC of
base metals
and welds
But: defects
may originate
from LOMI
decon
2-66
18/10/2005 12
Saint Laurent B1 SG
2 hot channel head
hammered by loose
parts during
commissioning tests
2 cylindrical
specimens ( 45 mm)
Shallow PWSCC in
cold work areas (base
metal)
2-67
18/10/2005 13
Gravelines SG 2 hot
channel head
2 PT indications in
the weld
Cylindrical specimen
( ~13 cm)
LOF and
interdendritic
corrosion prior to
commissioning
+ shallow partition
plate PWSCC
2-68
18/10/2005 14
Laboratory studies: PWSCC initiation: Susceptibility
Index (1)
Stress corrosion susceptibility index : 10000 / i
s
i
T
i
M
Stress Index
I
V
= k
1
V
4
Temperature index
,
T
= k
2
.
exp(-180000/RT)
Material index
i
M
2-69
18/10/2005 15
PWSCC initiation: Susceptibility Index (2)
Correlation between the susceptibility Index and the field
experience
2-70
18/10/2005 16
PWSCC Initiation: Studies (1)
PWSCC initiation time needed for
Characterization of the materials used for laboratory
studies
Characterization of materials used in the field
Determination of the life of field components
Comparing TT600 to MA600
Comparing A600 to A182/82
Support to field inspection interval determination
2-71
18/10/2005 17
PWSCC Initiation Studies (2)
Example: PWSCC threshold determination for as-
welded A182
100
1000
100 1000 10000 100000 1000000
Dure quivalente 325C (h)
C
o
n
t
r
a
i
n
t
e

a
p
p
l
i
q
u
e

(
M
P
a
)
CC-polie
CC-crouie
CC-poli-NF
CC-crouie-NF
200
300
400
500
600
absence de
fissuration
R
p0,2
2-72
18/10/2005 18
PWSCC Propagation Studies (1)
Following RPV CRDM PWSCC discovery, some units
had to operate with cracked heads
PWSCC CGR needed to establish optimized
inspection intervals
PWSCC CGR needed to optimize the heads
replacement planning
PWSCC propagation model developed for various
heats of CRDM materials
Propagation model further validated by field
inspections
2-73
18/10/2005 19
Influence of K, T and Material
(da/dt)
max325
= D.(K
Tinitial
K
ISCC
)
0.3
exp (-130 000/RT)
1,00E-12
1,00E-11
1,00E-10
1,00E-09
1,00E-08
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
KT initial (MPam1/2)
(
d
a
/
d
t
)
m
a
x

(
m
/
s
)
WF675
WH220
HB400
2-74
18/10/2005 20
Laboratory PWSCC CGR curve validated by field experience
Upper bound curve at 290 C in laboratory : da/dt = D.(K-9)
0.3
Mean curve measured on plants at 290 C : da/dt = E.(K-9)
0,5
1,E-12
1,E-11
1,E-10
1,E-09
0 20 40 60 80 100
K (MPa.m0.5)
(
d
a
/
d
t
)

2
9
0

(
m
/
s
)
(da/dt)upper 290
WF675
plants, hot dome
plants, cold dome
plants, hot calcul 290
mean curve, plants
upper curve WF675,
290C, laboratory
mean curve,
plants 290C
4 mm
2-75
18/10/2005 21
Conclusion (1)
At the high levels of standardization across the EDF PWR
fleet, materials problems become generic; waiting for an
unforeseen material failure is unacceptable
EDF must adopt a proactive approach to minimize the
impact of material degradation on plant availability,
especially problems associated with alloy A600/182/82
The EDF materials management strategy relies heavily on
DEs of field components in the Hot laboratories at Chinon
and on laboratory studies (both in-house and with partners)
2-76
18/10/2005 22
Conclusion (2)
Hot Laboratory DEs have provided significant contributions
to resolving A600/182/82 issues, for example:
Pressurizer nozzles DEs showed that A600 had to be
replaced with SS
RPV head CRDMs DEs showed that operating with a leak
was not recommended in particular because of the risk of
OD PWSCC initiation
SG channel heads DEs showed that PWSCC was not
significant even with cold work conditions; consequently
field inspection requirements could be relaxed
2-77
18/10/2005 23
Conclusion (3)
Cold Laboratory studies were a major contributor to the
A600/182/82 zones maintenance policy, in particular regarding:
The ranking of the A600/182/82 zones according to their
PWSCC susceptibility (optimization of the field inspections
strategy)
The determination of RPV upper and lower head
penetrations inspection interval
The determination of CRDM repair or replacement criteria
(CGR studies)
The determination of the margins brought by TT600 as
compared to MA600 and of A182 or A82 as compared to
A600
2-78
18/10/2005 24
Conclusion (4)
The beneficial role played by Hot and Cold Laboratory
studies in minimizing PWSCC in the French PWR Fleet
is clear. No other CRDM leak has occurred in a French
RPV head, which contrasts with PWR RPV head
cracking incidents worldwide
This EDF materials strategy and recent US
approaches have some similarities, in particular
regarding the DE of field components or specimens:
South Texas Project 1, North Anna 2, Davis Besse
2-79
18/10/2005 25
International Symposium related to the topic
of this presentation:
Fontevraud 6
Contribution of materials investigation to the
resolution of light water reactors issues
Fontevraud, France, September 18 21 2006
2-80
3
SESSION 1A: CRACK GROWTH AND INITIATION
The subject of crack growth and initiation in nickel-based alloys was addressed by six
participants in Session 1A. Summaries of the presentations are given below followed by the
questions asked, responses provided, and comments made by the participants concerning each
presentation. Click on the links to access directly copies of the materials presented together with
extended abstracts.
MRP Development of Crack Growth Rate Disposition Curves for Primary
Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Thick-Section Alloy 600
Components and Alloy 82, 182, and 132 Weldments, presented by G. White,
DEI (Paper 1A.1)
This presentation was given by G. White of Dominion Engineering, Inc. (DEI). The main points
made during the presentation were as follows:
x In 2001 and 2002, the Materials Reliability Program (MRP) developed a crack growth rate
(CGR) equation for thick-wall Alloy 600 wrought material [7]. It is based on controlled
testing of fracture mechanics specimens fabricated using 26 heats of thick-wall Alloy 600
material. Evaluation of the screened laboratory data on a heat-by-heat basis resulted in a log-
normal distribution of CGR curves that describes the observed variability in crack growth
rates. The MRP-recommended CGR curve corresponds to the 75
th
percentile level of this
distribution. As such, the recommended curve may be interpreted as the mean of the upper
half of the distribution describing the variability in CGR due to material heat. The
deterministic CGR equation developed by the MRP for Alloy 600 has been adopted by
Section XI of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code for continued-service evaluation of
PWSCC flaws detected in PWR reactor vessel closure head nozzles, including CRDM
nozzles. The MRP deterministic curve, and the probabilistic distribution of CGR data upon
which it is based, have also been applied as a key input to industry safety assessments for
PWSCC.
x The MRP study of the crack growth rates applicable for Alloy 600 wrought material also
included an assessment of the potential effect on CGR of the environment on the OD of a
reactor vessel closure head nozzle following leakage of primary coolant into the annulus
between the penetration nozzle and the vessel head. Based on this evaluation, the MRP
recommended that a factor of 2 be conservatively applied to the MRP CGR curve for
7
Materials Reliability Program (MRP) Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating Primary Water Stress Corrosion
Cracking (PWSCC) of Thick-Wall Alloy 600 Materials (MRP-55) Revision 1, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2002.
1006695.
3-1
evaluation of postulated flaws in Alloy 600 RVH nozzle base metal that are in contact with a
wetted annulus environment for leak rates up to 1 liter/h (0.004 gpm).
x A similar requirement for a CGR expression was identified for Alloy 82/182/132 weldments
following observations of cracking in primary circuit welds with high residual stresses and in
some J-groove welds attaching control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles to the reactor
closure head. In 2004, the MRP completed a CGR study similar to the previous study on the
Alloy 600 base metal. After reviewing the key metallurgical aspects of Alloys 82, 182, and
132, the MRP-115 report [8] describes the data and methods used to develop the CGR
equation for such weldments. The study analyzed in detail the laboratory testing techniques
that have been used to generate CGR data for these weld metals in simulated PWR primary
water environments. Appropriate screening procedures were developed and applied to
produce the final MRP database before using an agreed data reduction methodology to derive
two separate CGR curves as a function of temperature and stress intensity factor for Alloys
82 and 182/32, including consideration of the effects of dendrite orientation. For stress
intensity factors greater than 20 MPam, the new CGR curve for Alloy 182/132 weld metal
is nearly parallel to, and about four times higher than, the previously reported MRP-55 curve
for Alloy 600 wrought material. The MRP study included comparisons with other laboratory
data not used in derivation of the new MRP-115 lines, with the limited field data available
from repeat non-destructive examination inspections of a cracked primary circuit butt weld at
the Ringhals PWR in Sweden, and with the CGR disposition curves that have been proposed
by other workers.
Questions/comments and responses following the presentation were as follows:
x Question (J.-M. Boursier): In your unified equation of the crack growth rate of Alloy 600
thick products, you do not take into consideration a "material effect." Do you assume that
the crack growth rate of a steam generator partition plate (forging) is equivalent to the crack
growth rate of a vessel head penetration (tube)? What are the consequences in terms of
maintenance strategy in U.S. nuclear power plants?
Response (G. White): The MRP-55 crack growth rate equation was based on controlled
testing of fracture mechanics specimens fabricated using 22 heats of CRDM nozzle, thick-
wall tube, rolled bar, and forged bar material and 4 heats of plate material. No effect of
product form was evident in the screened database for thick-wall Alloy 600 material, with
some heats of many of the product forms (including both forged and rolled bar) having
relatively high crack growth rates and others of these same product forms having relatively
low crack growth rates [9]. However, only one of the 158 data points in the screened
database was identified as being for a forged plate material. The crack growth rate for this
single data point normalized for temperature and stress intensity factor is of intermediate
magnitude. The MRP continues to evaluate crack growth rate data from laboratory tests and
8
(PWSCC) of Alloy 82, 182, and 132 Welds (MRP-115), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1006696.
9
G. A. White, J. Hickling, and L. K. Mathews, "Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating PWSCC of Thick-Wall
Alloy 600 Material," Proceedings of 11
th
International Symposium on Environmental Degradation of Materials
in Nuclear Power SystemsWater Reactors (Stevenson, WA, August 1114, 2003), ANS, La Grange Park,
Illinois, 2003, pp. 166179.
3-2
in-service inspections to ensure the continued validity of its guidance concerning crack
growth rate equations.
x Question (U. Ehrnsten): What is the basis for "recent investigations appear to provide
convincing evidence that weld defects (e.g. hot cracking) do not play a significant role in
PWSCC initiation and propagation?"
Response (G. White): It is possible to gain some understanding of the effects of hot cracking
and ductility-dip cracking by examining metallurgical sections of the weld in the vicinity of
the main crack and elsewhere to determine the expected density of intergranular crack-like
defects. Mills and Brown [ 10] performed this sort of investigation as part of a program to
measure PWSCC crack growth rates for Alloy 82H test specimens. They observed extremely
few hot cracks and ductility-dip cracks and concluded, therefore, that hot cracking and
ductility-dip cracking had very little or no effect on crack growth rates. Other laboratory
studies [11,12] have tended to support the general conclusion that these types of weld defects
do not play a significant role in PWSCC initiation and propagation. However, it is
recognized that relatively large and sharp weld defects such as some weld lack of fusion
regions may have the potential to promote PWSCC by creating a local stress concentrator
and a high local crack tip stress intensity factor.
Comparative PWSCC Crack Growth Rate Studies of Alloy 52M and Alloy
182 Weld Metals, presented by R. Jacko, Westinghouse (Paper 1A.2)
This presentation was given by R. Jacko and was written by R. Jacko and R. Gold of
Westinghouse. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x Crack growth rate (CGR) tests were performed of Alloy 52M and Alloy 182 weld metals in
simulated primary coolant environments at 340C (644F). Tests were performed with the
crack growth direction both parallel to and perpendicular to the weld dendrites.
x CGRs for Alloy 182 weld metal were consistent with published literature for this alloy and
slightly below the EPRI disposition curve. The CGR parallel to dendrites (CGR in the TS
direction) was about 2.5 times higher than CGR perpendicular to the dendrites (CGR in the
TL direction).
x No intergranular cracking was detected in Alloy 52M weld metal. A small amount of
transgranular crack growth was observed, but this was attributed to corrosion fatigue
10
W. J. Mills and C. M. Brown, "Stress Corrosion Crack Growth Rates for Alloy 82H Welds in High Temperature
Water," Proceedings of 11
th
International Conference on Environmental Degradation of Materials in Nuclear
Power SystemsWater Reactors, (Stevenson, WA, August 1114, 2003), ANS, La Grange Park, Illinois, 2003,
pp. 12401254.
11
L. E. Thomas, J. S. Vetrano, S. M. Bruemmer, P. Efsing, B. Forssgren, G. Embring, and K. Gott, "High-
Resolution Analytical Electron Microscopy Characterization of Environmentally Assisted Cracks in Alloy 182
Weldments," Proceedings of 11
th
International Conference on Environmental Degradation of Materials in
Nuclear Power SystemsWater Reactors, (Stevenson, WA, August 1114, 2003), ANS, La Grange Park,
Illinois, 2003, pp. 12121225.
12
Analysis of Stress Corrosion Cracks in Alloy 182 Weld Metal After Exposure to PWR Primary Water (MRP-
107), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1009399.
3-3
associated with periodic unloading of the test specimens, and not to PWSCC. If the observed
crack growth was nevertheless attributed to PWSCC, it would be about 20 times slower than
the CGR observed with Alloy 182.
x Question (S. Bruemmer): Are there plans to test more specimens in the TS direction (cracks
growth parallel to the dendrites), and at 100C?
Response (R. Jacko): There are no more tests planned in the TS direction, but additional
tests are planned in the TL direction. Regarding crack growth tests at 100C, none have been
performed and none are planned. However, for Alloy 182, rising load tests were performed,
and showed no crack propagation.
x Question (B. Templeton): Your test matrix on Slide 11 indicates that you were investigating
pH variation as a test variable, but your test results seem to indicate no pH effectcan you
confirm that?
Response (R. Jacko): Yes. We observed no variation in crack growth rate based on pH for
Alloy 182 or Alloy 52M in the range that we tested.
x Question (unidentified attendee): Did you consider the possible effects of dilution of the
weld metal by the base material?
Response (R. Jacko): The weldment samples were 11 passes wide by 11 passes deep. The
test samples were taken from the center region of the weldment, such that dilution by the
base material is judged to be insignificant.
x Question (T. Yonezawa): The Alloy 52M weldment was fabricated using the GTAW
process, while the Alloy 182 weldment was fabricated using SMAW. The different
processes can lead to different strength or hardness levels, which can affect crack growth
rates. Did you check the hardness of the weld materials?
Response (R. Jacko): Yes, we tested both for hardness and for tensile strength. The Alloy
182 weld material had a tensile strength of about 60 ksi (414 MPa), and the Alloy 52M had a
tensile strength of about 50 ksi (345 MPa) or a little lower. The Alloy 52M weldment was
made with low constraint; when made with higher constraint, the tensile strength is generally
higher, about 60 ksi (414 MPa).
x Question (J.-M. Boursier): Do know whether the crack propagation in the Alloy 182 weld
material was due to corrosion fatigue or SCC?
Response (R. Jacko): The cracking in the Alloy 182 was all intergranular. No transgranular
crack propagation was observed. However, the load cycling involved in the test probably
had some effect on the measured crack growth rate.
3-4
Outline of "Evaluation Technology for SCC Growth of Ni Base Alloys
(NiSCC) Project" in Japan and Current Results in PWR Environment,
presented by Y. Yamamoto, JNES (Paper 1A.3)
This presentation was given by Y. Yamamoto and was written by Y. Yamamoto, M. Ozawa, and
K. Nakata of the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES). The main points made
during the presentation were as follows:
x CGR tests were performed of Alloy 600, Alloy 132, and Alloy 82 in simulated primary
coolant environments at 340C (644F) and 360C (680F). Tests were performed with the
crack growth direction both parallel to and inclined to the weld dendrites.
x The CGRs in Alloy 82 and 132 weld metals were nearly the same, and were about one order
of magnitude faster than those of base metal Alloy 600. The CGRs of the base metals were
less than 1/5 of the predicted curve from the MRP curve or the modified Scott model, while
those of the weld metals were approximately 5 times larger than the predicted curve.
x CGRs in the base material and in the two weld materials varied with temperature, with the
CGRs being about two times higher at 360C (680F) than at 340C (644F).
x The crack propagation direction in weld metals was along the dendrite direction, even when
the dendrite direction and the direction perpendicular to the peak tensile stress direction were
different.
x Question (J. Hickling): Slide 12 of your presentation shows that even the air fatigue pre-
crack in the specimen with inclined dendrites deviated greatly from the expected direction
based on the specimen loading. This indicates that the dendrite interface properties are very
important in the tested weld and casts some doubt on the real meaning of any K versus da/dt
plot. I realize that you did not actually use the data from this specimen in your evaluations
but would appreciate any comments you have on such anomalous behavior.
Response (Y. Yamamoto): I showed this slide to make a suggestion that the dendrite
interface properties are very important (as you indicated) and to suggest that the crack
direction has to be controlled. We tried to correct the K-value of the specimens with inclined
cracks using fracture mechanics. However, the corrected K vs. da/dt plots were a little bit
lower than those for the specimens with non-inclined cracks that are shown in slide 13. I
think one of the reasons for this result is the lack of consideration of the K
II
mode. Anyway,
in terms of conservatism, I think that it is very important to use specimens machined such
that cracks run parallel to the dendrite direction in order to evaluate the precise CGR.
3-5
Finite-Element Analysis of Welding Residual Stresses in Piping Butt
Weldments and their Effect on Crack Tip Stress Intensity Factors,
presented by J. Broussard, DEI (Paper 1A.4)
This presentation was given by J. Broussard and was written by J. Broussard, G. White and E. S.
Hunt of Dominion engineering, Inc. (DEI). The main points made during the presentation were
as follows:
x Classical strength of materials analysis methods and published fracture mechanics solutions
can be used to estimate stresses and crack tip stress intensity factors for use in CGR
calculations. However, these methods do not readily handle anomalies such as weld repairs,
are based on linear superposition, and do not fully consider the effect of stress redistribution
upon crack growth.
x Finite element analysis (FEA) methods are capable of handling factors not readily addressed
by classical superposition methods. In addition, FEA models using parametric inputs permit
different cases to be evaluated quickly.
x FEA methods should be used for important analyses, and as a check of classical
superposition models for other analyses.
x The standard generic industry model (in NUREG 313, Rev. 2) for welding residual stresses
appears to be conservative for as-designed welds but may not be bounding for welds with
repairs.
x Key parameters in calculation of stresses and stress intensity factors for use in CGR
calculations include:
The presence of weld repairs
Assumed crack aspect ratio
Assumed initial crack size
x The assumed value for the stress intensity factor threshold has a small to mild effect on the
crack growth time for relatively large initial crack sizes or high stress locations, but may have
a large effect for small initial crack sizes or relatively low stress locations.
x Fracture mechanics FEA modeling is key to understanding the level of engineering
conservatism in calculating crack growth rates in the presence of weld residual stresses.
x Question (C. Amzallag): Please refer to slide 8: In the case of axial cracks observed at V. C.
Summer and Tsuruga, the crack remains confined in the Alloy 182 weld metal, with no
propagation into the alloy steel nor into the stainless steel. Question: Can your fracture
mechanics models and material properties predict the shape of the cracks observed?
Response (J. Broussard): The material susceptibility of the low-alloy steel and stainless steel
are so low that no significant propagation into these materials occurs, resulting in the general
3-6
observed shape in slide 8. Because fracture mechanics FEA methods result in the J-integral
values around the crack front, it is possible to convert the J-integral values to stress intensity
factor values that can be used in combination with an assumed crack growth rate equation to
predict the evolution in shape of the crack front within the Alloy 182 material. We have not
attempted this procedure for the axial crack shown in slide 8.
x Question (P. Scott): Have you investigated the effect of initial misalignment of the two
halves of a butt weld on the residual stress fields?
Response (J. Broussard): No, we have not.
x Question (T. Yonezawa): In your analysis, have you calculated the residual stresses as each
layer of weld metal is applied? Have you evaluated the effect of stress relieving of the inner
weld passes provided by the heating associated with applying outer weld passes?
Response (J. Broussard): The welds typically have 5 to 10 layers of weld passes. The weld
material properties such as yield strength are temperature dependant. Therefore, the effects
of the later passes relieving stresses in the previous ones are considered.
x Question (J. R. Hsu): Please refer to slide 9: NUREG-0313 is for stainless steel residual
stresses. The stainless steel-Alloy 82/182-carbon steel weld in your application has different
material properties. Can residual stresses from NUREG-0313 be used for this application?
Were the finite element model results compared with experimental data?
Response (J. Broussard): FEA results for butt-welding models have been correlated for Ni-
based alloy welds in BWR shroud supports. These welds are similar in configuration to a
pipe butt weld. After cutting out samples from a fabricated reactor vessel, wire EDM was
used to cut through the weld. Strain gauges were used to measure the stress relaxation. The
measured stresses were found to correlate well with the FEA predicted stresses. These
results are discussed in report BWRVIP-59.
x Comment (A. Kroes): One needs to be cautious when determining residual stress without
considering the actual fabrication sequence. Even without weld repair, some welding
sequences can result in high stresses.
x Question (R. Nicholson): Does the finite element residual stress model consider a moving
heat source or consider that a full weld bead is introduced at temperature and then allowed to
cool?
Response (J. Broussard): The finite element model assumes that a weld pass is applied for
the full 360 at one time. A traveling weld bead has not yet been considered.
A Novel Approach for the Mitigation of PWSCC, presented by B. Templeton,
Structural Integrity Associates (Paper 1A.5)
This presentation was given by B. Templeton and written by B. Templeton and B. Gordon of
Structural Integrity Associates (SI). The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
3-7
x Crack initiation tests and crack growth rate tests indicate that increasing the potential a
relatively small amount could possibly inhibit both the initiation and growth of PWSCC
cracks.
x The current program will use constant extension rate tests to determine the effects of
increasing potential on PWSCC initiation, and to determine if increasing the potential can
stop already initiated cracks. Testing started in February 2005.
x Comment (J. Hickling): The concept of applying protective potentials to ameliorate PWSCC
was presented to utilities about 1-1/2 years ago. They were concerned about how the
potential could be applied, and about how it would affect nuclear instruments.
x Question (W. Bamford): If you impose a potential on the reactor vessel head, there may be
effects in other parts of the system. Have you thought about these potential effects?
Response (B. Templeton): I agree that there could be side effects. First we are trying to
prove the concept. Conceptually though, we are envisioning a distribution of polarizing
"components" that would throw current locally. Therefore, the side effects should be
minimized. We are not proposing polarization of the entire head.
x Comment (J. Hickling): Applying a potential would not be much different than going to a
very low hydrogen concentration.
Effect of Cyclic Loadings on the Stress Corrosion Crack Growth Rate in
PWR Primary Water, presented by C. Guerre, CEA (Paper 1A.6)
This presentation was given by C. Guerre and written by C. Guerre and O. Raquet of the
Commissariat lEnergie Atomique (CEA) and G. Turluer of the Institute for Radiological
Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN). The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
x Crack growth rate tests were performed at 289C (552qF) and 325C (617qF) of two heats of
Alloy 600 base material in simulated primary water at high R ratios and using both static and
cyclic loading.
x For the conditions and the materials tested, no systematic enhancing effect of cyclic loading
was observed. This could be the result of the heats being too sensitive to SCC, i.e., increases
in crack growth due to cyclic loading might occur for less sensitive heats with lower crack
growth rates. The existence of an enhancing effect of cyclic loading should be investigated
using heats with lower sensitivity.
x Tests at the lower temperature resulted in lower crack growth rates consistent with an
apparent activation energy found in the literature for constant load conditions.
3-8
x Question (unidentified attendee): The fatigue precrack, as well as the SCC crack, is very
irregular. Why is it so irregular?
Response (C. Guerre): The irregularity is attributed to the high heterogeneity of the base
material.
3-9
MRP Development of Crack Growth Rate Disposition Curves for
Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of
Thick-Section Alloy 600 Components and Alloy 82, 182, and 132 Weldments
G. A. White
11730 Plaza America Drive, #310, Reston, VA 20190
Phone: 703-437-1155, Fax: 703-437-0780, E-mail: gwhite@domeng.com
J. Hickling
EPRI
3412 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94304
Phone: 650-855-8976, Fax: 650-855-2002, E-mail: jhicklin@epri.com
C. Harrington
TXU Energy
P.O. Box 1002, Glen Rose, TX 76043
Phone: 254-897-6705, Fax: 254-897-0530, E-mail: charrin1@txu.com
Extended Abstract
Introduction
Nickel-based austenitic alloys, including wrought Alloy 600 and its associated weld metals, are
used extensively in pressurized water reactor (PWR) applications. Recent incidents of primary
water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 600 components other than steam generator
tubes in the primary circuits of PWRs have highlighted the need for a qualified equation for
crack growth rates to evaluate flaws found by in-service inspection. This requirement was
fulfilled for the wrought Alloy 600 base material by the issuance in 2002 of the Materials
Reliability Program (MRP) MRP-55 report
1
and the disposition curve established in that work
has since been incorporated into the ASME Section XI Code for flaw evaluation.
A similar requirement was identified for Alloy 82/182/132 weldments following observations of
cracking in primary circuit welds with high residual stresses and in some J-groove welds
attaching control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles to the reactor closure head. A
preliminary MRP crack growth rate (CGR) curve for Alloy 182 material was published in 2000,
but this was based on a fairly limited experimental database and simplifying assumptions. Weld
metals are by definition as-cast structures and, as such, are much more inhomogeneous than
wrought materials. The scatter introduced by the inhomogeneous nature of weld metals
necessitated the development of a more sophisticated approach. In 2004, the MRP completed its
MRP-115 report
2
on the appropriate crack growth rate disposition curves for the
Alloy 82/182/132 weld metals. Both the MRP-55 and MRP-115 studies were extensively
supported by the work of an international expert panel on PWSCC, organized by EPRI.
3-11
Crack Growth Rate Disposition Curve for Thick-Section Alloy 600 Components
This presentation describes the development of a CGR curve for Alloy 600 base metal by the
MRP.
1,3
It is based on controlled testing of fracture mechanics specimens fabricated using 22
heats of CRDM nozzle, thick-wall tube, rolled bar, and forged bar material and 4 heats of plate
material. Evaluation of the screened laboratory data on a heat-by-heat basis resulted in a log-
normal distribution of CGR curves that describes the observed variability in crack growth rates.
The MRP-recommended CGR curve corresponds to the 75th percentile level of this distribution.
As such, the recommended curve may be interpreted as the mean of the upper half of the
distribution describing the variability in CGR due to material heat. The deterministic CGR
equation developed by the MRP for Alloy 600 has been adopted by Section XI of the ASME
Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code for continued-service evaluation of PWSCC flaws detected in
PWR reactor vessel closure head nozzles, including CRDM nozzles. The MRP deterministic
curve, and the probabilistic distribution of CGR data upon which it is based, have also been
applied as a key input to industry safety assessments for PWSCC.
The MRP study of the crack growth rates applicable for Alloy 600 wrought material also
included an assessment of the potential effect on CGR of the environment on the OD of a reactor
vessel closure head nozzle following leakage of primary coolant into the annulus between the
penetration nozzle and the vessel head. Based on this evaluation, the MRP recommended that a
factor of 2 be conservatively applied to the MRP CGR curve for evaluation of postulated flaws in
Alloy 600 RVH nozzle base metal that are in contact with a wetted annulus environment for leak
rates up to 1 liter/h (0.004 gpm).
Crack Growth Rate Disposition Curves for Alloy 82, 182, and 132 Weldments
After reviewing the key metallurgical aspects of Alloys 82, 182, and 132, the MRP-115 report
2
describes the data and methods used to develop the CGR equation for such weldments. The
study analyzed in detail the laboratory testing techniques that have been used to generate CGR
data for these weld metals in simulated PWR primary water environments. Appropriate
screening procedures were developed and applied to produce the final MRP database before
using an agreed data reduction methodology to derive two separate CGR curves as a function of
temperature and stress intensity factor for Alloys 82 and 182/32, including consideration of the
effects of dendrite orientation. For stress intensity factors greater than 20 MPam, the new CGR
curve for Alloy 182/132 weld metal is nearly parallel to, and about four times higher than, the
previously reported MRP-55 curve for Alloy 600 wrought material. The MRP study included
comparisons with other laboratory data not used in derivation of the new MRP-115 lines, with
the limited field data available from repeat non-destructive examination inspections of a cracked
primary circuit butt weld at the Ringhals PWR in Sweden, and with the CGR disposition curves
that have been proposed by other workers. This presentation summarizes the MRP-115 study,
including an example of the way in which the curves can be applied to the assessment of further
growth through PWSCC of piping butt weld flaws that might be detected in service.
3-12
References
1. Materials Reliability Program (MRP) Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating Primary Water
Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Thick-Wall Alloy 600 Materials (MRP-55)
Revision 1, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2002. 1006695.
2. Materials Reliability Program Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating Primary Water Stress
Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 82, 182, and 132 Welds (MRP-115), EPRI, Palo Alto,
CA: 2004. 1006696.
3. G. A. White, J. Hickling, and L. K. Mathews, Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating PWSCC
of Thick-Wall Alloy 600 Material, 11
th
International Symposium on Environmental
Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power SystemsWater Reactors (Stevenson, WA,
August 1114, 2003), ANS, La Grange Park, Illinois, 2003.
3-13
MRP Development of Crack
Growth Rate Disposition
Curves for Primary Water
Stress Corrosion Cracking
(PWSCC) of Thick-Section Alloy
600 Components and Alloy 82,
182, and 132 Weldments
Glenn White Dominion Engineering, Inc.
John Hickling EPRI
Craig Harrington TXU Energy
Session 1A Crack Growth and Initiation
Monday, March 7, 2005
2005 EPRI Int'l PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conf.
Hyatt Regency, Tamaya Resort
Santa Ana Pueblo, New Mexico, USA
March 7-10, 2005
3-14
MRP PWSCC Growth Rate CurvesMarch 7, 2005 2 Copyright 2005 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Background
MRP-55 Evaluation for Alloy 600 Wrought Material
Database of Lab Testing Results
Development of Disposition Curve
Comparison with Available Plant Crack Growth Data
Analysis of Environment on CRDM Nozzle OD Above Weld
MRP-115 Evaluation for Alloy 82/182/132 Weld Material
Metallurgical Factors Specific to Weld Metals
Database of Lab Testing Results
Development of Disposition Curves
Comparisons with Other Data
Example
Conclusions
Presentation Outline
3-15
Background
3-16
Background
EPRI Materials Reliability Program (MRP) Expert Panel on PWR
Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) has been in
existence since August 2001
Core members include representatives from Westinghouse,
AREVA (U.S. and France), MHI, GE, Bettis, KAPL, NRC
Research, ANL, CEA, Vattenfall, Studsvik, DEI, and EPRI
Initial work was to determine a Crack Growth Rate (CGR) flaw
disposition curve for thick-section Alloy 600 components and
assess the likely OD annulus environment for leaking RPV head
penetrations
This base metal curve, published in November 2002 as EPRI
proprietary report # 1006695 (MRP-55), was adopted by ASME
Section XI for evaluation of flaws for continued service
Essential details of the work were published in 2003 by ANS at
the 11
th
Int. Conf. on Env. Deg. of Materials in Nuclear Systems
Priority over the last 2 years has been to develop analogous CGR
disposition curves (da/dt vs. K) for the 82/182/132 weld metals
3-17
Locations of Thick-Section Alloy 600
Material in PWR RCS
3-18
Typical PWR Reactor Vessel Head Nozzle
PWSCC
3-19
Locations of Alloy 82/182/132 Piping Butt
Welds
2
6
4
3
1
7
5
3
2
3
10
12
4
7
8
5
9
1
6
11
Example Westinghouse Design Plant Example CE Design Plant
3-20
Locations of Alloy 82/182/132 Piping Butt
Welds (cont'd)
Example B&W Design Plant
1
5
8
6
3
2
9
10
4
13
12
11
7
3-21
MRP-55 Evaluation
for Alloy 600 Wrought Material
3-22
MRP Laboratory CGR Database for Alloy 600
MRP Approach
Relevant, worldwide CGR results were obtained and re-evaluated
so as to screen out inappropriate test data (e.g., no attention was
paid to numerous tests where no crack growth due to PWSCC
was actually observed)
Consolidated database contained 158 data points for average
CGR during each test (consistent with ASTM practice for
measuring fatigue CGRs) plotted at a representative K value
(these ranged from 14.3 to 54.0 MPam)
All were obtained in a controlled primary water test environment
using fracture mechanics specimens (under either constant load
or constant displacement conditions)
Recommended MRP curve for CGR as a function of stress
intensity factor (K) was derived taking into account the statistics of
heat-to-heat variations and the strong effect of temperature
3-23
Derivation of MRP-55 Curve for Base Metal
Procedure Adopted
Insufficient data points were available from any single heat
over a wide range of K values to determine the form of CGR
dependence on stress intensity factor
Approach adopted was to assume the same form for the
CGR equation as in the modified Scott equation (derived
from a large amount of field data on SG tubing materials)
This involved assuming a stress intensity threshold value
for crack growth (K
ISCC
) of 9 MPam
Resulted in CGR vs. K power law relationship of the form
da/dt = D(K-9)
E
with Scott exponent E = 1.16
For each of the 26 heats of material in the database, a
mean power-law constant D was then calculated
3-24
Distribution of Heat Coefficients
Distribution describing CGR variability was taken as the log-
normal fit to the ordered median ranking of the D values for the 26
heats using most likely estimator methodology
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1E-13 1E-12 1E-11 1E-10
Power-Law Constant D at 325C (617F)
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n

F
Log-mean D's for 26 heats of Alloy 600
material assuming E = 1.16 with fit log-
normal distribution (most likely estimator);
see Table 3 for log-mean D values for each heat
D
25th Percentile
= 6.7710
-13
D
75th Percentile
= 2.6710
-12
25th Percentile
75th Percentile
D
50th Percentile
= 1.3410
-12
Median
3-25
Procedure Adopted (cont'd)
Recommended CGR curve was based on 75th percentile
level of the distribution of CGR variability as a function of
material heat and represents the mean of the upper half of
the distribution
MRP curve lies approx. 20% above the Scott equation
Approach is consistent with ASME code considerations,
where the goal is to make a best estimate of crack growth
Addresses the concern that cracking detected in operating
plants would tend to be in components fabricated from more
susceptible Alloy 600 heats
Likely that CRDM nozzles supplied by some material
vendors may crack at a significantly lower rate than
indicated by the MRP curve
3-26
Complete Set of Screened Laboratory Data
1.E-12
1.E-11
1.E-10
1.E-09
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
C
r
a
c
k

G
r
o
w
t
h

R
a
t
e
,

d
a
/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
MRP Curve
MRP Lab CGR Database (158
points)
Cook2 #75 Length Increase
Cook2 #75 Depth Increase
1 mm/yr
MRP Curve
Modified Scott
3-27
Practical Implications
Adoption of the Scott equation results in an apparent crack tip
stress intensity factor threshold, K
th
, of 9 MPam (8.19 ksiin)
However, no actual CGR data for CRDM nozzle materials is
available at K values < approx. 15 MPam
Therefore, caution must be exercised when predicting
Alloy 600 crack growth rates for low K values
In contrast, use of the Scott exponent E = 1.16 may result in
conservative estimations of CGR at high K values, since some
test and field data appears to indicate the appearance of a
plateau in the curve
3-28
Reasonable agreement with repeat field NDE data (limited
in U.S. to D.C. Cook plant), although large range exists for
calculated values of CGRs from operating plants due to:
uncertainties in ultrasonic measurements of crack size at
two or more different times
uncertainties in the estimates of K, which depend on
estimates of residual stress and the method of
calculating K
uncertainties in actual operating temperatures of CRDM
nozzles in different plants and in different countries
Comparison with Available Plant CGR Data
Approach
3-29
Limited U.S. data (from D.C. Cook nozzle #75) lie
well below the MRP curve
Most extensive measurements of CGR in operating
plants are from France
The data have been extrapolated by the MRP from
the reported operating temperatures in the plants to a
standard value of 325C (617F) for comparison
purposes
Values are compared with the results of fictive CGRs
predicted by using:
the reported K values for the French field data
random sampling from upper half of the MRP
distribution for CGRs
the K-dependence of the Scott equation
Approach (contd)
3-30
1.E-12
1.E-11
1.E-10
1.E-09
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
C
r
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k

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a
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,

d
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/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
EDF Field CGRs
Sample of 50-100 Percentile of
MRP Distribution
1 mm/yr
The MRP points were created by
sampling the upper half of the MRP
distribution for D and then calculating
the CGR for each EDF field stress
intensity factor K value assuming
K
th
= 9 MPam and E = 1.16.
Sample of Upper Half MRP Distribution vs. Plant
3-31
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1E-11 1E-10 1E-09
Crack Growth Rate (m/s) Normalized to 325C (617F)
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n

F
EDF Field CGRs
Sample of 50-100 Percentile
of MRP Distribution
One additional
MRP point:
7.1E-12
Coefficient Distributions for the Previous Slide
3-32
CGR in OD Annulus Environment
Environmental Factors Evaluated
Oxygen availability/consumption
Crevice chemistry
Role of Hydrogen
Role of Lithium Hydroxide and Boric Acid
Influence of Possible Impurities from Fabrication
Influence of pH
3-33
Analysis Results
Environment #1: Hydrogenated steam
Numerous laboratory tests in hydrogenated steam (e.g.
Economy et al., 1986 1995) have shown that PWSCC
rates are similar to those in normal PWR primary water
at the same temperature
Environment #2: PWR primary water within normal
specifications
Environment #3: Concentrated primary water (for low
leak rates)
A possible slightly alkaline pH is the only expected
significant factor for accelerating the CGR
3-34
Conclusions
For evaluation of (hypothetical) OD cracking above the
J-groove weld, the MRP recommends that CGR values
from the curve be multiplied by 2 to allow for uncertainty in
the exact composition of the external chemical environment
The MRP evaluations for cracking connected to the OD
environment are valid for low leak rates (typically < 1 liter/h
or 0.004 gpm)
Plant experience has shown this to be the usual case
Analysis would no longer be valid, however, if leak rates
were sufficiently high to result in a large, local decrease in
temperature and appreciable corrosion of low-alloy steel
3-35
MRP-115 Evaluation
for Alloy 82/182/132 Weld Material
3-36
MRP-115 Evaluation for Weld Metal Materials
Introduction
To date, relatively little PWSCC CGR data (18 points) has
actually been generated in the U.S. on Alloy 82/182 (outside
the naval reactors program)
These points from an EPRI program at Westinghouse were
previously used to generate a preliminary disposition curve
(MRP-21) ~5x higher than Scott model for base metal
Has been used by utilities, but never gained full acceptance
Panels work thus relied mainly on extensive test results
generated overseas (France, Sweden, Japan) and in the
NR program (unscreened database included 261 points)
Extensive consideration of screening criteria to be applied
resulted in realization that PWSCC in weld metals exhibits
additional features that have to be taken into account
3-37
Cast Structures are Heterogeneous & Complex
Crown
Root
1 mm
(a) (b)
3-38
Test Blocks Exhibit Different Geometries
Results in different degrees of restraint during weld
shrinkage (and thus varying residual strain levels).
Cooling patterns can also affect dendrite orientation.
3-39
Crack growth is along (parallel to)
the direction of the dendrites for the
TS and LS orientations.
Crack growth is across
(perpendicular to) the direction of
the dendrites for the TL, LT, ST,
and SL orientations.
Nomenclature for crack orientation
The first letter denotes the direction normal to the plane of the crack face.
The second letter denotes the direction of crack growth.
Specimen Orientation is Critical to Results
3-40
Crack Fronts May Be Highly Irregular (in 2 & 3D)
Examples of PWSCC fracture surfaces in Alloy 82 weld metal compact tension (CT)
specimens: unclear to what extent patterns arise from fundamental differences in
dendritic grain boundary (GB) susceptibility or from failure to transition adequately from
the transgranular fatigue pre-crack in air (lack of engagement). The latter would be a
test artifact of little relevance to field behavior.
However, recent investigations appear to provide convincing evidence that weld defects
(e.g. hot cracking) do NOT play a significant role in PWSCC initiation and propagation.
3-41
MRP Lab CGR Database for Alloy 82/182/132
Unscreened CGR Data for Alloys 82/182/132
1.E-12
1.E-11
1.E-10
1.E-09
1.E-08
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
C
r
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k

G
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a
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,

d
a
/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
1mm/yr
All CGRs are reported
maximum CGRs and are
not adjusted to account for
alloy type or crack growth
orientation
MRP-55 Curve
for Alloy 600
MRP-21 Curve
for Alloy 182
1.E-12
1.E-11
1.E-10
1.E-09
1.E-08
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
C
r
a
c
k

G
r
o
w
t
h

R
a
t
e
,

d
a
/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
1mm/yr
All CGRs are reported average
CGRs and are not adjusted to
account for percentage
engagement across the crack front,
alloy type, or crack orientation
MRP-55 Curve
for Alloy 600
MRP-21 Curve
for Alloy 182
Complete worldwide results for
AVERAGE CGR (144 points)
Complete worldwide results for
MAXIMUM CGR (158 points)
Decision was made to use average CGR data (as in MRP-55)
3-42
Key Data Screening Issues
Material within specifications including composition/condition/heat treatment
Mechanical strength properties
ASTM specimen size criteria and degree of plastic constraint
Pre-cracking technique (inc. straightness criteria, plastic zone size, crack morphology)
Special requirements for testing welds (e.g. pre-crack location, residual stresses/strains)
Environment (chemistry, temperature, electrochemical potential (ECP), flow rate at specimen,
neutron/gamma flux)
Loop configuration (e.g., once-through, refreshed, static autoclave)
Water chemistry confirmation by analysis (e.g., Cl, SO
4
, O
2
, Cr, total organic carbon (TOC),
conductivity)
Active constant or cyclic loading vs. constant displacement loading (e.g., using wedge)
On-line measurement of crack length versus time during test (including precision)
Actual crack length confirmed by destructive examination (assessment method/mapping)
Appropriateness of crack characteristics (fraction SCC along crack front, uniformity,
adequate SCC increment, transgranular portions within IGSCC fracture surface, etc.)
Possible effects of changes in loading or chemistry conditions during a test (including heat
up and cool down)
Calculation and reporting of K or K values
Reporting of raw a vs. t data and derivation of da/dt values
Reproducibility of data under nominally identical test conditions
3-43
Screened CGR Data for Alloys 82/182/132
Average CGR data for Alloys 182/132
after screening (43 points)
Average CGR data for Alloy 82 after
screening (34 points)
1.E-12
1.E-11
1.E-10
1.E-09
1.E-08
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
C
r
a
c
k

G
r
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w
t
h

R
a
t
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,

d
a
/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
1mm/yr
MRP-55 Curve
for Alloy 600
MRP-21 Curve
for Alloy 182
All CGRs are adjusted to account
for percentage engagement across
the crack front but not alloy type
or crack orientation
1.E-12
1.E-11
1.E-10
1.E-09
1.E-08
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
C
r
a
c
k

G
r
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t
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R
a
t
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,

d
a
/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
1mm/yr
MRP-55 Curve
for Alloy 600
MRP-21 Curve
for Alloy 182
All CGRs are adjusted to account
for percentage engagement across
the crack front but not alloy type
or crack orientation
Note the absence of results at K-values < 20 (A182) & < 28 MPam (A82)
3-44
Derivation of MRP-115 Curves for Weld Metals
Procedure Adopted to Analyze Screened Data
Modify reported CGR to allow for incomplete initiation of
PWSCC across crack front (divide by engagement fraction)
Adjust to common reference temperature of 325C using an
activation energy of 130 kJ/mole (31 kcal/mole)
Assume no stress intensity factor threshold (i.e. K
ISCC
= 0)
Perform a least-squares multiple linear regression analysis
using factors for weld (i.e. heat), alloy type, and orientation
Analogous to derivation of MRP-55 curve (for Alloy 600),
base the deterministic CGR equation on the 75
th
percentile
of the log-normal distribution for the 19 weld factors
Compare final lines with laboratory data not used in their
derivation, Ringhals plant data, and other disposition curves
3-45
Stress Intensity Factor Threshold for PWSCC
The threshold stress intensity factor, K
ISCC
, is a concept that
is difficult to implement as a practical engineering tool for
PWSCC of nickel-based alloys:
Because SCC is a time-dependent process, K
ISCC
is not an absolute
material property, but depends on test procedure and duration
K
ISCC
is sometimes designated at an arbitrary, slow, selected crack
growth rate
Slow crack growth over long periods can, however, be significant
In nearly all practical cases, SCC initiates in circumstances where
linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) cannot be applied
Initiation and arrest of cracks involve different physical processes
In MRP-55, a threshold K
ISCC
of 9 MPam was assumed as
a curve-fitting parameter for Alloy 600 based on the arrest
of cracks in Alloy 600 steam generator tubes once K values
decreased to ~ 9 MPam
3-46
K
ISCC
Threshold for PWSCC (cont'd)
Given the above, no K
ISCC
was assumed for Alloy 82/182/132:
No screened CGR data at all are available for Alloys 182/132 at
K-values < ~ 20 MPam and for Alloy 82 at K-values < ~ 27 MPam
For the weld metals, no comparable field data are available that might
allow such a threshold to be reasonably estimated
Analyses of weld metal cracking that involve the existence of pre-
existing defects (either real or postulated) could be strongly
influenced by assuming an arbitrary K
ISCC
Trial fits of the laboratory data with and without an imposed threshold
did not support the assumption of a particular K
ISCC
value
This conservative approach has been adopted until data become
available specific to the weld metals that justify a K
ISCC
threshold
The MRP has evaluated the effect of assuming a zero K
ISCC
value on the industry safety assessments for PWSCC of Alloy
82/182 piping butt welds
3-47
Distribution of Screened Data by Weld Factor
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.1 1. 10.
Weld Factor, f
weld
C
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D
i
s
t
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F
9 182 Welds
8 82 Welds
2 132 Welds
Log-Normal Fit
Weld factors for 19 welds of Alloy 82/182/132
material with fit log-normal distribution
(most likely estimator), K
th
= 0, and best fit E
25th Percentile
75th Percentile
Median
The Alloy 82 data have been normalized
(increased) by applying a factor of 2.61:
1/f
alloy
= 2.61
3-48
Recommended Disposition Curves (325C)
1.E-12
1.E-11
1.E-10
1.E-09
1.E-08
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
C
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k

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d
a
/
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t

(
m
/
s
)
The reference temperature for the
MRP curves is 325C (617F); the
recommended thermal activation
energy for temperature adjustment
is 130 kJ/mole (31.0 kcal/mole),
the same value recommended in
MRP-55 for base metal.
1 mm/yr
MRP-115 Curve for Alloy 182/132
CGR = 1.510
-12
K
1.6
MRP-115 Curve for Alloy 82
CGR = (1.510
-12
/2.6)K
1.6
For crack propagation that is
clearly perpendicular to the
dendrite solidification direction, a
factor of 2.0 lowering the CGR
may be applied to the curves for
Alloy 182 (or 132) and Alloy 82.
MRP-55 Curve for
Alloy 600 Base Metal
Laboratory testing indicates that
the CGR for Alloy 82 is on average
2.6 times lower than that for Alloy
182/132, so the MRP-115 curve
for Alloy 82 is 2.6 times lower
than the curve for Alloy 182/132.
3-49
Comparison of MRP-115 Curve with Other Data
Comparison with Ringhals Plant Inspection Data
1.E-12
1.E-11
1.E-10
1.E-09
1.E-08
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
C
r
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k

G
r
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a
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,

d
a
/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
MRP-115 Curve for Alloy 182/132
Ringhals 3 / Crack 1 / Depth
Increase from 2000 to 2001
Ringhals 3 / Crack 2 / Depth
Increase from 2000 to 2001
1 mm/yr
MRP-115 Curve for
Alloy 182/132
CGR = 1.510
-12
K
1.6
CGR = (1.510
-12
/2.6)K
1.6
All curves adjusted to 325C
The points for the Ringhals 3 hot leg safe end weld cracks are based on the
depth measurements made in 2000 and 2001 and the stress intensity factors
calculated by Ringhals (points shown at average of initial and final K
corresponding to best estimate initial and final depths). The Ringhals data
were adjusted from the operating temperature of 319C (606F) to the
reference temperature of 325C (617F) using the activation energy of
130 kJ/mole (31.0 kcal/mole).
3-50
Comparison of MRP-115 Curve with Other Data
Comparison with Other Disposition Curves
1.E-12
1.E-11
1.E-10
1.E-09
1.E-08
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
C
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a
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d
a
/
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t

(
m
/
s
)
Ringhals Two-Part Curve
(Adjusted to 325C)
EDF Alloy 182 Curve
All curves adjusted to 325C (617F)
1 mm/yr
MRP-55 Curve
for Alloy 600
MRP-21 Curve
for Alloy 182
MRP-115 Curve for
Alloy 182
CGR = 1.510
-12
K
1.6
Ringhals Two-Part Curve @325C
EDF Alloy 182 Curve
3-51
Application of MRP-115 Curves
Example Calculation for Flaw Growth in Alloy 182
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 60 120 180 240 300
time (months)
a
/
t

(
f
l
a
w

d
e
p
t
h
/
w
a
l
l

t
h
i
c
k
n
e
s
s
)
T=617 F
AR=3
AR=6
AR=10
AR=2
Assumes part-depth circumferential flaw (of various shapes) at a reactor vessel
outlet nozzle in safe end region and includes effect of residual stress.
3-52
Conclusions
3-53
Conclusions
An international expert panel was formed, collected data,
developed data screening criteria, supported development of data
reduction processes, and made best practices recommendations
for future testing
For the weld metals, in particular, a methodology was developed
for considering the potentially non-conservative effect of
incomplete engagement to intergranular SCC across the
specimen width and over test duration. The approach is
appropriate regardless of whether the incomplete engagement:
is caused by isolated islands of more crack-resistant material, or
is a testing artifact due to the difficulty of the crack transitioning from the
transgranular fatigue pre-crack to the intergranular stress corrosion crack
A stress intensity factor threshold (K
ISCC
) value was:
assumed at 9 MPam as a curve-fitting parameter for the Alloy 600 base
metal on the basis of crack arrest data for field cracks in Alloy 600 steam
generator tubes
not assumed at all (i.e. K
ISCC
= 0) for the Alloy 82/182/132 weld metals, based
on lack of data and other considerations
3-54
Conclusions (cont'd)
Linearized, multiple regression statistical models were fitted to the
screened databases for Alloy 600 and for Alloy 82/182/132,
including:
Arrhenius temperature correction
Alloy factor (Alloy 182/132 or Alloy 82) for the weld metals
Crack orientation factor for the weld metals
Crack tip stress intensity factor exponent
Assumed 1.16 value for Alloy 600 based on Scott's work with Alloy 600
steam generator tubes
Best-fit value of 1.6 for the weld metals derived from the MRP screened
laboratory database for Alloy 82/182/132
A "heat" or "weld" factor that accounts for the randomness associated with
composition, material processing, and weld fabrication
Insufficient data were available to include dissolved hydrogen
concentration (i.e., electrochemical potential), cold work, post-
weld heat treatment stress relief, or loading type (constant or
periodic unloading) directly in the models
3-55
Detailed comparisons with all other available data were performed
to verify the robustness of the regression models and the absence
of any hidden effects in the overall set of CGR data collected
Comparisons to available plant data from repeat NDE of actual cracks
Comparisons to laboratory data collected using specimens of material actually
removed from operating plants
Comparisons to laboratory data screened from the MRP databases due to
lack of full testing information, or tests not meeting all screening criteria
In other countries, somewhat different approaches have been
used to develop CGR disposition curves for nickel-based alloys
Example analyses were developed for both base and weld metals
As expected, the assumption of no stress intensity factor threshold for the
weld metals has a significant effect for relatively small, part-depth flaws
Recommendations of the expert panel were documented with
regard to best practices for performing future CGR tests with pre-
cracked, nickel-based wrought and weld metal specimens
3-56
The methodology and results of this work have now been
published:
MRP-55 (EPRI 1006695) was published in proprietary and non-proprietary
forms in 2002
G. A. White, J. Hickling, and L. K. Mathews, Crack Growth Rates for
Evaluating PWSCC of Thick-Wall Alloy 600 Material, 11
th
International
Symposium on Environmental Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power
SystemsWater Reactors (Stevenson, WA, August 1114, 2003), ANS, La
Grange Park, Illinois, 2003.
MRP-115 (EPRI 1006696) was published in proprietary form in 2004, with a
non-proprietary version planned for 2005
A paper is planned covering the weld metal study for the 12
th
International
Symposium on Environmental Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power
Systems (Salt Lake City in August 2005)
The MRP-55 base metal curve was adopted by ASME Section XI
for evaluation of flaws for continued service
The MRP continues to sponsor additional research activities:
Laboratory CGR testing (e.g. on HAZ effects)
Continuing evaluation of plant inspection data in the US and abroad
Monitoring of parallel efforts within the international technical community
3-57
1
Comparative PWSCC Crack Growth Rate Studies of
Alloy 52M and Alloy 182 Weld Metals
Richard J. Jacko and Robert E. Gold
Westinghouse Electric Co., LLC
Materials Center of Excellence
INTRODUCTION
Cracking was detected in a reactor vessel outlet nozzle to pipe safe-end-weld at Ringhals 4 in July 2000.
The degradation consisted of several deep axial cracks in the Alloy 182 weld. The subsequent field
repairs of these nozzle-safe end welds was effected with Alloy 52M, such that Alloy 52M was the weld
metal in contact with the primary water. Alloy 52M is a compositionally-modified version of Alloy 52,
used for the gas tungsten/gas metal arc welding of Alloy 690 components [Ref. 1]. The decision was
made to examine the resistance of Alloy 52M welds to crack propagation in a simulated primary water
environment. To provide direct comparison with other nickel-based welds, specimens of Alloy 182 weld
metal were tested under the same conditions. The results of these crack propagation tests are provided in
this report.
TEST PROGRAM
The crack propagation tests were performed using compact tension specimens prepared according to the
guidelines in ASTM E647. The weld materials were tested as either 0.6T or 0.7T specimens. All testing
was performed at a nominal temperature of 340qC (644qF). The Alloy 52M material used to fabricate the
CT specimens was purchased specifically from Uddcomb Engineering for this program. Most of the
Alloy 182 weld metal specimens were prepared by depositing multipass shielded metal are weld passes in
a V-groove machined into a thick Alloy 600 plate. One Alloy 182 specimen used for the Phase 3 testing
was machined from the first coupon used for the Ringhals process qualification of the repair project. The
specimens were prepared from the as-deposited weld metal i.e., no further heat treatment was used.
For this program, the test specimens were exposed to simulated primary water and the boron and lithium
chemistry changes that occur over a fuel cycle were moderated for each test phase. The dissolved
hydrogen concentration was controlled within a tight range, from a low of 33 cm
3
H
2
/kg H
2
O for Phase 1
to a high of 37 cm
3
H
2
/kg H
2
O for Phase 2. The specimens were prepared as 0.6T or 0.7T compact
tension specimens consistent with the guidelines of ASTM E647. The weld specimens were machined
with 10% side grooves on each side to accommodate the tendency of cracks in welds to grow in
characteristic crystallographic orientations and to deviate from the direction dictated by maximum stress.
For all but one of the specimens for which data are reported here, the specimens were tested in the T-L
orientation, in which the weld dendrites are oriented normal to the crack propagation direction. One
Alloy 182 specimen (182-UE-1) was tested in the T-S direction in which crack extension is parallel to the
dendritic solidification pattern. Specimens were loaded in series such that a single applied load was used
to stress a "chain" of specimens. This necessitated closely matching the specimens in a given test array so
that each specimen experienced the intended nominal stress intensity. The crack propagation was
monitored by interim inspections.
The autoclave systems used hydraulic loading. The unloading was generally performed using an R ratio
of 0.7 (Load
min
/Load
max
). Prior crack growth rate testing of welds showed that these tests present certain
challenges. Principally, there is difficulty transitioning from a transgranular fatigue precrack to an
intergranular or interdendritic PWSCC crack. The unload/reload period was controlled by means of a
sophisticated computer-controlled hydraulic system, which permitted control of the unload/reload period
over the range 10 seconds to 2.5 hours. The tests were performed with initial cyclic loading with cyclic
periods that varied from 30 seconds to 9000 seconds (2.5 hours) to encourage the transition to an
3-59
2
intergranular crack. The cyclic loading involved 4 steps. Cyclic loading periods of 1000 s or longer were
included in calculating the times during which SCC took place.
RESULTS
The specific program for which this report was prepared involved the testing of a single Alloy 182
specimen (designated here as UE-1) and four Alloy 52M specimens. To provide a broader perspective on
these results, six additional Alloy 182 compact tension specimens were tested. At the completion of
testing, most specimens were cyclically loaded to fracture to permit examination of the fracture surfaces.
Table 1 presents a detailed summary of the test results. The format of the table is described as follows.
The top section is a general summary of the test parameters and results. The total test times, autoclave
temperatures and nominal pH and hydrogen concentrations are shown for each test/test set. The lower
five rows provide specific results for:
x % engagement - this is the percentage of the specimen width over which the crack front was
found to have propagated,
x K
avg
and da/dt - these are the actual values determined from post-test examinations of the
specimens,
x da/dt K30 T340C this is the value for the crack growth rate at the test temperature (340qC)
normalized to a stress intensity of 30 MPam (the normalization procedure is described
below)
x da/dt K30 T325C this is the value for the crack growth rate further normalized to a test
temperature of 325qC, the temperature currently being used to normalize the current crack
growth rates of most nickel-based materials for the EPRI MRP program activities.
The subsequent lower sections of Table 1 provide results specific to the individual test phases. Actual
hydrogen concentrations and values of the total measured crack extension (da, in Pm) are shown, in
addition to the actual K
avg
and values determined for da/dt, both as-measured and corrected for stress
intensity and temperature as described above.
Crack growth rates were reported as-measured for the test conditions. As indicated above, these rates
were normalized to a common stress intensity of 30 MPam. The method used was that used in EPRI
MRP-55 (Ref. 2), based on previous efforts by Scott (Ref. 3). These models determine that the crack
growth rate, da/dt, is proportional to the crack tip stress intensity as (K-9)
1.16
. Therefore, to calculate the
crack growth rate for a stress intensity of 30 MPam, the measured da/dt for a test performed at, for
example, a K of 35 MPam was multiplied by [(30-9)/(35-9)]
1.16
or by 0.78. In a similar manner, the
crack growth rates were temperature-corrected to a common temperature of 325C (617F) using an
activation energy of 31.05 kcal/mole (130 kJ/mole) (Ref. 2) to account for small variations in test
temperature. These small corrections to crack growth rate based on stress intensity and temperature allow
direct comparisons to be made from one test to another. The crack growth measurements were taken by
digital analysis of both optical and SEM montage images of the fracture surface. Positions of the notch,
fatigue precrack and final PWSCC crack front were taken by careful measurements across the crack front.
Typically 50 to 200 measurements were taken across the CT specimen depending on the regularity of the
crack front.
Of the six Alloy 182 specimens tested previously with Alloy 52M specimens 52-1 and 52-2, the far left
column presents the averaged results for the two specimens tested at a stress intensity of 41.5 MPam.
The four Alloy 182 specimens reported in the right-adjacent column were tested at an average stress
intensity of 26.8 MPam. Each of these six specimens was tested in both Phases 1 and 2 as shown in
Table 1. The remaining Alloy 182 specimen, UE-1 in Table 1, was tested only in the pH 7.2 environment
of Phase 3 at a stress intensity determined to be 39.6 MPam. As mentioned earlier, this specimen was
3-60
3
tested in the T-S orientation; the measured crack growth rates are seen to be ~2.5 times higher than those
measured for the T-L oriented specimens. The results on Alloy 182 are consistent with industry trends
(Ref. 4).
The remaining four columns in Table 1 present data for the Alloy 52M specimens. Post-test examinations
were performed only for specimens 52-1 and 52-2. Specimen 52-1 was exposed in Phase 1 (pH 7.4) and
Phase 2 (pH 6.9) for a total cumulative exposure of 1402.3 hours at an average stress intensity of 29.5
MPam. Only a small amount of transgranular corrosion fatigue cracking was visible on the fracture
surface. Specimen 52-2 was exposed for a total of 2700.1 hours at an average stress intensity of 32.4
MPam; this specimen was tested in all three pH environments pH 7.4, pH 6.9, and pH 7.2. Again, the
only cracking visible on the fracture surface appeared to be due to transgranular fatigue. The amount of
fatigue cracking experienced in Alloy 52M is consistent with that predicted by Chopra et al. in Reference
5. Note in Table 1 that an upper bound estimate of the rate of stress corrosion cracking was made by
assuming that all cracking observed was due to steady state SCC rather than cycle dependent corrosion
fatigue. The as-measured overall crack growth rates (da/dt at 340qC) are indicated with an asterisk;
corrected/adjusted values for da/dt are not shown in the subsequent rows or in the summaries for the
individual Phase 1, 2 and 3 exposures.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of the compact tension crack growth rate tests for Alloy 182 are consistent with results
published in the literature for this weld metal. The single specimen tested in the T-S orientation exhibited
somewhat higher crack growth rates than those measured previously for Alloy 182 welds tested in the T-L
orientation.
All degradation observed in the Alloy 52M specimens, tested for periods up to 2700 hours at stress
intensities in the 32-35 MPam range, was due to corrosion fatigue resulting from the cyclic load-unload
sequence used in these tests. Examination of the post-test fractured surfaces revealed no indications of
intergranular stress corrosion cracking.
REFERENCES
1. Inconel Filler Metal 52M, Preliminary Data Sheet, Special Metals Welding Products Company
(undated specification sheet).
2. Materials Reliability Program (MRP) Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating Primary Water Stress
Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Thick-Wall Alloy 600 Materials (MRP-55) Revision 1, EPRI,
Palo Alto, CA: 2002. 1006695.
3. P. M. Scott, An Analysis of Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking in PWR Steam
Generators, presented at NEA/CSNI Specialist Meeting on Operating Experience with Steam
Generators, Brussels, Belgium, September 16-20, 1991.
4. Minutes of EPRI-MRP PWSCC Crack Growth Expert Panel Meeting, Gaithersburg, Maryland,
MRP 2003-38, October 3, 2003.
5. O. K. Chopra, W. K. Soppet and W. J. Shack, Effects of Alloy Chemistry, Cold Work, and Water
Chemistry on Corrosion Fatigue and Stress Corrosion Cracking of Nickel Alloys and Welds,
NUREG/CR-6721, April 2001.
3-61
4
Table 1 Crack growth rate test results Alloy 52M and Alloy 182 Specimens
Test No. 2 CT spec. 4 CT spec. 5.5C 5.56 5.57 5.58 5.59
Material Alloy 182 Alloy 182 Alloy 182 Alloy 52M Alloy 52M Alloy 52M Alloy 52M
Specimen average average UE-1 52-1 52-2 52-3 52-4
Orientation T-L T-L T-S T-L T-L T-L T-L
Total Test Time (h) 1402.3 1402.3 1297.8 1402.3 2700.1 1297.8 1297.8
Temp. deg C 339.8 339.8 341.6 339.8 340.7 341.6 341.6
pH plan 7.4/6.9 7.4/6.9 7.2 7.4/6.9 7.4/6.9/7.2 7.2 7.2
H
2
(cm
3
/kg) 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
% engagement 96% 84% 92% 96% 58% ?? ??
K avg (MPam) 41.5 26.8 39.6 29.5 32.4 ~34 ~34
da/dt, (m/s) T~340C 3.92E-10 1.93E-10 9.69E-10 1.35E-11* 1.28E-11* not not
da/dt K30,T340(m/s) 2.28E-10 2.34E-10 6.26E-10 max rate max rate examined examined
da/dt K30, T325C 1.21E-10 1.24E-10 3.09E-10 TG -cor. fatig TG -cor. fatig
Phase 1
pH 7.4 7.4 not 7.4 7.4 not not
Li (ppm) 6.5 / 2.6 6.5 / 2.6 tested 6.5 / 2.6 6.5 / 2.6 tested tested
H
2
(cm
3
/kg) 33.6 33.6 33.6 33.6
da (m) 876 493
K avg (MPam) 40.9 27.9 ~31.4 ~31.0
da/dt, (m/s) T~340C 3.49E-10 1.96E-10
da/dt K30,T340(m/s) 2.13E-10 2.25E-10
da/dt K30, T325C 1.14E-10 1.20E-10
Phase 2
pH 6.9 6.9 not 6.9 6.9 not not
Li (ppm) 1.9 / 0.8 1.9 / 0.8 tested 1.9 / 0.8 1.9 / 0.8 tested tested
H
2
(cm
3
/kg) 36.6 36.6 36.6 36.6
da (m) 1528 437
K avg (MPam) 43.3 26.3 ~27.6 ~27.3
da/dt, (m/s) T~340C 6.01E-10 1.72E-10
da/dt K30,T340(m/s) 3.30E-10 2.16E-10
da/dt K30, T325C 1.75E-10 1.14E-10
Phase 3
pH not not 7.2 not 7.2 7.2 7.2
Li (ppm) tested tested 3.2/2.6/2.0/1.1 tested 3.2/2.6/2.0/1.1 3.2/2.6/2.0/1.1 3.2/2.6/2.0/1.1
H
2
(cm
3
/kg) 35.3 35.3 35.3 35.3
da (m) 4526 ?? ?? ??
K avg (MPam) 39.6 ~35.3 ~34 ~34
da/dt, (m/s) T~340C 9.69E-10 not not
da/dt K30,T340(m/s) 6.26E-10 examined examined
da/dt K30, T325C 3.09E-10
3-62
Slide 1
Comparative PWSCC Crack Growth
Rate Studies of Alloy 52M and Alloy
182 Weld Metals
R. J. Jacko and R. E. Gold
PWSCC of Alloy 600
Santa Ana Pueblo, NM March 7 - 10,
2005
3-63
Slide 2
Background
zIncreased incidences of environmental degradation
(PWSCC) of Alloy 600 and the corresponding weld
metals have emphasized the need for expanding
the corrosion test database.
z The research reported here encompassed:
Crack growth rate testing of Alloy 52M used for
recent weld metal repairs at Ringhals 3 and 4,
Crack growth rate testing of Alloy 182 weld metal
specimens
3-64
Slide 3
Background (contd)
zTesting was performed in partial response to the repair of
cracking detected in a reactor vessel outlet nozzle to pipe
safe-end welds at Ringhals 3 & 4
zPWSCC growth rate testing in primary water conducted
during this program was used to obtain additional evidence
of SCC resistance of Alloy 52M as used during the Ringhals
3 and 4 nozzle repair project
zFurther details about this repair are provided in the
presentation titled RPV Outlet Nozzle Repair (SAFEPLAY)
for Ringhals Units 3 and 4
3-65
Slide 4
Experimental Program Crack
Growth Rate Tests
zCrack growth rate tests were performed on either 0.6T or 0.7T-compact
tension specimens prepared according to the guidelines of ASTM E647
zTesting was performed in 340qC (644qF) simulated primary water;
6.5 to 1.0 ppm Li, 1500 to 250 ppm B, ~35 cm
3
(STP)H
2
/kg H
2
O.
zSpecimens were actively loaded to nominal stress intensities between 26
MPam to 43 MPam.
zSpecimens were periodically unloaded to 0.7 initial load
Unloading period typically 9000 s (2.5 h) for most of test duration
3-66
Slide 5
Composition of Alloy 182 and
52M material
zThe Alloy 52M (Alloy 690 weld) material used to fabricate the CT
specimens was purchased specifically from Uddcomb Engineering for
this program.
zThe Alloy 182 weld metal specimens were prepared at a commercial
welding shop by depositing multi-pass shielded metal arc weld passes
in a V-groove machined into a two-inch by two-inch thick Alloy 600
plate.
zTest compositions are shown below.
C Cr Ni Fe Mn Mo Al Ti Nb + Ta Co
182 75A3 0.040 13.63 68.49 7.11 7.60 0.59 1.87
182 49A9 0.040 14.42 68.49 6.87 7.23 0.61 1.73
52M EX0A51P 0.020 30.04 60.37 8.42 0.81 0.02 0.10 0.21 0.85 0.007
- ++ - - - - - -
Alloy Heat
Composition - Major Elements (wt.%)
3-67
Slide 6
Microstructure of Alloy 52M
welds
Alloy 52M welds do not have intergranular M
23
C
6
/M
7
C
3
carbides present like 690TT
The higher %Cr present is assumed to increase the SCC resistance
3-68
Slide 7
Specimen Orientations
z Sketch showing the orientation of the compact
tension specimens with respect to the weld
orientation.
z All but one specimen was tested in the T-L
orientation where the weld dendrites are oriented
perpendicular to the crack growth direction.
z One specimen (182-UE-1) was tested in the T-S
orientation where the weld dendrites are oriented
parallel to the crack growth direction.
Faster crack growth rates are typically
observed in the T-S orientation.
T-L
Orientation
T-S
Orientation
Alloy 182
Weld
Alloy 52M or
182 Weld
T-L
Orientation
T-S
Orientation
Alloy 182
Weld
Alloy 52M or
182 Weld
3-69
Slide 8
Test Specimens loaded in series
Combinations of 0.6T and 0.7T CTs
zA combination of
Alloy 182 and Alloy
52M CT specimens
were tested in series
Same loads
Same test
solutions
Periodic and final
inspections using
combination of
compliance and
DC Potential
Drop
3-70
Slide 9
A 4-step Cyclic Loading Sequence was used to start
cracks growing during each test phase
zCyclic loading with increasing cyclic periods used to adjust crack
morphology from transgranular fatigue to intergranular PWSCC
zTrapezoidal waveforms used in four steps per Phase per below
zFor steps 3 and 4; 90% of the cycle spent at peak load
Phase 1&2 Load/K Cycle period N 1 t, step t = Phase scc
Step # Range (s) cycles total cycles duration (h) duration (h) time(h)
1 100% max -> 60% 30 1800 1800 15 15 ~0
2 100% max -> 60% 100 648 2448 18 33 ~0
3 100% max -> 70% 1000 90 2538 25 58 25
4 100% max -> 70% 9000 270 2808 676 734 701
Phase 3 Load/K Cycle period N 1 t, step t = Phase scc
Step # Range (s) cycles total cycles duration (h) duration (h) time
1 100% max -> 60% 30 1800 1800 15 15 ~0
2 100% max -> 60% 100 648 2448 18 33 ~0
3 100% max -> 70% 1000 90 2538 25 58 25
4 100% max -> 70% 9000 509 3047 1273 1331 1298
3-71
Slide 10
Test Environments
zpH plan:
Phase 1, pH 7.4, higher [Li]
Phase 2, pH 6.9, lower [Li]
Phase 3, pH 7.2, intermed. [Li]
zTest Materials:
Phase 1 and 2: Six Alloy 182 welds
and Two Alloy 52M welds
Phase 3: One Alloy 182 weld and
three Alloy 52M welds
zTest Temperature: 340C-342C
zAverage H
2
concentration: 35 cm
3
/kg
zTotal Test Duration:
Phases 1&2: 1402 hours at
temperature under load in the test
solution.
Phase 3: 1298 hours at temperature
under load
0
400
800
1200
1600
2
/
1
0
2
/
1
7
2
/
2
4
3
/
3
3
/
1
0
3
/
1
7
3
/
2
4
3
/
3
1
4
/
7
4
/
1
4
4
/
2
1
4
/
2
8
5
/
5
B
o
r
o
n

(
p
p
m
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
L
i
t
h
i
u
m

(
p
p
m
)
Test 5.5 Boron
Lithium
52M Crack Growth Rate Test - Phase 3
0
400
800
1200
1600
1
5
-
M
a
y
-
0
3
2
2
-
M
a
y
-
0
3
2
9
-
M
a
y
-
0
3
0
5
-
J
u
n
-
0
3
1
2
-
J
u
n
-
0
3
1
9
-
J
u
n
-
0
3
2
6
-
J
u
n
-
0
3
0
3
-
J
u
l-
0
3
1
0
-
J
u
l-
0
3
1
7
-
J
u
l-
0
3
2
4
-
J
u
l-
0
3
B
o
r
o
n

(
p
p
m
)
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
L
i
t
h
i
u
m

(
p
p
m
)
nominal B Actual B nominal Li actual Li
Phase 1 and 2 Boron and Lithium Control Bands
Phase 3 Boron and Lithium Control Bands
3-72
Slide 11
Crack Growth Rate Tests Alloy 182 and Alloy
52M in 340qC Primary Water Overall Summary
Test No. 2 CT spec. 4 CT spec. 5.5C 5.56 5.57
Material Alloy 182 Alloy 182 Alloy 182 Alloy 52M Alloy 52M
Specimen average average UE-1 52-1 52-2
Orientation T-L T-L T-S T-L T-L
Total Test Time (h) 1402.3 1402.3 1297.8 1402.3 2700.1
Temp. deg C 339.8 339.8 341.6 339.8 340.7
pH plan 7.4/6.9 7.4/6.9 7.2 7.4/6.9 7.4/6.9/7.2
H2 (cm^3/kg) 35 35 35 35 35
% engagement 96% 84% 92% 96% 58%
K avg (MPa-m^0.5) 41.5 26.8 39.6 29.5 32.4
da/dt, (m/s) T~340C 3.92E-10 1.93E-10 9.69E-10 1.35E-11* 1.28E-11*
da/dt K30,T340(m/s) 2.28E-10 2.34E-10 6.26E-10 max rate max rate
da/dt, T325C 1.21E-10 1.24E-10 3.09E-10 TG - cfat TG - cfat
**
***
Notes: * Maximum assumed Crack Growth Rate, (assumes all crack growth, including the fatigue component, is due to SCC
** Crack Growth Rate corrected to a common stress intensity factor, K = 30 MPam
*** Crack Growth Rate corrected to a common stress intensity factor, K = 30 MPam and temperature corrected to
325C using 32 kcal/mole
3-73
Slide 12
Alloy 182 PWSCC Results
zIntergranular environmental cracking was observed in all seven Alloy 182
weld specimens.
zFor the two tests, (T-L orientation), conducted at the higher average
stress intensities (approximately 42 MPam), approximately 2 to 3 mm of
growth was observed during the 1402 hours of exposure under stress.
zFor the four tests, (T-L), conducted in the lower stress intensity range
(~27 MPam), an average of 0.9 mm of crack growth was observed.
zFor the one test conducted in the (T-S) orientation at an average stress
intensity of 40 MPam, an average of 4.5 mm of crack growth was
observed during the 1298 hours of exposure
3-74
Slide 13
Fracture Morphology of Alloy
182 (T-L)
-Intergranular cracking clearly seen on the Alloy 182
fracture
surfaces.
- Mid-phase fatigue band also visible
- Interdendritic cracking seen at higher mag.
scc
scc
fatigue
fatigue
3-75
Slide 14
Fracture Morphology of
Alloy 182 (T-S) orientation
zMore significant PWSCC was
observed during testing in the
T-S orientation
zDendrites are oriented parallel
to the growth direction
zAverage crack growth rate was
2.5 times faster in this weld
direction
fatigue
scc
3-76
Slide 15
Comparison of Alloy 182
results with EPRI models
Alloy 182 Crack Growth Rates
1.0E-11
1.0E-10
1.0E-09
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Stress Intensity K, MPa-m
0.5
P
W
S
C
C

G
r
o
w
t
h

R
a
t
e

a
t

3
2
5
C
,

(
m
/
s
)
pH 6.9 pH 7.2 pH 7.4 MRP-115
3-77
Slide 16
Alloy 52M PWSCC Results
z Sketches of the crack profiles determined from the post-test examinations of the fracture
surfaces are presented for Alloy 52M specimens 52-1 and 52-2
z No features indicating an interdendritic PWSCC fracture morphology were noted at any
location along the crack front.
z The only features discernible at the end of the fatigue precrack were small transgranular
bands of additional fatigue propagation
Test 5.56 - CT , Optical
a/W(notch) = 0.475; a/W(pc) = 0.524; a/W(scc) = 0.526; da = 0.062 mm,
da max = 0.227 mm, 96% engagement
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000 13000
CT width (um)
C
r
a
c
k

(
u
m
)
Notch Precrack End of TG Corrosion Fatigue
`
3-78
Slide 17
Fracture Morphology of Alloy
52M (T-L)
The only features discernible at the end of the fatigue precrack were two small
transgranular bands of additional fatigue propagation
fatigue
fatigue
3-79
Slide 18
Corrosion Fatigue explains the
Cracking Observed in the 52M Welds
zA refined fatigue analysis was performed based on a corrosion fatigue
growth correlation published by Chopra et al.
z Based on Chopra model:
94 m of cracking for specimen 52-1, (vs. 62 m measured) and
186 m of cracking for specimen 52-2, (vs. 125 m measured)
zThe agreement between the measured crack advance and the predicted
corrosion fatigue crack advance is reasonable.
zThere were no indications of an interdendritic fracture morphology
observed anywhere along the crack front in either of the two Alloy 52M
specimens that were destructively examined.
These interdendritic features are always observed and
associated with PWSCC in these nickel-base alloy welds.
zThe transgranular fracture morphology for the 52M is entirely explained
by corrosion fatigue crack advance where the transgranular morphology
is what would be expected.
3-80
Slide 19
Comparison: Alloy 182 vs. 52M
Growth Rates
z The corrosion fatigue rates observed for the Alloy 52M specimens are represented as
crack growth rates i.e., in m/s units and plotted with the Alloy 182 data.
1.0E-11
1.0E-10
1.0E-09
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Stress Intensity K, MPa-m
0.5
P
W
S
C
C

G
r
o
w
t
h

R
a
t
e

a
t

3
2
5
C
,

(
m
/
s
)
pH 6.9 pH 7.2 pH 7.4 MRP-115 Alloy 52M - fatigue
Even assuming that the
Alloy 52M fatigue
cracking is due to "time
dependent SCC", the
rates are <20 times lower
than Alloy 182
3-81
Slide 20
Summary
zThe results of the compact tension crack growth rate tests for Alloy 182
are consistent with results published in the literature for this weld metal.
zGrowth rates obtained were slightly below an Alloy 182 curve proposed
by EPRI.
zAll cracking observed in the Alloy 52M specimens, tested for periods up
to 2700 hours at stress intensities up to 35 MPam, was due to corrosion
fatigue resulting from the cyclic load-unload sequence used in these
tests.
zExamination of the post-test fractured surfaces revealed no indications of
intergranular stress corrosion cracking.
zEven if the 52M cracking observed was considered to be due to time-
based PWSCC rather than cycle-based corrosion fatigue, the Alloy 52M
equivalent rates are approximately one-twentieth (or less) those
measured for Alloy 182 tested under the same test conditions.
3-82
Outline of Evaluation Technology for SCC Growth of Ni Base Alloys
(NiSCC) Project in Japan and current results in PWR environment
Y. Yamamoto, M. Ozawa and K. Nakata
Incorporated Administrative Agency
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES)
Fujita Kanko Toranomon Bldg., 3-17-1, Toranomon, Minato-ku,
Tokyo, 105-0001, Japan
Abstract
1. Outline of NiSCC project
Recently, SCC of Ni base alloys were detected in pressure boundary components of PWRs and
BWRs. If a crack is detected in a component during in-service inspection, the evaluation of crack
growth due to SCC and the evaluation of structural integrity are required. However, data of crack
growth rate (CGR) have not been acquired sufficiently. Therefore, the need to develop the SCC
growth rate evaluation method for base and weld metals of Ni base alloys has been recognized in
Japan.
In view of such situation, the project of Evaluation Technology for Stress Corrosion Crack Growth
of Ni Base Alloys (NiSCC) was commenced in 2000 and will be continued to 2005, which project is
organized by JNES, being supported by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in
Japan. The objectives of the project are to obtain the sufficient data of CGR in Ni base alloys,
especially in their welds and to develop the evaluation method of SCC growth rate for evaluating the
integrity of plants.
The SCC growth tests for base and weld metals of Ni base alloys are being conducted systematically
in simulated PWR and BWR water under constant load condition using CT specimens, in order to
make clear the relation between CGR and stress intensity factor K.
2. Currently obtained results on PWSCC growth tests
In this paper, currently obtained results from the constant load SCC growth tests in simulated PWR
primary water are described. Main targets for these tests are reactor vessel head penetrations, nozzle
safe-ends and in-core instrument nozzles.
Test methods
Materials used were Alloy 82 and 132 weld metals, as well as four heats of Alloy 600 base materials,
which were used for reactor vessel head penetrations of latest and early plant and for in-core
instrument nozzles of latest and early plant respectively. Simulating welding heat inputs of
commercial plants, SMAW and TIG welding techniques were applied for weld metals. Half-inch
compact tension specimens (1/2TCT) were prepared for crack growth test in PWR primary water at
temperatures of 340 and 360C (B:1800 ppm, Li:3.5 ppm, pH:6.4, DO<5 ppb, DH:30 cc/kg). The
specimen had side grooves with 5% depth of the thickness on each side surface. Each specimen was
3-83
pre-cracked at the tip of EDM slit by fatigue in air at room temperature where the maximum K value
was lower than 80% of that for the succeeding crack growth test and an intergranular pre-crack was
introduced in the specimen by a gentle cycle treatment in PWR primary water, in order to obtain
precise crack growth rate. K values were controlled from 20 to 50 MPam
1/2
.
The crack lengths were monitored by means of the reversing direct current potential drop method
(PDM). After the tests, actual crack lengths on the fracture surfaces were measured by averaging
crack lengths along the specimen thickness for each specimen, which were obtained with dividing the
area of SCC by the specimen thickness. Based on these observed results, the crack growth data
measured by PDM method were corrected so that the measured crack length coincided with the
actual one. The average CGRs were obtained from the slope of the corrected crack length vs. time
curve.
Test results
Figure 1 shows the relation between K value and the average CGR of Alloy 600 base metals
compared with the MRP curve [1] and the modified Scott curve [2]. And Fig.2 shows that of Alloy 82
and 132 weld metals compared with the modified Scott curve multiplied some factor on CGR to
specify the upper level of all data. The MRP curve and the modified Scott curve at 340C and 360C
were determined by using an activation energy of 130 kJ/mol.
An example of the fracture surface of Alloy 600 base metal specimen is shown in Fig.3. And that of
Alloy 82 weld metal specimen is shown in Fig.4.
In case of the specimen orientation of Alloy 132 weld metal was not consistent with the dendrite
direction, correct CGR didnt obtained because both fatigue pre-crack and SCC strayed from the
normal direction and propagated along the dendrite direction. Therefore, the CGRs of Alloy 132 weld
metal were determined from the SCC test results using the specimens machined out parallel to the
dendrite direction.
Main results are summarized as follows:
(1) CGRs showed test temperature dependence in both the weld and base metal: the CGR at 360C
was approximately twice as fast as that at 340C at 35 MPam
1/2
.
(2) The CGRs in Alloy 82 and 132 weld metals were nearly one order of magnitude faster than those
of base metal Alloy 600 in all test conditions. Little difference in CGR was observed among the four
heats of Alloy 600.
(3) The CGR data in base metals and weld metals were compared with the modified Scott model. The
experimental CGRs on base metals were less than 1/5 of the predicted curve from the modified Scott
model. On the contrary, those on weld metals were approximately 5 times larger than the predicted
curve.
(4) Interdendritic and intergranular cracks occurred in weld metals, Alloy 82 and 132, and base metal,
Alloy 600, respectively, in the tests. The crack propagation direction in weld metals was along the
dendrite direction, when the dendrite direction and perpendicular to stress direction was different
each other.
Future plan
(1) SCC growth tests under the K increasing condition (constant loading) both in PWR and BWR
environments are ongoing now. Additional data will be obtained in FY2005. From these results, CGR
vs. K curves will be proposed and reflected on regulatory rules on fitness-for-service.
(2) SCC growth tests under the K decreasing condition (constant displacement or load controlled)
and those to evaluate the cold work effects are now planed to be performed.
3-84
References
1. Materials Reliability Program (MRP) Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating Primary Water Stress
Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Thick-Wall Alloy 600 Material (MRP-55) Non-proprietary
version, July 18, 2002.
2. Scott, P. M. An Analysis of Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking in PWR Steam Generators,
Presented at NEA/CSNI Specialist Meeting on Operating Experience with Steam Generators,
Brussels, Belgium, September 16-20, 1991.
1.l1?
1.l11
1.l10
1.l09
1.l08
1.l0
0 20 40 60 80
Stress Intensity Factor K (MPa m
1/2
)
C
G
R

d
a
/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
(360C)5
10
-8
10
-9
10
-10
10
-11
10
-12
10
-7
(340C)5
Alloy 132
Alloy 82
Alloy 132
Alloy 82
360C
340C
1.l1?
1.l11
1.l10
1.l09
1.l08
1.l0
0 ?0 0 b0 80
1/2
)
C
G
R

d
a
/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
MRP Curve
(360C)
Modified Scott
Curve (360C)
10
-8
10
-9
10
-10
10
-11
10
-12
10
-7
(340C)
(340C)
0 20 40 60 80
Alloy 600
Closed Symbols : 360C
Open Symbols : 340C
for RVH nozzles of latest plant
for RVH nozzles of early plant
for ICI nozzles of latest plant
for ICI nozzles of early plant
Figure 1. Relation between K value and
the average CGR of Alloy 600
at 340C and 360C
Figure 2. Relation between K value and
the average CGR of Alloy 132
and Alloy 82 weld metals
at 340C and 360C
1 mm
1 mm
EDM slit
Fatigue pre-crack
in air
Env. pre-crack + SCC
Figure 3. An example of the fracture
surface of Alloy 600 specimen
tested at 35 MPa m
1/2

EDM slit
Fatigue pre-crack
Figure 4. An example of the fracture
surface of Alloy 82 specimen
tested at 35 MPa m
1/2
3-85
0
Outline of Evaluation Technology for SCC
Growth of Ni Base Alloys (NiSCC) Project
in Japan and current results in PWR
environment
Y. Yamamoto, M. Ozawa and K. Nakata
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
Material Reliability Evaluation Group
3-86
1
NiSCC Project
Background
The need to develop the CGR evaluation method for
base and weld metals of Ni base alloys has been
recognized.
SCC of Ni base alloys in pressure boundary
components of PWRs and BWRs.
- Evaluation of crack growth due to SCC
- Structural integrity assessment
3-87
?
Objectives
To obtain the sufficient data of CGR in nickel base
alloys in PWR and BWR environment for base
metals and weld metals.
To prepare CGR vs. K
curves for evaluation of
the integrity of plants.
CGR vs. K curve
Parameter Material,
Water chemistry,
Temperature, etc.
Stress Intensity Factor K
C
G
R

d
a
/
d
t
NiSCC Project
3-88
3
Target structures
NiSCC Project
PWR
PWR
nozzle
safe-ends
reactor vessel
head penetrations
in-core instrument
nozzles
PWR
PWR
nozzle
safe-ends
reactor vessel
head penetrations
in-core instrument
nozzles
BWR
BWR
ICM housing /
CRD stub tube
welds
shroud
support
nozzle
safe-ends
BWR
BWR
ICM housing /
CRD stub tube
welds
shroud
support
nozzle
safe-ends
3-89
+
FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005
Design and fabrication of testing
apparatus
BWR environment (Constant loading and cyclic loading test)
PWR environment-Nozzle (Constant loading test)
PWR environment -SG heat transfer tube
(Constant Loading test)
Preparing Crack Growth
Rate vs. K Curve
Program of Project
NiSCC Project
3-90
Test Conditions
Material :
Base Metal : Alloy 600 MA, 600 TT, 690 TT
Weld Metals : Alloy 132, Alloy 152 (for SMAW)
Alloy 82, Alloy 52 (for TIG)
Water Chemistry : PWR primary water
(simulated beginning of cycle RCS water,
B:1800 ppm, Li:3.5 ppm, pH:6.4, DO<5 ppb, DH:30 cc/kg)
Temperature : 290, 320, 340, 360qC
Stress Intensity Factor : 20 50 MPa m
1/2
(Now, test results of Alloy 600 MA, Alloy 132 and Alloy 82 at 340qC and 360qCare obtained. Other tests are
ongoing now.)
Current results on PWSCC growth tests
3-91
b
Chemical compositions of tested materials
Alloy 600 MA
C Si Mn P S Ni Cr Fe Cu
RVH nozzles of latest plant 0.017 0.29 0.32 0.009 0.001 74.03 16.21 8.57 0.05 975, 15 min
RVH nozzles of early plant 0.06 0.33 0.34 0.008 0.001 75.89 15.93 6.98 0.03 1050, 30 min
ICI nozzles of latest plant 0.031 0.25 0.39 0.004 0.001 73.41 16.15 8.94 0.02 930, 60 min
ICI nozzles of early plant 0.03 0.1 0.16 <0.001 0.001 75.31 15.33 8.75 <0.01 800, 120 min
Chemical compositions (wt%)
MA condition
C Si Mn P S Ni Cr Fe Cu Ti Nb+Ta
Alloy 132 0.05 0.22 2.8 0.005 0.004 69.9 15 9.7 <0.01 1.8
Alloy 82 0.03 0.21 3.08 0.001 0.002 73.94 18.32 1.39 0.02 0.33 ?.b1
Chemical compositions (wt%)
Weld metals
3-92
1/2TCT
Weld metal specimen sampling from
the welded joint of thick plate
Specimen sampling from
the actual RVH nozzle
8
0

m
m
OD
110 mm
ID
60 mm
1/2TCT
Specimen sampling from
the actual ICI nozzle
4
5

m
m
Specimen sampling
3-93
8
Test Procedure flow
1/2TCT specimens
Fatigue pre-cracking in air (ASTM E647)
Intergranular pre-cracking
in the primary water
Adjustment of water chemistry
Test start : Constant loading, PDM monitoring
SEM observation of fracture surface
Crack growth rate evaluation
PDM
Constant loading
Pre-crack
1/2TCT
Simulated BOC
Primary water
3-94
9
Average CGRs based on 'a
ave
were used.
CGR determination
t
0
crack area A
Crack length vs. time curve
by PDM monitoring
Time (Hr)
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h

a

(
m
m
)
'a
PDM
a
0
Measurement of actual
crack length by SEM
average crack length :
'a
ave.
= A/t
0
Correction of crack length
vs. time curve by 'a
ave.
correction factor :
'a
ave
/ 'a
PDM
Time (Hr)
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h

a

(
m
m
)
'a
PDM
a
0
'a
ave
CGR
Correction factor :
'a
ave
/ 'a
PDM
3-95
10
y b.01l03x 9.30l00
y 1.8l03x 1.03l01
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
1?.0
13.0
1+.0
1.0
1b.0
0 100 ?00 300 +00 00 b00 00 800 900 1000
8?
3+0
l 3 M lcm
0.00
30
1800
3.
b.+
3
0. 0.3
)
3
0. ?+
An example of PDM data
Time (Hr)
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h

a

(
m
m
)
Introduction of
intergranular pre-crack
K
max
= 23 MPa m
1/2
(R=0.7, Hold time : 0.3 hr)
Constant loading (periodical unloading)
K
max
= 23 MPa m
1/2
(R=0.7, Hold time : 24 hr)
CGR=5.19u10
-10
m/s
Alloy 82
Tested at 340qC
K = 35 MPa m
1/2
3-96
11
1.l1?
1.l11
1.l10
1.l09
1.l08
1.l0
0 20 40 60 80
1/2
)
C
G
R

d
a
/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
(360C)5
10
-8
10
-9
10
-10
10
-11
10
-12
10
-7
(340C)5
(360C)
(340C)
Alloy 132
Alloy 82
Alloy 132
Alloy 82
360C
340C
Relation between K value and the average CGR of
Alloy 132and Alloy 82 weld metals at 340qC and 360qC
upper bound of all data
(at 360qC)
da/dt = 4.78u10
-11
(K-9)
1.16
(at 340qC )
da/dt = 2.13u10
-11
(K-9)
1.16
(adjusted for temperature
dependence with an activation
energy of 130 kJ/mole)
3-97
1?
dud`
d`òu
200m
Side view of
tested specimen
Specimen orientation is not consistent
with the dendrite direction because of
horizontal welding. (Alloy 132)
These data were rejected.
Fatigue pre-crack
in air
EDM
slit
Crack propagated along the dendrite direction
An example of Alloy 132 tested specimen (1)
3-98
13
EDM
(1.0mm)
(2.6mm)
5mm
dud`
d`òu
(max. 2.6mm)
Fatigue pre-crack in air
(approx. 1.0mm)
EDM slit
Side view of tested specimen
Specimen machined out parallel to
the dendrite direction (Alloy 132)
The CGRs of Alloy 132 were
determined by these data.
An example of Alloy 132 tested specimen (2)
Fracture surface of tested specimen
3-99
1+
Relation between K value and the average CGR of
Alloy 600 at 340qC and 360qC
1.l1?
1.l11
1.l10
1.l09
1.l08
1.l0
0 ?0 +0 b0 80
1/2
)
C
G
R

d
a
/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
MRP Curve
(360C)
Modified Scott
Curve (360C)
10
-8
10
-9
10
-10
10
-11
10
-12
10
-7
(340C)
(340C)
0 20 40 60 80
(360C)1/4
(340C)1/5
Alloy 600
Closed Symbols : 360C
Open Symbols : 340C
for RVH nozzles of latest plant
for RVH nozzles of early plant
for ICI nozzles of latest plant
for ICI nozzles of early plant
upper bound of all data
(at 360qC)
da/dt = 2.39u10
-12
(K-9)
1.16
(at 340qC )
da/dt = 8.53u10
-13
(K-9)
1.16
(adjusted for temperature
dependence with an activation
energy of 130 kJ/mole)
3-100
1
(1) CGRs showed test temperature dependence in both the
weld and base metal: the CGR at 360qC was
approximately twice as fast as that at 340qC.
(2) The CGRs in Alloy 82 and 132 weld metals were nearly
equal each other, and one order of magnitude faster than
those of base metal Alloy 600.
Summary
3-101
1b
(3) The experimental CGRs on base metals were less than 1/5
of the predicted curve from the MRP curve or the
modified Scott model. On the contrary, those on weld
metals were approximately 5 times larger than the
predicted curve.
(4) Interdendritic cracks occurred in weld metals, Alloy 82
and 132, and intergranular cracks occurred in base metal,
Alloy 600, in the tests.
(5) The crack propagation direction in weld metals was along
the dendrite direction, when the dendrite direction and
perpendicular to stress direction was different each other.
Summary
3-102
1
Future plan
(1) Additional CGR data acquisition under the K
increasing condition (constant loading) both in PWR
and BWR environments .
From these results, CGR vs. K curves will be proposed and
reflected on regulatory rules on fitness-for-service.
(2) Following items are now planed to be performed.
- SCC growth tests under the K decreasing condition
(constant displacement or load controlled).
- Evaluation of cold work effects.
- SCC growth tests in low K region for K values d 20 MPa m
1/2
.
- SCC growth tests using large scale test models simulating
actual plant components.
NiSCC Project
3-103
Finite-Element Analysis of Welding Residual Stresses
in Piping Butt Weldments and Their Effect on Crack Tip Stress Intensity Factors
J. E. Broussard, G. A. White, and E. S. Hunt
Phone: 703-437-1155, Fax: 703-437-0780, E-mail: jbroussard@domeng.com
Extended Abstract
Recent inspections of nickel-based Alloy 182 piping butt weldments in pressurized water reactor
(PWR) power plants have revealed service-induced low potential stress corrosion cracking
(LPSCC).
1,2
Such cracking has the potential to lead to boric acid corrosion of ferritic steel
pressure boundary components by producing primary coolant leakage and, if circumferential in
orientation, could eventually cause piping rupture.
3
Costly visual and nondestructive
examinations are necessary to ensure safe plant operation. The optimal frequency of such
inspections is sensitive to the rate of crack growth in this weld material, which, in turn, is
influenced by the crack tip stress intensity factor (SIF).
The stress distribution acting on the crack plane is a combination of welding residual stresses and
piping operating stresses. While standard through-wall welding residual stress distributions
based on mockup stress measurements are available for butt weldment geometries, these are
limited in that they are generic for a wide variety of geometries and do not address anomalies
such as weld repairs. The present work examines differences between standard distributions and
those predicted by finite element analysis (FEA) methods.
Whether the residual stress distributions are obtained by classical methods or by FEA, crack tip
SIFs are typically calculated using handbook expressions that use arbitrary cubic stress
distributions acting on the crack plane.
4,5
The distribution applied to the handbook expression is
for the intact case (superposition assumption), regardless of the crack depth or aspect ratio.
These methods may not accurately estimate the true changes in crack tip stress intensity with
crack growth, since the remote stress distribution will change with crack growth through the
weld. The authors have developed an FEA methodology for calculating crack tip SIFs (through
the J-integral parameter) that accounts for the redistribution of stresses with crack growth.
References
1. A. Jenssen, K. Norrgrd, C. Jansson, J. Lagerstrm, G. Embring, and P. Efsing, Structural
Assessment of Defected Nozzle to Safe-End Welds in Ringhals 3 and 4, Fontevraud V
International Symposium on Contribution of Materials Investigation to the Resolution of
Problems Encountered in Pressurized Water Reactors, SFEN, 2002, pp. 4354.
3-105
2. G. Moffat, et al., Development of the Technical Basis for Plant Startup for the V. C.
Summer Nuclear Plant, Proceedings of ASME 2001 Pressure Vessels and Piping
Conference, ASME International, Atlanta, GA, 2001.
3. Materials Reliability Program: Alloy 82/182 Pipe Butt Weld Safety Assessment for US PWR
Plant Designs (MRP-113), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1007029.
4. I. S. Raju and J. C. Newman, Stress Intensity Factor Influence Coefficients for Internal and
External Surface Cracks in Cylindrical Vessels, Aspects of Fracture Mechanics in Pressure
Vessels and Piping, ASME PVP Vol. 58, 1982, pp. 3748.
5. A. Zahoor, Section 1.5, Internal Flaw, Arbitrary Stress Distribution, 1 d R
i
/t d 10, in
Chapter 8, Finite Length, Axial Part-Throughwall Flaw, in Volume 3 of Ductile Fracture
Handbook, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 1989. NP-6301-D.
3-106
11730 Plaza America Dr. #310
Reston, VA 20190
703.437.1155
www.domeng.com
Finite-Element Analysis of Welding Residual Stresses
in Piping Butt Weldments and Their Effect on Crack Tip
Stress Intensity Factors
2005 EPRI International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference
March 7-10, 2005
John E. Broussard, Glenn A. White, and E. Stephen Hunt
Dominion Engineering, Inc. (DEI)
Session 1A Crack Growth and Initiation
3-107
Stresses and Stress Intensity Factors in Piping Butt Welds 2 2005 EPRI International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference
Motivations
Illustrate options for calculating crack growth time
Show effect of key parameters for example butt weld configuration
Illustrate importance of assumptions made when comparing field crack
growth data to experimental data for controlled fracture mechanics
specimens
Show how knowledge of the level of engineering conservatism
depends on the analysis assumptions made
DEI's work in this area includes work sponsored by EPRI.
3-108
Outline
Background
Factors Affecting Crack Growth Time
Welding Residual Stress Calculation Methods
Matrix of 12 Example Cases for Pressurizer Surge Line Nozzle
Fracture Mechanics Modeling with Stress Redistribution
Conclusions
3-109
Background
PWSCC of Alloy 82/132/182 butt welds has become an increasing
concern
Cracks at several plants (Ringhals 3 & 4, VC Summer, Tsuruga 2, TMI-1)
Leaks at VC Summer and Tsuruga 2 (including small circ flaw at VC Summer)
Crack growth calculations support
Root cause analyses
Safety assessments
Development of inspection guidelines
Evaluation of flaws for continued service
A number of factors affect crack growth predictions
Butt weld design
Operating loads and temperature
Stresses (weld residual, weld repairs, differential thermal expansion, operating loads)
Stress intensity factor calculation model
Crack growth model
3-110
Location of Pressurizer Surge Line Nozzle:
Butt Weld Location #1
2
6
4
3
1
7
5
3
2
3
10
12
4
7
8
5
9
1
6
11
Westinghouse Design Plant CE Design Plant
3-111
Location of Pressurizer Surge Line Nozzle:
Butt Weld Location #1
B&W Design Plant
1
5
8
6
3
2
9
10
4
13
12
11
7
3-112
Overview of Factors Affecting Standard SCC
Crack Growth Calculation for Weld Metals
3-113
Circ Cracks Greater Concern Than Axial Cracks
In most cases axial cracks are
limited to width of weld
Cracks in weld do not propagate into
adjacent low-alloy or stainless steel by
SCC
Potential concern is with cases
involving A600 safe ends
Circumferential cracks can grow
through-wall, and around the
circumference
Potential risk of rupture
Potential risk of large leaks (boric acid
corrosion)
Example of cracks detected in a
reactor vessel hot leg outlet nozzle
3-114
Welding Residual Stresses
Generic Industry Models
Generic residual stress models established by testing
Most results were for thinner wall BWR piping
Generic models based on nominal fit of test data
NUREG-0313, Technical Report on Material Selection and
Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure
Boundary Piping: Final Report
"Evaluations of Flaws in Austenitic Piping," Transactions
of ASME, J. of Pressure Vessel Technology, v. 108, Aug.
1986, pp. 352-366.
3-115
Finite Element Model of Typical Pressurizer Surge Nozzle Weld
Alloy 182 Butter
Alloy 82/182 Weld
LAS Nozzle
SS Pipe
3-116
FEA vs. Standard Generic Model (Without Weld Repairs)
For Pipes < 1" Thickness
For Pipes > 1" Thickness
-80.0
-60.0
-40.0
-20.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fraction Through Wall (from ID)
W
e
l
d
i
n
g

R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

H
o
o
p

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
Generic <1 Inch Thick
HP Injection (t=0.8, Di/t =2.7)
Instrument (t=0.2, Di/t=5.6)
-80.0
-60.0
-40.0
-20.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
W
e
l
d
i
n
g

R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

H
o
o
p

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
Generic >1 Inch Thick
RPV (t =2.3, Di/t =13.0)
PZR Surge (t=1.7, Di/t=6.0)
PZR Safety (t=1.6, Di/t=3.1)
For Pipes < 1" Thickness
For Pipes > 1" Thickness
-80.0
-60.0
-40.0
-20.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
W
e
l
d
i
n
g

R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

A
x
i
a
l

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
Generic <1 Inch Thick
HP Injection (t=0.8, Di/t =2.7)
Instrument (t=0.2, Di/t=5.6)
-80.0
-60.0
-40.0
-20.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
W
e
l
d
i
n
g

R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

A
x
i
a
l

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
RPV (t =2.3, Di/t =13.0)
Generic results generally conservative through mid-wall
3-117
FEA vs. Standard Generic Model (with Weld Repair from ID Surface)
Axial Stress
-80.0
-60.0
-40.0
-20.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
W
e
l
d
i
n
g

R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

A
x
i
a
l

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
RPV (t =2.3, Di/t =13.0)
Generic results do not bound FEA results for areas with ID repairs
Hoop Stress
-80.0
-60.0
-40.0
-20.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
W
e
l
d
i
n
g

R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

H
o
o
p

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
RPV (t =2.3, Di/t =13.0)
3-118
Welding Residual & Operating Stresses
With Partial Arc ID Repair
Condition Axial Stress Hoop Stress
W
e
l
d
i
n
g

R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

a
n
d

O
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g

S
t
r
e
s
s

3
0

A
r
c

I
D

R
e
p
a
i
r

39.9 ksi Max ID Stress 54.6 ksi Max ID Stress
W
e
l
d
i
n
g

R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

a
n
d

O
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g

S
t
r
e
s
s

9
0

A
r
c

I
D

R
e
p
a
i
r

40.2 ksi Max ID Stress 52.0 ksi Max ID Stress 38.6 52.9
3-119
Welding Residual & Operating Stresses
With Partial-Arc Weld Repair from ID & OD Surface (FEA vs. FEA)
-50.0
-40.0
-30.0
-20.0
-10.0
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g

A
x
i
a
l

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
As-Designed
15 ID Repair
15 OD Repair
Partial-arc weld repairs from ID and OD produce high restraint and
result in through-wall stresses much higher than without weld repairs
-10.0
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g

H
o
o
p

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
As-Designed
15 ID Repair
15 OD Repair
3-120
Conclusions
Welding residual stresses are high and a significant contributor to butt weld
PWSCC
The generic welding residual stress model is conservative for the
as-designed case without repairs
Weld repairs from the ID surface (360 or partial-arc) significantly increase ID
surface stresses
Generic welding residual stress model does not bound FEA results for cases involving
repairs from the ID surface
Partial-arc weld repairs from the OD surface have high restraint and produce
similar through-wall stress distributions as for cases of ID repairs
Generic welding residual stress model does not bound FEA results for cases involving
partial-arc repairs from the OD surface
High stresses for cases involving partial-arc repairs are limited to the repaired
area
Expected to produce cracks limited to the repaired area, not 360
3-121
Parameters Considered in Set of 12 Example
Time to Leakage Calculation Cases
Geometry
Weld OD
Weld ID
Weld Thickness
Repaired? As-Designed 30 ID Repair
Temperature
Internal Pressure
External Axial Load
Assumed External Moment
Stress Driving Crack Growth
Type of Model Strength of Materials FEA
Include Weld Residual Stress? Yes No
Residual Stress Method? Standard Curve FEA
Include Thermal Expansion (Q) Stress? Yes (20 ksi on ID) No
Stress Intensity Factor Method
Crack Aspect Ratio
CGR Curve MRP-21 No Threshold
Initial Crack Depth
Modeling Parameter Cases Considered
W
e
l
d
C
o
n
f
i
g
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
Pressurizer Surge Line Nozzle
13.32 inches
10.00 inches
1.66 inches
653F (345C)
Crack Geometry Part-Depth Circumferential
2250 psi
Negligible
2,500,000 in-lb (15.8 ksi max. axial stress)
W
e
l
d
L
o
a
d
i
n
g
S
t
r
e
s
s
M
o
d
e
l
Axial
T
i
m
e

t
o

L
e
a
k
a
g
e
C
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
Newman-Raju Solution for Flat Plate
2c /a = 2
10% through-wall (4.2 mm)
3-122
Path 3 Used for Stress Input to Example Crack Growth Calculations
3-123
Stress Results for 12 Example Cases
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Normalized Through-Wall Distance from ID Surface (a /t )
Case 11+12
FEA,
30ID Repair
Case 9+10
FEA,
No Repair
-40,000
-20,000
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
A
x
i
a
l

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
p
s
i
)
Case 1+2
Q Stress,
Residual Stresses
Case 5+6
No Q Stress,
Residual Stresses
Case 3+4
Q Stress,
No Residual Stresses
Case 7+8
No Q Stress,
No Residual
Stresses
3-124
Stress Intensity Factor Results for 12 Example
Cases
.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Case 11+12
FEA,
30ID Repair
Case 9+10
FEA,
No Repair
Newman-Raju flat plate
solution* (for cubic
stress distribution)
Aspect ratio = 2c/a = 2
Crack face assumed to
be pressurized
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
C
r
a
c
k

T
i
p

S
t
r
e
s
s

I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y

F
a
c
t
o
r

a
t

D
e
e
p
e
s
t

P
o
i
n
t

(
M
P
a
m
)
Case 1+2
Q Stress,
Residual Stresses
Case 5+6
No Q Stress,
Residual Stresses
Case 3+4
Q Stress,
Case 7+8
No Q Stress,
No Residual
Stresses
*T. L. Anderson, Fracture Mechanics: Fundamentals and Applications, Second Edition, CRC Press, 1995, p. 632.
3-125
Two CGR Curves Assumed in Example Time to
Leakage Calculations
1.E-12
1.E-11
1.E-10
1.E-09
1.E-08
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
C
r
a
c
k

G
r
o
w
t
h

R
a
t
e
,

d
a
/
d
t

(
m
/
s
)
Curves based on a reference temperature
of 325C (617F) with the temperature
effect to be calculated with an activation
energy of 130 kJ/mole (31.0 kcal/mole)
1 mm/yr
MRP-21 curve for Alloy 182
(Bamford, et al., 9th Env. Degrad. )
CGR = 1.410
-11
(K9)
1.16
Alternate curve for Alloy 182
with no K threshold
(for example calcs in this
presentation only)
CGR = 3.010
-12
K
1.5
MRP-55 curve for Alloy 600
MRP-115 curve
for Alloy 182
3-126
Time for Crack Growth Results:
Strength of Materials Approach to Stress
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
T
i
m
e

f
o
r

C
r
a
c
k

G
r
o
w
t
h

t
o

L
e
a
k
a
g
e

(
y
e
a
r
s
)
Case 1
Q Stress,
Residual Stresses
Case 5
No Q Stress,
Residual Stresses
Case 3
Q Stress,
Case 7
No Q Stress,
No Residual
Stresses
K
th
= 9
.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Case 2
Q Stress,
Residual Stresses
Case 6
No Q Stress,
Residual Stresses
Case 4
Q Stress,
Case 8
No Q Stress,
No Residual
Stresses
K
th
= 0
3-127
Time for Crack Growth Results:
FEA Approach to Calculating Stress
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
T
i
m
e

f
o
r

C
r
a
c
k

G
r
o
w
t
h

t
o

L
e
a
k
a
g
e

(
y
e
a
r
s
)
Case 11 (Kth = 9)
FEA,
30ID Repair
Case 12 (Kth = 0)
FEA,
30ID Repair
No Growth Predicted
for Cases 9 and 10
FEA,
No Repair
3-128
Results of 12 Example Time to Leakage
Calculation Cases
1.7
1.5
1.2
1.1
2.4
1.9
2.3
1.6
0.6
0.6
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Case 1
w/Resid
Kth = 9
Case 2
w/Resid
Kth = 0
Case 3
NoResid
Kth = 9
Case 4
NoResid
Kth = 0
Case 5
w/Resid
Kth = 9
Case 6
w/Resid
Kth = 0
Case 7
NoResid
Kth = 9
Case 8
NoResid
Kth = 0
Case 9
w/Resid
Kth = 9
Case 10
w/Resid
Kth = 0
Case 11
w/Resid
Kth = 9
Case 12
w/Resid
Kth = 0
T
i
m
e

f
o
r

C
r
a
c
k

G
r
o
w
t
h

t
o

L
e
a
k
a
g
e

(
y
e
a
r
s
)
FEA Approach to Stress
N
o

C
r
a
c
k

G
r
o
w
t
h

P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
N
o

C
r
a
c
k

G
r
o
w
t
h

P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
Strength of Materials Approach to Stress
30ID Weld Repair As-Designed Weld
With Thermal Expansion Stress Without Thermal Expansion Stress
3-129
Fracture Mechanics with Stress Redistribution
Background
Stress intensity factors are often calculated using
superposition method
For cases with high residual stresses, superposition
Conservatively applies residual stresses as primary loads
Does not allow for stress relaxation and redistribution with crack growth
Development work was performed to modify the existing
stress analysis model to calculate J-integrals including the
effects of stress relaxation with crack growth
J-integral is appropriate for treatment of crack growth driven
by local residual stresses as it reflects the energy release
rate, not just the stress singularity at the crack tip due to
remote loading
3-130
Calculation Methodology
Initial application was for through-wall crack in outer row
CRDM nozzle parallel to weld contour with variable distance
above top of weld
Custom fracture mechanics code added to DEI welding
residual finite-element stress model
Stress redistribution from intact to cracked conditions
modeled
Redistribution modeled as an elastic unloading problem amenable to LEFM
Equivalent stress intensity factor (K) calculated from
J-integral
J-integral calculated using numerical volume integration
J-integral averaged across wall thickness
J-integral approach captures effect of Mode II and III contributions
2
1
avg
eq
J E
K
Q

3-131
Surge Nozzle ID30 Repair - 60% TW Crack, 6:1 Aspect Ratio
1
Surge Nozzle ID30 Repair - 60% TW Crack, 6:1 Aspect Ratio
Example of Fracture Mechanics FEA Model for
3-132
Fracture Mechanics Model for Circumferential Crack in CRDM Nozzle
180qDownhill-Centered
Crack
Crack Mesh Detail
Crack Face Elevation
Crack Block Region
Crack Front Key Hole
Crack Face
3-133
Relief of Axial Stress with Growth of Circumferential Crack in CRDM Nozzle
1
MN
MX
1
MN MX
Operating Condition Axial Stress
Crack Plane Elevation
3-134
Comparison to Other Data for Downhill-Centered Circumferential Crack in CRDM Nozzle
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360
Circumferential Crack Angle ()
S
t
r
e
s
s

I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y

F
a
c
t
o
r
,

K
(
k
s
i
i
n
)
MRP-105 (Plant C) MRP-104 (Westinghouse Plant Curve)
MRP-104 (CE Plant Curve) / NRC Prelim Assess MRP-103, App. B (B&W Plant Curve)
DEI FEA Model for Alternate Plant EMC2 High Yield Strength Center Nozzle
3-135
Conclusions
Classical strength of materials analysis methods and
published fracture mechanics solutions can be used to
estimate stresses and crack tip stress intensity factors.
However, these methods:
Do not readily handle anomalies such as weld repairs
Are based on linear superposition
Do not fully consider the effect of stress redistribution upon crack growth
Finite element methods are capable of handling factors not
readily addressed by classical superposition methods
Finite element models using parametric inputs permit
different cases to be evaluated quickly
Finite element analysis methods should be used
For important analyses
As a check of classical superposition models for other analyses
3-136
Conclusions (continued)
Standard generic model for welding residual stresses
appears to be conservative for as-designed welds but may
not be bounding for repaired welds
Key parameters in calculation of crack growth time:
Weld repair
Assumed crack aspect ratio
Assumed initial crack size
The assumed value for the stress intensity factor threshold:
Has a small to mild effect on the crack growth time for relatively large initial crack
sizes or high stress locations
May have a large effect for small initial crack sizes or relatively low stress
locations
Fracture mechanics FEA modeling is key to understanding
level of engineering conservatism given local residual stress
3-137
A Novel Approach for the Mitigation of PWSCC
Barry Gordon
3315 Almaden Expressway, Suite 24
San Jose, CA 95118-1557
bgordon@structint.com
408-978-8200
Bryan Templeton
6855 South Havana Street, Suite 350
btemplet@structint.com
303-792-0077
The mitigation of primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 600 and its weld
metals is critical to the operability of pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Increased efforts are in
place by the industry to develop and qualify effective short-term and long-term PWSCC
remedies. There is also an industry effort to investigate novel approaches for PWSCC
mitigation. This paper examines one such novel approach, i.e., to electronically increase the
corrosion potential of the PWR Alloy 600 components into a corrosion potential range where the
initiation and propagation of PWSCC of Alloy 600 and its weld metals is mitigated.
The results of a series of slow strain rate test (SSRT) conducted at The Ohio State University
(OSU) in the mid-1980s using a tensile specimens machined from Alloy 600 tubing (longitudinal
half-tube splits) with a cold-pressed hump, Figure 1, provided the technical motivation for this
investigation and project [1]. The results of the tests on these specimens, which provide a
complex stress state that facilitates PWSCC, revealed that increasing the corrosion potential of
Alloy 600 in deaerated PWR-type environments mitigated crack initiation, Figure 2. Subsequent
and more recent investigations using real-time crack growth rate monitoring indicated a profound
influence of hydrogen partial pressure/corrosion potential and the observation of worst case
PWSCC at corrosion potentials near the nickel/nickel oxide (N/NiO) equilibrium, Figure 3 [2].
Therefore, a test program has been initiated at the Colorado School of Mines to verify that
anodic polarization of Alloy 600 by perhaps only 100 mV will mitigate PWSCC. This could
eventually lead to the installation of relatively simple anodic protection systems for various
PWSCC susceptible components including top head penetrations, Figure 4.
References
1. N. Totsuka and Z. Szklarska-Smialowska, Effect of Electrode Potential on Hydrogen-
Induced IGSCC of Alloy 600 in an Aqueous Solution at 350 qC, Corrosion, Vol. 43, No.
12, December 1987, , NACE, Houston, TX, p. 734.
3-139
2. G. A. Young, N. Lewis, and D. S. Morton, The Stress Corrosion Crack Growth Rate of
Alloy 600 Heat Affected Zones Exposed to High Purity Water, USNRC-ANL
Conference on Vessel Penetration Inspection, Cracking, and Repairs, September 29
October 2, 2003, Gaithersburg, Maryland.
Figure 1.
PWSCC Split Alloy 600 Tube Tensile Specimens. (All dimensions in mm.) [1]
Figure 2
Percentage of PWSCC on the Fracture Surface as a Function of Applied Potential (SHE) [1]
3-140
Figure 3
Crack Growth Rate vs. Corrosion Potential to the Ni/NiO Transition (SHE) [2]
Counter electrode
- Direct Current
Source
+
Pt reference electrode
e
-
e
-
RPV Head Working electrode
Counter electrode
- Direct Current
Source
+
e
-
e
-
RPV Head Working electrode
Figure 4
Sketch of Possible Anodic Protection System for Top Head Penetrations
3-141
A Novel Approach for the
A Novel Approach for the
Mitigation of PWSCC
Mitigation of PWSCC
Bryan Templeton Bryan Templeton
Structural Integrity Associates, Inc Structural Integrity Associates, Inc
March 7, 2005 March 7, 2005
2005 PWSCC of Alloy 600 International
Conference & Exhibit Show
3-142
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /2 2
1. 1.
Demonstrate that Anodic Protection can be
Demonstrate that Anodic Protection can be
used to
used to
Prevent PWSCC initiation in Alloy 600 Components Prevent PWSCC initiation in Alloy 600 Components
Arrest on Arrest on- -going crack growth going crack growth
2. 2.
Establish a practical mitigation scheme
Establish a practical mitigation scheme
3. 3.
Establish a PWSCC testing facility at the
Establish a PWSCC testing facility at the
Colorado School of Mines with both
Colorado School of Mines with both
SSRT/CERT and CGR Testing capability
SSRT/CERT and CGR Testing capability
Project Objectives
Project Objectives
3-143
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /3 3
Anodic Protection Conceptual Schematic
Anodic Protection Conceptual Schematic
Counter electrode
- Direct Current
Source
+
e
-
e
-
RPV Head Working
electrode
3-144
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /4 4
Pourbaix Diagram for Ni Alloys in LWRs
Pourbaix Diagram for Ni Alloys in LWRs
What is Anodic
What is Anodic
Protection?
Protection?
Shifting potential
Shifting potential
positively on the
positively on the
Pourbaix Diagram
Pourbaix Diagram
P. M. Scott, Corrosion,
Vol. 56, No. 8
3-145
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /5 5
OSU Results
OSU Results
% PWSCC on the Fracture Surface as a Function of Applied Potential
Anodic Protection
3-146
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /6 6
Effect of Dissolved H
Effect of Dissolved H
2 2
on Alloy X
on Alloy X
-
-
750 HTH Crack
750 HTH Crack
Growth Rate
Growth Rate
at
at
360
360
q
q
C (680
C (680
o o
F)
F)
HTH = 1093 C/1h + 704 C/20h
D. Morton, et al., 10
th
ICEDMNPSWR, 2001
3-147
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /7 7
PWSCC Growth Rate vs. Corrosion Potential
PWSCC Growth Rate vs. Corrosion Potential
Difference from Ni/NiO
Difference from Ni/NiO
Nickel Nickel
Oxide Metal
Stability Stability
-50 0 50
P
W
S
C
C

G
r
o
w
t
h

R
a
t
e
,

m
i
l
s
/
d
a
y
Alloy X-750 AH, 338 C, 27.5 MPam
Alloy X-750 HTH, 360 C, 49.4 MPam
Alloy 600, 338 C, 66 MPam
D. Morton, et al., 10
th
ICEDMNPSWR 2001
AH = 885 C/24h + 704 C/20h
HTH = 1093 C/1h + 704 C/20h
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
CP Ni/NiO - CP, mV
3-148
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /8 8
PWSCC Test Loop Design
PWSCC Test Loop Design
Regenerative
Heat Exchanger
De-Min Bed
Oxygen Meter
Conductivity
& pH Meter
Flow Meter
Pressure Gauge
Pump
H
2
addition
Pressure Pulsation
Dampener
Valv
e
Water Reservoir with
Evacuation
capability, Argon
bubbling purge, and
H
2
addition directly
into the tank
Distilled Water
B and Li addition
Pressure Gauge
Waste Heat
Exchanger
Slow Strain
Rate Testing
Cortest Equip
Thermocouple
Pressure Regulator
3 Ports into the Autoclave Head
(already exist):
1 Reference Electrode
2 Counter Electrode
3 Thermocouple
Data Acquisition
System
Sintered Metal Water Filter
Low Pressure Rupture Disc
High Pressure Rupture Disc
Pressure Gauge
Valv
e
1 Liter
Autoclave
C
A
B
3-149
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /9 9
CSM Labs Test Loop Includes
CSM Labs Test Loop Includes
1 Liter Alloy 600 Autoclave 1 Liter Alloy 600 Autoclave
certified to 5000 psig at 650 certified to 5000 psig at 650
o o
F F
Brand Brand- -new new Cortest Cortest turnkey turnkey
CERT Test System including CERT Test System including
SSRT capability of 6.56 x 10 SSRT capability of 6.56 x 10
- -6 6
to to
6.56 x 10 6.56 x 10
- -8 8
in/s in/s
- -1 1
Dead weight tester with 3 ton Dead weight tester with 3 ton
fulcrum arm for constant load fulcrum arm for constant load
testing testing
Ag Ag- -AgCl AgCl Reference electrode Reference electrode
A
B
C
3-150
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /10 10
Other Test Loop Features
Other Test Loop Features
Brand Brand- -new National new National
Instruments Data Acquisition Instruments Data Acquisition
system including: system including:
Remote viewing of system Remote viewing of system
operation (over internet) operation (over internet)
System control programs with System control programs with
automatic shutdown safety automatic shutdown safety
features features
Labview Labview graphical interface graphical interface
Potential measurement and Potential measurement and
impressing capability impressing capability
3-151
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /11 11
Test Specimens
Test Specimens
Specimen Design by Institute of Nuclear Safety, Japan
Cold-pressed hump creates complex stress state that facilitates PWSCC
Simple flat dog bone-type or flat-notched specimen geometries did not
consistently produce PWSCC
Status: We have 10 specimens in hand
3-152
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /12 12
Current Microstructure and Processing Steps
Current Microstructure and Processing Steps
Cut a strip 1.16 wide, 5 long, and Cut a strip 1.16 wide, 5 long, and
0.375 thick from plate provided by GO 0.375 thick from plate provided by GO
Carlson Carlson - - Heat 36925 2E Heat 36925 2E
Hot rolled down to 0.044 by 20 long in Hot rolled down to 0.044 by 20 long in
8 passes 8 passes
Machined out 10 strips Machined out 10 strips
Pickled in 15% HNO Pickled in 15% HNO
3 3
and 2% HF at 140 and 2% HF at 140
o o
F F
Heat treated to produce intragranular Heat treated to produce intragranular
carbide distribution carbide distribution
Punched center hump to induce cold Punched center hump to induce cold
worked complex stress state worked complex stress state
Etchant: 80 mL
HNO
3
, 3 mL HF
State: As-heat Treated
Grainsize: ASTM 2.5 3.0
3-153
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /13 13
Test Plan
Test Plan
1. 1. Successfully crack 3 specimens Successfully crack 3 specimens
by PWSCC with: by PWSCC with:
ECP measurement ECP measurement
No impressed potential No impressed potential
Worst case environmental Worst case environmental
conditions conditions
2. 2. Impress an anodic potential beyond Impress an anodic potential beyond
+80mV range to see if cracking is +80mV range to see if cracking is
prevented in the same worst prevented in the same worst- -case case
environmental conditions environmental conditions
3. 3. Map out the successful operational Map out the successful operational
potential range potential range
4. 4. See if a pre See if a pre- -existing crack can be existing crack can be
arrested arrested
Temperature 617
o
F 325
o
C
Pressure 2200 psig
pH 7.6 @ 617
o
F
Dissolved H2 15 - 25 cc/kg (22 cc/kg first target)
Testing Strain Rate
Li 595 ppm
B 2.2 ppm
O <5 ppb
Reference Electrode Ag - AgCl
Counter Electrode Autoclave
Test Electrode Specimen
1.7 x 10
-7
/s to 5 x 10
-8
/s
Desired Test Conditions
Will conduct interrupted current experiments to measure the
IR drop of the system
Other Test Conditions
Aqueous Concentrations:
Electrodes
3-154
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /14 14
Schedule
Schedule
Test Loop construction was completed in
Test Loop construction was completed in
early February
early February
Initial Testing began in mid February
Initial Testing began in mid February
Still demonstrating cracking reproducibility
Still demonstrating cracking reproducibility
Plan to begin anodic testing later this spring
Plan to begin anodic testing later this spring
3-155
PRS PRS- -05 05- -006 006/ /15 15
Results to Date
Results to Date
To be added before presentation
To be added before presentation
3-156
Effect of cyclic loadings on the stress corrosion crack growth rate in PWR primary water.
C. Guerre, O. Raquet
Commissariat lEnergie Atomique (CEA)
DEN/DPC/SCCME/LECA
91191 Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex, France
G. Turluer
Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN)
DSR/SAMS, BP 17
92262 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex, France
Abstract
Fatigue air pre-cracked Compact Tensile (CT) specimens in Alloy 600 were tested in the VENUS
corrosion loop, a high temperature recirculating loop, which reproduces the conditions of primary water
of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR). In order to assess the effect of cyclic loading on Stress Corrosion
Cracking (SCC) crack growth, CT specimens were tested under either constant load or under low
frequency cyclic loading at 325C and at 289C. Two Alloy 600 materials, with respective microstructure
and mechanical properties, were studied. PWSCC crack growth rates and fracture surface were
characterized by macroscopic and microscopic observations. Comparison of crack growth rates
demonstrated that no systematic accelerating effect was observed for the conditions tested. Comparison of
the results obtained at 325C and at 289C showed that the apparent activation energy could appear
higher under cyclic loading than under constant load.
Introduction
Results of tests show that Alloy 600 is sensitive to stress corrosion cracking in primary water of PWR.
Since few years, there is a growing interest to assess the effects of stress transients on the Primary Water
Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC). Congleton and al. [1] concluded to an accelerating effect of cyclic
loading on Crack Growth Rate (CGR). Daret and Vaillant [2,3,4] showed that the accelerating effect was
not significant for very sensitive heats. Bosch and Vaillant [4,5] agreed with an environmentally assisted
cracking phenomena for frequencies below 0,01 Hz. Concerning the influence of the wave form, Lidar [5]
concluded that the saw-tooth wave form was the most damaging loading.
This study takes place in an IRSN / CEA program that focuses on the effect of low frequency and high R
ratio cyclic loading conditions on Alloy 600 in order to assess the effect of gentle cycling or periodic load
discharge. Two heats were tested, the first one (heat 3110439) was air melt by Allegheny Ludlum and the
specimens were machined in a hot rolled plate, the second one (heat WL344) was produced by Techphy
and was tested as forged.
Materials and experimental procedure
The main properties of the heats are given in table 1. The heat 3110439 was presumed to be more
sensitive to stress corrosion cracking than the WL344 heat.
3110439 WL344
C (%) 0,045 0,060
Vickers hardness 250 Hv 320 Hv
i
245 Hv
Grain size (ASTM) 4,3 4,5 6
Rp
0,2 %
(MPa) / R
m
(MPa) at room temperature 863/920 430 / 720
Rp
0,2 %
(MPa) / R
m
(MPa) at 289C 800 / 853 450 / 700
Rp
0,2 %
(MPa) / R
m
(MPa) at 325C 837 / 850 395 / 650
Table 1 : main properties of Alloy 600 heat 3110439 and heat WL344
i
The Vickers hardness measured in a grain containing intragranular carbides is higher than the hardness
measured in a grain free from carbides.
3-157
Tests were conducted on CT specimen. The thickness was either 25,4 mm or 20 mm according,
respectively, to 1TCT standard and CT 20 standard. All the specimens were air fatigue precracked
according to ASTM E399 and ISO/DIS 7539 standards. After the test, the specimens were broken open
by fatigue in air. Then, the fracture surface was analyzed by scanning electron microscopy in order to
characterize the fracture morphology and to measure the crack length.
The tests are performed in the VENUS corrosion loop. Venus is equipped with four independent
autoclaves, inside which up to three specimens can be tested in a daisy chain. Seven specimens were
tested simultaneously at 325C and eight specimens at 289C. The tests were performed in primary water
(100 ppm boron and 2 ppm lithium). Chlorides, fluorides and sulphates levels were kept lower than 150
ppb thanks to the use of ion exchange resins. The hydrogen content measured by a silver/palladium
membrane was kept within the range 25-50 cc.STP.kg
-1
.
At 325C, three types of waveform were investigated (constant load, triangular or saw-teeth wave form).
Details of the loadings have been described previously [8]. At 289C, specimens were tested only under
either constant load or saw-teeth wave form (R = 0.8 , f = 1.5 10
-3
2.3 10
-3
Hz) during at least 2000 h.
Results
1,E-11
1,E-10
1,E-09
1,E-08
1,E-07
1,E-06
0 10 20 30 40 50
K (MPam
1/2
)
289C - constant
289C - cyclic
325C - constant
325C - cyclic
da / dt (mm.s
-1
)
Figure 1: crack growth rate versus K
(Alloy 600 heat WL344)
1,E-11
1,E-10
1,E-09
1,E-08
1,E-07
1,E-06
0 10 20 30 40 50
K (MPam
1/2
)
289C - constant
289C - cyclic
325C - constant
325C - cyclic
da / dt (mm.s
-1
)
Figure 2: crack growth rate versus K
(Alloy 600 heat 3110439)
The graph of the figure 1 shows the crack growth rates versus the stress intensity factor measured on the
fracture surface for the heat WL344. The specimen tested at 289C and for which the reported crack
growth is 10
-11
mm.s
-1
did not propagate under cyclic loading. This graph shows that cyclic loading does
not lead to an enhanced crack growth rate. Assuming that the crack growth does not depend of the K
factor for the range tested, the comparison of results obtained at 289C and 325C lead to apparent
activation energy of about 190 kJ.mol
-1
under constant load. This value is over 130 kJ.mol
-1
, the reliable
value defined by Le Hong [7] on a statistical basis. Considering an average crack growth rate of 10
-11
mm.s
-1
to simulate that no propagation occurs, the apparent activation energy is even higher under cyclic
loadings.
Results for heat 3110439 are represented on figure 2. Due to the uneven crack front, all crack growth
rates are measured in the middle of the specimen. At 325C, cyclic loadings lead to an increase of the
crack growth rates by a factor 4, that can be considered as significant assuming a scatter ratio of 2 [2]. At
289C, the results are similar to those found for the other heat: cyclic loading lead to a decrease of the
crack growth rate. For the two heats, this effect could be explained by an increase of the apparent
activation energy under cyclic loading.
For all specimens tested, the fracture mode is mainly intergranular under constant load as well as under
cyclic loading.
3-158
1.E-09
1.E-08
1.E-07
1.E-06
1.6 1.65 1.7 1.75 1.8
1000 / T (K
-1
)
HB 400 [7]
WF675 [7]
WL344 cstt
WL344 cycl
da / dt (mm.s
-1
)
HB 400
WF 675
Figure 3 : da/dt versus 1000/T : comparison with values reported by Le Hong and al. [7]
On figure 3, crack growth rates measured on heat WL344 were compared to those reported by Le Hong
[7]. Heat WF 675 was characterized as very sensitive to SCC, whereas heat HB 400 was considered as a
medium sensitive product. Concerning values measured under static load, WL344 can be defined as
showing intermediate sensitivity between HB 400 and WF 675. According to Le Hong [7], cyclic loading
increases crack growth rates of medium sensitive product as HB 400. This graph shows that the behaviour
of heat WL344 is different at 325C as well as at 289C. This graph showed also that if our measurements
can approximately fit the apparent activation energy for constant loading, under cyclic loading the
apparent energy activation could be higher.
Conclusion
Air fatigue precracked CT specimen were tested at 289C and 325 C in primary water of PWR. For the
conditions and the materials tested, no systematic enhancing effect was found under cyclic loading. This
result can be explained by the fact that the heats are too sensitive to SCC. Tests at lower temperature
induced lower crack growth rates consistent with an apparent activation energy found in the literature
under constant load.
The existence of an enhancing effect should be investigated on heats with lower sensitivity.
References
[1] J. Congleton, E.A. Charles, Sui G., Review on effect of cyclic loading on environmental assisted
cracking of alloy 600 in typical nuclear coolant water, Corrosion science, volume 43, (2001)
[2] F. Vaillant, J.M. Boursier, C. Amzallag, J. Champredonde, J. daret, C. Bosch, Influence of a cycling
loading on crack growth rates of alloy 600 in primary water : an overview, 11
th
Int. Conf. Environmental
Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Systems, Stevenson, WA, Aug. 10-14 (2003)
[3] J. Daret, Influence dune sollicitation cyclique sur la vitesse de propagation de fissures dans lalliage
600 massif- Bilan des essais mens sur la boucle Pollux, CEA report RT-SCCME 598, (2002)
[4] F. Vaillant, Le Hong S., Amzallag C., Bosch C., Crack growth rate on vessel head penetrations in
Alloy 600 in primary water, Colloque Fontevraud IV, 14-18 september 1998
[5] C. Bosch , Etude de la relation entre la CSC et la FC basse frquence de lAlliage 600 en milieu
primaire REP, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Bordeaux, France (1998)
[6] P. Lidar, Aspects of crack growth in structural materials in light water reactors, Ph.D. Thesis,
Departement of Material Science and Engineering, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
(1997)
[7] S. Le Hong, F. Vaillant, C. Amzallag, Synthesis and comparison of crack growth rate measurements
on tubes and plates in Alloy 600 in high temperature hydrogenated primary water, in: Advances in
mechanical behavior, plasticity and damage, volume 2, Euromat 2000, eds D. Miannay, P. Costa, D.
Franois, A. Pineau, (2000)
[8] C. Guerre, O. Raquet, L. Duisabeau, G. Turluer, Effect of cyclic loadings on the stress corrosion crack
growth rate in Alloy 600 in PWR primary water, Eurocorr 2004, 12-16 september 2004
3-159
Nuclear Energy Division Laboratory of Aqueous Corrosion Study
2005 PWSCC of Alloy 600 International Conference & Exhibit Show
Santa Ana Pueblo, March 7-10, 2005
Effect of cyclic loadings
on the stress corrosion crack growth rate
in PWR primary water.
Catherine GUERRE
1
, Olivier RAQUET
1
Guy TURLUER
2
1
CEA, DEN/DPC/SCCME/LECA, 91191 Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex (France)
catherine.guerre@cea.fr
2
IRSN, French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety,
DSR/SAMS, BP 17, 92262 Fontenay-aux-roses Cedex (France)
3-160
Context
Context
1. Operating conditions of power plants generate cyclic loading besides
residual and static operational stresses.
For example, French nuclear power plants operate under variable
power.
2. In laboratories, many experimental procedures are used to simulate
propagation under constant loading conditions: constant K, partial
unloading, sequences of gentle cycling
->There is a growing interest to assess the role and effect of cyclic or
stress transients on the PWSCC behaviour of components.
3-161
Objectives
IRSN CEA program: Effect of Cyclic Loadings on SCC Growth Rate
in Primary Water Environment
Objectives
This IRSN CEA program focus on the effect of low frequency high
R ratio on Ni based alloys in view to improve knowledge of the
conditions and possible factors leading to enhanced CGR :
mechanical loading (frequency, wave form, )
temperature,
material properties,

under conditions representative of the primary water of PWR.
da
3-162
SUMMARY
Context and objectives
Material and experimental procedure
VENUS corrosion loop
Materials and mechanical loadings
Results
Heat WL 344
Heat 3110439
Discussion
Conclusion and perspectives
3-163
VENUS corrosion loop :
SCC crack VElocity measurements
in the primary water of PWR NUclear reactors
in CT Specimens using DCPD technique
Re-circulating corrosion loop :
Four independant autoclaves
-> up to three specimen per autoclave in daisy chain
-> 12 specimen in all
Up to 360C and 190 bars
High flow rate -> 2.5 m
3/
h
Water clean-up system (ion exchange resins)
Crack growth monitoring
-> acoustic emission, direct current potential drop method.
3-164
Venus loop
Mechanical electrical
cylinder
Frequency : from about
0.5 Hz to 10
-4
Hz
Various wave forms
Dissolved hydrogen level measured by a silver palladium probe
Acoustic emission and DCPD method
Circulating pump
Pressurizer
Heater
Ion exchange resin
3-165
MATERIALS : Alloy 600
Experimental procedure
Heat 3110439
(core)
WL 344
(core)
100 m
Heat 3110439 Heat WL344
Air melter Allegheny Ludlum Techphy
Metallurgical form Rolled As forged
Vickers hardness (Hv) 250 -320 245
Grain size (ASTM) 4.3-4.5 6
C (%) 0.046 0.06
Mechanical properties at 20C
Rp
0,2%
(MPa) 863 430
UTS (MPa) 920 720
3-166
CT specimen (25,4 mm or 20 mm thick)
Before the SCC test : the specimen are air fatigue precracked (a/W = 0.5) as
recommanded by ASTM E399 standard.
After the test : the specimen are broken open by fatigue in air.
PWR primary water at 325C and 289C
1000 ppm B, 2 ppm Li
water chemistry controlled by ion exchange resins
([Cl
-
], [SO4
2-
], [F
-
] < 50 ppb)
hydrogen content kept within the range 25-50 cc.kg
-1
Loadings conditions
at 325C : constant load or triangular wave form or saw-teeth wave form
at 289C : constant load or saw-teeth wave form
Experimental procedure
3-167
325C
Sequential loading * + constant load (+ partial unloading)
Direct loading + constant load
Direct loading + low frequency cycling (f=6 10
- 4
Hz, R=0.8) incl. a high frequency step
Triangular wave form
Saw tooth wave form
* f = 0.3 Hz->10
-3
Hz, R=0.3 -> 0.7
289C
Direct loading + constant load
Direct loading + low frequency cycling (f=6 10
- 4
Hz, R=0.8) incl. a high frequency step
Saw tooth wave form
Experimental procedure : details of the loadings
3-168
Fracture surface
Regular crack front.
No crack branching.
Mode I is respected.
Results : heat WL344
325C
Air fatigue pre-crack
Postcrack
1 mm
289C
3-169
Intergranular fracture is observed for constant load as well as for cyclic
loadings at 289C and at 325C.
Numerous intergranular precipitates are observed on the fracture surface.
Fracture surface
289 289 C, C, cyclic cyclic loading loading
10 m
325C, 325C, cyclic cyclic loading loading
3-170
Crack growth rates
1,E-11
1,E-10
1,E-09
1,E-08
1,E-07
1,E-06
0 10 20 30 40 50
K (MPam
1/2
)
289C - constant 289C - cyclic
da / dt (mm.s
-1
)
325C
A plateau effect was observed in a
range from 20 MPa.m
1/2
to 40
MPa.m
1/2
.
No crack growth occured at 289C
under cyclic loadings.
No accelerating effect of cyclic
laodings was found at 289C and at
325C.
3-171
Crack growth rates
[1] Le Hong, Vaillant, Amzallag, Synthesis and comparison of crack growth rate measurements on tubes
and plates in alloy 600 in high temperature hydrogenated primary water, Euromat 2000
Le Hong and al. [1]:
Q = 130 kJ/mol
Under constant load :
Q around 190 kJ/mol
(no statistical datas)
medium
sensitive
high
sensitive
1.E-09
1.E-08
1.E-07
1.E-06
1.6 1.65 1.7 1.75 1.8
1000 / T (K
-1
)
HB 400 [7]
WF675 [7]
WL344 cstt
WL344 cycl
da / dt (mm.s
-1
)
HB 400
WF 675
[1]
[1]
3-172
Fracture surface
air fatigue
pre-crack
fatigue
postcrack
Results : heat 3110439
Ep235
Sequence loading + constant load
0,5 cm
Sequence loading + constant load
Fracture morphology is a general pattern for all the
specimens :
- at 325c and at 289 C : uneven crack front,
- at 325C : deviation of the primary crack plane
and crack branching, but within the side grooves.
-> microstructural heterogeneities
3-173
1 cm
K = 19.2
MPam
1/2
K = 19.3
MPam
1/2
8 10
-7
mm/s
1,5 10
-7
mm/s
oxides
CT20, 289C,
cyclic loading
Fracture surface
oxide
3-174
Fracture surface
Constant load 289C
Triangular 325C
Intergranular fracture is observed for constant as well as for cyclic loadings at both
temperatures (R ratio =0.8 and low frequency)
Short circuits between the crack sides are found on the fracture surface (broken in
some cases during the high frequency step)
3-175
Crack growth rates
1,E-11
1,E-10
1,E-09
1,E-08
1,E-07
1,E-06
0 10 20 30 40 50
K (MPam
1/2
)
da / dt (mm.s
-1
)
325C
Crack growth are measured in the
middle part of the specimen (mode I
is respected).
At 325C,
cyclic loading -> x 4
At 289C,
no accelerating effect
3-176
Materials:
Irregular crack front on the heat 3110439 Alloy 600 (microstructural
heterogeneities).
Medium to high sensitive heats.
Influence of cyclic loading :
At 325C : Enhancing effect for one heat (x4)
At 289C : Decrease of the crack growth rates
Alloy 600 heats too sensitive to SCC
Influence of the apparent activation energy that is higher under cyclic
loading ?
Increase of the apparent activation energy
On-goings work
Cold-worked stainless steels
Weld metals (Alloy 182/82)
3-177
4
SESSION 1B: STRATEGIC PLANNING
Strategic planning was addressed by seven participants in Session 1B. Summaries of the
presentations are given below followed by the questions asked, responses provided, and
comments made by the participants concerning each presentation. Click on the links to access
directly copies of the materials presented together with extended abstracts.
MRP Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management (MRP-126), presented by
S. Chu, EPRIsolutions (Paper 1B.1)
This presentation was given by S. Chu of EPRIsolutions. The main points made during the
presentation were as follows:
x The MRP has issued MRP-126 for plants to use in developing their Alloy 600 management
plans. It provides short and long-term guidance for management of inspection, evaluation,
mitigation, and repair/replacement of all Alloy 600 base material (with the exception of
steam generator tubing) and Alloy 82/182 weld metal locations in PWR primary systems.
x The objectives of a plant's Alloy 600 management plan are as follows: 1) maintain plant
safety; 2) minimize the impact of PWSCC on plant availability; 3) develop and execute long-
term strategies for Alloy 600 management.
x MRP-126 was distributed to US PWR CNOs on December 21, 2004, marking the start of an
18-month implementation period for the mandatory requirement that Each plant shall
develop and document an Alloy 600 management plan, defining the processes it intends to
use to maintain the integrity and operability of each Alloy 600/82/182 component for the
remaining life of the plant. A plan is required to be in place at every operating PWR by
June 21, 2006.
x MRP-126 contains a list of good practices in its Table 1-1, Key Elements of a Plant Specific
Alloy 600 Management Plan. There are 15 key elements listed and matched to the NRCs
attributes for evaluation of generic aging management programs. The key elements cover
topics such as identification of Alloy 600/82/182 locations and inspection programs, plans
for implementation of Alloy 600/82/182 mitigation strategies and/or replacements, details
regarding inspection programs, and administrative items such as procedures for disposition of
inspection findings.
4-1
One comment was made following the presentation:
x Comment (C. King): The MRP-126 industry guidance calls for an Alloy 600 "plan" (rather
than "program") to allow previous work already done by utilities to be applied.
Programmatic Approach to the Management of PWSCC/Alloy 600 Issues,
presented by D. Peltola, Duke (Paper 1B.2)
This presentation was given by D. Peltola and authored by D. Peltola, C. Frye, and D. Whitaker
of Duke Energy. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x Because of the large number of Alloy 600 components at its seven nuclear units, Duke
Energy has developed a programmatic approach to management of PWSCC that is consistent
with MRP-126.
x The programmatic approach ranks the risk for the different pressure boundary Alloy 600
parts considering temperature, stress, operating experience, failure consequences, and
economic risks. The stress factor takes into account whether the component was subjected to
post weld heat treatment, and also takes into account whether a credible NDE has been
performed.
x Alloy 600 components attached to the pressurizer were found to have the highest risk
ranking, with components attached to the reactor vessel being next highest. The rankings
reflect the fact that steam generators and reactor vessel heads at all Duke units have been
replaced with PWSCC resistant components.
x The models will be updated to reflect operating experience and economic analyses, and
repair and contingency strategies will be developed.
x Question (B. Montgomery): How do you foresee "going forward" with implementation?
What is the impact of implementation issues (outage schedules, mitigation cost, etc.) on
scheduling mitigation processes?
Response (D. Peltola): We are applying mitigation to steam space nozzles first. We have
taken practical implementation capabilities into account. The outage duration will be the
limiting factor. We are trying to minimize scheduling impacts (no extension due to
mitigation activities).
x Question (C. Castelao): Are you applying any risk-informed ISI program in your plant? If
so, how were the pressurizer attachments ranked with the risk-informed ISI methodology
compared with their ranking with the specific program for Alloy 600/82/182?
Response (D. Peltola): No risk-informed ISI program has been included yet.
x Question (R. Hsu):
1. When you calculate risk, how do you handle the number of components? Do you
treat all reactor vessel head nozzles as one component?
2. What kind of stress are you referring to?
4-2
4-3
3. What kind of repair was done? The NRC still views Alloy 600 and Alloy 690 as the
same with respect to regulation.
Response (D. Peltola):
1. The heads addressed under the program were replaced with new heads having Alloy
690 nozzles, so this question does not apply to the current heads, which are resistant
to PWSCC.
2. The stress values used are general estimates and are not based on detailed stress
analysis.
3. The Alloy 600 safe end is cut out, and the safe end and weld replaced with Alloy 690.
We understand that the basis for a different treatment of Alloy 600 and Alloy 690 is
still to be developed.
x Question (W. Sims):
1. Isnt the hot leg more consequential? Why is there no strategy for the hot legs?
2. Aren't the penetrations all full-penetration welds?
1. We will be developing a strategy. We do not have any large-bore Alloy 600 welds on
the hot leg. We just have small-diameter instrument taps.
2. Yes, but they are only ferritic, not bi-metallic.
x Question (G. Rao):
1. When looking at component locations, are you considering only pressure boundary
locations?
2. How about the safety and economic implications for potential loose parts from
internal components?
3. What are the temperatures you used based on?
1. Yes, no internal components were included.
2. Loose parts are not considered. Visual examination of the hot leg flow element
components and replacement once-through steam generators with Alloy 690
materials shows a low potential for loose parts.
3. Operating temperatures were used.
x Question (S. Janes): Could you explain the process for choosing the assigned values for
susceptibility/consequence?
Response (D. Peltola): The Duke risk ranking was focused on relative risk development.
The idea was to give enough "spread" in the variable ranges so that all the components did
not have the same ranking value. The results were to develop "relative" risk. Please look at
the value details provided in the presentation's extended abstract.
Development of Alloy 600 Management Plans, presented by G. White, DEI
(Paper 1B.3)
This presentation was given by G. White and authored by G. White, M. Fleming, and E. S. Hunt
of Dominion Engineering, Inc. (DEI). The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
x This presentation described several approaches to the development of strategic plans for
managing Alloy 600/82/182 components in PWRs. Plant experience has shown that such
components may be susceptible to PWSCC because of the high residual stresses that
typically result from welding of such components. After presenting a basic matrix of
PWSCC experience by location within the RCS and listing the available analysis tools,
several examples of PWSCC evaluations are provided including a probabilistic safety
assessment and deterministic and probabilistic economic modeling.
x The key purpose of an Alloy 600 management plan is to provide a framework for ensuring
that plant safety is maintained, while the effect of PWSCC on plant availability is minimized.
In addition, the Alloy 600 management plan provides a long-term strategy for most
effectively allocating inspection, mitigation, repair, and replacement resources. Actions
taken and the timing of those actions will significantly affect the cost of PWSCC
management, and component- and plant-specific factors must be considered.
x The methodology presented by the authors uses such tools, as appropriate, as net present
value economic analysis, finite-element stress analysis, Weibull statistics, fracture
mechanics, and Monte Carlo statistical modeling. As warranted for particular sets of Alloy
600 components, an integrated life-cycle management (LCM) approach provides an objective
means for developing the set of the most promising management strategies. The final step is
the selection by the utility of one strategic plan for implementation.
x Modifications to the primary water chemistry parameters are potential means to reducing the
risk of PWSCC. The presentation includes the results of an example probabilistic evaluation
of the benefits of zinc addition to the primary coolant. In this type of evaluation, the benefits
of a reduced likelihood of PWSCC initiation and reduced personnel radiation exposure are
weighed against the costs of chemicals, associated equipment, labor, additional fuel
inspections, and additional water chemistry monitoring. For the example case shown,
addition of natural zinc to a concentration of 20 ppb resulted in a reduction in the risk of high
net life cycle costs. This effect was due to the benefit of zinc addition in reducing the
probability of significant PWSCC events.
x Question (G. Rao): Questions arise with respect to technically justifiable inputs for analysis
approaches. How do you model benefits of zinc addition on PWSCC?
Response (G. White): Of course, sound technical approaches based on the best available
information should be applied to develop modeling inputs. In our models of the benefits of
zinc addition on PWSCC, we have applied the results of laboratory tests showing an increase
in the time to crack initiation as a function of the zinc concentration level. The assumed
4-4
dependence on zinc concentration level is supported by studies of plant experience, including
for PWSCC of Alloy 600 steam generator tubes. Our past models have not taken credit for a
reduction in crack growth rate with zinc addition because the relevant laboratory data and
plant experience are as of yet inconclusive.
x Question (R. Hsu): Describe the approach for modeling crack initiation.
Response (G. White): Because physical models of PWSCC crack initiation based on first
principles are impractical, reliability engineering approaches such as Weibull statistical
modeling are applied based on plant experience supplemented with the results of relevant
laboratory tests. This is the standard approach in the industry. Care must be taken to define
an appropriate initiation crack size based on short crack growth considerations and the
detectability limits for the relevant plant NDE inspections.
Strategic Planning for Alloy 600 Programs, presented by G. Elder,
Westinghouse (Paper 1B.4)
This presentation was given by G. Elder of Westinghouse and authored by G. Elder of
Westinghouse and G. Gerzen of Exelon. The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
x Because of the increasing nature of PWSCC of Alloy 600/82/182 components in PWRs, U.S.
PWR plants are now required to develop Alloy 600 Management Programs. This
presentation described a process being developed by many plants to manage PWSCC of
Alloy 600 components. The result is a set of plans that meets the requirements of report
MRP-126 [13] (see Paper 1B.1). The process comprises six basic steps as shown in slide 2
of the presentation:
Task 1: Identify Alloy 600/82/182 Locations
Task 2: Plant-Specific Weld Repair and Inspection Experience (Joint Scope)
Task 3: Component Susceptibility Ranking
Task 4: Comparison with Industry PWSCC Experience
Task 5: Candidate Strategies for Evaluation
Task 6: Quantitative Technical-Financial Evaluation to Develop Optimal Strategies
x This process starts with a method of ranking the susceptibility of the various locations in the
plant and comparing the ranking to industry experience in order to prioritize upcoming
actions. The susceptibility evaluation utilizes a physically-based model that includes the
effects of time, temperature, residual and operating stresses, and the effects of manufacturing
methods. It also includes applicable data from recent laboratory findings and service
experience. The model has been developed and benchmarked for relevance by comparison
with operating experience with primary system components.
x The results of the susceptibility model are then used to calculate projections of crack
initiation, propagation, and leakage with time in a probabilistic manner. This process uses
industry-available information together with Westinghouse data and knowledge and decision
13
Materials Reliability Program: Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management (MRP-126), EPRI, Palo Alto,
CA: 2004. 1009561.
4-5
software tools, and it employs Monte-Carlo simulation of crack initiation, crack propagation,
crack detection, and leakage. Once the probabilities of failure are projected, the cost of
failure (emergency repairs, loss of production, etc.) is compared with the cost of the different
inspection, preventive, repair, or replacement actions, and the optimum action and timing are
identified. This process also evaluates the "risk" of waiting for the optimal time to
implement these solutions.
x Deliverables from the technical-financial evaluation include the following:
Plan for resolving Alloy 600 issue at all locations (what to do, when, and why)
Budgets for resolution of the issue
Sensitivity studies on impact of uncertainties on plant operation
Models that can be quickly modified to reflect industry events and plant-specific
inspection results (quickly determine effect on Alloy 600 plan)
Decision points for future
x Question (G. Kammerdeiner): Is the increase in stress state due to repairs a qualitative
evaluation? Have there been, other than the STP bottom mounted nozzles, cold leg locations
that have higher susceptibility to SCC, as compared to a similar hot leg location, due to
repairs?
Response (G. Elder): No. The increase in stress due to weld repairs has been determined by
finite element analysis in most cases. For a very few applications, it has been determined by
expert panel elicitation. The cold leg locations generally have lower susceptibility rankings
than the hot leg locations. This susceptibility is not zero, however, and will increase with
time. If a cold leg location has evidence of repairs, its susceptibility can be equivalent to
some hot leg locations.
Probabilistic PWSCC Failure Assessment of Alloy 600/82/182 Reactor
Vessel Subcomponents at Beznau 1&2 for a Sixty Year Life Extension,
presented by G. Rao, Westinghouse (Paper 1B.5)
This presentation was given by G. Rao of Westinghouse and was authored by G. Rao of
Westinghouse and G. Flueckiger of NOK (Switzerland). The main points made during the
x A probabilistic PWSCC failure assessment of Alloy 600/82/182 reactor vessel
subcomponents had been performed in 1998 and was updated in 2004. The failure
assessment considered microstructural data based on field replications, temperatures,
calculated stresses, industry crack growth rate data, and industry experience. The assessment
included evaluations using a probabilistic fracture mechanics code.
x The results of the evaluations indicate that the failure probability for the reactor vessel head
at Beznau 1 is high enough that mitigative actions should be taken soon, such as T-cold
conversion, zinc addition, or head replacement.
4-6
x The results of the evaluations indicate that the failure probability for the reactor vessel head
at Beznau 2 are low enough at 60 years, less than 5% probability of a 75% through-wall
crack, that no mitigative actions need to be taken. An important factor in the lower
probability of cracking at Beznau 2 is the significant microstructural difference between the
two units, with Unit 2 nozzles having a much higher grain boundary coverage by carbides.
x Assessment of inspection results for bottom mounted instrument penetrations at Beznau 1
and 2 indicate that additional inspections or evaluations may be necessary to establish the
significance of recorded lack of fusion indications in the welds.
A Matrix Evaluation of Repair/Modification Options for Reactor Pressure
Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles, presented by R. Payne, Framatome ANP
(Paper 1B.6)
This presentation was given by R. Payne and authored by R. Payne and S. Levesque of
Framatome ANP. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x In 2003, cracks were found in two bottom mounted nozzles (BMNs) at a nuclear power plant.
These BMNs were modified using a half nozzle technique similar to that used to repair heater
sleeves and instrument nozzles. With additional time for development of designs and
tooling, improved modification options may be available. This paper reviewed a full array of
options that could be considered for further development.
x Repair criteria provided by EPRI MRP were considered in the evaluation of the various
modification options. The options evaluated to these criteria included in-vessel full nozzle
modification, internal diameter temper bead modification, pad modification, small pad
modification, in-vessel weld overlay modification, mechanical seal, and a flexible end
diaphragm seal. A total of 13 repair options were evaluated considering 23 repair
characteristics, with varying weights assigned to the repair characteristics depending on their
importance. The inner diameter temper bead half nozzle modification was evaluated as being
the best modification option. Four half nozzle modification options, including the inner
diameter temper bead half nozzle modification option, were evaluated as being better than
the best full-nozzle modification.
x The evaluation tool used for this evaluation, i.e., the matrix evaluation methodology, is being
used to prioritize tooling development efforts at Framatome ANP for BMN modifications.
However, the tooling being developed by Framatome-ANP will support all of the pad and
inner diameter temper bead options.
x The evaluation discussed here was a generic evaluation, but can be customized to specific
evaluations that take into account factors such as the planned outage length and plant-specific
configurations. In addition, the evaluation matrix method can be applied to other locations
and repair concepts.
4-7
Assessment of the Repair/Remediation/Mitigation Techniques for
Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds, presented by D. Waskey, Framatome ANP
(Paper 1B.7)
This presentation was given by D. Waskey of Framatome ANP. The main points made during
the presentation were as follows:
x After providing an overview of service-related cracking in dissimilar metal welds in U.S.
BWRs and PWRs, the presentation covered the repair, remediation, and mitigation
technologies that have been developed and applied in the worldwide commercial nuclear
power industry in response to such degradation.
x For over 20 years, stainless steel butt welds in BWRs have experienced degradation due to
intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC). More recently, Alloy 82/182 piping butt
welds in PWRs have experienced PWSCC degradation. Ten specific cases of such BWR and
PWR degradation were cited in the presentation. In the U.S., the repair solutions used have
depended on the size of the pipe being repaired. An inlay/safe end replacement approach has
been applied to small nozzles (Palisades pressurizer PORV nozzle), a nickel-alloy structural
weld overlay approach has been applied to intermediate nozzle sizes (1216" diameter), and
a spool piece replacement approach has been applied to large nozzles (VC Summer reactor
outlet nozzle).
x The global solution options for dissimilar metal welds include the following:
Safe End Replacement
Weld Inlay (Both Preventive and Repair)
Structural Weld Overlay (WOL)
Weld Overlay for Stress Improvement (PWOL)
Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP)
Induction Heating Stress Improvement (IHSI)
Last Pass Heat Sink Welding (LPHSW)
Cavitation Peening
Laser Peening
x The presentation included a current assessment of the first five of these options including
relative cost, schedule, dose, OD spatial envelope, internal accessibility, inspection frequency
requirements, and ASME Code and Regulatory acceptance, as well as the long-term expected
service life of each technology. Slide 13 presents the advantages and disadvantages of the
five options. Based on the assessment, the following application recommendations were
made on the basis of pipe size:
4" & smaller Safe End Replacement
420" Structural Weld Overlay
2036" ID Originated Inlay
2036" MSIP
4-8
x The presentation concluded with discussion of a draft ASME Code Case addressing nickel-
alloy weld overlays to piping or components and of the three revisions to Code Case N-638
[14].
x Comment (M. Badlani): This is a clarification on the comment/slide by the presenter
regarding the indications found by the new PDI qualified UT in three BWR dissimilar metal
welds that had been previously treated with MSIP.
On two of these welds the old pre-MSIP UT data was examined using the new PDI
software, and it was found that these indications existed prior to the application of MSIP.
They were missed under the old UT examinations. In fact, the PDI enhanced images showed
no change in the extent of indications since MSIP was applied.
On the third weld the prior UT data was inconclusive. However, the field records were
reviewed and a finite element stress analysis was performed by an independent company, for
the actual geometry and actual radial contraction applied by MSIP to this weld. The
independent analysis confirmed that MSIP generated high compressive stresses in the
weldment and in all likelihood this indication existed prior to the application of MSIP.
x Comment (P. Riccardella): I just wanted to correct some terminology. You refer to PWOL
as "weld overlays for stress improvement." I will be covering PWOLs in my presentation
Wednesday afternoon, but in a nutshell, "P" stands for "Pre-emptive," meaning that they are
applied to a weld with no detected cracking as a mitigation rather than a repair. PWOLs may
be applied as "full structural" or as "partial structural," but, in any event, they are not applied
just for stress improvement. There is always some element of structural reinforcement
involved.
x Question (J. Hydeman): What methodology did you use to arrive at the recommended
dissimilar metal weld mitigation/repair techniques?
Response (D. Waskey): A set of assessment criteria including the factors of cost, schedule,
dose, OD spatial envelope, internal accessibility, long-term integrity, and Code and
Regulatory acceptance were ranked for each technique by a composite group of plant owners
and Framatome ANP experts.
14
Cases of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; Code Case N-638-1, "Similar and Dissimilar Metal Welding
Using Ambient Temperature Machine GTAWTemper Bead Technique," Section XI, Division 1, approved
February 13, 2003.
4-9
Shannon Chu
EPRI Solutions, Inc.
3412 Hillview Avenue
Palo Alto, CA 94304
MRP Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management (MRP-126)
The EPRI Materials Reliability Program (MRP) Alloy 600 Issue Task Group (ITG) determined
that every plant should have an overall plan for managing the issue of Alloy 600 PWSCC
degradation. This decision was based on the need for the industry to stop reacting to each
finding of Alloy 600 PWSCC degradation as an isolated event and start pro-actively managing
the issue.
The MRP has produced a report, Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management (MRP-126), for
plants to use in developing and documenting their individual Alloy 600 management plans. This
document provides short and long-term guidance for management of inspection, evaluation,
mitigation, and repair/replacement of all Alloy 600 base material (with the exception of steam
generator tubing) and Alloy 82/182 weld metal locations in PWR primary systems. It offers
comprehensive reference lists that can be used by newer staff to become more familiar with the
issue of Alloy 600 PWSCC degradation. More experienced staff can use the guidance document
as an outline for preparing their plant specific Alloy 600 management plan.
The objectives of an Alloy 600 management plan are as follows: 1) maintain plant safety; 2)
minimize the impact of PWSCC on plant availability; 3) develop and execute long-term
strategies for Alloy 600 management.
Copies of MRP-126 were distributed to US PWR Chief Nuclear Officers on December 21, 2004,
marking the start of an 18-month implementation period for the mandatory requirement that
Each plant shall develop and document an Alloy 600 management plan, defining the processes
it intends to use to maintain the integrity and operability of each Alloy 600/82/182 component
for the remaining life of the plant.
The guidance document includes some history and background information on the issue of
PWSCC of Alloy 600 and provides a description of various sections that may be included in
plant-specific Alloy 600 management plans. The sections described include: Assigned
Responsibilities and Interfaces, Industry Experience, Determine All Alloy 600/82/182 Locations,
Inspection Plan, Component Ranking, Mitigation, Repair/Replacement, and Maintaining the
Alloy 600 Management Plan. The document also contains several appendices that list helpful
references.
In addition to the mandatory requirement, the document contains a good practice element in
Table 1-1, Key Elements of a Plant Specific Alloy 600 Management Plan. There are 15 key
4-11
elements listed and matched to the NRCs attributes for evaluation of generic aging management
programs. The key elements are as follows:
x Alloy 600/82/182 locations and inspection programs
x Assigned responsibilities for Alloy 600 management (including individuals from multiple
disciplines and departments)
x Implementation plans (modification packages, budget, scheduling, etc.) with contingency
planning
x Plan for implementation of Alloy 600/82/182 mitigation strategies
x Plan for possible replacement of components as preventative action
x Detailed data (including location, component function, service history, temperature,
operating environment, fabrication records, etc.) about components containing Alloy
600/82/182 to be used in inspection ranking
x Plant specific inspection plan for detection of PWSCC cracking designed to detect any
PWSCC cracking before it impacts plant safety and operability
x Plant specific inspection matrix listing applicable inspection techniques for each type of
Alloy 600/82/182 component/weld
x Plant specific repair matrix listing acceptable repair techniques for each type of Alloy
600/82/182 component/weld
x Inspection schedule that meets Code and regulatory requirements for Alloy 600/82/182
locations (ASME and NRC requirements) for evaluation of inspection results
x Reference to applicable Code and regulatory requirements for Alloy 600/82/182 locations
(ASME and NRC requirements) for evaluation of inspection results
x Procedures for disposition of inspection findings
x Reference to site quality assurance procedures and associated regulations
x References to industry Alloy 600/82/182 experience
x Schedule for periodic review of industry data on available inspection, repair, and mitigation
technologies and lessons learned from industry experience
The Alloy 600 management plan guidance document was prepared by an EPRI consultant based
on an outline developed by a committee from the Alloy 600 Issue Task Group (ITG) and with
continued participation by the committee and review and comment from others in the Alloy 600
ITG.
Acknowledgements
The following individuals formed the committee that participated in development of this
document: Don Bemis, Dana Covill, Greg Gerzen, Larry Mathews, William Sims, Satyan
Sharma, and Les Spain. The following individuals provided significant comments that resulted
in vast improvements to the document: Tom Alley, Chris Kiefer, Terry McAlister, Sharon
Merciel, and Pete Okas.
References
1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal
Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-18002), Washington, D.C.: July 2001
4-12
2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report
(NUREG-1801, Vol. 2), Washington, D.C.: July 2001
3. Nuclear Energy Institute, Guideline for the Management of Materials Issues, NEI 03-08:
May, 2003
4. MTAG, Material Guidelines Implementation Protocol, Revision 1: April, 2004
4-13
Photo
MRP Generic Guidance for
Alloy 600 Management
(MRP-126)
Shannon Chu
Consultant to EPRI
4-14
2 Copyright 2004 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Alloy 600 Management Plans
Background
Alloy 600 Issue Task Group determined that a more
proactive approach to managing Alloy 600 was needed
at the individual plant level
Committee formed to develop guidance document for
plants to use
EPRI consultant coordinated and completed
development
Objectives
Maintain plant safety
Minimize the impact of PWSCC on plant availability
Develop and execute long-term strategies for Alloy 600
Management
Required to be in place at every operating PWR by June
21, 2006
4-15
Guidance Document - Mandatory Element
This guidance document includes a mandatory
requirement on page 1-1, that Each plant shall
develop and document an Alloy 600 management
plan, defining the processes it intends to use to
maintain the integrity and operability of each Alloy
600/82/182 component for the remaining life of the
plant.
MRP-126 was distributed to US PWR Chief
Nuclear Officers with a transmittal letter dated
December 21, 2004 indicating the start of the 18
month implementation schedule.
4-16
Guidance Document - Good Practice Element
Implementation of the key elements listed in Table 1-1
of this document is considered good practice. The
remainder of this document consists of background
material and general information.
4-17
Guidance Document Outline
Introduction history of the issue, objective of the
document, objectives of Alloy 600 management plans,
statement of requirement for PWRs to develop and
document a plan, key elements of plans (Table 1-1)
Assigned Responsibilities and Interfaces
Industry Experience
Determine All Alloy 600/82/182 Locations
Inspection Plan
Component Ranking
Mitigation
Repair/Replacement
Maintaining the Alloy 600 Management Plan
Appendices
4-18
Key Elements of a Plant Specific Alloy 600
Management Plan Table 1-1
NRC Evaluation
Attribute
Alloy 600 Management Plan Document Elements
1 Scope of
Program
- Alloy 600/82/182 locations and inspection programs
- Assigned responsibilities for Alloy 600 management
(including individuals from multiple disciplines and
departments)
- Implementation plans (modification packages, budget,
scheduling, etc.) with contingency planning
2 Preventative
Actions
- Plan for implementation of Alloy 600/82/182 mitigation
strategies
- Plan for possible replacement of components as
preventative action
3 Parameters
Monitored
/Inspected
- Detailed data (including location, component function,
service history, temperature, operating environment,
fabrication records, etc.) about components containing
Alloy 600/82/182 to be used in inspection ranking
4-19
Management Plan Table 1-1 (continued)
NRC Evaluation
Attribute
4 Detection of
Aging Effects
- Plant specific inspection plan for detection of
PWSCC cracking designed to detect any PWSCC
cracking before it impacts plant safety and operability
- Plant specific inspection matrix listing applicable
inspection techniques for each type of Alloy
600/82/182 component/weld
5 Monitoring and
Trending
- Inspection schedule that meets Code and regulatory
requirements for Alloy 600/82/182 locations {In-
Service Inspection (ISI), Pre-Service Inspection(PSI)}
and incorporates results from previous inspections
6 Acceptance
Criteria
- Reference to applicable Code and regulatory
requirements for Alloy 600/82/182 locations (ASME
and NRC requirements) for evaluation of inspection
results
4-20
Management Plan Table 1-1 (continued)
NRC Evaluation
Attribute
7 Corrective Actions - Procedures for disposition of inspection findings
- Plant specific repair matrix listing acceptable repair
techniques for each type of Alloy 600/82/182
component/weld
8 Confirmation
Process
- Reference to site quality assurance procedures and
associated regulations
9 Administrative
Controls
- Reference to site quality assurance procedures and
associated regulations
10
Operating
Experience
- References to Industry Alloy 600/82/182 experience
- Schedule for periodic review of industry data on
available inspection, repair, and mitigation
technologies and lessons learned from industry
experience
4-21
Appendices Valuable References
Summary of Key Industry Events Involving PWSCC of Alloy
600/82/182
Resources Locations of Alloy 600/82/182
Resources Inspection Planning
Resources Component Ranking and Susceptibility
Resources Mitigation
Example Inspection and Repair Matrix
Resources Repair/Replacement
Assorted EPRI and NRC Alloy 600/82/182 Resources
Assorted Owners Group Alloy 600/82/182 Resources
4-22
Committee Members and Comment
Contributors
Committee Members
Don Bemis
Dana Covill
Greg Gerzen
Larry Mathews
William Sims
Satyan Sharma
Les Spain
Additional Significant
Comments Submitted
Tom Alley
Chris Kiefer
Terry McAlister
Sharon Merciel
Pete Okas
EPRI Support - Christine King and Shannon Chu
4-23
D. W. Peltola
Duke Energy Corporation - Oconee Nuclear Station
7800 Rochester Highway
Seneca, SC, 29672-0752
C. R. Frye
D. E. Whitaker
Duke Energy Corporation - Nuclear General Office
PO Box 1006, Duke Mail Code EC07C
Charlotte, NC, 28201- 1006
Abstract
Due to the large numbers of Alloy 600 components at its seven nuclear units (particularly at the
three Oconee units), Duke Energy has developed a programmatic approach to the management of
Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) and related issues affecting Alloy 600
welds. The approach is based on a forced Risk ranking of all the Alloy 600 weld components at
all seven Duke nuclear units. The Risk ranking takes into account the individual components'
susceptibility to PWSCC, current Operating Experience (OE) and the component's failure
consequences. Additional statistical analysis of the risk values is used to identify all of the
highest Risk Alloy 600 weld components within the nuclear fleet. This information is being used
to develop and prioritize future component-specific Alloy 600 mitigation strategies.
PWSCC susceptibility is affected by many factors; the two most important factors appear to be
temperature, and stress. However, the actual condition of the Alloy 600 locations with respect to
many of the other underlying factors is unknown. Should the actual condition of any one of the
factors be extreme, it may take precedence over all the other factors in determining
susceptibility. For the above reason, the susceptibility ranking model also incorporates OE.
General laboratory and field experience has shown that with all other contributing factures being
equal, temperature has the most significant effect on component susceptibility to PWSCC. The
temperature difference between the cold leg, hot leg, and pressurizer can cause a significant
difference in crack initiation and crack growth rates. Because OE also shows a tendency towards
leakage at higher temperatures, the relative numerical values used for the susceptibility factors in
the overall Risk model are higher for higher temperatures. For this application, 650F is given a
susceptibility factor of 12, 602F a 6, 557F a 3 and less than 550F a 1.
To compare the relative stress, the joint configuration was compared and the PWHT was
considered. The possibility of repairs is addressed by assuming that the welded joint was
repaired during manufacturing. However, if creditable NDE has been performed (volumetric or
wetted surface exam) and no indications were found, a -4 stress factor value was assigned. It is
realized that other factors such as yield strength, product form, manufacturing steps, etc. also
affect stress, but it is felt that further detail would not greatly change the final action plan. The
stress factor numerical values are given in the following table.
4-25
Table 1 - Stress Factors Used for Alloy 600 Component Risk
Joint Design & PWHT Numerical Factor
Partial Penetration & No PWHT 12
Partial Penetration & With PWHT 10
Full Penetration & No PWHT 8
Full Penetration & With PWHT 6
Creditable NDE -4
OE is based on either finding leakage or finding an NDE indication on a like or similar location.
'Like' is defined as same location (the same temperature, steam or water environment, etc.), same
joint design, and same PWHT. OE factors used are 12 for leakage and 8 for an NDE indication.
'Similar' is defined as the same joint design and approximate temperature and are given OE
Factors of 10 for Leakage and 6 for an NDE indication. Note that the steam space environmental
effects are considered different from the water space environmental effects.
The consequence of a failure of an Alloy 600 component or 82/182 weld is based on the
economic cost of a failure and the challenge to safety from a LOCA. Failure in this application
means having to perform a repair. As with the susceptibility ranking, the consequence ranking
will be performed using known variables which have the greatest effect on consequence
The failure may be due to a large leak which would bring the plant down, a small leak which
would be discovered during an outage, or a NDE indication. The challenge to safety for most
locations can be characterized by the Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCDP) for different
size LOCAs and the probability of having a LOCA. Probability of experiencing a LOCA is
different from susceptibility ranking and is somewhat dependent on the past NDE, pipe size,
weld configuration, and history of crack morphology. The economic consequence of a failure
can be ranked as to the cost of an unplanned repair and the possibility of an unplanned outage.
The calculated rate of leakage and the time for a circumferential crack to grow to a critical crack
size are typically smaller for smaller pipe sizes. Circumferential cracking that could lead to a
break has been observed in partial penetration welds and in the HAZ of Alloy 600 components
attached by full penetration welds. ASME Code Section XI volumetric NDE is performed on
butt welds 4 inch Nominal Pipe Size. The numerical values assigned to safety consequences
are based on pipe size, weld joint and if the weld is to an Alloy 600 component, and range from
values of 10 to 24.
The economic risk is based on the possibility of leakage causing an unscheduled outage, the
approximate cost of the repair, and time to perform the repair. Generally speaking, leakage from
PWSCC of Alloy 600 locations other than steam generator tubes has been found during
scheduled refueling outages. This is because of the slow rate of leakage through PWSCC type
cracking and the requirements to perform BMV inspections. The exception to this rule may be
small bore piping where a through wall circumferential crack could grow to critical crack size in
one fuel cycle and cause an unscheduled outage. Circumferential cracks, whose failure could
result in large leak rates, have been associated with the HAZ of alloy 600 components next to
butt welds, partial penetration welds with root exposed to primary water, and Alloy 600 nozzles
4-26
welded with partial penetration welds. The economic cost of repairs and the time for repair
generally related to the pipe size with the larger pipes being more expensive. The numerical
values developed for the economic consequences range from 4 to 12.
The PWSCC susceptibility and the consequence rankings, developed separately above, were
combined (multiplied) to generate an individual Alloy 600 weld component Risk value.
These Risk values were then statistically evaluated. Individual components with Risk values
more than one standard deviation above the average were considered "High" Risk; those between
the average and plus one standard deviation "Above Average" Risk; those between the average
and minus one standard deviation "Below Average" Risk; and those components with individual
risk values less than one standard deviation below the average were considered "Low" Risk.
A Risk comparison was then made between the average unit and the average major component
Risk values. The five major component categories include Alloy 600 components attached to the
Reactor Vessel, the Pressurizer, the Hot Legs, the Cold Legs and the Core Flood Tanks. The
averages and the one-sigma values were calculated on a unit basis from the values of the Alloy
600 weld components. The Risk values were then compared, with the results included below.
Table 2 - Oconee Units 1, 2 & 3 Alloy 600 Component Risk Comparison
Major Component ONS 1 ONS 2 ONS 3
Average RV 479 433 433
Average PZR 903 976 976
Average HL 608 572 592
Average CL 510 484 510
Average CF 264 264 237
Unit Average / One Sigma 614 / 271 593 / 282 583 / 275
It is clear from this comparison, that the Alloy 600 components attached to the Pressurizer are,
by far, the highest Risk components. In addition, a similar comparison of all the Alloy 600
components at all seven Duke nuclear units shows that after the Oconee pressurizer components,
the McGuire & Catawba Pressurizer and Reactor Vessel attached components are next highest in
overall Risk. Finally, the Oconee high Risk components are few: 17 at ONS1/2 and 25 at ONS3.
The conclusions of this Risk evaluation and comparison are that, first, a simplified Risk
evaluation can provide useful information on individual Alloy 600 component basis, which can
be used to determine relative major component and overall average unit Risks; second, there are
only a few high risk Alloy 600 components, primarily on the Pressurizer; and third, that the Risk
comparison can provide insight to help in prioritizing mitigation strategies for Alloy 600
components at each of the seven Duke nuclear units.
Acknowledgments:
The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of Alton (Bud) Auvil of Welding Services,
Incorporated, in Norcross GA, who helped provide the initiative to get this paper started and
supported us with his comments and technical reviews.
4-27
1
Programmatic Approach to the
Management of PWSCC/Alloy
600 Issues
Conference and Exhibition - March 7,
2005
David W. Peltola, PE
Duke Energy-Oconee Nuclear Station
4-28
2
Significant Numbers of Oconee
Alloy 600 Components
375 Alloy 600 Components / Unit (ONS1
has additional 117 Pzr Heater Sleeves)
125 are Nozzles, Safe Ends, etc. per Unit
Used 250 Alloy 600 Welds in Oconee
Forced Ranking Risk Evaluation
Reactor Vessel Head & Steam Generator
Replacements have reduced the numbers.
Actual Per Unit Weld Numbers: ONS1 =
245, ONS2 = 242, ONS3 = 264
4-29
3
Rank Weld Components to Focus
on Relative Alloy 600 Vulnerabilities
Purpose is to Manage the A600 issue by
Maintain Plant Safety
Prevent Leakage, Corrosion or Rupture
Prioritize Future Actions
Identifying Component PWSCC Susceptibility
Identifying Component Consequence of Failure
Determine Risk (Susceptibility X Consequence)
Forced Component Ranking
Evaluation & Comparison of Results
4-30
4
Susceptibility Ranking
Three Key Operating Aspects
Temperature
Stress (Joint Configuration, PWHT, Repairs)
Apply Operating Experience (OE)
OE is divided into . . .
Identify if failure found by leakage or NDE
Is component Like or just Similar ?
Assign Values, 1 to 12 for Temperature, -4 to 12
for Stress & 6 to 12 for OE. The lower values
represent a lower PWSCC susceptibility.
4-31
5
Consequences Ranking
Values assigned from 4 (Low) to 24 (High)
Economic Cost of Failure (4 to 12)
Unscheduled outage Cost
Repair Cost (time)
Challenge to Safety-LOCA (10 to 24)
Pipe Size
Weld Joint
Attached Alloy 600 Component
4-32
6
Risk Ranking
Risk = Susceptibility X Consequences
Similar to Previous AREVA Rankings, but
Focus on Primary Attributes (T, )
Updated to Include Latest OE
Consistent With Recent Guidance
Model Follows MRP 126
Focus on Weld Components (MRP Butt Weld
Visual Exams)
4-33
7
Risk Statistics
Forced Risk Ranking Results in Individual
Component Risk Values
See if theyre Relatively High/Low
Use Standard Deviation as Ruler
High Risk Components > Average + One Sigma
Low Risk Components < Average - One Sigma
Use Unit Average and Compare to Major
Component Average Values per Unit
4-34
8
Risk Comparison Process
Develop Unit & Major Component
Averages by Weld Type
Develop Standard Deviation Values
Compare Unit & Major Component Values
Against System, Major Component or Unit
Determine Outliers (High / Low Risk)
4-35
9
General Results
Weld Results Were as Expected, but
Relative Values Gave Added Insight
High Risk Components
Pressurizer Attached Components
Moderate Risk Components
HL, CL, RV Attached Components
Low Risk Components
Core Flood Tank Components
4-36
10
Results-ONS Weld Risk Values
Major Component
ONS 1 ONS 2 ONS 3
Average RV
479 433 433
Average PZR
903 976 976
Average HL
608 572 592
Average CL
510 484 510
Average CF
264 264 237
Unit Average /
One Sigma
614 / 271 593 / 282 583 / 275
4-37
11
Duke Risk Evaluation Results
PZR
RV
HL
CL
CF/AT
S/G
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
Major Component
Risk Comparison
ONS1 ONS2 ONS3 MNS CNS
4-38
12
No. of Weld Components w/in Risk Bands
Risk Band ONS 1 ONS 2 ONS 3
Highest (greater
than Average + 1
Sigma)
17 17 25
Above Average
(Average + 1 Sigma)
131 79 81
Below Average
(Average - 1 Sigma)
86 137 141
Lowest (less than
Average - 1 Sigma)
11 13 17
Total 245 242 264
4-39
13
Conclusions
Oconee Continues its Primary Focus on
Pressurizer Attached Components
Then CNS & MNS RV & PZR Components
Cold Leg & Core Flood least Risk (All)
To Do
Update Models for OE
Update Models for economic analysis
Develop Repair and Contingency Strategies
4-40
Development of Alloy 600 Management Plans
G. A. White, M. R. Fleming, and E. S. Hunt
Extended Abstract
Depending on the plant design, Alloy 600 and Alloy 82/182 nickel-based materials are used in a
number of components in PWR plants. These include reactor vessels (top and bottom head
nozzle penetrations), pressurizers (instrument penetrations; heater sleeves; and surge, spray,
safety, and relief nozzles), and reactor coolant system (RCS) piping (butt welds and instrument
nozzles). Plant experience has shown that such components may be susceptible to primary water
stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) because of the high residual stresses that typically result
from welding of such components. In response to the potential for cracking, U.S. PWRs are
developing Alloy 600 management plans, and the EPRI Materials Reliability Program has issued
guidance on developing such plans. This presentation describes an approach developed by the
authors to constructing an Alloy 600 management plan. Results for a hypothetical plantbased
on data developed for several actual PWRsare presented as a case study.
The key purpose of an Alloy 600 management plan is to provide a framework for ensuring that
plant safety is maintained, while the effect of PWSCC on plant availability is minimized. In
addition, the Alloy 600 management plan provides a long-term strategy for most effectively
allocating inspection, mitigation, repair, and replacement resources. Actions taken and the
timing of those actions will significantly affect the cost of PWSCC management. Component-
and plant-specific factors must be considered. Component-specific factors include inspection
costs, the probability of the occurrence of cracks or leaks, and the costs and critical path time
associated with repairs, remedial measures, and replacement. Costs of repair and remediation,
for example, may vary depending on how they are incorporated into a management plan.
Repairs may be more costly if cracks or leaks are discovered and no provision to perform repairs
has been made. Plant-specific considerations include component configuration and loading,
material and fabrication factors, outage schedules (e.g., planned extended outages), power
uprates, T
hot
reductions, license renewal, and utility-specific objectives. Industry experience is a
key input to plan development.
The methodology presented by the authors uses such tools, as appropriate, as net present value
economic analysis, finite-element stress analysis, Weibull statistics, fracture mechanics, and
Monte Carlo statistical modeling. As warranted for particular sets of Alloy 600 components, an
integrated life-cycle management (LCM) approach provides an objective means for developing
the set of the most promising management strategies. The final step is the selection by the utility
of one strategic plan for implementation.
4-41
Reston, VA 20190
703.437.1155
www.domeng.com
March 7-10, 2005
Glenn A. White, Mark R. Fleming, and E. Stephen Hunt
Session 1B Strategic Planning
4-42
2005 EPRI International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference Development of Alloy 600 Management Plans 2
Outline of Presentation
Basic Approach to Development of A600 Management Plans
MRP-126 Program Elements
Economic Modeling
Matrix of Alloy 600 Locations
Analysis Toolbox
Examples
Water Chemistry Changes as PWSCC Remedial Measure
Refueling Water Level Considerations
Probabilistic CRDM Nozzle Risk Assessments
Deterministic Economic Modeling for Reactor Vessel Closure Head
Probabilistic Economic Modeling for Zinc Addition
Conclusions
4-43
Basic Approach
Purpose of Alloy 600 Management Plan
MRP-126 establishes a mandatory requirement that "Each plant shall
develop and document an Alloy 600 management plan, defining the
processes it intends to use to maintain the integrity and operability of
each Alloy 600/82/182 component for the remaining life of the plant."
MRP-126 is "a standard guideline that provides short- and long-term
guidance for managing
inspection,
evaluation,
mitigation, and
repair/replacement
of all Alloy 600 base material and Alloy 82/182 weld metal locations
[except steam generator tubing and reactor internals] "
4-44
Basic Approach
MRP-126
Objectives of an Alloy 600 management plan per MRP-126:
maintain plant safety
minimize the impact of PWSCC on plant availability
develop and execute long-term strategies for Alloy 600 management
4-45
Basic Approach
MRP-126 (cont'd)
Key good practice program elements per MRP-126 (incorporated from
US NRC NUREG-1801 attributes for evaluation of generic aging
management program):
Scope of Program
Preventive Actions
Parameters Monitored/Inspected
Detection of Aging Effects
Monitoring and Trending
Acceptance Criteria
Corrective Actions
Confirmation Process
Administrative Controls
Operating Experience
4-46
Basic Approach
Economic Modeling
In addition to maintaining plant safety and reliability, a third key
consideration is selection of a cost effective strategic plan
Therefore, there are three basic goals for development of an Alloy 600
management plan:
Ensure an extremely low risk of core damage (nuclear safety)
Ensure a low risk of pressure boundary leakage (defense in depth)
Result in lowest net present value life cycle cost
Two basic approaches to integrated economic modeling and strategic
planning:
Deterministic net present value (NPV) modeling with best estimate,
pessimistic, and optimistic cases (e.g., LcmVALUE software prepared
for EPRI Life Cycle Management Demonstration Project)
Monte Carlo probabilistic economic modeling to consider level of
economic risk in more detailed manner
4-47
Basic Approach
Economic Modeling (cont'd)
Establish risk of future cracks/leaks for each alternative considered
Establish consequences of leakage
Estimate costs for each alternative
Calculate Net Present Value (NPV) cost for each alternative assuming
Planned operating life, including life extension
Discount rate
Estimated value of lost production $/MWe
Labor Costs
Radiation Exposure Cost
4-48
Locations of Alloy 600
Westinghouse Design Plant
4-49
CE Design Plant
4-50
B&W Design Plant
4-51
Locations of Alloy 82/182/132 Piping Butt Welds
Westinghouse and CE Design Plants
2
6
4
3
1
7
5
3
2
3
10
12
4
7
8
5
9
1
6
11
Example Westinghouse Design Plant Example CE Design Plant
4-52
Locations of Alloy 82/182/132 Piping Butt Welds
B&W Design Plant
Example B&W Design Plant
1
5
8
6
3
2
9
10
4
13
12
11
7
4-53
Alloy 600, 82, and 182 Locations
Matrix for 69 Operating U.S. PWRs
Reactor Vessel
Lower Head
Piping Butt Welds and/
or Alloy 600 Safe Ends
CRDM/CEDM
Other
J-groove Nozzles
BMI
>1" NPS
>350F (177C)
B&W 7 69 per unit 08 per unit 52 per unit 25 per unit
9
CE 11 4191 per unit 711 per unit None 2729 per unit
9
CE 80 3 97 per unit 1 per unit 61 per unit 6 per unit
9
W 2-Loop 6 3749 per unit 1 per unit 36 per unit 0, 14 per unit None
W 3-Loop 13 6569 per unit 01 per unit 50 per unit 0, 618 per unit None
W 4-Loop 29 7497 per unit 05 per unit 58 per unit 622 per unit None
Key
Reported Cracks
Reported Cracks and Leaks
Note: Other Alloy 600/82/182 locations include: core support lugs, SG divider plate, head leak monitor tubes, etc.
Plant
Category
Reactor Vessel
Top Head
Instrument Nozzles
and/or
PZR Heater Sleeves
#
U.S. Units
4-54
Analysis Toolbox
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Materials, fabrication, and water chemistry factors
Consequences of failure
Review of plant experience
Time, temperature, stress, and material/fabrication category
Weibull statistical modeling (time to crack initiation or leakage)
Review of examination sensitivity
Stress calculations
Classical techniques
FEA
Critical flaw size calculation
Leak rate calculation
4-55
Analysis Toolbox (cont'd)
Crack Growth Calculations
Crack growth rate disposition curves
Crack tip stress intensity factor calculations
Boric Acid Corrosion Evaluations
Component Rankings
Temperature
Stress
Material and fabrication category
Consequence of failure
Safety and Economic Modeling
Deterministic models
Probabilistic Monte Carlo models
Benchmarking
Sensitivity studies
4-56
Water Chemistry Changes as PWSCC Remedial
Measure
Primary water chemistry variables that may affect PWSCC:
Effects of zinc on PWSCC
Effects of hydrogen on PWSCC
Effects of lithium, pH
T
and boron on PWSCC
The following are typically considered:
Influence on crack initiation
Influence on Crack Growth Rate (CGR)
Possible beneficial/adverse effects
Economic impact
4-57
Effects of Hydrogen Concentration and
Temperature on PWSCC
1.0
10.0
100.0
270 280 290 300 310 320 330 340 350 360
Temperature, C
H
y
d
r
o
g
e
n

C
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
,

c
c
/
k
g

Calculated
Ni/NiO Phase Transition
Hydrogen concentration for peak
crack growth rate observed in tests
Peak PWSCC initiation
susceptiblity from tests
0.5 atm hydrogen
0.1 atm hydrogen
Measured hydrogen
concentration
for Ni/NiO phase transition
4-58
Refueling Water Level Considerations
Mid-Loop Water Level Refueling Water Level
with SG Nozzle Dams
Refueling Water Level
with SG Nozzle Dams
and Surge Line Plug
4-59
Probabilistic CRDM Nozzle Assessments
Simplified Monte Carlo Simulation Model Flowchart
4-60
Probabilistic CRDM Nozzle Assessments
Example Sensitivity Study Results for Effect on Core
Damage Frequency (CDF)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Sensitivity Case Number
C
D
F

(
p
e
r

y
e
a
r
)
1st Year
2nd Year
3rd Year
B
a
s
e

C
a
s
e
4-61
Deterministic Economic Modeling
Reactor Closure Head Example Results
0K
5,000K
10,000K
15,000K
20,000K
25,000K
30,000K
Case 1
NDE Every
Outage
Case 2
NDE Every
2nd Outage
Case 3
NDE Every
4th Outage
Case 4
Reduce Head
Temp and
NDE Every
3rd Outage
Case 5
NDE Every
2nd Outage,
Replace Head
After 1st Flaw,
then NDE Every
4th Outage
Case 6
Replace Head
in Three Years
then NDE Every
4th Outage
C
o
m
p
u
t
e
d

N
P
V

C
o
s
t
s
Preventive Maintenance Corrective Maintenance Lost Production Consequential Costs
4-62
Probabilistic Economic Modeling
Primary System Zinc Addition
Compare the net present value (NPV) of basic options
Natural zinc addition at different concentrations
Depleted zinc addition at different concentrations
No zinc addition
Quantify costs
Chemicals
Equipment
Injection equipment
Additional filters or resin
Man power
Fuel inspections
Additional analyses (Ni and Zn monitoring)
4-63
Primary System Zinc Addition (cont'd)
Quantify Benefits
PWSCC
Predict likelihood of future occurrence in SG tubes, butt welds, CRDM nozzles, BMI
nozzles, etc, using statistical techniques (Weibull projections)
Quantify costs of inspections and repairs, including possible down time
Dose reduction
Predict likely dose reductions for each case (different target concentrations,
depleted versus natural, etc.)
Quantify economic benefit of lower dose rates
Quantify Other Economic Inputs
Discount rate (time value of money)
Replacement power costs
Manpower costs (may increase with time)
Plant life-time
Other planned maintenance activities (e.g., SG replacement)
4-64
Economics of Zinc Addition: Sample Results
0%
4%
8%
12%
16%
20%
24%
Cumulative NPV Cost for Operation through EOL
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n

o
f

L
o
w
e
r

9
5
t
h

P
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
l
e

M
o
n
t
e

C
a
r
l
o

C
a
s
e
s
No Zinc
Natural Zinc at 20 ppb
In this example,
zinc addition
reduces risk of high
net life cycle costs
4-65
Conclusions
All U.S. plants are required to develop an Alloy 600 Management Plant
for maintaining integrity and operability of each Alloy 600/82/182
component
Options for cost effective management tend to be specific to each
category of components:
Reactor Closure Head Penetrations
Reactor Bottom Head Penetrations
Piping Butt Welds
Instrument Nozzles and Heater Sleeves
Miscellaneous Locations
Plant specific parameters and preferences determine optimal course of
action
4-66
Strategic Planning for Alloy 600 Programs
Dr. G. Gary Elder
Westinghouse Electric Company
Nuclear Services
P.O. Box 355
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 USA
Phone: 412-374-4884, Fax: 412-374-3777, email: eldergg@westinghouse.com
Greg Gerzen
Exelon Nuclear
4300 Windfield Rd.
Warrenville Ill. 60555
Phone: 630-657-3845, Fax: 630-657-4328, email: greg.gerzen@exeloncorp.com
Abstract
Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 600 materials continues to
receive a high level of visibility and regulatory scrutiny because of the seemingly
continuous identification of cracking incidents during plant operation and regulatory
imposed plant inspections. In addition to these findings, there have been a large number
of incidents of part through-wall cracks in Alloy 600 base metal and Alloy 182/82 weld
material over this same time frame. While these findings do not always require an
immediate repair, the potential for large expenditures is high, and is increasing with time.
Given this situation, the need for an Alloy 600 Management Program is evident and is
now required by MRP-126, Materials Reliability Program: Generic Guidance for Alloy
600 Management. Plants need to have an assessment of the industry experience, clear
indications about which are the most susceptible locations in their plant, contingency
plans, in case a failure occurs at their plant, and action plans to prevent failures from
happening. Given the high financial exposure that Alloy 600 issues bear, it is also
important to identify the budgeting implications of alloy 600 actions, as well as the most
cost effective solution at each location.
A process employed by many power plants to manage this issue is shown in Figure 1.
This process consists of determining the susceptibility to PWSCC at each location in the
plant to prioritize upcoming actions and a technical and financial evaluation to determine
which solution to apply at these locations and the timing of this application. The output of
this program is a detailed financially justified plan for management of the alloy 600
PWSCC issues at each power plant.
This process starts with a method of ranking the susceptibility of the various locations in
the plant and comparing the ranking to industry experience in order to prioritize
upcoming actions. The susceptibility evaluation utilizes a physically-based model,
4-67
equation(1), which includes the effects of time, temperature, residual and operating
stresses, and the effects of manufacturing methods. It also includes applicable data from
recent laboratory findings and service experience. The model has been developed and
benchmarked for relevance by comparison with operating experience with primary
system components.
(1) Susceptibility Index = 1/t = Rate = A
n
e-Q/RT
Where: A is the microstructural factor which includes the effects of
manufacturing processes
is the combined residual plus operating stress
Q = apparent activation energy = 50 kcal/mole
R = gas constant =.001103kcal/mole
T = location specific temperature
The results of the susceptibility model are then used to calculate projections of crack
initiation, propagation and leakage with time in a probabilistic manner. This process uses
industry-available information together with Westinghouse data and knowledge, and
decision software tools. It employs Monte-Carlo simulation of crack initiation, crack
propagation, and leakage as shown in equations (2), (3), and (4).
(2) T
i
=(1/n
i
)
1/
i
[-ln(1-)]
1/
Where:
T
i
= Time, in Effective Full Power Years (EFPY) to initiate a crack,
n
i
= number of welds in ith location,
i
= Scale parameter for ith location,
= Shape parameter,
= random number (0< <1).
(3) T(c)=(1/CGR)[W(d
c
-d
i
)/100]
Where:
Crack sizes d
i
and d
c
are expressed as percent of wall thickness.
W = wall thickness.
CGR = crack growth rate projected by a standard industry PWSCC crack growth
model for base metal and 5X the base metal forecast for weld material.
(4) T(L)=T(c)+T(L)=Time-to-leak.
Where:
T
i
= Time to initiation.
T(c ) = T
i
+ T (c ) = Time to small crack.

A typical output from the crack initiation, crack propagation and leakage models is
contained in Figure 2. Once the probabilities of failure are projected, the cost of failure
4-68
(emergency repairs, loss of production, etc.) is compared with the cost of the different
inspection, preventive, repair or replacement actions, and the optimum action and timing
are identified. These models also include the simulation of crack detection during these
inspections. This process also evaluates the risk of waiting for the optimal time to
implement these solutions. The output of this program is a detailed financially justified
plan for management of the alloy 600 PWSCC issues at each power plant which meets
the requirements of MRP-126.
Westinghouse Proprietary
18
Prevention & Mitigation Strategy Development to
Proactively Manage Alloy 600
Susceptibility
Ranking
1.
2.
3.
Quantitative
Technical-Financial Evaluation
to Develop Optimal Strategies for
Resolution of this Issue
Task
6
Task
3

Surge nozzle
-pipe welds
Spray nozzle-pipe weld
Safety & relief
nozzle-pipe welds
RV nozzle-pipe
weld
CRDM motor housing
CRDM nozzles
to RV head welds
Instrument tubes
Core support
block
Monitor tube
Head vent pipe
Heat transfer tubing
Tubesheet (TS) cladding
Tube-TS cladding weld
Partition plate & welds
Primary nozzle closure
rings & welds
Bottom channel head
drain tube & welds
Task
1
Plant-specific
Weld Repair &
Inspection
Experience
(Joint Scope)
Task
2
Comparison
with Industry
PWSCC
Experience
Candidate
Strategies
for Evaluation
Task
5
Task
4
Figure 1: Alloy 600 Decision Advisor Process
EFPY to Crack Initiation & Leak
Pressurizer Surge Line Nozzle Weld (PW6)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0 10 20 30 40 50 6
Effective Full Power Years (EFPY)
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
0
PW6 Initiate
PW6 Zn Initiate
PW6 Leak
PW6 Zn Leak
Unit EFPY
Figure 2: Output of Crack & Leakage Models
4-69
Slide 1
Strategic Planning for Alloy 600
Programs
Gary Elder
Westinghouse Electric Co.
Greg Gerzen
Exelon Nuclear
4-70
Slide 2
Prevention & Mitigation Strategy
Development to Proactively Manage Alloy
600
Susceptibility
Ranking
1.
2.
3.
Quantitative
to Develop Optimal Strategies for
Resolution of this Issue
Task
6
Task
3

Surge nozzle
-pipe welds
Safety & relief
nozzle-pipe welds
RV nozzle-pipe
weld
CRDM motor housing
CRDM nozzles
to RV head welds
Instrument tubes
Core support
block
Monitor tube
Head vent pipe
rings & welds
Bottom channel head
drain tube & welds
Task
1
Plant-specific
Weld Repair &
Inspection
Experience
(Joint Scope)
Task
2
Comparison
with Industry
PWSCC
Experience
Candidate
Strategies
for Evaluation
Task
5
Task
4
4-71
Slide 3
Program Deliverables
zSusceptibility ranking of all alloy 600 locations within your plant
zComparison of susceptibility rankings to industry failures
zRecommended inspection, repair, replacement & mitigation strategies to
resolve this issue at your plant and the technical & financial justification
for these actions
What to do
When to do it
Why do it
zDevelops a plan which meets the requirements of Materials Reliability
Program: Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management (MRP-126)
4-72
Slide 4
Alloy 600 Locations in
Westinghouse Plants
Surge nozzle
-pipe welds
Safety & relief
nozzle-pipe welds
RV nozzle-pipe
weld
CRDM motor housing
CRDM nozzles
to RV head welds
Instrument tubes
Core support
block
Monitor tube
Head vent pipe
rings & welds
Bottom channel head
drain tube & welds
4-73
Slide 5
Alloy 600 Locations in CE
Plants
PZR & RC pipe-surge
line connections
Safety & relief
valve nozzle-pipe
welds
RCP suction
& discharge
Charging inlet
nozzles
Safety injection &
SDC inlet nozzle
Spray nozzles
Let-down & drain nozzles
CEDM motor housing
CEDM/ICI nozzles
to RV head welds
ICI nozzles-ICI guide tubes
Shutdown cooling
outlet nozzle
Surge nozzle-
pipe welds
rings & welds
Bottom channel head
drain tube & welds
PZR instrument
nozzles
PZR heater
sleeves
RVH vent nozzle
Monitor tube
RCS instrument nozzles
Guide lugs
flow skirt
4-74
Slide 6
Task 3
Susceptibility Ranking
zRank components using physics-based susceptibility model
This model incorporates microstructural and fabrication
effects, residual stress, time, and temperature
zA Susceptibility Index is calculated for each location
Susceptibility Index
Microstructural factor
Stress factor
Temperature Time
Susceptibility Index = 1/t = Rate = A
n
e-Q/RT
4-75
Slide 7
Benchmarking of Susceptibility
Index to Industry Data
Susceptibility Index (Si)
Example
1.00E-22 1.00E-20 1.00E-18 1.00E-16 1.00E-14 1.00E-12 1.00E-10 1.00E-08 1.00E-06 1.00E-04 1.00E-02 1.00E+00
L
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
Range of Industry Cracking Events to Date
More Susceptible
4-76
Slide 8
Candidate Strategies
zMitigation Techniques
Zinc Addition
MSIP
Waterjet Peening
O.D. Weld Overlay to put
I.D. in compression
Clad with alloy 690
material
zRepair Techniques
MNSA
Embedded Flaw Repair
Excavate crack & weld
repair
Nozzle Repair
Structural O.D. weld
overlay
Clad with alloy 690
material
Replace with alloy 690
material
Sleeving
4-77
Slide 9
Candidate Strategies
zComponent Replacement
Reactor Vessel Head
Pressurizer
Steam Generator
zOther Considerations
Containment hatch size
Outage length
Synergies with other actions
10 year ISI &/or other outage
activities
MSIP at other locations
Head assembly upgrades to reduce
future outage time
Contingencies when performing
inspections
Regulatory drivers (mandated
inspections)
Dose reduction from zinc
4-78
Slide 10
Task 6 - Quantitative Technical-
Financial Evaluation
zConstruct probability of crack or leak with time at each location from the
susceptibility model
zDetermine the probability of detection of cracks at each location
zEvaluate the cost of implementation of a selected strategy at each
location vs. do nothing
Do nothing means implement the industry inspection program and
do not take preemptive actions
Cost of implementation include cost of outage extension, forced
outage, replacement power
4-79
Slide 11
Task 6 - Quantitative
zWhere no pre-emptive action is taken, evaluate the probability and
consequence of cracks or leaks
Cracks discovered at mandated NDE inspections
Leaks detected at bare metal inspections
Costs of reactive repairs and/or forced outages
zEvaluation is performed to determine the optimal solution at each
location on a net present value basis
Costs escalated at plant specific rate
Costs discounted at plant specific rate
zResults in a recommended strategy to implement at each location and
the outage in which to implement it
4-80
Slide 12
Crack Initiation
T
i
= (1/n
i
)
1/
i
[-ln(1-)]
1/
Where:
T
i
= Time, in Effective Full Power Years (EFPY) to initiate a
crack,
n
i
= number of welds in ith location,
i
= Scale parameter for ith location,
= Shape parameter,
= random number (0< <1).
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

D
e
n
s
i
t
y
Time to Failure for Surge Nozzle Weld (EFPY)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0
2.5m
5m
7.5m
0.01
0.0125
0.015
0.0175
0.02
0.0225
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
Time toFailure for Surge Nozzle Weld(EFPY)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Monte Carlo Analysis
employed to develop
probability
distribution of crack
initiation with time
4-81
Slide 13
Crack Growth & Leakage
Models
The time to grow from one stage to the
next e.g., from initial size di to larger
size dc is given by
T(c) = (1/CGR)[W(d
c
- d
i
)/100],
Where:
Crack sizes d
i
and d
c
are expressed as per-
cent of wall thickness.
W = wall thickness.
T
i
= Time to initiation.
T(c ) = T
i
+ T (c ) = Time
to small crack.
T(L ) = T(c ) + T (L) =
Time to leak.
EFPY to Crack Initiation & Leak
Pressurizer Surge Line Nozzle Weld (PW6)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Effective Full Power Years (EFPY)
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
PW6 Initiate
PW6 Zn Initiate
PW6 Leak
PW6 Zn Leak
Unit EFPY
4-82
Slide 14
Determination of Optimal Time to
Implement Pre-Emptive Actions
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Refueling Outage
N
P
V

o
f

C
a
s
h

F
l
o
w
Net Benefit = NPV Preemptive Action NPV Do Nothing
Note: Example Only Not
Plant Data
4-83
Slide 15
Risk vs. Reward for
Pre-Emptive Action
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Refueling Outage
N
e
t

P
r
e
s
e
n
t

V
a
l
u
e

o
f

T
o
t
a
l

C
o
s
t

(
$
M
)
100%
89% 77% 70% 63%
57% 51% 46% 41% 36%
31% 27% 23% 20%
18% 16%
Probability of Head Replacement Being Implemented Prior to Crack or Leak Detection
Head Replacement Costs w/o Containment Penetration
Head Replacement Costs with Containment Penetration
Range of Costs with Detected Cracks or Leaks
11%
23%
30%
37%
43%
49%
54%
59%
64%
69%
73%
77%
80%
82%
84%
Probability of Crack Detection Causing Repairs
Note: Example Only
Not Plant Data
4-84
Slide 16
Deliverables from Technical
Financial Evaluation
zPlan for resolving alloy 600 issue at all locations
What to do When & Why
zBudgets for resolution of the issue
zSensitivity studies on impact of uncertainties on plant
operation
zModels that can be quickly modified to reflect industry
events & plant specific inspection results
Quickly determine effect on alloy 600 plan
zDecision points for future
4-85
Slide 17
Conclusion
zThis approach combines
Westinghouse OEM and fleet knowledge, operational,
engineering and field service experiences
Utility plant specific knowledge and experience
Industry experience
zEmploys decision analysis (probabilistic) methods) to evaluate the
risk & reward of various strategies employing the engineering,
operational, and financial inputs specific to a plant
zLeading to a plant-specific strategy to proactively manage
potential issues for each Alloy 600 location, with the justification
(financial and technical) for the strategy
zDevelops a plan which meets the requirements of Materials
Reliability Program: Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management
(MRP-126)
4-86
Probabilistic PWSCC Failure Assessment of Alloy 600/82/182 Reactor Vessel
Sub-components at Beznau Units 1 and 2 for a Sixty Year Plant Life Extension
Gutti V. Rao Westinghouse Electric Co, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Gottfried Flueckiger, NOK, Swizerland
Abstract
During April 1998, Westinghouse conducted a Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking
Assessment of Alloy 600 base metal and the associated Alloy 82 and 182 weld metal
subcomponents in Beznau Units 1 &2 as part of the Plant Life Extension (PLEX) study
undertaken by NOK. The study included probabilistic failure assessment of CRDM
penetrations and deterministic susceptibility assessment of other Alloy 600/82/182
subcomponents in the reactor vessels. The 1998 study incorporated analytical models and
contributing parameters consistent with the industry practice at the time. More recently
during December 2004, Westinghouse updated the 1998 PWSCC assessments with latest
Westinghouse probabilistic and deterministic models, microstructural data from field
replication of penetrations in both the units and recent industry experience. The current
paper summarizes the recent sixty year PLEX study results of Beznau Units 1 and 2.
Enhancements to the previous Beznau PLEX Assessments
The probabilistic Alloy 600/82/182 PWSCC failure assessments conducted as part of the
PLEX study in 1998 are updated in the current study with the following enhancements:
i) Microstructural data from field replication efforts of penetrations in both units
ii) Latest stress analysis results specific to Beznau penetration welds/flaw
tolerance handbook
iii) Latest industry crack rate models (MRP-55)
iv) Latest inspection results of Units 1 and 2 penetrations
v) Latest upper head mean fluid temperature analysis results
vi) Latest industry experience including BMI penetrations
Summary of Results
Deterministic and probabilistic Alloy 600/82/182 PWSCC assessments were made for the
Beznau Units 1&2 rector vessel sub-components. The probabilistic PWSCC assessment
results of the head penetrations considered the probability of reaching a 75 percent
through-wall crack for service periods of up to 60 years. The results are illustrated in
figures 1 and 2 and in table 1.
4-87
Figure 1
Probabilistic Assessment Results of Beznau Unit 1 Upper Bound Penetration
1.00E-06
1.00E-05
1.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.00E-02
1.00E-01
1.00E+00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
YEARS
F
A
I
L
U
R
E

P
R
O
B
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
OLD STRESS-NEW CGR
PREVIOUS
NEW STRESS
NEW STR-NEW TEMP 1
NEW STR-NEW TEMP 2
70
1.00E-06
1.00E-05
1.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.00E-02
1.00E-01
1.00E+00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
YEARS
F
A
I
L
U
R
E

P
R
O
B
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
OLD STRESS-NEW CGR
PREVIOUS
NEW STRESS
NEW STR-NEW TEMP 1
NEW STR-NEW TEMP 2
70
Figure 2
Probabilistic Assessment Results of Beznau Unit 2 Upper Bound Penetration
1.00E-08
1.00E-07
1.00E-06
1.00E-05
1.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.00E-02
1.00E-01
1.00E+00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 7
YEARS
F
A
I
L
U
R
E

P
R
O
B
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
OLD STRESS-NEW CGR
PREVIOUS
NEW STRESS
NEW STR-NEW TEMP 1
NEW STR-NEW TEMP 2
0
(Ref. 1)
1.00E-08
1.00E-07
1.00E-06
1.00E-05
1.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.00E-02
1.00E-01
1.00E+00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 7
YEARS
F
A
I
L
U
R
E

P
R
O
B
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
OLD STRESS-NEW CGR
PREVIOUS
NEW STRESS
NEW STR-NEW TEMP 1
NEW STR-NEW TEMP 2
0
(Ref. 1) (Ref. 1)
4-88
Table 1
Bounding RVHP Probabilities for 75% Through-Wall Crack
% Failure Probability for Time in Years
Penetration/Unit/
Temperature
(1)
20 30 40 50 60
Unit 1 Upper Bound 21.86 54.94 70.56 78.15 87.52
Unit 1 Lower Bound 1.05 4.11 8.95 14.37 22.67
Unit 2 Lower Bound <0.01 0.06 0.36 0.80 1.59
Unit 2 Upper Bound 0.03 0.46 1.31 2.99 4.46
Note:
1. Temperature values in Table 6-7 are mean values and those in Table 6-8 are bounding temperatures.
The results showed that at 60-year life, the predicted failure probabilities of RVH
penetrations were noticeably higher for Unit 1 than those for Unit 2 at the higher service
temperature. The failure probabilities of the penetrations in Unit 1 ranged from
23 percent to 88 percent. For Unit 2 penetrations, the failure probabilities RVH
penetrations ranged from approximately 1.6 percent to 4.5 percent. The probabilities for
Unit 1 are high enough at 40 years of life that mitigation options should be implemented
before that time is reached. Other plants with calculated failure probabilities in this range
have been found with significant cracking in their penetrations (Table 2).The
probabilities for Unit 2, on the other hand, appear to be low enough, even at 60 years, to
be acceptable for the life of the unit without any modification.
Table 2
Recent Inspection Results from Two Plants were utilized for Bench Marking
Crack Found
Year of
Operation
Failure Probability
(Updated Stress)
Plant A Yes 27 0.78
Plant B No 22 0.55*
Note:
* Probabilities do not reflect recent operation with Zinc Addition. Actual probability values are expected
to be lower.
An assessment of the BMI inspection results at Beznau Units 1&2 suggested that
additional inspections/evaluations may be necessary to establish the significance of the
recorded indications.
The deterministic PWSCC assessments provided susceptibility ranking of the locations in
each unit relative to the highest susceptible RVHP location in that unit.
4-89
The results of the deterministic assessments showed that:
The CRDM penetration followed by the J-groove weld are ranked higher than other
locations in Unit 1.The head vent tube followed by CRDM penetration are among the
higher-ranked ones in Unit 2.
Recommendations
Based on the higher cracking probabilities predicted for the Unit 1 RVH penetrations at
both 40 year and 60 year service times, it is recommended that appropriate mitigative
actions be implemented as soon as possible for Beznau Unit 1. These may include,
i) T-cold conversion ii) Zn addition and iii) Head replacement.
Until the mitigative actions are implemented for Unit 1, it is recommended that an in-
service inspection plan based on probabilistic crack initiation be developed and
implemented in the interim period.
Based on the results of the deterministic PWSCC assessments, it is recommended that the
Unit 2 head vent be inspected at the earliest opportunity.
It is recommended that additional inspections/evaluations be conducted of the large
number of lack of fusion defects identified in Units 1&2 BMI penetrations. The effort
should focus on determination of sizing and proximity to the wetted ID surface and any
role of inclusions in the cracking process.
The following recommendations are made for the BMIs Beznau Units, consistent with
industry recommendations in the US:
i) Beznau Unit with an upcoming 10-year reactor vessel ISI should plan to
supplement the lower vessel head bare metal visual inspections with volumetric
inspections. The inspections to be considered include UT of the nozzle and either
enhanced visual of the J-groove weld or ECT of the J-groove weld, depending on
vendor demonstrated capabilities.
ii) If an ISI is not scheduled in the near term, the unit should continue with visual
inspections per recommendations provided in MRP 2003-017.
4-90
Slide 1
Gutti Rao
Westinghouse Electric Company, Pittsburgh PA, USA
Gottfried Flueckiger
NOK, Switzerland
Probabilistic PWSCC Failure Assessment of Alloy
600/82/182 Reactor Vessel Subcomponents at Beznau
1&2 for a
Sixty Year Life Extension
2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference
Santa Ana Pueblo
New Mexico
March 7-10, 2005
4-91
Slide 2
Background
z 1992 ISI Inspections of Beznau Unit 1 revealed two small ET indications
(<.08 in.) in the RVH penetrations. Subsequent inspections in 1993 (ET) and
1997 (ET,UT) confirmed no further growth of these indications.
z Field microstructural replication of Unit 1 RVH penetrations was conducted
in 1997
z Initial PLEX study of Beznau 1&2 was conducted in 1998
z Probabilistic Failure Assessments were conducted in 1998 utilized Unit 1
replication results
z Field replication of Unit 2 RVH penetrations was conducted in 1999
z PLEX update incorporating Unit 2 replication results, latest Westinghouse
models, and industry experience since 1998
z The current paper summarizes the Alloy 600 assessments of the recent PLEX
update at Beznau 1 and 2
4-92
Slide 3
Purpose
z To summarize the results of the PWSCC assessments of the Reactor
Vessel Alloy 600/82/182 sub-components at
Beznau Units 1&2
The assessment is conducted as part of the 60-year plant life
extension efforts undertaken by NOK
The assessment is based on Westinghouse latest deterministic
and probabilistic structural reliability models
The RVH penetrations were assessed with the latest
Westinghouse Probabilistic Model
Other RV Alloy 600/82/182 locations were assessed by
Westinghouse deterministic model
4-93
Slide 4
Westinghouse Probabilistic
Model
z Uses mechanistic models for time to crack initiation and crack growth
due to PWSCC
z Calculates effects of uncertainties, such as stress, temperature,
microstructure, etc.
z Models independently reviewed
z Benchmarked against observations at D.C. Cook, Ringhals, Asco and
North Anna
z Software uses PFM methods approved by NRC for piping
risk-informed ISI
z The basic model was previously applied to 39 U.S. plants in
developing an Industry Histogram provided to U.S. NRC
4-94
Slide 5
Enhancements to the 1998
Probabilistic Assessments of Beznau
Units
The probabilistic PWSCC failure assessments of the Alloy 600 Reactor Vessel
Head Penetrations (RVHP) were conducted with the following enhancements:
z Microstructural data from the Westinghouse field replication results of
Units 1&2 Upper Head Penetrations
z Latest stress analysis results of the Beznau 1& 2 head penetration welds/
flaw tolerance handbook
z Latest Industry Crack Growth Models (MRP-55)
z Latest inservice inspection results of Beznau Units 1&2 Head Penetrations
z Latest upper head mean fluid temperature analysis results
z Latest industry service experience including BMI penetrations
4-95
Slide 6
Stress Analysis
Differences Between Previous and Current Modeling
z Penetration Nozzle Geometry
Current analysis based on Beznau Units 1&2 plant specific
geometry
Previous analysis based on a 4-loop Westinghouse plant
Major differences:
Penetration Nozzle Angle
J-Weld Sizes
Vessel Head
4-96
Slide 7
Stress Analysis (cont.)
Differences Between Previous and Current Modeling
z J-Weld Fabrication Process
Current analysis simulated the process with two weld passes
(8 layers of element)
Previous analysis simulated the process by imposing ovality on the
nozzle (2 layers of element)
z Current Finite Element Analysis
Uses more elements in general, especially near the J-weld region
Elastic plastic analysis techniques have been refined over the years
z Stress-Strain Curves
Both analyses used the same cyclic stress strain curve
4-97
Slide 8
Stress Analysis (cont.)
Set-Up
Angle
New Stress Old Stress Increase
(%)
0.0 63.85 34.4 85%
69%
40%
29%
18%
19.3 81.17 47.90
31.5 80.97 58.02
36.6 81.18 63.03
43.0 82.84 70.23
Beznau RV Head Penetration Stress Comparison
4-98
Slide 9
Microstructure
Impact of Field Replication Results
z Review of Unit 1 and Unit 2 replication results
showed significant microstructural differences in
the penetration heads between Units 1&2
z The lowest GBC in Unit 1 was 11.4% the lowest
measured in Unit 2 was 57.2%
4-99
Slide 10
Microstructure (cont.)
Replication Results
Replica Scanning Electron Micrographs Illustrating the Carbide
Distribution in Penetration No. 19 Material Unit 2
4-100
Slide 11
Crack Growth
Latest Industry Crack Growth Rate (CGR) Model
z MRP-55 Rev. 1 recommended the CGR curve
based upon 75
th
percentile level of the distribution
of the CGR variability
(Slide 14)
4-101
Slide 12
Service Temperature
Westinghouse Latest THRIVE Code Analysis Established Upper
Head Mean Fluid temperature
z Reactor coolant system conditions and core power distributions are
used on a per cycle basis
z Upper head region best estimate mean fluid temperature based on 5
past cycles of operation
z THRIVE analysis results:
Unit
Average Mean Fluid
Temperature
Maximum Mean
Fluid Temperature
Beznau 2 305.2C (581.4F) 307.2C (584.9F)
Beznau 1 305.9C (582.6F) 308.8C (587.8F)
(Slide 16)
4-102
Slide 13
Probabilistic Assessment
Results
Beznau Unit 1 Upper Bound Penetration
1.00E-06
1.00E-05
1.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.00E-02
1.00E-01
1.00E+00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
YEARS
F
A
I
L
U
R
E

P
R
O
B
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
OLD STRESS-NEW CGR
PREVIOUS
NEW STRESS
NEW STR-NEW TEMP 1
NEW STR-NEW TEMP 2
(Slide 19)
4-103
Slide 14
Probabilistic Assessment
Results (cont.)
Beznau Unit 2 Upper Bound Penetration
1.00E-08
1.00E-07
1.00E-06
1.00E-05
1.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.00E-02
1.00E-01
1.00E+00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
YEARS
F
A
I
L
U
R
E

P
R
O
B
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
OLD STRESS-NEW CGR
PREVIOUS
NEW STRESS
NEW STR-NEW TEMP 1
NEW STR-NEW TEMP 2
(Ref. 1)
(Slide 20)
4-104
Slide 15
Bounding RVHP Probabilities for 75%
Through-wall Crack for Temperature
Set 1
% Failure Probability for Time in Years
Penetration/Unit/
Temperature
(1)
20 30 40 50 60
UP BND/U1/308.8C 21.86 54.94 70.56 78.15 87.52
LOW
BND/U1/308.8C
1.05 4.11 8.95 14.37 22.67
LOW
BND/U2/307.2C
<0.01 0.06 0.36 0.80 1.59
UP BND/U2/307.2C 0.03 0.46 1.31 2.99 4.46
Note:
1. Temperature values in Table 6-7 are mean values and those in Table 6-8 are bounding temperatures.
(Slide 21)
4-105
Slide 16
Recent Inspection Results
Crack Found
Year of
Operation
Failure Probability
(Updated
Stresses)
Note:
* Probabilities do not reflect operation with Zinc additions. Actual probability values are expected to be
lower.
Plant A Yes 27 0.78
Plant B No 22 0.55
Recent inspection results from two plants were utilized for
bench marking
(Slide 22)
4-106
Slide 17
Summary
z Deterministic and probabilistic Alloy 600/82/182 PWSCC
assessments were made for the Beznau Units 1&2 rector
vessel sub-components.
z The probabilistic PWSCC assessment results of the head
penetrations considered the probability of reaching a 75
percent through-wall crack for service periods of up to 60
years.
(Slide 27)
4-107
Slide 18
Summary (cont.)
z At 60-year life, the predicted failure probabilities of
RVH penetrations are noticeably higher for Unit 1
than those for Unit 2 at the higher service
temperature.
The failure probabilities of the penetrations in
Unit 1 ranged from 23 percent to 88 percent.
For Unit 2 penetrations, the failure probabilities
RVH penetrations ranged from approximately
1.6 percent to
4.5 percent.
(Slide 28)
4-108
Slide 19
Summary (cont.)
z The probabilities for Unit 1 are high enough at 40 years of
life that mitigation options should be implemented before
that time is reached. Other plants with calculated failure
probabilities in this range have been found with significant
cracking in their penetrations.
z The probabilities for Unit 2, on the other hand, appear to be
low enough, even at 60 years, to be acceptable for the life of
the unit without any modification.
z An assessment of the BMI inspection results at Beznau
Units 1&2 suggested that additional inspections/evaluations
may be necessary to establish the significance of the
recorded indications.
(Slide 29)
4-109
Slide 20
Recommendations
z Based on the higher cracking probabilities predicted for the Unit 1
RVH penetrations at both 40 year and 60 year service times, it is
recommended that appropriate mitigative actions be implemented as
soon as possible for Beznau Unit 1. These may include:
T-cold conversion
Zn addition
Head replacement
z Until the mitigative actions are implemented for Unit 1, it is
recommended that an inservice inspection plan based on probabilistic
crack initiation be developed and implemented in the interim period.
(Slide 31)
4-110
Slide 21
Recommendations
(new slide)
4-111
A Matrix Evaluation of Modification Options for
Reactor Pressure Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles
Ronald J. Payne
AREVA
Framatome ANP
3315 Old Forest Rd.
Lynchburg, Virginia 24501
USA
PHONE: (434) 832-2328
FAX: (434) 832-3022
EMAIL:ron.payne@framatome-anp.com
Stephen Levesque
AREVA
Framatome ANP
3315 Old Forest Rd.
USA
PHONE: (434) 832-2375
FAX: (434) 832-3022
EMAIL:stephen.levesque@framatome-anp.com
INTRODUCTION
The onset of Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) has created the need for
modifications to the primary system including the replacement of nozzles containing Alloy 600 materials
and the replacement of entire components including Reactor Vessel Closure Heads (RVCHs), steam
generators, and pressurizer replacements scheduled for the near future.
In 2003, cracks were found in two Bottom Mounted Nozzles (BMNs) at a nuclear power plant. These
BMN penetrations were modified on an emergent basis using techniques commonly employed for the
modification of pressurizer heater and instrumentation nozzles. Subsequently, NRC Bulletin 2003-02 was
released on August 21, 2003, which required plants to perform Bare Metal Visual (BMV) on BMNs at the
next refueling outage or provide an action plan to enable BMV during a subsequent refueling outage.[1] If
operators choose to leave their Alloy 600 BMNs in service, increased inspection criteria is expected. The
replacement of the entire reactor vessel has not been considered because of the complexities involved;
however, the future cost of inspections may offset the cost of modifying the nozzles. This paper
discusses several modification options for the BMNs and ranks the modifications according to a set of
attributes that have been developed using the BMN repair criteria developed by the Materials Reliability
Program (MRP).[2]
BMN NOZZLE CONFIGURATIONS
There are two basic commercial designs for a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) with BMNs:
Westinghouse 2-loop, 3-loop, and 4-loop designs and Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) designs. The
Westinghouse design is a vertically oriented BMN secured to the cladded carbon steel lower head of the
RPV with an Alloy 82/182 J-groove weld. The B&W design has additional reinforcement at the upper
portion of the nozzle. The reinforcement was added to the nozzle to ensure structural integrity of the
nozzle during operation. The additional nozzle reinforcement increases the complexity of the weld on
B&W designed BMN. The basic geometry of the BMN in both designs is similar, which allows design
compatibility for modification development approaches.
MODIFICATION EVALUATION CRITERIA
Framatome ANP has been actively involved in the EPRI managed Materials Reliability Program. The
MRP has developed a list of repair criteria for BMN. This list was published to the MRP via email during
2004.[2] These attributes have been used as a basis for the evaluation of several modification
approaches to determine the best modification approaches for further development.
MODIFICATION CONCEPTS
Framatome ANP has developed several modification approaches to address PWSCC of the BMNs.
The modification approaches selected for this evaluation were: In-Vessel Full Nozzle Modification,
Internal Diameter Temper Bead (IDTB) Modification, Pad Modification, Small Pad Modification, In-Vessel
Weld Overlay Modification, Mechanical Seal, and the Flexible End Diaphragm Seal.
4-113
MODIFICATION EVALUATION
Through the participation of industry representatives and Framatome ANP experts representing all
disciplines related to modification of the BMNs, a modification evaluation was conducted in a weighted
matrix. The evaluators represented materials, structural analysis, component engineering, welding
engineering, tooling design, nondestructive evaluation, and field service implementation.
Weighting of the attributes was performed on a scale of 1-10 with the most important attributes
receiving higher scores. Each repair approach was scored according to each attribute. The attributes
were scored on a scale of 1-5 with a low score representing the best option. The sum of the weighted
score represents the score of the overall repair approach. Thus the lowest score is the best repair option
for the chosen set of criteria. Table 1 shows the final rankings of the modification evaluation.
Table 1: Modification Evaluation Rankings
Repair/Modification Option Score Wt. Score
IDTB Half Nozzle 45 190
Small PAD Half Nozzle Option B 49 210
PAD Half Nozzle 58 239
Small PAD Half Nozzle Option A 59 248
Small PAD Full Nozzle Option B 56 255
In-Vessel Full Nozzle 56 278
IDTB Full Nozzle 62 284
Small PAD Full Nozzle Option A 67 293
PAD Full Nozzle 66 293
In-Vessel Weld Overlay - Embedded Flaw 70 324
In-Vessel Weld Overlay - Flaw Removal 77 355
Flexible End Diaphragm Seal 81 385
SUMMARY
The Framatome ANP matrix evaluation of BMN modification options ranked the four half nozzle
approaches best with the IDTB half nozzle modification ranked number one. The half nozzle modification
approaches received better scores mostly due to the decrease in equipment development costs and
decreased schedule impact, although the half nozzle modification approaches are not technically superior
to the full nozzle modifications.
This evaluation tool is currently being used to prioritize tooling development efforts for BMN
modifications. Framatome ANP is developing the next generation machining tools for BMN modifications.
This tooling will support all the pad and IDTB modification approaches. Framatome ANP is also
developing a small diameter weld head for future IDTB modifications to BMN nozzles.
This evaluation was performed as a generic evaluation. This is a dynamic evaluation tool that can be
customized to specific applications. For example, a plant may opt to perform BMN modifications during
an extended outage, where the removal of internals and draining of the vessel would have less
importance than during a refueling outage. Plant specific geometries/configurations may also provide
different results.
The BMN matrix evaluation method is a general evaluation tool than can be used to prioritize
development efforts. Additionally, the matrix evaluation methodology can be applied to other
locations/concepts.
4-114
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank the following organizations for their input into this repair evaluation
study:
Duke Energy Nuclear Management Company
TXU Arizona Public Service
Entergy Tennessee Valley Authority
OKG First Energy
Dominion South Texas Project
Southern Nuclear Exelon
REFERENCES
[1] Boger, B. A., 2003, Leakage from Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head Penetrations and
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity, NRC Bulletin 2003-02.
[2] Finland S., Couch D., 2004, Repair Criteria for Bottom Mounted Nozzles (BMN), MRP 2004-033.
[3] Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook, Revision 1, TR-1000975, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, California, 2001.
4-115
A Matrix Evaluation of
Repair/Modification Options for
Reactor Pressure Vessel Bottom
Mounted Nozzles
EPRI PWSCC of Alloy 600 2005 International
Conference & Exhibition
Ron Payne
Steve Levesque
AREVA
Framatome ANP
4-116
> CRR 05-37
Outline
> Background
> BMN configurations
> MRP attributes of an ideal repair
> Repair/modification concepts
> Detailed assessment plan
> Tooling development
4-117
> CRR 05-37
Background
> Alloy 600 is being replaced throughout the
primary system
Repairs/modifications
RVCH IDTB, weld overlay, MSIP, small bore mod, etc.
Component replacement
SGR, RVCH, PZR, etc.
> Bottom mounted nozzles
What repair/modification approach is best?
4-118
> CRR 05-37
Background
> Framatome ANP developed a matrix evaluation of BMN
repair/modification options
Based on MRP attributes of an ideal repair
13 Framatome ANP developed repair/modification concepts
Framatome ANP internal evaluation matrix completed with
input from all facets of repair/modification
Unbiased to maximum extent practicable
Tooling design, materials, stress analysis, component
engineering, field service, and nondestructive evaluation
> Matrix evaluation with industry perspective though web
cast
Duke, TXU, Southern Nuclear, NMC, APS, Exelon, Entergy,
TVA, Dominion, First Energy, OKG, STP
4-119
> CRR 05-37 5
BMN Configurations
3 CE units with large diameter ICI BMN not specifically
evaluated but general evaluation applicable
4-120
> CRR 05-37
BMN Configurations
B&W BMN Configuration
Typical BMN Under Vessel
4-121
> CRR 05-37
Repair/Modification Attributes
> Developed from EPRI MRP 2004-033, Repair
Criteria for Bottom Mounted Nozzles
Life extension, cost, code applicability, regulatory
acceptance
Framatome ANP specific attributes added
4-122
> CRR 05-37
> Life of the repair
Materials assessment
> Corrosion resistant
materials
Pressure boundary
> ASME code compliance
Latest edition/code cases,
etc.
> Regulatory agreement
Acceptance of code rules,
relief request, etc.
> Impact on accident
analysis
Loss of coolant accident
> Maintain positional
tolerance
Control to original
specifications
> Loose parts concerns
Original configuration
influence
> Volumetrically inspectable
Determined by
configuration,
accessability, etc. during
implementation
> Future in-service
inspection requirements
Original construction code
requirements
> Future in-service
inspectability
Pressure boundary wetted
surface (visual)
> Crevice geometry
Inconel pressure boundary
4-123
> CRR 05-37
> Wetted weld root
Partial penetration weld
geometry
> Exposed carbon steel
BAC concern
> Anti-ejection device
Loss of coolant accident
> New stresses in exposed
Alloy 600
Welding/mechanical
stresses
> ALARA
Personnel exposure,
contamination potential
> Contingency cost
Predeployment &
development allocation
> Deployment cost
Total cost to perform
repair
> Outage impact
Time to perform repair,
impact on other activities
> Drain vessel
Must the vessel be
drained to perform the
repair
> Small footprint
containment
Size of equipment
> Multiple repair practicality
Ease of performing
multiple repairs
4-124
> CRR 05-37
In-Vessel Full Nozzle Modification
> Permanent repair solution
> Accomplished with RV in flooded condition
by use of a cofferdam deployed from above
the RV or by decon and drain of RV
> Virtually eliminates all Alloy 600 from service
> Challenging weld geometry
> A690 replacement nozzle
> No exposed CS
> Anti-ejection feature
> No crevice geometry
> No wetted weld root
> Contingency requirements
Embedded flaw analysis or
Ambient temperature temperbead welding
Challenging geometry
Half bead machine GTAW approach
> Post installation volumetric inspectability of
nozzle
> High development cost
Wholesale modification could offset
development cost
> Significant outage impact
4-125
> CRR 05-37
IDTB Half Nozzle Modification
> Adaptation of Framatome ANP RVCH IDTB
Modification
> Requires flaw evaluation of remaining A600
> Exposed CS
> Ambient temperature temperbead welding
> Limited post installation inspectability
Possible OD circ detection
Fully inspectable with system breach
Threaded SST connection with seal weld
possible
> Lower weld volume than PAD concepts
> Right circular weld geometry identical for
all penetrations
Framatome ANP Patent Pending
4-126
> CRR 05-37
IDTB Full Nozzle Modification
> Adaptation of Framatome ANP RVCH IDTB
modification
> Accomplished with RV in flooded condition
by use of a double wall cofferdam deployed
from above the RV
> Virtually eliminates all Alloy 600 from
service
> A690 replacement nozzles
> Exposed CS
> Anti-ejection feature
> Crevice geometry
Liner option
> Wetted weld root on attachment side
> Ambient temperature temperbead welding
Possible OD circ detection
Threaded SST connection with seal weld
possible
> Lower weld volume than PAD concepts
> Right circular weld geometry identical for all
penetrations Framatome ANP Patent Pending
4-127
> CRR 05-37
PAD Half Nozzle
> Widely applied permanent
modification to PZR instrument
and heater penetrations and STP
BMN
> Requires flaw evaluation of
remaining A600
> Exposed CS
> Wetted weld root
> Ambient temperature temperbead
welding
> Crevice geometry
> Limited post installation
inspectability
4-128
> CRR 05-37
PAD Full Nozzle Modification
> Accomplished with RV in
flooded condition by use of a
double wall cofferdam
deployed from above the RV.
> Virtually eliminates all Alloy
600 from service.
> Optional corrosion liner to seal
low alloy steel material
> Crevice geometry
> Utilizes PAD half nozzle
tooling and processes for
under vessel
> Wetted weld root
> Ambient temperature
temperbead welding
inspectability
4-129
> CRR 05-37
Small PAD Half Nozzle Option A
> Adaptation of widely used
modification to PZR
instrument and heater
penetrations
flooded condition by use
of a plug installed from
above or below RV
> A690 replacement
materials
> Exposed CS
> Crevice geometry
> Wetted weld root on
attachment side
> Ambient temperature
temperbead welding
inspectability without
breaching primary system
> Lower weld volume than
PAD concepts Framatome ANP Patent Pending
4-130
> CRR 05-37
Small PAD Full Nozzle Modification Option A
> Accomplished with RV in flooded
condition by use of a double wall
cofferdam deployed from above
the RV.
> Reduces alloy 600
Virtually eliminates A600 with
overbore
> Optional corrosion liner to seal
low alloy steel material
Ni plating option
> Crevice geometry
and heater penetrations
> Wetted weld root
welding
inspectability without breaching
primary system
4-131
> CRR 05-37
Small PAD Half Nozzle Option B
and heater penetrations
condition by use of a plug
installed from above or below RV
> A690 and SST replacement
materials
> Exposed CS
Stainless steel nozzle
welding
inspectability
Fully inspectable with system
breach
Threaded SST connection with seal
weld possible
> Lower weld volume than PAD
concepts
4-132
> CRR 05-37
Small PAD Full Nozzle Modification Option B
condition by use of a double wall
cofferdam deployed from above the
RV.
> Reduces alloy 600
Virtually eliminates A600 with overbore
> Optional corrosion liner to seal low
alloy steel material
Ni plating option
Stainless steel nozzle
welding
Threaded SST connection with seal
weld possible
> Adaptation of widely used modification
to PZR instrument and heater
penetrations
4-133
> CRR 05-37
In-Vessel Mechanical Seal
> In-Vessel sophisticated
machining of nozzle and
cladding
> Location specific
geometry
> Temporary repair
existing LCIP tube
existing LCIP weld
existing LCIP buttering
existing cladding
inconel buttering pad
RPV bottom head
Lower Core Instrumentation Penetration
Mechanical Backfitting or Repair
- of Weld and Buttering, Threaded Tight Cap
- of Penetration Tube, Threaded Sleeve
mech. thread locking (not shown)
hold down nut
sealing
tight cap
sealing
seal surface
original outside contour
can be realized, if requested
O-ring sealing
(stainless steel tube silver plated
with pressure holes)
or other adequate sealing
threaded connection
sleeve
mech. thread locking (not shown)
connection to thimble tube
(same shape as existing LCIP)
Patented
4-134
> CRR 05-37
In-Vessel Weld Overlay Embedded Flaw
> Embedded flaw analysis
assumes postulated flaw
does not exceed critical flaw
size
flooded condition by use of
a cofferdam deployed from
above the RV or by decon
and drain of RV
> Challenging weld geometry
> Susceptible high tensile
stress A600 at nozzle OD
weld tie-in
> No exposed CS
> Post installation volumetric
inspectability of nozzle
4-135
> CRR 05-37
In-Vessel Weld Overlay Flaw Removal
> Similar to in-vessel weld
overlay embedded flaw
but with either complete
flaw removal or reduction
in postulated flaw to sub-
critical size
> Complete flaw removal
requires ambient
temperature temperbead
welding of complex
geometry
4-136
> CRR 05-37
Flexible End Diaphragm Seal (FEDS)
> Based on 1993 European
application for repair of
RVCH penetration
performed by Framatome
ANP
> In-Vessel sophisticated
machining required
> Location specific geometry
> Susceptible high tensile
stress A600 at nozzle OD
weld tie-in
> Complex weld geometry
4-137
4-138
> CRR 05-37
Detailed Assessment Plan
Repair Option Score
Weighted
Score
IDTB Half Nozzle 45 190
Small PAD Half Nozzle Option B 49 210
PAD Half Nozzle 58 239
Small PAD Half Nozzle Option A 59 248
Small PAD Full Nozzle Option B 56 255
In-Vessel Full Nozzle 56 278
IDTB Full Nozzle 62 284
Small PAD Full Nozzle Option A 67 293
PAD Full Nozzle 66 293
In-Vessel Weld Overlay - Embedded Flaw 70 324
In-Vessel Weld Overlay - Flaw Removal 77 355
Flexible End Diaphragm Seal 81 385
> Subjective evaluation for trending purposes
Site outage constraints (i.e. SGR, 10-yr ISI) can influence/change
weighting/ranking
Original configuration influence not fully evaluated
4-139
> CRR 05-37
Tooling Development - Machining
> Next generation BMN machining
system
Supports multiple Framatome ANP
repair concepts
Roughing/finishing cutter change
capable
Simplified alignment
> 2.50 maximum diameter
> 18 axial stroke to facilitate
through wall BMN machining for
full nozzle replacement behind a
cofferdam
> Manual or remote operability
Spindle tele-presence sensors
Integral cameras
PLC control
4-140
> CRR 05-37
Tooling Development - Welding
> Water Cooled, 300 amp
capacity
> Dual axes wire manipulator
> Single weld vision with
renewable optical cover
Integral light guide
Remote Iris
Actuated weld filter
> Conventional gas lens
> Minimum welded ID 1.05
> Maximum diameter 3.50
> Maximum wall thickness
without configuration change -
0.44
4-141
> CRR 05-37
Summary
> Framatome ANP matrix evaluation of BMN
modification options ranked the four half nozzle
approaches best
Miniature IDTB half nozzle ranked number one
Prioritizes development efforts
> Dynamic evaluation tool
Continuous refinement
Additional input encouraged
Configuration and site specific weighting/ranking
> Can be applied to other locations/concepts
4-142
ASSESSMENT OF THE REPAIR/REMEDIATION/MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
FOR DISSIMILIAR METAL BUTT WELDS
Dave Waskey
Framatome ANP Inc. (AREVA Group)
3315 Old Forest Road
Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935
dave.waskey@framatome-anp.com
For over two decades stainless steel butt welds in Boiling Water Reactors
(BWRs) have been failing due to Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking
(IGSCC). During the last decade Alloy 600 Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds (DMWs)
started to fail by Primary Water Stress Corrosion (PWSCC) in BWRs, Table 1[1].
And now the first two Alloy 600 DMW PWSCC failures in Pressurized Water
Reactors (PWRs) have occurred on the VC Summer RV hot leg nozzle, Figure 1,
and the TMI hot leg surge nozzle, Figure 2.
These problems have resulted in a number of repair/remediation/mitigation
technologies being developed and used in the world wide commercial nuclear
industry, Table 2[2, 3, and 4]. This presentation will include a historical
perspective of these technologies and a current assessment of each including
relative cost, schedule, dose, inspection frequency requirements [5], and ASME
Code and Regulatory acceptance, as well as the long term expected service life
of each technology.
References:
1. W.H. Cullen, Jr. and T.S. Mintz, A Survey of World Wide Experience with
the Cracking Susceptibility of Alloy 600 and Associated Welds, Rev.2,
March 25, 2004.
2. J. Schmidt, D. Pellkofer, E. Weib, Alternative Methods for Post Weld
Treatment of Austenitic Pipe Welds to Increase the Operational Safety of
BWR Plants, Nuclear Engineering and Design 174, 1997.
3. EPRI Project Manager, S. Findlan, Materials Reliability Program:
Recommendations for Testing of Emerging Mitigation Techniques for
PWSCC (MRP-119), June 2004.
4. EPRI Project Manager, C. King, Materials Reliability Program: Generic
Guidance for Alloy 600 Management (MRP-126), November 2004.
5. EPRI Project Manager, C. King, Materials Reliability Program: Primary
System Piping Butt Weld Inspection and Evaluation Guideline (MRP-139),
Draft F, January 4, 2005.
4-143
Table 1 Dissimilar Metal Butt Weld Failures/PDI Rejectable in the US
Plant Type Plant Date Component Reference
GE Type 4 Vermont Yankee April 1986 RV Core Spray Nozzle LER 271-1986-005
CE Palisades 1 September 1993 PZR Relief Valve LER 225-1993-009
GE Type 4 Hope Creek 1 September 1997 RV Core Spray Nozzle LER 354-1997-023
GE Type 4 Duane Arnold 1 November 1999 Recirculation Riser LER 331-1999-006
W 3 Loop Summer 1 October 2000 RV Hot Leg Nozzle LER 395-2000-008
GE Type 3 Pilgrim 1 October 2003 RV Nozzle to Cap LER 293-2003-006
GE Type 4 Susquehanna 1 March 2004 RV Recirc Nozzle Event Notification
Report 40605
B&W Three Mile Island Fall 2003 RCS Hot Leg Surge
Nozzle
LER 289-2004-001
GE Type 3 Quad Cities Spring 2004 RV Recirc Nozzle
GE Type 4 Hope Creek Fall 2004 RV Recirc Nozzle LER 354-2004-010
Table 2 Dissimilar Metal Weld Global Solutions
> Safe End Replacement
> Weld Inlay (Both Preventive & Repair)
> Structural Weld Overlay (WOL)
> Weld Overlay for Stress Improvement (PWOL)
> Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP)
> Induction Heating Stress Improvement (IHSI)
> Last Pass Heat Sink Welding (LPHSW)
> Cavitation Peening
> Laser Peening
4-144
Figure 1 VC Summer RV Hot Leg Nozzle Failure
Figure 2 Three Mile Island RC Pipe Hot Leg Surge Nozzle
4-145
FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Assessment of
Repair/Remediation/Mitigation Techniques
for Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds
Dave Waskey
Framatome ANP
An AREVA and Siemens Company
4-146
2 FRAMATOME ANP, INC. > CRR 05-32
Agenda
> Overview of Dissimilar Metal Butt Weld
(DMW)Failures
> Review of Global Solutions
> Comparison of Available Techniques
> Regulatory Issues
> Conclusions
4-147
Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures in the US
Plant Type Plant Date Component Reference
GE Type 4 Vermont Yankee April 1986 RV Core Spray Nozzle LER 271-1986-005
CE Palisades 1 September 1993 PZR Relief Valve LER 225-1993-009
GE Type 4 Hope Creek 1 September 1997 RV Core Spray Nozzle LER 354-1997-023
GE Type 4 Duane Arnold 1 November 1999 Recirculation Riser LER 331-1999-006
W 3 Loop Summer 1 October 2000 RV Hot Leg Nozzle LER 395-2000-008
GE Type 3 Pilgrim 1 October 2003 RV Nozzle to Cap LER 293-2003-006
GE Type 4 Susquehanna 1 March 2004 RV Recirculation Nozzle Event Notification Report
40605
B&W Three Mile Island Fall 2003 RCPipeHot Leg Surge
Nozzle
LER 289-2004-001
GE Type 3 Quad Cities Spring 2004 RV Recirculation Nozzle
GE Type 4 Hope Creek Fall 2004 RV Recirculation Nozzle LER 354-2004-010
4-148
Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
> Small Nozzle Solution in US To Date
> Inlay/Safe End Replacement - Palisades PORV
4-149
> 12 16 Diameter Nozzle
Solution in US To Date
> Inconel Structural Weld
Overlay
Seven (7) on BWRs (Note:
three (3) were previously had
MSIP)
One (1) on PWR
4-150
> Large Nozzle Solution in US To Date
Spool Piece Replacement - VCS RV HL Nozzle
4-151
Butt Weld
0
TIME
Component Degradation Curve
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
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EPRI used with
permission
4-152
Dissimilar Metal Weld Global Solutions
> Safe End Replacement
> Weld Inlay (Both Preventive & Repair)
> Structural Weld Overlay (WOL)
> Weld Overlay for Stress Improvement (PWOL)
> Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP)
> Induction Heating Stress Improvement (IHSI)
> Last Pass Heat Sink Welding (LPHSW)
> Cavitation Peening
> Laser Peening
4-153
FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Technique Comparisons
4-154
Assessment Criteria
> Available Approaches:
Weld Inlay (Both Preventive & Repair)
Structural Weld Overlay (WOL)
Weld Overlay for Stress Improvement (PWOL)
4-155
Assessment Criteria
> Definitions
Repair Leaking or Unacceptable Flaw Size
Remediation Acceptable Flaw Size
Mitigation Prior to Flaw Identification
4-156
Assessment Criteria
> Dependent Factors
Cost
Schedule
Dose
OD Spatial Envelope
Internal Accessibility
Long Term (Life of Plant) Integrity
Code and Regulatory Acceptance
4-157
Pros & Cons
Pros Cons
MSIP x Places ID in compression
x No pipe entry
x Can be both mitigation and remediation technique
x Can be performed in flooded condition
x Can be life of plant repair
x Offers shortest schedule
x Cannot be used if flaw is above predescribed length
x Requires OD spatial envelope
x Requires regulatory approval for DM welds
x Not a repair option
x Requires subsequent outage inspection to verify no flaw
growth
x Accurate profile required prior to MSIP to design device
x Leaves flaw in place
x Leaves flaw exposed to RCS water
Preventative Overlay x Puts ID surface in compression
x Can be wet or dry
x Short schedule
x Can provide life of plant repair
x No subsequent outage flaw growth verification by
UT
x Mitigation technique, i.e. no flaws
x No Code rules requires regulatory approval
x Requires spatial envelope
Structural Overlay x Can be wet or dry
x Addresses compressive plus new structural
boundary
x Is both a mitigation and remediation technique
x Leaves flaw in place
x Requires spatial envelope
x Is more expensive and schedule intensive on larger
diameter pipes
x Requires subsequent outage inspections to show flaw has
not grown into outer 25% of wall
x No Code rules requires regulatory approval
Inlay x Permanently removes Alloy 182 from RCS
interface
x Represents lowest possible future inspection
requirements
x No OD spatial envelope needed
x Lower dose
x Shortest on component schedule for large pipes
x Can remove flaw or optionally imbed a flaw
x No regulatory approval required unless flaw
removal uses Ambient Temperature Temperbead
welding
x Breach system FME Concerns
x Drain down requirement
x Component accessibility challenges
(Spool Piece)
x Best for small pipes
x Highest confidence for life of plant repair
x No regulatory approval required
x Limited to smaller pipes based on cost and schedule
x Requires drain down
x FME concerns
x Higher dose location dependent
4-158
Application Recommendations
> Applications Recommendations
4 & Smaller Safe End Replacement
4 - 20 Structural Weld Overlay
20 - 36 ID Originated Inlay
20 - 36 MSIP
4-159
FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Regulatory Issues
4-160
Relief Requests/Code Cases
> Code Case N-XXX (Inconel Weld Overlay to Piping
or Components)
Applies to Inconel weld overlays to PI, P3, SS, Inconel
piping or nozzles
Same/similar rules as N-504 (Stainless Piping Weld
Overlay)
Will permit first layer as part of structural overlay
provided it has minimum 24% Cr
Provides temper bead rules by reference
Draft in Code Committee
4-161
Relief Requests/Code Cases
> Code Case N-638
Rev. 1
Redefined scope to permit use on dry vessels for radiological reasons
NRC endorsed with restriction requiring NB-5000 acceptance criteria
Rev. 2
Permits repair to SA-302 Gr.B that has been modified by nickel addition and
fine grain heat treatment
Clarifies impact testing acceptance to be based on Charpy V-notch lateral
expansion criteria
Provides provision to visually inspect prior to welding in lieu of surface
examination
Provides toughness testing adjustment temperatures clarifications to permit
PQRs to use Section III
Requires Contractor Code NDE rather than Section XI
Approved unanimously at December Section XI Meeting
Rev.3
Area limitation from 100 sq. in. to 500 sq. in. and greater sizes with Section III
and residual stress analysis w/o NRC RR approval
Technical basis document funded by EPRI expected at next Section XI
meeting
4-162
FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Conclusions
4-163
Dissimilar Metal Weld - Conclusions
> NEI 03-08: Guideline for the Management of
Materials Issues
Is a road map to show the NRC that the utilities are
proactive and aggressively addressing these issues
> MRP-139: Primary System Piping Butt Weld
Inspection and Evaluation Guideline
This guidance will be similar to the BWR IGSCC
program and recommends significant increased
inspections
> The Big Question
Will we see an industry trend for mitigation first on the
DMWs?
4-164
5
SESSION 2A: CRACKING AND RELIABILITY STUDIES
OF ALLOY 690
The subject of crack initiation and growth and initiation in Alloy 690 and its weld metals was
addressed by five participants in Session 2A. Summaries of the presentations are given below
followed by the questions asked, responses provided, and comments made by the participants
concerning each presentation. Click on the links to access directly copies of the materials
presented together with extended abstracts.
Assessment of PWSCC Resistance of Alloy 690: Overview of Laboratory
Results and Field Experience, presented by F. Vaillant, EDF (Paper 2A.1)
This presentation was given by F. Vaillant and written by F. Vaillant, J.-M. Boursier (EDF-
R&D), Y. Rouillon (EDF-DIN), O. Raquet, M. Helie (CEA Saclay), and P. Scott, M. Foucault
(Framatome-ANP France). The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x Current field experience in France has been that no SCC has occurred in Alloy 690
components after more than 20 years of service in the case of SG tube plugs, more than 15
years of service for SG tubes, and over 10 years of service in the case of CRDM nozzles (3
vessel heads).
x All of the many the laboratory tests that have been performed have demonstrated a very high
resistance to SCC of Alloy 690 in PWR primary water.
x In a few cases, a limited susceptibility to PWSCC has been observed in laboratory tests for
Alloy 690 with a microstructure characterized by intragranular carbide precipitation when
subjected to extremely severe loadings. For these cases, an approach based on the strain rate
damage model was developed. Based on this model, no significant cracking would be
expected in roll transitions of SG tubes during the lifetime of PWR plants. Moreover, the
results show that no SCC is expected for industrial products having the specified
intergranular carbide microstructure.
x Question (W. Cullen): Are there plans for additional testing of the PWSCC resistance of
Alloy 690?
Response (F. Vaillant): There are no current plans for additional testing. The results of the
tests already performed are considered conclusive and to demonstrate a very high resistance
to PWSCC of industrial grades of Alloy 690.
5-1
x Question (J. Hickling): When you showed your test results for the DCB and CT specimens
you said there was "no cracking." I assume that these were air-fatigue precracked specimens,
so that you were really saying that you detected no intergranular crack propagation.
However, for the test time shown, slow crack growth would not probably have led to even
one grain depth of growth, so the conclusion drawn is perhaps a little less certain than it
appears?
Response (F. Vaillant): I agree. This is the reason why I mentioned that the duration of the
tests (less than 1500 hours) was probably shorter than desirable. Nevertheless, no SCC
propagation was observed by SEM of the fatigue pre-crack.
x Question (R. Jacko): You report that there has been no observed PWSCC in Alloy 690 steam
generator tube plugs with up to 20 years of PWR exposure. Have there been any destructive
examinations performed of Alloy 690 plugs exposed for such long times? If so, what was the
longest exposure examined?
Response (F. Vaillant): Destructive examinations have been performed on steam generator
tube plugs of Alloy 690, but operating times were only about 25,000 hours. You are
certainly aware that the extraction of plugs from in-service steam generators is very
expensive.
x Question (J. Gorman):
1. What is the temperature for slides 12 and 14?
2. What was the crack morphology observed with the CERT specimens?
3. How can one assure that thick section Alloy 690 has a good microstructure?
Response (F. Vaillant):
1. 360C (680qF).
2. IGSCC.
3. Meeting specified mill annealing and thermal treatment temperatures and times
provides good assurance that the desired microstructure will be developed.
Microstructure checks are performed of the final product to verify that the desired
microstructure has been obtained.
A Review of PWSCC, Weldability, and Thermal Ageing of Nickel Weld
Metals in PWR Primary Water, presented by J.-M. Boursier, EDF (Paper
2A.2)
This presentation was given by J.-M. Boursier and written by J.-M. Boursier, F. Vaillant, B.
Yrieix, and T. Couvant of EDF R&D. The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
x This presentation provided an overview of the main results obtained in a variety of
investigations of 19% Cr, 22%, 26% Cr and 30% Cr alloys that compared them with Alloy
182 (15% Cr). SCC susceptibility in primary water at 360C (680qF) was evaluated using
constant load tests, RUB tests, and slow strain rate tests. The weldability of weld metals was
studied focusing on susceptibility to hot cracking. The resistance to thermal ageing was
investigated in order to detect any long term ordering of the Ni-Cr solid solution that could
induce embrittlement.
5-2
x Weld metals containing 30% chromium were found to have high susceptibility to hot
cracking, such that care is required to avoid hot cracking when making field welds.
x Thermal ageing was investigated in order to detect any long term ordering after 30,000 hours
at 400C (752qF) and 60,000 hours at 360C (680qF). Hardness measurements, Charpy tests
and resistivity measurements did not show any effect of ageing.
x A strong correlation between SCC susceptibility in primary water at 360C (680qF) and the
chromium content of these welds metals was observed. Neither crack initiation nor crack
growth was detected for material containing more than 26% Cr. Moreover, hot cracks, which
were frequently present in alloys containing 30%Cr, never propagated during stress corrosion
tests in the laboratory.
x R&D has contributed and still continues to provide solutions which contribute to the
optimization of nuclear power plant operation, especially for increase in PWR service life.
Future R&D studies will focus on studies of the complex microstructure of weld metals, on
the evaluation of cyclic loading on initiation and propagation of SCC, and on the influence of
weld defects on the fracture toughness of weld metals in relation to hydrogen content and
thermal ageing.
x Question (S. Bruemmer): I was very interested in your identification of hot cracking types
seen as solidification and liquation mechanisms. This behavior is very poorly understood for
Ni-base alloys, and it would be useful to determine key metallurgical and welding
characteristics that lead to cracking. Do you plan additional examinations to better
understand hot cracking mechanisms?
Response (J.-M. Boursier): I agree with your comment. We think that we should improve
our knowledge concerning weldability. We plan to carry out some additional work in future
years, mainly in support of new nuclear units. This future work focusing on hot cracking
mechanisms will probably be carried out in cooperation with vendors.
x Question (T. Yonezawa): With regard to the constant load test results shown on slide 7 of
your presentation, how did you distinguish between creep and SCC?
Response (J.-M. Boursier): The fracture surfaces of the creep failures only had dimples. The
cracks grew from weld defects.
x Question (J. Gorman): How did you make RUB samples (split tube reverse U-bends) from
solid weld metal?
Response (J.-M. Boursier): We machined tubes from the weld metal. Then we prepared
RUB specimens in the same manner as when using steam generator tubes.
5-3
Integrity of TT Alloy 690 Piping Material, presented by T. Yonezawa, MHI
(Paper 2A.3)
This presentation was given by T. Yonezawa and written by T. Yonezawa, K. Fujimoto, H.
Kaguchi, and S. Asada of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI). The main points made during the
x EPRI guidelines for cold worked and annealed steam generator tube material were published
in 1991 and 1999. However, there are no guidelines for hot finished thermally treated (TT)
Alloy 690. This leads to uncertainty regarding the appropriate requirements to use for this
type of material. To resolve this uncertainty, this paper discusses suitable material
specifications for hot finished TT Alloy 690 that, without causing deterioration of PWSCC
resistance, will result in material meeting mechanical property requirements.
x MHI considers that there is a worldwide consensus that M
23
C
6
carbides must be precipitated
semi-continuously at grain boundaries to maintain the PWSCC resistance of TT Alloy 690.
In order to achieve coherency of the lattice for grain boundary carbides with that of the
matrix (which is necessary for optimum PWSCC resistance), a suitable range of carbon
content and mill annealing temperature was established for cold finished material. This
recommended range, determined from the coherency of the grain boundary carbides, is the
range where high SCC resistance is achieved in high caustic solutions, used as an accelerated
test condition for PWSCC.
x The above approach has been applied to the quality control of cold finished TT Alloy 690 by
MHI for 17 years, and is still applied. However, in the case of hot finished TT Alloy 690,
dynamic re-crystallization occurs during hot working. The remaining chromium carbides in
hot worked material are mostly located at the grain boundaries. These grain boundary
chromium carbides increase in size during thermal treatment after mill annealing. For this
reason, the temperature-carbon range where suitable coherent grain boundary carbides are
achieved for hot finished TT Alloy 690 is located at lower temperatures and higher carbon
content than that for cold finished TT Alloy 690, as shown in slide 21. Also, the carbon
content for hot finished TT Alloy 690 can be higher than that for cold finished TT Alloy 690,
without deterioration of PWSCC resistance.
x Generally, ultrasonic examination is relatively difficult for large grained nickel-based alloys,
such as Alloys 600 and 690. Grain size increases with an increase of annealing temperature,
especially when at higher temperature than the secondary re-crystallization temperature.
Therefore, the mill annealing temperature must be kept below the secondary re-
crystallization temperature.
x Question (A. McIlree): Your presentation did not mention the issue (requirement) of a
minimum yield strength. In the US this is 35 ksi. Do you have a similar minimum yield
strength requirement in Japan, and how does your recommended processing meet this
requirement?
5-4
Response (T. Yonezawa): In Japan, there is the same requirement on yield strength as in the
US. In the ASME Code, Section II (2001 edition), hot worked (annealed) NO690 pipes are
specified as 30 ksi minimum yield strength. We proposed in 2003 that this be increased to
the same as for cold worked and annealed material, i.e., to 35 ksi. Japan also specified 35
ksi. In order to meet this requirement, it is not necessary to use special processing for TT690
pipes. With regard to meeting ultimate strength requirements at high temperature, hot
finished TT690 has little margin. To address this situation, we recommend use of a higher
carbon content and a lower mill annealing temperature than for cold finished TT690.
x Comment (S. Fyfitch): Your fabrication sequence indicates that following hot extrusion you
need to go to a mill anneal step. This may not necessarily be the case since the temperature
rises during the extrusion process, essentially producing a mill anneal.
Response (T. Yonezawa): Even if a high temperature working process is used, re-
crystallization is not enough by dynamic-recrystallization, and residual strain will remain
after hot working. We consider that mill annealing is needed after hot working to control the
microstructure, such as grain boundary carbides.
x Question (J.-M. Boursier): Concerning Alloy 690, another subject of interest is the release of
nickel oxides from steam generator tube materials during operation, since nickel becomes
activated in the neutron flux in the core and leads to surface contamination (by
58
Co) and
dosimetry problems. Do you have any information concerning the relationship between the
different steps of the fabricating process and the nickel release of Alloy 690?
Response (T. Yonezawa): With regard to nickel release from TT 690, the most important
factors controlled by the material fabricating process are the surface roughness and the thin
layer of cold worked (plastically strained) material on the surface. The thin surface layer of
cold worked material strongly increases the diffusion coefficient of the nickel. With these
factors in mind, for SG tubes, we require a very smooth inner surface and a minimal cold
worked surface layer.
x Question (S. Bruemmer): Within your "Fabrication Process" slide you showed a
straightening step for the tube. This was after the mill anneal, but before the thermal
treatment. Since the thermally treated carbide microstructure is very important to SCC
resistance, can the straightening operation produce high local deformation and alter
subsequent microstructure evolution?
Response T. Yonezawa): Usually the cold working ratio of the straightening process is less
than about 4%. From our studies, the straightening process does not affect the microstructure
after thermal treatment.
x Question (J. Gorman): Have long term PWSCC tests been performed to verify that hot
worked, mill annealed, and then thermally treated material has as good resistance to PWSCC
as does cold worked, mill annealed and then thermally treated material? What about hot
worked and thermally treated material with no mill anneal following the hot working?
Response (T. Yonezawa): We are conducting very long term verification tests for PWSCC
resistance for hot finished, mill annealed, and then thermally treated material and for cold
finished, mill annealed, and then thermally treated material. This testing is being conducted
with the sponsorship of the Japanese PWR owners group.
5-5
x Question (G. Rao): Your position seems to be that whatever process leads to the desired
microstructure is better. Please comment.
Response (T. Yonezawa): We have lots of data that correlates microstructure and PWSCC
behavior. Based on this we use microstructure as a quality control tool. However, we can
not so easily explain the mechanism by which microstructure affects PWSCC behavior.
Nevertheless, the database correlating microstructure and PWSCC behavior is strong.
x Comment (A. McIlree): Copson was not the inventor of Alloy 690. Rather, he was the
promoter. Alloy 690 was developed in the 1930s (before Copson's work) for use in milk
pasteurization applications.
Status of MRP Work to Demonstrate the Long-Term Resistance of Alloys
690, 152 and 52 to PWSCC, presented by J. Hickling, EPRI (Paper 2A.4)
This presentation was given and written by J. Hickling of EPRI. The main points made during
x The purpose and scope of the MRP-111 report (EPRI 1009801) published in March 2004 was
to evaluate existing field and laboratory test data regarding the behavior of Alloys
690/52/152 in order to demonstrate and quantify the margin of improvement of Alloys
690/52/152 over Alloys 600/82/182. Further purposes were to provide a technical basis for
development of future inspection requirements for Alloys 690/52/152, and to identify gaps in
the existing Alloys 690/52/152 data and suitable strategies to fill these gaps.
x The vast majority of Alloy 690 test specimens have been crack-free after exposures up to
100,000 hours. In contrast, most Alloy 600 specimens in both MA and TT conditions
developed PWSCC, often after relatively brief periods.
x There have been occasional instances of shallow intergranular cracking observed in Alloy
690 test specimens. This has mostly been the result of mechanical microfissuring, rather than
PWSCC. However, PWSCC may be possible to a small extent in conjunction with atypical
heat treatments and unusual alloy microstructures or compositions, especially if material is
subsequently cold worked.
x No PWSCC of Alloy 152/52 weld metals has been identified to date (but investigations are
limited).
x Two methods have been used to estimate the improvement factor provided by Alloy 690TT
as compared to Alloy 600. The first method, based on Weibull and Weibayes analysis,
provides an average improvement factor of 26.5 relative to Alloy 600MA material and 13.3
relative to Alloy 600TT. The second method, based on the ratio of test time to first Alloy
600 failure, provides an average improvement factor of 27.1. These numbers are
conservative, due to an absence of PWSCC in most Alloy 690 specimens within the test
duration.
x Field experience with Alloy 690 confirms the laboratory test results. Worldwide, numerous
PWR units have now operated with steam generators having Alloy 690 tubing for over nearly
fifteen years. Many other components containing Alloy 690 and its weld metals are also in
5-6
service; in this regard, Alloy 52 has been in service for over 10 years. To date, there have
been no indications of corrosion degradation in any of the Alloy 690 components in service
x Based on both laboratory and field data, it is concluded that Alloy 690 and its weld metals
Alloys 52/152 are very unlikely to develop PWSCC during extended PWR plant lifetimes
(60+ years).
x Some specific knowledge gaps were identified in MRP-111. These include:
Insufficient testing of Alloy 52 and 152 weld metals.
The effects of different product forms on PWSCC behavior have not been definitively
resolved.
Insufficient investigation of the effects of subtle changes in chemical composition,
changes in thermo-mechanical processing, and surface finish on PWSCC resistance.
No information regarding crack growth rates in base or weld metals if PWSCC should
occur.
A potential concern regarding the susceptibility of the HAZ to PWSCC (by analogy with
Alloy 600).
Corrosion fatigue behavior needs to be better defined (however, behavior similar to that
of Alloy 600 is expected).
LTCP (low temperature crack propagation) has been shown by naval reactor tests to be a
possible concern.
x Test results published in 2004 as MRP-123 showed that Alloy 690 is not completely
"immune" to PWSCC crack growth, but rates are low. A follow-on program is evaluating
crack growth rates in Alloys 690, 52 & 152 using sophisticated test techniques.
x Planned future work includes continuing to follow the NDE of thick-walled Alloy 690
components (e.g. replacement RPV heads in France), revision of MRP-111 in 2006, addition
of data from a WOG test program that compared Alloy 52M and 182 weld metals, and the
possible addition of data from a long-term Japanese test program on Alloy 690 and its weld
metals. An experimental program is currently being initiated to assess the PWSCC resistance
of the HAZ in welded, thick-section material of Alloys 600 and 690. The results from MRP-
111 and the additional test programs will be used, together with field inspection data, to
develop & refine a less-stringent NDE program for thick-walled components made of Alloy
690.
x Comments (R. Staehle): Your presentation shows clearly the great improvement in Alloy
690TT as applied to primary chemistry. I have three comments:
1. On the secondary side there are at least three environmental circumstances in which
SCC of Alloy 690 occurs:
a. Lead
b. Low valence sulfur
5-7
c. Mildly acidic
These are not well defined but seem credible. The occurrence of such SCC depends,
apparently, on the occurrence of deposit buildup and subsequent concentration; this
process is not well defined.
2. You might give some attention to the data which show that the composition of Alloy
690 is adjacent to a zone of significant general corrosion as identified in Copson's
lead oxide experiments as well as those of Killian in alkaline solution and in mildly
acidic solutions. The significance of this with respect to operational chemistries
should be defined.
3. Considering the large amounts of chromium in Alloy 690, long term consideration
should be given to depletion of chromium from the surface. This depletion increases
with increasing pH conditions and rates for preferential depletion should be defined.
x Question (J.-M. Boursier): On your slide No. 18, you identified various knowledge gaps
concerning PWSCC of 30% Cr alloys. Could you rank the gaps from high level of
importance to lower levels of importance?
Response (J. Hickling): This is quite a challenge since the gaps relate to different issues in
some cases (e.g., LTCP). I would rate the top three priorities as:
1. Product type and possible effect of mechanical/thermal processing on PWSCC
resistance.
2. Testing of Alloy 52M/152 weld metals from a sufficient variety of different welds.
3. Investigating possible HAZ effects.
Corrosion fatigue testing is probably a low priority item.
x Question (D. Lister): You indicate that some testing of the PWSCC resistance of Alloys 690
and its weld metals is being performed in supercritical water. The properties of supercritical
water are quite different from non-supercritical water. How do you extrapolate back to
service conditions?
Response (J. Hickling): We are including Alloy 600 in the test program. Its known behavior
will help us extrapolate the Alloy 690 and weld material results back to service conditions.
Response (R. Jacko): A region has been selected where the properties of supercritical water
are similar to those of 350/360C (662/380qF) water, e.g., with regard to heat capacity.
Comment (D. Lister): I was thinking primarily about conductivity.
Response (R. Jacko): I will have to check this aspect.
PWSCC Growth Rates of Cold Worked Alloy 690 & Alloys 52/152 Weld
Metal, presented by P. Andresen, GE Global Research Center (Paper 2A.5)
This presentation was given by P. Andresen and written by P. Andresen of the GE Global
Research Center and J. Hickling of EPRI. The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
x CGR tests in simulated primary water at 340360qC (644680qF) have been performed on
cold worked Alloy 690 material. The cold work is intended to simulate residual strains
present in the heat affected zone (HAZ) of welds and/or fabrication or surface cold work.
5-8
x Based on the CGR tests, a preliminary conservative assessment of Alloy 690 susceptibility to
crack growth through PWSCC shows:
Slow crack growth appears to occur in some (but not all) Alloy 690 materials at constant
K.
Rising dK/da loading shows somewhat higher CGRs and may be relevant in certain field
situations.
Truly intergranular crack propagation has not yet been demonstrated for Alloy 690
materials.
x Similar testing of Alloys 152 and 52 is now starting. Future work will also examine the
possibility of increased PWSCC susceptibility in the HAZ of Alloy 690.
x Questions (W. Cullen): How was the material processed?
Response (P. Andresen): The plate materials came in the hot worked and mill annealed
condition (1800F and 2000F (982C and 1093C)). Additional thermal treatment was not
performed by GE Research. The CRDM material was normal production materialGE
Research did no further thermo-mechanical processing apart from forging at room
temperature to yield about 20% or 40% reduction in thickness.
x Comment (R. Staehle): With respect to the transgranular SCC observed on some of your
fracture surfaces, transgranular SCC has also been observed in LPSCC of Alloy 600 by
Smialowska and co-workers at elevated potentials and pH ~3. Reviewing such data might be
helpful.
x Comment (J. Hickling): The specimens destructively examined to date hardly had an
opportunity to demonstrate an intergranular cracking mode of SCC since (at least in one
case) the total extent of crack growth at constant (or near constant) load was still less than the
typical grain diameter of the material.
Response (P. Andresen): When considering the entire crack front, there is a mix of areas
where the crack is positioned very near (and well aligned with) a grain boundary and where
the crack is part way into a grain (and therefore must grow extensively to encounter a grain
boundary). This geometric concern alone probably does not account for the very limited
intergranular cracking observed. It does highlight that only a limited volume of the
microstructure is sampled in such small increments of crack advance.
x Question (B. Templeton): From your banded microstructure do you know where you are
crackingin a carbide region or a denuded region? Mechanistically will that make a
difference?
Response (P. Andresen): Two issues. First, even in the one cross-sectional plane that we
showed, we think that we have captured SCC response in both microstructures. When you
consider the entire crack front, it is impossible to imagine that the microstructure aligns
perfectlythat is, the crack front sampled different microstructures. Second, there is
abundant evidence that microstructure is important in SCC, including the benefit associated
5-9
with grain boundary carbides. But there is little evidence that reasonable microstructural
variations result in a fundamental change in SCC mechanisms. Growth rates vary with
microstructure and this highlights concerns for good control of microstructures and for
evaluation of situations that might disrupt good microstructuresespecially in the
"thermomechanical processing" associated with weld metal and heat affected zones.
5-10
ASSESSMENT OF PWSCC RESISTANCE OF ALLOY 690 : OVERVIEW OF
LABORATORY RESULTS AND FIELD EXPERIENCE
Franois VAILLANT, Jean-Marie BOURSIER (EDF-R&D), Yves ROUILLON (EDF-DIN)
Olivier RAQUET, Max HELIE (CEA Saclay),
Peter SCOTT, Marc FOUCAULT (Framatome-ANP France)
Abstract
Alloy 690 (a nickel base alloy containing 30% chromium) is now widely used to replace components in alloy 600
that have been found to be susceptible to SCC in primary and secondary environments of PWRs. This choice was
based on extensive R&D programs undertaken by French laboratories during more than 25 years. They have enabled
the development of predictive models based on alloy 600 to be extended recently to alloy 690.
In primary PWR environments, laboratory results at 360C have demonstrated the strong SCC resistance of alloy 690
using RUB and constant load specimens machined from industrial steam generator (SG) tubes. No SCC was
observed in laboratory tests after 90000 h on RUBs and 100 000 h on 16 mock-ups with various roll transitions in SG
tubes incorporating some extremely severe rolling anomalies. Only limited cracking (100 to 200 m) was observed
after CERT tests on some experimental SG tubes with a seriously degraded microstructure. Even taking this cracking
into account, the margins for improved SCC resistance brought about by alloy 690 (with respect to alloy 600) are
very considerable, since no cracking was obtained on industrial tubes with as-specified microstructure with
intergranular carbides. Moreover, no crack propagation was obtained on fatigue precracked specimens machined
from a CRDM nozzle in alloy 690, under static or cyclic loading.
Current field experience in France shows no SCC in alloy 690 components after more than 20 years in the case of SG
tube plugs, more than 15 years for SG tubes, and over 10 years for CRDM nozzles (3 vessel heads).
Background
The choice of alloy 690 with 30% chromium in EDF PWRs was the result of a large scale R&D cooperative effort
between EDF, CEA, Framatome-ANP and Westinghouse in the early 80s [1,2]. This chromium level, by lowering
the observed dissolution/oxidation rate and maintaining high repassivation kinetics, was assumed to prevent SCC of
alloy 690 [3]. No cracking was reported in laboratory studies up to the middle of the 90s, but the durations of the
tests in primary water environments were limited. French laboratories have continued to sustain an extensive survey
program including many comprehensive investigations during the last decade. New interest in studying 690 in PWR
primary water has arisen more recently in the USA in the context of the renewal of vessel heads and bottom mounted
instrumentation penetrations needed after the extensive cracking was observed in alloy 600 components.
The decision to introduce alloy 690 for SG tubing in PWR plant was first taken in 1984 with applications in the
USA; the first SG replacement in France occurred in 1990 (Dampierre 1). Since that time, alloy 690 is the
replacement material in France for all components formerly fabricated in alloy 600 and for manufacturing new ones.
This paper summarizes French R&D effort on alloy 690 in PWR primary environment and its application to plants.
General overview of open literature
The general status of knowledge on alloy 690 from foreign laboratories is available in reference [4]. The longest
duration for SCC tests without any cracking being observed is 90 000 h at 360C on RUBs. Very few results with
any observed cracking were reported : the most significant SCC was obtained in hydrogenated steam at 380C on
RUBs of two pre-production heats with non-standard microstructure after 13824 h : one tube (mill-annealed (MA) at
965C + thermally-treated (TT) at 700C) and having only intragranular carbides cracked but no cracking was
observed on a tube MA at 1070C, resulting in intergranular carbide grain boundary decoration [5].
French R&D results
Experimental conditions
* Steam generator tubes : 40 SG tubes have been studied by EDF and CEA. They covered the evolution in
manufacturing procedures from the beginning of the development of alloy 690 with experimental and industrial tubes
having a wide range of microstructures resulting from various carbon contents and mill-annealed temperatures. Most
of the tubes were thermally treated at 700C [6,7]. The industrial tubes were first mill-annealed at 1040-1080C
(generally in a H
2
atmosphere) prior to thermal treatment (TT) at 700C, resulting in intergranular (IG) carbide
decoration of the grain boundaries. By contrast, two of the experimental tubes (WE092 and WE094) had a severely
5-11
degraded microstructure (with significant intragranular carbide precipitation) due to a two-step heat-treatment
1
associated with a high carbon content (above the specification limit of 0.040% in the case of tube WE092). Another
experimental tube (9G4), MA at 980C (H
2
atmosphere), was tested both in the MA and MA+TT conditions.
* Vessel head penetrations (VHP) : EDF has also investigated three VHPs : one pre-industrial and two industrial.
They were hot-extruded at 1110-1230C and then heat-treated at 715C. The resulting microstructure consisted of an
intergranular carbide precipitation and a grain size between 3 and 5.
Tests on SG tubes and VHPs fabricated from alloy 690 included RUBs, constant extension rate tests (CERTs using
tensile specimens with a gage length of 86 mm) at 5 10
-8
s
-1
, and constant load tests at ~0.9 UTS. All the tests were
performed at 360C in PWR primary water (PW : 1000 ppm B, 2 ppm Li) with 25-50 cc H
2
/kg controlled by a silver-
palladium sensor, in static autoclaves. Reference tests with alloy 600 were performed under the same conditions.
Micrographic examinations of cross-sections of the specimens were performed at the end of the tests.
The resistance to crack propagation was also assessed on fatigue-precracked specimens : DCB (thickness 10 mm) [8]
and CT (15 mm) with trapezoidal loading (partial unloading-reloading at K=30 MPam, R=0.7, frequency 2.8 10
-4
Hz); see [9] for experimental details. The fracture surfaces were examined at the end of the tests.
* SG tubes : Mock-ups with roll transitions were also tested by Framatome-ANP. They were tested in the form of
capsules made from SG tubes, including industrial roll transitions with and without some extremely severe rolling
anomalies. The capsule mock-ups containing hydrogenated water were introduced into an oven at 360C. The stress
level (up to about 450 MPa) resulted in the combination of residual stresses (from the mechanical expansion) and the
steam pressure inside the capsule. Sixteen mock-ups in alloy 690 (industrial tubes) were tested, with 40 mock-ups in
alloy 600 as controls.
SCC results on RUBs
* Despite some limited observations of lack of ductility to 10 m-depth within a cold worked layer that were due to
the bending applied when forming the RUB specimens from SG tubes, no SCC crack initiation or propagation was
noted after 72500 h to 90000 h on experimental tubes and 90000 h on industrial tubes (EDF, CEA). In every case for
Alloy 600 MA, rapid cracking (500 h) occurred. Though the lack of ductility observed could induce a significant
decrease of the stress level at the surface of the RUBs in alloy 690, it was proved that the tips of these defects were
still severely stressed. On the experimental tube WE092, a layer of 90 m was removed by electropolishing locally
and the stress level remained as high as 875 MPa even after 30000 h at 360C.
* In the case of VHPs, no cracking occurred within 12665 h on alloy 690, while SCC was observed between 500 h
and 2000 h on alloy 600.
SCC results from constant load tests
*A constant load test was performed by EDF on a specimen machined from the experimental SG tube WE092 at the
stress level of 686 MPa (0.95 UTS
360
), with the as-received surface state and anomalous intragranular carbide
microstructure. No significant SCC was observed (crack depths less than 10 m IG within the cold worked layer)
after 11000 h in PW at 360C. By contrast, a susceptible tube in alloy 600 suffered SCC (450 m) in 820 h.
* No cracking was observed within 18500 h on a VHP in alloy 690 at a true stress of 580 MPa (0.9 UTS
360
).
SCC results from CERTs
EDF and CEA have performed CERTs at an extension rate of 5 10
-8
s
-1
in a primary environment at 360C. The
specimens were either in the as-received surface state, or electropolished in some cases at EDF.
* SG tubes (width of tensile specimen : 4 mm)
Seven industrial tubes were tested : they exhibited small cracks (10 to 30 m) in the (external) cold work layer in the
as-received condition, and less than 10 m in the electropolished condition. By contrast, a reference tube of alloy
600 had a crack depth greater than 500 m in the as-received condition, and 50-100 m in the electropolished
condition. These results confirmed the very good SCC resistance of industrial tubes in alloy 690, even under a very
severe dynamic mechanical loading.
Five experimental tubes were also tested :
- three tubes had a maximum crack depth less than 20 m : heat 9G4 in the MA (980C) condition and two
others after MA at 980 and 1040C in a NH
3
atm followed by TT, tested with an electropolished surface state.
- two other tubes, however, showed some significant SCC susceptibility associated with an anomalous
intragranular carbide microstructure during CERT tests : specimens from heat WE092 HT E2 revealed crack depths

1
Heat treatments : E1 : 980C (NH
3
) + 700C, then 980C + 700C.
E2 : 980C (NH
3
) + 700C, then 1040C to 1060C + 700C
5-12
between 120 m and 170 m, and the longest crack in heat WE094 HT E1 was 250 m after testing with the as-
received surface state. In the electropolished condition, the maximum crack depth was only 40 m for heat WE092
HT E2. Cross-checking these tests by exchanging specimens between the laboratories provided similar results.
It can be concluded that under a very severe dynamic loading, tubes with anomalous extensive intragranular carbide
precipitation exhibited some significant sensitivity to SCC, particularly in the case where an initial cold worked layer
was present. A role of the MA atmosphere could not be proved in this case. By contrast, industrial tubes with
intergranular carbides demonstrated very good resistance to SCC, even in as-received cold worked surface condition.
* VHPs (specimen : 4 mm). No significant cracking was noted on two VHPs in alloy 690 even after an elongation
to failure of 44%. For comparison, IGSCC to a depth of 800 m was observed in similar tests on a VHP in alloy 600.
Results on mock-ups (SGs)
While the forty mock-ups in alloy 600 were found cracked by SCC with an average time to cracking of 8350 h, no
cracking was noted on sixteen mock-ups in alloy 690 after 100 000 h at 360C.
Results on crack propagation resistance
Tests on DCB specimens did not result in any propagation by SCC at 350C on a VHP in alloy 690 after 9500 h in
the as-received state, and 6800 h after tensile cold working to 20% [10]. These were completed by tests on CT
specimens with trapezoidal loading : no cracking was obtained after 1150 h at 360C or after 1240 h and 1488 h at
325C. Taking into account the severity of such loading observed in the case of alloy 600 [11], it was concluded that
the crack propagation resistance of alloy 690 with interganular carbides was completely satisfactory.
Conclusion
All the laboratory tests performed have demonstrated the extreme SCC resistance of alloy 690 in PWR primary water
environments. In some cases, some susceptibility to SCC was demonstrated on materials with an intragranular
carbide precipitation when subjected to extremely severe loadings. For these cases, an approach based on the strain
rate damage model was developed [10]. Based on this model, no significant cracking would be expected in roll
transitions of SG tubes during the lifetime of PWR plants. Moreover, the results show that no SCC is expected on
industrial products having the specified intergranular carbide microstructure.
It is also noted that current field experience in France has shown that no SCC has occurred in alloy 690 components :
after more than 20 years in the case of SG tube plugs, more than 15 years for SG tubes, and over 10 years in the case
of CRDM nozzles (3 vessel heads).
References

[1] Proceedings : Workshop on Thermally-Treated Alloy 690 Tubes for Nuclear Steam Generators ,
Pittsburg (PA), June 26-28, 1986. Rapport EPRI NP-4665-SR,July 1986
[2] C. GIMOND, P. SAINT-PAUL, J. BLANCHET, A. KLEIN, Choix de lalliage 690 pour les tubes de
gnrateurs de vapeur , Colloque International Fontevraud I, 2-6 September 1985, pp 270-279
[3] F. VAILLANT et al, Influence of Cr content and microstructure on creep and PWSCC resistance of nickel
base alloys , 9
th
Int. Symp. Environ. Degrad. of Mat. in Nucl. P Syst W. React., Newport Beach (CA), august 1999
[4] J. HICKLING, C.P. KING, Materials Reliability program (MRP), Resistance to Primary Stress Corrosion
Cracking of Alloy 690, 52 and 152 in Pressurized Water Reactors, EPRI draft report, December 2003. Prepared by
Framatome ANP (H. XU, S. FYFITCH et al)
[5] G.T. SUI, J.M. TITCHMARSH, G.B. HEYS, J. CONGLETON, Stress corrosion cracking of alloy 600
and 690 in hydrogen/steam at 380C , Corrosion Science, July 1996
[6] F. VAILLANT, Rsistance la corrosion sous contrainte en milieu primaire des alliages 690 et 800. Point
des rsultats en dcembre 1995 , note HT-44/95/013/A, January 1996
[7] O. RAQUET et al, Rsistance la CSC en milieu primaire REP de matriaux tubulaires en alliage 690
soumis une dformation globale constante , CEA technical report RT-SCCME 618, January 2003
[8] R. MAGDOWSKI, M.O. SPEIDEL, Stress corrosion crack growth of various materials exposed to
simulated PWR water , ETH Zrich report, EDF/ETH contract ND 3367-RE, April 1997
[9] F. VAILLANT et al, Influence of a cyclic loading on crack growth rates of alloy 600 in primary
environment: an overview , 11
th
Int. Symp. Environ. Degrad. of Materials in Nucl. P Syst W. React., Stevenson
WA, August 2003
[10] J.M. BOURSIER et al, Effect of the strain rate on the stress corrosion cracking in high temperature
primary water : comparison between the alloys 600 and 690 , Same conference.
5-13
Assessment of PWSCC resistance
of Alloy 690 : overview of laboratory
results and field experience
F. VAILLANT, J. M. BOURSIER (EDF/R&D),
Y. ROUILLON (EDF/DIN-Saint-Denis),
O. RAQUET, M. HELIE (CEA/SCCME-Saclay)
P. SCOTT, M. FOUCAULT (Framatome-ANP)
2005 PWSCC Intern. Conf.
Santa Ana Pueblo (NM), March
7-10 2005
5-14
20/06/2005 2
Background
80s : important R&D effort on alloy 690 (EDF, CEA, Framatome, Westinghouse)
1984 : decision to introduce 690 in plants (USA, France)
1990 : 1
st
application in France (SG replacement Dampierre 1), then vessel
heads
mid-90s : no SCC reported from lab. but limited durations of the tests
R&D overview in French laboratories and field experience
5-15
20/06/2005 3
General overview of open literature
From foreign laboratories :
- For the longest durations of tests : no SCC on RUBs after 90 000 h at 360C
(B&W)
- Only one case of significant cracking on RUBs: (Univ Newcastle)
SCC after 13800 h in hydrogenated steam at 380C on a tube with low MA
temperature (965C) + TT 700C (intragranular precipitation)
no SCC in the same conditions on a tube with MA 1070C + TT 700C
(intergranular precipitation)
5-16
20/06/2005 4
Experimental conditions of French R&D program 1
SGs : 40 tubes investigated
21 industrial tubes (high MA temperature (1040-1080C, generally H
2
) + TT 700C)
intergranular carbides
19 experimental tubes, (MA (980C<T<1040C, NH
3
or H
2
) r TT 700C)
* some with intergranular carbides
* others with inter + intra carbides,
among them WE092 and WE094
with a 2 step HT
Tubes Heat C (%) Heat treatment YS (MPa) 20C
Requirements
RCC M 4105
0.010< <0.040 - 275 < <470
Industrial 21 0.015 to 0.025 1040-1080C +
5hx700C
305 to 360
3 0.012 to 0.028
MA :
980 to 1045C
320 to 410
13 0.012 to 0.028 980C-1040C r
5hx700C
-
Experimental WE092 0.041 HT1 :
980C + 700C
499
HT2 :
980C + 700C
+ 1040-1060C
+700C
447
WE094 0.029 HT1 :
980C + 700C
-
HT2 :
980C + 700C
+ 1040-1060C
+700C
419
5-17
20/06/2005 5
Experimental conditions 2
Vessel head penetrations
1 pre-industrial and 2 industrial VHPs (hot extrusion 1110-1230C + 715C),
intergranular carbides
SCC tests * RUBs, constant load
* CERTs (5 10
-8
s
-1
),
* capsules mock-ups (industrial roll transition and severe anomalies),
* DCB 10, CT 15 with trapezoidal loading (1/h, R = 0.7)
Environment 1000 ppm B, 2 ppm Li, 25 to 50 cc H
2
/kg
360C except for some CT with trap. Loading
For each test, one reference sample in alloy 600
Destructive examination at the end of the tests
5-18
20/06/2005 6
SCC results 1
RUBs
No SCC was observed after 90 000 h at 360C
only some lacks of ductility (< 10 m) which could not propagate
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
100000
Number of specimens
M
a
x

d
u
r
a
t
i
o
n

o
f

t
h
e

t
e
s
t
s

(
h
)
600
690
reference
6 11
9
21
9G4 MA
industrial SG
tubes
experimental
SG tubes
MA + TT
WE092 &
WE094
VHPs
4
SCC
no SCC
5-19
20/06/2005 7
SCC results 2
Constant load tests
No SCC observed after at 360C on exp tube WE 092 E2, 686 MPa, 11000 h
industrial VHP, 580 MPa, 18500 h
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
20000
Number of specimens
T
i
m
e

t
o

f
a
i
l
u
r
e

(
h
)
1 3
600
690
no SCC
SCC
V = 0,9 UTS
Exp SG tube
WE092
industrial
VHP
3
5-20
20/06/2005 8
SCC results 3
CERTS
No significant SCC on industrial tubes or VHPs
Some SCC sensitivity on experimental tubes
with degraded microstructure (intra carbides)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Number of specimens
M
a
x

c
r
a
c
k

d
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
600 690
experimental
SG tubes
WE092 E2
WE094 E1
Reference
1 2 2 1
1
industrial
SG tubes
6
others
industrial
VHP
1
5-21
20/06/2005 9
SCC results 4
Tests on capsules mock-ups
* classical roll transition and severe anomalies on mechanically
expanded SG tubes
* hydrogenated water inside the capsules, at 360C
* 40 mock-ups in alloy 600 : average cracking time 8350 h
* 16 mock-ups in alloy 690 : no cracking after 100 000 h
5-22
20/06/2005 10
SCC results 5
Crack propagation resistance on industrial VHP in alloy 690
* DCB, 350C, - non cold worked (CW),
K = 15, 20, 25 MPam no SCC in 9500 h
K > 50 no SCC in 6780 h
- 20% CW (by tension)
15 < K < 60 no SCC in 6890 h
* CT 15 non CW, trapezodal loading (R=0.7, 1 cycle/h), K
max
= 30
- 360C : no SCC in 1150 h
- 325C : no SCC in 1240 h and 1488 h
5-23
20/06/2005 11
Life assessment with alloy 690 1
Background
* Very good SCC resistance of industrial tubes or VHPs
* Some SCC sensitivity in very severe loading conditions on degraded
products (intragranular carbides), which occurs for 10% elongation at
least.
Objective
Life assessment of 690 using
- experimental tube WE092 HT2
- strain rate damage model
- see presentation at 11th Env Degr Conf, Stevenson, 2003
5-24
20/06/2005 12
Life assessment of alloy 690 2
5-25
20/06/2005 13
On exp tube WE092 :
* at 360 C, for a stress of 0.9 UTS :
initiation time ~ 11 000 hours
SCC time to failure should be close to 200 000 hours.
* at 360 C, for an applied stress of 450 MPa :
initiation time ~ 30 000 hours
time to reach a crack depth of 100 m : | 615 000 hours
On industrial tubes
* no SCC expected
5-26
20/06/2005 14
Life assessment of 690 / 600 4
Alloy 690,WE 092 HT2 Alloy 600
5-27
20/06/2005 15
Field experience
No SCC was noted from French field with 690 :
* 20 yrs with SG plugs
* > 15 yrs with SG tubes
* > 10 yrs with CRDM nozzles (3 vessel heads)
5-28
20/06/2005 16
Conclusion
* Very good SCC resistance of industrial tubes or VHPs in alloy 690
* Some SCC sensitivity in very severe loading conditions on degraded
products (intragranular carbides)
* Life assessment approach with experimental alloy 690
in the as-received condition :
- This approach allows results of the evolution of the crack depth during CERTs and
constant load tests to be described in a same diagram
- Confirms the huge margins of SCC resistance of alloy 690 /
alloy 600, even in the case of an experimental tube
- no SCC expected with industrial products
* No SCC in the field
5-29
20/06/2005 17
Step dH/dt (s
-1
) Expected Measured
Time (h) Damage
(m)
Time (h) Damage
(m)
1 2.5 10
-7
60
2 4.4 10
-8
1870 90 1756 85
Cumulative
damage rule
5-30
A REVIEW OF PWSCC BEHAVIOR, WELDABILITY AND THERMAL AGEING OF
NICKEL WELD METALS CONTAINING 15 TO 30% CHROMIUM
J.M. Boursier, F. Vaillant, B. Yrieix, T. Couvant
EDF R&D
Materials and Mechanic of Components Department
Les Renardires - 77818 Moret sur Loing - France
Abstract
In 1991, a vessel head penetration was found leaking at Bugey 3 plant during the hydrotest. Metallurgical
investigations confirmed that this problem was again related to primary water stress corrosion cracking of alloy 600.
Moreover, the main crack initiated in the base metal of the penetration (alloy 600) has also propagated in the weld
metal in alloy 182. More recently, stress corrosion cracking in alloy 182 has been found on welds of U.S. plants.
SCC susceptibility of alloy 182 has been evidenced by several laboratories.
In France, all original vessel heads using alloy 600 have been or will be replaced with penetrations in alloy 690 (with
30% chromium). With respect to substitution materials, ELECTRICIT DE FRANCE has undertaken a large R&D study
focusing on the development of new weld metals. The aim of this study was to identify new materials that will be
able to weld alloy 690. Weld metals containing 15 to 30% Chromium have been studied.
This paper presents an overview of the main results obtained on 19% Cr, 22%, 26% Cr and 30% Cr alloys with
respect to alloy 182 (15% Cr). Firstly, stress corrosion cracking susceptibility in primary water at 360 C has been
evaluated during constant load tests, RUB tests, slow strain rate tests. No cracking was observed on material
containing more than 26% Cr for both initiation and propagation. A life assessment was performed for all weld
materials with respect to alloy 182. Secondly, the weldability of weld metals has been studied focusing on the
susceptibility to hot cracking. Thirdly, the resistance to thermal ageing has been investigated in order to detect any
long term ordering of the Ni-Cr solid solution that could induce embrittlement. Hardness, resistivity measurements
and Charpy tests results did not show any effect of ageing up to 60,000 hours at 360C.
Introduction
During a decennial hydrotest in 1991, a leakage was found in a vessel head penetration of Bugey 3 plant, due to
stress corrosion cracking [1]. The main crack, initiated in the penetration in Alloy 600, has also propagated in the
weld metal 182 (SMAW). More recently, several stress corrosion cracking have been detected in Alloy 182 welds in
American, Swedish and Japanese plants [2-3]. These degradations have been observed on welds that were not stress
relieved and repaired. In France, only one case of initiation of cracking in alloy 182 has been encountered on a steam
generator tubesheet which has been hammered by a loose part [4]. To contribute to the maintenance policy, a large
R&D program has been therefore undertaken by EDF and CEA, aiming to measure the crack growth rates in weld
metals [5]. Moreover, in order to be able to weld the alloy 690 that has replaced alloy 600, Electricit de France
studied new filler materials containing 22 to 30 % chromium. This paper presents an overview of the main results
obtained on 19% Cr, 22% Cr, 26% Cr and 30% Cr alloys with respect to alloy 182 (15% Cr).
Stress corrosion cracking resistance
In order to check the stress corrosion cracking resistance of the various studied alloys, several SCC tests have been
performed, (i) firstly to evaluate the susceptibility to crack initiation (RUB and constant load tests), (ii) secondly to
determine the crack propagation resistance (CERT and Crack Growth Rate tests).
All the corrosion tests were performed in simulated primary water of PWRs at 360C. The environment is
conditioned from deaerated demineralised water with the following elements : 2 ppm lithium as Lithia, 1000 ppm
boron as boric acid, 25-50 ml/kg dissolved hydrogen in water. The hydrogen content is monitored during the test by
a hydrogen Ag-Pb probe (inside the autoclave), which has been previously calibrated in a loop with an
Orbisphere sensor.
RUB tests
RUB tests were performed on Alloys 182 (15% Cr), 82 (19% Cr), 625 (22% Cr), 52 (30% Cr), 152 (30% Cr) and
Soudometal 30Cr. Samples have been examined after each period of 500 hours, the total duration of the RUB tests
5-31
reached 27,000 hours. In order to separate SCC initiation to hot cracking, observations have been realized according
to the procedure developed by EDF [6].
Alloy 182 : After 500 hours, SC cracks initiated. After 1500 hours, the crack depth reached 500 to 800 m.
Alloy 82 : The crack initiation occurred after 2000 hours on one specimen, and after 6500 hours 3 others samples in
alloy 82 have cracked. The crack path is intergranular, and the maximum crack depth is 980 m.
No Stress Corrosion Crack has been observed after up to 27,136 hours on alloys 625, 152, 52 and Soudmetal 30Cr
even on samples where weld defects have been identified.
Constant load tests
Constant load tests have been carried out on these as-welded alloys 182, 82 and 152 alloys in PWR primary water
with a nominal stress between 0.78 UTS for alloy 182/82 and 0.94 UTS for alloy 152. Alloys 182 and 82 evidenced
stress corrosion cracking within a short time (lower than 600 hours) in PWR primary water. By contrast, no SCC has
been observed on alloy 152 after up to 21,000 hours, even where hot cracks were present in the sample. 2 specimens
failed by creep (dimples on the fracture surface).
Slow strain rate tests
Slow strain rate tests have been performed on tensile specimens of alloys 182, 82, 625, Soudometal 22Cr and 26Cr ,
52, 152 and Soudometal 30Cr. These tests were carried out both in PWR primary water at a strain rate of 5.10
-8
s
-1
and in inert environment Argon at 10
-6
s
-1
at 360 C. Alloys 182 and 82 were highly sensitive to stress corrosion
cracking while alloy 625, Soudometal 22Cr and 26Cr are less susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. Beyond 26%
Chromium content, all the studied weld metals showed a very high resistance to stress corrosion cracking despite hot
cracks were present inside the specimens (alloys with 30%Cr) : no stress corrosion crack has been observed on
alloys containing more than 26% Chromium.
Metallurgical weldability
Nickel alloys are very frequently difficult to weld. These alloys are sensitive to hot cracking thus an experimental
study has been carried out in order to rank the various products and to understand their behaviors. The studied weld
metals have 15 to 30%Cr. They have been elaborated from industrial batches, prototype batches and simplified
laboratory alloys, and are mainly obtained by SMAW, which is the most critical process, but also by SAW and
GTAW. The solidification and liquation hot cracking sensitivity have been evaluated by Varestraint and Gleeble
tests. No ductility-dip cracking was observed. Metallurgical investigations (optical metallography, SEM, differential
thermal analysis, quenching in oriented solidification and thermodynamical calculations) have also been performed
on these alloys in order to link their hot cracking behavior to their chemical composition through their
microstructure [7]. The main conclusions are summarized in the following table.
Hot cracking
type
182 SMAW
82 GTAW
(15 22%Cr)
82 SAW
(18 22%Cr)
52 GTAW
(30%Cr)
52 SAW
(30%Cr)
152 SMAW
(30%Cr)
Solidification --- //-- - /-- /-
Liquation .-- //-- .- //- /.
These weld ability results allowed to qualify the 30%Cr alloys for several applications linked to the three processes
SMAW, SAW and GTAW.
Ageing
Because Nickel alloys containing 30% Chromium have a chemical composition close to the stoechiometry Ni
2
Cr, a
long term ordering transformation of the initial solid solution can occur during holding in temperature. This
microstructural transformation induces hardening and embrittlement, which are important for the operating
properties. This transformation is strongly reduced by adding other elements like iron and becomes unlikely for iron
content > 8% (EDF requirement)
1
. However thermal ageing tests have been performed to verify that the
transformation did not occur in these weld metals.
1
J.C. Van-Duysen, Etude bibliographique des transformations du type ordre-dsordre dans les alliages Nickel Chrome : Evaluation du
risque dvolution structurale de lalliage 690 la temprature de service , EDF R&D report HT-41/NEQ/1117-A, December 1990.
5-32
No increase of hardness was observed after 60,000 at 360 C, 30,000 hours at 400 C and 30,000 hours at 450
C on Alloy 152. For Soudometal 30Cr weld metal, a decrease of the hardness was observed after 60,000 hours
at 360C, for the three heat treatments. After 30,000 hours at 400 and 450 C, the curves seemed to show a
slight increase of the hardness but still in the scattered band of the hardness measurements.
Charpy tests have been performed on samples aged during 20,000 to 30,000 hours at 400C and 5,000 to
30,000 hours at 450C. Globally, the main tendency was a slight increase of the toughness with time in
temperature.
Electrical resistivity measurements have also been performed because this property, which decreases with the
long term ordering, is the most sensitive method to detect the earlier stage of the transformation. Moreover, at
the opposite of hardening and embrittlement, which could be due to other metallurgical transformation, this
decrease of resistivity is characteristic of the long term ordering. By contrast, short term ordering induces an
increase of resistivity. No decrease of the resistivity has been observed, the resistivity seemed to increase
around 20,000 hours at 400C, which could be due to short term ordering. TEM examinations shew no
evidence of any long term ordering.
Assuming an activation energy above or equal to 125 kJ/mole, the lack of microstructural evolution after 30,000 h at
400C and 60,000 h at 360C qualified these materials in operation at 325C respectively up to 500,000 h and
250,000 h. Nevertheless, ageing tests are carried on, and further investigations to validate the activation energy
accurately are in project.
This large study allowed the comparison of the long term behaviour of various weld nickel alloys containing 19 to
30 % chromium with respect to alloy 182 (15% Cr).
i Firstly, concerning the weld ability of weld metals, the high susceptibility to hot cracking of weld metals
containing 30 % chromium should be mentioned. Welds on site should be realized carefully.
i Secondly, concerning the ageing of these alloys, the resistance to thermal ageing has been investigated in order to
detect any long term ordering after 30,000 hours at 400C and 60,000 hours at 360 C. Hardness measurements,
Charpy tests and resistivity measurements did not show any effect of ageing.
i The strong dependency between the SCC susceptibility in Primary Water at 360 C and the chromium content of
these welds metals should be noticed. No cracking was observed on material containing more than 26% Cr for
initiation and propagation both. Moreover, hot cracks, which were highly present on alloys containing 30%Cr,
never propagated during stress corrosion tests in laboratory.
R&D has contributed and still continues to promote solutions which enables the optimisation of Nuclear Power
Plants operation, mainly for the increase of PWR service life. R&D studies will focus on the study of the complex
microstructure of weld metals, on the evaluation of cyclic loading on initiation and propagation both of SCC, on the
influence of weld defects on the fracture toughness of weld metals in relation to hydrogen content and thermal
ageing.
References
[1] J. Economou, A. Assice, F. Cattant, J. Salin, M. Stindel, NDE and metallurgical examinations of vessel
head penetrations , 3
rd
International Symposium of Fontevraud, September 12-16, 1994.
[2] Summer NPP Event, Material Reliability Program IIG Meeting EPRI, Clear Water Beach, December 7-8,
2000.
[3] Summary of US PWR reactor Vessel head nozzle inspections Results, USNRC, Conference on VHP
inspection, cracking and repairs, Gaithersburg September 29 October 2, 2003.
[4] J.M. Boursier, Y. Rouillon, S. Lehong, C. Amzallag, Metallurgical investigations and SCC tests on Ni-
Cr-Fe in PWR primary water , 4
th
International Symposium of Fontevraud, September 14-18, 1998.
[5] S. Le Hong, J.M. Boursier, C. Amzallag, J. Daret, Measurements of stress corrosion cracking
propagation rates in weld alloy 182 in primary water of PWR, 10
th
International Conference on
Environmental Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power System - Water Reactors, Lake Tahoe (NA),
August 2001.
[6] J.M. Boursier, M. Cleurennec, Y. Rouillon, F. Arnoldi, D. Buisine, Differentiation between hot cracking
and stress corrosion cracking in PWR primary water of alloy 182 weld material , EUROCORR99, Aachen,
August 1999.
5-33
[7] D. Buisine, P.H. Milleville, F. Vaillant, P. Vidal, L. Dunand-Roux, M. Martinovitch, Qualification des
nouveaux produits dapport en alliage base nickel haute teneur en chrome , Journes AFIAP, Colloque
Fabrication Soudage Contrles, Paris, Octobre 1995.
5-34
A review of PWSCC, weldability
and thermal ageing of Nickel weld
metals in PWR Primary water
J.M. Boursier, T. Couvant,
F. Vaillant, B. Yrieix
5-35
21/06/2005 2
Background
In 1991, a vessel head penetration was found leaking at Bugey 3 (France)
PWSCC of alloy 600
Initiation in the base metal (600) of the penetration
Propagation in the weld metal in alloy 182
More recently, PWSCC found in US, Swedish and Japanese plants
(alloy 182)
SCC susceptibility of alloy 182 studied by several laboratories
In France, replacement of all original vessel head using alloy 600 with
penetration in alloy 690, and welding of new vessel head adapters with
alloy 152
5-36
21/06/2005 3
Objectives
Weld metals with different chromium content
PWSCC susceptibility ?
Weldability : susceptibility to hot cracking ?
Thermal ageing susceptibility ?
Dendrites in alloy182
50 m
5-37
21/06/2005 4
MATERIALS Chemical composition (weight %)
Alloy
Product
reference
Welding
technique
Cr
(%)
Fe
(%)
C
(%)
Mn
(%)
Nb+ Ta
(%)
182 D481 SMAW 14.5 7.9 0.024 7.32 2.0
82 D347
GTAW
SAW
18.1 3.8 0.014 3.02 2.47
625 D476 SMAW 21.2 1.3 0.024 0.76 3.64
22Cr D512 SMAW 21.75 9.6 0.022 4.35 1.76
26Cr D642 SMAW 25 9.55 0.038 7.7 1.8
52 D543
GTAW
SAW
25.5 8.7 0.037 0.27 0.02
D502 29.3 10.75 0.040 3.6 1.6
152
D492
SMAW
28.8 9.62 0.040 3.51 1.59
D508 29.7 10.2 0.041 4.33 1.78
D510 29.8 10.4 0.044 4.25 1.71 30Cr
D647
SMAW
28.6 10.0 0.031 4.23 < 0.01
5-38
21/06/2005 5
STRESS CORROSION CRACKING (1/4)
Simulated PWR environment
360C
2 ppm of Li + 1000 ppm of B
25-30 ml/kg dissolved hydrogen
Initiation tests
Constant deflexion tests : RUBs
Constant load tests : 0.8 UTS for alloy 182 and 0.9 UTS for alloy 152
SSRTs
Strain rate : 5.10
8
s
1
5-39
21/06/2005 6
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
D
481-
2
D
481-
3
D
347
-1-1
D
347-
1-2
D
347-
1-3
D
347-
1-4
D
476-
1-1
D
476-
1-2
D
476-
1-3
D
543-
1
D
543-
2
D
543-
3
D
543-
4
D
502-
2-1-
1
D
502-
2-1-
3
D
502-
2-1-
4
D
502-
2-1-
6
D
502-
2-1-
7
D
508-
1-1
D
508-
1-2
D
508-
1-3
D
508-
1-4
T
i
m
e

t
o

c
r
a
c
k
i
n
g

(
h
)
Alloy 182
Alloy 82
Alloy 625
Alloy 52
Alloy 152
Soudomtal 30%Cr
Results of initiation tests (RUBs)
5-40
21/06/2005 7
Alloy 182 82 152
Nominal true stress
(MPa)
527 580 560 590 627
Duration (h) 96 572 8592 1240 21332
Result
SCC
(1,7 mm depth)
SCC
(1,5 mm depth)
No SCC
No rupture
No SCC
Creep failure
No SCC
Creep failure
Results of initiation tests (constant load)
5-41
21/06/2005 8
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
10 15 20 25 30 35
Chromium content (%)
M
a
x
.

c
r
a
c
k

d
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
Results of SSRTs
5-42
21/06/2005 9
METALLURGICAL WELDABILITY (1/3)
Welding techniques
Shielding Metal Arc Welding
Submerged Arc Welding
Gas Tungsten Arc Welding
Evaluation to hot cracking susceptibility
Varestraint test
Gleeble test
Criteria based on small deformations (0.015 < H < 0.03) and
expressed with : -./
5-43
21/06/2005 10
Results
Hot cracking type
182 SMAW 82 GTAW
(15 to 22% Cr)
82 SAW (18 to
22% Cr)
52 GTAW (30%
Cr)
52 SAW (30% Cr) 152 SMAW (30% Cr)
Solidification - to - - / / to - - - / to - - / to -
Liquation . to - - / / to - - . to - / / to - / / to .
Conclusions
30% Cr alloys have been qualified for several applications
For a given grade, the behaviour is very different with the batch
5-44
21/06/2005 11
Conclusions
Good liquation cracking behaviour ogood solidification cracking
behaviour
Very bad behaviour with one type of cracking overy bad behaviour
with the other
Impurity and alloying content are not always sufficient to explain the
different behaviours
The self-healing phenomena cannot be used to obtain a non sensitive
material
Some of the very bad behaviours have still no well-identified origin
5-45
21/06/2005 12
AGEING (1/4)
AGEING (1/4)
Situation
30% Cr alloys have a chemical composition close to the Ni
2
Cr
stoechiometry osusceptibility to long term ordering ohardening
oembrittlement
Evaluation
Hardness measurements
Charpy tests : embrittlement evaluation
Resistivity measurements
5-46
21/06/2005 13
AGEING (2/4)
AGEING (2/4)
Hardness results for alloy 152 (D492) in 3 thermal
treatment states
No increase of hardness after 60,000 h at 360C
No increase of hardness after 30,000 h at 450C
D492 - Agei ng at 360C
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
250
100 1000 10000 100000
Durat ion (h)
H
V

3
0
AW HT1 HT2
D492 - Agei ng at 450C
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
250
100 1000 10000 100000
Durat ion (h)
H
V

3
0
AW HT1 HT2
AW = As Welded, HT1 = 16 h at 610C, HT2 = 20 h at 550C + 16 h at 610C
5-47
21/06/2005 14
AGEING (3/4)
AGEING (3/4)
Charpy test results for alloy 152 (D492) in 3 thermal treatment
states
Tests after aging at 400 and 450C, until 30,000 h
Slight increase of the resilience with time, after aging 30,000 h at 400C
D492 - Ageing at 400C
7
8
9
10
11
100 1000 10000 100000
Durat ion (h)
C
h
a
r
p
y

t
e
s
t

(
d
a
J
/
c
m
)
AW HT1 HT2
7
8
9
10
11
100 1000 10000 100000
Durat ion (h)
C
h
a
r
p
y

t
e
s
t

(
d
a
J
/
c
m
)
AW HT1 HT2
AW = As Welded, HT1 = 16 h at 610C, HT2 = 20 h at
550C + 16 h at 610C
5-48
21/06/2005 15
AGEING (4/4)
AGEING (4/4)
Resistivity measurements for alloy 152 (D492) in 3 thermal
treatment states
No decrease of resistivity with time
Slight increase of the resistivity at 400C around 20,000 h (due to
short ordering ?)
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
100 1000 10000 100000
Durat ion (h)
R
e
s
i
s
t
i
v
i
t
y
,

.
c
m
AW HT1 HT2
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
100 1000 10000 100000
Duration (h)
R
e
s
i
s
t
i
v
i
t
y
,

.
c
m
AW HT1 HT2
AW = As Welded, HT1 = 16 h at 610C, HT2 = 20 h at
550C + 16 h at 610C
5-49
21/06/2005 16
CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
Susceptibility to hot cracking of weld nickel containing 30%
chromium.
Hardness measurements, Charpy tests and resistivity
measurements did not show any effect of ageing (tests in
progress).
Strong correlation between PWSCC susceptibility and
chromium content.
No SCC has been observed on materials containing more than
26%Cr (initiation/propagation).
5-50
21/06/2005 17
MATERIALS REQUIREMENTS (RCCM)
MATERIALS REQUIREMENTS (RCCM)
Alloy
Cr
(%)
Fe
(%)
C
(%)
Mn
(%)
Nb+ Ta
(%)
T
(C)
Ys
(MPa)
UTS
(MPa)
El.
(%)
20 > 250 > 550 > 30
182 13 17 < 10 < 0.1 5 9.5 1 2.5
350 > 190 - -
20 > 250 > 550 > 30
82 18 22 < 3 < 0.1 2.5 3.5 2 3
350 > 190 - -
625 20 23 < 7 < 0.1 < 1 3.2 4.2 - - - -
20 > 250
586
750
> 30
152 28 31.5 8 12 < 0.045 < 5 1.2 2.22
350 > 190 > 435 -
52 28 31 8 12 < 0.4 < 1 < 0.1 - - - -
Chemical composition (wt%) & Mechanical properties
5-51
21/06/2005 18
SPECIMENS FOR PWSCC TESTS
SPECIMENS FOR PWSCC TESTS
S
T
L
Stress
Propagation of PWSCC
RUBS : T-L
Cylindrical specimens : L-TS
5-52
21/06/2005 19
VARESTRAINT
VARESTRAINT
TEST
TEST
5-53
21/06/2005 20
Heat treating leading to short ordering
Heat treating leading to short ordering
5-54
Integrity of TT Alloy 690 Piping Material
T. Yonezawa
K.Fujimoto
Takasago R & D Center,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.,
2-1-1, Shinhama, Arai-cho,
Takasago City, Hyogo Pref., JAPAN 676-8686
H. Kaguchi
S. Asada
Kobe Shipyard and Machinery Works,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
1-1-1, Wadasaki-cho, Hyogo-ku,
Kobe City, Hyiogo Pref., JAPAN 652-8585
Abstract
1. Introduction
From the beginning of the practical use, after developing by H.R.Copson of INCO, Alloy 600
has been widely applied to the various components which have dissimilar metal weld joint for
light water reactors, based upon the low coefficient of thermal expansion and the fact that stress
relieving after welding is not required.
After experience of PWSCC in many components with Alloy 600, though these materials are
being replaced with thermally treated (TT) Alloy 690 for which there is no possibility of
PWSCC.
However, the metallurgical characteristics and mechanical properties of TT Alloy 690 are not
exactly the same as those of Alloy 600. Also, these properties for hot finished TT Alloy 600 are
not the same as those for cold finished TT Alloy 690.
Authors have proposed revision of the design stress intensity and yield strength values for Alloy
690 to ASME committee, in 2003, and the ASME Code Case N698 was established.
A.R McIlree edited the EPRIs Guidelines for PWR Steam Generator Tubing Specifications and
repair, in 1991 and 1999, based on the information from the EPRI workshop and his hearing with
the researchers, fabricators and material suppliers of USA, Japan and so on. This guideline was
established for cold finished TT Alloy 690 PWR Steam Generator Tubing. There is no guideline
for hot finished TT Alloy 690 specifications, up to now. Therefore, there is confusion between
hot finished and cold finished TT Alloy 690, for some experts in this field.
So, this paper discusses the most suitable material specification for hot finished TT Alloy 690
without deterioration of the PWSCC resistance, to meet the mechanical properties.
2. Fabricating Process for TT Ally 690
TT Alloy 690 is being applyed (or is planning to be applied) to the SG tubes, RPV (reactor
5-55
pressure vessel) head adapters, RPV outlet and inlet nozzles, various nozzles for pressurizer,
bottom mounted instrumentation, core support etc. as components to be used in PWR primary
coolant environment.
The fabricating process for these TT Alloy 690 components are classified as either hot finished
and annealed process, so called hot finished process or cold finished and annealed process, so
called cold finished process. The hot finished TT Alloy 690 is being applied to the all
components except SG tubes and small diameter pipes.
3. Metallurgical Properties of TT Alloy 690
1) Controlling of strength level
In case of Alloys 600 and 690, grain refining strengthening, solid-solution strengthening and
strain strengthening are available as strengthening mechanisms. That is, the tensile and yield
strength of the Alloy 690 must be determined mainly by the grain size, carbon content and
residual strain due to cold working.
Generally speaking, the grain size after mill annealing of the austenitic alloys decreases with
increase of the cold working ratio when higher than 10 percent. That is, the cold finished
austenitic alloy normally has finer grains and higher strength than the hot finished one.
Therefore, in order to gain the same strength level for hot finished Alloy 600 as that for cold
finished Alloy 600, extra high carbon content and /or extra low temperature mill annealing (so
called equalizing) were applied to the hot finished Alloy 600, and as a result, the PWSCC
susceptibility of this hot finished Alloy 600 was increased.
The best suitable carbon content and mill annealing condition must be selected for the hot
finished TT Alloy 690, reflecting the misunderstanding of hot finished Alloy 600.
2) Controlling of grain boundary carbide precipitation
Currently, it is worldwide consensus that the M
23
C
6
carbides must be precipitated
semi-continuously to maintain the PWSCC resistance for TT Alloy 690.
Authors have previously reported the effect of carbon content, mill annealing condition and
grain boundary carbide coherency on the IGSCC resistance in high caustic solution, used to
determine the accelerated properties of PWSCC resistance, as shown in Fig.1
1)
.
That is, in order to gain the coherency of the lattice for grain boundary carbides with that for
matrix, a range was recommended based on carbon content and mill annealing temperature.
This recommended range determined from the coherency of the grain boundary carbides is the
range where high corrosion resistance is achieved in high caustic solution, such as primary
water.
These data have been applied to the quality control of the cold finished TT Alloy 690 by
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. for 17 years, and still applied currently.
In case of the hot finished TT Alloy 690, dynamic re-crystallization must occur during hot
working. Remaining chromium carbides will be mostly located at the grain boundaries for hot
working condition. The grain boundary chromium carbides will grow up around the remaining
chromium carbides mentioned above as the core, during TT after mill annealing. Therefore,
the range of coherent grain boundary carbides for hot finished TT Alloy 690 is located lower
than that for cold finished TT Alloy 690, as shown in Fig.2. Also, the carbon content for hot
finished TT Alloy 690 is available to be higher than that for cold finished TT Alloy 690,
without deterioration of PWSCC resistance.
.
5-56
3) Other properties
Generally, ultrasonic examination is very difficult for large grained nickel based alloys, such
as Alloys 600 and 690. Grain size increases with an increase of annealing temperature,
especially when at higher temperature than the secondary re-crystallization temperature.
Therefore, the mill annealing temperature must be selected at a lower temperature than the
secondary re-crystallization temperature.
References
1) T.Kusakabe, T.Yonezawa, S.Tokunaga: Research on Corrosion Resistance of Steam Generator
Tube, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Technical Review, Vol.33(1996), No.1, P.6
1200
1150
1100
1050
1000
950
900
850
M
A

T
e
m
p
.

(
)
C Content (%)
0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.035
Intact
SCC/IGA Detected
Recommendable Range for TT690
(Coherent Type B)
NO SCC
SCC
(Incoherent)
Heat Treatment Conditions :
MA+70015h+SR (55015h)
Test Specimen : Highly Stressed C-ring
Environment : 10%NaOH, 325
Testing Time : 1,000h
1200
1150
1100
1050
1000
950
900
850
M
A

T
e
m
p
.

(
)
C Content (%)
0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.035
Intact
SCC/IGA Detected
(Coherent Type B)
NO SCC
SCC
(Incoherent)
MA+70015h+SR (55015h)
Recommendable Range for
Cold Finished TT 690
Recommendable Range for
Hot Finished TT 690
Figure 1 Effect of carbon content and mill
annealing temperature on IGSCC resistance
and coherency of grain boundary carbides
for cold finished TT Alloy 690
Figure 2 Recommendable range of carbon
content, mill annealing temperature
and coherency of grain boundary
carbides for hot finished TT Alloy 690
5-57
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Tamaya Resort, Santa Ana Pueblo, NM March 7-10, 2005
T. Yonezawa*, K.Fujimoto*,
H. Kaguchi**, S. Asada**
* Takasago R&D Center
**Kobe Shipyard and Machinery Works
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
5-58
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Contents
1. Introduction
2. Fabricating Process of Piping and Tubing
1) Controlling of Strength Level
2) Controlling of G.B. Carbide Precipitation
3) Other Properties
4. Summary
5-59
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Contents
1. Introduction
3) Other Properties
4. Summary
5-60
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
* After experience of PWSCC for Alloy 600, these components
are being replaced with TT Alloy 690.
* The metallurgical characteristics and mechanical properties
of TT Alloy 690 are not exactly the same as those of Alloy 600.
* Alloy 600 was originally developed by H.R.Copson of INCO.
Alloy 600 has been widely applied to components with
dissimilar metal weld joint, due to the low coefficient of
thermal expansion and the fact that stress relieving after
welding is not required.
1. Introduction
* These properties for hot finished TT Alloy 600 are not the
same as those for cold finished TT Alloy 690.
* We have proposed revision of the design stress intensity and
yield strength values to ASME committee, in 2003, and the
ASME Code Case N698 was established.
5-61
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
* A.R McIlree edited the EPRIs Guidelines for PWR SG Tube
Specifications and repair, in 1991 and 1999.
* This guideline was established for cold finished TT Alloy 690
PWR SG Tubing.
* There is no guideline for hot finished TT Alloy 690 spec.,
up to now.
Therefore, there is confusion between hot finished and cold
finished TT Alloy 690, for some experts in this field.
* So, this presentation discusses the most suitable material spec.
for hot finished TT Alloy 690 without deterioration of the
PWSCC resistance, to meet the mechanical properties.
1. Introduction (Contd.)
5-62
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Contents
1. Introduction
3) Other Properties
4. Summary
5-63
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
* In case of small diameter and thin wall tube and pipe will be
fabricated by the cold finished process, usually.
SG tubes are fabricated by cold finished process.
* The fabricating process for these TT Alloy 690 components
are classified as either hot finished and annealed process
or cold finished and annealed process.
* TT Alloy 690 is being applied (or is planning to be applied) to
the SG tubes, RPV (reactor pressure vessel) head adapters,
RPV outlet and inlet nozzles, various nozzles for pressurizer,
bottom mounted instrumentation, core support etc. as
components to be used in PWR primary coolant environment.
* The hot finished TT Alloy 690 is being applied to all
components except SG tubes and small diameter pipes.
5-64
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Contents
1. Introduction
3) Other Properties
4. Summary
5-65
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
* In case of Alloys 600 and 690, grain refining strengthening,
solid-solution strengthening and strain strengthening are
available as strengthening mechanisms.
* That is, the tensile and yield strength of the Alloys 600 and
690 must be determined mainly by the grain size, carbon
content and residual strain due to cold working.
3. Metallurgical Properties of Piping and Tubing
5-66
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
3. Metallurgical Properties of Piping and Tubing
* The grain size of the austenitic alloys remarkably grow at
higher temperature than the secondary re-crystallization
temperature.
* The secondary re-crystallization temperature for Alloys 600
and 690 locates at same temperature of the fully soluble
temperature for Cr carbides.
* But, in case of the cold finished Alloys 600 and 690, the grain
size after M.A. of the austenitic alloys decreases with increase
of the cold working ratio when higher than 10%.
* So, if fully soluble temperature will be selected as M.A., Alloys
600 and 690 must be annealed at higher temperature than the
secondary re-crystallization temperature.
* That is, the cold finished TT Alloys 600 and 690 normally have
finer grains, and higher strength than the hot finished one.
5-67
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Reactor Vessel Closure Head of PWR
4.06"
2.75"
Pipe(N06690 SB-167)
J-weld
(Alloy 690(ERNiCrFe-7))
Fig. Head adapters in which N06690 are used in RVCH
Reactor Vessel Closure Head of PWR
J-Weld
Alloy 690 (ERNiCrFe-7)
Pipe (N06690 SB-167)
2.75
4.06
2. Fabricating Process of Piping and Tubing (Contd.)
5-68
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
* In order to gain the same strength level for hot finished
Alloy 600 as that for cold finished Alloy 600, extra high C
content and /or extra low temperature M.A. (so called
equalizing) was applied to the hot finished Alloy 600,
and as a result, the PWSCC susceptibility of this hot finished
Alloy 600 was increased.
* The best suitable carbon content and M.A. condition must be
selected for the hot finished TT Alloy 690, reflecting the
misunderstanding of hot finished Alloy 600.
3. Metallurgical Properties of Piping and Tubing (Contd.)
5-69
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Contents
1. Introduction
3) Other Properties
4. Summary
5-70
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Pipes
for
RPV
Head
Adapter
SG
Tubes
VOD Furnace
Billet Making
Billet Ingot Casting
Machining
Mill Anneal
Cold Drawing
TT
Repeat
Cold Finished
Hot Finished
2. Fabricating Process of Piping and Tubing (Contd.)
Straightener
Hot Extrusion
From Catalog of Sumitomo Metals Ind.
5-71
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
10
2
MA600
TT600
MA690
TT690
SP800
: CRACKED
: CRACKED
: NOT CRACKED
: NOT CRACKED
: NOT CRACKED
: NOT CRACKED
10
3
10
4
Testing Time (Hr)
Stress
(kg/mm
2
)
MA600
TT600
SP800
TT690
Pre-Strained
R-U Bend Specimen
PWSCC test results in temperature accelerated
primary water (360)
Ni Cr Fe
Alloy
600
72.0 14.0
- 17.0
6.0
- 10.0
Alloy
800
30.0
- 35.0
19.0
- 23.0
39.5
Alloy
690
58.0 27.0
- 31.0
7.0
- 11.0
(T.Yonezawa et al : 1995)
5-72
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Schema of semi-continuous
/ coherent G. B. carbides
/ Type B
Matrix 1
Matrix 2
Cr Carbide
Matrix 1
Cr
Matrix 2
Carbide
Discrete
/Incoherent
Semi -Continuous
/Coherent
Cr Carbide
GrainBoundary
Coherent
Micro-Structure of Grain Boundary
(Semi-Continuous/Coherent/TypeB)
Matrix 1
Matrix 2
GrainBoundary
GrainBoundary
5-73
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Matrix M23C6
G.B.
5 nm
Lattice Image
Coherent G.B. M
23
C
6
Cr-Carbide to Matrix
5-74
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Effect of C content and
M.A. tempt. on SCC
resistance and Coherency
of G.B. carbides
The recommended
range shows
Coherent Type B.
This range agrees with
the range of high
corrosion resistance in
alkaline solution, and
shall be in primary
water.
1200
1150
1100
1050
1000
950
900
850
M
A

T
e
m
p
.

(
)
C Content (%)
0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.035
Intact
SCC/IGA Detected
(Coherent Type B)
NO SCC
SCC
(Incoherent)
MA+70015h+SR (55015h)
5-75
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
* Currently, it is worldwide consensus that the M
23
C
6
carbides
must be precipitated semi-continuously to maintain the
PWSCC resistance for TT Alloy 690.
* In order to gain the coherency of the lattice for G.B.
carbides with that for matrix, a range was recommended
based on the C content and M.A. temperature.
* We have previously reported the effect of C content, M.A.
condition and G.B. carbide coherency on the IGSCC resistance
in high caustic solution, used to determine the accelerated
properties of PWSCC resistance for the cold finished
TT Alloy 690.
* In case of the cold finished TT Alloy 690, fully soluble
temperature must be selected, to gain the high SCC resistance.
5-76
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
* This recommended range determined from the coherency of
the grain boundary carbides is the range where high
corrosion resistance is achieved in high caustic solution,
such as primary water.
* These data have been applied to the quality control of TT
Alloy 690 in MHI from 17 years ago.
5-77
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Recommendable range of C content, M.A. temperature and
coherency of G.B. carbides for hot finished TT Alloy 690
5-78
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
* In case of the hot finished TT Alloy 690, dynamic re-
crystallization must occur during hot working.
* Remaining Cr carbides will be mostly located at the G.B.
during hot working.
* Therefore, the temperature range of coherent G.B. carbides
for hot finished TT Alloy 690 is located lower than that for
cold finished TT Alloy 690.
* The G.B. Cr carbides will grow up around the remaining
Cr carbides as the core, during TT after M.A.
* So, reducing of the M.A. temperature is available without
deterioration of PWSCC resistance.
* Also, the suitable C content for hot finished TT Alloy 690
needs to be higher than that for cold finished TT Alloy 690
from the viewpoint of maintaining strength level.
5-79
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Contents
1. Introduction
3) Other Properties
4. Summary
5-80
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
*Ultrasonic inspection as nondestructive examination is very
difficult for the large grained nickel based alloy as Alloys 600
and 690.
* Grain size increases with an increase of M.A. temperature, at
higher temperature of secondary re-crystallization, especially.
* So, the M.A. temperature must be selected at lower tempt.
than the secondary re-crystallization tempt.
5-81
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
Contents
1. Introduction
3) Other Properties
4. Summary
5-82
07-10, 03, 05 EPRI Conf.
* The best suitable carbon content and mill annealing
condition must be selected for the hot finished TT Alloy 690,
with reflection of misunderstanding for hot finished Alloy
600.
4. Summary
* In case of the hot finished TT Alloy 690, dynamic re-
crystallization must be happened during hot working.
* The temperature range of coherent grain boundary
carbides for hot finished TT Alloy 690 is located lower than
that for cold finished TT Alloy 690.
* The suitable carbon content for hot finished TT Alloy 690
needs to be higher than that for cold finished TT Alloy 690 .
5-83
Extended Abstract for Alloy 600 Conference, March 2005, NM
Status of MRP Work to Demonstrate the Long-Term Resistance
of Alloys 690, 152 and 52 to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking
John Hickling, Technical Leader Materials Issues,
Technology Group Nuclear Sector
EPRI, Palo Alto, CA
Over the last thirty years, stress corrosion cracking in PWR primary water (PWSCC) has
been observed in numerous Alloy 600 component items and associated welds, sometimes
after relatively long incubation times. Repairs and replacements have generally utilized
wrought Alloy 690 material and its compatible weld metals (Alloy 152 and Alloy 52),
which have been shown to be highly resistant to PWSCC in laboratory experiments and
have been free from cracking in operating reactors over periods already up to nearly 15
years. It is nevertheless prudent for the PWR industry to attempt to quantify the
longevity of these materials with respect to aging degradation by corrosion in order to
provide a sound technical basis for the development of future inspection requirements for
repaired or replaced component items.
The MRP-111 report (EPRI 1009801), prepared by Framatome-ANP (now AREVA) and
published in March 2004, reviewed numerous laboratory tests, conducted over the last
two decades, that were performed with wrought Alloy 690 and Alloy 52 or Alloy 152
weld materials under various test conditions pertinent to corrosion resistance in PWR
environments. Test media relevant to the primary circuit included high temperature de-
aerated/hydrogenated water (with and without additions of zinc or some impurities),
simulated primary water and hydrogenated steam (sometimes doped with contaminants).
The vast majority of the Alloy 690 specimens did not develop cracking after exposure
times as long as 100,000 hours, whereas most of the Alloy 600 specimens in both MA
and TT conditions developed PWSCC in the same studies, often after relatively brief
periods. Occasional instances of shallow intergranular cracking in Alloy 690 material
were more consistent with mechanical microfissuring than PWSCC, although the latter
has occurred to some extent in conjunction with abnormal heat treatments and unusual
alloy microstructures or compositions. No PWSCC of the Alloy 152/52 weld metals has
been identified to date, but investigations are limited. Furthermore, the resistance of the
weld heat affected zone in the base metal does not appear to have been separately studied.
Wherever possible, the existing laboratory test data were evaluated to estimate the
improvement factor of Alloy 690 relative to Alloy 600. Average improvement factors of
at least 26 relative to Alloy 600MA material and 13 relative to Alloy 600TT material can
be derived, but these numbers are clearly conservative, due to an absence of PWSCC in
most Alloy 690 specimens within the test duration. In addition, Alloy 690 service
experience in PWRs was reviewed to augment the laboratory findings. Based on both
laboratory and field data, it was concluded that Alloy 690 and its weld metals are unlikely
to develop PWSCC during extended PWR plant lifetimes (60+ years). Hence, the
5-85
PWSCC inspection regimes developed in recent years for thick-walled component items
made of Alloys 600, 182, and 82 would be unnecessarily stringent if applied in exactly
the same way to comparable component item locations involving Alloys 690, 152 and 52.
MRP-111 also identified some specific knowledge gaps. This has led to an ongoing
program for focused testing of Alloy 690 material and its weld metals, sponsored within
the EPRI MRP program by the Mitigation WG (chairman: John Wilson, Exelon) of the
industry Alloy 600 Issue Task Group. The paper will review both the conclusions from
previous studies and the present status of this MRP work. Proof-of-concept testing
(published in 2004 as MRP-123), showed that Alloy 690 is not completely "immune" to
crack growth through PWSCC, but that rates are low. A follow-on program using
sophisticated test techniques to evaluate crack growth rates in Alloys 690, 152 and 52
will be described in a separate paper at this conference. A separate program, now
underway, will use alternative methods (thermal acceleration by testing in supercritical
fluids) to examine the long-term PWSCC resistance of various heats of 690 material and
at least one Alloy 52M weld deposit.
The MRP Alloy 600 ITG continues to follow NDE of Alloy 690 components
(particularly replacement RPV heads already in service for substantial periods in France)
and MRP-111 will be revised in 2006 to incorporate this service experience, as well as
the results from additional laboratory testing (including a planned examination of
possible HAZ effects). The goal here is to provide the technical basis for an appropriate
inspection regime for thick-walled components made out of these more PWSCC resistant
materials.
5-86
Status of MRP Work to
Demonstrate the Long-Term
Resistance of Alloys 690,
152 and 52 to PWSCC
EPRI MRP International Conference
on PWSCC of Alloy 600
Santa Ana Pueblo, NM, March 2005
John Hickling
Technical Leader Materials Issues
Technology Group / Nuclear Sector
5-87
2
Background
Alloy 690 and associated weld metals (Alloys 152/52) are
being widely used for repair and replacement of thick-section
components (such as CRDM vessel head penetrations)
considered susceptible to PWSCC
This choice of material relies heavily on laboratory work
carried out to demonstrate the suitability of thin-walled Alloy
690 tubing for replacement steam generators and the
excellent service experience in PWR applications to date
Nevertheless, some questions inevitably remain with regard
to the long-term behavior of these materials and the credit
which can be taken for superior resistance to PWSCC in
terms of inspection requirements.
The paper will present an overview of the current state of
knowledge on this topic and describe the proactive work
being performed by the MRP to confirm expectations of
satisfactory performance up to the end of plant life.
5-88
3
Purpose and scope of MRP-111 report (EPRI
1009801) published in March 2004
Report was prepared by Xu, Fyfitch, Scott,
Foucault, Kilian & Winter of Framatome-ANP
(now AREVA) to
Evaluate existing field and laboratory test data on the
behavior of Alloys 690/52/152
Demonstrate and quantify the margin of improvement
of Alloys 690/52/152 over Alloys 600/82/182
Provide a technical basis for development of future
inspection requirements for Alloys 690/52/152
Identify gaps in the existing Alloys 690/52/152 data
and suitable strategies to fill the gaps
5-89
4
Laboratory test conditions analyzed
High temperature de-oxygenated (deaerated) water
Additions of boron, lithium, and hydrogen
Additions of zinc
Hydrogenated steam
Steam doped with chloride, fluoride, and sulfate
anions
High temperature water (typically 680
o
F)
Hydrogenated steam (typically 750
o
F)
5-90
5
Laboratory test methods used to date
Double U-bend (simulating crevice conditions)
Reverse U-bend (RUB)
Constant Load Tests (CLTs)
Four-point bend
Steam generator tubing mock-up specimens, which
had the longest test duration of 100,000 hours
Slow-strain-rate test (SSRT) specimens
5-91
6
Laboratory test materials in MRP-111
15 different laboratory test programs involving Alloys
690/52/152 and Alloy 600 controls were reviewed
Approximately 40 heats of Alloy 690 with carbon content
from 0.001% to 0.065%
Approximately 300 Alloy 690/52/152 specimens in the
MA, TT, and thermally aged conditions
In most cases, test specimens were fabricated from SG
tubing
Two studies involving weld metals (Alloys 152 and 52M)
One study involving a plate material
One study with a laboratory heat cast and rolled into a bar
One study with CRDM nozzle forging material
5-92
7
Example of Alloy 690 SG heats tested in France:
(collaborative work by EdF and CEA using SSRT)
Specimen : cold pressed hump
Increase of hardness
High local strain rate (x10)
5-93
8
Some findings from laboratory testing in France
Two abnormal pre-production heats included in testing
Purposely produced with Cr and C on high end and Fe
on low end of specification
Atypical thermal history (two mill anneals)
Low density of intergranular carbides
Surface defects observed on various specimens
Largest defects found on two pre-production heats
Shallow intergranular cracking (mainly) also observed
during SSRT testing in primary water
Exceptions were one pre-production heat and one
industrial heat, where intergranular cracking was
somewhat deeper in heavily deformed (hump)
specimen, in which strain is highly localized
5-94
9
Published data from laboratory testing in France
EdF concludes that IGSCC of Alloy 690 material had been
provoked to a limited extent, but resistance is clearly high
5-95
10
Overall summary of laboratory test results
analyzed in MRP-111
Vast majority of Alloy 690 specimens were crack-free after
exposures up to 100,000 hours
Most Alloy 600 specimens in both MA and TT conditions
developed PWSCC, often after relatively brief periods
Occasional instances of shallow intergranular cracking in
Alloy 690 material observed
Mostly consistent with mechanical microfissuring, rather than
PWSCC
PWSCC may be possible to a small extent in conjunction with
atypical heat treatments and unusual alloy microstructures or
compositions, especially if material is subsequently cold worked
No PWSCC of Alloy 152/52 weld metals identified to date
(but investigations are limited)
5-96
11
Analysis of laboratory test results
Two methods have been used to provide a quantitative
estimate of IF
R
, the improvement factor for Alloy 690 relative
to Alloy 600
The first method is based on Weibull and Weibayes
analysis if sufficient test data are available
The Weibayes conservatively assumes one Alloy 690
failure to occur just beyond the test duration
T is the Weibull characteristic time (63.2% cumulative
fraction of failure)
600 ,
690 , ) 0 . 5 , 1 (
Alloy Weibull
Alloy r Weibayes
IF
R
T
T E

5-97
12
Analysis of laboratory test data
10
25
50
63.2
75
90
20% 600MA at
608
o
F
20% 600TT
at 608
o
F
20%690TT
Weibayes
at 680
o
F
1,000 10,000 100,000
Time to Failure, Hour
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
,

%
An example for 20% prestrained RUB from Alloy
600MA&TT and from Alloy 690TT
5-98
13
Often the Weibull and Weibayes analysis approach
cannot be performed to evaluate the test data
The second method is based on the ratio of the Alloy
690 material test time over the time to initial cracking
of highly susceptible (e.g., low-temp. MA) Alloy 600
This method is still conservative as none of the Alloy
690 specimens failed by the end of test duration
600
690
Alloy in cracking first to Time
Alloy of Time Test
IF
R

5-99
14
The IF
R
(second method) increases with increasing test
time, indicating that the IF
R
is limited by the test duration
Average IF
R
values are conservative estimates of the actual
improvement
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000
Stress Corrosion Test Duration, hour
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t

F
a
c
t
,

I
F
Primary Water
H2 Steam
Doped H2 Steam
H2 Steam, cracked
Linear (Primary Water)
5-100
15
Results of data analysis
The first method, based on Weibull and Weibayes
analysis, provides an average IF
R
of 26.5 relative to
Alloy 600MA material and 13.3 relative to Alloy
600TT material
The second method, based on the ratio of test time to
first Alloy 600 failure, provides an average IF
R
of
27.1, which is consistent with the first method
5-101
16
Field experience as summarized in MRP-111
The Alloy 690 laboratory test results have been
confirmed by the excellent field experience
Worldwide, numerous PWR units have now operated
with steam generators having Alloy 690 tubing over
nearly fifteen years
SG service is very aggressive for Ni-Cr-Fe Alloys, e.g.,
Alloy 600 failed first and very early in SG
Many other components containing Alloy 690 and its
weld metals are also in service
Alloy 52 for over 10 years
To date, there have been no indications of corrosion
degradation in any of the Alloy 690 components in
service
5-102
17
Conclusions as presented to US Regulator
The existing laboratory test data provide an average
improvement factor of 26 relative to Alloy 600MA
and 13 relative to Alloy 600TT
These numbers are conservative, due to an absence
of PWSCC in most Alloy 690 specimens within the test
duration
Alloy 690 service experience in PWRs has been
reviewed to augment the laboratory findings
Based on both laboratory and field data, it is
concluded that Alloy 690 and its weld metals Alloys
52/152 are very unlikely to develop PWSCC during
extended PWR plant lifetimes (60
+
years)
5-103
18
Specific knowledge gaps identified in MRP-111
Insufficient testing of Alloy 52 and 152 weld metals
Possible effects of product form not definitively resolved
Subtle changes in chemical composition and thermo-
mechanical processing effects on surface finish could
impair PWSCC resistance to some extent
No information on crack growth rates of base or weld
metals if PWSCC is postulated to occur
Potential concern for HAZ (by analogy with Alloy 600)
Corrosion fatigue (expect similar behavior to Alloy 600)
LTCP (low temperature crack propagation) has been
shown by naval reactor tests to be a possible concern
5-104
19
On-going experimental work in MRP A600 ITG:
Testing by Peter Andresen at GE-GRC
Proof-of-concept testing (published 2004 as MRP-123)
showed that Alloy 690 is not completely immune to
crack growth through PWSCC but rates are low
Follow-on program is evaluating crack growth rates in
Alloys 690, 52 & 152 using sophisticated test
techniques
Initial studies are focused on alloy 690 CRDM housing
(+ 20 to 40% cold work to simulate residual strains from
weld shrinkage)
Results are discussed in more detail in the next
presentation at this conference
5-105
20
Testing by Rich Jacko at Westinghouse (W)
A parallel program is currently in progress using alternative
methods (thermal acceleration by testing in supercritical fluids)
to examine the long term resistance of Alloy 690 and its weld
metals to PWSCC
Materials have been selected (see following slides) and
extensively characterized
Additional forging reductions of between 9 and 24% have been
applied to raise yield strength (needed to permit robust testing)
Crack initiation tests now in progress to help select exact
environments
Anticipated solution properties at 385C are being summarized
and compared with primary water at temperatures from 325C to
360C (see later slides)
CGR tests have now also just begun
5-106
21
Materials for crack growth studies at W
5-107
22
Materials for crack initiation studies at W
5-108
23
Factors in selection of test environment at W
5-109
24
Preliminary test environments at W
5-110
25
Future Work Planned by MRP Alloy 600 ITG
Continue to follow NDE of thick-walled Alloy 690
components (e.g. replacement RPV heads in France)
Expected Revision of MRP-111 postponed to 2006
Will add data from a WOG test program that compared
Alloy52M and 182 weld metals
Hope to include data from long-term Japanese test program on
Alloy 690 and weld metal
Experimental program currently being initiated to assess
PWSCC resistance of the HAZ in welded, thick-section
material of Alloys 600 and 690
Results from MRP-111 and the additional test programs
will be used, together with field inspection data, to develop
& refine a less-stringent NDE program for thick-walled
components made of Alloy 690
5-111
Extended Abstract for Alloy 600 Conference in Santa Ana Pueblo, NM
PWSCC Growth Rates of Cold Worked Alloy 690
Peter L. Andresen and John Hickling
This paper describes ongoing work sponsored within the EPRI MRP program by the Mitigation
WG (chairman: John Wilson, Exelon) of the industry Alloy 600 Issue Task Group. Some efforts
funded by GE Research (e.g., the Varying-K data) on Alloy 690 are also described.
The presentation addresses a stress corrosion cracking (SCC) growth rate evaluation of Alloy
690 in simulated PWR primary water at high temperature (340 360 qC). Two plate forms and
one CRDM housing form of Alloy 690 was evaluated using 0.5T CT specimens and reversing dc
potential drop (for crack length monitoring). Excellent experimental control (e.g., of water
purity, dissolved H
2
, temperature) and optimized experimental techniques (e.g., transitioning
from the fatigue precracking conditions to constant K SCC conditions, use of resistivity coupon
for correction, corrosion potential monitoring, etc.) were employed.
Because Alloy 690 is known to be resistant to SCC, these initial tests were performed in
simulated primary water chemistry under somewhat aggressive conditions involving:
x cold working by forging at 25 C by 20 40% reduction in thickness
x testing near peak in crack growth rate (near Ni/NiO transition) by controlling H
2
x testing at 340 and 360 qC to accelerate growth rates
x using periodic gentle cyclic loading to (re-)activate possible SCC
x using both constant, high K and Varying-K (rising dK/da) to simulate early growth in a
plant component
SCC growth was consistently indicated by dc potential drop under constant K conditions in the
plate materials, although post-test evaluation of the two specimens after testing showed very
limited signs of intergranular crack morphology. Scanning electron microscopy revealed a small
band of primarily transgranular growth along the crack front whose depth was consistent with the
dc potential drop data. Testing of the CRDM housing material is ongoing, but results so far
indicate a distinct reticence for cracks to grow under constant K conditions.
For the three heats / heat treatments of Alloy 690 evaluated to date, the apparent SCC growth
rates are low (in the range of 2 4 x 10
9
mm/s) and suggest a substantial factor of improvement
over Alloy 600. Further quantification should be possible at the completion of the program.
Analogous testing of Alloy 52 and 152 weld metal (without additional cold work) is now
starting.
Microstructural evaluation of the materials showed that the plate that received an 1800 qF
(982 qC) final anneal possessed a very uneven microstructure, with a banded appearance
involving areas with and without carbide decoration of the grain boundaries. The microstructure
of the CRDM housing material was quite homogenous, as expected from the nature of its
processing.
5-113
Testing under Varying-K conditions showed somewhat higher growth rates. These are
unusual, but potentially relevant tests, in which the K is varied as the crack grows in depth
(dK/da), and not as time passes. They thus differ from commonly used rising load (dK/dt)
SCC tests. Because K is controlled by stress and the square root of crack depth (K v Va), and
because weld residual stresses cause a large increase in effective stress once a short SCC crack
reaches a depth where linear fracture mechanics can be applied, such cracks can be driven by a
fairly steeply rising dK/da effect when relatively small (e.g., < 1 mm).
Given the importance of good microstructure and the deleterious effects of cold work, there is
some potential concern for weld metal (because of its cast structure), weld heat affected zones
(where carbides may dissolve and residual strains and stresses are known to occur), and any
sources / areas of microstructural inhomogeneity. Further MRP work is planned or ongoing to
address these issues.
5-114
SCC of Alloy 690
EPRI / MRP Program on
PWSCC Growth Rates of
Cold Worked Alloy 690
& Alloys 52/152 Weld Metal
Peter Andresen and John Hickling*
GE Global Research Center Schenectady, NY
* EPRI Palo Alto, CA
Alloy 600 Conference March 2005
5-115
SCC of Alloy 690
Overview
This is an on-going program to evaluate the crack growth
rates of several heats of cold worked alloy 690
completed studies on alloy 690 in plate form
two final anneals: 1800F and 2000F
6000+ hrs testing on 690 CRMD + 40% CW (GE funded)
some studies and plans on alloy 690 CRDM form:
20% CW, 360 C
just embarking on testing of alloys 152 & 52 weld metal
Alloy 690 CRDM provided by Duke Power
Alloy 152 & 52 welds provided by B&W Canada
5-116
SCC of Alloy 690
Testing Approach
Crack growth rates conditions for alloy 690:
cold worked by forging at 25 C by 20 40% (thickness)
cold work simulates weld residual strain in HAZ
used resistivity coupon for dcpd correction
0.5T CT specimens in 340 360 C PWR primary water
testing at 25 35 ksiin, including Varying-K
18 20 cc/kg H
2
to be near Ni/NiO, but on Ni-metal side
good water chemistry: ~2 volume exchanges per hour,
full-flow demineralization, and active H
2
sparging
measured potentials of 690 & Pt vs. Cu/Cu
2
O/ZrO
2
5-117
SCC of Alloy 690
Water Chemistry Control
High precision loop for
control / measurement
of water to:
inject impurities at
< 1 ppb levels,
control dissolved gas
mixtures by mass
flow controllers
use B/Li-equilibrated
demineralizers,
introduce Zn

5-118
SCC of Alloy 690
DC Potential Drop Measurement
High resolution dcpd
crack monitoring with
capability to maintain
constant K
max
with or without cycling.

More sophisticated control
using tables of conditions
and varying K (dK/da)
also exists in software.
Used resistivity coupon
for dcpd correction.
5-119
SCC of Alloy 690
Integrated Testing System
One of 27 fully
instrumented
high temp. water
SCC systems with:
water supply
autoclave
data acquisition
digital temp control
digital load control
constant K control

5-120
SCC of Alloy 690
Experimental Strategy
EPRI heat of Alloy 690 (NX8244HK11) used in two heat
treatment conditions: 1800F (1A) & 2000F (1B) anneal.
Cr Fe Al Ti Mn Si C S P N
30.03 9.20 0.36 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.018 <.001 0.004 0.01
Heat Temp. Yield UTS
%H
Rb
1A 1800F 35.1 ksi 95.2 ksi 51.0 78
1B 2000F 30.4 ksi 86.3 ksi 59.0 70
5-121
SCC of Alloy 690
Metallography of Alloy 690, c248
Microstructure of plate with 1800F anneal
shows compositional and carbide banding
5-122
SCC of Alloy 690
Microstructure
of plate with
1800F anneal
shows
compositional
and carbide
banding
5-123
SCC of Alloy 690
Microstructure of plate with 2000F anneal
shows little compositional and carbide banding
5-124
SCC of Alloy 690
Microstructure
of plate with
2000F anneal
shows little
compositional
and carbide
banding
5-125
SCC of Alloy 690
20% CW Alloy 690, 1800F Anneal
Well-behaved crack growth rate response
SCC#2 - c248 - 690, 25%RA, NX8244HK111, 1800F Anneal
11.3
11.31
11.32
11.33
11.34
11.35
11.36
11.37
11.38
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Test Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,

P
S
/
c
m

o
r

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e
Outlet conductivity x 0.01
CT potential Pt potential
c248 - 0.5TCT of 690 + 25%RA, 340C
25 ksiin, 550 B / 1.1 Li, 18 cc/kg H
2
T
o

R
=
0
.
7
,

0
.
0
0
1

H
z
+

9
0
0
0
s

h
o
l
d

@

5
0
6
h
T
o

R
=
0
.
7
,

0
.
0
0
1

H
z
+

8
5
,
4
0
0
s

h
o
l
d

@

6
6
5
h
1.4 x 10
-8
mm/s
N
E

P
o
w
e
r
O
u
t
a
g
e

@

1
2
4
7
h
2.4 x 10
-9
mm/s
T
o

C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t

K
@

1
7
5
7
h
5 x 10
-9
mm/s
E
N
D

O
F

T
E
S
T

@

5
1
3
5
h
5-126
SCC of Alloy 690
20% CW Alloy 690, 2000F Anneal
Well-behaved crack growth rate response
SCC#2 - c249 - 690, 20%RA, NX8244HK112, 2000F Anneal
11.31
11.33
11.35
11.37
11.39
11.41
11.43
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Test Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,

P
S
/
c
m

o
r

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e
Outlet conductivity x 0.01
c249 - 0.5TCT of 690 + 20%RA, 340C
25 ksiin, 550 B / 1.1 Li, 18 cc/kg H
2
1.4 x 10
-8
mm/s
T
o

R
=
0
.
7
,

0
.
0
0
1

H
z
+

9
0
0
0
s

h
o
l
d

@

5
0
6
h
T
o

R
=
0
.
7
,

0
.
0
0
1

H
z
+

8
5
,
4
0
0
s

h
o
l
d

@

6
6
5
h
N
E

P
o
w
e
r
O
u
t
a
g
e

@

1
2
4
7
h
8 x 10
-9
mm/s
T
o

C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t

K
@

1
7
5
7
h
3.7 x 10
-9
mm/s
E
N
D

O
F

T
E
S
T

@

5
1
3
5
h
5-127
SCC of Alloy 690
Macro Photographs of Alloy 690
c248 c249
Excellent agreement with dc potential drop
Post-test fatigue
340C growth
Air precrack
Machined notch
5-128
SCC of Alloy 690
SEM Micrographs of Alloy 690, c248
Can readily identify different regions by SEM
Post-test fatigue
340C growth
Air precrack
Machined notch
5-129
SCC of Alloy 690
Some evidence of intergranular morpology
Near the end of 340C
growth, i.e., at end of
stress corrosion crack
Some evidence of
intergranular facets
and secondary cracks
5-130
SCC of Alloy 690
Can readily identify different regions by SEM
Post-test fatigue
340C growth
Air precrack
Machined notch
5-131
SCC of Alloy 690
Alloy 690 CRDM Material
CRDM housing of Alloy 690 (heat WN415)
provided by Duke Power
Location C Mn Fe S Si Cu Ni Cr Co
check 0.018 0.31 10.14 0.0007 0.29 0.007 59.67 29.1 0.016
ladle 0.02 0.31 10.1 0.0007 0.28 0.007 59.75 29.04 0.015
Reported average yield strength = 37.7 ksi
Reported average tensile strength = 89.1 ksi
Annealed at ~721C for ~11 hours
5-132
SCC of Alloy 690
Alloy 690 CRDM Material
CRDM housing of Alloy 690 (heat WN415)
5-133
SCC of Alloy 690
41% Cold Work Alloy 690 CRDM
Well-behaved crack growth response in GE tests
SCC#2a - c280 - 690, 41%RA, WN415 CRDM
10.965
10.97
10.975
10.98
10.985
10.99
10.995
11
11.005
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
Test Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,

P
S
/
c
m

o
r

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e
Outlet conductivity x0.01
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t

K

@

1
1
0
8
h
c280 - 0.5TCT of 690 + 41%RA, 340C
25 ksiin, 550 B / 1.1 Li, 18 cc/kg H
2
T
o

R
=
0
.
7
,

0
.
0
0
1

H
z
+

9
0
0
0
s

h
o
l
d

@

5
8
1
h
~5 x 10
-10
mm/s
At 340C, pH = 7.60. At 300C, pH = 6.93
and potential would be ~155 mV higher
6.2 x 10
-9
mm/s
3 x 10
-9
mm/s
T
o

R
=
0
.
7
,

0
.
0
0
1

H
z
+

9
0
0
0
s

h
o
l
d

@

1
8
5
4
h
4.3 x 10
-9
mm/s
T
o

R
=
0
.
7
,

0
.
0
0
1

H
z
+

8
5
,
4
0
0
s

h
o
l
d

@

3
3
2
0
h
~0 mm/s
5-134
SCC of Alloy 690
41% Cold Work Alloy 690 CRDM
Well-behaved crack growth response in GE tests
SCC#3 - c280 - 690, 41%RA, WN415 CRDM
10.995
11.005
11.015
11.025
11.035
11.045
11.055
11.065
11.075
4000 4200 4400 4600 4800 5000 5200 5400
Test Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,

P
S
/
c
m

o
r

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e
Outlet conductivity x0.01
c280 - 0.5TCT of 690 + 41%RA, 340C
25 ksiin, 550 B / 1.1 Li, 18 cc/kg H
2
At 340C, pH = 7.60. At 300C, pH = 6.93
and potential would be ~155 mV higher
4.6 x 10
-8
mm/s
T
o

V
a
r
y
i
n
g
-
K

a
t

2
5

t
o

3
5

k
s
i
i
n
a
t

2

k
s
i
i
n

p
e
r

m
i
l
R
=
0
.
7
,

0
.
0
0
1

H
z

@

4
0
5
6
h
8.5 x 10
-9
mm/s
T
o

2
6

k
s
i
i
n

@

4
2
2
0
h
T
o

9
0
0
0
s

h
o
l
d

@

4
3
2
0
h
T
o

1
0
0
0
s

h
o
l
d

@

4
4
0
7
h
T
o

9
0
0
0
s

h
o
l
d
@

4
4
8
9
h
T
o

2
8

k
s
i
i
n
@

4
5
7
0
h
T
o

2
9

k
s
i
i
n
@

4
9
6
5
h
T
o

3
0

k
s
i
i
n
@

5
3
2
2
h
1.1 x 10
-8
mm/s
5-135
SCC of Alloy 690
EPRI Testing on Alloy 690 / 152 / 52
Evaluation of two 0.5T CT specimens of 690 CRDM and
of one specimen each of alloy 152 and 52 by:
cold worked alloy 690 by forging at 25 C by 20%
tested near peak in CGR (near Ni/NiO transition)
tested at 360C to accelerate testing
used periodic gentle cyclic loading to activate SCC
Observed very low growth rates as we approach
constant K conditions, with one specimen showing
reticence to sustain growth, the other growing slowly
5-136
SCC of Alloy 690
Summary
Ongoing, conservative assessment of possible Alloy 690
susceptibility to crack growth through PWSCC involves:
cold working test materials (plate & CRDM samples)
by 20 to 40% through forging at 25C
choosing simulated primary water chemistry to be
near the known CGR peak for Alloy 600
(near the Ni/NiO transition)
testing at elevated temperatures of 340 and 360C
using periodic "gentle" cyclic loading to (re-)activate
possible SCC
using both constant, high K and varying (dK/da)
loading to maximize CGR response
5-137
SCC of Alloy 690
Preliminary Conclusions
Ongoing, conservative assessment of possible Alloy 690
susceptibility to crack growth through PWSCC shows:
slow crack growth appears to occur in some (but not
all) Alloy 690 materials, even at constant K
rising dK/da loading shows somewhat higher CGRs
and may be relevant in certain field situations
truly intergranular crack propagation has not yet been
demonstrated for Alloy 690 materials
Analogous testing of Alloys 152 and 52 is now starting
Future work will examine the possibility of increased
PWSCC susceptibility in the HAZ of Alloy 690
5-138
6
SESSION 2B: REPAIR METHODS AND
TECHNOLOGIES
The subject of repair methods and technologies was addressed by six participants in Session 2B.
Summaries of the presentations are given below followed by the questions asked, responses
provided, and comments made by the participants concerning each presentation. Click on the
links to access directly copies of the materials presented together with extended abstracts.
Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly for Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted
Instrument Nozzles, presented by W. Sims, Entergy (Paper 2B.1)
This presentation was given by W. Sims of Entergy and authored by W. Sims of Entergy, P.
Kreitman of PCI Energy Services, and J. McGarry of Westinghouse. The main points made
x This presentation discussed developments related to the Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly
(MNSA) device that provides both sealing and structural support for small-bore nozzle
connections. It was developed starting in 1993 as an alternative to weld repair for leaks in
J-groove welds of Alloy 600 instrumentation nozzles, and it can also prevent potential
leakage at susceptible nozzle sites. MNSA installation is faster than welded repairs, can be
installed with water in the vessel (core offload is not required), and no NDE (PT or UT) is
required as part of the repair operation. MNSAs have been installed at more than 10 plants in
the U.S. since 1998. The presentation included a description of the plant-specific
engineering analysis required, along with licensing issues, installation tooling descriptions,
process steps, and schedule durations for a typical MNSA-2 installation.
x The new MNSA-2 design is an improvement over the original MNSA-1 design because it
seals on a machined counterbore instead of the outside of the vessel or pipe. The MNSA-2
also addresses installation issues on extremely inclined nozzle locations, and it was
developed as a repair option for reactor vessel bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI)
nozzles and pressurizer heater sleeves. The MNSA-2 system and special installation tooling
has been qualified for BMI nozzle applications, and an ASME Code Case (N-733) has been
developed to gain acceptance of the device as a permanent repair solution. In seismic load
testing, the MNSA-2 acted as a rigid body. General corrosion of the base metal exposed to
primary coolant is one of the listed plant-specific analyses, but corrosion rates are small for
deaerated, unconcentrated primary water.
6-1
x The MNSA-2 has several key design features:
It is a split device, so the pressure boundary does not have to be broken for installation,
eliminating any risk of uncovering the core.
It has an anti-ejection feature preventing a LOCA in the unlikely case of complete weld
failure.
It includes a leak (channel) tube as a redundancy to divert reactor coolant away from the
vessel in the event that the primary seal ever leaked.
It uses Belleville washers and a Grafoil seal compressed by bolts.
x The MNSA-2 was used to avert a possible 12-day extension of an ANO Unit 2 refueling
outage in the spring 2002, when six MNSA-2 devices were installed to repair leaking
pressurizer heater sleeves, saving the utility as much as $13 million compared to the costs
that would have resulted from mobilization and performance of welded repairs. One device
was installed in less than two shifts after a leak was found during heatup.
x Question (S. Janes): MNSA-1 installation requires NDE of the base metal to ensure there is
no carbon steel wastage. Why not with MNSA-2?
Response (W. Sims): Minor wastage would be visible during the counterbore operation for
the MNSA-2.
x Question (S. Janes): Do you need to disassemble an installed adjacent MNSA to machine for
a new leak location (i.e., to install an adjacent MNSA)?
Response (W. Sims): This is expected to be unlikely for reactor vessel bottom mounted
instrumentation nozzles. For the CE pressurizers that have the design with 120 heater
sleeves, it is possible that an adjacent MNSA would have to be uninstalled as part of the
operation.
x Question (J. Howson): What is the recovery process for the threaded holes in the shell?
Response (W. Sims): The holes can be oversized and threaded inserts (Heli-Coil) can be
used as required.
x Question (V. Nilekani): What are ISI and leak monitoring requirements on MNSA repairs?
Response (W. Sims): The approved code case allows visual inspection every outage and
dismantling and reassembly every ten years. Any leakage is classified as unidentified
leakage.
x Comment (B. Montgomery): For the BMI nozzle application, the MNSA has to be installed
with the core loaded because the thimbles have to be inserted for dose reasons.
6-2
"Small Pad" Weld Repair of Pressurizer Heater Sleeves and BMI Nozzles,
presented by B. Newton, PCI Energy Services (Paper 2B.2)
This presentation was given by B. Newton of PCI Energy ServicesWestinghouse. The main
points made during the presentation were as follows:
x The presentation described improvements to the conventional weld repair process for Alloy
600 pressurizer heater sleeves and reactor vessel bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI)
nozzles. The basic improvement to this permanent repair option is the use of an integrated
("small") pad design that reduces installation time and cost, reduces manual intervention by
eliminating any J-groove weld, and improves volumetric NDE coverage. The presentation
discussed the repair equipment and the automated repair process, including comparisons with
other repair options.
x The pad volume is reduced by more than 65% compared to conventional repairs, avoiding
overlap with adjacent penetration repairs. This size reduction is achieved by using a four-
axis welding system that enables a remote installation of the pad on the exterior vessel
surface with the replacement nozzle in place. By installing the pad with the nozzle in place,
the need for a J-groove weld (and the associated manual excavation/welding) is eliminated,
resulting in substantial reductions in pad weld thickness and diameter.
x The 48-hour hold step in the repair process is required after cooling and before final NDE.
The remote equipment can be used to make a repair to the pad if needed. Installation time
for the "small pad" repair is comparable to that for midwall weld repairs because of the
higher rate of weld metal addition for the "small pad" repair. The high angle for pressurizer
heater sleeves makes welding challenging for this geometry. The "small pad" footprint
avoids welding over MNSA bolt removal areas. The equipment is designed to function in the
relatively high radiation area under the reactor vessel.
x Question (H. Offer): Does the welding equipment orbit 360 or more on extreme hillside
locations? Does the concentration of bead starts and stops lead to nozzle distortion issues,
and need for alignment inspections?
Response (B. Newton): No, the welding equipment does not orbit 360 on extreme hillside
locations; a "double-up" method is used. A reduced weld thickness results in reduced
distortion. Alignment is monitored using PCIs Laser Trac system. Alloy 690 half-nozzle
movement occurs during welding, and is controlled through bead placement and weld
parameter controls. The Laser Trac system confirms alignment acceptability during and after
welding.
x Question (M. McDevitt): Has PCI resolved problems with weld cracking at the "triple point"
between the vessel, sleeve, and weld pad, and if so, has PCI produced a significant number of
defect-free weld mockups?
Response (B. Newton): PCI has identified the cause of triple point hot cracks, and designed
a weld process that will avoid the problem. PCI has not yet demonstrated a statistically large
sample of defect-free welds.
6-3
x Question (R. Payne): Did you perform a tempering evaluation under varying electrode
orientation and location geometry? Was any metallography performed to verify?
Response (B. Newton): Consistent tempering is expected because variations in electrode
orientation and location geometry will be identical from layer to layer. No metallography
has been performed to date.
x Question (M. Lashley):
1. Will this design allow angle beam examination of the new pad (does it have the
space)?
2. Have any mockups been inspected by NDE?
Response (B. Newton):
1. We perform a 0 inspection from the pad and a 0 inspection from the ID.
2. No.
x Question (M. Holmberg): Do you check the chromium content of the first weld pass to
ensure that the material properties are consistent with that assumed for Alloy 52 weld metal?
Response (B. Newton): No. Dilution is minimized thorough process controls. These
controls have, in other applications, been sufficient to maintain high first-layer chromium
levels. Application-specific testing will be performed as part of the development process.
x Question (S. Boggs):
1. How do you get a complete 0 UT of the pad to vessel with the nozzle in place? It
does not seem possible to get a complete pad UT due to the transducer interference
with the nozzle in place.
2. What envelope will the small pad weld head fit? Will it fit a pressurizer application?
Response (B. Newton):
1. We should be able to get a full exam of the pad to tube with the ID UT. For the pad
surface, accessibility is comparable to UT accessibility for conventional pad repairs.
This, combined with UT from the sleeve ID, will enable UT coverage equivalent to or
superior to that obtained for conventional pad repairs.
2. This equipment was designed to perform embedded flaw repairs in the spatial
envelope that exists under the reactor pressure vessel head. Equipment modifications
will be required to accommodate the smaller accessibility envelope beneath the
pressurizer. These modifications will be focused toward a size envelope equal to or
smaller than that afforded by the intended application.
Mid-Wall Weld Repairs for Pressurizer Heater Sleeves, presented by P.
Amador, Welding Services Inc. (Paper 2B.3)
This presentation was given by P. Amador and authored by P. Amador and J. Puzan of Welding
Services, Inc. (WSI) and D. Mattson of Structural Integrity Associates (SI). The main points
x The presentation described recent developments in welded repair options for pressurizer
heater sleeves developed by the authors including the new mid-wall repair option. The mid-
wall repair option is intended to further reduce repair time beyond the advances realized for
6-4
OD weld pad repairs. This presentation reviewed the mid-wall repair method including
procedures, the licensing process, the status of its first implementation at Waterford 3, and
other potential applications such as reactor vessel bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI)
nozzles. The presentation also briefly covered the experience with weld pad repairs at Palo
Verde Unit 2 and 3 in fall 2003 and fall 2004, respectively.
x The development program for the mid-wall weld repair technology included design and
licensing activities with ASME Section III and Section XI evaluations. The U.S. NRC
formally approved the mid-wall weld repair technique in October 2004, and the technology
was to be implemented in April 2005 at Waterford. The goal for the mid-wall repair method
was to reduce the repair schedule for pressurizer refurbishments to the range of 15-20 days,
thus allowing for pressurizer refurbishment during a normal refueling outage window and a
significant reduction in personnel dose. The program included development and
qualification of the inspection required to support a mid-wall repair.
x The mid-wall repair program involved development of remote welding equipment and
procedures to complete the mid-wall weld without weld root defects typical of similar partial
penetration welds. In addition, the program addressed mechanical tooling provided to ensure
alignment of the repair sufficient for heater reinstallation, tools to allow some of the repairs
to progress with the pressurizer filled, as well as tools required for PT and UT to document
weld quality in the field. A test program having the goal of no "triple point anomalies" or
welding solidification issues generated numerous defect-free weld samples.
x WSI/SI experience with OD weld pad repairs has included 11 of the 14 currently operating
CE-design plants in the U.S. The actual mid-wall weld is applied as an orbital welding
process, with a 0.4" shear length. The mid-wall weld sequential repair procedure comprises
four distinct phases:
Phase I: Remove heater, decontaminate, cut sleeve, and clean
Phase II: Place new sleeve into position, and install mid-wall weld head
Phase III: Perform final machining of weld ID, and perform remote video PT
Phase IV: Perform final automated UT, and reinstall heater and seal weld
The ID sever tool used in Phase I mounts to the adjacent nozzle. Each mid-wall weld head
has a lifetime of about 60 penetrations. Digital control is used to improve process control.
The root of the mid-wall weld is isolated from the primary water environment.
x Question (M. McDevitt): Has WSI developed and tested tooling that can extract any defects
detected on the mid-wall weld, and repair the excavation?
Response (P. Amador): Yes. WSI would completely machine out the new heater sleeve and
mid-wall weld, and repeat the installation. WSI has successfully demonstrated this
evolution.
6-5
x Question (G. Alkire): Has there been any corrosion testing performed on completed welds to
assess their susceptibility to PWSCC?
Response (P. Amador): No. Alloy 52 is considered to be resistant to PWSCC.
The Embedded Flaw Process for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head
Penetrations, presented by W. Bamford, Westinghouse (Paper 2B.4)
This presentation was given by W. Bamford of Westinghouse and authored by W. Bamford of
Westinghouse and P. Kreitman of PCI Energy Services. The main points made during the
x The embedded flaw repair for reactor vessel head penetrations (such as CRDM nozzles) was
developed in 1993, and first implemented at DC Cook 2 in 1996. The process was adopted
for OD weld repairs subsequent to the initial work in the early 1990s for CRDM nozzle ID
surfaces. The process has been given generic approval by the U.S. NRC including for J-
groove weld surfaces through issuance of Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs). Inspections
required by the July 3, 2003, SER are consistent with those for a structural weld, with both
UT and surface examinations required in most cases.
x Embedded flaw repairs using Alloy 52 weld metal additions seal cracks from the
environment, stopping PWSCC, and are permanent, nonstructural repairs. The small
thickness of the embedded flaw repair minimizes residual stresses in the weld and makes the
repair process relatively quick. Three layers of weld are required on attachment weld repairs,
and two layers for the tube ID or OD. The required welding can be performed remotely.
x The residual stresses produced by the embedded flaw technique have been measured using
mockups and found to be relatively low because of the small thickness of the weld. This
implies that no new cracks will initiate and grow in the area adjacent to the repair weld, so
long as it is not in a highly stressed region. The small residual stress produced by the
embedded flaw weld will act constantly, and therefore, have no effect on the already low
fatigue usage factors for this region.
x For embedded flaw repairs on the nozzle ID surface, Alloy 52 weld metal is applied to a 90
circumferential extent of the ID surface so that the edges of the applied weld metal are in the
compressive residual stress zones of the ID surface. For embedded flaw repairs on the nozzle
OD surface, Alloy 52 weld metal is applied to the full circumference. For an ID flaw the
repair can be accomplished in one half day, while for an OD or weld flaw the repair may take
as long as 1.5 days.
x The embedded flaw repair process is now fully developed and has been applied to at least 18
penetrations in five plants to date. Embedded flaw repairs remain in service at the following
plants: DC Cook 2 (two different applications including ID and OD repairs of the same
nozzle), Beaver Valley 1, ANO-1, and San Onofre 3. Leakage from one of the CRDM
penetrations at North Anna repaired using an embedded flaw technique was the result of
incomplete coverage of the Alloy 82/182 wetted surface due to misinterpretation of the
location of the interface between the weld buttering and the head low alloy steel. Lessons
6-6
learned and corrective actions have been implemented for this experience. The oldest repair,
at DC Cook 2 in 1996, has shown no degradation in recent examinations including during an
examination in 2004. A plant in Japan also recently implemented an embedded flaw repair.
Advances in Design and Implementation of Alloy 52 Structural Weld
Overlay Repair Welding, presented by B. Newton, PCI Energy Services
(Paper 2B.5)
This presentation was given by B. Newton of PCI Energy ServicesWestinghouse. The main
x The presentation discussed the development of structural weld overlay designs for PWR
piping, including a recent Alloy 52 weld development program. This program, which
addressed the key issues of welding sequence, welding equipment design, and process
parameters, resulted in the process improvements necessary for high quality (i.e., reduced
oxides, artifacts, and inclusions) weld overlays to be produced using orbital progression. The
improvements to the orbital progression process were achieved through improved process
controls and use of advanced welding equipment. The engineering design of the weld
overlays was coordinated with field inspection capabilities.
x The relatively high chromium content (2831.5%) of Alloy 52 and 52M makes these weld
metals easily oxidized, increasing welding difficulty. Optimization of gas (argon) shielding
is important because of the reduction in oxidation achieved.
x The first structural weld overlay for a PWR was applied at TMI Unit 1 to repair a part-depth
flaw in an Alloy 182 weld safe end region. [Editor: During the fall of 2003, a part-depth
(approximately 45% through wall) axial indication was discovered in a repaired pressurizer
surge line nozzle butt weld at TMI Unit 1 [15]. The indication had the characteristics of
PWSCC, but the presence of PWSCC was not confirmed.]
x Alloy 52 filler metal relies on aluminum and titanium as deoxidizers, and these elements
have proven troublesome with regard to weld quality. During the downhill progression
portion of the orbital weld, oxide inclusions tend to aggregate. Ultrasonic examination
consistently identifies these areas as rejectable "lack of bond" defects. To date, this problem
has been addressed through the use of a double-uphill welding progression instead of the
orbital weld progression.
x Orbital overlay welding has several advantages over other welding progressions:
Decreased welding time
Decreased radiation exposure
Decreased machining and prep time due to more regular final deposit shape
Fewer challenges to weld quality due to fewer starts and stops and decreased manual
interventions
15
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Cracking in Pressurizer Safety and Relief Nozzles and in Surge Line
Nozzle," NRC Information Notice 2004-11, May 6, 2004.
6-7
x Due to the poor machinability of Alloy 52, another goal of the development effort was to
eliminate the final machining step from the process. In addition, a joint PCI/EPRI effort is
underway to minimize the extent of sacrificial layers (which have an inadequate chromium
level for resistance to PWSCC). The goal of this investigation is to show that adequate
chromium levels are achieved after one (or less) sacrificial layer on carbon steel.
Beneficial Application of Alloy 52M Filler Materials to Dissimilar Metal
Weldments, presented by P. Amador, Welding Services Inc. (Paper 2B.6)
This presentation was given by P. Amador and authored by P. Amador and A. Auvil of Welding
Services, Inc., R. Smith of Structural Integrity Associates, S. Kiser of Special Metals Inc., and S.
Findlan and A. McGehee of EPRI. The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
x The authors have worked together to evaluate the use of Alloy 52 and 52M materials for
weld overlays (particularly for ambient temper bead applications) and for pressurizer mid-
wall heater sleeve repairs. This presentation described the experiments and testing
conducted, using field-simulated geometries, to evaluate the weldability of Alloy 52M.
Significant advantages were observed in the Alloy 52M weld deposits that improved the dye
penetrant surface examinations and the ultrasonic volumetric examinations. Results also
suggest that Alloy 52M has a greater tolerance to variations in welding parameters that avoid
cracking in the weld (both hot and cold cracking). In addition, the metallurgical evaluations
confirmed a significant reduction in the presence of oxides and small microfissures dispersed
throughout the weld deposit. The program concluded that high quality welds can be made
reliably using Alloy 52M filler material, and that the probability for making successful welds
is very high.
x Hot and cold cracking have been documented in a number of Alloy 52 applications, and
Alloy 52 weldments are known to exhibit a variety of entrapped oxide conditions. All of
these conditions affect the inspections required to document a quality deposit. To address
issues of concern, Special Metals Company has refined and improved the chemistry and
processing of Alloy 52, and the modified filler material Alloy 52M has been developed and
investigated by several users. The only difference in the specification of composition for
Alloy 52M versus Alloy 52 is that Alloy 52M has a higher specified range of niobium
(0.50-1.0% versus 0.10% maximum), although Alloy 52M heats typically have higher
manganese and lower aluminum. The use of Alloy 52M is very beneficial for weld overlay
applications because in addition to providing a highly corrosion resistant deposit, it can be
deposited using conventional orbital welding techniques (360 degree application), which
results in reduced welding time in comparison to the double-up approach.
x An experimental study investigated a full -inch thick overlay of Alloy 52M(S) filler
material on a 10-inch diameter carbon steel pipe. Alloy 52M(S) is Alloy 52M subjected to
special cleaning steps during the wire drawing process and denoted as "super-clean."
Dilution of the weld deposit with iron was measured to demonstrate that the initial layer of
the Alloy 52M is adequate to accommodate any dilution effects. (The first weld layer had a
chromium content of 26.3%, better than the target of 24%.) Punch marks were placed onto
6-8
the pipe to facilitate measurements of shrinkage. The additional axial shrinkage with each
progressive weld layer was observed to decrease due to the increased pipe rigidity after each
layer was applied. Most of the overlay was free of UT indications, but one region of
indications (3.7 inches circumferential by 2.3 inches axial) was detected on the downhill side
primarily at the mid-plane of the overlay. The indications were found to be primarily due to
porosity, with no evidence of hot cracks or ductility dip cracks. The weld porosity was likely
due to very low Power Ratio weld parameters. The weld quality was demonstrated to be
excellent even with 360 degree application in a 5G horizontal pipe position. The study also
addressed mid-wall welded repairs of pressurizer heater sleeves (also see Paper 2B.3). The
extra cleaning steps used with the super clean version of Alloy 52M appeared to be beneficial
for thick deposits such as weld overlays because the deposits have fewer oxide "floaters" and
improved resistance to ductility dip cracking and hot cracking.
x The Alloy 52M orbital weld overlay process was applied at Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 as a repair
for indications detected in February 2005 in a piping butt weld connecting the hot-leg RCS
piping to a drain line. No flaws were reported for the overlay weld. Future plans for the
weld overlay process included the EPRI preemptive weld overlay (PWOL) mockup program
for a pressurizer surge nozzle geometry and further development of the effective use of the
Power Ratio parameter.
x Question (D. Waskey): What position was the 26% chromium content value taken from?
Response (P. Amador): There is a good uniformity in the chromium content around the
circumference.
x Comment (P. Riccardella): I would like to make a comment on UT acceptance of weld
overlays. Part of the problem that all vendors have been dealing with to address oxide
floaters, etc. (as discussed by B. Newton and P. Amador) relates to UT acceptance standards.
Section XI standards are based on structural significance vs. Section III standards which are
workmanship-based. Many floater/lack of fusion type indications would be acceptable by
Section XI but not by Section III. Unfortunately, the new version of Code Case N-638
(Revision 2) discussed by D. Waskey yesterday invokes Section III standards, versus the
prior version (N-638, Revision 1) which permits Section XI standards. I fear that this is a
step backwards, and may result in unnecessary repairs and outage delays.
Response (D. Waskey): I agree fully with your comment and concern. However, the Code
Committee (WG-W Section XI) voted unanimously to respond to the NRC Regulatory Guide
1.147 R14 restriction so that utilities would not have to get relief to use N-638.
It should also be noted that the draft Code Case for nickel-alloy weld overlays will have
the similar desired Section XI NDE as found in N-504 and pending Appendix "P" for
stainless steel weld overlays. Therefore, there would only be a conflict with the temper bead
portion of the nickel-alloy weld overlays.
Discussions with the NRC are pursuing to understand and resolve their restriction.
6-9
Contact information:
Paul Kreitman
(847) 990-7443
kreitmpj@pci.westinghouse.com
MECHANICAL NOZZLE SEAL ASSEMBLY FOR
REACTOR VESSEL BOTTOM MOUNTED INSTRUMENT NOZZLES
Authors:
William D. Sims
Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 State Road 333
Russellville, AR 72845
Paul J. Kreitman, P.E.
PCI Energy Services LLC
One Energy Drive
Lake Bluff, IL 60048
John T. McGarry
Westinghouse Electric Company LLC
20 International Drive
Windsor, CT 06095
ABSTRACT
Increased concern over the susceptibility of Bottom Mounted Instrument (BMI) Nozzles
to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) have caused plant owners with
Westinghouse and B&W designed pressurized water reactors to look for practical repair
contingencies. In response to this industry demand, Westinghouse has developed a new
version of its Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly (MNSA2) for BMI applications.
MNSA devices have been successfully implemented on a variety of small bore nozzle
applications including Pressurizer heater sleeves, Pressurizer instrument nozzles and
reactor coolant system RTD taps. The MNSA mechanically seals leaking nozzles or can
prevent potential leakage at susceptible nozzle sites. Westinghouse and Entergy Nuclear
South co-developed an improved version of the system, MNSA2, to address installation
issues on extremely inclined nozzle locations, such as pressurizer outer periphery heater
sleeves. Entergy Nuclear has patented the new design.
The MNSA2 system uses a machined counterbore around the nozzle so that the seal is
located against a flat surface at the bottom of the counterbore. This is a significant
improvement over the original design, which relied on the vessel or pipe as-found surface
for seal contact. The new design saved Entergy, one of the largest nuclear operators in
the U.S., as much as 13 million dollars in 2002. The MNSA2 was used to avert a
possible 12-day extension of Arkansas Nuclear Ones Unit 2 refueling outage in the
Spring of 2002, when six MNSA2 devices were used to repair leaking heater sleeves on
6-11
Contact information:
Paul Kreitman
(847) 990-7443
kreitmpj@pci.westinghouse.com
the pressurizer. As direct result of this effort, the Entergy Nuclear team was awarded the
coveted Top Industry Practice Award (TIP) by the Nuclear Energy Institute in 2003.
Westinghouse has recently qualified the MNSA2 system and special installation tooling
for BMI applications in preparation for three 2003-2004 refueling outages. As
recommended by the NRC, Westinghouse has developed an ASME Code Case to gain
acceptance of the device as a permanent repair solution.
This presentation will explain in detail how the mechanical seal device works, and
discuss the advantages of this repair methodology compared to traditional half-nozzle
welded repairs. A description of the plant specific engineering analysis required is also
included along with licensing issues, installation tooling descriptions, process steps and
schedule durations for a typical MNSA2 installation.
Figure 1 - MNSA2 Device
6-12
Slide 1
Entergy
Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly
for Reactor Vessel
Bottom Mounted Instrument Nozzles
William Sims - Entergy
Paul J. Kreitman - PCI Energy Services
John T. McGarry - Westinghouse Nuclear Services
Presented at the
2005 PWSCC of Alloy 600 International Conference &
Exhibition
March 7-10, 2005
6-13
Slide 2
Entergy
Agenda
zMNSA Overview
zInstallation History
zQualification
zEngineering Analyses
zInstallation
zConclusion
6-14
Slide 3
Entergy
Typical Existing BMI Design
Vessel material is Low-Alloy Steel (SA-533).
Type 304 Stainless steel clad applied to ID
surface. Clad thickness is 7/32 nominal.
1/4 thick A-182 pad is weld deposited on
O.D. surface of vessel at each BMI location,
for the older Wplants.
Nozzle material is Alloy 600 (SB-166)
Clearance fit between Nozzle and carbon
steel vessel
Partial Penetration J-weld between nozzle
and vessel
J-Weld is A-182 Material
J-Weld prep (before buttering is applied) is
5/8 to 1 deep
6-15
Slide 4
Entergy
Typical BMI Array BMI
6-16
Slide 5
Entergy
MNSA Overview
zThe MNSA (Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly)
is a mechanical device that provides both sealing
and structural support for small bore nozzle connections.
zDeveloped as an alternative to weld repair for repairing leaks
in J-groove welded Alloy 600 instrument nozzles.
zMNSA is installed from the outside of the vessel and can be
installed on a leaking nozzle. They have been installed on
PWR Pressurizers and Hot Leg nozzles without having to
offload the fuel or drain the system.
6-17
Slide 6
Entergy
MNSA Overview
zMNSA has been designed and qualified as a repair for an
ASME Section III, Class1 pressure boundary.
zNRC has accepted the use of MNSA for other reactor
coolant nozzles on a two cycle basis
zWestinghouse has developed an ASME Code Case (N-733)
to justify MNSA as a permanent repair
zMNSA-2 clamp won the 2003 NEI TIP award for Entergy
South
6-18
Slide 7
Entergy
MNSA-2 Installation on BMI
Nozzle
MNSA-2 is an
improvement over the
MNSA-1 since it seals
on a machined
counterbore instead
of the outside of the
vessel or pipe
6-19
Slide 8
Entergy
MNSA-2
Main
Components
6-20
Slide 9
Entergy
Compression Collar
z Split Compression Collar
Weep holes allows fluid to be
channeled away from vessel in
event of primary seal leakage
6-21
Slide 10
Entergy
Channel Tube
z Diverts RC away from
vessel in the event primary
seal ever leaked
6-22
Slide 11
Entergy
Upper Inboard and
Outboard Flange
z Holds compression collar together and
loads seal through the collar, threaded rods,
and nuts
6-23
Slide 12
Entergy
Inboard Upper Flange
z Inboard flange
assembled onto
compression collar
z Outboard flange fits
over the top of inboard
flange forming a
continuous solid flange
6-24
Slide 13
Entergy
MNSA Installation Experience
MNSAs have been installed at the following Plants
zSONGS 2 & 3 (installed since 1998)
zCalvert Cliffs 1 & 2 (installed since 2000)
zFort Calhoun (installed since 2000)
zWaterford 3 (installed for one cycle in 1999)
zMillstone 2 (installed since 2002)
zPalo Verde 1, 2 & 3 (installed since 2000)
zANO 2 (installed since 2002)
6-25
Slide 14
Entergy
Qualification Testing of MNSA-
2
zAmbient Temperature Hydrostatic Testing
zThermal Cycle Testing
zSeismic Load Testing
6-26
Slide 15
Entergy
Plant Specific Analysis
zSection XI Evaluation of Flaw
zCorrosion Evaluation of Exposed Base Metal
zSection III Design Analysis
MNSA-2 Device
BMI Nozzle
Reactor Vessel Shell
6-27
Slide 16
Entergy
Installation Operations
zTurn Outside Diameter of Nozzle (if required)
zDrill and Tap Mounting Holes
zCounterbore Seal Surface
zMachine anti-ejection groove (if required)
zAssemble MNSA2 clamp
zInstall MNSA2 clamp
6-28
Slide 17
Entergy
O.D. Turning Module
6-29
Slide 18
Entergy
Drilling and Tapping Machine
6-30
Slide 19
Entergy
Counterbore Machine
Cutting Head
6-31
Slide 20
Entergy
Aligning Mounting Fixture
On Mock-Up
Uses tapped holes for
attachment to shell
Alignment:
CONCENTRIC TO NOZZLE
MOUNTING FACE
PERPINDICULAR TO NOZZLE
6-32
Slide 21
Entergy
Anti-Ejection
Groove Machining
6-33
Slide 22
Entergy
Six MNSA-2s Installed
at ANO Unit 2
6-34
Slide 23
Entergy
One MNSA-2 Installed at ANO 2
After Leak Found at Heatup
Installed in < 2 Shifts
Providing Entergy
Significant Savings in:
9Outage Duration
9Dose
9Replacement Power
Cost
6-35
Slide 24
Entergy
Conclusion
Why use MNSA for a Repair Strategy?
Installation is faster than welded repairs 2 shifts vs. 5 or more days for
a welded repair
Can be installed with water in the vessel
Core offload not required
No NDE Required
Significant dose reduction
zInstallation does not require breaching the pressure boundary (No risk
of uncovering core)
zAnti-ejection device prevents LOCA in case of complete weld failure
zOn-the-Shelf Contingency Plans Available
6-36
Abst ract
Small Pad Weld Repair of Pressurizer Heat er Sleeves and BMI Nozzles
Bruce Newt on
Direct or, Welding Engineering and Technology Development
847 990 7484
Fax: 847 362 6441
Email: newt onb@pci. west inghouse. com
Cracking in Alloy 600 J- groove welds cont inues t o t rouble t he nuclear
indust ry. J- Groove welds have been used ext ensively in Pressurizer inst rument
nozzles and heat er sleeves, as well as RCS inst rument nozzles and RV in- core
inst rument nozzles. Of part icular int erest are t he J- groove welds at t aching
Pressurizer heat er sleeves t o t he lower Pressurizer heads in CE plant s, and in
some West inghouse plant s. These welds have proven part icularly suscept ible
t o cracking and leakage, increasing t he level of indust ry int erest in t heir repair
or replacement . Pressurizer replacement is one available opt ion, but ot her,
more cost - effect ive repair alt ernat ives are needed. BMI nozzles are inst alled in
t he RPV bot t om head using a similar J- groove weld configurat ion. Recent BMI
leakage concerns indicat e a st rong need for a robust , cost - effect ive repair
alt ernat ive t hat will provide long- t erm mit igat ion.
The small pad weld repair met hod uses a uniquely designed four- axis
welding head t o inst all a repair pad on t he vessels ext erior surface. This weld
pad differs from convent ional repairs, in t hat t he pad size is reduced by more
t han 65%. This size reduct ion is achieved because t he four- axis welding
syst em enables remot e inst allat ion of t he pad wit h t he replacement nozzle in-
place a t ask no ot her welding syst em can duplicat e. By inst alling t he pad
wit h t he nozzle in place, t he need for a J- groove weld ( and t he associat ed
manual excavat ion/ welding) is eliminat ed. By eliminat ing t he J- groove weld,
subst ant ial reduct ions in pad weld t hickness and diamet er are achieved. The
result is a small pad t hat uses exist ing, approved met hodology ( i. e. , design,
inst allat ion, and NDE) t o achieve a permanent repair t hat is bot h cost and
schedule efficient . This unique repair is equally applicable t o Pressurizer heat er
sleeve replacement s and t o BMI nozzle repairs/ replacement s.
This paper discusses t he repair equipment , addresses t he overall repair
process, and cont rast s t he benefit s of t his repair approach wit h ot her repair
met hods current ly available.
6-37
Slide 1
Small Pad Weld Repair of Pressurizer Heater
Sleeves and BMI Nozzles
PCI Energy Services
6-38
Slide 2
Discussion Topics
z Pressurizer Heater Sleeve Configuration
z Repair Sequence
z Welding Machine Capabilities
z Benefits of Integral Pad, compared to:
Conventional Pad
Midwall Repair
z Repair in MNSA Locations
z Suitability for BMI repair
6-39
Slide 3
Initial Preparation
z Preparatory Steps
Remove Heater
Manual Cut
At socket weld
Extract Heater
Stuck Heater
Contingency plan
Pressurizer Shell
SA-533 Grade B
P3 Group 3
Existing Sleeve
SB-167 Alloy 600
6-40
Slide 4
Sleeve Removal
z Remove existing sleeve
Mechanically clean bore
Mechanically clean remnant
ID
PT/MT weld area
Surface exam area:
Weld Area
Base metal zone
extending 5 from
weld edge
Remnant
Surface Exam
Area
6-41
Slide 5
Replacement Sleeve
z Insert Replacement Sleeve
Section
z Prepare and Install
Laser-Trac Alignment Fixture
Positive, precision
alignment monitoring
Real-time feedback during
welding
z Result
Precise alignment between
replacement sleeve and
tube support plates
Simplified heater
reinsertion
6-42
Slide 6
Install Weld
z Integral Weld
Joins vessel and sleeve
Single weld progression
z Ambient Temperature
Temperbead
N-638 Methodology
Three weld layers
Alloy 52 Filler
6-43
Slide 7
Integral-Pad Configuration
Integral pad
Conventional Pad
J-Groove
(Conventional
Pad Only)
z Integral-Pad weld design
Integrates pad and
J-groove weld
Eliminates separate, manual
J-groove excavation/weld
Enables substantial weld size
reduction
z Result: Substantial Cost and
Schedule savings
6-44
Slide 8
z Contour-tracking
weld system
Unique to PCI
Four axes of movement
Enables unique, optimized
approach to welding
Proven, robust system
Beaver Valley Unit 1
North Anna Unit 2
ANO Unit 1
Five welding assemblies currently
available
55+ PCI welders trained in its
use
Training ongoing in PCI shop
Welding Equipment Set-up
3D Drawing of PCI
Weld Head
6-45
Slide 9
Contour-Tracking Weld System
6-46
Slide 10
48 Hour Hold
z Hold required before final
NDE
z Operations performed
during hold:
Prep pad for NDE
Remove alignment
fixture
Perform preliminary
(info only) NDE
Preparation/Welding of
other penetrations
6-47
Slide 11
ID UT
Probe
Surface UT
Probe
PT
Region
Final NDE
z Straight Beam UT
Qualified
Proven and accepted
Supplemental ID exam
Evaluates fusion between weld
and sleeve
Superior to conventional J-
Groove surface NDE
Result: Superior
assessment of pressure
boundary integrity
z PT
Weld and 5 adjacent
areas
6-48
Slide 12
PCI-Pad vs. Conventional Pad
z Reduced diameter and thickness
Weld volume reduced by >60%
Reduced volume = faster installation
Reduced thickness and diameter avoids overlap with
adjacent penetration repairs
z J-Groove weld eliminated
Eliminates J-groove preparation time
No manual welding required
Reduced manual intervention = reduced radiation
exposure
6-49
Slide 13
PCI-pad vs. Midwall Repair
z PCI-pad based on proven design
Avoids new regulatory issues
Avoids new design issues
z PCI-pad optimizes accessibility
Direct, hands-on monitoring of all activities
All tooling is external sturdy and accessible
Improved access for in-process repairs
z PCI-pad uses proven NDE methodology
Improved volumetric exam coverage
Defects/discontinuities readily repairable
z Reduced weld volume can enable weld installation times
comparable with midwall welds
6-50
Slide 14
PCI-pad in MNSA locations
z Westinghouse sleeve design
well suited to MSNA removal
locations
z PCI-pad footprint avoids
welding over MNSA bolt
removal areas
z Readily converts MNSA sites
to permanent weld repairs
Westinghouse
MNSA sleeve
design
MNSA
Bolt Holes
6-51
Slide 15
BMI Nozzle Repair
z Method suited to BMI Repairs
Temporary
(Using Alloy 600 sleeve)
Permanent
(Using Alloy 690 Sleeve)
z Suited to MNSA removal sites
z Contour-tracking weld system
already adapted to robotic
delivery system
6-52
Slide 16
Conclusions
z Integral Pad has compelling advantages
Smaller footprint, faster installation
Reduced manual intervention (no J-groove
weld)
Improved volumetric NDE coverage
z Integral pad relies on proven, existing
equipment for welding
z Integral pad methodology is readily adapted to
other nozzle configurations, including BMI
nozzles
6-53
Mid-Wall Weld Repairs for Pressurizer Heater Sleeves
-expanded abstract
Pedro Amador, Welding Service Inc.
Jim Puzan, Welding Service Inc.
Dick Mattson, Structural Integrity Associates
PWSCC of Alloy 600
2005 International Conference & Exhibition
March 7 - 10, 2005
Tamaya Resort and Spa, Santa Ana Pueblo, NM
Abstract
In the fall of 2003, while under contract to Arizona Public Service Company, Welding Services
Inc. (WSI) and Structural Integrity Associates (SI) supported the proactive repair of 34
previously unrepaired Alloy 600 heater sleeves on the Palo Verde Unit 2 pressurizer. This
project included development and use of the latest advancements in severing and welding
technology for this OD pad half nozzle repair. The project was completed in approximately 36
days on a non-critical path basis during a steam generator replacement outage for Palo Verde
Unit 2.
In the fall of 2004, WSI performed the same repair to Palo Verde Unit 3; this time on 36 Alloy
600 heater sleeves. WSI designed and implemented additional tooling, based on Unit 2 lessons
learned, in an effort to reduce the repair schedule since the Unit 3 repair was critical path. The
project was completed in approximately 28 days thus improving the repair schedule for the
slightly larger scope by approximately 8 days.
Additionally in 2004, WSI and SI funded and commenced an extensive R&D program aimed to
further reduce the repair schedule for pressurizer refurbishments to the range of 15-20 days; thus
allowing for pressurizer refurbishments during an otherwise normal refueling outage. A
significant reduction in dose over the conventional OD pad repair was also anticipated. The
WSI/SI program included development and qualification of both the welding and inspection
required to support a mid-wall repair.
WSI/SIs mid-wall repair and inspection process has been approved by the NRC. Entergy has
reviewed and validated the repair development program in support of planned implementation at
Waterford 3 in April 2005.
The program involved development of an array of tools and procedures to implement the repair.
This included remote welding equipment and procedures to complete the mid-wall weld without
weld root defects typical of similar partial penetration welds. In addition, the program addressed
mechanical tooling provided to ensure alignment of the repair (required for heater reinstallation),
tools to allow some of the repairs to progress with the pressurizer filled, as well as tools required
6-55
for NDE (PT and UT) to document weld quality in the field. The development program also
included design and licensing activities required to obtain NRC approval of the repair for
implementation.
This presentation will include a review of existing repair technologies, a description of recent
pressurizer heater sleeve repairs (Palo Verde Unit 2 and Unit 3, SONGS Unit 3), and the tooling
strategies employed. This presentation will also review the latest generation of heater sleeve
repair tooling the mid-wall repair technology, including procedures, the licensing process, and
the status of its first implementation at Waterford 3. Lastly, the presentation will review other
potential applications for mid-wall repair technology including reactor vessel bottom mounted
instrument penetrations (BMIPs).
6-56
1 Welding Services Inc.
Mid-Wall Weld Repairs for
Pressurizer Heater Sleeves
Repairs for Small Bore
J-Groove Welded Nozzles
EPRI 2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600
Conference, March 2005
Santa Ana Pueblo, NM
6-57
Contents
Background
Repair Concepts
ASME Code Evaluations
Mid-Wall Weld Repair Procedure
Applications
Summary
6-58
Background
Small bore nozzle/weld cracking has occurred in
PWRs since the mid-1980's
Local repairs/pre-emptive repairs/replacement have
been implemented
Posture in U.S. today is pre-emptive repairs or
replacement
Pressurizer
RPV top head
Two weld repair concepts have/will be implemented
Outside diameter (OD) weld pad repair
Mid-wall weld repair
6-59
Repair Concepts
6-60
Gen 1 OD Weld Pad Repairs
WSI / SI implementation experience
Calvert Cliffs
St. Lucie
Waterford
SONGS
ANO-2
Palo Verde
Conventional technology applied
Round weld pads
Existing nozzle removed using
boring/machining
6-61
Gen 2 Advanced OD Weld Pad Repairs
Palo Verde 2 in Fall 2003 (34 repairs in 36 days)
Palo Verde 3 in Fall 2004 (36 repairs in 28 days)
Improvements over conventional approach
Nozzle high speed severing
Square/rectangular weld pads, optimally sized
Pad boring via engineered machining system
6-62
Gen 1 and 2 OD Weld Pad Repairs
Disadvantages of OD weld pad repairs
Repair schedule and dose for multiple repairs (e.g., heater
sleeves, BMIPs)
Replacement sleeve alignment issues
Root of weld is exposed to PWSCC environments
These issues warranted further advancement in repair
technology in 2004 (i.e., mid-wall weld repair)
Continued use of OD weld pad repair applications
Small bore nozzles (less than ~20 mm diameter)
Other unique configurations
6-63
Mid-Wall Weld Repair Project
Background
Cooperative effort between WSI and SI
Project followed January 2004 CE owners meeting at WSI
Development project funded by WSI and SI
WSI repair tooling and NDE-PT
SI design/analysis, licensing, and NDE-UT
APS/Palo Verde served as lead plant for U.S. NRC
licensing
NRC formally approved mid-wall weld repair in October 2004
Entergy and SCE formed Alliance with APS for licensing
support/leverage
Waterford 3 in Spring 2005
Palo Verde 1 in Fall 2005
6-64
Gen 3 Mid-Wall Weld Repair
6-65
ASME Code Evaluations
6-66
Section III Evaluations
Load definition
Design bases (pressure/thermal transients)
Stress analyses
Three-dimensional finite element analyses
Section III evaluations
Stress criteria
Fatigue evaluation
6-67
Pressurizer Bottom Head Finite
Element Model
6-68
Section XI Evaluations
Postulated axial flaw in nozzle, cladding,
and J-groove weld
Stresses extracted from Section III
analyses
Linear elastic fracture mechanics and
elastic-plastic fracture mechanics
techniques utilized
Residual stress analyses
Fatigue crack growth analyses
6-69
Fracture Mechanics Finite Element
Model
6-70
Mid-Wall Weld Repair Sequential
Repair Procedure
6-71
Phase I
1. Determ and remove heater
2. Decontaminate the work area
3. Establish FME boundary, or
water seal as appropriate
4. Cut sleeve close to pressurizer
OD
5. Use high speed sever tool to cut
sleeve at approximately the
pressurizer mid-wall
6. Clean nozzle bore and PT weld
area
6-72
ID Sever Tool with Articulating Arm
6-73
Phase II
1. Install alignment reference
tooling
2. Fit and lock new sleeve
into position
3. Install mid-wall weld head
front-end
Remote video
Wire feed
Water cooled
AVC / auto stop controls
Component assembly for
quick change out
4. Inert gas chamber formed
6-74
Mid-Wall Weld Head Assembly
6-75
Mid-Wall Weld Head Operator Console
6-76
Mid-Wall Weld Repair
(as welded, prior to final surface prep)
Base
Material
Replacement
Sleeve
Mid-Wall
Weld
6-77
Phase III
1. Perform final machining of weld
ID for inspection
2. Remote video PT examination
Brush assembly for penetrant
application
Rack and pinion brush positioning
system
Bore-scope vision with head-up
display
Spray-on tool for developer
Recordable to VHS system
6-78
PT Tooling System
6-79
Phase IV
1. Final Automated NDE-UT
examination
Multi-channel automated
acquisition
Self-contained couplant
supply and return
Remote analysis
2. Remove FME system
3. Reinstall heater and seal
weld
4. Electrically connect heater
6-80
UT Tooling
Tool Head Head
6-81
Mid-Wall Weld Repair Test Program
Objectives of the program
No triple point anomaly or welding solidification issues
No volumetric reinspection of repair BMV per Bulletin 2004-01
Numerous weld samples generated
Large samples and field configuration (1.30 ID)
Sectioning, polishing and metallurgical testing
(photomicrographs)
Integration and testing with mid-wall UT system and verification
through metallurgical testing
Optimization of welding parameters
Successful program numerous defect-free weld samples
generated to complete the qualification and validation
6-82
Mid-Wall Weld Test Program
(20X; typical of numerous samples)
6-83
Applications for Mid-Wall Weld
Repair
J-groove welded Alloy 600 components
Pressurizers
Heater sleeves
Instrument nozzles
Bottom mounted instrument penetrations
(BMIPs)
Other RCS instrument locations
Hot legs
Cold legs
Steam generators
CRDM penetration refurbishments
6-84
Summary
Available small bore nozzle repair technology
options are comprehensive and in third
generation of development
Round OD weld pad repair (Gen 1)
Square OD weld pad repair (Gen 2)
Mid-wall weld repair (Gen 3)
Advanced mid-wall weld repair technology
Demonstrated and available
Licensed by the U.S. NRC
Planned for implementation in 2005 at Waterford
and Palo Verde
6-85
The Embedded Flaw Process for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations
Warren Bamford
Westinghouse Electric
Paul Kreitman
PCI Energy Services
Sealing off a flaw from the PWR environment with a corrosion resistant material
eliminates the most important mechanism of propagation, stress corrosion cracking,
leaving only one other mechanism, which is fatigue. The reactor vessel head is isolated
from the majority of the flow inside the reactor vessel, and as such is a very low fatigue
region. The calculated usage factor in the head region is typically less than 0.1.
Therefore the repair can be considered a permanent one, with a lifetime at least as long
as the reactor vessel.
The embedded flaw repair was originally developed by Westinghouse in 1995, and
presented to the USNRC as a relief request in October of that year. The NRC approved
the approach, and documented their approval in a Safety Evaluation Report dated
February 5, 1996. The repair involves welding a patch over an existing flaw or flaws in a
head penetration or its attachment weld. The repair technique was expanded to apply to
flaws on the OD of head penetration tubes in 2001, and a generic relief for this
application was approved in July 2003.
The embedded flaw repair is based on the concepts of the ASME Code Section XI,
where a flaw is qualified as embedded if it is sufficiently far from the surface of the
vessel that it is not affected by the environment, or any geometric effects resulting from
interaction with the surface. The thickness of the weld was determined directly from the
code requirement. The weldment is Alloy 52 (the companion weld for Alloy 690), which
is highly resistant to primary water stress corrosion cracking.
The embedded flaw repair technique is considered a permanent repair because as
long as a Primary Water Stress Corrosion Crack (PWSCC) remains isolated from the
primary water (PW) environment, it cannot propagate. Since Alloy 52 weldment is highly
resistant to PWSCC, a new PWSCC crack will not initiate and grow through the Alloy 52
overlay to permit the PW environment to contact the susceptible material. The
resistance of Alloy 690 and its associated welds, Alloys 52 and 152, has been
demonstrated by laboratory testing in which no cracking has been observed in simulated
PWR environments, and by approximately 10 years of operational service in steam
generator tubes, where no PWSCC has occurred.
The residual stresses produced by the embedded flaw technique have been
measured and found to be relatively low because of the small thickness of the weld.
This implies that no new cracks will initiate and grow in the area adjacent to the repair
weld, so long as it is not in a highly stressed region. There are no other known
mechanisms for significant crack propagation in this region because the cyclic fatigue
loading is negligible. The Cumulative Usage Factor (CUF) in the upper head region was
calculated to be less than 0.2 in the reactor vessel design report, as well as in various
aging management review reports.
6-87
The thermal expansion properties of Alloy 52 weld metal are not specified in the
ASME code, as is the case for other weld metals. In this case, the properties of the
equivalent base metal (Alloy 690) should be used. For that material, the thermal
expansion coefficient at 600qF is 8.2 E-6 in/in/degree F as found in Section II Part D.
The Alloy 600 base metal has a coefficient of thermal expansion of 7.8 E-6 in/in/degree
F, a difference of about 5 percent.
The effect of this small difference in thermal expansion is that the weld metal will
contract more than the base metal when it cools, thus producing a compressive stress
on the Alloy 600 tube or the attachment weld, where the crack may be located. This
beneficial effect has already been accounted for in the residual stress measurements
reported in the technical basis for the embedded flaw repair.
The small residual stress produced by the embedded flaw weld will act constantly, and
therefore, will have no impact on the fatigue effects in the CRDM region. Since the
stress would be additive to the maximum as well as the minimum stress, the stress
range would not change, and the already negligible usage factor, noted above, for the
region would not change at all.
The embedded flaw repair was first implemented at the DC Cook Unit 2, in 1996. The
repair was carried out entirely remotely, using tools which were installed on the same
end-effector that carried out the inspection of the head penetration. For an inside surface
flaw on the penetration, the repair can be accomplished in one half day, while for an OD
or weld flaw, the repair may take as long as 1.5 days. The thickness of the weld is such
that residual stresses are very small, and measurements have been made on actual
welds to verify this conclusion. For this reason, the embedded flaw technique is unlikely
to have any impact on the region surrounding the repair. In fact, after seven years of
service at DC Cook Unit 2, the embedded flaw repair was inspected and found to be in
its original condition, with no evidence of deterioration. The embedded flaw repair
technique has been applied to at least 18 penetrations in five plants to date.
6-88
Slide 1
The Embedded Flaw Process for
Repair of Reactor Vessel Head
Penetrations
Warren Bamford
Paul Kreitman
March 2005
6-89
Slide 2
zIntroduction
zAttributes
zBasis for the embedded flaw concept
zBasis for selection of Alloy 52 for repair weld
zExperience with embedded flaw repairs
zConclusions
6-90
Slide 3
Embedded Flaw Repairs:
RV Head Penetration and J-Groove Weld
View
A-A
Tube
A600
Weld
82/182
B
u
t
t
e
r
in
g
1
8
2
Weld
182
B
u
t
t
e
r
in
g
1
8
2
30
8
Clad
A
A
Tube
A600
Weld
82/182
B
u
t
t
e
r
i
n
g
1
8
2
3
0
8
C
la
d
Tube
A600
Weld
82/182
3
0
8
C
la
d
5
2
R
e
p
a
ir
W
e
ld
6-91
Slide 4
Introduction
zThe Embedded Flaw repair was developed in 1993, and first
implemented at DC Cook Unit 2 in the spring of 1996
zThe next repair was at North Anna 2, in the spring of 2001
zThe next repair was at Beaver Valley, in the spring of 2002
zPlant-specific relief requests were approved in each case
zOn December 12, 2001, Westinghouse submitted a generic relief
request for an embedded flaw repair that could be applied to
CRDM/CEDM J-weld surfaces.
zNRC approved the process generically with an SER on July 3, 2003
zThe repair was implemented using this process at two plants in the fall of
2004
6-92
Slide 5
Attributes
zSeals cracks from the environment, stopping PWSCC
zSmall thickness minimizes weld residual stresses
zWelding can be done remotely
zSmall amount of welding makes the repair timely
zWeld repair is not needed structurally , since critical flaw sizes
are very large
zEmbedded Flaw repairs are permanent repairs
6-93
Slide 6
Basis for the Embedded Flaw Concept
zOriginal Basis was a WOG repair program, 1993
Investigate and provide a local and 360
o
weld repair on
flawed material.
Provide a design that is consistent with rules of ASME
Section XI
Provide a weld process specification and repair design
package
zMock-ups successfully completed, residual deformations and
stresses measured
zRepairs over cracks were successfully completed
6-94
Slide 7
Depth of Weldment for Embedded Flaw
zSection XI requirement for a flaw to be considered
embedded: S > 0.4a
where S = distance from flaw to surface
a = half width of embedded flaw
zSet width of flaw (2a) equal to penetration thickness
(0.625 in.)
zWeld thickness (S) is then 0.125 inches
zFor smaller flaws the weld thickness can be smaller
6-95
Slide 8
Process
zWelding Procedure Specification and Procedure
Qualification Record Machine Gas Tungsten Arc Welding
Process (Remote)
WPS 3-43/F43-B MC-GTAW and PQR 603, 677 and
694A was utilized.
ASME Section II, Part C, AWS Class. ERNiCrFe-7
(Alloy-52) was used for the overlay weld.
Standard ASME Section IX Groove Weld Procedure.
ASME Section IX Testing included Bends,Tensile,
Hardness and ASTM-A262, Practice A Corrosion
Testing.
6-96
Slide 9
Alloy 52
zAlloy 52 is the weld metal analog of Alloy 690; it is used for
gas metal arc and gas tungsten arc deposition processes
[Alloy 152 = shielded metal arc coated electrode version].
zThe composition is very similar to that of Alloy 690 with
slightly higher Cr [28-31.5 wt %] and controlled additions of
Al and Ti [to 1.1-1.5 max combined]
zDeveloped to minimize issues related to hot cracking and
SCC susceptibility of Alloys 182 and 82
6-97
Slide 10
Alloy 52 - SCC Resistance
zOwing primarily to high Cr content, Alloys 52/152 and 690 exhibit
apparent immunity to primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC)
zService experience with Alloy 690 in SG heat transfer tubing, and
mechanical tube plug applications, and Alloys 52/152 as buttering,
cladding and weld filler materials has been exemplary, with no reported
degradation, after more than 15 years of service
zLaboratory testing of each of these materials emphasizes the corrosion
resistance - no known incidence of crack initiation or crack propagation
in primary water environments
6-98
Slide 11
Embedded Flaw Service Experience:
D C Cook Unit 2
zPen. 75 found to have ID surface flaw in 1994
zDepth approx. 40 percent of wall thickness
zEmbedded Flaw Repair implemented in 1996
zRepair re-inspected in Jan. 2002: No Indications on the weld
repair
6-99
Slide 12
North Anna Implementation
zAs a result of observed leakage on one of these penetrations in 2002, all
three penetrations were re-examined. Evidence of flaws was observed
zAn evaluation of these three repairs has been completed, with the
following conclusions:
The weld repairs did not achieve full coverage of the Alloy 82/182
wetted surface
These exposed Alloy 82/182 surfaces are the location of indications
found in 2002
zLessons learned and corrective actions have been implemented.
6-100
Slide 13
SER on Embedded Flaw
Repairs
zTechnical Basis submitted via WCAP 15987; to become 15987A
zSER issued July 3, 2003
zApproved a non-structural (seal) weld repair, of unspecified thickness
zThree layers of weld required on attachment weld repairs, and two
layers for the tube ID or OD
zSER acceptance was based on Westinghouse application of current
ASME Code fracture mechanics methods
zThe SER states that the embedded flaw repair is approved for
application to CE and Westinghouse designs
6-101
Slide 14
SER on Embedded Flaw
Repairs
z At or Above the Weld
The repair can be used for any flaws in the tube (ID or OD) that meet the ASME Section XI
acceptance criteria, which were endorsed by the NRC by letter to NEI on April 11, 2003.
Larger flaws are to be dealt with on a plant-specific basis
Circumferential flaws in the tube above the weld, regardless of size are treated on a plant-
specific basis, consistent with previous NRC approaches
z Below the weld
Larger flaws on the tube below the weld are approved, regardless of size, provided their
upper extremity does not reach the bottom of the weld
z In the Weld
The repair can be used for flaws of any type in the attachment weld
6-102
Slide 15
SER Requirements
zInspections are consistent with those for a structural weld, requiring
both UT and surface exams in most cases
zInspections must be performed by qualified inspectors
zLicensees must demonstrate that a plant-specific application is
bounded by the WCAP (15987, Rev. 2), including the ASME Code
fracture mechanics evaluation contained in Appendix C of the WCAP
(see SER paragraph 3.6)
6-103
Slide 16
DC Cook Unit 2 Repairs: Fall 2004
6-104
Slide 17
z Used Generic Relief Request, approved by NRC in July
2003
z Three layers on J-weld
z Two layers on penetration tube
z Remotely applied
z Dose:
Repair was 10 ReM
Inspection was 4 ReM
Vent line inspection was 3 ReM
6-105
Slide 18
Repair in Progress: Note Weld
Head
6-106
Slide 19
Completed Repair
6-107
Slide 20
Penetrant Exam in
Progress on Repair
6-108
Slide 21
Conclusions
zEmbedded Flaw Repair process is fully developed
zSER received from NRC, July 2003
zImplementation is complete, and remains in service
at the following plants:
DC Cook 2 [two different applications]
Beaver Valley
ANO-1
SONGS 3
zGood service experience : Oldest repair, at DC
Cook Unit 2, in 1996 has shown no degradation
zImplementation is relatively quick, and can be
accomplished remotely
6-109
Abst ract : Advances in Design and I mplement at ion of Alloy 52
St ruct ural Weld Overlay Repair Welding
Bruce Newt on
PCI Energy Services
Lake Bluff, I L 60044
Phone 847- 990- 7484
Fax : 847- 247- 9077
E- mail: newt onb@pci. west inghouse. com
St ruct ural weld met al overlays have been used for many years
for t he repair of BWR piping, and cont inue t o provide an effect ive
alt ernat ive t o convent ional excavat ion/ rewelding repairs on nuclear
piping and nozzles. These overlays rely on a design philosophy t hat
originat es in ASME Code Case N- 504, and are t ypically inst alled for
safe end regions using t he ambient t emperat ure t emperbead
met hodology described in ASME Code Case N- 638.
Recent ly t he first st ruct ural weld overlay for a PWR was applied
at Three Mile I sland, t o repair a part - t hrough flaw in an Alloy 182 weld
safe end region. As a result of t his finding, West inghouse has
developed st ruct ural weld overlay designs for t he most suscept ible
safe ends in bot h t he West inghouse and Combust ion Engineering
designs. The engineering design of t he weld overlays has been
coordinat ed wit h field inspect ion capabilit ies, as well as a weld
development program at PCI , in order t o bring a complet e solut ion t o
plant s wit h such a need.
St ruct ural overlays normally incorporat e Alloy 52 ( ERNiCrFe- 7)
filler met al. Alloy 52 filler met al relies on aluminum and t it anium as
deoxidizers, and t hese element s have proven t roublesome wit h regard
t o weld qualit y. During t he downhill progression port ion of t he orbit al
weld, oxide inclusions aggregat e. UT consist ent ly ident ifies t hese
areas as rej ect able lack of bond. To dat e, mit igat ion of t his lack of
bond has been effect ed by eliminat ing use of orbit al weld progression.
PCI , recognizing t he benefit s of orbit al overlay welding, has
pioneered a research effort t o ident ify t he specific causes of Alloy 52
oxide aggregat ion in t he downhill port ion of orbit al welding. This
research has culminat ed in specific process improvement s t hat enable
consist ent ly high qualit y Alloy 52 overlays using orbit al progression.
Welding sequence, welding equipment design, and process paramet ers
were key component s of t his st udy.
6-111
This report will provide a pict ure of t he approaches used by
West inghouse, Wesdyne, and PCI t o address design, inspect ion, and
welding. The result is reinst at ement of t he capabilit y for defect free
Alloy 52 st ruct ural overlay welds using orbit al welding progression.
6-112
A subsidiary of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC
Advances in Design and
Implementation of Alloy 52
Structural Weld Overlay
Repair Welding
and
PCI Energy Services
6-113
Discussion Topics
Alloy 690 Weldability Issues
Oxides and oxide inclusions
Issues related to Ultrasonic Flaw Detection
Double-Uphill vs. Orbital Progression
PCI Process Development
Objectives and Results
Significant Accomplishments
Ongoing Actions
Conclusions
6-114
Alloy 600 Defects
Repair Alternatives:
Local excavation and repair
Typically through-wall System must be drained and dried
Purge required usually problematic
Not well suited to machine welding higher radiation exposure
Weld Replacement
System must be drained and dried
Weld removal typically involves installation of a replacement pup
piece (i.e., two welds are required)
Purge required usually problematic
Complex fit-up; repairs are challenging
Overlay replaces underlying, flawed pipe/weld
Widely accepted as an alternative to pipe replacement
System remains water-filled
Welding accessibility excellent
6-115
Overlay Configuration
Designed using ASME Code Case N-504-2
Typically, assume 360 degree, through wall defect
Structural overlay replaces pipe
Weld encompasses entire pipe circumference
Overlay Thickness
Sized to serve as a structural pipe replacement
Overlay Length: Sufficient to;
Fully encompass defective weld region
Permit access for NDE
Overlay filler material
Alloy 52 (ERNiCrFe-7) or Alloy 52M (ERNiCrFe-7a)
28% - 31.5% Chromium
6-116
Alloy 52 Weldability
5G Weld
Weld Progression
Uphill Progression Downhill Progression
Alloy 52 Chemistry
Relies on Aluminum (1.1%) and Titanium (1.0%) as deoxidizers
Result: Surface oxides
Oxides of this nature are typical in nickel-based filler materials
Oxides appear on molten pool surface as floaters
Oxides are typically dispersed during welding
In Alloy 52 welds:
Aluminum and Titanium oxides are particularly tenacious
During welding, oxide appearance is no different that in other nickel-based fillers
These oxides, however, are not effectively dispersed during welding
Result: Oxides become entrapped during weld installation
Entrapment is directly affected by gravity
On 5G welds, oxide entrapment occurs primarily in the 12:00 to 4:00 position, when welding
downhill
On 2G welds, oxide entrapment may occur anywhere
6-117
UT Results
UT Software often detects entrapped oxides and
inclusions
Flaws may be geometrically adjacent
UT has difficulty distinguishing the separation between
adjacent flaws
UT may link adjacent flaws together
Resultant indications may appear as lack of bond
Result
Flaws must be minimized through welding process
controls
6-118
PCI Process Development
6-119
PCI Objective No. 1
Double-Uphill Progression
Install acceptable Alloy 52 and
52M overlays using double-
uphill progression
Status:
Welding Complete
PT accepted
Wesdyne PDI UT (Manual)
Alloy 52: Accepted
Alloy 52M: Accepted
EPRI PDI UT (Automated):
Alloy 52: Accepted
Alloy 52M: Accepted
Result:
Acceptable structural overlays
using double-uphill
progression
6-120
Double-Uphill vs. Orbital Progression
Double Uphill welding can result in:
Increased welding time
Increased radiation exposure
Increased machining/prep time due to irregular final
deposit shape
Increased challenges to weld quality
Significantly more starts and stops
Starts and stops typically require manual
grinding/prep
Increased hands on intervention in radiation
environments
6-121
PCI Objective No. 2
Orbital Progression
Install acceptable Alloy 52 and
52M overlays using orbital
progression
Status:
Welding Complete
PT accepted
Wesdyne PDI UT (Manual):
Alloy 52: Accepted
Alloy 52M: Accepted
EPRI PDI UT (Automated):
Alloy 52: Accepted
Alloy 52M: Accepted
Result:
UT-acceptable structural
overlays using orbital
progression
6-122
PCI Alloy 52 Deposit Quality
Conventional Overlay
Micrograph
Optimized PCI Overlay
Micrograph
Sample Locations:
2 Oclock position
on
5G Welds
(vertical downhill
progression)
6-123
Orbital Progression
Acceptable results achieved
through:
Process controls
Enhanced welding parameters
PCIs Assigned Progression
bead placement technology
Advanced PCI equipment
Optimized welding equipment
Digital parameter controls
Optimized gas shielding
Result:
Oxides/inclusions reduced
Weld installation time reduced
Final deposit uniformity improved
Enhances inspection accuracy
Reduces final surface prep
duration
6-124
PCI Objective No. 3
Eliminate Final Machining
Machining Disadvantages:
Complex operation
Final deposit must be concentric
Distortion of weldment adds to
machining complexity
May damage overlay and force
additional welding
PCI Solution
Speed Contour Tooling
developed
Fast, convenient approach
Achieves UT-suitable surface
PCI/Wesdyne Evaluation:
Acceptable for PDI UT
Partnership enables optimal approach
EPRI Evaluation: Acceptable for UT
Ground
Surface
Surface using
PCI Speed Contour
Tooling
6-125
PCI Objective No. 4
Minimize Sacrificial Layers
Sacrificial Layers:
Increase welding time
Do not add to overlay
structure
PCI Solution
Measure layer by layer
chemistry
Prove that adequate chrome
levels are achieved after one
(or less) sacrificial layer on
carbon steel
PCI/EPRI Team
Joint PCI/EPRI effort
Samples welded,
investigation underway
Results available to RRAC
member utilities
6-126
Conclusions
Alloy 52 welds contain oxides
Double Uphill progression involves:
Longer installation times
Increased radiation exposure
More starts and stops
PCI delivers high quality Alloy 52 orbital overlays
Reduced oxides, artifacts, and inclusions
Unique equipment and methodology
Superior end result
PCI tooling eliminates the need for final deposit
machining
PCI leads joint PCI/EPRI effort to eliminate sacrificial
layers
6-127
EPRI PWSCC of Alloy 600 2005 International Conference & Exhibition
March 7-10, 2005
Abstract
Beneficial Application of Alloy 52M Filler Materials to Dissimilar Metal Weldments
by
Pedro Amador and Alton Auvil, Welding Services Inc.
Richard Smith, Structural Integrity Associates
Sam Kiser, Special Metals Inc.
Shane Findlan and Andy McGehee, EPRI
The superior corrosion resistance provided by Alloy 52 weld deposits makes them
particularly attractive for repairs to components degraded by exposure to high-
temperature, high-purity, aqueous environments. Alloy 52 filler material has been used
for a number of weld overlay repairs, particularly in situations where the overlay was
used over degraded nickel-based substrates such as Alloy 82 or Alloy 182 welds. Other
welding applications use the Alloy 52 filler material to join components. Several welding
challenges have been identified from these dissimilar metal applications related to
weldability of Alloy 52.
Hot and cold cracking have been documented in a number of Alloy 52 applications. In
addition, Alloy 52 weldments are known to exhibit a variety of entrapped oxide
conditions. All of these conditions affect the inspections required to document a quality
deposit. To address issues of concern, Special Metals Company has refined and
improved the chemistry and processing of Alloy 52. A modified filler material, identified
as Alloy 52M (AWS 5.14 ER NiCrFe-7A, UNS N06054 in ASME Code Case 2142-2),
has been developed and investigated by several users.
Welding Services Inc., Structural Integrity Associates, EPRI, and Special Metals Inc.
have worked together to evaluate the use of these materials for weld overlays
(particularly for ambient temperbead applications) and for pressurizer mid-wall heater
sleeve repairs. This presentation describes the experiments and testing conducted, using
field-simulated geometries, to evaluate the weldability of Alloy 52M. Significant
advantages were observed in the Alloy 52M weld deposits that improved the dye
penetrant surface examinations and the ultrasonic volumetric examinations. Results also
suggest that Alloy 52M has a greater tolerance to variations in welding parameters that
avoid cracking in the weld (both hot and cold cracking). In addition, the metallurgical
evaluations confirmed a significant reduction in the presence of oxides and small
microfissures dispersed throughout the weld deposit. The program concluded that high
quality welds can be made reliably using Alloy 52M filler material, and that the
probability for making successful welds is very high.
6-129
A mid-wall repair method for pressurizer heater sleeves has been developed and licensed
by a WSI/SIA team that results in a high quality repair that can be performed in less time
and less radiation exposure than traditional pad repairs. Specialized equipment was
developed for every step of the process including severing and surface preparation,
inerting the welding volume, welding, post weld machining, and inspection using both
PT and UT techniques. The method severs the old Alloy 600 heater sleeve below the
original J-weld. The old sleeve material below the sever cut is removed and replaced
with a new Alloy 690 sleeve. The new sleeve is positioned at mid-wall of the pressurizer
head and welded using remote machine GTAW equipment with Alloy 52M filler
material. An ambient temperature temperbead welding procedure was qualified to
perform the weld without the need for PWHT. This partial penetration weld forms a
triple-point geometry and was carefully evaluated to avoid hot cracking issues (or triple-
point anomalies). An extensive experimental program using full simulation mock-ups
was conducted to define the equipment needs, weld configurations, and welding
parameters necessary to produce a sound weld. The weldment receives a full volumetric
ultrasonic examination after completion to validate integrity. A special inspection system
was developed for this purpose. In addition the weld is given a remote dye penetrant
surface examination. The method is planned for field implementation at Waterford Unit
3 in the Spring of 2005.
The use of Alloy 52M is also very beneficial for weld overlay applications because in
addition to providing a highly corrosion resistant deposit, the other benefit is that it can
be deposited using conventional orbital welding techniques (360 degree application).
This approach is beneficial because it takes less time to apply than the double-up
approach used successfully with Alloy 52 weld overlays. This experimental study
applied the Alloy 52M(S) filler material. This material is Alloy 52M subjected to special
cleaning steps during the wire drawing process and denoted as super-clean. A full -
inch thick overlay was applied to a 12-inch diameter Schedule 80 carbon steel pipe using
ambient temperature temperbead procedures to simulate application over P3 material.
The results included ultrasonic examination and metallographic sampling. Dilution of the
weld deposit with iron was measured to demonstrate that the initial layer of the Alloy
52M is adequate to accommodate any dilution effects. The weld quality was
demonstrated to be excellent even with 360 degree application in a 5G horizontal pipe
position.
Alloy 52M presents an improved filler material over Alloy 52 in terms of the welding
advantages. Greater flexibility to apply the weld deposit without defects is achieved. In
addition the extra cleaning steps used with the superclean version appear to be beneficial
for thick deposits such as weld overlays because the deposits have fewer oxide floaters
and improved resistance to ductility dip cracking and hot cracking.
6-130
Welding Services Inc.
1
Beneficial Application of FM52M
on
Dissimilar Metal Weldments
EPRI PWSCC of Alloy 600
2005 International Conference
March 7-10, 2005
Pedro Amador, Welding Services Inc.
Richard Smith, Structural Integrity Associates
Sam Kiser, Special Metals Inc.
Shane Findlan, EPRI
Andy McGehee, EPRI
6-131
2
Why use Nickel Base Alloys?
Compatible thermal expansion with ferritic
materials
Butters on P3 Group 3 materials
Field Installation without PWHT
Corrosion resistance
Dissimilar Welds
SCC Occurs in both BWR and PWR Environments
6-132
3
SCC Resistance of Ni Alloys
Key Factor is Chromium Content
More appears to be better
Ranking order is 182 to 82 to 52/152 or
14% to 20% to 30%
Fabrication
Typically use GTAW and SMAW
Hot cracking and Ductility Dip Cracking (DDC) can be
a problem if not addressed properly
Weld Dilution increases susceptibility to these issues
Well known problems with contamination by low
melting elements such as S, Se, Pb, etc.
6-133
4
FM52
Provides high Cr deposit very resistant to
stress corrosion cracking
Susceptible to hot cracking and DDC
especially in areas of high dilution and
restrained geometries
Presence of oxide floaters have been
troublesome for applications welded
downhill or full orbital on piping
components in horizontal position
6-134
5
What about FM52M?
Improved Weld Quality (many reports)
Significant Reduction in Oxide Floaters
Improved Resistance to Hot Cracking and
Ductility Dip Cracking
Only Minor Chemistry Change
to
FM52 Specification
6-135
6
Element
FM52
UNS N06052
AWS
ERNiCrFe7
FM52
Typical
FM52M
UNS N06054
AWS
ERNiCrFe-7A
FM52M
Typical
Ni Balance Balance Balance Balance
Cr 28.0-31.5 29-30 28.0-31.5 29-30
Fe 7.0-11.0 8.0 7.0-11.0 8.0
C 0.04 0.02-0.03 0.04 0.02-0.03
Mn 1.0 < 0.5 1.0 0.80
P 0.02 low 0.02 low
S 0.015 low 0.015 low
Si 0.50 0.10-0.20 0.50 0.10-0.20
Mo 0.50 0.12 0.50 low
Nb (Cb) 0.10 low 0.50-1.0 0.80
Al 1.10 0.60 1.10 0.15
AI+Ti 1.50 1.20 1.50 0.45
Cu 0.30 0.01 0.30 low
Ti 1.0 0.60 1.0 0.30
Nb (Cb)+Ta 0.10
Co
B
Zr
0.019
0.002
0.006
Higher Nb
Specification
Lower
Typical Al
Higher
Typical Mn
6-136
7
Purpose of this Study
Evaluate overlay application of FM52MS
deposited on carbon steel pipe
S indicates special processing to
promote cleaner welds
Experiments address two applications
Weld Overlay
Mid-Wall Pressurizer Sleeve Repair (FM52M)
6-137
8
Weld Overlay Experiment
10 inch Carbon Steel Pipe with ID water flow
GTAW Temperbead Procedure
Controlled Heat Input (consistent layers)
Controlled Power Ratio (targeted minimum
dilution)
Axial Shrinkage
Chemistry Measured for first 3 Layers
Ultrasonic Examination of Overlay
Metallographic Evaluation of Indications
6-138
9
Heat Input
6-139
10
Power Ratio
6-140
11
Overlay Detail
6-141
12
Sampling Plan
6-142
13
FM52MS Overlay
6-143
14
Overlay Results
Chemistry of Temperbead Layers
Axial Shrinkage
Ultrasonic Examination
Metallography
General Weldability Observations
6-144
15
Chemistry Results
Layer (Wt.%)
Element 1
st
2
nd
3
rd
Fe 20.8 11.3 9.4 8.9
Ni 50.1 56.9 58.3 59.5
Cr 26.3 29.0 29.5 29.3
Nb 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8
FM52MS
Note Cr
Recovery
6-145
16
Average Chemistry of Overlay
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
Fe Ni Cr Nb
Element
W
e
i
g
h
t

%
Layer 1
Layer 2
Layer 3
FM52MS
6-146
17
Axial Shrinkage after each Layer
Layer (inches)
Azimuth 1
st
2
nd
3
rd
4
th
5
th
0 0.145 0.175 0.194 0.205 0.207
90 0.120 0.220 0.231 0.248 0.261
180 0.195 0.195 0.201 0.205 0.207
270 0.134 0.205 0.209 0.214 0.216
6-147
18
Zero Degree UT Inspection
6-148
19
Location of UT Indications
6-149
20
UT Results
Most of this overlay was free of indications
One area about 3.7 inches circumferential
and 2.3 inches axial exhibited distribution
of indications (0
0
transducer) 2
nd
3
rd
layer
45
0
, 60
0
and creeping wave exams were
clear
Indications located on downhill side at mid-
plane of overlay
6-150
21
Location of UT Indications
6-151
22
Metallography Performed to Identify
Nature of Defects
UT Indications Observed in Area roughly
3.7 Circumferential by 2.4 Axial
Indications are primarily due to porosity
A few locations exhibited some short
interbead lack-of-fusion
No evidence of hot cracks or DDC
6-152
23
Photomicrographs (30x)
6-153
24
General Observations
Weldability and welder appeal of FM52MS is
excellent
Weld puddle is fluid and ties in well (appears
similar to stainless steel)
Recordable indications of this overlay have been
investigated and are related to porosity with small
interbead LOF likely due to low Power Ratio weld
Full orbital welding may benefit from parameter
changes especially for downhill progression
6-154
25
Summary Overlay Results
360 degree orbital temperbead welding
Overall deposit is clear
UT Indications in one area on downhill side @ mid-thickness of
overlay (between 2
nd
& 3
rd
Layer)
No evidence of oxide floaters
No evidence of hot cracking or DDC
Indications due to finely dispersed porosity and some small
interbead lack-of-fusion all primarily in one location
Defects likely related to welding conditions designed for ultra low
dilution
4
th
in a series of experimental WOLs exploring use of FM52 type
deposits
Recent successful field implementation of FM52MS pipe overlay
project.
6-155
26
Pressurizer Mid-Wall
Heater Sleeve Weld Repairs
6-156
27
Mid-Wall Repair Approach
6-157
28
Mid-Wall Repair Application
New approach that eliminates crevices
Efficient Application
Saves Time
Saves Exposure Dose
FM52M (high Cr)
Demonstrated Repeatability
11 Consecutive Successful Welds
No Unsuccessful Welds
6-158
29
Welding Head Features
Weld Head Features
Remote video
Wire feed
Water cooled
AVC / auto stop controls
Component assembly for
quick swap out
Inert gas chamber
6-159
30
Mid-wall Repair Application
Remote GTAW Temperbead Application
Specialized tooling system
PT and UT in-situ examinations
Metallographic confirmation
Use of FM52M
Explored several sleeve end-prep geometries
More than 100 mock-up welds evaluated
Established preferred set of welding parameters
6-160
31
Welding System
6-161
32
Sample Mid-Wall Weld
6-162
33
Weld Cross-Section
Sample P3-25
Oriented as-installed
Mag. Marker is 0.100
As-Polished
6-163
34
Results of Mid-Wall
Application
Oxide concerns eliminated
Repeatable welds
No Triple-point anomalies
Ultrasonic inspection clear
FM52M exhibits improved wetting and
stirring over FM52
Welder appeal excellent for FM52M
6-164
35
Whats Next?
Weld Overlay
EPRI PWOL Mockup
Models Surge Nozzle
MRP Documents and Presentations
Further Develop Effective Use of Power Ratio
Mid-Wall
Testing of FM52MS
Upcoming Field Implementation of FM52M
Other Applications
6-165
7
SESSION 3A: LABORATORY INVESTIGATIONS OF
CRACKS
This session reviewed the results of laboratory investigations of cracked Alloy 600/82/182 parts
removed from plants. Summaries of the presentations of the six participants are given below
followed by the questions asked, responses provided, and comments made by the participants
concerning each presentation. Click on the links to access directly copies of the materials
presented together with extended abstracts.
Laboratory Investigation of PWSCC of CRDM Nozzle 3 and its J-Groove
Weld on the Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Head, presented by S.
Fyfitch, Framatome ANP (Paper 3A.1)
This presentation was given by S. Fyfitch and written by H. Xu and S. Fyfitch of Framatome
ANP, and J. Hyres of BWXT Services. The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
x The work reported in this presentation involved metallurgical examinations of CRDM
Nozzle 3 and its J-groove weld that were included in a section removed from the Davis-
Besse reactor vessel head.
x The examination showed that the axial cracks in CRDM nozzle 3 were consistent with the
on-site NDE results. They also showed that the axial cracks were intergranular and typical of
Alloy 600 PWSCC. The axial cracks appear to have initiated at the CRDM nozzle I.D.
surface, propagated toward the OD, and extended into the J-groove weld.
x The axial cracks in the J-groove weld were interdendritic (IDSCC) and consistent with
PWSCC seen in Alloy 182 welds.
x A cluster of circumferential cracks were found on the J-groove weld bottom surface exposed
to the RCS. They were not connected to the axial cracks in the J-groove weld. The
circumferential cracks are more consistent with environmentally assisted stress corrosion
cracking such as PWSCC than with welding defects.
x Shallow interdendritic cracks (IGA) were found on the exposed Alloy 182 J-groove weld
surface due to corrosion attack from the oxygenated and concentrated boric acid slurry inside
the cavity.
7-1
x Question (G. Rao): From the presentation I understand that cracking initiated on the ID of
the penetration and progressed through wall providing flow of primary water into the cavity.
But the penetration material is reported as sound with good GB carbide coverage. What
caused the good material to crack then?
Response (S. Fyfitch): This particular heat of material has shown the greatest amount of
cracking among all of the B&W-design RV head nozzles. It does have a semi-continuous
carbide intergranular structure with essentially no intragranular carbides, which is typically
considered good from a PWSCC resistance perspective. However, it has a yield strength of
48.5 ksi and an ASTM grain size of 3, which are typically considered to be detractors to
PWSCC resistance. This to me reinforces my opinion of the common misconception that it
is possible to rank PWSCC susceptibility on microstructural characteristics and mechanical
properties.
x Question (V. Thomas): Regarding slide 15, was it the crack in the weld or in the nozzle base
material that allowed flow to occur?
Response (S. Fyfitch): My conjecture is that the large flaw in the weld had a higher flow
than the smaller crack in the nozzle.
x Question (W. Bamford): Please clarify the "circumferential" flaws in the J-groove weld for
nozzle 3.
Response (S. Fyfitch): The flaws referred to (i.e., short circumferential cracks) are on a
plane parallel to the nozzle O.D. surface (i.e., an r-Z plane) and located at 0.75 inch (19 mm)
radially from the penetration bore I.D.
x Question (R. Staehle): For the through wall cracks, did you see any evidence of chemical
reactions?
Response (S. Fyfitch): No, as indicated by slide 16 there was no evidence that could point to
chemical reactions (from the concentrated boric acid slurry inside the cavity) other than
PWSCC, involved in the cracking.
x Question (A. Silva): The first layer of stainless steel cladding is typically 309 or 309L
stainless steel which has a different composition to 308. The corrosion attack on the cladding
appears to be the interface between the low alloy steel and this 309 layer in the region where
carbon migration has occurred as a result of post-weld heat treatment. Was the corrosion
attack associated with any certain microstructural features or chemistry gradients?
Response (S. Fyfitch): Based on the readily available records, the cladding layer was Type
308 (possibly Type 308L) material applied by an automated six-wire submerged-arc welding
process, which produced a weld bead ~0.25" thick and ~1" wide; a search for the certified
chemical composition of the cladding material was not performed. However, the depth of
IGA on the stainless steel material does not go beyond 12 grains deep, which is within the
mixing zone of low-alloy steel and stainless steel. There were no chemical composition
gradients identified by EDS analysis.
x Question (J. Collins): On Slide 15 the wide crack noted in the weld was suggested to be a
contributor to the corrosion cavity. Previous studies have suggested that leakage through-
weld could not provide the significant cooling to create the significant corrosion rates.
7-2
Response (S. Fyfitch): No. My point was that the J-groove weld flaw was much wider than
typically seen in a wrought material, which would have increased the total leakage of
primary water through the crack in the nozzle. Recall also that the 10 flaw in nozzle #3 was
~1-inch (per NDE) above the J-groove weld, which also contributed to increased leakage.
Laboratory Investigation of the Stainless Steel Cladding on the Davis-
Besse Reactor Vessel Head, presented by J. Hyres, BWXT Services (Paper
3A.2)
This presentation was given by J. Hyres and written by H. Xu and S. Fyfitch of Framatome ANP,
and J. Hyres of BWXT Services. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x The work reported in this presentation involved metallurgical examinations of the Type 308
stainless steel cladding at the bottom of the cavity in a removed section from the Davis-Besse
reactor vessel head.
x The exposed cladding area was ~16.5 in
2
(~106 cm
2
). All of the cladding thickness
measurements were above the minimum specified value.
x There was shallow IGA on the exposed cladding surface. The IGA had initiated numerous
stress-corrosion cracks.
x Cladding upward deflection had opened up the deepest cracks. The maximum depth crack
was 0.099 in. (2.5 mm) deep.
x Question (T. S. Sharma): The direction of the corrosion at nozzle #3 of the Davis-Besse
reactor is at 10q down from the horizontal axis. Was there any investigation done as to why
the corrosion was at a 10q angle?
Response (J. Hyres): No, the cut out piece was shipped to our lab as we see in the slidewe
did not have an opportunity to see the original corrosion as it existed on to top of the vessel.
We could not give any metallurgical reason for the orientation of the corrosion.
x Question (G. Rao): Was there any evidence of contaminants in the coolant that could have
contributed to the corrosion?
Response (J. Hyres): There was nothing detected by EDS examination.
x Question (P. Andresen): In good welds there must be a dilution zone of varying chromium
(and nickel) content.
1. The cross-section showing the stainless steel and low alloy steel suggests lack of
fusion penetration between the low alloy steel and stainless steel.
2. It is also possible to interpret your chromium "profile" measurements (and also the
equiaxed grain appearance in the stainless steel near the low alloy steel) as consistent
with some corrosion of low chromium material (where good fusion and dilution
occurred) and even a small amount of corrosion of higher chromium material
7-3
(suggested by the absence of any low chromium material left behind and by the
thinner region of equiaxed grains in the stainless steel near the low alloy steel
interface). Do you agree? Finally, the cracks in the cladding are presumably SCC.
Have you tried to estimate growth rates or to rationalize the observation based on
laboratory observations?
Response (J. Hyres):
1. The laboratory investigations did not indicate the presence of low chromium material
on the stainless steel clad side of the bondline. This finding is supported by the
equiaxed grain structure observed on the exposed cladding surface and at the low
alloy steel/stainless steel bond, the EDS results, cladding thickness measurements,
and etched low alloy steel/stainless steel microstructures. Further, the EDS results
suggest a uniform dilution of chromium and nickel from nominal Type 308 stainless
steel values through the cladding thickness.
2. Crack growth rates for Type 308 stainless steel in concentrated boric acid were not
estimated, but are expected to be quite low at operating stresses based on literature
values.
x Question (G. Turluer): With regard to how long the cladding might have lasted without
failure, could you discuss the degradation mode considered for the cracks in the stainless
steel cladding and how consideration of that mode accounts for the estimated time to
cladding failure of 2 to 13 months?
Response (J. Hyres):
1. It was determined that the crack growth rates (based on literature values) for 308
stainless steel under operating stresses were quite low and would have taken 1 to 2
years to extend through the remaining cladding thickness. The controlling
degradation mechanism was the continued growth of the corrosion cavity, which
would increase the stresses on the cladding. Monte Carlo simulations were
conducted based on various assumed low alloy steel corrosion rates and yielded the 2
to 13 month range to cladding failure.
2. Based on the above, a slow strain rate test type of stressing mode in the presence of
concentrated boric acid was not considered.
x Question (J. Gorman): How was the environment established (and what were the results) by
ORNL to determine the crack growth rate for the future life of the cladding? How was the
crack growth rate estimated?
Response (J. Hyres): The ORNL modeling simulated the cavity geometry, temperature, and
pressure only. Crack growth rate values for 308 stainless steel in a concentrated boric acid
solution were taken from the literature, not measured directly.
Laboratory Investigation of the Alloy 600 Bottom Mounted Instrumentation
Nozzle Samples and Weld Boat Sample from South Texas Project Unit 1,
presented by A. McIlree, EPRI (Paper 3A.3)
This presentation was given by A. McIlree and written by H. Xu and S. Fyfitch of Framatome
ANP, J. Hyres of BWXT Services, A. McIlree of EPRI, and F. Cattant of EDF. The main points
7-4
x The work reported in this presentation mainly involved metallurgical examinations of a small
boat sample removed from a lower reactor vessel head leaking bottom mounted instrument
(BMI) nozzle at STP 1. The boat sample was taken at the intersection of the top surface of
the Alloy 182 J-groove weld and the Alloy 600 nozzle. Lower sections of this nozzle and a
second leaking nozzle, from below the J-groove welds, were also examined.
x The Alloy 600 microstructure (predominantly intragranular carbides with few intergranular
carbides) and the ID surface cold-worked layer made the BMI nozzles highly susceptible to
PWSCC.
x Three cavities were found in the weld metal in the boat sample. The cavities were located in
the weld metal at the interface with the Alloy 600 nozzle material. The cavities in the boat
sample were due to entrapment of the weld flux. The cavities were intersected by cracks
developed during plant service.
x The main crack in the boat sample had a Y-shape. The crack was intergranular and
consistent with PWSCC. The crack was oriented axially within the Alloy 600 nozzle
material, but branched into the Alloy 182 weld in a circumferential direction.
x There was a short circumferential crack that connected the largest cavity in the boat sample
to the wetted J-groove weld surface. It appeared to be intergranular. It was unlikely to have
been caused by hot cracking, although the mechanism (PWSCC, fatigue, or others) can not
be definitively established.
x The SEM/EDS examinations showed no weld repairs (weld repair would be with Alloy 82)
and no evidence of weld hot cracking, either near the three cavities, or in the remainder of the
boat sample.
x The Y-shaped crack and the short circumferential crack did not intersect each other; they
were linked through the cavity. The lab results could not establish whether the two cracks
initiated independent of each other or otherwise.
x Contrary to NDE results developed by in situ examinations performed before removal of the
boat sample, the Y-shaped axial crack did not go through-wall above the J-groove weld, and
the crack was shorter near the nozzle OD. These results suggest that, at least within the boat
sample, the crack propagated from the nozzle ID toward the OD, and then branched
circumferentially into the weld; however the crack can not be confirmed to have initiated
from the nozzle ID surface due to the boat sample size.
x Comment (G. Rao): The evidence you presented is convincing that the crack in the area of
the boat sample was growing in the outward direction. If this was due to initiation at the ID
of this bottom mounted instrument (BMI) nozzle, it could be a generic issue. This points out
that, if the material has high susceptibility, PWSCC can occur even at cold leg temperatures.
7-5
x Question (A. Silvia): What was the depth (i.e., the thickness) of the cold work layer on the
ID of the nozzle? Were any microhardness measurements taken of the cold work layer and
what were the hardness values?
Response (A. McIlree): The depth of the cold work on the ID surface was estimated to be
2550 Pm. Near surface Knoop hardness readings of 290 to 350 were recorded compared to
midwall readings of 225 to 250.
x Question (B. Templeton): Does this low temperature failure data point disprove the proposed
Arrhenius functionality for cracking susceptibility?
Response (A. McIlree): Yes and no. Yes because the activation (apparent) energy used
didn't do a good job in predicting the cracking. No because the Arrhenius activation energy
concept still applies fundamentally. I believe we the industry have not been able to
adequately account for the influence of cold work on the apparent activation energy.
x Question (G. Turluer): My question is with regard to the likelihood of PWSCC occurring on
BMI nozzles at such a low temperature. Can you describe the actual temperature difference
between the CRDM housings on the vessel head and the BMI nozzles?
Response (A. McIlree): The temperature difference between the CRDMs and BMIs at South
Texas Project is thought to be 40qF (22C).
x Question (P. Andresen): Entrapped flux/slag in welds is not that uncommon, and you
suggested that dissolution in PWR water could promote SCC initiation and/or growth. Are
you aware of any detailed evaluation of such flux residue or the chemistry that develops if
they are exposed to PWR water? It seems likely that this could be a significant accelerant
that may not be adequately captured in laboratory tests.
Response: I am not aware of any detailed evaluation of the influence of flux residue on
PWSCC. However, many years ago, EPRI was doing a test program using capsule samples
containing a steam environment. Capsules who's end caps were brazed rather than welded
cracked 10 times faster. The acceleration was related to remnant brazing flux, and led to the
development of the 'Doped Steam Test'.
x Question (W. Bamford): You presented one point of view with regard to the cracking
scenario, but it seems equally likely, if not more so, that the cracks began at the OD, and
propagated inward. Was the expert panel all in agreement here and, if not, why not present
the other viewpoint as well?
Comment (J. Gorman): I was a member of the expert panel and came to the conclusion that
the most likely scenario was OD initiation. In this scenario, a leak path developed in the 1/16
inch (1.6 mm) thick ligament between the top cavity and the OD surface of the weld due to
some undetermined mechanism such as a weld pipe. After the primary coolant reached the
cavity, corrosive solutions developed and led to accelerated crack growth in a complicated
pattern, eventually leading to an outward growth direction in the small part of the nozzle
contained in the boat sample. The main factors leading to this hypothesis were (1) the
helium leak test indicated that there was a leak path from the OD surface of the nozzle in the
annulus below the weld to the top surface of the weld, but not from the ID of the nozzle to
the weld, and (2) the presence of several other part wall flaws detected by NDE which clearly
showed OD initiation with no penetration to the ID.
7-6
Response (A. McIlree): The other point of view was already presented at the NRC meeting
in Germantown and on their website. That point of view as pointed out by Dr. Gorman in the
above comment was heavily based on NDE signatures. It was the cold worked ID surfaces
and the growth direction of the axial crack which influenced the present authors to our
conclusions. We'll never really know, and the bottom line is the samethe BMIs need to be
inspected.
Selection, Removal, Decontamination and NDE of North Anna 2 Retired
Reactor Vessel Head CRDM Penetrations, presented by F. Cattant, EDF
(Paper 3A.4)
This presentation was given by F. Cattant and written by F. Cattant (EDF), N. Peat (Failure
Characterisation Consultancy), R. Barnes, A. McIlree, and A. Ahluwalia (EPRI), and C.
Harrington (TXU Power). The material in this presentation is addressed along with that of the
next presentation (Paper 3A.5) below.
Destructive Examination of North Anna 2 Retired Reactor Vessel Head
CRDM Penetration No. 54 (Status Review), presented by G. Rao,
Westinghouse (Paper 3A.5)
This presentation was given by G. Rao and written by G. Rao (Westinghouse), A. Ahluwalia
(EPRI), and C. Harrington (TXU Power). The main points made during this presentation and the
preceding presentation (Paper 3A.4) were as follows:
x In Fall 2001 a bare metal visual inspection was performed of the reactor vessel head of North
Anna Unit 2. Based on this inspection, three penetrations were repaired. In Fall 2002, a bare
metal visual inspection was again performed, as well as ECT of all J-groove welds and UT of
penetrations. The visual inspection identified six potential leakers, and ECT found 63 of 65
J-groove welds to have indications. It was determined that 42 J-groove welds would require
repair. In addition, six penetrations had OD circumferential indications. The utility decided
to replace the reactor vessel head, and allowed EPRI/MRP to remove samples from head.
x The objectives of the investigations of the North Anna head include determining the most
probable cause(s) of initiation and propagation of the weld and base metal flaws, developing
an understanding of the circumferential flaws in the outer diameter of the penetration base
material, characterization of the annulus environment, and identification of any low alloy
steel corrosion, benchmarking NDE techniques, and obtaining initiation and crack tip data on
complete field-recovered flaws, including interaction of hot cracking.
x Part 1 of this project has been quite successful:
7 penetrations have been removed from the head.
5 penetrations have been decontaminated and replicated (Microset material for the
surface and silastic compound for the ID volume).
7-7
Novel and standard EC and UT techniques have been applied in field representative
conditions.
Penetration #54 has been supplied to Westinghouse hot laboratory in Pittsburgh for
destructive examination.
Penetrations #31 and #59 have been provided to NRC Research for destructive
examination at PNNL.
x The major objectives of the detailed destructive examination of Penetration #54, which field
and laboratory NDE indicated had a variety of defects, include physical characterization of
the defects present in the nozzle and weld, identification of mechanistic aspects of formation
of the defects, determining the interrelationship between various (axial, circ., or other) types
of defects, characterization of the annulus environment and of any wastage of the low allow
steel, and determination of the root cause of the cracking. The work accomplished to date
includes performance of laboratory NDE, development of detailed examination plans, and
initial sectioning and examinations. The examinations have not found any wastage of the
low alloy steel, nor any evidence of boric acid crystals in the annulus.
Questions/comments and responses following these two presentations (Papers 3A.4 and 3A.5)
were as follows:
x Question (J. Collins): What was the disposition of ET indication #3 in slide 19 (Cattant
presentation)? The concern is with regard to the distance of the indication above the weld.
Response (F. Cattant): The destructive examination is not yet advanced to a stage where we
can answer this question.
x Question (J. Hyres): Could you explain whey the UT results on slide 18 (Cattant
presentation) are so different from the ET results on slide 19 (Cattant presentation)?
Response (F. Cattant): UT is a volumetric technique. Since most of the indications of slide
18 are at the OD of the penetration, UT was able to detect them from the ID surface. ET is a
surface detection technique performed from the ID surface and is not capable of finding the
slide 18 OD indications.
x Question (J. Gorman): Please explain what the term "masked" means for a bare metal visual
(BMV) inspection.
Response (F. Cattant): "Masked" means that the top head could not be 100% inspected due
to physical obstruction of some areas.
High-Resolution Analytical Electron Microscopy Characterization of
Environment-Assisted Cracks in Alloy 182 Weldments, presented by S.
Bruemmer, PNNL (Paper 3A.6)
This presentation was given by S. Bruemmer and written by L. Thomas and S. Bruemmer of
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
7-8
x The work reported in this presentation involved examination using analytical transmission
electron microscopy (ATEM) of samples of Alloy 182 weldments removed from outlet
nozzle to 316SS safe end welds of the Ringhals-3 and -4 reactor vessels and from a CRDM
nozzle to reactor vessel head weld from Davis-Besse.
x The Alloy 182 welds show cellular coring, with Mn segregation and NbC precipitation, and
with extensive deformation in the matrix and near boundaries. Cracking occurred along
grain boundaries with little precipitation or segregation in the Ringhals samples versus along
heavily carbide-decorated boundaries in the Davis-Besse weld sample. Fine Nb/Ti and Cr
carbides at the grain boundaries are rapidly removed/oxidized at crack tips; the precipitates
may accelerate IGA.
x No evidence has been found of low-melting phases or melt-rejected solutes at any boundaries
to suggest solidification hot cracking. Corrosion products and crack-tip microstructures
indicate that the cracks are fully penetrated by primary water.
x There are many observations consistent with IGSCC of Alloy 600 in PWR primary water
including crack/crack-tip oxides and islands of Ni metal and Cr-rich oxide found in some
cracks. However, there is less IGA off of the main SCC cracks for Alloy 182 welds and
there is a unique "internal" oxidation of the dislocation structure.
x Additional research is needed on hot-crack and SCC microstructures for Alloy 182 welds to
develop a better understanding and discrimination of the interaction between hot cracking
and SCC. The research should include ATEM examinations of cracked samples from service
and from well-controlled laboratory experiments.
x Question (A. McIlree): Where did the Ringhals Alloy 182 sample come from?
Response (S. Bruemmer): The cracked samples examined from Ringhals-3 and Ringhals-4
were taken from Alloy 182 butt welds between low-alloy RPV steel outlet (hot-leg) nozzles
and Type 316 stainless-steel safe ends.
x Question (R. Staehle): Can you determine the chemistry in dislocations?
Response (S. Bruemmer): The ATEM analyses did not detect any local segregation or
second-phase precipitation along dislocations in the weld metal. Dilution effects through the
thickness of the TEM foil make compositional measurements at dislocation cores difficult. If
your question refers to the "tunnels" along the dislocation structure off crack walls, we
clearly detect the filamentary oxide.
x Question (J. Gorman): Does slide 2 have an editorial error? Specifically, is the Davis-Besse
nozzle really a CRDM nozzle, and not an outlet nozzle?
Response (S. Bruemmer): As illustrated in slide 3, the cracks we have examined are in the
Alloy 182 J-groove weld of CRDM nozzle #3 from Davis Besse. This particular nozzle and
its weld was discussed by Steve Fyfitch in his paper earlier in this session.
7-9
x Question (G. Rao): There is a belief that M
23
C
6
carbides are semicoherent and offer better
resistance to PWSCC crack propagation compared to other types (M
8
C
7
or MC) of carbides.
Are your oxidation findings consistent with this?
Response (S. Bruemmer): We certainly have sufficient evidence to conclude that Cr
7
C
3
carbides at grain boundaries in Alloy 600 can slow crack growth. The same is probably true
for M
23
C
6
-type carbides that form in higher alloy Ni-base alloys (X-750, 690) as well. I do
not believe that this is primarily due to a semi-coherent interface. Our current work on Alloy
182 shows that small M
23
C
6
and MC precipitates on grain boundaries rapidly oxidize. It is
very unlikely that these carbides improve degradation resistance; it is possible that they
accelerate intergranular attack and SCC. M
23
C
6
carbides may behave differently if they were
Pm in size rather than the 520 nm particles in the Davis-Besse example evaluated in this
investigation.
x Question (B. Alexandreanu):
1. What is the fraction of special boundaries (CSLs) in the Davis-Besse weld sample?
2. Did you notice any texture?
3. Did you observe any relationship between the cracking behavior of a grain boundary
and the relative orientations of the neighboring grains?
Response (S. Bruemmer): Most of our grain boundary structure versus SCC examinations
has been on alloy 600 and 300-series stainless steels. Weld microstructures and grain
boundary distributions are much more complicated. With that in mind, my answers are:
1. We have not established a coincidence site lattice (CSL) fraction based on our limited
observations for welds so fardefinition is different for the complex boundaries in
welds;
2. Yes;
3. Nothing definitive has been assessed. However as Peter Scott has shown, boundary
orientations in the weld metal can change along a single boundary. Once again, we
believe that only low-energy coherent 63s are inherently resistant to crack
propagation, and these are not common in the welds as they are in wrought Alloy
600. Nevertheless, we do find cracks stopping at some low 6 and low-angle
boundaries. Our orientation imaging microscopy (OIM) characterizations on these
welds are very limited and much more needs to be done for a better understanding.
x Question (B. Templeton): What limitations do you have with your ATEM-EDS technique
can you detect carbon?
Response (S. Bruemmer): Carbon is easily detected where it is present in high
concentrations, as in carbide particles. For example, carbides show up well in EDS maps
taken with the C x-rays. However, the EDS detection limits for C are too high to detect it at
bulk alloy concentrations in the matrix or segregated (without precipitation) at grain
boundaries. We also use electron energy loss spectroscopy (EELS), but find it more useful
for detecting boron than C. In addition, C is a contaminant that is often hard to remove from
sample surfaces. For grain boundary composition measurement (even ahead of crack tips),
we can use scanning Auger microscopy after in-situ fracture. Unfortunately, C
contamination can again be a problem along with the difficulty in obtaining intergranular
fracture in many alloys such as mill-annealed Alloy 600. Another important EDS limitation
comes up in specific cases of detecting a lighter element at small concentrations in the
7-10
presence of a heavier element with overlapping peak energies. A relevant example in the
Alloy 182 welds is the difficulty in quantifying low S in the presence of interfering Nb.
x Question (J. Hickling): You obviously think in different dimensions (nm vs. Pm) than
scientists like myself (mm+), let alone practicing engineers (inches?). Although you go to
great trouble confirming your observations at a number of crack tips, e.g., within a single
sample, how confident are you that you have actually characterized the material variability
that might be present, e.g., within a single weld, let alone numerous welds in a real
component ("Ringhals" vs. "Davis-Besse" differences in Alloy 182 cracking)?
Response (S. Bruemmer): This is obviously an important issue when high-resolution
techniques such as ATEM are used. We try our best to assess characteristics at multiple
dimensions from mm to Pm to nm by optical to SEM to TEM techniques and ensure
cracks/microstructures are as representative as possible. Unfortunately, welds offer a
considerable challenge in sample/area/pass variability. The best we can do is examine
multiple cross-sections and several crack/crack-tip regions in each sample.
x Question (P. Scott): I challenge the conclusion that liquid PWR water penetrates to the crack
tip. You have not proved to me that the porosity is connected but, if it is, then the idea that
solvated metal cations can pass along nanometer dimension tunnels seems to me impossible.
Surface diffusion of H
2
O seems a possibility or, as likely, oxygen anion transport in lightly
defective oxides. What evidence of B and Li penetration to tips do you have?
Response (S. Bruemmer): We have discussed this many times and I also believe that it is
unlikely that liquid water reaches the leading edge of attack for grain boundaries exhibiting
"penetrative" oxidation. However, in primary water, many Alloy 600 examples show open,
tight crack tips suggesting that water could reach the tip during in-service propagation. We
have found B in corrosion products near crack tips in Alloy 600 using electron energy loss
spectroscopy (EELS), but it is not found reproducibly in all samples. The detection of Li is
not possible by either EDS or EELS techniques in these corrosion-product oxides.
x Question (D. Lister): Since the crack tip seems to progress full of Cr-rich spinel, what is the
mechanism of formation of the Ni-metal "islands" (which block the crack width) behind the
tip?
Response (S. Bruemmer: The formation of Ni islands (lower concentrations of Cr and Fe
than the matrix) in some of the wider cracks indicates that Ni metal is stable in the crack
environment. As you know, potential/pH diagrams illustrate regions where specific oxides
and metallic elements can be stable. We know that PWR primary water systems operate near
the Ni/NiO line. Obviously, these crack regions are in the potential/pH space where Ni metal
is stable along with the Cr-rich spinel oxide.
x Question (G. Rao): Are there any surface effects of thin foils that might make the behavior
of material in the foils differ from the behavior of bulk materials?
Response (S. Bruemmer): There are always concerns that examinations on 50100 nm thick
foils may be influenced by surface effects such as dislocation losses and formation of surface
oxide. We take great care to avoid these well-known issues and separately image near-
surface structures versus those taken through the foil thickness. Our preparation approach
(low-angle ion milling) minimizes many surface film problems that can be present in
7-11
electropolished TEM foils. My short answer is "no." We believe our foil surfaces are not a
significant factor for our microstructural and crack-tip characterizations.
x Question (R. Staehle): What are your thoughts regarding the changes in compositions and
structures that occur when going from operating temperatures to room temperature?
Response (S. Bruemmer): It is difficult to determine whether subtle changes occur during
cooling without critical in-situ measurements. The closest we have at present is probably
Raman Spectroscopy which has identified the same oxides forming on Alloy 600 and
stainless steels at LWR temperatures that we see on crack walls and at crack tips. In wider
cracks, we have seen phases that suggest some precipitation from solution can occur during
cool down. We don't think that the temperature change significantly affects the extremely
narrow crack-tip areas, nor will it impact the altered composition we often detect in the metal
ahead of the crack tip.
7-12
Laboratory Investigation of PWSCC of CRDM Nozzle 3 and Its J-Groove Weld
on the Davis-Besse Reactor Vessel Head
Hongqing Xu and Steve Fyfitch
Framatome ANP, Inc., P.O. Box 10935, Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935
James W. Hyres
BWXT Services, Inc., 2016 Mt. Athos Road, Lynchburg, VA 24504-5447
ABSTRACT In February 2002, significant boric acid corrosion of the Davis-Besse low alloy steel
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) closure head was uncovered around control rod drive mechanism
(CRDM) nozzle No. 3. Subsequent on-site non-destructive examinations (NDE) found that nozzle
No. 3 had developed through-wall cracks due to primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC)
next to the J-groove weld. The CRDM nozzle 3 and its J-weld were carefully examined in the
laboratory by fluorescent penetrant testing and stereomicroscopy that identified the remnant of the
axial cracks in the Alloy 600 nozzle as well as the circumferential and axial cracks in the Alloy 182
J-groove weld. These cracks were subsequently sectioned for light optical metallography (LOM)
and scanning electron microscopy (SEM) for characterization.
Introduction
Davis-Besse initiated its 13th refueling outage (13RFO) in February 2002 after an accumulated
15.78 effective full power years (EFPYs) of operation. After removal of insulation from the reactor
pressure vessel (RPV) head, boric acid crystal deposits and iron oxide were found to have flowed
out from several of the openings in the lower service structure support skirt. Subsequent non-
destructive examinations (NDE) identified axial cracks in five control rod drive mechanism (CRDM)
nozzles adjacent to the J-groove weld. Initially, it was decided that the CRDM nozzles would be
repaired by boring out the original J-groove weld and the lower part of the nozzle containing the
cracks, and re-welding the remaining nozzle back to the RPV head. After boring out the lower part
of nozzle 3, a large corrosion cavity was found on the down-hill side of the low alloy steel RPV
head. Subsequently, a 17.5-inch (444 mm) diameter disc containing the remaining portion of the
nozzle 3 J-groove weld, part of the nozzle 11 J-groove weld, and the entire cavity was sectioned
from the RPV head by using water jet cutting. This disc along with the remnants of nozzles 2 and 3
were shipped to the laboratory for further examinations. This paper focuses on the nozzle 3 and
the J-groove weld examinations. The other two companion presentations in this conference
proceedings describe the examination results of the RPV head low alloy steel boric acid
corrosion
[ ] 1
and the cracking identified in the exposed stainless steel cladding
[ ] 2
.
Alloy 600 Base Metal of CRDM Nozzle 3
On-site NDE examinations detected 4 axial cracks in nozzle 3 near the J-groove weld. Because
nozzle 3 was bored from below to a height slightly above the J-groove weld at the up-hill side, most
of the axial cracks in the nozzle were known to be lost, except maybe a portion of the axial crack
on the up-hill side (180). A 1-inch (25.4 mm) long ring was sectioned off the lower end of the as-
received nozzle 3. The fluorescent dye penetrant test (PT) performed in the laboratory revealed a
cluster of partial through-wall axial crack indications near the 180location. These axial cracks
initiated from the nozzle I.D. surface with the deepest crack extending up axially ~0.5 inch (12.7
mm) from the end face and radially ~0.125 inch (3.2 mm) into the nozzle wall from the I.D. surface,
consistent with the on-site NDE results. In addition, the on-site NDE results indicated that the
through-wall portion of the nozzle #3 crack extended ~0.5 inch (12.3 mm) above the J-groove weld
7-13
on the nozzle 3 O.D., corresponding approximately to the nozzle removal height. However, there
were no signs of boric acid corrosion on the nozzle 3 penetration I.D surface at the up-hill side
(180). Hence, the boric acid leakage on the up-hill side of nozzle 3 could not be confirmed by the
destructive examinations in the laboratory
After the PT examination, the cracked area on the ring (near 180) was sectioned and the main
axial crack was opened for scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and energy dispersive X-ray
spectroscopy (EDS). Another specimen was mounted for light optical metallography (LOM) and
microhardness measurements. The SEM examination of the opened-up axial crack showed that
the in-service fracture surface was exclusively intergranular. In addition, secondary crack branching
was also found. LOM showed that the intergranular cracking is extremely tight near the I.D.
surface. The machined I.D. surface showed no discernable cold work. The grain boundaries were
decorated with fine globular semi-continuous carbides. The microstructure showed very few
intragranular carbides and an average grain size of ASTM No. 3.0, which was quite large for Alloy
600 CRDM nozzles.
Alloy 182 J-Groove Weld of CRDM Nozzle 3
Fluorescent PT was performed on the entire underside of the cavity and the I.D. surface of the
J-groove weld bore. On the bottom surface, or the reactor coolant system (RCS) side, the PT
revealed a cluster of short discontinuous circumferential cracks on the J-groove weld surface
between 0and 45. These cracks are located within the Alloy 182 weld, at 0.75 inch (19 mm)
radially from the penetration bore I.D. The fluorescent PT also identified one axial crack on the
down-hill side (~10) of the bore I.D. surface. This crack is about ~1.4 inches (36 mm) long,
extending to the top surface of the exposed J-groove weld and was facing directly toward the
nose of the corrosion cavity. This crack appears to be an extension of the through-wall crack (in
nozzle 3) at the down-hill side identified by the on-site NDE in the J-groove weld. Close
examination of the J-groove weld bore I.D. surface with a stereo microscope revealed two axial
cracks near the up-hill side.
When the metallographic specimen was mounted and examined under the microscope, a total
of three axial cracks are identified near the up-hill side (~180). None of the three axial cracks
near the up-hill side had penetrated the J-groove weld thickness. Cracking in the weld was
interdendritic, consistent with PWSCC in Alloy 182 welds in PWRs. Such interdendritic cracking
in Alloy 182/82 weld is also referred to as IDSCC, the equivalent of IGSCC in Alloy 600. For the
axial crack at the down-hill side (~10), the interdendritic cracking is similar to the axial cracks
near the up-hill side, except the crack is through the J-groove weld thickness and the crack path
is much wider. The interdendritic cracking surface clearly delineated a columnar weld
solidification structure. The center part of the fracture surface was coated with a thick corrosion
layer. The wide crack opening near the exposed J-groove weld surface facing the cavity could
be attributable to the flow of leaking primary coolant.
The circumferential cracks on the J-groove weld bottom surface are interdendritic and propagated
along the columnar solidification structure, similar to the axial cracks in the J-groove weld. The
depth of these circumferential cracks was shallow, penetrating approximately 0.020 inch (0.51 mm)
or less below the surface. Additional examinations determined that these circumferential cracks,
initiated on the Alloy 182 J-groove weld bottom surface, were not connected to the axial cracks in
the J-groove weld. A portion of the circumferential crack was bent to open the cracks for SEM,
which clearly revealed the interdendritic nature of the crack surface. All the cracks were exposed to
the RCS coolant. No such interdendritic/intergranular cracks or other welding defects were found
7-14
elsewhere inside the J-groove weld. Therefore, these circumferential cracks are more consistent
with environmentally assisted stress corrosion cracking such as PWSCC than with welding defects.
In addition to the circumferential cracking on the bottom surface of the J-groove weld, interdendritic
cracking initiating from the exposed stainless steel cladding surface was observed to extend into
the Alloy 182 weld. These cracks were due to intergranular attacks (IGA) on the exposed cladding
surface from the oxygenated and concentrated boric acid slurry inside the cavity. In the stainless
steel cladding, the cracks were perpendicular to the exposed cladding surface and along the
solidification direction, preferentially followed the elongated delta ferrite pools. After extending into
the Alloy 182 J-groove weld, the crack changed direction to propagate along the J-groove weld
columnar solidification structure. Similar to stainless steel cladding, the exposed J-groove weld
(Alloy 182) surface was also attacked by the oxygenated and concentrated boric acid in the
corrosion cavity. These interdendritic/intergranular attacks (IGA), due to exposure to the
oxygenated and concentrated boric acid slurry inside the cavity at elevated temperatures, were
only 0.004-inch (or 0.10-mm) deep.
Conclusions
1. The axial cracks found in the CRDM nozzle 3 are consistent with the on-site UT results.
The cracking in nozzle 3 was intergranular and typical of Alloy 600 PWSCC. The axial
cracks appear to have initiated at the CRDM nozzle I.D. surface and propagated into the J-
groove weld at the up-hill and down-hill locations.
2. At the up-hill side, the portion of the through-wall crack above the J-groove weld identified
by the on-site NDE was lost during the nozzle removal process. The axial cracks in the J-
groove weld were only partially through-wall. However, there was no sign of any boric acid
leakage near the up-hill side to confirm any of up-hill side cracks were through-wall.
3. At the down-hill side, the axial crack was through the J-groove weld. This crack was the
primary source of the leaking boric acid, which caused the large corrosion cavity seen on
the low alloy steel RPV head. The crack path was wider in the Alloy 182 J-groove weld than
in the Alloy 600 nozzle. It is postulated that the boric acid leak rate significantly increased
after the axial crack breached the J-groove weld at the down-hill side. The axial cracks in
the J-groove weld were interdendritic (IDSCC) and consistent with PWSCC seen in Alloy
182 welds.
4. A cluster of circumferential cracks were found on the J-groove weld bottom surface
exposed to the RCS. These circumferential cracks were intergranular and shallow (max.
depth 0.020-inch or 0.51-mm) and were not connected to the axial cracks in the J-groove
weld. These circumferential cracks are more consistent with environmentally assisted
stress corrosion cracking such as PWSCC than with welding defects.
5. Very shallow (0.004-inch or 0.10-mm deep) IGA were also found on the exposed Alloy 182
J-groove weld surface due to exposure to the oxygenated and concentrated boric acid
slurry inside the cavity at elevated temperatures.
Reference
1. H. Xu, S. Fyfitch, J.W. Hyres, Boric Acid Corrosion of the Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure
Vessel Head, PWSCC of Alloy 600 2005 International Conference & Exhibition Tamaya
Resort and Spa, Santa Ana Pueblo, NM.
2. H. Xu, S. Fyfitch, J.W. Hyres, Laboratory Investigation of the Stainless Steel Cladding on the
Davis-Besse Reactor Vessel Head, PWSCC of Alloy 600 2005 International Conference &
Exhibition Tamaya Resort and Spa, Santa Ana Pueblo, NM.
7-15
1 > 2005 EPRI PWSCC Conference and Exhibit Show FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Laboratory Investigation of PWSCC
of CRDM Nozzle 3 and Its J-Groove
Weld on the Davis-Besse
Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
Hongqing Xu and Stephen Fyfitch
Framatome ANP, Inc.
an AREVA and Siemens Company
Jim Hyres
BWXT Services, Inc.
2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600
March 7-10, 2005
7-16
RV Head Condition at 13th Refuel Outage
> Boric acid crystal deposits and iron oxide were found
to have flowed out from the openings in the lower
service structure support skirt .
7-17
RV Head Cavity at Down-Hill Side of Nozzle 3
> A large corrosion cavity was found in the low alloy
steel RV head, at the down-hill side of the CRDM
nozzle 3 during repair operation.
7-18
Water Jet Sectioning of RV Head Cavity
0 dow n-hi l l
180 up-hi l l
90
270
D
> A ~17.5-inch (~444-mm) dia. disc containing the
entire cavity was sectioned from the RV head by
water jet cutting.
7-19
RV Head Cavity Near Nozzle 3
270
q
180qup-hill
90
q
0q
> Viewing toward the up-hill side of nozzle 3
penetration.
7-20
RV Head Cavity Near Nozzle 3
> Viewing toward the nose of the cavity (down-hill side
of nozzle 3).
7-21
RV Head and J-groove Weld of Nozzle 3
Close-up of the J-groove weld
Nozzle 3 is near
the center of
RPV head
CRDM leadscreaw
assembly
Alloy 600 nozzle
Low alloy steel,
SA-533, Gr. B
(mod), Cl. 1,
plate
Type 308
stainless
steel cladding
Alloy 182 buttering
and J-groove weld
180
o
0
o
Nozzle
removal
height
7-22
On-Site UT Results of Nozzle 3
> On-site UT indicated 4 axial cracks in the Alloy 600
CRDM Nozzle 3. Axial cracks #1 and #3 were
determined to be through-wall, while #2 and #4 were
partially through-wall.
26
27
28
29
30
0
o
90
o
180
o
270
o
360
o
I
n
c
h
e
s

f
r
o
m

C
R
D
M

F
l
a
n
g
e
J-Groove Weld
Contour
#1
#2
#3
#4
Boring
height
7-23
As-Received CRDM Nozzle 3
> The lower part of Nozzle 3 was
bored out, to just above the J-
groove weld. So most of the axial
cracks in the nozzle were removed
and not available.
2
3
-
5
/
8

7-24
Laboratory PT of Nozzle 3
> Fluorescent dye penetrant test (PT) revealed a cluster
of partial through-wall axial crack indications near the
180 (up-hill) location.
Lower
surface of
Nozzle 3
PT Indications
7-25
Sectioning of Axial Indications in Nozzle 3
> The axial crack in the specimen C1A was opened
for SEM of crack surface. The specimen C1B was
mounted for metallography.
180
o
270
o
90
o
0
o
170
o
180
o
190
o
Met mount
surface
C1A
C1B
C1C
7-26
Microstructure and IGSCC of Nozzle 3
> The grain boundaries were decorated with fine semi-
continuous carbides with few intragranular carbides.
The large particles were Ti, Nb (CN). Grain size was
ASTM No. 3. Cracking was intergranular.
Nozzle ID
~30X
~900X
7-27
SEM of IGSCC Surface of Nozzle 3
> The in-service cracking surface has a "rock candy"
appearance due to IGSCC. Secondary IGSCC
branching is visible. The dimpled fracture surface
was made in the laboratory.
Secondary IGSCC
branching
7-28
Sectioning of J-Groove Weld Cracks
> One large axial crack was found through the
thickness of the J groove weld at ~10.
> Two tight axial cracks on the penetration I.D. surface
at ~180, indicated by the two black arrows.
270
o
180
o
0
o
90
o
Exposed Alloy 182 J-
groove weld
Exposed stainless
steel cladding
Low alloy steel
cavity side wall
Top of the
exposed J-
groove weld
270
o
180
o
0
o
Sectioning for
Specimen A2A2B3
Sectioning for
specimens
A2A6B2 & -B3
Thru-weld
axial crack
~10
Two axial
cracks
~180
7-29
Axial Crack in J-Groove Weld, Near ~10
> The wide crack is attributable to the flow of leaking
primary coolant into the cavity.
> Cracking in the weld was interdendritic (IDSCC),
consistent with PWSCC seen in Alloy 182 welds.
Exposed J-groove weld surface
The bore I.D.
7-30
SEM of IDSCC in J-Groove Weld, Near ~10
> Interdendritic surface delineates a columnar weld
solidification structure.
> Pockets of cavities were probably formed when the
dendrites were encircled by cracks and removed.
The bore I.D. Exposed J-groove weld surface
Interdendritic cracking
Covered by corrosion product
Ductile
tearing
7-31
SEM of IDSCC in J-Groove Weld, Near ~180
> Three interdendritic axial cracks are visible at ~180
(up-hill). None had penetrated the J-groove weld. The
axial cracks appear to have propagated from nozzle ID
toward OD, and extended into the J-groove weld.
The bore I.D.
Bore I.D.
180
o
Microhardness
traverse line
175
o
185
o
7-32
Laboratory PT of Underside Surface
> Fluorescent PT revealed a cluster of short shallow
discontinuous circumferential cracks on the underside.
> These shallow cracks are within the Alloy 182 J-groove
weld, but not connected to the axial cracks in the J-
groove weld.
Circumferential indications
are in the J-groove weld
between 0
o
and 45
o
and
0.75 inch from the bore I.D.
Specimen A2A6A2B2
mounting plane
Corrosion cavity in RPV head
Interdendritic
cracks
Boric acid
attack
RCS side
7-33
Shallow Circumferential Cracks on the
Underside Surface
> The cracks were bent slightly to open up, showing the
interdendritic cracking surface (IDSCC).
> All these cracks were exposed to RCS coolant. No
such interdendritic cracks or other welding defects
were found else where inside the J-groove weld.
7-34
Interdendritic Attacks of Exposed Surface
> IGA extended into the J-groove weld from the exposed
stainless steel cladding.
> The exposed Alloy 182 J-groove weld in the corrosion
cavity was similarly attacked (0.004-inch or 0.10-mm).
RPV head
corrosion cavity
Alloy 182
J-groove
weld
Type 308
stainless
steel
cladding
RPV head
corrosion cavity
Alloy 182
J-groove
weld
~375X
~48X
7-35
Summary and Conclusions
> The axial cracks in the CRDM nozzle 3 are consistent
with the on-site NDE results.
> The axial cracks in the nozzle 3 were intergranular
and typical of Alloy 600 PWSCC.
> The axial cracks in the J-groove weld were
interdendritic (IDSCC) and consistent with PWSCC
seen in Alloy 182 welds.
> The axial cracks appear to have initiated at the
CRDM nozzle I.D. surface, propagated toward OD,
and extended into the J-groove weld.
7-36
> A cluster of circumferential cracks were found on the
J-groove weld bottom surface exposed to the RCS.
They were not connected to the axial cracks in the
J-groove weld. The circumferential cracks are more
consistent with environmentally assisted stress
corrosion cracking such as PWSCC than with
welding defects.
> Shallow interdendritic cracks (IGA) were found on
the exposed Alloy 182 J-groove weld surface due to
corrosion attack from the oxygenated and
concentrated boric acid slurry inside the cavity.
7-37
Laboratory Investigation of the Stainless Steel Cladding
on the Davis-Besse Reactor Vessel Head
Framatome ANP, Inc.
P.O. Box 10935
James W. Hyres
BWXT Services, Inc
2016 Mt. Athos Road
Abstract
Laboratory analyses conducted on the welded stainless steel cladding on the Davis-Besse low alloy
steel reactor pressure vessel (RPV) closure head are described. These examinations focused on the
cladding located at the base of the corroded cavity in the head, which included approximately 16.5
in
2
(106 cm
2
) of exposed stainless steel cladding having an average thickness of 0.256 in (0.65 cm).
In this area, the cladding exhibited an upward bulge and a network of cracks. Laboratory samples
were prepared through the cladding to characterize the crack depths and morphology by light optical
microscopy (LOM), scanning electron microscopy (SEM), and energy dispersive spectroscopy
(EDS). Other laboratory characterizations included elevated temperature tensile testing and
microstructural/microchemical characterization through the cladding cross section.
Introduction
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in Oak Harbor, Ohio is a Babcock & Wilcox (B&W)
designed 177-FA (fuel assembly) pressurized water reactor (PWR), which went into commercial
operation in 1977. Davis-Besse initiated its 13th refueling outage (13RFO) in February 2002
after an accumulated 15.78 effective full power years (EFPYs) of operation. After removal of
insulation from the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head, boric acid crystal deposits and iron oxide
were found to have flowed out from several of the openings in the lower service structure
support skirt. Subsequent non-destructive examinations (NDE) identified axial cracks in five
control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles adjacent to the J-groove weld. In three CRDM
nozzles (Nos. 1, 2, and 3) located near the center of the RPV head, the through-wall axial cracks
extended above the J-groove weld. The CRDM nozzles were fabricated from Alloy 600 and
attached to the low alloy steel RPV head by an Alloy 182 J-groove weld. Both of these nickel-
base materials are known to be susceptible to primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC).
Similar axial cracks in CRDM nozzles have also been observed in other B&W 177-FA PWRs
1
.
Initially, it was decided that the five CRDM nozzles would be repaired by boring out the original
J-groove weld and the lower part of the nozzle containing the cracks, and re-welding the
remaining nozzle back to the RPV head. After boring out the lower part of nozzle #3, a large
7-39
corrosion cavity was found on the down-hill side of the RPV head. Subsequently, a 17.5-inch
(44.5-cm) diameter disc containing the remaining portion of the nozzle #3 J-groove weld, part of
the nozzle #11 J-groove weld, and the entire cavity was sectioned from the RPV head by using
water jet cutting. This 17.5-inch (44.5-cm) diameter disc along with the remnants of nozzles #2
and #3 were shipped to the laboratory for further examinations.
Type 308 stainless steel cladding is applied to the reactor coolant system (RCS) side of the
reactor vessel head as a corrosion barrier. The minimum specified thickness of this cladding
layer is 0.125" (3.2 mm). The cladding is applied using an automated six-wire process,
beginning near the edge of the vessel head and working toward the center in a circular pattern.
The final 8" (20.3 cm) diameter of the vessel head near the top dead center (TDC) was clad using
a manual six-wire process. This paper summarizes the portion of the laboratory results
2
related
specifically to the stainless steel cladding.
Laboratory Examinations
Elevated temperature tensile tests were performed at 600
o
F (315
o
C) on two miniature samples
prepared from an area of unexposed cladding. Wire electrical discharge machining (EDM) was
used. One sample was machined from an area near the RCS side of the cladding and the other
was located near the low alloy steel RPV head. These specimen locations were selected to
determine if a mechanical property gradient (possibly caused by iron dilution into the cladding)
existed across the cladding thickness. The results for both samples were within expected
laboratory scatter, therefore it was concluded that no mechanical property gradient existed.
These results were consistent with the Knoop microhardness (500 gram load) results, which
indicated a generally uniform hardness averaging ~225 HK through the cladding thickness.
Visual inspection of the exposed surface of the stainless cladding revealed significant cracking
between two weld beads near the area of maximum upward deflection. Closer inspection of the
cracking in this area revealed a network of fine cracking that appeared to be intergranular in
nature. Visual inspection of the opposite (RCS) side of the cladding indicated no cracking was
associated with the upward deflection.
Metallographic examinations conducted on polished transverse cladding sections revealed
several cracks emanating from the exposed surface of the cladding. Other areas of the exposed
cladding surface contained a shallow layer (1-2 grains deep) of intergranular attack (IGA) and
intergranular or interdendritic cracking. The grain structure of the cladding near the exposed
surface was equiaxed, where the solidifying weld metal mimicked the size and orientation of the
adjacent low alloy steel. The cladding structure quickly reverted to the expected weld metal
microstructure, which consisted of elongated delta ferrite pools in an austenite matrix. This
cladding microstructure was also present in areas still in contact with the low alloy steel RPV
head, indicating there was no corrosion wastage of the exposed cladding caused by the boric
acid.
EDS analysis was used to semi-quantitatively determine the chemical composition through
polished cladding cross sections to determine whether iron dilution from the low alloy steel
occurred during the cladding deposition process. Iron dilution would increase the iron content in
the cladding material, reducing its chromium content and corrosion resistance. The EDS
7-40
chemical composition results were consistent throughout the cladding cross section thickness,
which indicated significant dilution did not occur during cladding deposition. Additional EDS
analysis performed on open crack deposits indicated high levels of oxygen, suggesting the
deposits were primarily oxides.
Conclusions
1. The exposed cladding surface area was ~16.5 in
2
(~106 cm
2
), with an average cladding
thickness of 0.256" (6.5 mm). The minimum measured cladding thickness was 0.179" (4.5
mm). All measured values exceeded the minimum specified thickness of 0.125" (3.2 mm).
2. The exposed cladding surfaces contained a shallow layer (1-2 grains deep) of IGA. The
cladding grain structure in this area was equiaxed. A similar structure was observed in
cladding in still in contact with the low alloy steel head, therefore it was concluded that the
observed cladding thickness variations were within the normal deposition range and not
caused by corrosion wastage.
3. The upward deflection of the exposed cladding opened up cracks that extended a maximum
0.099" (2.5 mm) below the exposed cladding surface. The distance from the deepest crack
tip to the RCS side of the cladding was 0.139" (3.5 mm)
3
. No cracks were present on the
RCS side of the cladding.
4. The cladding mechanical properties, hardness, and chemical composition were within
specified limits and uniform through the cladding cross section, which indicated no
significant iron dilution occurred during the cladding deposition process.
5. In-depth flaw sizing data was provided to Oak Ridge National Laboratory for detailed
modeling analysis. Their study indicated a predicted operating time without cladding failure
of 2 to 13 months (5% and 95% percentiles, respectively), with a median operating time of 5
months
4
.
References
1. M.R. Robinson, D.E. Whitaker, M.L. Arey, and S. Fyfitch, Recent CRDM Nozzle PWSCC
Experience at Oconee Nuclear Station, Fontevraud 5, Proceedings of Contribution of
Materials Investigation to the Resolution of Problems Encountered in Pressurized Water
Reactors, SFEN, Paris, France (September 2002).
2. Hyres, J.W., "Final Report: Examination of the Reactor Vessel Degradation at Davis-Besse,"
BWXT Services, Inc. Report No. 1140-025-02-24, June 2003.
3. Hyres, J.W., "Final Report: Evaluation of the Exposed Cladding Cracking in the Davis-
Besse Reactor Vessel (RV) Head," BWXT Services, Inc. Report No. 1301-002-04-01, April
2004.
4. "NRC Issues Information on Studies Related to the Davis-Besse Reactor Head," NRC News
No. 04-053, May 4, 2004.
7-41
Laboratory Investigation of the Stainless Steel
Laboratory Investigation of the Stainless Steel
Cladding on the Davis
Cladding on the Davis
-
-
Besse Reactor Vessel Head
Besse Reactor Vessel Head
Hongqing Xu, Framatome ANP, Inc. Hongqing Xu, Framatome ANP, Inc.
Steve Fyfitch, Framatome ANP, Inc. Steve Fyfitch, Framatome ANP, Inc.
Jim Hyres, BWXT Services, Inc. Jim Hyres, BWXT Services, Inc.
PWSCC of Alloy 600 2005 International Conference & Exhibition PWSCC of Alloy 600 2005 International Conference & Exhibition
Tamaya Resort and Spa, Santa Ana Pueblo, NM Tamaya Resort and Spa, Santa Ana Pueblo, NM
March 7 March 7- -10, 2005 10, 2005
7-42
Introduction
Introduction

Corrosion cavity discovered next to Control
Corrosion cavity discovered next to Control
Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Nozzle #3
Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Nozzle #3
during 13RFO (February 2002)
during 13RFO (February 2002)

A 17.5" (44.5 cm) diameter section was
A 17.5" (44.5 cm) diameter section was
removed by Framatome and shipped to
removed by Framatome and shipped to
BWXT Services laboratory in Lynchburg,
BWXT Services laboratory in Lynchburg,
VA
VA
7-43
Cladding Background
Cladding Background

Type 308 stainless steel
Type 308 stainless steel

Applied using an automatic 6
Applied using an automatic 6
-
-
wire process;
wire process;
8" (20 cm) near center applied manually
8" (20 cm) near center applied manually

0.125" (3.2 mm) minimum specified
0.125" (3.2 mm) minimum specified
cladding thickness
cladding thickness

Corrosion barrier; not considered structural
Corrosion barrier; not considered structural

Why didn't it fail?
Why didn't it fail?

How much longer would it have lasted?
How much longer would it have lasted?
7-44
Laboratory Testing
Laboratory Testing

Visual/Stereovisual Inspections

Cladding Measurements

Mechanical Testing
Mechanical Testing

Metallography
Metallography

Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM)

Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy (EDS)
Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy (EDS)
7-45
As
As
-
-
Received Head Section
Received Head Section
Diameter: ~17.5" (~44.5 cm)
Thickness: ~7" (~17.8 cm)
0
180
90 270
Nozzle #3
Penetration
Nozzle #11
Penetration
B
C
D
A
7-46
Sectioning Through Cavity (Piece A)
Sectioning Through Cavity (Piece A)
Bottom
(Piece A2)
Top
(Piece A1)
7-47
Top View of Cavity
Top View of Cavity
180
90
270
0
Origin (red dot) located at
maximum upward deflection
7-48
Average Thickness: 0.256" (6.5 mm)
Minimum Thickness: 0.202" (5.1 mm)
Maximum Thickness: 0.314" (8.0 mm)
7-49
Measured Deflection: 0.182" (4.6 mm)
Curvature Correction: 0.030" (0.8 mm)
Actual Deflection: 0.152" (3.8 mm)
7-50
Dental mold used to calculate exposed
cladding surface area ~16.5 in
2
(106 cm
2
)
"Nose" of cavity located at 10
o
7-51
Elevated Temperature Tensile Testing
Elevated Temperature Tensile Testing
Tensile Test Comparison
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Engineering Strain (%)
E
n
g
i
n
e
e
r
i
n
g

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
Near RCS Near RV Head
UTS 54,800 psi 57,100 psi
0.2% Offset YS 30,500 psi 31,300 psi
Elongation 28.7% 28.7%
Red. Area 39.3% 34.3%
1.0" (25.4 mm)
Tests performed at 600
o
F (315
o
C)
7-52
Mechanical Testing
Mechanical Testing
-
-
Knoop
Knoop
Microhardness (500 gram load)
Microhardness (500 gram load)
Knoop Hardness (500 gram)
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
350.0
0.000 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.250 0.300 0.350 0.400 0.450 0.500 0.550 0.600 0.650 0.700 0.750
Stainless Clad Low Alloy Steel
7-53
0.25" (6.4 mm)
0.5" (12.7 mm) Surface Crack Map
7-54
Metallography
Metallography
Acetic-Nitric-Hydrochloric Swab Etch (All Samples)
Open Crack Near Bulge Typical Exposed Cladding Surface
Typical Bondline
RCS Side (No cracks found)
Typical Exposed Cladding Surface
Typical Bondline
300 m
40 m
150 m
150 m 40 m
40 m
7-55
Scanning Electron Microscopy
(SEM)
(SEM)
In-Service
Cracking
Remaining
Ligament
0.099" (2.5 mm)
0.139" (3.5 mm)
0.05" (1.2 mm)
7-56
(SEM)
(SEM)
100 m
A B C
Exposed Cladding
RCS Side
A
B
C
0.05" (1.3 mm)
7-57
Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy
Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy
(EDS)
(EDS)
Open Crack Deposit Analysis
(C, O, Al, Si, Cr, and Fe;
possible traces of Cl and Ni)
Element
Exposed
Surface
(Area 1)
Mid-
thickness
(Area 2)
Near
RCS
(Area 3)
Aluminum 0.11 0.01 0.10
Silicon 0.82 0.82 0.86
Chromium 18.36 18.01 18.16
Manganese 1.38 1.42 1.47
Nickel 8.87 8.88 8.88
Iron Balance Balance Balance
7-58

Exposed cladding area was ~16.5 in
Exposed cladding area was ~16.5 in
2 2
(~106
(~106
cm
cm
2 2
)
)

All cladding thickness measurements were
All cladding thickness measurements were
above minimum specified value
above minimum specified value

Shallow IGA on exposed cladding surface
Shallow IGA on exposed cladding surface
initiated numerous stress
initiated numerous stress
-
-
corrosion cracks
corrosion cracks

Cladding upward deflection opened up the
Cladding upward deflection opened up the
deepest cracks; 0.099" (2.5 mm) maximum
deepest cracks; 0.099" (2.5 mm) maximum
7-59

Minimum remaining cladding ligament
Minimum remaining cladding ligament
was 0.139" (3.5 mm) in this area
was 0.139" (3.5 mm) in this area

No ductile tearing observed at in
No ductile tearing observed at in
-
-
service
service
crack tips (i.e., failure was not imminent)
crack tips (i.e., failure was not imminent)

No significant Fe dilution observed on
No significant Fe dilution observed on
exposed cladding surface
exposed cladding surface

NRC/ORNL study indicated a predicted
NRC/ORNL study indicated a predicted
operating time without cladding failure of 2
operating time without cladding failure of 2
to 13 months (5% and 95% percentiles),
to 13 months (5% and 95% percentiles),
with a median operating time of 5 months
with a median operating time of 5 months
7-60
Laboratory Investigation of the Alloy 600 Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Nozzle Samples and
Weld Boat Sample from South Texas Project Unit 1
Framatome ANP, Inc., P.O. Box 10935, Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935
James W. Hyres
BWXT Services, Inc., 2016 Mt. Athos Road, Lynchburg, VA 24504-5447
Franois Cattant, Electricit de France (EDF)
Allan McIlree, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
In April 2003, evidence of primary water leakage was observed near two Alloy 600 bottom
mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzles (#1 and #46) at South Texas Project (STP) Unit 1.
Subsequent non-destructive examination (NDE) indicated cracking in the two BMI nozzles near the
J-groove weld. As a result, two segments of the two BMI nozzles and one J-groove weld boat
sample from nozzle #1 were removed and submitted for laboratory destructive examination. The
laboratory investigation was led by a panel of failure analysis experts from EDF, DEI, BWXT,
Exponent, EPRI, and Framatome ANP. The laboratory examinations included visual and stereo
visual inspections, dimensional inspections, fluorescent penetrant testing (PT), replication, X-ray
radiography, chemical composition analysis, modified Huey testing, microhardness testing, optical
metallography with progressive sectioning, scanning electron microcopy (SEM), and energy
dispersive spectroscopy (EDS).
The as-received boat sample from BMI nozzle #1 was approximately 1.30" (33 mm) long by 0.40"
(10 mm) wide on the concave surface and approximately 0.30" (7.6 mm) thick from the concave
surface to the apex of the convex surface. The concave surface of the boat sample consisted
mostly of the wetted surface of the J-groove weld and a portion of the BMI nozzle #1 near the outer
diameter (OD) surface. The convex surface of the boat sample was created by electrical discharge
machining (EDM) of the J-groove weld and the nozzle. The convex surface consisted of
approximately 40% BMI nozzle (Alloy 600) and 60% J-groove weld metal (Alloy 182).
Within the boat sample, three distinct lack-of-fusion cavities (defects #1, #2, and #3) were identified
in the J-groove weld along the BMI nozzle OD surface and the J-groove weld interface. These
three cavities were elongated in the circumferential direction along the nozzle OD surface.
However, part of cavity of defect #1 was seen between two passes of weld metal. The
composition of these two weld passes by EDS analysis was consistent with Alloy 182. The
evidence from the boat sample indicates that these three cavities were internal (i.e., below the
wetted weld surface) and not likely exposed to the primary water in the as-fabricated condition. A
dark yellowish substance was found entrapped in defects #2 and #3. EDS analysis results indicate
that the substance consisted of C, Ca, F, O, Si, Ti, and Al, which are typical elements in the flux
coating used for Alloy 182 weld rods. A small amount of residual deposits was also found on the
cavity wall (weld metal side) inside defect #1. These deposits were consistent with flux composition
as Al and Ti elements were identified by EDS analysis. Hence, the three lack-of-fusion cavities in
the boat sample were due to inclusion entrapment in the weld pool during welding. After being
intersected by the cracks, some of the entrapped inclusion had been dissolved or carried away by
water ingress.
Within the weld metal of the boat sample, the SEM/EDS results indicated that the weld materials
adjacent to the three defects were consistent with the Alloy 182 welding rod used for the BMI
7-61
nozzle J-groove weld at STP Unit 1. No weld repairs by Alloy 82 (Alloy 82 was used for weld repair
for the BMI nozzle J-groove weld according to STP) were identified in any of the boat sample
specimens examined. The SEM/EDS examinations did not reveal any evidence of hot cracking in
the J-groove weld, either adjacent to or near the three lack-of-fusion cavities or in the remainder of
the boat sample specimen evaluated.
On the cavity walls of defects #1, #2, and #3, very shallow intergranular cracks of approximately 1
grain deep (typical depth 0.0004" or 10 m) were present. The same shallow intergranular cracks
were found on both the BMI nozzle and the J-groove weld of the cavity wall. Hence, they were not
due to hot cracking. These shallow intergranular cracks appear to be consistent with corrosion due
to ingress of primary water. The largest lack-of-fusion cavity, defect #1, was approximately 0.25"
(6.4 mm) in length circumferentially along the nozzle OD surface. A short circumferential crack
was also present on the wetted surface of the J-groove weld above defect #1. This circumferential
crack traversed the 0.080" (2.0 mm) depth of weld metal between the wetted J-groove weld
surface and the cavity wall of defect #1. The circumferential crack was approximately 0.22" (5.6
mm) long at the wetted weld metal surface, which is about the same length as defect #1.
On the wetted J-groove weld surface, grinding marks perpendicular to the circumferential crack
were visible under a stereo microscope, but not visible by unaided human eyes. Metallography
performed on the cross section of the boat sample revealed no discernable cold worked layer from
the grinding on the wetted J-groove weld surface. The entire wetted J-groove weld surface contour
in the boat sample is smooth and shows no evidence of abusive grinding.
The circumferential crack was opened into two halves for SEM fractography. However, the crack
surfaces were covered by a layer of oxide corrosion product tenaciously attached to the substrate
weld metal. An attempt to remove this oxide layer without damaging the substrate weld metal was
unsuccessful. Hence, the SEM fractography did not yield any meaningful information regarding the
original crack surfaces. The SEM fractography of the wetted J-groove weld surface of the
circumferential crack indicated cracking to be intergranular. No definitive evidence of fatigue was
observed. Oxide thickness measurements made along the 0.080" (2.1 mm) ligament show
significant scatter and therefore did not provide any conclusive evidence regarding the crack
propagation direction.
A large axial crack was identified in both the BMI nozzle and the J-groove weld portions of the boat
sample. This axial crack intersected the tip of defect #1 at the nozzle OD to J-groove weld
interface. Although the axial crack and the circumferential crack did not directly intersect each
other, they were linked through defect #1. The lab results could not established whether the axial
and circumferential cracks were initiated independent of each other or otherwise. In addition, defect
#3 was intersected by a branch of the axial crack; hence it too was connected to defect #1 and the
circumferential crack. The extent of the axial crack and its branch in the boat sample was revealed
by progressive grinding and metallography. The axial crack and its branch in the BMI nozzle and
J-groove weld were intergranular and the crack morphology was consistent with primary water
stress-corrosion cracking (PWSCC) observed in Alloy 600 control rod drive mechanism (CRDM)
nozzles and other Alloy 182 welds in pressurized water reactors (PWRs).
In the nozzle portion of the boat sample, the axial crack was longer toward the nozzle inner
diameter (ID) than the nozzle OD. The upper extent (i.e., toward the upper RV head) of the axial
crack did not penetrate the nozzle OD surface above the toe of the J-groove weld. Hence, the
through-nozzle-wall portion of the axial crack was below the J-groove weld wetted surface. These
two findings contradicted the initial NDE results performed on-site before the nozzle #1 boat
sample was cut.
7-62
The branch of the axial crack intersected defect #3 perpendicularly to the circumferential
orientation of the defect. The branch of the axial crack gradually disappeared on the J-groove weld
side of defect #3. In addition, metallography shows the same crack branch in the nozzle,
extending from the EDM surface in a direction toward defect #3, indicating that the axial crack was
propagating toward defect #3 from the BMI nozzle side and was blunted by its intersection. All this
appears to suggest that the axial crack propagated from nozzle ID to OD, and branched
circumferentially at the weld/nozzle interface into the weld. However, due to the boat sample size,
the axial crack can not be confirmed to have initiated from the nozzle ID surface.
The Alloy 600 nozzle segments removed below the reactor vessel had no indications of cracking
on ID or OD surfaces during stereovisual inspections and fluorescent penetrant testing. A cold-
worked (CW) layer on the nozzle ID surface was identified by metallography. The microstructures
of nozzles #1 and #46 were examined by optical microscopy and SEM. In both nozzles, the
microstructure exhibited intragranular carbides with little or no carbide coverage on the grain
boundaries. The average grain size was ASTM No. 10 for both nozzles. Modified Huey tests were
performed on the specimens removed from nozzles #1 and #46 along with control specimens of
Alloy 600 to determine the bulk sensitization levels. The results show that both nozzles are not
sensitized, consistent with their microstructure exhibiting predominantly intragranular carbides. The
combination of a microstructure with predominantly intragranular carbides with little or no carbide
coverage on the grain boundaries, a very fine grain size, a high bulk yield stress, and the presence
of a cold-worked layer on the ID indicates that BMI nozzles #1 and #46 are likely to have high
susceptibility to primary water stress-corrosion cracking (PWSCC).
7-63
Laboratory Investigation of the Alloy 600
Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Nozzle
Samples and Weld Boat Sample
from South Texas Project Unit 1
Hongqing Xu AREVA
Steve Fyfitch AREVA
Jim Hyres BWXT Services, Inc
Allan McIlree EPRI
Franois Cattant EDF
PWSCC of Alloy 600 2005 International Conference & Exhibition
March 7-10, 2005
7-64
2
Background
On April 12,2003, visual inspection found a
small amount of white boric acid residue
around the O.D. of two Alloy 600 BMI nozzles
Nozzle #1
Nozzle #46
7-65
3
UT Inspection Results, Nozzle #1
Nozzle
wall
Weld
Helium leak
Tube
wall
Weld
Flaws 2 & 3
Leak path
postulated based
on UT results
7-66
4
UT Inspection Results, Nozzle #46
Tube
wall
Weld
Flaw 1
Tube
wall
Weld
Flaw 2
Leak path
postulated based
on UT results
7-67
5
Boat Sample Removal
One boat sample was
removed from the J-
groove weld of each
nozzle by EDM.
Unfortunately, the
nozzle #46 boat
sample was lost on-
site after cutting.
Only the boat sample
from nozzle #1 was
examined in lab.
Nozzle #1 Boat Sample Cutting
cutting
electrode
Alloy 182 J-
groove weld
Boat profile
7-68
6
As-Received Nozzle #1 Boat Sample
The boat sample was
1.30" (33 mm) long,
0.40" (10 mm) wide,
0.30" (7.6 mm) thick.
The concave (top figure)
surface is mostly the
wetted surface of the J-
groove weld.
The convex surface was
created by EDM, 40%
nozzle, 60% weld.
EDM surface
J-Groove weld
surface
7-69
7
X-Ray and Surface SEM Mapping
X-ray revealed an
additional cavity Defect
#3not exposed to the
surface.
Three lack of fusion
cavities were located near
the nozzle-to-weld
interface.
The axial crack Y-
branched to intersect
defects #1, #2, and #3.
Defect #1
Defect #3 Defect #2
Nozzle axial crack
Alloy 600
Nozzle
J-Groove
Weld
Y shaped axial
crack in nozzle
7-70
8
Cracks and Cavities in Boat Sample
Three cavities near the weld/nozzle interface
They are named as Defect #1,Defect #2, and Defect #3.
The boat sample contained two cracks developed during
service
A short circumferential crack was on the wetted surface of the
weld. It was directly behind and connected to Defect #1.
The Y shaped axial crack intersected defects #1, #2 , and #3.
The axial crack and the circumferential crack did not directly
intersect each other; they were linked through defect #1.
7-71
9
Boat Sample Sectioning
The approximate length and location
of the short circumferential crack on
the wetted surface of the weld (i.e., on
the back surface, see slide No. 15.)
Boat 1A
Boat 1B Boat 1C Boat 1D
Boat 1E
Cut #1 Cut #2 Cut #3 Cut #4
Y-shaped axial crack (see slide No. 18)
7-72
10
Cut #1, Boat Profiles
uo::!~!d
ùc
]_oov
~!d ~d
:uc
D 1
l` 1b
l` 1^
7-73
11
uo::!~!d
ùc
]_oov
~!d ~d
:uc
D 1
l` 1
l` 1b
7-74
12
uo::!~!d
ùc
]_oov
~!d ~d
:uc
D 3
l` 1D
l` 1
7-75
13
uo::!~!d
ùc
]_oov
~!d ~d
:uc
D ?
l` 1l
l` 1D
7-76
14
Cavities Contained Flux Inclusions
EDS confirmed the substance was consistent with the flux
coating used for Alloy 182 weld rods.
The lack of fusion cavities were due to flux (inclusion)
entrapment in and between weld passes and were not
exposed to primary water in the initial as-built condition.
Entrapped
dark yellow
flux
D 3
D ?
7-77
15
Short Circumferential Crack
The short circumferential
crack was directly behind
and connected to large
cavity, Defect #1.
Cracking appears to be
intergranular.
7-78
16
Circumferential Crack Opened Up
Piece 1B1
Piece 1B2
Wetted Weld
Surface
circumferential crack
surface (developed
during service)
1B2
1B1
1B2
l` 1b
1B1
1B2
Circumferential crack location
Shiny surface was due
to ductile fracture made
in laboratory
Cavity wall
7-79
17
Circumferential Crack Close-Up
l` 1b
l` 1b
Wetted
weld
surface
Alloy 600
Nozzle
In-service crack was on a plane
perpendicular to the two free
surfaces.
7-80
18
Axial Crack Progressive Grinding
Micrograph
viewing
direction
l` 11
progressive
grinding
faces
1: c
7-81
19
?ud c
3d c
+| c
| c
7-82
20
b| c
| c
8| c 9| c
10| c
7-83
21
BMI nozzle J-groove weld
Crack
contour
Defect 3
The axial crack profile is
marked on the left figure.
Contrary to NDE, no evidence
of through nozzle-wall
cracking above the J-groove
weld.
Contrary to NDE, crack was
shorter near the nozzle OD,
suggesting propagation from
ID toward OD within the boat
sample.
Axial crack profile (the
red line length is the
crack depth on each
progressive grinding
plane.)
7-84
22
Axial Cracks in Nozzle and Weld
The axial crack and
branching in the Alloy 600
nozzle and Alloy 182 weld
were intergranular and
consistent with PWSCC.
nozzle
weld
weld
nozzle
7-85
23
Axial Crack Propagation Direction
Defect #1
nozzle
weld
Circumferential cracks
nozzle wel
d
The axial crack appears to
propagate from nozzle ID
to OD, and branched
circumferentially at the
weld/nozzle interface into
the weld.
7-86
24
Alloy 600 BMI Nozzles #1 and #46
Nozzle #1 Nozzle
#46
BMI nozzles #1 and
#46 were cut below the
reactor vessel (below
the J-groove weld).
No indications were
found on ID or OD
surfaces with
fluorescent PT and
stereo-microscope
examination.
7-87
25
Cold Worked Layer on Nozzle I.D.
A cold-worked layer was found on the ID surface of both
nozzles. This was consistent with the gun-drilling
process used during BMI nozzle manufacturing.
Nozzle #46
ID surface
Nozzle #1
ID surface
7-88
26
Cold Worked Layer on Nozzle I.D.
The microstructures exhibited intragranular carbides with
little or no carbide coverage on the grain boundaries. The
average grain size was ASTM No. 10.
Nozzle #46
Nozzle #1
7-89
27
Modified Huey Test Results
Modified Huey test results were consistent with the
microstructure exhibiting predominantly intragranular
carbides.
Alloy 600 Control
Specimen
(non-sensitized)
Alloy 600 Control
Specimen
(sensitized)
Nozzle #1
Specimen
Nozzle #46
Specimen
Total surface area 3.919 in
2
3.982 in
2
1.728 in
2
1.364 in
2
Starting Weight 9.9460 g 10.3288 g 8.4932 g 6.7433 g
Weight after 24hr 9.9440 g 10.1973 g 8.4907 g 6.7415 g
Weight after 48hr 9.9447 g 9.6475 g 8.4886 g 6.7415 g
Weight loss (W) 1.3 mg 681.3 mg 4.6 mg 1.8 mg
Weight Loss Rate
(mg/dm
2
/day)
2.6 1,326 20.6 10.2
7-90
28
Conclusions
The Alloy 600 microstructure (predominantly
intragranular carbides with little intergranular carbides)
and the ID surface cold-worked layer made the BMI
nozzles highly susceptible to PWSCC.
The three weld cavities in the boat sample were due to
entrapment of the weld flux. The cavities were
intersected by cracks developed during plant service.
The cracking in the Y-shaped crack was intergranular
and consistent with PWSCC. The crack oriented axially
within the Alloy 600 nozzle, but branched into the Alloy
182 weld circumferentially.
7-91
29
Conclusions
The short circumferential crack, without branching,
connecting the large cavity to the wetted J-groove weld
surface, appears to be intergranular. It was unlikely
caused by hot cracking, although the mechanism
(PWSCC, fatigue, or others) can not be definitively
established.
The SEM/EDS examinations showed no weld repairs
(weld repair would be with Alloy 82) and no evidence of
weld hot cracking, either near the three lack-of-fusion
cavities, or in the remainder of the boat sample.
7-92
30
Conclusions
The Y-shaped crack and the short circumferential crack did
not intersect each other; they were linked through the cavity.
The lab results could not established whether the two cracks
initiated independent of each other or otherwise.
Contrary to NDE, the Y-shaped axial crack did not go
through-wall above the J-groove weld, and the crack was
shorter near the nozzle OD. The results suggest that, at least
within the boat sample, the crack propagated axially from
nozzle ID toward OD, and then branched circumferentially
into the weld; however the crack can not be confirmed to
have initiated from the nozzle ID surface due to the boat
sample size.
7-93
Selection, Removal, Decontamination and NDE of North Anna 2
Retired Reactor Vessel Head CRDM Penetrations.
Franois Cattant Electricit de France
Noel Peat Failure Characterisation Consultancy, UK
Robert Barnes Al Ahluwalia and Al McIlree Electric Power Research Institute
Craig Harrington TXU Power
Abstract
Non Destructive Examination (NDE) of the North Anna Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Head (RVH)
during the 2002 fall outage identified widespread crack indications in the Alloy 600 CRDM
penetrations and associated Alloy 182 and 82 J-groove attachment welds. Within the population
of 65 CRDM penetrations, 6 potentially contained a through-wall leak path and 42 would require
repair. When the Utility decided to replace the RPVH, a rare opportunity was provided to the
industry to undertake in-depth studies of representative defective CRDM penetrations from a
retired RPVH. Data obtained from these studies would be invaluable in validating safety
assessment statements. Information gathered during both the non-destructive and destructive
examination phases of the investigation would be used to advance the mechanistic understanding
of defect formation and assess accuracy and sensitivity of the NDE techniques employed. This
paper provides a summary of work undertaken during the first two phases of a three-phase EPRI
managed program concerning the detailed destructive metallurgical examination of selected
CRDM penetrations from the decommissioned North Anna Unit 2 reactor vessel head (RVH).
The two phases described are (i) selection and removal of penetrations from the retired RVH and
(ii) penetration decontamination and laboratory NDE. The first findings of the third phase the
detailed destructive examination - are presented in a separate paper at this conference.
Background
Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 600 and its weld metals is a major
equipment reliability challenge to the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fleet. A comprehensive
metallurgical examination of a degraded component is one of the proactive and informative
actions needed to advance the mechanistic understanding of Alloy 600 degradation in primary
water systems. The decommissioned North Anna Unit 2 RVH provides an excellent opportunity
to undertake detailed metallurgical examinations of representative components that will provide
information to support the MRP Alloy 600 materials management objectives.
Project Objectives
The broad aims of the destructive examination program on the North Anna Unit 2 RVH are: (i)
improve the fundamental understanding of the underlying degradation mechanisms of base and
weld metals, (ii) provide a description of surface and volumetric defects that can be used to
benchmark the stress modeling and NDE capability against real flaws, and (iii) gain insights into
the RVH annulus environments that develop as a result of primary water leakage.
7-95
Field NDE Penetrations Selection and Removal
Based on the field NDE results, 6 penetrations
have been selected for removal for further
examinations. These 6 penetrations cover a full
range of visual, UT and ET indications
(penetrations highlighted in grey in table 1).
Nozzle UT and ECT Findings BMV
10 Weld interface indications, lack of fusion Leaking
15
OD circumferential
(5 deg, 0.226)
No leakage
21 Potential leak path Leaking
35 OD axial Leaking
46 ECT circumferential adjacent to toe Masked
54
OD circumferential
(32 deg, 0.156)
(79 deg, 0.226)
No leakage
57 No detectable degradation Leaking
59
OD circumferential
(76 deg, 0.149)
(50 deg, 0.149)
Masked
63 Potential leak path Masked
65
OD circumferential
(72 deg, 0.152)
(30 deg, 0.078)
Masked
67
OD circumferential
(44 deg, 0.094)
No leakage
Table 1: NA2 2002 inspection summary for
leaking or degraded penetrations.
Seven penetrations were removed by flame torch
cutting, six of the penetrations were removed as
planned; a seventh was removed for further
investigation following the identification of a
condition discovered while performing one set of
cutting. The six specified penetrations were
removed without any known damage and metal
temperatures were kept within limits. The
identity and orientation of each penetration was
maintained throughout the removal process
(figure 1). All seven penetrations were packaged
and dispatched to the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL) for further work.
Figure 1: As removed penetration #51
Decontamination and Surface Replica
Due to limited resources, only 4 penetrations were decontaminated. The J-groove weld and
approximately -inch beyond the J-groove weld/clad interface, the whole of the penetration O.D.
below the weld and the penetration I.D. from its threaded end to approximately 1-inch above the
RVH outer surface were protected during decontamination. Areas on the penetrations outside
these could be treated more vigorously. A thin layer of a high-resolution polysiloxane surface
replication material (MicroSet) was applied as protection and also used to form a seal around
the RVH annulus crevice. Its first function was to cover and provide protection to the regions of
interest during more vigorous decontamination of the remaining exposed areas on the penetration
block. Secondly, loose deposits would be fixed by the replica material, providing an efficient
means of removing and capturing such deposits for possible examination at a later date. With the
protective replica in place, a dry-ice impingement process, in conjunction with light nylon
brushing and demineralised water, was employed to remove loose contamination from all of the
exposed un-protected surfaces of the penetration block. Two final high-resolution replicas were
obtained, this time to provide an accurate copy of the surfaces features, including surface
breaking defects for subsequent examination.
Laboratory NDE
Four industry NDE vendors participated
in the examination of the penetrations at
the PNNL facilities. They applied a variety of standard and
novel NDE inspection techniques to the four targeted
7-96
penetrations including Electromagnetic
Acoustic Transmission, Ultrasonic
Techniques (Time of Flight Diffraction
(TOFD), Pulse Echo (PE) straight beam
and shear wave), Eddy Current
techniques for detection of surface and
slightly sub-surface indications along
with some special Eddy Current
techniques. One vendor employed a new
deep-penetrating eddy current
technique, from the penetration tube I.D,
to detect voids on the low alloy steel
that might be indicative of primary
coolant leak-paths within the RVH
annulus. Other innovative eddy current
techniques applied were not only
designed to detect surface degradation,
but to also locate high stress regions
within the tube surfaces. All the new
techniques have been applied as if it
were real field inspections. At this stage,
given that some of the techniques were
experimental, and have not been
validated, the results are provided for
information only. Inspection data from
the 2002 refueling outage inspections at
North Anna Unit 2 are also specified.
Some differences were identified
between the two inspection data sets,
with new NDE indications recorded at
PNNL and some indications from the
2002 outage not repeated at PNNL. No
inspection of the J-groove weld has been
performed at PNNL, so the only data
available are those from the 2002
outage. Figure 2 presents the results
obtained for the penetration selected for
destructive examinations by EPRI (#54).
Penetration 54 Eddy Current Data
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360
Angular Location (Degrees)
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
o
n

R
a
n
g
e

(
I
n
c
h
e
s
)
Top of Weld
Bottom of the Weld
Ind 1 ET Tube ID
Possible Leak Path
Ind 2 ET Tube ID
Permeability Ind.
Ind 3 ET Tube ID
Permeability Ind.
Ind 4 ET Tube ID Not
Previously Report
Ind #1 Possible Leak Path
Ind #2 ET ID Tubing
Surface
Ind #4 ET ID Tubing
Surface
Ind #3 ET ID Tubing Surface
Penetration 54 Ultrasonic Data
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360
Angular Location (Degrees)
In
d
ic
a
tio
n
R
a
n
g
e
(In
c
h
e
s
)
Top of Weld
Bottomof the
Weld
Ind 1 UT Cir (UT1)
Ind 2 UT Cir (UT 3)
Ind 2 con't Cir
(UT 3)
Ind 3 UT Cir (UT 3)
Ind 4 Ut Cir (UT 1)
Ind 5 UT Axial Not
Previously
Repored
Ind #6 UT Cir
(UT 1 Missed
Located)
Ind #1 OD Cir
Ind #2 OD Cir
Ind #4 UT Cir
Ind #2 con't OD Cir
Ind # 3 OD Cir
Ind #5 ID Axial
Ind #6 OD Cir
Figure 2: summary of 2002 outage and PNNL ET (upper) and
UT (lower) inspection findings for penetration #54.
Silastic Molding
Silastic molds have been taken from the ID of 4 decontaminated penetrations. Molding of penetration tube
bores gives access to the tube geometry, such as deformation and ovality indicative of residual stress
distribution. In some instances, the mold can also capture surface defects such as machining marks or even
cracks.
Conclusion
Given the number of first-of-a-kind tasks the NA2 DE project had to accomplish, part 1 of this project has
been quite successful. 7 penetrations have been removed from the head; 4 have been decontaminated,
replicated (Microset material for the surface and silastic for the ID volume), novel and standard EC and
UT techniques applied. One penetration (#54) was supplied to Westinghouse in Pittsburgh for DE.
7-97
Selection, Removal,
Decontamination and NDE
of North Anna 2 Retired
Reactor Vessel Head CRDM
Penetrations.
2005 International PWSCC of
Alloy 600 Conference and Exhibit
Show Santa Ana Pueblo, NM
March 7-10, 2005
F. CATTANT (EDF)
N. PEAT (Failure Characterisation Consultancy)
R. BARNES, A. Mc ILREE, A. AHLUWALIA (EPRI)
C. HARRINGTON (TXU Power)
7-98
2
The Authors acknowledge
NRC RES for supporting decontamination and
NDE at PNNL
Dr. Steve Doctor and Mr. John Abrefah for
project management and operational support
Mr. Ronald King of EPRI Solutions for managing
penetration removal in Utah
Dominion Generation for donating penetrations
from the retired North Anna 2 RPV Head
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
7-99
3
Background
Project objectives
Field NDE
Penetration selection
Penetration removal
Decontamination
Surface replication
Laboratory NDE
Silastic molding
Conclusion
Presentation content
7-100
4
Fall 2001 - North Anna Unit 2 was inspected via bare metal
visual of the upper head surface.
3 penetrations were subsequently repaired
Fall 2002 North Anna Unit 2 was inspected via bare metal
visual, eddy current of all J-groove welds, and ultrasonic of
penetrations
6 potential leakers from BMV
63 of 65 J-groove welds had indications
42 J-groove welds would require repair
6 penetrations with OD circumferential indications
BMV for Leaking was either negative or masked
Utility decided to replace the Reactor Vessel Head
Agreed to allow EPRI/MRP to remove samples from head
Background
7-101
5
Project objectives
Determine the most probable cause(s) of initiation and
propagation of the weld and base metal flaws.
Understand the formation of the circumferential flaws in
the outer diameter of the penetration base material and
map their position.
Characterize the penetration annulus environment and
identify any low alloy steel corrosion.
Benchmark NDE techniques for flaw detection/
characterization, helping interrogation of other RCS
locations and Alloy 690/52/152 materials.
Obtain initiation and crack tip data on complete field-
recovered flaws, including interaction of hot cracking with
PWSCC that is of great value for 690 replacement as well.
7-102
6
Field NDE
NA2 2002 outage inspection summary for leaking or degraded penetrations
Penetration # UT and ECT Findings BMV Findings
10 Weld interface indications, LOF Leaking
15 OD circumferential indication No discernable leak
35 OD axial indication Leaking
41 OD circumferential indication Masked
46 ECT circumferential indication adjacent to toe Masked
54 2 OD circumferential indications No discernable leak
57 No detectable degradation Leaking
59 2 OD circumferential indications Masked
63 Potential leak path Masked
65 2 OD circumferential indications Masked
67 OD circumferential indication No discernable leak
7-103
7
Penetrations selection (1)
0
9 0
1 8 0
2 7 0
?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Group 1:
Visual: leaking
ET: weld surface
axial indications
outer portion of
the weld
=> Penetrations
#31 and #10
7-104
8
Group 2:
Repaired
UT: possible leak
path
PT: weld surface
indications
UT: axial indications on
the tube ID
ET: axial indications on the
tube ID, above or below
the weld
=> Penetrations
#51 and #63
0
9 0
1 8 0
2 7 0
?
5
1
4
3
6
2
6
6
6
6
7-105
9
Group 3:
No evidence of leak
UT: circumferential
indication at the tube
OD at the weld
elevation
ET: multiple weld
surface circumferential
indications
ET: axial tube ID indication
=> Penetrations #54
and #59
0
9 0
1 8 0
2 7 0
7
1
2
3
4 5
Penetration
54
7-106
10
Penetration removal (1)
Head at
Envirocare
UTAH Facility
7-107
11
References
Angles: 0 =
downhill; the arrow
points the 270
angle of the
penetration
Elevation: 0 mm =
penetration bottom
end
270
0 - downhill
90
180 - vent pipe
The head is
seen from
above
10
31
51
59
63
54
39
7-108
12
Torch
flame
cutting
Shipping
to PNNL
7-109
13
Decontamination
5 out of the 7 harvested
penetrations decontaminated
for further NDE
Protection of the zones of
interest with polysiloxane
surface replication material
Loose contamination
removed with a dry-ice
impingement process, in
conjunction with light nylon
brushing and demineralized
water
Process repeated
7-110
14
Surface replication
Buttering, weld,
bottom and
bottom end of
tube replicated
with
polysiloxane
surface
replication
material
Kept for further
visual and SEM
examination
7-111
15
Laboratory NDE - Goals
Perform examinations that were applied in the field
Ultrasonic TOFD and PE Straight beam from the tube inside
diameter
Surface scan with eddy current of the tube inside diameter from 2
above the J-Groove weld to the tube end wet side.
Surface scan with eddy current the J-Groove wetted surface weld
to include any buttering associated with the weldment from the
attached tube interface out to and beyond the weld into the
cladding.
Scan the ID surface of the tubing from the upper weld interface to
the dry side of the vessel head with available technology to detect
possible leakage path of primary coolant.
Scan the ID and OD surface of the tubing and J-Groove weldment
with developmental technology to determine the material
conditions with advance eddy current and magnetic field testing.
It is a technology evaluation project; not vendor comparison
7-112
16
Laboratory NDE - Photo of Pallet Stand
7-113
17
Laboratory NDE Example: penetration # 54
Four Vendors inspected the penetration
UT, ET, Specialize ET, and EMATS
J-Groove weld wet surface not inspected
Original field NDE showed indications on weld
surface
A new technology (ET) identified a possible leak path
Additional eddy current indications of permeability
were reported in the deep penetrating eddy current
inspection of the tube ID above weld inspection region
UT reported one additional axial indication, not
reported during field NDE
7-114
18
Nozzle #54 UT Indications Reported by Vendors
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360
Degrees
I
n
c
h
e
s
Top of Weld
Bottom of the Weld
Ind 1 UT Cir (UT1)
Ind 2 UT Cir (UT3)
Ind 2 con't Cir(UT3)
Ind 3 UT Cir (UT3)
Ind 4 Ut Cir (UT1)
Ind 5 UT Axial (Not
Pervoiusly
Reported)
Ind #6 UT Cir(UT1)
Ind #1 OD Cir
Ind #2 OD Cir
Ind #4 UT Cir
Ind #2 con't OD Cir
Ind # 3 OD Cir
Ind #5 ID Axial
Ind #6 OD Cir
7-115
19
Nozzle #54 ET Indications Reported by Vendors
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360
Degrees
I
n
c
h
e
s
Top of Weld (Not
Previously Reported)
Bottom of the Weld
Ind 1 ET OD Wastage
(Not Previously
Reported)
Ind 2 ET Tube ID (Not
Prevoiusly Reported)
Ind 3 ET Tube ID (Not
Prevoiusly Reported)
Ind 4 ET Tube ID (ET7)
Ind #1 Possible Wastage
Ind #2 ET ID Tubing Surf ace
Ind #4 ET Tubing ID Surf ace
Ind #3 ET ID Tubing Surf ace
7-116
20
Silastic molding (1)
Performed molding of inner volume for four
penetrations:
Provides information on inside geometry such as:
Deformation and ovality that could be used for
residual stress calculations from assembly and
welding operations
Surface defects such as machine marks (possibly
even surface cracks)
Allows correlation of penetration geometry with
spatial position
Highly accurate molds (micron level)
7-117
21
7-118
22
7-119
23
Conclusion
Given the number of first-of-a-kind tasks the NA2 DE
project had to accomplish, part 1 of this project has been
quite successful.
7 penetrations have been removed from the head.
5 penetrations have been decontaminated and
replicated (Microset material for the surface and silastic
compound for the ID volume).
Novel and standard EC and UT techniques have been
applied in field representative conditions.
Penetration #54 has been supplied to Westinghouse
hot laboratory in Pittsburgh for DE.
Penetrations #31 and #59 have been provided to NRC
Research for DE at PNNL.
7-120
Destructive Examination of North Anna 2 Retired Reactor Vessel Head
CRDM Penetration #54 Status Review
Gutti V. Rao Westinghouse Electric Co
Al Ahluvalia Electric Power Research Institute
Craig Harrington TXU Power
Abstract
During the 2002 fall outage inspections wide spread crack indications were recorded in
the North Anna 2 Alloy 600 CRDM penetrations and the associated Alloy 182 and 82
J-groove attachment welds. The decision to replace the Reactor Vessel Head by the utility
presented a unique opportunity for the industry to examine the nature and extent of
service related PWSCC degradation of the Alloy 600/182/82 CRDM penetrations and the
welds. As was detailed in a separate paper (Ref.1) in the present conference, as part of the
MRP/EPRI Alloy 600 materials management objective, four Alloy 600 CRDM
penetrations were sectioned out from the vessel head, decontaminated and shipped to the
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for further examination. Non-destructive
examinations were conducted by four independent contractors at the PNNL facilities.
Bases on the results of these examinations, Penetration no.54 was selected and shipped to
Westinghouse Hot Cell Facilities for detailed destructive examinations. The purpose of
the current paper is to summarize the sectioning plans and preliminary investigation
results of destructive examination of one of the four designated Penetrations, namely
penetration No. 54 currently in progress at Westinghouse Hot cell Laboratories in
Pittsburgh, Pa. The work is carried out in two phases namely i) Development of strategic
sectioning plan and ii) Detailed destructive examinations. The major objectives of the
program and the preliminary examination results are summarized.
Background
Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Nickel base Alloy 600 and the
associated Alloy 82/182 weld materials continues to be a major challenge to the PWR
industry over the past decade. The recent incidences at VC Summer (Ref. 2), Oconee
(Ref. 3), Davis Besse (Ref. 4) and North Anna 2 (Ref. 5) have demonstrated that the issue
can have a major impact on plant downtime and maintenance costs to the industry, as
well as have major impact on plant safety. Although there have been several
investigations conducted and predictive methodologies developed over the past decade,
reliable management of the Alloy 600 issue continues to be a challenge to the industry.
The availability of North Anna 2 Reactor Vessel Head Penetration samples presents a
unique opportunity to the industry, enabling a comprehensive investigation of the
PWSCC issue surrounding the Alloy 600 penetration and the Alloy 82/182 J-groove weld.
7-121
Project Objectives
The vendor inspection results of Penetration 54 suggested the presence of variety of
defects including circumferential cracking and potential wastage at the carbon steel
interface. The major objectives of the current hot cell investigation are:
i) Establish physical characteristics (position and dimensions) of the defects
ii) Provide insight into the mechanistic aspects of their formation
iii) Establish interrelation if any between different types of defects (axial and circ)
and technical basis
iv) Characterize the wastage and deposits at the carbon steel interface and,
v) Determine the root cause of cracking
Tasks Completed
The following tasks were completed as of Jan 30, 05:
x Removal of excess carbon steel to facilitate handling in the laboratory.
x Replication of the J-weld wetted surface and examination of the replica.
x Sectioning of the nozzle into three major pieces
x Annulus examination for wastage of the carbon steel
x Annulus gap measurements.
Preliminary Results
Examination of the J-weld wetted ID surface suggested the presence of several branched
out cracking. Examination of the weld also indicated non-homogenous width of the weld
beads, but the significance of this observation is not apparent at this time. Based on the
results of the vendor inspections, the preliminary sectioning plan followed radially
sectioning the penetration into three segments (A, B &C, figure 1), isolating the major
defect regions. One of the sectioning lines was positioned through a potential wastage
region while a second section intersected a group of indications.
No evidence of wastage was confirmed at a location where potential wastage was
identified by NDE nor were there boric acid deposits in the annulus region. Original
machining marks were readily visible in the annulus. Macro etching of the cut faces was
conducted to examine the weld interfaces and any major defects. Detailed sectioning
procedures are being developed by conducting Eddy Current and Ultrasonic testing from
the penetration ID and cur suefaces.The region examined to date included only 90 of the
annulus. At one location, significant weld penetration into the Alloy 600 tube was noted;
this penetration may have caused one of the NDE indications. Examination of smaller
sections of this piece is underway to characterize the defect indications and establish the
mechanistic aspects. The bulk of the laboratory examinations remain to be completed
including
x Dimensional measurements of silastic molds
x Light metallography
x SEM fractography
x Microchemistry analysis (energy dispersive spectroscopy, x-ray diffraction)
7-122
x Bulk chemical analyses
x Hardness surveys
x Characterization of the Alloy 600 and weld metal.
List of References
1. Francois Cattant at.,el , Investigation of Defective CRDM Penetrations
Removed from the Retired North Anna Unit 2 RPVH. 2005 international
PWSCC of Alloy 600 conference and Exhibit Show.March 7-10, 2005. Hyatt
Regency, Santa Ana Pueblo, New Mexico
2. Rao, G. V., Metallurgical Investigation of Cracking in the Reactor Vessel
Alpha Loop Hot Leg Nozzle to Pipe Weld at V. C. Summer Station,
Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3 Report, WCAP-15616, January 2001.
3. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor
Pressure Vessel Head Penetration NozzlesNRC Bulletin2001-01,
August 3, 2001.
4. Root Cause Analysis Report: Significant Degradation of Reactor Pressure
Vessel Head, Davis-Besse Nuclear power Station Report CR 2002-0891,
April 2002.
5. Rao, G.V., et al, Metallurgical Investigation of Cracking of the Alloy 82/182
J-Groove Weld of the Reactor Vessel Head Penetration Joint at North Anna
Unit 2 Station, Westinghouse Class 2 Report WCAP-15777, January 2002.
7-123
Slide 1
Destructive Examination of North Anna 2
Retired Reactor Vessel Head
CRDM Penetration #54
(Status Review)
2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference and Exhibit Show
Santa Anna Pueblo, New Mexico
March 7-10, 2005
Gutti Rao
Al Ahluwalia
Electric Power Research Institute
Craig Harrington
TXU Power
7-124
Slide 2
CREDITS
The expertise and support from the following
personnel is acknowledged
Al Mc Ilree (Electric Power Research Institute)
Francois Cattant (Electric DeFrance)
Noel Peat (Failure Characterization Consultancy, UK)
Joyce Conerman (Westinghouse)
Chris DeFlitch (Westinghouse)
Warren Junker (Westinghouse)
Al Vaia (Westinghouse)
Destructive Examination of NA Reactor
Vessel Head CRDM Penetration #54
7-125
Slide 3
Destructive Examination of NA
Penetration #54
BACKGROUND
z 2002 Fall inspections at North Anna 2
z Significant indications in several Alloy 600 CRDM nozzle
penetrations and attachment welds
z Decision to replace RV Head by the Utility
z Unique opportunity to conduct comprehensive destructive
examinations of Alloy 600 penetration and Alloy 182/82
attachment welds from service
7-126
Slide 4
Penetration #54
BACKGROUND (continued)
z Six affected nozzles shipped to PNNL and four were
deconed
z Independent NDE examinations by four industry Vendors
z Nozzle 54 shipped to Westinghouse for hot cell investigation
z The project is supported by EPRI/MRP
7-127
Slide 5
MAJOR OBJECTIVES
z Physical characterization of defects
z Mechanistic aspects of formation
z Interrelationship between various (Axial, Circ., or Other)
types of defects and technical basis
z Characterization of annulus environment & wastage
z Root cause of cracking
Penetration #54
7-128
Slide 6
PROGRAM PHASES
z PHASE I:
Development of Sectioning Plan
Preliminary Sectioning
z PHASE II
Detailed Sectioning
Destructive Examinations
Penetration #54
7-129
Slide 7
Penetration #54
PHASE I:
PRELIMINARY
SECTIONING AND
BASIS
Fabrication
&
Repair History
NDE Results
(Field, Vendor
& Hot Cell)
Program
Objectives
SECTIONING
PLAN
7-130
Slide 8
PHASE II SCOPE:
z DEFECT CHARACTERIZATION
Precise sizing by destructive examination
Location and orientation with respect to penetration axis
and weld position
Types of defects and their interrelation
z MECHANISTIC ASSESSMENTS
Destructive examinations (surface, metallographic,
fractographic & chemistry assessments)
Initiation & propagation mechanisms
Interrelation between various types of flaws
Penetration #54
7-131
Slide 9
Penetration #54
PHASE II SCOPE (continued):
z ANNULUS ENVIRONMENT
Document annulus condition and deposits if any
Physical characterization of wastage areas, if any
Chemical characterization of deposits
z ROOT CAUSE CONSIDERATIONS
Review of fabrication history & recent repair history
Results from previous investigations of NA boat samples
Current destructive examination results
Contributors to initiation and propagation of nozzle #54 cracks
Root cause assessments
7-132
Slide 10
Penetration #54
PROGRAM SCHEDULE AND HOLD POINTS
z The project is executed in sequential steps with hold points
requiring customer approval
z Phase I scope completed
z Phase II work is in progress
7-133
Slide 11
PHASE I
SECTIONING PLAN
AND
PRELIMINARY SECTIONING
Penetration #54
7-134
Slide 12
Penetration #54
PROGRAM SCHEDULE AND HOLD POINTS
z Phase I scope completed
z Phase II work is in progress
7-135
Slide 13
Penetration #54
Schematic Representation of Vendor NDE Findings
0
180
270
90
7-136
Slide 14
Penetration #54
As-Received Condition of CRDM Penetration No. 54
7-137
Slide 15
Penetration #54
EC Pencil Probe Tracing of Weld Interface
7-138
Slide 16
Penetration #54
Pencil Probe Tracing of the Weld Interface
7-139
Slide 17
Penetration #54
Sectioning Layout to Remove Excess Carbon Steel
3 in. minimum
clearance
from interface
7-140
Slide 18
Penetration #54
Piece in Fixture/Removal of Excess Carbon Steel
7-141
Slide 19
Penetration #54
Replication of J-weld (ID Face) Marking for Sectioning through
Penetration (OD Face)
7-142
Slide 20
Penetration #54
7-143
Slide 21
Penetration #54
7-144
Slide 22
Penetration #54
As-Sectioned Pieces A, B & C
0 180
68
Indication Group 3,4
Indication Group 1,2
Cut
(270)
Weld Area
Possible Wastage in CS
270
Cut
(60)
Cut (150)
Pc A
Pc B
Pc C
Penetration Tube
7-145
Slide 23
Penetration #54
J-Weld Replica Indication (300Location)
7-146
Slide 24
Penetration #54
0
1 2
150Cut Pc C Interface (Full Length)
between Head & Penetration
Replica of 150Cut Pc B Interface (Full
Length) between Head & Penetration
0 Gap: 0.016 inches, Off-set: 0.0060 inches
NOTE: Off-set refers to the elevation difference between the plane of the penetration and the plane of the
carbon steel.
0
1
2
7-147
Slide 25
Penetration #54
60Cut
7-148
Slide 26
Penetration #54
Piece A (60- 270)
7-149
Slide 27
Destructive Examination of NA Reactor Vessel
Head CRDM Penetration #54
Cut is 1 inch minimum
from butter and carbon
steel interface
Cut is 1 inch minimum from
bottom of last j-weld pass
Cut is 1 inch minimum
from end of j-weld
View of cuts
from top
Ridge is an artifact of
the cutting process
60Cut Face
7-150
Slide 28
Penetration #54
Piece A, 270Cut Face
7-151
Slide 29
Penetration #54
Lack of fusion
Weld + Butter
Area of Indications
Area of Indications?
Lack of fusion
Piece B, 60Face: Interpretation of +Pt
Eddy Current Scan
Piece B, 60Face: +Pt Eddy
Current Scan
7-152
Slide 30
Penetration #54
Macro Etch pc B1A, 150Face
7-153
Slide 31
Penetration #54
Macro Etch pc B1A, 150Face
Weld
Penetration
Penetration
Tube OD
7-154
Slide 32
Penetration #54
Piece B during Cutting Operation, Part
of Penetration Removed
Piece B Separated Penetration OD Face
at the Annulus
Carbon Steel
Surface in
the Annulus
ID Surface of
Penetration
Tube
7-155
Slide 33
Penetration #54
Piece B Sectioning
7-156
Slide 34
Penetration #54
60 face
150 face
135picture
(replica)
70picture
(replica)
90picture
(replica)
Detailed Sectioning Plan for Piece B
7-157
Slide 35
Penetration #54
TASKS COMPLETED TO DATE
z Removal of excess carbon steel to facilitate handling in the
laboratory
z Replication of the J-weld wetted surface and examination of
the replica
z Sectioning of the nozzle into three major pieces A, B, and C
z Annulus examination for wastage of the carbon steel
z Annulus gap measurements
z Examination of cut sections A, B, and C
z NDE Examinations
z Detailed sectioning plan
7-158
Slide 36
Penetration #54
PRELIMINARY RESULTS SUMMARY
z No wastage was identified at NDE identified location
z No evidence of boric acid deposits in the annulus region
z Significant weld penetration into the Alloy 600 tube at
150location
z Non-homogenous width of the weld beads
z Replica examination showed presence of branched cracks in the
J-weld ID face
z Evidence of defects on cut faces
z Macro-etch indicated potential cracking in the weld (150section)
consistent with the Vendor NDE results
7-159
High-Resolution Analytical Electron Microscopy Characterization
of Environmentally Assisted Cracks in Alloy 182 Weldments
Stephen M. Bruemmer and Larry E. Thomas
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, P.O. Box 999, Richland, WA 99352 USA
ABSTRACT
Cracks in alloy 182 weldments from Ringhals-4 and Davis Besse PWRs have been characterized by scanning
electron microscopy (SEM) and analytical transmission electron microscopy (ATEM). The goal of this work was
to investigate the causes of service failures in as-welded regions. SEM observations showed that the cracks
occurred along grain boundaries not interdendritic boundaries. X-ray mapping revealed cored weld structures with
segregated Mn and coincident Nb carbide precipitates. In the Davis Besse material, MnS inclusions were also
common. High-resolution ATEM showed no segregation along the grain boundaries leading cracks in the Ringhals
welds, and few intergranular carbide particles. In contrast, the grain boundaries in Davis Besse material were
highly decorated by both MC and M
23
C
6
-type carbides. Both materials contained high densities of dislocations
apparently caused by welding strains. Detailed ATEM examinations of the cracks and crack tips revealed
microstructures consistent with stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) in primary water. Corrosion products in the cracks
included fine-grained, Cr-rich spinel oxide often with adjacent Ni-rich metal, as well as spinel containing high Nb.
In addition, both materials showed a distinctive structure consisting of oxide-filled corrosion tunnels in the weld
metal up to the leading edges of cracks. No evidence of solidification hot cracking was found in either material.
INTRODUCTION
Recent instances of weld cracking in large pipes from the PWR primary-water circuits have led to metallurgical
analyses of the failed components to determine the causes of cracking. Although these investigations have
generally implicated SCC along interdendritic boundaries in the alloy 182 weld metal, contributions from hot
cracking have not been excluded. Heterogeneous microstructures and microchemistries during weld-metal
solidification occur and may influence the cracking process. The approach taken in this work was to investigate the
failure mechanisms by detailed electron microscopic investigations of the weld microstructures and characteristics
in cracks and at crack tips. SEM and high-resolution ATEM of cross-sectioned samples have been used to examine
several samples removed from the Ringhals Unit 4 and Davis Besse PWRs.
EXPERIMENTAL
Cross-section TEM samples containing service cracks were prepared from alloy 182 butt welds in outlet safe ends
from Ringhals-4 and a J-welded control-rod-drive housing (nozzle 3) from Davis Besse. In brief, thin slices were
cut by slow-speed diamond sawing after backfilling with a low-viscosity resin to protect cracks, polished to reveal
the cracks, and glued to 3-mm-dia washers with targeted crack areas at the washer center. The samples were dimple
ground from the washer side and ion milled for SEM and TEM characterizations. Repeated cycles of ion milling
and examination were used to obtain suitably thin areas of the crack tips and leading grain boundaries. SEM was
used to reveal the large-scale characteristics of cracks and second-phase particles by average-atomic-number
contrast, and grain structures by crystallographic orientation contrast. Elemental maps of the structures were also
obtained by energy-dispersive x-ray spectrometry (EDS). ATEM was performed with a 200 kV field-emission-gun
microscope using a wide variety of methods for high-resolution microstructural imaging and analysis. Fine-probe
EDS analysis and elemental mapping were used to identify corrosion products in the cracks and crack tips, as well
as to determine grain-boundary and precipitate compositions at resolutions down to ~1 nm.
WELD METAL MICROSTRUCTURES
At comparatively large scales observed with the SEM, backscatter electron (BSE) imaging and EDS elemental
mapping revealed that the cracking occurred along the grain boundaries in austenitic metal having cored structures
reflecting periodic compositional segregation during the weld solidification. BSE images indicating both
crystallographic orientation and average-atomic-number variations clearly showed the cracking along grain
boundaries with no evident phase separation or compositional fluctuations. The cracks were highly branched and
commonly appeared as isolated-appearing segments in the metallographic sections. Although the convoluted crack
shapes have been interpreted as indicating failure along interdendritic weld boundaries, this was inconsistent with
7-161
the lack of any discernible segregation or second-phase precipitation along the cracks. Large inclusions with sizes
occasionally up to a mm also appeared scattered throughout the weld areas. Higher-magnification SEM images
also showed extensive fine-scale precipitation throughout the grain interiors, with many of the particles appearing
at nodes in the crystallographically aligned cored structures. EDS elemental maps in the Ringhals-4 sample
revealed a cellular segregation structure with local regions of high Mn associated with Nb-rich carbides and Ti-Al
oxides plus corresponding depletions of Fe and Cr. Compositional measurements performed in the TEM showed
Mn concentrations up to ~9 wt% in matrix areas next to the Nb-rich particles as compared to ~5 wt% in the alloy
matrix. No discernible relationship appeared between the cracks and the cellular segregation or second-phase
precipitates. The Davis Besse sample also exhibited cellular segregation of Mn and associated Nb-Ti carbides, but
also contained many MnS particles throughout the grain interiors. In addition, the grain boundaries were heavily
decorated with fine MC-type carbides (M = Nb + minor Ti) as well as Cr
23
C
6
in places. Orientation imaging
microscopy in the SEM identified many weld metal grain boundaries with unexpected low 6 misorientations (e.g.,
67,615 and623), quite different than recrystallized alloy 600 (63 variants common). SCC cracks generally
followed random boundaries, but also occurred on low-6 special boundaries in some cases.
CRACK CORROSION PRODUCTS AND STRUCTURES
Cross-section TEM samples from several different crack locations were examined in both service alloy 182
weldments. The analysis areas varied from wide-open cracks down to the nm-wide crack tips and leading grain
boundaries. Owing to inherent microstructural heterogeneity of the welds, the crack structures were seen to vary
somewhat from area to area. Both materials showed spinel oxide fill in the center of cracks, fine-grained, Cr-rich
spinel on the crack walls and distinctive tunnel-like oxide penetrations into the adjacent matrix. These oxide
penetrations (apparently formed along dislocations that intersected the crack walls) seem to be a unique
characteristic of stress-corrosion cracks in the alloy 182 weld samples. The other common characteristic of many
cracks in both materials was the presence of adjacent Ni metal (possibly re-precipitated) and Cr-rich oxide. Few
impurities were seen in the Ringhals-4 weld cracks except where they intersected large flux inclusions. More
significant compositional differences were observed in the Davis Besse weld cracks with Nb-rich spinel present in
wide cracks. Isolated regions of high S and precipitated NiS were also found in cracks from the Davis Besse
material and may be attributed to the dissolution of crack-intersected MnS particles.
CRACK-TIP STRUCTURES AND LEADING GRAIN BOUNDARIES
Several cracks in each material were selectively thinned to the tips to allow detailed observations of the leading-
edge structures including the grain boundaries. In the Ringhals example, the gradually tapered cracks generally
remained open to tips even as the widths decreased to a few nm. Penetrative IG attack, common in alloy 600
primary water cracks, was rare in this alloy 182 weld metal. Most crack tip regions showed heterogeneous
reaction-zone structures with local regions of Ni-rich, Cr/Fe-depleted metal (>90% Ni) immediately ahead of the
tips along the leading grain boundary. These regions extended for 20-50 nm beyond the tip oxide in most cases.
The spinel oxide in the cracks became nanocrystalline at the narrow tips, but remained enriched in Cr (often Nb and
Mn as well) compared to the metal matrix with no impurities such as S or P detected. Corrosion tunnels in the
adjacent matrix grains stopped at the crack tips. Leading grain boundaries in the Ringhals material had few
precipitates and did not show significant segregation or depletion of alloying elements except for minor Nb
enrichment at distances >50 nm ahead of crack tips.
The Davis Besse weld material has revealed a different picture of cracking behavior along significantly carbide-
decorated grain boundaries. Penetrative IG attack is observed ending as nm-scale oxide along the grain boundary
plane. The cracks near the tips were filled with fine-grained Cr-rich oxide with a spinel structure. Detailed ATEM
examinations indicated that both the fine Nb-Ti (MC) carbides and slightly larger, Cr-rich M
23
C
6
carbides rapidly
became oxidized just behind the crack tips. Leading grain boundaries again show slight local Ni-rich metal, but the
fine IG carbides make measurements difficult. Later corrosion reactions produced the Ni-metal and Nb-rich oxide
regions seen in wider cracks at distances a few m behind the tips. Prominent corrosion tunnels also developed off
the crack walls in the wake of the advancing cracks. One example was also found showing S enrichment at a crack
tip in the Davis Besse material where IG MnS particles were present. However, observations so far have indicated
that the gradually tapered, oxide-filled cracks with no detectable S were more common in this material.
7-162
DISCUSSION
Although the main focus of this work has been on fine-scale TEM analyses of the cracks and grain boundaries,
important understanding has come from relatively large-scale observations of the weld-metal grain structures,
cracks and compositional variations in the SEM. These observations revealed that the cracking occurred along
'normal' high-energy grain boundaries in the austenitic metal, and not along interdendritic boundaries. The lack of
any recognizable melt-segregation products along the cracks strongly suggests that hot cracking was not involved.
All cracks were connected to surfaces and contained oxides consistent with those produced in PWR primary water.
The weld microstructures and compositions were somewhat different than commonly reported for Ni-base alloy
welds. The observations showed cellular-segregated structures in the austenitic weld-metal grains, with semi-
periodic arrangements of Nb-rich particles in local regions of Mn enrichment and Cr-Fe depletion. Interestingly,
the coring patterns in both welds were generally equiaxed even when the samples included sections from different
orientations relative to the component surface. Thus, the coring did not appear to derive from a directional
solidification process. These weld-metal structures revealed by the SEM examinations are difficult to reconcile
with expected microstructures with elongated dendrites resulting from directional solidification, or with cracking
along interdendritic boundaries formed by solidification. The grain boundaries on which cracking occurred did not
appear to coincide with either the segregated or depletion regions although the coring reflected the local
crystallographic orientations. Due to its similar Cr content, alloy 182 has been widely regarded as the weld-metal
analog to alloy 600, and is assumed to produce similar SCC behavior. Yet alloy 182 contains high Mn (5%) and
Nb (1.5%) and their compositional segregation is clearly an important factor in the weld microstructure.
TEM observations indicated many details of the crack characteristics that have limited precedents in prior work on
SCC cracks. One consistent observation in both materials was the presence of tunnel-like penetrations along the
walls of most cracks. These structures have not been found in SCC cracks produced in alloy 600 in a wide variety
of primary- or secondary-water environments. Although cracks in the alloy 182 samples exhibited a wide range of
different characteristics, the common presence of alternating Ni-metal and Cr-enriched oxide regions formed as
corrosion structures in narrow cracks and crack tips has been seen in alloy 600 cracks formed in PWR primary
water. Formation of Ni metal during SCC is considered an indication of local crack conditions in the
electrochemical regimes near the Ni/NiO stability line. TEM observations also showed that the cracks occurred
along grain boundaries with few precipitates in the Ringhals example and with high densities of both MC and
M
23
C
6
carbides in the Davis Besse example. It is clear from the crack-tip observations that both carbides are
unstable in the primary water environment, as are MnS particles when they are present. This reactivity is similar to
that seen for IG Ni boride precipitates in stress-relieved, steam-generator tubing and may play an important role in
crack initiation and propagation. Current observations suggest that hot cracking or hydrogen-induced cracking were
not the root cause of failure in these alloy 182 weldments and points back to an IGSCC process.
CONCLUSIONS
Electron microscopic observations of alloy 182 welds from Ringhals-4 and Davis Besse showed that the cracking
occurred along high-angle grain boundaries rather than along interdendritic boundaries. Based on the corrosion
structures found in the cracks, it appears that the cracks in all cases were penetrated by high-temperature water.
High dislocation densities observed in the weld metal around cracks further suggest that high stresses in the
material contributed to the cracking. Crack and crack-tip characteristics were generally consistent with previous
observations of IGSCC in alloy 600 steam generator tubing exposed to primary water. The lack of significant
segregation at cracked boundaries and the corrosion-product characteristics in cracks and crack tips makes
contributions of hot cracking unlikely. Additional high-resolution characterizations are continuing to establish
signatures of degradation mechanisms in cracked alloy 600 CRDM materials and are needed for well-controlled
laboratory IGSCC tests on alloy 600 and alloy 182 in PWR primary-water environments.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The work was supported by the SKI, EPRI, Framatome ANP and by the U.S. Department of Energy under contract
DE-AC06-76RLO 1830 with Battelle Memorial Institute. Helpful interactions with John Vetrano, Peter Scott, Pl
Efsing, Bjrn Forssgren, Gren Embring, Steve Fyfitch, Hongqing Xu and Karen Gott are gratefully recognized.
7-163
Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory
Operated by Battelle for the
U.S. Department of Energy
High-Resolution Analytical
Electron Microscopy Characterization
of Environment-Assisted Cracks
in Alloy 182 Weldments
High
High
-
-
Resolution Analytical
Resolution Analytical
of Environment
of Environment
-
-
Assisted Cracks
Assisted Cracks
in Alloy 182
in Alloy 182
Weldments
Weldments
S.M. Bruemmer and L.E. Thomas
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
PWSCC of Alloy 600
March 8, 2005
Research Supported by
Framatome ANP, EPRI-MRP, SKI and U.S. DOE
7-164
2
Materials Structure and
Performance
Characterization of Cracked Alloy 182 Welds
in PWR Primary Water Circuit
Samples: RPV outlet nozzle welds to 316SS safe ends from
Ringhals-3 and -4; RPV outlet nozzle weld from Davis Besse.
Methods for Weld Metal Microstructure/Microchemistry,
Crack Corrosion Products and Crack-Tip Characteristics:
SEM backscattered electron imaging and EDS x-ray mapping.
ATEM high-resolution imaging, EDS compositional analysis
and mapping, phase identification by electron diffraction.
Alloy 182 has much higher Mn (~6 wt%), Nb (~1.5 wt%)
and Ti (~0.5 wt%) than Alloy 600
7-165
3
Performance
Ringhals Unit 4
outlet nozzle at 25
Ringhals Unit 4
outlet nozzle at 25
Cracked Alloy 182 Welds Cracked Alloy 182 Welds
boat samples
TEM disk
(center)
SEM/BSE
J-weld
SCC
Cladding
Cracks
Nozzle
SCC
Davis Besse - material obtained with cracks from
alloy 182 J-weld, alloy 600 nozzle and SS cladding
Davis Besse - material obtained with cracks from
alloy 182 J-weld, alloy 600 nozzle and SS cladding
TEM foils
produced by
ion milling
7-166
4
Performance
IGSCC in Service Multi-Pass Welds IGSCC in Service Multi
IGSCC in Service Multi
-
-
Pass Welds
Pass Welds
Davis-Besse
IGSCC cracks
propagate through
multiple passes in alloy
182 welds; significant
pass-to-pass
microstructural
differences observed
Ringhals-4
Pass A Pass B
Pass C
Fine-Grain
Region
Large-Grain
Region
7-167
5
Performance
Outline
Weld Macrosegregation, Inclusions & Precipitates
Coring during solidification; Mn segregation coincides with Nb
carbide and Ti-Al oxides plus Cr and Fe depletion
Limited grain boundary precipitation of NbC in Ringhals; extensive
fine Nb(Ti) and Cr carbides in Davis Besse
Crack Characteristics & Corrosion Products
Crack-Tip Structures & Compositions
Comparisons to Alloy 600 Primary Water SCC
Analytical Electron Microscopy
Characterization of Environment-Assisted
Cracks in Alloy 182 Weldments
7-168
6
Performance
Dendrite Solidification and Coring
Dendrite Solidification and Coring
Dendrite arms in three dimensions grow towards each other
and trap enriched liquid (e.g., Mn, Nb) in the interstices
along with melt oxides; regular matrix of particles identified.
Liquid
pockets
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(Ti,Al)O
dark
NbC
light
7-169
7
Performance
Macrosegregation in Ringhals-4 Weld
SEM/EDS Elemental Maps
Macrosegregation
Macrosegregation
in Ringhals
in Ringhals
-
-
4 Weld
4 Weld
SEM/EDS Elemental Maps
30 m
Mn enrichment (from 4 wt% to ~9 wt%) in matrix locations
coinciding with Cr/Fe depletion and NbC) precipitates;
IGSCC does not follow segregated structure.
IGSCC
Cracks
7-170
8
Performance
Mn-rich
metal
Microstructures in Ringhals Alloy 182 Welds
Intragranular Nb carbides with Ti-Al oxide cores;
few intergranular MC carbides (M = Nb + Ti);
high matrix and near-boundary dislocation density
TEM brightfield images
7-171
9
Performance
0.2 m
STEM Nb-K
Ni-K Ti-K
Grain-Boundary Carbides in
Davis-Besse Alloy 182 Weld
EDS x-ray maps
MC darkfield image
Much higher fraction of grain boundaries
with arrays of fine (Nb,Ti)C carbides
present in Davis-Besse weld.
7-172
10
Performance
Grain Boundary Particles
in Davis-Besse Alloy 182 Weld
0.3 m
MnS
MC
STEM Mn-K
Nb-K Ti-K Ni-K
Nb-L + S-K
(Nb,Ti)C and MnS particles pinning grain boundary; significant MnS
found in matrix and occasionally at boundaries in Davis-Besse weld.
7-173
11
Performance
Orientational Imaging Microscopy of
Crack Path in Davis-Besse J-Groove Weld
Orientational Imaging Microscopy of
Crack Path in Davis-Besse J-Groove Weld
Cracks follow grain versus classical interdendritic boundaries.
Boundary orientations identified quite different than seen in
recrystallized alloy 600 (i.e., 63s and variants); cracks propagate
along random (R) and 623, short extension along LAB; ends at 67.
Inverse Pole Figure Image
R
R
R
R
LAB
LAB
LAB
LAB
67
621b
623
613a
R
R
R
615
SCC
Crack
7-174
12
Performance
Weld Microstructures Weld Microstructures
Weld Microstructures
Microstructure/microchemistry in multipass alloy 182
welds quite different than recrystallized alloy 600.
Solidification occurs last in dendrite interstices, leading
to NbC precipitation, Mn segregation and Cr/Fe
depletion. Classical solidification segregation at
interdendritic boundaries not present.
NbC is often found precipitated on (Ti,Al)O and TiN

inclusions. MnS also prevalent in Davis-Besse weld.
High density of fine MC and Cr carbides on Davis
Besse grain boundaries, few for Ringhals examples.
No significant impurity segregation, Nb segregation at
grain boundaries without NbC precipitation.
7-175
13
Performance
Outline
Adjacent Cr-rich oxide and Ni metal in many wide cracks;
Nb-rich spinel in Davis Besse
Dislocation structure and matrix tunnel-like attack
7-176
14
Performance
alternating Ni metal and oxide (fine-grained spinel) regions in crack
SCC Crack in Ringhals-4 Alloy 182 Weld
7-177
15
Performance
STEM/EDS Elemental Maps Ringhals STEM/EDS Elemental Maps Ringhals- -4 Sample 4 Sample
crack containing separated regions of spinel oxide and Ni metal
Ni metal
oxide
oxide
7-178
16
Performance
Davis Besse Alloy 182 Crack Corrosion Products
adjacent regions of Cr-rich spinel
oxide and Ni metal at crack walls;
Nb-rich spinel crystallites in
center
corrosion tunnels
Nb-rich spinel
crystallites
fine-grained
Cr-Fe spinel
Ni-rich metal
corrosion
tunnels
Nb-rich
spinel
fine-grained
Cr-Fe spinel
Ni-rich
metal
7-179
17
Performance
Crack Deformation Structures
Highly deformed matrix and localized dislocation structure off crack walls;
penetrative, tunnel-like attack/oxidation along dislocations into matrix
Highly deformed matrix and localized dislocation structure off c Highly deformed matrix and localized dislocation structure off crack walls; rack walls;
penetrative, tunnel penetrative, tunnel- -like attack/oxidation along dislocations into matrix like attack/oxidation along dislocations into matrix
TEM brightfield images - subset of dislocations in contrast
7-180
18
Performance
Tunnel-Like Attack
along Crack Walls in
Alloy 182 Welds
Ringhals-4 Sample
tunnels contain spinel-
structure oxide; formed
along dislocations in metal
adjacent to GB.
observed throughout
cracks and near crack tips
in both Ringhals & Davis
Besse samples.
unique observation, not
seen for any alloy 600
primary- or secondary-
water examples
TEM underfocus image - dislocations out of contrast
7-181
19
Performance
Crack Structures & Corrosion
Products in Alloy 182 Welds
Crack Structures & Corrosion
Products in Alloy 182 Welds
Primary crack oxide in Ringhals examples was fine-grained Cr-
rich spinel; large Nb-rich spinel crystallites in center of wide
cracks in Davis Besse due to dissolution of MC particles.
Many cracks in both alloy 182 examples show regions of Cr-
rich spinel oxide adjacent to Ni-rich metal
Unique observation of matrix, tunnel-like attack off crack walls
observed for both Ringhals and Davis Besse examples.
Oxidation appears to follow extensive dislocation structure off
crack walls, possibly due to Nb segregation?
7-182
20
Performance
Outline
Ringhals: narrow, but open crack tips with wall spinel and
few impurities, Ni-rich metal ahead of tip
Davis Besse: penetrative IGA leading degradation
7-183
21
Performance
Crack Tips Alloy 182 Weld
Ringhals-4 Sample
Crack Tips Alloy 182 Weld
Ringhals-4 Sample
Brightfield TEM - cracks rotated on edge, dislocations out of contrast
Open crack tips, fine-grained Cr-rich spinel on crack walls and at tip
7-184
22
Performance
Crack Tip in Ringhals-4 Alloy 182 Weld
Precipitate-free grain boundary leading crack with slight Nb segregation.
Nb and Mn in crack-tip oxide, Cr/Fe-depleted, Ni-rich metal ahead of tip
Distance from crack tip, nm
7-185
23
Performance
Penetrative IGA in Davis-Besse Alloy 182 Weld
Nearly all cracks end in oxide-filled, attacked grain boundaries: quite different
than Ringhals examples, very similar to alloy 600 in primary/secondary water
100 nm
oxide darkfield
image
crack
front
tunnels
tip
TEM brightfield
image
7-186
24
Performance
Leading Edge of IG Attack in Davis Besse
TEM brightfield
oxide
front
inclined
grain
boundary
carbides
disappear
High density of fine Nb(Ti)C and Cr
23
C
6
carbides in grain boundaries at and
ahead of IGA tip. Carbides are not
present in the corrosion product oxide
at distances of a few hundred nm behind
the tip. These precipitates are rapidly
oxidized in the tip environment and not
slowly oxidized in place as observed for
Cr
7
C
3
carbides (to Cr
2
O
3
) in alloy 600.
7-187
25
Performance
Tip Structures in Davis-Besse Alloy 182 Weld
TEM brightfield - underfocus
M
23
C
6
darkfield
spinel oxide darkfield
Cr
23
C
6
oxide
tip
oxide
tip
tunnels
tunnels
Tunnel-like attack along grain boundary and in matrix behind tip;
NbC particles immediately oxidized followed by Cr carbides.
inclined
boundary
Cr
23
C
6
7-188
26
Performance
O-K Cr-K
Fe-K
Ni-K
Ti-K
Nb-L
100 nm
tip
x-ray maps
100 nm
tip
STEM image - crack tip area
carbides
Tip Compositions in Davis-Besse Alloy 182 Weld
Oxide-filled crack tip at grain
boundary decorated with Cr
carbides and Nb/Ti carbides.
Carbides removed with Nb
and Ti incorporated into
spinel oxide.
oxide
tip
7-189
27
Performance
Crack-Tip Structures and
Chemistries in Alloy 182 Welds
Crack-Tip Structures and
Chemistries in Alloy 182 Welds
Ringhals examples show narrow, open crack tips with fine-
grained Cr-rich spinel oxide on walls; enriched Nb and Mn has
been observed in tip oxide with no impurities; Nb segregation at
leading grain boundaries.
Leading edge of degradation in Davis Besse samples nearly
always reveal penetrative grain boundary attack; fine IG
carbides are rapidly oxidized as corrosion proceeds. Very
similar to IGA tips found in OTSG second-side examples.
Davis Besse also showed an example of S-enhanced cracking
along boundaries containing MnS; NiS precipitated at tip.
Matrix, tunnel-like attack off crack walls ends at the tip regions
suggesting that the wall dislocations structures are nearly
asactive as the grain boundary, possible Nb segregation.
7-190
28
Performance
Outline
Characterization of Environment
Characterization of Environment
-
-
Assisted
Assisted
Cracks in Alloy 182
Cracks in Alloy 182
Weldments
Weldments
7-191
29
Performance
(1) Narrow, Penetrative Attack Along Virtually All Crack-Intersected Grain Boundaries
Attackedgrain boundaries consist of oxide-filled zones with widths of a few nm and lengths to tens
of m (length/width ratios up to ~10000). The oxide, either NiCr spinel or (NiCr)O, in the narrow
zones is nanoporous and nanocrystalline. Similar structures at intersected boundaries are found in
primary-side SG tubing from service, as well as in model boiler and l aboratory crack-growth samples.
This is a key characteristic for alloy 600 in primary or Pb-containing secondary water.
Penetrative IGA is only seen for the Davis Besse alloy 182 when fine carbides are pre sent on the
grain boundary. May be comparable to boride dissolution for OTSG stress relieved heats.
(2) Limited Evidence for Extensive Plastic Deformation During Grain Boundary Attack
Dislocation densities associated with attackedboundaries are generally quite low in most alloy 600
service and laboratory model boiler samples. This suggests that extensive plasticity is not required
for IG environmental degradation. In contrast to the attackedboundaries, SCC crack-tip regions in
the same samples typically show high dislocation densities.
Quite different for the alloy 182 examples, extensive matrix and near-boundary dislocation
structure, unique tunnel-like attack along dislocations off crack walls not seen for alloy 600.
PNNL Observations of Primary-Water SCC
Cracks and Crack-Tips for Alloy 600/Alloy 182
7-192
30
Performance
PNNL Observations of Primary-Water SCC
Cracks and Crack-Tips for Alloy 600/Alloy 182
(3) Composition Changes Ahead of Crack Tips and AttackedGrain Boundaries
Local Ni-rich, Cr/Fe-depleted regions are measured extending 30-50 nm ahead of crack tips
and attacked grain boundaries. This composition change is clearly associated with the
corrosion front, and is not found along grain boundaries away from the crack or attack tips.
Nearly identical composition change identified along alloy 182 leading grain boundaries.
(4) Ni Metal and Adjacent Cr-rich Oxide Detected in Wide Cracks
In some cases, comparatively large 'islands' of nearly pure Ni metal and adjacent Cr-rich oxide
are seen in crack regions well behind the tips. However, this separation of phases has not been
found near the crack tips nor has it been seen in narrow attackedboundaries.
Nearly identical structures identified in alloy 182 wide cracks well behind tips.
(5) Interfacial Oxidation of Grain Boundary Carbides
Under normal primary-water conditions, a thin non-porous layer of Cr
2
O
3
forms at Cr
7
C
3
carbide interfaces in cracks. In some cases (particularly at higher temperatures), Cr
7
C
3
carbides present along grain boundaries in alloy 600 are reacted to form layered Cr
2
O
3
.
This is found both in the main SCC cracks and in attackedboundaries behind tips.
Fine Nb(Ti)C and Cr
23
C
6
carbides were rapidly dissolved/oxidized at crack tips with Nb, Ti
and Cr incorporated into corrosion product spinel oxide.
7-193
31
Performance
Conclusions
Service alloy 182 welds show cellular coring (Mn segregation, NbC
precipitation) and extensive deformation (matrix and near boundaries).
Cracking can occur along grain boundaries with limited precipitation or
segregation. Fine Nb/Ti and Cr carbides at grain boundaries rapidly
removed/oxidized at tips, precipitates may accelerate IGA.
No evidence of low-melting phases or melt-rejected solutes at any
boundaries to suggest solidification hot cracking. Corrosion products and
crack-tip microstructures indicate cracks fully penetrated by primary
water.
Many observations consistent with IGSCC of alloy 600 in PWR primary
water including crack/crack-tip oxides and islands of Ni metal and Cr-rich
oxide found in some cracks. Less IGA off SCC cracks for the alloy 182
weld and unique internal oxidation of dislocation structure.
Additional research needed on hot-crack and SCC microstructures for
alloy 182 welds including cracked samples from service and from well-
controlled laboratory experiments.
7-194
8
SESSION 3B: FIELD EXPERIENCEMITIGATION AND
REPAIR
Mitigation of PWSCC on Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles by
Waterjet Peening, presented by G. Elder, Westinghouse (Paper 3B.1)
This presentation was given by G. Elder of Westinghouse and authored by G. Elder of
Westinghouse and M. Taniguchi of MHI. The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
x The leakage discovered at South Texas Project in 2003 has shown that reactor vessel bottom
mounted instrumentation (BMI) penetrations may be susceptible to PWSCC. This
presentation discussed a Waterjet Peening (WJP) process that can be used to impart a
compressive stress to the inside diameter of the BMI nozzle and also to the wetted surface of
the J-groove weld and nozzle outside diameter near the weld to eliminate susceptibility to
PWSCC. The WJP process was developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and has been
implemented at seven PWRs in Japan to date, and Westinghouse has a license agreement to
apply this process. (The process was originally developed for BWR plants by Hitachi.)
Even though the probability of PWSCC leading to leakage of these nozzles is low due to
their reduced temperature, WJP can provide additional margin which may be particularly
important for plants employing license extension.
x WJP employs the energy of the bursting of cavitation bubbles on the Alloy 600 surface to
impart a compressive residual stress to these surfaces, retarding the initiation of PWSCC on
these surfaces. Extensive qualification testing, including hardness measurements as a
function of depth below the treated surface, has demonstrated that this area of compressive
stress extends to a depth of 0.020 inches (0.5 mm). Peening effectiveness has been verified
through measurement of the increase in the width of an axial slit in a thin pipe. Corrosion
testing has also demonstrated that this compressive residual stress is effective in retarding
PWSCC.
x The 10-year ISI of the reactor vessel, when the vessel internals are removed and the BMI
nozzles may be inspected, is an appropriate time for implementation of the WJP process.
The total elapsed time for the WJP process (including installation of equipment, functional
testing, peening of the ID, OD, and J-groove weld surfaces, and tear down) is 6.5 to 8 days
depending on the actual number of BMI nozzles.
x The single indication detected in an outermost BMI nozzle at Takahama Unit 1 in Japan in
2002 was determined to be not growing and therefore likely a scratch.
8-1
Session 3B: Field ExperienceMitigation and Repair
x Question (S. Boggs): Is Mihama 3 water jet peening (WJP) going to be applied to the weld
and OD of the bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzle?
Response (G. Elder): Mihama 3 will apply WJP only to the BMI nozzle ID. However, WJP
has been applied to the OD of several nozzles of BWRs and in mockup testing.
x Question (A. Demma): Have you investigated the cavitation peened surface by scanning
electron microscopy? Has some SCC testing been performed in high temperature PWR
simulated environment?
Response (G. Elder): The WJP process does not create defects or change the microstructure
of the material. Yes, appropriate corrosion testing has been performed.
x Question (H. Offer): What evaluations (analyses or tests) have been performed or considered
to verify that the WJP process stress improvement will last the life of the plant? Is it
expected that the process should be repeated over time to account for stress shakedown when
in service?
Response (G. Elder): Based on steam generator experience and the depth of the compressive
stress layer created, it is expected that repeated applications would not be required.
Field Implementation Experience at Asco Unit 1 and 2 with Upper Head
Temperature Reduction, presented by H. Lenz, Westinghouse (Paper 3B.2)
This presentation was given by H. Lenz and authored by H. Lenz, F. Organai, and P. Kreitman of
Westinghouse. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x Upper head temperature reduction (UHTR) is an effective program to reduce the propensity
for cracking of reactor vessel head nozzles and J-groove welds. Different processes for
UHTR implementation are available based on the particular plant design configuration. A
field modification program of reactor upper and lower internals components was developed
to provide additional bypass flow to the upper head region of the reactor vessel, lowering the
bulk fluid temperature in contact with the closure head, and thus the head penetration
temperature, to cold-leg temperature levels. The UHTR also provides a benefit in terms of
increased margin for LOCA safety analyses.
x The required process and tooling can be developed relatively quickly, within 4.5 months in
the case of the Spanish plants Asc Unit 1 and 2. The modifications at Asc were performed
off the critical path of the outage schedule. At Asc Unit 1, UHTR was implemented in 2003
through modification of the upper support plate flange and removal of the irradiated
specimen access plugs. (A large hole was machined by EDM above each of the six specimen
access plugs in the core barrel flange.) At Asc Unit 2, UHTR was implemented in 2004
through the less complex operation of removal of selected spray nozzle plugs from existing
flow nozzles on the core barrel flange that protrude through holes in the upper support plate
flange.
8-2
x The expected reduction in upper head temperature is generally verified through a
combination of thermal-hydraulic modeling, flow mockups (e.g., one-fifth scale), and field
temperature measurements.
x Question (J. Bennetch): What effects does this modification have on:
1. Baffle jetting;
2. Temperature distribution of reactor internals (i.e., effect on baffle former bolt
cracking);
3. Power output.
Response (H. Lenz):
1. The impact of implementing an Upper Head Temperature Reduction program on
baffle jetting will be to reduce the core pressure drop and thus somewhat reduce the
driving forces for the potential for baffle jetting for a downflow baffle/barrel region
plant. In summary, the UHTR is a benefit relative to the potential for baffle jetting
degradation for a downflow plant.
2. No effect on the reliability of the baffle former bolts through a temperature shift is
expected, but the situation might be different for an upflow conversion.
3. Any effect on power output is negligible.
x Question (M. Moran): Did you perform any type of post-modification testing to confirm that
the results of the design changes to reduce the head temperature were obtained?
Response (H. Lenz): This was not done at the Asc plant, but it was performed at other
plants.
Alloy 52 Welding in Nuclear Applications: Performance Issues and
Weldability Testing, presented by D. Waskey, Framatome ANP (Paper 3B.3)
This presentation was given by D. Waskey of Framatome ANP. The main points made during
x The presentation addressed the performance and weldability issues specific to Alloy 52
GTAW weld filler material, which is being used as a substitute for Alloy 82. Weldability
issues for Alloy 52 have significantly delayed plant repair schedules in some cases. Welding
tests such as the "Chabenat" weldability test in combination with application specific
mockups are used to substantiate field weldability performance. Several case studies were
presented, and an ongoing filler material evaluation/selection program was described.
x Experience with Alloy 52 indicates that weld defects are always present if one looks closely
enough and that the surface appearance is not always indicative of the weld quality. Hot
cracks and ductility dip cracks, termed "Type 1" cracks, are very small, numerous, and
dispersed over the deposited weld metal. The larger "Type 2" cracks are typically located
close to the fusion line.
8-3
x Case studies were presented for pressurizer nozzle repair, reactor vessel nozzle repair, BWR
stub (CRDM) tube repair, and piping structural weld overlay. Difficulties with Alloy 52
have resulted from improper screening of weld material, out-of-position welding affecting
shielding integrity, "solidification anomalies," and vertical down welding flaws.
x The "Chabenat" test apparatus (slide 18) allows the key Alloy 52 weldability factors of
restraint, reheat, and dilution to be controlled and investigated. These factors were found to
effect the propensity for both "Type 1" and "Type 2" cracks. In addition, proper gas
shielding has been found to be a key factor, and composition differences for the weld wire
material can be significant. Niobium was shown to have a significant benefit in reducing
"Type 1" cracks, and molybdenum was shown to have a significant benefit in reducing "Type
2" cracks. It was recommended that weld wire heats be selected on an application-specific
basis.
x It was concluded that it is unlikely that an ideal Alloy 52 filler material will ever be
developed, but that structurally sound weld metal can be deposited. The challenges of Alloy
52 vary on a case by case basis and warrant end-use consideration.
x Question (H. Offer): What is the mechanism by which molybdenum has been shown in
testing to reduce or eliminate the presence of Type 2 cracking? Likewise, what is the
mechanism for reducing Type 1 cracking with the addition of niobium?
Response (D. Waskey): The metallurgical mechanisms were not studied in this project. The
benefits of Mo for dissimilar metal dilution and thus the reduction of Type 2 cracks and Nb
for the reduction of Type 1 cracks were concluded based on empirical weldability test data.
Florida Power and Light Turkey Point 3 Reactor Vessel Closure Head
Replacement, presented by M. Moran, FPL (Paper 3B.4)
This presentation was given by M. Moran of FPL and authored by M. Moran of FPL and J.
Paljug of Framatome ANP. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x The reactor vessel closure head at Turkey Point Unit 3 was replaced in fall 2004 because of
the generic susceptibility to PWSCC of the original Alloy 600 CRDM nozzles. An FPL
evaluation considered ongoing inspection and repair costs versus replacement or application
of mitigation techniques. The conclusion of this evaluation favored replacement, and FPL
chose an extensive replacement project including other associated components.
x The replacement head, which was ordered in 2002, was forged at Japan Steel Works, and an
Antonov cargo plane was used to transport the head. The size of the head required that a
hole be cut in the containment building at a cost similar to that for the head itself. Over 100
containment tendons were removed, and three tendons were damaged unintentionally during
the cutting process. A tower crane was used to pour concrete to seal the containment
building after the repaired tendons were tensioned.
8-4
x The integrated head assembly package included integrated shielding, an integrated lift rig, an
integrated missile shield, integrated duct work, inspection-friendly insulation, cable bridges,
quick connects, new cables, and future on-board fan capability. This was the most complete
integrated head assembly design to date.
x FPL attributes the success of the replacement to teamwork and the development of an
integrated outage schedule. The outage was scheduled for 56 days, 45 of which were
associated with the reactor vessel head replacement. The actual reactor vessel head work
was completed in 46.7 days. Several improvements were identified for the upcoming head
replacement project at Turkey Point Unit 4. The FPL QA program was applied for the
Turkey Point replacement, but this choice is being reevaluated for the future St. Lucie
replacements.
x Based on its experience, FPL recommends the following practices for a head replacement
project:
Early planning providing the basis for funding, schedule, and operating schedule impact
and an effective interface plan
Minimizing the number of vendors, limiting the "hand-offs" required
Prior outage walkdowns to provide the information and measurements needed for proper
planning and fitup
Teamwork
Westinghouse Experience with Reactor Vessel Head Replacements,
presented by J. Hydeman, Westinghouse (Paper 3B.5)
This presentation was given by J. Hydeman and authored by J. Hydeman, R. Sterdis, M. Ball,
and C. Candee of Westinghouse. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x This presentation discussed Westinghouse's experience with replacement of reactor vessel
closure heads. At the time of the conference, three head replacements had been performed,
including head package upgrades accompanying two of these replacements. Head
replacement removes the Alloy 600 nozzles that are susceptible to PWSCC and addresses
head inspectability issues. A total of five simplified head upgrades have been completed.
The simplified head upgrades provide both critical path time and worker exposure savings
during future refueling activities. Lessons learned are being applied to current projects, and
installation times, worker exposure, and safety events are showing decreasing trends.
x The implementation team is made up of a dedicated project manager and numerous
disciplines and includes leads in the areas of manufacture, design, installation, and design
change package development. The team is organized to allow interaction of the various
disciplines throughout the project. Contracting arrangements can vary widely with different
prime contractors, reactor vessel head suppliers, CRDM suppliers, upgrade package
suppliers, etc.
8-5
8-6
x A standardized process assures that the final component meets the design specifications.
Materials and fabrication processes are selected to improve resistance to corrosion
mechanisms. Optional replacement CRDMs can be factory installed or welded at the
customer site prior to the start of the outage. For Westinghouse-design plants, replacement
CRDMs can be provided with the original configuration (multiple canopy seal welds), as a
single piece with a canopy seal weld at the head adapter flange, or as a single piece with full
penetration weld. For CE-design plants, the CEDMs are provided with improved design
features and are installed at the customer sites. An option has been developed to eliminate
the thermal sleeve, which makes inspection more difficult, while maintaining its thermal
barrier function.
x For the head replacement project at Farley Unit 1 in fall 2004, worker exposure was less than
10 person-REM compared to the planned exposure of 13.5 person-REM. A key factor for
the Farley project was on-site engineering support to quickly resolve issues.
x Lessons learned include the following:
Head fabrication should budget 3 years to address lead times in the manufacturing
process and to arrive on site prior to the outage for pre-outage assembly activities.
Headquarter planning activities should budget 24 months to allow for design
collaboration with the customer and preparation of field procedures and installation
drawings to support utility design modification schedules.
A rigorous design process is to be followed with strong considerations for installability.
The installation should be treated as a construction project rather a field service activity.
All stakeholders need to be engaged throughout the project.
x Question (T. S. Sharma): What is the material of the top hat that was used to transport the
new reactor vessel head with the enclosure assembly into containment?
Response (J. Hydeman): The material of the top hat was steel.
Pre-emptive Pressurizer Heater Sleeve Repairs at Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station, presented by P. Riccardella, Structural Integrity
Associates, for R. Meeden, APS (Paper 3B.6)
This presentation was given by P. Riccardella of Structural Integrity Associates on behalf of R.
Meeden of APS. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x This presentation described the process used at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station for
management and replacement of Alloy 600 pressurizer heater sleeves, and it provided the
utility perspective on some of the topics covered in Paper 2B.3, "Mid-Wall Weld Repairs for
Pressurizer Heater Sleeves." The overall management process was presented including
repair/replacement study results, recommendations to plant management, the selected repair
alternative, and net present value economic study results. The management process has led
to replacement of all pressurizer heater sleeves in Palo Verde Units 2 and 3. Replacement of
the heater sleeves in Palo Verde Unit 1 was scheduled for fall 2005.
x A repair/replacement study was performed by Dominion Engineering, Inc. (DEI) to evaluate
Palo Verde specific conditions including:
Degradation predictions
Plant conditions (3 identical units, 36 heater sleeves per unit)
Impending stream generator replacements
Repair alternatives
Net present value cost analysis
x A full-scale pressurizer mockup (including surge line, support skirt, and labyrinth entrance)
was used by Welding Services Inc. (see Paper 2B.3) to support the replacement program.
x The Unit 2 replacements were performed in fall 2003 using an ambient temperature temper
bead process with machine GTAW and no pre-heating required. The Unit 2 repairs of 34
heater sleeves were completed in 36 days, within the window of the steam generator
replacement outage and with 32 person-REM of exposure.
x The Unit 3 replacements were accelerated to the fall 2004 outage after two leaking heater
sleeves were discovered during the spring 2003 refueling outage and an additional heater
sleeve leak discovered midcycle in spring 2004. The Unit 3 replacements resulted in a 20-
day extension to the original outage schedule. The Unit 3 repairs of all 36 heater sleeves
were completed in 28 days, with 49 person-REMof exposure. An increased pad size was
used to overlap MNSA hole locations. An improved alignment tool and machining of the
remaining sleeve significantly improved heater insertion, but machining of the remaining
sleeve resulted in foreign material exclusion (FME) issues.
x For the planned fall 2005 replacements at Unit 3, FME control is being developed for the
machining operation of the remaining sleeve. In addition, Palo Verde is monitoring progress
of the mid-wall repairs being performed at Waterford as an input to a decision whether to
apply this new repair method, which is designed to reduce repair time and personnel
exposure, at Unit 3.
x Comment (D. Waskey): The presenter may have implied that temper bead welding was not
used during the first Unit 2 repair because preheat was used. Temper bead welding was in
fact used but with the use of preheat as permitted by ASME Section XI.
RPV Outlet Nozzle Repair (SAFEPLAY) for Ringhals Units 3 and 4,
presented by B. Kroes, Westinghouse Electric Belgium (Paper 3B.7)
This presentation was given by B. Kroes of Westinghouse Electric Belgium and authored by B.
Kroes of Westinghouse Electric Belgium and H. Sjstrand of Ringhals. The main points made
8-7
x This presentation discussed the repair/mitigation technique applied to the Alloy 182 reactor
vessel outlet nozzle to safe end welds at Ringhals Units 3 and 4 in Sweden. Axially oriented
PWSCC indications were discovered in these units at this location in 2000 and 2001. The
largest defects extended to a depth of approximately 30 mm or 40% of the wall thickness.
The defects were removed using EDM, and the resulting boat samples were investigated to
determine the root cause of the cracking. The specific configuration of these welds at
Ringhals 3 and 4 is believed to have resulted in relatively high residual stresses.
x In response, a robust repair system (SAFEPLAY) was developed capable of restoring the full
structural capacity of the nozzle and the normal 10-year ISI interval by (1) weld repair of the
boat sample divots and (2) application of a corrosion resistant ID overlay onto the existing
Alloy 182 safe end weld. This overlay precludes future PWSCC cracking by removing the
Alloy 182 material from the primary water environment. Based on risk, cost, and schedule
evaluations, an ID repair method was preferred as compared to the safe end replacement
option previously implemented at the VC Summer station. For the SAFEPLAY repair, the
plant is configured to allow dry access to the inside of the reactor vessel outlet nozzles via
the top of the reactor vessel.
x The SAFEPLAY process qualification included extensive weld process qualifications and
demonstrations on four representative full-size mockups. Following formal weld procedure
qualifications, the full repair sequence including decontamination, cavity machining, cavity
filling, groove machining, and groove welding was implemented twice in order to simulate
the actual field conditions. The final ID surface is a good surface for future reactor vessel
ISIs.
x The thickness of the Alloy 52M protective layer applied on the inside of the nozzle was
selected based on the characteristics of the qualified nozzle NDE system. A thickness
approximately 50% greater than the detection target of the NDE system was applied. Before
the protective layer is applied, new Alloy 82 material is used to fill the boat sample cavity.
The secondary stresses in the nozzle weld region are not significantly affected by the repair
process, and ASME stress limits are respected with significant margin.
x To evaluate the impact of the residual stresses following the repair and to confirm the
corrosion resistance of the Alloy 52M material, both accelerated doped steam initiation
testing and PWSCC crack propagation testing were performed. Both tests confirmed the full
resistance of the Alloy 52M materials against PWSCC, irrespective of the potentially
unfavorable residual stress levels in the as-welded joints.
x The approximate duration of the repair for Ringhals 4 in fall 2002 was 46 days with 39.8
person-REM of radiation exposure. The performance window was exceeded by
approximately 10 days due to a weld defect discovered during intermediate NDE. These
figures were reduced for the subsequent Unit 3 operation to 27 days with 19.5 person-REM
of exposure given the lessons learned at Unit 4 and the smaller boat sample volumes.
x Based on the favorable Ringhals experience, SAFEPLAY is proposed as an alternative to
MSIP or safe end replacement. The estimated critical path duration for preemptive
SAFEPLAY implementation as a permanent PWSCC mitigation technique on three reactor
8-8
vessel outlet nozzles is approximately 11 days, with estimated accumulated dose of 10 to 15
person-REM. It is possible for work to proceed simultaneously on two nozzles.
8-9
Mitigation of PWSCC on Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles by
Waterjet Peening
Dr. G. Gary Elder
Nuclear Services Business Unit
P.O. Box 355
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 USA
Phone: 412-374-4884, Fax: 412-374-3777, email: eldergg@westinghouse.com
Mr. Masaru Taniguchi
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,LTD.
Kobe shipyard & Machinery Works
1-1 Wadasaki-cho 1-chome, Hyogo-ku,
Kobe 652-8585 Japan
Phone:+81-78-672-3530 Fax:+81-78-672-3515
email:masaru_taniguchi@mhi.co.jp
Abstract
The discovery of cracking and leaking of the bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI)
nozzles at the South Texas plant in the spring of 2003 has led to concern over potential
cracking at this critical location. Other plants have now begun volumetric inspection of
these locations. Since replacement of the reactor vessel or repair of all the BMI nozzles is
difficult, a method to lower the susceptibility to PWSCC at these locations is desired. The
Waterjet Peening process can be used to impart a compressive stress to the inside
diameter of the BMI nozzle and also to the surface of the j-weld and the nozzle outside
diameter near the weld to eliminate susceptibility to PWSCC.
The Waterjet Peening process has been developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and
has been implemented at seven plants in Japan to date. This process is shown in Figure 1.
Westinghouse has a license agreement to apply this process. Waterjet Peening employs
the energy of the bursting of cavitation bubbles on the alloy 600 surface to impart a
compressive residual stress to these surfaces. This compressive stress acts to retard the
initiation of PWSCC on these surfaces. Extensive qualification testing has demonstrated
that this area of compressive stress extends to a depth of 0.020 in. (0.5 mm.). Corrosion
testing has also demonstrated that this compressive residual stress is effective in retarding
PWSCC.
The Waterjet Peening equipment can be employed to treat both the inside diameter of the
nozzles in the vicinity of the j-groove weld, the surface of the j-groove welds, and the
area of the outside diameter of the nozzle above the weld. This process can be
implemented in concert with the 10 year in-service inspection when the vessel internals
are removed and these nozzles are inspected. Even though the probability of PWSCC
8-11
leading to leakage of these nozzles are low due to their reduced temperature, Waterjet
Peening can provide additional margin which may be important for plants employing
license extension.
Figure 1: Waterjet Peening Process
Generate cavitation flow at boundary between fast jet from nozzle and
surrounding water
Create plastic deformation at material surface using shock pressure from
collapsing of cavitation bubbles
Change residual stress at and near material surface from tension to
compression
8-12
Slide 1
MI TSUBI SHI
HEAVY I NDUSTRI ES, LTD.
Mitigation of PWSCC on
Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles
by Waterjet Peening
Dr. G. Gary Elder
Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC.
Mr. Masaru Taniguchi
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD.
8-13
Slide 2
MI TSUBI SHI
Agenda
zDescription of Waterjet peening Process
zResults of Qualification Testing
zSite Implementation
The Water Jet Peening (WJP) Technique was
developed by MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES,
LTD and HITACHI, LTD and successfully applied
at several PWR plants in Japan. (Notes: WJP
Technique was originally developed for BWR
plants by HITACHI, LTD.)
8-14
Slide 3
MI TSUBI SHI
BMI Nozzle Cracking Is A Low Probability
Event But With High Consequences
zEven in low temperature environment, high residual stresses
can lead to PWSCC
Cracking in steam generator cold leg tube & plug
expansions
zBMI Nozzle fabrication sequence included periodic grinding
prior to penetrant exams and allowed straightening after
welding
zBMI J-Weld made with SMAW (shielded metal arc welding)
process
Can leave weld defects in service & create high residual
stresses
zHowever, In-Service Inspection experience to date has
discovered very few cracked BMI nozzles
zMitigation by reducing residual stresses can develop
additional margin to PWSCC at these critical locations
8-15
Slide 4
MI TSUBI SHI
z Generate cavitation flow at boundary between fast jet from nozzle and
surrounding water
z Create plastic deformation at material surface using shock pressure from
collapsing of cavitation bubbles
z Change residual stress at and near material surface from tension to compression
Principle of Water Jet Peening
Plastic deformation caused
by cavitation impact
Principle of Waterjet Peening
8-16
Slide 5
MI TSUBI SHI
BMI nozzle
600 alloy
J-weld
600 alloy
600 alloy
buttering
Stainless
steel
cladding
Vessel lower
head
bH' uo! uu h
u
bH' uo! uu h
ùmu
BMI nozzle near the
center
BMI nozzle near the
circumference
Area of OD
Peening
Area of ID
Peening
Waterjet Peening Coverage
Uphill side
Downhill side
8-17
Slide 6
MI TSUBI SHI
Water jet peeningfor BMI
- General methodology - Application to inner surface of BMI
- Water Jet from 2 holes arranged 180 degrees on Nozzle
- Nozzle rotates and goes up-down in pipes
State of WJP in small diameter pipe
Injection Nozzle
Rotation
Up-down
Clamping mechanism
R/V
BMI nozzle
BMI nozzle
WJP area
200
WJP Nozzle
(rotation & reciprocation)
Waterjet Peening of BMI
Nozzle Inner Surface
~ 8 in.
8-18
Slide 7
MI TSUBI SHI
BMI nozzle near the
vessel center
BMI nozzle near the
vessel periphery
Waterjet Peening of BMI J-
Weld & Nozzle Outer Surface
Peening of Nozzle O.D. Accomplished by reciprocating nozzle at specific
locations around periphery
Peening of J-Weld accomplished by rotating peening head around nozzle at
a fixed distance from nozzle
8-19
Slide 8
MI TSUBI SHI
- [test piece]tensile stress by welding
- [results] (before; as welded) (after WJP)
surface Max.+460MPa -400MPa (compression)
in depth 0.5mm Max.+530MPa -20-130MPa (compression)
Mocked-up of BMI
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Depth of surface (mm)
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

s
t
r
e
s
s

(
M
P
a
)
As Weld0
axial
As Weld
circumferential
As Weld180
axial
As Weld18
circumferential
WJP0
axial
WJP
circumferential
WJP180
axial
WJP18
circumferential
Improvement of Residual Stress Of
BMI Nozzle I.D. by Application of Waterjet Peening
(0.020 in.)
8-20
Slide 9
MI TSUBI SHI
An Example Of Residual Stress
Of BMI Nozzle J-Weld
800
b00
00
?00
0
?00
00
b00
800
0.0 0.? 0. 0.b 0.8 1.0 1.? 1.
180" |l
180" |l
0" |l
0" |l
??" |l
??" |l
??k3m m " |l
??k3m m " |l
180
180
(Surface)
Depth (mm)
Solid : Welding direction
Open : Cross direction
against welding
180(uphill side) after WJP
(downhill side) after WJP
225after WJP
180Initial value prior to
WJP
X : 225after WJP at R=37mm
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

s
t
r
e
s
s

(
M
P
a
)
8-21
Slide 10
MI TSUBI SHI
Hardness of WJP surface PT after WJP
No surface Defects
Appearance after WJP
(2) Hardness
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Depth from surfacemm
H
a
r
d
n
e
s
s
H
v
0
.
3
)
|o " |l
u " |l
NCF600
Verification Of Residual Stress Improvement
Effects By Hardness Measurement
8-22
Slide 11
MI TSUBI SHI
Essentially No Change To
Microstructure From Waterjet Peening
[No WJP] [After WJP]
X 100
X 500
8-23
Slide 12
MI TSUBI SHI
M/C Crane WJP Controller
Pump
Water tank
Reactor Vessel (R/V)
WJP device
High-pressure
water
Nozzle rotation
Nozzle
reciprocation
Clamping
mechanism
BMI
1
7
0
2
0
0

m
m

Clamping mechanism
R/V
BMI
BMI
W
J
P

a
r
e
a
2
0
0
WJP Nozzle
(rotation & reciprocation)
Bottom Mounted
Installments (BMI)
[WJP photo.]
Typical Containment Set-Up
I.D. Peening
Image of application
8-24
Slide 13
MI TSUBI SHI
Water jet peeningfor BMI
M/C
lu! |uud!ù_ |uu

'u "u
Hoo o
kouù_
o |ud \::!
lo:`òuù_ lo!
'u_òu \o!
|!umù_ |ud
bH' uo!
||D |umu
Ol !
J-Weld Peening Set-UP
8-25
Slide 14
MI TSUBI SHI
Thin pipe with slit
S
S+
Measuring the
deformation
[After WJP]
[Shapes]
ID16mm`
t
1mm
Slit width; 2mm
WJP
[Before WJP]
In-process Verification of
Peening Effectiveness
Normal method of determining peening effectiveness is by Almen strips
Use of Almen strips in small diameter pipes is difficult due to space limitations
Testing has determined that slit width change in small diameter pipe can be
used to determine peening strength
8-26
Slide 15
MI TSUBI SHI
Anticipated Site Schedule
Peen I. D.
Peen O.D. & J-Weld
2.5 4
days @ 60
min/BMI
each
operation
total 3.5
5 days
Install equipment and functional test ( 2 days)
Tear Down (1 day)
BMI NDE to be performed prior to Peening as Part
of 10 year ISI
Total Elapsed Time 6.5 8 days
1 day stagger
8-27
Slide 16
MI TSUBI SHI
Waterjet Peening Field
Experience
Plant Number of BMI Note
2001 Mihama-2 36 (2 Loop) No indication
Ohi-1 58 (4 Loop) No indication
Mihama-1 30 (2 Loop) No indication
Ohi-2 58 (4 Loop) No indication
2002
Takahama-1 50 (3 Loop)
One Indication in
outermost nozzle
Takahama-2 50 (3 Loop) No indication
2003
Genkai-1 36 (2 Loop) No indication
2004 Takahama-1 1 (3 Loop)
No indication after
Repair
2005 Mihama-3 50 (3 Loop) Planning
All Peening to Date has Been I.D. Only
8-28
ABSTRACT
Field Implementation Experience with Upper Head Temperature Reduction Program
Authors:
Herbert Lenz
Fabrizio Organai
Paul J. Kreitman, P.E.
Westinghouse has developed a program for the field modification of the reactor upper
and lower internals components to provide additional bypass flow to the upper head
region of the reactor vessel. This modification will reduce the vessel head bulk fluid
temperature to the cold leg temperature, which will then reduce the closure head
penetration temperatures. By this field modification the propensity for cracking of
reactor vessel head penetrations and J-groove welds due to primary water stress corrosion
cracking (PWSCC) is significantly decreased. This Upper Head Temperature Reduction
(UHTR) modification has been implemented in the Spanish plants Asc Unit in spring
2003 and in Asc unit 2 in spring 2004.
Based on the design configuration of the two plants two different techniques have been
applied. In Asc Unit 2 a remotely removal of existing flow plugs was sufficient. For
Asco Unit 1 a more complex approach including machining of holes into the upper
support plate was required. Both modifications were selected in such a way to have
minimal impact to the structural components of the reactor internals, and to minimize
outage time during field service.
For a successful field implementation experts knowing the local situation as well as
specialist for machining and auxiliary systems were on-site. Besides the machining
capacity, several auxiliary systems like long handling tools, positioning plates, grippers,
vacuum systems, filters, etc. and the appropriate engineering knowledge about were
required. To adapt to local requirements, to use the best technical approaches as well as
to optimize pricing a multinational Westinghouse team with groups from Spain, Germany
and the U.S. worked together during qualification, preparation and field implementation
phase.
This paper focuses on the different techniques, discusses challenges encountered, and
offers lessons learned from the experience using a multinational approach.
8-29
Slide 1
Field Implementation Experience at
ASCO Units 1 & 2 with
Upper Head Temperature Reduction
Herbert Lenz, Fabrizio Organai, Paul Kreitman
8-30
Slide 2
Upper Head Temperature
Reduction (UHTR)
z Field modification program of the reactor upper and lower
internals components
z Provide additional bypass flow to the upper head region of
the reactor vessel
z Lowers the bulk fluid temperature underneath the closure
head, resulting in lower reactor vessel penetration
temperatures
z Reduces propensity for cracking of reactor vessel head
penetrations and J-groove welds
UHTR program for T
hot
plants
8-31
Slide 3
Upper Internal
Components
Cold
Leg
Flow
RV Head
Penetrations
Hot
Leg
Flow
RV
Downcomer
Flow
Spray
Nozzle Upper
Support
Plate
Flange
Core
Barrel
Flange
Hold
Down
Spring
Reactor
Vessel
Head
Reactor
Vessel
Upward flow
through guide
tubes
8-32
Slide 4
Implementation Designs
z Improved process to implement UHTR depending on the
different plant design in Asc unit 1 and 2
no machining in core barrel flange
no removal of lower internals from RV
modifications performed off-critical path
z Upper support plate modification and irradiated specimen
access plug removal in Asc unit 1
z Spray nozzle plug removal in Asc unit 2
8-33
Slide 5
Asc Unit 1 Configuration
before UHTR
8-34
Slide 6
Unit 1 - Upper Support
Plate Modification
Reactor
Vessel
Head
Reactor
Vessel
Newly
Machined
Hole
Existing
Specimen
Hole
(plug removed)
Flow
Upper
Support
Plate
Flange
Core
Barrel
Flange
Hold
Down
Spring
Electric discharge
machine (EDM) large
holes above each
specimen access hole
Remove irradiated
specimen access plugs
8-35
Slide 7
Equipment needs
z EDM heads and
power supplies
z Positioning plates
z Long handling tools
z Flush pump for
demineralised water
z Debris removal
system
z Camera systems
z Internals riser blocks
8-36
Slide 8
Process and Tooling
Development
z From Order to Field Readiness in 4.5 months
z Integrated global Westinghouse implementation
team from various locations in Spain, Germany,
and United States
z Use of already existing field proven equipment, e.g.
long handled tooling
z Testing, qualification and personnel training under
realistic conditions on a full scale mock-up
Major Design Implementation Steps and Milestones
8-37
Slide 9
Machined Flow Holes
Top of Flange
Bottom of Flange
8-38
Slide 10
Integrated Global Westinghouse
Implementation Team
z Site Manager
z Quality Assurance
z Shift Leads
z EDM specialists
z Tooling Specialist (Vacuum system,
long handling tools, etc.)
z Local support workers
z Project management support
On-site Crew (14 persons)
8-39
Slide 11
Asc Unit 2 Configuration
before UHTR
Core Barrel Flange
(Top View)
Existing Flow
Nozzles and
Plugs
Specimen
Access Plugs
Upper Internals Flange
(Top View)
Holes to Allow
Core Barrel
Flow Nozzles to
Protrude
Through the
Upper Support
Plate Flange
Existing Lift Holes
with Roto-Lock
Inserts (covered
by 1/8" thick
plates at bottom)
Existing Lift Holes
with Roto-Lock
Inserts (bore is
completely
through-wall)
8-40
Slide 12
Unit 2 Spray Nozzle Plug
Removal
Removed selected
spray nozzle plugs from
existing flow nozzles on
the core barrel flange
that protrude through
holes on the upper
support plate flange
Flow
8-41
Slide 13
Mockup of a Pair of Flow Nozzles
and Plugs for a Typical Plant
8-42
Slide 14
Demonstration of
Remotely Removing a
Flow Plug
8-43
Slide 15
Summary & Conclusions
z UHTR is an effective program to reduce propensity
for cracking of reactor vessel head penetrations
and J-groove welds
z 2 processes for UHTR implementation available
based on plant design configurations
z Modifications performed off-critical path
z Process and tooling development for Asc within
4.5 months
z Benefit of an integrated global Westinghouse team
8-44
Alloy 52 Welding in Nuclear Applications: Performance Issues and
Weldability Testing
Dave Waskey
Framatome ANP Inc. (AREVA Group)
dave.waskey@framatome-anp.com
In the last two decades, Alloy 690 has been used in replacing Alloy 600 as the
material of choice in nuclear power plants. Simultaneously, a similar change with
filler material has taken place as Alloy 52 GTAW filler material is being used as a
substitute for Alloy 82. A new material typically requires new techniques in order
to be used successfully as has been the case for Alloy 52.
Alloy 52 has resulted in numerous weldability issues that have significantly
impacted plant repair schedules, Figure 1, and have caused Regulatory
involvement to accept aberrant conditions, Figure 2.
To date, FANPs experience shows that evaluating and selecting an Alloy 52
chemistry is a process, not a test [1]. FANPs filler material verification program
consists of performing in-house welding tests, Figure 3, to establish a baseline
performance level followed by application driven mock-ups to further substantiate
field weldability performance.
This presentation will explore several case studies that highlight different
challenges of Alloy 52 welding and how those challenges were met. The
presentation will conclude with a history of the FANP ongoing filler material
evaluation / selection program.
Reference:
1. Alain Chabenat, Andre Thomas, and Dave Waskey, Hot Cracking
Susceptibility of 30% Cr Inconel Filler Metal in GTAW Deposits, Sixth
International EPRI Conference, June 16 18, 2004, Sandestin, FL.
8-45
Figure 1
Weld Flaws on a Pressurizer Nozzle Pad Repair
Figure 2
UT Indications in Vertical Down Welding Position of a Dissimilar Metal Butt Weld
Typical Vertical Down Welding Flaws
8-46
Figure 3
Weldability Testing
Restraint: with or
without hole
Base metal:
Base material or pre-deposit
Welding parameters:
thermal cycle and
dilution
Restraint: with or
without hole
Base metal:
Restraint: with or
without hole
Base metal:
Restraint: with or
without hole
Restraint: with or
without hole
Base metal:
Welding parameters:
thermal cycle and
dilution
Welding parameters:
thermal cycle and
dilution
> The Chabenat
Weldability Test
> Fast and Reliable
8-47
FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Alloy 52 Welding in Nuclear Applications:
Performance Issues and Weldability Testing
Dave Waskey
Framatome ANP
An AREVA and Siemens Company
8-48
Agenda
> Observations & Experiences on Welding Alloy 52
> Case Studies
Pressurizer Nozzle Repair
Reactor Vessel Nozzle Repair
BWR Stub Tube Repair
Piping Structural Weld Overlay
> Welability Evaluation Techniques
Past
Present
Future
> Conclusions
8-49
Observations & Experiences
> Embedded flaws that go undetected by NDE are
harmless.
> The surface appearance of a weld can be
deceiving.
> ALARAinterpass cleaning vs. rework
> Out-of-position welding complicates shielding gas
issues.
8-50
Cracks Observed
> Cracks Type 1
very small, rather
numerous
dispersed in the weld
metal
8-51
Cracks Observed
> Cracks Type 2
larger than Type 1
close to the fusion line
8-52
Weld Buildup Observations
Alloy Welding NDE Metallography
Surface PT: Clear 10 linear indications
Volumetric UT: Clear Total length: 0.109
52-1 Cleanminor oxide
build-up
Ave length: 0.011
52-2 DirtyHand brushed
after the 5th layer
Ave length: 0.016
52-3 Dirtyflat topped after
the 3rd and 7th layer
Ave length: 0.009
1/2 Thickness PT: Clear 51 linear indications
Surface PT: Not Clear Total length: 1.193
52M-1 Clean
Flat topped at 1/2
Thickness and PTed
Volumetric UT: Clear Ave length: 0.023
52M-2 Clean
Ave length: 0.020
8-53
Weld Buildup Observations
Typical cracks seen in the Alloy 52 / 52M weld deposits
Alloy 52 pad showing surface oxide build-up
Alloy 52M pad, "clean"
Reveals both Type 1 and
Type 2 Cracks
8-54
FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Case Studies
8-55
Case Studies PZR Nozzle Repair
> Machine GTAW
temperbead buildup
> Hot cracking and/or dip-
ductility cracking (DDC)
8-56
Case Studies RV Nozzle Repair
> Machine GTAW
temperbead buttering
> Excessive oxide and
nitride stringers
> Out-of-position welding
affected shielding
integrity
8-57
Case Studies BWR Stub Tube Repair
> Solidification Anomalies
detected during UT at the
triple point in partial
penetration mockup welds
> Verified during
metallographic evaluation
> Anomalies smaller than
0.050 were analyzed and
determined to be an
acceptable condition weld
technique modified to
minimize the anomalies
8-58
Case Studies Piping Structural Weld Overlay
Typical Vertical Down Welding Flaws
8-59
FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Weldability Evaluation
Techniques
8-60
Alloy 82 Evaluation Techniques Past
> Thick weld deposit in flat position
> Cross-sectioned at 45 for metallography
> Categorized the results for applications
8-61
Alloy 52 Evaluation Techniques Present
> Thick circular pad
> Welded in out-of-position
> No interpass cleaning
allowed
> Cross-sectioned at the
quadrants for metallography
> Results Numerous fissures,
some large
> Thick square pad
> Welded in flat position
> Interpass cleaning allowed
> Cross-sectioned at a 45 for
metallography
> Results Few fissures, all
very small
8-62
> NG pipe
> 6G position
> Interpass cleaning
allowed
> Metallography performed
at the quadrants
8-63
Alloy 52M w/ 4% Mo
2 layers: ERNi-1
Alloy 52M
2 layers: ERNi-1
Alloy 52MNb
2 layers: Ni Rod 99
3 layers: ER309L
8-64
Alloy 52 Evaluation Techniques Future
> The Chabenat
Weldability Test
> Fast and Reliable
Restraint: with or
without hole
Base metal:
Welding parameters:
thermal cycle and
dilution
Restraint: with or
without hole
Base metal:
Restraint: with or
without hole
Base metal:
Restraint: with or
without hole
Restraint: with or
without hole
Base metal:
Welding parameters:
thermal cycle and
dilution
Welding parameters:
thermal cycle and
dilution
8-65
Presentation of the Results on 3-D Axis
X axis:
restraint
Y axis:
reheat
Z axis :
dilution
8-66
Welding with Alloy 52 on Alloy 182 deposit:
Reheat
Dilution
Restraint
0
56
38
40
0
Dilution with
182 and 690
Dilution with
Alloy 182
8-67
Typical Chemical Analysis Of Ni Base Alloys
Base
Alloy 690
Base
Alloy 600
Wire
Alloy 52
Wire
Alloy 82
C 0.025 0.03 0.02 0.03
Si 0.13 0.3 0.15 0.17
Mn 0.1 0.3 0.25 3
Ni 59 74 60 70
Cr 30 16 29 21
Mo
Nb 2.3
Al 0.3 0.2 0.7
Ti 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2
Fe 9.6 8.3 9 2.7
8-68
Welding Wire Types Tested (Nominal Chemistries)
52 52MnNb 52Nb 52M 52M+Mo
C 0.02 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.02 C
Si 0.14 0.13 0.2 0.03 0.03 Si
Mn 0.25 2.7 0.5 1 0.7 Mn
Ni 60 54 56 60 56 Ni
Cr 30 30 30 30 30 Cr
Mo 4 Mo
Nb+Ta 1.8 1.4 1 1 Nb+Ta
Al 0.7 0.5 Al
Ti 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.2 Ti
Fe 9 11 10 9 9 Fe
8-69
FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Conclusions
8-70
Conclusions
> When welding with Alloy 52, there are risks of
encountering two types of cracking :
Type 1 microcracks, fine and dispersed over the deposited
metal
Type 2 cracks, larger and next to the fusion line of stainless
steel
> The Framatome ANP weldability tests have shown that
restraint, thermal cycles and dilution have a significant
effect on the propensity of both Type 1 and Type 2
cracks.
> It has been shown that Nb has a significant effect in
reducing Type 1 cracks.
> It has been shown that Mo has a significant effect in
reducing Type 2 cracks.
8-71
Conclusions
> It is unlikely that a perfect Alloy 52 filler material
will ever be developed, but structurally sound
weld metal can be deposited.
> The challenges of Alloy 52 vary on a case by case
basis and warrant end use consideration.
> Advances in alloy evaluation techniques continue
to enable Framatome ANP to meet the welding
challenges of Alloy 52.
8-72
8-73
EPRI 2005 PWSCC of Alloy 600 International Conference & Exhibit Show
Tamaya Resort, Santa Ana Pueblo, NM
March 7-10, 2005
Michael F. Moran
Florida Power and Light Company
700 Universe Blvd.
Juno Beach, Florida 33408
Joe Paljug
AREVA
Framatome-ANP
Lynchburg, VA 24506
Turkey Point Unit 3 Reactor Vessel Closure Head Replacement
One resolution path for Alloy600 material is component replacement. By the end of
CY2004, there have been 14 RVCH replacement projects in the US. Previous industry
experience and lessons learned have been shared at various conferences in the past. In
keeping with that practice, the purpose of this presentation is to share FPL/Framatome ANP
experience from the RVCH replacement project at FPL Turkey Point Unit 3 plant,
completed in the Fall of 2004.
As with other US plants, the 4 FPL plants are susceptible to A600 PWSCC. An FPL
evaluation considered ongoing inspection and repair costs versus replacement components
versus mitigation techniques. The conclusion favored replacement and FPL chose an
extensive replacement project including other associated components.
The Turkey Point 3 project was a full-scope replacement outage; including the following
major items;
x New Reactor Vessel Closure Head
x New A690 penetrations
x New CRDM mechanical drives
x New CRDM coil stacks
x New RVLMS / CETNA seals
x New Integrated Head Assembly
x New cables and connectors on IHA
x New bulkhead panel for connectors.
The Integrated Head Assembly Package was designed with the following features;
x Integrated shielding
x Integrated lift rig
x Integrated missile shield
8-75
x Integrated duct work
x Inspection friendly insulation
x Cable bridges
x Quick connects
x New cables
x Future on-board fan capability.
An integrated project team was established to provide maximum effectiveness and
efficiency in preparing, designing, and implementing the full-scope project. Team members
included FPL, Framatome ANP, SGT and Westinghouse. The initial project meetings
began in September 2002, with the outage beginning on September 27, 2004 and plant
restart commenced on December 02, 2004.
Design and construction of a Temporary Assembly Building was required. Additional
preoutage activities included planning, designing and implementing;
x Tower Crane and work platform
x Temporary Power
x Tendon detensioning equipment
x Reactor head and IHA presassembly
x Heavy haul activities.
The outage was scheduled for 56 days, 45 of which was associated with the Reactor Head
Replacement. The Reactor Head work was completed in 46.7 days. Development of an
integrated outage schedule was of utmost importance considering the many replacement
components. Outage activities also included;
x Tendon detensioning / concrete cut
x Heavy haul / Heavy lift
x Final Assembly / test
x Installation / coordination with the Refueling Crew.
The project was successful due to a dedicated, multi-disciplined project team with the
following attributes;
x Projects, Engineering, Framatome ANP, SGT assembled in same location
x Engineering and Projects review each others documents
x Healthy respect for each other
x Significant benchmarking
x Engineering specs developed by implementers
x Highly motivated and dedicated staff
x Experience match
x Very professional relationship
x Open Communication
x Confidence of upper management.
There were a number of improvements that will be considered in the next replacement
project at Turkey Point 4 this Spring, such as;
8-76
x Office space needed
x Clerical support
x FPL Electrical engineering support
x FPL project staffing
x Electrical Connector assembly
x RVLMS seal
x Work package interface
x Design change packages IAW FPL procedures.
In summary, a replacement project can be successful with consideration and implementation
of a few crucial steps. Early planning will provide the basis for funding, schedule, operating
schedule impact. Developing the scope early will allow for an effective interface plan.
Minimizing the number of vendors will also limit the hand-offs required during the
project. Prior outage walkdowns provide the information and measurements needed for
proper planning and fitup. In the end, success is derived from teamwork, and developing
the project team early can produce the working relationships needed for effective teamwork.
8-77
Page
Florida Power and Light
Turkey Point Unit 3
Reactor Vessel Closure Head
Replacement
2005 PWSCC of
Alloy 600
International
Conference and
Exhibition
St. Lucie Plant
Turkey Point Plant
March 8, 2005
8-78
Reactor Head Replacement
Topics of Discussion
Purpose
Scope of Replacement
Utility Planning phase
Team Development
Engineering / Fabrication
Site implementation
Lessons Learned
8-79
Purpose of this presentation:
To share
Framatome ANP
/ FPL experience
with RVCH
replacement at
FPL Turkey Point
Unit 3 plant that
was completed in
the Fall of 2004
8-80
Project Scope
PROJECT SCOPE:
New Reactor Vessel Closure Head
New A690 penetrations
New CRDM mechanical drives
New CRDM coil stacks (1 unit)
New RVLMS / CETNA seals
New Integrated Head Assembly
New cables and connectors on IHA
New bulkhead panel for connectors
8-81
Project Scope
Integrated Head Assembly Package:
Integrated shielding
Integrated lift rig
Integrated missile shield
Integrated duct work
Inspection friendly insulation
Cable bridges
Quick connects
New cables
Future on-board fan capability
8-82
Utility Planning Phase
Project Scope Constraints:
Susceptibility ranking
Threshold for risk
Outage schedules
Hatch vs head size
Inspection costs
Options:
Inspect / repair
Replace
Mitigate
8-83
Team Development
Project
Engineering
Projects
Framatome
-ANP
SGT
MPEG
Engineering
Engineering
VP
Plant VP Projects VP
CNO
8-84
Engineering / Fabrication
Engineering by Framatome ANP
and SGT
Fabrication by Framatome ANP /
Westinghouse
Construction by SGT
8-85
Site Implementation
Preoutage
Head / ISI Assembly Pre-Install assembly
Temporary Assembly Building
Tendon detensioning equipment
Tower Crane / Platform
Temporary Power
Heavy Haul
8-86
Site Implementation
Outage
Tendon detension / concrete cut
Heavy haul / Heavy lift
Final Assembly / test
Installation / coordination with
Refuel Crew
Post Outage
Tendon greasing
Tower Crane / Platform down
8-87
Overall Schedule
Bus Case
Fabrication
Engineering
Pre
Outage
2002 2005 2004 2003
8-88
Lessons Learned - what went well
x Dedicated Project Team
Projects, Engineering, Framatome ANP, SGT
assembled in same location
Engineering and Projects review each others
documents
Healthy respect for each other
Significant benchmarking
Engineering specs developed by
implementers
Highly motivated and dedicated staff
Experience match
Very professional relationship
Open Communication
Confidence of upper management
8-89
Lessons Learned -improvement
opportunities
Underestimated office space needed
Clerical support up front
Dedicated electrical discipline
FPL staffing
Electrical Connector assembly
RVLMS seal
Work package interface
Design change packages IAW FPL
procedures
8-90
Summary
Evaluation of options
Early planning for funding, schedule,
operating schedule impact
Develop scope early - interface plan
Minimize number of vendors
Develop team early
Prior outage walkdowns
Success is derived from teamwork
8-91
Westinghouse Experience with Reactor Vessel Head Replacements
Bob Sterdis, Mike Ball, Clark Candee
Abstract
Westinghouse has successfully completed 3 RVH replacements and 5 simplified head
upgrades over the past several years. The head replacements support Utility Asset
Management programs that address Alloy 600 issues at Westinghouse designed plants.
The simplified head upgrades provide both critical path time savings and worker
exposure savings during refueling activities. The replacement heads and head upgrade
designs provided by Westinghouse and its hardware suppliers address Alloy 600 issues,
boric acid leakage issues, and head inspectability issues. With each completed project,
Westinghouse has seen a decreasing trend in installation times, worker exposure, and
safety events and is applying lessons learned to future replacement projects.
One of the key elements of the Westinghouse replacement projects is project
management. Westinghouse has a dedicated project manager from the start of the
project. The implementation team is made up of numerous disciplines and includes leads
in the areas of manufacture, design, installation, and design change package
development. The team is organized to allow interaction of the various disciplines
throughout the project. For example, the installation lead participates in the design
process to assess the design for installability. A project plan is developed which
identifies program deliverables, inputs, and interfaces. An integrated schedule is
prepared to show the linkage of the various team outputs.
In the area of RVH fabrication, Westinghouse has taken the approach to utilize multiple
vendors. Each of these vendors are qualified suppliers and are selected based on their
match to a given replacement project. In all cases, Westinghouse has established a
standardized process which assures that the final component meets the design
specifications. Materials and fabrication processes are selected to improve resistance to
corrosion mechanisms. As part of the head replacement, utilities have elected to
purchase new Control Rod Drive Mechanisms. The CRDMs can be factory installed or
welded at the customer site prior to the start of the outage. Replacement CRDMs can be
provided with a like replacement (canopy seal welds) or as a single piece with full
penetration welds. The Combustion Engineering plant drive mechanisms (Control
Element Drive Mechanisms) are provided with improved design features and are installed
at the customer sites.
For head assembly upgrades, the primary design objectives have focused on refueling
outage optimization. These upgrades include: (1) an integral cooling system that
eliminates ductwork, (2) optimized cable configuration, (3) an integral missile shield, (4)
radiation shield, (5) Core Exit Thermocouple upgrades, and (6) access and personnel
safety improvements. Experience and other engineering considerations have led to
additional design advancements which allow for increased access for top of head
8-93
inspections and for installability to maximize assembly pre-outage and to minimize field
assembly time in containment.
Installation of the replacement reactor vessel head and head assembly upgrades must
occur within the time constraints of the refueling outage. Westinghouse has gained
significant experience in the installation of head replacements that is used in the planning
and execution of current projects. The headquarters planning phase includes the
following elements; (1) N-1 plant walkdown, (2) installation plan which identifies all
elements to be addressed, (3) installation procedures, (4) installation drawings, (5)
lessons learned reviews, (6) outage readiness reviews, (7) component handling and
tooling, and (7) hardware fit-up and crew training. Westinghouse has applied its
Customer Program methods to optimize installation activities that fit into utility outage
schedules.
Westinghouse has recently completed 2 head upgrades in the Fall of 2004. A
replacement head and head upgrade was successfully installed at Farley Unit 1 during
their 39 day outage. Westinghouse supplied a replacement reactor vessel head with
factory installed CRDMs built by MHI. The old head was stripped; components to be
reused stored, and prepared for removal from containment. The disposal container
supplied by WMG was installed in the yard outside the RSG storage facility. The
radiation shield was installed on the replacement head and the assembly was rigged into
containment by Bigge, a subcontractor to Westinghouse. The new head was set on the
head stand and the head assembly upgrade components were installed. New cable
bridges were installed and CRDM and DRPI cables connected to the head assembly once
on the vessel. A second head replacement was completed at Kewaunee. Westinghouse
supplied a replacement head with factory installed CRDMs built by MHI. After normal
head disassembly activities the head was placed on the containment rail system supplied
by Bigge over the head stand. The old head was stripped; components to be reused
stored, and head placed in the Duratek disposal container. The disposal container was
then moved out of containment and prepared for removal from site. The new head was
moved into containment for reassembly. The service structure and lower and upper
shrouds were reinstalled, coil stacks and ARPIs placed on new CRDMs, and seismic
bumpers adjusted. The head was then placed on vessel for final assembly including
welding of the RVLIS and head vent lines. Both jobs achieved significantly less
personnel exposure than what was budgeted.
Through this extensive experience, Westinghouse has identified the following lessons
learned to be applied to future projects. Head fabrication should budget 3 years to
address lead times in the manufacturing process and to arrive on site prior to the outage
for pre-outage assembly activities. Headquarter planning activities should budget 24
months to allow for design collaboration with the customer and preparation of field
procedures and installation drawings to support utility design modification schedules. A
rigorous design process is to be followed with strong considerations for installability.
The installation should be treated as a construction project rather a field service activity.
And finally, utility personnel (all stakeholders) need to be engaged throughout the
project.
8-94
Slide 1
Westinghouse Experience with RV Head
Replacements
EPRI International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference
Jeff Hydeman -- Manager, Reactor Components
Upgrades and Major Projects
R J Sterdis -- Manager, RVH Installation Services
Mike Ball -- Manager, RVH Design Engineering
Clark Candee -- Manager, RVH Business Development
8-95
Slide 2
Experience Summary
z Westinghouse has successfully completed 3 RVH
replacements and 5 simplified head upgrades
z Westinghouse and its hardware suppliers provide the best
solution to the Alloy 600 material issues, boric acid
leakage issues, and head inspectability issues
z Utilities are seeing benefits in head replacements and
head assembly upgrades
z Lessons learned applied to current projects
z Installation times, worker exposure, and safety cases are
showing decreasing trends
8-96
Slide 3
Westinghouse RVH Replacement
Experience
Customer Prime RVH CRDMs Upgrades Engr. Install.
Surry 2 MHI MHI MHI W W W
Farley 1&2 W MHI MHI W W W
Prairie Island 1&2 W MHI MHI W W W
Pt Beach 1&2 W MHI MHI W W W
Kewaunee W MHI MHI N/A W W
Beaver Valley 1 W ENSA C-W W W Bechtel/W
Calvert Cliffs 1&2 BWC BWC W W W/BWC AREVA
Ft Calhoun OPPD MHI W W W W
Ginna RGE BWC AREVA W W RGE
Millstone 2 MHI MHI W W W W
Robinson 2 W MHI MHI W W W
Seabrook N/A N/A N/A W W/Sbrk W(1)
Waterford N/A N/A N/A W W W(1)
Wolf Creek N/A N/A N/A W W/WCNOC W(1)
Comanche Peak W ENSA C-W W W Becht el/ W
8-97
Slide 4
Project Management
z Project management
Dedicated from start of program
Team organization
Project management areas of focus
Design & Fabrication of replacement head
Head insulation design, fabrication, and installation
Stress analysis
HAUP design
DCP
Field installation (including welding of CRDMs)
8-98
Slide 5
RVH Fabrication
z Westinghouse has
established relationships
with multiple suppliers
Westinghouse
involvement in design
spec which specifies key
elements of design
(material, welds,
insulation, inspectability,
etc.)
z Materials and fabrication
processes selected to
improve resistance to
corrosion mechanisms
z Field installed or factory
installed CRDMs
8-99
Slide 6
CRDM /CEDM Design Options
Westinghouse plants:
Like replacement - with upper, mid
and lower canopy seal welds.
Single piece with canopy seal weld
at the head adapter flange
Single piece with full penetration
weld two design options
Combustion Engineering plants
Replacement CEDM hardware will
include improved design features
such as:
Improved Inconel X spring
Modified gripper gap
Plasma sprayed journals on the
latch guide tube vs. chrome
plating.
Uses omega weld attachment
to the RVCH nozzle.
8-100
Slide 7
Full Penetration Housing Design Options
Two-
piece
Housing
Full
Penetration
Bi-Metallic
Butt Weld
Full
Penetration
Butt Weld
Design Option 2
Design Option 1
8-101
Slide 8
Improved Inspectability Thermal
Sleeve Redesign Options
Original design presents
challenges for RVCH
inspections & access
penetration tube.
Thermal barrier function of
the thermal sleeve still
required.
New design addresses both
issues.
ExistingThermal Sleeve Designfor Eliminationof Thermal Sleeve
8-102
Slide 9
Head Assembly Upgrades
z Primary Design Objectives Focused on Refueling Outage
Optimization
Integral Cooling System Eliminates Ductwork
Optimized Cable Configuration
Integral Missile Shield
Radiation Shield
Radial Arm Stud Hoists
Core Exit Thermocouple Cable and Connection Upgrades
Tie Rod Improvements
Access and Personnel Safety Improvements
8-103
Slide 10
Head Assembly Upgrades
z However, Experience and Other Engineering Considerations Have
Led to Additional Design Advancements
Increased Access for Top of Head Inspections and Repair
Large hinged doors for easy access
Easily removable insulation with gap to allow visual
Increased shielding
Design for Installability to Support Integrated Head Replacement
Outage Plan
Significant assembly performed outside containment pre-
outage
Modularized design to minimize field assembly
8-104
Slide 11
Radiation Shield Design for
Inspectability and Maintenance
8-105
Slide 12
Field Installation
z Field Installation
Field experience
Procedures/installation
drawings
Durations of significant
activities
CH tooling
Safety considerations
8-106
Slide 13
Recent Implementations
Farley Unit 1
z Scope
RRVH, CRDMs, and insulation
HAUP installation
Reuse of DPRI coils, coil stacks, and
upper shroud
Rig old head out and install disposal
container
Rig new head assembly into
containment
z Organizations involved
MHI supply of head CRDMs, and
insulation
WMG disposal container
Westinghouse installation
contractor
Bigge- rigging subcontractor
Williams electrical subcontractor
MasterLee- Instacoat of RVH
z Duration, ALARA, etc.
Outage duration 39 days
Actual dose of 9.748 Rem versus
budgeted dose of 13.5 Rem
8-107
Slide 14
Farley Unit 1
z Outage highlights
Head moves in and out of
containment
Removed DRPI coils and CRDM
coil stacks with head on vessel
Vented CRDM to eliminate
leakage potential
Use of head mounted jib crane to
stack head
On-site engineering support to
quickly resolve issues
HAUP design installed easily
Actual head radiation levels and
good worker practices led to
lower than projected doses
Successful fan flow test
8-108
Slide 15
Kewaunee
z Scope
Replacement RVH, CRDMs and head
insulation
Reuse APRI and coil stacks
Reuse upper and lower shrouds
Install new seismic bumpers and cable
unistrut
Weld RVLIS and head vent lines
Install disposal container and rig old head
out
Rig new head into containment
z Organizations involved
MHI Supplied RRVH and CRDMS
Transco Supplied insulation
Westinghouse Installation contractor
Bigge Rigging subcontractor
Duratek Disposal container
z Duration, ALARA
Planned window for replacement was 17
days
Actual dose of 6.98 REM versus budgeted
dose of 10.770 REM
z Outage Photos
8-109
Slide 16
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant
Reactor Head Replacement 2004
8-110
Slide 17
New RVCH in Houston Unloaded
08
08
-
-
04
04
-
-
2004
2004
8-111
Slide 18
Brand New RVCH
The new RVCH was delivered on
8-21-2004.
W/Bigge team moved the RVCH
into the Aux Building Loading
Dock area and upended it in the
South end of the building.
8-112
Slide 19
The shipping package was
removed during the period
from 9-14-04 to 9-18-04.
Removing the Shipping Package
8-113
Slide 20
Disassembly Phase
On 10-13-04 work began in the
cavity
Measurements were taken to
provide information for welding of
the RVLIS piping on the new head.
RVLIS
RVLIS
8-114
Slide 21
Disassembly Phase
RVLIS Head Vent Piping
8-115
Slide 22
Disassembly Phase
RPI Coils
Service
Structure
8-116
Slide 23
Disassembly Phase
Old RVH Stripped
As of 10-21-2004 the
total dose accounted
for by specific
activities to the end
of the Disassembly
phase is 3.870 Rem
with 970 RWP-Hours
8-117
Slide 24
Encapsulate
10-20-2004
The encapsulant paint was put
on the flange. Where possible
the paint was sprayed on. In the
tight spots and in the stud holes
a mop that had been tied back
on itself was used.
8-118
Slide 25
Top Hat & Closure Plate
8-119
Slide 26
Top Hat coming in CTMT
The Top Hat
was moved
into
Containment
on 10-23-04.
8-120
Slide 27
Top Hat going on RVCH
The Top Hat was moved into Containment and lowered over the
head onto the BCP on 10/23/2004.
While torquing the studs one of the threaded blocks on the BCP
broke loose from the plate.
8-121
Slide 28
Down-Ending the Package/
Exiting CTMT
The package was down ended
at approximately 1800 10-24-
2004.
8-122
Slide 29
Duratek Package On Transporter in
Yard
8-123
Slide 30
11-07-2004
Perkins Tractor
and Trailer arrives
on site.
8-124
Slide 31
11-7-2004 Lifted package off
transporter, removed A-Frame and
Shoe.
Off loading package from trailer
8-125
Slide 32
Loading the Trailer
8-126
Slide 33
11-8-2004 @ ~1730 Two
Layers of shielding plates (~2
inches thickness total) were
bolted to the bottom closure
plate to reduce the contact
and general area (GA) dose
rate.
Adding Steel Plates to BCP
Before shielding = 900 mr/hr contact & 350 mr/GA.
After shielding = 60 mr/he contact & 60 mr/hr GA.
8-127
Slide 34
11-09-2004 & 11-10-2004
Perkins and Duratek continued the Preparation for shipping.
The maximum dose rate at 2 Meters from the plane of the Transporter is now
approximately 5 mR/hr on one side and 6 mR/hr on the other side.
Preparation for shipping, Adding shielding
8-128
Slide 35
11-14-2004
On Sunday the DOT inspection
was successfully completed and
the placards installed.
Ready for Inspection
8-129
Slide 36
11-15-2004 @ ~0635
Final checks made on the package and trailer, once the
shipping paperwork was in the hands of the driver, postings
were taken down and the Package left site to be delivered to
EnviroCare in Utah.
Ready for Shipping
8-130
Slide 37
Down Ending the New RVCH in Aux
Building Loading Dock
8-131
Slide 38
Moving the New RVCH into CTMT
8-132
Slide 39
Work on the New RVCH
8-133
Slide 40
11 11- -18 18- -2004 2004
Assembly of the RVCH
8-134
Slide 41
It All Comes Together
11-23-2004
Total Reassembly
exposure 0.240 pRem
8-135
Slide 42
Final Destination
The package arrived in Utah on 11
The package arrived in Utah on 11
-
-
23
23
-
-
2004
2004
8-136
Slide 43
Lessons Learned
z Head fabrication lead time > 36 months
z Design and installation planning lead time > 24
months
z Use a rigorous design process
z Design for installability
z Treat as construction project
z Utility plant personnel involved throughout
8-137
Slide 44
Conclusions
z Westinghouse has a number of ongoing RVH
Replacement projects through 2007
z Westinghouse has expanded its core of
experienced personnel on head replacements
z Westinghouse has expertise to help utilities with
their planning process
8-138
Pre-emptive Pressurizer Heater Sleeve
Repairs at PVNGS
Rex Meeden
Arizona Public Service Company
5801 S. Wintersburg Rd.
Tonopah, AZ 85354-7529
Abstract
PWSCC of alloy 600 material is well known within the nuclear industry. However,
plant specific degradation predictions vary due to time at temperature, material
yield strength, etc. While plants are aware of susceptibility, some do not have
definitive plans for replacement of alloy 600 material.
This paper describes the process utilized at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
Station for management and replacement of pressurizer heater sleeves. A repair
/replacement study was performed to evaluate Palo Verde specific conditions
including;
x Degradation predictions
x Plant conditions: 3 identical units, 36 heater sleeves per unit,
impending stream generator replacements
x Repair alternatives
x Net present value analysis
The overall management process will be presented including repair/replacement study
results, recommendations to plant management, selected repair alternative and NPV
results. The management process has led to replacement of all pressurizer heater sleeves
in Palo Verde units 2 and 3. Heater sleeves in Palo Verde unit 1 are scheduled for Fall
2005.
References
1. Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Pressurizer Heater Sleeve
Repair/Replacement Study, DEI 686, September 2001.
8-139
Pre-emptive Pressurizer Heater Sleeve
Repairs at PVNGS
Conference and Exhibition
Rex Meeden
March 7-10, 2005
8-140
Contents
Background Information
Repair/Replacement Study
Mockup Preparations
Unit 2 Installation
Unit 3 Installation
Unit 1 Installation
8-141
July 1993, 2 heaters
failed, unremovable
Machined lower section
of heater
Plugged sleeve
October 2000, heater
sleeve leak at
previously plugged
location
8-142
Pad repair method
Repaired leaking sleeve
and suspect additional
sleeve
Circular pad design
Pre-heated vessel
(blankets)
Installation duration 8
days for 2 sleeves
8-143
January 2001, Management decision to perform
pre-emptive repair of pressurizer heater sleeves
Initiated repair/replacement study to determine best course
of action for Palo Verde (industry experience, susceptibility,
repair alternatives, cost)
Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assemblies (MNSAs) purchased
as contingency
MNSA purchased primarily for unexpected shutdown
8-144
DEI Repair/Replacement Study
Industry Experience
1989: Calvert Cliffs 2 identified 20 leaking sleeves (pad
repair installed on 120 sleeves)
1994: Calvert Cliffs 1 identified 2 leaking sleeves (nickel
plated 120 sleeves)
1997: St. Lucie 1 (nickel plated 120 sleeves)
2000, ANO-2 identified 12 leaking sleeves during a mid-
cycle shutdown (12 plugged sleeves)
Heater sleeve material yield strength at ALL plants
equal to or greater than that at Palo Verde
8-145
Palo Verde Degradation Predictions
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
Outage Number
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d

C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

L
e
a
k
i
n
g

S
l
e
e
v
e
s
Palo Verde 1
Palo Verde 2
Palo Verde 3
8-146
Alternatives considered
nickel plating
sleeve repair
pressurizer replacement (new/refurbishment)
Economic analysis (NPV)
3 identical units
36 heater sleeves per unit
Conclusion: Implement sleeve pad repair in all 3
units during steam generator replacement outages
Unit 2 - 2003, Unit 1 - 2005, Unit 3 - 2007
8-147
Mockup Preparations
Full scale pressurizer mockup
(WSI), including surge line,
support skirt and labyrinth
entrance
Lift platform designed to work
3 stations in parallel
Work efficiency
Accommodate varying height of
personnel
Reduce radiological exposure
8-148
Mockup Preparations
Simulated welding and
machining process on
3 stations in parallel
Simulated alignment of
new and old sleeve
Rectangular pad
configuration (SI)
8-149
Unit 2 Installation
Utilized ambient temperature temper bead process
Gas tungsten arc welding (machine GTAW)
No pre-heating required
Re-used portion of heaters
Eliminated heaters subjected to uncovery
Encountered 1 stuck heater
Successfully removed from pressurizer
Alignment issues during heater insertion
Crud buildup on remaining sleeve
Configuration of heater to sleeve weld
8-150
Unit 2 Installation
Fall 2003 SGRO:
Completed repair of 34
heater sleeves (2 sleeves
previously plugged)
Radiological exposure 32
rem
Installation duration 36
days (4 days longer than
anticipated scheduled,
within SGRO window)
8-151
Unit 3 Installation
Originally scheduled for Fall 2007 during SGRO
2 MNSAs installed in U3R10 (Spring 2003)
1 MNSA installed in U3M11 (Spring 2004)
Additional 5 day down time to install MNSA
Management decision to accelerate installation to
Fall 2004 refueling outage
20 day extension to original outage schedule
8-152
Unit 3 Installation
Palo Verde Degradation Predictions
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
Outage Number
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d

C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

L
e
a
k
i
n
g

S
l
e
e
v
e
s
Palo Verde 1
Palo Verde 2
Palo Verde 3
8-153
Unit 3 Installation
Increased pad size to overlap MNSA hole locations
Installed 36 new heaters
Improved alignment tool and machining of remaining
sleeve significantly improved ability to insert heaters
Machining of remaining sleeve resulted in FME
issues
8-154
Unit 3 Installation
Fall 2004 U3R11: Completed repair of 36 heater
sleeves
Radiological exposure 49 rem
Higher dose rates than unit 2
Installation duration 28 days (2 days ahead of
anticipated schedule)
8-155
Unit 1 Installation
Scheduled for Fall 2005 SGRO
Pad repair of 36 heater sleeves
Install 36 new heaters
Develop FME control for machining of remaining
sleeve
Monitoring progress of mid-wall repair
8-156
RPV Outlet Nozzle Repair (SAFEPLAY) for Ringhals Units 3 and 4
Bert Kroes
Westinghouse Electric Belgium
Rue de lindustrie 43
1400 Nivelles, Belgium
Phone: +32(0)67288234, Fax: +32(0)67288334, e-mail:
kroes-a@notes.westinghouse.com
Hans Sjstrand
Ringhals AB
43022 Vrbacka
Sweden
Phone: +46(0)340667782, Fax: +46(0)340665515, email: hans.sjostrand@ringhals.se
ABSTRACT
The Ringhals 3 and 4 Nuclear power stations are pressurized water reactors of Westinghouse
design and were commissioned in the early 1980s. The Reactor Pressure Vessels (RPV) are
equipped with stainless steel safe ends, that are joined to the carbon steel nozzle through an Alloy
182 nozzle buttering and an Alloy 182 double-sided groove weld. The fabrication practices of
vessel manufacturer Uddcomb were comparable to those of other vendors that have supplied
RPVs to Westinghouse, except for the fact that a double sided groove weld design was used for
the nozzle to safe end weld whereas single sided joints were more commonly used by other
vendors.
During the 2000 and 2001 RPV Nozzle to Safe end weld ISI of the units, axially oriented defects
were identified in the nozzle to safe end welds of the RPV outlet nozzles. The largest defects
extended to a depth of approximately 30 mm or 40 % of the ligament. In line with the Swedish
legislation, the nozzle defects were removed using EDM and the resulting boat samples were
investigated to determine the root cause of the cracking. PWSCC was identified as the failure
mechanism causing the cracking and based on stress analysis and conservative crack growth
analyses, the units were allowed to start up leaving the boat sampling cavities in place. As a result
of the locally small ligament and the typically conservative crack growth predictions, the ISI
intervals for the RPV outlet nozzles was shortened to approximately one fuel cycle.
To minimize the impact on plant operation of the Alloy 182 RPV outlet nozzle cracking issue and
to extend the ISI intervals, nozzle repair was recommended and a repair strategy was developed
and implemented over the 2002 2003 time frame for both units. The repair aimed at restoring
the original structural capacity of the nozzle to safe end joint and at returning to a normal 10 year
ISI interval. This meant that all nozzles (even those that had not yet experienced any PWSCC )
needed to be treated. Based on risk, cost and schedule evaluations, an ID repair method was
preferred as compared to the safe end replacement option previously implemented at the VC
Summer power station. The thickness of the protective layer applied on the inside of the nozzle
was selected based on the characteristics of the qualified nozzle NDE system; a thickness app
50% larger than the detection target of the NDE system was applied.
8-157
The ID repair method, later referred to as SAFEPLAY (SAFE end Protective LAYer) was
implemented in a semi-remote fashion using a shielded working platform lowered in the RPV and
allowing for direct access of the area to be repaired.
The SAFEPLAY process qualification included extensive weld process qualifications and
demonstrations on representative mock-ups. Four full size mock-ups consisting of SA 508 Cl 2
and SA 182F316 forgings were joined using Alloy 182 in accordance the original fabrication
procedures. Following formal weld procedure qualifications, the full repair sequence including
decontamination, cavity machining, cavity filling, groove machining and groove welding was
implemented twice simulating the actual field conditions. This detailed process qualification work
became a cornerstone for the later successful field implementation. A particular challenge for the
qualification effort was the use of Alloy 52 type filler material for the application of the final ID
weld layer. In an effort to minimize weld cracking, Alloy 52M was selected as a corrosion barrier
between the orginal Alloy 182 weld material and the primary coolant. A tightly controlled set of
welding parameters, in combination with a weld bevel configuration minimizing the weld
constraint finally resulted in good weld quality, with a minimal amount of micro-cracks. It is
finally noted that all the interfaces with the P3 nozzle material were welded using an ambient
temperbead method. Process qualifications showed excellent toughness properties of the heat
affected zones exposed to the temperbead welding.
The modified nozzle configuration was analyzed to reflect the newly introduced materials such as
Alloy 82 for the cavity repair and Alloy 52M for the ID layer. The impact on the ASME NB-3200
secondary stresses in the nozzle was found to be very small. To evaluate the impact of the
residual stresses following the repair and to confirm the corrosion resistance of the Alloy 52M
material, both accelerated doped steam initiation testing and primary water SCC crack
propagation testing were performed. Both tests confirmed the full resistance of the Alloy 52M
materials against PWSCC, irrespective of the potentially unfavorable residual stress levels in the
as-welded joints.
Following the extensive process qualifications, the SAFEPLAY methodology was taken to the
field and applied to the Ringhals 3 and 4 RPV outlet nozzles. The Ringhals 4 repair was
successfully completed in the fall of 2002, but the Westinghouse performance window was
exceeded by approximately 10 days due to a weld defect discovered during intermediate NDE.
For Ringhals 3, the schedule was improved by approximately 5 days as compared to the initial
performance window, largely due the benefit of the Ringhals 4 lessons learned. The accumulated
dose was below the initial estimates for both projects.
Following the successful SAFEPLAY application at Ringhals, Westinghouse is promoting the
use of this method as an alternative to other mitigation techniques for RPV nozzle to safe end
weld cracking such as MSIP. The SAFEPLAY implementation is a permanent mitigation method
for Alloy 82/182 RPV nozzle to safe end cracking that can preemptively be implemented within a
performance window of approximately 11 days for three RPV outlet nozzles. In case the process
is applied as a repair, the implementation will be longer but still compare favorably to other
solutions such as safe end replacement.
8-158
Slide 1
RPV Outlet Nozzle Repair (SAFEPLAY)
EPRI Alloy 600 PWSCC Conference
March, 2004
Bert Kroes - Westinghouse Electric Belgium
Hans Sjstrand Ringhals AB
8-159
Slide 2
RPV Outlet Nozzle Repair (SAFEPLAY)
z Background and concept
z Repair Method
z Applied Processes
z Repair System Qualifications
z Field Implementation
z Preemptive SAFEPLAY application
8-160
Slide 3
RPV Nozzle to safe end weld
cracking - background
z PWSCC of Reactor Vessel to Safe End Weld at Ringhals 3 & 4
z Unacceptable indications in the Units 3 & 4 Alloy 182 nozzle to safe end
welds detected by ID UT/EC in 2000 (unit 4) and 2001 (unit 3), removed
by boat sampling
z Resulting constraints : Short Inspection Intervals ( one year, due to da/dt)
8-161
Slide 4
RPV Nozzle Repair Method -
Concept
Concept
z Develop a robust Repair System capable of
restoring full structural capacity of the nozzle by
weld repair of the boat sample divots and
application of a corrosion resistant ID overlay onto
the existing Alloy 182 RPV nozzle weld to preclude
future PWSCC cracking.
8-162
Slide 5
Required
z Dry and low dose access to 3HL nozzles
(barrel/inverted hat) + decontamination
z Existing field machining equipment
z Existing field welding equipment
z Existing NDE methods
RPV Nozzle Repair Method -
Concept
8-163
Slide 6
RPV Nozzle Repair Method
Access System
Plant conditions:
z Lower Internals had to be removed from the RPV
for ALARA reasons.
z Reactor pool is filled for shielding of lower internals
(on their storage stand).
z No water barrier between the storage area and the
RPV
z Dry access to the RV Outlet Nozzle Safe End
welds via the top of the RPV
8-164
Slide 7
RPV Nozzle Repair Method
Access System
8-165
Slide 8
Applied Processes Repair
Sequence - Nozzle with divots
z Nozzle ID decontamination
z Divot machining
z PT examination
z Divot filling using Alloy 82
z 360 degree groove machining
z Intermediate UT/PT
z Overlay welding using Alloy 52M to fill groove
z Final Machining and final NDE
8-166
Slide 9
Modification of the existing divot shape
Applied Processes - Machining
8-167
Slide 10
Applied Processes - Repair
welding - Nozzles with divots
8-168
Slide 11
Applied Processes - Repair
welding - Nozzles without
divots
8-169
Slide 12
Repair System Qualifications
z Weld Procedure Qualifications
z Production Weld Test (PWT)
z Factory Acceptance Test (FAT)
z Site Acceptance Test (SAT)
z Structural Verifications
8-170
Slide 13
Repair System Qualifications
Weld Procedure
8-171
Slide 14
Repair System Qualification-
Coupon Fabrication
8-172
Slide 15
Repair System Qualification -
Structural Verifications
z New materials were introduced into the Nozzle to
safe end weld area (Alloy 82 and Alloy 52M)
ASME III NB 3200 type of stress analyses were
performed to verify secondary stress (fatigue)
behavior.
z Confirm resistance to PWSCC of Alloy 52M
accelerated SCC testing under doped steam
environment (four point bending, initiation) and
primary water environment (pre-cracked CTs).
8-173
Slide 16
Repair System Qualifications -
Stress Analyses
z Three different axi-symmetric FE models were
developed to cover different weld configurations
z Analysis evaluated primary plus secondary stress
range (3Sm) and fatigue usage factor
z Introduction of Alloy 82 and Alloy 52M does not
significantly affect secondary stresses in the nozzle
weld region and ASME stress limits are respected
with significant margin
8-174
Slide 17
Repair System Qualification -
Accelerated SCC testing of Alloy 52M
8-175
Slide 18
z Conclusions of Doped Steam Test
Alloy 52M weld exhibited complete resistance to
stress corrosion crack initiation for exposure
times equivalent to 45 years of service
Alloy 182 welds initiated cracking in exposure
times less than 1/5 th of the exposure times for
Alloy 52M
z Propagation testing under primary water conditions
recently completed. No SCC was observed during
destructive examination of pre-cracked specimens
after app 6000 hrs of primary water exposure.
Repair System Qualification
Accelerated SCC testing of Alloy 52M
8-176
Slide 19
Field Implementation - Access System
8-177
Slide 20
Field Implementation Access System
8-178
Slide 21
Field Implementation Barrel
and Inverted Hat
8-179
Slide 22
Field Implementation Barrel
and Inverted Hat
8-180
Slide 23
Field Implementation Nozzles
Decontamination
8-181
Slide 24
Field Implementation
Divot Machining
8-182
Slide 25
Field Implementation
Groove Machining
8-183
Slide 26
Field Implementation - Access
8-184
Slide 27
R 3 and 4 Nozzle Repair
Major Facts
z RPV ID Nozzle Overlay Method compares favorably to
Safe End Replacement method
z Westinghouse and team members demonstrated ability to
implement FOAK type of project within 9 months from
scratch to site
z Ringhals 4 duration: app 46 days, 39.8 REM radiation
exposure
z Ringhals 3 duration: app 27 days, 19.5 REM radiation
exposure (benefit of lessons learned and smaller boat
sampling volumes)
8-185
Slide 28
Basic SAFEPLAY Concept
8-186
Slide 29
SAFEPLAY application as a
mitigative process
z Based on favorable Ringhals experience, Westinghouse
proposes the use of SAFEPLAY as an alternative to MSIP
or Safe End replacement
z Estimated critical path duration for preemptive SAFEPLAY
implementation on 3 Hot Leg nozzles: 13 days (approach is
much simpler without boat sampling volumes)
z Estimated accumulated dose: 10 to 15 REM
8-187
Slide 30
Conclusions
z Semi-remote ID repair method viable alternative to safe end
replacement approach in case of significant PWSCC in
vessel nozzle to safe end welds
z SAFEPLAY method can be used as PWSCC mitigation
techniques for RPV nozzles
8-188
9
SESSION 4A: BORIC ACID CORROSION
This session reviewed work underway to better define the causes and rates of boric acid
corrosion, how best to inspect for it, and ways to detect precursor primary coolant leaks.
Summaries of the presentations of the participants are given below followed by the questions
asked, responses provided, and comments made by the participants concerning each presentation.
Click on the links to access directly copies of the materials presented together with extended
abstracts.
Boric Acid Corrosion of the Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Head,
presented by S. Fyfitch, Framatome ANP (Paper 4A.1)
This presentation was given by S. Fyfitch and written by H. Xu and S. Fyfitch of Framatome
ANP, and J. Hyres of BWXT Services. The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
x The work reported in this presentation involved metallurgical examinations of the cavity
region of a removed section from the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head.
x Boric acid corrosion wastage of the RPV head low alloy steel (LAS) exposed a cladding
surface area of ~16.5 in
2
(~106 cm
2
). The "best guess" calculation of the total amount of
RPV metal lost is ~260 in
3
(~4261 cm
3
).
x The LAS microstructure consisted of three distinct regions present in the HAZ at the clad to
LAS interface: an acicular structure near the clad interface, a fine-grained structure further
away, and a coarse-grained structure beyond the HAZ.
x Striations on the cavity side wall appeared to have been influenced by boric acid solution
level initially and by the RPV head LAS microstructure afterward. The banded
microstructure of the LAS plate showed a general correlation with preferential corrosion that
produced a striated texture on the cavity walls.
x There was no evidence of erosion present on as-found cavity walls. However, erosion may
have played a part in the initial formation of the cavity.
x Undercut regions were observed around the perimeter of the exposed cladding. These are
attributed to localized galvanic corrosion between the LAS and the stainless steel cladding.
There was no evidence of cracking or disbonding associated with any of these areas.
9-1
x Comment/Question (J. Hickling): I compliment the authors on the careful documentation of
a difficult to handle sample. However, I question the interpretation of 2 aspects here:
1. The link between the visible striations and segregation in the steel, given the situation
of corrosion by acid,
2. The (admittedly non-oriented) depressions on the cavity wall as not being evidence of
flow effects, given the surface texture and the most plausible scenario for the very
turbulent conditions within the cavity.
I suggest that the conclusions reached here be revisited in the light of the data (and surface
textures) generated in the extensive MRP testing program on BAC now in progress.
x Response (S. Fyfitch): The complete report (reference 2) contains additional evidence for the
general correlation between the cavity striations and the banded microstructure in low-alloy
steel. Again, reference 2 contains additional evidence showing the lack of a typical scalloped
("orange peel") appearance expected when erosion-corrosion occurs. It has been speculated
that the depressions may have formed as a result of boiling and evaporative bubbling of the
concentrated boric acid mixture on the RPV head. I will be quite interested in reviewing the
results obtained in the mentioned MRP testing program.
x Question (R. Nicholson): Figure 18 seems to show decarburization of the HAZ adjacent to
the weld metal interface. From the examination of undercut regions, could the presence of
the decarburized zones have contributed to the extent of the undercut?
Response (S. Fyfitch): I agree that there is likely to be some decarburization present, but the
observed undercut regions are typical of what has been seen in prior testing and attributed to
galvanic corrosion effects.
x Question (G. Rao): Has there been any attempt made to establish the extent of corrosion with
each outage (cycle) from the striations or oxide color changes identified on the cavity wall?
Response (S. Fyfitch): No, that type of evaluation was not included in the scope of work.
x Question (D. Lister): Could you comment on the distribution of corrosion products that
would have been formed from the cavity metal? It seems that the relatively apparent absence
of corrosion products from the immediate cavity area reinforces the argument of many
corrosion mechanisms arising from an extremely turbulent environment constantly ejecting
material from the cavity.
Response (S. Fyfitch): The RPV head, in the vicinity of the cavity, was covered with a
mixture of boric acid deposits and low-alloy steel corrosion products several inches thick
when the RPV head inspection was first performed at the Davis-Besse site. The cavity itself
(beneath this thick layer) was filled with a mixture of concentrated boric acid and low-alloy
steel corrosion products. Some of this material was analyzed by the utility and the results are
available elsewhere. All of this material was removed prior to shipment of the 17.5-inch
(44.5-cm) disc to the laboratory. The only deposits present in the cavity, when it was
received at the laboratory, were residuals from the water jet cutting operation.
9-2
Generic Guidance for an Effective Boric Acid Inspection Program for
PWRs, presented by T. S. Sharma, American Electric Power (Paper 4A.2)
This presentation was given by T. S. Sharma and written by T. S. Sharma of American Electric
Power and G. Rao of Westinghouse. The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
x The work described in this presentation involved preparation of guidelines for development
of plant-specific boric acid corrosion control programs (BACCP) at PWRs. The guidelines
were developed by the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) for the MRP by a task team
with representatives from several utilities, EPRI, INPO and NEI. The guidelines apply to
PWRs of Westinghouse, CE, and B&W design.
x The guidelines are contained in WCAP-15988, Revision 1, and have been approved for
implementation by the WOG Executive Committee for all US PWRs. The action items of
guidelines are mandatory under NEI Materials Guidelines Implementation Protocol NEI 03-
08. These action items include having a BACCP, and addressing 11 "key elements" of the
BACCP as discussed in the guidelines.
x Highlights of Revision 1 of WCAP 15988 include requirements for: (1) enhanced personnel
training, (2) documentation, (3) component specific screening for pumps/valves,
(4) evaluation of the BACCP by comparison with INPO guidance, and (5) an implementation
schedule. With regard to implementation, utilities are required to update their plant-specific
programs within 18 months after issuance of WCAP-15988, Rev. 1.
x Question (W. Cullen): With regard to the screening process noted on slide 13, does it imply
that there is no evaluation of boric acid corrosion?
Response (T. S. Sharma): The screening criteria require, before evidence is removed, that
certain steps be taken to ensure that there is not a problem such as boric acid corrosion.
Comment (G. Rao): Ten to twelve utilities were involved in developing the generic guidance
contained in the WCAP; there was lots of input and participation.
x Question (P. Scott): The generic guidelines that you described seem to be directed at
dispositioning boric acid deposits after the leak event. Do you have guidelines regarding
leak management during operation to decide whether serious damage is being done during
the leak event (by steam cutting, boric acid particle erosion in steam jets, flow assisted
corrosion, etc.)?
Response (T. S. Sharma): The WCAP covers the inspection of potential leak locations, (1) as
a normal shutdown and startup activity of the plant to detect leaks, and (2) once a leak is
identified, evaluation and disposition of the leak. The WCAP notes that, for leaks observed
during plant operation, engineering evaluations should be performed and appropriate
corrective actions implemented as per plant-specific procedures. Evaluation of the effects of
a leak (steam cutting, erosion, etc.) should be performed per the plant-specific program. The
WCAP is a broad, generic guideline document intended to assist utilities develop plant-
specific programs.
9-3
x Question (G. Turluer): Do the guidelines provide a clear description of the strong leak rate
dependence of possible damage?
Response (G. Rao): The guidelines described in this talk do not provide any plant-specific
examples. The guidelines require that records be kept, that actions be taken to prevent leaks
from developing, and actions be taken to address leaks that occur. The guidelines are not
meant to address all situations, but rather to provide basic tools for addressing leakage.
Response (T. S. Sharma): The guidelines discussed in this talk are different from the
nondestructive examination (visual inspection) program. In this regard, the guidelines
require that there be a visual inspection program and provide considerable guidance for the
inspections, but do not cover the visual inspection program in detail since such detailed
guidance is provided in other referenced documents.
MRP Boric Acid Corrosion Testing Program Task 1 Static/RI and Task 3
Separate Effects/DEI, presented by A. McIlree, EPRI (Paper 4A.3)
This presentation was given by A. McIlree and written by A. McIlree and A. Ahluwalia of EPRI,
J. Lumsden of Rockwell Science Center, and C. Marks and G. White of Dominion Engineering,
Inc. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x The overall objective of the boric acid corrosion test program is to support the determination
of visual inspection intervals to ensure that boric acid corrosion does not result in wastage
that causes stresses to exceed ASME Code allowable values. The specific objective of the
work discussed in this presentation is to provide experimental data that improves the
understanding of the progression of boric acid wastage at RPV head penetrations and
identifies the influence of plant-specific parameters on wastage, thereby supporting
development of required inspection intervals for PWR plants with various penetration
designs.
x The boric acid corrosion test program has four tasks. Task 1 involves corrosion tests in
stagnant and low flowing (<0.005 gpm) primary water, simulating the early stages of CRDM
penetration degradation. Task 2 involves corrosion tests in flowing primary water, with
measurement of real time corrosion rate and ECP under laminar and impact flow. Task 3
involves testing focused on a matrix of laboratory immersion corrosion, autoclave chemistry,
and electrochemical polarization curve tests for concentrated boric acid and wetted molten
boric acid environments. Task 4 involves full-scale mockup tests for CRDM nozzles and
tests of synergies from Tasks 1, 2, and 3.
x Overall conclusions based on work performed for Tasks 1 and 3 to date include:
Corrosion rates in stagnant primary water are less than 0.001 inches/yr.
Corrosion rates under extreme concentrated conditions are as high as 6 inches/yr.
Galvanic coupling (or crevices) did not significantly increase corrosion rates.
Corrosion rates are greatest at intermediate temperatures and boric acid concentrations
(50%, versus 1% or 90%)
The presence of lithium significantly reduces corrosion rates.
9-4
For high boric acid concentrations, no large reductions in corrosion rate occur due to
deaeration (for the laboratory conditions tested).
Corrosion rates under deoxygenated conditions were about half to two-thirds of the rates
under the corresponding oxygenated conditions.
x Question (G. Turluer): Having faced this potential issue in France in the 1990s, we
discontinued chemical investigations with CEA that were intended to determine the
properties of the leaking coolant at low flow rates. This was because we came to realize the
complexity of the problem. Based on this experience, I have the following question: Is there
any understanding of the high corrosivity of concentrated deaerated boric acid solutions? I
suggest that the higher acidity properties of the polyboric acids produced by water removal
be considered.
Response (A. McIlree): These conditions will hopefully be addressed in Task 3 single
effects tests.
x Question (P. Scott): It would help me to judge the practical significance of the results if the
saturated vapor pressure was also quoted at the higher test temperatures. Do you think it
credible that oxygen could play a role under large deposits of boric acid?
Response (A. McIlree): The immersion tests reported here were performed in a closed vessel
that did not include any instrumentation. Autoclave testing in progress will produce vapor
pressure data. It is possible for deposits to play a protective role by reducing oxygen levels.
However, our testing shows that if pH is sufficiently acidic, then high wastage rates can exist
in the absence of oxygen. I think we need to wait for all the data to come in, including the
mock-up testing, before we make any final judgments on this question.
x Question (J. Bennetch):
1. Will NRC data be integrated into the final report for this test program?
2. Does the projected corrosion rate under deaerated conditions match field experience
with the half nozzle repairs that leave exposed carbon steel to the reactor coolant?
Response (A. McIlree):
1. Probably not. However, as indicated on an introductory slide with the flow chart,
there will be an attempt to model the process in preparation for the Task 4 mockup
tests.
2. I am not aware that corrosion rates have been as yet derived from field experience for
half nozzle repairs. That is one reason why we are doing the tests.
Response (J. Gorman note added subsequent to meeting): Corrosion rates for bare carbon
steel exposed to full temperature deaerated reactor coolant are covered in Appendix B-1 and
Figure 4-3 of the Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook, Revision 1, EPRI report 1000975. The
corrosion rates are quite low, and are not expected to result in problems during plant life
times. The rates are low because the reactor coolant is not concentrated, is fully deaerated,
and has a mildly alkaline pH during power operation.
9-5
Inspection Automation Software, presented by R. Pedersen, Real-Time
Software (Paper 4A.4)
This presentation was given and written by R. Pedersen of Real-Time Software. The main points
x The objectives of the equipment and software discussed in this presentation are to improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of boric acid corrosion inspections.
x Inspection results are entered electronically on any of several commercially available hand
held devices as they are performed. The devices transmit the results to a central computer as
they are entered.
x The software used has been configured to make entry of data easy, accurate, and complete.
Once the data are entered into the handheld device, the software automatically enters the data
into the plant system for access and use. The software is compatible with a variety of
normally used databases for electronic data.
x The program has been implemented at the Cook plant. A utility representative (T. S. Sharma
of AEP) indicated that it has been very successful at improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of boric acid inspections.
There were no questions following this presentation.
FLS: Leak Detection System, presented by D. Schemmel, Framatome ANP
(Paper 4A.5)
This presentation was given and written by D. Schemmel and W. Knoblach of Framatome ANP.
The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x This presentation described the purposes, design and service experience of the FLS Leak
Detection System. The objective of the FLS Leak Detection System is to detect low rates
of primary coolant leakage in areas such as the reactor vessel top and bottom head so as to
provide protection against undetected leakage that could result in excessive boric acid
corrosion.
x The FLS Leak Detection System uses tubes that sample the air in the locality and measure
its humidity. The system can be installed in locations thought to be susceptible to primary
coolant leakage, and was described as being able to detect low leakage rates, to provide
trending analysis capabilities, and to reliably discriminate against false alarms.
x The system can detect leaks down to about 0.005 gpm (0.02 liters/min). The system
compensates for changes in general area humidity, thus avoiding false alarms.
x There are 12 FLS Leak Detection System installations world wide, including one in the
USA (Davis-Besse lower reactor vessel head). The system has performed reliably and has
detected about eight in-service leaks.
9-6
x Question (G. Alkire): Is there a sensing saturation point where FLS cannot distinguish
between high background humidity and new leakage?
Response (D. Schemmel and W. Knoblach): The dew point in the RPV head area is
normally less than 20C, and is far below the humidity that develops if a leak occurs under
the insulation. When a leak occurs under the insulation, the relative humidity increases to
close to 100%. However, the relative humidity in the sensing tube never reaches 100%.
x Question (A. Ahluwalia): What are the installation times, maintenance requirements, and
recalibration needs for a FLS system on a RPV head?
Response: (D. Schemmel and W. Knoblach):
Installation times: RPV head: ~2 days
Balance of system: ~1 week
Testing: ~1 week
Maintenance: Calibration ~ 1/year of 1 humidity sensor
Other components minimal (valves ~ 5 years)
Computer equipmenttypical
Corrosion of Reactor Pressure Vessel Steel by an Impinging Jet of PWR
Coolant, presented by J. Pongpuak, UNB (Paper 4A.6)
This presentation was given by J. Pongpuak and written by J. Pongpuak, D. Lister, and W. Cook
of the University of New Brunswick. The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
x The test program described in this presentation investigates the effect of an impinging jet of
simulated PWR primary water on the corrosion of RPV steel with the intent of determining
the controlling parameters, such as water chemistry, flow rate, and velocity.
x Fixed parameters used for the tests include a coolant temperature of 325qC (617qF), a
pressure of 14.5 MPa (2100 psi), coolant chemistry with 1500 ppb boron and 2.66 ppm
lithium (pH
300qC
=6.9), coolant purged with hydrogen, and a distance between the orifice and
the LAS sample strip of 2 mm (0.08 in.). Varied parameters for the tests include the flow
rate, velocity, orifice size and application of heat flux. Corrosion rates are measured using
surface profilometry and electrical resistance measurements.
x Preliminary conclusions based on the testing performed to date include:
A cooling effect from the flashing jet is important; sample temperature is decreased from
about 275qC (527qF) to 98qC (208qF).
The presence or absence of heat flux is important; local mass loss and penetration rate are
increased when heat flux is present. With no heat flux, the liquid film survives and
increases general corrosion over the whole strip.
Flow rate is important; the local loss rate of metal is increased as the flow rate increases.
9-7
Jet velocity is important; the maximum penetration rate is increased as the jet velocity
increases.
Changes in ECP are not reflected by changes in corrosion rate.
At low flow rate (but high jet velocity), there is apparently no continuous liquid stream in
the jet.
x Question (J. Gorman): What back pressure is maintained in the tank with the sample?
Response (J. Pongpuak): The tank is at atmospheric pressure.
x Comment (J. Hyres): In the Davis-Besse case, the low alloy steel was up to 5 to 6 inches
(127 to 152 mm) away from the jet. This is quite different than the 2 mm (0.08 in.) jet to test
strip distance used in these tests, and could influence the corrosion rates.
x Comment (A. Ahluwalia): We consider that the corrosion of the steel takes place in three
stages: (1) stagnant, (2) jet impingement, and (3) concentrated boric acid solution/molten
boric acid salt. The hypothesis is that FAC is not important to the final stage of the
corrosion. The tests described in this presentation are focused on the earlier stages of the
corrosion process.
x Question (G. Turluer): Did you vary the hydrogen concentration, and could variations in the
hydrogen concentration affect the results?
Response (J. Pongpuak): Hydrogen was not varied. We think that variations in hydrogen
might affect the corrosion rates, but have no data regarding this question.
Comment (J. Hickling): Hydrogen was not a variable in these tests. The purpose of the
hydrogen was to remove oxygen from the simulated primary coolant.
x Question (B. Grambau): Did you quantify the amount of heat flux in your samples? How
does your experimental heat flux compare with the actual heat flux that would be present in a
thick-walled pressure vessel?
Response (J. Pongpuak): For the preliminary results, the heat flux was not quantified. We
are currently modifying the heating block to allow temperature gradients to be measured and
therefore to provide some measure of heat flux.
x Question (unidentified attendee): What were the reasons for selecting a flow rate of 200
ml/min (0.05 gpm) for the tests?
Response (J. Pongpuak): The 200 ml/min (0.05 gpm) value was selected based on the
assumed value for a small leak.
9-8
Boric Acid Corrosion of the Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
Framatome ANP, Inc.
P.O. Box 10935
James W. Hyres
BWXT Services, Inc.
2016 Mt. Athos Road
Abstract
In February 2002, significant corrosion was discovered on the Davis-Besse low alloy steel reactor pressure vessel
(RPV) closure head. Subsequent investigations determined that this had resulted from primary water leakage
allowing boric acid corrosion to occur. A 17.5-inch (44-cm) diameter section of the RPV head was removed for
laboratory non-destructive and destructive examinations. Detailed visual inspections were performed to
characterize salient features. A non-shrink-molding compound was used to create impressions of the corroded
cavity of the head and the underside of the stainless steel cladding beneath the cavity (reactor coolant side). The
resulting molds were used to obtain accurate area measurement of the exposed cladding and preserve the
dimensional and surface characteristics of the corroded area. Samples from selected areas of low alloy steel and
stainless steel cladding were removed for light optical metallography (LOM) and for Scanning Electron
Microscopy (SEM) to characterize the corrosion surface due to boric acid attack. This presentation includes the
results and conclusions of these low alloy steel examinations.
Introduction
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in Oak Harbor, Ohio is a Babcock & Wilcox (B&W)
designed 177-FA (fuel assembly) pressurized water reactor (PWR), which went into
commercial operation in 1977. Davis-Besse initiated its 13th refueling outage (13RFO) in
February 2002 after an accumulated 15.78 effective full power years (EFPYs) of operation.
After removal of insulation from the RPV head, boric acid crystal deposits and iron oxide were
found to have flowed out from several of the openings in the lower service structure support
skirt. Subsequent non-destructive examinations (NDE) identified axial cracks in five control
rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles adjacent to the J-groove weld. In three CRDM nozzles
(Nos. 1, 2, and 3) located near the center of the RPV head, the through-wall axial cracks
extended above the J-groove weld. The CRDM nozzles were fabricated from Alloy 600 and
attached to the low alloy steel RPV head by an Alloy 182 J-groove weld. Both of these nickel-
base materials are known to be susceptible to primary water stress corrosion cracking
(PWSCC). Similar axial cracks in CRDM nozzles have also been observed in other B&W 177-
FA PWRs
1
.
Initially, it was decided that the five CRDM nozzles would be repaired by boring out the
original J-groove weld and the lower part of the nozzle containing the cracks, and re-welding
the remaining nozzle back to the RPV head. After boring out the lower part of nozzle #3, a
large corrosion cavity was found on the down-hill side of the RPV head. Subsequently, a 17.5-
inch (44-cm) diameter disc containing the remaining portion of the nozzle #3 J-groove weld,
9-9
part of the nozzle #11 J-groove weld, and the entire cavity was sectioned from the RPV head
using a water jet cutting technique. This 17.5-inch (44-cm) diameter disc along with the
remnants of nozzles #2 and #3 were shipped to the laboratory for further examinations.
The RPV head was manufactured from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section II
specification SA-533 Grade B (mod.) Class 1 material that was clad with Type 308 stainless
steel. The minimum specified thickness of the RPV head material was 6.625-inch (168.3-mm)
and the minimum cladding thickness was 0.125-inch (3.2-mm). This presentation summarizes
the portion of the laboratory results
2
related specifically to the corrosion wastage examinations
of the RPV head material.
Laboratory Examination Results
To capture a permanent replica of the cavity, two dental molds were made (the second served
as a back-up). A dental mold of the underside of the stainless steel cladding beneath the cavity
(RCS side) was also made.
Corrosion wastage was noted on the top surface of the as-received RPV head section in the
areas adjacent to the cavity. An exposed stainless steel cladding surface area of approximately
16.5 in
2
(106 cm
2
) was created. It appeared that the only remaining original RPV head surface
present on this removed 17.5-inch (44-cm) diameter disc was located on the uphill side of the
nozzle #3 penetration at the 180
o
orientation. A "best guess" calculation of total RPV metal
lost was ~260 in
3
(~4261 cm
3
). This includes both the cavity and the areas adjacent to the
cavity on the top of the head. Also evident was the striated appearance of the cavity side wall.
These striations were most prominent near the mid-thickness of the RPV head. It appears that
the striations are initially parallel to the boric acid solution level in the cavity, then gradually
shift parallel to the RPV head (i.e., parallel to the stainless steel cladding). The striations
diminished as the exposed surface of the stainless steel cladding was approached. The striations
also become less well defined as the distance from the nozzle #3 penetration increases. In these
areas, the side wall exhibits an irregular texture consisting of rather large rounded depressions.
The lack of directionality in these depressions suggested that they were formed due to general
boric acid corrosion, in the absence of well-defined flow. However, since the only remaining
as-found cavity walls were some distance away from the axial crack (located at ~10
o
), it is also
possible that erosion may have played a part in the initial cavity formation.
The low alloy steel microstructure consisted of three distinct regions present in the heat-
affected zone (HAZ). The microstructure was acicular near the stainless steel cladding
interface and transitioned to a fine-grained structure approximately 0.1-inch (2-mm) from the
interface. A coarse-grained structure was observed approximately 0.3-inch (8-mm) from the
interface. Some microstructural banding (indicated by alternating lighter and darker streaks)
was also observed in the coarse-grained structure approximately 0.5-inch (13-mm) from the
interface.
The striations on the cavity side wall (low alloy steel) appear to be influenced by the boric acid
solution level in the cavity initially and the RPV head microstructure afterward. The banded
9-10
microstructure of the low alloy steel plate showed good correlation with the preferential
corrosion that produced the striated texture.
Several regions around the perimeter of the exposed cladding contained undercutting between
the cladding and RPV head low alloy steel. The presence of these undercut regions indicated
that a localized galvanic interaction between the cladding and low alloy steel accelerated the
corrosion somewhat. There was no evidence of cracking or disbond associated with these
regions.
Conclusions
The following conclusions were made:
x Boric acid corrosion wastage occurred on the RPV head surface and exposed a cladding
surface area of approximately 16.5 in
2
(106 cm
2
). A "best guess" calculation of total
RPV metal lost was ~260 in
3
(~4,261 cm
3
).
x The low alloy steel microstructure consisted of three distinct regions present in the heat-
affected zone (HAZ). The microstructure was acicular near the stainless steel cladding
interface, transitioning first to a fine-grained structure, followed by a coarser-grained
structure as the distance from the interface increased. Some microstructural banding
was also observed in the coarse-grained structure.
x The striations on the cavity side wall appear to be influenced by boric acid solution
level initially and the RPV head microstructure afterward. The banded microstructure
of the low alloy steel plate showed good correlation with the preferential corrosion that
produced the striated texture.
x As the distance from the nozzle #3 penetration increases, the side wall exhibits an
irregular texture consisting of rather large rounded depressions. The lack of
directionality in these depressions suggested that they were formed due to general boric
acid corrosion, in the absence of well-defined flow.
x The undercut regions observed around the perimeter of the exposed cladding were due
to localized galvanic corrosion between the low alloy steel and the stainless steel.
There was no evidence of cracking or disbond associated with any of these areas.
x There was no evidence of erosion present on the as-found cavity walls; however,
erosion may have played a part in the initial cavity formation.
References
1. M.R. Robinson, D.E. Whitaker, M.L. Arey, and S. Fyfitch, Recent CRDM Nozzle
PWSCC Experience at Oconee Nuclear Station, Fontevraud 5, Proceedings of
Contribution of Materials Investigation to the Resolution of Problems Encountered in
Pressurized Water Reactors, September 23-27, 2002, SFEN, Paris, France (2002).
2. J.W. Hyres, "Final Report: Examination of the Reactor Vessel Degradation at Davis-
Besse," BWXT Services, Inc. Report No. 1140-025-02-24, June 2003.
9-11
Boric Acid Corrosion
of the Davis-Besse
Presented By:
Stephen Fyfitch
Advisory Engineer, Materials Group
Framatome ANP, Inc.
March 7-10, 2005
9-12
Boric Acid Corrosion
of the Davis-Besse
Hongqing Xu and Stephen Fyfitch
Framatome ANP, Inc.
James W. Hyres
BWXT Services, Inc.
9-13
Davis-Besse Failure Analysis Workscope
> Hot cell examinations of CRDM nozzles #2 and #3
and cavity associated with degraded RV head
> Examinations included
Visual inspections
Dye-penetrant testing
Scanning electron microscopy
Energy dispersive spectroscopy
Metallography
Microhardness measurements
9-14
Schematic Diagrams of Davis-Besse Head
and J-groove Weld Configuration
Close-up of the J-groove weld
Nozzle 3 is near
the center of
RPV head
CRDM leadscreaw
assembly
Alloy 600 nozzle
Low alloy steel,
SA-533, Gr. B
(mod), Cl. 1,
plate
Type 308
stainless
steel cladding
Alloy 182 buttering
and J-groove weld
180
o
0
o
Nozzle
removal
height
9-15
Boric Acid Deposit Locations
(10RFO to 13RFO)
Nozzl e #3
9-16
RPV Head Degradation
Nozzle #3
9-17
> 2005 EPRI PWSCC Conference and Exhibit Show FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
As-Received Head Section
Di amet er : ~17.5" (~44.5 c m)
Thi c k ness: ~7" (~18 c m)
0
180
90 270
Nozzl e #3
Penet r at i on
Nozzl e #11
Penet r at i on
B
C
D
A
Dow n-hi l l
Up-hi l l
9-18
Cavity (Toward 90
o
)
270
q
0q
90q
180
q
Cavi t y w al l
st r i at i ons
9-19
Cavity (Toward 270
o
)
270
q
180
q
90q
0q
Cavi t y w al l
st r i at i ons
I r r egul ar t ex t ur e
and r ounded
depr essi ons
9-20
Cavity (Toward 180
o
)
270
q
180
q
90q
0q
Lac k of c or r osi on
Nozzl e #3 J -
gr oove w el d
9-21
Cavity (Toward Nose, ~10
o
)
270
q
180
q
90q
0q
Nose
Cl ad sur f ac e
9-22
Curing of Cavity Dental Mold
9-23
Cavity Dental Mold
0 90
9-24
Cavity Dental Mold
180 270
Est i mat ed c avi t y vol ume ~165 i n
3
(~2704 c m
3
)
Est i mat ed t ot al met al l oss ~260 i n
3
(~4261 c m
3
)
9-25
> 2005 EPRI PWSCC Conference and Exhibit Show FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Top View of Cavity (Piece A2)
180
90
270
0
Max i mum
upw ar d
def l ec t i on
l oc at i on
(r ed dot )
Ex posed RV head c l addi ng sur f ac e
measur ed appr ox i mat el y 16.5 i n
2
(~106 c m
2
)
9-26
Low Magnification Photograph
of Cavity Sidewall
90
9-27
Macrophotograph of Low Alloy Steel and
Stainless Steel Cladding
Acicular
Fine-Grained
Coarse-
Grained
0.1 i nch
Stainless Clad Low Alloy Steel
9-28
Typical Low Alloy Steel
Microstructure Near Bond
~100X
2% Ni t al
~375X
2% Ni t al
9-29
Microstructure 1/4" from Bond
~100X
2% Ni t al
~375X
2% Ni t al
9-30
Microstructure ~1/2" from Bond
~100X
2% Ni t al
~375X
2% Ni t al
9-31
Micrograph Showing Horizontal Striations
Observed on Cavity Wall
LOM
~18X
Et c hed
9-32
Cavity Wall Striations
LOM
~18X
Et c hed
9-33
Cavity Wall Surface Near 90
o
SEM
SE Mac r ogr aph
~18X
SEM
SE Mac r ogr aph
~15X
9-34
Undercut Regions
Near
30q
Near
315q
Under c ut r egi ons
obser ved at per i met er of
ex posed c l addi ng due t o
l oc al i zed gal vani c
c or r osi on bet w een LAS
and st ai nl ess st eel
9-35
Undercut Region
LOM
(~48X, Et c hed)
No evi denc e of
c r ac k i ng or di sbond
assoc i at ed w i t h
t hese ar eas
9-36
> Boric acid corrosion wastage of RPV head surface
exposed cladding surface area ~16.5 in
2
(~106
cm
2
)
> Best guess calculation of total RPV metal lost
~260 in
3
(~4261 cm
3
)
> Low alloy steel microstructure consisted of three
distinct regions present in HAZ
Acicular structure near clad interface
Fine-grained structure further away
Coarse-grained structure beyond
9-37
> Striations on cavity side wall appear to be
influenced by boric acid solution level initially and
RPV head microstructure afterward
Banded microstructure of low alloy steel plate showed
good correlation with preferential corrosion that
produced striated texture
No evidence of erosion present on as-found cavity
walls
However, erosion may have played a part in initial
cavity formation
9-38
> Undercut regions observed around perimeter of
exposed cladding due to localized galvanic
corrosion between low alloy steel and stainless
steel
No evidence of cracking or disbond associated with
any of these areas
9-39
Santa Anna Pueblo, New Mexico.
Generic Guidance for an Effective Boric Acid Inspection for PWRs
By: T. Satyan Sharma, American Electric Power and
G. V. Rao, Westinghouse Electric Company
Abstract
Since the late 1970s, numerous boric acid leaks have been reported in the primary system and
other borated systems in Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) which have resulted in the corrosion
and wastage of primary pressure boundary components and/or degradation of other safety related
components. In March 1988, the NRC issued Generic Letter GL88-05 which stated that boric acid
leakage affecting the primary pressure boundary integrity should be procedurally controlled to
ensure continued compliance with the licensing basis.
In 2002, the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) initiated an effort to develop a generic
guidance document to serve as a basis for the development of station-specific inspection
procedures by the licensees. With the participation from other owners groups, EPRI, INPO and
NEI, a generic guidance document (WCAP-15988-NP) was developed and issued in March 2003.
The document considered key attributes of a good boric acid inspection program and included
identification of locations, inspection procedures and methods, program ownership and
responsibility, personnel qualification and training and continued improvement and self-
assessment methods.
Since the issuance of WCAP-15988, additional developments in the understanding of Davis-
Besse issue, service experience and inspections in several operating plants, INPO audit findings
as well as the recent NRC Order, established the need to revise the document to respond the
current industry needs and include the lessons learned. This effort resulted in reissuing the
WCAP-15988, Revision 1 in March 2005.
Specifically, revision 1 of the WCAP addressed the following issues:
Assess the impact of the NRC order and recent lessons learned,
Review INPO findings from recent audits and provide resolution
Provide additional information from the NRC September 2003 Boric Acid Workshop
Update the WCAP-15988 rankings for systems and components
Provide needed clarifications and revisions in response to NRC communications
Provide more detail for chemistry testing of the residues found
Standard for the Boric Acid Leakage Inspector Training
Training for the General Nuclear plant personnel
Component Specific Guidance for Inspection of Pumps and Valves
Formalise the implementation recommendations at PWRs
9-41
Revision 1 of WCAP-15988 is being issued to PWR Utilities for implementation under
the requirements of the NEI 03-08 and the NEI Materials Guidelines Implementation
Protocol. Under NEI 03-08, following two action items are mandatory for all PWRs
under the definitions provided in the Materials Guidelines Implementation Protocol
1. Each PWR utility shall have a Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program (BACCP).
2. The BACCP shall encompass all the key elements described in Section 4 of this
WCAP document. The titles, organization, and number of key elements used in
each plant-specific program may vary, so long as the objectives of the 11 key
elements are maintained.
As part of the issuance of the WCAP to all Utility Executives, it is recommended that the
plant specific BACC programs be reviewed and updated as required within 18 months of
the issue date of the WCAP, Revision 1.
9-42
6662.ppt
Slide 1
T. Satyan Sharma
American Electric Power
Gutti Rao
WCAP-15988, Revision 1
Generic Guidance for an Effective Boric Acid
Corrosion Control Program for Pressurized Water
Reactors
March 7-10, 2005
9-43
6662.ppt
Slide 2
PURPOSE
To Provide Guidance for Developing
Plant Specific Boric Acid Corrosion
Control Programs (BACCP) For
PWRs
9-44
6662.ppt
Slide 3
Participation and Scope
z The document is developed by WOG for the MRP by a
Task Team made up with Several Utility
Representatives, EPRI, INPO & NEI
z Covers PWRs with Westinghouse (CE) and B&W
design
9-45
6662.ppt
Slide 4
Status
z WCAP-15988 Rev. 0 was issued in March 2003 as a
WOG Recommended Document
z INPO used the document to evaluate the Utility specific
programs during 2003-04
z NEI, NRC and INPO commented that the WCAP is a
good document but lacks the directive for
Implementation of the recommendations
z NRC also noted that the WCAP needs to have
Executive Muscle behind it to direct the Utilities to
Implement the requirements
9-46
6662.ppt
Slide 5
Status (contd)
z WOG Charter was revised in March 2004 to
accommodate issuance of binding recommendations to
WOG Member Utilities
z NEI issued the Material Implementation Protocol, NEI-
03-08 in 2004 with provisions for issuance of
Mandatory requirements
9-47
6662.ppt
Slide 6
Status (contd)
z WOG Authorized Revision to WCAP-15988 to include:
Binding language in the requirements
Lessons Learned from the INPO Review Visits in 2003-04
Review INPO findings from recent audits and provide resolution
Implement INPO Excellence Program Recommendations on
BACCP (draft)
Additional information from the NRC September 2003 Boric Acid
workshop
Assess the impact of the NRC order and recent lessons learned
Update the WCAP-15988 rankings for systems and components
Be consistent with MRP Guidance on chemical analyses of the boric
acid residue.
9-48
6662.ppt
Slide 7
Status (contd)
z Currently Revision 1 of the WCAP is has been
approved for implementation by the WOG Executive
Committee for all
US PWRs
z NRC-NRR has reviewed the draft WCAP-15988, Rev. 1
and has provided comments
z This is the First WOG Document to be issued Under
NEI 03-08 Protocol
9-49
6662.ppt
Slide 8
Status (contd)
Action Items mandatory under the NEI Materials
Guidelines
Implementation Protocol NEI 03-08
1. Each PWR utility shall have a Boric Acid Corrosion
Control Program (BACCP).
2. The BACCP shall encompass all the key elements
described in Section 4 of this WCAP document. The
titles, organization, and number of key elements used
in each plant-specific program may vary, so long as
the objectives of the 11 key elements are maintained.
9-50
6662.ppt
Slide 9
SCOPE
The Eleven Key Elements are:
1. Identification of Inspection Locations
2. Obstructions to Visual Inspections
3. Program and Inspection Procedures
4. Inspection Methods
5. Other Inspections and Parallel Programs
6. Screening, Evaluation, and Disposition
7. Data Collection and Documentation
8. Corrective and Mitigating Actions
9. Program Ownership and Responsibility
10. Personnel Qualification and Training
11. Continuous Improvement and Self-Assessment
9-51
6662.ppt
Slide 10
WCAP 15988 Rev.1 Highlights
z Enhanced Personnel Training
z Documentation Requirements
z Component Specific Screening Requirements for
Pumps/Valves
z BACC Program Health Guidance from Gap Analysis
Against INPO Guidance
z Implementation Schedule
9-52
6662.ppt
Slide 11
Training Requirements
z WCAP-15988 Rev.1 has expanded the Personnel Training
into 4 categories
General site employee awareness training for the
identification of borated water leaks,
Training for personnel performing the inspection for
borated water leaks,
Training for the condition evaluation and corrective
actions, and
Training for Supervisors and Managers.
9-53
6662.ppt
Slide 12
Documentation Requirements
z A log or database of all borated water leak locations
shall be maintained for evaluation, monitoring, and
trending purposes.
z The disposition activity for an identified leak should not
be completed until sufficient boric acid cleanup to
ensure that the base metal condition is adequately
assessed.
9-54
6662.ppt
Slide 13
WCAP 15988 Rev.1
z Screening, Evaluations and Disposition Guidance for
Pumps/Valves have been included
z The screening criteria noted are applicable to bolted
and gasketed connection leaks in pumps and valves
and are not applicable to through wall leaks.
z Some options for Mitigation is included, such as
Mechanical Stress Improvement, Cladding, use of
PWSCC resistant materials etc.
9-55
6662.ppt
Slide 14
Program Health Rating & Criteria
z Program Infrastructure,
z Program Staffing and Experience
z Implementation effectiveness
z Target values/ranges
9-56
6662.ppt
Slide 15
Recommended Implementation
Schedule
Utilities to Update the Plant specific Programs within
18 month after WCAP-15988, Rev. 1 is issued.
9-57

Extended Abstract
PWSCC of Alloy 600
2005 International Conference and Exhibition
March 7 10, 2005 Santa Ana Pueblo, NM
Status Report on the MRP Boric Acid Corrosion Testing Program
Tasks 1 and 3
A. Ahluwalia,* A. McIlree
EPRI
3412 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94304
*Phone: 650-855-2028, Fax: 650-855-2002, E-mail: kahluwal@epri.com
J. Lumsden
Rockwell International Science Center
1049 Camino Dos Rios, Thousand Oaks, CA 91360
Phone: 805-373-4136, Fax: 805-373-4383, E-mail: jblumsde@rsc.rockwell.com
G. White
Abstract: The EPRI Materials Reliability Program (MRP) has initiated a laboratory test program
to address the potential for significant boric acid corrosion (BAC) of PWR primary pressure
boundary components, including reactor vessel closure heads. The test program is expected to
produce data confirming the adequacy of the periodic inspection program proposed by the U.S.
industry for reactor vessel closure heads, including both bare metal visual inspections for leakage
and nondestructive examinations for indications of stress corrosion cracks in CRDM penetrations
and other types of Alloy 600 closure head penetrations. The inspection regime developed by the
MRP is based on conservative assumptions regarding the potential for rapid BAC of low-alloy
steel components and is consistent with plant experience with leaking J-groove penetrations.
Four series of tasks comprise the current BAC test program. These tasks supplement the
previous BAC laboratory test efforts documented in Revision 1 of the EPRI Boric Acid
Corrosion Guidebook (EPRI report no. 1000975). The first three series of tasks are being
performed in advance of a two-year program of full-scale mockup tests, which is expected to be
completed by the end of 2006. Each of the first three tasks is designed to evaluate a different
significant aspect of the BAC process. In the first Task 1, a highly instrumented crevice
apparatus is being used to investigate stagnant and low flow primary water conditions. In the
second Task 2, to be reported separately, a primary water flow loop is being used to investigate
the effect of jet velocity on the instantaneous BAC rate. The third Task 3, immersion corrosion
rate, chemical concentration, and electrochemical tests including highly concentrated
environments, will provide separate effects information.
9-59

Task 1 tests are being performed in a modified heated crevice device that was originally
developed to perform hideout studies in an Alloy 600 tube to carbon steel tube support crevice.
For BAC testing, the crevice was not heated, and electrochemical potential (ECP) of the crevice
and bulk were monitored with reference electrodes. Electrochemical noise and galvanic current
were measured to determine corrosion rates. Tests were performed in a simulated end-of-cycle
primary water (0.5 ppm Li, 200 ppm B) bulk environment at 200, 250, and 280C. Currently,
measurements made under stagnant conditions indicate that low alloy steel corrosion and low
alloy steel/Alloy 600 galvanic corrosion rates are less than 0.001 inches/yr. ECP of the crevice
was always slightly greater than the bulk, and both decreased with time.
Task 3 immersion corrosion tests were performed in concentrated boric acid solutions and
molten boric acid at a range of temperatures and pressures. Test specimens included bare metal
specimens, creviced specimens, and galvanically coupled specimens. Corrosion rates up to
about 6 inches/yr were observed at intermediate temperatures (200C vs. 100C or 315C) and
boric acid concentration of 50% versus 1% or 90%. Corrosion was significantly slowed by the
presence of lithium. For high boric acid concentrations, no large reduction in corrosion rate due
to deaeration was observed. No significant acceleration due to galvanic coupling or crevices was
seen. The chemical concentration and electrochemical tests of Task 3 were still in progress as of
February 2005, and so will not be reported.
Measured corrosion rates are comparable to literature values. However, BAC Guidebook has
limited data for high boric acid concentrations, and has no data on the effect of lithium.
9-60
MRP Boric Acid Corrosion Testing
Task 1 Static / RI
Task 3 Separate Effects / DEI
MRP Alloy 600 PWSCC Workshop
March 9, 2005
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Al McIlree, Al Ahluwalia
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Jesse Lumsden
Rockwell Science Center (RI)
Chuck Marks, Glenn White
9-61
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 2
Objectives of BAC Testing
The Overall Objective:
Support the determination of visual inspection intervals to
ensure that boric acid corrosion does not result in wastage
that causes stresses to exceed ASME Code allowables.
Specific Objective:
Provide experimental data that improves understanding of
the progression of boric acid wastage at RPV head
penetrations and identifies the influence of plant-specific
parameters on wastage, thereby supporting development
of required inspection intervals for PWR plants with
various penetration designs.
9-62
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 3
BAC TASKS
Task1
Stagnant/Low Flow
Task 2
Flowing/Impingement
Task 3
Separate Effects Tests
Task 4
Full-Scale Mockup
Task 1: Corrosion tests in stagnant and low flowing (<0.005 gpm) primary water,
simulating early stages of CRDM penetration degradation
Stagnant Results to be presented
Task 2: Corrosion tests in flowing primary water, with measurement of real time corrosion
rate and ECP under laminar and impact flow
Separate Presentation this session
Task 3: Testing focused on a matrix of laboratory immersion corrosion, autoclave
chemistry, and electrochemical polarization curve tests for concentrated boric acid and
wetted molten boric acid environments
Immersion test results to be presented
Task 4: Full-scale mockup tests for CRDM nozzles
Planned tests of synergies from Tasks 1, 2, and 3
9-63
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 4
Overall MRP BAC Testing Program
9-64
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 5
Task 1: Stagnant/Low Flow Testing
(RI)
9-65
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 6
Clamping
Ring
Radial
Port Ring
Clamping
Ring
Autoclave Body
PTFE Collar Water Cooled
Ring
Task 1
Approach
Use modified Instrumented Tube/Tube Support Plate Heated Crevice
from EPRI/DOE Hideout-SCC Programs to Simulate RPV/Nozzle
Annulus
Monitor corrosion potential (ECP), noise, and galvanic current in a
simulated primary water environment at 200, 250, and 280C
Between Upper
PTFE Seal
Part of Ring &Tube
9-66
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 7
Task 1
Example of Signals Obtained During System Check
Deaerated (Ar bubbling) system at 230C was switched to air saturated while monitoring ECP, noise, galvanic I
Corrosion Rate is Proportional to the Standard Deviation of the Current Noise
Standard Deviation of the Low Alloy Steel Current Noise
Deaerated Aerated
Crevice 0.67 X 10
-6
A/cm
2
42.1 X 10
-6
A/cm
2
Bulk 1.43 X 10
-6
A/cm
2
1.69 X 10
-6
A/cm
2
-3 10
-5
-2 10
-5
-1 10
-5
0
1 10
-5
2 10
-5
3 10
-5
4 10
-5
400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400 2800
Noise, Plate
0.5 ppm Li
+
, 200 ppm B
+
230
o
C
Aerated
C
u
r
r
e
n
t

D
e
n
s
i
t
y

(
A
/
c
m
2

)
Time (sec)
-3 10
-5
-2 10
-5
-1 10
-5
0
1 10
-5
2 10
-5
3 10
-5
4 10
-5
400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400 2800
C
u
r
r
e
n
t

D
e
n
s
i
t
y

(
A
/
c
m
2

)
Time (sec)
Noise, Plate
0.5 ppm Li
+
, 200 ppm B
+
230
o
C
Deaerated
-700
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
0 2 10
4
4 10
4
6 10
4
8 10
4
0.5 ppm Li
+
, 200 ppm B
+
, 230 C
E
C
P

(
S
H
E
)
Time
Start Air Sparge
ECP of Steel in Bulk Water
ECP of Steel in Crevice
9-67
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 8
Task 1
Potential Measurements at 280C
-600
-550
-500
-450
-400
-350
-300
0 5 10 15 20 25
Time (hours)
Crevice
Bulk
Electrochemical Potential
200 ppm B
+
, 0.5 Li
+
, 280
0
C
Day 47
P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
V
o
l
t
s

v
s

S
H
E
)
-600
-550
-500
-450
-400
-350
-300
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Time (Hours)
Electrochemical Potential
200 ppm B
+
, 0.5 Li
+
, 280
0
C
Day 3
P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l

(
V
o
l
t
s

v
s

S
H
E
)
Crevice
Bulk
Crevice potential is always greater than Bulk
Both Crevice and Bulk potential decrease with time
The difference between crevice and bulk potentials also decreases with time
9-68
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 9
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
280 280 250 250 200 200
C
o
r
r
o
s
i
o
n

R
a
t
e

A
f
t
e
r

O
n
e

W
k

(
m
p
y
)
Temperature (
o
C)
Bulk
Crevice
Bulk
Crevice
Crevice
Bulk
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
280 280 250 250 200 200
C
o
r
r
o
s
i
o
n

R
a
t
e

A
f
t
e
r

4
5

D
a
y
s
,

2
5

D
a
y
s

@

2
0
0
o
C

(
m
p
y
)
Temperature (
o
C)
Bulk
Bulk
Bulk
Crevice
Crevice
Crevice
7 days
45 days
Task 1
Low Alloy Steel Corrosion Rates In Primary Water
Corrosion Rates at all temperatures remain low
Negative rate at 200C caused by a polarity change between electrodes, most
likely hydrogen reduction occurring on low alloy steel
9-69
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 10
Task 1
Low Alloy Steel-Alloy 600 Galvanic Corrosion Rate at 250C
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
G
a
l
v
a
n
i
c

C
o
r
r
o
s
i
o
n

R
a
t
e

(
m
p
y
)
Days
200 ppm B
+
, 0.5 ppm Li
+
, 250
0
C
Galvanic Couple
Alloy 600 Tube to RPV Steel Rod in Bulk Water & In Crevice
Crevice
Bulk
9-70
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 11
Task 3: Separate Effects Testing
(DEI)
9-71
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 12
Task 3: Separate Effects Testing
Task Structure
Immersion Tests (Task 3A)
Autoclave Tests (Task 3B)
Electrochemical Tests (Task 3C)
Electrode Qualification (Task 3D)
9-72
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 13
Immersion Testing
Test setup
Test matrix
Results for oxygenated solutions
Results for deoxygenated solutions
Results for crevice and galvanic coupons
Task 3: Separate Effects Tests
Presentation Topics
9-73
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 14
Task 3A: Immersion Tests
Purpose
Description:
Immersion tests in concentrated boric acid solutions and
molten boric acid at a range of temperatures and
pressures. Test specimens included bare metal
specimens, creviced specimens, and galvanically coupled
specimens
Areas Addressed:
Corrosion rates and location for low alloy steel in a
concentrated boric acid solution or molten boric acid
(H-B-O) environment
Galvanic corrosion behavior in these environments
Crevice corrosion behavior in these environments
Effect of moisture content on the corrosivity of molten
boric acid
9-74
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 15
Immersion Test Setup
Closed Vessel
Glass Coupon Holder
Closed 300 ml Stainless
Steel (T316) Vessel
9-75
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 16
Test Coupons
Free Specimen
Creviced
Specimen
Galvanically
Coupled
Specimen
9-76
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 17
Test Parameters and Measured Results
Boric Acid Concentration
Lithium Concentration
[H
3
BO
3
] & [Li] give pH
T
Oxygen Concentration
Temperature
Average Corrosion Rate
Microscopy (optical &
SEM/EDS)
Weight Loss
Dissolved Iron
Corrosion Product ID
XRD
SEM/EDS
Test Parameters Measured Results
9-77
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 18
Specialized electrodes have been developed for concentrated
boric acid and molten H-B-O environments at elevated
temperature and pressure
Work performed by Pennsylvania State University
(Prof. Digby Macdonald)
Candidate ECP and pH electrodes were prepared and
electrochemical potential measured as function of
temperature
Electrode Development
Electrode Electrolyte
Temperature
Range (C)
Ag/Ag
3
BO
3
H
3
BO
3
25 ~ 330
Ag/Ag
3
BO
3
H
3
BO
3
+KCl 25 ~ 250
Ag/AgCl H
3
BO
3
+KCl 25 ~ 250
W/WO
3
H
3
BO
3
+NaOH 50 ~ 330
9-78
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 19
Immersion Test Results
Initial Test Matrix (Oxygenated Conditions)
Temperature
C
g/kg
water basis
g/kg
water basis
1 100 11.4 2000 ppm B 0 Li/B = 0
2 100 1000 50:50 slurry 0 Li/B = 0
3 100 9000 10% water 0 Li/B = 0
4 100 11.4 2000 ppm B 0.024 Li/B = 0.002
5 100 1000 50:50 slurry 2.13 Li/B = 0.002
6 100 9000 10% water 19.54 Li/B = 0.002
7 100 11.4 2000 ppm B 0.607 Li/B = 0.05
8 100 1000 50:50 slurry 56.22 Li/B = 0.05
9 100 9000 10% water 919.5 Li/B = 0.05
10 200 11.4 2000 ppm B 0 Li/B = 0
11 200 1000 50:50 slurry 0 Li/B = 0
12 200 9000 10% water 0 Li/B = 0
13 200 11.4 2000 ppm B 0.024 Li/B = 0.002
14 200 1000 50:50 slurry 2.13 Li/B = 0.002
15 200 9000 10% water 19.54 Li/B = 0.002
16 200 11.4 2000 ppm B 0.607 Li/B = 0.05
17 200 1000 50:50 slurry 56.22 Li/B = 0.05
18 200 9000 10% water 919.5 Li/B = 0.05
19 315 11.4 2000 ppm B 0 Li/B = 0
20 315 1000 50:50 slurry 0 Li/B = 0
21 315 9000 10% water 0 Li/B = 0
22 315 11.4 2000 ppm B 0.024 Li/B = 0.002
23 315 1000 50:50 slurry 2.13 Li/B = 0.002
24 315 9000 10% water 19.54 Li/B = 0.002
25 315 11.4 2000 ppm B 0.607 Li/B = 0.05
26 315 1000 50:50 slurry 56.22 Li/B = 0.05
27 315 9000 10% water 919.5 Li/B = 0.05
[H
3
BO
3
] [LiOH-H
2
O]
Test
#
100, 200, and 315C
H
3
BO
3
Basis Solutions:
2000 wppm B, 50:50
slurry, 10% Water
Li/B= 0, 0.002, and 0.05
Base Test Length
= 7 days
Some tests showing
relatively low or high
corrosion rates repeated
with a different test length
between 2 and 10 days
9-79
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 20
Oxygenated General (Free) Corrosion100C
0.07
4.18
0.14
0.06
4.29
0.15
0.00 0.00 0.02
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
11.4 1000 9000
Boric Acid Content (g
H3BO3
/kg
H2O
)
C
o
r
r
o
s
i
o
n

R
a
t
e

(
i
n
/
y
e
a
r
)
Li/B = 0
Li/B = 0.002
Li/B = 0.05
100C
Aerated
9-80
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 21
0.04
4.69
5.31
0.02
3.78
4.55
0.00
0.34
0.12
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
11.4 1000 9000
H3BO3
/kg
H2O
)
C
o
r
r
o
s
i
o
n

R
a
t
e

(
i
n
/
y
e
a
r
)
Li/B = 0
Li/B = 0.002
Li/B = 0.05
200C
Aerated
9-81
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 22
0.01
1.50
1.14
0.01
1.65
0.78
0.00
0.14
0.08
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
11.4 1000 9000
H3BO3
/kg
H2O
)
C
o
r
r
o
s
i
o
n

R
a
t
e

(
i
n
/
y
e
a
r
)
Li/B = 0
Li/B = 0.002
Li/B = 0.05
315C
Aerated
9-82
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 23
Conclusions Regarding General Corrosion
Corrosion significantly
slowed by the presence of
lithium
Corrosion highest at
intermediate boric acid
concentration (50%, versus
1% or 90%)
Corrosion highest at
intermediate temperature
Temperature effects likely related to conversion
of boric acid to boric oxide, changes in
volatility and dissociation constant of boric
acid, and change in water vapor pressure
0 0.002 0.05
100C 100C 100C
200C 200C 200C
315C 315C 315C
100C 100C 100C
200C 200C 200C
315C 315C 315C
100C 100C 100C
200C 200C 200C
315C 315C 315C
B
o
r
o
n

(
g

H
3
B
O
3
/
k
g

H
2
O
)
0 to 0.05 in/year
0.05 to 1 in/year
>1 in/year
Li/B
11.4
1000
9000
9-83
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 24
Test Results for Deoxygenated Conditions
Nitrogen Cover Gas
Test # T (C) g
H3BO3
/kg
H2O Li/B
1 100 11.4 0
2 100 1000 0
11 200 1000 0
20 315 1000 0
27 315 9000 0.05
0.07
4.18
4.69
1.50
0.08
0.03
3.40
2.13
0.88
0.00
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 2 11 20 27
Test Condition Number
C
o
r
r
o
s
i
o
n

R
a
t
e

(
i
n
/
y
e
a
r
)
Aerated
DeAerated
0 0.002 0.05
100C 100C 100C
200C 200C 200C
315C 315C 315C
100C 100C 100C
200C 200C 200C
315C 315C 315C
100C 100C 100C
200C 200C 200C
315C 315C 315C
B
o
r
o
n

(
g

H
3
B
O
3
/
k
g

H
2
O
)
Li/B
11.4
1000
9000
9-84
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 25
Deoxygenated Corrosion Conclusions
Corrosion rates under deoxygenated conditions were
about half to two-thirds of the rate under the corresponding
oxygenated conditions
Rates measured are comparable to literature values
BAC Guidebook has limited data on very high boric
acid concentrations
BAC Guidebook has no data on effect of lithium
New data not inconsistent with existing data (which
are only available for lower boric acid
concentrations)
9-85
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 26
Galvanic and Crevice Corrosion Results
0 0.002 0.05
100C 100C 100C
200C 200C 200C
315C 315C 315C
100C 100C 100C
200C 200C 200C
315C 315C 315C
100C 100C 100C
200C 200C 200C
315C 315C 315C
B
o
r
o
n

(
g

H
3
B
O
3
/
k
g

H
2
O
)
Li/B
11.4
1000
9000
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
4
4
.
6
9
0
.
3
4
1
.
5
0
0
.
1
2
0
.
0
6
6
.
5
3
0
.
3
9
1
.
0
8
0
.
1
0
0
.
0
5
6
.
6
6
0
.
3
0
1
.
1
8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 10 11 17 20
Test Condition Number
C
o
r
r
o
s
i
o
n

R
a
t
e

(
i
n
/
y
e
a
r
)
Free
Galvanic
Creviced
Test # T (C) g
H3BO3
/kg
H2O Li/B
1 100 11.4 0
10 200 11.4 0
11 200 1000 0
17 200 1000 0.05
20 315 1000 0
Oxygen Cover Gas
9-86
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 27
Galvanic and Crevice Corrosion Conclusions
No significant changes in corrosion rates for creviced or
galvanically coupled coupons compared to freely exposed
coupons
Apparent increase in corrosion rate for Condition #11
not believed to be significant because of differences in
final coupon shape given that the reported corrosion
rate is based on initial surface area
No visual evidence of crevice corrosion
9-87
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 28
Applicability of Results
Key factors indicate that the hydrated molten boric acid
environments that produced high laboratory corrosion rates may
not be applicable to operating plants:
Li from primary water acts to buffer the pH and reduce corr. rates
It may be very difficult under plant conditions to keep molten
boric acid hydrated
Over time, viscous boron species and/or corrosion products may
act as a physical barrier protective of the steel surface
For the annulus environment on the nozzle OD, the high ratio of
low alloy steel surface area to solution volume may facilitate
buffering of the solution pH after initial dissolution of iron into the
solution, lowering the subsequent corrosion rate
Plant experience with leaking J-groove penetrations indicates little
potential for sustained high corr. rates for relatively small leak rates
The remaining tests planned under the overall MRP BAC testing
program will investigate these factors further
9-88
PWSCC Workshop
Mar. 05, 29
Task 1 and Task 3 Overall Conclusions
Corrosion rates in stagnant primary water are less than 0.001
inches/yr
Corrosion rates under extreme concentrated conditions are as
high as 6 inches/yr
Galvanic coupling (or crevices) did not significantly increase
corrosion rates
Corrosion greatest at intermediate temperatures and boric acid
concentration (50%, versus 1% or 90%)
Presence of lithium significantly reduced corrosion rate
For high boric acid concentrations, no large reduction in
corrosion rate due to deaeration for laboratory conditions
tested
Corrosion rates under deoxygenated conditions were about
half to two-thirds of the rate under the corresponding
oxygenated conditions
9-89
Ryan Pedersen
Real-Time Software
P.O. Box 712543
Salt Lake City, UT 84171

[Author Information]
Ryan Pedersen
Real-Time Software
1844 West 8250 South
West Jordan, UT 84088
Abstract
Cutting edge software converts the cumbersome, inefficient manual paper process of
data gathering into a state-of-the-art software package that gathers and analyzes data
for better productivity. Bringing together powerful capabilities of hand held devices,
digital imagery, bar code scanning along with communication technology and industry
standard databases into one solution.
Simplify the data gathering process:
Remote data capturing is becoming more accurate and simpler through electronic
forms. Not only do electronic forms eliminate paper in the data capturing process; but
also, makes data gathering powerful and simple do to through the intuitive customizable
forms. This means that there is only one point of data entry for all information input, not
two or three. This cutting edge process reduces the amount of human errors and
significantly reduces the time it takes to gather remote data.
Enhances Reporting Capabilities:
Due to the nature of electronically gathering data at the source, you can enhance data
capturing through the use of barcode scanning, image capturing and other input
devices. A picture is worth a thousand words, is especially true when gathering data.
This reduces the need for lengthy textual descriptions and also allows for further review
after the inspection is done. Once the data is gathered to the database, this information
is available through database search routines and produce informative reports based on
specific criteria.
Example of how this technology improves the data gathering process:
BORIC ACID INSPECTION AT A NUCLER POWER PLANT:
x System engineer conducts onsite inspection
x Submits data entry on handheld device at the source
x Takes digital pictures of imperial device at the source
x Information taken to office PC to sync with corporate networked computer
system.
x Historical data collected in database
9-91
Paper Preparation Guidelines
x Reports and graphs generated for analysis
x Boric Acid Inspection information is available to the NRC for review
Features:
x Palm and Pocket PC platform compatible
x Capture images and barcodes
x One touch synchronization
x Customizable handheld forms
x ODBC compatible
Benefits
x Integrates with any existing system
x Helps elaborate textual data
x Quickly transfers data to main DB
x Allows easy data entry on handhelds
x Connects to virtually any database
Figures and Tables
Overview of Data gathering (Figure 1)
-2-
9-92
Presented By
Ryan Pedersen
PPT presentation version: 4.1
Real-Time Software
Inspection Automation Software
9-93
Issues at D.C. Cook
Problems with a paper process
1. Forms that were filled out were incomplete
2. Data gathering inconsistent
No Database
1. Ability to track the history very difficult
2. No consistent information
3. Altered data on paper forms
4. Lost of gathered data
9-94
Solution Concept
Gather as much data at the source as possible
Simple interface make it easy to use
Digital pictures a must
User must complete all fields in form -
explanation of question if necessary
Simple to transfer the information to a database
Not hardware dependent able to upgrade as
technology does
Connect to any industry standard database
9-95
Pocket PC
Palm
Handheld Technology
Analysts project wide-scale
handheld adoption to increase
business efficiency
Two leading handheld systems
Pocket PC (CE)
Palm
9-96
Problem Solved
Replace paper forms with electronic forms
Capture more complex data at the source in one
step: digital images, barcode, signature..
Complete solution for remote data capturing
Simple interface & easy to use
Improves productivity
Lowers radiation dose
A database of information
9-97
Focus on data, not issues
Paper Process Step Electronic
10 Min Get paper form 0
10 Min Fill out form 1 Min
10 Min Enter data into Database 1 Min
30 Min Total Time 2 Min
To perform an inspection is fast and easy
Short stay time and single inspection keeps
radiation dose ALARA
Focus on the analysis of the data captured
not data gathering issues
9-98
Reduce lengthy textual description (pictures,drawings)
Database contents more accurate: 1/2/03, 2/1/03
Capture complex data
9-99
Data is entered on handheld the rest of
the work is done by software.
Overview of data capture
9-100
Different types of dialog
Text Numeric Comment
9-101
Multi-choice Dialog
2 Choice
List Box
4 Choice
3 Choice
9-102
Date/Time, Barcode, Picture Dialogs
Date/Time Barcode Digital Picture
*(same form different handheld)
9-103
Drawing / Signature Dialog
9-104
View Database Push Records
9-105
ODBC is an interface that enables applications to access a database
ODBC is on every PC
Some supported databases:
ORACLE
MYSQL
Microsoft SQL Server
Microsoft Access
FileMaker Pro
Database interface - ODBC
9-106
Data Browser
Database become accessible via LAN & internet
Password Protected Access!
9-107
Concepts you may want to incorporate
Handheld Data gathering choices:
GPS
Audio
Portable Printer (Bluetooth / IR)
Wireless connection
Database
Searches
Reports
Import legacy data
View multiple images per record
Field that are not in form (Manager use)
9-108
Program Managers wish list
Push data to a handheld verification/update
Auto-fill questions
Conditional questions on handheld form
Required answers
One form for both Palm and Pocket PC handhelds
One PC program to talk to both Palm and Pocket PC
User can not delete forms on handheld
9-109
End of presentation
Questions?
9-110
FLS: Leak Detection System
Dick Schemmel, Dr. Walter Knoblach and Dave Ciesielski
AREVA
Framatome ANP
Lynchburg, VA 24501
1. Introduction
In response to incidents involving Alloy 600 cracking, plants have been performing bare metal visual
(BMV) and non-destructive examination (NDE) inspections. These inspections can only be performed at
long intervals, are difficult, costly in terms of time, money and dose and, experience shows, are not fool
proof. Additional assurance that significant stress corrosion cracking, and potential boric acid attack does
not occur between outages (inspections) could be obtained by implementing a highly sensitive and
reliable on-line leak detection system directed toward areas where Alloy 600 is found within the plant.
Current technical specification limits provide sufficient margin against gross structural degradation of
most piping systems. However, leak rates well below the current limits could still promote relatively high
corrosion in carbon and low alloy steel components in systems containing boric acid. For components
such as CRDM nozzles, current leak detection requirements do not provide sufficient, if any, margin
against gross structural degradation. Global leakage monitoring and leakage limits alone may not always
be adequate to detect and quantify structural degradation due to coolant leakage. Localized leak detection
can be sensitive enough to detect low enough leak rates to minimize boric acid corrosion.
Detection methods with improved sensitivity and location capability are needed to detect leaks such as
many recently discovered in the industry. Many leak rates reported were very small (<0.01 gpm), detected
visually and were reported as "drips," "weepage," "seepage," "boric acid deposit," etc. About 40% of
leaks are reported to be from cracks with leak rates varying from <0.01 gpm to >100 gpm. FLS, with
sensitivity of 0.005 gpm, has the capability to detect and locate small leaks.
2. Description
FLS is a humidity monitoring system that can be installed inside of the reactor containment and used to
detect small leaks in components by detecting changes in the environments (surrounding area) moisture
content. In the event that a leak occurs and develops, FLS provides early detection of the leak and will
allow monitoring the leak progression even during normal operation of the plant. A particularly
important feature of the FLS system is its high detection sensitivity and its ability to locate the position
of leaks within a few meters.
The key to the FLS system is the Sensor Tube that can be installed in close proximity to pressurized
water/steam containing components that are suspect to leakage. This sensor tube (see Figure 1) has
porous sintered metal elements, typically located at one-foot intervals, and is resistant to both high
temperature and high radiation levels.
Figure 1. Section of a FLS Sensor Tube (flexible type)
9-111
A number of Sensor Tube sections are joined end-to-end to form a sensitive section which is connected
within a closed loop monitoring line initially filled with dry air. An existing differential in the water
vapor concentration causes the moisture outside of the sensor tube to diffuse through the porous elements
and into the dry air inside the sensitive section, thus forming a humidity image (humidity profile) of the
air around the sensor tubes.
The ends of the sensitive section are routed back to the FLS Measurement Station (see Figure 2) using
normal stainless steel (non-sensitive section) tubing. The sensors are allowed to soak for a defined
time (15 min to 1 hr) and then during the measurement cycle the monitoring line is purged and the moist
air (if moisture is present) is pumped through the humidity detector for measurement.
Figure 2: Typical FLS Test Loop and Schematic
Figure 3. Principle of FLS Operation
9-112
The monitoring line includes a r eference ambient conditions
his
-
he repeatability of this process, the comparison of the reference RST and test peak to the sensor area
. Experience
he FLS system is currently in operation at 12 nuclear plants worldwide with 10 years of operating
ed
> 12 FLS systems installed worldwide since
> l operating years accumulated
al wear
Leaks detected by FLS:
oom-sensor-tube (RST) that measures the r
(background) of a location sharing the same air space but not susceptible to leaks. Also, with every
measurement cycle, a calibration module injects a precise amount of moisture into the end of the air
stream, which shows up as a clear peak (test peak) at the end of the humidity measurement trace. T
allows the system to normalize the location (time) axis to the correct scale to allow the correlation of data
time to measurement loop distance (see Figure 3). The comparison of the monitored peaks from the
reference RST and the test peak allow discrimination of potential leaks in the sensitive region being
monitored.
T
indication, allows for internal diagnostics to automatically detect system problems as well as account for
changes in the background resulting from seasonal and operational changes in ambient conditions. The
FLS software includes an automatic mode that permits a dynamic adjustment to the threshold alarm to
compensate for changes in ambient conditions. Analysis of the data can always prevent any false
indication of leaks or spurious alarms.
3
T
experience. The first US installation was at the Davis-Besse plant where the initial installation monitor
the lower head area. Consideration is being given for the expansion of the system to monitor the upper
head area (below the insulation). Figure 4 presents results from a detected leak.
enerator blow down
> on deaeration pipe
ges
in line
> 3 leaks on Steam G
lines
1 leak
> 2 leaks on CRDM tube flan
> 2 leaks on Steam Generator dra
1994
41 tota
> no single failures on sensor tubes
> only few hardware failures by norm
& tear
Figure 4: Example for a leak detected by FLS:
CRDM flange leak on VVER 440 RPV Upper Block
Test peak
2 weeks after leak onset ~10 hrs after leak onset
Humidity at RPV head
leak detected
red line = measurements at indicated times
blue line = after repair
9-113
1 > FLS: Leak Detection System - March 9, 2005 EPRI Alloy 600 International Conference FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
FLS:
Leak Detection System
Dick Schemmel,
Advisory Engineer
Dr. Walter Knoblach,
Application Engineer
EPRI Alloy 600 International Conference
Santa Ana Pueblo, NM; March 9, 2005
9-114
Topics:
> FLS - Integral to the ALLOY 600 Solution:
Review of Benefits from Monitoring for
Leaks
Description of FLS Design and Capabilities
Results from Davis-Besse Installation and
Worldwide Experience
Developed and serviced jointly by AREVAs USA based Electronic
System Technology group and Germany based Diagnostics &
Instrumentation Organization
9-115
Initial Situation Alloy-600 Problem
> Primary Water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) on
INCONEL 600 nozzles\welds of RV Head (control
rods) and RV Lower Head (incore guide tube
nozzles)
4 out of 5 such cracks might be unknown
> Corrosion of the external carbon steel by escaping
boric acid from Primary Coolant
> resulting leakage begins with such low leakage rates
that previously available detection methods (periodic
inspection or global monitoring) cannot either:
Detect that a small leak exists with certainty
Identify either the location of the leak or leak rate
9-116
> Visual inspection (BMV) on RV Upper & Lower
head every outage
> Information only every 1.5 TO 2 years from BMV,
UT and\or Eddy Current
> Costly in $ (BMV ~$250K, UT ~$1-2M, Eddy Current
>$500K) and Dose
Many hardly visible locations
Damaged spots often hidden by deposits
Industry Response to PWSCC in the USA
> During plant operation Davis-Besse KNOWS
they DO NOT have a leak under the RV
9-117
> If you can measure it, you know what the status is!
Existing leak detection requirements do not provide sufficient,
if any, margin against gross structural degradation
Monitoring can identify there is a leak and its location, or verify
you do not have a leak, however:
> 40% of leaks discovered are associated with
cracks including rates <0.01 gpm
> Detection methods with improved sensitivity and
location capability are needed to detect leaks
Plant Status 101: NRC\EPRI Conclusions
> FLS can be installed in locations thought
susceptible and:
Detect low leakage rates and provide trending analysis
Reliably discriminate against false alarms
9-118
Sensitive
Section
Measurement
Station
Non-Sensitive
Section
9-119
Solution with FLS
Basic Principle
9-120
FLS Project Davis Besse
System Layout
RV Insulation
RV
Reactor cavity
Room humidity
reference (RST)
Sensor
tube
Sensor
tube
Measuring Station
Processing Station
Data link
tube
Optional upgrade
Monitoring
Lines
Valves
Humidity sensor
Flow sensor
etc.
Computer
Process control
Analysis
Alarm outputs
Network access
9-121
Would FLS have discovered
Davis-Besses Leak?
Unidentified Leak Rate at Davis-Besse (Cycle 13)
Definitely
YES!!
RV head
damage
discovered
FLS leak alarm threshold (0.1 GPM)
FLS detection threshold (0.01 GPM)
9-122
FLS Project Davis-Besse
Leak Calibration Curve
C
o
r
r
e
c
t
e
d

F
L
S

l
e
a
k

s
i
g
n
a
l

a
m
p
l
i
t
u
d
e

[
p
p
m
]
Measured data
linear fitting
Leak rate [GPM]
Measured data
linear fitting
Verified
threshold
0.005 GPM
9-123
FLS on RPV Head / Tubes Layout
(NPP Obrigheim / Germany since 1994)
Air flow
direction
Sensor elements
Sensor tube
(permeable)
Tube fitting
Connecting tube
(impermeable)
9-124
FLS on RPV Head / System Performance
(NPP Obrigheim / Germany since 1994)
Responses to leak simulations
at 3 different positions
(0 / 120 / 240)
Abs. humidity
[C dewpoint]
Time (7hrs / Div)
9-125
Monitoring of Pressurizer & Surge Lines
= FLS sensor tube
9-126
Monitoring of RPV Bottom Head
Oskarshamn 2 / Sweden (BWR)
RST
sectors
I II III IV
test
peak
FLS
humidity
profile
Leak localization
with 4 separated
sensitive sectors
9-127
Example for a leak detected by FLS:
CRDM flange leak on VVER 440 RPV Upper Block
08-01-02
03:00
08-01-02
22:30
08-13-02
15:45
red line = measurements at indicated times
blue line = after repair on 2002-08-23 15:45
test peak
Estimated leak rate: 0.035 gpm
9-128
FLS - Future System Design
di gi t a l di gi t a l
Remote access
through VPN
(Internet)
Measuring
Station MS 1
Monitoring Line(s)
FLS Offline
SW for
analysis, etc.
Computer
with FLS
Online SW
Ethernet, etc.
Firewall
Compressor
Cabinet 1
Analog Unit
Measuring
Station MS 2
Analog Unit
PLC PLC
periodic
messages
(status, alarms)
Backbone LAN (plant)
Containment wall
9-129
Leak simulation tests in Bohunice 3, Slovakia 1992
FLS for closure head of RPV in Obrigheim, Germany 1994
FLS for primary circuit of Ringhals 1 (BWR), Sweden 1997
FLS for feedwater, steam and reheater pipes
of CANDU in Point Lepreau and Gentilly 2, Canada 1998
Activity and humidity (FLS part) leak detection system
of the primary circuit in Mohovce 3 & 4, Slovakia 1999
FLS for primary circuit and individual plant
compartments in Kozloduy 3,4,5 & 6, Bulgaria 2001
FLS for RPV (bottom) of Davis-Besse, USA 2003
FLS for RPV (bottom) of Oskarshamn 2, Sweden 2004
FLS References
9-130
FLS Scoreboard
> 12 FLS systems installed worldwide since 1994
> 41 total operating years accumulated
> no single failures on sensor tubes
> only few hardware failures by normal wear&tear
Leaks detected by FLS:
> 3 leaks on Steam Generator blow down lines
> 1 leak on deaeration pipe
> 2 leaks on CRDM tube flanges
> 2 leaks on Steam Generator drain line
9-131
Conclusions and Prospects for FLS
> Limits and regulations for leak monitoring
expected to be tightened in the future
> Operating experience with FLS in Davis-Besse
and Europe should impact these new regulations
> FLS is a valuable early-warning system that has
sensitive leak detection capability (0.005 gpm)
> Analysis of FLUS data trends leak rate magnitude
over time and alarms at preset user-defined levels
> The system design compensates for changing
conditions maintaining data integrity
9-132
CORROSION OF REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL STEEL
BY AN IMPINGING JET OF SIMULATED PWR COOLANT:
STATUS REPORT ON AN EPRI/MRP EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
J. Pongpuak, D.H. Lister and W. Cook
UNB Nuclear
Department of Chemical Engineering
University of New Brunswick
PO Box 4400
Fredericton, NB
CANADA, E3B 5A3
ABSTRACT
Specific aspects of the possible corrosion of PWR reactor pressure vessel (RPV) steel by coolant
leaks issuing from cracked penetrations in RPV heads are being studied in a laboratory loop at
UNB. In each of the first four experiments of the program, a 2 mm-long jet of borated and
lithiated coolant with a high-temperature pH of ~ 6.9 was directed from a small-diameter orifice
at 325
o
C onto a sample strip of RPV steel mounted on a heating block. The orifice and sample
assembly were mounted in a tank containing air at atmospheric pressure. The sample strip had
two wires connected to each end to allow its electrical resistance to be monitored during a run
and had a thermocouple attached; increases in resistance reflected the thinning due to corrosion.
The potential of the strip was also measured relative to a high-temperature Ag/AgCl reference
electrode installed in the loop just upstream of the orifice.
The four experiments, each of which lasted five days, investigated the effects of coolant volume
flow rate, jet velocity and heat flux on the damage sustained by the sample strip. In the
experiments with heat flux through the strip, the metal temperature was adjusted to 275
o
C at the
outset; the subsequent impingement of the coolant jet cooled the strip to 96-98
o
C. The damage
was estimated after each run by examining the strip with SEM and performing surface
profilometry. Approximately circular craters, centred on the jet impact spot, were formed (see
Figure 1). Crater diameters increased with coolant flow rate, ranging from 6 mm to 10 mm.
Crater depth at the edge, presumable where fluid shear stresses were greatest, increased with jet
velocity but the depth in the centre stayed about the same. Samples of oxide scraped from strips
were analysed with XRD and generally found to be haematite and magnetite, while after the run
with no heat flux through the strip, boric acid was also found. The ECP of the strip was
measurable for all the runs except the one at the lowest flow rate, for which it was suspected that
the electrical continuity through the coolant jet was broken by extensive flashing of the liquid to
steam. The measured ECP generally fell during a run except just after a fresh tank of coolant
was valved in, when a sharp increase occurred. The changes in ECP were not reflected by
changes in corrosion rate as indicated by the on-line resistance measurements.
The average volumetric loss rate of metal was also estimated from the crater profiles for all of
the runs and is currently being evaluated with regard to the test parameters. The two modes of
attack bulk metal loss and penetration seem to be somewhat independent of each other.
9-133
Thus, increasing the volumetric flow rate of coolant widens the crater but has little effect on the
depth, while increasing the velocity (which, in these experiments, occurred as the volumetric
flow decreased at smaller orifice diameters) narrowed and deepened the troughs.
Cooling from the flashing coolant jet reduces the metal temperature to below 100
o
C; heat flux
through the metal increases rates of local metal loss and penetration, but reduces general
corrosion (presumably as liquid cannot survive for long over the surface).
Further work is ongoing and the results will ultimately be compared with both existing data on
boric acid corrosion (BAC) and new findings being generated in parallel programs at other
laboratories.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This work is supported by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI project managers:
A. Ahluwalia and J. Hickling) and the authors also wish to acknowledge the guidance provided
by members of the Alloy 600 ITG (especially C. Harrington and L. Spain), as well as by
colleagues at other laboratories participating in the current MRP BAC program.
Figure 1: Examples of the damage craters formed without (left) and with (right) heat flux
9-134
Corrosion of Reactor Pressure Vessel
Steel by an Impinging Jet of PWR
Coolant: Status Report on an
EPRI/MRP Experimental Study
Janit Janit Pongpuak Pongpuak
Derek H. Lister Derek H. Lister
Willy Cook Willy Cook
UNB Nuclear UNB Nuclear
University Of New Brunswick University Of New Brunswick
CANADA CANADA
9-135
Introduction
Introduction
Cracking of PWR Reactor Pressure

Cracking of PWR Reactor Pressure
Vessel (RPV) head penetrations has led in
Vessel (RPV) head penetrations has led in
one case to severe corrosion of the low
one case to severe corrosion of the low
-
-
alloy steel head material.
alloy steel head material.
9-136
If the coolant, which contains boric acid,

If the coolant, which contains boric acid,
leaks through cracked penetrations, it can
leaks through cracked penetrations, it can
attack the external surface of the head.
attack the external surface of the head.
This program explores the interaction

This program explores the interaction
between jets of coolant and RPV steel.
between jets of coolant and RPV steel.
9-137
Objective
Objective
To investigate the effect of an impinging jet

To investigate the effect of an impinging jet
of simulated PWR primary water on the
of simulated PWR primary water on the
corrosion of RPV steel and to determine the
corrosion of RPV steel and to determine the
controlling parameters:
controlling parameters:
Chemistry;
Chemistry;
Flow rate;
Flow rate;
Velocity; etc.
Velocity; etc.
9-138
Experimental Loop
Experimental Loop
9-139
Test Section and RPV Steel
Test Section and RPV Steel
Sample
Sample
114.30 mm (4 )
88.90 mm (3 )
25.40 mm (1)
4.76mm(3/16)
12.70 mm
(1/2)
6.35 mm(1/4)
0.79 mm (0.031)
25.4 mm
(1)
9.53mm(3/8)
Thermocouple port
1.59mm(1/16) 12.70 mm
(1/2)
9-140
Experimental Conditions
Experimental Conditions

Fixed Parameters
Fixed Parameters
Coolant temperature and pressure
(325qC and 14.5 MPa)
[B] =1500 ppm, [Li] = 2.66 ppm, pH
300qC
= 6.9
Coolant purged with H
2
Distance between orifice and sample strip = 2 mm

Varied Parameters
Varied Parameters
Run No. 1 2
Volumetric flow rate (ml/min)
Jet velocity (m/s)
Orifice size (mm) required to
keep pressure at 14.5 MPa
(2250 psi )
200
95
0.26
200
95
0.26
135
105
0.20
70
115
0.14
Applied heat flux No Yes Yes Yes
3 4
9-141
Corrosion and Corrosion Rate
Analysis
Analysis

Electrical Resistance Measurement
Electrical Resistance Measurement
L
R
A
U
where
R = Resistance ()
= Resistivity (-m)
L = Distance between voltmeter leads in mm
A = Cross sectional area of sample (w x t) (mm
2
)
V
t
w
L
9-142
Example of thickness determination of sample strip from
resistance measurement
1 2 3 4
5
A
p
p
a
r
e
n
t

A
v
e
r
a
g
e

T
h
i
c
k
n
e
s
s

(
m
m
)
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
6 7 8
9-143
Analysis
Analysis

Electrochemical Corrosion Potential (ECP)
Electrochemical Corrosion Potential (ECP)
Ag/ Ag/AgCl AgCl high high- -temperature reference electrode temperature reference electrode


Surface
Surface
Profilometry
Profilometry
9-144
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Days of Experiment
S
a
m
p
l
e

T
e
m
p
e
r
a
t
u
r
e

(
o
C
)
Cooling Effect of Jet Impingement
Cooling Effect of Jet Impingement
Jet valved in
Temperature of sample before and after jet valved in
9-145
Heat Flux Effect (at 200 ml/min)
Heat Flux Effect (at 200 ml/min)
Appearance of sample removed after the
experiment
Run 1 No heat flux Run 2 With heat flux
9-146
Heat Flux Effect
Heat Flux Effect
Appearance of sample removed after the
experiment with no heat flux
Run 1 High general corrosion and undercutting
9-147
Heat Flux Effect
Heat Flux Effect
SEM analysis
Run 1 No heat flux Run 2 With heat flux
Damage crater diameter for both cases ~ 10 mm
holes
9-148
Heat Flux Effect
Heat Flux Effect
Surface profilometry
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Crater Radius (mm)
C
r
a
t
e
r

D
e
p
t
h

(
m
m
)
Original surface
Run 1 No heat flux
Run 2 With heat flux
x
Surface profiles of jet impact craters after 5 days of exposure
at flow rate of 200 ml/min
9-149
Heat Flux Effect
Heat Flux Effect
Corrosion rate
From surface profilometry
From resistance measurement
Corrosion Rate
Corrosion Rate
Metal volume
removed
(mm
3
/ a)
Penetration at
crater edge
(mm/ a)
1 1260 15.9 6.2
2 2860 36.2 6.6
Resistance
Average
thinning of strip
(mm/ a)
Run
Run
9-150
Heat Flux Effect
Heat Flux Effect
ECP
Run 1 No heat flux
Fresh coolant tank valved in
Changes in ECP not reflected by changes in corrosion rate
Air in test tank depleted
Air in test tank depleted
9-151
1 2
3 4 5
A
p
p
a
r
e
n
t

A
v
e
r
a
g
e

T
h
i
c
k
n
e
s
s

(
m
m
)
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
9-152
SEM Analysis
SEM Analysis
Flow Rate Effect
Flow Rate Effect
(with heat flux)
(with heat flux)
70 ml/min 135 ml/min 200 ml/min
10 mm
9-153
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Crater Radius (mm)
C
r
a
t
e
r

D
e
p
t
h

(
m
m
)
Original surface
70 ml/min
135 ml/min
200 ml/min (with heat)
Surface profiles of jet impact craters after 5 days of exposure with
heat flux
Flow Rate Effect
Flow Rate Effect
9-154
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
0 50 100 150 200 250
Flow Rate (ml/min)
A
v
e
r
a
g
e

M
e
t
a
l

L
o
s
s

R
a
t
e

(
m
m
3
/
a
)
Effect of volumetric flow rate on the average metal loss rate
Flow Rate Effect
Flow Rate Effect
Metal loss rate from surface profilometry
9-155
Effect of jet velocity on penetration rate at crater edge
40
50
60
70
80 90 100 110 120
Jet velocity at the orifice (m/s)
A
v
e
r
a
g
e

P
e
n
e
t
r
a
t
i
o
n

R
a
t
e

(
m
m
/
a
)
Flow Rate Effect
Flow Rate Effect
Penetration rate from surface profilometry
9-156
Cooling effect from the flashing jet is important;
sample temperature is decreased from about
275 qC to 98 qC.
Heat flux is important; local mass loss and
penetration rate are increased. With no heat flux,
the liquid film survives and increases general
corrosion over the whole strip.
Flow rate is important; local loss rate of metal is
increased.
9-157
Jet velocity is important; maximum penetration
rate is increased.
Changes in ECP are not reflected by changes in
corrosion rate.
At low flow rate (but high jet velocity), there is
apparently no continuous liquid stream in the jet.
9-158
10
SESSION 4B: INSPECTION TECHNOLOGIES AND
PLANNING
The subject of inspection technologies and planning was addressed by six participants in Session
4B. Summaries of the presentations are given below followed by the questions asked, responses
The Challenges of Compliance with ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII,
"Performance Demonstration for Ultrasonic Examination Systems,"
presented by T. McAlister, SCE&G, for J. Lindberg, Framatome ANP (Paper
4B.1)
A brief overview of this presentation was given by T. McAlister of SCE&G on behalf of J.
Lindberg and M. Hacker of Framatome ANP. The main points made during the presentation
were as follows:
x A brief overview of this presentation material was made at the conference. Detailed
information is available in the extended abstract and presentation slides.
x Work on the various supplements of the Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI) process
is in various stages of completion. The EPRI NDE Center maintains detailed information on
the status of the various PDI programs.
Development of MRP Inspection Plan for RPV Top Head Nozzles Part I
Nozzle Leakage, Ejection and Examination Volume Evaluations, presented
by P. Riccardella, Structural Integrity Associates (Paper 4B.2)
This presentation was given by P. Riccardella of Structural Integrity Associates. The main
x The MRP has developed a comprehensive inspection program for reactor vessel closure
heads in U.S. PWRs to address PWSCC of Alloy 600 head penetrations, which has led to
cracking and leakage in a number of plants. The inspection program is based on a safety
10-1
assessment [16,17] that addressed all safety-related concerns that could develop as a
consequence of PWSCC in the closure heads.
x The main safety concerns are the potential for nozzle ejection as a result of circumferential
cracking of the nozzles above the attachment welds to the vessel, and severe wastage of the
closure head that could develop as a result of significant leakage occurring over an extended
period without corrective action. Small amounts of leakage from the nozzles, although not a
safety concern, are also addressed by the plan, with the objective of maintaining the
probability of such leakage within an acceptable range.
x A number of analyses were performed in support of the inspection program. These include a
Weibull analysis of field experience that incorporates inspection results from 30 plants (2250
nozzles) of which 14 (96 nozzles) were found to have leaks or significant cracks requiring
repair. The Weibull analysis provided a model for expected frequency of nozzle leakage
versus time. The Weibull fit included extrapolations back in time to the time of first leak or
crack for a particular plant. Note that the plant experience since spring 2003 is consistent
with the data shown on slide 5.
x A probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) model was also developed that predicts the
probability of a circumferential crack growing to a significant size that could potentially lead
to nozzle ejection. The effects of inspections (both visual inspections for signs of leakage
and non-destructive inspections for cracking) were addressed in the PFM analyses, and
various inspection protocols were studied to determine an inspection program that results in
acceptable levels of quality and safety. The PFM analyses were benchmarked with respect to
field inspection results in which nozzle leakage and circumferential cracking were observed
through adjustment of select model inputs. Four case studies of reactor vessel heads in CE-
and Westinghouse-design plants were used to support the evaluations; the last original head
in a B&W-design plant will be replaced in fall 2005. Deterministic analyses were also
performed which demonstrated that the inspection frequencies established by probabilistic
analyses are conservative.
x Examination coverage requirements are also defined in the plan for both visual and
volumetric/surface examinations to ensure that the inspections address the entire region in
which PWSCC may reasonably be expected to occur. The volumetric/surface examination
coverage requirements [18] are based on welding residual stress calculations and
deterministic fracture mechanics analyses in combination with a review of prior inspection
data encompassing 237 detected flaws, all of which would have been detected if
examinations were performed over just the required examination volume.
16
Materials Reliability Program Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Safety Assessment for U.S. PWR
Plants (MRP-110NP): Evaluations Supporting the MRP Inspection Plan, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004.
17
Materials Reliability Program Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Analysis of PWR Reactor Pressure Vessel Top
Head Nozzle Cracking (MRP-105NP), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1007834-NP. NRC ADAMS Accession No.
ML041680489.
18
Materials Reliability Program: Generic Evaluation of Examination Coverage Requirements for Reactor
Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, Revision 1 (MRP-95R1NP), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004.
10-2
x The resulting inspection plan is demonstrated to maintain the increase in core damage
frequency due to potential nozzle failure or severe vessel wastage associated with top head
nozzle PWSCC at ~10
-6
per plant year or less, and the probability of leakage associated with
this phenomenon at <5% per plant year.
x Question (G. Wilkowski): The table in slide 11 gave circumferential cracks used for
benchmarking. Were all those through-wall cracks, and were the lengths reported the
maximum lengths? Is there any documentation of the crack lengths on the ID vs. OD for the
leaking cracks?
Response (P. Riccardella): Table 4-6 of report MRP-110NP [19], which is publicly available
on the US NRC ADAMS system, compiles more detailed information about these
circumferential cracks. Only the two largest cracks were through-wall (i.e., leaking) flaws.
The others were all connected to the OD surface only. The lengths reported are measures of
the total circumferential extent of the indications. For the two leaking cracks, definitive
information is not believed to be available regarding the crack length on the ID vs. OD.
Development of a Comprehensive Inspection Program for RPV Top Head
Nozzles: Part IIFailure Mode and Effect Analysis, Wastage Evaluation,
and Safety Assessment Report, presented by G. White, DEI (Paper 4B.3)
This presentation was given by G. White of Dominion Engineering, Inc. (DEI). The main points
x This presentation, which was coordinated with the previous presentation (Paper 4B.2),
emphasized three aspects of the MRP safety evaluation for closure head nozzles:
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)
Deterministic and probabilistic wastage evaluations
Summary of the industry inspection plan document, MRP-117 [20]
x The purpose of the FMEA is to anticipate the possibility of modes of failure that have not
been observed in plants and thus ensure that the appropriate additional evaluations are
performed. A comprehensive block diagram of the relationships among the plausible aging-
related failure modes was developed by the MRP as a key part of the FMEA process.
x The wastage evaluations consider the available U.S. and international experience with
leaking penetrations and other primary system components. Deterministic and probabilistic
wastage models were developed based on available laboratory boric acid corrosion data to
19
Materials Reliability Program Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Safety Assessment for U.S. PWR
Plants (MRP-110NP): Evaluations Supporting the MRP Inspection Plan, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004.
20
Materials Reliability Program Inspection Plan for Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetrations in U.S. PWR
Plants (MRP-117): MRP Inspection Requirements, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1007830. NRC ADAMS
Accession No. ML043560355.
10-3
confirm that the inspections required by the industry plan provide protection against
structurally significant wastage with high confidence.
x The industry inspection program requires a thorough, bare metal visual (BMV) examination
of the head every refueling outage, except for low susceptibility (based on time at
temperature) heads for which BMV examinations are required every third refueling outage or
5 calendar years, whichever occurs first. More significantly, the inspection program requires
volumetric or surface, non-destructive examinations at re-inspection intervals based on a
calculated time-temperature susceptibility correlation (RIYs). The volumetric inspection
frequency results in inspection intervals, following initial inspection, ranging from every
outage for the most susceptible (highest temperature) heads to every 8 calendar years for the
least susceptible (lowest temperature) heads.
x Based on the MRP-117 inspection program document, an ASME Section XI Code Case
(N-729 [21]) that defines appropriate examination requirements for reactor vessel closure
head nozzles has now been approved by ASME. This code case is expected to provide an
alternative to inspections currently required under the first revised U.S. NRC Order
EA-03-009 [22].
x Question (G. Wilkowski): Was the 20 ksi limit for inspection areas benchmarked against the
Oconee nozzle that had a crack that extended to the end of the tube?
Response (G. White): Yes, the examination zone (as defined in Code Case N-729) based on
the 20 ksi limit has been applied to a large body of inspection experience for CRDM nozzles,
including for one Oconee 3 flaw that extended 3.5 inches below the bottom of the weld.
None of the 237 cracks included in the study documented in Figure 5-1 of MRP-95 [23] were
located exclusively outside of the examination zone.
x Question (G. Wilkowski): Did you account for residual stresses in the tubes prior to
welding?
Response (G. White): Our stress models have assumed that the residual stresses in the tubes
are exclusively due to the welding process. This assumption, which results in a highly
stressed zone in the weld region, is consistent with the locations of CRDM nozzle cracks that
have been detected. It is recognized that fabrication practices such as tube straightening prior
to the nozzle being installed could be responsible for some of the differences in PWSCC
susceptibility observed between the different material supplier categories (due to both
21
Cases of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; Code Case N-729, "Alternative Examination Requirements
for PWR Reactor Vessel Upper Heads With Nozzles Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration Welds,"
Section XI, Division 1, 2005.
22
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Issuance of First Revised NRC Order (EA-03-009) Establishing Interim
Inspection Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Heads at Pressurized Water Reactors," EA-03-009,
February 20, 2004.
23
Materials Reliability Program: Generic Evaluation of Examination Coverage Requirements for Reactor
Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, Revision 1 (MRP-95R1NP), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004.
10-4
effective increased yield strength due to strain hardening effects and possible residual stress
effects).
Comment (J. Hickling): I compliment the speaker and all others involved in MRP-110 on a
very careful and thorough piece of work. It should be pointed out, however, that the Boric
Acid Corrosion (BAC) Wastage Expert Panel mentioned in one of your slides has not
specifically reviewed the appropriate appendix of the report (Appendix E). They were
convened in November 2002 to review a similar appendix to MRP-75 and have not been
involved since then. Your representation of their conclusions is appropriate with additional
emphasis on the fact that the assumptions behind the wastage model need to be revisited as
soon as enough results from the ongoing MRP and NRC BAC testing programs become
available. The author of the 2002 letter report from the Expert Panel is, in fact, participating
in the detailed BAC evaluations in the parallel session 4A of this conference.
Response (G. White): Thanks for your clarification of the involvement of this expert panel.
I would just note here that the conclusions of MRP-110 with regard to wastage are based to a
large measure on plant experience with leaking J-groove penetrations described in Section 7
of that report. The modeling work described in Appendix E supports that experience, and the
ongoing MRP boric acid corrosion test program being managed by EPRI is designed to
address the uncertainties in the current understanding of the wastage process.
Advances in NDE of Alloy 182 Components, presented by C. King, EPRI, for
F. Ammirato, EPRI (Paper 4B.4)
This presentation was given by C. King of EPRI on behalf of F. Ammirato of EPRI. The main
x Under the Materials Initiative of the U.S. nuclear power industry, programs are now in place
to accelerate the development, qualification, and implementation of innovative NDE devices
and techniques. This presentation described the NDE developments sponsored by the
Materials Initiative with particular attention to NDE of nickel-based materials and
weldments. As described in the extended abstract and on slide 3 for this presentation, the
Materials Initiative is a new major initiative to comprehensively and aggressively address
materials degradation issues.
x Reliable NDE is a fundamental consideration for safe, reliable, and economic operation of
nuclear plants in the following ways:
Assessing the structural integrity of components,
Monitoring the fleet of operating plants for early identification of material degradation
trends,
Developing and implementing rational and effective inspection strategies, and
Providing accurate and timely information to plant owners to enable evaluation of repair,
reinspection, or replacement options.
x A key issue with regard to examinations of PWR Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds in the U.S.
is the availability of detailed design configuration and component accessibility information.
10-5
This information is needed to support detailed assessments of the level of weld inspectability,
and must be gathered using in-situ measurements because of frequent differences between
actual configurations and design drawings (even including unexpected second welds).
Complex piping butt weld configurations (e.g., multiple weld joints) and uneven inspection
surfaces (probe liftoff and uncertainties in probe position) create challenges to the
effectiveness of NDE.
x Overviews of the following NDE projects were included in the presentation:
Electromagnetic Acoustic Transducer (EMAT) Development, Expansion, and
Acceleration (slide 10) (note: "SH" is an abbreviation for "shear")
Ultrasonic Techniques for Examining Dissimilar Metal and Other Alloy 600 Welds with
Rough or Wavy Outside Surfaces (slide 11)
Implementation of Phased Array Examination of Dissimilar Metal Piping Welds
(slide 12)
Dissimilar Metal Weld NDE Mockups Containing Realistic Weld Crown Conditions
(slide 13)
Ultrasonic Transducer Research (enhanced conventional transducer technology for
application to dissimilar metal piping butt weld NDE) (slides 1415)
Surface Examination of Nickel Alloy Welds (eddy current array probe technology)
(slides 1617)
NDE Technology and Measurement of SCC (advanced electromagnetic methods to assess
material degradation prior to emergence of macroscopic cracking) (slides 1819)
Dissimilar Metal Weld Configuration Database (slides 2022) (note: yes, additional
mockups are required to address the actual configurations that exist in the field)
Enhanced Statistical Analysis Capabilities of Performance Demonstration Qualification
Data (slides 2324)
Inspection Methodology for Pressurizer (Butt Weld) Nozzles (slides 2526)
x Improving and qualifying NDE for Alloy 600/182 locations is receiving high priority in 2005
and 2006 work plans. Multiple parallel paths are being pursued to develop new probes,
techniques, and scanning devices. The existing library of mockups for technique
development and qualification is being enhanced, and there is an intense effort to qualify
inspection procedures and personnel. Finally, there is also an industry-wide effort to assess
as-built Alloy 82/182 piping butt weld configurations.
Experience in Reactor Head Nozzle and J Weld Inspections, presented by J.
Lareau, Westinghouse (Paper 4B.5)
This presentation was given by J. Lareau of Westinghouse and authored by J. Lareau of
Westinghouse, D. Adamonis of Westinghouse-WesDyne International, P. Sjoberg of
10-6
Westinghouse-WesDyne-TRC, and P. Kreitman of Westinghouse-PCI. The main points made
x An overview of Westinghouse's inspection technology and experience was presented as
related to PWR reactor vessel upper and lower head penetrations. An average of one
inspection has been performed each month since the time that the NRC order on upper heads
was issued. Several types of probes are used to perform volumetric and surface examinations
from the ID and OD/weld surfaces, and three basic systems are available for inspection of
bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzles in reactor vessel lower heads. Leak path
inspections are not applicable to the BMI nozzles because these nozzles have a nominal
clearance fit, rather than the interference fit for CRDM nozzles. Repair technology,
including a robotically delivered remote fluorescent dye penetrant testing (FPT) system, is
integrated with the inspection systems.
x Typically as much time is spent on the confirmation of signals as on inspection itself.
Inspection of an open nozzle typically requires 20 minutes, while inspection of a nozzle
having a thermal sleeve using a gap scanner probe roughly requires 60 minutes. "Craze
cracking" indications are often found on the nozzle ID surface, but experience has shown that
these indications do not propagate in depth although they may increase in area.
Westinghouse has repaired only three ID flaws to date.
x The primary inspection probe for CRDM nozzles is a blade with tip diffraction (TOFD) and
straight beam ultrasonic crystals along with an eddy current coil. This combination provides
complete coverage for the detection of ID- or OD-initiated flaws. For open housing CEDMs,
the base probe configuration adds additional TOFD arrangements. A volumetric UT
inspection capability from the OD surface is also available to increase coverage and as
confirmatory testing. Specialized J-groove scanners provide eddy current test capability for
the J-groove weld and nozzle OD. This technology has been used extensively to confirm the
presence of wetted surface connectivity for TOFD indications detected by ID probes.
x The following three options, which all include a combination of TOFD, straight beam, and
eddy current sensors in a single inspection head, are available for inspection of the BMI
nozzles:
If the inspection is performed concurrent with a 10-year reactor vessel ISI, then the BMI
inspection probe may be attached to the same robot used for the vessel inspection. This
adds only about 4 hours to the time for the reactor vessel examination.
The second option, which requires removal of the lower internals, is based on a pole
delivery system from the refueling deck.
The third option can be performed with the internals left in place, but is a somewhat
slower inspection. The equipment for this option includes two servo-controlled
reversible movements with end of stroke and position references.
x Question (J. Collins): How effective have you found the leak path identification method?
Response (J. Lareau): The leak path mockup had 0.06" and 0.12" wide leak paths machined
into the carbon steel with a pencil grinding tool. The 0.12" wide path was readily detected,
10-7
and the 0.06" wide path was detected for 50% of its length. Using just an amplitude based
criterion does not work to determine a leak path due to the random nature of the material
grain structure and shrink fit contact pressure. Leak paths are determined by an indication
shape evaluation called a "river bed" evaluation in which a leak is determined by a
continuous indication from the top of the weld to the top of the scan extent.
x Question (A. Silvia): How reliable are the PT and ET examinations in finding PWSCC
cracks? How well did ET and PT examinations correlate?
Response (J. Lareau): PT and ET correlation has been excellent in the limited number of
cases where both were performed. To do an effective PT, the dwell time and developed time
have to be doubled or tripled over the Code required minimums. There have been cases
where the PT found a spot indication and ET has found a linear indication. In one case (VC
Summer safe end) destructive testing showed that the PWSCC grew subsurface behind a
surface compressive layer caused by the final grinding. ET detected the flaw (~0.01"
subsurface) for its entire length.
Thermal Imaging for the Detection of PWSCC in Alloy 82/182 Welds,
presented by J. Lareau, Westinghouse (Paper 4B.6)
This presentation was given by J. Lareau of Westinghouse and authored by J. Lareau and W.
Junker of Westinghouse. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x The presentation describes a thermal imaging inspection technique that has not yet been
applied to the commercial nuclear power industry. The technique is a non-contact technique
that detects surface breaking discontinuities on the basis of a discontinuity causing an
asymmetry in the temperature response to a laser spot. There is also an "after glow" effect
caused by the asymmetric heat flow going subsurface.
x The technique may be used to complement eddy current techniques for complex geometries
where tooling becomes an issue. The system has the advantage that flaws that tend to go
subsurface along parts of their lengths can still be detected because of penetration of the heat
flow 1030 mils (250750 m) deep. The laser system uses visible light, which does not
interfere with the thermal imaging in the infrared spectrum. The "flying spot" technique is
proposed for implementation whereby discontinuities are identified as spatial and temporal
perturbations in the heat diffusion. A mirror system is used so that complex geometries can
be scanned without the need for sophisticated surface-following mechanisms; large changes
in the distance from the probe to the surface can be accommodated. Laboratory tests have
been used to verify the viability of the method for PWSCC flaws in addition to fatigue cracks
and compressed sample notches. Variations in the emissivity of the inspection surface cause
relatively slow changes in the inspection signal (i.e., background noise) that can be filtered
out.
x At the time of the conference, all equipment needed for the inspection technique was
received. All available EPRI/MRP samples had been scanned, but permission was needed
from the NRC for the thermal imaging technique to be used for examinations of reactor
vessel upper head penetrations per NRC Order EA-03-009, Revision 1. Additional activities,
10-8
such as optimization of process parameters and coupling to a robotic delivery system, were
planned.
x Question (M. McDevitt): Has thermal imaging surface crack detection been used in other
industries?
Response (J. Lareau): Yes, it has been in use for several years in other industries, including
the aerospace industry.
x Question (W. Bamford): How deep does a flaw have to be to be detected using this
technique?
Response (J. Lareau): About 1020 mils (250500 m) deep, but hard data on this are not
available.
x Question (V. Nilekani): Has, or can, this thermal imaging technology be used for other types
of corrosion degradation mechanisms (such as IGSCC, wall thinning due to flow accelerated
corrosion, etc.)?
Response (J. Lareau): It has or can be used for other applications. It is sensitive to the x, y,
and z dimensions. However, for PWSCC, the focus is on the x and y dimensions. The z
depth dimension is more difficult but has been used in the aerospace industry.
x Question (A. Hiser): How would interpretation of indications be different from PT or ECT,
given the extensive time required in investigating false positives from PT/ECT?
Response (J. Lareau): The thermal imaging technique looks for abrupt linear indications.
Each type of examination technique has its own set of challenges.
x Comment (D. Schlader): NDE techniques many times are used as complementary tests to
acquire a more complete picture of what is being detected and characterized. A simple
technique is not 100% effective in most cases.
10-9
Abstract for EPRI International Conference on Alloy 600
The Challenges of Compliance with ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, Performance
Demonstration for Ultrasonic Examination Systems
Author
John T. Lindberg
Manager NDE Strategic Solutions
Framatome ANP, Inc., an AREVA and Siemens Company
10-11
The implementation of the requirements for ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, Performance
Demonstration for Ultrasonic Examination Systems, has transformed ultrasonic examinations in the
US nuclear industry. Meeting these ASME Section XI requirements has resulted in improvements in
the quality, technology, and reliability of ultrasonic examinations (UT). However, the recognition of
these improvements has been gradual because of the technical and economic challenges of the
Performance Demonstration process. This paper offers an NDE services vendors perspective of the
challenges associated with complying with the ultrasonic examination performance demonstration
process for examinations performed on pressurized water reactors.
Within the US nuclear industry, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) mandated the
requirements of ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII - Performance Demonstration for Ultrasonic
Examination Systems, for ultrasonic examinations performed with the scope of ASME Section XI.
Recognizing the technical and economic challenges of complying with the Appendix VIII
requirements, US utilities formed the Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI) to establish a
unified approach for meeting these new requirements. Through cooperative funding and appointment
of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) NDE Center as the PDI administrator (PDA), a
program was established to conduct performance demonstrations of ultrasonic examinations systems.
The key elements of the PDI program consisted of: design and acquisition of open and blind ultrasonic
examination test specimens; development of demonstration administrative procedures, protocol, and
personnel; and attaining regulatory acceptance of the PDI program. By the mid 1990s, these elements
were in place, and the nuclear inspection industry began the process of demonstrating the performance
of their ASME Section XI ultrasonic examination procedures and personnel.
Implementation of the PDI program was phased in incrementally, based on the availability of test
specimens and complexity of the examination. Demonstrations to qualify piping examinations for
wrought austenitic and ferritic piping welds (Appendix VIII, supplements 2 and 3); and bolting
examinations (Supplement 8) were conducted first. These were followed by: reactor pressure vessel
clad/base metal interface (Supplement 4), reactor pressure vessel welds (Supplement 6), reactor
pressure vessel nozzle inner radius examinations (Supplement 5), and reactor pressure nozzle to vessel
welds (Supplement 7). The latest performance demonstrations to be implemented were for full
structural overlaid wrought austenitic piping welds (Supplement 11), dissimilar metal weld
examinations (Supplement 10), and Supplement 14 the combination of supplements 2 and 10. As
qualifications were attempted for each new supplement, the difficulty for successful completion of the
performance demonstration increased. These examination qualification difficulties were related to
changes in weld structure and metallurgy, flaw morphology, component geometry, and transmission of
sound through complex geometries, isotropic, and anisotropic materials. The robustness of existing
ultrasonic examination techniques, and the training and expertise of the ultrasonic examination
personnel were also key factors contributing to the success of initial performance demonstrations.
The nuclear NDE services industry has been significantly challenged with the implementation of the
ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII ultrasonic examination performance demonstration requirements.
Initial examination qualification efforts by NDE services vendors often resulted in marginal success,
and limited qualifications. Considerable technical and economic resources continue to be expended in
the conduct of these UT performance demonstrations. This paper will discuss these challenges and
offer an introspective from the NDE services vendor perspective on complying with the ASME
Section XI, Appendix VIII ultrasonic examination performance demonstration requirements for the
examination of pressurized water reactor welds and related components.
10-12
The Challenges of Compliance with ASME Section XI,
Appendix VIII, Performance Demonstration for
Ultrasonic Examination Systems
John Lindberg,
Michael Hacker,
AREVA
10-13
FRAMATOME ANP, INC. 2
International Alloy 600 Conference
Introduction
Discussion on:
> The challenges in qualifying UT
procedures for the examination
of nozzle to safe-end dissimilar
metal welds to the requirements
of ASME Section XI, Appendix
VIII, Supplement 14
> Background ASME Section XI,
Appendix VIII
> PDI Qualification Process
> Supplement 14 Ultrasonic
Examination Qualification
Experience
Initial Qualification Attempt
Second Qualification Attempt
Final Results
> Supplement 10 Requalification
> Summary and Lessons Learned
10-14
ASME Section XI
> ASME Section XI, Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant
Components
Requires periodic nondestructive examinations (visual, surface, or
volumetric) of reactor pressure vessels, piping, and related
pressure boundary components to assess structural integrity
Appendix VIII to ASME Section XI establishes requirements for the
qualification/performance demonstration of ultrasonic examination
techniques, equipment and personnel
In the US, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) mandates the
ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII requirements for ultrasonic
examination performed within the scope of ASME Section XI
Implementation of the Appendix VIII requirements has resulted
improvements in the quality, technology and reliability of ultrasonic
examinations
The industrys recognition of these improvements has been gradual
due to the technical and economic challenges associated with
complying with the performance demonstration requirements.
10-15
Performance Demonstration Initiative
> Recognizing the challenges involved in complying with the
Appendix VIII requirements, US utilities formed the
Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI) to pool funding
and resources, and establish a unified industry approach to
meet the Appendix VIII requirements
> Because of their NDE qualification experience for IGSCC in
BWRs, the EPRI NDE Center was appointed as the
Performance Demonstration Initiative Administrator (PDA) to
administer the PDI program.
> Key Elements of the PDI Program consisted of:
Design and acquisition of open and blind ultrasonic examination
test specimens,
Development of performance demonstration administration
procedures, protocol, and test personnel, and
Attaining regulatory acceptance of the PDI program.
> By the mid 1990s, these key elements were in place and the
industry began demonstrating the performance of ASME
Section XI ultrasonic examination procedures.
10-16
Appendix VIII Requirements
> Appendix VIII requires:
Demonstration of procedure performance first,
Phase 1- Open testing, and Phase 2 - Blind test specimens
Qualification of UT personnel
> Appendix VIII categorizes weld examination types into
Supplements with performance demonstration requirements
Supplement 2 - OD Austenitic Pipe with IGSCC,
Supplement 3 OD Ferritic Pipe
Supplements 4 RPV welds inner 15% and cladding
Supplements 5 RPV nozzle inner radius welds
Supplements 6 RPV welds outer 85%
Supplements 7 RPV nozzle to shell welds
Supplements 8 Bolting
Supplements 10 Dissimilar Metal Welds
Supplements 11 Weld Overlay welds
Supplements 14 PWR Dissimilar Metal Welds from ID
10-17
Performance Demonstration (PDI) Process
> Supplements 2, 3 Austenitic, and ferritic piping implemented
first Least challenging
> Supplements 4, 6 and 5, 7 RPV implemented next
> Supplements 8 Bolting and studs
> Supplements 11 - Weld overlays to support BWR piping
> Supplement 10 implemented last Most Challenging
> Supplement 14 = Combination of Supplements 2, 3, and 10
Automated ultrasonic examination of the dissimilar metal (DM),
nozzle to safe-end weld, from the reactor nozzle inside surface of a
pressurized water reactor (PWR)
Combination of two different qualification types - Supplement 2 and
3, austenitic and ferritic piping; and supplement 10, dissimilar metal
piping welds
Most difficult qualification due to configuration, and materials
Examinations typically performed in conjunction with 10 year Reactor
Vessel examinations with automated examination tooling
10-18
Supplement 14 Configuration
> This figure shows typical
PWR shop welded inlet
nozzle to safe-end to elbow
configuration
> Limited access to the weld
> Configuration changes from
the reactor nozzle inner bore
area to the piping weld
> Examination is further
complicated by change in
materials from RV low alloy
steel nozzle forging to Alloy
600 safe-end material, to
stainless or ferritic piping
weld
> This is shop welded with
smooth ID surface. Many are
field welded, w/ rough ID.
10-19
Supplement 14 Qualification
Spring 2003 Initial Attempt
> Confidence with UT techniques
implemented and refined over
20- 30 yrs of automated reactor
vessel examinations were
utilized as the basis for initial
qualification effort.
> During open demonstration
phase, difficulties were
encountered in demonstrating
the detection and sizing
capabilities of the procedures.
> Modifications were implemented
including:
Procedural revisions,
Varying essential parameters of
the ultrasonic transducers,
Many changes resulted in
improvements to the detection
and sizing capabilities.
> Site examination schedule
precluded implementation of all
technique improvements.
10-20
> Customers site examination schedule needs drove completion
of qualfication,
Rather than qualfication plan or schedule
> Performance Demonstration Administrator permitted blind
phase of qualfication to begin; however,
Technique refinements were not fully implemented or tested
> More difficulties occurred during blind demonstration phase;
Additional adjustments were made, but did not improve overall
results
> Field Welded Joint configuration and surface conditions
hindered data quality using existing techniques.
Additional unique technique modifications were warranted, but
not enough time to evaluate each problem and resolve.
> With hard work, and long hours by Level II, III personnel, and
qualification personnel,
The qualfication was completed with limited Supplement 14
qualification
10-21
> Results
Procedure was qualified, but flaw
detection and sizing of axially
oriented flaws was limitation;
Detection of flaws was only fair
with certain piping and weld
geometries; but no repeatable
detection or sizing of flaws when
scanning was performed from a
field welded (rough) surface.
Qualifications were sufficient to
meet customers minimum needs,
but did not meet Framatomes or
customers expectations
Limited qualification came at a
very high cost, and painful.
Man-months of time
Loss of customer confidence
Requalification was needed to
resolve limitations.
10-22
Supplement 14 Requalification Plan
Key Elements of Requalification Plan
> Performance of a root cause evaluation to analyze limitations.
> Development of potential solutions for each of the limitations.
> Achieve consensus from technical experts on solutions, through
use of Framatome design review process, on any changes and
improvements that would be developed and implemented.
> Establish and implement a requalification schedule and budget.
> Attain executive management approval of the requalification plan.
> Evaluate & validate the effectiveness of technique refinements.
> Attain final technique validation by successfully completing Phase
1, open demonstrations; and gaining approval from PDA to
proceed with Phase 2, blind demonstration.
> Implement Phase 2, blind demonstrations, and successfully qualify
the supplement 14 examination techniques.
> Successfully qualify sufficient UT personnel needed to perform
supplement 14 examinations needed for fall 2004 examinations.
10-23
> Supplement 14 requalification project began in late 2003
> To address procedure qualification limitations, many
changes to technique essential variables were
conceptualized:
Hardware - Probes (size, frequency, focusing), scanner and
probe hardware
Software Analysis enhancements, data handling
> Assignment and dedication of key resources
Level III lead
Level IIs
Key engineering and technical resources
> Executive level review and approval was required due to
strategic importance of Supplement 14 qualification
Weekly technical reviews with oversight and management
reviews of project progress and budget
Manage the qualification as a field project
10-24
> Testing of hardware and software improvements
performed between January 2004 to April 2004
Review of progress by PDA in February Qualfication
schedule finalized
> Began Phase 1 open demonstrations early April 2004,
completed by mid April, and approved to start Phase 2
> Phase 2 Flaw detection portion of the blind
demonstration proceeded smoothly,
Successfully demonstrated improvements in axial flaw
detection, and
Capability to detect both circumferential and axial flaws in
the difficult field welded geometry condition
> Phase 2 - Flaw sizing demonstration was very demanding
Numerous scans required Use of Inspection Zone technique
(70 to 80) manhours required to analyze a single data set
Only one Level II analyzed data with Level III verification
Some additional refinements were necessary
Phase 2 completed in 4 weeks.
10-25
Supplement 14 Requalification Results
> By mid May, the results were
disclosed by the PDA:
Supplement 14 ultrasonic
examination procedure qualified
for detection and length sizing of
flaws with no limitations.
Depth sizing was demonstrated to
be within alternative acceptance
criteria of 10% of RMSP (root mean
square of mean piping wall
thickness).
Appendix VIII supplement 14 flaw
sizing criteria of 0.125 RMS was
not achieved, but flaw sizing within
the 10% RMSP is considered to be
an acceptable alternative.
In addition to the successful
qualification of the procedure, (3)
Framatome personnel were
qualified on the procedure.
The qualified procedure was used
to support nozzle to safe-end
examinations performed during the
fall 2004 at Turkey Point plant.
10-26
Recent Supplement 10 Requalification
Experience
PDI Supplement 10 - Automated DM
weld examination from piping OD
> New Scanner Developed to support
fall 2004 DM weld examinations
Improved Scanner Assembly
Installs quicker and increases no. of
transducers in scanner package.
> Used DM Lessons Learned to Qualify
Improved UT techniques
Contoured Transducers results in
improved transducer to pipe contact
Capable of faster scan speeds
Reduces # scans/scan time required
> PDI Requalification Results
Incorporation of lessons learned
resulted in smooth requalification of
existing DM examination procedures
UT technique improvements resulted
in industry best results for
qualification.
Integrated focus on improving
examination system hardware with UT
technique resulted in successful
qualification.
10-27
Summary and Lessons Learned
> DM weld examination, Supplement 14 qualification is most difficult
UT performance demonstration to date
Others with similar experiences
Very costly Man-months in resource commitments
Over $1M USD in resources, hardware, software
> Lessons Learned
Initial Overconfidence Dont be overconfident!
Plan and schedule in advance. Then, Work the Plan!
Allow sufficient time to implement plan
Need: Focused Plan, Committed resources and budget
Provide Technical Oversight of Qualification Plan
Honest evaluations of procedure capabilities and limitations
Causal analysis to determine solutions
Periodic reviews and challenges from technical peers & PDA
Implement testing to evaluate solutions
Plan and Implement for Success - Address Issues Proactively
Review, evaluate and communicate progress with plan
10-28
Development of MRP Inspection Plan for RPV Top Head Nozzles
Part I Nozzle Leakage, Ejection and Examination Volume Evaluations
Peter C. Riccardella
6855 South Havana Street, Suite 350
The MRP Task Group on Alloy 600, Top Head Working Group* has developed a comprehensive
inspection program [1] for RPV top heads in U.S. PWRs to address Alloy-600 Primary Water
Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC), which has been responsible for nozzle cracking and
leakage in a number of plants. The inspection program is based on a safety assessment that
addressed all safety related concerns that could develop as a consequence of PWSCC in the top
heads. The main safety concerns are potential nozzle ejection due to circumferential cracking of
the nozzles above the attachment welds to the vessel and severe wastage of the RPV head that
could develop due to leakage occurring over an extended period without corrective action. Small
amounts of leakage from the nozzles, although not a safety concern, are also addressed by the
plan, with the objective of maintaining the probability of such leakage within an acceptable
range. An ASME Section XI Code Case [2] implementing this inspection plan is currently in the
Code approval process, and once approved, is expected to provide an alternative to inspections
currently required under U.S. NRC Order EA-03-009 [3].
A number of analyses were performed in support of the inspection program [4, 5]. These include
a Weibull analysis of field experience, illustrated in Figure 1, that incorporates inspection results
from thirty plants (2250 nozzles) of which fourteen (96 nozzles) were found to have leaks or
significant cracks requiring repair. The Weibull analysis provided a model for expected
frequency of nozzle leakage versus time.
__________________
*The following members of the MRP Alloy 600 Issue Task Group and Top Head Working Group
made significant contributions to this work:
o Craig Harrington, TXU Nuclear
o Larry Matthews, Southern Nuclear
o Christine King, EPRI
o Glenn White, Dominion Engineering
10-29
A probabilistic fracture mechanics model was also developed that predicts the probability of a
circumferential crack growing to a significant size that could potentially lead to nozzle ejection.
The effects of inspections (both visual inspections for signs of leakage and non-destructive
inspections for cracking) were addressed in the PFM analyses and various inspection protocols
were studied to determine an inspection program that results in acceptable levels of quality and
safety. Figure 2 presents a typical plot of probability of nozzle ejection versus time predicted by
the PFM model, with and without periodic inspections. The significant role that periodic
inspections play in reducing the probability of failure, and maintaining it at an acceptable level
during continued plant operation, is plainly apparent in this plot.
The PFM analyses were benchmarked with respect to field inspection results in which nozzle
leakage and circumferential cracking were observed. Deterministic analyses were also
performed which demonstrated that the inspection frequencies established by probabilistic
analyses are conservative.
Examination coverage requirements are also defined in the plan [6], as illustrated in Figure 3, for
both visual and volumetric/surface examinations, to ensure that the inspections address the entire
region in which PWSCC may reasonably be expected to occur. The resulting inspection plan is
demonstrated to maintain the increase in core damage frequency due to potential nozzle failure
or severe vessel wastage associated with top head nozzle PWSCC at ~10
-6
, and the probability of
leakage associated with this phenomenon at <5% per plant year.
References:
1. Materials Reliability Program: Inspection Plan for Reactor Vessel Closure Head
Penetrations in U.S. PWR Plants (MRP-117): MRP Inspection Requirements, EPRI,
Palo Alto, CA: 1007830. 2004
2. CASES OF ASME BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL CODE; Code Case N-729
Alternative Examination Requirements for PWR Reactor Vessel Upper Heads With
Nozzles Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration Welds, Section XI, Division 1,
Submitted for Approval by Main B&PV Committee Dec. 2004
3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Issuance of First Revised NRC Order (EA 03
009) Establishing Interim Inspection Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Heads at
Pressurized Water Reactors, EA-03-009, February 20, 2004
4. Materials Reliability Program: Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Analysis of PWR
Reactor Pressure Vessel Top Head Nozzle Cracking (MRP-105), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA:
1007834. 2004
5. Materials Reliability Program: Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Safety
Assessment for U.S. PWR Plants (MRP-110): Evaluations Supporting the MRP
Inspection Plan, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 1009807. 2004
6. Materials Reliability Program: Materials Reliability Program Generic Evaluation of
Examination Coverage Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration
Nozzles (MRP-95), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 1009129 (Rev. 1) 2004
10-30
Oconee 1
Crystal River 3
North Anna 2
Millstone 2
Beaver Valley 1
TMI-1
Oconee 3
Cook 2
ANO-1
Surry 1
Davis-Besse
St. Lucie 2
North Anna 1
Oconee 2
0.02
0.01
0.05
0.10
0.20
0.50
0.63
0.90
1 10
EDYs
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n

o
f

U
n
i
t
s

w
i
t
h

L
e
a
k
a
g
e
100
EDYs at detection of leakage or cracking
EDYs at first leak or crack extrapolated
back using slope b = 3
All inspection data adjusted to 600 F (Q = 50 kcal/mole)
Weibull slope of
b = 3 assumed for fit
to extrapolated data
Median Rank Regression yields
Weibull characteristic
time T = 15.21 EDYs
Figure 1 Weibull Plot of RPV Top Head Inspection Data
10-31
POF by Net Section Collapse at Various Temperatures and Inspection Intervals
0.0E+00
2.5E-04
5.0E-04
7.5E-04
1.0E-03
1.3E-03
1.5E-03
1.8E-03
2.0E-03
2.3E-03
2.5E-03
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
EFPYs
P
D
F

o
f

N
S
C

(
p
e
r

y
e
a
r
)
590F: PDF of NSC w/o
inspection
590F: PDF of NSC w/ 4-EDY
FULLV insp. (17.6)
580F: PDF of NSC w/o
inspection
580F: PDF of NSC w/4-EDY
FULLV insp. (26.4)
600F: PDF of NSC (Base
Case)
600F: PDF of NSC w/4-EDY
FULLV insp. (11.8)
Note: 4 EDY equals 6 years @ 590
o
F and 9 years
@ 580
o
F assuming the activation energy = 50 kcal/mol
Figure 2 Typical PFM Model Results Illustrating Probability of Top Head Nozzle Ejection
versus Time with and without Periodic Inspections
a = 1.5 for Incidence Angle, < 30 and
ICI nozzles or 1 for Incidence Angle,
> 30
OR
To the end of tube whichever is less
Figure 3 Illustration of RPV Top Head Nozzle Inspection Zone
10-32
Development of MRP
Development of MRP
Inspection Plan for RPV
Inspection Plan for RPV
Top Head Nozzles
Top Head Nozzles
Part I
Nozzle Leakage, Ejection and
Examination Volume Evaluations
Peter Riccardella Peter Riccardella
Structural Integrity Associates Structural Integrity Associates
March 9, 2005 March 9, 2005
10-33
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /2 2
Summary
Summary
Background
Background
Field Experience
Field Experience
PFM Methodology
PFM Methodology
Benchmarking
Benchmarking
Case Studies
Case Studies
Examination Coverage Requirements
Examination Coverage Requirements
Examination Intervals
10-34
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /3 3
Objectives:
Objectives:
Develop generic methodology to

Develop generic methodology to
determine probabilities of top head
determine probabilities of top head
nozzle leakage and failure (ejection)
nozzle leakage and failure (ejection)
Apply to sample of U.S. PWRs in support

Apply to sample of U.S. PWRs in support
of MRP Safety Assessment
of MRP Safety Assessment
Use to define inspection plan that

Use to define inspection plan that
provides acceptable level of quality and
provides acceptable level of quality and
safety
safety
RPV Top Head PFM Project underway since
Sept. 2001 under EPRI / MRP sponsorship
MRP-105: Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Analysis of PWR Reactor Pressure
Vessel Top Head Nozzle Cracking, EPRI 1007834, March, 2004
10-35
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /4 4
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements
Following members of the MRP Alloy
Following members of the MRP Alloy
-
-
600
600
Issue Task Group and Top Head Working
Issue Task Group and Top Head Working
Group made significant contributions to
Group made significant contributions to
this work:
this work:
Craig Harrington (TXU Nuclear) Craig Harrington (TXU Nuclear)
Larry Matthews (Southern Nuclear) Larry Matthews (Southern Nuclear)
Christine King (EPRI) Christine King (EPRI)
Glenn White (Dominion Engineering) Glenn White (Dominion Engineering)
10-36
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /5 5
RPV Top Head Field Experience
RPV Top Head Field Experience
(Thru Spring
(Thru Spring
-
-
03)
03)
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
550 560 570 580 590 600 610
Head Oper. Temp. (Degrees F)
E
F
P
Y

@

H
e
a
d

O
p
e
r
.

T
e
m
p
.
Leaks
Cracks/No Leaks
Visual/Clean
NDE/Clean
5 EDY
10 EDY
15 EDY
15 EDYs
10 EDYs
5 EDYs
EDYs= Effective Degradation Years
(Equiv. EFPYs @ 600 F)
10-37
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /6 6
Weibull Model of Field Data
Considers only plants that have performed
Considers only plants that have performed
non
non
-
-
visual NDE thru Spring
visual NDE thru Spring
-
-
03
03
Population = 30 plants (2250 nozzles) Population = 30 plants (2250 nozzles)
14 had leaks or significant cracking (96 nozzles) 14 had leaks or significant cracking (96 nozzles)
15 inspected & clean treated as Suspensions 15 inspected & clean treated as Suspensions
1 plant performed partial NDE (early life suspension 1 plant performed partial NDE (early life suspension
no effect ) no effect )
Plants that performed only visual examinations (and Plants that performed only visual examinations (and
were found clean) excluded from analysis were found clean) excluded from analysis
10-38
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /7 7
(contd)
(contd)
WEI
WEI
-
-
BAYES analysis method
BAYES analysis method
1 1
Weibull Slope = 3.0 assumed from prior Alloy 600 Weibull Slope = 3.0 assumed from prior Alloy 600
experience experience
Determine best fit through field inspection results Determine best fit through field inspection results
Plants w/ multiple cracked or leaking
Plants w/ multiple cracked or leaking
nozzles extrapolated back to time of first
nozzles extrapolated back to time of first
leak or crack
leak or crack
w/ same assumed Weibull slope of 3 w/ same assumed Weibull slope of 3
1
R. B. Abernathy, The New Weibull Handbook, Reliability and Statistical Analysis
for Predicting Life, Safety, Survivability, Risk, Cost and Warranty Claims, Fourth
Edition, Sept. 2000
10-39
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /8 8
Oconee 1
Crystal River 3
North Anna 2
Millstone 2
Beaver Valley 1
TMI-1
Oconee 3
Cook 2
ANO-1
Surry 1
Davis-Besse
St. Lucie 2
North Anna 1
Oconee 2
0.02
0.01
0.05
0.10
0.20
0.50
0.63
0.90
1 10 100
EDYs
C
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F
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U
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w
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L
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a
k
a
g
e
/
C
r
a
c
k
i
n
g
EDYs at detection of leakage or cracking
EDYs at first leak or crack extrapolated
back using slope b = 3
All inspection data adjusted to 600 F (Q = 50 kcal/mole)
Weibull slope of
b = 3 assumed for fit
to extrapolated data
Median Rank Regression yields
Weibull characteristic
time T = 15.21 EDYs
10-40
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /9 9
Elements of PFM Analysis
Elements of PFM Analysis
Monte
Monte
-
-
Carlo PFM model
Carlo PFM model
Applied stress intensity factors for circumferential
Applied stress intensity factors for circumferential
cracks
cracks
Statistical characterization of laboratory PWSCC
Statistical characterization of laboratory PWSCC
crack growth rates
crack growth rates
Effect of inspections (inspection interval, type of
Effect of inspections (inspection interval, type of
inspection and probability of detection)
inspection and probability of detection)
Benchmarked and calibrated with respect to field
Benchmarked and calibrated with respect to field
inspection data (leakage and circumferential
inspection data (leakage and circumferential
cracking)
cracking)
Case Studies of real plants of various designs and
Case Studies of real plants of various designs and
PWSCC susceptibility
PWSCC susceptibility
10-41
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /10 10
Simulating the Effect of Inspections
Simulating the Effect of Inspections
Probability of Detection Curve Used in MRPER Algorithm
0%
15%
30%
45%
60%
75%
90%
0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700
Flaw Size (in)
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
f

D
e
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
FULLV Curve from Ref.1
Vendor 1
Vendor 2
Detected
Not Detected
10-42
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /11 11
Circumferential Crack Data
Circumferential Crack Data
Used for Benchmarking
Used for Benchmarking
Plant Nozzle # EDYs
Crack Lengths
(Deg.)
Davis-Besse 2 19.24 34
Oconee 2 18 22.20 36
North Anna 2 41 19.70 46
Oconee 3 2 21.70 48
Oconee 3 23 21.70 66
Crystal River 3 32 16.17 91
North Anna 2 65 19.70 102
North Anna 2 54 19.70 111
North Anna 2 59 19.70 126
Oconee 3 50 21.70 165
Oconee 3 56 21.70 165
Avg.= 20.29
10-43
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /12 12
Benchmark Analysis Results
Benchmark Analysis Results
11
7
6
3
2
1.00E-03
1.00E-02
1.00E-01
30 60 90 120 150
Circ. Crack Length (degrees)
P
r
o
b
.

o
f

C
i
r
c
.

C
r
a
c
k

E
x
c
e
e
d
i
n
g
Plant Cum. Size Dist.
Base Case Parameters
Benchmarked Parameters
10-44
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /13 13
Case Study Plants
Case Study Plants
I
I
-
-
CE plant with head temperature of
595.5F
595.5F
.
.
Current EDYs = 14.6, and plant has announced
Current EDYs = 14.6, and plant has announced
plans to replace head in Spring 2006
plans to replace head in Spring 2006
II
II
-
-
592F
592F
.
.
Currently at 10.5 EDYs with no plans to replace
Currently at 10.5 EDYs with no plans to replace
head
head
III
III
-
-
Westinghouse plant with head temperature
Westinghouse plant with head temperature
of
of
580F
580F
. Currently at 11.1 EDYs and
. Currently at 11.1 EDYs and
performing its baseline inspection (NDE plus
performing its baseline inspection (NDE plus
BMV) in Spring 2004
BMV) in Spring 2004
IV
IV
-
-
Cold head Westinghouse plant (T =
Cold head Westinghouse plant (T =
567F
567F
).
).
Current EDYs = 5.1 with no plans to replace
Current EDYs = 5.1 with no plans to replace
head. BMV has been performed, and first NDE
head. BMV has been performed, and first NDE
will be performed in Spring 2007
will be performed in Spring 2007
10-45
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /14 14
Typical Case Study Result:
Probability Of Leakage
Probability Of Leakage
Case Study II - Probability of Leakage
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
EFPYs
P
r
o
b
.

o
f

L
e
a
k

(
o
r

S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t

C
r
a
c
k
i
n
g
)
No Insp.
Insp. Per NRC Order
Insp per MRP Plan B
Insp per MRP Plan C
Transition to
High Suscept.
F-02
Baseline
NDE
F-05
S-07
F-08
10-46
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /15 15
Probability Of Nozzle Ejection
Probability Of Nozzle Ejection
Case Study II - Probability of Nozzle Ejection
0.00E+00
2.50E-04
5.00E-04
7.50E-04
1.00E-03
1.25E-03
1.50E-03
1.75E-03
2.00E-03
2.25E-03
2.50E-03
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
EFPYs
P
D
F

o
f

N
S
C

(
p
e
r

y
e
a
r
)
Insp per NRC Order
Insp per MRP Plan B
Insp per MRP Plan C
Transition to
High Suscept.
F-02
Baseline
NDE
F-05
F08
S-07
10-47
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /16 16
Summary of Case Study Results
Summary of Case Study Results
Inspection Program
Plant Prob.
of:
NRC Order MRP Plan B MRP Plan C
NSC 4.8 x 10
-4
4.8 x 10
-4
6.9 x10
-4
Case Study I
Leak 1.6% 1.6% 4.9%
NSC 4.1 x 10
-4
3.9 x 10
-4
3.1 x 10
-4
Case Study II
Leak 4.6% 4.4% 4.6%
NSC 3.7 x 10
-4
2.4 x 10
-4
2.3 x 10
-4
Case Study III
Leak 1.7% 1.8% 1.79%
NSC 7.8 x 10
-5
9.6 x10
-5
6.0 x 10
-5
Case Study IV
Leak 0.47% 0.48% 0.41%
10-48
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /17 17
Technical Basis for Examination
Coverage Requirements
Reviewed Stresses in Large Number of Operating
Reviewed Stresses in Large Number of Operating
Plants that Bound U.S. PWR Fleet (51 of 69)
Plants that Bound U.S. PWR Fleet (51 of 69)
Determined distance above or below weld at which
Determined distance above or below weld at which
stresses drop below 20 ksi tension in all cases
stresses drop below 20 ksi tension in all cases
Fracture Mechanics analyses performed to
Fracture Mechanics analyses performed to
demonstrate that postulated flaws outside of and
demonstrate that postulated flaws outside of and
just impinging on exam volume will not grow
just impinging on exam volume will not grow
unacceptably in time period until next inspection
unacceptably in time period until next inspection
MRP-95: Generic Evaluation of Examination Coverage Requirements for Reactor
Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, EPRI 1009129 (Revision 1), Sept, 2004
10-49
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /18 18
Typical Nozzle Stress
Typical Nozzle Stress
Distributions
Distributions
-40,000
-30,000
-20,000
-10,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
Height (inches)
H
o
o
p

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
p
s
i
)
Uphill, Inside of Tube
Uphill, Outside of Tube
Weld Region
69.68 to 71.441
-20,000
-10,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
65 66 67 68 69 70 71
Height (inches)
H
o
o
p

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
p
s
i
)
Downhill, Inside of Tube
Downhill, Outside of Tube
Weld Region
65.601 to
66.788
Uphill Side of Nozzle Downhill Side of Nozzle
10-50
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /19 19
Resulting Examination Coverage
Resulting Examination Coverage
Requirements
Requirements
a = 1.5 a = 1.5 for Incidence Angle, for Incidence Angle, < < 30 30
and ICI nozzles or 1 and ICI nozzles or 1 for for
Incidence Angle, Incidence Angle, > 30 > 30
OR OR
To the end of tube whichever is To the end of tube whichever is
less less
A-B-C-D = Volumetric examination zone
for the tube (base metal)
A-D = Surface examination zone for the
tube ID
F-E-C = Surface examination zone for the
J-groove weld (filler metal and buttering)
and tube OD below the weld
F-E = Surface examination zone for the J-
groove weld (filler metal and buttering)
10-51
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /20 20
(contd)
(contd)
Reviewed prior inspection data,
Reviewed prior inspection data,
encompassing 237 detected flaws,
encompassing 237 detected flaws,
Review indicated that all would have been
Review indicated that all would have been
detected if inspections had been performed
detected if inspections had been performed
over just the required Exam Volume
over just the required Exam Volume
MRP-95: Generic Evaluation of Examination Coverage Requirements for Reactor
Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, EPRI 1009129 (Revision 1), Sept, 2004
10-52
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /21 21
Examination Interval:
Examination Interval:
Definition of Terms
Definition of Terms
Three levels of examination defined:
Three levels of examination defined:
Level 3
Level 3
Tube volume only OR wetted

Tube volume only OR wetted
surface only
surface only
Level 2
Level 2
Tube volume PLUS 50% of welds

Level 1
Level 1

Re
Re
-
-
Inspection Years (RIY)
Inspection Years (RIY)
RIY = RIY = EFPY normalized to 600 EFPY normalized to 600 F using 31 F using 31
kcal/mole activation energy (similar to EDYs, but kcal/mole activation energy (similar to EDYs, but
with more conservative activation energy with more conservative activation energy
characteristic of PWSCC growth) characteristic of PWSCC growth)
10-53
PRS PRS- -05 05- -007 007/ /22 22
Baseline based on EDY
Baseline based on EDY
EDY > 12; next outage EDY > 12; next outage
EDY EDY > > 8; 2 8; 2
nd nd
outage outage
EDY < 8; February 10, 2008 EDY < 8; February 10, 2008
Re
Re
-
-
Inspection Before RIY = 2.25 or 8 calendar
Inspection Before RIY = 2.25 or 8 calendar
years
years
Extend to RIY = 3.0 or 10 calendar years if: Extend to RIY = 3.0 or 10 calendar years if:
Last Last Vol/Sur Vol/Sur was Type 2 was Type 2 AND AND CCDP CCDP < < 5x10 5x10
- -3 3
OR OR
Last Last Vol/Sur Vol/Sur was Type 1 was Type 1
Maintains Maintains CDF ~ 10 CDF ~ 10
- -6 6
and Prob. of Leakage < 5% and Prob. of Leakage < 5%
10-54
Development of a Comprehensive Inspection Program for RPV Top Head Nozzles:
Part II - Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, Wastage Evaluation, and
Safety Assessment Report
G. A. White
Extended Abstract
The MRP Task Group on Alloy 600, Top Head Working Group* has developed a comprehensive
inspection program for reactor vessel closure heads in U.S. PWRs to address PWSCC of Alloy
600 head penetrations, which has led to cracking and leakage in a number of plants. The
inspection program is based on a safety assessment that addressed all safety-related concerns that
could develop as a consequence of PWSCC in the closure heads. The main safety concerns are
the potential for nozzle ejection as a result of circumferential cracking of the nozzles above the
attachments welds to the vessel, and severe wastage of the closure head that could develop as a
result of significant leakage occurring over an extended period without corrective action. Small
amounts of leakage from the nozzles, although not a safety concern, are also addressed by the
plan, with the objective of maintaining the probability of such leakage within an acceptable
range. This presentation is the second of two presentations describing the technical bases for the
inspection plan. Presented are a failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) and deterministic and
probabilistic wastage evaluations. Also presented is a summary of the industry inspection plan
document, MRP-117.
1
The FMEA and wastage evaluations, which are documented in report MRP-110,
2
are two of the
main safety assessment evaluations. The purpose of the FMEA is to anticipate the possibility of
modes of failure that have not been observed in plants and thus ensure that the appropriate
additional evaluations are performed. The wastage evaluations consider the available U.S. and
international experience with leaking penetrations and other primary system components.
Deterministic and probabilistic wastage models were developed based on available laboratory
boric acid corrosion data to confirm that the inspections required by the industry plan provide
protection against structurally significant wastage with high confidence.
__________________
*The following members of the MRP Alloy 600 Issue Task Group and Top Head Working Group
made significant contributions to this work:
o Craig Harrington, TXU Nuclear
o Larry Matthews, Southern Nuclear
o Christine King, EPRI
o Peter Riccardella, Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.
10-55
The industry inspection program requires a thorough, bare metal visual (BMV) examination of
the head every refueling outage, except for low susceptibility (based on time at temperature)
heads for which BMV examinations are required every third refueling outage or 5 calendar
years, whichever occurs first. More significantly, the inspection program requires volumetric or
surface, non-destructive examinations at re-inspection intervals based on a calculated time-
temperature susceptibility correlation (RIYs). The volumetric inspection frequency results in
inspection intervals, following initial inspection, ranging from every outage for the most
susceptible (highest temperature) heads to every 8 calendar years for the least susceptible (lowest
temperature) heads. Incentives are built into the program for performing more comprehensive
inspections that include examination of the wetted surfaces of the J-groove welds, by permitting
extended inspection intervals if such inspections are performed in addition to the required nozzle
volumetric examinations.
An ASME Section XI Code Case
3
implementing this inspection plan is currently in the Code
approval process, and once approved, is expected to provide an alternative to inspections
currently required under the first revised U.S. NRC Order EA-03-009.
4
References
1. Materials Reliability Program Inspection Plan for Reactor Vessel Closure Head
Penetrations in U.S. PWR Plants (MRP-117): MRP Inspection Requirements, EPRI, Palo
Alto, CA: 2004. 1007830.
2. Materials Reliability Program Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Safety Assessment
for U.S. PWR Plants (MRP-110NP): Evaluations Supporting the MRP Inspection Plan,
EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1009807-NP (non-proprietary).
3. CASES OF ASME BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL CODE; Code Case N-729
Alternative Examination Requirements for PWR Reactor Vessel Upper Heads With Nozzles
Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration Welds, Section XI, Division 1, Submitted for
Approval by Main B&PV Committee Dec. 2004.
4. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Issuance of First Revised NRC Order (EA-03-009)
Establishing Interim Inspection Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Heads at
Pressurized Water Reactors, EA-03-009, February 20, 2004.
10-56
Reston, VA 20190
703.437.1155
www.domeng.com
Development of a Comprehensive Inspection Program
for RPV Top Head Nozzles:
Part II - Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, Wastage Evaluation,
and Safety Assessment Report
March 7-10, 2005
Glenn A. White
Session 4B Inspection Technologies and Planning
Wednesday, March 9, 2005
10-57
Development of Inspection Program for RPV Top Head: Part II 2 2005 EPRI International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference
Outline
Introduction to MRP-110, Materials Reliability Program
Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Safety
Assessment for U.S. PWR Plants
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
Boric Acid Corrosion (BAC) Wastage Evaluations
Conclusions
10-58
Acknowledgements
Following members of the Materials Reliability Program
(MRP) Alloy 600 Issue Task Group made significant
contributions to this work:
Craig Harrington (TXU Energy)
Larry Matthews (Southern Nuclear)
Christine King (EPRI)
Peter Riccardella (Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.)
10-59
Introduction to MRP-110
10-60
MRP-110 Safety Assessment Closure Heads
Purpose
The MRP-110 safety assessment report demonstrates
an extremely low probability of damage to the nuclear fuel core, and
a low probability of primary coolant leakage
associated with the potential for aging degradation of the nickel-alloy
components of reactor vessel closure head (RVCH) penetrations.
The safety assessment necessarily assumes that an appropriately
designed program of inspections is implemented.
An ASME Section XI Code Case (N-729) defining an appropriate
inspection program is currently in the Code approval process, and
once approved, is expected to provide an alternative to inspections
currently required under the first revised U.S. NRC Order EA-03-009.
The Code Case requirements are based on the MRP-117* inspection plan
document developed by the MRP.
*Materials Reliability Program Inspection Plan for Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetrations in U.S. PWR Plants (MRP-117): MRP
Inspection Requirements, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1007830.
10-61
MRP-110* Report Structure
1. Introduction And Summary (+ App. A)
2. Failure Mode And Effect Analysis (FMEA) (+ App. B & C)
3. Flaw And Wastage Tolerance Calculations (+ App. D)
4. Inspection Experience
5. Welding Residual Stress And Stress Intensity Factor Calcs
6. Nozzle Ejection Evaluations
7. Head Wastage Evaluations (+ App. E)
8. Consequential Damage Assessment
9. Inspection Capabilities
10.Replacement Head Materials
*Materials Reliability Program Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Safety Assessment for U.S. PWR Plants (MRP-110NP): Evaluations
Supporting the MRP Inspection Plan, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1009807-NP (non-proprietary).
10-62
Typical PWR Reactor Vessel Head Nozzle
PWSCC
10-63
Scope of MRP-110
RVCH penetrations joined to ID of head with a J-groove weld. The
analysis in MRP-110 focused on the following:
Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) penetrations
Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) penetrations
In-Core Instrumentation (ICI) penetrations
These nozzles make up 5055 of the total 5139 RVCH penetrations in
the set of 69 original heads
The following J-groove nozzles are not specifically addressed in MRP-
110:
Head Vent Nozzles (West. & CE) [58]
Smaller diameter and no control rod
Small-Diameter Thermocouple Nozzles (2 B&W plants) [16]
Covered in MRP-103 and have been eliminated or replaced with Alloy 690 material
Auxiliary Head Adapter Nozzles (2 West Plants) [8] and De-gas Line Nozzles (2 West Plants) [2]
Similar geometry to CRDM nozzles and only installed in cold heads
10-64
Types of RVCH Penetrations
CRDM Nozzle CEDM Nozzle
ICI Nozzle
Head Vent Nozzle
10-65
Types of RVCH Penetrations (cont'd)
Internals Support
Housing Nozzles
DGL Nozzle
T/C Nozzle
AHA Nozzle
10-66
Overall Process Flowchart
10-67
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
10-68
FMEA Introduction
FMEA is a technique of Total Quality Management to ensure
product reliability
An FMEA seeks to identify plausible failure modes and their
following principal characteristics:
Cause
Effect (consequence)
Detectability
Frequency of Occurrence
Relationships among the failure modes are illustrated using
a block diagram
10-69
FMEA Purpose
The FMEA facilitates a structured approach for proactive
identification of possible failure modes
Anticipate possibility of failure modes / paths not yet observed in field
Direct subsequent technical evaluations in the closure head safety assessment
Identify inspection detectability requirements
Ensure robust defense for all credible failure paths
The FMEA flow chart was developed by the MRP to
determine the possible ways that the aging degradation
mechanisms known to affect the penetration materials may
lead to safety-significant failures
Brainstorming without prejudice of past inspection results
Open consideration of materials, fabrication, and operations factors
10-70
Boric Acid Corrosion Wastage
Environmental Fatigue
Reactor Vessel Head Low-
Alloy Steel
PWSCC
Low-Temperature Crack
Propagation (LTCP)
Alloy 182/82 Weld Buttering
PWSCC
Low-Temperature Crack
Propagation (LTCP)
Alloy 182/82 J-groove Weld
PWSCC
SCC in a Non-Primary Water
Environment
OD of Alloy 600 Nozzle above
J-Groove Weld
PWSCC
Alloy 600 Nozzle (Tube)
(in J-groove region)
Plausible Aging
Degradation Mechanisms
RVCH Penetration
Component / Material
FMEA Scope
Components and Degradation Mechanisms
10-71
FMEA Failure-Path Flow Chart
Key Parameters for Degradation Mechanisms
xMaterial alloy composition
xMaterial structure (microstructure and defects)
xCyclic stress range
xCyclic stress rise time
xMean stress (including residual stress)
xTemperature
xpH / Electrochemical potential (ECP)
xAqueous species (impurities)
(Nickel-Base Alloy / Low-Alloy Steel)
xStress
xTemperature
xpH
xElectrochemical potential (ECP)
xAqueous species (impurities)
SCC in a Non-Primary Water Environment
(Nickel-Base Alloy)
xStress
xTemperature
PWSCC
(Nickel-Base Alloy)
Key Parameters
Plausible Aging
10-72
Key Parameters for Degradation Mechanisms
xLithium-boron ratio in primary water
xBoric acid concentration in crevice / cavity
xDissolved oxygen concentration in crevice / cavity
xpH in crevice / cavity
xElectrical conductivity in crevice / cavity
xLeak rate
xVelocity field
xWall shear stress
xTemperature
xPressure
xGalvanic coupling to nickel-alloy nozzle / weld and
stainless steel cladding
Boric Acid Corrosion Wastage
(Carbon and Low-Alloy Steel)
xDissolved hydrogen concentration
xStress
xTemperature
Low-Temperature Crack Propagation
(LTCP)
(Subset of Nickel-Base Alloys)
Key Parameters
Plausible Aging
10-73
Nozzle and Weld Flaw Geometries
10-74
FMEA Failure-Path Flow Chart (Fig. 2-2 of MRP-110)
10-75
Types of Conditions
Head fabrication
Material processing
Nozzle fabrication
Welding process
Plant operation
Water chemistry
Operating conditions, transients, etc.
Aging degradation
RCS leakage
Boric acid corrosion
Loose parts generation
Captured loose parts
Released loose parts
Accident events
LOCA
Consequential damage
Core damage
The following types of conditions are reflected in the
FMEA flow chart:
10-76
Failure Path Classification
Each failure path in the FMEA flow chart is classified:
A not credible classification reflects a determination that the identified condition
or mechanism cannot occur to a high degree of certainty and is supported by a
strong technical argument and thorough documentation with a high threshold.
A not actionable classification reflects a determination that the condition can
occur but cannot be reliably detected or quantified and therefore requires that
adequate protection be provided at a higher level in the failure process.
An actionable classification reflects a determination that the condition can occur
and can be reliably detected or quantified. These conditions are inputs to the
probabilistic and deterministic evaluations and ultimately shape the detectability
requirements for inspections.
10-77
FMEA Conclusions
The FMEA results:
confirm that nozzle ejection and head wastage are the two major potential safety
concerns
help define the inspection capabilities that are needed to detect degradation
before defense in depth is compromised
The generation of loose parts is a potential third concern
that helps to set the required inspection area for periodic
nonvisual inspections.
The FMEA results were used in combination with the overall
safety assessment results to set the requirements in the
MRP inspection plan and ASME Code Case N-729, which is
currently under consideration for approval
10-78
Boric Acid Corrosion (BAC)
Wastage Evaluations
10-79
Closure Head Wastage Evaluations
Topics
Wastage tolerance calculation
Davis-Besse experience
Other CRDM nozzle experience
Other PWSCC experience
Experience with leakage from mechanical joints and seal
welds
Wastage modeling
10-80
Process to Develop Wastage Technical Basis
MRP-110
Section 7:
Technical Basis
for Wastage
Probabilistic
Risk
Assessment
for Wastage
Deterministic
Assessment
for Wastage
Additional
BAC Testing
(2004-2006)
Existing BAC
Test Data
Plant
Experience
with Boric
Acid Corrosion
(BAC)
Allowable
Wastage
Maintaining
Code Stresses
BAC Wastage
Review Panel
Establishment
of BAC
Wastage
Rates
Revised Technical
Basis Document if
Warranted
Assessment of
New BAC Test
Data
10-81
Wastage Tolerance Calculation
Finite Element Model
Finite element model of
PWR head with high
diameter to thickness ratio
No credit taken for elastic-
plastic performance of the
low-alloy steel head base
material or for the membrane
pressure capability of
unsupported cladding
Primary membrane and
primary membrane plus
bending stress through the
center of the remaining
ligament for increasing
volumes of wastage
10-82
Wastage Tolerance Calculation
Finite Element Analysis Results
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
0 50 100 150 200 250
Head Volume Removed (in
3
)
L
i
n
e
a
r
i
z
e
d

S
t
r
e
s
s

I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y

(
k
s
i
)
Pm + Pb
Sm = 26.7 ksi
1.5Sm = 40.0 ksi
Pm
The results show that
about 150 in
3
of
material loss from the
top surface of the head
can be lost without
exceeding the ASME
Code allowable
stresses
Results are
representative for
other vessels because
of high diameter to
thickness ratio
assumed
10-83
Davis-Besse Experience
Sectioning Plan for Wastage Cavity Adjacent Nozzle #3
0
180
90
270
B
A
C
D
E
x
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n

o
f

t
h
e

R
e
a
c
t
o
r

V
e
s
s
e
l

(
R
V
)

H
e
a
d

D
e
g
r
a
d
a
t
i
o
n

a
t

D
a
v
i
s
-
B
e
s
s
e
,
F
i
n
a
l

R
e
p
o
r
t
,

B
W
X
T

S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
,

I
n
c
.
,

L
y
n
c
h
b
u
r
g
,

V
A
:

2
0
0
3
.

1
1
4
0
-
0
2
5
-
0
2
-
2
4
.

10-84
Summary
After the 1993 vessel head cleaning, the first evidence of leakage from
the head was reported at 10RFO in 1996. The boric acid deposits
were such that they blocked visual inspection of 4 of the 69 nozzles,
including nozzle #3. Therefore, the leakage in 1996 was many times
larger than that required to be detectable through bare metal visual
(BMV) inspection.
The timeline documents several indications that it took more than two
years of operation after the 1996 refueling outage for the leak rate to
increase to the 0.1 gpm considered necessary for rapid corrosion of
relatively large areas of the head:
The progression of the unidentified primary system leakage rate,
Video evidence of the increase in the size of the pile of boric acid deposits on the head
surface,
Clogging of the containment air coolers, and
Plugging of the containment radiation monitor filters
10-85
Summary (Continued)
On this basis, a BMV inspection at 1.52.0 year intervals would have
detected the leakage at least four years prior to the relatively large
volume of wastage being discovered at 13RFO in 2002, assuming a
hypothetical timing of refueling outages such that the boric acid
accumulation was just missed in 1996.
The presence of red-colored boric acid deposits on the vessel flange
at 11RFO in 1998 was another indicator that the situation warranted
evaluation because a red or orange color for boric acid deposits
indicates the presence of iron corrosion products, whereas boric acid
deposits that do not incorporate corrosion products are white in
appearance.
The Davis-Besse experience supports the conclusion that BMV
examinations performed at appropriate intervals with appropriate
corrective action as required are sufficient to prevent significant
wastage.
10-86
Summary (Continued)
Plants with lower head temperatures than Davis-Besse would tend to
require more time to reach equivalent conditions due to lower crack
growth rates.
10-87
Other CRDM Nozzle Experience
55 Leaking CRDM Nozzles in U.S.
34 were repaired with a method that exposes the bore wall.
Three of the Davis-Besse nozzles had evidence of wastage
The large Davis-Besse cavity adjacent to nozzle #3.
The wastage around Davis-Besse nozzle #2 with maximum dimensions of 4 inches by 3/8 inch
by 2 inches.
The wastage around nozzle #1 was less than 1/16 inch deep.
In the remaining nozzles (31), wastage of the low-alloy steel would have likely been observed, if
present.
NDE techniques have identified leakage pathways through the interference
zone of many leaking CRDM nozzles. This may be evidence of small
amounts of wastage in the surrounding head material.
In two cases, visible but small wastage volumes have been observed
(estimated < 1 in
3
of wastage):
A small cavity was visible in the low-alloy steel material at the bottom of the annulus that was
approximately 3/16" deep.
Some minor material loss was visible at the top head surface adjacent to the nozzle.
Only the wastage adjacent to Davis-Besse nozzle #3 was structurally
significant.
10-88
Other CRDM Nozzle Experience
Summary (continued)
Most of the 55 leaking nozzles were discovered during the first BMV
examination:
BMV examinations were not performed regularly in the industry until late 2000.
Based on the number of leaking nozzles and the size of the observed cracking, it
is likely that many of the 34 CRDM nozzles (that were repaired in a manner that
would likely have revealed significant wastage had it been present) were leaking
for at least two operating cycles.
The experience with leaking CRDM nozzles supports the conclusion
that BMV examinations performed at appropriate intervals are
sufficient to prevent significant wastage.
10-89
Other PWSCC Experience
Summary
Other Alloy 600 penetrations and Alloy 182/82 welds in the primary
system have developed leaks, including the following:
Pressurizer instrument nozzles
Pressurizer safe end nozzles
Pressurizer heater sleeves
RCS hot leg instrument nozzles
RCS reactor hot-leg piping nozzle butt welds
Reactor vessel closure head thermocouple nozzles
Despite over 100 of these components reported to have leaked due
to PWSCC, structurally significant wastage of the surrounding low-
alloy steel material has never been reported.
The repair activities that were performed subsequent to such
leakage being detected would generally have been expected to
reveal significant wastage given the guidance developed by plants
regarding boric acid corrosion following NRC Generic Letter 88-05.
10-90
Other PWSCC Experience
Summary (continued)
The most significant example of wastage occurring due to PWSCC at
a location other than the reactor vessel closure head is the ANO 2
heater sleeve experience in 1987. Wastage of the low-alloy steel
bottom pressurizer head approximately 1.5 inches in diameter and
0.75 inch deep occurred over an operating period of approximately six
months. The wastage volume is estimated to be less than 1 in
3
.
The VC Summer experience in 2000 for the leak in the reactor hot leg
Alloy 182 nozzle safe end weld showed visible corrosion of the low-
alloy steel nozzle material, but not enough to be measured, despite
the accumulation of more than 200 pounds of boron deposits.
The experience with other leaking Alloy 600/82/182 components
supports the conclusion that BMV examinations performed at
appropriate intervals are sufficient to prevent significant wastage.
10-91
Wastage Modeling
Summary
Deterministic and probabilistic wastage models were developed as a
check on the conclusion based on plant experience that BMV
examinations performed at appropriate intervals provide adequate
protection against significant head wastage
The wastage models assume the existence of a leaking CRDM nozzle
The deterministic model conservatively estimates the time from
leakage that is detectable by BMV examination until rapid wastage
could occur
The probabilistic model considers the wastage rate as a function of
leak rate on a probabilistic basis
10-92
Wastage Modeling
Volume of Boron Deposits Released
A simple boron mass
balance indicates the
volume of deposits
released as a function of
leak rate and cycle length
The plot at right is based
on an average boron
concentration in the
primary coolant over the
fuel cycle of 750 ppm
0.1
1.
10.
100.
1,000.
10,000.
100,000.
1,000,000.
1.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00
Leak Rate (gpm)
V
o
l
u
m
e

o
f

B
o
r
i
c

A
c
i
d

D
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
R
e
l
e
a
s
e
d

D
u
r
i
n
g

F
u
e
l

C
y
c
l
e

(
i
n
3
)
18-month Fuel Cycle
24-month Fuel Cycle
Cycle average boron concentration of 750 ppm and
zero deposit porosity assumed. The density of boric
acid crystals is 1.44 g/cm
3
(0.052 lb/in
3
).
Assumed sensitivity of bare metal
visual (BMV) leak inspections:
10 in
3
( lb) of boric acid deposits
5 in
3
( lb) lower bound
20 in
3
(1 lb) upper bound
10-93
Wastage Modeling
Probabilistic Model Results
Median results of the
model are consistent with
the typical plant
experience for leaking
CRDM nozzles showing
little or no wastage
The model shows high
confidence that Code
allowable stresses would
not be exceeded given a
leaking nozzle and
periodic bare metal visual
examinations performed at
an appropriate interval
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.001 0.01 0.1 1. 10. 100.
Size of Wastage Cavity at Time of Detection (in
3
)
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n

F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
,

F
1.5 EFPY Fuel Cycles
2.0 EFPY Fuel Cycles
Bare metal visual (BMV) examinations
performed every refueling outage for a
plant with a head temperature of 605F
The probability of the wastage cavity size exceeding
the allowable wastage volume of ~150 in
3
is less than
1u10
-4
for both 1.5 and 2.0 EFPY cycles.
10-94
Head Wastage Evaluations
Conclusions
Shows that adequate protection against boric acid wastage
is provided by bare metal visual examinations performed at
appropriate intervals.
Evaluation is supported by the experience with over 50
leaking CRDM nozzles, including the observation of the
Davis-Besse wastage cavity.
10-95
Conclusions
10-96
Conclusions of MRP Safety Assessment Work
Axial nozzle cracking leading to nozzle rupture is not a
credible failure mechanism.
Critical axial crack length is much greater than the height of the nozzle region
subject to welding residual stresses
Significant margin exists against nozzle ejection due to the
amount of time required for a circumferential crack to grow
to critical size.
Periodic bare metal visual examinations at an appropriate
interval provide assurance against significant wastage of the
low-alloy steel head material.
10-97
Conclusions of MRP Safety Assessment Work
(cont'd)
A program of nonvisual NDE and bare metal visual
examinations at appropriate intervals provides adequate
protection against safety-significant failures.
In addition, the probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM)
analyses (MRP-105) show a low probability of pressure
boundary leakage.
10-98
Advances in NDE of Alloy 182 Components
PWSCC of Alloy 600
2005 International Conference & Exhibition
March 7-10, 2005
Frank Ammirato
EPRI
ABSTRACT
In response to several issues that have emerged relative to materials degradation in
operating nuclear plants in the US, the industrys executives have launched a new major
initiative to comprehensively and aggressively address this critical strategic issue. Under
the Industry Initiative on Management of Materials Issues, the US nuclear industry has
allocated significant resources above current efforts to focus, coordinate, and accelerate
the industrys attention to materials degradation. Each organization servicing the nuclear
industry was then tasked to perform a self-assessment to identify gaps between the
current capability of technology and the level that is required to address the damage
mechanisms and materials in the Degradation Matrix. The Materials Initiative then
allocated resources to bridge the most critical gaps.
NDE was recognized early on as a key technology in the Materials Initiative strategy.
Reliable NDE is a fundamental consideration for safe, reliable, and economic operation
of nuclear plants in the following ways:
x Assessing the structural integrity of components
x Monitoring the fleet of operating plants for early identification of material
degradation trends
x Developing and implementing rational and effective inspection strategies
x Providing accurate and timely information to plant owners to enable evaluation of
repair, reinspection, or replacement options.
Under the Materials Initiative, programs are now in place to accelerate the
development, qualification, and implementation of innovative NDE devices and
techniques. This paper will describe the scope of the Materials Initiative with special
attention to the NDE developments it is sponsoring. Since many of the identified gaps
are associated with NDE of nickel-based materials and weldments, the paper will focus
on this challenging aspect in particular.
10-99
Advances in NDE of Alloy 182
Components
PWSCC of Alloy 600
2005 International Conference &
Exhibition
March 7-10, 2005
Frank Ammirato
EPRI
10-100
Outline
Background
R&D efforts to improve NDE of Alloy 600/182 locations
Butt welds
Vessel head penetrations
Conclusions
10-101
Overview
Self-assessments of industry Issue Programs, including the
NDE Center, directed by the Materials Initiative identified
gaps in NDE technology pertaining to Alloy 600/182 butt
welds and VHPs
EPRI utility advisors assigned high priority to improving
NDE for these applications
MTAG/MEOG (Materials Initiative) provided additional
funding in 2004 and 2005 to augment & accelerate the
work
Focus
R&D to improve NDE
Qualification of inspection teams
Parallel paths are being pursued to increase the chance for
success and to speed up delivery of solutions
10-102
Capsule Summary of the Technical
Gaps-Alloy 600/182 NDE
Flaw detection limitations due to configuration
Ex., Tapers, rough surfaces, adjacent welds, access
Flaw sizing does not meet Code requirements in all
situations
Lack of knowledge of configurations
Qualification of NDE is specific to configuration
Unavailability of qualified NDE affects
Code compliance
Implementation of MRP ISI Guidelines
Accurate interpretation of ISI results
Detection & sizing are reliable when
access and surface conditions
are adequate for ISI
10-103
Complex Configurations Compound NDE
Difficulties-Example
36" PWR STEAM GENERATOR NOZZLE CONFI GURATI ON ( 711/ X)
316 SS
304L SS CLADDI NG
316
I NCONEL182 OR 82
308 SS
SA 216
27. 5" I D
27. 75" I D
35. 6" OD
3. 5
1. 35
Proximity of welds means
the beam must travel
though both welds and
buttering
10-104
Inadequate Contact on Uneven Surfaces
Reduces NDE Effectiveness
Smaller footprint improves contact,
but contact can still be a problem
10-105
Regular profile
Irregular profile
0 dB
45
Nominal beam
characteristics
Illustration of Effect of Poor Contact
30
-12 dB
Coupling
-10 dB
Variable coupling
0
Degraded and distorted
beam
10-106
Actual Configuration
Second weld not in design
drawing
Note waviness
10-107
NDE Project Overviews
10-108
EMAT Development, Expansion, and
Acceleration
Objective: Take advantage of the power of SH waves for
more effective examination of DM welds using EMAT
generation (ElectroMagnetic Acoustic Transducer)
Tasks:
Solicit EMAT concepts
Prototype EMAT-SH probes have been successful
Needs
Improve coupling, power
Higher frequency
Smaller footprint/flexibility
Interference immunity
Application development & qualification
10-109
Ultrasonic Techniques for Examining Dissimilar
Metal and Other Alloy 600 Welds with Rough or
Wavy Outside Surfaces
Objective: Develop & qualify probes & scanning devices
capable of examining DM and other butt welds with uneven
outside surfaces
Tasks-
Solicit probe/scanner concepts
Assessment
Qualification
10-110
Implementation of Phased Array Examination of
Dissimilar Metal Piping Welds
Objective: Qualify phased array UT procedures for range of
existing mockups according to Appendix VIII of ASME
Section XI
Tasks-
Select vendor for first phase-existing qualification scope
(smooth outside surfaces)
Laboratory preparation for qualification
Appendix VIII qualification
Second Phase- extend to complex configurations.
10-111
Dissimilar Metal Weld NDE Mockups
Containing Realistic Weld Crown Conditions
Objective: Prepare mockups representative of complex as-
installed DM butt weld configurations to support R&D and
qualification activities
Tasks:
Configuration data gathering
Design & fabricate first-phase mockup set to assess
chance for success of NDE R&D
Design & fabricate DM qualifications mockups
10-112
Ultrasonic Transducer Research
Objective: Challenge & support transducer manufacturers
to develop enhanced conventional transducer technology
for application to dissimilar metal butt weld NDE
Tasks:
Use advanced modeling to design & evaluate probe
parameters that have promise to overcome geometric
limitations to effective examination
Build & evaluate prototype probes
If successful, proceed to qualification and technology
transfer
10-113
Computer Modeling of Complex
Configuration-Probe Design Concept
10-114
Surface Examination of Nickel Alloy Welds
Objective: Enhance the capability of eddy current array
probe technology for application of VHP J-Groove welds
and DM butt welds
Tasks-
Development of next generation liquid-filled ET array
probes for BMI and CRDM application
ET array probe development and evaluation for butt weld
application
Development & assessment of non-scanning ET probes
for complex butt weld geometries
Revisit ET analysis techniques for minimization of false
calls in Nickel Alloy weld exams
10-115
Surface Exams of Nickel Alloy Welds
Proposed NDE Center Program Expansion
Liquid filled ET array technology for
RPV top and bottom head exams
Modifications based on lessons
learned at Watts Bar
Technique for minimization of
false calls
Evaluation under submerged
conditions
Develop ET array technology for
DM welds
Develop ET technology for difficult
to access welds
Feasibility of Mat-type ET array
(no scanner required)
BMI Field Trial at Watts Bar No. 2
10-116
NDE Technology and Measurement of SCC
Objective: Use advanced electromagnetic methods to
assess material degradation prior to emergence of
macroscopic cracking & to assess effectiveness of chemical
or mechanical mitigation approaches
Tasks:
Laboratory studies on field-removed samples & mockups
Fabricate new samples with gradation of degradation
Sensor refinement & assessment
On-site performance testing
10-117
What is NDE for Material Characterization?
Addresses need for early NDE detection, assessment, and
monitoring of incipient stages of material degradation to allow
timely remedial measures
Before the fact: material characterization
After the fact: flaw characterization
Applicable to all material types initial focus on
SS 304/316
Alloy 600/182 materials
Damage forms addressed
Fatigue cracking
Stress corrosion cracking
Also applicable for assessing effectiveness of mitigation
10-118
Dissimilar Metal Weld Configuration
Database
Objective: Develop & implement a database of DM butt
weld configurations to:
Assist in determining whether additional mock-ups are
required to address the actual configurations that exist in the
field,
Assist in planning for alternative examinations if needed,
Assist in planning for the application of various mitigation
processes
Tasks-
Design & populate database
Develop standard queries
Implementation
10-119
Background
MRP
Materials Reliability Program Primary System Piping Butt
Weld I&E Guideline
Augmented Inspection Program
More frequent examinations required for many welds
Effectiveness of examination is a primary factor in
determining frequency of examination
Adequate coverage obtained?
Are qualified techniques applicable to configuration?
Actual configuration information critical factor in making
determination
10-120
Background
MRP Survey
MRP 2003-39
MRP requested all PWR owners to gather useful plant-
specific information on joint configurations and access to
prepare for future volumetric examinations
Applicability to qualified Procedures
Access to examination (Automated/Manual)
MRP 2004-038
MRP requested all PWR owners to send all walk down
information gathered to EPRI so it can be compiled and
sorted into a useable format
MRP 2004-05 raised this to a good practice for the industry
following the issuance of Implementation Protocol
Similar action in BWRVIP
10-121
Enhanced Statistical Analysis Capabilities of
Performance Demonstration Qualification Data
Objective: Enable statistical analysis of NDE performance data
to support current industry materials programs such as MRP,
BWRVIP and MTAG
Tasks-
Convert existing databases into a flexible format
V&V
Design standard queries and custom query builder
10-122
Capabilities
At the completion of the project the following capabilities will
exist
Easy evaluation of pass rates for various types of
qualifications sorted by 1
st
, 2
nd
and 3
rd
attempts
Evaluation of overall performance sorted in numerous ways
Passed/Failed
Evaluation of performance for specific procedures
Manual verses automated
Data will be able to sorted to evaluate the effect of a specific
variable or a combination of variables
Configuration
Access condition
Material type
Flaw mechanism
Flaw orientation
Weld crown condition
Flaw location
10-123
Inspection Methodology for Pressurizer Nozzles
Objective: Ensure availability of qualified NDE-(procedures,
mockups, personnel) for dissimilar metal welds in
pressurizer system
High temperature
Small diameter
Tasks-
Identify range of configurations and gaps in existing PDI
mockup set
Design & build additional mockups if needed, develop
and evaluate NDE techniques
10-124
Inspection Methodology for Pressurizer Nozzles
2004 -
Available field data reviewed from actual pressurizer nozzle
configurations
Recommendations made for PDI to build additional pressurizer
nozzle mockups including:
Surge nozzles*
Spray nozzles*
Safety/Relief nozzles*
* Emphasis on designs containing tapered weld
configurations with related geometry including adjacent
welds.
2005 - NDEC & PDI designing and fabricating additional
pressurizer nozzle mockups
10-125
Conclusions
Improving and qualifying NDE for Alloy 600/182 locations is
receiving high priority in 2005 and 2006 work plans
Multiple parallel paths are being pursued to develop new
Probes
Techniques
Scanning devices
Enhancement of existing library of mockups for technique
development & qualification
Intense effort to qualify inspection procedures and personnel
Industry wide effort (BWER and PER) to assess as-built butt
weld configurations
10-126
Experience in Reactor Head Nozzle and J Weld Inspections
J. P. Lareau
20 International Dr.
Windsor, CT 06095
Phone-860-731-1605
Fax-860-731-1678
e-mail-john.p.lareau@us.westinghouse.com
Donald Adamonis
Westinghouse-WesDyne International
Per Sjoberg
Westinghouse-WesDyne-TRC
Paul Kreitman
Westinghouse-PCI
Westinghouse has provided a comprehensive inspection strategy for the various nozzle
configurations and j welds in reactor pressure vessel heads (RPVH) as well as the bottom
mounted instrumentation nozzles (BMI) in the lower head. The diversity in configuration
and geometry has provided considerable challenges for both the NDE techniques and the
mechanical delivery tooling. In addition, there have been considerable demands for the
training of inspection crews to meet an inspection program that has been averaging one
campaign per month for the last three years, including plants on three continents.
The inspection strategy is coupled with repair techniques, should the need arise. Both pre
and post repair inspection capabilities are provided. As part of the repair technology, a
robotically delivered remote fluorescent dye penetrant testing (FPT) system is provided.
This FPT system is coupled with a vision system to measure indications to satisfy the
requirements of the ASME Code.
For control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles, the primary inspection probe is a
blade with tip diffraction (TOFD) and straight beam ultrasonic crystals along with and
eddy current coil. This combination provides complete coverage for the detection of ID
or OD initiated flaws.
For open housing CEDMs, the base probe configuration adds additional TOFD
arrangements. An OD scanner is also available in order to increase coverage behind the
funnel attachment threads. This provides utilities with the ability to satisfy the inspection
requirements in accordance with the recent NRC inspection order, EA-03-009 Rev 1.
A combination of specialized j groove scanners provides eddy current test capability for
the j groove weld and nozzle OD. This has been used extensively to confirm the
10-127
presence of wetted surface connectivity for TOFD indications detected during the ID
scanning.
For the BMI inspections, three options are provided. In conjunction with a 10 year ISI,
the probe is attached to the same robot (SUPREEM) that is used for vessel inspection. A
second option is a pole delivery system from the refueling deck, which requires the
internals to be removed. A third option, provided in conjunction with Tecnatom, has the
ability to perform the inspection with the internals in place. In all cases, a combination of
TOFD, straight beam and eddy current sensors are included in a single inspection head.
10-128
Slide 1
Experience in Reactor Head
Nozzle and J Weld Inspections
J. P. Lareau
March, 2005
10-129
Slide 2
RPVH Inspection Technology
z Inspection Approach from ID
TOFD UT for OD Flaws and Sizing
Eddy Current Testing for ID Flaws
0 Degree UT for Leak Path
Confirmatory UT methods
z Inspection Approach from OD
Eddy Current Testing for Detection and/or
confirmation of ID Results
Weld surface and Nozzle OD Coverage
10-130
Slide 3
Open Housing Scanner Offers Eddy
Current and TOF Inspection Capability
10-131
Slide 4
Westinghouse Triple Combo
Blade Probe
zThree examinations
performed simultaneously:
PCS 24 TOFD ultrasonic
examination of
penetration tube
Eddy current
examination of
penetration tube ID
surface
Straight beam ultrasonic
examination for leak path
identification
Crosswound
ECT Coil
Straight Beam
UT Probe
PCS 24 TOFD
Transducer Pair
10-132
Slide 5
Gapscanners for Sleeved
Penetrations
z Blade probes are delivered into
the annulus between the the ID
surface of the penetration and
OD surface of the thermal
sleeve, on the order of 0.125
inches
z The Gapscanner end effectors
can be used with a variety of
eddy current and ultrasonic
blade probes for inspection and
characterization
Eddy current probes
TOFD ultrasonic probes
Combination TOFD/ECT
probes
Pulse-echo ultrasonic
probes
10-133
Slide 6
J-Weld and Penetration Tube
OD EC Inspection
Over 600 j
groove welds
inspected in
US plants
10-134
Slide 7
OD Confirmatory Testing and
Increased Coverage
Volumetric UT
from Nozzle OD
Increased
coverage to
meet NRC
Order
Confirmatory
testing
10-135
Slide 8
WesDyne/TRC BMI
Inspection System
z Requires removal of lower internals
z Placed on the penetration with
long-handled tools
z Lifted with the fuel crane (or other
available crane)
z The manipulator is supported by
the long-handled tools and
centered directly to the penetration
10-136
Slide 9
Tecnatom BMI Inspection
System
z BMI Scanner
Two servo-controlled reversible
movements with end of strokes
and position references.
Light-weight casings
Water-tight
Self-centering
inspection module
10-137
Slide 10
SUPREEM BMI Inspection
System
z Perform Concurrently with 10
Year Reactor Vessel ISI
z Lower Platform Finishes in
Advance of Upper
z Use Lower Platform Down Time
10-138
Slide 11
Penetration Tube ID Eddy
Current Results
10-139
Slide 12
PCS24 TOFD UT Results
OD Circumferential OD Axial
10-140
Slide 13
Leak Path Identification
z Not applicable to BMI
inspections
z Possible leak path
identified with straight
beam, high frequency
ultrasonics
z Leak path leads to loss
of shrink fit integrity and
a resulting increase in
reflectivity
z Diagnostic tool rather
than a primary inspection
method
10-141
Slide 14
Penetration Tube OD ECT
and ID TOFD Results
10-142
Slide 15
J-Groove Weld ECT Results
10-143
Slide 16
Reactor Vessel Head PT
Results
10-144
Slide 17
Inspection and Repair
History-US Plants
z RPVH Inspection
32 ISIs performed since initial bulletin
1776 volumetric exams of nozzles
55 ET surface exams (w/o UT) of nozzles
616 J weld ET surface exams
z RPVH Repair
2 RPVH replaced due to weld cracking
2 welds repaired with embedded flaw overlay
10 nozzle OD indications repaired with overlay
10-145
Slide 18
Post repair NDE-Embedded
Flaw
ID exam-same as pre
repair
OD exam-PT (Thermal
Imaging in the future)
10-146
Slide 19
Remote PT of Embedded
Flaw Repair
Remote delivery of
fluorescent dye penetrant
system
10-147
Thermal Imaging for the Detection of PWSCC in Alloy 82/182 Welds
J. P. Lareau
Windsor, CT 06095
Phone-860-731-1605
Fax-860-731-1678
Email: john.p.lareau@us.westinghouse.com
Warren Junker
Abstract
The detection of PWSCC Alloy 82/182 welds in the primary system has been a constant
challenge, especially with the difficult geometry of the j groove welds in reactor pressure
vessel head penetrations. At present the options are a dose intensive penetrant test or a
mechanically difficult surface riding eddy current test.
A thermal imaging technique has been developed to provide a non contacting remote
inspection method. A scanning fiber based laser source provides spot heating of the
weldment while an infrared camera measures the heat diffusion in both space and time.
Uniform, symmetric diffusion would be expected in a PWSCC free surface while
perturbations of this pattern would result from the presence of cracking. The laser
scanning is effected by a simple rotary motion for one axis and an oscillating mirror for
the other. By use of the mirror, complex geometries can be scanned without the need for
sophisticated surface following mechanisms. Since the laser wavelength is in the visible
spectrum, the intensity of the laser spot does not interfere with the camera operating in
the infrared spectrum, so both heating and imaging can be performed simultaneously.
In laboratory tests, each sample of PWSCC in actual welds was successfully imaged with
the camera mounted 1-2 m away from the part. The image processing provides a near
real time C scan presentation.
10-149
Slide 1
Thermal Imaging for the Detection of
PWSCC in Alloy 82/182 Welds
J.P. Lareau
March, 2005
10-150
Slide 2
Thermal Techniques
z A non-contact technique for detection of surface
breaking discontinuities.
Complements eddy current techniques for complex
geometries where tooling is an issue
z Proposed implementation via Flying Spot technique.
Discontinuities are identified as spatial and temporal
perturbations in the heat diffusion
10-151
Slide 3
Thermal Techniques-
Experimental Apparatus
10-152
Slide 4
Principles of Thermal Detection
z In the presence of a
discontinuities the heat
flow becomes
asymmetric.
Heat Flow
LASER
Spot
Crack
z In the absence of
discontinuities the heat flow
is uniformly distributed
around the heat source.
10-153
Slide 5
Principles of Thermal Detection
z The asymmetric heat flow
causes accentuated heating
that leads to an After Glow.
Heat Flow
LASER
Spot
Crack
After Glow
10-154
Slide 6
Thermal Image Processing
Input Image of After Glow Processed Image showing
cracks
Motion
Motion
10-155
Slide 7
Thermal Inspection
z Data Acquisition Computer
z Solid State Visible Light
Laser
10-156
Slide 8
Thermal Inspection-Lab
z IR-Camera (up to 2 m
aaway)
z X-Y-Z Scanning Tank
z Fiber-optic Light delivery
z Analysis Computer
10-157
Slide 9
Thermal Inspection Using
Mirror Optics
Laser Optics
Sample
Mirror
Camera
10-158
Slide 10
Thermal Inspection
z Fiber-Optic Delivery
z Focusing Lens (Coated
Optics)
z Transport Mast
z Visible spectrum to prevent
I/R camera signal saturation
10-159
Slide 11
Inspection Parameters
z Surface Emissivity
z Inspection Rate
z Temperature Rise
Optics depth of field
Laser Power and wavelength
10-160
Slide 12
Thermal Imaging Results
Measurement Points
Laser Spot
Dye Penetrant Thermal C-Scan
Image Processing
Eddy Current C-Scan (100kHz)
10-161
Slide 13
Sample 3-11 (Fatigue Crack)
Thermal C-
Scans
EC 500 kHz
Oxidized Oxidized +Paint
10-162
Slide 14
EPRI Sample Tight Notch
EC 500 kHz
Thermal C-
Scans
10-163
Slide 15
EPRI Sample X Notches
EC 500 kHz
Thermal C-
Scans
10-164
Slide 16
EPRI PWSCC Sample
With
Mirror
Direct
View
10-165
Slide 17
Thermal Techniques
z Status
All Equipment for Thermal inspection received and
experiments are proceeding.
All available EPRI/MRP samples have been scanned
z Issues
Thermal imaging not yet recognized as a surface exam in
the NRC Order
10-166
Slide 18
Thermal Inspection (Future)
z Evaluate alternate wavelengths and power levels
z Perform an MRP demonstration for proof of principle
z Couple to robotic delivery system
z Optimize data processing
10-167
11
SESSION 5A: MITIGATION METHODS
This session reviewed work completed or underway to identify and qualify methods for
mitigating the occurrence of PWSCC in Alloy 600/82/132/182 parts in PWRs. Summaries of the
presentations of the participants are given below followed by the questions asked, responses
Laser Peening: A Surface Stress Improvement Technique for Alloy 600
PWSCC Mitigation, presented by A. Demma, EPRI (Paper 5A.1)
This presentation was given and written by A. Demma of EPRI. The main points made during
x This presentation reviewed how peening technologies fit into the array of available PWSCC
mitigation methods, describes the how and why peening is used, and discusses the status of
development of peening for use in the nuclear power industry.
x EPRI has a peening project directed at development of peening methods for mitigation of
PWSCC of Alloy 600. The project is investigating three peening processes (cavitation
peening, laser peening, and fiber laser peening) for use on Alloy 600 and its weld metals.
Two laser peening vendors are involved (Toshiba and Metal Improvement Company (MIC)).
The tests involve residual stress measurements, tests on flat plates, welded plates, pipes, and
a BMI mock-up. It is planned to provide a topical report to the NRC at the end of 2005 with
laser peening, cavitation peening, and abrasive water jet peening results.
x The current status of laser peening was summarized as follows:
Laser peening is commercially deployed in the aeronautics industry. Vendors include
LSP Technologies, Inc. (LSP) and MIC, and customers using laser peening include the
United States Air Force (USAF), General Electric (GE), Rolls Royce (RR), etc. There is
also interest in use of laser peening by the oil industry.
Fiber laser peening is now available in the nuclear industry from Toshiba, who has
applied it in Japanese BWR and PWR plants. The applications include core shroud welds
and bottom head control rod drive (CRD) stub tubes in BWRs and bottom mounted
instruments (BMIs) and reactor vessel nozzle-pipe welds in PWRs.
Laser peening or fiber laser peening could be one of the processes used for Alloy 600
PWSCC mitigation in American and European PWRs.
11-1
x Question (J. Gorman): Can fiber laser peening (FLP) treat the OD of J-groove welds on
bottom mounted instrument (BMI) nozzles?
Response (A. Demma): FLP has not been applied to the outside area around the J-groove
weld of BMI nozzles to date. At Ikata Unit 1 of Shikoku Electric Power Co., only the inner
surfaces were fiber laser peened at the end of 2004. But, from a technical point of view, it
should be possible to treat the outside of the J-groove weld on BMI nozzles with FLP.
Toshiba Corp. is currently developing a 3-D robotic system for delivering FLP to this
location. It would be preferable to treat both ID and OD surfaces of the nozzle/J-groove
weldments, as it is not clear if crack initiation occurs on the ID, OD, or both.
x Comment (P. Andresen): Surface deformation/compression techniques should be used with
caution. A change in residual stress inherently involves plasticity, which aggravates SCC (all
else being equalincluding stress). Peening also must create tensile stress, both in depth and
often around the periphery of the affected surface. In general, existing cracks grow faster,
and the threshold depth (for accelerated crack growth) scales with the depth of the "peening"
process. Perhaps the greatest concern, which is rarely if ever evaluated in tests, is the "wash
out" of thin compressive layers as a result of creep, cycling and plasticity in high temperature
water. This may be a particular concern in welds because of the large weld residual stresses,
and aggravated if there is differential thermal expansion (e.g., in ferrite containing stainless
steel welds) and after repeated startups and shutdowns. Clearly there are success stories, but
less often documented are the disappointments which often relate to the issues above coupled
with challenges in application to real components.
Response (A. Demma): I agree that tensile stresses must be present, generally in depth
below the surface compressive stresses, in order to satisfy stress equilibrium requirements.
Stress measurements (like the contour method) or process modeling (using the eigenstrain
method) can provide maps of stresses to answer the question of the resulting stresses in
complex geometries subjected to peening.
To address the issue of stress change around the periphery of the treated surface, the
intensity of peening can be progressively reduced by decreasing the number of peening
layers at the periphery, for example.
Concerning the "wash out" of stresses due to creep or cyclic loading, we plan to perform
some SCC testing at high temperature to address the issue of stress relaxation. Also, fatigue
life improvement is currently the main application for laser peening (for the aeronautics
industry). Testing and finite element analyses could be performed to answer these issues for
specific components and loading conditions.
x Comment (J. Gorman): Shot peening of steam generator tubes has worked well for 15+
years in plants where it was applied before operation. It has continued to provide protection
against PWSCC of Alloy 600 tubes despite experiencing many shutdownstartup cycles.
x Question (S. Fyfitch): (1) What was the precrack depth in the U-bend test? (2) Do you have
long-term autoclave tests planned in primary water or doped steam with similar specimens?
Response (A. Demma): The precracked SCC U-bend specimens were all exposed to sodium
thiosulfate until cracked, e.g., for about 24 hours. Then, for the "precracked then laser
peened" condition, half of the surface of the stressed region was laser peened, while the other
11-2
half was not. After immersing the precracked specimens in the room temperature thiosulfate
solution, the cracks located in the unpeened region grew extensively, while the cracks located
in the peened area did not appear to grow further. This testing was very qualitative. To
answer the second part of your question, we need to perform some SCC testing in a high
temperature environment (to answer the potential concern of stress relaxation). These tests
could be performed using the doped steam method. However, we would prefer to perform
these tests in a simulated primary water environment at elevated temperature (around 360C
(680F)). In this accelerated test in a primary water environment, we expect to be able to
apply the factor of improvement between peened and unpeened specimens determined using
the tests at 360C (680F) to the BMI service temperature (approximately 290C (554F)).
x Question (H. Offer): What are the plans to qualify laser peening for off-normal field
application conditions, considering that the process is applied point-wise and therefore may
be more sensitive to local surface anomalies in contour, finish, and pre-existing stress
conditions?
Response (A. Demma): A lot of testing has already been performed of "off-normal"
conditions. For example, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has investigated
the effect of varying the incidence angle. The incidence angle can vary more than 50 from
the surface normal without affecting the resulting residual stress. It is important to note laser
peening is based on the interaction of photons with the material, therefore this process is very
suitable for use in difficult geometries and for a range of surface roughness.
In aerospace applications of laser peening in air, the laser pulse intensity is recorded for
each spot, so that if a spot is not sufficiently treated, the robotic system comes back to treat it
again. The fiber laser peening system uses a water proof camera system to confirm the laser
peening area. In our current testing plan, we will address the result of peening techniques on
pre-existing stress conditions from welding.
Application of Surface Stress Improvement for the Mitigation of Alloy 600
PWSCC, presented by R. Payne, Framatome ANP (Paper 5A.2)
This presentation was given by R. Payne and was written by R. Payne and S. Levesque of
Framatome ANP. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x This presentation reviewed developments regarding three stress improvement (SI)
techniques: abrasive water jet conditioning, laser peening, and cavitation peening. It also
discussed the potential for using these techniques to ameliorate PWSCC in components made
of Alloy 600 and its weld metals.
x Per the MRP Butt Weld I&E Guidelines, SI techniques should only be applied to uncracked
weldments. When effective SI techniques are applied to uncracked weldments, they have the
potential of allowing inspection frequencies to be reduced.
x Abrasive water jet conditioning, laser peening, and cavitation peening all develop thin
compressive layers, with peak compressive stress of about 80 to 100 ksi (552 to 690 MPa).
Laser peening produces the thickest compressive layer (> 40 mils (> 1 mm)). The
compressive layer thicknesses produced by cavitation peening (~20 mils (~0.5 mm) and
11-3
abrasive water jet conditioning (~510 mils (~0.130.25 mm)) are greater than those
produced by typical glass bead peening (~2 mils (0.05 mm)).
x It is desirable for the process to remove undetected shallow defects. Abrasive water jet
conditioning removes about a 30 mils (0.8 mm) thick surface layer. The ablative properties
of cavitation peening are being investigated.
x SI techniques can be applied to many Alloy 600 components and weldmentsdepends on
access. The effectiveness can vary with the angle of incidence, which may be uncertain
because of part geometry variations. The effects of variations in the angle of incidence for
laser peening and cavitation peening are being investigated.
x Current discussion points regarding use of SI techniques for mitigation of PWSCC of Alloy
600 and its weld metals include:
How effective are SI techniques on service exposed material?
Can surface SI be applied for existing flaws with regulatory acceptance?
What are the effects of low cycle fatigue on surface treatment: Will "shakeout" occur,
and how will this vary depending on geometry, operating stress, and load transients?
Will SI techniques be shown by cost-benefit analyses to be cost effective, considering
total lifecycle costs and potential risks?
x Question (R. Jacko): Were the test results shown for cavitation peening performed with
wrought material or welded material?
Response (R. Payne): The work was performed using wrought material.
x Question (unidentified attendee): Can cavitation peening prevent PWSCC initiation caused
by relatively deep and high grinding-induced surface stresses?
Response (R. Payne): Grinding surface stresses can sometimes prevent peening from being
effective. For this reason, situations with deep and high residual stresses need to be
identified, and then ablative processes used to remove the hardened, high stress, surface layer
before peeing.
x Question (J. Lareau): Was laser peening done on oxidized or clean metal surfaces?
Response (R. Payne): Laser peening was mostly done using clean metal surfaces.
x Comment (J. Gorman): Service experience with pre-cracked steam generator tubes that were
shot peened in the 19861990 time period was relatively good. The peening was found to
reduce the rate of cracking, and caused no disasters.
11-4
The Applicability of MSIP for Mitigating PWSCC in Pressurizer Nozzle to
Safe-end Welds, presented by M. Badlani, AEA Technology Engineering
Services, Inc. (Paper 5A.3)
This presentation was given by M. Badlani and was written by M. Badlani and T. Damico of
AEA Technology Engineering Services, Inc., and Edward Ray of Westinghouse. The main
x This presentation reviewed the status of development of the Mechanical Stress Improvement
Process (MSIP) for use in PWR applications. The techniques involves mechanically
deforming weldments so as to put the susceptible ID surfaces into a compressive stress state.
It is considered to prevent initiation of SCC and to also prevent growth of pre-existing
cracks.
x MSIP has been used successfully in BWRs since 1986, and has been applied to over 1300
welds including 500 nozzle and safe-end welds.
x MSIP has been qualified by analysis and test for several PWR dissimilar metal weld
applications. It is expected to be ready for application to pressurizer nozzle welds by June
2005.
x Question (S. Fyfitch): Have you evaluated the effects of MSIP on nozzle locations that
have thermal sleeves?
Response (M. Badlani): Yes. We have included the thermal sleeve in our models and looked
at the effect of MSIP on these nozzle locations. The radial contraction imposed on the OD
by MSIP has been found to have minimal impact on the displacements at these locations.
x Question (G. Wilkowski): Have you done any sensitivity studies to examine the effect of
differences in strength of weld metal and ferritic material being greater than the stainless pipe
or safe end? Additionally, there could be ID weld repairs or ID surface grinding that affect
PWSCC.
Response (M. Badlani): Yes. We use the actual material properties for the various materials
in the finite element analyses. Additionally EPRI has run qualification tests on actual BWR
12" recirculation nozzle/safe-end mockups and demonstrated that MSIP
generates
compressive residual stresses in the inner dissimilar metal weld region and is an effective
process for mitigating stress corrosion cracking. The nozzle assembly used in the test was
taken from a cancelled BWR plant and so the materials, geometry and fabrication were
similar to those in actual service. Materials were: Nozzle SA5O8CL2, Safe-end SA182-
316L, and Weld 82/182.
This mockup had flaws implanted in the Alloy 82/182 butter as well as a representative
full thickness repair (~3 inches long) in the nozzle/safe-end weld to provide a region with
large tensile residual stresses. Residual stresses were measured before and after MSIP
in
the weld repair region. The results confirmed that MSIP
generated high compressive

residual stresses in both the hoop and axial directions.
See the Mockup Details, Flaw/Repair Details and Residual Stress Measurements by EPRI
(Figure 11-1).
11-5
Figure 11-1
Mockup Details, Flaw/Repair Details and Residual Stress Measurements
11-6
Figure 11-1
Mockup Details, Flaw/Repair Details and Residual Stress Measurements (contd)
11-7
Figure 11-1
11-8
Figure 11-1
11-9
Figure 11-1
11-10
Figure 11-1
11-11
Figure 11-1
11-12
x Question (J. Gorman): How do you assure that displacement is uniform around the
circumference? How uniform are the results?
Response (M. Badlani): The flexibility of the tooling assures that the displacement is fairly
uniform around the circumference. Diameter measurements every 45 around the
circumference have confirmed this in several tests. Moreover, both ANL (for USNRC) and
EPRI have measured stresses on MSIP treated specimens at 0 and 90 (ANL) and 0, 90,
180, and 270 (EPRI) and found them to be compressive and fairly uniform around the
circumference.
Preemptive Weld OverlaysA Cost Effective Solution to PWSCC Concerns
in PWR Piping System Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds, presented by P.
Riccardella, Structural Integrity Associates (Paper 5A.4)
This presentation was given and written by P. Riccardella of Structural Integrity Associates. The
main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x This presentation discussed the use of preemptive weld overlays (PWOLs) as a mitigating
measure against PWSCC at dissimilar metal nozzles. The technique involves application of a
weld overlay of Alloy 52 as either a full structural repair or as a thinner stress mitigating
technique. It is intended to allow augmented inspection frequencies to be reduced to normal
frequencies.
x Based on PWSCC experienced at dissimilar metal welds, the MRP is recommending
augmented inspections. Inspections are often difficult, and can require access from the ID.
x Many large diameter dissimilar metal welds utilized leak before break (LBB) arguments to
eliminate postulated breaks at that location from the licensing basis. However, NRC
guidance is that there should be no potential corrosion mechanism that could lead to cracking
and, if the piping is susceptible to SCC, that two effective mitigation methods must be used.
The NRC guidance further indicates that remedial stress improvement treatment alone is not
sufficient to support LBB evaluation, and that piping that had been repaired by weld overlays
would not qualify for LBB. However, PWOL is considered to provide two mitigation
methods (favorable residual stress reversal and structural reinforcement with resistant
material), and to thus support continued use of LBB.
x The status of PWOL development is as follows. Design requirements have been defined and
example calculations have been completed. A patent application has been submitted (patent
pending). An MRP contract has recently been awarded covering development of a mock-up
for residual stress confirmation, NDE demonstration, and preparation of a topical report for
submittal to the NRC. A meeting with the NRC to discuss PWOL has been scheduled.
11-13
x Question (M. Badlani): Did you investigate the effects of weld overlays on thermal sleeves?
Response (P. Riccardella): Weld overlays do not produce much radial deflection, and thus
are not expected to significantly affect thermal liners. We have applied weld overlays to
many BWR nozzles with thermal liners with no reported problems.
x Question (S. Fyfitch): Would the NRC care to comment regarding the statement made in this
presentation that preemptive weld overlays (PWOLs) provide "two means" of mitigation
(residual stress reversal plus application of a reinforcement layer of crack resistant material)
and the applicability of this statement to the Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.6.3 statement
regarding the desirability of their being two mitigation techniques?
Response (A. Hiser): The NRC has not as yet developed a final position on this topic. In
addition, it should be noted that SRP 3.6.3 is a draft document and is not a formal
requirement.
Response (P. Riccardella): We are meeting with the NRC next week, and working on a
topical report to obtain NRC approval. It's somewhat of an unusual licensing situation, since
we are not requesting relief from any existing requirement. We are just trying to establish
agreement that, if we perform this mitigating action, we will achieve the stated objectives
(Code inspection intervals, Code Case N-504-2 inspection volume, and preserve leak before
break (LBB)).
Comment (J. Riley): When evaluating how to address LBB, one should recognize that the
General Design Criteria (GDC) do not say that there must be two independent mitigation
methods. Rather, the GDC require that there be a low probability of cracking.
x Question (unidentified attendee): Please comment on the need for two mitigation methods
when applying LBB in the presence of SCC.
Response (P. Riccardella): Proving LBB does not necessarily require identification of two
mitigation methods if the system, structure, or component (SSC) is affected by SCC. Two
mitigation methods are discussed in the draft SRP and LBB rule statements under
consideration. The GDC requires a low probability of rupture and does not mention
mitigation methods.
x Question (G. Wilkowski): Need to consider that, for surge line LBB analyses, thermal
transient stresses were used and not seismic stresses.
Response (P. Riccardella): We will address the appropriate controlling stresses in our LBB
analyses of surge nozzles.
x Question (unidentified attendee): Did you include in-surge and out-surge transients in your
analysis of pressurizer surge nozzles?
Response (P. Riccardella): Yes. We have performed a complete fatigue analysis, covering
all applicable transients.
x Question (A. Demma): In the residual stress analysis described in your presentation, you
have considered the case of there having been an ID repair present in the weld. However,
have you considered the case of a crack being present before the application of the weld
11-14
overlay? This is to address the situation where there is of an undetected crack of a depth
larger than a critical depth based on UT technology for the geometry being considered.
Response (P. Riccardella): We have not covered this situation in the current program.
However, there was extensive work done on weld overlays (WOL) of cracked pipe welds in
the BWR program (since the weld overlays were primarily being used for repair of IGSCC
cracked pipes). One test, reported in EPRI NP-7103-D, involved placing a series of ID
notches ranging from 15% to 60% thru-wall in two sides of a large SS pipe weld. One half of
the pipe was exposed to boiling magnesium chloride. A WOL was then applied, and the
other half exposed. The results consistently showed cracking at the notch tips in the notches
exposed pre-WOL, and none in the notches exposed post-WOL.
x Question (T. Yonezawa): Your presentation is theoretically very clear. However, In the case
of on-site welding, there are often difficulties in achieving 100% successful welding. Do you
have any ideas for addressing problems associated with the overlay welding not being fully
successful? We consider that repair welding must not be permitted.
Response (P. Riccardella): My answer to this question is multi-fold:
1. We apply WOLs with very highly controlled automated welding processes which will
greatly reduce variability in the welding process.
2. There are over 500 WOLs in service on BWR welds with prior IGSCC cracking,
some of which have been in service for over 20 years. There has never been an
instance of the underlying cracking propagating into the inspection zone.
3. Finally, the PWOL does not depend exclusively on residual stresses. It provides the
"belt and suspenders" of a PWSCC resistant structural reinforcement of the weld, in
addition to residual stress reversal.
x Question (T. S. Sharma): On the weld overlay issue and its patent application: (1) What
exact element of the weld overlay process is being patented? (2) If somebody did the overlay
weld in a plant, will they be encroaching on the patent, once it is issued?
Response (P. Riccardella): I am not a lawyer. However, my understanding is that the key
word in the PWOL patent application is "pre-emptive." If an overlay weld were applied pre-
emptively in a plant, it would encroach on the patent, once it is issued.
I should also mention that, with the award of the MRP PWOL project to Structural
Integrity/Welding Services Inc. (SI/WSI), we have agreed to assign the rights to the patent to
EPRI/MRP, when and if it is issued.
x Question (unidentified attendee): Regarding slide 15 in your presentation, which shows a
weld overlay over a dissimilar metal weld, is the weld a full strength weld in the region
applied to the stainless steel weld?
Response (P. Riccardella): Yes. It is applied in a manner such that one can inspect the outer
25% of the stainless steel weld.
Corrosion Resistant Barriers for Repair and Mitigation of Alloy 600
Cracking, presented by J. Lareau, Westinghouse (Paper 5A.5)
This presentation was given and written by J. Lareau of Westinghouse. The main points made
11-15
x This presentation described development work being performed using the supersonically
induced mechanical alloying technology (SIMAT) to apply protective coatings to Alloy 600
parts and weldments. The process involves applying coatings at ambient temperature using
supersonic jets to impinge particles at high velocity, resulting in metallurgically bonded
coatings.
x Several coating materials are being investigated, including nickel, stainless steel, zirconium
boron, zirconium oxide, and titanium carbide. Tests of coated specimens have been
subjected to doped steam testing, with encouraging results (the coating prevented the
cracking that occurred with uncoated specimens). It has been demonstrated that CRDM ID
and OD geometries can be coated.
x The status of development of the SIMAT process was described as being as follows.
Demonstration of coatings for nuclear applications is underway, as is optimization of process
parameters and field tooling. NRC licensing will then be addressed.
x Question (unidentified attendee): When the supersonically induced mechanical alloying
technology (SIMAT) process is used to coat over a crack, will the coating remain intact
despite crack opening displacement occurring?
Response (J. Lareau): We have performed tests in which we have coated over cracks, and
then strained the specimens, with no problems being observed.
2
, B/Li/pH and Zn on PWSCC of Alloy 600: Interim
Report on MRP Testing, presented by P. Andresen, GE Global Research
Center (Paper 5A.6)
This presentation was given by P. Andresen and written by P. Andresen of the GE Global
Research Center and J. Hickling of EPRI. The main points made during the presentation were as
follows:
x This presentation reviewed the results to date of ongoing tests that are investigating the
effects on CGR in Alloy 600 of (1) hydrogen concentration, (2) boron and lithium
concentrations and/or pH, and (3) zinc additions.
x Preliminary results to date regarding the effects of changes in the hydrogen concentration on
PWSCC CGR are that:
The short term CGR response to changes in hydrogen may be exaggerated because of
changes in Ni/NiO and Ni-Fe-Cr/spinel oxide stabilities on the DC potential drop.
The longer term effects of changes in the H
2
concentration on the CGR of Alloy 600 are
in moderate agreement with KAPL data, e.g., the ratio of the peak CGR to the
background CGR is only ~2.5 3X for Alloy 600, the peak CGR at 325qC (617F)
occurs at 8 13 cc/kg H
2
(i.e., 20 cc/kg is off peak), the width of the peak at half-
11-16
maximum is ~50 mV = 7X change in H
2
, a peak height of 7 8X is observed for Alloys
X750 or 82/182.
The mitigation benefit for a given component depends in a rather complex manner on the
alloy, temperature, and the current vs. target H
2
.
x Preliminary results to date regarding the effect of B/Li/pH effects are that there is no
evidence that B/Li/pH have an effect on CGR over the range of 603200 ppm B, 0.37 ppm
Li, and 6.07.5 pH
T
. This is consistent with test results reported by Morton (KAPL), and is
also consistent with expectations based on the Pourbaix diagram for nickel and water.
x Preliminary results regarding zinc additions are that some reduction in CGR may occur at
high Zn levels (150 ppb) but that there is limited evidence to date of a benefit at 30 ppb Zn.
It is considered that follow-up, corroborative experiments are essential. New tests are being
started at lower stress intensities (15 ksiin. (16.5 MPam)). It is believed that the benefit of
zinc is related to its incorporation into the spinels structure, and the crack tip oxides are often
observed to have an NiO structure. An additional issue is the transport of Zn to the crack tip,
which requires that the oxides along the crack walls be saturated in Zn. It is not clear
whether this is a rate limiting process, but clearly lower CGRs (e.g., by lowering the stress
intensity) will enhance the likelihood that Zn will be present at the crack tip.
x Question (A. Demma): Could you please comment on the potential detrimental effects of
increasing the hydrogen fugacity during operation on structural materials or fuel, and also
comment on which potential adverse effect is of most concern in your opinion?
Response (P. Andresen): I am not that knowledgeable on crud deposition on fuel, but I have
heard that higher hydrogen might reduce nickel deposition. I don't think higher hydrogen
will increase fuel corrosion or hydriding, which occurs primarily from corrosion reactions in
zircaloy 4. In iron and nickel-based structural materials we and others have shown that the
hydrogen permeation rate in high temperature water is controlled by the coolant hydrogen
fugacity and that it is quite rapid. For this reason, the fugacity of hydrogen in the metal
equilibrates with the coolant in perhaps 10 hours in thin walled iron and nickel alloys and
perhaps in hundreds of hours in thicker wall components. Since BWRs typically have 0.01
0.1 ppm hydrogen in the water, and PWRs have about 3 ppm hydrogen (i.e., about 30 to 300
times more), it doesn't seem as though an additional two or three times increase in hydrogen
will be a major factor. However, we understand too little about in situ fracture resistance
(i.e., in the presence of the environment), and there are sound reasons to be concerned for
both low temperature (70140C (158284F)) and high temperature (LWR operating
temperature) fracture toughness (J-R and K
IC
) response after long term exposure to the
environment.
x Question (J.-M. Boursier): Your study is largely based on having confidence in the DC
potential drop crack length monitoring system. What is the minimum crack growth rate
(CGR) ratio measured under various conditions that you consider to be significant? Have
you performed similar studies for crack initiation?
11-17
Response (P. Andresen): There is no single-valued answer to the "having confidence"
question.. Maximizing our confidence in crack growth rate data requires the best techniques,
repeating the tests, running tests for extended periods to evaluate the stability in growth rate
response, changing/repeating test conditions to show that they are reproducible in a single
specimen, and running single-condition tests to compare potential drop with actual crack
advance. While I have innumerable examples of reproducing data within 10-20% as I
change test conditions or specimens, I think in general that changes of about 50% are a
practical minimumand this may also represent a minimum change that we would want to
pursue for mitigation of SCC in plant components.
We have extensive crack initiation testing facilities but are not evaluating initiation in this
program.
Review of Primary Chemistry Effects on PWSCC, presented by J. Gorman,
DEI (Paper 5A.7)
This presentation was given by J. Gorman and was written by J. Gorman of Dominion
Engineering, Inc. and K. Fruzzetti of EPRI. The main points made during the presentation were
as follows:
x The use of constant elevated pH regimes with pH
T
about 7.17.3 are increasingly being
accepted in industry. They have provided proven benefits for dose rates and are expected to
provide benefits for fuel deposits. The effects on PWSCC initiation of such high lithium/pH
regimes are judged to be minor, and they are expected to have no effect on CGR.
x The use of zinc provides benefits with regard to shutdown dose rates and PWSCC, and is
recommended for these reasons. However, there is a need to ensure compatibility of zinc
with fuel, especially for high duty cores, and to apply zinc in careful manner (e.g., at low
concentrations and partial cycles at start).
x Control of hydrogen at the high end of the allowed range, e.g., at 4550 cc/kg seems
desirable to reduce PWSCC peak CGRs. In the longer term, if proven useful and safe,
hydrogen concentrations above current limit of 50 cc/kg may be desirable. In this regard,
tests evaluating the effects of higher hydrogen on CGR are in process. However, gathering
and evaluation of data regarding the effects of hydrogen concentration on fuel and shutdown
dose rates is considered desirable.
x Desirable research topics regarding chemistry effects on PWSCC include clarifying the
effects of lithium and pH on PWSCC initiation and CGR (ongoing), verifying that higher
hydrogen reduces PWSCC CGRs, especially for Alloy 600 weld metals (ongoing), and
verifying that higher hydrogen has no significant adverse effects on fuel or shutdown dose
rates (proposed research).
x Comment (R. Jacko): With regard to zinc concentrations, when we (Westinghouse) first
looked at it, we were looking at PWSCC mitigation. However, as we looked further at the
11-18
data, we came to believe that lower doses of zinc at longer times might produce the same
benefits as high levels for shorter times.
Response (J. Gorman): I agree that lower doses over longer times might have the same
stabilizing effects on oxide films as higher dose for shorter times, and thus might provide
similar benefits for crack initiation, except for those few additional cracks that might initiate
during the longer oxide stabilization period. However, the situation is not so clear with
regard to crack propagation. As discussed in the presentation, zinc has not consistently
reduced the rate of crack propagation. A reasonable hypothesis is that crack propagation is
only slowed if enough zinc can get to the crack tip to stabilize spinel type oxides at that
location. The ability to get high enough levels of zinc to the crack tip to slow crack growth
may increase as zinc concentration is increased.
x Comment (R. Jacko): I agree with the insignificant effects of lithium on crack growth rate
described in your presentation. However, with regard to crack initiation, I still believe that
there is an effect of pH on crack initiation. I was able to correlate primary coolant pH with
steam generator tube PWSCC performance, and I believe that it shows an effect of pH.
Response (J. Gorman): It would desirable to review this topic in detail. If PWSCC behavior
in plants correlates with the pH regime used, this would be an important observation.
x Question (T. Yonezawa): Have you read our 1997 paper (Japanese conference) that checked
the effects of lithium, boron and pH on PWSCC behavior?
Response (J. Gorman): The data described at the 1997 Amelia Island symposium (T.
Tsuruta, et al., "PWSCC Susceptibility Tests for Improving Primary Water Chemistry
Control," Eighth International Symposium on Environmental Nuclear Power SystemsWater
ReactorsVolume 1, August 1014, 1997, Amelia Island, FL, v1p395, ANS, 1997) were
included in the 2002 statistical reevaluation by EPRI of the effects of primary chemistry on
initiation of PWSCC. The 2002 statistical evaluation is documented in the following report:
Materials Reliability Program: A Model of the Effects of Li, B, and H
2
on Primary Water
Stress Corrosion Crack Initiation in Alloy 600 (MRP-68), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2002.
1006888.
x Comment (J. Hickling): As discussed in my presentation at the Zinc Addition Workshop in
Toronto in August 2004, the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of zinc at mitigating
PWSCC are different for initiation and propagation. The benefits of zinc for mitigating
initiation are quite certain. However, the effects of zinc on propagation are not so certain,
and tests are underway to more fully investigate them.
11-19
Laser Peening: An Emerging Surface Stress Improvement Technique
For Alloy 600 PWSCC Mitigation
Anne G. Demma
Palo Alto, CA 94304-1344
ademma@epri.com
Extended Abstract
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is an extremely important degradation mechanism for the
structural materials used in the current generation of nuclear power plants and has resulted in
costly capacity factor losses associated with the inspection, repair and replacement of susceptible
components. Austenitic stainless steel components in Boiling Water Reactors (e.g., primary
system piping and reactor internals) and nickel-alloy components in Pressurized Water Reactors
(e.g., steam generator tubing, vessel penetrations and dissimilar metal welds in primary system
piping) have been particularly susceptible to SCC.
Initiation of cracking at these susceptible locations can be prevented by modifying the residual
stresses to a compressive state at, and close, to the coolant-exposed surface. Several processes
for achieving the desired residual stress modification have been developed and are commercially
available (e.g., induction heating stress improvement, mechanical stress improvement, abrasive
water jet peening, and weld overlay). However, most of these processes have only been qualified
and applied to butt weld joints in piping. Also, some of the process equipment requires access to
a large portion of the outside of the pipe. Due to interferences with other plant systems or piping
runs, the access needed is often not available. Accordingly, there is a need for other mechanical
mitigation processes that can be used for other weld geometries and for less-accessible welds.
In this paper, emerging mechanical mitigation technologies called laser peening and fiber laser
peening are investigated for potential use in candidate applications in PWR plants, specifically
for Alloy 600 weldments. Laser peening (LP) uses laser-induced shocks to introduce
compressive residual stresses in the surface layers of metals
1
. Laser peening requires a high laser
pulse irradiance (1 to 50 GW/cm
2
) and a short pulse duration (10 to 50 ns)
1
. The treated surface
is generally coated with an ablative layer (tape or paint) to act as both an absorption and
insulation layer. The laser light is absorbed by the tape, forming a plasma that exerts a pressure
pulse on the surface of the metal. A tamping layer consisting of a laminar flow of water confines
the plasma and increases the pressure applied to the surface of the part. The pressure pulse
induces a shock wave that deforms the near surface material plastically, resulting in a layer of
compressive residual stresses near the surface. LPs primary advantage is the lasers ability to
induce compressive residual stresses at greater depths than other surface stress improvement
methods
2
. The laser peening system developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL) consists of a neodymium (Nd) doped phosphate glass slab, flash lamp pumped laser
incorporating stimulated Brillouin scattering (SBS) phase conjugation
3,4
. The LLNL laser
peening system generates a maximum 20 J pulse with a full width half maximum (FWHM) pulse
duration of 10 to 50 ns at a maximum repetition rate of 5 Hz
2
. Laser spots are delivered with an
irradiance up to 12 GW/cm
2
, using a 3 to 5 mm square spot size. The laser is typically operated
11-21

-2-
at a full width half maximum (FWHM) pulse duration of 18 ns. Laser peening is a candidate
application for mitigating SCC in the C22 waste packages for the Yucca Mountain Project
(YMP), as laser peening has been shown to produce compressive stress depths up to 6 mm in
Alloy C22
5
. Laser peening has also been shown to produce depths of residual stress up to 3.7
mm in 316L stainless steel. Room temperature SCC tests were performed in Alloy 600 U-bend
specimens in sodium thiosulfate solution
6
. The four conditions considered were unpeened, pre-
cracked and unpeened, pre-cracked and laser-peened, and laser peened. While cracks developed
on the outer surface of unpeened coupons after one day in the thiosulfate solution, no cracks
were observed on the laser peened specimen after fourteen days of testing. Laser peening also
retarded SCC on pre-cracked Alloy 600 U-bend specimens tested in room temperature sodium
thiosulfate solution
6
.
Fiber laser peening (FLP) also uses laser-induced shocks to introduce compressive stress in the
treated surface of the metals
7,8,9,10
. The main differences from traditional laser peening are in the
laser system and the delivery system which result in possible underwater treatment and improved
accessibility
11
. The laser system used for FLP consists of a Q-switched frequency doubled
Nd:YAG laser with water-penetrable wavelength of 532 nm (visible green). The FLP laser
system generates a pulse energy between 60 and 100 mJ, with a spot diameter from 0.4 to 0.6
mm, a pulse number density from 18 to 135 pulses/mm
2
, and a pulse repetition rate from 120 to
130 Hz. FLP does not use an ablative layer, which causes the extreme surface (about a
micrometer from the surface) to oxidize through the reaction between the material surface and
oxygen released from the dissociation of water due to the active plasma. The delivery system
consists of an optical fiber and at the end of the fiber a laser peening device with a laser peening
head
11
. Fiber damage due to dielectric breakdown is avoided by introducing a homogenizer with
a lens array
8
. The delivery position of the laser is controlled by CAD or measured data. FLP
treatment results in compressive residual depths of about 1 mm in the following materials: 20%
cold worked 304 stainless steel
10
, 316L stainless steel
11
, and nickel-based Alloy 600
11
and its
weld metal Alloy 182. In the current set-up for FLP in plants, two fibers can be active at once,
thereby decreasing treatment time
11
. The average surface roughness after FLP treatment is about
a few micrometers.
Toshiba has applied laser peening for mitigating SCC in BWR reactor core shrouds in Japanese
nuclear power plants since 1999, using water penetrable laser peening with optics delivery
initially
10
and then FLP (since 2002)
11
. Five BWR core shrouds and three BWR RPV bottom
heads have been processed with these technologies since 1999. The minimum treatment time is
about 6 s/cm
2
with an irradiation condition of 18 pusles/mm
2
pulse density and a laser system of
300 Hz pulse repetition rate. An example of process time is about 10 days per fusion line in the
BWR core shroud. One PWR plant used FLP to treat its Bottom Mounted Instruments (BMI)
nozzles and its reactor vessel (RV) nozzles at the end of 2004.
EPRI is investigating various surface stress improvement technologies for Alloy 600 including
cavitation peening, laser peening and fiber laser peening. The investigation includes residual
stress measurements in flat plates, welded plates, pipes, and BMI mockups as well as SCC
testing. This investigation will result in a topical report to the NRC at the end of October 2005
with the results from these various processes.
11-22

-3-
In conclusion, laser peening is commercially deployed in the aeronautics industry and fiber laser
peening is available to the nuclear industry with the Japanese experience in BWRs and PWRs.
Based on experience to date, laser peening and fiber laser peening could be some of stress
improvement processes used for Alloy 600 PWSCC mitigation in American and European PWRs.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to acknowledge Toshiba Corporation, particularly Dr. Yuji Sano and Mr.
Hiroshi Sakamoto, for providing new information for this paper on the application of Fiber Laser
Peening to BMI and RV nozzles in Japanese Pressurized Water Reactors.
References
1
L. Berthe, P. Peyre, X. Scherpereel, and R. Fabbro. Laser-shock surface processing of materials, in Lasers in
Surface Engineering. N.B. Dahotre, Editor, 1998, ASM International, p. 465-504.
2
M.R. Hill, A.T. DeWald, A.G. Demma, L.A. Hackel, H.-L. Chen, C.B. Dane, R.C. Specht, F.B. Harris. Recent
developments and commercial applications of laser peening technology. Advanced Materials & Processes, August
2003, p. 65-67.
3
C.B. Dane, L.E. Zapata, W.A. Neuman, M.A. Norton, L.A. Hackel. Design and operation of a 150 W near
diffraction-limited amplifier with SBS wave front correction. IEEE Journal of Quantum Electronics, 1995, 31 (1), p.
148-163.
4
C.B. Dane, L.A. Hackel, J.M. Halpin, J. Daly, J. Harrison, F.B. Harris. High-throughput laser peening of metals
using a high-average-power Nd:glass laser system. Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical
Engineering, 2000, Bellingham, WA, USA: Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers.
5
A.T. DeWald, J.E. Rankin, M.R. Hill, M.J. Lee, H.-L. Chen. Assessment of tensile residual stress mitigation in
Alloy 22 welds due to laser peening. Journal of Engineering Materials and Technology, 2004, 126 (4), p. 465-473.
6
H.-L. Chen, J. Rankin, L. Hackel, G. Frederick, J. Hickling, S. Findlan. Laser peening of Alloy 600 to improve
intergranular stress corrosion cracking resistance in power plants. Sixth International EPRI conference on Welding
and Repair Technology for Power Plants, Sandestin, Florida, June 2004.
7
Y. Sano, N. Mukai, K. Okazaki and M. Obata. Residual Stress Improvement in Metal Surface by Underwater Laser
Irradiation. Nuclear Instruments & Methods in Physics Research B 121, 1997, p. 432-436.
8
T. Schmidt-Uhlig, P. Karlitschek, G. Marowsky and Y. Sano. New Simplified Coupling Scheme for the Delivery of
20MW Nd:YAG Laser Pulses by Large Core Optical Fibers. Applied Physics B, 72, 2001, p.183-186.
9
Y. Sano, M. Kimura, A. Sudo, Y. Hamamoto and S. Shima. Development and Application of Laser Peening System
to Prevent Stress Corrosion Cracking of Welded Components. Proc. Int. Institute of Welding (IIW), Select
Committee: Underwater Welding Doc. SCUW-186-00, Commission IV Doc. IV-769-2000, July 2000, Florence,
Italy.
10
Y. Sano, M. Kimura, K. Sato, M. Obata, A. Sudo, Y. Hamamoto, S. Shima, Y. Ichikawa, H. Yamazaki, M.
Naruse, S. Hida, T. Watanabe, Y. Oono. Development and Application of Laser Peening System to Prevent Stress
Corrosion Cracking of Reactor Core Shroud. Proc. 8th Int. Conf. on Nuclear Engineering, (ICONE-8), April 2000,
Baltimore, MD, ICONE-8441.
11
M. Yoda, N. Mukai, M. Ochiai, M. Tamura, S. Okada, K. Sato, M. Kimura, Y. Sano, N. Saito, S. Shima, T.
Yamamoto. Laser based maintenance and repair technologies for reactor components. Proc. 12th Int. Conf. on
Nuclear Engineering, (ICONE-12), April 2004, Arlington, VA, ICONE12-49238.
11-23
Laser Peening
A Surface Stress Improvement
Technique for Alloy 600 PWSCC
Mitigation
Anne G. Demma
Project Manager, Nuclear Power, EPRI
EPRI Alloy 600 SCC Conference
March 2005
11-24
Outline
SCC Mitigation techniques
Laser peening (in air)
Fiber Laser peening (underwater)
Applications in nuclear reactors
EPRI project
Peening technologies
Focused on Alloy 600
11-25
SCC Mitigation
Chemical Mitigation
Noble metal
Zinc
Hydrogen
Stress Improvement Mitigation
MSIP
PWOL
Abrasive water jet peening
Cavitation peening
Laser peening
Changes to material, when
repair or replacement
Cladding
Heat treatment, composition
Weld heat input
11-26
Laser Peening Concept
Laser peening provides:
Large compressive surface
residual stress (> 50% S
y
)
Deep layer of compressive
residual stress (to 6 mm)
Smooth surface finish
Good process control -800
-400
0
400
0 4 8 12
Depth (mm)
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

s
t
r
e
s
s

(
M
P
a
)
Ti-6Al-4V
13 mm thick
Laser peened
(10-18-3)
Glass bead peened
(Source: LLNL/MIC/UCD)
11-27
Laser Peening History
Shot peening (since at least 1940s)
Operation of first ruby laser (1960)
Research on laser interaction with solids (1960s)
First laser peening reference: Battelle Columbus
Laboratories (1972) (Fairand et. al. J. Appl. Phys.)
LP commercialization: LSP Technologies (1995)
First commercial application: GE aircraft engines (1997)
LLNL/MIC CRADA partnership (1997), UC Davis (2001)
First application in nuclear reactors: Toshiba on BWR core
shroud (1999)
First application of fiber laser peening (FLP) in nuclear
reactors: Toshiba on BWR core shroud (2002)
First application of FLP in PWRs (2004)
11-28
Laser Peening System - LLNL/MIC
Characteristics:
Nd:Glass slab flash lamp pumped
laser (1 m)
Excellent beam quality
High average power
Energy output to 20 Joules
Pulse width range 10-50 ns
Rep rate to 6 shots/sec
Spot size: 3-5 mm
Robotic part handling
Fast and accurate
Adaptable to field use
11-29
Laser Peening of 316L Stainless Steel
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
0 5 10 15 20
Depth (mm)
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
M
p
a
)
316L_3 (10-18-2)
316L_4 (10-18-4)
Near surface stress
~ -444 MPa with 2 layers
of peening
~ -420 MPa with 4 layers
of peening
Residual stress depth
2.9 mm with 2 layers of
peening
3.7 mm with 4 layers of
peening
316 Stainless
steel in 40%
MgCl
2
at 160qC
316 Stainless
Steel in 40%
MgCl
2
at 160qC
11-30
Weld material (Alloy 600) cracks readily in room temperature sodium
thiosulfate solution under sufficient tensile residual stress
SCC testing of Alloy 600 U-bend coupons in different conditions (14 days)
Laser Peening of Alloy 600
Not pre-cracked, laser peened
No Cracking
Pre-cracked, then laser peened
Crack growth retarded
Pre-cracked, unpeened
Extensive Cracking
(Source: EPRI/LLNL)
Alloy 600 U-bends suffer from
IGSCC in about 24 hours
11-31
Fiber Laser Peening System - Toshiba
(Source: Toshiba)
Toshiba Laser System:
Underwater application
Nd:YAG laser (532 nm)
Pulse energy: 40-100 mJ/pulse
Pulse width: 8 ns
Spot diameter: 0.4-1.0 mm
Pulse density: 18-135 pulse/mm
2
Pulse repetition rate: 120-300 Hz
No ablative layer
Fiber optic delivery:
Improved accessibility
Materials:
Base Metal: Type 304/304L/316/316L, Alloy
600/690
Weld Metal: Stainless Steel, Alloy 82/182,
52/132
11-32
Fiber Laser Peening on 316L Stainless Steel
(Source: Toshiba)
11-33
Fiber Laser Peening of Ni-based Alloys
(Source: Toshiba)
SCC Testing in HT Water (288C) for 500 hrs
11-34
Fiber Laser Peening Applications for BWRs
Application to Core Shroud (Stainless Steel)
H1 (outside & inside), H2 & H3 (outside), H4 (outside), H1 (outside & inside), H2 & H3 (outside), H4 (outside),
H6a & H6b (inside & outside) H6a & H6b (inside & outside)
V2 (inside), V4 V2 (inside), V4 V5 (inside), H7 (inside) V5 (inside), H7 (inside)
Experience: 5 BWR Plants
Operation time: about 10 days/fusion line
Application to RPV Bottom Head (Alloys 600/182)
Peening Area: CRD Stub Tube and ICM Housing
Experience: 3 BWR Plants
Operation time: about 1 month
: Peening Area
(Source: Toshiba)
11-35
Laser System
Optical Fiber
Cable
RV
Twin Work Platform
Control Units
Laser Peening Device
(for BMI Nozzles)
Inside of Control Container
Laser System
Container
Control Unit
Container
Optical Fiber
Cable
FLP Device
LUT Device
Fiber Laser Peening Applications for PWRs
(Source: Toshiba)
11-36
Laser System
Optical Fiber
Peening Head
Mirror
Laser
Optical
Fiber
BMI
(Alloy 600)
RV
J-weld
Area to be
Peened
RV
Laser Peening Device
Work Platform
Experience: 1 PWR Plant
(Source: Toshiba)
Fiber Laser Peening in PWRs - BMIs
11-37
Peened Area
+PNGV
0Q\\NG
Laser Peeni ng Devi c e
Experience: 1 PWR Plant
Fiber Laser Peening in PWRs - RV Nozzles
(Source: Toshiba)
Stainless Steel
Alloy 132
11-38
Mechanical Mitigation Applications
for Alloy 600 RV welds
RVH
penetrations
BMI
penetrations
Nozzle safe-
ends
Fiber Laser
Peening
Possible Available Available
Laser Peening
(in air)
Possible
x
Possible?
Cavitation
peening
x
Possible Possible
PWOL
x x
Possible
MSIP
x x
Possible
11-39
EPRI Peening Project
Processes: cavitation peening, laser peening, FLP
Materials: Alloy 600 and its weld metals
Two laser peening vendors: Toshiba and MIC
Residual stress measurements
Flat plates
Welded plates
Pipes
BMI mock-up
Compare processes with each others
One topical report to the NRC at the end of 2005 with laser
peening, cavitation peening, and abrasive water jet peening
results
11-40
Conclusions to Date
Laser peening is commercially deployed in the aeronautics industry
Vendors: LSP, MIC
Customers: USAF, GE, RR, etc.
Interest from the oil industry
Fiber laser peening is now available in the nuclear industry
Vendor: Toshiba
Customers: Japanese BWR and PWR plants
Laser peening or fiber laser peening could be one of the processes
used for Alloy 600 PWSCC mitigation in American and European
PWRs
11-41
Application of Surface Stress Improvement
for the Mitigation of Alloy 600 PWSCC
Ronald J. Payne
AREVA
Framatome ANP
3315 Old Forest Rd.
USA
PHONE: (434) 832-2328
FAX: (434) 832-3022
EMAIL:ron.payne@framatome-anp.com
Stephen Levesque
AREVA
Framatome ANP
3315 Old Forest Rd.
USA
PHONE: (434) 832-2375
FAX: (434) 832-3022
EMAIL:stephen.levesque@framatome-anp.com
INTRODUCTION
Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) of Alloy 600 materials is a recurring problem that has affected
nuclear power plants since the 1980s. Three factors contribute to SCC: a susceptible material, an
environment that causes SCC for that material, and sufficient tensile stress to induce SCC. Elimination of
any of these factors prevents SCC. The focus of this paper is the elimination of the tensile stress, in
particular applying surface stress improvement processes to Alloy 600 to relieve the tensile stresses
imparted during welding. To address the onset of SCC of Alloy 600 in nuclear power plant components,
several mitigation approaches have been developed that alter the stress state at the surface of the
material. This paper introduces the following Surface Stress Improvement (SSI) processes: laser
peening, abrasive water jet conditioning, and cavitation peening. Each process is discussed in detail
regarding ease of application, production rate, depth of compressive residual stress, and tooling
limitations. The application of surface conditioning technologies to primary system components is
discussed showing the validity of each surface conditioning process for the Bottom Mounted Nozzles
(BMNs) of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV).
SURFACE STRESS IMPROVEMENT TECHNOLOGIES
The primary surface stress improvement technologies for mitigation of Primary Water Stress
Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 600 within commercial nuclear power plants are: laser peening,
cavitation peening, and abrasive water jet conditioning. Each of these technologies offers different
approaches to altering the stress state of the material; therefore, each technology differs in its applicability
to nuclear power plant components. Additionally, each technology imparts varying degrees of residual
stress with the material. In general, the depth of peening increases with each respective process.[1, 2]
Laser Peening
Laser peening is a process that utilizes a short duration (20 ns) laser pulse focused to an energy
density of about 200 joules per square centimeter at the surface of a metal coated with dark paint and a
thin overlay of transparent material, like water. The laser light passes through the water and is absorbed
by the dark paint. The interaction creates a pressure shock wave in the range of 10,000 atmospheres
(150,000 pounds per square inch) that in turn creates a compressive stress layer directly underneath the
focused pulse. The water layer helps contain the shock.
The laser peening process has been used remediate SCC on the core shrouds of reactor pressure
vessels. The peening was performed submerged, with no need to drain the vessel, and without an
ablative layer (i.e. tape or paint).[3] A recast surface with micro-cracking has been observed in samples
prepared without an ablative layer.
11-43
Abrasive Water Jet Conditioning
Abrasive water jet conditioning utilizes high-pressure water that draws abrasive particles into the high
velocity fluid stream in a mixing chamber and delivers the particles through a focusing tube onto the
component surface. Abrasive water jet conditioning removes material at the surface. This ensures the
removal of existing PWSCC defects that are too shallow to be detected by nondestructive examination,
and leaves a new surface that has no previous PWSCC degradation. Abrasive water jet conditioning also
imparts a compressive residual stress at the component surface, which prevents PWSCC initiation and
growth. Data has shown that abrasive water jet conditioning imparts a compressive residual stress similar
to shot peening, with the added benefit of material removal.
Abrasive water jet conditioning has been employed in the remediation of Control Rod Drive
Mechanism (CRDM), Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM), and In Core Instrument (ICI) nozzles on
reactor vessel closure heads.[2]
Cavitation Peening
Cavitation peening utilizes high pressure water jet pumps to produce a high speed submerged water
jet. This water jet produces a cloud of intense cavitation that impinges upon the material surface. The
collapse of the cavitation bubbles upon the surface of the material creates a shock wave at the surface of
the material which peens the materials similarly to shot peening. The water jet propels the bubbles at
high speed, which intensifies the collapse. The bubble collapse produces impact pressure as high as
125,000 pounds per square inch at the material surface. Compressive stress generates on the surface
since plastic deformation produced by peening is elastically constrained by the surrounding material. The
cavitation peening bubble collapse can be tailored to remove material from the surface.
Cavitation peening has been performed on reactor internals of Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) in
Japan to prevent SCC by reducing the surface residual stress.[4]
SURFACE STRESS IMPROVEMENT APPLICATIONS
Alloy 600 was used extensively in the construction of commercial nuclear power plants. For decades,
power plant operators have been faced with the remediation of SCC of Alloy 600. Remediation of many
components has been through the complete replacement of the component. Complete component
replacement is not practical on larger and more complex components such as the reactor vessel, where
Alloy 600 exists in the BMNs. Applications such as the BMNs are practical locations for SSI.
PWSCC of steam generator tubing was one of the first components to be treated with SSI. Shot
peening of the tubing was applied after the steam generator had been in service in many plants, and a
few steam generators were shot peened prior to commissioning of the plant. Much research has been
focused on the cracking of Alloy 600 steam generator tubing. Generally, it is felt that the compressive
residual stresses from the process inhibit the initiation of PWSCC.[5,6] Some research has shown that
the earlier the shot peening was performed the better the benefit became.[7] And research suggests that
the compressive stress from shot peening is more effective on short cracks than long cracks. The short
cracks in this study were possibly undetectable during initial evaluations of the tubing and existed prior to
shot peening. The shot peening served to retard the crack growth rate of these short cracks.[8] This data
suggests that a SSI should be employed prior to plant operation, or to fresh material. Both abrasive
waterjet conditioning and cavitation peening provide methods for removal of the service exposed material
without forming a recast layer and associated defects during the SSI operation which effectively presents
fresh material for future operation.
Laser peening, abrasive water jet conditioning, and cavitation peening have been employed in the
remediation of SCC of commercial nuclear power plant primary system components.
BOTTOM MOUNTED NOZZLES
The BMNs are located on the lower head of the RPV. The general design of the BMNs is a vertically
oriented nozzle welded into the spherical shell of the RPV. The original BMNs were Alloy 600 nozzles
welded with 182 filler metal to the 182 cladded RPV with a J-groove weld geometry. Two of these
nozzles have been repaired on an emergent basis, which has prompted the industry to consider more
11-44
detailed inspection criteria for the nozzles. With adequate surface stress improvement, the inspection of
these nozzles could be returned to the original construction code.
Performing SSI on these nozzles requires a tolerant process that can deal with the variability of the
nozzle geometry. The design of the BMNs allowed for a large variation in weld prep, which results in a
large variation in the final weld geometry. In order to effectively peen the J-groove weld surface, the
peening process must be able to tolerate these variations. The process must have variability in stand-off
distance and angle of incidence to account for the penetration geometries within the RPV. In order for a
SSI process to be competitive, it has to offer a technically acceptable solution for low cost and low risk.
The laser peening process provides ample tolerance for angle of incidence, but requires precise
stand-off distance to maintain proper control of the process, although given the proper equipment, stand-
off distance can be controlled. Abrasive water jet conditioning provides both ample stand-off distance
and angle of incidence tolerance; however, the process requires abrasive reclamation equipment.
Cavitation peening provides stand-off distance and angle of incidence tolerance on par with abrasive
water jet conditioning, and cavitation peening is naturally suited for a submerged application and
minimizes control and reclamation equipment. Both abrasive waterjet conditioning and cavitation peening
provide removal of the service exposed material.
CONCLUSION
PWSCC of Alloy 600 in commercial nuclear power plants has been addressed using surface stress
improvement technologies. The use of SSI on components such as the reactor vessel bottom mounted
nozzles may be cost effective alternative to replacing the material.
Additionally, a SSI process that provides material removal to introduce new material to the
environment, which eliminates possible crack initiation below detectable limits by non-destructive
evaluation offers an additional level of confidence in the process.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank the following people for their input to the surface stress improvement
processes discussed in this paper:
Mool Gupta, UVA
Lloyd Hackel, MIC
Anne Demma, EPRI
Tom Butler, Ormond LLC
Georges Chahine, Dynaflow Inc.
Brian Hall, Framatome ANP Inc.:
REFERENCES
[1] Butler T., Using Cavitation Peening to Obtain Deep Compressive Residual Stress, via the
internet, 07/13/2004, www.hcf.utcdayton.com/papers/0900_Butler.pdf
[2] Hall J.B., Stuckey K. B., and Fyfitch S., Using an Abrasive Waterjet to Machine and Remediate
Nuclear Components, Proceedings of 9th International Symposium on Environmental
Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power Systems-Water Reactors, TMS, 1999, p.775.
[3] Shimarmura M., et al., Underwater Robotic System for Preventative Maintenance of Core Shroud
by Laser Peening, Proceedings of 9th Int. Topical Meeting on Robotics and Remote Systems,
Seattle, WA, March 2001
11-45
[4] Yoshimura V. T., et al., Reduction of Residual Stress by Peening with Reflected Water Jet, JSME
Materials and Mechanics Division Meeting, pp. 469-470 (Oct. 2000).
[5] Shah V.N., Lowenstein D. B., Turner A.P. L., Assessment of Primary Water Stress Corrosion
Cracking of PWR Steam Generator Tubes, Nuclear Engineering and Design, v. 134, 1992, pp
199-215.
[6] Hernalsteen P., PWSCC in the tube expansion zone an overview, Nuclear Engineering and
Design, v. 143, 1993, pp 131-142.
[7] Slama G., Shot peening experience after 9 years, Proceedings of Fontevraud III, SFEN, 1994, pp
289-299.
[8] Park I., Primary water stress corrosion cracking behaviors in the shot-peened Alloy 600 TT steam
generator tubings, Nuclear Engineering and Design, v. 212, 2002, pp. 395-399.
11-46
FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Application of Surface Stress
Improvement for the Mitigation of Alloy
600 PWSCC
EPRI PWSCC of Alloy 600 2005 International
Conference & Exhibition
Ron Payne
Steve Levesque
AREVA
Framatome ANP
11-47
Outline
> Industry perspective on Stress Improvement (SI)
MRP draft Butt Weld I&E guidelines
> Surface SI technologies
Abrasive waterjet (AWJ) machining
Laser peening
Cavitation peening
Low plasticity burnishing (LPB)
Shot peening
> Application of surface SI to primary system
components
> Current development activities
11-48
MRP Butt Weld I&E Guidelines
> For purposes of SI discussion, draft BW I&E can be
generally applied to all A600 locations
> Surface SI (conditioning) applied to uncracked weldments
only
Effective SI on cracked weldments must demonstrate crack
tip in compression
> Category C weldment definition
Not made of resistant materials
No known cracks based on PDI
Treated with an acceptable SI process
> Category C Inspection Requirement
PWSCC Category C weldments should all be inspected
during the next two outages. If no cracks are found during
these inspections, weldments should be inspected according
to a schedule consistent with the existing ASME Code
inspection program or an approved alternative.
11-49
Abrasive Water Jet Conditioning
> Compressive residual stress induced near the surface with ~.03
material removal
> Confinement and capture of spent abrasive required
> PWSCC initiation assumed at end of mitigation depth corrosion
allowance for life assessment - ~55 years
Unmitigated RVCH weld repair PWSCC life assessment ~2.5 EFPY
Clear surface examination resets life expectancy
> Framatome ANP AWJ was proven best mitigative process in MRP
study
AWJ Tool Head
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
0 5 10 15 20 25
Depth (mils)
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
Base Metal Hoop Stress
Base Metal Axial Stress
Weld Metal Hoop Stress
Weld Metal Axial Stress
11-50
> High power, short duration laser pulse
Highly compressive surface residual stress
Deep layer of compressive residual stress
Laser Peened Aluminum
Laser Peening
11-51
Cavitation Peening
> Submerged Ultra-High Pressure (UHP)
waterjets generate intense cavitation
Millions of bubbles per second are generated
in the region around the jet
Utilizes existing UHP equipment inventory and
knowledge base from AWJ cutting and
mitigation applications in US NPPs
> When the cavitation bubbles collapse on the
surface they induce deep residual
compressive stresses
Jet drives the bubbles at high velocity,
intensifying the effect of the collapse
> Parts are peened by sweeping the jets over
the surface
> No secondary waste
> Peening intensity is controlled by varying the
traverse speed of the jet over the surface.
Sequence from high speed film of
cavitation bubble collapse simulated
by laboratory spark discharge
Note the formation of high speed re-
entrant Jet
11-52
Residual Stress Comparisons
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Depth, inch
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

S
t
r
e
s
s
,

k
s
i
Laser, 3X, 10 GW/cm^2, Ti Cavitation, 1 pass, 55ksi, Ti
Cavitation, 1 pass, 35ksi, Ti Conventional Shot Peened Ti
Residual Stress Comparison
11-53
Peening with tape
(2 layers)
SI Ablative Properties
Peening without tape
(2 layers)
> Cold ablative processes can remove shallow defects without
detrimental effects
Application of AWJ SI in RVCH modification removes ~.03
material
High power density Laser Peening without ablative layer leaves
recast layer
Cavitiation ablative properties under investigation
> Possible SCC initiation sites below detectable limits to be
addressed for non-ablative processes
Oxide packing at grain boundaries of service exposed materials
Laboratory simulation of service exposed materials difficult
Possible pre-mitigation preparation (flapping)
11-54
FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Application of Surface Stress
Improvement to Primary System
Components
11-55
Primary System Component
Butt Weld Application
> Surface SI requires ID access
Potentially beneficial where OD access is limited or
high radiation environment
> No significant geometry constraints beyond
access, i.e. right circular cylinder geometry
> Low performance risk
No modification to component
> Potential applications
W3 & 4 loop primary
pipe DMW
B&W core flood
PZR relief
Others?
11-56
Primary System Component
RVCH and BMN Application
> Effective SCC mitigation requires processing of all
wetted surfaces with tensile residual stress
Nozzle ID, J-groove weld surface, and nozzle OD
adjacent to the weld
RVCH thermal sleeve limits ID access
> Low performance risk
No modification to component
> BMN submerged application vs. CRDM application
in air
> Subsequent inspection requirements
BW I&E model
Lower internals removal for BMN?
11-57
Typical CRD Nozzle Configurations
Thermal Sleeve
Thermal Sleeve gap
entrance
Lead Screw
CE
CE
B&W
W
Head
J-Groove Weld
Nozzle
11-58
Peripheral RVCH CRDM Nozzle Geometry
> Weld is hand ground
The minimum fillet depth
becomes a large fillet in the
crotch area
Small blend radius at upper
intersect
Significant change in surface
area around nozzle
> Effects of radius change
Minimal effect at the upper
intersect
Significant effect at the crotch
area of nozzle
11-59
14 FRAMATOME ANP, INC. > CRR 05-36 14
BMN Configuration
11-60
Laser Peening - FANP/NSF Developments
> Investigate application of laser peening to ill-
defined complex A-600 attachment weld geometry
RVCH CRDM penetration
BMN penetrations
Characterize incident angle influence on peening
effectiveness
Define and develop adaptive control methodology for
peening effectiveness
Acoustic feedback as measure of peening effectiveness
Apply adaptive spot size control methodology
Optical and/or Ultrasonic range finding
11-61
Laser Peening - Angle of Incidence Testing
> Testing involved a change
of the incident angle of
the exciting pulse
Energy density delivered
to the surface changes
Effects of preferential
beam polarization not
evaluated
> Testing suggests that
peening effectiveness of
anticipated application
geometry is possible
Peening effectiveness
80% or better up to
incident angles of 25
11-62
Effect of Jet Angle on Peening Intensity
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Angle (deg)
D
e
f
l
e
c
t
i
o
n

A
Cavitation Peening - Angle of Incidence
11-63
Cavitation Peening - Standoff
Cavitation Peening- Almen Deflection versus
Standoff
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20
Standoff
D
e
f
l
e
c
t
i
o
n

(
.
0
0
1
"
)
11-64
Laser Peening Acoustic Feedback
> Initial concept of acoustic
feedback as a measure of peening
effectiveness developed by FANP
and NSF Laser Center
> Initial experimentation has proven
acoustic feedback is an effective
adaptive control method
Strong correspondence of
acoustic feedback with peening
effectiveness
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
100Ps
acoustic response on steel
(ac. sens.: DPA type 4006)
A
C
O
U
S
T
I
C

P
U
L
S
E
TIME
11-65
Cavitation Peening - Current Development
Activities
> Investigate application of cavitation peening to ill-
defined complex A-600 attachment weld geometry
BMN penetrations
Framatome ANP is providing EPRI samples for residual
stress profile determination and corrosion testing
through a collaborative program including:
Flat Plate Testing
Welded Plate Testing
BMN Mockup Testing
11-66
Cavitation Peening - Current Development
Activities
> Cavitation peening flat plate testing results
0 10 20 30 40 50
-100
-75
-50
-25
0
25
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
Depth (x 10
-3
in.)
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
-600
-400
-200
0
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
M
P
a
)
Depth (x 10
-3
mm)
> Low energy process
Lower magnitude compressive
residual stress
Slower processing speeds
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030
Depth (in.)
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
> High energy process
Increased compressive
residual stress
Magnitude & depth
Faster processing speeds
11-67
Cavitation Peening Ablative Properties
> Cavitation peening process can be tailored to
provide ablative properties at the material surface
11-68
Surface Stress Improvement
Discussion Points
> Effectiveness on service exposed material?
Can surface SI be applied for existing flaws with
regulatory acceptance?
> Effects of low cycle fatigue on surface treatment -
shakeout
Specific location geometry, operating stress, and load
transient dependency
> Cost-benefit analysis
Total lifecycle cost
Risk elements
11-69
ABSTRACT
The Applicability of MSIP for Mitigating PWSCC in
Pressurizer Nozzle to Safe-end Welds
Thomas Damico, Manu Badlani, AEA Technology Engineering Services, Inc.
Edward Ray, Westinghouse
Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 600 has become a cause of
major concern in PWRs affecting plant safety and availability. Among locations
susceptible to PWSCC, the Pressurizer Nozzle to Safe-end dissimilar metal welds
(82/182) rank near the top. The use of Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP)
to mitigate PWSCC in the Pressurizer Nozzle to Safe-end welds is discussed herein.
MSIP is a stress related mitigation method that produces a favorable stress pattern by
removing the as-welded tensile residual stresses and generating compressive residual
stresses in the inner weld region. MSIP is accepted by the USNRC and has been
successfully used for mitigating stress corrosion cracking in BWRs including nozzle to
safe-end dissimilar metal welds (82/182) since the mid 1980s.
While the materials for the nozzles, safe-ends, and welds in the PWRs are identical to
those in the BWRs, the nozzle and safe-end wall thicknesses are significantly greater.
Variations in the safe-end geometries (shorter lengths) introduce additional differences
compared to the BWR safe-end configurations. A program was sponsored by the
Westinghouse Owners Group for Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering designed
plants to verify the applicability of MSIP for mitigating PWSCC in the Pressurizer
Nozzle/Safe-end welds. The nozzles included in the program were the Pressurizer surge,
safety/relief and spray for both the Westinghouse and CE fleets. For the CE plants the
RCS surge, shutdown cooling outlet and drain line nozzles were included as additional
locations. Representative geometries and material properties were used for the
nozzle/safe-end weldments to perform inelastic finite element analyses simulating the
application of MSIP. Selective mockups were fabricated for process and tooling
qualification testing. The analyses and qualification tests confirmed that MSIP
generates compression in the inner weld region and will provide an effective method for
mitigating PWSCC in the Pressurizer Nozzle/Safe-end welds.
11-71
Authors:
Thomas Damico
AEA Technology Engineering Services, Inc.
241 Curry Hollow Road
Pittsburgh, PA 15236-4696
Phone: (412) 655 1200
Fax: (412) 655 2928
E-mail: damico@aeatech.com
Manu Badlani
Phone: (412) 655 1200
Fax: (412) 655 2928
E-mail: badlani@aeatech.com
Edward Ray
Post Office Box 355
Phone: (412) 374 5411
Fax: (412) 374-4941
E-mail: ray1ea@westinghouse.com
11-72
Slide 1
The Applicability of MSIP for
Mitigating PWSCC in
Pressurizer Nozzle to Safe-End Welds
Manu Badlani
Thomas Damico
Westinghouse
Edward Ray
11-73
Slide 2
Basic Concept of MSIP
a. Application of Pressure to
Contract Pipe
b. Mechanism of Compression
Generation in Axial and
Hoop Directions
Displacement Controlled Uses a hydraulically operated
mechanical clamp to contract pipe on one side of the weld.
11-74
Slide 3
MSIP Implementation Equipment
11-75
Slide 4
Surge nozzle
-pipe welds
Safety & relief
nozzle-pipe welds
Alloy 600 Locations in
Westinghouse Pressurizer
11-76
Slide 5
PZR & RC pipe-surge
line connections
Safety & relief
valve nozzle-pipe
welds
Surge nozzle-
pipe welds
Let-down & drain nozzles
Shutdown cooling
outlet nozzle
Alloy 600 Locations in CE Pressurizer
11-77
Slide 6
WOG Phase 1 Pressurizer MSIP
Program Completed
Completed June 2004
- Generated Stress Analysis for CE and WE Fleets
WE and CE Pressurizer
o Surge Nozzle
o Safety/Relief Nozzles
o Spray Nozzles
CE Additional Nozzles
o RCS Surge
o Shutdown Cooling
o Drain Line
- Preliminary MSIP Tooling and Installation Equipment Design
- A number of plant walkdowns performed
- Results available to customers via WOG website via WCAP-16271
11-78
Slide 7
CEOG Surge Nozzle
Post-MSIP-Axial StressN/SE Weld
11-79
Slide 8
CEOG Surge Nozzle
Post-MSIPHoop StressN/SE Weld
11-80
Slide 9
WOG Phase 2 MSIP
Pressurizer Program
Complete the generic FTE evaluations for MSIP to mitigate PWSCC at the
nozzle to safe-end weld for the pressurizer nozzles including the RCS piping
for the CE Fleet. This includes design and qualification of equipment.
Engineering and Licensing Evaluations
- Pressurizer nozzle-to-safe end-to-pipe structural evaluations
- Flow restriction on the piping due to the reduced pipe section
diameter
- Evaluate fatigue to ASME code requirements with the change in
geometry from the MSIP
- Qualification of global, local and fatigue stresses to ASME code
requirements
- LBB evaluation, LOCA, Post-LOCA, and LOCA forces are evaluated
- Provide a generic 50.59a evaluation
Detailed Design and Fabrication
- MSIP tooling
- Lifting and handling equipment
11-81
Slide 10
WOG Phase 2 MSIP
Pressurizer Program (contd.)
Qualification and Testing
- Design and Fabrication of Mockups
- MSIP process performed on representative safe-end
mockups
- Lifting and handling equipment qualification during the MSIP
tooling qualification
- Strain gage testing of the Surge, Safety/Relief and Safe
Shutdown Nozzles
- Functional and Load tests of MSIP and lifting and handling
equipment
Generic Procedures and Installation Parameters
- Field Service Procedure
- Training Procedure
- MSIP application parameters
Engineering and Qualification Report (Class 2 and Class 3 reports)
11-82
Slide 11
Surge Nozzle MSIP Tool
Concept
11-83
Slide 12
MSIP Tooling
Westinghouse Surge Nozzle
11-84
Slide 13
Safety/Relief Valve MSIP
Tool Concept
11-85
Slide 14
Spray Nozzle MSIP Tool
Concept
11-86
Slide 15
MSIP Tooling
Westinghouse Spray/Relief and Safety Nozzles
11-87
Slide 16
MSIP Tooling
CE Shutdown Cooling Nozzle
11-88
Slide 17
Mockup Detail of RCS Safe
Shutdown Mockup for CE Fleet
11-89
Slide 18
Surge Nozzle - Mockup
11-90
Slide 19
Shutdown Cooling Nozzle -
Mockup
11-91
Slide 20
Safety/Relief Nozzle - Mockup
11-92
Slide 21
Proof of Principle Test
11-93
Slide 22
Tihange Pressurizer Surge Line Nozzle To
Safe-End Mock-Up Tooling Set-Up For
Qualification Test
11-94
Slide 23
Tihange Pressurizer Surge Line Nozzle To
Safe-End Mock-Up Qualification Test Load Application
11-95
Slide 24
Tihange Pressurizer Surge Line Nozzle To Safe-End
Mock-Up Stress Measurement With Active Strain-Gages
11-96
Slide 25
Tihange 2 MSIP qualification program
demonstrated that the MSIP process was very
effective in generating compression at the weld
location
Demonstrated that the MSIP process works well in
thick-walled PWR applications
Demonstrated that the post-MSIP OD profiles are
acceptable for in-service inspections
Tihange PZR Surge Line Nozzle To Safe-End
Mock-Up Qualification Test Summary
11-97
Slide 26
Inspection Of Short Safe-End
DM Weldments
Program under way at WesDyne/EPRI to develop UT
Inspection Technique/Qualification
Sample weldments made by EPRI
Program to be completed by June 2005
Qualification of Inspection Personnel upon successful
completion of program
11-98
Slide 27
MSIP Proven Technology
MSIP is an effective mitigation process for SCC
- One time application protects weldments against SCC
- Has prevented crack initiation
- Arrests existing cracks in the compressive zone
MSIP is cost-effective versus weld repair/replacement
- Reduces both critical downtime and personnel radiation exposure
MSIP does not affect Critical Path. Typically completed during 1-2 outage shifts
Accepted by USNRC (NUREG 0313) as a Stress Improvement method
- Qualified by Argonne National Labs for the USNRC
- Independent verification by EPRI
- Verified on thick section pipe/nozzles for PWRs Tihange pressurizer
surge nozzle and Westinghouse/CE Pressurizer nozzle mockups.
Operating Experience since 1986 of over 1300 welds including 500 nozzle and safe-end
welds
11-99
Slide 28
MSIP Conclusions
Analyses and tests confirm applicability of MSIP for PWR
nozzle welds
MSIP ready for implementation on pressurizer nozzles by
June 2005
Application of MSIP will protect pressurizer nozzle welds
against SCC
11-100
Preemptive Weld Overlays A Cost Effective Solution to PWSCC
Concerns in PWR Piping System Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds
Peter Riccardella, Marcos Herrera,
6855 S. Havana St. #350 3315 Almaden Expy. #24
Centennial, CO 80112 San Jose, CA 95118
Pedro Amador, Greg Gerzen,
Welding Services, Inc. Exelon Nuclear
2225 Skyland Ct. 4300 Winfield Road
Norcross, GA 30071 Warrenville, IL 60555
This paper summarizes the technical justification for use of preemptive weld overlays (PWOLs)
as a solution to PWSCC in Alloy 82/182 dissimilar metal butt welds in PWR primary system
piping.
The MRP Task Group on Alloy 600, Butt Weld Working Group has developed a preliminary
inspection guideline for PWSCC susceptible butt welds in PWR primary system piping [1].
Because of field experience with cracking and leaking of such welds, and concerns about
potential weld repairs during original construction, which greatly aggravate the concern, the new
guideline calls for more frequent volumetric inspections than currently required by ASME
Section XI. Furthermore, many such large diameter welds have been evaluated to demonstrate
leak-before-break (LBB) in order to eliminate postulated breaks at those locations from the
licensing basis. Current NRC guidance on LBB [2], however, states that to qualify for
consideration, there must be no potential for degradation by erosion, erosion/corrosion,
erosion/cavitation, water hammer, thermal fatigue, or other corrosion mechanisms that could lead
to cracking in the affected piping. Susceptibility to PWSCC would thus eliminate these welds
from LBB consideration under current regulations.
Structural Integrity Associates and Welding Services, Inc. have pioneered the PWOL (patent
pending) concept to resolve these problems. PWOL objectives are as follows:
x Mitigate potential future PWSCC in susceptible locations by two means:
o Favorable residual stress reversal
o Structural reinforcement with a resistant material
x Improve inspection intervals and inspectability:
o PWSCC mitigation permits return to ASME Section XI inspection interval
o Overlaid weld inspections are easier to qualify for and perform than inspections of
the original dissimilar metal weld (DMW). In accordance with current Code
guidance for weld overlays (Code Case N-504-2), the inspection volume for a
weld overlaid joint is the overlay material itself, and a portion (but not all) of the
underlying butt weld.
11-101
x Preserve LBB status of the affected welds:
o Meets NRC criteria for two mitigation methods
o PWOL increases critical crack lengths providing greater LBB margins
x PWOLs result in weld overlay thicknesses and lengths that are economically practical to
apply preemptively during normal refueling outages.
PWOL design is governed by a number of considerations. The PWOL must supply sufficient
thickness of resistant material (Alloy 52 weld metal) to provide new structural reinforcement of
the original pipe weld sufficient to sustain design basis loads within ASME Code margins.
Secondly, the PWOL must allow for inspectability of the DMW being overlaid, as well as any
adjacent welds in close proximity (see Figure 1 below). Finally, the PWOL must supply
sufficient thickness to effectively reverse the highly tensile residual stresses from the original
DMW (including potential effects of an in-process repair weld, as illustrated by the yellow
region in Figure 1). Residual stress evaluations using models such as that shown in Figure 2
have been performed, and PWOL designs developed, for pressurizer steam space nozzles,
pressurizer surge nozzles and main coolant loop hot leg nozzles. Implementation schedule
estimates have been developed for each of these PWOL applications indicating that all but the
main coolant loop hot leg nozzles can be completed within a fifteen day outage. The larger
diameter hot leg nozzles would require slightly longer outage duration.
Preparation of a generic licensing report is underway [3], with Exelons Byron / Braidwood as
the lead plants. The report will be submitted to obtain NRC concurrence with the above stated
PWOL objectives.
References:
1. Material Reliability Program: Primary System Piping Butt Weld Inspection and
Evaluation Guideline (MRP-139), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, Draft F, January 4, 2005
2. U.S. NRC, Standard Review Plan 3.6.3, Elimination of the Postulation of Dynamic
Effects Associated with Pipe Ruptures from the Design Basis
3. Structural Integrity Associates Report, Technical Basis: Preemptive Weld Overlays for
Alloy 82/182 Butt Welds in PWRs SIR-04-079, Rev. A, Sept. 2004
11-102
Figure 1 Finite Element Model of Typical Surge Nozzle PWOL, Showing Stress Paths for
Residual Stress Evaluation. Yellow Region at ID of Path 3 Represents Original
Construction Repair (Conservatively Assumed).
11-103
PWOLs
PWOLs
A Cost Effective
A Cost Effective
Solution to PWSCC
Solution to PWSCC
Concerns in PWR
Concerns in PWR
Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds
Peter Riccardella Peter Riccardella
March 9, 2005 March 9, 2005
11-104
PRS-05-008/2
Summary
Summary
The Problem
The Problem
PWSCC PWSCC
Augmented Inspection and Inspectability Augmented Inspection and Inspectability
Leak Before Break Leak Before Break
The Solution
The Solution
Preemptive Weld Overlay (PWOL)

Preemptive Weld Overlay (PWOL)
PWOL Design Requirements
PWOL Design Requirements
Structural Sizing Structural Sizing
Residual Stress Improvement Residual Stress Improvement
Leak Before Break Leak Before Break
Inspection Considerations Inspection Considerations
Example Analyses and Results
Example Analyses and Results
11-105
PRS-05-008/3
PWSCC in PWR
PWSCC in PWR
Cracking/Leakage Observed in Several
Cracking/Leakage Observed in Several
Plants
Plants
V.C. Summer (RPV hot leg nozzle; leakage + V.C. Summer (RPV hot leg nozzle; leakage +
shallow circumferential crack) shallow circumferential crack)
Ringhals Ringhals 3 & 4 (axial cracks detected by UT) 3 & 4 (axial cracks detected by UT)
Tsuruga Tsuruga 2 (PZR relief nozzle; leak from axial crack) 2 (PZR relief nozzle; leak from axial crack)
Three Mile Island Unit 1 (Surge line nozzle to hot Three Mile Island Unit 1 (Surge line nozzle to hot
leg; axial crack detected by UT) leg; axial crack detected by UT)
11-106
PRS-05-008/4
Inspection & Evaluation Guideline
Inspection & Evaluation Guideline
(MRP
(MRP
-
-
139, Draft F)
139, Draft F)
PWSCC Crack Growth Rates 1.5 to 4 times greater than PWSCC Crack Growth Rates 1.5 to 4 times greater than
A A- -600 for A 600 for A- -82/182 weld metals 82/182 weld metals
Weld repairs performed during plant construction a Weld repairs performed during plant construction a
significant factor significant factor
Often from inside surface after completion of full weld from out Often from inside surface after completion of full weld from outside side
These result in high inside surface tensile residual stresses These result in high inside surface tensile residual stresses
Plant construction records often incomplete on such repairs Plant construction records often incomplete on such repairs
Analysis and experience show that axial cracks more Analysis and experience show that axial cracks more
likely, likely, but deep circumferential flaws cannot be ruled out but deep circumferential flaws cannot be ruled out
in regions of weld repairs in regions of weld repairs
MRP thus recommending augmented examinations MRP thus recommending augmented examinations
(beyond standard ASME XI or RI (beyond standard ASME XI or RI- -ISI Programs) ISI Programs)
11-107
PRS-05-008/5
Inspectability Considerations
Inspectability Considerations
Inspection of dissimilar metal butt welds a
Inspection of dissimilar metal butt welds a
challenging task
challenging task
Some design details render welds virtually
Some design details render welds virtually
un
un
-
-
inspectable
inspectable
RPV nozzle safe
RPV nozzle safe
-
-
ends often require
ends often require
inspection from ID
inspection from ID
11-108
PRS-05-008/6
Leak Before Break Considerations
Leak Before Break Considerations
Many large diameter DMWs utilized LBB to eliminate Many large diameter DMWs utilized LBB to eliminate
postulated breaks there from licensing basis postulated breaks there from licensing basis
However, NRC requirements for LBB (SRP 3.6.3) state: However, NRC requirements for LBB (SRP 3.6.3) state:
To qualify for consideration, there must be no potential . . . To qualify for consideration, there must be no potential . . .
corrosion mechanisms that could lead to cracking in the corrosion mechanisms that could lead to cracking in the
affected piping affected piping
SRP 3.6.3 (item 6) states, for piping susceptible to SCC: SRP 3.6.3 (item 6) states, for piping susceptible to SCC:
Remedial stress improvement treatment alone is not Remedial stress improvement treatment alone is not
sufficient to support LBB evaluation. sufficient to support LBB evaluation.
Non Non- -conforming piping that had been treated by conforming piping that had been treated by two two
mitigation mitigation methods within the first two years of service methods within the first two years of service
would qualify for LBB. would qualify for LBB.
Piping that had been Piping that had been repaired repaired by weld overlays would not by weld overlays would not
qualify for LBB. qualify for LBB.
11-109
PRS-05-008/7
The Solution
The Solution
-
-
PWOL
PWOL
Mitigate potential future PWSCC in susceptible
Mitigate potential future PWSCC in susceptible
locations
locations
by two means
by two means
:
:
Favorable Residual Stress Reversal Favorable Residual Stress Reversal
Structural Reinforcement with Resistant Material Structural Reinforcement with Resistant Material
Improve inspection intervals and inspectability
Improve inspection intervals and inspectability
PWSCC Mitigation permits return to ASME Section XI PWSCC Mitigation permits return to ASME Section XI
(or RI (or RI- -ISI) inspection intervals ISI) inspection intervals
Overlaid weld inspection easier to qualify for and Overlaid weld inspection easier to qualify for and
perform than original DMW perform than original DMW
Preserve Leak Before Break status of affected
Preserve Leak Before Break status of affected
welds
welds
11-110
PRS-05-008/8
WOL Design Requirements:
WOL Design Requirements:
Structural Sizing
Structural Sizing
Two types of design basis flaws assumed for
Two types of design basis flaws assumed for
PWOLs:
PWOLs:
100% thru original nozzle wall and 360 around 100% thru original nozzle wall and 360 around
circumference (full structural overlay) circumference (full structural overlay)
75% thru original nozzle wall and 360 around 75% thru original nozzle wall and 360 around
circumference (reduced thickness overlay) circumference (reduced thickness overlay)
WOL must satisfy ASME XI margins (IWB
WOL must satisfy ASME XI margins (IWB
-
-
3640)
3640)
in presence of above flaw assumptions
in presence of above flaw assumptions
Minimum WOL length is 1.5Rt plus length of
Minimum WOL length is 1.5Rt plus length of
susceptible material on OD of original DMW
susceptible material on OD of original DMW
WOL thickness & length must also be checked
WOL thickness & length must also be checked
against residual stress & inspectability criteria
against residual stress & inspectability criteria
11-111
PRS-05-008/9
PWOL Examples:
PWOL Examples:
Structural Sizing Results
Structural Sizing Results
WOL Thickness
(in.)
Nozzle
Reduced
Thickness
Full
Structural
Minimum
Length
(in.)
Pressurizer Spray 0.210 0.292 4.28
Pressurizer Surge 0.210 0.427 6.27
RCS Hot Leg 0.481 1.045 11.30
11-112
PRS-05-008/10
Residual Stress Model:
Pressurizer Spray Nozzle
11-113
PRS-05-008/11
Residual Stress Thermal Model
(Early in 1
(Early in 1
st st
Layer)
Layer)
11-114
PRS-05-008/12
(Middle of in 2
(Middle of in 2
nd nd
Layer)
Layer)
11-115
PRS-05-008/13
(End of 3
(End of 3
rd rd
Layer)
Layer)
11-116
PRS-05-008/14
Residual Stress Results:
ID Surface Axial Stress @ 650F
-70000
-60000
-50000
-40000
-30000
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Distance from ID Weld Repair Centerline (in)
S
t
r
e
s
s

(
p
s
i
)
Pre-WOL Post-WOL Post-WOL w/Oper.Loads
Nozzle(LAS)
PWSCC
Susceptible
Region Safe-End(SS)
11-117
PRS-05-008/15
Pressurizer Surge Nozzle
11-118
PRS-05-008/16
ID Surface Hoop Stress (650 F)
-40000
-30000
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Distance from ID Weld Repair Center (in)
S
t
r
e
s
s

(
p
s
i
)
Pre-WOL Post-WOL Post-WOL w/Oper.Loads
Nozzle(LAS)
PWSCC
Susceptible
Region
Safe-End(SS)
11-119
PRS-05-008/17
Post WOL Through-wall Axial Stress at 650 F
-40000
-30000
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Distance from ID Surface (in)
S
t
r
e
s
s

(
p
s
i
)
Path 1 Path 2 Path 3 Path 4 Path 2A Path 2B
11-120
PRS-05-008/18
RCS Hot Leg Nozzle
RCS Hot Leg Nozzle
11-121
PRS-05-008/19
RCS Hot Leg Nozzle
RCS Hot Leg Nozzle
Inside Surface Axial Stress
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
axial distance (in.)
s
t
r
e
s
s

(
k
s
i
)
Pre WOL Post WOL Post WOL w/Oper.Loads
W
e
l
d
B
u
t
t
e
r
O
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
W
e
l
d
Nozzle(LAS)
PWSCC
Susceptible
Region
Piping (SS)
11-122
PRS-05-008/20
Final PWOL Designs
Final PWOL Designs
(Reflecting
(Reflecting
Resid
Resid
. Stress & Inspectability)
. Stress & Inspectability)
Nozzle
WOL Thickness
(in.)
WOL Length
(in.)
Pressurizer Spray 0.30 7.19
Pressurizer Surge 0.44 9.81
RCS Hot Leg 0.48 11.60
WOL Thickness
(in.)
Nozzle
Reduced
Thickness
Full
Structural
Minimum
Length
(in.)
Pressurizer Spray 0.210 0.292 4.28
Pressurizer Surge 0.210 0.427 6.27
RCS Hot Leg 0.481 1.045 11.30
vs.
Structural
Sizing
11-123
PRS-05-008/21
PWOL Implementation Times
PWOL Implementation Times
Orig. Nozzle Dimensions
PWOL Dimensions
Nozzle
Outer Diam.
(in.)
Thickness
(in.)
Thickness
(in.)
Length
(in.)
Approx.
Welding
Time (hrs.)
Pressurizer Spray 6.0 0.875 0.30 7.19 30
Pressurizer Surge 15.0 1.28 0.44 9.81 120
RCS Hot Leg 33.0 2.33 0.48 11.60 250*
* Based on two weld heads welding
11-124
PRS-05-008/22
Surge Nozzle LBB Results
Surge Nozzle LBB Results
Condition
Crack
Morphology
Critical
Flaw Size,
inches
Leakage Flaw
Size, inches
Leakage
Rate, gpm
Without Overlay SCC 19.33 9.67 13.65
Without Overlay Fatigue 19.33 9.67 94.83
With Overlay Fatigue 22.77 11.39 60.92
With Overlay SCC 22.77 11.39 6.55
With Overlay SCC 22.77 12.59 10.0
11-125
PRS-05-008/23
PWOL Status
PWOL Status
Design Requirements Defined and
Design Requirements Defined and
Example Calculations Complete
Example Calculations Complete
Patent Application Submitted (Patent
Patent Application Submitted (Patent
Pending)
Pending)
MRP Contract Recently Awarded
MRP Contract Recently Awarded
Mock
Mock
-
-
up for Residual Stress Confirmation and
up for Residual Stress Confirmation and
NDE Demonstration
NDE Demonstration
Topical Report for NRC Submittal

Topical Report for NRC Submittal
NRC Meeting Scheduled
NRC Meeting Scheduled
11-126
Corrosion Resistant Coatings (SIMAT) for Repair and Mitigation of Alloy 600
Cracking
J. P. Lareau
Windsor, CT 06095
Phone-860-731-1605
Fax-860-731-1678
Email-john.p.lareau@us.westinghouse.com
Warren Junker
Bruce Newton
Westinghouse-PCI
Westinghouse has developed a series of corrosion resistant coatings that can be applied
on the primary side surface of various Alloy 600 locations. The process deposits fine
metal powder onto the surface using Supersonically Induced Metal Alloying Technology
(SIMAT). The powder is accelerated in a specially designed nozzle to speeds
approaching Mach 3. The individual micron range sized particles kinetically weld to the
substrate, building up a corrosion resistant layer without producing any thermal stresses
that are typical of conventional welding. The interface produces a diffusion bond into the
substrate. In addition, there is no dilution layer into the substrate that could reduce the
corrosion resistance.
Laboratory testing has been performed to demonstrate both the mechanical and corrosion
resistant properties of the coatings. Thermal cycling, bond strength and ductility under
bending loads have also been measured. A minimum ten fold increase in corrosion
resistance was demonstrated at the termination of the testing. Also, tests have shown that
pre-existing cracks can be coated and arrested.
Process control and the powder composition produce a ductile layer that is built up and
compacted by subsequent layers to minimize porosity and local lack of fusion. The
coating process can be used as a preventive mitigation or as an embedded flaw repair.
The final coating surface is controllable to allow post process NDE (penetrant testing
and/or ultrasonic testing).
A robotic delivery system provides a remote coating capability. Complex geometries,
such as the control drive nozzle and j weld have been successfully coated, as well as the
ID surface of the nozzles.
A variety of Alloy 600 applications are being investigated, including:
x RPVH J groove welds
x CRDM inside surface
x Safe end welds
x RPV internals
11-127
Slide 1
Corrosion Resistant Barriers for Repair
and Mitigation of Alloy 600 Cracking
J.P. Lareau
March, 2005
11-128
Slide 2
SIMAT
z SIMAT (GDS)
Supersonically Induced Mechanical Alloying Technology
Gas Dynamic Spray
Initially observed in supersonic wind tunnel experiments
11-129
Slide 3
SIMAT- Why?
z Key Advantages
No thermal stress issues (performed at ambient
temperatures)
No dilution into substrate
z An Alternative to Weld Repair
Inexpensively applied coating for corrosion resistance
Repair of mating surfaces flanges
Embedded flaw repair for PWSCC
11-130
Slide 4
SIMAT - Process
Stages of Coating Formation
Supersonic Flow
High Velocity Impact
z Surface cleaning and activation
z Formation of a coating substrate
z Formation and densification of
the layers by flow of high
velocity
particles
z Metalurgical diffusion bond
11-131
Slide 5
Critical Parameters for Powder
Consolidation
z Gas Pressure
z Gas Temperature
700 F
z Gas Composition
He, N
2
, Air
z Powder Morphology
z Nozzle Geometry
Orifice Diameter
Drift Length
Inlet Angle
Outlet Angle
z Surface Preparation
11-132
Slide 6
SIMAT Equipment
Powder Flow
Control
Gas
Temperature
Control
Gas Pressure
Control
Sprayer
11-133
Slide 7
SIMAT Project
z SIMAT - Supersonically Induced Mechanical Alloy
Technology
Patent pending
11-134
Slide 8
Coating of CRDM OD
Geometry
11-135
Slide 9
Materials Under Study
Substrates
I600
Stainless Steel
Steel
z Powders
Nickel
Stainless Steel (316)
Zirconium - Boron
Zirconium Oxide
Titanium Carbide
11-136
Slide 10
Other Process Parameters
z Initial Surface Finish
z Powder Flow
z Gas Temperature
z Gas Pressure
z Nozzle Geometry
z Nozzle-Surface Gap
z Nozzle Movement
Pattern
Speed
11-137
Slide 11
Completed Sample Testing
z Visual
z Metallographic
z Accelerated Corrosion-doped steam at 750 F
z Thermal Cycling
z Bond Strength
z NDE (UT, PT)
z Plastic deformation (spalling)
z ID and OD Coating of CRDM Geometry
z Sealed and Arrested Existing Cracks
11-138
Slide 12
Corrosion Samples
z I600 Plate
z Cold Worked
z Machined Into
Bars
z Work hardened
z Loaded beyond
yield
z Coated
z Test
11-139
Slide 13
Corrosion Test Results
Coated
sample-no
cracking
Uncoated
sample with
cracking
11-140
Slide 14
Coating of Cracked Sample
Uncoated,
cracked sample
SIMAT coating
arrests crack growth
11-141
Slide 15
Thermal Cycling Test
(I600 Substrate)
Thermal cycling of Coating
11-142
Slide 16
Cross Section Of Ni
TiC coating on I 600
z Coating has excellent
bonding to the substrate.
I600
Ni/TiC
Coating
I 600
11-143
Slide 17
SIMAT-Next Steps
Demonstrate coatings for nuclear applications -
Ni, SS316, Alloy I52...
z Evaluate Process Control Methodologies
Optimize deposition parameters
Complete corrosion and bond strength testing
z Develop Field Tooling
z NRC Licensing
z Complete Process Adaptation
11-144
Slide 18
Implementation Options
SIMAT
Supreem
Surface to
be repaired
Sprayer
Camera
11-145
Extended Abstract for Alloy 600 Conference in Santa Ana Pueblo, NM
2
, B/Li/pH and Zn on PWSCC of Alloy 600
Peter L. Andresen (GE-GRC) and John Hickling (EPRI)
This paper describes ongoing work sponsored within the EPRI MRP program by the Mitigation WG
(chairman: John Wilson, Exelon) of the industry Alloy 600 Issue Task Group.
The stress corrosion crack growth rate (CGR) response of Alloy 600 is being evaluated in simulated, high
temperature (325 qC) PWR primary water, with particular emphasis on the opportunities for mitigation by
optimizing the dissolved H
2
fugacity or by additions of Zn (as Zn acetate). The effects of changes in the
B/Li/pH level in the water are also being studied. A single heat of highly susceptible Alloy 600 (heat
93510) from an archive CRDM housing was used to fabricate 0.5T CT specimens. Reversing dc potential
drop was employed to monitor crack length, which included the use of an identical resistivity coupon to
correct for changes in material resistivity vs. time. Excellent environmental control (e.g., of water purity,
dissolved H
2
, temperature) and optimized experimental techniques (e.g., transitioning from in-situ
fatigue precracking to constant K SCC conditions, corrosion potential monitoring, etc.) were utilized.
While there is inherent overlap in the tasks, they were designed to isolate and characterize the effects of
individual step changes in chemistry "on-line".
Published data from several sources show that there is a peak in CGR in the vicinity of hydrogen level,
and thus electrochemical corrosion potential (ECP), corresponding approximately to the phase boundary
for Ni/NiO stability in high-temperature water:
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0 1 10 100 1000
H
2
Fugacity, cc/kg
A
r
b
i
t
r
a
r
y

G
r
o
w
t
h

R
a
t
e
-900 -850 -800 -750 -700
Corrosion Potential, mV
she
50 mV Full Width
Half Max
Change in CGR for
various step changes in H
2
H
2
change 600 82/182
10 o 20: 1.24X 1.34X
20 o 40: 1.61X 2.17X
40 o 80: 1.38X 2.11X
20 o 80: 2.23X 4.58X
20 o200: 2.42X 5.93X
10 o200: 2.99X 7.97X
Peak in Growth Rate = 3X
as Expected for Alloy 600
For 325C where potential p
by 59.35 mV per 10X n in H2
& 118.7 mV per unit n in pH
NiO Ni
Phase Stability
as Expected for Alloy 82/182
Schematic Plot of Effect of
H
2
on Crack Growth Rate
Figure 1. Schematic drawing of the expected effect of changes in H
2
fugacity on PWSCC CGR for
one particular temperature, based on previously published data.
However, it should be recognized that, in practice, many factors interact in a complex manner to affect the
actual variation in growth rate likely to be observed with changing hydrogen fugacity:
x The maximum enhancement in CGR (relative to the rate far away from the Ni/NiO transition)
depends on yield strength, with annealed Alloy 600 showing a 2.5 3X peak effect, and higher
strength alloys such as X-750 and Alloy 82H weld metal showing a 7 8X peak effect.
11-147
x The width of the peak varies with material (and possibly material condition), ranging from | 40 to
|80 mV FWHM (full width half maximum).
x The location of the peak vs. Ni/NiO varies with material the peak in CGR does not appear to
occur exactly at the Ni/NiO phase boundary.
x The H
2
fugacity associated with the Ni/NiO peak varies with temperature (which affects both the
H
2
fugacity coefficient and the Ni/NiO phase boundary). There is also a much smaller effect of
temperature on the corrosion potential of the material itself (e.g., doubling the H
2
fugacity implies
a shift of 16.7 mV at 286 qC, but 18.4 mV at 343 qC).
x If plotted as an "overpotential" from the Ni/NiO phase boundary (which captures the temperature
effect on both the H
2
fugacity and the Ni/NiO transition), a single CGR vs. ECP curve accurately
fits the data for a given material, but the engineering value of plots vs. H
2
fugacity is lost.
Preliminary observations in the present studies on the effect of H
2
fugacity on PWSCC growth rates of
Alloy 600 are consistent with the schematic shown in Figure 1. A more robust analysis should be
possible when the present test program is complete.
The influence of B and Li concentrations (and thus pH) in simulated primary water is being evaluated
using a variety of approaches, e.g., maintaining constant high temperature pH and varying B and Li, or
maintaining constant Li and changing pH by varying B. These tests have not yet been completed, but the
data to date show virtually no effect on PWSCC growth rate of changes in B/Li/pH chemistry in 325 qC,
hydrogenated water when evaluated over the range of 60 3200 ppm B, 0.3 7 ppm Li and 6.0 7.9
pH
325C
. This is fully consistent with expectations, because the Ni/NiO phase boundary is unaffected by
pH in this range (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Pourbaix diagram for the Ni-H
2
O system at 300 qC showing the parallel nature of the
response of the H
2
/H
2
O and the Ni/NiO lines in the pH regime of | 5.5 to 9.5.
Outside of this pH range, the role of dissolved Ni species can become important.
11-148
The effect on CGR of adding Zn (as Zn acetate) has so far only been evaluated for two Alloy 600
specimens tested at 25 ksiin in 325 qC PWR primary water containing 600 ppm B, 2.2 ppm Li, and 30
cc/kg H
2
. After achieving an equilibrium PWSCC growth rate response at constant K, the system was
spiked with 150 ppb Zn for six weeks, then tapered back toward 30 ppb Zn. Some reduction in CGR
was indicated at the 150 ppb Zn level, but there was little evidence of a benefit at the 30 50 ppb Zn
level, possibly because rapid crack propagation was outstripping the ability to dynamically supply Zn to
the tip of a growing crack (new oxides formed along the crack walls also absorb Zn). Another test, which
should exhibit a lower CGR before adding zinc, has been initiated at a reduced stress intensity factor
(15 ksiin).
11-149
Alloy 600 Mitigation
2
, B/Li/pH
and Zn on PWSCC of Alloy 600:
Interim Report on MRP Testing
Peter Andresen and John Hickling*
GE Global Research Center Schenectady, NY
* EPRI Palo Alto, CA
Alloy 600 Conference March 2005
11-150
Overview
This program is evaluating chemical methods to mitigate
primary water (PW) SCC susceptibility of Alloy 600.
Optimization of H
2
fugacity to avoid peak in growth rates
Evaluation of benefits of adjusting pH/B/Li
Zn additions
Similar benefits should accrue to other Ni-base structural
materials, such as Alloy 182/82 weld metal, Alloy 690
11-151
Experimental Strategy
Crack growth rate measurements techniques with
thorough transition from fatigue to SCC.
Use susceptible heat of A600
(CRDM heat 93510 from Framatome).
Two 0.5T CT specimens tested in series.
Moderate stress intensity factor, K = 25 ksiin
Test in 325C water with a range of Zn, B/Li & H
2
Use B/Li-equilibrated demineralizer to maintain
high water purity and good H
2
control.
Use ZrO
2
/ CuO and Pt reference electrodes.
11-152
Alloy 600 CRDM Housing
Heat 93510 received from Framatome
Considered various orientations; used orientation at right,
which is the C-L orientation
11-153
Alloy 600 CRDM Housing
Heat 93510 received from Framatome
Material ranked #2 in susceptibility in MPR-55 Rev.1
Test C Mn Fe S Si P Cu Ni Cr Co Al Mg B Ti
Ladle 0.047 0.23 8.94 0.002 0.30 0.005 0.01 74.43 15.42 0.057 0.19 0.005 0.0032 0.34
Check 1 0.045 0.22 9.20 0.002 0.32 0.005 0.01 74.40 15.26 0.060 0.18 0.005 0.0019 0.27
Check 2 0.045 0.21 8.81 0.001 0.29 0.005 0.01 74.74 15.25 0.060 0.19 NR NR 0.31
Check 3 0.046 0.21 8.98 0.001 0.30 0.005 0.01 74.77 15.14 0.060 0.14 NR NR 0.26
YS, ksi TS, ksi Elongation, %
93510 39.0 98.3 48
93511 37.1 92.2 48
Final annealing for both heats was 1685
o
F for ~20 minutes
in a continuous anneal furnace, followed by water quench.
11-154
Integrated Testing System
One of 27 fully
instrumented
high temp. water
SCC systems with:
water supply
autoclave
data acquisition
digital temp control
digital load control
constant K control

11-155
High precision loop for
control / measurement
of water to:
inject impurities at
< 1 ppb levels,
control dissolved gas
mixtures by mass
flow controllers
use B/Li-equilibrated
demineralizers,
introduce Zn

11-156
DC Potential Drop Measurement
High resolution dcpd
crack monitoring with
capability to:
maintain constant K
max
with or without cycling
sequence of conditions
that trigger on a/W
varying K (dK/da) to
simulate components
11-157
Resistivity Changes in Ni Alloys
Must compensate using coupon of
identical Alloy 600 with identical thermal history
0.41
0.415
0.42
0.425
0.43
0.435
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
Time, Hours
E
q
u
i
v
a
l
e
n
t

a
/
W

a
s

i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d

b
y

d
c
p
d
1.035
1.04
1.045
1.05
1.055
1.06
1.065
1.07
1.075
1.08
1.085
1.09
Heat 89, normalized
then current compensated
Shift in Resistivity in 325C Ar
Heat 89 of Alloy 600 from
John Foster, Westinghouse
Heat 89, normalized
to initial reading, then
converted to a/W
Potential data are normalized to
the first data point in that series,
then compensated for current
3
.
2

x

1
0
-
7

m
m
/
s
7
.
9

x

1
0
-
8

m
m
/
s
3
.
6

x

1
0
-
8

m
m
/
s
1
.
8

x

1
0
-
8

m
m
/
s
Crack length & growth rate data are
computed assuming this resistivity
shift occurred in a 1TCT specimen
11-156
Ni/NiO Effects on DC Potential Drop
Crossing into Ni metal stability produces shorting in
the crack wake and apparent decrease in crack length
11-159
Crack Tip Chemistry
Oxidants are consumed in
the crack, producing a
large change in potential
and large shift in chemistry
H
2
is not consumed, and
chemistry in PWSCC is
~constant in crack.
11-160
Crack Tip Chemistry
Thus, high growth rates occur as oxidants shift the
crack chemistry and can overwhelm B/Li buffering
27.5
27.6
27.7
27.8
27.9
28
28.1
28.2
28.3
2200 2250 2300 2350 2400 2450
Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e

o
r

C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,

P
S
/
c
m
CT Corrosion Potential
c85 - 1T CT of Sens. SS - AJ9139
95 ppb H
2
, 1200 ppm B, 2.2 ppm Li, 288C
30/21 ksin,
0.01 Hz + 900 s hold
3.5 x 10
-6
mm/s
2.5 x 10
-8
mm/s
T
o

2
0
0

p
p
b

O
2

@
2
2
7
9
h
T
o

9
5

p
p
b

H
2

@
2
3
5
4
h
6 x 10
-8
mm/s
pH
288C
~ 6.79
11-161
20% Cold Worked Alloy 600
23.5
23.55
23.6
23.65
23.7
23.75
4700 4800 4900 5000 5100 5200 5300
Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e

o
r

C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,

u
S
/
c
m
Annealed + 20%CW Alloy 600
2000 ppb O
2
, Pure Water
Outlet Conductivity
CT Potential
2.1 x 10
-7
mm/s
T
o

c
o
n
s
t

3
1
.
1

M
P
a
m
@

3
4
4
9
h
3.2 x 10
-8
mm/s
Pt Potential
T
o

2
0
0

p
p
b

O
2
@

4
1
7
4

h
T
o

9
5

p
p
b

H
2
@

4
8
1
6

h
T
o

2
0
0
0

p
p
b

O
2
@

5
1
0
7

h
2.0 x 10
-7
mm/s
29-5
Clear, reproducible effects of water chemistry
11-162
Effects of
H
2
Fugacity on
SCC Growth Rates
11-163
Ni Alloy Crack Growth Rate vs H
2
Proximity of Ni/NiO
and H
2
/H
2
O is
very important
for Ni alloys
Proximity depends on
H
2
& temperature but
not on pH
Low H
2
unwise because of radiolysis in core
n H
2
11-164
Ni Alloy Crack Growth Rate vs. H
2
KAPL data: consistent benefit of nH
2
288 360 C
X750 AH shows peak shifted from Ni/NiO
Max
Full width
at half max
For alloy 600:
height | 2.5 3X
width | 50 mV
(| 8X ' in H
2
)
11-165
Alloy 600 Crack Growth Rate vs. H
2
Schematic of change in growth rate vs. H
2
for alloy 600
& alloys 82/182 at one particular temperature (325C)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0 1 10 100 1000
H
2
Fugacity, cc/kg
A
r
b
i
t
r
a
r
y

G
r
o
w
t
h

R
a
t
e
-900 -850 -800 -750 -700
Corrosion Potential, mV
she
50 mV Full Width
Half Max
Change in CGR for
various step changes in H
2
H
2
change 600 82/182
10 o 20: 1.24X 1.34X
20 o 40: 1.61X 2.17X
40 o 80: 1.38X 2.11X
20 o 80: 2.23X 4.58X
20 o200: 2.42X 5.93X
10 o200: 2.99X 7.97X
as Expected for Alloy 600
For 325C where potential p
by 59.35 mV per 10X n in H2
& 118.7 mV per unit n in pH
NiO Ni
Phase Stability
as Expected for Alloy 82/182
Schematic Plot of Effect of
H
2
on Crack Growth Rate
11-166
n In enhancement vs. H
2
for high YS materials
Ni Alloy Crack
Growth Rates vs H
2
11-167
Effect of H
2
& B/Li/pH on SCC
Test Li, ppm B, ppm pH
300C
(1)
H
2
, cc/kg
(2)
Duration
hours
1 2.2 600 7.2 20 o 40 o 80 3500
2 0.3 60 6.9 20 o 40 o 80 3500
3 7 910
(3)
7.5 20 o 40 o 80 3500
4 7 3200 6.9 20 o 40 o 80 3500
5
2 o 7 o 2
o 0.3 o 2
1100 o 3200 o
1100 o 60 o 1100
6.9 30 5500
6 7
1440 o 290 o 1440
o 4350 o 1440
7.3 o 7.9 o 7.3
o 6.7 o 7.3
30 5500
500 hrs for SCC transitioning + 1000 hrs per test segment
Each test uses two series-loaded 1TCT specimens
11-168
Thermodynamic response in ECP to changes in H
2
2X change in H
2
= 17.9 mV at 325C
Alloy 600 CRDM, 325C, 600 B / 2.2 Li, 20 cc/kg H
2
H
2
Effects on SCC Growth Rates
SCC#3c - c261 - Alloy 600, CRDM Tube, 93510
11.08
11.13
11.18
11.23
11.28
11.33
11.38
11.43
11.48
1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Test Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-0.9
-0.89
-0.88
-0.87
-0.86
-0.85
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
P
S
/
c
m

o
r

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e
CT potential
Pt potential
c261 - 0.5TCT of A600 CRDM, 325C
25 ksiin, 20 cc/kg H
2
, 600 B / 2.2 Li
4.4 x 10
-8
mm/s
T
o

C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t

K

@

1
0
4
0
h
T
o

4
0

c
c
/
k
g
H
2

@

1
8
5
7
h
4.6 x 10
-8
mm/s
T
o

8
0

c
c
/
k
g
H
2

@

2
6
9
7
h
2.3 x 10
-8
mm/s
3 x 10
-8
mm/s
11.1
11.15
11.2
11.25
11.3
11.35
11.4
11.45
1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Test Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-0.9
-0.89
-0.88
-0.87
-0.86
-0.85
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
P
S
/
c
m

o
r

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e
CT potential
Pt potential
c262 - 0.5TCT of A600 CRDM, 325C
2
, 600 B / 2.2 Li
5.3 x 10
-8
mm/s
T
o

C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t

K

@

1
0
4
0
h
T
o

4
0

c
c
/
k
g
H
2

@

1
8
5
7
h
3.4 x 10
-8
mm/s
T
o

8
0

c
c
/
k
g
H
2

@

2
6
9
7
h
3.4 x 10
-8
mm/s
11-169
Response immediately after H
2
change, but then n in CGR
Alloy 600 CRDM, 325C, 600 B / 2.2 Li, 20 cc/kg H
2
H
2
Effects on SCC Growth Rates
SCC#2a - c261 - Alloy 600, CRDM Tube, 93510
11.12
11.14
11.16
11.18
11.2
11.22
11.24
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
Test Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
P
S
/
c
m

o
r

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e
c261 - 0.5TCT of A600 CRDM, 325C
2
, 600 B / 2.2 Li
4.4 x 10
-8
mm/s
T
o

C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t

K

@

1
0
4
0
h
C
h
a
n
g
e

f
r
o
m

2
0

t
o
4
0

c
c
/
k
g

H
2

@

1
8
5
7
h
2.3 x 10
-8
mm/s Outlet conductivity y100
SCC#2b - c261 - Alloy 600, CRDM Tube, 93510
11.24
11.26
11.28
11.3
11.32
11.34
11.36
11.38
11.4
11.42
11.44
2100 2300 2500 2700 2900 3100 3300 3500
Test Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
P
S
/
c
m

o
r

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e
c261 - 0.5TCT of A600 CRDM, 325C
2
, 600 B / 2.2 Li
T
o

C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t

K

@

1
0
4
0
h
T
o

4
0

c
c
/
k
g
H
2

@

1
8
5
7
h
4.6 x 10
-8
mm/s
Outlet conductivity y100
T
o

8
0

c
c
/
k
g
H
2

@

2
6
9
7
h
3 x 10
-8
mm/s
11-170
Conclusions on H
2
Effects
Summary and Preliminary Interpretation of H
2
Results to date:
Observed thermodynamic response to ECP for changes in H
2
Short term CGR response may be related to changes in
Ni/NiO and Ni-Fe-Cr/spinel oxide stabilities on dcpd
Effects of H
2
on CGR of alloy 600 in moderate agreement with
KAPL data:
peak to background is only ~2.5 3X
peak at 325C is 8 13 cc/kg H
2
, so 20 cc/kg is off peak
width of peak at half-max is ~50 mV = 7X change in H
2
a peak height of 7 8X is observed for X750 or 82/182
Mitigation benefit for a given component depends in rather
complex manner on alloy, temperature & current vs. target H
2
11-171
Effects of
B/Li/pH on
SCC Growth Rates
11-172
Ni Alloy Crack Growth Rate vs H
2
Proximity of Ni/NiO
and H
2
/H
2
O is
very important
for Ni alloys
Proximity depends on
H
2
& temperature but
not on pH
Corrosion potential (H
2
/H
2
O) is parallel to Ni/NiO,
so expect little effect of pH
T
between 6 9
11-173
11.08
11.1
11.12
11.14
11.16
11.18
11.2
1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700
Test Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
P
S
/
c
m

o
r

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e
c261 - 0.5TCT of A600 CRDM, 325C
27.5 MPam, 20 cc/kg H
2
, 600 B / 2.2 Li
4 x 10
-8
mm/s
T
o

C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t

K

@

1
0
4
0
h
D
e
m
i
n

c
a
u
s
e
s

s
l
o
w

n
i
n

L
i
p
L
i
,
p
p
H

b
y

~
0
.
3

@

1
3
3
5
h
Outlet conductivity y100
A600, 325C, 20 cc/kg H
2
, 600 ppm B
No effect of change in B/Li chemistry, ~0.3 'pH
4.3 ppm o 2.2 ppm Li = pH
325C
of 7.5 o 7.2
11-174
B/Li Effects at Constant pH
B = 1100 o 3200 o 1100 o 60 pH
300C
= 6.9
Li = 2 o 7 o 2 o 0.3 pH
325C
= 7.25
SCC#2 - c283 - Alloy 600, CRDM Tube, 93510
11.14
11.19
11.24
11.29
11.34
11.39
11.44
1200 1700 2200 2700 3200
Test Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
P
S
/
c
m

o
r

P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e
c283 - 0.5TCT of A600 CRDM, 325C
2
, Varying B/Li
3.5 x 10
-8
mm/s
Conductivity x0.01
T
o

C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t

K

@

1
2
0
1
h
T
o

1
1
0
0

p
p
m

B
,
2

p
p
m

L
i
T
o

3
2
0
0

p
p
m

B
,
7

p
p
m

L
i

@

1
8
8
0
h
T
o

6
0

p
p
m

B
,
0
.
3

p
p
m

L
i

@

3
3
1
5
h
T
o

1
1
0
0

p
p
m

B
,
2

p
p
m

L
i

@

2
6
7
5
h
pH
325C
constant at ~7.25
11-175
Effect of pH on CGR of X-750 (Morton)
Little effect on growth rate of changes in pH
T
= 6 9
11-176
Effect of pH on CGR of CW SS, 340C
Little effect on growth rate of change from pure water
to 1000 B / 1 Li, pH
340C
= 6.0 o 7.34
c163 SCC #6a - 750MPa Cool Work 304L SS, TSh
12.83
12.85
12.87
12.89
12.91
12.93
12.95
12.97
3500 3700 3900 4100 4300 4500 4700
Time, hours
C
r
a
c
k

l
e
n
g
t
h
,

m
m
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,

V
s
h
e

o
r

C
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,

P
S
/
c
m
Pt Potential
Outlet Conductivity
CT Potential
c163 - 750MPa Cool Work 304L
27.5 MPam, Pure Water
T
o

3
1
6
0

p
p
b

H
2
@

7
4
8
h
T
o

3
4
0
C
@

2
2
5
5
h
R
e
p
l
a
c
e
d

h
i
g
h

P
p
u
m
p

@

4
2
3
9
h
T
o

R
=
0
.
7
,

0
.
0
0
1

H
z

+
8
5
,
4
0
0
s

a
t

K
m
a
x

@

3
3
7
8
h
T
o

1
0
0
0

p
p
m

B
1

p
p
m

L
i

@

4
1
6
7
h
3 x 10
-8
mm/s
11-177
Conclusions on B/Li/pH Effects
Summary and Preliminary Interpretation of B/Li/pH
effects to date:
No evidence of B/Li/pH effects on crack growth rate
over range of 60 3200 ppm B
0.3 7 ppm Li
6.0 7.5 pH
T
Consistent with Morton (KAPL) data
Consistent with expectation from Pourbaix diagram
11-178
Effects of
Zn Addition on
SCC Growth Rate
11-179
Zn: Penetration to Crack Tip
Limited benefit of Zn in
BWRs related to high
corrosion potential, which
drives Zn
2+
from crack.
But at low potential, Zn
diffuses slowly and is
initially consumed by
incorporation into crack
oxides.
11-180
Effects of Zn on SCC Growth Rate
T
e
s
t
s

s
t
a
r
t
e
d
Test Li, ppm B, ppm pH
300C
(1)
Zn, ppb
Duration
hours
1 2.2 600 7.2 0 o 30 5000
2 2.2 600 7.2
0 o 10 o
30 o 0
6500
3 0.3 1200 6.9 0 o 30 o 0 5000
500 hrs for SCC transitioning + 1500 hrs per test segment
Each test uses two 1TCT specimens; 325C, 30 cc/kg H
2
Spike Zn for several weeks to saturate system and crack
Testing focused on Ni-metal stability = high H
2
11-181
Conclusions on Zn Effects
Summary and Preliminary Interpretation of Zn Results:
Some benefit may occur at high Zn levels (150 ppb)
Limited evidence of benefit to date at 30 ppb Zn
Follow-up, corroborative experiments essential
Removed specimen for analysis
Starting new CTs at 15 ksiin
Concern for benefit of Zn when Ni-metal is stable
and/or oxides with NiO structure at crack tip
benefit of Zn is related to incorporating into spinel
11-182
Review of Primary Chemistry Effects on PWSCC
J. A. Gorman, Dominion Engineering, Inc., Reston, VA
K. Fruzzetti, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA
Extended Abstract
Introduction
Most of the information covered in this presentation is taken from the latest revision of
the EPRI PWR Primary Water Chemistry Guidelines (Primary GL: report 1002884, Rev.
5, Volumes 1 and 2, Sept. 2003). As noted in the Primary GL, and illustrated in Slide 4,
the main objectives of primary water chemistry are to:
x Assure primary system pressure boundary integrity
x Assure fuel cladding integrity and achievement of fuel performance objectives
x Minimize out of core radiation fields
With regard to pressure boundary integrity, the main concern during design of PWRs in
the 1960s and 1970s was with SCC of stainless steels. This concern resulted in limits
being placed on the allowed concentrations of chlorides, fluorides and sulfates (150 ppb
each), and a limit of 100 ppb on oxygen for temperatures above 250F. Since the late
1970s, the main concern with PWR primary boundary integrity has been with PWSCC of
Alloy 600. PWSCC first affected SG tubes (first 600MA and then 600TT). Since the
late 1980s, PWSCC has also affected thicker wall Alloy 600 components such as nozzles.
Since about 2000, PWSCC has been observed in Alloy 182/132/82 welds.
Tests and evaluations have shown that water chemistry effects on PWSCC are generally
minor compared to the much larger effects of microstructure, stress, and temperature.
For example, variations in microstructure, stress, and temperature can change rates of
PWSCC by factors of 10 to 1000. In contrast, chemistry changes within practical limits
affect the rate of PWSCC by a few percent to up to factors of about 2 to 5. However,
chemistry is more accessible for control in an already constructed plant than the other
stronger influences. For this reason, it is considered worthwhile to optimize chemistry to
minimize PWSCC initiation and/or growth.
The main chemistry parameters potentially affecting PWSCC initiation and growth are
lithium concentration and/or pH
T
, hydrogen concentration (which affects ECP), and zinc
concentration. Other water chemistry parameters, e.g., the concentrations of chlorides
and sulfates typically observed at PWRs, are known to have insignificant effects on the
rate of PWSCC.
Effect of Lithium and pH on Initiation of PWSCC
Statistical analyses of initiation test results using RUB specimens were updated in 2002
(EPRI report 1006888, April 2002, MRP-68) and re-assessed during the most recent
revision of the Primary GL. For data between 320-330C, it was found that:
x Boron has a statistically insignificant effect on PWSCC, which implies that pH is
not a factor controlling PWSCC within the range evaluated.
1
11-183
x For lithium changes within practical limits there was no significant effect in time
to cracking for changes associated with going from coordinated pH
T
6.9 to
coordinated pH
T
7.2 (see Slide 9).
There were no data in the 320-330C temperature range for lithium below 0.66 ppm.
Higher temperature data extrapolated to 330C indicate that there are increased times to
PWSCC initiation for lower lithium, but whether and how strongly this effect applies in
the 320-330C range are uncertain.
Westinghouse presented preliminary results of WOG tests to the Primary GL Committee
in Sept. 2002. These were results of crack initiation tests at 325C using RUBs for
simulated pH
310C
6.9, 7.2 and 7.4 fuel cycle regimes (6 boron/lithium concentrations,
one week for each, for each of many simulated fuel cycles). Assessment of these
preliminary data during the Primary GL revision indicated that the WOG data are not
statistically different from the MRP-68 results (see Slide 11). The final WOG data are
currently being incorporated into the MRP-68 database for assessment.
Effect of Lithium and pH on PWSCC Crack Growth Rate (CGR)
Earlier EPRI/Westinghouse CGR tests indicated no effect of lithium or pH
T
on CGR.
Recent WOG tests also indicate no significant effect of lithium or pH
T
on CGR. EPRI
MRP is completing a CGR testing matrix that includes a separate study of Li/B and pH
effects. KAPL tests using Alloy X-750 indicated no significant effect of pH
T
variations
between 6.2 and 8.7 on CGR. pH
T
below 6.2 resulted in lower CGR, but this pH is not
applicable to PWR primary coolant.
Overall Assessment of pH
T
/Lithium Effects on PWSCC
x Initiation: Lithium and pH have insignificant effect for lithium 0.66 ppm (may
have increased time to initiation below 0.66 ppm).
x CGR: Lithium and pH have insignificant effect.
The authors consider that greater weight should be given to CGR data since CGR tests
use more realistic thick wall specimens, and since the parts of most current concern are
thick wall.
Hydrogen Effects on Initiation and CGR of PWSCC
Results of MRP-68 statistical evaluations indicate that, at 330C, there is a small effect of
hydrogen concentration variations within the allowed range of 25-50 cc/kg (see Slide 15).
The minimum initiation time (most aggressive condition) was found to occur at ~32
cc/kg.
Typical CGR test results, e.g., from Morton, et al., at the 10th Environmental
Degradation Conference, 2001 indicate that there is a relatively strong effect of hydrogen
on CGR, up to a factor of 5 for higher strength materials (see Slide 17). The most
aggressive conditions (fastest CGRs) occur close to the Ni/NiO phase transition, which is
measured to occur at around 13 cc/kg at 338C. EPRI MRP is performing a separate
2
11-184
CGR test matrix to study hydrogen effects under more relevant primary water chemistry
conditions for commercial PWRs.
Compiled CGR test results as shown in Slide 19 indicate:
x The most aggressive conditions (fastest CGR) occur close to Ni/NiO phase
transition.
x The hydrogen concentrations for peak CGR and for the Ni/NiO phase transition
vary strongly with temperature.
x The most aggressive hydrogen concentration appears to be different for initiation
than for CGR. However, there is little confidence in this result because of high
scatter in the initiation test data.
Main Conclusions Regarding Hydrogen and PWSCC
x Hydrogen/ECP has relatively strong effect on CGR.
x The most unfavorable condition varies with temperature similar to the variation
of the Ni/NiO phase transition with temperature.
x Reducing hydrogen to concentrations well below those that cause peak CGR at
plant temperatures is not considered practical.
x It appears beneficial from a PWSCC standpoint to operate at the upper end of, or
even above, the current allowed range for hydrogen of 25 to 50 cc/kg. However,
the possible side-effects of using higher hydrogen concentrations require
evaluation.
Effects of Zinc on PWSCC
Almost all laboratory tests indicate that zinc in reactor coolant reduces the rate of
initiation of PWSCC, with a factor of 2 delay for 20 ppb zinc, and a factor of 10 delay for
120 ppb zinc. Tests to date regarding the effects of zinc on CGR are mixed, with some
tests indicating that zinc reduces CGR, and others indicating no effect. A reasonable
hypothesis is that zinc reduces CGR in cases where it reaches crack tip and stabilizes
oxide spinels there. If this hypothesis is true, zinc should reduce the growth rate of small
cracks where access is better and the CGR is lower. EPRI MRP is performing CGR tests
to resolve such issues.
Limitations on Chemistry Changes Imposed by Fuel and Radiation Field Considerations
Lithium and pH Considerations. Constant elevated pH
T
(between 7.1 and 7.3) has been
found to reduce shutdown dose rates and should reduce fuel deposits. For this reason, the
Primary GL recommends this regime. However, use of a constant elevated pH
T
regime
may involve higher lithium concentrations at the beginning of the fuel cycle (BOC), and
this raises concerns regarding fuel cladding corrosion,.. Because of fuel cladding
corrosion concerns, fuel vendors typically impose limits on allowed lithium
concentrations. In this regard, lithium up to 3.5 ppm at the BOC is now widely accepted.
On a case basis, lithium up to 5 or 6 ppm has been accepted for brief periods at BOC. In
this regard, Comanche Peak 2's field experience with high BOC lithium (5 and 6 ppm)
appears favorable. The combination of PWSCC concerns and fuel corrosion concerns
lead most plants to select relatively modest constant elevated pH
T
, e.g., 7.1 or 7.2.
3
11-185
Zinc. As discussed earlier, use of zinc may provide a strong benefit with respect to
mitigation of PWSCC. Zinc has the added benefit of reducing shutdown dose rates.
However, use of zinc for high duty cores raises fuel clad deposit and AOA concerns
during its initial application. Nevertheless, zinc should be beneficial in the long-term
since it is expected to reduce the source term for deposits, i.e. the levels of dissolved
corrosion products in the coolant are expected to decrease with time as zinc exposure
increases. EPRI FRP has an on-going project to evaluate zinc injection at a bounding (or
near-bounding) high duty plant.
Hydrogen. No significant effect of hydrogen on either fuel deposits/AOA or shutdown
dose rates has been observed in plants operating in the recommended range of 25-
50cc/kg, but there is little data outside this range of experience. This is a topic that will
be addressed in future work.
Conclusions
x The process involved in chemistry optimization is illustrated in Slide 29.
x The use of a constant elevated pH regime with pH
T
about 7.1-7.3 is increasingly
accepted in the industry. It provides proven benefits for dose rates and expected
benefits for fuel deposits. Its effects on PWSCC initiation are judged to be minor,
and it is expected to have no effect on CGR.
x Use of zinc provides benefits with regard to shutdown dose rates and PWSCC,
and is recommended for these reasons. However, there is a need to ensure its
compatibility with the fuel, especially for high duty cores, and to apply zinc in a
careful manner (e.g., low concentrations and partial cycles at start).
x Control of hydrogen at the high end of the allowed range, e.g., at 45-50 cc/kg, or
higher, seems desirable to reduce PWSCC peak CGRs. In the longer term, if
proven effective and acceptable, use of hydrogen concentrations above the current
limit of 50 cc/kg may be desirable. In this regard, tests evaluating effects of
higher hydrogen on CGR are in process, and gathering and evaluation of data
regarding the effect of hydrogen concentration on fuel and shutdown dose rates is
expected to begin shortly.
4
11-186
EPRI/DEI 1
Review of Primary Chemistry Effects on
PWSCC
Prepared by
Jeff Gorman, DEI
Keith Fruzzetti, EPRI
Presented by Jeff Gorman, DEI
PWSCC of Alloy 600
2005 International Conference and Exhibition
March 7-10, 2005 Santa Anna Pueblo, NM
11-187
EPRI/DEI 2
Overview of Presentation
Review of main objectives of primary chemistry control
Review of chemistry effects on PWSCC
Limitations on chemistry changes imposed by fuel and
radiation field (shutdown dose rate) considerations
Discussion of how different competing effects are
balanced in the Primary Guidelines
Conclusions
Current recommendations for plants
Needed research
11-188
EPRI/DEI 3
Objectives of Primary Chemistry
Note: Most of the information covered in this presentation is
taken from the latest revision of the EPRI PWR Primary
Water Chemistry Guidelines (Primary GL: report
1002884, Rev. 5, Volumes 1 and 2, Sept. 2003)
Main objectives:
Assure primary system pressure boundary integrity
Assure fuel cladding integrity and achievement of fuel
performance objectives
Minimize out of core radiation fields (shutdown dose
rates)
11-189
EPRI/DEI 4
PWR Primary Chemistry Optimization
Chemistry
Control Issues
Clad Corrosion
Crud Deposition
Alloy 600 PWSCC - RCS
PWSCC of SG tubes
Monitoring/Analysis
Impurity Control
Radiation
Fields
Crud
Bursts
Materials
Degradation
& Mitigation
Fuel
Performance
Water
Chemistry
Guidelines
Radiation
Exposure
11-190
EPRI/DEI 5
Pressure Boundary Integrity
- Main Concerns -
Main concern during design of PWRs in 1960s and
1970s was with SCC of stainless steels. Resulted in:
Limit of 150 ppb on chlorides, fluorides and sulfates
Limit of 100 ppb oxygen for temperature above 250F
Since late 1970s, main concern with PWR primary
boundary integrity has been PWSCC of Alloy 600
First affected SG tubes (600MA and then 600TT)
Since late 1980s, has also affected thicker wall Alloy
600 components such as nozzles.
Since about 2000, affect has been observed in Alloy
182/132/82 welds
11-191
EPRI/DEI 6
Pressure Boundary Integrity (Cont.)
- Influence of Chemistry -
Water chemistry effects on PWSCC are generally minor
compared to much larger effects of microstructure, stress
and temperature
Variations in microstructure, stress and temperature
can change rates of PWSCC by factors of 10 to 1000
Chemistry changes within practical limits affect rate of
PWSCC by few percent to up to factor of 2 to 5
However, chemistry is more accessible for control in an
already constructed plant than the other stronger
influences
Considered worthwhile to optimize chemistry to
minimize PWSCC initiation and/or growth
11-192
EPRI/DEI 7
- Influence of Chemistry -
Main chemistry parameters affecting PWSCC initiation
include
Lithium concentration and/or pH
T
Hydrogen concentration (affects ECP)
Zinc concentration
Hydrogen level is also known to affect crack growth rates
Effect of zinc on PWSCC propagation is currently unclear
Other water chemistry parameters, e.g., concentrations of
chlorides and sulfates typically observed at PWRs, have
insignificant effect on rate of PWSCC
11-193
EPRI/DEI 8
- Lithium Concentration/pH
T
Effects -
Effect of Lithium and pH on Initiation of PWSCC
Statistical analyses of initiation test results using RUB specimens were
updated in 2002 (EPRI report 1006888, April 2002, MRP-68) and re-
assessed during most recent revision of PWR Primary Water Chemistry
GLs. For data between 320-330C:
Boron: statistically insignificant effect on PWSCC implies pH is not
a factor
Lithium: Rate of PWSCC initiation vs. lithium conc. shown on next
slide
Lithium changes within practical limits: no significant effect in time to
cracking for changes associated with going from coordinated pH
T
6.9
to coordinated pH
T
7.2
However, no data for lithium below 0.66 ppm, where higher
temperature data extrapolated to 330C indicate increased times
to PWSCC initiation for lower lithium
11-194
EPRI/DEI 9
Effect of Lithium Concentration on Characteristic Life
11-195
EPRI/DEI 10
T
Effects (Cont.) -
Westinghouse presented preliminary results of WOG
tests to Primary Guidelines Committee in Sept. 2002
Initiation tests at 325C using RUBs for simulated
pH
310C
6.9, 7.2 and 7.4 cycles (6 boron/lithium
concentrations, one week for each, for each of many
simulated fuel cycles)
Preliminary data assessed during GL revision
indicating that the WOG data are not statistically
different from the MRP-68 results (see next figure)
Final WOG data currently being incorporated into the
MRP-68 database for assessment
11-196
EPRI/DEI 11
T
Effects (Cont.) -
Comparison of Model with WOG Experiments at
pH 6.9, 7.2, & 7.4 and Field Data
0.1
1.0
10.0
6.8 6.9 7 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5
pH
R
a
t
i
o

t
o

l
i
f
e

a
t

p
H

7
.
3
No trend in field data
(flat) in this range 95th
percentile
range of
calibration
data about
model
Model
11-197
EPRI/DEI 12
T
Effects (Cont.) -
PWSCC Crack Growth Rate (CGR)
Earlier EPRI/Westinghouse CGR tests indicated no effect
of lithium or pH
T
Recent WOG tests indicate no significant effect of lithium
or pH
T
on CGR
EPRI MRP completing a CGR testing matrix that includes
separate study of Li/B and pH effects
KAPL tests using Alloy X-750 indicated no significant
effect of pH
T
variations between 6.2 and 8.7 on CGR
pH
T
below 6.2 resulted in lower CGR, but this pH is
not applicable to PWR primary coolant
11-198
EPRI/DEI 13
T
Effects (Cont.) -
Overall assessment of pH
T
/Lithium effects
Initiation and crack growth rate may have different
lithium/pH
T
dependencies
Initiation: Lithium and pH have insignificant effect for
Lithium 0.66 ppm (may have increased time to
initiation below 0.66 ppm)
CGR: Lithium and pH have insignificant effect
Greater weight given to CGR data since
CGR tests use more realistic thick wall specimens
Parts of most current concern are thick wall
11-199
EPRI/DEI 14
- Hydrogen Effects -
Initiation
Results of MRP-68 statistical evaluations indicate that, at
330C, time to initiation varies as shown in next figure
(base case concentration taken as middle of allowed
range, i.e., 37.5 cc/kg)
Minimum initiation time (most aggressive condition)
found to occur at ~32 cc/kg
Relatively flat curve over guideline allowed range of
hydrogen concentrations (25-50 cc/kg)
11-200
EPRI/DEI 15
Effect of Hydrogen Concentration on Time to PWSCC Initiation
(MRP-68 Model, no boron effect)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Hydrogen Concentration, cc/kg
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e

T
i
m
e

t
o

P
W
S
C
C
11-201
EPRI/DEI 16
- Hydrogen Effects (Cont.) -
CGR
Typical CGR test results shown on following slide from
Morton, et al., at the 10
th
Environmental Degradation
Conference, 2001. Results indicate:
Strong effect of hydrogen on CGR, up to factor of 5 for
higher strength materials
Most aggressive conditions (fastest CGR) occur close
to Ni/NiO phase transition, measured to occur at
around 13 cc/kg at 338C
EPRI MRP is performing a separate CGR test matrix
to study hydrogen effects under more relevant primary
water chemistry conditions for commercial PWRs
11-202
EPRI/DEI 17
CGR in Alloy 600 at 338C vs. Dissolved Hydrogen (Morton, et al.,
10
th
Environmental Degradation Conference, 2001)
11-203
EPRI/DEI 18
Compiled CGR test results shown on following slide from
Primary GL. Results indicate:
Most aggressive conditions (fastest CGR) occur close
to Ni/NiO phase transition
Hydrogen concentrations for peak CGR and for Ni/NiO
phase transition vary strongly with temperature
Most aggressive hydrogen concentration appears to
be different for initiation than for CGR
Little confidence in this result because of high
scatter in initiation test data
11-204
EPRI/DEI 19
1.0
10.0
100.0
270 280 290 300 310 320 330 340 350 360
Temperature, C
H
y
d
r
o
g
e
n

C
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
,

c
c
/
k
g

Calculated
Ni/NiO Phase Transition
Hydrogen concentration for peak
crack growth rate observed in tests
Peak PWSCC initiation
susceptiblity from tests
0.5 atm hydrogen
0.1 atm hydrogen
Measured hydrogen
concentration
for Ni/NiO phase transition
Effects of Hydrogen Concentration and Temperature on Ni/NiO
Phase Stability and Peak CGR for PWSCC in Alloy 600 (from
Primary GL)
11-205
EPRI/DEI 20
Main conclusions regarding hydrogen and PWSCC
Hydrogen/ECP has relatively strong effect on CGR
Most unfavorable condition varies with temperature
similar to variation of Ni/NiO phase transition
Reducing hydrogen to concentrations well below those
that cause peak CGR at plant temperatures not
considered practical
Appears beneficial from PWSCC standpoint to operate at
upper end of, or even above, current allowed range of 25
to 50 cc/kg, but possible side-effects require evaluation
11-206
EPRI/DEI 21
- Zinc Effects -
Almost all laboratory tests indicate that zinc in the reactor
coolant reduces rate of initiation of PWSCC
Factor of 2 for 20 ppb zinc
Factor of 10 for 120 ppb zinc
Tests to date regarding effects of zinc on CGR are mixed
Some tests indicate zinc reduces CGR
Some tests indicate no effect
Hypothesis is that zinc reduces CGR in cases where it
reaches crack tip and stabilizes oxide spinels there.
If true, zinc should reduce growth of small cracks where
access is better and CGR is lower
EPRI MRP is performing CGR tests to resolve such issues
11-207
EPRI/DEI 22
Limitations on Chemistry Changes Imposed
by Fuel and Radiation Field Considerations
Lithium and pH Considerations
Constant elevated pH
T
(between 7.1 and 7.3) has been
found to reduce shutdown dose rates and should reduce
fuel deposits Primary GL recommend this regime
Use of constant elevated pH
T
regime may involve higher
lithium concentrations at BOC raises concerns
regarding fuel cladding corrosion, as well as potential
PWSCC concerns discussed earlier
Because of fuel cladding corrosion concerns, fuel
vendors impose limits on lithium
Lithium up to 3.5 ppm at BOC now widely accepted
On case basis, lithium up to 5 or 6 ppm accepted for
brief period at BOC
Comanche Peak field experience appears favorable
11-208
EPRI/DEI 23
Limitations on Chemistry Changes Imposed by
Fuel and Radiation Field Considerations (Cont.)
Lithium and pH Considerations (Cont.)
Combination of PWSCC concerns and fuel corrosion
concerns lead most plants to select relatively modest
constant elevated pH
T
, e.g., 7.1 or 7.2
Zinc
Use of zinc may provide strong benefit with respect to
mitigation of PWSCC
Zinc has added benefit of reducing shutdown dose rates
Use of zinc for high duty cores raises fuel clad deposit
and AOA concerns during initial application although
zinc believed to be beneficial in the long-term
EPRI FRP has on-going project to evaluate zinc injection
at a bounding (or near-bounding) high duty plant
11-209
EPRI/DEI 24
Hydrogen
The effects of hydrogen on either fuel deposits/AOA or
shutdown dose rates are not well understood
JAPCO/Studsvik paper (Hisamune, et al., JAIF, 1998)
indicates:
Lower hydrogen (26 cc/kg) reduced fuel deposits and
dose rates at Tsuruga 2 vs. operation with higher
hydrogen (29 cc/kg)
Attributed to higher hydrogen increasing stability of
nickel metal vs. NiO, leading to higher solubility and
concentrations of nickel in coolant, and more fuel
deposits
Laboratory tests by Studsvik indicated that lower
hydrogen reduced rate of PWSCC initiation
11-210
EPRI/DEI 25
Hydrogen (Cont.)
Comments on JAPCO/Studsvik positions:
Industry support for hypothesis that increases in
hydrogen concentration lead to higher fuel deposits
and shutdown dose rates not located in technical
literature
The effects of hydrogen on PWSCC are complex and
vary with temperature, as discussed earlier in this
presentation position that lower hydrogen within
allowed range is always better for PWSCC not
supported by CGR data at some temperatures
11-211
EPRI/DEI 26
Conclusions
Lithium and pH
Use of constant elevated pH regimes with pH
T
about 7.1-
7.3 increasingly accepted in industry
Proven benefits for dose rates and expected benefits
for fuel deposits
Effect on PWSCC initiation judged to be minor
No effect expected on CGR
11-212
EPRI/DEI 27
Conclusions (Cont.)
Zinc
Use of zinc provides benefits with regard to shutdown
dose rates and PWSCC, and is recommended for these
reasons
However, need to ensure compatibility of zinc with
fuel, especially for high duty cores, and to apply zinc in
careful manner (e.g., low concentrations and partial
cycles at start)
11-213
EPRI/DEI 28
Conclusions (Cont.)
Hydrogen
Control of hydrogen at high end of allowed range, e.g., at
45-50 cc/kg, or higher seems desirable to reduce
PWSCC peak CGRs
In longer term, if proven useful and safe, use of hydrogen
concentrations above current limit of 50 cc/kg may be
desirable
Tests evaluating effects of higher hydrogen on CGR
are in process
Gathering and evaluation of data regarding effect of
hydrogen concentration on fuel impact and shutdown
dose rates considered desirable
11-214
EPRI/DEI 29
PWR Chemistry Optimization
Chemistry
Control Issues
Materials
Degradation
Fuel
Performance
Water
Chemistry
Guidelines
Radiation
Exposure
PWSCC
Li, B, pH: no significant effect
Benefit from higher Hydrogen
Zinc benefit
Fuel
Effects on high duty
fuel under evaluation
Chemistry Control
Higher hydrogen operation
to be evaluated
Radiation Exposure
Increased pH good
Zinc benefit
11-215
EPRI/DEI 30
Conclusions (Cont.)
Desirable Research Topics
Continue to clarify effects of lithium and pH on PWSCC
initiation and CGR (on-going)
Verify that higher hydrogen reduces PWSCC CGRs,
especially for Alloy 600 weld metals (this research is
ongoing)
Verify that higher hydrogen has no significant adverse
effects on fuel or shutdown dose rates (proposed
research)
11-216
12
SESSION 5B: FIELD EXPERIENCEINSPECTIONS
The subject of field experienceinspections was addressed by six participants in Session 5B.
Summaries of the presentations are given below followed by the questions asked, responses
Situation of the Alloys 600 and 182 Issues in the Belgian Nuclear Power
Plants, presented by R. Grard, Tractebel Engineering (Paper 5B.1)
This presentation was given by R. Grard and authored by R. Grard, P. Daoust, P. Dombret, D.
Couplet, and C. Malkian of Tractebel Engineering. The main points made during the
x An overview of PWSCC practices and experience was presented for the seven PWR units
operating in Belgium. Information and data were presented regarding inspections and
analyses performed and the general strategy applied for Alloy 600 reactor vessel closure head
nozzles, Alloy 182 piping butt welds, reactor vessel safety injection nozzles, and Alloy 600
reactor vessel bottom head penetrations.
x The seven Belgium units are Tihange 1, 2, and 3 and Doel 1, 2, 3, and 4. Tihange 1 us
similar to the French 900 MWe units. All seven units have Alloy 600 reactor vessel closure
head nozzles except for the Alloy 690 replacement head installed at Tihange 1 in 1999.
Tihange 2 and 3 and Doel 3 and 4 are relatively recent vintage plants and all have Alloy 182
reactor vessel inlet and outlet and pressure nozzle piping butt welds. In addition, all seven
units have Alloy 600 reactor vessel bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzles, and
there are several other miscellaneous types of Alloy 600/82/182 applications in some of the
units.
x In total, 23 reactor vessel closure head inspections by ET (in some cases combined with UT
for depth sizing) have been carried out since 1992. The only case of significant cracking was
at Tihange 1, where a long axial through-wall crack extending below the weld all the way
down to the bottom of the penetration was detected in one penetration in 1998. Fracture
mechanics and crack growth analyses demonstrated that the crack would remain acceptable
in the next cycle, and the unit was allowed to restart. A new head with Alloy 690
penetrations was installed at the next outage in October 1999, and an inspection of the
replaced head confirmed that the crack growth was substantially lower than the prediction. It
is expected that a leak would not have occurred in the original head at Tihange 1 for another
year or two of operation. The program of future inspections of the Belgian reactor vessel
closure heads is under discussion. Based on the French experience, the inspection plan for
12-1
Session 5B: Field ExperienceInspections
the Belgian reactor vessel closure heads is not based on a time at temperature (i.e., effective
degradation years) approach. Current law limits plant operation to a 40-year operating
period.
x Regarding the BMI penetrations, some indications interpreted as lack-of-fusion fabrication
defects were detected by ET/UT at the weld/base metal interface in Doel 2 in 1995, and a
reinspection in 2000 showed no evolution. Bare metal visual inspections of the BMI
penetrations were carried out for all units (except Tihange 1 for dosimetry reasons) in 2003
2004, and there was no evidence of boric acid deposits. The program of future inspections of
the Belgian BMI nozzles is under discussion.
x Detailed assessments have been performed for the Alloy 182 piping butt weld locations,
including an inventory of the Alloy 182 locations, a detailed review of the fabrication
procedures (as available, including weld repairs and heat treatments), detailed stress analysis
(including welding residual stresses), and fracture mechanics and crack growth analysis.
Only a moderate benefit was reported for finite-element welding residual stress calculations
versus standard residual stress distributions. On the bases of these evaluations, a "risk-
informed" ranking was performed of the various locations, and four risk groups were defined.
These risk groups formed the basis for selected components being inspected at intervals
accelerated compared to the standard ISI program.
x A small axial indication of approximately 4u26 mm was detected in October 2002 at the
inside surface of the Alloy 182 pressurizer nozzle to surge line transition weld of Tihange 2.
This indication is located close to a fabrication repair on the outside surface. A Mechanical
Stress Improvement Process (MSIP) was validated for application on the pressurizer to
nozzle weld, and repair techniques were also investigated. The weld was reinspected in May
2003, and again in October 2003, and no evolution was detected. Therefore the MSIP was
not applied, and this weld was to be inspected again in March 2005. There is no proof that
this indication was caused by PWSCC.
x ET of the inner surface of an Alloy 182 reactor vessel outlet nozzle weld in October 2003 in
Tihange 2 detected an axially oriented 10 mm long indication, with a signal phase typical of
crack-like flaws. Although the flaw is not visible by UT, the depth of the indication was
estimated to be approximately 1 mm. The weld was to be re-examined in 2005, and a repair
process by local grinding capable of removing 4 mm of depth was being qualified.
x The proactive inspection and analysis program implemented in the Belgian units to control
the PWSCC issue made it possible to detect defects early on, well before they could lead to a
leak. Continuous attention is paid to any new information that might enhance the
understanding of the damage mechanism or the effectiveness of the preventive means
applied.
12-2
x Question (C. King): How do you decide how often to volumetrically inspect your Alloy 600
reactor vessel heads?
Response (R. Grard): We focus on older, hotter head plants and inspect them more
frequentlyevery or every other refueling outage. For medium age and temperature plants,
we inspect every other refueling outage. For low temperature plants, we inspect every 3 to 4
refueling outages.
A Swedish Perspective on PWSCC of Alloy 182, presented by A. Jenssen,
Studsvik Nuclear (Paper 5B.2)
This presentation was given by A. Jenssen of Studsvik Nuclear and was authored by A. Jenssen,
K. Norring, and M. Knig of Studsvik Nuclear, P. Efsing of Ringhals, and C. Jansson of
SwedPower. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x The presentation summarized the approach taken in Sweden to disposition of PWSCC in
Alloy 182 welds, including application of a bounding bi-linear crack growth rate expression.
The presentation began with a summary of the PWSCC detected in the reactor vessel outlet
nozzle to safe end welds in Ringhals Units 3 and 4 in 2000 (also see Paper 5B.4).
x A review of available worldwide data for crack growth rate testing using controlled Alloy
182 weld fracture mechanics samples was used to develop a bi-linear expression relating the
crack growth rate to the crack-tip stress intensity factor. In addition to data developed in
Sweden, French and U.S. data were applied. The data shown on page 5.B.2-9 of the
presentation materials constitute the data set before the data screening process was applied.
Data for specimens tested under multiple conditions were excluded from the evaluation if
crack growth could not be measured directly on the fracture surface. The data were adjusted
to a common reference temperature using an activation energy of 130 kJ/mole.
x The presentation described details of one set of laboratory crack growth rate testing
performed for Alloy 182 by Studsvik in Sweden. The purpose of these experiments was to
verify and support the bi-linear upper bound disposition line. Eight CT specimens (5% side
grooves on either side), fatigue pre-cracked in air, were simultaneously exposed in an
autoclave at a temperature of 320C. Each specimen was loaded (individually) to achieve the
desired initial stress intensity factor, and subsequently the specimens were locked in this
position for the entire duration of the test (2616 hours). No DC potential drop measurements
were made. Subsequent to testing, a fractographic examination was conducted to determine
the fracture mode and crack advance. Load versus time plots verified that the crack growth
rate was fairly constant. Intergranular cracking (PWSCC) was observed in all eight
specimens, and crack advance was determined by measuring and averaging the crack length
at 20 equally distanced points along the fracture surface. For four specimens showing
incomplete engagement of the crack front to intergranular cracking, the unengaged portions
of the crack front were excluded from the calculation of the average crack growth rate across
the crack front. The resulting data indicated a plateau level (i.e. the crack growth rate is
independent of stress intensity factor) above a stress intensity factor of 2830 MPam.
Below this level the crack growth rate decreases with decreasing stress intensity factor. Data
12-3
12-4
from this test supports the bi-linear Ringhals disposition curve, although the plateau level
suggested by the laboratory data is three times lower than the disposition line.
x Successive inspection of the weld flaws at Ringhals Unit 3 in 2000 and 2001 facilitated a
comparison of this field crack growth rate data with the laboratory data and the Ringhals bi-
linear disposition curve. The field data agree very well with the laboratory data, supporting
the Ringhals disposition line. The tolerance bars on the two Ringhals field data points on
page 5.B.2-21 of the presentation materials reflect the uncertainty in the UT depth sizing.
x Crack growth rate testing is continuing in Sweden at lower stress intensity factor levels and
on the effect of temperature.
x Question (R. Grard): What was the origin of the material you tested? Was it a weld made
specifically for this program?
Response (A. Jenssen): A test weld specifically for this program was produced by Ringhals
plant personnel using procedures representative of plant welds.
Control Rod Drive Mechanism Examinations at Point Beach Nuclear Plant,
presented by W. Jensen, NMC (Paper 5B.3)
This presentation was given by W. Jensen of Nuclear Management CompanyPoint Beach
Nuclear Plant. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x This presentation covered the reactor vessel closure head inspections performed at Point
Beach Units 1 and 2. In 2001, the Nuclear Management Company (NMC) embarked on an
effort to ensure that the latest automated ultrasonic (AUT) techniques would be used during
the upcoming CRDM nozzle examinations at Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP). This effort
involved personnel from PBNP and EPRI, as well as personnel from the various examination
vendors who bid on the work at PBNP. The presentation discussed the results of these
efforts, as well as lessons learned which can be applied by other utilities.
x PBNP has two Westinghouse-designed, two-loop PWRs with reactor vessel closure heads
each containing 49 CRDM penetrations and one head vent line penetration. PBNP Unit 1
commenced commercial operation in 1970 followed by Unit 2 in 1972. At the time of its
CRDM nozzle examination in 2002, Unit 1 had accumulated approximately 14.6 EDY. By
the first CRDM nozzle examination on Unit 2, it had accumulated approximately 16.6 EDY.
Because of the relatively small size of the Point Beach head, the penetrations tend to have
very steep angles versus the head surface. This results in a small gap available for insertion
of NDE blade probes.
x The following inspections have been performed at Point Beach:
Eddy current only of CRDM nozzle inner surfaces in 1994 for Unit 1 with no indications.
After removal of direct contact asbestos insulation, bare metal visual examination in
spring 2002 for Unit 2 and fall 2002 for Unit 1 with no indications of leakage.
UT examination of Unit 1 in fall 2002 with no indications reported. The small gaps
between the thermal sleeve and nozzle resulted in 15 blade probes being destroyed.
Three thermal sleeves were removed to achieve additional coverage.
UT examination of Unit 2 in fall 2003 with no indications reported. No thermal sleeves
were removed, and radiation exposure was greatly reduced compared to the previous
Unit 1 inspection. A separate program was initiated to address specific U.S. NRC
questions.
UT examination of Unit 1 in spring 2004. UT showed indications in a single nozzle
(No. 26) at the weld root. PT of this nozzle showed relatively faint spiderlike indications
on the J-groove weld surface. After grinding to a depth of 3/16 inch, PT indications
remained. Although these indications were not confirmed to be service-related as
opposed to fabrication flaws, a half-nozzle repair was performed because of the high dose
that would result from flaw excavation.
x An ID temper bead repair process was applied to Nozzle 26 of Unit 1 in spring 2004. This
process was complicated by the design of the relatively small reactor vessel closure head for
two-loop Westinghouse-design plants. Because of the steep angle associated with the
relatively small Point Beach head, the repair Alloy 52 weld necessarily came into contact
with the existing Alloy 182 J-groove weld. To address this weld overlap issue, a crack
growth analysis was performed that conservatively assumed Alloy 52 to be subject to the
same crack growth rate as Alloy 600. This evaluation assumed 1.5 EFPYs of crack growth
until the time that the head for Unit 1 is scheduled to be replaced in fall 2005. (Head
replacement for Unit 2 was performed in spring 2005.)
x Because of the favorable experience of the previous inspections, repair equipment and
personnel were not mobilized at the time the indications in Nozzle 26 of Unit 1 were
detected. This approach turned out to be economically disadvantageous. Other lessons
learned concerned the change in UT blade probe technology for Nozzle 26 and the possibility
of applying fabrication records from initial plant construction to show that the Nozzle 26
indications were fabrication-related. In the case of the 2004 inspection of Unit 1, it would
have been preferable for a review of the UT data for Nozzle 26 to be performed before the
step to perform PT was taken.
x Question (C. King): Given additional data, could the repair performed have been shown to
be unnecessary?
Response (W. Jensen): In todays environment, the utility would have made a more vigorous
case that the repair was not necessary for operation for a single cycle.
12-5
Some Recent Experiences on Stress Corrosion Cracking in B/P-WR
Environments and Remedies/Strategies from a Utility Point of View,
presented by P. Efsing, Ringhals (Paper 5B.4)
This presentation was given by P. Efsing of Ringhals and authored by P. Efsing and H.-.
Georgsson of Ringhals. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x This presentation covered plant experience with SCC at the Ringhals and Barsebck stations
operated by Ringhals AB in Sweden, including both PWR and BWR experience, as well as
the approach taken to inspection, repair, and replacement at these plants. The utility
estimates that an average production loss of 20 days per year has resulted due to SCC at these
stations over the preceding 10 years. Indications have been found in Alloy 600 wrought
material and Alloy 82/182 weld metals in such different locations as heavy section pipe
welds in both BWR and PWR, small-bore instrumentation nozzle welds, brackets to piping
systems in reactor vessel internals in BWR, and reactor vessel upper head penetrations of the
PWRs.
x One set of experience that has generated much interest is the reactor vessel outlet nozzle to
safe end weld cracking detected at Ringhals Units 3 and 4 in 2000. This experience has been
previously reported but some new information has now been developed. Ringhals addressed
the detected safe end weld cracks and the potential for additional cracks to form through a
repair and replacement program that included application of an internal Alloy 52M girdle
weld on all of the hot-leg nozzle welds. The Alloy 52M "beltline" on the ID surface was
designed to be sufficiently thick for defects to be sized within the belt. Although there were
documented weld repairs associated with the cracking in Unit 3, this was not the case for the
Unit 4 cracking. Therefore, the presence of weld repairs does not appear to be a necessary
condition in all cases for PWSCC of nickel-alloy piping butt welds.
x The presentation also covered BWR experience with SCC from the mid-1990s, which is not
available in the open literature, for the Barsebck 1 and 2 and Ringhals 1 units. Barsebck
Unit 1 was shut down in 1999, and Barsebck Unit 2 was scheduled to be shut down in May
2005. This experience included SCC of the Alloy X-750 brackets used to support the ECCS
system attached to the core shroud head. In the case of Barsebck 1, five axial defects were
detected at this location by a combination of internal and external ultrasonic examinations.
The defects were subsequently removed and destructively examined by Studsvik. It was
concluded that "IGSCC / hot cracking" was the degradation mechanism.
x Despite service-related cracking in the Ringhals PWR reactor vessel upper heads likely being
limited to shallow surface defects, head replacements have now been performed for all three
of these units (head replacement for Unit 3 was scheduled for summer 2005). The
experience with weld defects for Unit 2, which was replaced in the mid-1990s, has been
previously reported. The weld flaws in Unit 2 are believed to be fabrication-related and not
PWSCC. In 2000 and 2002, 26 shallow surface defects were found in Units 3 and 4. The
decision to replace the heads in these two units was based on an economic analysis that
balanced the cost of replacement (given particulars of the Swedish regulatory structure)
against the benefits of reduced inspection costs and reduced risk of forced outages.
12-6
x The presentation concluded with the recommendations that replacement materials (i.e., Alloy
690/52/152) be qualified in a more generic and stringent manner and that modified water
chemistries be qualified for PWRs and BWRs. R&D costs will be temporarily high because
of simultaneous management of original and replacement materials.
x Question (B. Cullen): Please discuss your thoughts on how the "tightness" of surface-
breaking cracks impact on the leak rate calculation as part of a leak-before-break (LBB)
consideration. Will a leak rate be significantly decreased to the point that the LBB margin
will be violated?
Response (P. Efsing): Obviously the "surface tightness" adds yet another obstacle for "free
water flow" through any through-wall defect. Thus it could decrease the water flow and the
LBB margin. However, the "tightness" is not unique to the surface area, but appears also
elsewhere in the crack path. From this point of view, my opinion is that if the "true crack
path" in some manner is taken into account in the leakage analysis, this issue should have
been dealt with, even though it was not the original purpose. I also believe that when a
defect propagates to become through-wall, the stress release will cause the defect to open up
and thus this problem might be more of a detection/characterization problem than a leakage
problem.
x Question (C. King): Are you considering any pre-emptive mitigation for components, and is
that based at all on the actual inspection costs?
Response (P. Efsing): Some remedial actions have already been taken at Ringhals, for
example the vessel head replacements on the three PWRs, which have been carried out
despite the likely outcome of the inspections being that there would have been no serious
reactor safety issues. Another example is the girdle overlay welding of all reactor vessel
outlet nozzles at Ringhals 3 and 4 with the more resistant Alloy 52 in order to minimize the
future risks of developing defects in known susceptible areas. In this context one can almost
mention all of the Alloy 600 and its weld metal areas if the total risk of developing PWSCC
should be mitigated. It is worth noting though that despite the fact that the degradation of the
nickel-based materials has been known for a long time, the total number of defects, excluding
the vessel head issues, has been surprisingly low, especially on the BWR side of the problem.
Despite this, it is easy math for a plant owner to vote for replacement as a mitigation
measure rather than inspections and repairs, since the cost for the plants being out of service
is high and increasing. The inspection costs are one factor, but not the most important one
when assessing the different options regarding plant operation in Sweden today.
Cracking of Alloy 600 Nozzles and Welds in PWRs: A Review of Cracking
Events and Repair Service Experience, presented by W. Bamford,
Westinghouse (Paper 5B.5)
This presentation was given by W. Bamford of Westinghouse and authored by W. Bamford and
J. Hall of Westinghouse. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
12-7
x This presentation updated previous reviews by the authors of Alloy 600/182/82 service-
induced cracking events in PWRs. Also reviewed were the histories of repair and
replacement activities such as replacement-in-kind, pressure boundary relocations with half
nozzle repairs, and use of mechanical repairs that leave the cracked nozzles in place. The
presentation also reviewed the service history of materials used in repairs or replacements,
including Alloy 600 with enhanced heat treatments, Alloy 182, Alloy 690, and the weld
metals Alloy 52, 52M, and 152. The service experience with these repairs has been such that
they are very reliable and trouble-free, as long as they are properly installed.
x Additional Alloy 600/182/82 components have now experienced cracking in PWRs,
including steam-space pressurizer butt welds, reactor vessel bottom head nozzles, and steam
generator bowl drains. In addition, circumferential indications (but located inside the
pressure boundary) have been reported for Alloy 600 pressurizer heater sleeves at one plant.
More than 600 CRDM penetration J-groove welds have now been inspected in the U.S.
Significant differences have been observed for these inspections on the basis of vessel
fabricator. No indications of PWSCC have been found in reactor vessel bottom mounted
instrumentation (BMI) nozzles since the leakage detected at South Texas Project. (All the
subsequent examinations of BMI penetrations have been of base metal.) Some small-
diameter penetrations in B&W-design plants have also shown cracking although this
experience was not included in the presentation slides. Finally, the presenter agreed that the
lack of weld fusion observed at Ringhals 2 in 1992 was not service-induced.
x Generally, significant incubation time is required for cracking. The incubation time depends
on some factors that are known and others that are not. Base metals have generally shown
shorter incubation times compared to weld metals although weld metal inspections have not
been as frequent. In addition, small-bore tubes and pipes have generally shown cracking
earlier than larger diameter applications.
x It was concluded that PWSCC of Alloy 600 base and weld metals continues as plants age.
Repair, mitigation, or replacement of Alloy 600 parts or major components is being used to
resolve the issue. Given enough operating time, Alloy 600 and Alloy 182/82 will crack.
Most Alloy 600 materials have been in service long enough that cracking is increasingly
likely, so licensees should be prepared for future occurrences and move toward mitigation.
x Question (A. Silvia): Could you please discuss in more detail the cracking observed at
Palisades in 1993?
Response (Editor): The Palisades cracking was circumferential in orientation and located in
the heat affected zone (HAZ) of the pressurizer Alloy 600 PORV nozzle safe end adjacent to
the safe end to pipe weld [24]. The total length of the cracking was 2.5 inches on the ID and
3.5 inches on the OD, in a 3 inch nominal pipe size. (The 3.5 inch OD crack length
represented 32% of the OD circumference of the safe end.) The repair involved machining a
24
"Pressurizer Safe End Crack Engineering Analysis and Root Cause Evaluation," Consumers Power Company,
Palisades Plant, Docket 50-255, October 7, 1993, NRC Acc. No. 9310120430 931007 PDR ADOCK 05000255.
12-8
new weld prep in the Alloy 600 safe end and welding on a new stainless steel spool using
Alloy 600 filler metal (GTAW for root pass and SMAW for filler passes).
x Comment (G. Rao): The issue of cracks developing in Alloy 182 and not in Alloy 152 in the
embedded flaw repair situation needs to be looked at more carefully. It is the weld HAZ of
the base metal that is susceptible to cracking, not the weld itself. So this issue is common to
both cases. Some sort of surface treatment following the weld repair to address the residual
stresses in the HAZ would help to mitigate the potential for cracking.
x Comment (C. King): I do not disagree that mitigation and repair methods have been
successfully applied on a variety of locations; however, our weak point is the NDE. These
plants are rather old and we have difficulty determining that Alloy 600 surfaces are crack-
free.
BMI Cleaning and Inspection at PVNGS, presented by T. Wilfong, APS, for
E. Fernandez, APS (Paper 5B.6)
This presentation was given by T. Wilfong of Arizona Public Service (APS) on behalf of E.
Fernandez also of APS. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x Pre-existing conditions such as coating remnants, stains, and other obstructions may
compromise effective bare metal visual inspections of some PWR reactor vessel bottom
mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzles. This presentation described a process for cleaning
and inspecting BMI nozzles to allow sensitive bare metal visual inspections to be performed.
The process uses a robot that delivers CO
2
"dry ice" media to clean a localized area on each
penetration. The process works by freezing the target coating, which is subsequently blown
off by the expanding CO
2
.
x There are several advantages of using CO
2
as opposed to other types of media:
CO
2
blasting cleans the annular area by expansion.
CO
2
blasting produces no added radioactive waste or hazardous residues that have to be
disposed of.
There is no surface metal removal as in abrasive cleaning.
There is no surface rusting as in water jet cleaning.
x In spring 2003, an "access inspection" of the Palo Verde Unit 3 BMI nozzles (also known as
incore instrumentation (ICI) nozzles) was performed and showed no obvious evidence of
leakage, but white Spraylat coating was detected on several nozzles. As a result, Palo Verde
formulated a plan to perform visual inspection and remove coating from the area of concern
at the BMI nozzle interface crevice. Given the difficult access and high radiation fields, APS
teamed with Jamko Technical Solutions to build first-of-a-kind robotic tooling to remotely
inspect all BMI nozzles, clean the annulus area, and re-inspect and document all nozzle
locations. A full-size BMI nozzle mockup and simulated insulation floor were constructed to
support the development effort.
12-9
x The as-found inspections revealed Spraylat remnants on every BMI nozzle. The examples
shown in the presentation are for some of the most heavily coated nozzles. The robot
traverses across the insulation flooring, secures onto a nozzle, and elevates to spray directly
at the nozzle annulus, reaching heights ranging from 11 inches to 3 feet. An area consisting
of at least " down the nozzle and " radially along the vessel outer surface was cleaned on
39 of 61 Unit 2 nozzles. The cleaning process did not compromise the integrity of future
visual inspections for BMI nozzle leakage.
x Some unforeseen factors prevented Palo Verde from completing cleaning of all 61 nozzles in
a particular unit at one time. The insulation surface conditions caused track travel issues, and
the deflection of flooring prevented proper positioning for higher elevation nozzles. In
addition, the clearance at the center locations did not match design drawings, and the
cleaning robot was not able to reach some center locations. The robot now has two sets of
jacks so that it can now reach more locations. Palo Verde will continue to perform
examination and cleaning operations for the three units during upcoming refueling outages.
In some cases, three outages may be required to complete the cleaning operations for a
particular unit.
12-10
Situation of the alloys 600 and 182 issues in the Belgian nuclear power plants
R.Grard, Ph.Daoust, Ph.Dombret, D.Couplet, Ch.Malkian
Tractebel Engineering,
Avenue Ariane, 7
B-1200 Brussels, Belgium
Introduction
7 PWR nuclear units are operated in Belgium by the Utility Electrabel, which represent a total
capacity of more than 5700 MW. The present paper summarizes the activities carried out in
Belgium in relation with the Inconel 600 and 182 issues (inspections, analyses and general
strategy).
RPV head inspection status
Inspections have been carried out on the RPV head penetrations since 1992, after cracking of
these components was first discovered in France.
The only case of significant cracking in Belgian RPV heads was Tihange 1, where a long axial
through-wall crack extending below the weld all the way down to the bottom of the penetration
was detected in one penetration in 1998. Fracture mechanics and crack growth analyses
demonstrated that the crack would remain acceptable in the next cycle and the unit was allowed
to restart. A new head with Inconel 690 penetrations was installed at the next outage in
October 1999, and an inspection of the replaced head confirmed that the crack growth was lower
than the prediction
Some small cracks were also detected in Doel 1 RPV head, and are followed by regular
inspections, but the growth of these cracks is slow, particularly in the depth direction (of the
order of 0.3 mm/year). A repair technique is being qualified for potential application on the 2
affected penetrations in Doel 1 at the next outage in 2005. Some indications characterized as
scratches are also present in Doel 2 and not evolving. No indications were detected in the
other units, except one indication in Tihange 3 which cannot be confirmed as a crack and did not
evolve in 4 successive inspections.
The inspections carried out on the different units at the end of 2003 were detailed in [1]. The
only new inspections performed in 2004 were UT inspection of Doel 4 and Tihange 3 RPV
heads. There was nothing to report in Doel 4 and the crack that was followed since 1998 in
Tihange 3 has not shown any evolution. In total 23 RPV head inspections by ET (in some cases
combined with UT for depth sizing) have been carried out since 1992. Recently high resolution
televisual inspections of the J-groove welds were added to the program
A bare metal visual inspection of all RPV heads was performed in 2002-2004 except in Tihange
1 (head replaced in 1999, Inconel 690 penetrations). Even though the accessibility was not
always optimal and it was not always possible to inspect visually 100% of the surface, the heads
were generally clean with locally some rusty streaks or small boric acid crystals attributed to
12-11
previous canopy seal leaks. No evidence of RPV head corrosion was seen. The further
inspection program is under discussion.
Other components in Inconel 600
Inspections were also carried out on other Inconel 600/182 components, namely the safety
injection nozzles on the reactor pressure vessel in Doel 1 and 2 and the bottom penetrations.
Since these components are at the cold leg temperature (287C), the risk of cracking and the
crack propagation rate in case of cracking are significantly reduced.
There are some small surface indications in the safety injection nozzle welds in Doel 1-2, but
they are not critical due to the relatively low stress level and low temperature. There are also
several subsurface lack of fusion indications at the weld/base metal interface.
Regarding the bottom penetrations, some indications interpreted as fabrication defects (lack of
fusion) were detected by ET/UT at the weld/base metal interface in Doel 2 in 1995 and
reinspected in 2000 without evolution. Bare metal visual inspections of the BMI penetrations
were carried out for all units (except Tihange 1 for dosimetry reasons) in 2003-2004. There was
no sign of any boric acid deposit. The further inspection program (periodicity, technique) is
under discussion.
Alloy 182 safe-ends welds
The cracking events at VC Summer and Ringhals in the hot leg nozzle to piping Inconel welds
gave rise to the concern that a similar situation might occur in the Belgian units, which also have
Inconel 182 welds in the reactor pressure vessel and pressurizer nozzle to safe-end welds in the
Doel 3 Tihange 2 and Doel 4 Tihange 3 units (the older units Doel 1-2 and Tihange 1 have
stainless steel buttering and welds). A detailed assessment of the situation in the Belgian units
was performed, including an inventory of the Inconel 182 locations, a detailed review of the
fabrication procedures (including weld repairs and heat treatments), detailed stress analysis
(including welding residual stresses), fracture mechanics and crack growth analysis.
This evaluation showed that for the reactor pressure vessels, all the welds were made prior to the
final heat treatment and stress-relieved with the vessels. The stress level is expected to be below
the generally accepted initiation threshold of 350 MPa. In one case, however, a repair was made
after the final heat treatment (fortunately on a cold leg). For the pressurizer welds, the buttering
was made before the final heat treatment and stress relieved, but the weld itself was made after
and is not stress relieved. The hoop stress level in these welds is close to the 350 MPa threshold
at the inside surface. The axial stresses are much lower, which is in agreement with the axial
orientation of the defects detected in VC Summer and Ringhals.
On the basis of these evaluations, a risk informed ranking of the different Inconel 182 welds
resulted in the definition of four groups, with decreasing risk level:
Group 1 : transition welds between pressurizer and surge line (in the first place Tihange 2,
which was repaired in fabrication).
Group 2 : transition welds between pressurizer and discharge line, safety valves and spray
line.
12-12
Group 3 : RPV outlet nozzle transition welds, and one inlet nozzle weld (repaired after final
heat treatment).
Group 4 : transition welds of other RPV inlet nozzles.
Based on this risk level and on plant operational constraints, selective provisions have been
adopted to reinforce the standard ISI programme, mainly by reducing the UT inspection interval
by a factor 3 for group 1, and a factor 2 for groups 2 and 3. The ASME interval of 10 years is
maintained for Group 4. In addition, the absence of leakage is checked by bare metal visual (or
dye penetrant) testing between two such ultrasonic examinations. An eddy current examination
(ET) of the inner surface of all RPV nozzle welds (Groups 3 & 4) is planned over the period
2003-2006.
As a result of this increased inspection program, a small axial indication of approximately 4x26
mm was detected in October 2002 at the inside surface of the pressurizer nozzle to surge line
transition weld of Tihange 2. On the basis of the fracture mechanics analyses, the Safety
Authorities gave the green light for the restart of the unit for six months. In the meantime, the
Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP, AEA patented process to mechanically contract
the pipe on one side of the weld, replacing the residual tensile stresses with compressive
stresses) was validated for application on the pressurizer to nozzle weld. Repair techniques
were also investigated. The weld was reinspected in May 2003, and again in October 2003, and
no evolution was detected. Therefore the MSIP was not applied. This weld will be inspected
again in March 2005.
The eddy current examination (ET) of the inner surface of the RPV nozzle welds in October
2003 in Tihange 2 detected an axially oriented 10 mm long indication, with a signal phase
typical of crack-like flaws, in the alloy 182 weld of an outlet nozzle. Expertise conducted by
remote visual examination and by UT did not reveal any further information, what led
eventually to a depth estimate of approximately 1 mm. As the PWSCC nature of the indication
could not be dismissed, the weld will be re-examined in 2005 and a repair process by local
grinding is being qualified.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the proactive inspection and analysis program implemented in the Belgian units
to control the PWSCC issues of Inconel 600 and 182 made it possible to detect defects early on,
well before they could lead to a leak. Continuous attention is paid to any new information that
might enhance the understanding of the damage mechanism or the effectiveness of the
preventive means applied.
Aknowledgements
The authors thank Electrabel for the permission to publish these results.
References
[1] Belgian Activities on Alloys 600 and 182 Issues R.Grard, Ph.Daoust (Tractebel
Engineering, Brussels, Belgium ),Conference on Vessel Head Penetration inspection,
Cracking and Repairs, September 29 - October 2, 2003, Gaithersburg, MD, USA.
12-13
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R.Grard, Ph.Daoust, Ph.Dombret, D.Couplet, C.Malkian
PWSCC of Alloy 600 International Conference and Exhibition
Santa Anna Pueblo, NM, March 7-10, 2005
Situation of the alloys 600 and 182 issues in the
Belgian Nuclear Power Plants
12-14
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Belgian Nuclear Units operated by Electrabel
Unit Capacity First NSSS
MWe,netto Operation designer
Tihange 1 962 1975 Westinghouse
Tihange 2 1008 1983 Framatome
Tihange 3 1015 1985 Westinghouse
Doel 1 392.5 1974 Westinghouse
Doel 2 440 1975 Westinghouse
Doel 3 1006 1982 Framatome
Doel 4 985 1985 Westinghouse
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Alloy 600/82/182 in the Belgian units
RPV head penetrations (600/182) in all units except
Tihange 1
RPV and PZR nozzle to piping transition welds (Inconel
182) in T2-D3-T3-D4
Steam generators:
aPartition plate and tubes in D1 in I 600 (all other SG replaced)
aSG tubesheet cladding in D3 D4 T3
aSG nozzle to safe-end welds in Inconel 82 in T1
aSG drain weld in D4 T3 in Inconel 182
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Alloy 600/82/182 in the Belgian units
Safety injection nozzles on reactor pressure vessels in D1-
D2
Core support blocks in all units
BMI in all units
12-17
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Alloy 600 Base material inspection status in Belgium
(2005) RPV heads
Tihange 1 (318C)
aOctober 1992 (123 000 h): no crack, 1 indication
aMarch 1998 (163 000 h): several cracks (1 heat), one axial
crack extending down to bottom of penetration, restart allowed
for 1 cycle based on fracture mechanics justification
aOctober 1999: RPV head replaced (Inconel 690)
Tihange 2 Doel 3 (287C):
aInspected by ET in 1993 ( 80 000 h) and 2000 ( 133 000 h):
no indications
aNext inspection planned in 2005.
12-18
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Alloy 600 Base material Inspection status in Belgium
(2005) RPV heads
Tihange 3 Doel 4 (318C):
aTihange 3 inspected by ET in 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001 and by VT
and UT in 2004 ( 148000 h)
aOne indication followed since 1998, no evolution.
aDoel 4 inspected by ET in 1994, 1999, (100 000 h) and by VT and
UT in 2004 ( 141 000 h): no indication
12-19
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Alloy 600 Base material Inspection status in Belgium
(2005) RPV heads
Doel 1 and 2 (307C)
aDoel 1 inspected in 1993 (ET), and in ET+UT in 1998, 1999,
2001, UT only in 2003 (215 000 h)
aSmall crack propagation followed since 1998 (0.3 mm/year)
aRepair technique being qualified for potential application in
Doel 1 in 2005
aDoel 2 inspected in ET+UT in 1994, 2000, UT only in 2003
(194 000 h): small scratches (not considered as cracks) no
evolution
12-20
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Equivalent Degradation Years (03/2005)
19.8 19.1 318 Tihange 3 Doel 4
2.1 287 Tihange 2 - Doel 3
318
318
307
Temp (C)
24
5.5
Tihange 1 (RPV head replaced 1999)
Tihange 1 new head
13.4 12.3 Doel 1-2
EDY Unit
EDY: equivalent years at the reference temperature of 316C (Arrhenius law with
activation energy 50 kcal/mole)
12-21
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RPV head Bare Metal Visual inspections
All units (except T 1)
inspected in 2002-2004
(some less than 100%)
Clean heads with locally
some rusty streaks and
boric acid traces,
attributed to canopy seals
leaks
No evidence of RPV head
corrosion
12-22
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BMI Bare Metal Visual examinations
All units inspected in 2003-2004 except Tihange 1
(dosimetry)
No indication of boric acid deposits
Tihange 1 inspection planned in 2005
Further program and BMV periodicity under discussion
12-23
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11
Dissimilar metal welds (Inconel 182)
Tihange 2 and 3 Doel 3 and 4
RPV nozzle to piping welds:
aInconel 182 buttering, Inconel 182 weld, SA316 safe-end
aStress relieved after welding
aOne repair after final stress relief in Doel 4 (cold leg)
PZR welds (surge line, aspersion, discharge, safety valves):
aInconel 182 buttering, Inconel 182 weld, SA316 safe-end
aNot stress relieved after welding (only after buttering)
aSignificant repair in Tihange 2 surge line weld
12-24
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Based on international experience feedback (VC Summer,
Ringhals, Tsuruga) a systematic assessment of Inconel
182 welds was performed:
aInventory
aFabrication details (PWHT, repairs)
aService conditions (temperature)
aStress analysis (incl. residual stress)
aDefect tolerance analysis
aThrough-wall flaw stability and leak rate
12-25
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Stress and fracture mechanics analyses
aNormal operating stresses at RPV outlet or inlet nozzle to safe
end welds are maximum 220 MPa, well below threshold for
PWSCC initiation ( 350 MPa).
aNormal operating hoop stresses at PZR nozzle to safe end
welds are close or above threshold for initiation ( 350 MPa)
(high contribution of residual stresses)
aAxial stresses much lower than circumferential stresses
axial crack more likely
aIf initial defect is postulated, crack growth rates are high.
12-26
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Through-wall defect analysis in RPV inlet nozzle
(weld repaired in fabrication after stress relief in one unit)
Crack stable with
margins
Very small leak
rate (2 - 5 kg/h)
12-27
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Residual welding stresses simulation
(PZR to surge line transition)
Axial Circumferential
180 MPa on first 15 mm,
increasing
120 MPa at inside surface
becoming rapidly compressive
12-28
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Risk-informed ranking in 4 categories:
aGroup 1: transition weld between PZR and surge line (1st rank
Tihange 2 due to repair)
aGroup2: transition weld between PZR and discharge line,
spray line, safety valves
aGroup 3: RPV outlet nozzle transition welds (+ 1 inlet nozzle
with repair)
aGroup 4: RPV inlet nozzle transition welds
12-29
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ASME ISI programme
ASME: volumetric testing (UT) inspection of inner third of
transition welds every 10 years.
aRPV: inspection from inside, detection limit for PWSCC flaws
5 mm in depth
aPZR: inspection from outside, detection limit for PWSCC flaws
2 mm in depth
Little benefit expected from enhancements of defect
detection and sizing techniques by these methods
shortening of examination intervals
supplementary testing techniques
12-30
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Reinforcement of ISI programme (for next 10 years):
aUT inspection interval reduced by 3 on group 1 welds and by 2
on group 2 welds
aIn addition, BMV or PT between two UT inspections
aGroup 3 welds: VT, ET and UT from inside every 5 years;
BMV or PT on outside surface between UT inspections
aGroup 4 welds: VT, ET and UT from inside every 10 years;
BMV or PT on outside surface between UT inspections
12-31
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19
Pressurizer surge nozzle to safe-end weld Tihange 2
Oct. 2002 inspection
Axial indication
Close to fabrication repair
Could be exposed to primary water
Flaw dimension 4 x 26 mm
D
C Inconel 182
SA 508 Cl3
316 SS
12-32
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Pressurizer surge nozzle to safe-end weld
Restart authorized for 6 months in 10/2002 after fracture
mechanics analysis
Validation of MSIP (Mechanical Stress Improvement
Process, AEA patent) on surge line geometry (conical safe-
end)
Re-inspections in May 2003 and in October 2003 did not
show any difference with 10/2002 inspection; MSIP was not
applied
Evaluation of potential repair/replacement techniques
Inspection at next outage (March 2005)
12-33
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Principle of MSIP (AEA technology)
Mechanically contract the
pipe on one side of weldment
Replace residual tensile
stresses with compressive
stresses
12-34
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MSIP tool for application on conical surge line geometry
12-35
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Mock-up for MSIP
qualification
Tihange 2 surge line
Courtesy of Westinghouse
12-36
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MSIP application on
Mock-up
Courtesy of Westinghouse
12-37
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25
Tihange 2 RPV outlet nozzle indication
ET in October 2003:
aAxially-oriented 10 mm long indication in Inconel 182 weld;
signal phase typical of crack-like flaw
aRemote visual examination and UT did not reveal further
information
aDepth estimated 1 mm
Qualification of repair technique by grinding
Next inspection in March 2005.
12-38
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26
Figure 2 : Tihange 2 - Doel 3 : Vessel Safe End
Vessel
Alloy 182 - Buttering
Alloy 182 - weld
SS Safe end
SS clad
A
Typical safe-end weld
10 x 1 mm
indication
12-39
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Tihange 2 RPV outlet H2 Grinding tool
12-40
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Additional actions - Materials investigations
Joint program on PWSCC with Belgian Nuclear Research
Center SCK.CEN (co-funded):
aParticipation to GE-EPRI round robin
aNational program
Participation to FROG program
12-41
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Summary
RPV head penetrations:
aProgram in place since 1992
aSignificant cracking detected in Tihange 1 in 1998; head
replaced in 1999
aSmall indications in other units followed by regular inspections
aSlow propagation in Doel 1 (0.3 mm/year)
aRepair of 2 penetrations in Doel 1 planned in 2005
12-42
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Summary (continued)
Program on Inconel 182 safe-end welds started after VC
Summer event:
aInventory and fabrication details
aStress analysis (incl. residual stress)
aFracture mechanics and crack growth analysis
aRisk-based ranking of critical locations
aIncreased inspections frequencies and additional techniques
12-43
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31
Summary (continued)
Significant findings:
aSmall indication in Tihange 2 surge line weld, in 10/2002, no
evolution in 05/2003 and 10/2003; next inspection 03/2005.
Potential solutions: MSIP or repair.
aSmall indication in Tihange 2 outlet nozzle weld in 10/2003;
next inspection 03/2005. Potential solution: repair by local
grinding
The proactive inspection and justification strategy followed
in Belgium made it possible to detect flaws well before they
could cause leaks in the primary pressure boundary.
12-44
A Swedish Perspective on PWSCC of Alloy 182
A. Jenssen
Studsvik Nuclear AB
SE-611 82 Nykping
Sweden
C.Jansson
SwedPower AB
Box 527
SE-162 16 Stockholm
Sweden
P. Efsing
Ringhals AB
SE-430 22 Vrbacka
Sweden
K. Norring
Studsvik Nuclear AB
SE-611 82 Nykping
Sweden
M. Knig
Studsvik Nuclear AB
SE-611 82 Nykping
Sweden
Abstract
During the re-fuelling outages in 2000 of two of the PWR plants in Sweden, Ringhals 3 and 4,
defect indications were found in the nozzle to safe end welds by means of in-service inspections
[1, 2]. Both eddy current (ET) and ultrasonic techniques (UT) were employed. Two reportable
defects were detected in Ringhals 3, and four planar defects, interpreted as cracks, were found in
Ringhals 4. All defects were located in the hot leg outlet nozzles, oriented in the axial direction
of the safe end. Examination of boat samples removed from the nozzles revealed axial cracks
confined to the weld metal, alloy 182. Cracking was intergranular and branched, suggesting that
crack propagation was caused mainly by PWSCC. A flaw tolerance analysis verified that
operation of Ringhals 3 could continue for another cycle, leaving the defects as they were [3]. In
Ringhals 4, which was inspected later, the indications were larger, and the reactor had to shut
down for root cause and flaw tolerance analyses. Upon re-inspection of the nozzles in Ringhals 3
in 2001, a third defect, also oriented in the axial direction of the safe end, was detected.
One component in the flaw tolerance analysis was the development of a disposition line for alloy
182 in PWR primary water. The first step in this effort was to collect crack growth rate data from
laboratory tests, primarily from France, Sweden and the US. Data representative for steady state
crack growth were then identified by applying a set of screening criteria to the database. The
screening criteria were related to material tested, water chemistry, test temperature, test time,
loading conditions, and crack monitoring. After necessary adjustments to the data (e.g.
recalculation of crack growth rates to a common temperature), a conservative crack propagation
law was applied to the data that passed the screening. Figure 1 shows the proposed bi-linear
disposition line together with the data passing the screening criteria.
12-45
In order to manage PWSCC of Ni-base weld metals on a long-term basis, crack growth
experiments have been initiated to verify and support the bi-linear upper bound disposition line.
In a first experiment, the effect of stress intensity, in the range 20 to 55 MPam, on the crack
growth rate of alloy 182 in PWR primary water (1200 ppm B, 2.2 ppm Li, 25 ml H
2
/kg H
2
O) was
investigated. Eight 1T-CT specimens (5% side grooves on either side), fatigue pre-cracked in air,
were simultaneously exposed in an autoclave at a temperature of 320 C. Once the
environmental conditions in the autoclave were stable, each specimen was loaded (individually)
to achieve the desired initial stress intensity. Subsequently, the specimens were locked in this
position for the entire duration of the test (2616 hrs). Since the load decreases as the crack
advances in a constant displacement test, load data were used as an indicator for crack
propagation. No DCPD measurements were made. Subsequent to testing, a fractographic
examination was conducted to determine the fracture mode and crack advance. Intergranular
cracking (PWSCC) was observed in all eight specimens. Crack advance was determined by
measuring and averaging the crack length at 20 equally distanced points along the fracture
surface. Stress intensity factors at the start and at the end of testing were calculated based on load
data and on the initial and final crack lengths determined in the fractographic examination. Crack
growth rates were calculated by dividing the crack advance with the total test time, assuming
crack growth initiated when the load was applied. Load data supports this assumption as the load
started to decrease early on in the test, see Figure 2. The load decrease was also constant over
time (Figure 2), suggesting the crack growth rates did not vary during the test. Crack growth rate
data are plotted in Figure 3, together with the Ringhals, EDF and MRP 115 disposition curves [4,
5]. The data in Figure 3 indicate a plateau level (i.e. the crack growth rate is independent of K
I
)
above a stress intensity of 28-30 MPam. Below this level the crack growth rate decreases with
decreasing stress intensity. Data from this test supports the bi-linear Ringhals disposition curve;
although the plateau level suggested by the lab data is three times lower than the disposition line.
The defected nozzle at Ringhals 3 was inspected on two consecutive occasions, in 2000 and 2001.
Crack growth rate data evaluated from the inspection data are shown in Figure 3. As shown by
Figure 3, the data agree very well with the lab data, and supports the Ringhals disposition line.
References
1. A. Jenssen, K. Norrgrd, J. Lagerstrm, G. Embring and D. R. Tice, Assessment of
Cracking in Dissimilar Metal Weld, Presented at 10
th
Intl Symp. on Environmental
Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power Systems Water Reactors, Lake Tahoe, Nevada
(August 2001).
2. A. Jenssen, K. Norrgrd, J. Lagerstrm, G. Embring, C. Jansson and P. Efsing, Structural
Assessment of Defected Nozzle to Safe-End Welds in Ringhals 3 and 4, Presented at Intl
Symp. on Contribution of Materials Investigation to the Resolution of Problems Encountered
in Pressurized Water Reactors, Fontevraud, France (September 2002).
3. P. Efsing and J. Lagerstrm, Analysis of a Defected Similar Metal Weld in a PWR Power
Plant, Paper ID 22275, Presented at ICONE-10, Intl Conf. on Nuclear Engineering, ASME
(April 2002).
12-46
4. S. Le Hong, J. M. Boursier, C. Amzallag and J. Daret, Measurements of Stress Corrosion
Cracking Growth Rates in Weld Alloy 182 in Primary Water of PWR, Presented at 10
th
Intl
Symp. on Environmental Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power Systems Water
Reactors, Lake Tahoe, Nevada (August 2001).
5. Materials Reliability Program (MRP) Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating Primary Water
Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 82, 182, and 132 Welds (MRP-115), EPRI,
Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1006696.
1,0E-10
1,0E-09
1,0E-08
1,0E-07
1,0E-06
1,0E-05
10 100
K
I
(MPam)
d
a
/
d
t

(
m
m
/
s
)
da/dt screened and recalculated for
320 degree C
Trend Curve at 320 degree C
da/dt=6,0E-07 for KI>= 25,1
da/dt=5,79E-20 KI
9,3
for KI<25,1
da/dt = [mm/s]
KI = [MPam]
Figure 1. Screened data and disposition line for alloy 182 in PWR primary water. All data are
recalculated to 320 C.
Figure 2. Example of load data from the test. Figure 3. Crack growth rate data in PWR
primary water compared to the Ringhals
disposition line and field data. All data at
320 C.
12-47
A Swedish Perspective on PWSCC of
Alloy 182
A. Jenssen, P. Efsing, C. Jansson, K. Norring
M. Knig
2005 PWSCC of Alloy 600 International Conference & Exhibit Show,
March 7-10, 2005
12-48
Outline
Introduction
Ringhals disposition line
CGR testing
Field data
Summary
12-49
Introduction (1)
During the annual outage of year 2000 indications were
observed by NDE (UT & ET) in welds between the RPV
and safe-ends in Units 3 & 4
Buttering
Alloy 182
Weld
Alloy 182
RPV steel
5
Cladding
Stainless steel
~6
~20
~28
15
7
9
.
5
Safe end
Stainless steel
Two defects in Unit 3 and
four in Unit 4
All defects in outlet
nozzles, oriented axially
12-50
Introduction (2)
Flaw tolerance analyses allowed Unit 3 to continue
operation for one reactor cycle
Examination of boat samples combined with a fracture
mechanics analysis allowed Unit 4 to continue operation to
the next planned outage
Cracking was inter-
granular and
branched, suggesting
propagation was
caused by PWSCC
12-51
Introduction (3)
The flaw tolerance analyses included the development of a
disposition line for Alloy 182
Management of PWSCC of Ni-base welds on a long-term
basis:
CGR testing has been initiated to verify and support
the disposition line
Field data
12-52
Ringhals disposition line (1)
Three primary sources of data: French, American and Swedish
1,0E-10
1,0E-09
1,0E-08
1,0E-07
1,0E-06
1,0E-05
10 100
KI (MPam)
d
a
/
d
t

(
m
m
/
s
)
All data collected
12-53
The data-set was reviewed and screening criteria were
applied to construct a conservative disposition curve
Material: no heat specific trends were observed
Water chemistry: 1200 ppm boric acid, 2 ppm Li and
25 -50 ml H
2
/kg H
2
O
Temperature: an activation energy of 130 kJ/mole
was used
Test time: data points with test times > 200 hours
were used
12-54
Continued
Mechanical loading: constant load data. Data
produced with short hold times were regarded as
conservative
Crack monitoring: for specimens tested under
multiple conditions data were dismissed if crack
growth could not be measured directly on the fracture
surface
A bi-linear bounding curve was developed based on the
screened data
12-55
Screened data and bounding curves for Alloy 182 crack
growth in PWR primary water. Data recalculated to 320 C
1,0E-10
1,0E-09
1,0E-08
1,0E-07
1,0E-06
1,0E-05
10 100
K
I
(MPam)
d
a
/
d
t

(
m
m
/
s
)
da/dt screened and recalculated f or
320 degree C
Trend Curve at 320 degree C
da/dt=6,0E-07 for KI>= 25,1
da/dt=5,79E-20 KI
9,3
for KI<25,1
da/dt = [mm/s]
KI = [MPam]
12-56
CGR testing (1)
Normally DCPD is used in CGR measurements
uneven crack fronts and unbroken ligaments are
complicating factors
periodic unloading is applied to break up the
ligaments
Another approach was used to support the Ringhals
disposition line
Measure the CGR of Alloy 182 as a function of K
I
Demonstrate the existence of a plateau level
12-57
CGR testing (2)
Experimental
Eight 25 mm CT specimens (5% SG on
either side) were individually loaded
and simultaneously exposed in an
autoclave
Each specimen was loaded to the
desired K
I
value and then locked in this
position for the entire duration of the test
No DCPD measurements were made
Inlet
Outlet
Inlet
Outlet
12-58
CGR testing (3)
Experimental, contd
K
I
ranged from 20 to 55 MPam
The load on each specimen was
monitored continuously
CGRs and K
I
were calculated
based on crack length and load
data (assuming cracking started
at time zero)
12-59
CGR testing (4)
Temperature 318.72.7 C
Hydrogen 29.62.5 ml H
2
/kg H
2
O
Conductivity, outlet 19.90.8 S/cm
Boron 12975 ppm
Lithium 2.280.02 ppm
Sulphate 6.70.8 ppb
Chloride 7.20.7 ppb
Test Environment
12-60
CGR testing (5)
Fractography
12-61
CGR testing (6)
Crack Length Measurement
Crack advance was determined by measuring and
averaging 20 equally spaced points along the crack front
Four specimens had areas that seemed to be
representative of uniform crack growth
The average crack growth for these areas was used
in the evaluation
CGRs determined on the representative areas were
always higher than the values obtained by the
standard procedure
12-62
CGR testing (7)
Crack Fronts
Arrows indicate specimens for which the CGR was
evaluated with the alternative procedure
K=56.1 MPa m
I

Pre-fatigue
Post-fatigue
K=49.8 MPa m
I

Pre-fatigue
Post-fatigue
K=43.7 MPa m
I

Pre-fatigue
Post-fatigue
K=41.9 MPa m
I

Pre-fatigue
Post-fatigue
K=36.7 MPa m
I

Pre-fatigue
Post-fatigue
K=30.6 MPa m
I

Pre-fatigue
Post-fatigue
K=23.7 MPa m
I

Pre-fatigue
Post-fatigue
K=19.7 MPa m
I

Pre-fatigue
Post-fatigue
12-63
CGR testing (8)
1,0E-08
1,0E-07
1,0E-06
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
K
I
[MPam]
d
a
/
d
t

[
m
m
/
s
]

a
t

3
2
0

C
K
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
K
final
K
inital
12-64
Field data & other disposition lines
320 C
12-65
Summary
A disposition line was developed as part of the
fitness for service analysis for Ringhals Units 3 and 4
Lab data supports the bi-linear disposition line
Field data agrees well with the lab data
CGR testing is continuing at lower K
I
levels and on
the effect of temperature
12-66
CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM EXAMINATIONS AT POINT BEACH
NUCLEAR PLANT
William A. Jensen
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
Point Beach Nuclear Plant
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, Wisconsin 54221
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the examination of pressurized water reactor (PWR) control rod drive
mechanism (CRDM) nozzles and other vessel head penetration nozzles fabricated from Alloy 600 for
primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). Cracking in nozzles (mostly axial in nature) has been
identified in France, the United States, and other countries since the late 1980s. Over the past five (5)
years, nuclear power plants in the United States have been faced with the growing issue of multiple,
sometimes through-wall, PWSCC flaws in their reactor pressure vessel (RPV) CRDMs and the leakage
from these flaws (e.g., Davis Besse, Oconee, etc.). The number of plants having these problems caused the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) to issue multiple NRC Bulletins starting with 2001-01.
In 2001,the Nuclear Management Company (NMC) embarked on an effort to ensure that the latest
automated ultrasonic (AUT) techniques would be utilized during the upcoming RPV CRDM examinations
at Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP). This effort involved personnel from PBNP, the Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI), as well as personnel from the various examination vendors who bid on the work
at PBNP. This paper will present the results of the efforts, as well as lessons learned which can be applied
by other utilities who will be performing these examinations in the future.
Background
Most Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) have Alloy 600 Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM)
penetrations and other vessel head closure penetrations (VHPs) that extend above the Reactor Pressure
Vessel (RPV) head. In original designs, the stainless steel housing of the CRDM was screwed and seal-
welded onto the top of the penetration, however, later designs are butt-welded. The weld between the
penetration top and bottom pieces is a dissimilar metal weld, which is also called a bimetallic weld. The
penetrations protrude below the vessel head, thus exposing the inside surface of the penetrations to reactor
coolant. The CRDM penetration and other VHPs are basically the same for all PWRs worldwide, which
use an American design (except in Germany and Russia). The areas of interest for potential cracking are
the weld between the penetration and reactor vessel head, and the portion of the penetration inside the
reactor vessel head above the penetration-to-vessel weld.
Beginning in 1986, leaks were reported in several Alloy 600 pressurizer penetrations at both U.S. and
foreign reactors from several different NSSS vendors. In 1989, it was identified that primary water stress
corrosion cracking (PWSCC) was an emerging technical issue after cracking was noted in Alloy 600
pressurizer heater sleeve penetrations at a U.S. PWR. At that time, the NRC determined that the cracking
was not of immediate safety significance because the cracks were axial, had a low growth rate, were in a
material with an extremely high flaw tolerance (high fracture toughness) and, accordingly, were unlikely to
propagate very far. These factors also demonstrated that any cracking would result in detectable leakage
and the opportunity to take corrective action before a penetration would fail. The NRC staff issued
Information Notice 90-10, dated February 23, 1990, to inform the U.S. nuclear industry of the issue.
In September 1991, cracks were found in an Alloy 600 VHP in the reactor head at Bugey 3, a French PWR.
Nondestructive examinations (NDE) in PWRs in France, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and Japan
were performed, and additional VHPs with axial cracks were detected in several European plants. About 2
percent of the VHPs examined at that time contained short, axial cracks. Close examination of the VHP
12-67
that leaked at Bugey 3 revealed very minor incipient secondary circumferential cracking of the VHP.
During the 1990s, utilities in France and Japan replaced vessel heads as a preventative measure. The
replacement heads penetrations were made up of a different type of Inconel (i.e., I-690). Material experts
believe that this alloy is much more resistant to the effects of PWSCC.
NRC Order EA-03-009 showed that the NRC was extremely concerned about the issue and wanted to
ensure that U.S. utilities were properly addressing it.EA-03-009 required U.S. PWR owners to perform
various amounts of NDE on their RPV heads, based upon the Effective Damage Years (EDY).
Fundamentally, this formula uses the effective number of years the plan has operated at full power
[Effective Full Power Years (EFPY)] along with the temperature that the RPV closure head was subjected
to, thus yielding an EDY number for the given RPV head. The NDE required ranged from visual
examinations up to and including volumetric examinations [i.e., ultrasonic examinations (UT)] and/or
surface examinations [Liquid Penetrant (PT) or Eddy Current (ET)] of the tubes and j-groove welds.
Point Beach Specifics
Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) has two (2) Units, both Westinghouse-designed, two-loop PWRs with
RPV heads containing forty-nine (49) CRDM penetrations and one (1) head vent line penetration. Both
plants were designed and built in the mid- to late 1960s. Due to the large number of nuclear plant orders
being processed by Westinghouse at that time, PBNPs Unit 1 RPV was fabricated by Babcock and
Wilcox, at their Mount Vernon plant and the Unit 2 vessel was fabricated by Combustion Engineering, at
their Chattanooga facility. Due to the age of these units (fabrication circa 1967-68), a great deal of detailed
information on the installation of the CRDM penetrations and subsequent welding operations was not
considered extremely important for archival records, and thus not archived.
PBNP Unit 1 commenced commercial operation on December 21, 1970 followed by Unit 2 on October 1,
1972. At the time of the first CRDM examination (2002), Unit 1 had accumulated approximately 14.6
EDY, and by the first CRDM examination on Unit 2, it had accumulated approximately 16.6 EDY. This
placed them near the top of the list for risk of having PWSCC.
After a successful outage in the Spring of 2002 in which bare metal visual examinations only were
performed, PBNP Engineering and NDE personnel began planning a similar scenario for the Fall 2002
outage on Unit 1 (U1R27), scheduled to commence on September 14, 2002. However, on August 8, 2002,
the NRC released Bulletin 2002-02, which required licensees to provide the following information:
1. If the licensee planned to supplement their inspection programs with non-visual NDE methods, they
were requested to provide a summary discussion of the supplemental inspections to be implemented.
The summary discussion was supposed to include EDY, methods, scope, coverage, frequencies,
qualification requirements, and acceptance criteria.
2. If the licensee did not plan on supplementing their program with non-visual NDE methods, they were
requested to provide a justification for the continued reliance on visual examination as the primary
method to detect degradation (i.e., cracking, leakage, or wastage). It also required a discussion that
addressed the reliability and effectiveness of the inspections to ensure that all regulatory and technical
specification requirements would be met during the operating cycle, as well as the basis for concluding
that unacceptable vessel head wastage would not occur between inspection cycles that relied on
qualified visual examinations.
It was the belief of PBNP personnel that, based upon their Unit 2 experiences, and the fact that Unit 1 had a
lower EDY than Unit 2, a BMVT should be justifiable. However, PBNP management decided that the
most conservative route should be taken, and directed that Areva be alerted of the need to perform the AUT
of the VHPs. Even though the contingency plans for AUT were in place, a great deal of additional activity
had to occur in approximately four (4) weeks to ensure that the site was prepared to perform the work.
12-68
The examinations went very well, and, due to increased training by Areva, no thermal sleeve removal, and
an excellent underhead decontamination effort by the PBNP Radiation Protection department, the total
radiation exposure was cut in approximately one-half of the previous total (Table 1).
Table 1
Examination Personnel Exposure Reductions
Outage Task Personnel Exposure
Initial Surveys and Underhead
Decontamination
1.84Rem(0.0184 Sv)
UT Examination 8.72Rem (0.0872 Sv)
U1R27
Thermal Sleeve Remove/UT/Replace 12.28Rem(0.1228 Sv)
Initial Surveys and Underhead
Decontamination
0.774Rem(0.0077 Sv) U2R26
UT Examination 4.25 Rem (0.0425 Sv)
Using the experiences of U2R26 and the fact that Unit 1 had a lower estimated EDY than Unit 2 prior to its
last outage (15.6 vs. 16.6), the NMC/Areva team felt that U1R28 would be a fairly straight-forward outage.
This feeling was so pervasive that PBNP management directed the CRDM Project Manager to not have the
Areva repair equipment or personnel on site. Based on what had happened previously, this appeared to be
a low-risk decision that would save the asset owner (We Energies) a substantial sum of money.
The assumptions of the team were proven wrong. On April 28, 2004, during the analysis of data from
Penetration 26, the Areva analysts found a suspect (flaw-like) area at approximately 180 azimuth (Figure
1). The on-site Areva Level III analyst then notified the PBNP Level III of this anomaly found in the AUT
data. After discussions with the PBNP Level III and CRDM Project Manager, and consulting with the RPV
Engineer, it was determined that a liquid penetrant (PT) examination would be performed on the j-groove
weld and tube of Penetration 26. Simultaneously, the UT data was sent to an Areva Level III off site for a
second review. The PT examination was performed on April 29, with small, linear indications being
located (both circumferential and axial in nature) (Figure 2).
Figure 2 Penetration 26 PT Indications
Figure 1 Penetration 26 UT Indications
12-69
Conclusions
Although thousands of RVHPs have been examined over the past few years in the United States, these
examinations cannot be viewed by utility personnel as routine. As evidenced by the events at PBNP, all
parties must be thoroughly prepared for any contingency. Although the PBNP team had dealt with this
workscope several times before, they did not fully account for all possible outcomes. Several areas were
identified which could have made a difference in the outcome of U1R28:
1. The previous AUT examinations on Unit 1 were not completely understood (e.g., Penetration 26 had
an axial blade probe examination vice a circumferential blade probe examination the previous outage).
2. No attempt was made to retrieve any baseline (i.e., construction) reports and review them prior to the
outage. Had this been done in advance, an Engineering evaluation could have possibly been
performed showing that the AUT indications were from original fabrication defects in the j-groove
weld that extended into the penetration.
On the positive side, several areas were identified that were great successes:
1. Personnel from PBNP and Areva worked together as a team over almost three years.
2. The team made great strides forward in areas such as under head decontamination, equipment
reliability, and general worker practices.
3. Training of NMC NDE personnel in AUT data review lessened the burden on the Areva analysts of
dealing with most site and regulatory personnel.
Thanks
The author would like to thank the following individuals and or groups for their support over the past three
years:
Hartford Steam Boiler Insurance and Inspection Company:
Messrs. Roger Bardo and Duane Oakley
Nuclear Management Company and/or Point Beach Nuclear Plant:
Messrs. Ronald Barker, Roy Brown, Tom Dachelet, Frank Dohmen, Loyde Hawki, Brian Kemp, Mark
Huting, Gary Sherwood, Chuck Tomes, and everyone in Radiation Protection and Maintenance.
Areva:
Messrs. Mike Key, Kent Gebbetsburger, Ryan Maggi, Bob Pruitt, Craig Ranson, Mike Webster, and the
SumoROCKY operators.
References
1) United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Information Notice 90-10, Primary Water
Stress Corrosion Cracking of INCONEL 600, USNRC, Washington, D.C., February 23, 1990.
2) NRC Generic Letter 97-01, Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration and Other
Vessel Closure Head Penetrations, USNRC, Washington, D.C., April 1, 1997.
3) NRC Information Notice 2001-05, Through-wall Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure
Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, USNRC, Washington, D.C., August 1, 2002.
4) NRC Bulletin 2002-02, Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection
Programs, USNRC, Washington, D.C. August 9, 2002.
5) NRC Order EA-03-009, Issuance of First Revised NRC Order (EA-03-009) Establishing Interim
Inspection Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Heads at Pressurized Water Reactors, USNRC,
Washington, D.C., February 20, 2004.
6) PWR Materials Reliability Program, Interim Alloy 600 Safety Assessments for US PWR Plants
(MRP-44): Part 2: Reactor Vessel Top Head Penetrations, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, 2001, TP-1001491,
Part 2.
7) PWR Materials Reliability Program Response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01 (MRP-48), EPRI, Palo Alto,
CA, 2001, TP-1006284.
12-70
William A. Jensen
Committed to Nuclear
Excellence
Control Rod Drive Mechanism
Examinations At Point Beach Nuclear
Plant
12-71
Overview
Industry Background
Point Beach Specifics
Vendor Selection and Equipment
Examination History
Repair Information
Lessons Learned/Conclusions
12-72
Industry Background Information
1986: Leaks were identified in Alloy 600
pressurizer nozzles in the U.S.
February 1990: United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) issues
Information Notice 90-10.
September 1991: Cracks found in Alloy 600
head penetrations at Bugey 3 (France).
12-73
(Cont.)
April 1997: NRC issues Generic Letter 97-01
requesting information from PWR owners
regarding inspections of CRDMs and other
nozzles.
April 2001: NRC issues Information Notice
2001-05 to alert the industry about cracking
found at Oconee, Unit 3.
12-74
(Cont.)
2002: NRC issues Bulletin 2002-01 requiring
each PWR to submit information regarding
description of any conditions identified,
examination plans, etc. to NRC within 15
days.
12-75
(Cont.)
2003: NRC issues EA-03-009, which requires
PWR owners to perform, based on the
calculated effective damage years (EDY) of
their RPV closure head, visual and/or non-
visual examinations.
12-76
Two Units - Westinghouse 2-loop design
(132-inch ID)
Alloy 182 J-groove welds
49 Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM)
Penetrations
33 with thermal sleeves
16 open housings
1 Head Vent Line Penetration
12-77
Background Information (Cont.)
Unit 1: Fabricated by Babcock & Wilcox
(1968)
Unit 2: Fabricated by Combustion
Engineering (1969)
Unit 2 EDY in Fall 2003: 16.6
Unit 1 EDY in Spring 2004: 15.5
12-78
PBNP Closure Head Layout
32 31 35
16 12 15
36 20 45 44 19
24 4 7 3 23
28 46 40 39 43
13 8 1 6 11
29 47 41 38 42
25 5 9 2 22
21 48 49 18 34
17 10 14
37
33 30
26
27
RPV Head
Vent Line
12-79
J-Groove Weld Layout
Closure Head
J-Groove Weld
12-80
J-Groove Weld Nomenclature
Downhill
Uphill
12-81
Typical Peripheral Nozzle
Configuration (w/Thermal Sleeve)
0.40-0.50 inch
(10-12 mm) gap
12-82
Selection of a Vendor
2001: Received bids from three (3) fully
qualified vendors.
Carefully reviewed the capabilities of each
vendor from both an NDE standpoint and a
repair standpoint.
Selected Framatome ANP (now Areva) as
winning bidder, based on experience and
capability to perform both exams and repairs.
12-83
Areva Equipment
SumoROCKY bottom-up delivery system
12-84
Areva Equipment UT Probes
Blade Probe Rotating Probe
12-85
Areva AUT Display
CRDM with
Thermal
Sleeve
Uphill
Downhill
12-86
TOFD Overview
Lateral Wave (1)
Flaw Tip
Signal (2)
Tube Backwall
Signal (3)
Lateral Wave (1)
(Not seen on A-scan due to ID
flaw)
Flaw Tip Signal
(2)
Tube Backwall Signal (3)
12-87
PBNP Examination History
Unit 1 Refueling 21 (Spring 1994)
Eddy Current only (first in U.S.)
No indications (95% coverage)
After asbestos insulation removal, bare metal
visual examination (BMV)
No indications of leakage
No UT performed, but equipment staged in
case BMV located leakage
12-88
PBNP Examination History (Cont.)
Unit 1 Refueling 27 (Fall 2002)
Asbestos insulation removal, BMV, UT
No flaw indications noted
Approximately 90% coverage
Destroyed approximately 15 blade probes
due to severe environment (i.e., small gaps
in between thermal sleeve and nozzle)
Removed three thermal sleeves to achieve
additional coverage
12-89
Unit 2 Refueling 26 (Fall 2003)
BMV, UT
No flaw indications
Approximately 90% UT coverage
PBNP Level III and 2
nd
NMC Level III for
additional data review
No thermal sleeves removed
Radiation exposure dramatically reduced
from previous outage
12-90
BMV, UT examination
Greater than 95% coverage UT
Used PBNP Level III for additional data
review
One CRDM (Nozzle 26) showed UT
indications
UT exam followed by PT, which also
showed indications
12-91
Nozzle 26 Indications
Large UT signal detected at the weld root (downhill
location - 180q)
12-92
Several PTs revealed relatively faint
J-groove surface indications
Nozzle 26 Indications (Cont.)
12-93
Nozzle 26 Indications (Cont.)
Depth of indications > 3/16 inch
Conservative repair of nozzle performed due to
high dose involved with flaw excavation
12-94
Nozzle 26 Repair
Areva ID Temper Bead repair process
Very complicated due to smaller
Westinghouse 2-loop RPV design
Simplified repair process outline follows
12-95
Nozzle 26 Repair Step 1
THERMAL
SLEEVE
CUT LINE
STEP 1
THERMAL SLEEVE
CUTTING
Sever existing guide sleeve
12-96
2GTHQTODCUGNKPG
TQVCVKPI76
7UKPI76VCMGCUDWKNV
OGCUWTGOGPVU
4QNNGZRCPFPQ\\NG
STEP 2
ROLL EXPANSION
12-97
Locate cut-line
Machine the lower nozzle
and form weld prep
Etch the original J-groove
weld to locate fusion line
Size weld overlap
PT and UT the original
J-groove weld in the area of
the overlap
STEP 3
NOZZLE REMOVAL
AND WELD PREP
MACHINING
12-98
Perform IDTB Weld
48 hour Hold
STEP 4
WELDING
12-99
Machining of weld
surface suitable for NDE
during 48 hour
Perform UT and PT of
weld after the 48 hour
hold
STEP 5
GRINDING, MACHINING,
AND NDE
12-100
Grind chamfer on
existing structural weld
STEP 6
ORIGINAL
WELD GRINDING
12-101
Install and weld
replacement lower guide
sleeve
STEP 7
THERMAL SLEEVE
REATTACHMENT
12-102
Weld Overlap Issue
AND NDE
GRINDING/MACHINING
STEP 5
With small diameter
(132) heads, the repair
A52 weld will come into
contact with the existing
A182 J-groove weld
Unique design
challenge for the
Westinghouse 2-loop
plants
Weld ligament
12-103
Weld Overlap Issue (Cont.)
Crack growth rates in the Alloy 52 material
are very low but undocumented. The
analysis therefore conservatively assumed
Alloy 600 CGRs (MRP-55)
Analysis demonstrated that a worst-case flaw
in the A82/182 would take in excess of 1.5
EFPY to go through the remaining Alloy 52
weld (0.26 weld ligament assumed)
12-104
The Finish Line
June 4, 2004
PBNP Level III and Authorized Nuclear
Inservice Inspector performed/witnessed the
final leak test at normal operating
pressure/temperature
June 7, 2004
PBNP Unit 1 entered Mode 1 (Full Power)
12-105
Conclusions
Areas for improvement:
Previous AUT examination on Nozzle 26
were not completely understood (i.e., UT
responses from axial blade probe versus
circumferential blade probe)
No attempt to find baseline reports and
review them prior to performing either AUT
or PT
12-106
Conclusions (Cont.)
Areas for improvement:
Team pushed ahead with PT prior to
completion of Arevas off-site Level IIIs
review of the AUT data
Personnel had become complacent with
several successful outages.
12-107
Conclusions (Cont.)
Areas which worked:
NMC and Areva personnel worked as a
team
After 1
st
outage with AUT, PBNP Radiation
Protection personnel improved
decontamination efforts which greatly
reduced radiation levels underhead
(approximately )
12-108
Conclusions (Cont.)
Areas which worked:
Areva personnel took great pains to
improve equipment between outages
NMC Level III personnel trained on Areva
data analysis software, thus freeing Areva
analysts from answering many questions
from management and regulatory
authorities
12-109
Committed to Nuclear
Excellence
The teamwork and extra effort put forth
by all those involved assured that we
performed all activities in a safe
manner and that we succeeded in
spite of many challenges.
12-110
Thank You for Your Attention
12-111
Some recent experiences on stress corrosion cracking in B/P-WR
plants and remedies/strategies from a utility point of view
Pl Efsing and Hans-ke Georgsson
Ringhals AB
SE-430 22 VRBACKA, SWEDEN
During the last 10 to 15 years, a number of incidents related to cracking in Nickel based alloys
have been unveiled in the Nuclear Power plants at both sites that are operated by Ringhals-
Gruppen in Sweden, Ringhals north of Varberg and Barsebck, north of Malm. The frequency
of defects is slightly higher on the PWR side relative to the BWR side, but the number of lost
production days is significantly higher on the BWR side, with the exception of the vessel head
penetration issue at Ringhals 2, which caused a forced outage from May to December in 1993.
An estimated average production loss of some 20 day/year in total has been the outcome over the
preceding 10 years, which from a utility perspective is totally unacceptable. Further the goodwill
costs of safe and sound operating power plants needs to be assessed, which makes the actual
costs even higher. Some of the main events that has caused prolonged and in some cases forced
outages will be presented and put into their correct perspective during the presentation.
Indications have been found in Nickel based alloys and their weld metals in such different
locations as heavy section pipe welds in both BWR and PWR, small bore instrumentation nozzle
welds, brackets to piping systems in reactor vessel internals in BWR and vessel head
penetrations of the PWR-plants.
From a safety point of view, the most important case with respect to plant operation in a short-
term perspective, were defects found in year 2000 in welds between the RPV-nozzles and the
safe-ends of the RCS. The defects were found in two PWR units in Ringhals, Ringhals 3 and 4
[1]. There are two interesting parameters in this issue, first the fact that there was a similar case
almost at the same time in the US (VC Summers) and second the apparent look alike to a
degradation case in Barsebck 1 (a 600 MWe BWR unit). The defects in these cases were
characterized by being very tight, all where underestimated by a qualified inspection system to a
larger or smaller extent, and in the case of Ringhals 3 and 4, the surface detection system
partially failed to characterize them correctly as being surface breaking. The defects in Ringhals
3 and 4 was handled through a repair and replacement program, including a internal girdle weld
manufactured from Alloy 52 on all of the hot-leg nozzle welds. Thus removing the threat of
exposed Alloy 182 to the media at the most likely location of crack initiation in the plants. It can
also be mentioned that the general belief that most cracking in nickel based weld metals is
connected to weld repairs, is not supported by the finding in Ringhals 3 and 4, where the defects
in Ringhals 3 does not show any signs of influence from neither local nor global weld repairs.
Recently two incidents of cracking in small bore instrumentation nozzles in the PWR plants and
three cases in the BWR plants have attracted some attention to the situation regarding J-groove
welds in these areas. In Ringhals 4, a leak through a reference measurement nozzle of the PZR
was detected during routine walk down of the plant in the beginning of the Re-Fuelling Outage
of 2003, and in Ringhals 2, similar findings was made around drainage pipes for the Steam
Generator water chamber and man way cover during the outage of 2004 [2]. These defects are
both penetrating through the entire weld thickness and have resulted in a small limited local
12-113
leakage of reactor water. Inspections of other similar areas have not revealed any other potential
leakers or even any other defects/indications, which is somewhat surprising but fits well into
the thinking that the defects in Nickel based weld metals are extremely individual with respect to
weld repairs and local conditions, which causes some individuals to be more sensitive than
others. In the BWR plants, defects have been indicated by the ISI in several J-groove type welds
connecting reference level measurement nozzles to the RPV. The defects in these cases are
considered to be very shallow, opposite to the finding in the PWR-plants, but instead they are
quite numerous. In both Ringhals 1 and Barsebck 2, multiple defects have been found by means
of ET-inspections. Since the most limiting case from a structural integrity perspective is a radial
defect, the system has been optimized with respect to the need for this case. When a flaw
tolerance analysis is performed within the Swedish regulatory premises, the defects needed to be
detected (and sized/characterized) are as small as 2,4 mm in length and 1,2 mm in TWE. For
defects far away from the nozzle-to-weld fusion line, a system has been qualified for height
sizing, but for defects close to or at the fusion line, no such system is available. Out of a total of
34 defects, 6 defects are in the area where no height sizing currently is available. The solution of
this issue still remains an open one. One possible remedy would be over lay welding to avoid
Alloy 182 to be media touched, however, without very high confidence in the actual defect
initiation process, this may be a more technical/tactical than practical solution. This since even
very small defects, emancipating from the manufacturing, still could be present even if a more
resistant weld metal, i.e. Alloy 52 or its derivatives, is used. These weld metals have also been
shown to be very difficult to weld with respect to welding defects such as hot crack and other
micro fissures. The relative structural concern of these defects may be debated but as long as
they are present they impose a threat to the operation of the power plant by possibly showing up
as an indication during ISI.
The first and second generation of ASEA Atom designed BWR plants generally featured an
ECCS system attached to the core shroud head. The system is built up by an austenitic piping
system with brackets of the Nickel based alloy Inconel X-750. This alloy has been known since
the end of the 1970s to be sensitive to stress corrosion cracking, given un-favorable heat
treatment in both P- and BWR environments. Un-favorable in this case generally mean low
solution annealing temperature, in some cases below 1000qC (~1800qF), and a precipitation
hardening in two steps, resulting in two different structures of precipitates. EPRI has through an
extensive program derived several options of heat treatments that are more resistant to SCC, that
are used today. This was of small relief however during the latter part of the 1990s when
virtually all of the early constructed BWR-plants in Sweden were struck by cracking in the
ECCS-brackets. It is interesting to note that in most of this case, it was the base metal that was
exhibiting cracking, not the Alloy 182 weld metal. In Ringhals 1, this has resulted in a
component exchange such that a new core lid was order and installed within 3 years of operation.
In Barsebck 2, the decision, partially due the political situation, was taken to verify safe
operation by continuous inspections and an ambitious R&D program in order to verify the crack
growth rates in typical materials, both archive pieces of the same vintage, and pieces removed
from the power plant. This work will be presented at a later stage at the Environmental
Degradation Conference in August 2005 [3].
The component that has attracted the most international attention is most likely the Reactor
Pressure Vessel Heads of the PWR-plants, mainly due to the Davis-Besse incident and the
12-114
relatively large number of infected plants. It is interesting to note that there seems to be great
similarities between the different vendors, such that all have been affected to larger or less
extent. Portions of this issue have struck Ringhals too. Already in the beginning of the 1990s, a
defect was indicated in a J-groove weld to a CRDM-penetration in the RPVH in Ringhals 2,
resulting in a VH-exchange a few years later. This issue has been extensively reported elsewhere
[4]. In the end of the 1990s, several indications where found by means of ET-inspections. A
total of 26 VHP have defects that have been tracked by the inspections. These defects are
considered to be shallow and of no structural concern. Despite this, the RPVH are in the
exchange program, where Ringhals 4 replaced its vessel head 2004, and Ringhals 3 is scheduled
for replacement in 2005 [5]. The reason for this was a cost benefit analysis that estimated the
costs for future inspections and qualification and the possibilities for forced outage in the future
that rather extensively proved to be more expensive than the replacement cost. This is partially
due to the relatively small scrapping costs that need to be added to the project costs, due to the
decision to include the costs for teardown and materials handling onto the production costs in
Sweden in the form of a tax. The positive spin-off is a situation where the power plants currently
are planning for a life extension, partially triggered by the investments, that fits well to the
replacement strategy.
Despite large replacement programs, there will still be plenty of locations with exposed Alloy
600 and its weld metals remaining in the power plant for a number of years to come. The
continuous support of these areas by relevant defect tolerance assessment including the
generation of not overly conservative crack growth rate laws for both the base metal and all
relevant weld metals is of high priority to be able to. Especially to increase the data available at
both very high K-levels, i.e. over 40 MPam and at very low, i.e. below some 20 MPam in
order to verify or even enhance the current understanding. It will continue to be part of the focus
for the coming years with respect the R&D program at both Ringhals and the other Swedish
utilities in order to maintain safe operation over the coming 30+ years, or until a relevant
alternative is available. This despite the fact that over the next few years to come, there will be
funding problem with respect to the new materials that are introduced that need an extensive
qualification and validation of their relative usefulness and applicability for long term resistance
to environmental degradation and ageing during service.
References:
1 A. Jenssen, K. Norrgrd, J. Lagerstrm, G. Embring, C. Jansson and P. Efsing,
Structural Assessment of Defected Nozzle to Safe-End Welds in Ringhals 3 and
4, Presented at Intl Symp. on Contribution of Materials Investigation to the
Resolution of Problems Encountered in Pressurized Water Reactors, Fontevraud,
France (September 2002).
2 P. Efsing, B. Forssgren and R. Killian et.al. Submitted to be presented at
Environmental Degradation in 2005
3 A. Jensen and P. Efsing, ibid.
4 Gutti Rao and Gran Embring NRCs Vessel Head Penetration Inspection,
Cracking and Repair Conference, Gaitherburg 2003
5 P. Efsing, ibid.
12-115
Some recent experiences on stress
corrosion cracking in B/P-WR
environments and
remedies/strategies from a utility
point of view
Pl Efsing and Hans-ke Georgson
Ringhals AB
12-116
PWR issues:
Safe-End cracking in unit 3 and 4
RPV-head/CRD-penetration cracking
Instrumentation nozzles/Steam generator drainage pipes
BWR issues
Thick section Ni-base weld Barsebck
Instrumentation nozzles
Inconel X-750 brackets ECCS Barsebck and Ringhals 1
Remedies
RnR Repair and Replacement
Inspections - Friklassning
12-117
Ni-base cracking in PWR:
Background
Well known and reported incidents in Ringhals 3 and 4 as well
as VC Summers
PWSCC in Alloy 82/182
Equally known and at the moment of more concern case of
cracking in Vessel Head penetrations and J-groove welds of
CRDM
1991 - Bugey
1992 - Ringhals 2
2000 and on - Oconee, North Anna, ANO, Davis Besse
All of these issues of equal importance and originating from
the same mistake - not taking sum of knowledge into account!
12-118
The Safe-end issue!
Indications during inspection with qualified
inspection system during R3-2000 outage
Interpreted as embedded flaws!
Fit for service analysis allowed further operation without any
restrictions
Later that summer more defects where indicated in
R4
Still most defects interpreted as being embedded
At least one surface breaking
Cut outs taken to provide NDE-dept. with valuable data
4 boat samples extracted
Many similarities to VC Summers case
12-119
VC Summer weld build up
From Gutti Rao et.al. Proceeding
of Fontevraud 5 p. 29-ff
Ringhals weld build up
12-120
Inspection results Unit 4
First inspection with
qualified system
4 defects of importance
indicated
3 embedded, 1 surface
breaking
All defects indicated as
axial with respect to piping
direction
6 boat samples in 4 areas
extracted
12-121
And we noted that:
All where surface breaking
The qualified inspection system failed to interpret the results as
defects
Possibly due to limitation of fixed reporting level of signal
Inability to understand actual appearance of defect
Big discrepancy of sizing above 10 mm and below
approximately 5 mm!
Have seen this previously !
Defects much tighter at surface breaking side than
expected!
Resulted in a large cooperative development program with
participants from the Swedish Utilities and the Qualification
center SQC
12-122
The R4-weld has documented repairs where-
as this is not true for R3
No grinding operation on inside that has left
traces at surface as cold work
The absolute connection between defects and
weld repairs is not a postulate but rather a
troubling circumstance!
12-123
Metallographic examinations
Carried out to determine damage mechanism but
also to verify ISI-results
Propagation by interdendritic SCC
Branching - winding structure
Un-cracked ligaments
Indications of Hot-cracking (high Si-levels)
No growth of defect in either of SS och CS!
No circumferential defects larger than 2 mm in
depth
12-124
Generic pictures of SCC/R4
12-125
Barsebck 1 case
5 axial defects found by a combination of internal and
external UT-examinations
Defects were cut out by EDM and inspected in Studsvik
Judged to be a combination of Hot cracking and IDSCC
It is our opinion that it is difficult to distinguish between the two types if the
media has touched the Hot crack!
The specific weld has been repaired (!)
Not the others!
Possible to maintain operation for 2 cycles (Unit 1 shut down
due to political agreement November 1999)
12-126
SS vs. Ni-base IGSCC
SS-IGSCC B1-313/B02 Ni-base SCC B1-313/B02
12-127
Theoretical aspects
It can be shown that the expected behavior of a similar defect
is to tighten itself at the surface!
Done that both simplified and more complex!
Defects are thus to be expected to have very small COA!
The un-cracked ligaments are expected nature of cracking
Due to the dendritic structure
Branching similar to what is found in IGSCC commonly found
also in IDSCC
Basic features are the same!
12-128
Final words on this:
Metallography indicates IGSCC/Hot Cracking as degradation
mechanism in both cases
Inspection method could have been optimized from the very
beginning (we knew that this would happen!)
We need better knowledge of basic input
Only hot leg needs to be assessed ???
J-R data indicates as expected stable crack growth as a
possibility
Some missing areas of interest in CGR-data (high K-
levels/valid tests and low K-levels!)
No perfect coupling to repairs (one of the initial screening
criteria)
12-129
Remedy
Enhanced inspection system/condensed inspection program to enable
Unit 3 and 4 to continue operation
Description can be found in Proceedings of:
ICONE10 2002 - Efsing/Lagerstrm and
Fontevraud 5 2002 - Jenssen et.al.
Long term operation called for removal of the inspection demands
(>300kEuros/year, station)
Owner want to focus on actions for 60 years of operation
Replacement/Repair
VC Summer replaced the entire Safe End
Forsmark performed girdle welding
12-130
Safe End Repair Program -
SERP
Welding of a less susceptible top layer preferable to complete exchange
Divots ground and filled with Alloy 82
Belt line machined and filled with Alloy 52M
10 WPSs - Including temper bead welding at LAS-Nozzle!
Small gap where Alloy 52 can be welded successfully at old materials!
Excellent final result but:
10 days outage elongation
Repairs in the media touched surface
The repair program demonstrated the need for an extensive qualification of procedures
12-131
12-132
Ringhals RPVH situation
R2: RPV head replaced due to cracking in mid 1990-s
The first indication cost 7 month forced outage!
R3/4: RPV head scheduled for repair within next 5-year
period due to international experience and microfissures on
internal side of CRDM nozzles
Inspection results
Surface breaking defects found in 26 penetrations between
2000 and 2002
Depth less than 2 mm (lower bound inspection capability)
Measurements on samples: < 1mm!
lengths varying from less than 4 mm to 18 mm
Defect clusters found in 16 penetrations, Crackled surface
12-133
The situation:
Despite good quality data:
Rapid crack growth - small detection targets -
complicated qualification of NDT - short inspection
interval
Easy to come to the conclusion that replacement or
exchange is the solver for most issues
As long as EAC/operationally induced defects are
an issue it is efficient both with respect to reactor
safety issues and plant economics issues, to consider
replacement
Demands on Engineering Department at power
plants
Defend Cost efficiency and Availability
Remedy Replace Vessel heads ASAP
12-134
X-750 cracking
Multiple stations struck during outages 1999
No qualified methodology for inspection - In-house
inspection tools used
Detection not the issue: Characterizing and sizing!
Well known issue of X-750 from late 70s in US
X-750, low solution annealing temp, double aged and
welded (with Alloy 182) = Cracking
Low stresses during operation - High thermal stresses if
in use
12-135
Overview
Consist of two independent
systems
6 fingers
Several spray nozzles at each
finger
Connected to the lid/shroud
head with 28 brackets and 8
stainless steel fixtures
Operation based on
diversification - two halves
each capable of fulfilling the
need
B58
B52
A6
8
A58
B68
12-136
View of a defected bracket
4 out of 5 defects in the brackets
found in the lower area near piping
side of the brackets
Also rim positioned brackets found
defect
Symmetrical distribution - B1/2 and
O2!
Additional defect in Inconel 182
weld metal, at upper and lower end
SCC suspected and confirmed by
metallography from cut outs from
the rim brackets
One defect diverge in appearance:
12-137
12-138
What do we do:
Currently evaluating Crack Growth Rate of X-750 under
realistic conditions
High ECP / Medium stress levels
Refined FE analysis to estimate actual allowable crack
extension
Current Inspection program is qualified to detect,
characterize and size!
See Efsing et.al. In Proceeding from 3rd NDE in Relation to Structural Integrity, Sevilla 2001
Aiming at 3 year inspection interval for 100% inspection
OKG and Ringhals has settled for an exchange policy (No such decision
possible in Barsebck!)
12-139
Ringhals Unit 1-ECCS
Defects found both in weld metal and in base metal
Digital behavior expected
Small component
Rapid crack extension
If initiated and growth worthy - then cracked!
Moderatortanklock
Indikation
Indikation
Stag
12-140
Component replacements
Only possible way for many core components
Replacement of Core shroud, lid, ECCS, core
support structures as grid etc.
Done in most Swedish plants
12-141
Conclusions
SCC in Ni-base alloys a definite threat to long
term reliable and economical production in
current power plants
Inabilities to handle ISI can be both costly both safety
wise and economical
More emphasis must be placed on inspection by cause
and inspection for actual defects
Despite this: many areas do not show any
sign of degradation despite 30+ years of
operation
No need to rush for complete replacements
12-142
Replacement materials need to be qualified in
a more generic and stringent manner before
inspection relief can be obtained
On-going work regarding 690 and its weldmetals need to
be pursued
Modified chemistry in both P and B-WR
Need to qualify
Temporary high R&D costs currently due to
both old and new materials!
12-143
Cracking of Alloy 600 Nozzles and Welds in PWRs:
A Review of Cracking Events and Repair Service Experience
W. H. Bamford and J.F. Hall
Westinghouse Electric
Alloy 600 and its compatible weld metals, Alloys 182 and 82, are present in various pressure
boundary locations in pressurized water reactors. Similarly, more corrosion resistant Alloy 690
and its weld metals, Alloys 52, 52M and 152, are increasingly present in PWR pressure boundary
applications because of repair, replacement or new construction. Depending upon the specific
plant designs, these applications are in one or more of the following major components: main
loop piping, reactor vessel upper and lower heads, steam generators and pressurizers. Since 1986,
service induced cracking of Alloy 600 nozzles and welds, frequently resulting in primary coolant
leakage, has become an increasingly common occurrence resulting in the need to repair or replace
nozzles and welds or to replace major component (e.g., reactor vessel heads).
This presentation updates previous reviews by the authors of Alloy 600/182/82 service-induced
cracking events. Recognizing the importance of repairs/replacements and mitigations, and the
use of alternative and more corrosion resistant materials, the paper reviews the histories of repair
and replacement activities such as replacement-in- kind, pressure boundary relocations with half-
nozzle repairs and use of mechanical repairs that leave the cracked nozzles in place. The
presentation also reviews the service history of materials used in repairs or replacements,
including Alloy 600 with enhanced heat treatments, Alloy 182, Alloy 690 and weld metals Alloy
52, 52M and 152. The service experience with these repairs has been such that they are very
reliable and trouble-free, as long as they are properly installed.
12-145
1
Cracking of Alloy 600 Nozzles and Welds in
PWRs: A Review of Cracking Events and
Repair Service Experience
Warren H. Bamford
John F. Hall
Westinghouse Electric Co. LLC.
12-146
2
Introduction
Alloy 600 Nozzles and Welds continue to crack in-service
in PWRs.
Field Service Experience
Generally, significant incubation time
Base metals have shorter incubation times than weld metals
Small bore tubes and pipes crack earlier than larger diameter
applications
Repair Experience
Repairs/replacements for Alloy 600 have excellent service history
Corrosion resistant alternative materials also have an excellent
service history in repairs/replacements and new plant applications
12-147
3
Introduction
We will review and summarize
Occurrences of cracking in Alloy 600 components and welds,
emphasizing recent events
Types of repairs/replacements and their service histories
12-148
4
Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations
First observed as a leak at Bugey 3 [EdF], 1991, 12 years
service.
This led to a surge of inspections worldwide
98% of EdF heads have at least one crack
100% of B&W designed & manufactured heads have at least one
crack
Percentages are much smaller with other manufacturers
After Bugey 3, no further leaks were found until 2000, when
Oconee 3 had serious cracking.
Most cracks have been axial, but, circumferential cracks have
been found in at least six units.
There are now at least 8 other units with leaks.
In Spring of 2002, Davis Besse reported severe boric acid
corrosion degradation of the head due to leakage through
cracks.
12-149
5
Head Penetration J-Groove Attachment
Welds
In 1992 Ringhals 2 found extensive lack of fusion in their J-
Groove weld regions [Rotterdam vessel] - repairs implemented.
To date(fall 2004), inspections are complete on about 488 J-
groove welds, with the results being related to the manufacturer:
Rotterdam Dockyard: ~85% cracked (85 inspected)
Combustion Engineering: 0% cracked ( 353 inspected)
Chicago Bridge and Iron: 0% cracked ( 19 inspected)
Babcock and Wilcox: ~70% cracked (31 inspected)
EdF reported that 11 reactor vessels heads were inspected after
replacement, about 754 welds, with no cracking found
12-150
6
Surry Unit 1 (RDM)
Nozzle 27
12-151
7
Bottom Mounted Instrumentation
Penetrations
EdF has inspected 17 units (~900 tubes), with no
indications
Ringhals has inspected one unit, no findings
Doel has inspected 2 units, no findings
MHI has inspected 4 units, no findings except one
possible scratch with no measurable depth
South Texas found two leaking BMIs in April 2003;
these have been repaired, and the cause was
attributed to weld defects from fabrication
Additional, voluntary inspections are underway at
other plants: 4 inspections since spring 04, no
findings
12-152
8
RV Outlet Nozzle Safe End Regions
Ringhals 3 found small cracks in June 2000, and left
them in service for a period of one year, before repair
Ringhals 4 found small cracks in July 2000, repairing
them by removing appropriate boat samples
VC Summer identified a through-wall leak in October
2000
All flaws were axially oriented, and limited to the weld
width, no more than two inches
All flaws were in hot leg nozzle welds
Two of the three were in heavily repaired welds
12-153
9
Small Bore Piping in CE designs
In CE designs, the main loop piping is carbon steel
Therefore there are only a few large diameter lines with Alloy 182
welds, but many small ones
Examples:
PZR Instrument Nozzles and Heater Sleeves
SG Primary Head Instrument Nozzle
Hot Leg Piping Sampling Nozzles
The first cracking was in the base metal of the first two listed,
after 1-5 years service
The earliest failures were at the hottest locations
Cracks occurred in pipes with yield strength as low as 35 ksi ,
the minimum, value permitted.
Prior to 2003, flaws were always axial, and detected by leakage,
HOWEVER
12-154
10
Alloy 600 Cracking Recent Events
Pressurizer Heat Sleeves:
Palo Verde-2: Fall 2003 during replacement of all heater sleeves
No leaks, NDE inspection of sleeves resulted in 12 sleeves with
indications, all at or above J-groove weld (not in pressure
boundary. NDE was performed, for information only.
Five sleeves had circumferential indications (first occurrence, but
not independently confirmed)
CE owners committed to 100% bare metal visual of all sleeves at
each RFO, NDE of any leaking sleeves to characterize flaw
orientation, expansion if any circumferential indications
A detailed integrity evaluation was performed and sent to NRC
Similar indications found at SONGS 3 and Palo Verde 3
12-155
11
Steam generator bowl
drain Catawba-2
Leakage detected by visual
inspection at partial
penetration weld;
2
nd
occurrence at plant,
3
rd
overall
Drain is beneath divider
plate, may see T
Hot
(617F)
Hard-rolled into hole,
partial penetration weld
Divider Plate
Fillet Weld
.09
.06
GAP
Alloy 82/182
Carbon Steel
Centerline
of Channel
Head
Divider Plate
Divider Plate
Mouse Hole
Drain
Coupling
(S.S.)
Alloy 600 Tube
S.S. Clad
(inches)
12-156
12
Tsuruga-2 pressurizer butt
welds
Visual inspection
discovered five axially
oriented flaws in Alloy 132
(similar to Alloy 182) relief
valve nozzle-to-safe end
weld
NDE identified two
additional flaws in safety
nozzle-to-safe end weld
12-157
13
J-Groove Welds: RV Upper Head Nozzles:
Several new cracking incidents, but no unusual events
Cracking is mostly in base metal
Most highly susceptible heads have been replaced
J-Groove Welds: RV Bottom Nozzles
No new cracking events since STP-1 in 2003
Several plants have performed volumetric NDE with no indications
noted
No welds have been examined, but base metal would be expected
to crack first
12-158
14
Butt welds
Approximately 150 butt welds are inspected per year in the USA, per
Section XI
No new cracking events since Tsuruga 2 in 2003; total of 5 found in the
past 5 years (< 1%)
Cracking of welds continues to be rare compared to base metal
Alloy 182/132 Repair Welds
Rare instances have occurred of cracks initiating in repaired regions of
RV primary hot leg nozzles
Examples would be VC Summer and Ringhals 4
Bottom line: PWSCC of Alloy 600 base and weld metals continues
as plants age. Repairs, mitigation, or replacement of Alloy 600
parts or major components is being used to resolve the issue.
12-159
15
Alloy 600 Repairs, Replacements, and
Mitigations
Head Penetrations with J-Groove Welds
Replace in kind
Half nozzle repair
Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly
Flaw Excavation
Butt Welds
Spool piece replacement
Flaw Excavation
Flaw Excavation and welding
12-160
16
Repair Summary: Vessel Penetrations
Eval. exposed
flaws
A182 weld w/A690
>15 258/13 Half Nozzle
Must cover high
stressed A600 and
A182
>8 18/ 5 Embedded
Flaw Repair
One installation had
leak due to
improper installation
>3 8/2 MNSA2
Two locations
developed leaks
>7 31/9 MNSA
Issues Max.
Service
Time (years
thru 12/04)
# Applications
/ #Plants
Repair Type
12-161
17
Repair/Mitigation Summary: Butt Welds
Issues Max.
Service
Time (years
thru 12/04)
Number
of
Applica-
tions
Repair Type
Cracks reinitiate
with A182 welds
- Many Flaw Excav.
+welding
Cracks reinitiate - Many Flaw
Excavation
None >18 >1300 MSIP
None >20 >1000 Weld Overlay
A52 thick section
welding is difficult
- Many Spool Piece
12-162
18
MNSA
12-163
19
Embedded Flaw Repairs:
RV Head Penetration and J-Groove Weld
View
A-A
Tube
A600
Weld
82/182
B
u
t
t
e
r
i
n
g
1
8
2
Weld
182
B
u
t
t
e
r
i
n
g
1
8
2
3
0
8
C
la
d
A
A
Tube
A600
Weld
82/182
B
u
t
t
e
r
i
n
g
1
8
2
3
0
8
C
la
d
Tube
A600
Weld
82/182
3
0
8
C
la
d
5
2
R
e
p
a
ir
W
e
ld
12-164
20
12-165
21
Summary and Discussion
Alloy 600 and Alloy 182/82 will crack
Base metal cracks before weld metal
Cracking leads to leaks, not breaks, due to high ductility
Most Alloy 600 materials have been in service long enough that
cracking is increasingly likely, so be prepared for future occurrences
Many repair and mitigation options are available
Repairs and mitigation techniques have been successful, when
properly applied
For best results and minimum uncertainties, planning is essential.
12-166
BMI Cleaning and Inspection at PVNGS
E. Fernandez
Arizona Public Service Company
5801 S. Wintersburg Rd.
Abstract
In many cases pre-existing conditions such as coating remnants, stains and
other obstructions may prevent performing bare-metal visual inspections of some
RPV lower head penetrations. This paper describes a process for cleaning and
inspecting bottom mounted instrument (BMI) nozzles on PWR reactor vessels to
allow bare metal inspections to be performed. The process utilizes a robot that
delivers CO
2
media to clean a localized area on each penetration.
The advantages of using CO
2
as opposed to other types of media are:
1. CO2 blasting cleans the annular area by expansion.
2. CO2 blasting produces no added radioactive waste or hazardous residues
that have to be disposed of.
3. No surface metal removal as in abrasive cleaning.
4. No surface rusting as in water jet cleaning.
References
1. James A. Snide, CO2 Pellet CleaningA Preliminary Evaluation,
Materials & Process Associates, Inc., October 12, 1992.
2. Robert W. Foster, Carbon Dioxide (Dry-Ice) Blasting, Cold Jet Inc.
3. The Fundamentals of Dry Ice Blast Cleaning, Cold Jet Inc
12-167
2005 PWSCC of Alloy 600 International Conference and
Exhibition
Ed Fernandez
March 7-10, 2005
12-168
Background
Prior to Fall 2003 refueling outage ICI penetrations
were not included in BAW program
Section XI examination satisfied by remote visual
examination from the floor of the ICI chase
In Spring 2003, ISI performed an access
inspection of Unit 3 BMIs during 3R10
Results showed no obvious evidence of leakage,
however;
Spraylat coating was detected on several nozzles
12-169
3R10 Lessons learned
BMI access will be difficult and dose intensive
One insulation opening 12-inch x 12-inch
60 feet off the floor of ICI chase
Scaffolding, special ladders required
1 MR fields expected at insulation access hatch
Initial examinations would have to be performed
remotely with robot traversing across the insulation
floor.
Cleaning would be required as well as baseline the
clean condition
12-170
Examination Preparations
APS teamed with Jamko Technical Solutions to
build first of a kind robot tooling to
Inspect remotely all ICI nozzles
Clean the annulus area
Re-inspect and document all nozzle locations
Design started in June 2003 and completed mock-
up testing in September/October 2003
PVNGS built a full size BMI mock-up and simulated
insulation floor to practice driving and mapping
paths to each BMI
12-171
Scope of Examinations
Initial as-found inspection of the bare metal surface
of lower RPV head, and a 360 degree visual exam
of all (61) penetrations.
Cleaning the area of interest and bare metal visual
inspections for baseline (post clean).
Exam performed by APS Level III VT-2 personnel
experienced in recognizing primary nozzle leaks.
12-172
As-found Inspection
As found inspections were
performed using robotic
equipment equipped with
zoom capabilities
Lighting was sufficient for
visual exam and additional
lighting provided by robot
Able to obtain clear close-up
views of nozzle annulus
areas.
12-173
As-found Inspection
There was spray-lat remnants observed in every BMI nozzle
In most cases the interface between nozzle and vessel could
be distinguished.
There were no evidence of boric acid deposits on the nozzle -
bottom head interface during the initial as-found inspection
12-174
CLEANING/POST INSPECTION
Robot to perform inspection,
cleaning and re-inspection
in one evolution
Traverses across insulation
flooring, secures onto a
nozzles and elevates to
position spray nozzle
directly at the anulus
The robot was designed to
reach heights ranging from
11 to 3.
12-175
Clean using dry ice media to remove spray-lat
An area consisting of at least down the nozzle and
radially along the vessel was cleaned on 39 of 61 nozzles
12-176
12-177
Challenges
Unforseen factors prevented us from completeing all
61 nozzles.
Insulation surface conditions causing track travel issues
Deflection of flooring prevented proper positioning of higher
elevation nozzles
Clearance at the center locations did not match design
drawings and cleaning robot was not able to reach some
center locations
12-178
Future Plans
Implement robot modifications to address the
access issues
Continue to perform examination and cleaning
operations for next Units refueling outages, 1R11
and 3R11
Continuation of cleaning in Unit 2R12
12-179
13
SESSION 6: REGULATORY ISSUES
The subject of regulatory issues was addressed by six participants in Session 6. Summaries of
the presentations are given below followed by the questions asked, responses provided, and
comments made by the participants concerning each presentation. Click on the links to access
directly copies of the materials presented together with extended abstracts.
EPRI MRP Alloy 600 Issue Task Group Interaction with the NRC, presented
by C. Harrington, TXU Energy (Paper 6.1)
This presentation was given by C. Harrington of TXU Energy. The main points made during the
x The presentation provided an overview of the process being applied in the U.S. by the
Materials Reliability Program (MRP) to address aging degradation of Alloy 600/82/182
materials in PWR plants. The presentation discussed the interactions between the MRP and
the U.S. NRC in this area, and the presentation emphasized the shift to a more proactive
approach (i.e., paradigm) to managing materials degradation issues in the U.S. industry.
Paper 6.2 below presents the U.S. approach to management of materials degradation from the
larger perspective of all materials degradation issues.
x The MRP is a utility-directed oversight structure with a mission to proactively address and
resolve, on a consistent industry-wide basis, existing and emerging performance, safety,
reliability, operational, and regulatory PWR material-related issues. The MRP is directed by
the PWR utilities and managed by EPRI. The NEI 03-08 structure is applied as a mechanism
for determining whether requirements should be made mandatory (see Paper 6.2).
x Every MRP utility can have a member on the PWR Materials Management Program
(PMMP) executive committee, which oversees both MRP and Steam Generator Management
Program (SGMP) activities. The Technical Support Subcommittee (TSS) within the MRP is
intended to take over an issue from an individual Issue Task Group (ITG) once the issue has
been "solved," i.e., placed into a stable maintenance mode. Changes in structure of the MRP
were under consideration at the time of the conference.
x The Alloy 600 ITG has within its scope all Alloy 600 base material (with the exception of
steam generator tubing) and Alloy 82/182 weld metal locations in PWR primary systems.
One challenge within the Alloy 600 ITG has been to maintain the widespread active
participation of utility representatives given the time required for detailed conference calls
and reviews of lengthy reports. There are many utility participants in the Alloy 600 ITG
beyond those listed on page 6.1-11 of the presentation materials.
13-1
x The unexpected cracking detected at North Anna Unit 2 in fall 2002 led to a significant
reassessment within the Alloy 600 ITG to ensure that the approaches taken in the Alloy 600
area are sufficiently proactive to anticipate potential crack locations or geometries that have
not yet been observed in the field.
x The new materials management paradigm may be viewed as follows:
Establish current safety basis considering all credible failure modes ("how safe today")
Ensure continued safety basis compliance with robust inspection and evaluation regimes
("how stay safe tomorrow")
Enable economical long-term management strategies through degradation prevention
x The U.S. NRC and industry clearly have different roles but also certain common goals, and
positive steps are being taken to achieve those goals through communication, collaboration,
and cooperation. Interactions between the MRP and the U.S. NRC on the topic of boric acid
corrosion testing includes the participation of Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), which
recently performed such testing under sponsorship of U.S. NRC. Regarding the removed
CRDM penetrations from the original North Anna 2 head, Westinghouse is examining one
penetration for the MRP and the U.S. NRC has taken possession of two other penetrations.
One key issue under discussion with the NRC is the appropriate "regulatory footprint" given
industry-mandated requirements. This issue is also concerned with industry activities beyond
the MRP. Another key challenge concerns developing an appropriate framework for dealing
with the very small amount of primary coolant leakage that typically results if a through-wall
crack were to occur.
x Question (D. Peltola): Does slide 15, depicting declining credibility with various industry
events, imply that the identified plants maybe did not respond appropriately and were the
reasons for the loss in credibility?
Response (C. Harrington): My paradigm in preparing the slide was to reflect a sense of the
U.S. PWR industry response to the identified events, and it was in no way intended to imply
anything about those individual utilities. In most cases, the individual plants/utilities deserve
credit for the initial condition discovery as well as their response. However, through maybe
2001 or so, the response by the U.S. PWR industry was often a bit too defensive and maybe
less rigorous and open-minded than it might have been. This was the source of declining
credibility to which I was referring in the slide. My apologies to anyone that felt that the
intent was to challenge individual plant actions.
13-2
Industry Management of Materials Degradation, presented by J. Riley, NEI
(Paper 6.2)
This presentation was given by J. Riley of NEI. The main points made during the presentation
were as follows:
x This presentation provided a comprehensive overview of the approach to the management of
materials degradation issues by the U.S. nuclear power industry. The presentation gave the
full perspective of the approach to materials degradation, whereas Paper 6.1 emphasized the
management of Alloy 600/82/182 issues. The Materials Reliability Program (MRP) is a
subset of the Materials Initiative. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) plays a key role in the
management of the Materials Initiative within the U.S. industry.
x In August 2002, the industry initiated a self-assessment process to determine the activities
needed to ensure that the industry "gets ahead" of materials degradation issues. The charter
of the executive task force and working group formed at that time was to assess materials
issue programs to identify gaps, areas of overlap, and strengths and weaknesses. The scope
covered a broad range of PWR and BWR materials. One key part of the self-assessment
process addressed the differences in enforcement mechanisms within the EPRI Issue
Programs, including the MRP. With some exceptions, no ability existed to enforce
implementation of industry guidance. The self-assessment process resulted in a series of
recommendations including that the formal NEI Initiative Process be used and that a
Materials Initiative be established.
x The industry (through NSIAC, the NEI committee of all utility CNOs) committed
unanimously to establish an internal industry commitment (not a regulatory commitment)
that each plant would follow the requirements of the Materials Initiative, effective January 2,
2004. The objective of the Materials Initiative is to assure safe, reliable, and efficient
operation of U.S. nuclear power plants in the management of materials issues. The policy
statement of the Materials Initiative, which is captured in the NEI 03-08 document, stresses
that "the safety and operational risk significance of each issue is fully established prior to
final disposition," rather than working toward a pre-chosen resolution.
x The NEI 03-08 guideline documents the Materials Initiative, defines roles, responsibilities,
and expectations, provides for an integrated approach, and established the Materials
Executive Oversight Group (MEOG) and the Materials Technical Advisory Group (MTAG).
These two groups periodically meet with the U.S. NRC to ensure regular communication at
this level on materials issues, and no sunset clause applies to the MEOG and MTAG at this
time.
x The budget for the Materials Initiative fund is $12 million for the two-year period 2004
2005. At the time of the conference, approximately $9 million of this fund was already
distributed. Funding of specific projects is based on the relevance of the proposed work to
the Strategic Plan. Slides 18 through 20 list specific funded projects. See Paper 4B.1 and
Paper 4B.4 for more details on the funded projects in the area of NDE.
13-3
x The Strategic Plan defines the key issues and objectives for the industrys management of
materials issues. Revision 0 of this document was approved in March 2004, and Revision 1
was under development at the time of the conference. Other key tools being developed by
the industry under the Materials Initiative include the Degradation Matrix (DM), Issues
Management Table (IMT), Implementation Protocol, and Materials Program Tool Kit. In
addition, Materials Performance Metrics have been established to facilitate assessments of
the performance of the industry on materials issues.
x The Degradation Matrix, which was developed by Robin Dyle of Southern Nuclear with
expert input, identifies materials used for major passive components/systems within the
Materials Initiative scope. Within the Degradation Matrix, a color code is used to designate
the status of work to address a particular degradation mechanism for a particular material in a
particular component. Green denotes that the required work is now in place, yellow denotes
that the required work is in progress, and red denotes that none of the required work is in
progress. The first version of the Degradation Matrix, which is a living document, is
complete and publicly available. The Issues Management Table is a complementary
document, also maintained as a living document, and reflects a different breakdown in the
plant equipment.
x The Implementation Protocol, which was approved in April 2004, defines the three
implementation levels of "mandatory," "needed," and "good practice." Executive approval is
required for documents with "mandatory" or "needed" elements. Likewise, executive
approval is required from within a particular utility, in addition to other requirements, for
deviations from "mandatory" or "needed" elements. Such deviations must document what
substitute measure is being relied upon and why that is equivalent. The relevant industry
Issue Programs must be notified of such deviations so that the preparers of the relevant
industry guideline can consider appropriate changes for future revisions and also to facilitate
overall management of materials degradation issues by the MEOG and other groups.
x The Materials Program Tool Kit is intended to be a set of documents that form the basis of
information needed to set up or maintain a materials management program. This item was
scheduled to be released a couple months after the conference. The purpose of the road map
in the Materials Program Tool Kit is to ensure that all plants are aware of all relevant
documents. The tool kit also incorporates NEI 03-08, the RCS MDMP Guidelines,
Implementation Protocol, Strategic Plan, Degradation Matrix, and Issues Management Table.
x Question (G. Turluer): This presentation seems in line with international preoccupations
related to aging management. Could you elaborate about intentions to compare with
international views? Also, I note that a first international symposium on Aging Management
will be organized by the French regulators in France (Dijon, June 22-24, 2005, asn.gouv.fr).
Response (J. Riley): The Materials Initiative is targeted at U.S. nuclear power plants and
materials issue programs, but it will only succeed if we communicate with international
organizations and share experience. The materials issue programs all strive to include
international members in their organizations. All the IPs support international conferences.
13-4
Finally, one of the MTAGs objectives is to strengthen communication with international
organizations to share new technical information and operational experience.
x Comment (R. Dyle): International experience related to materials degradation has been
sought and incorporated where available. As the Degradation Matrix was developed, we
used experts with international experience to capture as much relevant information as
possible. The issue programs have international members that provide insights. Also, the
MTAG members served as the Action Plan Working Group on Materials Degradation as part
of the EPRI process which has international members.
Alloy 82/182 Piping Butt Welds: Developing Inspection Guidance,
presented by C. King, EPRI (Paper 6.3)
This presentation was given by C. King of EPRI and authored by C. King of EPRI and D. Covill
of Progress Energy. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x The presentation covered the process used by the MRP to develop inspection guidance for
Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds in U.S. PWR plants. Subsequent to the conference, this
inspection guidance was finalized and issued to U.S. utilities as report MRP-139 [25]. The
presentation also discussed the effect of PWSCC on piping butt welds classified as leak-
before-break (LBB) locations. Considered in development of the inspection guidance was
BWR experience, Alloy 82/182 piping butt weld plant experience, and NDE capabilities for
dissimilar metal welds. Dana Covill is now co-chairman of the Alloy 600 Issue Task Group
of the MRP.
x As part of the process to develop inspection guidance, the MRP identified all the various
types of Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds in U.S. PWRs. Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds are
used in most but not all cases in the U.S. in which a low alloy steel nozzle mounted on a
vessel or pipe is welded to a stainless steel safe end or pipe. These locations in a particular
plant depend mainly on whether stainless steel RCS pipes or low alloy steel RCS pipes (ID
clad with stainless steel) are used.
x There have been leaks at VC Summer, Tsuruga 2, Palisades (in the heat affected zone, not in
the weld), and a navy test reactor (also in the heat affected zone, not in the weld). Ringhals 3
and 4, VC Summer, Tsuruga 2, and TMI-1 have also had cracks or indications that did not
leak. In addition, Tihange 2, and Calvert Cliffs 2 have had possible indications that were not
confirmed as stress corrosion cracks. At Calvert Cliffs 2, axial and circumferential
indications were reported in a hot leg drain nozzle weld, and axial indications were reported
in a cold leg drain nozzle weld. [Editor: Subsequent to the conference, DC Cook 1 reported
an axial crack indication (88% through-wall) in an Alloy 82/182 pressurizer safety nozzle
(steam-space) piping butt weld.] Most of cracks found have been axial and limited to the
length of the weld. One short shallow circumferential crack was found at VC Summer.
None of the cracks discussed here posed significant safety risk at the time of discovery. Two
25
Material Reliability Program: Primary System Piping Butt Weld Inspection and Evaluation Guideline
(MRP-139), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2005. 1010087.
13-5
of the cracks (VC Summer and Tsuruga 2) were detected by visual inspections. The others
were detected by NDE, and only at TMI-1 through an ASME Appendix VIII inspection.
x Some technical gaps exist in non-destructive examinations of Alloy 82/182 welds, including
flaw detection limitations due to component configuration such as tapers, rough surfaces,
adjacent welds, and limited access. In some situations, the current flaw sizing capabilities do
not meet code requirements. A lack of knowledge of configurations can interfere with
inspections because the qualification of NDE techniques is configuration-specific. The
unavailability of qualified NDE techniques affects code compliance, implementation of MRP
ISI guidelines, and accurate interpretation of ISI results. For some locations, it may be
necessary to develop inspection methods because some locations cannot be inspected with
standard techniques.
x The inspection guidance for Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds is based on a series of safety
analysis documents. These documents are identified on slide 22 of the presentation. Note
that the document on crack growth rates in Alloy 82/182 weld metal (MRP-115 [26]) has
been completed. Because much of the resources of the MRP were devoted to reactor vessel
closure head issues, the process to complete the safety assessments and inspection guidance
for Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds required more than three years.
x The MRP-139 inspection guidance document establishes long-term inspection frequencies to
effectively manage PWSCC using an approach similar to U.S. NRC Generic Letter 88-01
[27]. The guideline recommends inspection (by qualified method) frequencies, with
consideration for material (resistant or non-resistant), mitigation efforts, temperature (cold
leg vs. hot leg), and pipe size (t4" OD and <4" OD). Alloy 82/182 welds in risk-informed
ISI programs will be re-evaluated.
x In order to develop an inspection schedule, plants will need to identify welds as resistant or
non-resistant material. The inspection schedule for non-resistant welds should consider
whether or not mechanical mitigation (full structural overlay, stress improvement) has been
performed, the as-welded condition, the presence of cracks, and the temperature the weld is
exposed to (hot leg, cold leg, or pressurizer temperature). The guidance for inspection
schedules also discusses mitigation methods including modification of materials, stress
improvement, and modification of environment (chemical mitigation).
x The fact that Alloy 82/182 welds may not meet the original leak-before-break guidance of
NUREG-1061 Vol. 3 and draft SRP 3.6.3 had been under consideration by the industry for
over a year. The key concerns are that PWSCC is an active cracking degradation
mechanism, although observed pipe cracks have been small and primarily axial, and that it
may be possible that this could result in circumferential cracks that would make breaks more
likely to occur than predicted by cracks postulated in LBB analysis. Also, the PWSCC
leakage path is more tortuous than fatigue cracks used in previous LBB evaluations, so it
26
(PWSCC) of Alloy 82, 182, and 132 Welds (MRP-115NP), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1006696-NP. NRC
ADAMS Accession No. ML051450555.
27
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping,"
NRC Generic Letter 88-01, January 25, 1988.
13-6
seems that the calculated leakage could be less than that from fatigue cracks. The MRP
formally began its evaluations of the potential effect of PWSCC on LBB guidance in August
2004, and a report on this subject was being prepared by the MRP. Slide 31 shows the size
of the subset of Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds covered by LBB assumptions.
x The recent evaluations by the MRP show that the technical basis for LBB remains strong:
PWSCC observed in Alloy 82/182 butt welds in several plants has been primarily axial in
nature,
long part-through wall circumferential flaws are not likely to develop,
there is adequate time between leakage detection and growth to critical flaw size to allow
safe shut down,
adequate margin remains considering alternative leak rate calculation methodologies
(flaw morphology),
there is increased plant sensitivity to unidentified leakage, and
response to leak rates less than 1 gpm (Tech. Spec. Limits) has improved over recent
years.
Comparison of Leak Rates from Alloy 82/182 Butt Weld Cracks for Leak-
Before-Break Assessment, presented by A. Nana, Framatome ANP (Paper
6.4)
This presentation was given by A. Nana of Framatome ANP and authored by A. Nana and K.
Yoon of Framatome ANP. The main points made during the presentation were as follows:
x Past leak-before-break (LBB) submittals have not considered PWSCC cracks in Alloy
82/182 piping butt welds or Alloy 600 base metals, and the leak rate calculations have only
considered the conventional fatigue crack morphology. This presentation addressed
differences in the leakage prediction when the through-wall flaw is evaluated as a fatigue
crack versus as a PWSCC crack for various PWR LBB piping systems. The presentation
also discussed the impact of this finding on the overall LBB assessment methodology.
x The LBB evaluation procedures are provided in Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.6.3 with
details for LBB evaluation given in U.S. NRC NUREG 1061, Volume 3. According to the
original NRC guidelines, LBB cannot be applied if active degradation mechanisms such as
PWSCC are present in the piping system. SRP 3.6.3 requires a margin of 10 on the leak
detection capability (detection of unidentified leakage) of the plant. Since the leak detection
systems of the plants have been demonstrated to meet U.S. NRC Reg. Guide 1.45, a leak
detection capability of 1 gpm within an hour was used in the LBB applications by individual
utilities. The resulting crack size with a factor of 10 on leakage (10 gpm) is typically referred
to as the leakage crack size.
x The leakage crack sizes associated with PWSCC cracks tend to be significantly greater than
fatigue cracks as a result of the tight and tortuous flow path. This presentation summarized
the benchmarking of an AREVA in-house leak rate code "KRAKFLO" to the Battelle Phase
13-7
II data and more recently to the limited SCC field data. It also summarized the sensitivity
study, involving five different PWR piping systems, to understand the differences in leakage
crack size predictions, for a 10 gpm leak rate, when considering a conventional fatigue crack
versus PWSCC-type crack morphology.
x KRAKFLO has already been benchmarked to an extensive number of IGSCC crack
experiments performed in the Battelle Phase II program [28]. This program included 82
IGSCC crack experiments with cracks ranging in size from 0.029" (0.74 mm) to 1.098"
(27.89 mm) and measured leakage rates ranging from 0.0003 gpm (1.34u10
-5
kg/s) to
3.84 gpm (0.199 kg/s). As a result of the benchmarking to the Phase II data, the
recommended values for the surface roughness and the number of 45-degreee turns per inch
of wall thickness were established (surface roughness of 200 m and tortuosity of 24 45-
degree turns/inch). These values are very similar to those recommended by the EPRI PICEP
leak rate code [29]. For leak rates greater than about 0.05 gpm (0.003 kg/s), slide 10 shows
very good agreement between the IGSCC leak rates from the Battelle Phase II program and
the KRAKFLO predictions. Leak rates less than 0.05 gpm are not directly relevant to LBB
assessments based on a leak rate of 1.0 or 10 gpm. (For the lowest set of leak rates in slide
10, plugging was occurring resulting in overprediction of the leak rate.)
x The predictions of KRAKFLO were shown to be consistent with the limited plant data for
leak rates through cracks in Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds or Alloy 600 safe ends. Slides 13
and 14 show the comparison of the predictions with the BWR experience at Duane Arnold
and the PWR experience for a leaking pressurizer PORV safe end at Palisades.
x Based on the best fit to a sensitivity study of five example LBB piping systems shown in
slide 16, KRAKFLO predicts a 37% increase in the crack length resulting in a leak rate of
10 gpm when considering an SCC morphology over the conventional fatigue morphology.
Consistent with LBB evaluation guidelines, the results of this study are based on
deterministic analysis. A safety factor of 10 on the detectable leak rate is maintained to
account for the uncertainties in geometry, materials, and loading.
x The authors also compared their results to the predictions of the SQUIRT code sponsored by
the U.S. NRC. The crack morphology parameters for the SQUIRT code appear to be based
on limited metallographic examinations. The authors suggested that the disparity in the
predictions of the KRAKFLO and SQUIRT codes be evaluated further.
x Question (J. Gorman): How do you address possible cracks that form an array of small
cracks separated by ligaments that start linking up and increasing the leak rate?
Response (A. Nana): From a leak-before-break (LBB) perspective, for pipe butt welds this
type of crack morphology was benchmarked using the KRAKFLO code for the Palisades
event. Indeed, if the cracks in fact do link up, this is highly desirable from a LBB standpoint
28
Calculation of Leak Rates Through Cracks in Pipes and Tubes, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 1983. NP-3395.
29
PICEP: Pipe Crack Evaluation Program (Revision 1), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 1987. NP-3596-SR.
13-8
since cracks are postulated typically as "continuous" cracks with a higher leakage rate
prediction.
x Comment (C. King): We are trying to find some of these Batelle Phase II samples to perform
further destructive examinations to further understand the influences of crack morphology on
leak rates.
Potential Cracking in Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles, presented
by C. Morgan, Westinghouse (Paper 6.5)
This presentation was given by C. Morgan of Westinghouse. The main points made during the
x This presentation summarized the approach and interim results of safety evaluations being
performed by the U.S. industry for reactor vessel bottom mounted nozzles (BMNs). The
work is being performed as a cooperative effort of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG),
B&W Owners Group (B&WOG), and EPRI/MRP. The coordinated response of the U.S.
PWR industry is being performed under NEI Initiative 03-08.
x The BMN program is addressing issues associated with potential cracking in the BMNs, and
the impacts of leakage or failure of one or more BMNs. The WOG BMN program applies to
domestic Westinghouse NSSS designs, and Combustion Engineering designs with bottom
mounted nozzles. The B&WOG has a similar program to address the B&W NSSS design.
Both programs are being coordinated, several of the tasks are being completed jointly, and
task summary reports are being provided to EPRI/MRP. EPRI/MRP will produce an overall
industry report addressing the overall risk associated with cracking of BMNs and will
provide inspection and repair guidance.
x Volumetric examinations have been performed of BMNs in more than 25 units to date
worldwide, with only two penetrations at South Texas Project Unit 1 showing cracks or
leaks.
x In Westinghouse plants, BMNs are called bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzles
and have a typical diameter of 1.5 inches. There is a variety of detailed BMI nozzle designs
with some designs having butt welds to safe ends or weld pads on the outer head surface.
The BMN design in B&W-design plants is a modified design having a thicker nozzle (2.0
inch diameter) welded inside the head to the original nozzle (1.03 inch diameter). Three of
the 14 operating CE-design units in the U.S. have BMNs. The nozzle diameter for these
three units is 3.0 inches.
x The following types of BMN evaluations were discussed in the presentation:
Three-dimensional welding residual stress finite-element analyses for five plant
geometries (performed by Dominion Engineering, Inc.)
Critical flaw size calculations
Crack growth calculations for axial and circumferential flaws
13-9
Collateral damage assessment of loads on nearby BMNs due to a failure of a single BMN
considering asymmetric cavity pressure events, pipe whip, direct jet impingement, and
reactor vessel insulation frame movement (performed by B&WOG)
Failure mode and effect analysis (team included Westinghouse, AREVA, and utility
representatives)
LOCA analyses as a function of assumed break size
Probabilistic risk evaluations to determine the effect on the core damage frequency
x The FMEA provided input regarding the failure mechanisms and locations where an
inspection program should focus.
x Question (R. Corbit): Can you quantify "periodic visual inspection"?
Response (C. Morgan): Presently, the safety analysis would support no visual inspection
being required in the case that a volumetric inspection were performed. However, this is a
safety analysis and should not be considered the sole basis for an inspection guideline.
Inspection guidelines for the bottom mounted nozzles are still under development.
Summary of NRC Funded Efforts Involving Alloy 600 Base Material and
Weldments for Piping and CRDM Applications, presented by G. Wilkowski,
Engineering Mechanics Corporation of Columbus (Paper 6.6)
This presentation was given by G. Wilkowski of Engineering Mechanics Corporation of
Columbus (Emc
2
) and authored by G. Wilkowski, D. Rudland, W. Cheng, Y. Chen, and Y.
Wang of Emc
2
and P. Scott and F. Brust of Battelle-Columbus. The main points made during the
x The presentation covered several work areas funded by the U.S. NRC related to Alloy 600
wrought material and Alloy 82/182 weldments in PWRs:
Expert panel elicitation for redefinition of large-break loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs)
Improved probabilistic pipe fracture mechanics code
Technical basis for new leak-before-break (LBB) regulatory guide
Improved leak-rate code (SQUIRT)
Fracture toughness J-R curves for Alloy 82/182
Examination of LBB for pipe susceptible to PWSCC
Prevalence of weld repairs from initial construction
Residual stress finite element analyses (FEA) for Alloy 82/182 dissimilar metal welds
Completed Phase I and ongoing Phase II of program to evaluate PWSCC of CRDM
nozzles
13-10
x An elicitation of 12 non-NRC expert panel members was used to estimate LOCA
probabilities. These predictions, which included PWSCC as a factor, were applied by the
NRC staff to determine mean predictions of LOCA frequencies as a function of pipe
diameter. Only normal operating conditions were considered as seismic considerations are
being accounted for in a separate study.
x In parallel to the expert elicitation effort but as a longer-term activity, a probabilistic
computer code is being developed for LOCA predictions. This new code will incorporate the
results of recent and future deterministic analyses for residual stress fields, leak rate, and
fracture. A key goal of the new code is to predict crack growth and multiple initiation sites
for SCC mechanisms more realistically than any existing piping probabilistic fracture
mechanics code. Other work is investigating the effect of weld repairs and the potential
concern of long circumferential surface cracks for Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds.
x The presentation included some of the detailed stress FEA work completed by Emc
2
for the
CRDM nozzle geometry. Results were presented illustrating the effects of weld groove
geometry, weld sequencing, and how stresses may change after welding on tubes that were
given a surface treatment to produce compressive surface stresses. The effect of the residual
stress field on the growth of axial CRDM nozzle cracks was investigated using a matrix of 37
fracture mechanics FEA cases in which the distribution of stress intensity factors along the
crack front was calculated. These results are being used to provide comments on ASME
Code Case N-694-1 [30].
x The presentation concluded with a note that an international group program called MERIT is
being formed. This new group is similar to the past International Piping Integrity Research
Group (IPIRG) program, but will support development of probabilistic pipe LOCA codes and
associated deterministic improvements. The main contractor supporting the group is
Battelle-Columbus, with Emc
2
being a subcontractor. This program should start December
2005, and US industry participation is desired.
x Question (A. Demma): In the FEA modeling simulating surface treatments, what was the
method used for simulating these processes (for example, did you use an eigenstrain
analysis), and were the inputs based on experimental results?
Response (G. Wilkowski): The surface residual stresses were simulated by having a thin
layer of elements along the entire tube surface where grinding occurs, then allowing those
element to change in temperature and then return to the normal temperature until the desired
residual stresses were obtained. Hence, displacement-controlled surface residual stresses
(strain) are developed for the desired magnitude and depth.
x Comment (W. Bamford): In response to the suggestion that the NRC have a public meeting
to discuss your work, it is important to emphasize that such discussions are held regularly at
30
Cases of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; Code Case N-694-1, "Evaluation Procedure and Acceptance
Criteria for PWR Reactor Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles," Section XI, Division 1, approved February 20,
2004.
13-11
ASME Code meetings. An NRC public meeting is probably not needed for this subject, as
the ASME Code meetings are public.
x Question (B. Grambau): What is the publication schedule for the detailed technical results of
the two programs discussed in this presentation?
Response (G. Wilkowski): The efforts presented in this paper come primarily from two
different projects: (1) "Alloy 600 Cracking" for CRDM applications, and (2) "Technical
Development of Loss of Coolant Accident Frequency Distributions" for piping applications.
The CRDM work has been published in several ASME PVP publications and letter reports
distributed to Section XI WGFE members (see below list). There is no NUREG report from
this work at this time, although some are planned. The same is true for the LOCA work for
piping (see below list); however, there has been a NUREG report on the LOCA elicitation
efforts.
Response to Question on Paper 6.6: References Related to CRDM Nozzles
G. Wilkowski, Z. Feng, D. Rudland, Y.-Y. Wang, R,. Wolterman, and W. Norris,
"Summary of On-Going NRC Efforts to Define Circumferential-Crack-Driving-Force
Solutions for CRDM Nozzles," presented at USNRCs Nuclear Safety Research
Conference, October 2002.
D. Rudland, Y.-Y. Wang, Z. Feng, W. Norris, and G. Wilkowski, "Circumferential-
Crack-Driving-Force Solutions for CRDM Nozzles," 17th SMiRT conference, Prague,
Czech, August 2003.
D. Rudland, G. Wilkowski Y.-Y. Wang, and W. Norris, "Analysis of Weld Residual
Stresses and Circumferential Through-Wall Crack K-solutions for CRDM Nozzles," to be
in future NUREG/CP report on NRCs Vessel Head Penetration Inspection, Cracking,
and Repair conference, September 29-October 2, 2003.
D. Rudland, G. Wilkowski Y.-Y. Wang, and W. Norris, "Analysis of Circumferential
Through-Wall Crack K-solutions for CRDM Nozzles," International Journal of Pressure
Vessels and Piping, 81 (2004) pp. 961-971.
Y. Chen, D. Rudland, and G. Wilkowski, "Impact of Welding Sequence on the CRDM
Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld Stress Analysis," 2004 ASME/JSME Pressure Vessels and Piping
Conference, August, 2004.
Rudland, D., and Wilkowski, G., "Development of Axial Surface Crack K-Solutions for
Control Rod Drive Mechanism," Final report to U.S. NRC, January 16, 2004. (Copies
given to Section XI WGFE members.)
D. Rudland and G. Wilkowski, "Predicting Axial Crack Growth in Control Rod Drive
Mechanisms Tubes," Emc
2
report to NRC-RES, April 30, 2004. (Copies given to Section
XI WGFE members.)
13-12
Response to Question on Paper 6.6: References Related to CRDM Nozzles (continued)
W. Cheng, D. Rudland, G. Wilkowski, and W. Norris, "Effects Of Weld Geometry On
Residual Stress and Crack Driving Force For Centerhole Control Rod Drive Mechanism
Nozzles Part I Weld Residual Stress," Proceedings of ASME-PVP 2005 ASME/JSME
Pressure Vessels And Piping Conference, Denver Colorado, July 17-21, 2005.
David L. Rudland, Wentao Cheng, Gery Wilkowski, and Wallace Norris, "Effects Of
Weld Geometry On Residual Stress and Crack Driving Force For Centerhole Control Rod
Drive Mechanism Nozzles Part II Circumferential Cracked K-solutions," in
Proceedings of ASME-PVP 2005 ASME/JSME Pressure Vessels and Piping Division
Conference, July 17-21, 2005, Denver Colorado, USA.
Gery Wilkowski, Rick Wolterman, and Dave Rudland, "Impact Of PWSCC And Current
Leak Detection On Leak-Before-Break Acceptance," Paper PVP2005-71200,
Proceedings of ASME-PVP 2005 ASME/JSME Pressure Vessels And Piping Conference,
Denver Colorado, July 17-21, 2005.
Response to Question on Paper 6.6: References Related to LOCA/Piping
Wilkowski, G., Scott, P., Rahman, S., Rudland, D., Wolterman, R., Krishnaswamy, P.,
and Fairbanks, C., "Considerations for Probabilistic Analyses to Assess Potential
Changes to Large-Break LOCA Definition for ECCS Requirements," Proceedings of
ICONE10, 10th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, April 2002.
G. Wilkowski, R. Tregoning, P. Scott, and D. Rudland, "Status of Efforts to Evaluate
LOCA Frequency Estimates Using Combined PRA and PFM Approaches," in
proceedings of 28th MPA-Seminar, Stuttgart Germany, October 2002.
P. M. Scott, R. J. Olson, and G. M. Wilkowski, "Development of Technical Basis for
Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures," NUREG/CR-6765, May 2002.
D. L. Rudland, G. Wilkowski, and P. Scott, "Effects of Crack Morphology Parameters on
Leak-rate Calculations in LBB Evaluations," in International Journal of Pressure Vessels
and Piping, Vol. 79, pp 99-102, 2002.
P. Scott, R. Olson, G. Wilkowski, and T. Santos, "Development of the Technical Basis
for a New Regulatory Guide," 17th SMiRT conference, Prague, Czech, August 2003.
D. Rudland, R. Wolterman, and G. Wilkowski, "Impact of PWSCC and Current Leak
Detection on Leak-Before-Break," to be in future NUREG/CP report on NRCs Vessel
Head Penetration Inspection, Cracking, and Repair conference, September 29-October 2,
2003.
Williams, C., Brust, F., Scott, P., Rudland, D., Wilkowski, G., Tregoning, R., and Santos,
C., "The Impact of Fracture Toughness and Weld Residual Stress on Inconel 82/182
Bimetal Welds on Leak-Before-Break," ASME PVP, Vol. 479, July 2004.
13-13
Response to Question on Paper 6.6: References Related to LOCA/Piping (continued)
R. Tregoning. L. Abramson, and P. Scott, "Estimating Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA)
Frequencies Through the Elicitation Process," NUREG-1829 draft report for comment,
October 8, 2004.
Tregoning, R. L., Abramson, L. R., Scott, P. M., and Chokshi, N., "LOCA Frequency
Evaluation Using Expert Elicitation," 18th International Conference on Structural
Mechanics in Reactor Technology (SMiRT18), Beijing, China, August 2005.
Wilkowski, G., Rudland, D., Cheng, W., Chen, Y., Wang, Y., Scott, P., and Brust, F.,
"Summary of NRC Funded Efforts Involving Alloy 600 Base Material and Weldments
for Piping and CRDM Applications," presented at EPRI/PWSCC Conference, March
2005. [This proceedings report]
13-14
EPRI MRP Alloy 600 Issue Task
Group Interaction with the NRC
Craig Harrington, TXU
Alloy 600 ITG Co-Chairman
13-15
Materials Reliability Program
(MRP) Overview
13-16
PWR Materials Reliability Program
A utility-directed oversight structure with a mission to
proactively address and resolve, on a consistent industry-
wide basis, existing and emerging performance, safety,
reliability, operational, and regulatory PWR material-
related issues
Directed by the utilities and managed by EPRI
Focus = issue resolution and closure
Involves major US NSSS vendors, PWR Owners Groups,
NEI, and INPO
13-17
PWR Materials Reliability Program
Responsible for fully addressing designated issues
Establishing consistent, technically sound industry positions
Completing necessary supporting research
Performing required analyses
Developing appropriate requirements and guidance
Coordination with appropriate industry organizations
Determining when requirements should be made mandatory
Represent industry positions before the NRC Staff
13-18
Reporting Structure of the PWR MRP
PWR Materials Management Program (PMMP)
Executive Committee
MRP Integration and
Implementation Group
(IIG)
Steam Generator
Management Program
(SGMP)
ITG ITG ITG ITG TSS
13-19
MRP Committees
PWR Materials Management Program (PMMP)
Executive Committee provides oversight of both the
SGMP and the MRP - includes one executive of each
member utility company
PMMP Executive Oversight Committee performs the
day to day business of the PMMP - 5 to 7 members
Integration and Implementation Group (IIG)
recommends issues and resources, approves ITG funding -
10 to 12 members
13-20
Issue Task Groups (ITG)
Formed to address specific technical issues
Technical level managers and industry experts
Diverse participants & perspectives
US Utilities, EDF, JAPC, Kansai, AREVA, Dominion Engineering, EPRI,
GE-Research, NEI, Southwest Research, Structural Integrity,
Westinghouse.
Open forum, interactive process applied to develop
industry consensus issue resolution
13-21
Issue Task Groups (ITG)
Current ITGs
Alloy 600 ITG
Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals/JOBB ITG
Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity ITG
Fatigue ITG
13-22
Alloy 600 ITG Scope and Vision
Scope
All Alloy 600 base material (with the exception of SG tubing)
and Alloy 82/182 weld metal locations in PWR primary
systems.
Vision
The issues related to PWSCC of Alloy 600/82/182 will be
considered by the NRC staff and industry as one of routine
materials management (i.e., well understood requirements and
stable regulatory environment)
13-23
Alloy 600 ITG Scope and Vision
Mission
Establish sound technical positions on A600 for industry
Understand the implications of failure Safety & Economic
Develop degradation management tools for A600 locations
Safety assessments
Inspection & evaluation guidance
Mitigation methods & strategies
NRC interface to establish a stable regulatory environment
13-24
Whos Who of MRP Alloy 600 ITG
Utility Chairmen
Dana Covill
Craig Harrington
EPRI Project Managers
Christine King
Al Ahluwalia
NEI MRP Representative
Jim Riley
INPO Representative
Russ Warren
NRC Interface
Bill Cullen
EPRI Alloy 600 Technical Team
Jeff Landrum
John Langevin
Pedro Lara
Carl Latiolais
Al McIlree
Curtis Miller
Brian Rassler
Pat ORegan
Frank Ammirato
Bob Barnes
Shannon Chu
Anne Demma
Shane Findlan
Greg Frederick
John Hickling
Kim Kietzman
WG Chairmen
Mitigation John Wilson
Assessment Greg Kammerdeiner
Inspection Tom Alley
13-25
Alloy 600 ITG Working Groups
Assessment
Reactor Vessel Top Head
Reactor Vessel Bottom Head
Dissimilar Metal Welds
Other A600/82/182 Locations
Destructive Exams of Field Failure & Boric Acid Corrosion Testing
Inspection
Vendor Demonstrations for CRDM & BMN Inspections
Collection and dissemination of inspection results
Mitigation
Chemical & Mechanical Methods
Replacement Materials
Fundamentals of PWSCC Mechanism
13-26
MRP / NRC Interaction
13-27
Old Materials Management Paradigm
The failure at Plant X was unique because
My plant is different because
I can delay or avoid taking action because . . .
Our inspections will find the flaw-types observed in the
fleet . . .
We only have to inspect components where failure has
consequences to safety . . .
In operation any effluent flashes leaving dry boric acid . . .
13-28
Watershed Events vs. Credibility
Bugey GL 97-01 VC Summer
& Oconee
North Anna 2 Davis Besse
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e

C
r
e
d
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
13-29
New Materials Management Paradigm
Establish current safety basis considering all
credible failure modes . . .
Ensure continued safety basis compliance with
robust inspection & evaluation regimes . . .
Enable economical long-term management
strategies through degradation prevention . . .
13-30
New Materials Management Paradigm
Major Industry Initiatives
NEI 03-08 Materials Initiative
Proactive management of RCS materials across the fleet
Degradation Matrix / Issue Management Table
Anticipate materials problems before they find us
13-31
NRC / MRP Interaction Today
Communication
Regular meetings to review
Overall status of industry activities on a topic
Analytical methods
Intermediate results
Final reports
Inspection & Evaluation Guidelines
13-32
Collaboration
Boric Acid Corrosion testing
Joint participation in scope development & status reviews
North Anna 2 CRDM penetration
Removal MRP
NDE NRC-RES funded the facility & support
Destructive testing - MRP & NRC-RES
Analytical Methods and Results
Stress analysis, fracture mech., crack growth rates, etc.
13-33
Cooperation
ASME Code actions
Code Case N-729
Code Case N-722
Transition from current interim Order to long-term plan
Determination of balance between industry mandated
and NRC mandated requirements (Regulatory
Footprint)
Refined understanding of leakage relative to A600
13-34
Conclusion
Paradigms have shifted
NRC and Industry clearly have different roles but
certain common goals
Positive steps are being taken to achieve those
goals through communication, collaboration, and
cooperation
13-35
Industry Management of
Materials Degradation
2005 International PWSCC of A600 Conference
Jim Riley, NEI
(202) 739-8137
13-37
Overview
Self- Assessment
Materials Initiative
MEOG / MTAG Roles
Materials Program Funding
Strategic Plan
Implementation Protocol
Degradation Matrix
Issues Management Table
Materials Management Program Guidelines
Continuing MEOG/MTAG roles
13-38
Self-Assessment
Executive task force and working group formed in
response to NEI Executive Committee
recommendations Aug 02
Charter
Assess materials issue programs to identify gaps, areas of
overlap, strengths and weaknesses
Report findings and recommendations to NSIAC
Scope
PWR primary and SG secondary, BWR RPV and primary
pressure boundary components, materials issues related to
nuclear fuels, and related NDE and chemistry/corrosion
control programs
13-39
Self-Assessment IP Scope
EPRI Issue Programs
BWRVIP
MRP
FRP
SGMP
Owners Group Programs
BWROG
B&WOG (OTSG, Chemistry, NDE and Materials)
CEOG (Chemistry, SG and Section XI)
WOG/CEOG Materials
Other EPRI Programs
NDE Center
Corrosion Control
Other
PDI
13-40
Self-Assessment
Industry self-assessment conclusions
No overall coordination of industry efforts on
materials issues
No ability to enforce implementation of industry
guidance
No verification of implementation
Participation in materials issue programs lacking
13-41
Self-Assessment
Recommendations
Create executive-level and technical oversight groups
Establish policy on the management of materials
issues
Use the NEI Initiative Process
Expand INPOs role
Enhance communications
Define regulatory interface
Establish a NSIAC Materials Initiative
13-42
Industry Initiative
Internal industry commitment to establish
and implement a defined policy and
associated actions
Requires affirmative vote from 80% of
NSIAC (NEI committee of all utility CNOs)
Materials Initiative was unanimous
Commits the entire nuclear power industry
13-43
Objective - assure safe, reliable and
efficient operation of US nuclear power
plants in the management of materials
issues
Each licensee will meet the intent of NEI
03-08, Guideline for the Management of
Materials Issues
Initiative to be effective January 2, 2004
13-44
The purpose of the Materials Initiative is to
provide:
Consistent management process
Prioritization of materials issues
Proactive approaches
Coordinated approaches
Oversight of implementation
13-45
Initiative requires commitment to provide:
Executive leadership
Technical personnel
Funding for materials issues and materials issue
programs
Implementation of applicable guidance
documents
13-46
Approved by NSIAC in May 2003
Initiative was effective January 2, 2004
MTAG and MEOG established in August 2003
Preparation work proceeded throughout 2003
13-47
Policy Commitment
Policy Statement
the industry will ensure that its management of
materials degradation and aging is forward-looking and
coordinated to the maximum extent practical.
Additionally, the industry will continue to rapidly
identify, react and effectively respond to emerging
issues. The associated work will be managed to
emphasize safety and operational risk significance as the
first priority, appropriately balancing long term aging
management and cost as additional considerations. To
that end, as issues are identified and as work is planned,
the groups involved in funding, managing and providing
program oversight will ensure that the safety and
operational risk significance of each issue is fully
established prior to final disposition.
13-48
NEI 03-08 Guideline
Documents the Materials Initiative
Establishes policy
Establishes two standing committees
Executive Oversight
Technical Advisory
Defines roles, responsibilities, and
expectations
Provides for an integrated approach
13-49
Materials Issue Programs
Governed by the Initiative
EPRI
BWRVIP
MRP
SGMP
Fuels Reliability Program (as impacted by
materials management strategies)
Corrosion Research
Chemistry Control
NDE
13-50
Materials Issue Programs
Governed by the Initiative
Owners Group Subcommittees
Materials
Chemistry
RPV
NDE
Steam Generators
13-51
Roles and Relationships
MEOG oversight and broad policy guidance
NSIAC members
Executive Leads of Issue Programs (IPs)
MTAG overall coordination and development
of strategic plan and protocols
Technical leads of the materials IPs
At large membership
Materials IPs continue to be responsible for
technical program work
13-52
Materials Initiative Fund
Special assessment to fund long term projects that
address materials degradation
$60K per reactor per year for two years
Approximately $9 million distributed already
Projects evaluated based on relevance to strategic plan
37% to PWR issues
24% to BWR issues
39% to generic issues
13-53
Materials Initiative Funding
Funded Projects:
A600
Completion of IMT for PWR components
Fundamental research on PWSCC
Managing PWSCC in A82/182 butt welds
Studies of field PWSCC cracks in A600
Corrosion Research
Initiation of EAC and growth of short cracks
Interaction between local deformation and EAC
13-54
Chemistry Control
Mitigation of SG fouling
NDE
EMAT development
UT of DMW with rough surfaces
UT phased array of DMW
DMW quals with realistic crown conditions
UT transducer research
Surface exam of nickel alloy welds
NDE technology and measurement of SCC
13-55
Steam Generators
Creation of realistic flaws for NDE qualifications
BWR
Fracture toughness in high fluence BWR materials
Crack growth in high fluence BWR materials
On-line noble metal chemical application
Fuels
Impact of BWR water chemistry on fuel
performance
13-56
Strategic Plan
Defines the key issues and objectives for the industrys
management of materials issues
Rev 0 approved in March 2004
Defines intermediate (high priority) and long term strategic issues
Defines critical gaps
Identifies key IP deliverables for 2004
Includes summaries of IP 2004 work plans
Initial Degradation Matrix and Issue Management Table
Revised annually
13-57
Degradation Matrix
Identify materials used for major passive
components/systems within Materials Initiative Scope
Obtain inputs from experts, laboratory R&D, industry
operating experience
Identify potential degradation mechanisms
Determine material applicability
Define areas of uncertainty
Identify and characterize issues that pose potential
threats
Adequately addressed, programs managing issues
Work in progress that will develop tools to manage issues
No program to address, insufficient work in progress to address
vulnerability
13-58
PWR BWR
PWR Reactor
Pressure
Vessel
PWR
Pressurizer
PWR
SG
Shell
PWR
Reactor
Internals
PWR
Piping
PWR SG
Tubes &
Internals
BWR
Pressure
Vessel
BWR
Reactor
Internals
BWR
Piping
Level 1
Materials Degradation Matrix
e030 Corrosion-assisted fatigue is a known phenomenon on secondary side (e.g., in the vicinity of girth welds in steam generator shells
and in the region of feedwater nozzles) and is not like environmental fatigue described in other areas of this DM. Environmental
fatigue research relevant to this specific phenomenon is not ongoing within MRP Fatigue ITG, and is a potential gap.
Level 3
Level 2
Reduction in Toughness
RiT
PWR
Component
Material
SCC
SCC
Corrosion/Wear
C & W
Fatigue
Fat.
Aging Irradiation
1
Subdivisiono IG IA TG LTCP PW Wstg Pit Wear FAC HC LC/Th Env Th Emb VS SR Th
n
Fl
C&LAS
?
e002
N ?
e002
N ?
e003
Y
e004
N N Y
e005
N Y
e006
Y
e007
Y
e008
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
C&LAS
Welds
?
e002
N ?
e002
N ?
e003
Y
e004
N N Y
e005
N Y
e006
Y
e007
Y
e008
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Wrought
SS
?
e012
N ?
e012
?
e013
?
e012
N N N N N Y
e014
Y
e015
N N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
SS Welds &
Clad
Y
e016
?
e017
Y
e018
?
e013
?
e019
N N ?
e020
N N ?
e014
Y
e015
Y
e022
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Wrought
Ni Alloys
N N N ?
e023
Y
e023
N N N N Y
e014
Y
e014
Y
e015
PWR
Pressurizer
(Including
Shell, Surge
and Spray
Nozzles, Heater
Sleeves and
Sheaths,
Instrument
Penetrations)
Ni-base
Welds &
Clad
N ?
e024
N Y
e023
Y
e025
N N N N N Y
e014
Y
e015
13-59
Materials Degradation Matrix
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
3.2 Material Compositions and Properties
A large variety of welding materials and welding processes are used to join carbon and low-alloy
steels, and it is not practical to show typical material compositions and material specifications.
Section NB-2431.1 of Section III, Division I of the ASME Code requires that weld materials
have tensile strength, ductility and impact properties that match those of either of the base mate-
rials being welded, as demonstrated by tests using the selected weld material and the same or
similar base materials. Section NB-2432.2 of Section III, Division I of the ASME Code requires
that the chemical composition of the welding material be in accordance with an appropriate
ASME Code welding specification (in Section II.C of the Code), but leaves the choice of the
specific material up to the manufacturer.
The most common weld processes used to join carbon steel and LAS parts include submerged
arc welding, shielded metal arc welding (SMAW), and gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW). Post-
weld heat treatment is generally required per ASME Code rules after welding of the carbon and
low-alloy steels used for reactor coolant system service.
4.3 Fatigue Degradation Mechanisms and Mitigation Options
Fatigue is the structural deterioration that can occur as the result of repeated stress/strain cycles
caused by fluctuating loads or temperatures. After repeated cyclic loading, if sufficient localized
micro-structural damage has been accumulated, crack initiation can occur at the most highly
affected locations. Subsequent cyclic loading and/or thermal stress can cause crack growth.
A brief description of the relevant fatigue-related degradation mechanisms is provided below.
4.3.1 High-Cycle Fatigue
The most classical fatigue-related degradation mechanism is high-cycle (HC) fatigue. HC
fatigue involves a high number of cycles at a relatively low stress amplitude (typically below the
materials yield strength but above the fatigue endurance limit of the material). High cycle
fatigue may be:
13-60
Identify component and component function
Identify material(s) of construction
Identify degradation mechanism(s)
May be a different mechanism for different
location/material of a component
Likelihood or predominance of a mechanism
should be considered and ranked (e.g. IGSCC may
overwhelm fatigue)
13-61
IMT Process (cont.)
Identify locations that can fail
Identify consequences of failure, including
system responses to help prioritize
location/component importance
Identify inspection capabilities and history
what can be done and is it effective to deal
with the degradation of concern
13-62
IMT Process (cont.)
Identify evaluation capabilities what is known
about environmental effects on crack growth and
initiation etc.
Identify mitigation options/technologies. This
would include things such as chemical (e.g. zinc,
NMCA), mechanical (e.g. MSIP), or system
operation changes (e.g. BWR feedwater flow
controller)
Identify repair or replacement options, capabilities
and limitations
13-63
IMT Process (cont.)
Based on the information above, identify
knowledge gaps/needs
Prioritize the work to resolve gaps and
identify who will do what pieces of the
work to eliminate the gap.
13-64
Example IMT, BWR
Equipment Material Failure
Mechanism
Consequences
of Failure
Mitigation Repair /
Replace
I & E
Guidance
Gaps Priority
&
Basis
Responsible
Program(s)
BWR
Recirculation
piping
SS (lc and
hc),
Inconel
welds
SCC, fatigue Leakage,
forced outage
Yes, chemical
and stress
improvement
Yes, replace pipe
or weld overlay
Yes,
BWRVIP-75
Low
solution
available
BWRVIP,
WCC
BWR Vessel Cs/las, ss
clad,
welds
IGSCC,
IASCC,
TGSCC,
FIV, Th &
Env Fatigue,
Emb, Th
aging,
Fluence
LOCA loss
of asset
Yes HWC,
NMCA
Yes nozzle
repair
Yes covers
embrittlement
and weld
degradation
Low
solution
available
BWRVIP
BWR
Internals
Ss, cass,
cs, welds,
Inc
IASCC,
IGSCC,
FIV, Wear,
EF, Emb,
Fluence
R&D
needed
Core
configuration
Yes some,
work needed
Yes shroud and
top-guide, costly
work needed
Yes (interim)
13 BWRVIP
I&E
Guidelines
work needed
High
existing
and
potential
unresolve
d issues
BWRVIP,
WCC, FRP,
Corrosion
Research
13-65
DM and IMT Status
DM complete and distributed to the NRC
and industry in November
IMT in process MRP project for 2005
Degradation Matrix and Issues Management
Table to be maintained as living documents
13-66
Approved in April
Implementation levels defined
Mandatory
Needed
Good Practice
Published guidance must clearly define importance of
guidance elements
Executive approval required for documents with
Mandatory and Needed elements
Mandatory and Needed elements captured in plant
procedures and programs
Periodic MTAG review for consistency
13-67
Deviations from Mandatory and Needed
elements
Executive approval required
Plus independent third party concurrence for
deviations from Mandatory elements
Captured in plant Corrective Actions Programs
IPs notified
Implementation must be verified
Utility self assessment
INPO reviews
13-68
Materials Program Tool Kit
Intent is to develop a set of documents that form the
basis of information needed to set up or maintain a
materials management program
MTAG Ad Hoc Committee authored
RCS Materials Degradation Management Program
Guidelines provide overview
Scope
Key attributes
Organization
Admin controls
Key activities
Implementation
13-69
Materials Program Tool Kit
Tool Kit Contents:
NEI 03-08, Guideline for the Management of Materials
Issues
RCS MDMP Guidelines
Road Map to Mandatory and Needed documents
Strategic Plan
Degradation Matrix
13-70
Materials Performance Metrics
Metric Green White Yellow Red Comments
Unexpected
materials related
NRC Generic
correspondence
No NRC
correspondence
Industry guidance
followed by a GL
NRC beats us to
the punch
Order issued
Unknown or
accelerated
materials
degradation
morphologies
0 events
Found under
industry inspection
guidance
Accelerated
(You found it
accidently)
Unknown
(It found you)
Lost capacity or
unplanned
/extended outages
due to materials
issues
25 days for fleet >50 days for fleet >75 days for fleet >100 days for fleet
NRC Inspection
findings greater
than green
0 findings > green N/A N/A >0
INPO materials
program related
AFIs
5 significant
>5 and <12
significant
>12 significant >20 significant
Implementation of
Mandatory and
Needed
requirements
Implemented w/
acceptable
deviations
>0 unacceptable /
weak deviations
IP Guidance issued
to address
prioritized gaps
90% as scheduled 80% as scheduled 70% as scheduled <70% as scheduled
13-71
MTAG / MEOG Activities
MEOG and MTAG meet regularly -
oversight
Monitor industry experience with materials
degradation and resolution of related issues
Continue development of strategic plan,
program guidelines, performance metrics, etc.
Monitor materials IP performance
Oversee materials initiative projects
Generic NRC interface
13-72
Alloy 82/182 Piping Butt Welds: Developing Inspection Guidance
Christine King
EPRI Materials Reliability Program
Alloy 600 ITG
Dana Covill
Progress Energy
Co-Chair Alloy 600 ITG
The Alloy 600/82/182 Degradation Management Program is based on BWR experience,
Alloy 82/182 butt weld field experience, and NDE capabilities for dissimilar metal welds.
The basis for current draft of guidelines is discussed here along with the impacts of
PWSCC on LBB locations.
The Alloy 600/82/182 Degradation Management Program includes the following steps:
x Characterize the degradation mechanism
x Determine all Alloy 600/82/182 locations in the RCS for all vendor designs
x Conduct generic operability and safety assessments assuming the occurrence of
PWSCC at these locations.
x Develop flaw inspection and evaluation technology and guidelines for all
locations
x Evaluate/develop mitigation options
x Evaluate/develop repair/replacement options
These actions are designed to meet the objective of effectively managing PWSCC of
Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds.
Three options are available that treat at least one of the SCC factors, they are material
replacement (carbon steel, 316 nuclear grade, corrosion-resistant cladding (inlay)), stress
improvement (and welding approaches), and environment changes (hydrogen water
chemistry, noble metal coating).
13-73
Table 1 Butt Weld
Locations
Location
Westinghouse
Design Plants
Combustion
Engineering
Design Plants
Babcock & Wilcox
Design Plants
Reactor Vessels
- Inlet & Outlet Nozzles
- Core Flood Nozzles
Yes
No
No
2
No
No
Yes
Pressurizers
- Surge Line Nozzles
- Spray Nozzles
- Safety & Relief Valve Nozzles
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
RCS Piping Loop
- SG Inlet & Outlet Nozzles
- RCP Suction & Discharge Nozzles
No
4
No
No
Yes
3
No
Yes
RCS Branch Line Connections
- HL Pipe to Surge Line Connection
- Charging Inlet Nozzles
- Safety Injection and SDC Inlet
- Shutdown Cooling Outlet Nozzle
- Pressurizer Spray Nozzles
- Let-Down and Drain Nozzles
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1. Table does not include butt welds in instrument nozzles 1 inch NPS and smaller, or welds that operate at less
than 550F (CRDM nozzle to flange butt welds, BMI nozzle to pipe butt welds, core flood tank nozzle butt
welds).
2. One CE design plant has Alloy 82/182 welds and is evaluated with the Westinghouse design plants.
3. Palo Verde does not have Alloy 82/182 RCP suction and discharge nozzle welds.
4. One plant has Alloy 82/182 butt welds at this location.
There have been leaks at VC Summer, Tsuruga 2, Palisades (in the heat affected zone,
not in the weld) and a navy test reactor (also in the heat affected zone, not in the weld).
Ringhals units 3 and 4, VC Summer, Tsuruga 2, and TMI-1 have also had cracks or
indications that did not leak. In addition, Tihange 2, and Calvert Cliffs 2 (2 locations
noted) have had possible indications that were not confirmed as stress corrosion cracks.
This field experience was used in the safety assessment to temper the deterministic
results. Most of cracks found have been axial and limited to length of weld. One short
shallow circumferential crack was found at VC Summer. None of the cracks discussed
here posed significant safety risk at the time of discovery. Two of the cracks (VC
Summer and Tsuruga 2) were detected by visual inspections. The others were detected by
NDE (only TMI was Appendix VIII).
Some technical gaps exist in non-destructive examinations of Alloy 600/182, including
flaw detection limitations due to component configuration such as tapers, rough surfaces,
adjacent welds, and limited access. In some situations, the current flaw sizing
13-74
capabilities do not meet code requirements. A lack of knowledge of configurations can
interfere with inspections because the qualification of NDE techniques is configuration
specific. The unavailability of qualified NDE techniques affects code compliance,
implementation of MRP ISI Guidelines, and accurate interpretation of ISI results.
Inspection guidance for butt welds in PWR plants in going to be based on the results of
several safety analyses. The diagram below shows the references used.
Final Butt Weld Safety
Assessment Report
(Report MRP-113)
Safety Assessment for
Westinghouse and CE
Plants
(Westinghouse)
(Report MRP-109)
B&W Design Plants
(AREVA)
(Report MRP-112)
Evaluation of the Effect of
Weld Repairs on DM Butt
Welds (Structural Integrity
Associates)
(Report MRP-114)
Welding Residual &
Operating Stresses for
Selected Nozzles
(Dominion Engineering,
Inc.) (Report MRP-106)
Crack Growth Rates in
Alloy 82/182 Weld Metal
(MRP report documenting
the work is in preparation)
Probabilistic Risk
Evaluation
(Westinghouse)
(Report MRP-116)
Experience with Cracking
of Alloy 182 in BWR
Plants (GE)
(Report MRP-57)
Figure 1 Safety Assessment Documentation
A Primary System Piping Butt Weld I&E Guideline is being developed. This document
establishes long-term inspection frequencies to effectively manage PWSCC using an
approach similar to GL 88-01. The guideline recommends inspection (by qualified
method) frequencies, with consideration for material (resistant or non-resistant),
mitigation efforts, temperature (cold leg vs. hot leg), and pipe size (>4 OD and <4 OD).
Alloy 82/182 welds in RI-ISI programs will be re-evaluated.
In order to develop an inspection schedule, plants will need to identify welds as resistant
or non-resistant material. The inspection schedule for non-resistant welds should
consider whether or not mechanical mitigation (full structural overlay, stress
improvement) had been performed, the as welded condition, is the weld cracked or
uncracked, and the temperature the weld is exposed to (hot leg, cold leg, or pressurizer
like temperatures). The guidance for inspection schedules also discusses mitigation
methods including modification of materials, stress improvement, and modification of
environment (chemical mitigation).
The fact that Alloy 82/182 welds may not meet original leak-before-break guidance of
NUREG-1061 Vol. 3 and draft SRP 3.6.3 had been under consideration by the industry
for over a year. The key concerns are that PWSCC is an active cracking degradation
mechanism, although observed pipe cracks have been small and primarily axial, and it
may be possible that this could result in circumferential cracks that would make breaks
more likely to occur than predicted by cracks postulated in LBB analysis. Also, the
13-75
PWSCC leakage path is more tortuous than fatigue cracks used in previous LBB
evaluations, so it seems that the calculated leakage could be less than that from fatigue
cracks.
The technical basis for LBB remains strong, PWSCC observed in Alloy 82/182 butt
welds in several plants has been primarily axial in nature, long part-through wall
circumferential flaws are not likely to develop, there is adequate time between leakage
detection and growth to critical flaw size to allow safe shut down, adequate margin
remains considering alternative leak rate calculation methodologies (flaw morphology),
there is increased plant sensitivity to unidentified leakage, response to leak rates less than
1 gpm (Tech Spec Limits) has improved over recent years, and generally the unidentified
leakage is trended.
The industry must balance information from various sources in order to develop
guidelines in the absence of widespread problems. Sources to be considered include
related material degradation experience, previous experience with PWSCC of Alloy 600
materials, actual field results, current NDE capabilities, expected future NDE capabilities,
safety significance of degradation, and consideration of whether or not butt weld
degradation could jeopardize other regulations.
13-76
Alloy 82/182 Piping Butt
Welds: Developing
Inspection Guidance
Christine King
EPRI Materials Reliability Program
Alloy 600 ITG
Dana Covill
Progress Energy
Co-Chair Alloy 600 ITG
PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference
March 7-10, 2005
13-77
2
Agenda
Alloy 600/82/182 Degradation Management Program
BWR Experience
Alloy 82/182 BW Field Experience
NDE Capabilities for DM Welds
Basis for Current Draft of Guidelines
How PWSCC impacts LBB locations
Summary
13-78
3
Program
Steps Required to Reach Objective
Characterize the degradation mechanism
Determine all Alloy 600/82/182 locations in the RCS for all vendor
designs
Conduct generic operability and safety assessments assuming the
occurrence of PWSCC at these locations.
Develop flaw inspection and evaluation technology and guidelines
for all locations
Evaluate/develop mitigation options
Evaluate/develop repair/replacement options
13-79
4
Time
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

d
e
g
r
a
d
a
t
i
o
n
SG
BWR Pipe
RPV Head
Butt Weld
Degradation Curves
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
0
Pressurizer Heater
Sleeves
BWR Internals
13-80
5
A Little History on BWR Butt Weld Cracking
Stainless steels selected due to resistance to known corrosion
mechanisms
Showed up in early 80s
Safe end leaks
NRC issued two bulletins (82-03, 83-02)
NRC issued two GLs (84-11, 88-01)
88-01 implemented mandatory inspections
Required Tech Spec change to follow requirements of GL 88-01
Note that some IGSCC started showing up in the 1970s
Core spray spargers
Unique because of cold work
There was an inspection transient
Initially, lots of geometry, ID condition calls
Started qualification effort using real cracks in test samples
More indications were classified as cracks.
Continued to work on inspection procedure until there was a
reasonable assurance of correct calls
However, still experiencing failure to detect flaws
Not technology, but surface conditions and interpretation of signals
13-81
6
A Little History on BWR Butt Weld Cracking
Why did degradation level off? (one plant example)
266 welds in scope of 88-01 (some plants have over 400)
SI on about 80 in 1985, about 15 more in 1987
About 40 overlays of cracked welds
Significant inspection scope upon issuance of 88-01
Replaced all the 12 recirc risers welds
Reduced number of welds with bent pipe
Implemented hydrogen water chemistry
Now, about 150 are resistant material, 50 SId, and 40 WORs
No new cracks or growth of existing cracks since early 90s
Aggressive replacement and mitigation efforts resulted in
essentially no new IGSCC after implementation
Three options available that treat at least one of the SCC circles
Material (Carbon Steel, 316 Nuclear Grade, Corrosion-Resistant
Cladding (inlay))
Stress (Stress Improvement, welding approaches)
Environment Hydrogen Water Chemistry, noble metal coating
13-82
Butt Weld Locations
13-83
8
Butt Weld Locations
Summary
Location
Westinghouse
Design Plants
Combustion
Engineering
Design Plants
Babcock & Wilcox
Design Plants
Reactor Vessels
- Inlet & Outlet Nozzles
- Core Flood Nozzles
Yes
No
No
2
No
No
Yes
Pressurizers
- Surge Line Nozzles
- Spray Nozzles
- Safety & Relief Valve Nozzles
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
RCS Piping Loop
- SG Inlet & Outlet Nozzles
- RCP Suction & Discharge Nozzles
No
4
No
No
Yes
3
No
Yes
RCS Branch Line Connections
- HL Pipe to Surge Line Connection
- Charging Inlet Nozzles
- Safety Injection and SDC Inlet
- Let-Down and Drain Nozzles
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1. Table does not include butt welds in instrument nozzles 1 inch NPS and smaller, or welds that operate at less
than 550F (CRDM nozzle to flange butt welds, BMI nozzle to pipe butt welds, core flood tank nozzle butt
welds).
2. One CE design plant has Alloy 82/182 welds and is evaluated with the Westinghouse design plants.
3. Palo Verde does not have Alloy 82/182 RCP suction and discharge nozzle welds.
4. One plant has Alloy 82/182 butt welds at this location.
13-84
9
Butt Weld Locations
Westinghouse Design Plants
2
6
4
3
1
7
5
3
13-85
10
Butt Weld Locations
Westinghouse Design Plants
Application
Identification
Number
Typical
Temperature
(F)
Typical ID
(inches)
Typ. Number
(3 Loop
Plant)
Pressurizer
- Surge Line Nozzle
- Spray Nozzle
- Safety/Relief Nozzles
1
2
3
653
10
4
5
1
1
4
RCS Hot Leg Pipe
- Reactor Vessel Outlet Nozzles
3
- Steam Generator Inlet Nozzles
4
4
5
600-620 29
--
3
--
RCS Cold Leg Pipe
- Steam Generator Outlet Nozzles
4
- Reactor Vessel Inlet Nozzles
3
6
7
550-560 --
27.5
--
3
1. Figures only show locations in pipes greater than 1" NPS and operating at temperatures greater than about 550F.
2. Plants with original reactor vessel closure heads have CRDM nozzles with Alloy 82/182 nozzle-to-flange butt
welds (4" diameter).
3. There are no Alloy 82/182 RPV nozzle welds in Westinghouse 2-loop plants and some early Westinghouse
3-loop plants.
4. One plant has Alloy 82/182 butt welds between the reactor coolant piping and steam generator nozzles.
13-86
11
Butt Weld Locations
Combustion Engineering Design Plants
2
3
10
12
4
7
8
5
9
1
6
11
13-87
12
Butt Weld Locations
Combustion Engineering Design Plants
Application
Identification
Number
Typical
Temperature
(F)
Typical ID
(inches)
Typical
Number
Pressurizer
- Surge Line Nozzle
- Spray Nozzle
- Safety/Relief Nozzles
1
2
3
643-653
10
3
5
1
1
2-3
RCS Hot Leg Pipe
- Surge Line Nozzle
- Drain Nozzle
4
5
6
600
10
10
2
1
1
1
RCS Cold Leg Pipe
- RCP Inlet Nozzles
- RCP Outlet Nozzles
- Safety Injection
- Letdown/Drain Nozzles
- Charging Inlet Nozzle
7
3
8
3
9
10
11
12
549-560
30
30
10
2.25
1.3
1.3
4
4
4
2
4
4
2
2. Some plants with original reactor vessel closure heads have CEDM/ICI nozzles with Alloy 82/182 nozzle-to-
flange butt welds.
3. One plant does not have Alloy 82/182 welds at reactor coolant pump.
4. One plant has 8 cold leg letdown/drain nozzles.
13-88
13
Butt Weld Locations
B&W Design Plants
1
5
8
6
3
2
9
10
4
13
12
11
7
13-89
14
Butt Weld Locations
B&W Design Plants
Application
Identification
Number
Typical
Temperature
(F)
Typical ID
(inches)
Typical
Number
Pressurizer
- Surge Line Nozzle
- Spray Nozzle
- PORV Nozzle
- Safety Relief Nozzles
1
2
3
4
650
10
4
2.5
2.5-3
1
1
1
2
Reactor Vessel
2
- Core Flood Nozzle 5 577 14 2
RCS Hot Leg Pipe
- Surge Line Nozzle
- Decay Heat Nozzle
6
7
601-605 10
12
1
1
RCS Cold Leg Pipe
- RCP Inlet Nozzles
- RCP Outlet Nozzles
- High Pressure Injection Nozzles
- Letdown/Drain Nozzles
8
9
10
11
557
28
28
2.5
1.5-2.5
4
4
4
4
Core Flood Tanks
- Outlet Nozzle
- Pressure Relief
12
13
RT 14
2
2
2
2. As of July 2004, there are two remaining B&W plants that have reactor vessel closure heads with Alloy 600
CRDM nozzles and Alloy 82 nozzle-to-flange butt welds (69 4" welds at temperature < 605F).
13-90
Butt Weld Field Experience
& NDE Capabilities
13-91
16
Alloy 82/182 Butt Weld Field Experience
Summary Status Worldwide
Plants with leaks
VC Summer
Tsuruga 2
Palisades (HAZ, not in the weld)
Navy test reactor (HAZ, not in the weld)
Plants with cracks/indications
Ringhals 3 & 4
VC Summer
Tsuruga 2
TMI-1
Tihange 2?
Calvert Cliffs 2 (2 locations?)
13-92
17
Alloy 82/182 Butt Weld Field Experience
Hot Leg and Cold
Leg Drain Lines
Surge Line
Hot Leg
Hot Leg
Pressurizer
Hot Leg
BW Location
1977 Crack Calvert Cliffs 2
1974 Crack TMI 1
1983 Crack Ringhals 4
1981 Crack Ringhals 3
1987 Leak and Crack Tsuruga 2
1982 Leak and Crack VC Summer
Date of
Commercial
Operation
Crack/Leak Plant Name
13-93
18
Butt Weld Field Experience
Characterization of Cracks
Most cracks axial and limited to length of weld (Tsuruga 2
shown)
Axial crack growth into Alloy 600 safe ends
Crack growth rate lower in Alloy 600
Length of weld plus safe end less than critical flaw length
One short shallow circumferential crack at VC Summer

None of the above cracks posed significant safety risk at discovery
Two (VC Summer and Tsuruga 2) were detected by visual inspections
Others were detected by NDE (only TMI was Appendix VIII)
b. Cross Section at Leak (90)
c. Cross Section at Crack (315)
13-94
19
Current Inspections Required
These welds are within ISI population and
inspected per ASME XI
Visual inspections for leakage and BAC
BMV inspections associated with NDE for >1 NPS
Volumetric NDE for sizes >4 NPS
Any volumetric NDE performed must meet
ASME Section XI Appendix XIII requirements
One way is through the EPRI Performance
Demonstration Initiative
For some locations, it may be necessary to develop
inspection methods
13-95
20
Capsule Summary of the Technical
Gaps-Alloy 600/182 NDE
Flaw detection limitations due to configuration
Ex., Tapers, rough surfaces, adjacent welds, access
Flaw sizing does not meet Code requirements in all
situations
Lack of knowledge of configurations
Qualification of NDE is specific to configuration
Unavailability of qualified NDE affects
Code compliance
Implementation of MRP ISI Guidelines
Accurate interpretation of ISI results
Detection & sizing are reliable when
access and surface conditions are
adequate for ISI
13-96
Alloy 82/182 Pipe Butt Weld
Safety Assessment
Basis for New
Recommendations
13-97
22
Roadmap to Documents
Final Butt Weld Safety
Assessment Report
(Report MRP-113)
Westinghouse and CE
Plants
(Westinghouse)
(Report MRP-109)
B&W Design Plants
(AREVA)
(Report MRP-112)
Evaluation of the Effect of
Weld Repairs on DM Butt
Welds (Structural Integrity
Associates)
(Report MRP-114)
Welding Residual &
Operating Stresses for
Selected Nozzles
(Dominion Engineering,
Inc.) (Report MRP-106)
Crack Growth Rates in
Alloy 82/182 Weld Metal
(MRP report documenting
the work is in preparation)
Probabilistic Risk
Evaluation
(Westinghouse)
(Report MRP-116)
Experience with Cracking
of Alloy 182 in BWR
Plants (GE)
(Report MRP-57)
13-98
23
Deterministic Analyses
Primary objective was to address the safety
significance of postulated flaws in Alloy 82/182 butt
welds
Specific analyses included
Critical flaw size
Time to through wall leak
Time between 1 gpm/10 gpm and failure
Leak rate as function of flaw size
Margin between leak and failure
13-99
24
Summary of Deterministic Results
Circumferential PWSCC
Large Bore Piping
Primary loop nozzle welds (SG, RCP, RV) have large margins
from leakage to break
Pressurizer Nozzle Welds and Safe Ends
Time between leakage and break is less than the 10 year ISI
interval
Small Bore Pipes
Time between leakage and break is less than the 10-year ISI
interval
Deterministic results were as expected
Primary factors: crack growth rate in weld material and
assumed circumferential flaws
13-100
25
Probabilistic Analysis
Overview
Probabilistic analyses performed for several limiting
locations in Westinghouse, CE, and B&W design plants
Locations with shortest time from leak to critical flaw
Locations with largest consequences (core damage)
Addresses the probability that a flaw could grow through the
wall and result in core damage
Quantify the probability of leakage from circumferential flaws
Axial flaw contribution to core damage frequency is not significant
Evaluate the change in core damage frequency
Assess various inspection frequencies from a risk perspective
Take advantage of existing approved approaches (e.g.,
piping risk informed inspection basis)
13-101
26
Probabilistic Analysis: Key Conclusions
Impact of butt weld PWSCC on CDF is
insignificant
Change in core damage frequencies ranged from 1.8
E-8 to 8.7 E-8 per reactor year;
Changes in inspection frequency and accuracy
have only small impact on CDF
Larger impact on probability of leakage
10 year inspection intervals are adequate from
risk perspective
13-102
27
Primary System Piping Butt Weld I&E Guideline
Establishes long-term inspection frequencies to
effectively manage PWSCC
Approach similar to GL 88-01
Material (resistant or non-resistant)
Inspection (by qualified method)
Mitigation
Temperature (cold leg vs. hot leg)
Pipe Size (>4 OD and <4 OD)
Alloy 82/182 welds in RI-ISI programs will be re-
evaluated
13-103
28
Considerations for Inspection Schedule
Categorize
Resistant
Non-Resistant
Full Structural Overlay
Stress Improvement
As Welded
Cracked
Uncracked
Hot Leg, Cold Leg, and Pressurizer like Temperatures
Discusses Mitigation Methods
Modification of Materials
Stress Improvement
Modification of Environment
13-104
29
Considerations for Inspection Schedule
Resistant
Code examinations/schedule or approved alternative
Non-Resistant
Dependent on category
Augment the code examination schedule
Work in progress
Currently under review by Alloy 600 ITG members
Review process
MRP IIG
PMMP Executive Committee
NSIAC (extra step request by PMMP EC)
13-105
30
LBB Key Questions
For more than a year, there has been an awareness
that Alloy 82/182 welds may not meet original leak-
before-break guidance of NUREG-1061 Vol. 3 and
draft SRP 3.6.3
Key questions included:
PWSCC is an active cracking degradation mechanism, although
observed pipe cracks have been small and primarily axial
Could this result in circumferential cracks that would make breaks more
likely to occur than predicted by cracks postulated in LBB analysis?
PWSCC leakage path is more tortuous than fatigue cracks used in
previous LBB evaluations
Will calculated leakage be less than that from fatigue cracks?
13-106
31
Alloy 82/182 LBB Locations
3* NA NA Core Flood Piping
0 1 NA Shutdown Cooling
Suction
Plant Type
System
B&W CE Westinghouse
0 1 0 Safety Injection
0 1 16 Surge Line Piping
7 11 30 Main Loop Piping
* This project did not evaluate these locations because they are at
containment temperature and are isolated from the RCS.
13-107
32
LBB Conclusions
The technical basis for LBB remains strong:
PWSCC observed in Alloy 82/182 butt welds in several
plants has been primarily axial in nature
Long part-through wall circumferential flaws not likely
Adequate time between leakage detection and growth
to critical flaw size to allow safe shut down
Adequate margin remains considering alternative leak
rate calculation methodologies (flaw morphology)
Increased plant sensitivity to unidentified leakage
Response to leak rates less than 1 gpm (Tech Spec Limits)
improved
Generally the unidentified leakage is trended
13-108
33
Summary
To develop guidelines in the absence of widespread
problems, industry must balance information from
various sources
Related material degradation experience
Previous experience with PWSCC of Alloy 600 materials
Actual field results
Current NDE capabilities
Expected future NDE capabilities
Safety significance of degradation
Can this degradation jeopardize other regulations?
Stay Tuned.
13-109
Comparison of Leak Rates from Alloy 82/182 Butt Weld Cracks
for Leak-Before-Break Assessment
Ashok D. Nana and Kenneth K. Yoon
AREVA
Framatome ANP
P.O. Box 10935
Abstract
Discovery of leaking cracks in Alloy 82/182 bimetal welds at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station
has lead the industry to reassess the Leak-Before-Break (LBB) analysis of the reactor coolant
system pressure boundary piping components involving Alloy 600 base metals and Alloy 82/182
welds. The leaking cracks were attributed to primary-water-stress-corrosion-cracking (PWSCC).
To-date, LBB submittals have not considered PWSCC cracks in bimetal welds or Alloy 600 base
metals and the leak rate calculations have only considered the conventional fatigue crack
morphology. There are limited observed in-service leakage cracks of Alloy 82/182 pipe butt
welds with plant measured leak rate data. Effects of PWSCC induced crack morphology
involving these welds is investigated through various modeling techniques. The differences in
leakage prediction when evaluating as a fatigue crack versus assessing as a PWSCC crack is
addressed for various PWR LBB piping systems. The impact of this finding to the overall LBB
assessment technology is discussed.
Introduction
LBB analysis submittals, reviewed and approved by the NRC to date, have primarily been
performed considering the conventional fatigue crack morphology. In October 2000, PWSCC
type leaking cracks in the Inconel 82/182 bimetallic welds at the hot leg to reactor pressure
vessels nozzle welds at the V.C. Summer nuclear plant were discovered. Similar PWSCC issues
have occurred at the Ringhal plant. Although the PWSCC cracks to-date have been primarily
axial (with a few small cracks that were circumferentially oriented), it calls into question
previous LBB analysis containing Alloy 600 and Alloy 82/182 weld materials that used fatigue
crack morphology.
The LBB evaluation procedures are provided in Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.6.3 with details
for LBB evaluation given in NUREG 1061, Volume 3. According to the original NRC
guidelines, LBB cannot be applied if active degradation mechanisms such as PWSCC are
present in the piping system. At the time the LBB analyses were performed and reviewed by the
NRC, there was no known active degradation mechnism that could potentially lead to through-
wall cracking. SRP 3.6.3 requires a margin of ten on the leak detection capability (detection of
13-111
unidentified leakage) of the plant. Since the leak detection systems of the plants have been
demonstrated to meet Reg. Guide 1.45, a leak detection capability of 1 gpm within an hour was
used in the LBB application by the individual utility. The resulting crack size with a factor of
ten on leakage (10 gpm), is typically referred to as the leakage crack size.
In August 2004, an MRP LBB task group was formed to determine if the LBB required margins
are still met when considering PWSCC crack morphology in lieu of the fatigue crack
morphology in the prediction of leakage crack sizes for LBB involving Alloy 600 and Alloy
82/182 butt weld materials. The leakage crack sizes associated with PWSCC cracks tend to be
significantly greater than fatigue cracks as a result of the tortuous flow path. This presentation
summarizes the benchmarking of an AREVA in-house leak rate code KRAKFLO to the
Battelle Phase II data and more recently to the SCC field data. It also summarizes the sensitivity
study, involving five different PWR piping systems, to understand the differences in leakage
crack size predictrions, for a 10 gpm leak rate, when considering a conventional fatigue crack
versus PWSCC-type crack morphology.
Leak Rate Codes KRAKFLO and PICEP
Similar to leak rate code LEAK-01, the predecessor code to PICEP, AREVAs in-house Code
KRAKFLO was originally developed from NRCs leak rate code LKRATE. KRAKFLO had
already been benchmarked to an extensive number of intergranular-stress-corrosion-cracking
(IGSCC) crack experiments performed in the Battelle Phase II program
1
. This program included
82 IGSCC crack experiments with cracks ranging in size from 0.029 (0.74 mm) to 1.098
(27.89 mm) and measured leakage rates ranging from 0.0003 gpm (1.34 x 10
-5
kg/s) to 3.84 gpm
(0.199 kg/s). As a result of the benchmarking to the Phase II data, the recommended values for
the surface roughness and the number of 45-degreee turns per inch of wall thickness were
determined (since the details of the flow path are not known). These values are very similar to
those recommended by the PICEP
2
leak rate code.
Benchmarking of Leak Rate Code KRAKFLO to Field Data
There is very limited actual field data involving SCC cracks. The two most prominent events
with measured leak rate data are the Duane Arnold event of June 1978 and the Palisades event of
September 16, 1993. At the Duane Arnold plant (BWR) the leaking inlet nozzle safe end was
found to have a continuous internal circumferential crack with a through-wall crack in an 80-
degree segment. At the Palisades plant circumferential cracking ~ 3 (7.6 cm) long was
observed in the PORV safe end. The OD of the crack location consisted of six discontinuous
cracks, each about a 1/2 (1.27 cm) long. Both these cracks were analyzed as IGSCC cracks
considering various modeling techniques for the crack shape. For the Duane Arnold event, the
predicted leak rate ranged from 3.07 to 3.43 gpm (0.19 to 0.22 kg/s) compared to the measured
leak rate of 3 gpm. For the Palisades event the predicted leak rates ranged from 0.11 to 0.15 gpm
(0.007 to 0.009 kg/s) compared to the steam leak on the order of 0.2 gpm equivalent water.
13-112
Leak Rate Sensitivity Study on Crack Morphology
Leak rate sensitivity studies were performed on five different piping systems with Alloy 82/182
butt welds. The purpose of the study was to determine the effect of the percent increase in the
crack length when considering the crack with an SCC morphology instead of the conventional
fatigue morphology. The results from this limited group of piping systems showed that on
average, the percent increase in the crack length is about 37%.
Comparison to SQUIRT Code Predictions
In 1995 an improved model for crack morphology parameters (surface roughness, number of
turns and actual crack path length) was proposed in NUREG/CR-6004. This model has been
incorporated into the SQUIRT leak rate code. Recently Engineering Mechanics Corporation of
Columbus
3
analyzed six typical LBB piping system locations using SQUIRT through work
supported by NRC-RES. PWSCC morphology parameters were determined from very limited
service cracks using photomicrographs. Based on this limited study it was concluded that the
length of the leakage crack in the weld when considering it with a PWSCC crack morphology
was 69% greater than when considering it as a fatigue crack. For IGSCC morphology, the
increase in crack length was even greater at 89%.
Conclusions
KRAKFLO has been successfully benchmarked to the Battelle Phase II data as well as the
limited field data for SCC. KRAKFLO has been demonstrated to be a good pre-predictive leak
rate code for SCC morphology. From an LBB perspective, KRAKFLO predicts a 37% increase
when considering the crack with SCC morphology over the conventional fatigue morphology,
whereas, SQUIRT predicts a 69% increase for PWSCC. The SQUIRT program is based on an
improved model for crack morphology but it appears to be based on limited actual SCC crack
experiments where the individual parameters are determined through metallographic
examinations. The morphology parameters were statistically determined for a probabilistic
evaluation. Consistent with LBB evaluation guidelines, the results of this study is based on
deterministic analysis. A safety factor of 10 over leakage detection crack size is maintained to
account for the uncertainties in geometry, materials and loading.
References
1. Calculation of Leak Rates Through Cracks in Pipes and Tubes. Palo Alto, Calif.: Electric
Power Research Institute, Final Report, December 1983. NP-3395.
2. PICEP: Pipe Crack Evaluation Program (Revision 1). Palo Alto, Calif.: Electric Power
Research Institute, Special Report, December 1987. NP-3596-SR.
3. D. Rudland, R. Wolterman, G. Wilkowski, and R. Tregoning, Impact of PWSCC and
Current Leak Detection on Leak-Before-Break, proceedings of Conference on Vessel Head
Penetration, Inspection, Cracking, and Repairs, Sponsored by USNRC, Marriot
Washingtonion Center, Gaithersburg, MD, September 29 to October 2, 2003.
13-113
1 > 2005 EPRI PWSCC Conference and Exhibit Show FRAMATOME ANP, INC. FRAMATOME ANP, INC.
Comparison of Leak Rates
from Alloy 82/182 Butt Weld Cracks
Presented By:
Ashok D. Nana
Principal Engineer, Materials & Fracture Group
AREVA
Framatome ANP
March 7-10, 2005
13-114
Comparison of Leak Rates
from Alloy 82/182 Butt Weld Cracks
Ashok D. Nana and Kenneth K. Yoon
AREVA
Framatome ANP
This presentation is a Summary of the tasks performed for the EPRI MRP LBB
Task Group
13-115
Outline
> Objective
> Background on LBB
PWSCC in Alloy 82/182 Pipe Butt Welds of PWRs
Fatigue Cracks versus PWSCC Crack Morphologies
> MRP LBB Task Group 2004/2005
To address LBB Issues for the Industry
> Leak Rate Analysis Using KRAKFLO (AREVA)
Phase I - Benchmarking Code to IGSCC data
Phase II Benchmarking Code to Field data
Phase III - Leak Rate Sensitivity Study on
5 LBB Piping Systems
> Review 2003 EMC
2
Presentation on Similar Issue
> Summary & Conclusions
> Recommendations for Future Study
13-116
Objective
> To re-assess leakage flaw sizes in LBB
applications considering PWSCC/IGSCC type
crack morphologies in lieu of conventional
fatigue crack morphologies used in past LBB
submittals.
13-117
Background on LBB
> PWSCC issues in Pipe Butt Welds
Oct. 2000, Hot Leg Nozzle to Pipe Weld at V.C. Summer Plant,
Similar issues occurred at 4 other plants (foreign & domestic)
> LBB evaluation procedures are provided in SRP 3.6.3 &
NUREG 1061, Vol. 3. Per the Guidelines:
LBB cannot be applied if active degradation mechanisms (such
as PWSCC) are present in the piping system
> At the time LBB analyses were performed and reviewed there
were no known active degradation mechanisms that could
potentially lead to through-wall cracking
> Most plants met Reg. Guide 1.45 that required leak detection
capability of 1 gpm. Since a factor of 10 is required for LBB,
a 10 gpm leakage crack size was typically evaluated.
13-118
Background on LBB
V. C. Summer PWSCC Issue --- Hot Leg Piping Butt Weld
To-date PWSCC cracks in DM Butt Welds have been primarily
axially oriented.
13-119
Background
> PWSCC issue calls into question previous LBB Analysis
Containing Alloy 82/182 materials and that
Used fatigue crack morphology.
> Industry must justify present & past LBB submittals to the NRC
relative to PWSCC
Demonstrate adequate LBB Margins are maintained with
consideration of PWSCC Crack Morphology
> Fatigue cracks have relatively smooth surface roughness with
relatively straight leakage path through the pipe wall
> PWSCC cracks are tight cracks with a more tortuous flow path
through the pipe wall than fatigue cracks
Source for Sketch: EMC
2
2003 Presentation on Impact of PWSCC on LBB
13-120
Background
> U.S. PWR plants with Alloy 82/182 PWSCC susceptible LBB
locations:
Main Loop Piping -- 48 Plants
Surge Line Piping -- 17 Plants
Shutdown Cooling Line -- 1 Plant
Safety Injection Line -- 1 Plant
> Key Issue Accounting for 10 gpm leakage crack size
prediction considering PWSCC crack morphology over
conventional fatigue cracks used in LBB analysis.
> AREVA study initiated under MRP LBB Task Group to
address:
Initial benchmarking to SCC data & then
Assess impact of considering PWSCC on existing LBB
approved PWR piping.
13-121
Phase I: -- Benchmarking KRAKFLO to IGSCC data
> AREVA Leak Rate Code KRAKFLO
Originally developed from NRC leak rate Code LKRate
Similar to LEAK-01 and PICEP
Previously benchmarked to extensive Number of IGSCC
crack experiments in Battelle Phase II Programs
Involving 82 experiments
Cracks ranging in size from 0.029(0.74mm) to 1.1(28mm)
Measured leak rates ranging from 0.0003 gpm (1.34 x 10
-5
kg/s) to 3.84 gpm (2.00 x 10
-1
kg/s)
Benchmarking to phase II data helped establish
recommended values for
Surface roughness (200Pm) with associated
Number of 45-degree turns/inch = 24
PICEP Code has similar recommended values
13-122
KRAKFLO Predictions against Battelle Phase II
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+00
1.0E-05 1.0E-04 1.0E-03 1.0E-02 1.0E-01 1.0E+00
Measured Leak Rate (kg/s)
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d

L
e
a
k

R
a
t
e

(
k
g
/
s
)
Tests 1 - 6
Tests 19 - 82
Tests 7 - 18
13-123
Phase II Benchmarking to Field Data
> Very limited field data exist involving SCC with measured
leak rate.
> In 2004, under a MRP task, KRAKFLO was benchmarked to
two most notable events:
Duane Arnold (BWR) Event of June 1978
Complex crack at a leaking Inlet nozzle safe end
Continuous internal circ. crack with 80-deg.Thru-Wall crack
Palisades event of September 1993
Circ. crack ~ 3(7.6 cm) long, observed in PORV safe end
> KRAKFLO recommended values for IGSCC used in
benchmark analysis
Both cracks analyzed considering various modeling
techniques for crack shape
Uncertainty in loading considered for Duane Arnold case
13-124
Duane Arnold Event with IGSCC
Thermal
Sleeve weld
Safe end
Crevice
Thermal
Sleeve weld
Safe end
Crevice
Source for Sketch: Draft MRP -140 Report
13-125
Benchmarking of KRAKFLO to Field Data
Duane Arnold Inlet Nozzle Safe End Circ. Flaw
Case # Flaw Length
(in)
Bending
Moment
Load
(in-lbs)
Crack Shape
1
Leak Rate
(gpm)
1 7.2 225,000 Parallel 3.07
2 7.63 225,000 Divergent 3.43
3 7.2 negligible Parallel 1.5
4 7.63 negligible Divergent 1.7
1
Parallel length of crack is constant through the wall thickness
Divergent - crack at ID plane less than crack at OD or exit plane
Note: Cases 1 and 2 (with applied moment loads) represent realistic conditions
Comparison to measured data: Duane Arnold had an unidentified
leakage rate of 3 gpm into the primary containment sump.
13-126
Benchmarking of KRAKFLO to Field Data
Palisades PORV Safe End Circ. Flaw
Case
#
Flaw Type and Length Crack
Shape
1
Leak Rate
(gpm)
1 6 discontinuous cracks, each 0.5 long Parallel 6 x 0.0089
= 0.05
2 6 discontinuous cracks, each 0.75 long Parallel 6 x 0.0265
= 0.16
3 Single crack, 1.5 long Parallel 0.17
4 Single crack, 2.25 long Parallel 0.55
5 6 discontinuous cracks, each 0.5 long Convergent 6 x 0.019
= 0.11
6 6 discontinuous cracks, each 0.55 long Convergent 6 x 0.0245
= 0.15
7 Single crack, 2.25 @ ID and 3.0 @ OD Divergent 1.12
1
Parallel length of crack is constant through the wall thickness
Convergent crack at ID plane greater than crack at OD or exit plane
Divergent - crack at ID plane less than crack at OD or exit plane
Cases 5 and 6 represent realistic crack configuration.
Comparison to measured data: Palisades observed steam leak with
leak rate of ~0.2 gpm.
13-127
Phase III: -- Leak Rate Sensitivity Study
> Following successful benchmarking of KRAKFLO
to field & test SCC data, a sensitivity study was
performed on:
5 different LBB piping systems involving Alloy 82/182
Butt Welds
> Objective: Determine percent increase in crack
length when considering crack with a SCC
morphology in lieu of a fatigue crack
> The results from this limited group of piping
systems showed that:
On average, the percent increase in crack length is
about 37%
13-128
KRAKFLO RESULTS OF SENSITIVITY STUDY
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
Length of Leaking Fatigue Crack, mm
L
e
n
g
t
h

o
f

L
e
a
k
i
n
g

S
C
C

C
r
a
c
k
,

m
m
IGSCC
y = 1.37x
Length of leaking SCC Crack = 1.37*length of Fatigue Crack
5 LBB Piping Systems
-- RV Outlet
-- RV Inlet
-- Pressurizer Surge
-- Decay Heat
-- Cold Leg to Safe End
13-129
2003 EMC
2
> In 1995, improved model of crack morphology
parameters proposed in NUREG/CR-6004
Parameters such as surface roughness, number of turns
were determined to be based on ratio of COD and global
roughness.
Values calculated using interpolation procedure.
Actual flow path length found to depend on number of
turns.
Equations established using engineering judgment
> This model incorporated in recent version of
SQUIRT leak rate code
> Sensitivity study performed on 6 different LBB
piping systems to study %increase in crack
length when SCC morphology is considered
13-130
2003 EMC
2
> PWSCC crack morphology parameters:
Determined from limited in-service cracks using
photomicrographs
Mean and standard deviation of crack morphology
parameters were used for the sensitivity analysis
> Results of their sensitivity study (for Battelle and
NRC) showed the following average increase in
SCC crack lengths over fatigue crack lengths:
69% increase in crack length for PWSCC morphology, and
89% increase in crack length for IGSCC morphology
13-131
> A 3-Phase systematic approach was used to:
Benchmark KRAKFLO to SCC tests
Benchmark to field service data
Perform sensitivity study on 5 LBB piping systems from two
NSS Vendor designs
Above evaluations performed using consistent set of crack
morphology variables
> From LBB perspective: SCC crack morphology over
Fatigue Cracks:
KRAKFLO predicts a 37% increase for IGSCC morphology
EMC
2
predicts a 89% increase for IGSCC morphology
EMC
2
predicts a 69% increase for PWSCC morphology
> Disparity in IGSCC results between EMC
2
and this study
needs to be investigated further
> No V&V has been performed for new version of SQUIRT
with improved model for SCC (presently NRC has no plans)
13-132
Comparison of SQUIRT to
Battelle Phase II data:
Only published work --
based on earlier version
of SQUIRT Code
SQUIRT predicted results
showed significant scatter
in data (+/- 50%) for
cracks with a COD of 220
Pm.
Since these cracks
produced leak rates in 2
to 3 gpm range, they are
important for
benchmarking for LBB
13-133
> KRAKFLO has been demonstrated to be a good
pre-predictive leak rate code for SCC morphology
against presently available SCC data
> EMC
2
2003 presentation work:
Not benchmarked to Battelle Phase II data or field
service data
Based on morphology parameters that were statistically
determined for a probabilistic evaluation
> LBB methodology and this study are based on:
Deterministic evaluation
Considers a safety factor of 10 to account for
uncertainties in geometry, materials and loading
13-134
Recommendations for Future Study
> To address the disparity in SCC predicted results
using KRAKFLO versus EMC
2
work:
It is suggested that the SQUIRT Code (with COD based
improved model) be used to benchmark against the
Battelle Phase II data as well as to the field data (as a
minimum)
Benchmarking using consistent basis for determining
crack morphology parameters
Following successful benchmarking, a sensitivity study
can then be performed and compared against the factor
of 1.37 or ~ 1.4 determined in this study for the SCC
morphology
13-135
Potential Cracking in Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles
Chris Morgan
Westinghouse
Haymaker and Northern Pike
Monroeville, PA 15146
morgance@westinghouse.com
Abstract
Due to the generic nature of this issue across much of the domestic PWR fleet and the
broader industry efforts to manage Alloy 600 issues, a coordinated fleet-wide response to
reactor vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzle (BMN) cracking has been determined to be
appropriate under NEI Initiative 03-08. Therefore, a coordinated response combining the
efforts and resources of the WOG, the B&WOG, and the MRP has been developed.
The BMN Program is addressing issues associated with potential cracking in the BMNs,
and the impacts of leakage or failure of one or more BMNs. The WOG BMN program
applies to domestic Westinghouse NSSS designs and Combustion Engineering designs
with bottom mounted nozzles. The B&WOG has a similar program to address the B&W
NSSS design. Both programs are being coordinated; several of the tasks are being
completed jointly; task summary reports are being provided to EPRI/MRP. EPRI/MRP
will produce an overall industry report addressing the overall risk associated with
cracking of BMNs and will provide inspection and repair contingencies.
The following activities are being completed in the WOG BMN program:
x Design Basis Investigation and Inspection Summary
x Design and Fabrication of BMI Nozzles
x Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
x Integrity Evaluation
x Risk Evaluation
x Small Break LOCA Analyses
x LOCA forces and reactor cavity compartment pressurization forces
x Emergency Response Guidelines
The following activities are being completed in the B&WOG program:
x Support of Industry Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
x Design and Manufacturing Data Collection
x Loss of Coolant Accident Analysis
x Collateral Damage Assessment
x Finite Element Stress Analysis of Existing Configuration
x Deterministic Fracture Mechanics Analyses
x Probability of Tube Failure
x Wastage Assessment
x Probability of Head Failure
x Core Damage Frequency
The following activities are being completed under the direction of EPRI/MRP:
13-137
x Industry Operation & Inspection History and Ongoing Industry Inspection
Results
x Conditional Core Damage Probability
x Regulatory Requirements
x BMN Management Plan
x Backup and Proprietary Documents
13-138
Slide 1
Potential Cracking in Reactor Vessel
An Industry Approach
WOG and BWOG
13-139
Slide 2
z Background
z Materials and Fabrication Records
z Summary of Geometries
z Selection Criteria for Representative Cases
z Preliminary Integrity Results for Axial, Circumferential Flaws
z Collateral Damage Assessment (B&WOG)
z FMEA
z Small Break LOCA Evaluation
z Risk Evaluation
z Summary of Interim Status
13-140
Slide 3
Background
z RV upper head penetrations have cracked and leaked in many plants
z Concern raised about the Bottom Penetrations
z > 25 plants inspected to date (Volumetric) worldwide, only South Texas has
shown cracks and leaks (2)
z Safety Assessments are underway for all operating PWRs with these
penetrations
z Coordinated fleet-wide response to Bottom Mounted Nozzle (BMN) cracking
consistent with NEI Initiative 03-08
z WOG and BWOG are leading the effort, with continuous interaction with EPRI
MRP
13-141
Slide 4
Critical information collected and documented:
x Outline drawings including bill of materials
and configuration
x Material certifications including heat
numbers, chemistry, and mechanical
properties
x Fabrication sequence and applicable welding
processes, and BMN guide tube design
Materials and Fabrication Records
13-142
Slide 5
Alloy 600
Alloy 82 or 182
Alloy 182
Leak Path
Through Original
Nozzle Wall
Alloy 600
Geometry: Westinghouse Design vs.
B&W Design
Representative WDesign B&W Design
13-143
Slide 6
Variety of Westinghouse BMI
Nozzles
13-144
Slide 7
Geometry Comparison
0.58 1.67 in. 0.45 0.587 in. 1.5 in. Westinghouse
1.99 in. 1.125 in. 3.0 in. CE
1.10 in. 0.21 in. (bottom)
0.69 in. (top)
1.03 in. (bottom)
2.0 in. (top)
B&W
J Groove
Weld Length
Tube Thickness Tube OD
13-145
Slide 8
Evaluation Process
z 3-D Elastic Plastic FE Analyses Completed On
Five Geometries
CE plant
3 W
1 B&W
z Critical Flaw Sizes Calculated
z Crack Growth
Axial and Circ Flaws (surface and thru-wall)
Same methods used as for upper head penetrations
Highest stress along the tube used
13-146
Slide 9
Axial Flaws: Preliminary
Results
z Critical Thru-Wall Flaw Length
CE plant: 35
Wplants : 13
B&W plants: 4.77
Axial flaw not likely to reach critical size
z Surface Flaw to Leakage
Effect of flaw shape, initial depth investigated
ID and OD axial flaws behave similarly
Axial flaw governs time required for leakage
At least 12 years required from ID flaw initiation to
leakage
13-147
Slide 10
Circumferential Flaws:
Preliminary Results
z Critical Through-Wall Flaw Length
CE plant: 324
Wplant : 320
B&W plant: 339
At least 9 years required from leak to critical
length
13-148
Slide 11
Collateral Damage
Assessment (B&WOG)
z Prepared a deterministic collateral damage assessment which calculated loads
on nearby BMNs due to failure of a single BMN considering:
Asymmetric cavity pressure effects
Pipe whip
Direct jet impingement
RV insulation frame movement
z The critical circ. flaw size of a flawed nozzle at the inside surface of the RV is
110 degrees
z Results will be used in a probabilistic assessment of BMN collateral damage
13-149
Slide 12
FMEA
z Team Included W, AREVA, and utility representatives
z BMN subcomponents defined for consideration (BMN penetration tube, J-
groove weld, thimble tube, etc.)
z List of failure mechanisms defined (fatigue, PWSCC, vibration, etc.)
z Failure modes considered (J-groove weld/lack of fusion, BMN penetration/axial
flaw above the weld, etc.)
z Failure effects identified (crack, leak, loose part, jet impingement, etc.)
z Failure dispositioned based upon detectability (actionable, not-actionable)
z Output of BMN FMEA provided input required to address failure mechanisms
and locations where an inspection program should focus
13-150
Slide 13
z Westinghouse 2, 3, and 4 loop HP and LP, and CE ECCS systems
evaluated
z ECCS systems for Westinghouse designs can mitigate break sizes
greater than ID of one BMN.
z CE system design can mitigate a break size greater than ID of 5 BMNs.
z Success criteria evaluated in PRA is one train of ECCS injecting into all
lines with operator action to start cooldown and depressurization at 45
minutes at rate of 100 degrees F/hr.
z B&W ECCS can mitigate break sizes of the ID of 3 BMNs.
Small Break LOCA Analyses:
Preliminary Results
13-151
Slide 14
Risk Evaluation: W/CE (Preliminary)
* Used initial flaw area bench-marked for reference plant to give probabilities of an axial
through-wall flaw of 34% and 36% after 10 and 11 years of operation, respectively
5.49E-
09
9.04E-
03
575 6.08E-07 3.41E-
05
2.43E-
05
Circ. Full
Break
0.0 0.0 1.0 1.04E-06 5.63E-05 4.16E-05 Circ. Detect.
Leak
0.0 0.0 < 0.1 1.60E-06 9.01E-05 6.38E-05 Circ. Through
Wall
0.0 0.0 1.0 1.00E-05 4.21E-04 4.00E-04 Axial Detect.
Leak
0.0 0.0 < 0.1 1.61E-05 6.82E-04 6.43E-04 Axial Through
Wall
Change
In CDF
CCD
Prob.
GPM
Leak
Freq.
Per Year
60-Year
Prob.*
40-Year
Prob.*
Flaw
Type
Failure
Mode
13-152
Slide 15
Summary of Interim Status
z Integrity Evaluations for 3 WPlants, 1 B&W , and
1 CE Plant Completed
z Preliminary Results (W/CE)
Small change in CDF of 5.49E-09, for new BMN
event, Negligible by definition of RG 1.174
z Periodic visual exam sufficient to avoid nozzle
ejection
z 10 year volumetric ISI is sufficient to ensure no
leakage
13-153
1
Summary of NRC funded Efforts Involving
Alloy 600 Base Material and Weldments
for Piping and CRDM Applications
By
G. Wilkowski , D. Rudland, W. Cheng, Y. Chen, and Y. Wang - Emc2
P. Scott and F. Brust - Battelle-Columbus
Abstract
This paper summarizes a number of recently completed and on-going efforts that involve
structural integrity assessments of piping and CRDM nozzles that involve Alloy 600 and its
weldments. The piping work is from the recently completed Battelle Integrity of Nuclear
Piping (BINP) program that was internationally funded, and the on-going NRC Loss-of-
Coolant Accident (LOCA) Redefinition program. The CRDM work is from the completed
NRC CRDM Cracking Phase I - Improved Probabilistic Model Development for Time to
Failure from Leakage program and the on-going NRC Phase II Alloy 600 Cracking
program. Future plans from these programs will be discussed, as well as plans for a new
international pipe integrity program called MERIT this is based more on probabilistic piping
LOCA predictions and associated deterministic methodologies.
Summary
The authors of this paper are involved in several programs for the US NRC that deal with
PWSCC cracking in In82/182 welds and Alloy 600. The work on piping butt welds involves
projects for Redefinition of Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Requirements, as well as the
development of a technical basis for a new Regulatory Guide for leak-before-break (LBB) and
considerations for piping that has been approved for LBB but is susceptible to PWSCC.
Additionally there is a separate program looking as PWSCC cracking for CRDM nozzles.
In the work for LOCA redefinition for piping, two parallel efforts were being undertaken. The
first was to estimate the LOCA probabilities through an elicitation panel. This involved 12 non-
NRC panel members with a significant amount of experience in several technical areas that were
needed. PWSCC was a factor that the participants had to account for in their individual
predictions. Those predictions were then used by the NRC staff to get mean predictions of
LOCA frequencies as a function of pipe diameter. This elicitation effort considered only normal
operating conditions; seismic considerations are being accounted for in a separate study.
The parallel effort to the LOCA elicitation efforts involves the development of a probabilistic
computer code for LOCA predictions. This is a new code that involves implementation of recent
and development of additional deterministic analyses for residual stress fields, leak rate, and
fracture. Perhaps more importantly is developments in the code to be able to predict crack
growth and multiple initiation sites for SCC mechanisms more realistically than any existing
piping probabilistic fracture mechanics code. For instance, the PRAISE code has the capability
to make predictions for IGSCC, but the accuracy was not well documented. Recent analyses
were conducted for BWR piping with IGSCC using the older water chemistry of plants to predict
the size of crack in a 12-inch diameter recirculation line after 25 years, see Figure 1. Actual
13-155
2
service experience showed cracks much longer in length than the predictions. Furthermore, if a
crack was to occur in a pipe girth weld, there is a higher probability that a second or third crack
might initiation than considering that these additional cracks would occur on a totally random
basis. If there are additional cracks, then something needs to be known about how closely those
cracks might be spaced. This information needs to be obtained from service experience. Figure
2, shows an example of examining IGSCCs from the 28-inch diameter Nine Mile Point Unit 1
main recirculation loop that was taken out of service. Additional service data of this type are
needed to generate statistic relationships that would make the analyses more realistic.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
half surface length, b, inches
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
c
r
a
c
k

d
e
p
t
h
,

a
,

i
n
c
h
e
s
Figure 1 PRAISE code predictions for IGSCC in 12 diameter BWR recirculation
piping using old water chemistry for 25 years
0
5
10
15
20
25
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Shortest distance to encompass all initiation sites,
percent of circumference
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d

i
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
o
n

s
i
t
e
s
Mean curve
2 standard deviation curves
Figure 2 IGSCC data from PT tests on 21 welds removed from Nine Mile Point
28 diameter main recirculation line in 1982
For PWSCC cracking in piping, a significant amount of work is being done to better understand
if there are situations where long circumferential surface cracks could develop in In82/182
welds. The analyses performed for VC Summer properly showed the locations where cracks
occurred, see Figure 3. Additional analyses, including weld repairs, are planned for the near
future.
13-156
3
30. 18. 6. -6. -18. -30.
Circumferential
crack location
(at high stress location
in cladding)
30. 18. 6. -6. -18. -30.
Circumferential
crack location
in cladding)
50. 30. 10. -10. -30. -50.
Leak location
(coincides with high stress
location at OD crown)
50. 30. 10. -10. -30. -50.
Leak location
Leak location
(a) Axial stresses (b) Hoop stresses
Figure 3 Comparison of crack locations and residual stress analyses for VC Summer
For CRDM nozzles, there is a separate program investigating residual stresses in J-welds under
various conditions, circumferential cracking above the J-weld, and axial cracks for assessment of
the recent ASME Section XI Code Case N-694-1. Numerous results will be shown to see the
effects of weld groove geometry, weld sequencing, and how stresses may change after welding
on tubes that were given a surface treatment to produce compressive surface stresses.
For axial cracks in CRDM tubes, 37 very detailed FE analyses were conducted in tubes with
simulated weld residual stresses and axial crack in the tubes. This provided some suggested
enhancements on how to properly conduct the analyses in Code Case N-694-1. Additionally, the
results showed that if the Code Case analysis procedure was to be used, then to properly predict
the crack shapes found in service (see Figure 5), then the crack growth rate in the length
direction of the surface flaw needed to be increase on the average by a factor 15. This was
because the K values at the deepest point in the surface cracks were 2 to 3 times greater than at
the ends of the surface cracks. Using the general PWSCC equation from the Code Case gave
growth rates of 5 to 10 times greater in the depth than length directions, whereas the service
experience shows the cracks are growing 2 to 5 times faster in length than depth.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 1 2 3 4
axial length, inch
d
e
p
t
h
,

i
n
c
h
nozzle 1 data
nozzle 2 data
nozzle 3 data
nozzle 5 data
nozzle 47 data
tube thickness
0.75t
1:1 line
2:1
3:1
4:1
5:1
Figure 4 Shape of axial surface cracks from actual CRDM head showing length 2
to 5 times depth
13-157
1
Summary of NRC Funded Efforts Involving
Alloy 600 Base Material and Weldments
for Piping and CRDM Applications
by
G. Wilkowski, D. Rudland, W. Cheng, Y. Chen, Y. Wang - Emc
2
P. Scott, F. Brust - Battelle-Columbus
EPRI PWSCC Conference
March 2005
13-158
2
March 2005
Several NRC-RES Structural Integrity/Materials programs are
involved in evaluation of Alloy 600 cracking.
LB-LOCA redefinition program (Rob Tregoning/Carolyn
Fairbanks NRC-RES)
Considers Alloy 600 pipe butt welds
CRDM Phase II Alloy 600 Cracking (Wally Norris/Joel Page
NRC-RES)
Extension of work done in Phase I program
Examination of:
Circumferential crack analyses in CRDM nozzles for probabilistic time
to failure from leakage (similar to Dominion/SIA for EPRI/MRP)
Axial crack evaluations for Code Case N-694-1
13-159
3
LB-LOCA Redefinition Program
Program objective:
To determine the probability of pipe breaks as a function of opening area to
assess if the LB-LOCA size (DEGB of largest pipe) can be changed for ECCS
requirements.
Considerations for In82/182 welds and Alloy 600
Need to consider all current and potential future degradation mechanisms
(i.e., PWSCC) since virtually all US plant to have life extension from 40 to 60
years of operation.
Technical basis for new LBB Regulatory Guide
Considerations for pipe already approved for LBB but susceptible to PWSCC
Two paths for LOCA redefinition evaluations
Near-term estimates by expert panel (Elicitation Group 12 non-NRC
members for normal operating conditions), as well as separate study for
consideration of seismic contributions.
Development of improved probabilistic pipe fracture mechanics code
Includes many deterministic aspects that have been developed in various NRC
piping programs that are not in current piping PFM codes
13-160
4
Development of Improved Probabilistic Pipe Fracture
Mechanics Code
Including many deterministic fracture mechanics aspects from
past NRC programs, and some on-going developments.
Improved leak-rate code (Windows version of SQUIRT) with PWSCC
crack morphology parameters (roughness, number of turns, actual
flow path to thickness) determined from service removed cracks.
Many other improvements to SQUIRT code
Recent revision of SQUIRT given to MRP
Developed In82/182 weld metal J-R curves
Cracks in center of weld or in buttering had higher toughness than crack
along fusion line. In 82/182 weld metal much tougher than stainless steel
SA/SAW weld metal (in 2004 PVP paper).
Examination of LBB for pipe sensitive to PWSCC
With more tortuous flow path, the PWSCC leakage crack size is about 1.7
times longer than the LBB submitted crack lengths, so difficult to satisfy
LBB requirement of a SF of 2 between leakage crack size and crack size
at N+SSE.
Need to redo analyses with tougher weld metal J-R curves
13-161
5
March 2005
Developments of interest for piping (continued):
Determination of number of flaws and weld repairs in several
bimetallic cold-leg welds from a cancelled CE plant
PNNL effort, 7 weld repairs found in 3 cold-leg welds (3 repairs in one weld)
ID surface
OD surface
13-162
6
March 2005
Residual stresses in bimetallic welds
VC Summer and CE cold-leg weld analyzed to date
Encouraging results on next two VGs
Summer was non-PWHT weld that originally had major repairs
Examining several bimetallic geometries and cases
Hot leg (30 diameter)
As-welded
PWHT
Repair welded (2 depths)
Repair welded and then PWHT
Vary strength of base metals and weld metal for probabilistic input
Surge-line nozzle weld (10-14 diameter)
Safety injection or other smaller diameter lines (4 to 8 diameter)
13-163
7
VC Summer - Hoop Residual Stresses at Operating Temperature (After All
Welding, Hydro-Test, and Heat Up) Repair welding outside then inside
Leak location
50. 30. 10. -10. -30. -50.
13-164
8
VC Summer - Axial Residual Stresses at Operating Temperature (After All
Welding, Hydro-Test, and Heat-Up) Repair weld outside then inside
30. 18. 6. -6. -18. -30.
Circumferential
crack location
in cladding)
Buttered region
13-165
9
Important Consideration for LBB and PWSCC is Whether Large
Circumferential Cracks Could Occur in Butt Welds
Other In82/182 weld geometries to be examined to see if high longitudinal
stress location moves toward main weld
13-166
10
Other Considerations for PWSCC in Piping
Historical Similarities
Last weld pass was on the ID root procedure used in original 9-Mile
Point BWR main recirculation line piping that experienced significant
IGSCC cracking.
Similar procedure for many large
diameter pipe In82/182 welds,
i.e., CE cold-leg weld.
13-167
11
March 2005
Other considerations for LOCA Probabilistic code
Including methods to incorporate multiple crack initiation and
potential for development of long surface crack real threat
to LOCA and LBB.
PRAISE code ineffective for predicting length of IGSCCs
PRAISE run for IGSCC using
old BWR water chemistry for
25 years in 12 diameter
recirculation piping.
Predicted cracks
length significantly shorter
than service experience.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
half surface length, b, inches
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
c
r
a
c
k

d
e
p
t
h
,

a
,

i
n
c
h
e
s
Half crack length, inch
C
r
a
c
k

d
e
p
t
h
,

i
n
c
h
13-168
12
March 2005
Other considerations for LOCA Probabilistic code
IGSCC growth rate on surface of ID surface cracks was 4 times greater than
in depth direction
Hypothesis - stresses on surface close to ends of crack at higher stresses, so there may
be near tip multiple initiations giving a higher effective growth rate on surface. Cannot be
determined from lab specimen testing!
Need to consider if there is a SCC crack formed, what is the likelihood of
additional cracks forming service history driven
If there are multiple cracks, how closely are they spaced around the circumference
0
5
10
15
20
25
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Shortest distance to encompass all initiation sites,
percent of circumference
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d

i
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
o
n

s
i
t
e
s
Mean curve
2 standard deviation curves
Nine-Mile Point 28 Recirculation IGSCC data - 1982
Looking for similar data for
cracks documented by PT in
other pipe systems, IGSCC
as well as other cracking
mechanisms and various diameters
13-169
13
CRDM Phase II Alloy 600 Cracking Program
On-going Phase II program
Additional residual stress solutions for different conditions
Weld sequencing
Effect of welding on tubes with surface compressive stress treatments
Comparisons with Dominion Engineering solutions
Emc
2
Full head, monotonic stress-strain curves of annealed weld metal and
base metals, simulate each weld bead (14 to 24 weld beads) with 9 to 16
elements in each weld bead.
Dominion Engineering Part of head, many times used cyclic stress-strain
curve with weld metal modeled as elastic-perfectly plastic, and with two weld
passes per analysis
K solutions for circumferential through-wall cracks
Axial surface crack K solutions for Code Case procedures
Code Case N-694 assessments
13-170
14
Overall Modeling Strategy
K-Solution Analysis
Applying the service load (pressure and temperature)
Unzipping the cracked mesh
Calculation of K-solution
Curve-fit for use in probabilistic code structure
1
2
3
5
4
6
7
9
8
10
11
12
13
Weld
Height
1
2
3
5
4
6
7
9
8
10
11
12
13
1
2
3
5
4
6
7
9
8
10
11
12
13
Weld
Height
Stress Mapping
Transferring all solution variables (stress tensor, strain tensors, displacement, BC)
from weld stress mesh to a pinned-crack mesh
Weld Stress Analysis
Simulate heat treatment for stress relieving
Installing tube into RPV head by shrinkage fit
Simulate welding the J-groove
Hydro-testing
13 to 20 elements in each weld pass to
deal with the temperature and stress
gradients in the weld region
13-171
15
Center-Hole Nozzle - J/K-solutions
Low strength tube
Equivalent plastic strains
High strength tube
13-172
16
Many Sensitivity Studies on Center-Hole Nozzle
Example sensitivity study: Center-hole nozzle K
max
versus K
avg
(Average value used in Emc
2
and SIA/MRP analyses)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Half angle, degrees
K
e
q
,

k
s
i
-
i
n
0
.
5
Case 1 - 605F - low yield - 0mil - average
Case 1 - 605F - low yield - 0mil - max
Case 6 - 605F - high yield - 0mil - average
Case 6 - 605F - high yield - 0mil - max
3 ksi-in
0.5
20 ksi-in
0.5
13-173
17
Recent Nozzle Geometry Study Center hole
13-174
18
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
50 100 150 200 250 300
Vertical Distance to Top of the Head (mm)
H
o
o
p

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
M
P
a
)
G. Ang.=15, Hw=20 mm G. Ang.=22.5, Hw=20 mm G. Ang.=45, Hw=20 mm
Root of weld with 20-mm height Root of weld with 31-mm height
Root of weld with 28-mm height
In-Service ID Hoop Stress
Effect of groove angle and weld height low yield tube
Larger angle gives
slightly lower
hoop stresses
60-mm (2.36)
46-mm (1.8)
20 ksi (137 MPa)
13-175
19
In-Service Axial Stress Through Thickness of Tube
(2mm above weld root) - Effect of groove angle and weld height
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
0 4 8 12 16
Radial Distance to the Tube ID (mm)
A
x
i
a
l

S
t
r
e
s
s

(
M
P
a
)
Weld root location
ID surface of tube
OD surface of tube
Weld height controls axial stresses
13-176
20
Weld Height Effects on Axial Stress Change is Attributed to
Hinging Action around Initial Weld Beads
13-177
21
Sidehill Nozzle - Weld Geometry/Meshing
70,000 nodes and 64,000 8-node linear brick elements in the side-hill model.
1.35-in
1.7-in
1.35-in
1.7-in
53
13-178
22
Recent Comparison of Weld Sequencing
for Sidehill Nozzle
Original sidehill nozzle weld sequencing in
Phase I program involved welding in 90-degree
segments on sides first then 90-degree segments
on down-hill and up-hill sides.
1
st
weld sequence
side quadrant
2
nd
weld sequence
side quadrant
3
rd
weld sequence
down-hill quadrant
4
th
weld sequence
up-hill quadrant
Recent efforts involve creating the weld beads
completely around the circumference all at one
time (flash weld). Similar to Dominion
Engineering efforts for EPRI/MRP.
Start - Downhill
Finish Uphill
Newer heads may use a weld sequence that
starts at the downhill side and goes toward the
uphill side with alternating short segments.
(Look at in the future.)
13-179
23
Comparison of Weld Sequencing for Sidehill Nozzle
(After welding at room temperature)
Axial stresses making the weld beads all at
once (Dominion/EPRI/MRP analysis
procedure)
Max = 750 MPa
Axial stresses making weld in 90-degree
arcs (Emc
2
Phase I procedure following
a US PWR manufacturer procedure)
Max = 872 MPa
Magnitude of maximum axial stresses higher in 90-degree weld sequencing,
and peak axial stress locations in tube sensitive to weld sequencing
13-180
8
VC Summer - Axial Residual Stresses at Operating Temperature (After All
Welding, Hydro-Test, and Heat-Up) Repair weld outside then inside
30. 18. 6. -6. -18. -30.
Circumferential
crack location
in cladding)
Buttered region
13-181
25
Effectiveness of Surface Compressive Stress Treatment
Study using center-hole nozzle (axisymmetric)
First introduce compressive residual stresses in tube prior to
conducting weld simulation analyses room temperature, no
interference fit
Compressive stresses in the surface
layers of 0.04-inch (-1 mm) deep
Triple Point
2t (t = tube thickness)
Triple Point
Hoop stresses
Triple Point
Triple Point
Axial stresses
13-182
26
Comparison of hoop stresses after welding on tubes with
and without surface stress treatment
Tube without
compressive surface stress
treatment prior to welding
Tube with
treatment prior to welding
Axial cracks could still
form in this region
This area could be surface
stress treated after welding
13-183
27
Comparison of axial stresses after welding on tubes with
and without surface stress treatment
Tube without
Tube with
Axial stress increased above the triple point
This area could be surface
stress treated after welding
13-184
28
CRDM Nozzle Axial Crack Evaluations
Objective: Conduct detailed FE analyses to see what guidance
needed to validate the ASME Code Case N694 procedures
Code Case does not specify how stresses in tube should be determined
typical FE analyses
Code Case analytical solutions assume stress through the thickness is
constant down the axis of the tube
Used center-hole and steepest side-hill nozzle residual stress solutions
from Phase I program
Mapped residual stresses on new model with pinned axial surface cracks
of different length, depth, locations (from the weld, and uphill or down-hill
locations)
Unpin the cracks and solve for the K solutions along the entire crack front
Suggested enhancements given to NRC and presented to ASME
Section XI WGFE (May 2004 and March 2005)
13-185
29
Parametric Analysis Matrix
Case
#
Weld residual
stress case
Crack location
a/t
considered
Half crack lengths
considered, mm
1 Sidehill
Uphill ID side, centered 67.5
mm from bottom of J-weld
0.25, 0.50,
0.75
16.88, 33.75, 67.5
2 Sidehill
Downhill OD side, centered
30 mm from bottom of J-weld
0.25, 0.50,
0.75*
10, 12, 14.5
3 Sidehill
Uphill ID side, centered 33
mm from bottom of J-weld
0.25, 0.50,
0.75
67.5
4
Low yield
Centerhole
ID, centered 30 mm from
bottom of J-weld
0.25, 0.50,
0.75
17.5, 22.5, 29
5
High yield
Centerhole
ID, centered 30 mm from
bottom of J-weld
0.25, 0.50,
0.75
17.5, 22.5, 29
* Only the longest crack had a/t=0.75 in order to keep c/a>1.
37 FE Cases
13-186
30
Operating and residual stress in side-hill CRDM nozzle
Tube
thickness
13-187
31
K-solutions Longer Crack Case
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Crack front angle, deg
K
e
q
,

M
P
a
-
m
0
.
5
Crack Tip where
stress was taken
Solid line - Newman-Raju with stress at crack center
Dashed line - Newman-Raju with stress at crack tip
Circle - Anderson with stress at crack center
Triangle - Anderson with stress at crack tip
Diamond - FEM
a/t=0.25, 2c=135mm
Uphill, internal crack
Path
dependence
issues
13-188
32
K-solutions Variable Gradient Along Crack Length
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Crack Front Angle, deg
K
e
q
,

M
P
a
-
m
0
.
5
a/t=0.25, 2c=45mm
Centerhole, internal crack
Crack Tip where
stress was taken
Solid line - Newman-Raju with stress at crack center
Dashed line - Newman-Raju with stress at crack tip
Heavy solid line - Newman-Raju with maximum stress
Circle - Anderson with stress at crack center
Triangle - Anderson with stress at crack tip
Square - Anderson with maximum stress
Diamond - FEM High stress location
13-189
33
Consideration for Code Case N-694-1 Modification
FE K-solutions examined had K higher in depth direction than
length direction implying cracks should grow through
thickness easier. However, dimensions of actual crack lengths
frequently greater then depth.
BWR IGSCC service experience showed that the length of IGSCC surface
crack growth was ~4 times greater than could be calculated, i.e., crack growth
rate effectively 4 times higher on surface.
Analysis for crack growth only, does not consider new multiple initiation sites
close to crack tip, so needs to be conservative in crack length calculations.
Recently examined data for crack sizes from actual CRDM UT
evaluations to see in-service crack length versus crack depth
behavior to shed light on this concern.
Cant say which plant at this time, but RPV head already replaced.
13-190
34
Actual CRDM nozzle axial crack sizes
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
axial length, inch
d
e
p
t
h
,

i
n
c
h
nozzle 1 data
nozzle 2 data
nozzle 3 data
nozzle 5 data
nozzle 47 data
tube thickness
ASME Section XI Meeting - WGFE
March 1, 2005
Actual in-service CRDM axial crack data
Length was 2 to 5 times greater than depth, but K lower at ends
Actual CRDM nozzle axial crack sizes
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 1 2 3 4
axial length, inch
d
e
p
t
h
,

i
n
c
h
nozzle 1 data
nozzle 2 data
nozzle 3 data
nozzle 5 data
nozzle 47 data
tube thickness
0.75t
1:1 line
2:1
3:1
4:1
5:1
13-191
35
ASME Section XI Meeting - WGFE
March 1, 2005
Accounting for K at end of surface flaws is lower than K in
center shows
For cases examined in past CRDM FE axial crack report,
K at ends was 33 to 50% of K at center
Using crack growth equation in Code Case [da/dt = C(K-K
th
)
1.16
] gives
calculated da/dt at ends of surface flaw to be 10 to 20% of da/dt at the center
(2.5 to 5 times smaller growth on total length than in depth)
But service data says total crack length is 2 to 5 times larger than
depth!
A factor of 5 on crack growth rate in length direction is lower bound
to match service experience (could be factor of 5 to 25)
To get Code Case procedure to agree with service experience, average
growth rate at ends of surface flaw was a factor of ~14.6 greater then in
depth direction.
13-192
36
SUMMARY
Significant amount of work is being conducted in NRC LOCA
program for:
Development of probabilistic LOCA computer code
LBB Regulatory Guide and considerations of LBB for pipe susceptible to PWSCC
CRDM Alloy 600 Cracking Phase II program examining many
aspects relative to circumferential and axial cracking
Future program of consideration for EPRI/MRP/VIP is new
International Group program called MERIT similar
organization to past International Piping Integrity Research
Group Program (IPIRG) but for probabilistic pipe LOCA code
development and associated deterministic improvements
Main contractor is Battelle-Columbus (Emc
2
is subcontractor).
NRC, CANDU Owners Group, SKI, Rolls Royce Nuclear (UK), Korea (KINS,
KOPEC, KEPRI, KAERI), CRIEPI (Japanese utilities), Taiwan, possibly several
other countries.
Details for membership to MERIT can be obtained from Paul Scott at Battelle
(614) 424-5330 scottp@battelle.org.
13-193

A-1
A
APPENDIX A: AGENDA
Tamaya Resort, Santa Ana Pueblo, NM March 7-10, 2005


Keynote Speeches

K.1 8:20 AM David Mauldin Arizona Public Service U.S. Utility Keynote

K.2 9:00 AM Allen Hiser NRC Keynote

K.3 10:00 AM Robin Jones EPRI Keynote

K.4 10:40 AM Francois Cattant EDF - International Utility Keynote

K.5 Keynote Panel Discussion

1A Crack Growth and Initiation
Monday Afternoon, 3/7/05 Chair: John Hickling, EPRI

1A.1 1:00 PM G. A. White, DEI
MRP Development of Crack Growth Rate Disposition Curves for Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking
(PWSCC) of Thick-Section Alloy 600 Components and Alloy 82, 182, and 132 Weldments

1A.2 1:30 PM Richard J. Jacko, Westinghouse Electric Co.
Comparative PWSCC Crack Growth Rate Studies of Alloy 52M and Alloy 182 Weld Metals

1A.3 2:00 PM Yutaka Yamamoto, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES)
Outline of "Evaluation Technology for SCC Growth of Ni Base Alloys (NiSCC) Project" in Japan and
Current Results in PWR Environment

1A.4 2:50 PM J. E. Broussard, DEI
Finite-Element Analysis of Welding Residual Stresses in Piping Butt Weldments and their Effect on Crack
Tip Stress Intensity Factors

1A.5 3:20 PM Bryan Templeton, Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.
A Novel Approach for the Mitigation of PWSCC

1A.6 3:50 PM C. Guerre, CEA, France
Effect of Cyclic Loadings on the Stress Corrosion Crack Growth Rate in PWR Primary Water

1B Strategic Planning
Monday Afternoon, 3/7/05 Chair: Christine King, EPRI

1B.1 1:00 PM Shannon Chu, EPRIsolutions
MRP Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management (MRP-126)

1B.2 1:30 PM David Peltola, Duke Power Company
Programmatic Approach to the Management of PWSCC/Alloy 600 Issues

A-3
1B.3 2:00 PM G. A. White, DEI

1B.4 2:50 PM G. Elder, Westinghouse Electric Company Nuclear Services
Strategic Planning for Alloy 600 Programs

1B.5 3:05 PM Gutti Rao, Westinghouse
Probabilistic PWSCC Failure Assessment of Alloy 600/82/182 Reactor Vessel Subcomponents at Beznau
1&2 for a Sixty Year Life Extension

1B.6 3:30 PM Ronald J. Payne, Framatome ANP
A Matrix Evaluation of Repair/Modification Options for Reactor Pressure Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles

1B.7 4:00 PM Dave Waskey, Framatome ANP
Assessment of the Repair/Remediation/Mitigation Techniques for Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds

Tuesday, March 8, 2005

2A Cracking and Reliability Studies of Alloy 690
Tuesday Morning, 3/8 Chair: Bill Cullen, NRC

2A.1 8:00 AM Francois Vaillant, EDF
Assessment of PWSCC Resistance of Alloy 690: Overview of Laboratory Results and Field Experience

2A.2 8:30 AM Jean-Marie Boursier, EDF
A Review of PWSCC, Weldability, and Thermal Ageing of Nickel Weld Metals in PWR Primary Water

2A.3 9:00 AM Toshio Yonezawa, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

2A.4 10:00 AM John Hickling, EPRI
Status of MRP Work to Demonstrate the Long-Term Resistance of Alloys 690, 152 and 52 to PWSCC

2A.5 10:40 AM Peter L. Andresen, GE Research
PWSCC Growth Rates of Cold Worked Alloy 690 & Alloys 52/152 Weld Metal

2B Repair Methods and Technologies
Tuesday Morning, 3/8 Chair: Dana Couch, TVA

2B.1 8:00 AM William Sims, Entergy
Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly for Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Instrument Nozzles

2B.2 8:30 AM Bruce Newton, PCI Energy Services-Westinghouse
Small Pad Weld Repair of Pressurizer Heater Sleeves and BMI Nozzles

2B.3 9:00 AM Pedro Amador, Welding Service Inc.
Mid-Wall Weld Repairs for Pressurizer Heater Sleeves

2B.4 9:50 AM Warren H. Bamford, Westinghouse
The Embedded Flaw Process for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations

2B.5 10:20 AM Bruce Newton, PCI Energy Services-Westinghouse
Advances in Design and Implementation of Alloy 52 Structural Weld Overlay Repair Welding
A-4

2B.6 10:50 AM Pedro Amador, Welding Services Inc.
Beneficial Application of Alloy 52M Filler Materials to Dissimilar Metal Weldments

3A Laboratory Investigations of Cracks
Tuesday Afternoon, 3/8/05 Chair: Al McIlree, EPRI

3A.1 1:00 PM Steve Fyfitch, Framatome ANP
Laboratory Investigation of PWSCC of CRDM Nozzle 3 and its J-Groove Weld on the Davis-Besse

3A.2 1:30 PM James Hyres, BWXT Services, Inc.
Laboratory Investigation of the Stainless Steel Cladding on the Davis-Besse Reactor Vessel Head

3A.3 2:00 PM Al McIlree, EPRI
Laboratory Investigation of the Alloy 600 Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Nozzle Samples and Weld Boat
Sample from South Texas Project Unit 1

3A.4 2:50 PM Francois Cattant, EDF
Selection, Removal, Decontamination and NDE of North Anna 2 Retired Reactor Vessel Head CRDM
Penetrations

3A.5 3:20 PM Gutti Rao, Westinghouse
Destructive Examination of North Anna 2 Retired Reactor Vessel Head CRDM Penetration No. 54 (Status
Review)

3A.6 3:50 PM Steve Bruemmer, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
High-Resolution Analytical Electron Microscopy Characterization of Environment-Assisted Cracks in Alloy
182 Weldments

3B Field Experience - Mitigation and Repair
Tuesday Afternoon, 3/8/05 Chair: Pete Riccardella, SIA

3B.1 1:00 PM Dr. G. Gary Elder, Westinghouse Electric Company
Mitigation of PWSCC on Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles by Waterjet Peening

3B.2 1:30 PM Herbert Lenz, Westinghouse
Field Implementation Experience at Asco Unit 1 and 2 with Upper Head Temperature Reduction

3B.3 2:00 PM Dave Waskey, Framatome ANP
Alloy 52 Welding in Nuclear Applications: Performance Issues and Weldability Testing

3B.4 2:50 PM Mike Moran, FPL
Florida Power and Light Turkey Point 3 Reactor Vessel Closure Head Replacement

3B.5 3:05 PM Jeff Hydeman, Westinghouse
Westinghouse Experience with Reactor Vessel Head Replacements

3B.6 3:30 PM P. Riccardella, Structural Integrity Associates, for Rex Meeden, APS
Pre-emptive Pressurizer Heater Sleeve Repairs at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station

3B.7 4:00 PM Bert Kroes, Westinghouse Electric Belgium
RPV Outlet Nozzle Repair (SAFEPLAY) for Ringhals Units 3 and 4

A-5

Wednesday, March 9, 2005

4A Boric Acid Corrosion
Wednesday Morning, 3/9/05 Chair: Al Ahluwalia, EPRI

4A.1 8:00 AM Steve Fyfitch, Framatome ANP
Boric Acid Corrosion of the Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Head

4A.2 8:30 AM T. Satyan Sharma, American Electric Power Co. & WOG
Generic Guidance for an Effective Boric Acid Inspection Program for PWRs

4A.3 9:00 AM Al McIlree, EPRI
MRP Boric Acid Corrosion Testing Program Task 1 Static/RI and Task 3 Separate Effects/DEI

4A.4 9:50 AM Ryan Pedersen, Real-Time Software
Inspection Automation Software

4A.5 10:20 AM Dick Schemmel, Framatome ANP (AREVA)
FLS: Leak Detection System

4A.6 10:50 AM J. Pongpuak, University of New Brunswick
Corrosion of Reactor Pressure Vessel Steel by an Impinging Jet of PWR Coolant

4B Inspection Technologies and Planning
Wednesday Morning, 3/9/05 Chair: Terry McAlister, SCE&G

4B.1 8:00 AM Terry McAlister, SCE&G, for Mike Hacker, Framatome ANP
The Challenges of Compliance with ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, Performance Demonstration for
Ultrasonic Examination Systems

4B.2 8:30 AM Peter Riccardella, Structural Integrity Associates
Development of MRP Inspection Plan for RPV Top Head Nozzles Part I Nozzle Leakage, Ejection and
Examination Volume Evaluations

4B.3 9:00 AM G. A. White, DEI
Development of a Comprehensive Inspection Program for RPV Top Head Nozzles: Part II Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis, Wastage Evaluation, and Safety Assessment Report

4B.4 9:50 AM Christine King, EPRI, for Frank Ammirato, EPRI
Advances in NDE of Alloy 182 Components

4B.5 10:20 AM J. P. Lareau, Westinghouse Electric Co.
Experience in Reactor Head Nozzle and J Weld Inspections

4B.6 10:40 AM J. P. Lareau, Westinghouse Electric Co.
Thermal Imaging for the Detection of PWSCC in Alloy 82/182 Welds

5A Mitigation Methods
Wednesday Afternoon, 3/9/05 Chair: Gary Elder, Westinghouse

5A.1 1:00 PM Anne Demma, EPRI
Laser Peening: A Surface Stress Improvement Technique for Alloy 600 PWSCC Mitigation
A-6

5A.2 1:20 PM Ronald J. Payne, Framatome ANP
Application of Surface Stress Improvement for the Mitigation of Alloy 600 PWSCC

5A.3 1:40 PM Manu Badlani, AEA Technology Engineering Services, Inc.
The Applicability of MSIP for Mitigating PWSCC in Pressurizer Nozzle to Safe-end Welds

5A.4 2:10 PM Peter Riccardella, Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.
Preemptive Weld Overlays A Cost Effective Solution to PWSCC Concerns in PWR Piping System

5A.5 3:00 PM J. P. Lareau, Westinghouse Electric Co.
Corrosion Resistant Barriers for Repair and Mitigation of Alloy 600 Cracking

5A.6 3:30 PM Peter L. Andresen, GE Research
Effects of Dissolved H2, B/Li/pH and Zn on PWSCC of Alloy 600: Interim Report on MRP Testing

5A.7 4:00 PM J. Gorman, DEI
Review of Primary Chemistry Effects on PWSCC

5B Field Experience - Inspections
Wednesday Afternoon, 3/9/05 Chair: Dan Schlader, Framatome AREVA

5B.1 1:00 PM R. Grard, Tractebel Engineering
Situation of the Alloys 600 and 182 Issues in the Belgian Nuclear Power Plants

5B.2 1:30 PM A. Jenssen, Studsvik Nuclear
A Swedish Perspective on PWSCC of Alloy 182

5B.3 2:00 PM William Jensen, Nuclear Management Company, LLC - Point Beach Nuclear Plant
Control Rod Drive Mechanism Examinations at Point Beach Nuclear Plant

5B.4 2:50 PM P. Efsing, Ringhals
Some Recent Experiences on Stress Corrosion Cracking in B/P-WR Environments and
Remedies/Strategies from a Utility Point of View

5B.5 3:20 PM W. H. Bamford, Westinghouse
Cracking of Alloy 600 Nozzles and Welds in PWRs: A Review of Cracking Events and Repair Service
Experience

5B.6 3:50 PM Troy Wilfong, Arizona Public Service, for Ed Fernandez, Arizona Public Service

Thursday, March 10, 2005

6 Regulatory Issues
Thursday Morning, 3/10/05 Chair: Craig Harrington, TXU

6.1 8:00 AM Craig Harrington, TXU
EPRI MRP Alloy 600 Issue Task Group Interaction with the NRC

6.2 8:30 AM Jim Riley, NEI
Industry Management of Materials Degradation
A-7

6.3 9:00 AM Christine King, EPRI
Alloy 82/182 Piping Butt Welds: Developing Inspection Guidance

6.4 9:50 AM Ashok Nana, Framatome ANP
Comparison of Leak Rates from Alloy 82/182 Butt Weld Cracks for Leak-Before-Break Assessment

6.5 10:20 AM Chris Morgan, Westinghouse
Potential Cracking in Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles

6.6 10:50 AM G. Wilkowski
Summary of NRC Funded Efforts Involving Alloy 600 Base Material and Weldments for Piping and CRDM
Applications
A-8

B-1
B
APPENDIX B: ATTENDANCE LIST BY LAST NAME

March 12, 2005 Date:
Attendance List - By Last Name
EPRI: PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference
Kawaljit Ahluwalia
Project Manager
EPRI
3412 Hillview Ave.
Palo Alto, CA 94304
Tele: 650-855-2028
Fax: 650-855-2002
E-Mail: kahluwal@epri.com
Bogdan Alexandreanu
Nuclear Engineer
Argonne National Lab.
9700 S. Cass Avenue, Bldg 212, C207
Argonne, IL 60439
Tele: 630-252-5684
Fax:
E-Mail: abogdan@anl.gov
Gary Alkire
Sr. Engineer
Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road, Cantera
Warrenville, IL 60555
Tele: 630-657-3838
Fax: 630-657-4328
E-Mail: gary.alkire@exeloncorp.com
Lewis Allen
Engineer
South Texas Project
NSC - N3001, PO Box 289
Wadsworth, TX 77483
Tele: 361-972-8623
Fax: 361-972-8041
E-Mail: ldallen@stpegs.com
C. Thomas Alley Jr.
Technical Systems Manager II
Duke Energy
ECO7C / PO Box 1006
Charlotte, NC 28201-1006
Tele: 704-382-3993
Fax: 704-382-3797
E-Mail: ctalley@duke-energy.com
Pedro Amador
VP, Enginering
2225 Skyland Court
Norcross, GA 30071
Tele: 678-728-9236
Fax: 770-729-8242
E-Mail: pamador@wsi.aquilex.com
Claude Amzallag
Engineer
EDF - SEPTEN
12-14, Avenue Dutrivoz
Villeurbanne
FRANCE
Tele: 33-4-72-82-71-44
Fax: 33-4-72-82-76-99
E-Mail: claude.amzallag@edf.fr
Peter Andresen
GE Global Research
One Research Circle K1-3A39
Schenectady, NY 12309
Tele: 518-387-5929
Fax: 518-387-7007
E-Mail: andresen@crd.ge.com
Bud Auvil
VP Product Management
2225 Skyland Court
Norcross, GA 30071
Tele: 678-728-9261
Fax: 770-729-8242
E-Mail: AAuvil@wsi.aquilex.com
Manohar Badlani
Chief Engineer
AEA Technology Engineering SVCS
Pittsburgh, PA 15236
Tele: 412-655-1200
Fax: 412-655-2928
E-Mail: badlani@aeatech.com
Warren Bamford
Consulting Engineer
Westinghouse
4350 Northern Pike
Tele: 724-722-6049
Fax: 724-722-5597
E-Mail: bamforwh@westinghouse.com
Jim Bennetch
Engineer III
Dominion Generation
5000 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, VA 23060
Tele: 804-273-3169
Fax: 804-273-2653
E-Mail: jim_bennetch@dom.com
B-3
Michael Benson
TMI/Exelon
Box 480
Middletown, PA 17022
Tele: 717-948-8512
Fax:
E-Mail: mlbenson@amergenenergy.com
Thomas Bilik
Reactor Engineer
2443 Warrenville Road
Lisle, IL 60532
Tele: 630-829-9744
Fax: 630-515-1278
E-Mail: txb@nrc.gov; jma@nrc.gov
Cheryl Boggess
Sr. Project Mgr. and Principal Engineer/Primary
Systems Asset Management
Westinghouse
PO Box 158
Madison, PA 15663-0158
Tele: 724-722-6019
Fax: 724-722-5597
E-Mail: boggescl@westinghouse.com
R. Scott Boggs
Materials Programs Engineer
Florida Power and Light Co.
700 Universe Blvd.
Juno Beach, FL 33477
Tele: 561-694-4207
Fax:
E-Mail: scott_boggs@fpl.com
Jean Marie Boursier
Scientist
EDF
MMC - Le Renardiers
77818 Moret-Sur-Loing
FRANCE
Tele: 33-1-60-73-63-45
Fax: 33-1-60-73-68-89
E-Mail: jean-marie.boursier@edf.fr
John Broussard
11730 Plaza America Dr., Suite 310
Reston, VA 20190
Tele: 703-437-1155
Fax: 703-437-0780
E-Mail: jbroussard@domeng.com
Stephen Bruemmer
Laboratory Fellow
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
P.O. Box 999
Richland, WA 99352
Tele: 509-376-0636
Fax: 509-376-6308
E-Mail: bruemmer@pnl.gov
Michael Burke
Manager, Materials Center Of Excellence
1340 Beulah Rd.
Tele: 412-256-1788
Fax: 412-256-1221
E-Mail: burkema@westinghouse.com
T. David Burleigh
Associate Professor
New Mexico Tech
801 Leroy Place
Socorro, NM 87801-4796
Tele: 505-835-5831
Fax: 505-835-5626
E-Mail: burleigh@nmt.edu
Mike Carpenter
Mgr.,Comp Replacements
AREVA
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-3177
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: <ike.carpenter@framatome-anp.com
Carlos Castelao
CSN (Spanish Nuclear Regulatory Body
c / Justo Dorado, 11
Madrid
SPAIN
Tele: 34-913460271
Fax: 34-913460216
E-Mail: ccl@csn.es
Francois Cattant
Senior Engineer
EDF
MMC, Avenue des Renardires
Moret sur loing Cedex
FRANCE
Tele: 33-1-60-73-78-16
Fax: 33-1-60-73-68-89
E-Mail: francois.cattant@edf.fr
B-4
Shannon Chu
Technical Program Coordinator
EPRIsolutions
P.O. Box 10414
Palo Alto, CA 94034
Tele: 650-855-2897
Fax: 650-855-8588
E-Mail: schu@epri.com
Hansub Chung
Principal Researcher
Korea Electric Power Research Inst.
103-16 Munji-Dong, Yusung Gu
Nuclear Power Lab.
Dae Jon
Korea
Tele: 82-42-865-5641
Fax: 82-42-865-5514
E-Mail: kschung@kepri.re.kr
Jim Cirilli
PSEG Nuclear LLC
PO Box 236, MC X06
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-7461
Tele: 856-339-1856
Fax: 856-339-7461
E-Mail: james.cirilli@pseg.com
Jak Collins
NRC
11545 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MA 20555
Tele: 301-415-4038
Fax:
E-Mail: jxc@nrc.gov
Kerry Cooper
Senior Chemist
TXU Power
PO Box 1002, M33
Glen Rose, TX 76043-1002
Tele: 254-897-0462
Fax: 254-897-5066
E-Mail: kcooper3@TXU.com
Richard Corbit
ISI/Alloy 600 Programs Owner
Exelon Corp.
Route 441, TMI, PO Box 480
Middletown, PA 17057
Tele: 717-948-8658
Fax:
E-Mail: rcorbit@amergenenergy.com
Robert Couch
Engineering Specialist
Tennessee Valley Authority
Sequoyah and Watts Bar
1101 Maricet Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402
Tele: 423-751-2867
Fax: 423-751-8247
E-Mail: rdcouch@tva.gov
Barry Craig
Customer Relations Consultant
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc.
Suite 22-311
5500 Military Trail
Jupiter
FL, FL 33458
Tele: 561-691-9490
Fax: 561-630-0575
E-Mail: craigbl@adelphia.net
Carlos Cueto-Felgueroso
Integrity of Components
Tecnatom Sa
Avda. Montes de Oca 1
28709 San Sebastian Reyes
SPAIN
Tele: +34-91-659-8724
Fax: +34-91-659-8677
E-Mail: ccueto@tecnatom.es
Bill Cullen
Sr. Materials Engineer
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
M/S T10 E10
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Tele: 301-415-7510
Fax: 301-415-5074
E-Mail: whc@nrc.gov
Philippe Daoust
Product Manager
Tractebel Engineering
Avenue Ariane.7
B-1200-Brussels
BELGIUM
Tele: 32-2-773-7247
Fax: 32-2-773-8900
E-Mail: philippe.daoust@tractebel.com
Anne Demma
Project Manager/Nuclear Power
EPRI
Palo Alto, CA 94304-1344
Tele: 650-855-2026
Fax: 650-855-2002
E-Mail: ademma@epri.com
B-5
Mason Dove
Materials Principal Engineer
Southern Nuclear
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201
Tele: 205-992-5289
Fax: 205-992-5793
E-Mail: mwdove@southernco.com
Robin Dyle
Principal Engineer
Southern Nuclear
42 Inverness Center Parkway
Tele: 205-992-5885
Fax: 205-992-5793
E-Mail: rldyle@southernco.com
James Edwards
Senior Nuclear Specialist/Vogtle Plant Support
Southern Nuclear Operating Company
P. O. Box 1295
40 Inverness Center Parkway, BIN B031
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295
Tele: 205-992-7723
Fax: 205-992-7149
E-Mail: jaedward@southernco.com
Pl Efsing
Senior Specialist
Ringhals AB
Rttb
VRBACKA
SWEDEN
Tele: +46-46-724514
Fax: +46-46-775848
E-Mail: pal.efsing@ringhals.se
Ulla Ehrnstn
Senior Research Scientist
VTT Industrial Systems
PO Box 1704, 02044 VTT
Espoo
FINLAND
Tele: +358-20-722-6860
Fax: +358-20-722-6990
E-Mail: ulla.ehrnsten@vtt.fi
. Gary Elder
Westinghouse Electric Company Nuclear
Services
4350 Northern Pike
Tele: 412-374-4884
Fax: 412-374-3777
E-Mail:
Mark Fleming
Reston, VA 20190
Tele: 703-437-1155
Fax: 703-437-0780
E-Mail: mfleming@domeng.com
Gottfried Flueckiger
Mechanical Department
Nordostschweizerische Kraftwerke AG
Nuclear Power Plant Beznau
Doettingen
SWITZERLAND
Tele: 0041-56-266-75-07
Fax: 0041-56-266-77-01
E-Mail: gottfried.flueckiger@nok.ch
Gregory Frederick
Mgr., Advanced Welding Applications
EPRI
1300 WT Harris Blvd.,
Charlotte, NC 28221
Tele: 704-547-6071
Fax: 704-547-6109
E-Mail: gfrederi@epri.com
Steve Fyfitch
Adv. Engineer
AREVA
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-1610
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: Steve.fyfitch@framatome-anp.com
Robert Grard
Principal Engineer
Tractebel
2: B-1200
Avenue Ariane 7
Brussels
BELGIUM
Tele: 32-2-773-83-63
Fax: 32-2-773-89-00
E-Mail: ROBERT.GERARD@TRACTEBEL.COM
Delores Gomez-Briceno
Structural Materials
Av. Complutense 22, Ed. 30
Madrid 28040
SPAIN
Tele: 34-91-3466608
Fax: 34-91-3466661
E-Mail: lola.gomezbriceno@ciemat.es
B-6
Jeff Gorman
Reston, VA 20190
Tele: 703-437-1155
Fax: 703-437-0780
E-Mail: jgorman@domeng.com
Ben Grambau
Supv. Enginer
AREVA
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-3229
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: Ben.grambau@framatome-anp.com
Catherine Guerre
Engineer
C.E.A.
Centre de Saclay, 91191
GIF S/ YVETTE
FRANCE
Tele: +33-1-6908-1626
Fax: +33-1-6908-1586
E-Mail: catherine.guerre@cea.fr
Mike Hacker
NDE Services Level III
AREVA
Framatome ANP
155 Mill Ridge Road
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-3169
Fax: 434-832-2555
E-Mail: mike.hacker@framatome-anp.com
Hannu Hnninen
Professor
Helsinki University of Technology
P.O. Box 4200
Espoo
FINLAND
Tele: +358-9-4513530
Fax: +358-9-4513537
E-Mail: hannu.hanninen@tkk.fi
Craig Harrington
Consulting Engineer / Technical Programs
TXU Power
PO Box 1002
Glen Rose, TX 76043
Tele: 817-641-8575
Fax: 817-897-0972
E-Mail: charrin1@txu.com
Marcos Herrera
Sr Associate
San Jose, CA 95118-1557
Tele: 408-978-8200
Fax: 408-978-8964
E-Mail: mherrera@structint.com
John Hickling
Technical Leader - Materials Issues / TG-NP
EPRI
Palo Alto, CA 94304
Tele: 650-855-8976
Fax: 650-855-2002
E-Mail: jhicklin@epri.com
David Hills
Branch Chief, DRS
Lisle, IL 60532
Tele: 630-829-9733
Fax: 630-515-1278
E-Mail: deh@nrc.gov; jma@nrc.gov
Allen Hiser
Section Chief Component Integrity
NRS-Research
M/S T10-E10
Washington , DC 20555
Tele: 301-415-5650
Fax:
E-Mail: alh1@nrc.gov
Melvin Holmberg
Reactor Inspector
Lisle, IL 60532
Tele: 630-829-9748
Fax: 630-515-1278
E-Mail: msh@nrc.gov; jma@nrc.gov
Roger Holmes
Tech. Specialist
Southern California Edison
P.O. Box 128
14300 Mesa Rd., D2F
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
San Clemente, CA 92674
Tele: 949-368-9103
Fax: 949-368-6249
E-Mail: holmesrl@songs.sce.com
B-7
Chae Hong Jeon
Manager/Technology Research & Development
Institute
Korea Plant Service & Engineering Co. Ltd.
196 Geumgok-dong, Bundang-gu
Seongnam Gyeonggi-do
KOREA
Tele: 82-31-710-4189
Fax: 82-31-710-4179
E-Mail: chjeon@kps.co.kr
Cho Hong Seok
Manager/Technology Research & Development
Institute
Korea Plant Service & Engineering Co., Ltd.
196 Geumgok-dong, Bundang-gu
Seongnam Gyeonggi-do
KOREA
Tele: 82-31-710-4188
Fax: 82-31-710-4179
E-Mail: chs@kps.co.kr
Daniel Hopkins
TXU Power
P.O. Box 1002
Glen Rose, TX 76043
Tele: 254-897-6196
Fax: 254-897-0972
E-Mail: dhopkins@txu.com
J Howson
Capability Manager
Rolls-Royce
PO Box 2000, Raynesway
Derby
GREAT BRITAIN
Tele: +44 (0)01332 632129
Fax:
E-Mail: Helen.Bell@Rolls-Royce.com
Kaihwa Hsu
Project Manager
US NRC
Rockville, MD 20852
Tele: 301-415-4088
Fax: 301-415-2002
E-Mail: krh2@nrc.gov
Jeff Hydeman
Mgr. Reactor Vessel Head Programs, Installation
Services
4350 Northern Pike
Tele: 412-374-6540
Fax: 412-374-6277
E-Mail:
James Hyres
Principal Engineer
BWXT Services, Inc.
2016 Mt. Athos Road
Tele: 434-522-5053
Fax: 434-522-6860
E-Mail: jwhyres@bwxt.com
Rafael Ibaez-Sandin
Principal Engineer
Westinghouse
Padilla 17
Madrid
SPAIN
Tele: 34-91-210-6577
Fax: 34-91-210-6633
E-Mail: ibanezr@westinghouse.es
Eddie Ivins
Business Manager
AREVA
155 Mill Ridge Road
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-3781
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: Eddie.Ivins@framatome-anp.com
Richard Jacko
Consulting Eng./Science and Technology
Department
Westinghouse Electric Co. LLC
1340 Beulah Road
Tele: 412-256-1268
Fax: 412-256-1221
E-Mail: jackorj@westinghouse.com
Steve Janes
Project Manager
Dominion Nuclear CT.
Rope Ferry Rd.
Waterford, CT 06385
Tele: 860-447-1791
Fax: 860-437-5916
E-Mail: Steve_D_Janes@dom.com
Christer Jansson
SwedPower AB
Box 527
Stockholm
SWEDEN
Tele: +46-8-739-6852
Fax: +46-8-739-6900
E-Mail: christer.jansson@swedpower.com
B-8
Willie Jennings
Senior Engineer
Southern Nuclear Operating Company
40 Inverness Parkway, Bin 056
Tele: 205-992-5886
Fax: 205-992-5294
E-Mail: willandchrisj@aol.com
William Jensen
Principal Engineering Analyst - NDE Level III
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241
Tele: 920-755-6960
Fax: 920-755-6583
E-Mail: bill.jensen@nmcco.com
Anders Jenssen
Studsvik Nuclear
SE-611 82
Nykping
SWEDEN
Tele: +46-155-22-14-96
Fax: +46-155-26-31-50
E-Mail: anders.jenssen@studsvik.se
Santit Jirawongkraisorn
Engineer, Piping Analysis & Fracture Mechanics
Westinghouse
PO Box 355
Tele: 724-722-6029
Fax: 724-722-5597
E-Mail: jirawos@westinghouse.com
Robin Jones
Tech. Exec. Material Science & Engineering
EPRI
Palo Alto, CA 94034
Tele: 650-855-2790
Fax: 650-855-
E-Mail: rjones@epri.com
Warren Junker
Westinghouse
1344 Beulah Rd
Tele: 412-256-1234
Fax: 412-256-2205
E-Mail: junkerwr@westinghouse.com
Mark Kachmar
Director/Engineering Services
4350 Northern Pike
Tele: 412-374-3799
Fax: 412-374-3777
E-Mail: kachmamp@westinghouse.com
Greg Kammerdeiner
Fleet Materials Programs Manager
First Energy
76 South Main Street
Akron, OH 44308
Tele: 330-384-4682
Fax: 330-384-5567
E-Mail: kammerdeinerg@firstenergycorp.com
Brian Kemp
Principal Engineer
Nuclear Management Company
186 County Road U
Valley View Business Center
River Falls, WI 54016
Tele: 715-425-6417
Fax:
E-Mail: brian.kemp@nmcco.com
Dan Kerr
Sr. Consulting Engineer
Pacific Gas & Electric
3400 Crow Canyon Road
San Ramon, CA 94583
Tele: 925-866-5481
Fax: 925-866-5511
E-Mail: dsk1@pge.com
E. Kim Kietzman
Project Manager
EPRI
1300 Harris Blvd.
Charlotte, NC 28078
Tele: 704-547-6163
Fax:
E-Mail: kkietzma@epri.com
Dr. Renate Kilian
NGTM
Framatome ANP GmbH
Freyeslebenstr. 1
Erlangen
GERMANY
Tele: +49-9131-189-7363
Fax: +49-9131-189-2911
E-Mail: renate.kilian@framatome-anp.com
B-9
Christine King
Project Mgr., Materials Reliability Program
EPRI
Palo Alto, CA 94034
Tele: 650-855-2605
Fax: 650-855-2002
E-Mail: cking@epri.com
Ron King
Manager, Technology Development
Palo Alto, CA 94034
Tele: 650-855-2647
Fax: 650-855-2002
E-Mail: rking@epri.com
Samuel D. Kiser
Director of Technology
Special Metals Welding
1401 Burrie Road
Newton, NC 28658
Tele: 828-465-0352 x205
Fax: 828-464-8993
E-Mail: skiser@smwpc.com
Walter Knoblach
Framatome ANP
PO Box 3220, Dept SGD
Erlangen
GERMANY
Tele: +49-9131-1893204
Fax: +49-9131-1895501
E-Mail: walter.knoblach@framatome-anp.com
William Koller
Principal Engineer
Bechtel Plant Machinery, Inc.
500 Penn Center Blvd.
Tele: 412-829-8717
Fax: 412-829-8430
E-Mail: wjkoller@aol.com
Paul Kreitman
Director of Engineering
Westinghouse - PCI Energy Services
One Energy Drive
Tele: 847-990-7443
Fax:
E-Mail: kreitmpj@pci.westinghouse.com
Albertus Kroes
Fellow Engineer
Westinghouse Electric Belgium
Rue de lIndustrie, 43
Nivelles
BELGIUM
Tele: +32-67-28-82-34
Fax: +32-67-28-83-34
E-Mail: kroes-a@notes.westinghouse.com
Jun Kusaka
Plant Maintenance Section
The Japan Atomic Company
Myojin-cho 1
Tsuruga
JAPAN
Tele: 0770-26-1111
Fax: 0770-26-8081
E-Mail: jyun-kusaka@japc.co.jp
Jerold Kusky
Inspection Services
GE Energy, Nuclear
3901 Castle Hayne Road
Wilmington, NC 28401
Tele: 910-675-5898
Fax: 910-362-5898
E-Mail: jerold.kusky@GE.com
Jeff Landrum
Project Manager
EPRI
1300 WT Harris Blvd.
Charlotte, NC 28262
Tele: 704-547-6053
Fax: 704-547-6168
E-Mail: jlandrum@epri.com
John Lareau
Chief Engineer
WesDyne
20 International Drive
Windsor, CT 06095
Tele: 860-731-1605
Fax:
E-Mail: john.p.lareau@us.westinghouse.com
Michael Lashley
Associate
Tele: 303-792-0077
Fax: 303-792-2158
E-Mail: mlashley@structint.com
B-10
Seung-gun Lee
Researcher
Korrea Power Engineering Company
360-9 Mabuk Guseong
Yongin Gyeonggi
South Korea
Tele: 82-31-289-4472
Fax: 82-31-289-3189
E-Mail: gun@kopec.co.kr
Herbert Lenz
NSBU
Westinghouse
Dudenstrasse 44
Mannheim
DENMARK
Tele: +49 621 388 2125
Fax: +49 621 388 2471
E-Mail: herbert.lenz@de.westinghouse.com
Steve Levesque
Tooling Engineer
AREVA
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-3130
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: Stephen.levesque@framatome-anp.com
Dr. Derek Lister
P. O. Box 4400
Fredericton
CANADA
Tele: 506-447-3299
Fax:
E-Mail: dlister@unb.ca
Eric Loehlein
Technical Services Engineering, Programs
FENOC, Beaver Valley Power Station
Beaver Valley Power Station, Route 168
Shippingport, PA 15077
Tele: 724-682-4808
Fax: 724-682-4095
E-Mail: loehleine@firstenergycorp.com
Zhanpeng Lu
Fracture and Reliability Institute, Tohoku
University
Aramaki Aoba 6-6-01, Aoba-ku
Sendai
JAPAN
Tele: 81-22-2177520
Fax: 81-22-2177543
E-Mail: zhanpeng@rift.mech.tohoku.ac.jp
Leo Martin
Tech Services Superintendent
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant
HNP01
5413 Shearon Harris Road
New Hill, NC 27562
Tele: 919-362-2296
Fax: 919-362-2375
E-Mail: leo.martin@pgnmail.com
David Mason
Senior Engineer
Exelon Nuclear
Braidwood Station
35100 S. Rt. 53, Suite 84
Braceville, IL 60407
Tele: 815-417-2790
Fax: 815-417-3999
E-Mail: david.mason@exeloncorp.com
David Mauldin
VP Nuclear Engineering & Support
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
5801 S. Wintersburg Road
Wintersburg, AZ 885354
Tele: 623-393-5553
Fax: 623-393-6077
E-Mail: dmauldin@apsc.com
Terry McAlister
Project Manager
SCE&G
PO Box 88
Jenkinsville, SC 29065
Tele: 803-345-4758
Fax:
E-Mail: tmcalister@scana.com
Mike McDevitt
Engineer
14300 Mesa Rd., #D3B
PO Box 128
Tele: 949-368-5170
Fax: 949-368-9007
E-Mail: mcdevimj@songs.sce.com
Allan McIlree
Project Manager
EPRI
3412 Hillview Ave.
Palo Alto, CA 94304
Tele: 650-855-2092
Fax: 650-855-2002
E-Mail: amcilree@epri.com
B-11
Bernard Michaut
Services Sector
Framatome ANP
10, rue Juliette Rcamier
69456 Lyon Cedex 06
FRANCE
Tele: +33-672748317
Fax: +33-472748745
E-Mail: bernard.michaut@framatome-anp.com
Ben Montgomery
ISI Engineer
Callaway Plant, AmerenUE
Junction Hwy CC and O
Fulton, MO 65251
Tele: 573-676-8539
Fax: 573-676-4334
E-Mail: blmontgomery@cal.ameren.com
Mike Moran
Reactor Head Project Engineering
Manager/Nuclear Engineering
Florida Power and Light
9760 SW 344th Street
Florida City, FL 33035
Tele: 305-246-7239
Fax: 305-246-6495
E-Mail: marcela_lugo@fpl.com
Chris Morgan
Westinghouse
Haymaker and Northern Pike
Tele: 412-374-5354
Fax: 412-374-4011
E-Mail: morgance@westinghouse.com
David Morton
Principal Engineer
KAPL Lockheed Martin
River Road, Bin 48
Schenectady, NY 12301-1072
Tele: 518-395-6142
Fax: 518-395-4422
E-Mail: mortond@KAPL.gov
Kenneth Muller
Program Owner
American Electric Power
D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant
One Cook Place
Bridgman, MI 49106
Tele: 269-466-5901, x3583
Fax: 269-466-3454
E-Mail: kamuller@aep.com
Ryuji Murakami
General Manager / Plant Dept.
Nuclear Engineering, Ltd.
1-3-7 Tosabori - Nishiku
Osaka
JAPAN
Tele: +81-6-6446-9363
Fax: +81-6-6446-1746
E-Mail: rmurakami@neltd.co.jp
Ashok Nana
Pincipal Engineer
AREVA
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-2393
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: Ashok.nana@framatome-anp.com
Don Naylor
Engineer
Wolf Creek Generating Station
1550 Oxen Ln NE, PO Box 411
Burlington, KS 66839
Tele: 620-364-8831 x 4584
Fax: 620-364-4154
E-Mail: donaylo@wcnoc.com
Linda Nelson
Conference Manager
To PLAN Ahead
1055 Lamplighter Road
Niskayuna, NY 12309
Tele: 518-374-8190
Fax: 518-374-8140
E-Mail: lnelson@nycap.rr.com
Bruce Newton
Director Welding Engineering and Equipment
Technology
PCI
Energy Drive
Tele: 847-990-7484
Fax:
E-Mail: newtonb@pci.westinghouse.com
Ray Nicholson
HM Principal Inspector, Health and Safety
Executive
HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
St. Peters House, Balliol Road
Bootle
UNITED KINGDOM
Tele: 44-151-951-3668
Fax: 44-151-951-4163
E-Mail: ray.nicholson@hse.gsi.gov.uk
B-12
Vijay Nilekani
Executive Technical Director
International Access Corporation
1015 18th Street N.W., Suite #504
Washington, DC 20036
Tele: 202-223-7040
Fax: 202-296-5373
E-Mail: vijay.nilekani@iacdc.com
Nicolas Nordmann
Reston, VA 20190
Tele: 703-437-1155
Fax: 703-437-0780
E-Mail: nnordmann@domeng.com
Henry Offer
Eng. Fellow - Welding
GE Nuclear Energy
175 Curtner Avenue, Mail Code 111
San Jose, CA 95125
Tele: 408-925-2686
Fax:
E-Mail: Henry.Offer@GENE.GE.com
Marta Baladia Olmedo
Engineer
Centrales Nucleares Almarez-Trillo
Avda Manoteras 46B1S
Madrid
SPAIN
Tele: 34-91-555-9111
Fax: 34-91-556-6520
E-Mail: mbo@cna.es
Joe Paljug
Product Manager
AREVA
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-2539
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: Joe.paijug@framatome-anp.com
Denise Paraventi
Senior Engineer
Bechtel Bettis, Inc.
814 Pittsburgh - McKeesport Rd.
West Mifflin, PA 15122
Tele: 412-476-7571
Fax: 412-476-5990
E-Mail: paravent@bettis.gov
Brant Patnode
Structural Engineer
Bechtel
354 Malta Avenue
Ballston Spa, NY 12020
Tele: 518-243-5090
Fax: 518-243-5507
E-Mail:
Ron Payne
Mgr., Component Repairs
AREVA
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-3177
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: Ron.payne@framatome-anp.com
Noel Peat
Failure Characterisation Consultancy
Dove Chapel Cottage, Milldale
Ashbourne
UNITED KINGDOM
Tele: +44 (0) 1335 310000
Fax:
E-Mail: noel.peat@e-fcc.com
Ryan Pedersen
Real-Time Software
1844 West 8250 South
West Jordan, UT 84088
Tele: 801-718-1700
Fax: 801-313-9019
E-Mail: ryan@real-timesoftware.com
David Peltola
Senior Engineer
Duke Energy
Oconee Nuclear Station, 7800 Rochester Hwy
Seneca, SC 29672-0752
Tele: 864-885-4586
Fax: 864-885-3402
E-Mail: dwpeltol@duke-energy.com
Francisco Perosanz
Structural Materials
CIEMAT
Av. Complutense 22, Ed. 30
Madrid
SPAIN
Tele: +34-91-3466611
Fax: +34-91-3466661
E-Mail: franciscojavier.perosanz@ciemat.es
B-13
Walt Peterson
Technical Specialist
SCE - San Onofre Generating Station
PO Box 128 (D3B)
Tele: 949-368-9007
Fax: 949-368-9007
E-Mail: peterswj@songs.sce.com
Janit Pongpuak
P.O. Box 4400
Fredericton
CANADA
Tele: 506-452-6046
Fax: 506-453-3591
E-Mail: janit.pongpuak@unb.ca
Mark Quirin
Operations Manager
2225 Skyland Court
Norcross, GA 30071
Tele: 678-728-9260
Fax: 770-729-8242
E-Mail: mquirin@wsi.aquilex.com
Gutti Rao
Adv. Technical Engineer/Materials Cemter of
Excellence
Engergy Center, Bay 512B
4350 Northern Pike
Tele: 412-374-6233
Fax: 412-374-6647
E-Mail: RAOGV@WESTINGHOUSE.COM
Miro Reichenbach
Fellow Engr. Nuclear Components Engineering
ANAV
NPP Vandellos II , Ctra. Nacional 340, km 1,126
Hospitalet del Infante, Tarragona
SPAIN
Tele: 34-649963438
Fax: 34-977818995
E-Mail: reichem@anacnv.com
Peter Riccardella
Sr. Associate
Tele: 303-792-0077
Fax: 303-792-2158
E-Mail: priccard@structint.com
Jim Riley
Sr. Project Manager
NEI
Suite 400
1776 I Street NW
Washington, DC 20006
Tele: 202-739-8137
Fax: 202-533-0193
E-Mail: jhr@nei.org
Tony Romano
Business Manager
AREVA
155 Mill Ridge Road
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-2933
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: tony.romano@framatome-anp.com
Guy Roussel
Engineer
A.V.N.
Rue Walcourt, 148
B-1070 Brussels,
Tele: BELGIUM
Fax:
E-Mail: gr@avn.be
Richard F. Schaller
Life Cycle Mangement Dept. Leader
Mailing Station 7960
P.O. Box 52034
Phoenix, AZ 85072
Tele: 623-393-5045
Fax: 623-393-5680
E-Mail: Richard_Schaller@apsc.com
Dick Schemmel
Advisory Engineer
AREVA
1300 Old Graves Mill Road
Lynchburg, VA 24502
Tele: 434-832-3042
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: richard.schemmel@framatome-anp.com
Dan Schlader
Alloy 600 Program Manager
AREVA
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-2539
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: Dan.schlader@framatome-anp.com
B-14
Eric Schoonover
System Engineer
SONGS
PO Box 128
Tele: 949-368-9693
Fax: 949-368-9007
E-Mail: schoonej@songs.sce.com
Peter Scott
Framatome.ANP
Tour AREVA
92084 Paris La Defense Cedex
FRANCE
Tele: +33-1-47-96-3577
Fax: +33-47-96-0501
E-Mail: peter.scott@framatome-anp.com
Claudia Scott
Wetinghouse Electric Company
4350 Northern Pike
Tele: 412-374-6503
Fax: 412-374-3777
E-Mail: Scottce@westinghouse.com
Robert G. Sears
Lead Welding Engineer
P.O. Box 128
14300 Mesa Rd., #D2F
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
Tele: 949-368-9104
Fax: 949-368-6249
E-Mail: searsrg@songs.sce.com
T. Satyan Sharma
Principal Engineer
American Electric Co.
500 Circle Drive
Buchanan, MI 49107-1357
Tele: 269-697-5143
Fax: 269-697-5570
E-Mail: trsatyan-sharma@aep.com
Paul Sherburne
Business Manager
AREVA
155 Mill Ridge Road
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-2933
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: Paul.sherburne@framatome-anp.com
Alan Silvia
Principal Materials & Welding Engineer
Bechtel Plant Machinery, Inc.
PO Box 1021, 600 Liberty Street
Schenectady, NY 12301-1021
Tele: 518-243-5493
Fax: 518-243-5507
E-Mail: alan.silvia@bpmionline.com
Milan Simoncic
Nuclear Power Plant Krsko
Vrbina 12
8270 KRSKO
SLOVENIA
Tele: 386-7-48-02284
Fax:
E-Mail: milan.simoncic@nek.si
William Sims
Supervisor Design Engineer
Entergy Operations
1448 State Road 333
Russellville, AR 72845
Tele: 479-858-4378
Fax: 479-858-4496
E-Mail: wsims@entergy.com
M. Srinivasan
Sr. Materials Engineer
U.S. NRC
Two White Flint North
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
Tele: 301-415-6356
Fax: 301-415-5074
E-Mail: mxs5@nrc.gov
Roger Staehle
Adjunct Professor
University of Minnesota
22 Red Fox Road
North Oaks, MN 55127
Tele: 651-482-9493
Fax: 651-484-5735
E-Mail: maryilg@rwstaehle.com
Richard Stavsky
Westinghouse
4350 Northern Pike
Tele: 412-374-3666
Fax: 412-374-2252
E-Mail: stavs1rm@westinghouse.com
B-15
Robert Stewart
Project Engineer / Plant Support
Southern Nuclear
40 Inverness Center Parkway
Tele: 205-992-5640
Fax: 205-992-5002
E-Mail: rwstewar@southernco.com
Damian Sutton
ISI Supervisor
Southern Nuclear
42 Inverness Center Parkway, Bin B234
Tele: 205-992-5161
Fax:
E-Mail: ddsutton@southernco.com
Itaru Suzuki
Engineer/S&TD
EPRI
1300 W.T. Harris Blvd.,
Charlotte, NC 28262
Tele: 704-717-6425
Fax: 704-547-6035
E-Mail: isuzuki@epri.com
Thomas Taylor
Product Line Manager
General Electric
3901 Castle Hayne Road, M/V L30
Wilmington, NC 28402
Tele: 910-675-6045
Fax: 910-292-6045
E-Mail: thomas.taylor@gene.ge.com;
ahdee.chan@gene.ge.com
Moses Taylor
Sr Consulting Engineer
San Jose, CA 95118-1557
Tele: 408-978-8200
Fax: 408-978-8964
E-Mail: mtaylor@structint.com
Tina Taylor
Director
Palo Alto, CA 94304
Tele: 650-855-2819
Fax: 650-855-8588
E-Mail: ttaylor@eprisolutions.com
Bryan Templeton
Sr Engineer
Tele: 303-792-0077
Fax: 303-792-2158
E-Mail: btemplet@structint.com
Victor Thomas
RCS Engineer
PO Box 128, 14300 Mesa Rd. #D3B
Tele: 949-368-9135
Fax: 949-368-9007
E-Mail: thomasvg@songs.sce.com
Shinya Toiguchi
Mitsubish Heavy Industries, LTd
Minato-ku
16-5, Konan 2-chome
Tokyo
Japan
Tele: 81-3-6716-5712
Fax: 81-3-6716-5858
E-Mail: kensaku_yajima@mhi.co.jp
Hiroaki Tomita
Nuclear Plant Component Designing Dept
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
1-1, Wadasaki-cho, Hyogo-ku
Kobe, Hyogo
JAPAN
Tele: 81-78-672-3273
Fax: 81-78-685-2399
E-Mail: hiroaki_tomita@mhi.co.jp
Guy Turluer
Consultant
Guy Turluer Consulting
59 rue de la Hacquinire
Bures/Yvette
FRANCE
Tele: + 33-1-69-07-89-70
Fax: + 33-1-69-07-89-70
E-Mail: guy.turluer@wanadoo.fr
Ron Tyler
Engineering Programs Supervisor
Farley Nuclear Plant
PO Box 470
Ashford, AL 36312
Tele: 334-814-4948
Fax:
E-Mail: rltyler@southernco.com
B-16
Francois Vaillant
EDF R&D
Materials & Mechanics of Components
Les Renardieres Research Center
Moret Sur Loing
FRANCE
Tele: 33-1-60-73-63-03
Fax: 33-1-60-73-68-89
E-Mail: francois.vaillant@edf.fr
Dave Waskey
Mgr. Welding Services
AREVA
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Tele: 434-832-2873
Fax: 434-832-3840
E-Mail: dave.waskey@framatome-anp.com
Bruce A. Weir
VP Sales
R. Brooks Associates
1120 High Mountain Road
Franklin Lakes, NJ 07417
Tele: 201-644-8207
Fax:
E-Mail: baweir@rbrooks.com
Andy Wells
Civil Engineering Supervisor
Duke Power Company
7800 Rochester Highway
Seneca, SC 29672
Tele: 864-885-4159
Fax: 864-885-3402
E-Mail: pawells@duke-energy.com
Glenn White
Reston, VA 20190
Tele: 703-437-1155 x247
Fax: 703-437-0780
E-Mail: gwhite@domeng.com
Troy A. Wilfong
Radiation Protection Sr.
5801 S. Wintersburg
Mail Sta. 6265
Tele: 623-393-3342
Fax: 623-393-3511
E-Mail: tWILFONG@APSC.COM
Gery Wilkowski
President
Engineering Mechanics Corporation of Columbus
3518 Riverside Drive, Suite 202
Columbus, OH 43221
Tele: 614-459-3200
Fax: 614-459-6800
E-Mail: gwilkowski@emc-sq.com
Kensaku Yajima
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.,
16-5, Konan 2-Chome, Minato-ku
Tokyo, 108-8215
Tele: 81-3-6716-5712
Fax: 81-3-6716-5858
E-Mail: kensaku_yajima@mhi.co.jp
Yutaka Yamamoto
Material Reliability Evaluation Group, Safety
Standard Division
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
Fujita Kanko Toranomon Bldg, 3-17-1,
Toranomon, Minato-ku
Tokyo
JAPAN
Tele: 81-3-4511-1753
Fax: 81-3-4511-1898
E-Mail: yamamoto-yutaka@jnes.go.jp
Tetsuo Yamamoto
Mechanical Technology & Design Dept.
Toshiba Corporation
8 Shinsugita-cho, Isogo-ku
Yokohama
JAPAN
Tele: 81-45-770-2152
Fax: 81-45-770-2448
E-Mail: tetsuo2.yamamoto@toshiba.co.jp
Toshio Yonezawa
Senior Research Engineering Manager
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD.
2-1-1, Shinhama, Araicho
Takasago
JAPAN
Tele: 81-78-672-3446
Fax: 81-78-685-2399
E-Mail: toshio_yonezawa@n.trdc.mhi.co.jp
B-17

C-1
C
APPENDIX C: ATTENDANCE LIST BY COMPANY

Attendance List By Company
Company Last Name First Name
A.V.N. Roussel Guy
AEA Technology Engineering SVCS Badlani Manohar
American Electric Co. Sharma T. Satyan
American Electric Power Muller Kenneth
ANAV Reichenbach Miro
AREVA Waskey Dave
AREVA Paljug Joe
AREVA Schemmel Dick
AREVA Nana Ashok
AREVA Schlader Dan
AREVA Carpenter Mike
AREVA Payne Ron
AREVA Grambau Ben
AREVA Fyfitch Steve
AREVA Levesque Steve
AREVA Romano Tony
AREVA Ivins Eddie
AREVA Hacker Mike
AREVA Sherburne Paul
Argonne National Lab. Alexandreanu Bogdan
Bechtel Patnode Brant
Bechtel Bettis, Inc. Paraventi Denise
C-3
Bechtel Plant Machinery, Inc. Koller William
Bechtel Plant Machinery, Inc. Silvia Alan
BWXT Services, Inc. Hyres James
C.E.A. Guerre Catherine
Callaway Plant, AmerenUE Montgomery Ben
Centrales Nucleares Almarez-Trillo Olmedo Marta Baladia
CIEMAT Perosanz Francisco
CSN (Spanish Nuclear Regulatory Body Castelao Carlos
Dominion Engineering, Inc. White Glenn
Dominion Engineering, Inc. Broussard John
Dominion Engineering, Inc. Gorman Jeff
Dominion Engineering, Inc. Fleming Mark
Dominion Engineering, Inc. Nordmann Nicolas
Dominion Generation Bennetch Jim
Dominion Nuclear CT. Janes Steve
Duke Energy Peltola David
Duke Energy Alley Jr. C. Thomas
Duke Power Company Wells Andy
EDF Boursier Jean Marie
EDF Cattant Francois
EDF R&D Vaillant Francois
EDF - SEPTEN Amzallag Claude
C-4
Engineering Mechanics Corporation of Columbus Wilkowski Gery
Entergy Operations Sims William
EPRI Suzuki Itaru
EPRI King Christine
EPRI McIlree Allan
EPRI Landrum Jeff
EPRI Hickling John
EPRI Ahluwalia Kawaljit
EPRI Demma Anne
EPRI Kietzman E. Kim
EPRI Jones Robin
EPRI Frederick Gregory
EPRI Solutions, Inc. King Ron
EPRI Solutions, Inc. Taylor Tina
EPRIsolutions Chu Shannon
Exelon Corp. Corbit Richard
Exelon Nuclear Alkire Gary
Exelon Nuclear Mason David
Failure Characterisation Consultancy Peat Noel
Farley Nuclear Plant Tyler Ron
FENOC, Beaver Valley Power Station Loehlein Eric
First Energy Kammerdeiner Greg
C-5
Florida Power and Light Moran Mike
Florida Power and Light Co. Boggs R. Scott
Fracture and Reliability Institute, Tohoku University Lu Zhanpeng
Framatome ANP Knoblach Walter
Framatome.ANP Scott Peter
Framatome ANP Michaut Bernard
Framatome ANP GmbH Kilian Renate
GE Energy, Nuclear Kusky Jerold
GE Global Research Andresen Peter
GE Nuclear Energy Offer Henry
General Electric Taylor Thomas
Guy Turluer Consulting Turluer Guy
Helsinki University of Technology Hnninen Hannu
HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate Nicholson Ray
International Access Corporation Nilekani Vijay
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization Yamamoto Yutaka
KAPL Lockheed Martin Morton David
Korea Electric Power Research Inst. Chung Hansub
Korea Plant Service & Engineering Co. Ltd. Hong Jeon Chae
Korea Plant Service & Engineering Co., Ltd. Hong Seok Cho
Korrea Power Engineering Company Lee Seung-gun
Mitsubish Heavy Industries, LTd Toiguchi Shinya
C-6
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Tomita Hiroaki
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc. Craig Barry
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD. Yonezawa Toshio
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Yajima Kensaku
NEI Riley Jim
New Mexico Tech Burleigh T. David
Nordostschweizerische Kraftwerke AG Flueckiger Gottfried
NRC Collins Jak
NRS-Research Hiser Allen
Nuclear Engineering, Ltd. Murakami Ryuji
Nuclear Management Company Kemp Brian
Nuclear Management Company, LLC Jensen William
Nuclear Power Plant Krsko Simoncic Milan
Pacific Gas & Electric Kerr Dan
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Bruemmer Stephen
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Schaller Richard F.
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Mauldin David
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Wilfong Troy A.
PCI Newton Bruce
PSEG Nuclear LLC Cirilli Jim
R. Brooks Associates Weir Bruce A.
Real-Time Software Pedersen Ryan
C-7
Ringhals AB Efsing Pl
Rolls-Royce Howson J
SCE - San Onofre Generating Station Peterson Walt
SCE&G McAlister Terry
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Martin Leo
SONGS Schoonover Eric
South Texas Project Allen Lewis
Southern California Edison Thomas Victor
Southern California Edison McDevitt Mike
Southern California Edison Holmes Roger
Southern California Edison Sears Robert G.
Southern Nuclear Dyle Robin
Southern Nuclear Dove Mason
Southern Nuclear Sutton Damian
Southern Nuclear Stewart Robert
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Jennings Willie
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Edwards James
Special Metals Welding Kiser Samuel D.
Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. Templeton Bryan
Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. Herrera Marcos
Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. Riccardella Peter
Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. Taylor Moses
C-8
Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. Lashley Michael
Structural Materials Gomez-Briceno Delores
Studsvik Nuclear Jenssen Anders
SwedPower AB Jansson Christer
Tecnatom Sa Cueto-Felgueroso Carlos
Tennessee Valley Authority Couch Robert
The Japan Atomic Company Kusaka Jun
TMI/Exelon Benson Michael
To PLAN Ahead Nelson Linda
Toshiba Corporation Yamamoto Tetsuo
Tractebel Grard Robert
Tractebel Engineering Daoust Philippe
TXU Power Harrington Craig
TXU Power Cooper Kerry
TXU Power Hopkins Daniel
U.S. NRC Srinivasan M.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Holmberg Melvin
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hills David
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bilik Thomas
University of Minnesota Staehle Roger
University of New Brunswick Pongpuak Janit
University of New Brunswick Lister Derek
C-9
US NRC Hsu Kaihwa
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Cullen Bill
VTT Industrial Systems Ehrnstn Ulla
Welding Services, Inc. Auvil Bud
Welding Services, Inc. Amador Pedro
Welding Services, Inc. Quirin Mark
WesDyne Lareau John
Westinghouse Bamford Warren
Westinghouse Lenz Herbert
Westinghouse Morgan Chris
Westinghouse Boggess Cheryl
Westinghouse Jirawongkraisorn Santit
Westinghouse Ibaez-Sandin Rafael
Westinghouse Stavsky Richard
Westinghouse Junker Warren
Westinghouse Electric Belgium Kroes Albertus
Westinghouse Electric Co. Rao Gutti
Westinghouse Electric Co. LLC Jacko Richard
Westinghouse Electric Company Burke Michael
Westinghouse Electric Company Hydeman Jeff
Westinghouse Electric Company Kachmar Mark
Westinghouse Electric Company Nuclear Services Elder Gary
C-10
Westinghouse - PCI Energy Services Kreitman Paul
Wetinghouse Electric Company Scott Claudia
Wolf Creek Generating Station Naylor Don
C-11

2005 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Inc. All rights reserved.
Electric Power Research Institute and EPRI are registered service marks of
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Printed on recycled paper in the United States of America
Program:
Nuclear Power
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Alloy 600

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Materials Reliability Program:

Session 1A: Crack Growth and Initiation

Session 2A: Cracking and Reliability Studies of Alloy 690

Session 2A: Cracking and Reliability Studies of Alloy 690

with or without cycling.

Session 3A: Laboratory Investigations of Cracks

NbC is often found precipitated on (Ti,Al)O and TiN

lu! |uud!`u_ |uu

Cracking of PWR Reactor Pressure

If the coolant, which contains boric acid,

This program explores the interaction

To investigate the effect of an impinging jet

Develop generic methodology to

Apply to sample of U.S. PWRs in support

Use to define inspection plan that

Tube volume only OR wetted

Tube volume PLUS 50% of welds

Tube volume PLUS 100% of welds

generated high compressive

Preemptive Weld Overlay (PWOL)

Topical Report for NRC Submittal

One short shallow circumferential crack at VC Summer

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