Electrical & mechanical systems in a modern road tunnel

G.M. Taylor Electrical Engineer & Project Manager, Australia ABSTRACT: This paper intends to outline all major aspects of electrical and mechanical systems associated with the modern road tunnel including; Electrical Power Distribution Systems - H.V. & L.V. Power Distribution, Standby Generation and UPS Systems. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Control Systems SCADA. Ventilation - Traffic emission and emergency smoke control and extraction. Communications - Emergency Telephone, Radio rebroadcast & Public Address Systems. Lighting - HID Counterbeam and Symmetrical Systems, Emergency Egress, Monitoring and Control systems. Traffic Management & Control - Incident detection, CCTV, VMS, LUS. Fire Alarm Systems - Linear Heat Detectors, Fire Indicator Panels, Hydrant Booster Systems, Extinguishant Gas Discharge Systems, Sprinkler and Foam Deluge Systems. Design Development Key Stakeholder involvement.

1. CONFIGURATION OF THE ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS. Security of supply is the paramount design criterion applied to electrical systems in road tunnels. Without power supplies the majority of the life safety critical systems will cease to function, with obvious serious implications in terms of traveller security. In order to ensure continuity of supply the following measures are almost universally adopted; 1.1 Incoming H.V. Power supplies. Twin H.V / L.V. Switchrooms (one usually at each end of the tunnel(s)) with completely independent incoming H.V. mains supplies to each. (that is, from different sections of the local electricity supply companys distribution grid). 1.2 H.V.Bus Tie System Implementation of an automatic H.V. bus tie system to changeover the incoming supply from one switchroom to the other in the event of a mains supply failure to one or other of the switchrooms. (Supplies being provided to / from both during normal operation). Employing such a system rather than providing supply redundancy at L.V. (415V) greatly reduces the complexity of the final L.V. distribution system, resulting in considerably fewer cables being required within the tunnel which provides major

savings in both initial capital and ongoing maintenance costs. 1.3 Split Chassis Main Switchboards. Provision of split chassis main L.V. Main Switchboards within each of the twin switchrooms, featuring an L.V. Bus selector switch to allow the removal from service of either of the dual redundant supply transformers (11KV / 415V).

A typical split chassis 415V 3 Phase main switchboard undergoing installation works.

One such board is installed within each switchroom, each board being split across the two tunnels. (Right and left hand sides of the board) and across 2 supply transformers (11KV / 415V).

1.4 Emergency Standby Generation Capacity. Installation of a standby diesel driven generating set connected to an independent fire rated Essential Systems distribution network supplying emergency lighting and life safety critical control and monitoring systems in case of total incoming mains failure is strongly recommended. This generating set may be located in a fire rated and acoustically insulated room within or adjacent to either of the twin switchroom buildings. It is important to note that this set is rarely designed t o meet the full operational load of the tunnel due to economic considerations. Usually, major ventilation fan loads are not supplied from this system, as this would require the provision of a large amount of standby generation capacity. 1.5 Uninteruptible Power Supplies. Utilisation of battery backed uninteruptible power supplies (UPS) to cover essential systems (Control, lighting CCTV fire alarm etc) during the changeover period either between switchrooms (Failure of incoming supply to a single switchroom) or until the standby generating set runs up to speed and assumes load (total incoming mains supply failure). A single large UPS unit could be located within a switchroom or multiple small units located locally around the tunnel complex. Economics usually favour the use of a single large unit.

Uninteruptible power supply. PLC Cabinet. q Jet fan motor control centre (for 4 x 42KW fan units). q Fire extinguisher and emergency telephone cabinet. q Fire Hose reel cabinet.
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2. FIRE RATING OF ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS. In order to ensure the functionality of the electrical systems during a major fire emergency, some form of fire rating must be applied to them in terms of their design. Its is impractical to consider a completely fire proof approach (say, as per a petrochemical plant) on cost grounds however the following should be born in mind; 2.1 Low Smoke Zero Halogen In order to minimise as far as is practically possible noxious smoke emissions generated by PVC compounds a blanket low smoke zero halogen approach should be adopted for all cables and plastic conduit systems etc. 2.2 Application of Appropriate Cable Fire Rating. In Australia apply the standards as described in AS1313 with regards to the fire rating for all internal cabling and associated support systems. 2.3 Assessment of the System with regards to Potentially Explosive Atmospheres. In terms of AS 3000:2000 Clause 9 Systems installed within potentially explosive atmospheres, it is not usual (or reasonably practicable in terms of initial installation and ongoing maintenance costs) to install intrinsically safe electrical systems. (As can be found in deep coal mines and petrochemical plants). On this basis, prevention is far more cost effective than cure. Situations that could generate an explosive atmosphere (ie petrol tanker crash) must be negated via the implementation of appropriate tunnel management procedures. 3. VENTILATION The ventilation system associated with a modern road tunnel forms the primary fire / life safety critical system used to control and or extract smoke in a major fire situation in addition to maintaining tenable conditions during normal traffic conditions. Its

An example of a combined electrical distribution, control (PLC & jet fan MCC) and emergency fire fighting equipment niche. (Crafers S.A.).

Note that the final overall door system comprised by the tunnel cladding system has yet to be installed. From right to left;
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Normal Services Electrical Distribution Board. Essential Services Distribution Board.

functionality under emergency conditions must therefore be assured as best possible. 3.1 Normal Operation. In normal circumstances the ventilation system will be primarily engaged in traffic emissions clearance in response to SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) and environmental system inputs / outputs. 3.2 Emergency Override Operation. It is usual to provide manual override remote control from the Tunnel Control Centre in case of an emergency situation. (Smoke / fume clearance). This control is usually undertaken by fully trained Operators, fully versed in emergency situation smoke control techniques associated with that particular tunnel. 3.3 Manual Fire Brigade Override Control Provision. Many tunnel Operating Organisations are understandably reticent about controlling tunnel ventilation systems during emergency conditions, usually from remotely located control offices. It is therefore now commonplace (certainly in Australia) to find a dedicated ventilation control station local to the tunnel complex for the sole use of the fire brigade. This is usually accessed via the secure Fire Indicator Panel enclosure. Such control usually featuring override of all associated fan protection systems, including;
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surisation systems are carefully balanced and controlled, if the egress path becomes over pressurised, it may not be possible to open the access fire doors.

Jet fans undergoing installation works .

4. TUNNEL ROAD LIGHTING The lighting within a modern road tunnel comprises the most technically sophisticated type of road lighting system currently available. It must be able to reveal vehicles, objects and possibly pedestrians to drivers entering a tunnel portal often at high speed, with possibly large differences between external and internal luminance / illuminance levels. In doing so it must be as energy efficient as possible, adequately robust, reliable and easily maintained. 4.1 Lighting Techniques. 4.1.1 The Counter Beam System. Assuming uni-directional traffic flow under normal operation a high efficiency High Intensity Discharge Counter beam design could be employed. This technology achieves savings in terms of;
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Over temperature of the fan motor. Excessive vibration. Airflow alarms.

Thus the fans can be run in an emergency situation by the fire brigade to destruction in both forward (with the normal flow of traffic) or reverse (against the normal flow of traffic) dependent upon the fire incidents location and prevailing wind conditions. 3.4 Emergency Egress Path Pressurisation. Emergency egress cross passageways and escape stairwells etc are provided with pressurisation systems (pressurisation fans and motorised relief dampers) to prevent the ingress of smoke during a fire emergency. Such systems being triggered in response to an appropriate fire alarm condition, with air being provided from the area or bore clear of the alarm condition. It is very important that such pres-

Initial installation costs. Ongoing maintenance and energy costs.

The counterbeam system operates upon the same principles as normal exterior road light; the aim is to provide a bright background (carriageway surface and lower walls) against which objects are perceived in silhouette, rather than in direct vision. In practice, this results in a reduction of the light level (carriageway luminance levels) required, generating the

savings as listed above. Counterbeam systems are particularly suited to shorter tunnels (<1km) where no interior zone is required. 4.1.2 The Symmetrical System. The symmetrical approach involves the provision of higher illuminance levels to enable drivers to perceive objects via normal or direct vision. This usually requires the provision of a greater number of luminaries with an attendant increase in energy and maintenance costs. 4.2 Associated Lighting Issues. The following issues should be considered in the final tunnel lighting design; q Emergency level lighting comprised by night level switched circuits, fed via the essential power distribution network. q Design to comply fully with requirements of CIE88 & BS 5489 Part 7 q Control via central control (SCADA) or proprietary tunnel lighting control systems in response to exterior ambient daylight (luminance) levels. q IP65 (AS1939) luminaire rating to minimise dirt ingress and extend cleaning periods. q Refer to CIE88 / BS5489 Pt 7 for comprehensive tunnel lighting design criteria / methodologies.

All emergency egress pathways and facilities (Fire fighting points, emergency telephone positions and emergency egress path signage) must feature fully maintained emergency lighting.

A typical emergency egress passageway entrance door.

Note; q Emergency egress path signage q Paint system to door. q 2 hour rated fire door. q Wheel chair friendly access q Disabled push button door actuation. q Pressurisation fan air inlet and modulating exhaust dampers above the door. q Rotating green emergency egress path beacon (not actuated). The deployment of a proprietary emergency lighting monitoring system to reduce maintenance costs (statutory requirement) is strongly recommended.

A typical HID counter beam tunnel lighting system. (Crafers S.A.)

5. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT & ITS SYSTEMS. 5.1 CCTV Surveillance & Video Incident Detection vid. CCTV surveillance is required for all emergency egress paths and must be designed to ensure that all emergency facilities / installations are also covered. Cameras mounted within the tunnels for traffic surveillance can be easily instrumented to give incident

Note; q End of threshold zone 2, commencement of transition zone 1. (First drop in luminance) q End of transition zone 1, commencement of transition zone 2. 4.3 Emergency Egress & Facilities Lighting.

detection capability. Exterior portal surveillance cameras will also be required. 5.2 External ITS Systems.

directly with the tunnel control centre. Each phone should be uniquely identifiable so as to allow immediate identification of the source of the incoming call at the TCC. Automated recording of all incoming calls should also be implemented. Each tunnel located phone should have its own line back to a local PABX. This local PABX is then connected back to the remote TCC via Telstras network. 7. SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM. (SCADA) 7.1 System Overview. The tunnel complex will require an overall system to monitor and control (both automatically and via manual operator initiation) all the various discrete systems; q H.V. L.V. & Essential Power Systems. q Control the tunnel road lighting. q Control the tunnel ventilation system in response to internal air quality levels. q Control the tunnel drainage pumping system. q Monitor the operational status of all equipment. As the SCADA system is responsible for the operation of the tunnel life safety critical systems, its design must be very carefully addressed. System redundancy and general robustness constitutes the 2 major design criteria. 7.2 SCADA System Architecture & Operation. The SCADA system may comprise a number of industrial programmable logic controllers (PLCs) communicating across a fully redundant ring configured optical fibre ethernet LAN via digital modems. This ensures a high level of system redundancy and robustness as in the event of damage occurring to the network, a redundant communications path will exist. If communications within any particular PLC is for any reason lost, the device is normally programmed to continue operation in response to its individual program and local input / output (I/O) status. A typical PLC based SCADA system is shown b elow. 7.3 SCADA Systemgraphic User Interface (GUI) .

5.2.1 Variable Message Signs (VMS). As an absolute minimum 1 large VMS should be installed adjacent each entrance portal to alert drivers as to lane closures etc. 5.2.2 Overheight Vehicle Detection. Over height vehicle detection and signage systems are also usually installed prior to the tunnel to alert drivers as to the status of their vehicle with respect to the tunnels clearance envelope. Such systems usually comprise infared light beams projected across the carriageways. When broken by an overheight vehicle a secret message sign is triggered to advise the driver to divert or stop. 5.3Lane Use Signals. (LUS). Lane use signals are usually installed above each entrance and exit portal featuring easily recognisable Red Cross / Green arrow aspects. Within the tunnel further LUS are recommended at approximately 100M intervals to confirm lane availability to transiting traffic. 6. EMERGENCY TELEPHONES. Emergency telephone handsets are usually installed at regular intervals throughout the length of each tunnel (say 50M). They are often also collocated with emergency equipment / fire fighting cabinets and within emergency egress passageways. Ideally, these phones should be considered as a seamless overall emergency telephone system communicating

Human interfacing with the SCADA system is achieved via a Graphic User Interface (GUI). The GUI / SCADA will be networked to give access (both local and remote as required) for day to day systems monitoring by the Operator, initiation of maintenance procedures or in an emergency situation the implementation of predefined emergency response plans. An example of the initial front end

screen from a major tunnel SCADA system is shown below for reference.

The P.A. System should be interconnected with the RRB system so as to interrupt radio rebroadcasts within the tunnel with substituted P.A. messages. 10. FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS. 10.1 Deluge Systems.

8. RADIO REBROADCAST (RRB) SYSTEM. In longer or deeper tunnels an RRB system is required to ensure continuity of radio coverage throughout the tunnel complex; q Rebroadcast of all commercial and public service radio stations available off air at the tunnel site. q Rebroadcast of the Government Radio Network (Trunked radio comms system). q Rebroadcast of the Operators maintenance radio frequency. q Rebroadcast of any remaining emergency services frequencies not covered by the GRN rebroadcast provision. In terms of hardware, this system may comprise all the necessary off air receivers and signal amplifiers installed within an adjacent communications room, plus tunnel roof mounted leaky feeder coaxial cable and switchroom roof mounted antennae.

Deluge (sprinkler) systems are often not deployed in relatively short tunnels. (A risk assessment should still be undertaken however). Where the tunnel length is >500M or where a potentially high hazard level has been identified a zoned deluge system may be deployed. Usually this comprises a series of individually controlled water (of foam) supplies feeding discharge nozzles over the vehicle envelope. Discharge of such systems is often automatically instigated via the zoned linear heat detector run through the tunnels A line and feature manual override cancel capability. 10.2 Fire Hose Reels & Hydrants. A series of fire hoses (for public use) and hydrants (fire brigade use) should be provided around the tunnel complex. These systems can be fed via a large diameter ring configured water main. If the local towns water supply is adequate this could be directly connected, or the town water supply stored in large header tanks.

9. PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM (P.A.). P.A. systems are primarily installed to manage emergency pedestrian movements during a fire alarm or major incident closure situation. Due to the high level of ambient traffic noise (>100db) present within a road tunnel, it is not possible to provide a P.A. system that can be heard within a moving veh icle. The P.A. system may be rack mounted within an adjacent switch or plant room and feature a local access microphone for emergency services usage. 10.3 Extinguishant Gas Discharge Systems

A typical fire hydrant / booster position undergoing i nstallation works

Switchrooms should be covered by an extinguishant gas (FM200) discharge system for protection of the various power supply and control systems. 11. FIRE ALARM SYSTEMS. 11.1 Detection Systems. Fire detection within road tunnels can be reliably achieved via the use of roof mounted linear heat detectors. These detectors comprise shielded electrical cable whose electrical characteristics change with an increase in temperature. Emergency egress paths should have as a minimum smoke detection installed. Very Early Smoke Detection and Alarm (VESDA) should be considered for implementation within switchrooms / comms rooms and any similar electrical / electronic equipment spaces, owing to the critical nature of the systems contained therein. Manual break glass units (manual call points) should be located in emergency egress paths and emergency fire equipment nich e cabinets for use by the public. The tunnel alarm system should be zoned to allow the immediate location of any fire alarm break glass unit, linear heat or smoke detector activation by the attending fire brigade. 11.2 Fire Indicator Panels. (FIPs). A comprehensive Fire Indicator Panel (FIP) system must be installed to manage the fire alarm installation. The FIP system should also feature a direct telecommunications link to nearest major fire station. The Fire Alarm / FIP systems should also be interconnected with the SCADA system to raise alarms at the remote TCC and initiate automated ventilation system control responses to fire alarm conditions. (Appropriate emergency egress path pressurisation, start up or close down of jet fans for smoke control etc). Liaison will be required at the design development stage to ensure that all the local brigade requirements are understood and met within the detailed d esign.
A typical fire equipment monitoring SCADA system screen displaying;

Emergency niche cabinet door status (open / closed). q Hose reel status (cabinet doors open / closed and water flow). q Extinguisher weights.
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12. TUNNEL DRAINAGE PUMPING SYSTEM. 12.1 Overview. Most road tunnels require the provision of a large sump and associated pumping system sized to handle anticipated water ingress flows. The capacity of both sumps and extraction pumps will need to be accurately assessed with a view to likely ground water conditions and anticipated storm water levels. Systems redundancy must be ensured, thus a mult iple pump system should be utilised featuring pump duty sharing to minimise maintenance requirements. Pumping and pump duty cycling is automatically controlled by the overall SCADA control system. Manual override control provision being also made available to the Operator via the SCADA system GUI as described above. 12.2 Environmental Issues. The drainage pumping station outfall will need careful attention in terms of environmental issues. Any drainage water from the tunnel being likely to be highly polluted as a result of both local soil conditions and traffic spillages etc. (A storm water interception system is usually installed to cater for such requirements). 12.3 Intrinsic Safety. The electrical installation associated with the drainage pumping system should be configured such that it cannot initiate an explosion in case of a major fuel spillage. The sump areas should have hydrocarbon detection installed with remote alarm transmission via the overall SCADA control system.

13. DESIGN DEVELOPMENT. Consultation with all key stakeholders must be undertaken at some considerable length to ensure that key requirements are met and issues addressed in a coordinated manner at an early stage in the services design cycle. These consultations should include senior personnel from;
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With careful design, implementation and ongoing management, traveller safety within road tunnel facilities is being considerably improved. New build projects feature technology which only 20 30 years ago was unavailable, whilst many older facilities are now being retrofitted with many of the key systems described above. Modern road tunnels could therefore be considered as perhaps some of the safest routes travelled today.

The local fire brigade. Police. Ambulance service. Tunnel Operations & Management Or-

ganisation. End User Groups (Public Transport Operators, Freight Haulage Group Representatives.
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And of course;
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Local Residents.

It is essential to ensure that all these diverse groups perceive real involvement with the overall design development process. They will no doubt all have very different points of view as to how the numerous issues are resolved, however their input is vital. It is a statutory requirement (in Australia and New Zealand) for the local Fire Safety Officer to formally sign off on the overall functionality of the tunnels fire protection systems prior to issuing a certificate of connection for the remote monitoring by the brigade of the tunnel complexs FIP system. (This normally dependent upon the satisfactory completion of a Hot Smoke Test within the tunnel(s). The importance of closely involving senior local brigade representatives at an early stage cannot therefore be overstated. All design work must be referenced against the various international standards;
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PIARC (World Road Association). CIE (Lighting) Local National Standards (AS/NZS, BS

etc). 14. CONCLUSION. As result of recent major tunnel incidents in Europe (St Gothard and Mont Blanc incidents with regards to road tunnels in particular) the key life safety issues have been brought well and truly into the public domain.